1
1. Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
Facts: Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented
to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of the
registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of
donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be
annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio
Balbin appears to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of
the land. The register of deeds denied the requested
annotation for being “legally defective or otherwise not
sufficient in law.” It appears that previously annotated in
the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are
three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin
in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and
Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owner’s
duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s
copies of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the
register of deeds refused to make the requested
annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the
Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the
action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.
Ruling:
2. Republic v. CA and Naguit
Facts: On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land. The application
sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the
land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government,
and Angeles opposed the petition. The court issued an
order of general default against the whole world except
as to Angeles and the government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land
was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he
renounced all his rights to the subject property and
confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of
Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the
same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees in addition to existing
coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and
paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied
the land openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be
alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable
only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was
not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Ruling: Land Titles; Land Registration; Requisites
for the filing of an application for registration of title
under Section 14 (1) - There are three obvious
requisites for the filing of an application for registration of
title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that
the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and;
that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Same; Same; Absent a legislative amendment the
rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all
lands of the public domain which are not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant - we are mindful of the absurdity that would
result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the
OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12,
1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Same; Same; The more reasonable interpretation of
Section 14 (1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed - the more reasonable interpretation of
Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right to utilize
the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership
in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable,
as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property.
Same; Same; There are no material differences
between Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree and Section 48 (b) of the Public of Land and
Section 14 (1) of Property Registration Decree are of
the same type - there are no material differences
between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to
agricultural lands of the public domain, while the
Property Registration Decree uses the term alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. It must be
noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.
Same; Same; Even if possession of the alienable
public land concerned on a date later than June 12,
1945 and such possession being open, continuous
and exclusive, then the possessor may have the
right to register the land by virtue of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree - Prescription is one
of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[25] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty
(30) years.[26] With such conversion, such property may
now fall within the contemplation of private lands under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable
public land commenced on a date later than June 12,
1945, and such possession being been open, continuous
and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
3. Kidlapos v. Baguio Gold Mining Company
Facts: On August 31, 1954, herein petitioners sued the
Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines,
to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral
claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping
the parcels claimed by plaintiffs. The complaint also
sought to enjoin the Director of Mines from proceeding
with the lode patent applications of The Mining
Company. After due trial, CFI found that the plaintiffs had
failed to substantiate their claims. Upon appeal the CA
finding that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest
Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson,
and that it formed part of the Public domain, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the actions by the
Court of First Instance. Plaintiffs had filed in Court the
present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the
registration, and moved to dismiss the applications.

Ruling: Judgments; Res Judicata; Difference in
forms of action does not prevent operation of rule -
difference in forms of action are irrelevant for the
purposes of res judicata. It is a firmly established rule
that a different remedy sought or a diverse form of action
does not prevent the estoppel of the former adjudication.
Same; Same; A matter of defense and not
jurisdiction - res judicata is a matter of defense and
does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to act on a
second suit between the parties on the same subject
matter.
Same; Same; Scope of former judgment - if the record
of the former trial shows that the judgment could not
have been rendered without deciding the particular
matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter
as to all future actions between the parties, and if a
judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises,
they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
4. Benin v. Tuason
Facts: On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three
separate complaints containing substantiallythe same
allegations. In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged
that they were the owners andpossessors of the three
parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of
the complaint,located in the barrio of La Loma (now
barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of
Caloocan, province of Rizal andthat they inherited said
parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin; In Civil
Case No. 3622the plaintiffs alleged that they were the
owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural
land,described in paragraph V of the complaint, and that
these parcels of land were inherited by themfrom their
deceased father Bonoso Alcantara.
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the
owners and possessors of a parcel ofagricultural land
located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose),
municipality of Caloocan,province of Rizal, having an
area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this
parcel of landwas inherited by plaintiffs from their
ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same
fromhis parents; and they and their predecessors in
interest had been in open, adverse and
continuouspossession of the same; had said lands
declared for taxation purposes.
