Is Brueggemann Really a Pluralist?

Author(s): Jon D. Levenson

Source: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, (Jul., 2000), pp. 265-294
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity School
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Is BrueggemannReally a Pluralist?
Jon D. Levenson
Harvard Divinity School

One characteristicof WalterBrueggemann'srecently published Theology of the

Old Testamentthatdistinguishesit fromcomparablestudies is its author'sexplicit
commitment to hermeneuticalpluralism.Whereas the classic works of biblical
theology located the enterprise within a univocally Christian framework,
Brueggemann'smassive and learned volume proposes a "contextualshift from
hegemonic interpretation... towarda pluralisticinterpretivecontext."' The tran-
sition is not an option but a necessity in a postmodernsituationmarkedby "the
disestablishmentof the triumphalistchurchin the West" and the loss of "a con-
sensus authority.""No interpretiveinstitution,"he writes, "ecclesialor academic,
can any longersustaina hegemonicmode of interpretation,so thatour capacityfor
a magisterialor even a broadlybased consensus about a patternof interpretation
will be hardto come by."2For Brueggemann,this loss is a gain, since "the [bibli-
cal] texts themselves witness to a pluralityof testimonies concerning God and
Israel's life with God."3The disintegrationof consensus goes hand in hand with
"the paralleldisestablishmentof the institutionalvehicles of such interpretation"
thathave repressedawarenessof the rich internaldiversityof the Old Testament.4
In the absence of a hegemonic consensus, enforcedby repressiveand discrimina-
tory institutions,"thetestimonyof Israel"will be able to recover its character"as
a subversive protest and as an alternativeact of vision that invites criticism and
transformation."'For Brueggemann,the repressivenessand discriminationof the

'Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy

(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997) 710. Henceforth, this book will be abbreviated TOT.
2Ibid., 709-10.
3Ibid., 710.
4Ibid., 707.
5Ibid., 713.

HTR 93:3 (2000) 265-94

266 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

institutionsis reflected in the dominance of the white males within them. In a

situationof morediversityof race andgender,he repeatedlytells us, valid alterna-
tive visions will blossom.6
Brueggemann'sbook leaves JamesBarrwith "theimpressionof a total surren-
der to postmodernism.""Not so much to postmodernismin all its forms," Barr
immediatelyadds, "as to the sort of liberal/postmodernmixtureinfluentialin the
so-called 'liberal'churchesand theological schools, wherethe gospel is a combi-
nation of altruism,egalitarianism,anti-elitism, pluralism, multiculturalismand
politicalcorrectness."7The questionarises,however,whetherany worldview that
fails to challenge the commitmentsBarrsummarizesin his last clause can really
qualify as postmodernismat all. Would not a genuine "pluralityof testimonies"
and "a subversive protest as an alternativeact of vision" subvert the gospel of
"altruism,egalitarianism,anti-elitism, pluralism,multiculturalismand political
correctness"and show how the Old Testamentoffers an alternativeto them, too?
Indeed,if we take as definitionalJean-Fran9oisLyotard'sinfluentialcharacteriza-
tion of postmodernthoughtas the suspicionof metanarratives,Brueggemann,for
all his invocationof postmodernistterminology,would not qualify as postmodern
at all. For he rejectsthe claim thatLyotard'sdefinitionis characteristicof our age
and maintainsinstead that "oursituationis one of conflict and competition be-
tween deeply held metanarratives." Therefore,he writes,"themetanarrativeof the
Old Testament(or of the Bible or of the church)... must enter into a pluralistic
context of interpretation,in orderto see whatof [sic] disputeand accommodation
is possible."8Whatwe have, in otherwords,is not really a "pluralisticinterpretive
context"in the postmodernsense, in which there is no bedrockof truthto which
interpretationmust eitherprove faithfulor fall into discredit.Rather,we are con-
fronted with something more akin to a capitalist market place, in which rival
interpretations engage in "conflict and competition" until one of them-
Brueggemannhopes it will be "themetanarrativeof the Old Testament(or of the
Bible or of the church)"-emerges triumphant.In spite of Brueggemann'sfre-
quentemploymentof thepostmodernistrhetoricof subversion,protest,andplurality,
whathe actuallyenvisions is morelike the liberalvision of a public space in which
different interpretationscompete freely in the firm conviction that throughthis
process the truthwill eventuallywin out.
In the free marketmodel of economic organization,it is not too hardto deter-
mine which contestant has scored victory in that process of "conflict and
competition."The balancesheet rules. In the case of the marketplace of ideas, the

6Among many examples, see ibid., 89.

7JamesBarr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old TestamentPerspective (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 1999) 561.
8TOT,712.
 JON D. LEVENSON 267

matteris more complex. In the laboratorysciences, there have traditionallybeen

criteriaby which the success or failure of a hypothesiscan be adjudicated.In the
case of ideas in other domains, such as the interpretationof literature(especially
scriptures),determiningthe victor (thatis, eliminatingexcess plurality)is a more
difficult-some wouldsay, impossible-task. Forthisreason,even if Brueggemann
did not invoke "apluralityof testimonies"andkindredpostmodernideas,just how
he thinksthis "conflictandcompetition"can be adjudicatedwould remainmurky.
Withouta higher standardto which to appeal-a metanarrative,so to speak, that
trumpseven the Christianmetanarrativeto which he is committed9-how are we
to know which interpretationshave won the "conflict,"survived the "competi-
tion," and earneda place at the table in the new "accommodation"?For, despite
Brueggemann'sadvocacy of pluralismand unyieldingopposition to "hegemonic
interpretation,"not every interpretationreceives a place at his hermeneutictable.
Some are neglected altogether.One notes, for example, that in his seven hundred
and seventy-seven page Theology,markedas it is by encyclopedic learning,two
popular,contemporary,biblically-oriented belief systems,each withenormoustheo-
logical implications, are nonetheless never addressed:Scientific Creationismand
the Biblical Codes. Is theirexclusion owing only to the repressiveforce of institu-
tional inertiaand the hegemonic interpretationthat inevitably accompaniesthis?
Or is theresome standardof reasonand evidence thatrightlykeeps the multitudes
of adherentsto these two systems (many, perhapsmost of them, white males)
quite outside the pale of academicand religious respectability?And if such stan-
dards(howevertentativeandcorrigible)do exist, mightthey not, at least in theory,
be fairly brought to bear against other perspectives as well-traditionalist,
liberationist,and whatever-without an accusationof racialor genderbias or other
self-interesteddistortion?
One way that Brueggemann handles this nettlesome problem is also in con-
tinuity with liberal tradition. He shifts the focus from the definitive statement
of a norm or truth to the open-ended process of ascertaining it. Although in
practice Brueggemann assumes standardsof judgment that transcend specific
communities and particularidentities (this is, in fact, unavoidable), his inter-
est is not in the result of the "conflict and competition between deeply held
metanarratives,"but in the process of dispute itself. He insists that "the dis-
pute cannot be settled ultimately but only provisionally." The reason for this
is crucial. For Brueggemann, the dispute continually resists settlement not
because he is some sort of skeptic, for whom closure is an epistemological

9Already on the first page of his book, Brueggemann announces that "I write and exposit
as a Christian interpreter," but one who is "acutely aware of and concerned about the destruc-
tiveness implicit in every form of supersessionism." TOT, 1, n.l.
268 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

impossibility, but because he adheres to a theological conviction that "this

disputatious quality is definitional for Israel and for [YHWH]," their restless
Deity who shakes up all preconceptions through his endlessly surprising and
"contradictoryself-presentations."10
Just how far this interesting alliance of Old Testament theology and
postmodernist hermeneutics can go is most unclear. As we have seen,
Brueggemann'spostmodernismdoes not preventhim fromadvocatingthe biblical
metanarrativealone, as he understandsit, and he leaves open the crucial question
of just how much pluralityhe would accept as legitimateif his candidatewere to
win the "conflict and competitionbetween deeply held metanarratives"that he
thinks is takingplace. In this connection, it is revealing that Brueggemann'sac-
ceptance of pluralismdoes not extend to the domain of ethics. Indeed, he cites
with enthusiasmJacquesDerrida'sown belief in "the indeconstructibilityof jus-
tice"11andspeakspositivelyof the Jewishtraditionsthathold even YHWHhimself
accountableto "thisirreducibleclaim of justice."'2
Why justice, however, is "indeconstructible"is again unclear. In welcoming
"the disestablishmentof our usual modes of interpretation,"Brueggemanncites
with approvalKarl Marx's famous claim that lies at the foundationof ideology
critique:"theideas of the dominantclass become the dominantideas.""3There is,
however, no lack of applicationsof the Marxistclaim not only to "modesof inter-
pretation"but also to visions of justice, with which, after all, they are willy-nilly
associated. In the case of the Old Testament,if one were so inclined, one could
deflate the demandsof prophets,priests,and sages forjustice by reducingthem to
the class interestof those who makethem-the white males of the time. Similarly,
in the case of WalterBrueggemann'sown vision of justice, one might reduce his
fierce opposition to what he labels "militaryconsumerism"(and his notion that
Old Testamenttheology standsfour squareagainstit)14to his own frequentlyself-
acknowledgedstatus as a "tenuredwhite male."'5After all, few Americans who
speak forthrightlyin favor of the militaryor capitalismhave (or are likely to re-
ceive) tenure, certainly not in liberal Protestantseminariesof the sort in which
Brueggemannteaches;andthe percentageof non-whiteswho believe in and serve
in the militaryis far higherthanthe percentagethatbecome professorsor publish

