Confidential

NEWSLETTER
Materials and Inspection Engineering
‘The Rusty Chronicle’
December 2005
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

Contents

Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Announcements & Upcoming Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Training Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Web-based Software for Fitness for Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Expansion of the FAIR+ program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
News on the MCI-Infobase for Refineries and Gas/LNG plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Materials Technology Institute – Lofty Name, Down to Earth Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Materials & Inspection Engineering Meeting 2005 - Where Upstream and Downstream met . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

DOWNSTREAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Failure of LRCCU Caustic Regenerator Off Gas Return Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Flow Accelerated Corrosion in a Boiler Feed Water Deaerator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Root Cause Investigation of Hydrogen Blistering and HIC of a HCU Fuel Gas Scrubber in a Canadian Refinery . . . . . . . 12
Degradation Prediction and Assessment Models Coming to CWW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Materials analysis of Pernis FCCU 44-year-old C-0.5% Mo reactor vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Rhineland Refinery Hydrocracker Piping Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Anchors away! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

UPSTREAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Discipline Leadership in EP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Capacity Enhancement of the PTT Gas Supply Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Investigation of Un-Commanded Closures of EPW Surface Control Subsurface Safety Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

WATER FLOODING – MATERIALS SELECTION CHALLENGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

DEP.39.01.10.11-Gen. Manual - selection of materials for life cycle performance (EP) – 2005 Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Cathodic Protection Review - Nigeria LNG Bonny Plant and Incoming Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

STRESS RELIEF! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Who’s Who - Organograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Staff Announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
GSEI Materials & Inspection Engineering group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
GSEI/1 Downstream Materials & Inspection Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
GSEI/1 Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
GSEI/2 Upstream Materials Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
GSEI/3 Inspection Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
GSEI/4 Upstream Materials and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
GSEI/5 Downstream Pressure Equipment Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

If you have any questions or comments about this Newsletter, please contact your respective focal point or the editor: Goh Gim-
Choon (gim-choon.goh@shell.com)

NOTICE
The material contained in this Newsletter is intended for the use of Shell Global Solutions and its associated companies, Shell Global Solutions International B.V. and the Shell Research
and Technology Centres in Thornton, Grand Couronne, Hamburg and Singapore and their client companies only, and is provided subject to the terms of the relevant services agreements.
It is provided for the purpose of information only and should not be applied in any specific situation without having obtained further clarification and advice from the relevant Shell Global
Solutions company. None of the associated Shell Global Solutions companies accepts responsibility for the accuracy or completeness or for the applicability or the application by anyone of
the material contained herein. Copyright of this publication is vested in Shell Global Solutions International B.V., The Hague. This document may not be reproduced without the prior written
consent of the copyright owner.


The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
Editorial

You’ve most probably all heard the old cliché that “the only true constant in our lives
is change itself”. This cliché certainly rings true for me as I look back on 2005. We
have witnessed major changes in all parts of Shell during the year and in my opinion,
most have been good. Overall it has been a great year!

It has certainly been a year of significant change for Royal Dutch Shell, and it’s
associated upstream, downstream, G&P and related businesses. It has also been a
year of progress and of great success as we continue to r ecover from the difficulties
that emerged in 2004. The unification of Royal Dutch and Shell Transport into
one parent company, Royal Dutch Shell plc, was completed in July and significant
progress, and results, have been achieved towards our strategy of “more upstream
and more profitable downstream”. All segments of the business are having a successful year. Although annual
earnings have not been announced for 2005, we can certainly expect strong performance from all segments of
the RDS business. It is also reassuring to see the significant and ever increasing capital investment in the company,
19 billion USD 2006, as this will no doubt assure sustained progress towards our strategy in the years to come.

It has been a year of significant change for Shell Global Solutions as well, most all being driven by the needs
of our customers. Early in the year both Chemicals Technology and CRI/Criterion joined Shell Global Solutions
providing additional technical capabilities that allows us to span the entire hydrocarbon chain – from production
to retail. Also, an Innovation & Technology vice presidency position was created to provide a greater emphasis
in this area and to assure a strong linkage to customer needs. In addition, a decision to simplify our commercial
relationship with Shell customers was taken and efforts are underway to provide more focus in the area of non-
Shell new business development. All of these changes have been made to allow Shell Global Solutions to better
support the corporate strategy of “more upstream and more profitable downstream”. Global Solutions has grown
to include nearly 5000 employees as a result. Our core purpose continues to be to deliver value to our customers
through these technologies and our very competent staff.

The Material and Inspection Engineering global group has continued to change and grow through the year as
well and, meeting the needs of our customers continues to be our primary objective. At year-end we had 134 staff
in our global group and plan to grow to 147 by the end of 2006. A significant part of this growth will be in the
Asia Pacific service center where we will grow from our current 8 staff to 12-15 by the end of 2006 or early in
2007. Financially and otherwise we have had a very successful 2005 in our global group thanks to you, our loyal
customers, and to the hard work and dedication of our staff! Most importantly, we worked safely through the year
without any serious incidents or injuries. I look forward to an even more successful 2006!

All the best for a successful 2006 and once again, I hope you enjoy reading this issue of “The Rusty Chronicle”.

Bill Coit


 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
CONFIDENTIAL
Announcements & Upcoming Events
Training Courses
In 2005 we ran a number of materials engineering training
courses.
The M183 Materials and Corrosion course was fully revised
and streamlined in 2004 into a two-week, one-site based
format, with lectures given by Cranfield University and Shell
Global Solutions. The course was again held in Amsterdam
this year in October/November and was attended by a
record number of participants, coming from the four corners
of the world and from upstream, refineries, chemicals and
gas/LNG plants, as well as other disciplines from within
Shell Global Solutions.
In September we successfully ran the very first M273
Advanced Refinery Corrosion course in Amsterdam. This
was a new course, designed as a follow-up to the M183
course to develop competencies in the areas of anticipation
and diagnosis of materials and corrosion problems in
refineries, in particular the critical degradation mechanisms
and prevention strategies for the main refinery process units.
In 2006, this course will be run in Kuala Lumpur in March
and return to Amsterdam in September.
The M276 Fitness For Service (FFS) course continues to be
in demand as an export course and in 2005 was run in the
United Kingdom, Thailand and the Sultanate of Oman with
participants coming from a number of locations.
Web-based Software for Fitness for Service
New software for assessing fitness for service (FFS) of
pressure vessels has been launched on the Shell customer
wide web (CWW). The new pressure vessel application
compliments the pipework assessment software in terms
of the tools available for assessing damaged or degraded
processing plant.
The software comes under the MCI Infobase on the CWW.
The advantage of web-based software is that it provides
the customer with the latest technology whilst eliminating
the administrative burden of distribution, installation and
maintenance of software. It is an ideal solution for both the
customer and developer.

December 2005 – issue 10
We have set the following course dates for 2006:
M276 Fitness for Service
Kuala Lumpur, 27 February - 3 March, 2006
M273 Advanced Refinery Corrosion
Kuala Lumpur, 6 March - 10 March, 2006
Amsterdam, 18 September - 22 September, 2006
M183 Materials and Corrosion course
Amsterdam, 6 November - 17 November, 2006
Information related to the courses and enrolment can be
found on the Shell Open University website web:
http://sww-openuniversity.shell.com
If you to do not have access to the SWW for registration
purposes, please use the registration form on
http://www.shellglobalsolutions.com/learning
Specific details for the individual courses and possibilities for
export courses can be obtained from the following people:
l M183 Materials and Corrosion - Simon Marsh
(GSNL-GSEI/1)
l M273 Advanced Refinery Corrosion – Pieter Blauvelt
(GSNL-GSEI/1)
l M276 Fitness For Service – Andrew Saunders-Tack
(GSNL-GSEI/1).
More information on all Shell Learning and Development
engineering courses can be obtained from Jan Blum
(jan.blum@shell.com)
The Vessels assessment software includes guidance on
corrosion damage tolerance of:
l cylindrical and spherical vessels
l hemispherical, semi elliptical and torispherical ends
l integrally reinforced nozzles
The software currently covers the following design codes:
l ASME VIII division 1 and 2
l BSPD 5500 and BS1515 vessels
l AS 1210 (Australia)
l EN13445
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
The longer-term plan is to develop and extend the range of
solutions available in the FFS software. Future developments
will extend the number of design codes available, and the
number and type of structural details. As an example, work
has just been completed on the assessment of damaged
pad-reinforced nozzles. There are also plans to include the
assessment of crack-like damage in addition to the existing
corrosion loss assessments. All the assessment methods used
in the FFS software is based on the current Shell Global
Solutions Handbook for corroded pressure vessels.
Fitness for service assessment (FFS) is a new technology to
many potential users in refineries, gas and chemical plants.
Screenshot of the new customer-wide web software.
Expansion of the FAIR+ program
The Focused Asset Integrity Review program (FAIR+) will be
upgraded to the Shell Advanced Focused Asset Reliability
and Integrity program (provisionally known as SAFARI),
adopting the same process and methodology as applied in
the Steam Cracker Performance Review.
Amalgamation of FAIR+ with other established review
processes in a structured and integrated way offers an
improved assessment method of the total integrity of
the operating assets. As such the program provides a
fundamental precursor to the Business Improvements
Reviews (BIR).
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
The M276 training course has been developed to introduce
the FFS concepts to customers. In addition, the course is
an excellent forum for customers to put forward their own
requirements and ideas for FFS. As an example, customers
requested the assessment methods for pad-reinforced
nozzles be included in the FFS software. It should be noted
that access to the FFS software is conditional on completing
the M276 course.
For more information please contact David Ritchie
(david.d.ritchie@shell.com) or Andy Saunders-Tack
(andrew.saunders-tack@shell.com)
The program consists of the following review modules
(1) design integrity, (2) asset integrity (existing FAIR+MS
Management systems and FAIR+ER Equipment Review),
(3) organisational effectiveness and (4) operational integrity
to support the operating assets. The program is modularized
and structured in such a way that the customer can select the
modules of interest for maximum flexibility. The modules can
be used in stand-alone mode with varying levels of depth,
or they can be used in an integrated fashion, all depending
on customer needs.

 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
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The integrated reviews identify areas of vulnerability across
disciplines and across technical and organisational aspects.
Gaps against Best Practices are identified and risk assessed
highlighting improvements across the entire business
operation.
In addition to the integrated approach, another strength
of the offering is the unique manner in which technical
observations from various disciplines are brought on an
equal footing with observations from the organisational
effectiveness review through the use of smart keywords. This
enables identification of failing management systems and
underlying behavioural patterns that are at the root cause of
integrity flaws.
News on the MCI-Infobase for Refineries and Gas/LNG plants
2005 has been an active year for the MCI-Infobase team.
The MCI-Infobase has now successfully been rolled out
through the Shell GS CWW to 60 customer sites across
28 countries. The latest verification of user lists (December
2005) gave a total number of individual customer licenses
as 3591 (each site regulates its own users). This includes
registration of most of the inspection personnel, plus others
such as technologists and operations personnel so that they
are able to access the data whenever they might need it.
Throughout 2005 content has been added to and updated,
and as users you see the changes immediately. The
following list provides highlights of the changes that you
have seen throughout the year:
l For sites with the appropriate license agreements with
Shell Global Solutions, the globalised Best Practice Guides
are now made available as they are approved.
l New degradation libraries have been incorporated into
the Refining and Gas/LNG MCI-Infobase.
l Incorporation of material from the globalised
generic Corrosion Control Manuals (CCM’s) on the
Crude Distilling Unit (CDU) and Hydrotreater and
Hydrodesulphuriser (HTU/HDS) units.
l Within the Gas/LNG MCI-Infobase the Dehydration unit
has been updated to include glycol dehydration.
l Within the Inspection sections of the Gas/LNG and
Refining MCI-Infobase, the first significant revision to
the paper-based Shell NDT Handbook has occurred,
including new/improved information on Digital
Radiography; ToFD ultrasonics; Long Range UT for both
short and long distances; PEC; Inspection for CUI and UT
thickness gauging.
l The Contractors database has been completely updated.

December 2005 – issue 10
Benefits:
Customers (Refineries, LNG/Gas plants, petrochemical
complexes) will receive a detailed review of management
systems, design, equipment, operations and maintenance
practices, and the underlying organizational structure that
underpins them. Gaps against Best Practices are highlighted
and a prioritised program, based on relative risk, is
proposed that will improve plant/unit availability through
enhanced equipment integrity and reliability.
For more information, please contact Andre Blaauw
(andre.blaauw@shell.com) and Arnoud van der Post
(a.vanderpost@shell.com), Shell Global Solutions NL
l A new Corrosion Monitoring ebook has been added to
the system.
l The Fitness For Service (FFS) handbooks are available
though the MCI-Infobase to all MCI-Infobase licensed sites
who have sent participants to the M276 FFS course or
held an export version of the course on-site. Additionally
the calculation software for both pipework and pressure
vessels are now live and available.
In 2006 we intend to build on the existing content and add
further features such as:
l Corrosion Prediction Models - This will be a major
addition to MCI. Models to be made available in
2006 will include Shell’s proprietary models such as
HydroCorr, CORRAT, and SNAC (Shell Neutralizing
Amine Corrosion), and corrosion by NH4HS, NH4Cl,
HCl, and H2SO4. Additional models associated with
SCC and metallurgical degradation such as HTHA will
be developed. Access to these prediction models will be
dependent upon the relevant service agreements.
l Further updates to units in MCI-Infobase for Refineries
in-line with the globalised generic CCMs.
l Incorporation of newly approved globalised Best Practice
Guides (for sites with the appropriate license agreements
with Shell Global Solutions).
l Incorporation of the API flowcharts for degradation
libraries for the MCI-Infobase.
l Further updates to the Inspection section.
l Alignment between the MCI-Infobase and MATHELP.
If you have any questions about the MCI-Infobase or are
interested in receiving access to the system please contact
Andrea Etheridge (andrea.etheridge@shell.com) or (for US
customers) Ying Xiao (ying.xiao@shell.com).
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
Materials Technology Institute – Lofty Name, Down to Earth Products
What’s this all about?
The Materials Technology Institute (MTI) is an international
consortium of companies who have interest in materials
issues. It’s one of the organizations in which Shell GSI
maintains membership and participation under the
Baselayer R&D program. There are currently 52 MTI
member companies including major petroleum and
chemical product producers, paper and drug manufacturers,
materials suppliers and equipment fabricators, and
consulting companies. Bill Fort is Shell’s representative to
MTI.
MTI is headquartered in the United States, where it
traditionally held three meetings yearly. Over the last few
years MTI has begun holding once-yearly meetings in
Europe – 2004 and 2005 in the Netherlands. Expansion
into the Far East is currently under consideration. But,
MTI’s website is quickly becoming a primary means of
communication, reducing the criticality of face-to-face
meetings.
What’s in it for me?
MTI’s major efforts revolved around (1) helping member
companies share non-proprietary information and
(2) sponsoring selected R&D to develop new technologies
and incorporate new for the benefit of member companies.
The scope includes materials, corrosion, inspection,
equipment integrity, process safety, and fabrication issues
among others. MTI’s original focus on the chemical process
industries has now been broadened to include all of the
processing industries.
Member companies get to pool resources to do R&D.
MTI sponsored R&D projects by nature addresses non-
proprietary technologies of broad interest to the member
companies. It has resulted in best practices and standards,
new testing, inspection and evaluation techniques, new
materials, new construction and repair methods, and
training programs.
Member company employees have access to a wealth of
professional education and information sharing through the
MTI discussion forums, technical meetings, and R&D project
work with their peers in other member companies.
What’s new at MTI?
l The
book “Implementing and Evergreening RBI in Process
Plants” has just been published. Shell personnel can
purchase the book at the discounted price of USD 20.00
(+shipping & handling) until 1 April 2006, versus the full
price of USD 475.00. A workshop was held last year to
discuss new ideas around RBI. Another 1 to 1-1/2 day
workshop/conference is being planned for early 2006,
which will include both MTI member company and outside
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
presentations focusing on new ideas for evergreening RBI
and other risk-based processes.
l Two state-of-the-art presentations on Stainless Steel
Casting were presented at the last meeting in October.
Don Bird of Stainless Foundry and Engineering and
Raymond Moore discussed a range of topics related to
specification, quality control, and heat treatment of alloy
castings. Videos of the presentations and the visual aids
can be viewed for the next few months on the MTI website.
l The Materials Selector Series of publications is now
available on CD. Shell personnel can purchase the CD
at the discounted price of USD 20.00 (+ shipping &
handling) until 1 April 2006.
l A project is currently underway on Statistical Analysis of
NDE Data.Phase I produced an audit protocol to help
judge confidence of data. Phase II will report on statistical
tools.
l MTI is updating its best-selling “Guidelines for Assessing
Fire & Explosion Damage”, originally published in 1990.
The update will add a ready reference guide (a list of
immediate things to do when an incident occurs), a
revised methodology for evaluating explosions, damage
assessment protocols, an energy assessment evaluation
methodology, discussions on deflagration-to-detonation
transitions, sabotage investigations (including sabotage
of the investigation), field testing techniques (field
metallography, etc.), storm damage assessment, pump
explosions and ignition sources, and selected case
histories. Publication is expected by end of 2006.
l MTI conducted a workshop “From Condition Assessment
to Real-Time Plant-Floor Prognostics and Diagnostics” in
February 2005. The workshop considered Materials
Degradation, Sensors & Measurements and Operations
& Maintenance. Results are available by link from the MTI
to the PNNL website. The workshop identified (1) sharing
of asset performance data between operations and
maintenance and (2) understanding of the consequences
and actions by operators to off-normal conditions as key
needs – both very much in line with SGSI efforts.
l MTI will produce a handbook Materials Selector for
Organic Solvents to provide guidance in selecting
materials of construction for equipment & piping handling
organic solvents. The publication will cover 52 solvents,
including the neat solvent, the solvent with water and
with oxygen, and over a range of temperatures. Metal,
polymer and elastomer compatibility information
and corrosion rates will be included. MTI companies
are invited to contribute data and case histories. The
handbook is expected to issue in about two years.
How can I participate?
Employees of Shell companies having at least 50% Shell
ownership can participate in MTI activities. Your first step
is to go to the MTI website (http://www.mti-global.org) and
request member access. After confirmation, you will be