The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged,
in their respective complaint, thatsometime in the year
1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession
of their lands, thedefendants, particularly the defendant
J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents
andrepresentatives, with the aid of armed men, by force
and intimidation, using bulldozers and otherdemolishing
equipment, illegally entered and started defacing,
demolishing and destroying thedwellings and
constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements. They madeinquiries regarding the
probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they
discovered for the firsttime that their lands, as described
in their respective complaint, had either been
fraudulently or rroneously included, by direct or
constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1
(known asSanta Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the provinceof Rizal
in the names of the original applicants for registration,
now defendants, Mariano SeveroTuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y
de la Paz, DemetrioAsuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and
Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged
that the registered owners had appliedfor the registration
of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate
and the DilimanEstate; that the registration proceedings
were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of
LandRegistration; They allege that the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681, containing theboundaries,
technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2(Diliman Estate) was
published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision
was handeddown in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries
and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 werealtered
and amended; that the area of parcel No. 1 as
mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is biggerthan the area of
parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration
as published in theOfficial Gazette; that the amendments
and alterations, which were made after the publication
ofthe original application, were never published; that on
March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered inLRC No. 7681
based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the
decision of March 7, 1914 adecree of registration was
issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431,
decreeing theregistration in the names of the applicants
of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate
andDiliman Estate). They contend that the decision
dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is nulland void
because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction
to render the decision for lackof publication; that Decree
No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7,
1914 in LRCNo. 7681 is likewise null and void from the
beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a
voiddecision and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate),is also null and
void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant
to a void decree ofregistration. The lower court rendered
a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. A motion for new
trialwas filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on
January 30, 1965. However, before themotion for new
trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on
February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court
and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed
the recordon appeal.The record on appeal, after it had
been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or
authorized bythe trial court, was approved on September
29, 1965.
Ruling: Land Registration; Amendment to
application for registration need not be published
anew if the amendment merely excludes portions
2
covered by the original application - Under Section 23
of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an
amendment of the application for registration when it
appears to the court that the amendment is necessary
and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court
may at any time order an application to be amended by
striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the
application. The amendment may be made in the
application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the
application and the survey plan go together. If the
amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for
registration of an area or parcel of land not previously
included in the original application, as published, a new
publication of the amended application must be made.
The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all
persons concerned regarding the amended application.
Without a new publication the registration court can not
acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is
added to the area covered by the original application,
and the decision of the registration court would be a
nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly
included land.11 The reason is because without a new
publication, the law is infringed with respect to the
publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and
third parties who have not had the opportunity to present
their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice.12 But if the amendment consists in the
exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original
application and the original plan as previously published,
a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case,
the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not
affected by the failure of a new publication.
Same; Slight increase in area registered over the
area contained in the application is not fatal to the
decree of registration - We believe that this very slight
increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the
conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ...
included additional lands which were not originally
included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette."
It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more
than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We
believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters,
between the computation of the area when the original
plan was made and the computation of the area when
the amended plan was prepared, cannot be considered
substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1.
Same; Registration Court has no jurisdiction only
insofar as areas not covered by original application
are added - The settled rule, further, is that once the
registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain
parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings
in virtue of the publication of the application, that
jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and
described in the application. If it is later shown that the
decree of registration had included land or lands not
included in the original application as published, then the
registration proceedings and the decree of registration
must be declared null and void in so far — but only in so

far — as the land not included in the publication is
concerned.
Same; Error in the plans does not nullify the decree
of registration - We may further observe that underlying
the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in
the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is
erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is
registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875,
practically all plans for land registration were defective
especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but
so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the
validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land
registered can be determined, the technical description
in the certificate of title may be corrected without
cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made
in this case by approved surveys which embrace all of
the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final
decrees merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions
would lead to chaos.
Same; Full transcription of the decree of registration
in the Registration Book though made in a disorderly
manner is valid - There is no showing that the manner
of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that
photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was
done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of
registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book,
and also as copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
the circumstance that the beginning of the technical
descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page,
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to
nullify the said certificate of title.
Same; Purposes of the land Registration Law stated
- the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496),
which generally are to ascertain once and for all the
absolute title over a given landed property31; to make,
so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the
court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such
title32; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to
any question of legality of title33; and to decree that land
title shall be final, irrevocable and indisputable.
