Ladislao Espinosa vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No 181071
March 15, 2010

Facts:
On August 6, 2010, private complainant Andy metro went to the house of Ladeslao Espinosa in
Sta. Cruz, Zambales. While standing outside, Merto shouted violent threats, challenging
petitioner to face him outside. Fearing for the safety of his family, Espinosa went out of his
house and confronted Merto. However, as soon as he drew closer to the private complainant, the
latter drew and hurled a stone at Espinosa. Espinosa was able to duck to avoid getting hit and
instinctively retaliated by hitting the leg of Merto with a bolo scabbard. Merto fell to the ground.
Espinosa continued to maul the victim with the bolo scabbard until he was restrained. The victim
sustained two bone fractures which took six months to completely heal. Espinosa was charged
with frustrated homicide but was found guilty for the crime of serious physical injuries noting
that the prosecution had failed to prove the element of “intent to kill” which is necessary to a
conviction for Frustrated Homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgement of conviction
with modification that the penalty imposed be lowered by one degree in accordance with the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

Issue:
Should the justifying circumstance of self-defense be appreciated in favour of the petitioner?

Held:
No. While the existence of the first (unlawful aggression) and third (lack of sufficient
provocation) are without question, the argumentation is on the existence of the second element
which is the reasonable necessity of the means employed to preventer repel the attack.
The continuous hacking by petitioner constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to
repel the private complainant’s
attack- and is therefore unjustified. Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a
bolo scabbard in fending off the unlawful aggression
–
the circumstances show that after the aggressor was taken down to the ground, the petitioner
ceased to be motivated with the lawful desire of defending himself. He was then acting with
intent to harm the private complainant shoes aggression had already ceased.
 People v. Boholst-Caballero (1974)
ART. 11 RPC SELF-DEFENSE
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

accused-appellant: Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero (Boholst here, for brevity)

Facts:

(According to Boholst)

• The couple had a rough marriage. Soon after, Caballero left, and Boholst and her daughter was left to the
support of her parents.
• One night, after carolling, Boholst met Caballero who upon seeing her, manhandled her. There were an
exchange of words and later on, Caballero was already holding her by the hair and slapping her face
until her nose bled.
• Caballero pushed her to the grounds, and to stop herself from falling, she held on to his waist. As she did
so, she grasped the knife tucked by the left side of his body.
• She fell to the ground then Caballero knelt over her and chocked her saying that he will kill her. Because
she had no other recourse, she pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him, hitting the left side
of his body near the belt line.
• When she was finally free, she ran home and on the way, she threw the knife.
• In the morning, she surrendered to the police and presented the torn and blood-stained dress she wore
that night. The police officer accompanied her to look for the weapon but when it can no longer be
found, she was advised to just give any knife and she did (now marked Exhibit C).

(According to the Prosecution’s witness, Caballero’s friend)

• On the night of the incident, Boholst was already waiting for Caballero, and when he approached her,
she suddenly stabbed Francisco her with the knife marked by the prosecution as Exhibit C.
• His friends brought him to the hospital where he was later interviewed by the police officer confirming
that his wife stabbed him. But because he needs blood transfusion, he needs to be transferred to another
hospital. He died on the way.

Issue: Did Boholst act in legitimate defense of her person?

Held: Yes.

Ratio decidendi:

• The RTC held that Boholst’s evidence was not clear and convincing:
 • Testimony improbable as brought out by her demonstration during the trial
• No wound or injury on her body treated by the physician
• That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C is incredible
• Contradictory statements
• Has motive: husband’s abandonment
• The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court
on facts testified by the witnesses
• The trial court judge overlooked an important piece of evidence that could confirm the narration of the
appellant: location of the wound inflicted on the victim.
• As she was flat on her back and and her husband choking her, she had no other recourse but to pull out
the knife inserted at the left side of her husband’s belt and stabbed him hitting the left back portion just
below the waist, as also described by the attending physician as the left lumbar region.
• The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong indication of the
truth of her testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite natural
for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the man’s belt and thrust it at that
section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.
• This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the prosecution witness that is if it was
true, then the wound should have been directed towards the front of the body of the victim rather than at
his back.
• The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-
defense.
• Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her husband and for several months prior to
the incident, she appeared resigned to her fate.
• She also surrendered herself immediately the morning after.
• The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches as stated by Boholst for it to penetrate
through the left lumbar region to the victim’s large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter. >.<
• All the elements of self-defense are present:
• unlawful aggression as pointed out above
• reasonable necessity for means employed: woman strangled and chocked by a furious aggressor,
rendered almost unconcious by the strong pressure on her throat. What is vital is the imminent peril
to Boholst’s life. The knife afforded appellant the only reasonable means with which she could free
and save herself. Necessity knows no law.
• Lack of sufficient provocation: Boholst did not provoke Caballero. She gave a valid excuse that she
went carolling to earn money for their child.

