Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Please find enclosed the following pleadings to be filed in the above-referenced case:
Please note the opposing party has filed their own Motion to Reconsider on 3/18/19.
I shall file a separate Objection thereto pursuant to the Court’s rules on or before 3/28/19.
Sincerely,
Paul J. Maravelias
Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias
Paul Maravelias (“Respondent”) respectfully requests The Honorable Court reconsider its 3/8/19 Order
extending the stalking order for one year. Maravelias acknowledges the good and noble intentions of the
current Court, but humbly argues its Order is more appealable than appealing. In support, he states as follows:
1. On 2/7/19, the Court granted Maravelias’s Motion to State Reasons for Granting Extension,
stating it found Paragraphs “12, 13, 22-24, and 27” of DePamphilis’s 1/24/18 Verified Motion to Extend
constituted “good cause to extend the Stalking Final Order of Protection”.
2. At the 2/12/19 Hearing on the extension, the Court verbally clarified its intention with granting
the Motion to State Reasons was to have a more “focused” hearing.
3. On 3/8/19, the Court issued an Order extending the stalking order based solely on its finding:
“Mr. Maravelias continued efforts at disparaging Ms. DePamphilis and her family
by making offensive and hateful statements in public postings on the internet”
4. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of DePamphilis’s Motion to Extend do not notice any such allegation;
they paraphrased the Supreme Court’s summary of Maravelias’s past truthful “offensive” statements he had
made in his testimony, not on the internet, at the first extension. Paragraphs 22-24 forged the now-exposed
“following” false accusations. Paragraph 27 accused Maravelias of attaching a public social media exhibit to
an appellate brief to show DePamphilis lied. An allegation about “statements” “on the internet” appears
nowhere in the paragraphs to which this Court strictly constrained the legal scope of the extension case.
8. As it stands, this Court’s Order extends a stalking order disparaging Maravelias’s rights and
reputation 1 where Maravelias was never given a fair opportunity to be fully heard in his defense 2,3. It
egregiously violates the notion of “fundamental fairness” that the Court would bait Maravelias into preparing a
1
The Court’s Order worshipfully caresses Ms. DePamphilis’s emotions by punishing Mr. Maravelias for his “offensive” personal beliefs and
statements made in public, but see State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632 (2009), recognizing a personal liberty interest against reputational or social stigma by
and through governmental determinations such as stalking protective orders, implicating due-process protections for reputational aspects alone. It is
Maravelias whose reputation is wrongly “disparaged” by the existence of an “offensive” and “hateful” governmental “restraining order”, and whose
legal rights are being violated.
2
Cf. N.H. CONST, Pt. I, Art. 15, “Every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs that may be favorable to himself … and to be fully heard in
his defense.”
3
Cf. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2, Rule 2.6
C. As-Applied Through the Court’s Present Reasoning for Extending the Stalking Order, RSA
633:3-a, III-c. Violates Fundamental Rights Guaranteed By the 1st and 14th Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution and Part I, Articles 22, 15, and 2 of the N.H. Constitution
i) The As-Applied Violation of Freedom of Speech
10. Absent reversal, the Court’s order stands to caricaturize New Hampshire family courts into a
risible laughing-stock of Orwellian tyranny, feminist-Marxist speech-police, and punitive misandry to chill
public expressive conduct – an embarrassing spectacle profitable for all Americans to appreciate the modern
state of civil “protective” order statutes and the insidious terrorism against personal liberty into which they
have shamefully suppurated.
11. This Court’s order openly punishes Maravelias’s public self-defensive speech on the “internet”
– comments repudiating DePamphilis’s false accusations of “stalking” which this subjective Court finds
“offensive” and “hateful” – and continues a “stalking protective order” stripping Maravelias of his
fundamental constitutional rights because he engaged in such “offensive” political speech 4 in public. It is
lamentable that this Court would commit such rampant desecration of Maravelias’s freedom of speech under
Pt. I, Art. 22 of the State Constitution and the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. To constitutionally
attribute extension to a defendant’s public speech-acts, such speech must evince an objective likelihood of
imminent crime or violence. Here, it is undisputed Maravelias made no such unprotected speech.