Same; Remedies of party unlawfully deprived of
property through fraudulent registration - It is the
settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him
of his land that he claims had been wrongly registered in
the name of another person must recognize the validity
of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that
a reconveyance may only take place if the land that is
claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the
name of the person who procured the wrongful
registration. No action for reconveyance can take place
as against a third party who had acquired title over the
registered property in good faith and for value. And if no
reconveyance can be made, the value of the property
registered may be demanded only from the person (or
persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his
name.
Same; Effects of in rem proceedings in land
registrations - The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in
rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the
decision rendered in said registration case bound the
lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto,
and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including
the government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation,
or included in the general inscription "To whom it may
concern", and such decree will not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for
reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may only be
reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by
fraud would file in the competent court of first instance a
petition for review within one year after entry of the
decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had
acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration
of said period of one year, the decree, or the certificate
of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible
(See. 38, Act 496).
Same; Mere possession cannot defeat title issued
under the Land Registration Act - the possession by
the appellees, either by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at
all, would be unavailing against title holder of a Torrens
certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now in
question. From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title No.
735 was issued, no possession by any person of any
portion of the lands covered by said original certificate of
title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of
title derived from said original certificate of title, could
defeat the title of the registered owner of the lands
covered by the certificate of title.
Same; Titles of purchasers in good faith for value
cannot be annulled without due hearing - The buyers
of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the name
of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid for the
lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for
value. The purchasers of these lots have built thereon
residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even
churches. But the lower court, disregarding these
circumstances, declared null and void all transfer
certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived,
from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave
error committed by the lower court. And the error is
compounded when the lower court ordered appellant J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under said
appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the
possession of the parcels of lands that are claimed by
them in the present cases. The possessors of the lots
comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and
who hold certificates of title covering the lots that they
bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the
decision of the lower court would annul their titles and
compel them to give up the possession of their
properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower
court is to deprive persons of their property without due
3
process of law.44 The decision of the lower court would
set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a
certificate of title who acquired the property covered by
the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that
his title is perfect and incontrovertible.
Judgment; Res Judicata; Elements of Res Judicata -
In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the
following requisites must be present: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of
the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of
cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-
283).
Same; Same; Instance where parties though not
privies to the prior action are affected by the
judgment therein - But granting that the plaintiffs-
appellants herein are not privies of the defendants
Santiago in the former litigation over this same property
(S.C.G.R. No. L-5079), still the pronouncement of this
Court, made in the former case, to the effect that the
Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of
Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was
neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by
composicion con el estado, and, therefore, vested no
ownership over the land therein described in favor of
Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein
appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the
document does not depend upon the person who invoke
it.
5. Director of Lands v. IAC
Facts:
6. Director of Lands v. IAC and Acme
Facts: The Director of Lands has brought this
appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.
The land subjects of the Land Registration
proceedings was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962,
from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of
the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities.
Ruling: Land Registration; A juridical confirmation
proceeding should at most be limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time as it is not so much one
to confer title as it is to recognize a title already
vested - Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the
logical inevitability of considering possession of public

land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the
State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the
required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a
title already vested. The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected by operation
of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in
Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."
Same; Constitutional Law; The 1973 Constitution
cannot impair vested rights, thus where land was
acquired in 1962 when corporations were allowed to
acquire lands not beyond 1,024 hectares, the same
may be registered in 1982 although under 1973
Constitution corporations cannot acquire lands of
the public domain - Even on the proposition that the
land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,
there can be no serious question of Acmes right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed
to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring
interests in public land to which the vendor had already
acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely
accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution
which forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already vested
before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court
has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
Same; Same; Same; - The fact, therefore, that the
confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its
own name must be regarded as simply another
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly
more than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to
be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt
of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable
that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under
either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had
title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
Same; Same; The ruling in Meralco v. Castro-
Bartolome (114 Scra 799) that public land ceases to
be so only upon issuance of a certificate of title, is
hereby reconsidered and abandoned. Correct rule is
that Susi v. Razon 48 Phil 424 - The Court, in the light
of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no
longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule,
as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is
that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally
or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following
that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the
land subject of this appeal was already private property
at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at
the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding
or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical
person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again,
finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco.