Boholst acted in the legitimate defense of her person. Judgment of conviction set aside. Acquitted.
 JOSE FRIAS, JR. and GERVACIO TACAS, petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents

G.R. No. L-65762 June 23, 1984

FACTS: Appellant Gervacio Tacas is a member of the police force a policeman for 24 years
admitted having shot Bartolome Arellano. However, he claims that he did so in self-defense
and/or in the fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.

The accused witnesses testify, Tacas just one and a half meter on the same side of the barangay
road while Frias walked eight meters from them on the other side of the road. Arrellano saw
Frias aiming a carbine at Bartolome Arellano who was then facing Tacas and eight meters from
Frias. Bartolome Arellano was unarmed and was walking slowly in a stooping manner .
Thereafter, Bartolome Arellano ran and Tacas moved such that the latter was about to meet the
former. However, when Bartolome Arellano noticed the approaching Tacas, Arellano turned
around and ran back to where he was formerly even as Frias moved to the 'RIC' which is made of
hollow blocks and Tacas returned to the edge of the LB canteen. He was beside Tacas when
Tacas and Frias fired. Furthermore Ricaldo Bilag narrated that Arellano was fatally shot, the
latter was walking on the national road and was being followed by accused Gervacio Tacas who
was with an armalite. Tacas was wearing brief and sleeveless shirt. Standing by the road behind
Tacas was accused Jose Frias, Jr. who was with a carbine. At the far end of the barangay road
walking to and fro around four meters from Tacas was Francisco Arellano. Bartolome Arellano
was without any weapon and find the victim incapable of unlawful aggression. Bilag also
narrated that it was only after the incident at bar that he learned that Jaime Yerre, Jr. and Manuel
Pajela were also shot on August 3, 1980 and he heard that it was Bartolome Arellano who shot
the two during a mahjong game; but he does not know if the buckshot used by Bartolome
Arellano in shooting said victims was recovered by the police authorities.

Manuel Pajela and Jaime Yerre, Jr. testified that while they were playing mahjong at
about 5:30 in the morning of August 3, 1980, they were fired at with a shotgun by Bartolome
Arellano. Tacas, that he was sleeping when he was suddenly awakened by the sound of gunfire
followed by cries of Pajela's wife for help; that looking at the window, he saw Pajela bleeding
and about to be carried inside his house; and that he then grabbed his service armalite and went
down in his brief and undershirt to responded to an urgent call for help. Jose Frias testified that
he was awakened when he heard a loud explosion coming from the eastern side of his house. that
he looked out of the window and saw Pajela lying on a table, bleeding, that he went down and
saw Tacas, his father-in-law, calling upon Bartolome Arellano to surrender; and that Bartolome
Arellano was in the street proceeding towards the RIC marker, and that Bartolome Arellano was
armed with a "bulldog" shotgun.
ISSUE: W/N the killing was justified by the defense of fulfillment of duty

HELD: If there is a circumstance justifying the defendant's act, he is exempt from both criminal
and civil liability, except in paragraph 4, Article 11, where the civil liability is borne by the
persons benefited by the act. Fifth justifying circumstance which exempts a person from criminal
liability is found in this provision: "Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office." The requisites of the defense of fulfillment of duty are: (1)
that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or duty; (2)
that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right.

Tacas fired a warning shot, asked B. Arellano to surrender, and then fired another
warning shot. So when B. Arellano refused to surrender but tried to elude arrest and pointed his
gun at Tacas, first at the RIC marker and then at the silag tree, Tacas had very little choice but to
use his weapon. In fact, according to Paguirigan, B. Arellano and Tacas fired "simultaneously"

As it was the duty of Tacas to arrest B. Arellano and to prevent him from escaping,
sooner or later, it would come to the point where the lawman and the suspect had to face each
other. In that crucial moment when Tacas and B. Arellano, both armed, faced each other, they
had to make a split decision of putting their guns down or firing. They both elected to fire and B.
Arellano was killed while Tacas survived. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that
Tacas should not have fired at all. As his life was in peril, his judgment can not be questioned.

ACCORDINGLY, as recommended by the Solicitor General on the ground that Gervacio

Tacas acted in the fulfillment of a duty and in the legitimate exercise of his authority, said
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

For insufficiency of evidence, appellant Jose Frias, Jr. is also ACQUITTED.

G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 175482

ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were
found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring
with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco
Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.

Issues:

1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has
a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.

2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation
in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.

Held:

The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position with
a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a position
with a salary grade “27” or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for
being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.

The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code
and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly
vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident
bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if the act was not one relative
to the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include officers with
such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity.
Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not
preclude application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more comprehensive
in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect
his personal interest.

Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was
proper.