'OIbid.,715.
"Ibid., 740, n. 39. Brueggemann gives the reference for Derrida's comment as Jaques
Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mythical Foundation of Authority,"' Cardozo Law Review 11
(1990) 919-1045, but cites it from John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1993) 193.
'2Ibid., 740.
3lIbid.,707.
'4Ibid., 718-20.
'See, for example, ibid., 89, 713.
 JON D. LEVENSON 269

in Old Testament theology. At West Point or on Wall Street, in other words,

Brueggemann's social and political vision might qualify as subversion or pro-
pheticcritique,but in the liberalProtestantacademicworldin which he works,it is
far from it.
In short, for all his advocacy of radicalismand acknowledgmentof his own
social location, Brueggemannfails to recognize the destructiveor deconstructive
potential for his own theology in the ideology critiquethat he readily applies to
others. Although he writes as if he is opposed to hegemonic interpretationin
general, his true opponent would seem to be various kinds of theological and
social conservatism.'6But this use of the rhetoricof postmodernismand ideology
critique may be overkill. For the relativizercan be relativized,'7and the type of
reasoning that Brueggemannemploys to deconstructtraditionaltheologies and
magisteriaof various sorts harborsthe potentialto deconstructhis own passion-
ately held ethical commitmentsas well.18Conversely,if a vision of justice can be
pronounced"indeconstructible,"then perhapsa commitmentto a religious tradi-
tion and its modes of authoritymight fall in the same category, whateverthe race,
gender, or social status of those who adhereto them.

* Brueggemann on Jewish Biblical Interpretation

Brueggemann'sexplicit and self-conscious commitmentto hermeneuticalplural-
ism moves the range of legitimate interpretationsbeyond the circumferenceof
Christianityitself, again in a dramaticbreakwith just aboutevery previous work
of this scope on Old Testamenttheology. "HereI insist,"he writesnearthe end of
his book, "thatif the churchhas no interpretivemonopoly on the Old Testament,
then it must recognize the legitimacy of otherinterpretivecommunities,of whom

16Barr (The Concept of Biblical Theology, 549) points out "a certain selectiveness in
[Brueggemann's] perception of ideology," which "is applied to mattersof royalty and temple, but
not to the Ten Commandments[TOT, 183-86] or to practices like the jubilee year, which is a 'wise
and cunning provision' and a 'radical vision' [TOT, 189-90], but is not described as ideology."
"7SeePeter L. Berger, A Rumor of Angels (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 31-53. It
is one thing to say that social factors have reduced or eliminated our awareness of certain
valuable interpretations (a liberal view). It is quite another thing to say that social factors
exhaustively explain and thus help deconstruct certain interpretations (a radical view). Though
Brueggemann leaves it unclear which of these two very different positions he is taking, he
gives the impression that he is closer to the latter, more radical view.
'1Brueggemann's passionate emphasis on justice, especially social justice, skirts the criti-
cal fact that many kinds of arrangements that he and his readers find highly oppressive go
totally without critique in the Hebrew Bible, including the prophets. The idea that one can cite
the biblical demands forjustice and then fill the word in with content from one's own personal
values is highly problematic as a mode of application of biblical teaching. The dubious notion
that justice is "indeconstructible" serves to disguise the problem posed by the diversity and
plurality of ideas of justice in all periods, our own certainly included.
270 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

the primaryandprincipalone is the Jewishcommunity."19 Once again, the warrant

for pluralismis not skepticismor its fraternaltwin, relativism,but rathera deeply
theological affirmation.In this case, whatBrueggemannaffirmsis the "polyvalent
quality"of the Old Testament,which allows andrequirescontemporaryinterpret-
ers "todrawthe Old Testamenttext to ourcircumstance,"a circumstancein which
"Jewishfaith and an actual Jewish communitymust be on the horizon of Chris-
tians."20As in the case of his generalorientationtowardpluralism,so in the case
of his generosity towardJudaism,"what is theologically requiredby the text as
such is positivelyreinforcedby historicalcircumstanceandits enduringdemands."
What Brueggemannexhibits here is more than respect for Judaism;it is a claim
that "if Christianappropriationof the Old Testamenttoward Jesus is an act of
claiming an elusive traditiontowarda Jesus-circumstance,we can recognize that
other imaginative appropriationsof this elusive traditionare equally legitimate
and appropriate."21
Were Brueggemannan advocateof a thoroughgoinghermeneuticalrelativism,
as some postmodernistsare, this openness towardJudaismwould be readily un-
derstandable.Jewish biblical interpretationwould be "equally legitimate and
appropriate"only because we lack the groundson which to rule out any interpre-
tation,to invalidate,thatis, anycommunityof interpretation. To refutethe suspicion
of relativismhere, Brueggemannneeds to identify "an imaginativeappropriation
of this elusive tradition"that is not legitimate and not appropriate,and explain
why. It is, afterall, hardlya bold move to includethe outsiderin an edifice whose
walls have tumbledanyway;inclusivenesson the partof those who have lost the
capacity or the self-confidence to exclude is cheap. By not providing a
counterexample,he leaves unknownthe identity of the control on his pluralism
that prevents it from decomposing into relativism. Still, given his remarkscon-
cerning the "indeconstructibility"and irreducibilityof justice, we can make an
educated guess regardingthe natureof this control. Presumably,in the present
American context an illegitimate appropriationof the Old Testament would be
one that defended or advancedthat "militaryconsumerism"that we mentioned
before, and kindredsocial and political arrangements.A wide, perhapsinfinitely
wide, rangeof religiouscommunitiesis legitimateandappropriate,so long as they

'I9bid., 733. The sentence is, of course, incoherent in a benign way, since the Jewish
tradition does not speak of an "Old Testament" but of the Tanakh or Miqra'. On this whole
terminological problem, see Jon D. Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, The Old Testament, and
Historical Criticism: Jews and Christians in Biblical Studies (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox, 1993), esp. chaps. 1-2. (Henceforth, this book will be abbreviated HBOTHC). In this
essay, for purposes of simplicity I shall generally follow Brueggemann's usage, but occasion-
ally add the term Tanakh where the context would seem to require it.
20TOT,734.
21Ibid., 735 (Brueggemann's emphasis).
 JON D. LEVENSON 271

all affirmthe same vision of thejust society. Behind Brueggemann'sthought,it is

not difficult to detect the Enlightenmentnotion that religion is essentially per-
sonal, subjective, and optional, whereas ethics are public, objective, and
indispensable.Needless to say, this moderndichotomyis very much at odds with
the worldview of the literaturewhose theology Brueggemannis exploring.
Brueggemannalso leaves obscurethe groundon which he stands when he af-
firms the equal legitimacy of Christian and Jewish interpretationsof the Old
Testament/Tanakh.As he acknowledgesrepeatedly,this has hardlybeen the tradi-
tional Christianview. Logically, a vantagepointfrom which one can pronounce
two traditionsto be equally legitimatemust transcendboth of them. The theology
at which Brueggemannhints, tantalizingly,would seem to be a theology of the
Old Testament/Tanakhthatsees it as primaryand superiorto its Jewish and Chris-
tian successor communities and with a larger and more productive vision than
either of them can fully encompass. In short, although Brueggemannidentifies
himself as a believing Christian,the vantagepointfrom which he surveys Judaism
and Christianityis one situatedwithin the Tanakh/OldTestamentand perceived
independentlyof both. This, of course, implies in turnthat we can view the Old
Testament/Tanakhin andof itself, apartfrom the Jewish,Christian,or otherinter-
pretivecommunityin which we stand.It is hardto imagine an implicationmore at
odds with postmodernismthanthat.
If the truthis indeed found at the Olympianperch from which both traditions
are surveyed, then the differences between the two must be minimized in the
pursuitof the commondenominator.And this is, in fact, the tackthatBrueggemann
takes throughoutthe book. As he emphaticallyasserts at the outset, "whatJews
and Christiansshare is much more extensive, much more important,much more
definitionalthan what divides us."22As we shall see, even things thatseem pecu-
liar to Judaismcan, in his view, be readily converted into Christianequivalents.
Pluralismhere would seem to mean the plurality(or, better,duality) of successor
communities that validly reflect the truthfound in their common scripture,the
book called the Tanakhby Jews and the Old Testamentby Christians.
Behind this view, however, it is not too hardto detect a Protestantpreference
for scriptureandoriginsover traditionanddevelopments.If so, then the Olympian
perch does not transcendrabbinicJudaismand ProtestantChristianityequally at
all. For characteristicof the formerhas always been an affirmationof the twofold
Torah, the Writtenand the Oral. Though critical scholarshipshows the Written
Torah to be chronologically earlier, rabbinictraditiondoes not subordinatethe
Oralto the Writtenor conceive the Tanakhas having stood alone priorto the Oral
Torahof the rabbisthemselves. (The reverse,however, is the case: rabbiniclitera-

22Ibid., 108 (Brueggemann's emphasis).