Same; Same; Same; Same; - While this opinion
seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively
recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent,
but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of
searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as
well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested
chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a
juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the
1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
7. Mindanao v. Director of Lands
Facts: Appelllants, heirs of Pelagio Zara filed
an application for registration of a parcel of
land on August 4, 1960. Their grounds were
on the basis on provisions of Act 496 that
their grandfather has been granted a Spanish
Title and CA 141 Chap 8 Sec. 48, that
their predecessor--‐in--‐interest had been in
continuous and adverse possession of the
4
land in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years. Their application was opposed
by the Director of Lands and Vicente V.
de Villa on the ground that parcel of land
had been included in the parcel of land
applied for in registration by Vicente de Villa
in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601
was adjudicated on September 30, 1949.
Ruling: Public Lands; Torrens System; Judgments;
Res Judicata; Judicial confirmation of title - should
the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not
applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the
provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of
C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and
adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for
more than 30 years immediately preceding the
application.
Same; Basis of decree of judicial confirmation of title
- The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation
authorized therein is not that the land is already privately
owned and hence no longer part of the public domain,
but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for
thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant.
Same; Personality of oppositor – Persons, who claim
to be in possession of a tract of public land and who
have applied to the Bureau of Lands for its purchase,
may oppose its registration under section 48 of the
Public Land Law.
8. De Castro v. Marcos
Facts:
Ruling: Cadastral Law; Cadastral Proceedings;
Procedure for re-opening; Publication not required;
Inclusion of additional territory in a plan; Effect of
absence of new publication upon jurisdiction of
cadastral court - The foregoing provision establishes
the procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such
procedure does not include publication. Neither is
publication mentioned in any of the other provisions of
Republic Act 931. Section 1 above-quoted merely states
that "the competent Court of First Instance, upon
receiving such petition, shall notify the Government,
through the Solicitor General." About two years back, we
held in a case, 5 that under Republic Act 931, it is
unnecessary to furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of
the reopening petition "inasmuch as said Act [931] only
required service thereof to the Solicitor General."
Jurisprudence informs us that "[a]n order of court in a
cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make
it include land not previously included therein is a nullity
unless new publication is made as a preliminary to such
step" and that "additional territory cannot be included by
amendment of the plan without new publication." 6 Upon

the other hand, the jurisdiction of a court to issue orders
providing for exclusion of land included in the original
plan is not affected by failure to order a new publication.
Same; Notice to the government of a re-opening
petition suffices; Reason; When petition for re-
opening of cadastral proceeding can successfully be
blocked - If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of
land by an alleged right that has accrued prior to the
institution of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in
rem, he is, of course, to be deemed to have received
notice thru the publication therein made. If his rights are
derived from the government after the land has been
declared part of the public domain by the cadastral court,
then notice to the government of a reopening petition as
provided by law, should suffice. For the government is
supposed to take up the cudgels for a public land
grantee, or at the very least, notify the latter. It must be
remembered that a petition for reopening under Republic
Act 931 can successfully be blocked if it is shown that
the land involved therein has already "been alienated,
reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally or
permanently disposed of by the Government.
Same; Basis of re-opening of cadastral proceeding
in Director of Lands v. Benitez; Explained; Off- shore
land could not be the subject of cadastral survey -
True, Director of Lands vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31,
1966, ruled that the petition to reopen filed in that case
under Republic Act 931, must be published as required
in Section I of the Cadastral Act (Act 2259) because
such case is still governed by the procedure laid down by
the latter law. The Benitez case, however, must be read
in its factual context. There, the petition of the Benitez
spouses for reopening the cadastral proceedings
covering the entire city of Tacloban, was based on the
claim that "through oversight, inadvertence and
excusable neglect a portion of" 1,805 square meters of
Lot 2157 of the land originally registered in the name of
petitioners therein "has not been included in the original
survey." They prayed that after appropriate proceedings,
said portion (designated as Lot No. 1 of the subdivision
plan) be adjudicated to them pursuant to Republic Act
931. In fact, back of the Benitez declaration that
publication is necessary is jurisprudence heretofore
stated, 11 that such publication is required when
additional territory is sought to be included in the original
plan. Indeed, the record of Benitez in this Court shows
that the opposition to the reopening petition is predicated
on the averment that the cadastral court did not include
the lots in controversy because those lots were "part of
the offshore land" and hence, of the public domain which
could not be the subject of cadastral survey or of the
cadastral case.