 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

given a password that allows you to fully access the website.
From there you can access the on-line information exchange
forum, past forum exchanges, R&D project information,
contacts in other member companies, and much more.
Currently, about 55 Shell and Shell JV employees have
access.
23-26 October in Dallas. The Orlando meeting will feature
a presentation on Nano-Coatings Technology. The next MTI
European meeting (EuroTAC 2006) will be held on 24 April
2006 in Germany. Dow-Dupont will present a one-day
course “Choosing the Right Elastomer” in conjunction with
the EuroTAC meeting.

This years MTI meetings in the United States will be held For more information please contact: Bill Fort
20-23 February in Orlando, 5-8 June in St. Louis and (william.fort@shell.com)

Materials & Inspection Engineering Meeting 2005 -

Where Upstream and Downstream met
From the 5 to 7 September 2005 the Global Upstream and
Downstream Materials & Inspection Engineering Meeting
MIEM 2005 was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. With
overwhelming response, a total of 110 participants from
40 companies in 20 countries attended the meeting.
• EP Inspection Harmonisation (EPE Inspection Quality System)
• Effectiveness of Pipework Inspection in EPEs UPGRADE Project
• Judging from the feedback rating from the participants,
which averaged at 4.03 out of 5, the MIEM was indeed a
success.

The first day saw a combined

session for both the Upstream and
Downstream participants, with focus
on integrity related risk management
as well as project management
issues. For the second and third days,
separate sessions for the Upstream
and Downstream were held, a
wide-ranging list of topics relating to
Materials, Corrosion and Inspection
in Oil and Gas production and
Operating. Operational experience
and problems faced by the various
sties, both Shell and non-Shell, were
also actively shared and discussed.
Some of the topics presented and
discussed are shown following:

Downstream
• Fouling RRM for Relief and Depressurising system
• Impact of O2 and Oxidant to Corrosion in Amine Gas Treating
• High Temperature Corrosion in Delayed Coker Heater
• Best Practice for Furnace inspection
• FAIR+ Fired Equipment
• Platformer Heaters Life Assessment using Omega Methods
• PEC corrosion monitoring – Set up and Experience
• Rogue Weld Material Detection in Stainless Steels
• IDMS Implementation Experience
Upstream
• EP FAIR+ World wide Project
• Shearwater - state of the art, but not perfect
• High Temperature coating and its qualification
• Scoter Subsea Tie-back Design vs Operation
• Pearl Gas to Liquid materials selection
• Cost Effective ROV inspection of riser and underwater
piping systems
The minutes are now available:
(a) On the Customer Wide Web. Go to: Customer Wide
Web > CWW portal > Engineering > Materials and
inspection engineering > Events > MIEM Minutes >
MIEM 2005 or;
(b) Livelink: https://sww-knowledge.shell.com/knowhow/
livelink.exe?func=ll&objId=46288479&objAction=browse&sort=
name
(c) If you would like a CD rom, a hard copy of the minutes
or both, please email wilma.kampschoer@shell.com
For more information please contact Woon Eng Ong
(woon-eng.ong@shell.com), Mike Thompson
(mike.j.thompson@shell.com) or Wilma Kampschoer
(Wilma.kampschoer@shell.com)


The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

DOWNSTREAM
Failure of LRCCU Caustic Regenerator Off Gas Return Line
Sour off gases from the Caustic Regenerator were being
disposed of by sending them to the CO Boiler via the R&R
flue gas line. A leak was discovered in the sour off gas
return line near the tie-in point to the main duct. Inspection,
after removal of the insulation, revealed this particular
section of the line to be totally disintegrated. In fact, the
last 1m of the line (at the CO Boiler end) was found to have
reverted almost fully to its oxide form (see photographs
below). Remaining steel thickness was less than 1mm at the
locations of detachment. The failed line was1% Cr - 0.5%
Mo, schedule 80 (5.5mm nominal wall thickness).
CONFIDENTIAL
efficiency of the steam super heater. The 1% Cr - 0.5% Mo
sour off gas line has an upper temperature limit to avoid
excessive oxidation resistance of around 600°C. Moreover,
as the auto-ignition temperature of CO is 610°C, conditions
could have existed to support some degree of internal
combustion that could explain the extent of the oxidation
and the porous and uneven morphology of the oxide layer.
Sites that have a similar set-up mixing Caustic Regenerator
sour off gas with R&R section flue gas may need to consider
inspecting the line in question to ascertain its integrity.

The caustic regeneration sour off gases may contain up For further information please contact Cheong-Ming Tan
to 12% oxygen. It mixes with CO-rich R&R flue gases at (c-m.tan@shell.com), Port Dickson Refinery.
temperatures in the range of 550–620°C, depending on

Cross section of the above 2” line with oxide layer built up inside. Samples of the internal oxide layer.

Flow Accelerated Corrosion in a Boiler Feed Water Deaerator

Introduction
During the recent LRCCU turnaround in the Shell Refining
Company Port Dickson (SRCPD) in Malaysia, it was found
that the spargers (spray tubes) in the BFW deaerator had
corroded very severely, to the point that some of the sparger
ends were completely wasted and needed replacement.

Details of the deaerator

Design operating conditions are as follows:

Deaerated water make-up: 8400 tonnes/day

LP steam throughput: 1056 tonnes/day
LP steam temperature: 200°C (215°C actual)
Feed water outlet temperature: 150°C (operating values
slightly lower)

Figure 1. Schematic overview of the deaerator.


 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
CONFIDENTIAL
The main sparger header (14300mm long x 273mm
OD) consists of 42 sparger arms (approx. 805mm long x
60.3mm OD). Each spider arm consists of 59 holes of 7mm
diameter and an additional 7mm diameter drain hole. The
failure of the spargers occurred on the “hot” end side of the
deaerator vessel, i.e. on the deaerator drain nozzle side
(Figure 2).
Figure 2. A more detailed photograph of the failed sparger arms. The whole
area, inclusive of the end-cap of the arm is corroded away. What are
left are the very sharp and very thin remains of the arm.
All sparger arms on the “cold” end side, where the feed
water enters the vessel were found to be intact and without
measurable corrosion loss (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Overview of the sparger facing the “cold” end side of the deaerator.
On the left-hand side the centre LP steam inlet pipe is visible.
Inspection findings
Sparger inspection
Once the failed sparger arms were removed from their
location a detailed visual inspection was carried out.
Contrary to expectation, corrosion losses were found on
the external side of the sparger instead of the internal side.
Measurements were carried out on one of the removed
sparger arms and are shown in Figure 4.
One can clearly observe that towards the area where the
sparger was damaged, the external diameter decreased.
Figure 5, shows an area where corrosion has occurred but
not as dramatic as on the other sparger arms. One can still
see the location of the holes, but that they have grown from
7mm to 20mm.
10
December 2005 – issue 10
Figure 4. Results from the OD measurements. Black numbers refer to the
distance (in mm) from the sparger distribution pipe. Red numbers are
the actual diameters measured with a vernier caliper.
Figure 5. Detailed photograph of a sparger arm at the steam outlet holes. This
sparger arm was not as heavily corroded as the sparger arms depicted
in Figure 2 and was found nearer to the center of the sparger header.
The hole size as per original construction drawing is 7mm.
By looking at the outer contours of the tube (bottom and top)
one can observe that near the holes, the material is slightly
indented as the thickness around the holes have been
reduced.
Another observation of the failed sparger is that at the
location where thinning starts (i.e. the reduction of the
OD becomes measurable) the external colour of the tube
changes quite abruptly from brownish-red (nearer the
sparger header) to shiny-black at the location of failure
(Figure 2). The sparger arms that were intact, on the side
where the demin water enters, were all brownish red over
the whole tube surface.
Internal inspection
It was difficult to understand why the sparger had corroded
on one side of the deaerator only, therefore, a more
detailed visual inspection was carried out. The aim was to
see if there were any deposits in the sparger arms that may
have hampered proper flow through one side creating a
preferential flow towards the corroded side. [Note that no
deposits were found during the initial inspections by both
plant inspectors and technologists.] This detailed visual
inspection resulted in the following:
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
Tube row counting started from the “cold” or good side of
the deaerator.
l Tubes first row
West: some debris inside near drain hole
East: some debris and wire mesh parts found inside
l Tubes second row
West: debris and pieces of wire mesh inside tube end
East: clear
l Tubes third row FAC (Ref. 1) are given below:
West: small amount of debris inside, pieces of wire mesh
present inside
East: clear
l Tubes sixth row
East: debris and wire mesh inside
l Tubes eighth row
East: deposits/debris found inside
l Tube ninth row
East: deposits found
l Tube eleventh row
West: wire mesh particles found inside tube towards drain
hole
All other tubes on the south side not mentioned above were
clear. All remains of the tubes on the north side were clear.
The source of the wire mesh could not be established.
Another observation was made on the shell; the water level
seemed to be higher than the level that was indicated in the
drawing. The feed water level inside the drum could clearly
be seen as manifested by a change in colour on the vessel
shell. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the deaerator vessel.
The Normal Water Level (NWL) as given in the detailed
construction drawing is set at 1750mm. The actual height
of the water level appears to be 800mm higher. There is a
lower level towards the feed water outlet. From this info one
can see that there is a slight difference between the “cold”
and “hot” side of the vessel.
According to the manufacturer, the calculated velocities of
steam (based on provided data) are as follows
l Inletpipe: 80m/s
l Horizontal headers: 68m/s each; 137m/s if one is
blocked
l Sparger pipes: 79m/s each (42 in total); 151m/s if the
horizontal header at side of demin water inlet is blocked
l Holes (59 with diameter 7mm) give the same velocity in
all sparger pipes if all holes are opened
It was calculated that the velocities, in the case where one
side is blocked, are unacceptably high and will lead to
erosion.
Flow accelerated corrosion
The most likely form of degradation that has severely
thinned the sparger arms is Flow Accelerated Corrosion
(FAC). FAC is the cause of many failures in boiler / steam
generating facilities. FAC manifest itself as thinning
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
corrosion associated with high purity, low oxygen
condensate (or boiler feed water) caused by the relative
movement of the fluid against the metal surface. Metal
loss results from the removal of the protective oxide film by
localised turbulence. In SRCPDs case, the corrosion was
found to be on the waterside of the deaerator near the exit
of the LP steam (holes). The LP steam causes turbulence
around the sparger holes and increases the relative velocity
of the water near the surface of the pipe. Critical factors for
l Velocity above 2.1m/s can remove oxide film
l Damage is aggravated by localised turbulence
l pH is usually below 9.3 (note that the feed water is
controlled between 8.5 and 9.3)
l Maximum damage at 140ºC (one phase flow) to 180ºC
(two phase flow)
l Corrosion rates between 0.10–10mm/year
l Oxygen levels below 15-20ppb do not allow the
protective film to become stable
It will be difficult to establish the liquid velocity near the
area of failure, but it would not be difficult to believe that
the relative velocity of the feed water is higher than 2.1m/s.
The pH of the feed water (combined polished condensate
and demin water) is usually controlled between 8.5 and
9.3, exactly in the range where FAC can be expected. As
indicated above, the temperature of the feed water outlet
at nozzle N3 is around 150°C right in the temperature
window where the highest corrosion rates are expected.
The oxygen levels in the feed water are normally controlled
between 10–20ppb; at these levels it is difficult for
magnetite (the protective film) to become stable.
Discussion
In order to get corrosion on one side of the sparger
header only, there has to be some kind of maldistribution.
Maldistribution can be caused by blockage of the header,
on the side where demin water is injected. During the
blockage all steam will be diverted to the side where the
feed water take-off nozzle is located. To maintain the same
operating duty (FW outlet temperature, FW throughput and
oxygen levels) more steam needs to be injected adding to
the already increased steam velocity at the sparger holes.
This than leads to the flow accelerated corrosion described
above.
The blockage has most probably been caused due to
incidents in early 2005. On 13 January 2005, the larger
part of Peninsular Malaysia was affected by a power grid
failure. The loss of power caused an automatic shutdown
of SRCPDs LRCCU, inclusive of the boiler system. During
the crash shutdown, catalyst (aluminium-silica) entered the
steam system and collected in the clean condensate tank.
The following month, a superheater tube in the CO-boiler
ruptured. A significant amount of BFW was consumed to
quench the flue gas line that resulted-in a drastic drop in
the clean condensate tank level. At low tank level, the silica
loading in the clean condensate feeding to the Mixed Bed
11
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

increased significantly, due to the leaching from the cat fines LP steam in the sparger header. A detailed visual inspection
collected at the tank bottoms. This was suspected to have led of the spargers on the demin water side of the deaerator
to high silica in the steam, which eventually fouled the Wet confirmed the presence of debris and other solids in the
Gas compressor turbine. sparger arms.