272 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

turesometimes speaksof the superiorityof the OralTorahover the Written).This

makes all talk about a common scripturemore problematicand more in need of
nuancethanseems to be the case at first glance. In any event, for all his invocation
of postmodernthought,Brueggemann'sversion of pluralismis not comfortable
with the idea that some differencesbetween Jews and Christiansare both impor-
tantandirreducible.He is happierwith a notionof interfaithdialogue as involving
mutualaffirmationthan with one involving mutualjudgmentand critique.23

* The Critique of Brevard Childs

Brueggemannsuggestively contrastshis own approachto biblical theology with
the "canonicalmethod"of BrevardS. Childs, noting that Childs's use of the no-
tion of canon has evolved over the years. At the core of it, however, there has
always stood a self-conscious commitmentto a religiously engaged reading, as
indicatedby the last two wordsof the title of Childs's most influentialwork,Intro-
ductionto the Old Testamentas Scripture.The "canonical,"as Brueggemannputs
it, "concernsthe 'belief-ful' readingof the text by the communityof faith."For the
biblical interpreter,the "'canonical'means the actualliteraryshape of each of the
books of the Bible, for the literaryshape itself is an act of theological intentional-
ity." But canon in its more traditionalmeaning refers to a list of normative or
authorizedtexts,andin Childs'stheology,thefactof canonmeans,as Brueggemann
correctlyputs it, "thatany particularbiblical referenceto a theme or topic must be
taken in the context of how that theme or topic is treatedelsewhere and every-
where in the text, so thateach partmust be read and understoodwith referenceto
the whole."24
Since Childs's "communityof faith"is Christianand "the whole" of his Bible
includesthe New Testament,it is inevitablethathis own applicationof the canoni-
cal method will see in the two testaments"two witnesses to Jesus Christ."25In
Brueggemann'sjudgment,this is unfortunatefor severalreasons.First, in the sec-
tion on the Christiangospel in Childs's culminatingsynthesis, Biblical Theology
of the Old and New Testaments,26"theOld Testamentalmostdisappears,"since it
has "not much to say about Jesus as the Christ."27 Second, and more fundamen-
tally, Childs's holistic reading of his bipartiteBible implies that "Jews who read

23Fora development of this distinction, see the fine article by Leora Batnitzky, "Dia-
logue as Judgment, Not Mutual Affirmation: A New Look at Franz Rosenzweig's Dialogical
Philosophy," JR 79 (1999) 523-44.
24TOT,90.
25Ibid., 91.
26Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological
Reflection on the Christian Bible (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992).
27TOT,92.
 JON D. LEVENSON 273

the Hebrew Bible are in fact reading a different book." Brueggemannconcedes

that "for Childs the terms old-new do not signify supersessionism,"but he still
believes thatChilds's methodof biblicalinterpretation
is grosslyunfairto the larger
Jewish-Christianreality:
In clearingthe groundin this way, Childs in principleeliminatesthe
vexing issues of how Jews and Christianscan live togetherand read
togetherin the same book, for theirbooks are not the same. Moreover,
Childs would therebyeliminatethe rich possibilities for sharedread-
ing, even thoughin his Exoduscommentaryhe pays sporadicattention
to Jewishexegesis.28
One need not, however, pronounceChilds's enterprisean unqualifiedsuccess
in orderto see that it is considerablymore complex thanBrueggemann'saccount
indicates. It is true,for example,thatChildsbelieves that"eachpart[of the Chris-
tian Bible] must be read and understoodwith referenceto the whole" and that, in
so believing,Childsdepartsfromthe uncompromisinglydiachronic,author-centered
interpretivemethodof historicalcriticism.But it is not just that"the literaryshape
itself is an act of theologicalintentionality."
Rather,applicationof historical-critical
methodto the literaryshapeof thereceivedtextenablesthe criticto recovera trajec-
tory thatprovidesclues as to the rangeof acceptabletheologicalinterpretations.In
Childs's own words:
The materialwas shapedin orderto providemeans for its continuing
appropriationby its subsequenthearers.Guidelineswere given which
renderedthe materialcompatiblewith its futureactualization.29
WhereasBrueggemannthinksthat"Childsregardshistoricalcriticismin principle
as a distorting enterprise that casts the Bible in categories alien to its own
intention,"0Childs actuallyrequireshistoricalcriticismin orderto makehis larger
theological point. It is only when historicalcriticism gains a monopoly in the in-
terpretiveprocess, so thata theologicalreadingof the Bible in its integrityis ruled
out of order,thatChilds finds it "a distortingenterprise."His "canonicalmethod"
thus adoptsthe techniquesof historicalcriticism (which Childs practicesmaster-
fully) and appliesthemto the largerChristiantheological objectivesthathistorical
criticism alone-practiced, thatis, outside the communityof interpretationwhich
is the ChristianChurch-can never generateor address.
Given the key role that historicalcriticismplays in Childs's method, one must
dispute Brueggemann'sclaim that "Childsin principleeliminates the vexing is-
sues of how Jews and Christianscan live togetherand read together in the same

28Ibid., 91.
29Childs,Biblical Theology, 71. See also Childs's own rebuttalto Brueggemann on pp. 72-73.
30TOT,90.
274 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

book [andalso] eliminate[s]the richpossibilitiesfor sharedreading."The identity

of the book thatJews andChristiansreadtogetherdisappearsin its entiretyonly in
the largesttheologicalcontext,the contextof "Bible,"for the Jewishandthe Chris-
tian Bibles really are different(and were differentlong before Childs devised his
"canonicalmethod").But this hardlyimplies thatJews andChristianscannotread
their respective Bibles together with profit, and still less that they cannot "live
together."As I have writtenelsewhere, "on the pursuitof the historicaland literal
senses of scripture,Jews, Christians,andotherscan work in tandem,andthe broad
ecumenical characterof critical biblical scholarshipcan and should continue."31
Considerthis illustrationof the importanceof canonicalshapingin Childs's Bibli-
cal Theologyof the Old and New Testaments:
For example, in the Old Testamentthe book of Deuteronomy,which
arose historicallyin the late monarchialperiodof Israel'shistory,was
assigneda particularcanonicalfunctionas interpreterof the law by its
structureandpositionwithinthe Pentateuch.32
Here, Childs finds theological significance in the fact that Deuteronomy is not
placed with works of the same period (for example, Jeremiah,Kings) but incor-
porated within the Pentateuch.No one dismissive of historical criticism could
accept or even graspthe point. For it dependson the conclusion thatMoses is not
the historical authorof Deuteronomyand that the latter could by a historically
defensible logic have been placed with Jeremiahand Kings ratherthanat the end
of the Pentateuch, where it now stands. Although Brueggemann sees Biblical
Theology of the Old and New Testamentsas having a "frontalchristological ac-
cent,"33this point, and thousandsof others in this and Childs's other books, can
be readily and equally graspedand affirmedby Jews as by Christians:it is trulya
sharedreading. This possibility comes about not because Childs transcendsthe
christological commitmentsthat, in fact, energize all his labors, but because for
both Christianand historical-criticalreasons, he prescindsfrom harmonizingthe
two testamentsof his Bible. In his own words, "the task of Old Testamenttheol-
ogy is, therefore,not to Christianizethe Old Testamentby identifying it with the
New Testamentwitness, but to hear its own theological testimony to the God of
Israel whom the churchconfesses also to worship."34Far from leaving Jews out,
Childs's position includes Jews (and other non-Christians),without absolutizing

31HBOTHC,80.
32Childs,Biblical Theology, 71. See also his Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 211-13, 221-24.
3TOT, 91, n.82.
34Brevard S. Childs, Old Testament Theology in a Canonical Context (Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1985) 9.
 JON D. LEVENSON 275

and totalizing historicalcriticism-so long as the difference manifest in the vari-

antBibles is openly acknowledgedand freely acceptedand the importanceof the
interpreter'sinevitable placementin a communityand a traditionis not slighted.
There are other senses, too, in which Childs's deeply Christian, deeply
christological theology is alert to the danger of prematureChristianizationand
solicitous of remainingin dialogue with the Jewish tradition.Considerthe funda-
mental question of which text to use as the basis for analysis and interpretation.
To the traditionalJew, the answer is simple-the Masoretic Text (MT), the text
painstakinglypreserved,normalized,and annotatedby the ongoing rabbinictra-
dition. In the Christianchurch, the issue is more vexed, with some expositors
favoring the MT or its antecedents(hebraica veritas) and others, noting that the
Septuagint(LXX) often underliesthe scripturalcitations in the New Testament,
arguingthatthe rabbinictext has no authorityfor Christians.Given Brueggemann's
view that Childs thinks that Jews and Christiansare not reading the same book,
one naturallyexpects Childs to elect the LXX, or at least to be neutral on the
issue. On the contrary,Childs endorses the MT. The reason is especially reveal-
ing-and especially telling againstBrueggemann'spoint. It is that "only this one
historic community has continued through history as the living vehicle of the
whole canon of Hebrew scripture,"35 and "thecrucialpoint to be made is thatthe
early Christiancommunityof the New Testamentnever developed a doctrine of
scriptureapartfrom the Jewish."36One should also note that the orderof discus-
sion of the books in Childs's Introductionto the Old Testamentas Scripture is
that of the (Jewish) Tanakhand not that of the (Christian)Old Testament. The
conclusion is inescapable:Childs acts deliberatelyin opposition to some aspects
of his own Christiantraditionin orderto preservethe very possibility of a "shared
reading"of the Tanakh/OldTestamentby Jews and ChristiansthatBrueggemann
thinks he destroys.
It bears emphasizing that the rationaleby which Childs preserves these con-
tacts with Judaism derives from his Christian theology and not from some
external circumstance. It would be naive to doubt, however, that his particular
Christiantheology of Judaism has been influenced by religious liberalism and
by historical criticism, which is closely associated with liberal theology. In fact,
the openness to Judaism in Childs's work is unthinkablewithout the liberaliz-
ing influence of the Enlightenment; allegiance to the premodern Christian
traditioncannot account for it.37Still, the reasoning he offers is the reasoning of

"Childs, Introduction, 97.