Same; Legal standing or personality to sue in land
registration or cadastral proceedings; Case at bar -
In an early case, 13 this Court declared that mere
citizens could have no interest in public land. At about
the same time, this Court also held that to give a party
standing in a court of land registration, he must make
some claim to the property. 14Then, in Archbishop of
Manila vs. Barrio of Sto. Cristo, 15 this Court pronounced
that although an opponent in a land registration
proceeding could not show title in himself, he was not
discapacitated from opposing the registration sought by
another. Plain was the statement there that "[a]ll that is
necessary to enable anyone to exert the faculty of
opposition is that he should appear to have an interest in
the property." And, so this Court added, "it is immaterial
whether this interest is in the character of legal owner or
is of a purely equitable nature as where he is the
beneficiary in a trust." Later, this Court described a
homesteader who had not yet been issued his title but
who had fulfilled all the conditions required by law, as a
person who should be regarded as an equitable owner of
the land. 16 Similarly, a purchaser of friar land has an
equitable title to the land before the issuance of the
patent.17 Pitargue vs. Sorilla,18 laid down the principle
that a bona fide applicant of public land may protect his
right of possession and sue for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer or pursue any suitable remedy provided by law.
Indeed, an awardee in a sales application is authorized
to take possession of the land to enable him to comply
with the requirements of the award before title can be
issued. 19 We held in still another case, 20 that a
homestead entry segregates the homestead from the
public domain and divests the Director of Lands of
control and possession thereof except if the homestead
application is finally disapproved and the entry annulled
or revoked.
Recently, we declared that persons who claim to be in
possession of a tract of public land and have applied with
the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary
personality to oppose registration. 21 We have held, too,
that an award under a sales application has "the effect of
withdrawing the lands of the public domain that were
'disposable' by the Director of Lands." 22
Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is
narrowed down by the specific conditions therein set
forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is
possible "only with respect to such of said parcels of land
as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by
the Government." 23 The statute made it abundantly
clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only, if
the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with." Thus it is, that the
alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any provisional or
permanent disposition by the government of the land
claimed should suffice to bar reopening.
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is
an awardee in the public bidding held upon her own
township sales application. Of course, the award up to
now has not been fully implemented because she has
not yet complied with one condition imposed on her. But,
if the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at least a
provisional one, enough to prevent reopening by
respondent Akia as to the land disputed.
5
Special Civil Action; Certiorari; When courts
ordinarily do not deny writ of certiorari - Well it is to
remember that "[c]ourts ordinarily do not deny the writ [of
certiorari] if the result would be to deprive a party of his
substantial rights and leave him without remedy."
9. Valisno v. Plan
Facts: Petitioners Flordeliza and Honorio purchased
from the legal heirs of Agapita Blanco (Guillermo,
Guillermo,Jr., Manuel and Rosario) 2 parcels of land.
These lands were located at Sitio Sisim, Brgy. Cabaruan,
Isabela. They declared the parcels of land in their name
for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive
possession in the conceptof owners. They hired Fermin
Lozano as caretaker who had his house built thereon.
Private respondent Cayaba ousted Lozano from the land
and built an apartment thereon.
He claimed that
he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a
deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido G.
Noriega's favor by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano.
Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondent
for recovery of possession of the subject lands before
the then CFI. The court decided in favor of petitioners
who were declared owners thereof.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower
court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners. It ruled
that the subject lands is different is different from the
land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the petitioners.