It is suspected that due to the incident above, the silica in the
LP steam had deposited in the steam nozzles at the demin
water inlet side (which is the colder side).
Operational data of the period around the January power
failure suggest that immediately after the start-up, more
steam at higher temperature was required to deaerate less
feed water at lower temperature, suggesting that there is
some kind of restriction in the steam sparger. Although it
appears that these higher steam demands only lasted for a
couple of days and to destroy a pipe with a nominal wall
thickness of 3.6mm needs more time than that. Even at the
highest corrosion rate for FAC (10mm per year) it would
take more than 4 months to fully consume the pipe wall
thickness. Hence, if the events of January 2005 are the
initiator of the severe corrosion, the (partial) blockage of the
tubes must have been sustained for months after the power
failure.
Conclusions
The failure of the sparger arms is caused by Flow
Accelerated Corrosion caused by a maldistribution of the
The power failure of 13 January 2005 is most probably
the initiator for the blockage in the sparger and certainly
had an effect during the first days after start-up. However,
the operational data suggest that the “normal” operating
window was resumed within one week after start-up with
no measurable evidence of any obstruction in the sparger
header/arms.
Under normal operating conditions without blockage
leading to preferential flow, the deaerator should be able to
perform its function without the degradation observed.
Reference:
1. Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the
Fossil Electric Power Industry WRC Bulletin 490,
March 2004, Jonathan D. Dobis and David N.French.
For more information please contact the author:
Reggy Fransz (r.fransz@shell.com)

Root Cause Investigation of Hydrogen Blistering and HIC of a HCU Fuel

Gas Scrubber in a Canadian Refinery

In a 2004 Hydrocracker turnaround, hydrogen blisters were
found in an amine fuel gas scrubber in a Canadian Refinery.
Figure 1 shows plate sample removed from the vessel.
This damage resulted in the replacement of the pressure
vessel. Initial investigation by the client did not reveal any
obvious causes that could explain the observed hydrogen
blistering damage. Subsequently, Shell Global Solutions was
requested to assist in the investigation of the root cause(s) of
the damage.
Condition of the Steel Plates
The material for the scrubber vessel was specified as ASME
Section II-A A516 Grade 70. Chemical analyses of selected
shell courses showed that the chemical composition of the
steel was within the limits specified by ASME. However,
significant concentrations of inclusions were found existing
in highly banded conditions (see Figure 2). These are
most likely manganese sulfide impurities (also called “MnS

An amine gas treating process specialist and a corrosion

specialist from Shell GSUS joined the client’s investigation
team. The expanded team requested additional inspection
and non-destructive testing (NDT) of the scrubber, more
detailed metallurgical analysis, and longer-term historical
process and operating data. The additional inspection and
NDT revealed severe hydrogen induced cracking (HIC)
in addition to the hydrogen blistering. All damage was
confined to the lower section of the scrubber. Metallurgical
analysis indicated that the steel plates used for the vessel
were highly susceptible to HIC. Furthermore, the amine
scrubber vessel had historically operated with very high rich
amine loading. The combination of these factors led to the
observed hydrogen blistering and HIC damage.
Figure 1. The Plate Samples Removed from the Vessel

12
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
stringers”). They were left in the steel during the steel making
process and were elongated during the rolling operations in
making the pressure vessel plates. These stringers are known
to act as initiation sites for hydrogen blistering and HIC.
MnS Stringers
Figure 2. Micrographs Showing the Steel Microstructure and Manganese Sulfide
(MnS) Inclusions (Mag. 500X)
Cross-section macrographs in un-etched condition (see
Figure 3) clearly show the subsurface delaminations
occurring at multiple planes inside the steel plates and
features of HIC (“stepwise cracking”). These macrographs
also show the high concentration of MnS stringers present
inside these steel plates.
It is worth noting that there were no shallow blisters near
the tower ID surface from these cross-section macrographs.
Nearly all of the blisters observed were created by
subsurface delaminations located at approximately 30%
wall from the ID surface. Hydrogen blistering caused by
short-term, accelerated corrosion often creates near-surface
blistering and detectable metal loss. Absence of such
shallow blisters suggests that these blisters may have been
a result of long-term corrosion and associated hydrogen
charging.
A proprietary, semi-quantitative predictive model was used
to assess the susceptibility of these steel plates to HIC. The
metallurgical variables and chemical composition were used
as input to the model. The results are shown in the following
table.
Shell Course No. 3 4 5 6 8
Susceptibility 11.5 8 14 13.5 14
A score of less than 6 generally indicates that steel has a
good resistance to hydrogen blistering and HIC. A score
of 6-8 indicates that the steel is susceptible to hydrogen
blistering and HIC. A score of 10 and above would indicate
that the steel is highly susceptible to hydrogen blistering
and HIC. Based upon these criteria, all of these steel plates
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 3. Cross-Section Macrographs Showing the Density of Inclusions and
Hydrogen Blistering and HIC
used to fabricate the scrubber were highly susceptible to
hydrogen blistering and HIC damage.
Process and Operating Conditions
This vessel has been used to scrub H2S from the various
vent gases from the Hydrocracking Unit (HCU) before they
are routed to the refinery fuel gas system. The system used
15% monoethanol amine (MEA) from 1984 to 1996, then
switched to 50% dimethylethanolamine (MDEA or Ucarsol
HS-101) in 1996, primarily for energy conservation.
The earlier investigation efforts by the client focused on the
rich amine loading data for the most recent two run cycles
(i.e. between 1996 and 2004). The acid gas loading of the
combined rich amine from the scrubbers (a total of 4) during
this period has been generally less than 0.5 mole H2S/mole
amine. The number of weekly samples where the acid gas
loading exceeded 0.5 mole/mole was less than 3% of the
total samples.
Examination of the metallurgical results prompted the team
to investigate long-term process data, especially those prior
to 1996. It was discovered that the amine circulation rates
were historically low before 1996 (see Figure 4). This trend
had at least occurred since 1988 and possibly earlier. This
had resulted in a rich amine loading in excess of 0.8 mole
H2S/mole amine. Highly loaded rich amines are well known
for causing hydrogen charging and associated hydrogen
blistering and HIC. In fact, highly loaded rich amine had
caused severe corrosion in the feed section of the unit’s
downstream regenerator tower.
Recommendations
In order to prevent future recurrence, the following actions
were recommended to the client: (a) establish an upper
operating limit of 0.45 mole H2S/mole amine for the rich
amine loading; (b) benchmark the susceptible areas of the
13
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

scrubber tower and inspect with UT methods for potential For additional information, please contact Deyuan Fan at
delaminations as well as thinning in future inspections. deyuan.fan@shell.com

Rich Amine Loading

Flow of 15 wt% MEA/50 w% MDEA Reqd for 0.4 mol/mol Rich Loading
Inlet H2S @ Design Value of 42.2 lbmol/hr, Semi Lean at 110 M3/D
M3/D
500

MEA Actual, M3/D

400 MDEA Actual, M3/D

15 wt% MEA Target
15 wt% MDEA Target
300

200

100

0
Dec 92

Dec 00
Dec 90

Dec 94

Dec 98

Dec 02
Dec 96
Dec 88

Figure 4 Historical Amine Circulation Rat

Degradation Prediction and Assessment Models Coming to CWW

We have begun the development of a set of comprehensive

Corrosion and Metallurgical Degradation Prediction and
Assessment Models. These tools integrate years of Shell’s
technology development as well as industry knowledge. The
models can be used for both Downstream and Upstream
applications. The models enable field engineers to reach
expert opinion regardless of distances and time zones.

Access to the models will exclusively via the Customer Wide

Web (CWW). Once a user is authenticated by CWW for
proper license, he/she can assess the newest release of the
model. There will be no worries about updates or upgrades
as these changes will be automatic The user can store and
retrieve his/her input and outputs directly on the web or
on local discs. All the models will have similar “look and
feel” input and output user interfaces. Figures 1 and 2 Figure 1. NH4HS model input screen
show sample input and output screens for the ammonium
bisulphide corrosion prediction model.

14
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
Figure 2. NH4HS model output screen
We are currently working on the following models to make
them ready for release1:
Predict-SW®2 (Ver1.0.2) - NH4HS Corrosion
CORRAT – Simplified CO2 corrosion
HYDROCOR – CO2/H2S/O2/MIC/Organic Acids
HCl Corrosion – simple model based upon pH
H2SO4 Corrosion – Empirical data and correlations
H2SOv (II) – Advanced H2SO4 corrosion models
NH4Cl – Shell proprietary data
SNAC – Shell Neutralize Amine Corrosion
HTHA – High Temperature Hydrogen Attack
Releases of these and other new models will be announced
via the Newsforums.
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
The corrosion prediction modules currently are highly
fragmented in industry. Most engineers continue to use
the various published simple curves and charts to predict
corrosion in complex systems. The technical modules in the
API RBI software tools are known to be highly conservative.
Shell possesses over half a century of corrosion technology.
Some have evolved into predictions tools, such as
HYDROCOR and ASSET, which are well recognized in the
oil Industry.
The long-term plan is to consolidate all existing models into
a web-based environment such that the customers can have
direct access. We are also investing in additional R&D to
develop new models and add data to the existing models.
When fully developed, we will have models covering the
most relevant corrosion and metallurgical degradation
mechanisms occurring in oil and gas production, refining,
and petrochemical facilities.
In the future, interfaces will be made such that these
models can be integrated with corrosion control and other
asset management tools. For example, interfaces will be
constructed such that these models can input real time data
from the DCS or process computer. This will allow corrosion
rate be calculated online and damage be accumulated
over the entire operation cycle for a piece of equipment or
piping.
If you have any questions about the development and access
to these models, please contact Andrea Etheridge
(andrea.etheridge@shell.com) or Bert Pots (bert.pots@shell.com).
1 Access to these models may be restricted based upon the
business relationship and contractual agreements.
2 Predict-SW is a registered trademark of Honeywell-
InterCorr.
15
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

Materials analysis of Pernis FCCU 44-year-old C-0.5% Mo reactor

vessel
During the April/May 2002 shutdown at SNR Pernis,
equipment from the Catalytic Cracker 2 (CC2) unit was
replaced. SNR Pernis observed upon dismantling the
equipment, that it was very brittle. Samples from the C-
0.5%Mo reactor vessel and upper riser section and from
the 310SS reactor lower riser section were sent to Shell
Global Solutions, Amsterdam. The condition of the C-
0.5%Mo reactor vessel material, after 44 years of operation,
was of particular interest for the reference of other sites
with similarly designed equipment of the same era still in
operation.

Metallurgical assessment of the C-0.5%Mo reactor

vessel weld (sample A) and wall (sample B, Figure 1)
microstructures showed no significant modification over the
44 year service life; however the C-0.5%Mo reactor riser
(sample C, Figure 2) did seem to have undergone significant
modification.
Figure 1. C-0.5%Mo reactor wall (sample B); fairly equiaxed fine grains of
ferriteand pearlite with most carbides as speroids and some remnant
pearlite

Typically hydrocarbon feed and catalyst in a reactor riser

reaches temperatures of 650-730°C, decreasing to around
540°C at the riser outlet. The reactor generally sees a
temperature range of 510-540°C. The higher thermal
energy that would have been available to the reactor riser
is likely to explain why this material (sample C, Figure 2)
underwent significant transformation of pearlite grains to
smaller ferrite grains; while the reactor vessel (sample B,
Figure 1), operating at a lower temperature, showed the
presence of grains of both ferrite and the original pearlite.
As a consequence, where no degradation of the C-0.5%Mo
material had taken place a lower (and better) ductile-to-
brittle-transition-temperature (DBTT) in the range 0-40°C
was exhibited, with an average ambient fracture toughness Figure 2. C-0.5%Mo reactor riser (sample C); fine ferrite grains, very few
of 70J. Where degradation of the material did take place carbides within grains most located on grain boundariesv
a higher (and worse) DBTT in the range 20-100°C was
observed, with an average ambient impact toughness of 9J.
These results are shown in Figure 3 and are in line with the carbide formation at the grain boundaries, however this
SNR Pernis’ observation that it was very brittle. should be expected after 44 years of operation within the
sensitizing termperature range (370-815°C). As expected,
Hence, higher oprerating temperatures of the C-0.5%Mo neither sample exhibited a DBTT.
material leads to greater material degradation and poorer
mechanical properties. In particular, the DBTT is a critical This study has provided additional information on the
factor to consider when specifying minimum pressurization properites of C-0.5%Mo steel after long service exposure.
temperatures of C-0.5% pressurized equipment; this is However, the degradation behaviour of this equipment
especially important as the initial impact toughness is shown is already addressed properly in current SGSI operating
to be quite low even before any material degradation has procedures and the materials degration library, therefore,
taken place. there is no need to modify current practices for these
materials. The possibility of degree-of-sensitisation (DOS)
The appearance of the 310SS dissimilar metal weld material testing austenitic stainless steel material in shutdowns should
(sample D), between the 310SS lower section of the be considered to avoid soda ash wasing for polythionic
reactor riser (sample E) and the C-0.5%Mo upper section acid stress corrosion cracking (PTASCC).
of the reactor riser (sample C) was consistent with fresh
as-deposited filler material. The parent 310SS lower reactor For further information please contact Natalie Beer, GSEI/1
riser material appeared somewhat degraded with some (natalie.beer@shell.com).

16
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
Absorbed Impact Energy

A: C-0.5Mo reactor weld

B: C-0.5Mo reactor wall
C: C-0.5Mo reactor riser
D: 310 dissimilar riser weld
E: 310 reactor riser

Temperature

Figure 3. Plot of Charpy (Cv) Impact values as a function of temperature for various sections of the FCCU reactor vessel and reactor riser

Rhineland Refinery Hydrocracker Piping Leak

Introduction
Godorf (Rhineland Refinery North), in September
2005 experienced a piping leak in a small bore drain
nozzle located in the outlet piping spool from one of the
Hydrocracker reactors. The failure was due to internal
Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (Cl-SCC). The source of
chlorides was traced to the make up hydrogen from the CCR
Platformer. Hydrogen chloride is normally removed from the
hydrogen make-up stream in chloride guard beds. However,
it is believed that sub-optimal operation of the chloride
guard bed resulted in a period of high chloride carryover.
The make-up H2 gas chloride catchers were out of service
during the first three weeks after HCU start-up in May 2005.
that was measured in water collected after the unit was shut
down.
The plant
The Godorf Hydrocracker unit consists of two trains of
3 reactors in series, as schematically displayed in Figure 1:
Chloride related problems such as pitting corrosion or
Cl-SCC have previously not been experienced in this unit.
However, NH4Cl fouling has been experienced in the
recycle gas heat exchangers.

Another key learning from this incident is the finding of low

pH water phase in the insulated drain nozzle attached to the
reactor outlet line operating at 370-390ºC. It is estimated
that the temperature of the nozzle during operation was
around 150ºC on the outboard end near the valve location.
At these conditions, one would expect the nozzle to be
‘dry’ due to low vapour pressure of water in the process.
However, it is thought that the drain nozzle filled with water
during startup. Evidence was found that water remaining
from hydrotesting was present in the furnace tubes - this
water may have been pushed into the reactor and settled
out in the low point drain nozzle. Subsequently, the water
in the nozzle absorbed a significant amount of HCl and
then may have sealed off after being covered with a layer Figure 1. Line-up of the reactor section
of heavy waxy hydrocarbon. This would explain the water
remaining in the deadleg as well as the low pH condition

17
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

The Incident Process Sampling

The 2” (DN50) drain nozzle on the outlet pipe spool of After seeing what seemed like deposits in the nozzles on
R-7405 was found leaking through the insulation. the radiographs, it was agreed to sample and analyse
Removal of the insulation from the drain nozzle revealed any fluids and solids remaining in the drain nozzles. After
hydrocarbons and hydrogen weeping from just above the depressurising, separate fluid samples were taken from
second weld above the 2” drain valve (see Figure 2). The below and above the valve in each drain nozzle. Samples
leak appeared to be coming from crack-like defects. of the deposits found in the nozzles were taken once the
nozzles were cut-off. A summary of the analysis results for
Because the leak progressively worsened and visually the the liquid samples were as follows:
leaks appeared to be from small cracks, the unit was shut
Tr a i n 1
down in a controlled manner for investigation and repair.
R - 7 40 1
A taskforce was commissioned to investigate the cause of the R e ac tor R - 7 40 5
cracking and to work out a repair proposal. After reviewing U/ V B/ V AVG B/ V A/ V AVG
the prevailing process conditions and the materials of pH 3.7 4.3 4.0 6.1 9.0 7.6
F- mg/l 26 109 67.5
construction (Werkstoff 1.4541, equivalent to stainless steel
Cl- mg/l 427 56 241.5
type 321), internal and/or external Cl-SCC were postulated SO4 -- mg/l 1853 553 1203
as the most likely causes for the cracking. pO4 --- mg/l
NO3 - mg/l 3 3
Non-destructive Testing
Tr a i n 2
Non-destructive testing (NDT) was carried out to establish
R - 7 40 6 R - 7 40 3
whether the cracking initiated internally or externally and to R e ac tor
establish the extent of cracking in the unit. This work started B/ V A/ V AVG B/ V A/ V AVG
while the unit was shutting down. pH 5.2 5.1 5.2 8.7 9.0 8.9
The scope for NDT was agreed to be the small-bore branch F- mg/l 27450 24730 26090 48 145 96.5
Cl- mg/l 2840 2920 2880 213 321 267
connections on the reactor piping from between the first
SO4 -- mg/l 87960 95130 91545 1052 1590 1321
reactors and the first feed/effluent heat exchangers in both pO4 --- mg/l 534 534 9 9
reactor trains. Furthermore it was decided to try to check
some of the welds in the main piping as well. A combination A/V = above valve, B/V = below valve, AVG = average
of Radiography, Eddy-current, Ultrasonic Flaw detection
and Liquid Penetrant techniques were employed for the
inspection.