36Ibid., 99.
37Thereis room to wish that Childs were more cognizant of the Enlightenment influence
on his thinking and appreciative of it. Although Barr may overstate the issue, his critique on
this point (The Concept of Biblical Theology, 432-33) has value.
276 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

a Christiantheologian and not that of someone reaching back to a stage of Isra-

elite religion antecedent to and transcendentover Judaism and Christianity. In
this, he differs markedlyfrom Brueggemann.
But thereis another,more subtlesense in which Childsadjuststhe enterpriseof
Old Testamenttheology in a way that establishesa certainpoint of contact, or at
least of empathy, with Jewish approaches to the Tanakh; and here again
Brueggemann,the self-avowed pluralist,is critical. "Childs's way of coming to
termswith historicalcriticism,"Brueggemannremarks,"seems to be to reachbe-
hind the moderncriticalperiod,back to the Reformation,to considerand replicate
its way of interpretation,which is not yet contaminatedby moderncriticism."38
To be sure,this observationassumesChilds is in oppositionto historicalcriticism,
an assumption that I have just taken pains to qualify.39Butthere is more to
Brueggemann'scritiquethanthat. For him, Childs's interestin and utilizationof
"precritical"commentaryis "notlikely to make effective contactwith what is our
roughly postcriticalsituation."4Here, he raises the valid question as to whether
Childshas, in fact, integratedhis involvementin the classic commentarieswith his
acceptanceof historicalcriticism.I, for one, very much doubt that any such inte-
grationis possible andbelieve thatthe responsibletheologicalexegete will instead
respect the autonomy of the different approacheswhile bringing them into dia-
logue and mutualcritique,insofaras this is possible. WhatBrueggemannmisses,
however, is somethingthat would be very much on the mind of most Jewish ob-
servers:the fresh airthathas come into Old Testamenttheology when a Protestant
scholar, deeply involved in critical study, finds productiveinsights in literature
thatmost in his guild andin his churchrarelyconsult,relegatingthemto the dustbin
of the "precritical."For as rareas involvementin the world of pre-Enlightenment
biblical scholarshipis in Protestantcircles, it is very much at the center of the
universeof most committedJewish biblicists. "Situatingour own analysis within
the continuumof Jewish biblical exegesis," writes Shalom Carmyabout biblical
scholarshipin the traditionalJewish mode, "is more than a nostalgic exercise in
historicalpiety: it defines an essential dimensionfor study."41
Jewishbiblicalscholarswho agree with this and whose criticalscholarshipis in
the service of a deeply theocentricorientationcannot but resonatewith Childs's
reclamationof pre-modemcommentators.Eventhoughthecontentof theirtheology

38TOT,91.
3Ironically, Barr (The Concept of Biblical Theology, 545) notes that in TOT "[h]istorical
criticism is almost entirely neglected, and almost all mentions of it are entirely negative." On
the dangers to biblical theology inherent in Brueggemann's view of historical
criticism, see the fine review by Paul D. Hanson, "A New Challenge to Biblical Theology,"
JAAR 67 (1999) 447-59.
40TOT,91.
4IShalomCarmy, "A Room with a View, But a Room of Our Own," Tradition 28 (1994) 41.
 JON D. LEVENSON 277

is quitedifferentfrom thatof Childsand exclusive of it, the questionsfaced will be

analogousto a remarkabledegree.Whatis therelationshipof theplainsense (peshat,
sensus literalis, sensus historico-grammaticus)to the other larger,more imagina-
tive, and theologicallyfreightedsenses of scripture(derash,sensusplenior) and to
the sense uncoveredby modem criticism?What is the religious value of the plain
sense, andhow can it be responsiblymaintainedalongsidethe others?42How can an
intellectuallyhonestbelievercontinueto give allegianceto classical christological
doctrinesor to rabbinichalakhot(laws) while doubtingthe exegeses on which they
are founded?Analogy is not identity,of course, and a traditionthat speaks of two
mutuallyimplicated,synchronousTorahs,a Writtenand an Oral, has a dynamic
differentfrom Childs's reformulatedCalvinistscripturalism,with its foundationin
the doctrineof sola scriptura.But in comparisonwith the ways biblical studies are
generallyconductedin Christianinstitutions-ProtestantandCatholic,conservative
and liberal-the affinity of Childs's method with Judaismis apparentand consti-
tutesfurtherevidence thatBrueggemann'sview of Childs'srelationshipto Judaism
misses some essentialfeatures.
Childs's connectionwith the Jewishcommentarytraditionis, in fact, more than
a matterof analogy. An examinationof the index casts doubtuponBrueggemann's
judgmentthat"inhis Exoduscommentary[Childs]pays sporadicattentionto Jew-
ish exegesis."43Thoughclassical Jewish interpretationis only one of the sources
upon which Childs draws (the gravamenof the book rest with form-criticismand
Christiantheological exegesis), there are too many allusions to rabbinicmidrash
and targumand to medieval Jewish commentatorsto justify the adjective "spo-
radic."In the last category, note the multiple referencesto Rashi, Rashbam,Ibn
Ezra, and Nachmanides-not one of whom, incidentally,appearsin the index to
Brueggemann'sself-consciously pluralisticand pro-JewishTheology of the Old
Testament,a longer work.
None of this diminishes the explicit christological commitmentsthat animate
BrevardChilds's labors.And Brueggemannis surely right in stating the obvious
point thatthis is quite a difference from Judaism. But what of it? Why should an
avowed pluralistbe troubledby difference? And why should those Jews who do
theirbiblical interpretationsin the service of their own particulartraditionbe put
off at the sight of a Christian sensitive to interfaith issues doing likewise?

42See Uriel Simon, "The Religious Significance of the Peshat," Tradition 23 (1988) 41-
63. These are problems of which Childs is keenly aware, in a way that is almost unparalleled
among contemporary Protestant scholars. See Brevard S. Childs, "The Sensus Literalis of
Scripture: An Ancient and Modern Problem," in Herbert Donner et al., eds., Beitrdge zur
alttestamentlichen Theologie (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977) 80-93.
43TOT,91. The reference is to BrevardS. Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical, Theological
Commentary(OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974).
278 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Brueggemann's assault on Childs recalls the recent observation of Edward T.

Oakes regarding the unspoken parochialism of so much contemporary
multiculturalism:
Even inside our own culture,which is often called "post"-modern be-
cause of its self-imageof being moreaccommodating to local traditions
andintercultural understanding thanwas Enlightenedmodernity,Chris-
tianity still is made to feel somethinglike the bastardson who shows
up uninvited at the annual family picnic. Inside all the talk about
multiculturalism, contemporarycultureoften balks at includingChris-
tianity in its "gorgeousmosaic."This uneasinesshas sometimesbeen
dubbedthe "ABCRule,"meaning"anythingbut Christian."44
To this, Brueggemann,himself a committedChristian,mightrespondthatChilds's
"frontalchristological accent" refuses to play by the rules of multiculturalism
and thus actually defaces the "gorgeous mosaic." For, in Brueggemann's read-
ing, Childs standswith the greatfigures of Old Testamenttheology of yesteryear
"who simply assumed . . . that the Old Testament inevitably and indisputably
culminates in the New Testament and in the messiahship of Jesus."45In short,
Brueggemanndoes not see Childs as sensitive to interfaithissues at all.
Childs's substantialinvolvement in Jewish exegesis demonstrates,however,
that he does not think the putative culminationunderdiscussion is either inevi-
table or indisputable.If he thoughtthe Christianinterpretationto be unavoidable
and beyond reasonable doubt, he would hardly show respect to commentators
who work on a completely different set of assumptionsand, in many cases, at-
tack the Christianclaims. But, more importantly,Childs's canonical method is
explicitly and sharply at odds with the historicism and evolutionism that sees
Christianityas the sole, natural,and reasonable outcome of the historical pro-
cess. "Thestatusof canonicity is not an objectively demonstrableclaim," Childs
wrote in an early programmaticmonograph,"but a statement of Christian be-
lief."46 It is no derogation of the act of faith upon which Childs's entire
hermeneutical edifice rests to call it exactly that: an act of faith. As such, it
leaves wide open the possibility that reasonablepeople, reading the same scrip-
ture and reconstructingthe same history, might make a different act of faith, or
none at all.47 By its very nature, such faith can never settle for relativism but