The land occupied by the petitioners has not been
successfully identified with that described in the
complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed
outright. Also, it is undisputed that the private respondent
is the present occupant of the land since he purchased it
from Tomasita F. Verano and that he is the actual
possessor of the property, thus he possesses it with a
just title and he need not show or prove why he
possesses the same. Finally, contrasting the evidence of
the respondent and petitioner, the court choose the
respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a
vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the
adjoining properties with known boundaries and
landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch
prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess
works.
Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition for
registration of the property before the CFI which was
opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the
dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a
prior judgment of the court. The CFI dismissed the
opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal
before the SC.
With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders
both parties to submit their briefs. Only the petitioner
submitted their own brief within the given period thus the
SC considered the case submitted for decision with the

brief of the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion to
amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as
a co-applicant to the petition.
Ruling: Land Registration; Actions; Practice and
Pleadings; In land registration cases, an opposition
partakes of the nature of an answer with
counterclaim and a motion to dismiss the opposition
is not unauthorized as Rules of Court are merely
suppletory to such proceedings - Verily, the Land
Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading
similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of
the rules contained therein in land registration
proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever
practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious
termination of the land registration case, this Court in
Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of
the application for registration of therein appellants upon
a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having
been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have
jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be
registered in appellants' name had previously been
registered in the names of the oppositors. To have
allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual
course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The
same consideration applies to the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same - It must be noted that the
opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a
counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim
would be considered a complaint, this time with the
original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original
plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim
may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared
in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The
latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for.
Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if
ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity
that petitioners complain of stems basically from the
infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration
cases, and not from it being unauthorized.
Same; Same; Judgments; The Doctrine in Abellara v.
Farol 74 Phil 284 needs re-evaluation. A final
judgment in an ordinary civil case determining
ownership of a certain land is res judicata in the land
registration case where the parties and the property
are identical, including the addition of a party in the
registration case where he claims co-ownership -
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata
operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply:
[a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have
been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a
judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v.
Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in CA-G. R.
No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered
by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. There is, between the registration case
under consideration and the previous civil action for
recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent
Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the
application for registration does not result in a difference
in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-
owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-
ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private
respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the
land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-
ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the
evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed
of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is
his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
10. Director of Lands v. CA and Valeriano
Facts: In their application for registration filed on
May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for
brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple
of the land applied for partly through inheritance in
1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that
it is not within any forest zone or military reservation;
and that the same is assessed for taxation
purposes in their names.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
opposed the application on the principal ground that the
land applied for is within the unclassified region of
Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March
1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are
denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the
disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.
After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of
the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was
affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court.
Ruling: Civil Law; Land Registration; Regalian
Doctrine; Classification of Public Lands, an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department,
not the courts; Absence of classification of land
renders the land as unclassified in consonance with
the Regalian Doctrine - In effect, what the Courts a quo
have done is to release the subject property from the
unclassified category, which is beyond their competence
and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the
Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains as unclassified land
until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored
Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with
the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, 4 and that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.
Same; Same; Estoppel by State; Non- Presentation
of evidence that property within the unclassified
6
region, will not operate against the State under the
rule that the State cannot be estopped by omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents - The
recommendation of the District Forester for release of
subject property from the unclassified region is not the
ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC
No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property
to be within the unclassified region was not presented in
evidence will not operate against the State considering
the stipulation between the parties and under the well-
settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, 6 if
omission there was, in fact.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Torrens System; Land
within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development is beyond the jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System
- While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has
been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that
an lands comprised therein are automatically released as
alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding
merely Identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial
proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands
upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it
would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court
to register it under the Torrens System.
Same; Same; Where the property is still unclassified,
possession of applicants, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership - Since the subject
property is still unclassified, whatever possession
Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership.
Same; Same; Conversion of property into fishpond
or titling of properties around it, does not
automatically render the property as alienable and
disposable; Remedy is the release of the property
from its being unclassified - The conversion of subject
property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged
titling of properties around it, does not automatically
render the property as alienable and disposable.
Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property
from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants,
and it appearing that there are titled lands around the
subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious
consideration to the matter of classification of the land in
question.
11. Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. CA
Facts: On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused
the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of Sunbeam
Convenience Foods, Inc., over 2 parcels of land namely
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 and Lot 2-Sgs-2409.
On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was
registered with the Register of Deeds who in turn issued
Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels

of land. Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No.
Sp-24 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificate of Titles were issued over the 2 lots, both in
favor of defendant Coral Beach Development
Corporation.
On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General instituted before
the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for
reversion. SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH then filed a
Motion to Dismiss which was granted by the Court of
First Instance.
The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. The former alleges that Court of First
Instance committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint and in not finding that Lots I
and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
Ruling: Civil Procedure; Petition for Review; Review
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion;
Premises for granting review - A review is not a matter
of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted
only when there are special and important reasons
therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the
premises for granting a review:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court or has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court; and
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or
so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to
call for supervision.
Same; Motion to Dismiss; Admissions; Filing of a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action, carries with it the admission of the material
facts pleaded in the complaint - The filing of the
Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of
cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission,
for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material
facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the Republic.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was
the classification of the lands as forest lands. This
material allegation stated in the Republic's complaint'
was never denied specifically 9 by the defendants
(petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH.
Same; Certiorari; Certiorari; available only when
there is no appeal, speedy or adequate, remedy in
the ordinary course of the law - Certiorari is one such
remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available
only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 15
The long line of decisions denying the petition for
certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially
in instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far
outnumbers the instances when certiorari was given due
course. The few significant exceptions were: when public
welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or
when the broader interests of justice so require, or when
the writs issued are null, 16 or when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.
Land Registration; Public Lands; Land remains
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition - If it is true that the lands
are forest lands, then all these proceedings become
moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until
it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.10
Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of
the State.11 Thus, before any land may be declassified
from the forest group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there
must be a positive act from the government. Even rules
on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless
and until the land classified as forest land is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
12. International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. UP
Doctrine: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its
rights over the area to UP. Thus, UP became the owner
of the land, subject only to existing concession. Since
there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this
means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee
must not be affected, impaired, or diminished; it must be
respected BUT insofar as the Government is concerned,
all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively
assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P.
Having been effectively segregated and removed from
the public domain or from a public forest and,
in effect, converted into a registered private woodland,
the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry
over it were likewise terminated. BIR also lost authority
to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to
collect forestry charges and other fees thereon
because of this full transfer.
Facts: International Hardwood is engaged in the
manufacture, processing, and exportation of plywood. It
wasgranted by the Government an exclusive
license for 25years expiring on Feb 1985 to cut,
collect and remove timber from a timber land in the
provinces of Quezon and Laguna.
Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License
Agreement, the President issued Executive Proclamation
No.791. Under this proclamation, certain parcels of land
7
of the public domain in Quezon and Laguna were
withdrawn from sale or settlement and were reserved for
the UP College of Agriculture as experiment station for
the college.
On 1964, still during the effectivity of the
License Agreement, RA 3990 was enacted establishing
a central experiment station for UP for the colleges of
agriculture, veterinary medicine, arts and sciences.
Under RA 3990 the land described in Proc. 791 was fully
cede to UP, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from
Hardwood:
1. Payment of forest charges due and
demandable under the License Agreement to UP,
instead of the BIR.
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood
within the land described in RA 3990 be performed by
UP personnel.
However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused
to accede to UP’s demands.
International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for
declaratory relief seeking a declaration that UP does NO
Thave the right to:
1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of
timber and other forest products,
2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3. Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and
royalties from Hardwood and/or
4.Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that
portion of its concession covered by a License
Agreement, ceded in full ownership to UP by RA 3990.
Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000in
damages.
UP filed its Answer:
1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue
and that the petition states no cause of action
2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on
the forest products cut and felled within the area ceded
to UP under RA 3990
CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor
of Hardwood:
1.RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and
seal the timber cut by International Hardwood within the
tract of land and collect the corresponding charges
prescribed by NIRC

2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim
CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case
involves purely legal questions.