Figure 2. Location of leak

18
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
The amount of liquid obtained from the R-7402 and
R-7404 outlet line drain valves was too little to determine the Inside surface
chemical composition. A sample of the salt-like solids found
on the inner surface of the R-7405 outlet line drain was
analysed. It too contained chlorides.

Metallographic Investigations
The failed R-7405 drain nozzle was taken to a specialised
laboratory for metallographic investigation. After cutting Cracked surface
and cleaning of the sample, various cracks in the cross-
section cuts, starting from the inner surface of the sample,
were already visible with the naked eye. The sample was
then examined in the as-cut state in a scanning electron
microscope (SEM). Fine cracking typical of Cl-SCC were Figure 5a. Crack surface
visible in the cross-section, see Figure 3. The cracking
started from the inside surface.

One of the cracks was broken open to examine the crack

surface. The crack surface was typical for Cl-SCC, running Chloride, Cl-
transgranular and showing numerous branch cracks, see
Figure 4. Finally, a map of chloride-ion occurrence on
the crack surface was made using the energy dispersion
spectrum (EDS) technique, Figures 5a/b.

Outside Surface

Figure 4 Figure 5b. Chloride map (EDS)

Crack

Inner Surface

Figure 3. Circumferential cross-section

Transgranular Crack

Figure 6. Metallography showing cracking near weld root – internal surface

of nozzle.

Branched Cracks Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking

Figure 4. Opened crack surface
Metallography performed by Shell Global Solutions in
Amsterdam confirmed Cl-SCC initiating from the inside of
the drain nozzle as the cause of cracking, Figure 6.
The conclusion from the metallographic investigation and
sampling that the cracking appeared to be Cl-SCC initiated
on the inner surface of the nozzle.
For Cl-SCC to initiate and propagate six conditions are
needed:

19
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
CONFIDENTIAL
1. Susceptible material; the construction material used for
the drain nozzle (and all other reactor circuit piping)
was Werkstoff 1.4541, welded with 1.4551 (German
equivalents of stainless steel type 321 and type 347
respectively), which is susceptible to Cl-SCC.
2. Tensile stresses; Residual stresses due the welding
operations and hoop stresses due to the operating
conditions were present in the material.
3. Metal temperature above 60°C; At normal operating
conditions the temperature of this branch is well over
60°C.
4. Chlorides; chlorides were present in the drain nozzle as
could be seen from the analysis of the samples of fluids
and solids taken from the failed nozzle. chlorides were
also present in the cracks (see Figure 5b).
5. Free water; Again as can be seen from the liquid samples
taken from the drain nozzles, liquid water was present in
the nozzles. Explaining why and how free water could be
present there under the prevailing conditions however is
not straightforward and needed separate investigation.
6. Oxygen or low pH; A cathodic reaction is needed to
electrochemically balance the anodic metal dissolution
reaction (the “cracking”). Under atmospheric conditions
Oxygen takes part in this reaction, under acid conditions
H+-ions (protons, the “acidity”) can take the place of
Oxygen.
370°C
20° 273°C
C
175°C
50
60
180 mm
Figure 6. Nozzle temperature profile
20
December 2005 – issue 10
Chlorides
The source of the chlorides found in the drain nozzles is
most probably chloride carry-over from the Godorf CCR
Platformer (PFU3). This unit is the main Hydrogen supplier
for the Hydrocracker unit (HCU). Chlorine/Hydrogen
chloride is normally removed from the Hydrogen make-up
stream from PFU3, but nevertheless chlorides have known
to still be present in the Hydrogen. Suboptimal operation of
the Chlorine catchers may have aggravated this situation;
during the first three weeks after HCU start-up in May 2005
the make-up H2 gas chloride catchers were out of service.
Under normal operating conditions with the chloride catcher
on line the chloride slip through the catcher beds is less then
2ppmw. However, without the chloride catcher in service
the chloride content of the H2 make-up gas may be up to
25 ppmw.
Free water
Free water in the reactor system cannot readily be
explained. The system is normally considered to be “dry”.
Water will be present in the process stream, but under the
prevailing process conditions it should not condense.
Potential sources of free water that were identified were:
• Process water; Water is being formed in the
Hydrocracking process; in the reactors any oxygen-
containing components in the feed will be hydrogenated
to water (O + H2 → H2O). Under the prevailing process
conditions it should however not condense out in process
stream or at least stay dissolved in the process stream.
Free water from process water under the prevailing
conditions is unlikely.
200 mm
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
• Water remaining from hydrotesting; The affected piping
was newly installed during the last shutdown and
subsequently hydrotested. Water may have remained
in the system even after draining. During start-up it was
found that one of the furnace passes was blocked. With
some effort this was cleared (via the reactor system). An
explanation for this could be that testing water
from the feed effluent exchangers found its way to the
furnace where it blocked a furnace pass. This water was
subsequently moved through the entire reactor system.
• Water in feed; The feed is drawn from a tank, at most the
feed is saturated with water, i.e. any water carried in the
stream is dissolved. Free water would cause problems at
the feed pumps, here the temperature is 180°C, water
vapour would form and the pump would cavitate. This
is not experienced and free water from the HCU feed is
therefore unlikely.
• DIPA entrainment in recycle gas; Another source of water
could be entrainment of DIPA in the recycle gas (H2)
from the H2S scrubber. Water entrainment via this route
is unlikely however, it would have to pass through a
knockout drum/demister and a compressor.
Apart from free water, also a location must have existed
were this water could remain, below its boiling point. Due
to their physical dimensions the drain nozzles form potential
cold-bridges. The nozzle and the valve are insulated
under normal operating conditions, but the valve handle is
protruding from the insulation. Moreover, the insulation on
the nozzles was only installed a few days after start-up, this
to check for flange and valve leaks during and after start-up.
Initial estimates (1st order simulation) show that that the
temperature drop in a drain nozzle like was installed, is
considerable. As can be seen from Figure 6, assuming that
the nozzle was full of stagnant liquid and evenly insulated,
the temperature drop over the nozzle is some 200°C (from
370°C main process temperature to about 175°C just
above the drain valve). A temperature profile measured
on-site using a hand-held contact thermometer stuck into the
insulation at the nozzle directly opposite the failed nozzle
in the vertical up position, was in good agreement with this
result. Measurements here ranged from 300°C close to the
main line down to around 150°C in the vicinity of the first
valve.
Under normal conditions it is thought that even when
temperatures drop in the drain nozzles eventually the water
will disappear from the nozzles because to the “dry” process
gas flowing above it. It is likely however that the water in the
nozzle became covered with a layer of waxy hydrocarbons
during operation, preventing the water from evaporating.
Oxygen or Low pH
As can be seen from the analysis of the liquid drained from
the drain nozzles, the pH in the first two drains is low (4-5).
Conditions prevailing under the solid deposits found on
the inside surface of the nozzles were probably even more
acidic, which can be deducted from the fact that general
corrosion of the stainless steel surface was found there.
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
Causes for acidity are most likely the chlorides dissolved and
the high levels of Fluorides found in the first two nozzles.
The most likely source of the Fluorides is the pickling process
carried out in the final stage of production of the stainless
steel reactor piping. Although every care was taken to
rinse the system using demin water after the pickling and
passivating operation until neutral solution pH was reached,
the only credible source of Fluorides is the pickling solution.
In the second pair of nozzles the pH was substantially
higher, probably due to Ammonia (NH3) dissolving in the
water at this stage, also lower levels of Fluorides were found
here.
The difference in pH between the first and the second pair
of nozzles can explain why cracking was only found in the
first pair. At higher pH (>7), Cl-SCC can only occur in the
presence of Oxygen. The difference in pH between Train 1
and Train 2 can explain why substantially more cracking is
found in the R-7405 drain compared to the R-7406 drain.
Probable Root Cause
As mentioned the cause of the cracking in, and subsequent
leaking of, the R-7405 reactor outlet piping drain nozzle is
Cl-SCC. Similar cracking was found in the equivalent nozzle
on the outlet piping of R-7406. Cl-SCC in these two nozzles
was initiated by the presence of free water containing
chlorides at a low pH and at elevated temperatures.
Water has most likely been trapped in the drain nozzle
during the unit start-up phase. Sources of water could have
been process water and/or remaining hydrotesting water.
The water was trapped and allowed to remain as a result
of prevailing low temperatures in the nozzle and by the fact
that the water was probably covered by a layer of heavy
hydrocarbons.
Chlorides were present in the water due to fact that during
start-up chloride catcher operation was suboptimal. This
caused high levels of hydrogen chloride (HCl) in the process
gas, which dissolved in the water trapped in the drain
nozzle. This and high levels of Fluoride found in the nozzles
caused acidification of the trapped water (i.e. low pH).
Ammonia, increasing the pH in the water, does not seem to
have dissolved in the water in these nozzles yet.
Even at full operating temperature the liquid in the drain
nozzles stayed at temperature levels of around 150–200°C,
which at the prevailing operating pressure is low enough to
induce chloride stress corrosion cracking
Why now and not before?
This is a valid question as stainless steel drain nozzles
have been in service for a long period without giving rise
problems like this. What was different this time?
An explanation could be that due to the changed reactor
configuration after the new first reactors (R-7405/06) the
hydrocarbons are still relatively heavy. Essentially the heavy
feedstock is at this stage only hydro-treated (i.e. Sulphur,
Nitrogen and Oxygen removed). This allowed a wax cap to
be formed over the water in the drain nozzles.
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 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
CONFIDENTIAL
In the past the feed at the first drain nozzle was already
partially cracked into lighter hydrocarbons, maybe
incapable of forming such a stable wax cap. In the latter
case, water, potentially even containing chlorides, would
have evaporated from the nozzles rather fast, not allowing
time to initiate Cl-SCC.
22
December 2005 – issue 10
Remedial Actions
After establishing that the likely cause of cracking to be
Cl-SCC, it was decided to eliminate all six reactor outlet
line drain nozzles and replace them with caps, minimising
the remaining potential low-point liquid trap. All remaining
stainless steel nozzles in the reactor system were inspected
and as far as could be established crack-free. Also no
further fouling or corrosion was found. The start-up
procedures were reviewed to minimise the risk of Cl-SCC.
For more information please contact Pieter Blauvelt
(pieter.blauvelt@shell.com) or Jan Vonk (jan.vonk@shell.com).
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
Anchors away!
A summary of the work involved replacing refractory anchors in the CO Boiler at Stanlow
Manufacturing Complex.
As part of Stanlow’s Catalytic Cracking Unit, the CO
Boiler captures energy available from CO in addition to
eliminating it as a pollutant, preventing it being released to
atmosphere. This is done by converting carbon monoxide
(CO) to carbon dioxide (CO2) by combustion. The low
pressure flue gas exhausting from the Power Recovery
Train is routed to the CO Boiler where it is utilised as fuel.
Supplementary firing of the CO Boiler is by fuel gas, and
by maintaining a constant temperature in the boiler this fuel
firing ensures total CO combustion before the flue gases are
released to atmosphere.
During October 2005, the CO Boiler at Stanlow was out of
service for an unplanned turnaround following the discovery
of a leak in the lower evaporator section. Whilst the tube
replacement was being carried out, significant cracking was
found in the shell refractory lining material. Three layers
are used in the insulation system of the CO Boiler system,
as depicted in Figure 1. Associated with the cracking was
the failure of a large number of the Type 310 stainless steel
refractory anchors. It was intended to replace the refractory
anchors and insulation material within the restrictive
turnaround time frame.
Once damaged sections of the refractory had been removed
it was possible to obtain samples of the failed anchors.
Typically, the anchors had failed around the boss region,
either at the weld, the threaded portion of the shaft or
the ‘V’-shaped legs (Figure 2). This region is the interface
between the hot face layer and insulation layer 2. The
preliminary investigation confirmed suspicions that the
anchors were embrittled. To gain further confidence of long-
term anchor performance, it was resolved to replace the
anchors in an ‘upgraded’ material.
It is stated in DEP 64.24.32.30-Gen. that Type 310 stainless
steel is an acceptable material for the manufacture of
refractory anchors in service temperatures below 1100°C.
This implies that the original specification anchors (i.e. Type
310 stainless steel) should be sufficient for the application;
given the design temperature of the boiler is 950°C.
However, cracking of the refractory material is likely to have
accelerated degradation of the anchor material by exposing
the anchors to the flue gas environment.
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
To select the most appropriate upgraded material, Group
experience was sought through Shell Global Solutions.
Given availability of various alloys to the site, Inconel 601
was selected as being the most suited to the application.
Supporting the material change, and to give further
confidence of increased component lifetime, the anchor
design was modified such that a larger boss and thicker
section bar were used.
An external laboratory performed further failure analysis.
From the investigation, it was concluded that sigma phase
had formed in the anchors. Formation of this phase made
the anchor material susceptible to brittle fracture.
There were several factors that are likely to have contributed
to failure of the anchors:
• The configuration of the refractory in the CO Boiler.
The regions where failure occurred are those that are
likely to have experienced the highest stresses due to
the orientation and thermal expansion of the insulation
system.
• The performance of the original insulation expansion
joints is unknown. It is postulated that the poor installation
of these joints led to excessive loading of the anchors at
the hot face – insulation layer 2 boundary. The expansion
joints were reinstated as per specification to help prevent
the problem reoccurring.
• The quality of the original anchor fabrication weld was
observed as poor with respect to penetration. Cracking
had occurred in both the weld metal and from the weld
toe in the majority of anchors examined. Appropriate
weld procedures were used for the fabrication and
installation welds of the reinstated anchors.
Despite the size of the task, with in excess of 2000 anchors
being fabricated and installed, the job was completed
successfully without increasing the turnaround interval.
For further information please contact
Doug Conquest (douglas.conquest@shell.com) or
Andrea Etheridge (andrea.etheridge@shell.com).
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 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

Hot face layer

Refractory Anchor

Insulation layer 2

Insulation layer 1
Shell wall

Figure 1. Insulation system used in the CO Boiler (schematic representation).

Th r eaded boss

Stem
Leg

Figure 2. Typical failures of CO Boiler refractory anchors discovered during the recent turnaround.

