Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Please find enclosed Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for filing in the above-referenced case.
During the 2/12/19 Hearing in this case, Judge Leonard allowed me 48 hours to submit the
within legal argument(s) in written form as opposed to hearing them as oral argument.
Sincerely,
Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias
Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) respectfully moves this Honorable Court to dismiss the
1/24/19 Motion to Extend Stalking Order filed by Christina DePamphilis (“Plaintiff”) and end
1. The Court stipulated that it found good cause for the 1/24/19 temporary stalking order
a. Paragraphs ¶12-13 (viz., the past 2018 extension case had illuminated that Maravelias
had called the Plaintiff mean/bad names to others a few times);
b. Paragraphs ¶22-24 (viz., Plaintiff alleges Maravelias has “followed” her in summer
2018 and again “in his vehicle” on “10/23/18”); and
c. Paragraph ¶27 (viz., Maravelias submitted a NH Supreme Court Reply Brief containing
a public court exhibit allegedly in violation of the 8/7/18 “extended terms”).
2. This Court held a Hearing on 2/12/19 which assumedly established the following facts:
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
a. Cell phone location history proves Paul Maravelias did not “follow” Plaintiff on
10/23/18 in Windham. At all times material, “3:45pm to 4:15pm”, he was miles-away
doing business in Concord, NH. Maravelias was at the Administrative Office of the
Courts, the USPS Post Office, and the NH Supreme Court filing a Motion.
b. Christina DePamphilis testified she knew Maravelias has two vehicles, a Black Alfa
Romeo and a Black Minivan, but she feared he could possibly have different vehicles.
She claimed the 10/23/18 following vehicle was a “white SUV” and speculated it could
be Maravelias’s, though not knowing. But she had priorly asseverated in her sworn
Verified Motion that Maravelias was following her “in his vehicle”. (¶23)
c. Paul Maravelias testified he’s never been in the Salisbury Beach area at any times
material (to wit, “August 2018”) nor ever followed the Plaintiff.
d. Regarding Plaintiff’s allegation at ¶27 and the 8/7/18 “extended terms”, Maravelias
testified they were issued ultra vires without legal authority. He has filed a federal
lawsuit against state criminal enforcement officials for declaratory/injunctive relief.
3. Assuming the above facts, Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend does not state a claim under the
statute for extension. There was no “following” (¶22-24), no act of stalking by Maravelias filing
a legal appellate brief (¶27), and Maravelias’s behavior long-ago of calling Plaintiff not-nice
names to other people (¶12-13) does not amount to present concern for her safety and well-being.
4. Even ignoring all facts found at yesterday’s Hearing and assuming all of Plaintiff’s well-
pleaded allegations within the Verified Motion to Extend, the Court must dismiss. The following
5. First, there is a difference between 1) the absence of reversible error within the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, and 2) the absence of actual error which this Court may correct
1
The Supreme Court’s 1/16/19 Order denying Maravelias’s appeal of the 2018 extension in this case is
instructive: “‘The trial court is in the best position to view the current circumstances, as well as the
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
6. Second, insofar as Plaintiff’s 2/11/19 Bench Memorandum invokes a passing-reference to
collateral estoppel, the requirements of collateral estoppel are not satisfied2 where Plaintiff
attempts to hand-cuff this Court because of a Supreme Court Order denying the appeal of the
past 2018 extension – i.e., meaningfully different arguments tailored to a different case.
2018 extension are separate arguments from Maravelias’s new arguments – however similar – in
this motion to dismiss the new 2019 extension. “A trial court … has the authority to revisit an
earlier ruling on a motion to dismiss if it becomes aware that the ruling may be incorrect.” Gray
v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160 (2010) See also Route 12 Books Video v. Town of Troy, 149 N.H. 569,
575 (2003).