"Edward T. Oakes, "Pascal: The First Modern Christian," First Things 95 (August/Sep-
tember, 1995) 45.
45TOT,93.
46BrevardS. Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970) 99.
47Biblical scholars who make no act of faith in the traditional religious sense, however, still
must employ presuppositions, and the presupposition that defines the corpus that they identify
as the "Bible" will necessarily constitute an act of deference to one traditional religious
community or another. Historical criticism is powerless to tell us which body of literature is
 JON D. LEVENSON 279

must testify to the all-encompassingreality uncoveredin revelation. On the other

hand,in testifying to a reality thatit knows not to be "objectivelydemonstrable,"
Childs's faith exhibits the epistemological modesty and circumspectionthat are
necessary to a genuine pluralism. Unlike Brueggemann's, Childs's respect for
Judaismis rooted in his Christianfaith and not in some hypotheticalvantagepoint
that is neutral as between the two traditions and therefore able to pronounce
them of equal worth.48By forthrightlyowning his particularismas a Christian,
Childs is able to respect and learn from the particulartraditionthat is Judaism.

* Is Jon Levenson Too Jewish?

In his substantialcritiqueof the presentwriter,Brueggemannpresentsme, too, as
having abandonedhistorical criticism in favor of a community-specifictype of
biblical interpretation.My "rejectionof historicalcriticism is more pointed and
polemical than is Childs's," Brueggemannclaims, "because historical criticism
has been almost completely a Christian enterprise and has bootlegged the
WellhausianconsensusthatpicturedJudaismas decadent,degenerate,andlegalis-
tic, a caricatureof Judaismfosteredby Christianscholarshipthat has legitimated
profoundChristiandistortionsof Jewish tradition."Brueggemannalso points out
that "Levensonagrees with Childs that Jews and Christiansdo not read the same
Bible" and that "each particulartext must be read in light of the whole."49For
Brueggemann,it is noteworthythat"whileLevensonagreesin principlewith Childs
on the main points, . . . the outcome for the two is very different. Levenson's
determinationto fend off Christiansupersessionistreadings is a very different
matterfromChilds's resolve to have a Christianreadingthatinevitablystandsin a
long traditionof supersessionism."50

biblical. At most, it can only describe a range of compositions that various communities have
judged to be canonical, leaving open the key question of which of these (and in which order)
comprise the "Bible." On the relationship of historical criticism to traditional affirmations,
see HBOTHC, esp. pp. 106-26.
48See Brevard S. Childs, "Does the Old Testament Witness to Jesus Christ," in Jostein
Adna et al., eds., Evangelium, Schriftauslegung, Kirche: Festschrift fiir Peter Stuhlmacher
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1977) 57-64.
49TOT,94. Brueggemann erroneously attributes this last point to my "following the eight
interpretive rules of Moses Maimonides." He is actually referring to my use of the eighth of
Maimonides' thirteen principles of Judaism. See HBOTHC, 62-81.
5?TOT,94. Actually, my agreement with Childs may be more restricted than Brueggemann
recognizes. Childs's conception of canon strikes me as a contemporary reformulation of the
Reformation notion of scripture as self-interpreting (interpres sui ipsius). My own emphasis
in these discussions tends, instead, to fall on the interaction of scripture with other aspects of
religious tradition and thus obviously grows out of Jewish doctrines of the twofold Torah, the
Written and the Oral. I would stress more than he the inevitability of interpreters' standing
within communities and simultaneously challenging and deferring to the modes of authority
280 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Although Brueggemann is grateful that I have provided "a crucial reminder

of the ways in which our Christian expository history has been both ill-in-
formed and destructively self-serving," he finds my own constructive proposals
in the realm of biblical theology unacceptable. For they are, in his perception,
simply the mirror image of Childs's christocentric interpretations and thus
fail to allow for hermeneutical pluralism: "In the end, Levenson must finally
assert that any reading of the text, Christian or critical, that is not Jewish is a
misreading." The problem is not simply that my method "does not leave room
for Christian interpretation,"but, more importantly, that "it violates the char-
acter of the text itself," which "simply will not be contained in any such vested
reading."51
Brueggemannis not alone in his perceptionthatI have rejectedhistoricalcriti-
cism. AnotherprominentOld Testamenttheologian,RolandE. Murphy,sees me
as "ambivalent,if not simply opposed, to any role for historicalmethodology in
biblicaltheology"and thinksthat I "cannotadmitthe time-conditionedcharacterof
Scripture[andtherefore]favora synchronicapproachoverthe diachronic."52 Whatis
curioushereis the unspokenassumptionof dualism:the recognitionof a synchronic
dimension to the received text must mean that the diachronicdimension is with-
out muchsubstanceor relevanceto the interpretiveprocess.The refusalto eliminate
either dimension, the determinationto recognize the limitations of both, is seen
as ambivalence.This notion thatone must engage in one set of proceduresor the
other, but not both, warmsthe cockles of the heartsof two sets of biblical schol-
ars otherwise opposed: historicists and fundamentalists. My own approach,
however, which has won the approbationof neithergroup of absolutists, is for-
mulated in explicit opposition to the underlying dualism itself and seeks to
understandthe contribution and the limitations of each perspective and also
how it might credibly interactwith others.53

of their traditions. That Childs does not elaborate a theology for communities other than his
own is understandable and laudable, but there is still room to wish that he gave more recog-
nition to the distinctly Protestant character of his proposal. On this, see HBOTHC, 172, n. 39.
5'Ibid.,95. Given Brueggemann's deference to postmodernisthermeneutics, it is odd to see him
implying the existence of a reading that is not "vested." What is it, and where does one find it?
52RolandE. Murphy, "Reflections on a Critical Biblical Theology," in H. T. C. Sun et al.,
eds., Problems in Biblical Theology: Essays in Honor of Rolf Knierim (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1997) 271-73. James Barr (The Concept of Biblical Theology, 299) is more ex-
treme and twice as wrong. He thinks I am trying "to destroy both historical criticism and
biblical theology at the same time."
53Hencemy conclusion to chap. 4 of HBOTHC(p. 105): "Bracketing tradition has its value,
but also its limitations. Though fundamentalists will not see the value, nor historicists the
limitations, intellectual integrity and spiritual vitality in this new situation demand the careful
affirmation of both."
 JON D. LEVENSON 281

Thus, in the conclusion to the essay thatboth Brueggemannand Murphycite, I

write that "the form of biblical scholarshipthat would incorporatethese reflec-
tions is one like that of BrevardChilds, which, in the words of James L. Mays,
'holds a series of moments [in the historyof the biblical text] in perspective,pri-
marily the original situation, the final literary setting, and the context of the
canon.'"54I then go on to add a Jewish categorythatdoes not fall underthe rubric
of "'canon' in Childs's ratherProtestantformulation,"the categoryof postbiblical
tradition,which in rabbinictheology "has its own normativecharacterand may
not be disregardedsimply becauseit distortsthepeshat [plainsense]."55And what
do I adduceas an analogyto this necessaryJewishinvolvementwith literaturethat
dates from afterthe periodof the Tanakh?The involvementof Christianinterpret-
ers with the New Testament."In short,"I conclude, "Judaismand Christianity
differ from each othernot only over 'whatit means' as opposed to 'whatit meant';
they also differ over the antecedentof 'it,' andthis difference,crucialto the shape
andidentityof those communities,can neverbe resolvedby historicalcriticism."56
How Brueggemanncan readthis as saying that"anyreadingof the text, Christian
or critical,that is not Jewish is a misreading"is beyond me.
Brueggemann'sclaim that I reject historicalcriticism because of its involve-
ment in anti-Jewishmodes of Christiantheology is equally wide of the mark.As
I have been at pains to document,I do not rejecthistoricalcriticism at all but view
the sense of scripturethat it uncovers and develops as indispensable. My com-
ments about the co-optation of the historical-criticalmethod for supersessionist
purposes are indeed "pointedand polemical," to use Brueggemann's terms, but
they do not signify a critique of the method itself. On the contrary,in the same
book to which Brueggemannand Murphyrefer, I dissent from the view of my
colleague, JamesL. Kugel, thathistoricalcriticismof the Bible is "fundamentally
a Protestantundertaking."That it has been pressed into the service of certain
traditionalChristiantheological postures, including supersessionism, is beyond
doubt, but as I point out, "the truthof a method must be logically distinguished
from the uses to which it is put."57The target of my "pointedand polemical"
remarksis not Christiansupersessionistdoctrine, but ratherthe attempt to use
historical criticism to demonstrateand validate it, the refusal to perceive the dif-