24
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

UPSTREAM
Discipline Leadership in EP
This article is to give an overview of the EP discipline
leadership activities carried out over the last year, and will
hope fully become a regular feature in the Rusty Chronicle.
If you get lost with all the new acronyms Please refer to the
a glossary at the end of this article. This reports the facts as
they are at this time; there still may be some minor changes,
as part of the final review by SIEP and Global Solutions
HR departments and the final endorsement by the Facilities
Asset Leadership Team.
CONFIDENTIAL
FALT, and the MCII sponsor is John Mossman (those of you
who attended the MIEM in KL may remember John attended
representing the FALT and was also involved in the MCII
DEN team meeting held after the MIEM). There are
11 discipline engineering teams reporting to the FALT, and
MCII is one of the bigger disciplines, with 314 people in
MCII in EP, based on the most recent data.
The MCII DLT is chaired by Ian Rippon, nominally called at
present the Global Discipline Head (GDH), though the exact
title still needs to be confirmed by HR in SIEP and Global
Solutions. The DLT is made up of the discipline heads from
the regions (called RDH) and the discipline heads from the
GTP (also called RDH). The current structure of the MCII DLT
is:

New technical leadership structure EPA Maimunah Ismail

In EP our discipline is now called the materials, corrosion, WillemVan Gestel
EPE (materials and corrosion)
integrity and inspection discipline (MCII); the big change
Hans Stoops (inspection)
here is the full incorporation of inspection within the MCI
EPG Godwin Ibe
discipline. The integrity element here reflects an alignment
EPM Nasser Behlani
with the downstream engineers, and the skill blocks you EPR Not yet assigned
see in the competence based development (CBD) tool are EPW Bill Grimes
the same skill blocks as now used by the downstream MCII E P T-P Maarten Simon Thomas
engineers. Jim Smith
EPT -W Bill Grimes
GSEI/2 Gert Kerkveld
The technical leadership structure in EP has just been GSEI/3 Peter Geenen
changed – this was rolled out in the Technical and GSEI/4 Sergio Kapusta
Operating Excellence (T&OE) meetings of 5-8 December BSP Ho, Kong-Nam
2005. SCAN Girgis, Magdy
WOODSIDE Brameld, Michael
PTE Not yet assigned
Technical Leadership Team (TLT) PTE Not yet assigned
GDH Rippon, Ian

Facilities Asset Leadership Team (FALT)
MCII Discipline Leadership Team (DLT)
The main change here is that the DLTs now report directly
to the FALT, removing one level of management in between
the DLTs and the FALT. (For those of you involved in this
work prior to December 2005, the discipline team was
called the discipline expertise network (DEN), and there
was a separate DLT that the DENs reported to; on this team
we were represented in 2005 by Ian Hines who did some
sterling work representing and supporting the MCII team
to T&OE and the FALT. In December 2005 each DEN has
become a new DLT (there are 11 DLTs), and the old DLT has
been disbanded.)
The FALT is chaired by Leo van der Aar, T&OE and made
up of engineering managers from the regions and the
global technical partners (GTP). For MCII GTP covers mainly
GSEI/2, GSEI/4 and EPT-P with some other engineers in
EPT-R, EPT-W and GSEI/3. Each DLT has a sponsor on the
This team includes all the regions, all the main GTPs and
other teams who are not fully represented in the regions
or the GTPs and gives a good representation of the MCII
structure worldwide. I’ll talk more about the PTEs below. It is
recognized there are some areas that are not well covered
at present e.g. EPR (Russia) is a new region, and we have
no representative on the DLT yet for EPR yet (hoping to
get one assigned in Jan 2006). There are also a few MCII
people, particularly those working as Shell secondees in
non operated ventures, who may feel they are not well
represented by this structure; we hope to ensure all these
people are covered by the end of 2006. If anyone in MCII in
EP is not clear who is their representative on the DLT, please
contact Ian Rippon. The bold names in the table represent
a core MCII DLT that you will see published on the T&OE
website; this only includes the regions, the main GTPs, the
PTEs and the GDH.
The role of the DLT
The DLT work on discipline capability management and
technical management; a large number of items fall under
the DLT, including new and revised CBD skills blocks and
profiles, skill pool staff database (who is in the skillpool),
standards (both regional and DEPs), discipline health checks,

25
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
CONFIDENTIAL
cross posting, technology overview, succession planning
(do we have the people and skills we need for now and
the future), training overview, practices worth replicating,
portfolio management and integration (PMI – standardizing
software usage). We also have agreed on some specific
technical goals that we want to work on globally in 2006,
covering MATHELP, the technical assurance framework and
gap analysis process and improving availability of corrosion
inhibition systems. The DLT agrees upon a global Discipline
Improvement Plan for each year, and this gets incorporated
within the regional and GTP discipline plans, so there is
alignment between global, regional and local goals. The
DLT has a monthly teleconference and meets together face to
face at least once a year (usually at both the MIEM and the
annual NACE International conference). The DLT members
are expected to spend 10% of their time on DLT issues.
Role of the Global Discipline Head
The GDH chairs the DLT, and in this capacity reports to
the discipline sponsor on the FALT (John Mossman in our
case); the GDHs are appointed by the FALT. The GDH is
selected as one of the PTEs in the discipline, so has roles of
capabilities management as well as technical expertise. The
GDH coordinates the preparation of the global Discipline
Improvement Plan with the DLT and ensures that all the
deliverables of the annual Discipline Improvement Plan
are allocated to the members of the DLT and that the plan
is implemented. The GDH works with the DLT and the
Global Skill Pool Manager (Harry van Langen) to develop
and maintain the Discipline Resource and Strategy Plan
(addressing staff competency and skills) and maintain
an overview of the global MCII population. The GDH is
expected to spend 33% of his/her time on GDH issues (note
this includes any PTE work covered below).
New technical positions
Also rolled out at this time are the new principal technical
expert (PTE) positions. Within the technical career structure
we now have the following new positions:
GTC Global Technical Consultant Letter classified None currently in
MCII
CS Chief Scientist – an innovation Letter Classified One in MCII –
and technology oriented Dick Horvath
position
PTE Principal Technical Expert JG 2/1 3 PTEs in MCII
SME Subject Matter Expert JG 3/2 6 expertise areas
identified within
MCII
Appointment to these new positions is not an automatic
promotion, and promotion would have to be progressed
following the usual promotional route; they do however
extend the technical ladder by 1-2 job groups and give
positions in which promotion is possible, and give additional
higher job group technical positions in the discipline. For
the PTEs, most of those selected are currently JG2; this new
position will mean a change of position description from
principal corrosion engineer to principal technical expert,
which is minor change! But it will give these people the
opportunity to have a more global focus, make use of their
skills more widely within the company and give them the
26
December 2005 – issue 10
opportunity to apply for promotion to JG1 when they are
ready for that step. Note also that introduction of these new
technical positions does not mean that these are the only
high job group technical positions - these are additional
positions to those that already exist in the technical structure.
The GTC and the CS are not appointed by the FALT – there
are only a handful of these positions in the company, and
not all disciplines have a GTC or a CE position. This is a
good point to congratulate Dick Horvath on this appointment
- it is a fine reflection of the work he has put into the
discipline, both within Shell and in external bodies like
NACE International.
The role of the PTE
34 PTE expertise areas have been identified under the
11 discipline engineering teams reporting to the FALT. Three
of these PTE positions are in MCII – the expertise areas are:
• Materials Selection and Design
• Materials Performance in Operations
• Inspection Engineering
It is recognized that this is not the most ideal grouping of
skills within MCII; but this is a start and it may be possible to
build a case for additional PTE positions in the future.
The people who have been selected for these positions have
not yet been formally appointed, so I cannot tell you who
they are at this stage; the names will be released in the new
year. The PTEs provide technical input to the DLT, and will
have key roles to play in providing input to the R&D and
technology programmes, providing short term consultancy
on a call-off basis, actively managing the SGN and other
discipline tools (like MATHELP), leading expert networks (of
SMEs and other specialists), representing Shell externally
with industry, institutions and universities and other work
supporting the DLT. The PTE expected to spend 25% of their
time on PTE work. The PTE appointments are to individual
engineers; it is anticipated they would keep this role for a
long period of time, and take the role with them if they move
jobs to a different location.
The role of the SME
The PTEs have a large set of roles and responsibilities,
and cannot achieve this without relying upon networks of
technical experts throughout Shell. Six SME positions have
been identified:
• Metallic Materials Engineering
• Non-Metallic Materials Engineering
• Materials Corrosion Engineering
• Materials Mechanical Engineering
• Materials Asset Integrity Management
• Inspection Engineering
Again these are quite broad grouping of skill groups; this
is a starting point and there may be a case for proposing
additional types of SME in the future. Regions or GTP may
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
not have SMEs in all of these 6 positions, either because
they have no one of that skill level within the region or GTP
(and they obtain this service from a GTP or outsource it),
or because there is no business reason to have an SME in
that position for that region (e.g. if only minimal amount of
non-metallic material is used, this could either be a case for
not having a non-metallic materials SME in that region, or a
very strong case for needing an SME (as maybe more non-
metallic materials should be used)).
The current status is that every region/GTP has proposed
SMEs; now that the PTEs have been appointed, they will
have to make these networks work, and one of the first
tasks will be to assess the proposed SMEs and see who
already clearly meets the technical requirements, or what the
development needs are. This is still work in progress and the
SME position is not as well defined as the other positions.
At the time of writing final draft roles and responsibilities
exist for the PTEs, the RDH and the GDH; these will be
incorporated into their 2006 personal performance
contracts, once these individuals are formally appointed.
Other Items
Some other items to be aware of:
• Averaging over the skillpool, 75% of the skillpool have
carried out a self assessment in the CBD system. If you
have not yet carried out your own self assessment,
I encourage you to do this as soon as possible, and use
the data for development discussions with your team
leader. The CBD web site is at http://swwep-w.shell.
com/people_ep/content/exp/competence/index.htm. There
are various help document on this site. If you select the
CBD Application Tool this will give you the links to the
live application sites – pick the one most appropriate
for you (there is no Global Solutions site – EP staff in
Global Solutions should use the SIEP site). You will be
asked for your user name (normal log in user name) and
a password; for first time entry select “forgotten your
password?” and a new password will be emailed to you.
Once in the tool there is a notice board, which again
gives more guidance and some FAQs. For first time users,
read the introduction section. Select “my CBD” and “my
details” to set up the link to your supervisor and your
offline reviewer (who should be a trained CBD assessor
– there is a link to a list of these on the front page of
the CBD application tool ) and what your skillpool is
- skillpool group discipline engineering, skillpool disc
eng materials and corrosion (this includes materials and
corrosion profiles and separate inspection profiles). Select
“my CBD”, “competence assessment” and “start a new
competence assessment” to enter the tool. You will be
asked what profile you want to be assessed against.
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
• Some of the regions/GTP do not yet have enough CBD
assessors in the MCII discipline. Work is required to train
up sufficient assessors; in the interim period the global
pool of MCII CBD assessors is being used. Note assessed
CBD profiles are required for any promotion or transfer.
• The global survey of the MCII skillpool identified
51 vacancies (16%); this reflects the growth in the
business (e.g. in EPR) as well as what is called as “the
big crew change”, with a large number of engineers
retiring within the next 5 years. The primary methods of
addressing this shortage is through bringing in graduates
and mature hires, though other methods are also being
investigated. Work is ongoing to fill these positions, but
there is a global shortage of MCII engineers, both within
Shell and across the industry as a whole. The employee
referral programme was rolled out in 2005 – this is where
you can make a difference to this issue, by identifying
people who may be potential mature hires and if they are
interested registering them in the referral programme.
• There will be one global graduate early career
development and assessment programme across the whole
of Shell, called “Develop”. This covers the first 3-5 years
of the new technical professionals within the company. The
programme will be formally launched in Q1 2006.
• Practices worth replicating (PWR) is in the process of
being rolled out. What practices do you have that could
be used across the region or possibly globally? Note that
anybody can submit a PWR, and no item is too small to
be considered a PWR. Do you know who your PWR focal
point is, who can help you submit a PWR?
• MATHELP has been rolled out in all major regions;
the system will really become effective as the EP MCII
support tool when engineers across the company start
submitting data to be included in MATHELP. Do you have
a spreadsheet that other people may be interested in
using? Do you have a report/standard/specification that
could be used as an example for someone doing a similar
piece of work in a different region? Do you have training
material or a presentation on a particular topic that
may be of interest other regions, or other people within
your own region? Do you have feedback on particular
equipment / vendors that should be more widely shared?
Do you know who your MATHELP focal point is, who can
help you submit information for inclusion into MATHELP?
27
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

Glossary

Where would we be in Shell without some new acronyms for a new initiative? Here are the ones from this document:

CBD Competence Based Development

CS Chief Scientist – an innovation and technology oriented position
DEN Discipline Expertise Network – the old name for the DLT, now
superceded
DLT Discipline Leadership Team – team made up of the regional
discipline head and the heads of the Ep MCII teams in global
technical partners (Global Solutions and Ep projects), plus the lead
MCII engineers in other parts of the company not yet covered by the
regional and technical partner structure.
EpR Ep Russia – a new region split off from the old EpM
FALT Facilities Asset Leadership Team – team made up of the engineering
managers from all the regions and the global technical partners
GDH Global Discipline Head – chairs the MCII DLT and reports to the
MCII sponsor on the FALT. Note this title is not yet confirmed – this
is the 4th title for this position so far, so may change again.
GTC Global Technical Consultant
GTp Global Technical partners – for MCII this covers mainly GSEI/2,
GSEI/4 and EpT-p with some other engineers in EpT-R, EpT-W and
GSEI/3
MCII Materials, corrosion, inspection and integrity – the name of the
discipline in Ep
pMI portfolio Management and Integration – standardizing software
usage. These are the people who control GID scripting.
pTE principal Technical Engineer
pWR practices Worth Replicating
T&OE Technical and Operating Excellence
RDH Regional Discipline Heads – this covers the RDH in the regions and
is also used to describe the discipline heads in the GTp
SME Subject Matter Expert - 6 expertise areas identified within MCII

For more information, please contact

Mike Thompson (mike.j.thompson@shell.com) or Ian Rippon (ian.rippon@shell.com) MCII Global Discipline Head

Capacity Enhancement of the PTT Gas Supply Network

Work has recently been completed on increasing the supply
and distribution capacity of PTT’s gas supply network. The
project delivered an extra 9% gas throughput capacity
that has an estimated benefit of $100MM/year based
on the value of the extra gas delivered to PTT customers.
PTT is the former Petroleum Authority of Thailand, now
a Public Company. PTT owns the gas supply network in
Thailand. PTT gathers gas from fields in the gulf of Thailand
and supplies large industrial customers and power plants
throughout Thailand. Two large diameter 410 Km pipelines
bring the gas onshore at Rayong. The gas is processed at
Rayong, and then sent through an onshore network to PTT’s
customers. A third offshore line delivers gas to the southwest
of Thailand.
The project was an extremely broad ranging multi-
disciplinary project that covered all disciplines from gas
compression offshore to onshore gas processing including
an evaluation of the effect of gas specification changes to
the customers’ burners. The project not only had to find a
solution, but also had to deliver the capacity increase to the
customer. This meant working together with PTT to prepare
the system for the recommended changes. The extra gas
throughput capacity was demonstrated by trial runs of the
system before and after the enhancement measures were
adopted.
The major contribution to the enhancement delivered by
Shell Global Solutions came from de-bottlenecking the two
410 Km offshore gas export pipelines to Rayong. Most
of the de-bottlenecking work was done by cooperation
between GSEI in Amsterdam and GSUP in Rijswijk. The
offshore lines had run at what was believed to be their
maximum capacity for many years. Doubts about their
condition prevented attempts to increase the capacity. The
capacity enhancement was supported amongst others by