8. Fourth, since the standard for extending a stalking order is much lower than for the
original issuance thereof3 – despite the same requested one-year-order remedy – the Court
defendant’s prior acts, and determine whether an extension is necessary for the safety and well-being of
the plaintiff.’ Id. [MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. (2008)] at 11. We will uphold the trial court’s
findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are tainted by error of law, id. at 10, mindful
that it is for the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented, and
that our role is not to determine whether we would have ruled differently, but whether a reasonable person
could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same evidence, Cook v. Sullivan,
149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003); see also MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 190 (2007).” (Emphasis added)
2
“For collateral estoppel to apply, three basic conditions must be satisfied: (1) the issue subject to
estoppel must be identical in each action; (2) the first action must have resolved the issue finally on the
merits; and (3) the party to be estopped must have appeared as a party in the first action, or have been in
privity with someone who did so.” Stewart v. Bader, 154 N.H. 75, 80 (2006) The issues Maravelias raises
herein are not “identical”, because they are in reference to the current 2019 extension, and because they
meaningfully differ in substance. Further, Maravelias did not have a fair and full opportunity to litigate all
of these issues even with regards to the different 2018 extension case. “A party against whom estoppel is
pleaded must have had a full and fair prior opportunity to litigate the issue or fact in question.” Id.
3
Compare RSA 633:3-a, III-a. to RSA 633:3-a, III-c.
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
which itself comes into reasonable question after the fact4. I.e., if the underlying stalking order
violated statutorily mandated rights, due-process rights, or constitutional rights, any extensions
thereof necessarily re-prejudice a defendant by subjecting him or her to the lower extension
A. This Court Must Dismiss the Stalking Order Because Its Application Thereof Has
Violated the Equal Protection Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions
9. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “no state shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
10. On 12/10/18, subject to the stalking order, Defendant Maravelias submitted a Motion
and accompanying 20-page Memorandum of Law to this Court. Plaintiff then filed an Objection.
11. Maravelias’s Motion claimed a statutory right under RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b) and
13. Over two months after Maravelias’s 12/10/18 Motion, this Court has not ruled upon it
nor taken any action on it whatsoever. But this Court granted DePamphilis’s 1/24/19 Motion the
4
“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness.” Saviano
v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 320 (2004).
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
14. Christina DePamphilis is a lawyer-represented 18-year old female. Paul Maravelias is
15. As applied, this Court’s implementation of the stalking order has violated all
applicable state and federal constitutional Equal Protection clauses. Where both parties claimed a
right, the Court acted immediately on one party’s claim yet has still taken no action in response
to the other party’s over two months later. The parties were similarly-situated and no legitimate
reasons exists for the disparity; Maravelias even reminded the Court of his outstanding 12/10/18
Motion on 1/4/19 by filing a Motion for Timely Ruling. Further, Maravelias’s claimed right was
16. Dismissal is the appropriate remedy to the said Equal Protection violation. The said
violation came about by and through this stalking order, which was temporarily extended
B. This Court Must Dismiss the Stalking Order Because It Violated the 30-Day Hearing
Requirement in 2018, a Critical Due-Process Right, Thereby Losing Personal Jurisdiction
Over Maravelias
17. Maravelias herein repeats and incorporates Paragraphs ¶13-17 of his 1/28/19 First-
Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection, presenting the substance of this issue.
18. In summary, it is not fair to subject Maravelias to the lower standard for extension
(RSA 633:3-a, III-c.) when the past order giving rising to Plaintiff’s current extension motion
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
was issued in violation of Maravelias’s due process rights, where this Court failed to hold a
Hearing on the past extension within 30-days of Plaintiff’s 1/5/18 Motion to Extend.5
19. The causal nature of the new extension by means of the violative first extension
renders this objection to the Court’s continued exercise of personal jurisdiction a new issue.
20. The Court may hear a new stalking petition from Plaintiff as part of a new case, but
must dismiss this case which can only continue to exist by virtue of upholding this Court’s 2018
C. This Court Must Dismiss the Stalking Order Because It Violated Maravelias’s Advance-
Notice Rights by Relying Upon Plaintiff’s Photographic Exhibits She Noticed Nowhere in
Her 1/5/18 Extension Motion, Rather Ambushing Maravelias on 6/8/18 Almost Half-a-Year
Later at the Hearing’s Final Day
21. Maravelias herein repeats and incorporates Paragraphs ¶26-27 of his 1/28/19 First-
Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection, presenting the substance of this issue.