54HBOTHC,79. The quote from Mays is found in James L. Mays, "Historical and Canoni-
cal: Recent Discussion about the Old Testament and Christian Faith," in Frank Moore Cross
et al., eds., Magnalia Dei: The Mighty Acts of God: Essays on the Bible and Archaeology in
Memory of G. Ernest Wright (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976) 524.
55HBOTHC,81.
56Ibid., 80-81.
57HBOTHC,88. Kugel's comments are in James L. Kugel, "Biblical Studies and Jewish
Studies," Association for Jewish Studies Newsletter 36 (Fall, 1986) 22.
282 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

ference between Heilsgeschichte and the history that fair-mindedcritics recon-

struct. That use of historical criticism, by the way, is one that Childs does not
exemplify.
The impressionthatbothBrueggemannandMurphyhave is thatI thinkbiblical
scholarshipof everymodeshouldreinforcetraditionalJewishinterpretations. (Given
the vast range and variety of those interpretations,this would be a hardrequire-
mentto enforce,even on oneself.)HadI suggestedthis,Brueggemannwould surely
be right in comparingmy own supposedlyexclusivistic Judaismto the Christian
supersessionistinterpretationthatI critique. In pointof fact, however, I insist on a
very different point: that all the successor-communitiesto biblical Israel devel-
oped foundationalmidrashimthat are, to one degree or another,at odds with the
plain sense of the scripturesthataretheircommonlegacy. This process is an inevi-
table consequenceof the very phenomenonof traditionformationand can be seen
almosteverywherewithinthe HebrewBible itself. It is also one reason thatI cau-
tion "the Jew who may be inclined to enjoy the thoughtthat historicalcriticism
may at long last be aboutto liberatethe HebrewBible fromthe New Testament"to
give the mattermore thought.For "thepulverizingeffects of the historical-critical
method do not respect the boundariesof religions: the method dismembersall
midrashicsystems, reversingtradition."58 Those are hardlythe wordsof an uncriti-
cal traditionalistof any sort, and they are light years away from that of which
Brueggemann erroneously accuses me: "preemption of the text for Jewish
reading."59Amore accurate assessment would be that I show both Jewish and
Christianreadingsto be problematicin the light of historicalcriticism,and I invite
membersof both communitiesto join the effort to reflect on the commonalityof
the problem.
Behindmy reflectionon "thepulverizingeffects of the historicalcriticalmethod
[on] all midrashicsystems"lies a millenniumof Jewishinvolvementin peshat and
threehundredyearsof historicalcriticismof bothtestamentsof the ChristianBible.
In the mindsof some scholars,these two endeavorswipe away or at least override
the respective "midrashicsystems" that undergirdand define rabbinicJudaism
and Christianity.My experienceis thatProtestants,because they are the heirs to a
doctrineof sola scripturaand the idea thatthe literalor plain sense is sovereign,
are more inclinedthanJews to thinkso. These Protestantcommitmentsunmistak-
ably informWalterBrueggemann'sjudgmentthatmy putative"preemptionof the
text for Jewish readingis unacceptable... because it violates the characterof the
text itself."6 Is it not odd thatsomeone who declareshimself committedto work-
ing in a postmodernframeworkhas so little inhibition in speaking about "the

58HBOTHC,29-30.
59TOT,95.
60Ibid.
 JON D. LEVENSON 283

characterof the text itself'? Have the postmodernistsnot been the most vociferous
in the claim thatinterpreterscannotshed theircommunalidentitiesand traditional
allegiances and attainan Olympianperch from which one can view "the text it-
self'? And so, for all his self-proclaimedaffinities with postmodernismand his
outspoken advocacy of pluralism and opposition to hegemonic interpretation,
Brueggemann'sProtestantloyalty to sola scriptura,rephrasedas "thetext itself,"
is still determinativefor his theology, enablinghim to passjudgmenton a position
thathe (mistakenly)thinks is a "preemptionof the text for Jewish reading."
Not surprisingly,Roland Murphy,a Roman Catholic, has a bit more empathy
on this issue. In his view of my work, "ultimatelythe biblical text is unabashedly
understoodin the frameworkof Judaism,and the traditionof the oral Torah."61
Here, much turnson two words, "ultimately"and "unabashedly."I do indeed ar-
gue that for Jewish exegetes committed to the rabbinic tradition, "the whole
Pentateuchmustultimately(butnot immediatelyor always) be correlatedwith the
oralTorahof the rabbis."62In picking up "ultimately"but leaving out the material
in the parenthesis,Murphy'sparaphraseloses somethingessential. And "unabash-
edly" implies that I sense no tension between peshat and derash, and between
traditionaland critical study, whereas exactly that tension is the subject of the
book he and Brueggemannare critiquing.63I should add that the refusal to accept
historicalcriticismand to work withinthe tensionbetween it and traditionalinter-
pretation has become characteristic of Orthodox Judaism. The position that
Brueggemanncalls a "preemptionof the text for Jewish reading"is actually, in
certainimportantways, positionedon the pluralisticside of an importantdivide in
contemporaryJudaism.
In both Brueggemann's and Murphy's thinking, there is a notion that the
Old Testament theologian must allow the text itself to speak in its own voice.
As we have seen, this underlies Brueggemann's claim that my proposal "vio-
lates the character of the text itself [which pushes beyond a Jewish reading
toward] a reading as large as the nations and as comprehensive as creation."64

6'Roland E. Murphy, "Old Testament/Tanakh-Canon and Interpretation,"in Roger Brooks

and John J. Collins, eds., Hebrew Bible or Old Testament? Studying the Bible in Judaism and
Christianity (Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 5; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1990) 24. Ironically, this is the same volume in which my words quoted above
in n. 53 first appeared. The volume resulted from a conference at the University of Notre Dame
in 1989 that Murphy and I both attended.
62HBOTHC,81.
63Murphyis also in error when he writes that I "cannot agree with N. Sarna's attempt to
interpret the Torah in the light of modern historical criticism." (Murphy,"Reflections," 272).
My actual disagreement with Sarna is over the degree of continuity between medieval Jewish
plain sense exegesis (pashtanut) and modern historical criticism. See HBOTHC, 66-70.
6TOT, 95. Note the unspoken assumption: a Jewish reading is too cramped to deal ad-
equately with the division of humanity into nations and with the grandness of creation!
284 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Similarly, Murphy maintains that Old Testament theology does not have to be
Christian theology and can legitimately engage in "the systematization in bib-
lical categories of the understandingof God, humans, and creation," provided,
of course, that it does not impose an artificial unity on the variegated texts in
the Old Testament.65That this endeavor has value can be readily granted, but
one must still pose the urgent question, how can the midrashic systems that
are Judaism and Christianity absorb the insights that Old Testament theology
(so conceived) generates?66Is the operative hope here that the people of Is-
rael and the church will come to abandon their claim to election and see each
other's claim as validated by their common scripture? Perhaps this is what
Brueggemann means by "a reading as large as the nations and as comprehen-
sive as creation." If so, it is odd in yet another sense that he appeals to "the
characterof the text itself." For, as I concluded in the Death and Resurrection
of the Beloved Son, "the competition of these two midrashic systems for their
common biblical legacy reenacts the sibling rivalry at the core of ancient
Israel's account of its own torturedorigins."67The old expression "the father-
hood of God and the brotherhoodof man" captures one important dimension
of the legacy of the Old Testament/Tanakh.But another, more prominent di-
mension speaks of God's mysteriously singling out one son from his brothers
for a special destiny, to be reenacted in the experience of the ongoing com-
munity. The divine Father is not an egalitarian. There is, in short, a kind of
supersessionism internal to the Hebrew Bible, and no appeal to the common
scripture of Judaism and Christianity can overcome it.

65Murphy,"Old Testament/Tanakh," 28.

66Itis one thing to say that historical criticism enables us to obtain a purchase on the text
that is at odds with traditional Jewish and Christian understandings and with the first impres-
sions of moderns of whatever sort when they read the text. With this, I have always been in
hearty agreement. The claim that this historical-critical purchase is normative and sovereign,
however, is not historical, but theological in character, and cannot be advanced without the
invocation of authority structures of some kind or another. The invocation of "the text itself'
is most at home in Protestantism and cannot serve as the basis for a wide-ranging pluralism
on issues of normative theology.
67JonD. Levenson, The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Transformation
of Child Sacrifice in Judaism and Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) 232.
Brueggemann (TOT, 94, n. 89) understands me to be saying in that volume that "the notion of
a father giving his beloved son is a pervasive one [that] the church has . . . turned . . . against
the Jews in a polemical, exclusivist way." This is certainly true, but I also connect this same
notion with ideas of chosenness in both the Tanakh and in rabbinic midrash. That is why my
last text is a Tannaitic midrash that is a parallel to the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen and
whose point is "to justify the preference for the latecomers at the expense of those whom they
dispossess" (Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 230-31). Because the supersessions are in-
ternal to the common scriptural legacy of the Jews and the church, appeal to the common
legacy does not overcome the supersessionism, even if it mitigates it.
 JON D. LEVENSON 285

And so, when Brueggemannobserves that"whileLevenson agrees in principle

with Childs on the main points, we should notice that the outcome for the two is
very different,"68should we be surprised?Is the goal of Old Testament/Tanakh
theology to resolve rabbinicJudaismand Christianityinto an antecedentcommu-
nity that has not survived,thus obliteratingthe act of divine singling out (and the
Jews and the Churchwith it)? If not, we should hardlyexpect a Jew and a Chris-
tian,even when they agreeon some "mainpoints,"to come to the same substantive
results.Brueggemann(in his postmodernistvoice, not his Protestantvoice) tells us
thatthere is no "consensusauthority,""thetexts themselves witness to a plurality
of testimoniesconcerningGod and Israel'slife with God,"and "conflictand com-
petition" are inevitable and even desirable. Why, then, are the differences that
Childs and I have with each othernot positive, or at least inevitable?It seems that
Brueggemannthe postmodernisthas yielded hereto Brueggemannthe liberalProt-
estant-the Old Testamenttheologian who still hopes that "the text itself' will
overcome the differencesbetween communitiesand result in a common theology
of their common scriptures.