28
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
GSEI/2 using fitness for service methods. GSUP worked
closely with PTT to prepare the lines for inspection so that
the actual condition of the pipelines could be assessed after
many years of service. An additional obstacle was that
sections of piping on the compressor platform had not been
fully hydrotested for the required pressure and one section of
the topside pipework/riser system was slightly undersized.
Bend and Tee in the 30” Export line
Because sections of the lines had not been fully hydrotested,
it was necessary to use fitness for service methods and
inspection to justify the enhanced pressures to avoid re-
testing the lines.
Pipework stress analysis of the Tee joint and top of the riser on the platform
A re-test was not feasible due to the extended loss of service
during the hydrotest. The lines would have had to have been
de-gassed, filled with water and then de-watered and then
gassed up again. This would have resulted in weeks of lost
production, which would have been unacceptable to PTT
and their customers.
Inspection programmes organized by GSEI/3 and PTT
showed that the actual delivered thickness of the nominally
undersized sections were enough for the enhanced
pressure/capacity , and that there were no critical welding
defects present, which could have failed during
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
System stresses were applied to detailed FEA models to estimate local weld stress
for the fitness for service assessment of critical damage for the inspection survey
a hydrotest. The results of the inspection surveys showed
that there was no critical damage in the lines, which would
prevent an increase in Maximum Allowable Operating
Pressure (MAOP). The fitness for service work on the topside
pipework and risers required pipework stress analysis to
check on the system stresses and local finite element analysis
to check on detailed stress levels at Tees. The stress analysis
work was carried out by GSEM and the results were directly
input to the fitness for service assessment.
The uprating of the older of the two pipelines to Rayong
ultimately was not pursued as there were issues that could
not be resolved. The recommended pressure enhancements
to the other line had to be first approved by PTT’s insurers
before being applied to the system. Application of the
enhancements were made incrementally following a plan
developed by GSUP and PTT. The final step was to make
a test run of the system to verify the actual additional gas
throughput achieved.
The enhancements produced by de-bottlenecking the
two main export lines were a substantial part of the
improvement. Another substantial capacity gain was
obtained by a pigging program aimed to clean the
pipelines, where the resulting smoothing of the pipe wall
helped reduce friction losses and pressure drop, thus
increasing the pipeline’s capacity. Other smaller but still
significant gains were made elsewhere. Overall, the project
was the most wide ranging in terms of scope and depth that
the author has been involved in, which is a good example
of multidisciplinary thinking out of the box. An additional
feature of the project was the depth to which Shell Global
Solutions worked with the PTT engineers in their operations.
For more information, please contact David Ritchie
(david.d.ritchie@shell.com)
29
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
CONFIDENTIAL
Investigation of Un-Commanded Closures of EPW Surface Control
Subsurface Safety Valves
EPW has experienced a series of un-commanded closures
(UCC) of surface control subsurface safety valves (SCSSV)
in several subsea production wells in Gulf of Mexico. In one
case, the SCSSV UCC of a 20,000 bbl/day production well
led to 5-month shut-in (or $1.2MM/day loss of production
at today’s oil price). EPW retrieved the SCSSV for a full
examination, which cost about $13MM. A team was formed
to investigate the UCC cause that included EPW engineers,
GSEI staff, GSUA staff and the SCSSV manufacturer.
GSEI/4 was initially requested to examine the compatibility
of SCSSV materials with the hydraulic fluid. However,
during the disassembly of the HAB-2 SCSSV, visible metallic
shavings were found in the hydraulic system even though
it has sub-micron filtering devices. GSEI/4 staff analyzed
the metallic shavings using scanning electron microscopy
(SEM) and the energy dispersive analysis of X-ray (EDAX)
as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Key findings are (1) large
size, some in millimeters, and significant quantity of metallic
shavings were found in the system at various locations and
(2) seven different types of metallic shavings were positively
identified. Only three types of metallic shavings, Alloys
718, 825, and 925, can be associated with the component
materials. Four other foreign materials, which included two
silver brazing materials, C-276 and MP-35N, not relating to
SCSSV components, were found present.
Figure 1. A large metallic shaving found in the SCSSV hydraulic system
Figure 2. The shaving was identified to be Inconel 825 using SEM/EDAX
30
December 2005 – issue 10
The ball-check seat areas of the SCSSV hydraulic system
were also examined using SEM. Two gross damages, large
impression on the seat shoulder and abrasion on the ID wall,
were observed. Improper seating of the ball likely caused
the large impression; the pin likely caused the abrasion on
the ID wall (Figure 3). Many indentation marks on the seat
surface, especially the metal-to-metal seal surface, were
observed (Figure 4).
Impression
Abrasion
on shoulder
on ID surface
Figure 3. Schematic drawing showing the cause of damages in the ball-check
seat area.
Figure 4. Indentation marks found on the ball-check seat area.
The positive material identification (PMI) and microscopic
examination work conducted by GSEI/4 identified the
root cause of this failure. Introduction of large metallic
shavings and cross-contamination of foreign materials in
the SCSSV was likely caused by the inadequate QA/QC
process in the SCSSV manufacturing facilities. These
transient metallic shavings trapped in the ball-check seat
areas or the damages they created provided the leak paths
and prevented proper sealing of the ball check. This led to
un-commanded closures (UCC) of surface control subsea
safety valves (SCSSV). Based on these findings, EPW has
requested the SCSSV manufacturer to revise their QA/OC
procedure in their manufacturing process.
For more information, please contact: J. Chang
(jemei.chang@shell.com)
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
WATER FLOODING – MATERIALS SELECTION CHALLENGES
In recent years there has been an increase in the planned
use of water flooding to maintain reservoir pressure and
enhance oil recovery in future oil fields. In fact many projects
are not economically viable without water floods. This
includes Deepwater projects, even those that make use of
subsea wells such as Bonga, Bonga SW (Nigeria), Gumusut
(Malaysia) and BC-10 (Brazil). The related challenges are
magnified by the fact that many projects are financed jointly
with other companies, or supplied as “industry standard
equipment” and hence designs may differ significantly.
The usual threats to the integrity of water flood performance
include reservoir plugging and corrosion due to the
presence of oxygen and bacteria. Dealing with these threats
has always been challenging, but the options are somewhat
limited in offshore fields. For Deepwater applications an
additional threat is (corrosion) fatigue, notably of the steel
catenary risers.
The reservoir plugging threat is related to the reservoir
characteristics and the completion design. Many Deepwater
reservoirs, e.g. those in the Gulf of Mexico, consist of
unconsolidated sands, for which Shell has selected gravel
packs with rather fine gravel. As a result, it is felt that solid
particles greater than 15 μm will cause plugging. Water
treatment facilities usually incorporate filtration, hence solids
in the water that enters the injection piping is controlled. In
some cases extremely fine filters are used, a case in point
is when a sulfur reduction unit (SRU) is part of the system.
Whether such particles will be generated in the injection
system itself due to occasional corrosion, e.g. during upsets
of the oxygen control system, is unknown, but it is clear that
if such particles are generated, plugging of the small gravel
pack area will occur quickly. Work is in progress to evaluate
this further, but in the meantime systems with such “tight”
reservoirs are designed such that no corrosion particles can
be generated.
Of the corrosion threats, oxygen attack is well understood.
A model has been developed by Shell Global Solutions
(Pots) to quantify the corrosion rate due to oxygen as
a function of its concentration. Almost all systems are
de-oxygenated in some manner, usually to a very low
concentration (<10ppb), which implies that the maximum
dissolved oxygen concentration of about 8ppm will seldom
be experienced. Typical upset concentrations are thought to
be in the range of 100-200ppb; the duration of the upsets
depends on the alarm and control system and on operator
diligence. Enhanced oxygen corrosion due to galvanic
effects between carbon steel and stainless steel (see below)
may be another threat. A magnification factor of three has
been agreed for design purposes.
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
De-oxygenation had historically been done with vacuum
deaerators, which are well established and reliable.
Unfortunately they are rather big and heavy and thus less
suitable for most offshore operations. Use of alternative
systems such as the Seaject and Minox systems has not been
very successful. There appears to be some light at the end
of the tunnel as the latest experience on the Bonga FPSO
with the Minox system is favorable. To date a dissolved
O2 concentration of 20-50ppb is achieved, the remainder
can easily be polished with oxygen scavenger. It should be
noted that the project team did a very thorough analysis
of experience in other locations and developed detailed
operating procedures. It was concluded that a key to success
was steady flow into the units. Another interesting data point
is the use of only oxygen scavenger on the Fluminense FPSO
(Bijupira & Salema, offshore Brazil) to control the dissolved
oxygen. The rather high water temperature, sufficient
residence time in the FPSO piping and the chemical cost
being low as compared to that of methanol needed for the
Minox operation justified this approach as compared to
revamping the Minox unit.
The last significant threat in conventional water injection
systems is that of microbial induced corrosion (MIC).
Where straight oxygen corrosion typically results in a more
general mode of attack, MIC causes localized corrosion.
Grooving corrosion that led to the failure of some North
Sea flowlines has been attributed to MIC. Clearly this threat
is most likely to cause problems in low flow and stagnant
systems where biofilms can form. The threat is probably
exacerbated by the combination of bacteria and oxygen.
Since regular pigging of water injection flowlines is highly
undesirable or even impossible it is important to design the
system to operate at relatively high velocities. Since it is
difficult to completely avoid stagnant areas, e.g. in valves,
corrosion resistant alloys have to be used. Moreover, the
presence of bacteria has to be minimized by means of good
commissioning practices to start off with a clean system and
biocide treatments. Also, fine filtration will certainly help by
minimizing solids in the water injection system.
The main additional threat to loss of integrity of deepwater
systems is a shift will from a fatigue to a corrosion fatigue
mode of the steel catenary risers. Risers are normally
designed for 200 year fatigue life and this shift reduce the
projected life by a significant factor of about 50 or more
years. There are various ways to cope with this such as
using greater wall thickness, higher strength material or CRA
liner. The former two options are usually less attractive as
they cause additional welding challenges.
31
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
CONFIDENTIAL
The list of above requirements has translated in various
designs of water injection systems as noted below:
• The Bonga WI flowlines comprise of bare carbon steel
risers, which are clad with Alloy 825 at the hang-off
and touchdown areas to deal with the fatigue threat.
Part of the 825 liner is coated to eliminate galvanic
coupling with carbon steel. The remainder of the
flowline is lined with high density polyethylene (HDPE).
• The Basis for Design of the Ursa Princess Water Flood
project calls for completely clad riser and HDPE
horizontal flowline section, but the use of HDPE in most
of the riser is under evaluation. On the platforms, the
low pressure parts of the system are typically made of
FRP, whereas the high pressure piping and accessories
make use of stainless steels with PREN greater than
42.5 and CRA.
DEP.39.01.10.11-Gen. Manual - selection of materials for life cycle
performance (EP) – 2005 Revision
The 2002 revision of DEP.39.01.10.11 was updated in
2005 to incorporate more recent Shell Group and industry
upstream E&P experience with respect to materials selection
and materials performance from subsurface to pipelines.
The manual is an excellent resource on materials selection
guidelines for both new projects and existing facilities.
Cathodic Protection Review
Nigeria LNG Bonny Plant and Incoming Pipelines
Nigeria LNG (NLNG) operates a LNG plant at Bonny Island,
Nigeria, with plant capacity increasing steadily since its
original start-up in 1997. The network of incoming pipelines
is growing as well, from initially only one pipeline to six
operating pipeline systems expected in the near future.
NLNG requested Shell Global Solutions to conduct a health
check review of their cathodic protection (CP) systems to
assure integrity of their existing underground assets and
a review of the proposed designs for the new incoming
pipelines.
A number of observations and recommendations were made
to NLNG that may be more or less typical for any plant
and pipeline system that is undergoing rapid expansion. By
implementing these recommendations, GSEI/4 estimate that
NLNG could potentially save $300,000 USD. This article
provides some of the key points and recommendations that
should be useful to other cathodic protection projects based
on the NLNG review.
Consistency and coordination of the design process among
different parties
32
December 2005 – issue 10
It is obvious that the above represent high CAPEX solutions.
It can be argued that if we spend a lot of money on
sophisticated oxygen removal and sometimes SRU systems,
supplemented with detailed operational procedures and
operator training, the use of CRA and HDPE is over the top.
Indeed other operators reportedly solely rely on operational
control. In some cases, other operators are using different
sand control methods for their wells. At the time of writing
this article, these various options are still being hotly
debated.
For more details, contact: Maarten Simon-Thomas
(maarten.simon-thomas @shell.com)
It is intended to maintain the DEP.39.01.10.11, Manual
- Selection of Materials For Life Cycle Performance (EP), as a
live document with annual or bi-annual updates. To ensure
that the manual contains current E&P industry and Shell
Group best practices, Shell and contract staff are requested
to send proposed changes and items for inclusion in the
next revision to the document custodian – Ken Welsh
(ken.welsh@shell.com).
A different natural gas producer is building each of the five
new incoming pipelines, with each one of them utilizing a
different engineering and construction contractor. Of course,
each one has its own CP design procedures, and even
when Shell’s DEPs are specified as base-line documents,
there are different interpretations and applications of the
requirements. A short meeting at the beginning of a project
between the relevant specialists representing both sides
can usually clarify the design process and data to be used.
Unfortunately a plant may not have a CP specialist on staff
and therefore is not able to provide the necessary oversight.
Another factor to consider, especially when several projects
are being done simultaneously, is how to coordinate the
work so the most effective result is obtained. In this case,
we found that each contractor wanted to install their own
small impressed current CP system at the plant. This is not
necessary and creates a whole range of problems that are
further explained below.
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
Consider operating data from existing CP systems in new
designs.
Most cathodic protection design standards, including Shell
DEPs, include basic default design standards, e.g. design
cathodic current density as a function of coating type, soil
resistivity, temperature and project life, current output limits
for various types and sizes of anodes, etc. The variable that
affects the CP design the most is the design cathodic current
density. In a location where there is little specific design data
available or when a coating with relatively little long-term
field experience is used, any locally available data from an
existing plant or pipeline cathodic protection system is very
helpful.
The DEPs and most CP standards encourage CP designers
to take advantage of actual field data rather than rely
solely on the default values. In the case of NLNG, the
existing pipeline system has the same type of coating as
the new pipelines and operates in the same temperature
range and soil conditions. For pipelines in the swamp, the
new projects were using CP current requirements ranging
from 0.01 to 0.225mA/m2 for a thirty-year life, while
the actual current requirement for the existing pipeline
is 0.043 mA/m2 after 8 years. Using this value, and
accounting for some continued coating degradation and
safety factor, we recommended that all the new projects use
0.130mA/m2 for a 30-year design life.
Can existing CP facilities protect new pipelines?
There is one existing transformer-rectifier (TRR) and
groundbed on the incoming pipeline at Bonny Plant that is
rated for 24 Amps DC output but is currently only running
at an output of 4.3 Amps DC. The total future (30-year
life) current requirement after all pipelines are installed is
estimated to be 47 Amps DC. So rather than have each
pipeline install a separate TRR, we recommended that the
next pipeline to be constructed install a TRR and groundbed
rated for 48 Amps DC, which would be able to provide the
CP current requirement for all the pipelines. This would be
in addition to the existing 24 Amp DC TRR and groundbed
that would be used to provide contingency against early
failure of anodes in the new groundbed. There are many
advantages to this approach and some disadvantages.
Advantages include reduced capital cost, maintenance
cost, space savings and reduced possibility of stray current
corrosion. One disadvantage is that the CP requirement of
each new pipeline must be coordinated through the plant
personnel to make arrangements for the bonding of each
new pipeline to the existing TRR.
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
Is there space for new groundbeds?
Impressed current groundbeds must not be too close
to earthing systems, buried piping or metallic electrical
conduits to avoid the possibility of stray current corrosion
on these other facilities. The efficiency of groundbeds is also
reduced if they are to close together. Therefore, it is often
difficult to find enough area for multiple, new groundbeds in
an existing plant. So one large groundbed is often a better
option than many small groundbeds.
Stray current corrosion
When pipelines with individual impressed current systems
cross or come very close laterally, there is a potential
for stray current corrosion to occur. The possibility of this
happening depends on many factors (coating quality,
distance between groundbeds and other pipelines, current
output, soil resistivity, etc.). The most common solution to
stray current corrosion is to bond the offended pipeline to
the negative of the offending TRR. With fewer individual
TRRs, each pipeline is by design connected to the negative
of the same TRR(s), which greatly minimizes the potential for
stray current corrosion problems.
Monitoring facilities (test posts) and drawings at
crossings
Test posts and good drawings of the facilities at foreign
pipeline crossings and other sources of DC (DC rail lines)
are necessary to monitor for stray current corrosion. Test
posts on both structures (pipelines, rail system, etc.) are
required to perform the tests for stray currents.
Owner/operator CP procedures and skill and CP
Contractor expertise
Many locations necessarily rely upon a CP contractor to
perform routine CP surveys and for general CP consulting.
Contractors normally work for many customers with different
specific requirements and practices, especially regarding CP
criteria, frequency of and process of performing instant-off
testing, how stray current problems should be handled
and data reporting. To minimize the chance of inadequate
procedures from being used or poor advice being provided
by local CP contractors, robust CP procedures should be
created for each plant or pipeline along with obtaining
specialist advice as required. This will also assist local
staff in expanding their CP experience plus it help them to
properly guide their CP contractor(s).
For more details, contact: Paul Nichols,
(paul.r.nichols@shell.com)
33
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

STRESS RELIEF!