12. Since Maravelias’s public “comments” on the “internet”, made in response to and about the
existence of this very same court case and unjust restraining order, do not fall into any categories lacking
First Amendment protection (e.g., threats of violence or “fighting words”), the Court’s extension is
unconstitutional. The Court cannot lawfully extend a stalking order because a defendant communicated his
4
Criticizing a governmental determination - a wrongful “stalking” restraining order maligning Maravelias’s name – is political speech.
ii) The As-Applied Violation of Equal Protection and the Principle of Stare Decisis
13. This Court has been applying unequal, inconsistent interpretation schemes of RSA 633:3-a in
civil stalking order decisions. In other stalking cases from the last year, this Court has explicitly clarified
“disparaging”, “offensive” words alone with zero threatened violence do not amount to present or ongoing risk
sufficient to sustain a stalking order. In other similar cases, the Court has adopted this proper constitutional
interpretation of RSA 633:3-a even where the “offensive”, “hateful” communications were made directly to a
petitioner, as opposed to third-party political self-defensive speech in a public forum, the case of Maravelias’s
alleged “offensive” comment(s). See generally Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
14. Here, the Court disparately punishes Maravelias with continued stalking order extension solely
based on the accusation he made “offensive” comments in public, themselves purposed to decry the perverse
injustice of this very stalking order. Accordingly, the Court’s extension is unconstitutional and contumelious
towards the core tenets of our common law legal system; See U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV, supra, and N.H.
CONST, Pt. I, Art. 2 and 15. “The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in
question treats similarly situated persons differently.” Longchamps Electric, Inc. v. New Hampshire State
Apprenticeship Council, 145 N.H. 502, 506 (2000). “The equal protection guarantee is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Lennartz v. Oak Point Associates, P.A., 167 N.H.
459, 462 (2015). As previously stated, the Court’s attitude towards “offensive” statements within stalking
order cases has taken drastically different turns for different yet identically situated defendants. Since
Maravelias is an older male and pro se litigant, he is statistically likely to suffer such unequal, prejudiced
judicial outcomes. 6,7,8 The Court’s unequal application of the law also violates stare decisis: if non-threatening
5
Maravelias assumes the Court refers to comments made on a YouTube video of the 2018 Hearing on the past extension in this case. However, the
Court’s order does not even identify the specific “offensive” comment(s) and is therefore unconstitutionally vague regardless. (See infra)
6
Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L.J. (2005).
“[Plaintiffs in sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases] were significantly more likely to win when a female judge was on the bench. This
effect was independent of judicial ideology—the presence of both liberal and conservative female judges increased the probability that plaintiffs
prevailed on panels of varying ideological composition.” Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol114/iss7/5
7
Basile, S. (2005). A Measure of Court Response to Requests for Protection. Journal of Family Violence, 20, 171-179. (Finding strong bias against
males in civil protective order cases in proximate Gardner, MA trial court)
8
Quintanilla, V. D., Allen, R. A. and Hirt, E. R. (2017), The Signaling Effect of Pro se Status. Law and Social Inquiry, 42: 1091-1121.
doi:10.1111/lsi.12261 (Finding a significant systemic disadvantageous effect of proceeding pro se attributable to an inherent signaling effect from the
title and to the socialization of the legal profession)
D. As-Applied Through the Court’s Present Extension of the Order, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. Is
Unconstitutionally Vague
15. The Court has failed to identify what specific alleged “offensive and hateful statements” on the
“internet” by Maravelias it finds warrant extension. This defect alone renders the extension legally erroneous
and reversible: when issuing RSA 633:3-a protective orders, trial courts are required to make specific factual
findings in support. 9 Due process naturally requires that this apply also to extensions of such orders. The
Court’s vague 3/8/19 Order – the current application of RSA 633:3-a, III-c. – fails to adequately notify
Maravelias, a person of ordinary intelligence, of what kinds of self-defensive public “statements” of opinion
are likely to cause extension of a stalking order. It is unclear that Maravelias defending his wrongly-defamed
name to third-parties on the internet amounts to concern for the “well-being” of the false-accuser Petitioner, or
what constitutes as “hateful”. The statute for extension, as-applied, is therefore unconstitutionally vague. 10
E. The Court Cannot Lawfully Grant Any Stalking Order Extension Because RSA 633:3-a, III-
c. is Facially Unconstitutional
i) Substantial Overbreadth and Vagueness in Violation of the 1st Amendment to the
Federal Constitution and Pt. I, Art. 22 of the State Constitution
16. A statute is facially overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473
(2010). See also Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Resources & Economic Dev., 163 N.H. 215, 220-21 (2012).
Such is the case with RSA 633:3-a, III-c., which inexplicably widens the legal standard for stalking order
extension to mere service towards a plaintiff’s “well-being”. Any constitutionally protected speech-act or
lawful act at all by a defendant with which a plaintiff merely disagrees enables and requires the Court to
extend the stalking order: e.g., even a defendant’s basic act of appearing as an adverse party or asserting he has
never “stalked” the plaintiff, which is often undeniably true in such civil cases where a disturbingly low
“preponderance of evidence” standard applies for obtaining such stalking protective orders in the first place.