22. Maravelias preserved this issue in his 6/25/18 Motion for Reconsideration to this
Court. The 1/16/19 Supreme Court Order did not address this ripe and valid issue.
23. It is well settled that a “defendant is entitled to be informed of the theory on which
the plaintiffs are proceeding and the redress that they claim as a result of the defendant's
actions.” Morency v. Plourde, 96 N.H. 344, 346, 76 A.2d 791, 792 (1950).
5
This argument is meaningfully different from the one the Supreme Court’s 1/16/19 Order rejected. The
latter decided whether the 30-days-violation was grounds for an appellate court to reverse the 2018
extension – not whether Maravelias’s new objection here bars the trial court from granting another 2019
extension, the instant argument.
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
24. For the reasons already stated, this Court cannot grant another extension based upon
D. This Court Must Dismiss the Stalking Order Because The 8/7/18 “Extended Terms”
Were Issued Ultra Vires in Defiance of Statutory and Constitutional Law
25. Maravelias repeats and incorporates by reference all the facts and arguments
appearing in Maravelias’s recently filed federal lawsuit regarding the 8/7/18 “extended terms”
nominally attached to this stalking order, N.H. Federal District Court, Maravelias v. Coughlin et
al. (Case No. 1:19-CV-143), which was entered as an Exhibit in yesterday’s Hearing. The said
26. By and through this stalking order, Plaintiff has been allowed to disparage and injure
Maravelias with said “extended terms” not authorized by the controlling statute, RSA 173-B:5,
and in violation of the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution, the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Part I Articles 2, 12, 22, and 23 of the NH
Constitution. Further, granting the “extended terms” was likely a criminal act in violation of
27. Amending the stalking order to dissolve these terms is not a sufficient remedy. Since
the granting of said terms implicated Equal Protection rights and other due-process issues
discussed hereinabove, and as these “extended terms” were only allowed to transpire by and
through the vessel of this underlying “stalking order”, said order cannot be retrospectively
considered as not violating Maravelias’s due-process rights in application, and the Court cannot
therefore extend it. This is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a new stalking petition.
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
E. This Court Must Dismiss Because the Original Stalking Order is Grounded Upon a
Material Allegation Which Did Not Appear in Plaintiff’s Petition, Violating Advance-
Notice Due-Process Rights
28. Maravelias herein repeats and incorporates by reference Paragraphs ¶18-25 of his
Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection, presenting the substance of
this issue.
F. This Court Must Dismiss Because Opposing Counsel Failed to Obey Circuit Court Rule
1.8(C), Which Prejudiced Maravelias
29. Maravelias herein repeats and incorporates Paragraphs ¶4-6 of his 1/15/19
30. Plaintiff’s counsel knew of the Court’s rule to reach-out to the other party to attempt
to obtain concurrence prior to filing such a Motion: counsel obeyed this rule in the past.
Maravelias was therefore caught-off-guard by the 2019 Motion to Extend and given less time to
F. This Court Must Dismiss Because RSA 633:3-A, III-C. Is Facially Unconstitutional for
Overbreadth and Vagueness, and Because It Is Virtually Impossible for Any Such
Extension Not to be Plagued by Said Overbreadth and Vagueness Defects
31. For a concise summary of this issue without verbose constitutional law analysis,
Maravelias repeats herein and incorporates by reference Paragraphs ¶99-118, Cause of Action
recently filed federal lawsuit, N.H. Federal District Court, Maravelias v. Coughlin et al. (Case
No. 1:19-CV-143), itself entered into the instant case as an Exhibit in yesterday’s Hearing.
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
32. For a more rigorous treatment of this issue, Maravelias repeats herein and
Order of Protection.
II. Dismiss Plaintiff’s 1/24/2019 Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order
of Protection, ending this case; and
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was
forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the
Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.
_______________________________
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087