* Judaismas a Resourcefor Christianity?

As we have seen, Brueggemannis refreshinglyand vociferously opposed to the
legacy of Christiansupersessionismthat has been a centralfeatureof Old Testa-
menttheology since the birthof the disciplinein the Enlightenment.The opposition
appearsnot only in his programmaticreflections but also in the way he handles
specific issues. His commentson the role of Christiansupersessionismin the con-
ventional interpretationof the Old Testamentcult, for example, are highly astute
and manifestan extraordinarydegree of self-awareness.69But Brueggemanngoes
furtherthansimply undertakingto purgethe disciplineof its anti-SemiticTendenz.
Rather,the celebrateddeclarationof Pope Pius XI, issued as the storm clouds of
the Holocaust gathered,and endorsedby Brueggemann,could serve as the motto
for his own theology of the Jewish-Christianrelationship: "Spirituallywe are all
Semites."70For, time andagain,he assertsthe two-fold fact of the priorityof Israel
and the commonality of its legacy with that of the church. "It strikes me," he
writes about"Israelas [YHWH's] partner,""thatfor all the polemics that sustain
supersessionism,the truthis that these two communities, because they face the
same God, sharethe same reassuring,demandinglife" and that "theylive parallel
histories."71Affirming this model of priorityand commonality, Brueggemannis

68TOT,94.
69Ibid., 651-54.
70Ibid., 109.
7Ibid., 449. In this lattercomment, Brueggemannis endorsingRosenzweig's understanding.See
his n. 73. But see also the extremelyimportantqualificationdevelopedby Batnitzky(see n. 23, above).
286 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

able to reverse the longstandingattitudeof the churchtowardthe Jews and advo-

cate this as an "enduring . . . [issue] intrinsic to Old Testament theology":
"attendanceto the Jewish communityas co-reader,co-hearer,and co-practitioner
of the text, wherebythe communitythatChristianshave long demonizedbecomes
a heeded truth-teller."72
In this way, Brueggemannis able to utilize the Jewish traditionto recovernotes
in the Old Testamentwitness to which the churchhas become deaf. The complex
"characterof [YHWH], who in incommensurabilitywill be obeyed, but who in
mutualityinvites challenge," is a case in point. "The high classical traditionof
Christianinterpretation," in his judgment,"hasnot paid sufficient attentionto this
latteraspect of [YHWH's] fidelity,"but can and "mustrelearnthis aspect of the
interactionof God and humanpersons from its Jewish counterpart."To the Old
Testamenttheologian,more hangs, therefore,on interfaithdialogue thanthe laud-
able butmoregeneralgoals of mutualunderstandingandimprovedintercommunal
relations."This is the enduringimperativeof ecumenism,to recover from others
what'one'sown interpretivefocus has made unavailable."73
Logic supportsBrueggemann'sclaimhere,as does the historyof Jewish-Christian
interactionin biblicalstudies(includingthe studyof theNew Testament).Encounter-
ing an interpretationthatcomes froma culturalcontextalien to one's own can surely
be bracingandenlightening,shockingus out of ourfamiliaritywiththe scriptureand
enrichingourunderstanding of it. Surelythereis somethingin the HebrewBible that,
in a complexculturalprocess,producesthe wide varietyof interpretivecommunities
thatlayclaimto it, andthetextis betterunderstoodwherethediversityof thesuccessor
communitiesis acknowledgedandbroughtintothe discussion.
But Brueggemanngoes further.It is not simply thatJudaismprovides insights
into the common scripturethatthe Christiantraditionhas lost. Rather,even when
the issue is not one of Christians'recovering throughJudaism what their own
appropriationof the Old Testamenthas obscured,Brueggemannis eager to show
thatthe two traditionsarespeakingaboutthe same generalexperienceand thatthe
Jewish symbols applyin equalmeasureto the church.Onejust has to know how to
convert the terms. For example, while again abjuringthe idea of supersession,
Brueggemannmaintainsthat"theJewishmodel of exile andhomecomingreceived
a christologicalequivalence in termsof crucifixion and resurrection,"and there-
fore "theChristiancommunityseeks roughlyto speakaboutthe same experienced
andanticipatedrealityas do Jews."74And, accordingto Brueggemann,even some-
thing ostensibly so distinctivelyrabbinicin characteras the study and practiceof
Torahcomes over into Christianity.Brueggemanndevelops the idea of the "prac-

72Ibid.,745.
73Ibid.,459.
74Ibid., 77.
 JON D. LEVENSON 287

tice of Torahas worship"not only to help "Christianreadersof the Old Testament

to overcome stereotypesaboutlegalism,"but also because "it is a way of under-
standingChrist,who is both the one who commandsandthe one who offers self in
intimacy."75WhereasChristianityhas traditionallyconceived TorahandChristas
opposites (with the latterprovidingliberationfrom the former)or at least as mutu-
ally exclusive, Brueggemannpresents them as parallel articulationsof the same
underlyingreality. Indeed,even the "matterof sages establishingrabbinicmodes
of teaching"-at first glance so characteristicallyJewish and so alien to Christian-
ity-"is importantfor Christianreadersof the Old Testament"because it sheds
light on the emergence of the Christianmovement itself (for example, Jesus' dis-
putes with scribes, Pharisees,Herodians,and Sadducees) and because it helps to
explain Christians'own "attentivenessto the textual tradition."76
In makingthese moves fromJudaismto Christianity(while renouncingall claim
to superiorityor supersession), Brueggemanninadvertentlycalls into doubt his
bold hermeneuticalmanifesto about "a pluralityof testimonies concerning God
and Israel's life with God," "our situation [as] one of conflict and competition
between deeply held metanarratives,"the need for "the metanarrativeof the Old
Testament [to] enter into a pluralisticcontext of interpretation,"77 and the like.
For the pluralitybroughtabout by the eventual division of ancient Israelitereli-
gion into Judaism and Christianityseems in his view to be mostly a mirage.
Whateverthe rangeof "testimoniesconcerningGod and Israel's life with God"in
the Tanakh/OldTestament,the same range can be found in both successor-com-
munitiesor if it cannotpresentlybe found, it will once Christianscome to see "the
Jewish community [as] a heeded truth-teller."And the "conflict and competition
between deeply held metanarratives"that Brueggemannconsiders characteristic
of our postmodernsituationwill find Judaismand Christianityon the same side,
since they differ really only in vocabulary,each Jewish item having, happily, its
"christologicalequivalence."If parallellines do not meet, "parallelhistories"78do
not collide, or, if they do, it is only because of a tragic failure to perceive the
superficialityof the difference and the comprehensivenessof the identity.Recall
Brueggemann'sclaim that"whatJews and Christiansshare is much more exten-
sive, much more important,muchmore definitionalthan what divides us."79
One can readilyconcede this importantclaim withoutdenying,as Brueggemann
seems to, thatthe differencescan also be essential andthe boundariesbetween the
two communities not always porous. Consider an illustration.What the English