See RSA 633:3-a, III-a. Pampering a plaintiff’s personal contentment and mental happiness (serving their
“well-being”) far exceeds the legitimate governmental purpose of RSA 633:3-a to protect victims from
stalking. The Court’s Order admits that its finding “good cause” for the extension “directly relates to [serving
the] well-being of the plaintiff”, citing the controlling case law MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 9 (2008).
9
See Kiesman v. Middleton, 156 N.H. (2007), Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283 (2001), Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. (2007), etc.
10
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). Extending a restraining order because a defendant makes “offensive” or “hateful” comments to third-
parties about a remorseless liar legally abusing said defendant “invites arbitrary enforcement” of these vague, undefined, subjective terms. Id.
ii) Substantial Violation of Equal Protection Rights Under the 14th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and Pt. I, Art. 2 of the N.H. Constitution
18. Maravelias repeats his argumentation at ¶48-50 (discussing the lack of narrow-tailoring in the
“safety and well-being” language through the lens of the “underinclusiveness” doctrine) and rephrases it into a
facial challenge on the grounds of state and federal constitutional Equal Protection rights. The legal standard
for a new stalking order at RSA 633:3-a, III-a. (to show the plaintiff has been “stalked”) is much higher and
more stringent than the standard for extension at RSA 633:3-a, III-c. (merely to show that such extension
would serve a plaintiff’s “safety and well-being”). New stalking defendants and past stalking defendants
facing another new extension are “similarly situated” for purposes of equal protection, as are new stalking
plaintiffs and plaintiffs seeking an extension of a stalking order. To concede comparatively broader rights to
stalking plaintiffs seeking a further extension violates the Equal Protection rights of new stalking plaintiffs not
already having a protective order; similarly, affording new stalking defendants broadened comparative
protection of liberty interests violates the Equal Protection rights of stalking defendants facing further
extension. Unlike a criminal conviction of guilt proven beyond all reasonable doubt, a civil finding of
“stalking” on the “preponderance of evidence” standard cannot lawfully distinguish between past and new
stalking defendants for purposes of the “similarly situated” element of Equal Protection analysis. Therefore, no
possible set of circumstances exists where the lowered extension standard of RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is not facially
unconstitutional. This impinges upon the fundamental rights inherently limited by stalking protective orders.
F. The Court’s Extension Errs to Adduce an Iota of Credibility to Christina DePamphilis’s
Wild Representations, Where Gaping Swaths of Her Testimony and Verified Motion Were
Revealed as Fantastical Contrivances, Flabbergasting Falsehoods, Inexplicable Self-
Contradictions, and/or Phantasmagorical Hallucinations
20. The Court misidentifies its own 8/7/18 Order not granting Petitioner’s 7/12/18 Reply (where
the ameliorated “knowingly” and “about her” improvements were conceded) but rather impetuously granting
the more-punitive terms requested in Petitioner’s original 7/2/18 Motion. Perhaps the Court realized John J.