Ruling: Civil Procedure; Declatory Relief - The
stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues
unquestionably satisfy the requisites for declaratory
relief: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must
have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue
invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 7
There is a justiciable controversy where there is an
actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one exists
between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before
the court, and that the declaration sought will help in
ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable
controversy when it is translated into a claim of right
which is actually contested.
Public Lands; Forest Lands; Transfer of Ownership;
Effect on existing timber license agreements - When
it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic
of the Philippines completely removed it from the public
domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas
covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and
segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its
rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed
the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute
owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession.
That the law intended a transfer of the absolute
ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the
word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or
possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential
quality. 11 The proviso regarding existing concessions
refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means,
however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber
licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it
must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the
Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the
license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed
to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full
ownership. This is further borne out by Section 3 of R.A.
No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general
fund of the University of the Philippines."
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction of Bureau of
Forestry - Having been effectively segregated and
removed from the public domain or from a public forest
and, in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious
from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971
to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject
to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A.
No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is
subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law.
Same; Same; Same; Authority to collect forest
charges - As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil
Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the
industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however,
exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject
to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the
fruits. 14 In the instant case, that exception is made for
the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession,
which has been given the license to cut, collect, and
remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to
UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative
duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or
royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as
provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not
be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines
through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the
very nature of the transfer as aforestated.
13. Republic v. CA
Facts:
Ruling:
14. Republic v. Bacus
Facts: In 1981, Bacus filed an application for the
registration of a 496-m2 parcel of land in the CFI of
Misamis Occidental. The Republic through the Director
of Lands opposed the application on the ground that said
land was still a part of the public domain since the land is
still part of a public forest.
The CFI and CA ruled in favor of Bacus. The CA relied
on the certification of City Development Coordinator of
Ozamis City, who certified that the subject land was
within the commercial-residential zone and the
certification of the Register of Deeds of Ozamis City, who
certified that the lots near and surrounding the subject
land had already been registered in favor of private
persons.
Ruling: Public Land Law; Forest Lands; Forest
Lands are not alienable as such can be the subject
of private appropriation only when they are
declassified and declared as alienable - There should
be no more question at this time that forest lands are not
alienable as such and can be the subject of private
appropriation only when they are declassified and
declared as alienable. As long as they remain forest
lands, no court has jurisdiction to order their registration
in the name of a private person.
Same; Same; Same; Unless and until the land
declassified the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply - Unless and until the land classified
as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it 'may form part of the disposable
agricultural (or commercial/residential) lands of the public
8
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Positive act of the
government needed to declassify land classified as
forest - It bears emphasizing that a positive act of
government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule that forest
lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert them into private property settled - It
is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them
into private property (Vano v. Government of Philippine
Islands, 41 Phil. 11; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107
Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñ;oz, 23 SCRA 11
82; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of
Lands v. Reyes and Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68
SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648;
and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but
even then, possession of the land prior to the
reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable
cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement
under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The law is clear on
who may declassify forest lands and declare them
alienable and disposable - The law is equally clear on
who may declassify forest lands and declare them
alienable and disposable. Act No. 141 provides in no
uncertain terms that:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:
(a) Alienable or disposable, (b)
Timber, and (c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No valid
reason for respondent court to conclude that the
subject land was no longer forest land and could be
 9

the subject of private appropriation - The respondent

court could not have been unaware of the above-quoted
cases or of the cited laws which were in force at the time
it rendered its decision. There was therefore no valid
reason for it to conclude that the subject land was no
longer forest land and could be the subject of private
appropriation. This ruling had no firmer basis than the
certifications made by minor functionaries who had no
authority whatever in the classification of public lands.
Curiously, they were not even connected with the Bureau
of Forest Development.

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Under the

doctrine of separation of powers, the Courts can
only apply the law and have no authority to enact or
execute them - Even with the best of motives, the courts
of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives
of the legislative and executive officials as long as it has
not been shown that they have acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial intervention, and much less usurpation, cannot
be the panacea for every legal problem hopefully brought
to us for resolution. Under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the courts can only apply the law and have no
authority to enact or execute them. The last two
functions belong to the political departments of the
government and cannot be arrogated by the judiciary.