Need an urgent advice when I am not around?

Here is one of those out of office reply we recently come
across, and thought it would be nice to share with you. It
goes like this:

5. l.
1 s t D ec 200 to my e-mai )
t i l 3 c e s s y y y
ce un ve ac (ext.y
b e o u t-of offi I will not ha tact Xxxxxx llowance.
I’ll uentiall
y on A
lease c rrosion
Conseq ent matters p ith 3/4” Co
w
For urg arbon steel
c
or use
tings,
e a s o n s Gree
S
xxx
Xxxx X

Cleanliness crazy
Have you heard of this Corrosion engineering student who
suddenly became cleanliness crazy?

His wife noticed that every week he thoroughly cleaned all

the metallic items in the house, especially the ceiling fans.
He made sure that there was no dust on any of the metallic
components. She was happy, but would have been happier
if he cleaned the whole house with that regularity, as she
had to do all the other cleaning. One day while arranging
his books, she found the reason for the sudden craze of her
husband for cleaning the metallic components. The latest
book he had been reading was “Under deposit corrosion
can cause catastrophic failures”!

34
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter
Who’s Who - Organograms
Staff Announcements
Moved In
Keith McKinney
On 16 January Keith McKinney has joined GSEI/1. Keith
joins us from GSEI/5 in Houston and brings with him a
wealth of downstream experience, most notably in the
Chemicals area. In GSEI/1 Keith’s primary tasks will be in
both the Chemicals MSU and the FAIR teams.
Ingrid Bos
On 1 January, Ingrid Bos has transferred out of the Business
Support Team GSEI/0 and started an assignment in GSEI/1.
Ingrid’s tasks in this role will continue to include her FAIR
activities but she will also work on CWW and BSP R&D activities.
Mike Fleming
Mike Fleming, joined the Inspection Technology Business
Team GSEI/3 as the European IDMS business support
specialist. Before joining Shell Global Solutions, Mike was
the PEI staff engineer at Martinez Refinery. The effective
date of his move was 1st November 2005, but Mike will be
working from the US-Martinez refinery till the end of 2005,
to support the IDMS-implementation work from the US and
to finalise his specialist training.
Mike will move to SRTCA in early January.
Mike comes to GSEI/3 with 20 years of broad PEI
experience and integrity management in the Downstream
business. His primary task will be to provide IDMS
implementation and support to the Downstream European
OU’s.
Salim Mwachuo
Salim Mwachuo joined GSEI on 10 October 2005. He
will be based in SRTCA for an initial period of training/
broadening in both Inspection Technologies and Materials/
Corrosion Engineering, followed by a second period as
GSEI Service provider. Salim will be trained and working in
both GSEI/1 and GSEI/3 departements. Salim started his
training/broadening in GSEI/3.
Prior to joining Shell Global Solutions, Salim worked as an
Inspection Engineer at KPRL Refinery in Kenya.
December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL
Jorge Penso
Jorge Penso joined GSEI/5 in July 2005 from Stress
Engineering Services. Jorge possesses a PhD in welding with
25 years of combined academic and industrial experience
in metallurgy, corrosion and welding. He will be working in
the areas of FFS, welding consultancy and failure analysis,
with specialization in coke drum cracking.
Ying Xiao
Ying Xiao, double MS in Mathematics and Chemical
Engineering with Corrosion focus, joined GSEI/5 in July
2005 from a research project with Conoco-Philips. She is
now working in the corrosion and materials group on the
corrosion prediction models and failure analysis.
Steve Roberts
Steve Roberts, BS Mechanical Engineer from Oklahoma
State University, joined GSEI/5 in October 2005. Steve
has 15 years of experience in pressure equipment design.
Prior to joining Shell, he worked as a pressure equipment
engineer in Lyondell Chemical. Steve is now working in
the PEI PTF (project task force) group working on capital
projects.
Ayman Cheta
Ayman Cheta, MS Mechanical Engineer University of Illinois
with 18-year experience from BP Amoco, joined GSEI/5
in December 2005. Ayman will be working in the PEI PTF
group doing work on valve and piping specifications global
alignment and major projects. He will also be involving with
FFS work.
David Breitkruez
David Breitkruez was transferred from Mobile Refinery to
GSEI/5 in Sept 2005. Dave was an Inspection Supervisor
for Mobile and has been with Shell for 15 years in various
assignments in the US and Canada in the materials
and inspection discipline. Dave is working in the PEI
group, performing FAIR’s, RBI assessments, Asset Master
Planning, and T/A work scope reviews. He also provides
administrative support to the PEI Tech-Net.
35
 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

Retirement

Roy Schelling
On 22nd December 2005 Roy Schelling retired from
GSEI/1 after 30 years service. Roy started work for Billiton
International Metals in 1976 and held a number of positions
there before transferring over to work for Shell, after Shell
divested it’s interest in Billiton in the early 1990’s. Many
of you know Roy for his recent role as the backbone for
the SulTAN and CORAS work in Shell Global Solutions. In
this capacity Roy has contributed invaluable new data and
insight into the high temperature sulphur and high TAN
corrosion modelling work. To mark his final day at work and
celebrate his contribution over the years, Roy was joined
by family, friends, plus new and old colleagues for a very
enjoyable party in the centre of Amsterdam.
Farewell Maestros
John Reynolds and Dick Horvath
John Reynolds and Dick Horvath both retired effective
December 31, 2005, each after 37 years of service. A joint
retirement party was held in their honor on December 13,
2005 at the Plaza Club on the top floor of One Shell Plaza.
Many current and retired employees, friends, and family
joined Dick and John in this celebration of 74 years of
service to Shell.
the implementation of the Process Safety Initiatives related
to equipment integrity, a pioneer in the API standards
development and inspector certification programs, the leader
of the most awarded Technical Network (PEI Tech-Net) which
developed and implemented many Shell best practices in
the area of Pressure Equipment Integrity. He has published
and given many talks and papers in industry the world over
and is the author of the famous “101 Essential Elements of
Pressure Equipment Integrity Management.”
Dick graduated from the University of Delaware with a BS
degree in Chemical Engineering and joined Shell a mere
two weeks before John Reynolds in 1968! He started at the
Emeryville Research Center as a materials and corrosion
engineer. Dick stayed in the materials discipline for his
entire career, working in pipeline, in Head Office, at Norco,
Geismar and WTC. Dick has had a tremendous influence
on Shell’s understanding and mitigation of corrosion and
degradation of equipment in refining, distribution, and
petrochemical processes. He was deeply involved in the
1987 Norco CCU explosion investigation, and his work
led to significant effort in Shell on injection point design,
monitoring, and integrity. Dick also contributed a huge
body of knowledge to the understanding of the corrosion
chemistry of water wash systems, and was a key contributor
to our knowledge about controlling these systems. Dick has
also been a very active member of both API and NACE,
in the consensus standards-writing bodies related to our
industry and in contributions to industry publications. Dick
has been honored with numerous awards over the years,
such as the NACE T. J. Hull award, and the Russell A.
Brannon award. Recently, he was named to the prestigious
position of Chief Scientist for Materials in Shell.

The impact that John and Dick have had on the

advancement of applied knowledge in Corrosion, Materials,
Inspection, and Pressure Equipment Integrity Management in
Shell, and in the Oil and Gas industry is beyond measure,
incalculable.

John graduated from the University of Wisconsin with

a BS in Mechanical Engineering and a MS in Materials
Engineering in 1967. He joined Shell in 1968 at the Denver
plant as a plant engineer. John worked in various technical
and managerial assignments in the Hague, Head Office,
and several US plant locations over the course of his 37 Dick Horvath (left) and John Reynolds (right) with Paul Hamilton
year career. Although his primary focus was Pressure at their farewell party.
Equipment, he also had assignments as an Engineering
Services manager and as an Asset Manager in his career.
Among his many contributions, John was the developer of
the focused asset reviews, now called FAIR’s, a leader for

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The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
GSEI Materials & Inspection Engineering group

W.G. Coit - Materials & Inspection Global Manager

+1 281 544 7912

Secretarial support to the GSEI-group in Amsterdam

W.H.A.M. Kampschöer (Wilma) +31 20 630 2121
G. Boes (Geertje) +31 20 630 2244
M. Magdi (Monique) +31 20 630 2830
M.M.A. op den Velde (Monique) +31 20 630 3355

Secretarial support to the GSEI-group in Houston

S.L. Lackey (Stacey) +1 281 544 9198 (GSEI/4)
S.E. Weems (Sharon) +1 281 544 8158 (GSEI/4)
S.M. Rodriguez (Sonia) +1 281 544 7971 (GSEI/5)

Secretarial support to the GSEI-group in Kuala Lumpur

A. Zainal-Abidin (Ayu) +60 3 2170 3781

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 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

GSEI/1 Downstream Materials & Inspection Engineering

Business Team Manager: M. Sargent
Business Leadership Team*: K. Smit, A. Blaauw, W. Fort, P. Blauvelt and A. Saunders-Tack
Product (CVP) Teams
Team Responsibilities: Product development; Product Marketing; Sales; Implementation Planning and Co-ordination

Team Leader** Team Members

FAIR (Focused Asset Integrity Reviews) A. Blaauw N. Beer, P. Blauvelt, I.Bos, M..P de Boer, N. Dowling,
R. Fransz, G.C. Goh, J.P. de Jong, W. Liek, K. McKinney,
W-E Ong, N. René de Cotret, J. van Roij, A. Saunders-Tack,
FAIR +MS+ER focal point for refineries: N. René de Cotret
ECM (External Corrosion Management) A. Etheridge J. van Bokhorst, A. Blaauw, N. Dowling, J.P de Jong,
W. Liek, K. McKinney,J. van Roij, P. van Loon, P. Rol
CORAS (Crude Oil Risk Assessment Service) N. Dowling P. Blauvelt, W. Fort, G C Goh, JP de Jong, W. Liek,
W-E Ong, N. René de Cotret, J. van Roij, A. Saunders-Tack,
S. Zhang
PCR (Process Corrosion Reviews – P. Blauvelt N. Beer, M.P. de Boer, N. Dowling, W. Fort, R. Fransz,
including Corrosion Clinics, CCMs, G.C. Goh, S. Marsh, K. McKinney, W.E. Ong,
IOW, WW reviews and N. René de Cotret, J. van Roij, K. Smit, S. Zhang
GAME implementation support)
MCI-Infobase A. Etheridge N. Beer, P. Blauvelt, I. Bos, M.P. de Boer, S. Marsh,
S. Mwachuo, S. Zhang
Low-Coking Ethylene Tubes (Daido) A. Saunders-Tack T. Wolfert, (F. Terwijn – Consultant)
PROFIT/FFS/RLA A. Saunders-Tack N. Beer, K. Smit, P. Blauvelt, K. McKinney

Business Leadership Team* - Responsibilities include Departmental business plan preparation and implementation

Team Leader** - Responsibilities include management of budgets, team member mentoring/coaching, team member performance
feedback, product/service business performance feedback (revenue, CSI etc.)

MSU and Zone Services Teams

Team Responsibilities: MSU Support, Helpdesk; Additional Services; Focal points; Project Support; Developments; Best Practices;
RBI Implementation Support
Team Leader** Team Members
Refining P. Blauvelt N. Beer, M.P. de Boer, N. Dowling, A. Etheridge,
J.P. de Jong, W. Liek, S. Mwachuo, N. René de Cotret,
J. van Roij, A. Saunders-Tack, T. Wolfert, S. Zhang
W. Fort, R. Fransz, G.C. Goh, W.E. Ong
Chemicals K. Smit K. McKinney, J. van Roij, A. Blaauw
W. Fort, G.C. Goh. W.E. Ong
LNG/Gas Processing A. Blaauw N. Beer, N. Dowling, S. Marsh, K. Smit,
R. Fransz
SMDS and Gasification K. Smit A. Saunders-Tack, T. Wolfert, Z.P. Zhang
Far East Zone Team (See specific team W. Fort R. Fransz, G.C. Goh, W.E. Ong
roles for Refining, Gas, Chemicals etc above)

Note: The Team Leader is the Projects focal point for each MSU

38
The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
Business Teams
Team Responsibilities Team Leader Team Members
R&D, BSP, Innovation M. Sargent N. Beer, M.P. de Boer, I. Bos, J. Van Bokhorst, N. Dowling,
A. Etheridge, W.Fort, J.P. de Jong, W. Liek, P. Van Loon,
S. Marsh, K. McKinney, N. René de Cotret, J. van Roij,
A. Saunders-Tack, K. Smit, T. Wolfert, S. Zhang
Marketing, (Advertising, Sales Pipeline etc) A. Etheridge I. Bos, A. Saunders-Tack
Quality Management M.P. de Boer R. Fransz
HSE W. Liek J.P. de Jong, T. Wolfert, Ong, Woon-Eng
Information Management & Exchange N. Beer P. Blauvelt, M.P. de Boer, R. Fransz, S. Marsh, I. Bos
(CWW Web-site, Library, Knowledge
gatekeeping)
Newsforum & Newsletter G.C. Goh R. Fransz, W.E Ong, N. Beer
MIEM K. McKinney P. Blauvelt, N. Beer, W.E. Ong, S. Mwachuo,
Training Course Staffing A. Etheridge S. Marsh, N. Dowling (M183), P. Blauvelt (M273),
A.Saunders-Tack (FFP),

Specialist Technical Services Focal Points

Technical Speciality Focal Point Alternate Focal Points
Welding & Fabrication A. Blaauw N. Dowling, S. Marsh, T. Wolfert, R. Vulla (GSEI/2)
Cathodic Protection, Pipeline Coatings J. van Bokhorst P. Rol (Pipeline Coatings), P. Nichols (CP, Houston)
Painting & Coatings P. Rol P. van Loon
Refractories T. Wolfert G.C. Goh
Non-metallics, Linings P. van Loon F. Janssen, L. De Mul (GSEI/2)
Failure Analysis, Corrosion Testing A. Saunders-Tack P. Blauvelt, N. Dowling, A. Etheridge (CIP), W. Fort (KL),
W. Liek, S. Marsh, K. McKinney
Corrosion Monitoring J. van Roij A. Etheridge, N. Beer
RBI (Co-ordination with GSCC) M. Sargent Implementation of resources from Services Teams
Standards (DEPs, MESC) K. McKinney A. Blaauw, M.P. de Boer, S. Marsh

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 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

Downstream Materials & Inspection Engineering – Customer Focal Points for MSU Services
REFINING MSU

Refinery Location SM/AE GSEI/1 Focal Pointt

AMERICAS
Argentina (CAPSA, Buenos Aires) Jos Reekes Manuel Gonzalez (HOU)
Canada (MER, Sarnia, Scotford) Kim Watson Simon Yuen (HOU)
Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo) Jos Reekes Manuel Gonzalez (HOU)
Venezuela (Caracas, CRP Cardon) Jos Reekes Manuel Gonzalez (HOU)
Colombia (Ecopetrol) Wim Deelen Manuel Gonzalez (HOU)

AFRICA
Kenya (Mombasa) John Sykes Pieter Blauvelt
Nigeria (NNPC) D. Bax Marc Paul de Boer
South Africa (Durban) John Sykes Pieter Blauvelt
MIDDLE EAST
Saudi Arabia (Al Jubail/Saudi Aramco) Dick Wesdorp Marc Paul de Boer
UAE (Takreer) Peter Verhulst Nick Dowling