Coughlin’s shocking misconduct, panicked, and seized the damage-control opportunity to retroactively
pretend the ameliorated terms were granted, hoping nobody would notice. If an honest oversight, this Court’s
lackadaisical, dismissive effortlessness here is reminiscent of John Coughlin’s thoughtless scribbling-off on
the illegal Orwellian terms in the first place. With all due respect, this is a denigrating mockery of pro se
Maravelias’s basic legal rights. This Court so nonchalantly handles his potential criminalization and arrest for
“possessing” pieces of paper in his own legal brief, crucially dependent on the exact version of the terms. The
Court had even learned the Windham Police were actually criminally investigating this demented travesty. As
it goes without saying, the Court cannot uphold the constitutionality of terms it never in fact granted. 13
11
Assuming dubitante that Christina DePamphilis never willfully lied, she necessarily: 1) asserted-as-fact that “Maravelias followed” her on 10/23/18
to “cheer practice” (Verified Motion) and asseverated with “10 out of 10” certainty the face of the allegedly-pursuing vehicle in Windham was
Maravelias’s (sworn testimony), when Maravelias was in fact in Concord, 2) swore under penalty of perjury that her Verified Motion alleging
multiple summertime “following” incidents was true and accurate to the best of her knowledge, only to testify that there was only one such believed
summertime “following” incident, 3) asserted in her Verified Motion that the 10/23/18 “following” vehicle was Maravelias’s, when in fact she
testified it was a completely different, white vehicle she had no idea if Maravelias had ever owned or driven, while intimately knowing his “two”
“black” cars he owns and routinely drives, 4) inexplicably changed the time of the alleged 10/23/18 “following” accusation from “7:00pm” (Verified
Motion) to “4:00pm” (sworn testimony), otherwise indicative of an attempt to bait Maravelias into preparing a suddenly-non-responsive evidentiary
defense, 5) mysteriously happened to guess that Maravelias might have Google phone location history proving where he was and thus coincidentally
consciously premeditated an absurd and failed attack against Maravelias’s phone location evidence predicated on the notion that he had “multiple
phones”, using an arcane two-year-old police search record of his family member’s house as apparent support, 6) said that she was referenced in the
web description of Maravelias’s book “David the Liar”, then admitted she was not in fact referenced therein, 7) said she continues to be “stalked” by
Maravelias “every day”, even though she could not name a single instance Maravelias attempted to interact with her in years, apart from the
“following” false accusation, 8) asserted-as-fact in her Verified Motion that Maravelias “intimidated” and “harassed” her friend by “recording” the
friend at Dunkin Donuts, even though she was not there and admitted to having no idea whether this was true or false, 9) admitted that she had no
evidence whatsoever to suggest that the alleged summertime “following” incident involved Maravelias, not ever identifying nor even seeing the
driver, 10) admitted Maravelias never submitted criminal complaints about her to the “Windham” and “Salem” police departments, which she had
asserted-as-fact in her Verified Motion, 11) stalked and gained illicit access to Maravelias’s private business product support web forum to monitor
his communications, 12) testified that, although she knew Maravelias’s false arrest in 2017 in connection with her “stalking order” was annulled, not
prosecuted, and legally accepted as “false”, she still wished that the defamatory internet record of said false arrest “should” appear as the “first” result
in a Google search for Maravelias’s name as opposed to elsewhere on the first page, not even endeavoring to conceal her outrageous bad-faith
motivations of retaliatory slander and libel, inter multa exempla alia. That this Court would esteem such a litigant as anything less than a mentally
disturbed individual and/or a brazen perjuring felon – let alone “credible” – strains the scope of legal error and approaches judicial misconduct.
See Appellant’s Brief in 2018-0483 for comprehensive summary of the record documenting Christina DePamphilis’s drug and alcohol use.
12
See John Coughlin’s 8/7/18 hand-written Order on the final page of DePamphilis’s 7/12/18 Reply proposing the slightly-ameliorated terms: “The
13
Court granted The The [sic] Petitioner’s Motion for Modification of Stalking Final Order of Protection on 8/7/18”; Cf. John Coughlin’s 8/7/18 hand-
III. THE N.H. SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT BAD-FAITH AND HOSTILE BIAS
AGAINST MARAVELIAS, THE FUTILITY OF APPEAL, AND GENERIC FAIRNESS
written Order on the final page of DePamphilis’s Original 7/2/18 Motion containing the original more-punitive terms lacking the words “knowingly”
and “about her”: “granted as to Petitioner’s Request for Relief A.; B1; B2; B3 John J. Coughlin”.
14
If appellate issue preservation on these state constitutional challenges to the “extended terms” should ever pass into dispute, Maravelias demands in
fairness his single paragraph here suffice to preserve these issues in light of Dist. Div. R. 3.11(E), imposing a strained 10-page limit on this document.
15
Ordering a civil defendant not to “possess” public court exhibits and internet pages constituting “social media” “directly or through a third party” is
an unheard-of abuse of power rarely or never performed by a judicial officer; it is therefore not a “judicial act” within the U.S. Supreme Court’s test
for determining the scope of judicial immunity. Indeed, issuing such draconian criminalization of private legal self-defense conduct under the guise of
a concomitant “stalking restraining order” has never happened before ever in any jurisdiction anywhere in the history of the universe.
B. The Court’s Extension Shocks the Conscience and Assaults Fairness Given the “Offensive”
and “Hateful” Slander Campaign DePamphilis Continues to Wage Against Maravelias
“Whoever secretly slanders his neighbor, him I will destroy.” – Psalm 101:5
25. This Court improperly usurps a stalking order as punishment for alleged defamatory conduct to
magnify the injustice against Maravelias, the victim of DePamphilis’s outrageous slander and libel. David
DePamphilis has been personally approaching people he believes know Paul Maravelias to perpetuate a vile,
tortious campaign to defame and harass Maravelias. E.g., DePamphilis has recently approached teenage
employees of a local coffee shop – complete strangers – “warning” them Paul Maravelias is a “pedophile” 20,
emailed a Windham state representative claiming Maravelias’s asking-out a girl to dinner in 2016 represented
a likelihood Maravelias “may sexually assault her”, caused language describing Maravelias as a “sexual
predator” and “piece of shit stalker” to appear on public internet pages when one Googles Maravelias’s name,
16
To wit, the Supreme Court not only declined to reverse the outrageous fee award against Maravelias for a truthful stalking petition, but recently
issued an unheard-of Order instructing Maravelias to pay for DePamphilis’s attorney’s fees for the good-faith Supreme Court appeal case itself!
17
See Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration in 2018-0483, indicating where Robert Lynn’s Court patently mischaracterized transcribed testimony.
18
See Id., exposing Robert Lynn’s unapologetic calpestation of Maravelias’s rights without even making a single reference to Maravelias’s chief
arguments and evidence in the appeal case. E.g., the Supreme Court’s shameful Order willfully omitted any reference to DePamphilis’s incitative
“middle-finger” bullying/harassment post against Maravelias proving she had no “fear”, exposing Justice Lynn’s unscrupulous feminist activism.
19
E.g., the Court’s 3/8/19 Order addresses absolutely none of Maravelias’s multiple legal arguments for dismissal in his 2/14/19 Motion to Dismiss.
20
DePamphilis’s reprehensible “pedophile” slander against Maravelias is an artifact of cognitive dissonance and psychological projection.
DePamphilis’s own son Nicolas, in his twenties, has been in an intimate homosexual anal relationship with a 17-year-old boy named Nate since Nate
was only 16 years of age. While 16 is the age of consent, Nate ostensibly weighs less than David’s daughter and has the physical semblance of an
emaciated pre-pubescent young girl; See e.g. https://goo.gl/AsBZuV, https://goo.gl/SoitTA, https://goo.gl/h2aw1J, https://goo.gl/YtSrK8, etc. It is for
this reason it comforts David DePamphilis to slander Paul Maravelias a “pedophile”, as DePamphilis knows Maravelias embraces healthy, natural,
and orderly sexual preferences for humans of substantial somatosexual maturity who are also female. Therefore, DePamphilis’s delusional
“pedophile” slander against Maravelias functions as a cognitive-dissonance-reduction coping mechanism for paternal feelings, plausibly homophobic,
of shame, bitterness, and rage. Psychopathology aside, DePamphilis’s criminal slander against Paul Maravelias is contemptible and must be ceased.
26. Regarding Maravelias’s constitutionally protected conduct of vindicating his own wrongly
disparaged name on the internet, Petitioner was displeasured primarily by two artifacts: 1) a YouTube video of
Maravelias’s testimony at the public 2018 extension hearing, and 2) a public court document she herself
submitted, allegedly containing her address. If the Court reconsiders and terminates indefinitely this stalking
order within 30 days of this Motion, Maravelias hereby agrees that he will, within 10 days of the Clerk’s
notice of such order ending this case, 1) remove from the web Petitioner’s own offensive court pleading (viz.,
the 1/5/18 Motion to Extend) and 2) remove the YouTube video of Maravelias’s 2018 testimony.
27. It is under duress of continued wrongful loss of constitutional rights that Maravelias
begrudgingly offers to restrict his public expression in this way, solely to please the arbitrary whims of New
Hampshire judicial officers. Maravelias expects this compelling fact to heighten SCOTUS interest once the
activist, bad-faith NH Supreme Court renders its obligatory screw-Maravelias appeal-rejecting Order in utter
blindness to fact and law, if the instant Motion is denied and another necessary NHSC appeal pursued.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable, Well-Meaning Court:
I. Grant this Motion, including any further relief as may be deemed just and necessary;
II. Reconsider and totally dissolve the extension of the Stalking Order, ending this case;
III. If not granting Prayer II, dissolve the 8/7/18 extended terms; and
IV. Make a finding to identify the certain “offensive” “internet” comment(s) causing extension.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE – I, Paul Maravelias, certify by signature hereunder that this document was sent this
day to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On this ___ day of March 2019, before me, _________________________, the undersigned officer,
personally appeared ________________________, known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he/she executed the
same for the purposes therein contained, who being by me first duly sworn, on his oath, deposes and says:
__________________________________
[signature of affiant]
Paul J. Maravelias
[typed name of affiant]
____________________________________
Notary Public