ASIA
Indonesia (Cilicap) Iwan Salim Ong, Woon-Eng
Philippines (FPIC, Tabangao/SGEI) Theo Bodewes Reggy Fransz
Taiwan (Formosa/CSLC) Theo Bodewes Bill Fort/Ong, Woon-Eng
Japan (Showa Shell Tokyo, Showa Shell
Kawasaki Niigata,Yokkaichi,
Seibu Yamaguchi, TOA Kawasaki) Atsushi Kitazume/Dick Wesdorp Bill Fort
Malaysia (Port Dickson, Petronas PPTB) Siew, Hong Siang Ong, Woon-Eng
Singapore (Pulau Bukom) Mike van Beuzekom Gim Choon Goh
Brunei (ROS) Kees van Burg Reggy Fransz
Reliance Industries Limited Fred Means W. Fort
Thailand (ARC, TOC Sriracha) Theo Bodewes Gim Choon Goh

EUROPE
API (Italy) Dick Wesdorp Pieter Blauvelt
Czech Republic (Litivinov) Dick Wesdorp Nicole René de Cotret
Cyprus (Cyprus Oil Terminal Ltd.) Letty de Ungria Marc Paul de Boer
France (Berre, Pt Couronne, Reichstett) Jos Reekers Nicole René de Cotret
Germany (Shell Deutschland Oil: Elbe manufacturing:
(Harburg & Grassbrook), Heide, Rhineland
(Godorf & Wesseling)) Reiner Busch Marc Paul de Boer
Netherlands (Pernis) Dick Wesdorp Nick Dowling
Scandinavia (Fredericia, Gothenburg, Mongstad, PREEM) Frans Spijker Pieter Blauvelt
Cressier, Antwerp, Teeside (Petroplus) John Sykes Nick Dowling
United Kingdom (Stanlow) John Sykes A. Etheridge

AUSTRALIA/NEW ZEALAND
Australia (Clyde, Geelong) M. v Beuzekom R. Fransz
New Zealand (Whangarei) M. v Beuzekom R. Fransz
Refining Technology Contacts BGM
GSRC (FCCU Technology) Mart Nieskens Goh, G C / T. Wolfert
GSRH (Hydroprocessing & Base Oils) John Newsome Pieter Blauvelt
GSRD (Distillation/Thermal Conversion) Henk Vasmel Marc Paul de Boer
GSRL (Light Ends Conversion) Martiel Luther Pieter Blauvelt
GSGT (Gas/Liquid Treating & Sulphur Processes) Henk Grootjans Kees Smit
GSRU (Energy, Utility, Water & Waste) Herman Hegge Johan van Roij

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The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
Downstream Materials & Inspection Engineering – Customer Focal Points for MSU Services
CHEMICALS MSU

Plant Location SM/AE GSEI/1 Focal Point

Stanlow (UK) Frank van Breukelen *Keith McKinney
Pernis/Moerdijk (Netherlands) Frank van Breukelen Johan van Roij
Berre (France) Frank van Breukelen Johan van Roij
SADAF (Al Jubail) Frank van Breukelen Keith McKinney
Seraya (Singapore) Frank van Breukelen Goh, Gim Choon
Nanhai (China) Frank van Breukelen Johan van Roij
NPC (Thailand) Harry van Dijk Goh, Gim Choon
ATC (Thailand) Harry van Dijk Goh, Gim Choon

Chemcials Technology Contacts BGM GSEI/1 Focal Point

Lower Olefins & Aromatics (GSTLO) H. Schrivers Kees Smit
EO & Derivatives (GSEOD) Ben Ramakers Johan van Roij
PO & Styrene Monomer (GSTPS) Joke Driessen Johan van Roij

* Andrea Etheridge is the focal point for Stanlow merged site with Chemicals support from Keith McKinney

Downstream Materials & Inspection Engineering – Customer Focal Points for MSU Services
GAS / SMDS MSU

Plant Location SM/AE GSEI/1 Focal Point

MLNG (Malaysia) Kees van Burg Reggy Fransz
BLNG (Brunei) Kees van Burg Reggy Fransz
OLNG (Oman) Cri Staal-Collett Natalie Beer
NLNG (Nigeria) Paul Rodenburg Simon Marsh
GASCO (Abu Dhabi) Peter Verhulst Simon Marsh
Hazira (India) Abdi Nayak Simon Marsh
Altamira Cri Staal-Collett Simon Marsh
Sakhalin LNG Kees van Burg Reggy Fransz
Woodside (Australia) Roy Nap Reggy Fransz
Emmen (Netherlands) Cri Staal-Collett Nick Dowling
St Fergus, Bacton and Mosmorran (UK) Cri Staal-Collett Natalie Beer
SMDS Bintulu (Malaysia) Kees van Burg Kees Smit

Gas Technology / Projects Contacts SM/AE GSEI/1 Focal Point

Engineering (GSG/1) Roy Nap Simon Marsh
Operations (GSG/1) Roy Nap Simon Marsh
Gas to Liquids Conversion (GSGC) Mattijs Senden Kees Smit
Gasification & Hydrogen (GSGG) Piet Zuideveld Kees Smit
LNG/Gas Processing (GSGL) Barend Pek Simon Marsh
Projects (GSP) Phil Holland Nick Dowling

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 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

GSEI/1 Contact Information

Surname Initials Telephone Location Room GSM Email:

Beer N.L. +31-20-630-2407 AMS MEB-10-11 +31 64 638 2468 Natalie.Beer@shell.com
Blaauw A. +31-20-630-3671 AMS MEB-10-09 +31 65 512 3079 andre.blaauw@shell.com
Blauvelt P.N. +31-20-630-3167 AMS MEB-10-21 +31 65 209 6413 Pieter.N.Blauvelt@shell.com
de Boer M.P. +31-20-630-2461 AMS MEB-10-24 +31 65 209 6161 marcpaul.deboer@shell.com
van Bokhorst J.R. +31-20-630-3554 AMS MEB-10-03 +31 65 209 6127 jan.vanbokhorst@shell.com
Bos I. +31-20-630-3050 AMS MEB-10-26 +31 652 096 477 Ingrid.bos@shell.com
Dowling N.J.E. +31-20-630-3082 AMS MEB-10-24 +31 65 209 6287 nicholas.dowling@shell.com
Etheridge A. +44-151-735293 CIP B304 Rm 47 +44 7789 73898 andrea.etheridge@shell.com
Fort W.C +60 3 2170 3979 KL Level 19 +60 12 326 6053 william.fort@shell.com
Fransz R, +60-3-2170-3865 KL Level 20 +60 12 303 0607 r.fransz@shell.com
Goh G.C. +65-6263-5023 KL Level 19 +60 12 321 2796 g-c.goh@shell.com
de Jong J.P. +31-20-630-2145 AMS GL-03 09 Jan-Peter.deJong@shell.com
Liek W.E. +31-20-630-2594 AMS GL-03 08 +31 65 209 6104 willem.liek@shell.com
van Loon P.J.M. +31-20-630-2627 AMS MEB-10-03 +31 65 252 1847 peter.vanloon@shell.com
Marsh S.R. +31-20-630-3157 AMS MEB-10-11 +31 65 209 6194 simon.marsh@shell.com
McKinney K. +31-20-630-2276 AMS MEB-10-33 +31 65 251 1449 keith.mckinney@shell.om
Ong W. +60-3-2170-3756 KL Level 19 +60 12 378 0821 Woon-Eng.Ong@shell.com
René de Cotret N.L. +31-20-630-2135 AMS MEB-10-26 +31 65 209 6306 n.renedecotret@shell.com
van Roij J.F.M. +31-20-630-3955 AMS MEB-10-33 +31 65 512 3078 johan.vanroij@shell.com
Rol P. +31-20-630-3569 AMS MEB-10-03 +31 61 247 7958 p.rol@shell.com
Sargent M.A. +31-20-630-3147 AMS MEB-10-10 +31 65 261 8143 margaret.sargent@shell.com
Saunders-Tack A. +31-20-630-2446 AMS MEB-10-29 +31 65 209 6216 andrew.saunders-tack@shell.com
Smit K. +31-20-630-2308 AMS MEB-10-25 +31 65 512 3082 kees.k.smit@shell.com
Wolfert A. +31-20-630-2298 AMS MEB-10-25 +31 65 512 3086 ton.wolfert@shell.com
Zhang Z.P. +31 20 630 2483 AMS MEB-10-21 +31 6 52618180 samuel.zhang@shell.com

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The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
GSEI/2 Upstream Materials Engineering

G.E. Kerkveld – Business team manager in Amsterdam, The Netherlands

+31 20 630 2438

Metallic materials corrosion & corrosion control

Amsterdam - NL
M. Brown (Madeleine) +31 20 630 2960
E.L.J.A. Hendriksen +31 20 630 3544
P.A. Hiron +31 20 630 2685
S. Huizinga +31 20 630 2449
J.G. de Jong +31 20 630 2592
C.C. Kettle +31 20 630 2456
B. McLoughlin +31 20 630 3117
J.A.M. de Reus +31 20 630 2742
D.M. Queen +31 20 630 3011
N.J. Wilcock +31 20 630 2079
M.E. Wilms +31 20 630 2479
Rijswijk - NL
I.J. Rippon +31 70 447 2719
K.A.D. Welsh +31 70 447 4617
Kuala Lumpur – Malaysia
M. Thompson +60 3 21703931
R. Vulla +60 3 21703954

Metallic materials mechanical performance, microstructural degradation & welding,

failure analysis
Amsterdam - NL
A. Deurhof +31 20 630 2065
C.J.R. Groenenberg +31 20 630 2171
R.K. Ohm +31 20 630 2628
C.G.F. Stenger +31 20 630 2422

Material degradation and failure modelling, prediction of remaining life,

Fitness For Purpose
Amsterdam - NL
R.J.W. Koers +31 20 630 2229
D. Ritchie +31 20 630 2387
C.W.M. Voermans +31 20 630 2485

Non-metallic materials performance & joining, failure analysis

Amsterdam - NL
F.A.H. Janssen +31 20 630 2228
A. Mesman +31 20 630 2282
L.M. de Mul +31 20 630 2318
K.M. Orzessek (Karin) +31 20 630 3160
J.B.W. van Zummeren +31 20 630 2493

Pipeline engineering
Amsterdam - NL
H.H.J. Wiegerinck +31 20 630 2142

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 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

GSEI/3 Inspection Technology

P.V. Geenen - Business team manager in Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Tel + 31 20 6303146

Deputy business team manager: M. Lorenz

Business support team member: M. Lorenz
Product (CVP) teams
Team responsibilities: Product development; product marketing; sales;
implementation planning and co-ordination
CVP Leader* Team Members
PEC (Pulsed Eddy Current) P. Crouzen I. Munns, J. van der Steen, D. Badoux
NII (Non Intrusive Inspection) S. Terpstra P. van de Camp, Ian Munns
PST (Pipe Support Tool) A. Visser P. van der Veer, J. van Nisselroij
NDT Guide (part of MCI-Infobase) R. Hulsey All
Pipeline/Piping Inspection P. van der Veer
NDT Consultancy M. Lorenz All

MSU focal points

Market sector unit MSU support, helpdesk; additional services; focal points; project support;
developments; best practices.
Focal points
Refining R. Hulsey For GSEI/1 customers focal points/Service Mngr’s/AE’s
see GSEI/1 org. matrix
Chemicals D. Kronemeijer Idem
LNG/Gas P. van der Veer Idem
E&P S. Terpstra Idem
Industrial Markets M. Lorenz Idem
APSC Kuala Lumpur Office (NDT-issues) J. McGregor

Specialist technical services focal points

Technical speciality Focal point Alternate focal points
Ultrasonics/Phased arry J. van Nisselroij A. Visser
Guided Waves P. van der Veer P. van de Camp
TOFD J. van Nisselroij A. Visser
PEC (Pulsed Eddy Current) P. Crouzen J. van der Steen
MFL (Magnetic Flux Leakage) P. van der Veer
EC (Eddy Current) D. Kronemeijer
Intelligent Pigs P. van der Veer
Optical Techniques P. van de Camp
Thermography P. van de Camp
Radiography I. Munns P. van der Veer
MPI/Dye Penetrant A. Visser
(AE) Acoustic Emission M. Hoekstra P. v.d. Camp
Leak Detection P. van de Camp
Inspection Data Management System M. Fleming R. Hulsey
Novel Inspection Techniques P. van de Camp

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The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
Business teams
Team responsibilities Team leader** Team members
Marketing i.e., Advertising, Sales Pipeline etc. M. Lorenz
Quality Management M. Lorenz
HSE P. van der Veer
Sample Data Base Registration/Storage P. van der Veer
Courses A. Visser
Contractor data Base A. Visser
Filing A. Visser Spec’s/Standards/Procedures
Equipment Control & Storage J. van der Steen
Calibration A. Visser
Inspection Technology gate-keeping P. van de Camp
Knowledge Management Systems P. Geenen

CVP Leader*: Responsibilities include CVP staircase/business plan preparation and implementation, management of
budgets, team member mentoring/coaching, team member performance feedback, product/service business
performance feedback (revenue, CSI etc.)
Team Leader**: Responsibilities include team member mentoring/coaching, team member performance feedback, product/
service performance feedback.

Jan 2006

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 The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10
CONFIDENTIAL

GSEI/4 Upstream Materials and Integrity

S.D. Kapusta – Business team manager in Houston U.S.A.
+1 281 544 7633

Metals corrosion, properties & integrity

S.C. Canter +1 281 544 8258
Y. Chen +1 281 544 6295
J. Gonzalez +1 281 544 9171
R.C. John +1 281 544 7229
Y. Li +1 281 544 8733
B.P. Miglin +1 281 544 9090
W.L. Odell +1 281 544 8059
B.F.M. Pots +1 281 544 7028
D. Raghu +1 281 544 7231
P.F. Schmidt +1 281 544 8273
J.A. Stockman +1 281 544 8018
L.L. Wheaton +1 281 544 7432

Non-metals performance & properties

J. Chang +1 281 544 6034
P.F. Schmidt +1 281 544 8273

Coatings & Linings

H.R. Mitschke +1 281 544 8012
P. Nichols +1 281 544 8538
A.N. Villa +1 281 544 6778

- Materials Selection and Specification for Upstream Assets

- Tube mill/product assessment and qualification
- Development/assessment of corrosion management strategies
- Corrosion/erosion monitoring strategies/methods
- Inhibitor selection and inhibition schemes
- Non-metallic material applications
- Pipeline Integrity Risk Management (Pipe RBA)
- Focused Asset Integrity Reviews
- Failure Analysis services
- Laboratory testing services for materials properties and corrosion resistance
- Coating consultancy services for pipelines and offshore structures
- Rehab and new construction coating evaluation
- Subsea insulation selection and evaluation

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The Materials and Inspection Engineering Newsletter December 2005 – issue 10

CONFIDENTIAL
GSEI/5 Downstream Pressure Equipment Integrity
W. Dominguez– Business team manager in Houston U.S.A.
+1 281 544 7900

Materials and corrosion management

S.K. Arensman
J.G. Edmondson
D. Fan
J. Fu
R. Hoffpauir
J.M. Jackson
H.E. Mead
R.D. Rothengass
D.W. Wang
Y. Xiao

Pressure equipment inspection, integrity

M.S. Bell
D.J. Breitkruez
G.C. Briner
K. Schoenleber
D.A. Thain
C. Whittle
T.P. Wylie

Fitness for service, mechanical design, life assessment

M.A. Gonzalez
D.S. Kim
J. Penso
P.D. Parikh
S.K. Yuen

Project Task Force*

E.A. Doe
G.M. Gallo
A.W. Humphrey
D.M. Prokopchuk
S.C. Roberts

Non-destructive evaluation
H. Figueroa
W.M. Gaasch
L.A. Whittington

* Current job titles misaligned with other GSUSI staff (i.e. Sr. Staff Eng in PTF = Advisor in GSUSI)

47