75Ibid., 599.
76Ibid., 690.
77Ibid., 710, 712.
78See n. 71, above.
79Ibid., 108 (Bruggemann's emphasis).
288 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

andthe Americanssharemay be muchmoreextensive, important,and definitional

than what divides them. This does not mean, however, that the Houses of Parlia-
mentarethe equivalentof the Capitol,that 10 Downing Streetis the English White
House, or thata map of Londoncan be easily correlatedwith one of Washington,
DC, once one comes to understandthe deep unitythatunderliesthe shallow differ-
ences. Nor do the deep commonalitiesand continuitiesof English and American
cultureand politics imply thatthere was nothingof any great importanceto fight
aboutin 1775or 1812.Currenciesareconvertible,languagesaretranslatable(though
with inevitablelosses), but culturesand traditions,when they are living and lived,
are irreduciblydifferent,and no amountof similarity,common derivation,good
will, mutualrespect, and communicationcan change this. Indeed, cultures with
deep commonalitiesare able to engage in a process of mutualcritiqueandjudg-
ment in ways thatculturesthatare more thoroughlydissimilarcannot.
An illuminatingcase in point is Brueggemann's"Jewishmodel of exile and
homecoming"in comparisonwith its supposed"christologicalequivalencein terms
of crucifixionand resurrection."Thatthe two patternscan be fruitfullycompared
is beyond doubt.Nor should we overlook the fact thatJews may find theirinsight
into exile/homecomingdeepenedby the comparisonwith crucifixion/resurrection,
and if so, a likely by-productwill be empathywith a point of Christianbelief that
initially seems so foreign to Judaism.Conversely,Christiansmay find it produc-
tive to read Old Testamentnarrativesaboutexile and homecoming in the light of
their own confession about the crucifixion and resurrectionof Jesus. In the pro-
cess, they may well discover new depth in a dimensionof Judaismthat may have
previously struck them as parochialand outmoded. And approachingthe issue
from either end can shed light on Ezekiel's vision of the valley of the dry bones
(Ezek 37:1-14), which displays both patterns,nationalrestorationafter exile and
the resurrectionof the dead, and suggests thatthe two are not so far apartas both
Christiansand Jews may unthinkinglybelieve.
But are thereno irreducibledifferences,nothingin "theJewish model"thatstill
cannot,with all the will in the world,be translatedinto some "christologicalequiva-
lence"? In fact, the contrasts,no less thanthe commonalities,are revealing.In the
Tanakh/OldTestament,forexample,exile andhomecomingarenationalevents:those
who experiencethemareboundtogetherby a commondescentand a common his-
torythatdemarcatethemfromotherfamiliesandothernations,who, in turn,may or
may not undergoanalogousexperiences.And at the centerof the whole ideaof exile
andhomecominglies the landthatGodpromisedthe commonancestor-not simply
a homelandin generalor the conditionof landednessor giftednessor of promise,but
a specificandspeciallandpromisedto a specialpeopleby theirincomparableGod.80

80SeeBrueggemann's theological and moral reflections in his insightful volume, The Land:
Place as Gift, Promise, and Challenge in Biblical Faith (OBT; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977).
 JON D. LEVENSON 289

What Israelexperiencesin the processesof exile and homecoming,at least as de-

scribedin theTanakh/OldTestament,is, in short,emphaticallynotthecommonhuman
condition.The crucifixionandresurrectionof Jesus,by contrast,is the experienceof
an individual,an experiencethatChristianinterpretersfromPaul on have tendedto
see as paradigmaticof the humanconditionat its greatestintensityand depth. The
paradigmcan be appropriated by anyone,withoutregardto descent,nationalhistory,
or geographyand withoutany need to changeidentitiesat these levels. Thatthe two
models,exile/homecomingandcrucifixion/resurrection, have muchin commonand
even perhapsa geneticconnectiondoes not obviatethe differences.If the differences
are minoror not definitional,however,thenthe identityof Israelas a naturalfamily
(thoughone that outsiderscan, by a miraculousprocess,join, in rabbiniclaw) is
minorandnot definitional.And that is an idea at which classicalJudaism,for all its
universalistictendencies,balks at least as stubbornlyas classical Christianityem-
bracesit.
I hasten to add that this does not imply that Christiansare unable to derive a
spirituallesson from the patternof exile and homecomingor to respect it (as Jews
can respect crucifixion and resurrection)without adoptingit. Nor have I here en-
dorsed the claim of any group (including contemporaryJews) to be the moder
heirs to the status of biblical Israel. My point, rather,is that there is no "equiva-
lence"between the two models, andthe defining structuresof the two traditionsin
theirclassical articulationspreventChristiansfrom simply and directly absorbing
the Jewish mode, and vice versa.Thereis an irreducibledifferencehere, which all
the sharingand common groundin the world cannotovercome.
The same conclusion applies to Brueggemann'sremarksabout the "matterof
sages establishing rabbinicmodes of teaching"and its relevance to Jesus and to
"thetextualtradition"of the church.It is beyond disputethatJesus' teachings and
the disputationsin which he found himself can be productivelyilluminatedby the
study of early rabbinicJudaism.Indeed, it is quite conceivable that were the his-
toricalJesus alive today, he would be muchmore at home in a Mishnahor Gemara
class in a synagoguethanin a churchin whichChristcrucifiedandrisenis preached.
But the historical Jesus is not at all what "the textual tradition"of the church
presents;he is, in fact, concealed by it and must, by a difficult process of literary
excavation,be recoveredfrom the christologicalconfessions thathave shapedthe
New Testamentand all subsequentChristianbelief. The claims thereinmade for
Jesus against the scribes, Pharisees, Sadducees, and Herodians with whom he
disputes are not paralleledin the claims made for individual rabbis in Talmudic
literature.To state the obvious, Jesus is not presented as one link in a reliable
chain of traditionand engaged in collegial discussion and dispute with his peers.
Indeed,one would have to doubtthe self-awareness,or at least the traditionalism,
of anyone who claimed to be Christianbut doubted that Jesus was peerless. In
other words, the study and practice of Torah, which Brueggemann is eager to
290 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

interpretas "a way of understandingChrist,"proceeds on completely different

assumptionsfrom those thathave provenmost potentin the shapingof Christian-
ity-this despite the common origins of rabbinic Judaism and Christianity in
Israelite religion and the striking identification of both Torah and Christ with
Wisdom in the respective traditions.
Onceagain,we see that,thoughit canfunctionas a catalystforrespect,self-knowl-
edge, historicalunderstanding, andempathy,the commonlegacy does not puncture
the wall betweenthe two communitiesor enableitems to pass over it with ease and
withoutseriousloss. Evenif commonaltiesoutweighdifferences,the differencescan
still be definitionalandirreducible.Even withoutsupersessionism,the Christianap-
propriationof the IsraeliteandJewishheritagesis highlyproblematic.
One reasonthatthe depthof this problemeludes Brueggemannis his failureto
distinguishadequatelybetweenIsraelitereligion andJudaism,thatis, between the
religion mandated by the Hebrew Bible and the religion of late biblical and
postbiblicalJews (especially rabbinicJews) seeking to appropriateit. Tradition-
ally, criticalscholarshave employed the term"Judaism"to refer to a late stage of
the tradition,usually beginning in the early postexilic period (there is no exact
division, and usage varies widely). Althoughthe terminologyis inevitablya bit
arbitraryandcan lenditselfto anti-Semitism,it is usefulto the historical-criticalgoal
of accuracyin historicaldescriptionand the avoidanceof anachronism.Thereare,
for example,majordifferencesbetweenthe religionsof preexilicfigureslike Amos
andIsaiah,on theone hand,andpostexilicpersonageslikeEzra,Ben Sira,andAqiva,
on the other.The most obviousdifferenceis thatAmos andIsaiah,and the redacted
books that bear their names, exhibit no awarenesswhatsoeverof a law book re-
vealed to Moses, whereasthat book, the writtenTorah in whateverrecension, is
centralto Ezra, Ben Sira, and Aqiva. To call the religion of the late figures, the
religioncenteredon the Book of the Torah,"Judaism"andthe religionof the earlier
figures,which lacks a settledtextualfoundation,"Israelitereligion"can, for all its
vulnerabilities,help maintainclarityon this andothercrucialdifferences.
WalterBrueggemannobscures all this by insisting on "the Jewishness of the
Old Testament."81 By this, he meansan opennessof Christiansto Jewishreadings,
vigorous renunciation of supersessionism,anda resistanceto facile harmonization
with Christiandoctrine. But he also wishes to drawattentionto the claim that"the
Old Testamentin its theological articulationis characteristicallydialectical and
dialogical, not transcendentalist."82 This, in his view, requirestheological inter-
pretersto attendto certainfeaturesof the text thatBrueggemannlabels as Jewish:
hyperbole, ambiguity, and openendedness.83To be sure, he does so with a

8"Ibid., 107. See his discussion on 107-12.

82Ibid., 83 (Brueggemann's emphasis).
83See ibid., 110-11.
 JON D. LEVENSON 291

momentof ambivalence.Though"thereis nothingdefinitionallyJewish aboutany

of them," he concedes, "all of them together, however, add up to the openness,
playfulness and oddness that seem to embody the Jewishness of the text."84
Yet each memberof this lattertriadis also open to doubt.Rabbinicmidrashon
aggadic (that is, narrative)materialsoften has an openness or a playfulness that
those used to readingthe Bible as sourceof doctrine(as many Christiansare) may
indeed find refreshing.Aggadic midrashis not altogetheropen-ended,however,
but ratherseeks not infrequentlyto eliminate readings that might, for example,
encourageadherentsof non-rabbinicforms of Judaism,or of otherreligions. And
midrashon halakhah(law), traditionallythe centerof Talmudicdiscourse, drives
towardnormativejudgments in ways that those who prize openness for its own
sake or look for playfulness can only find enormouslydisappointing.The "odd-
ness"of Jewishtexts thatBrueggemannadmiresmay be a functionof unfamiliarity.
Those who work regularlyin the field may not find these modes of readingodd at
all or likely to make the biblical text seem odder.
A bettercandidatefor a Jewish approachto the text, I shouldthink,would be a
readingthat gives priorityto the Torah,to the Pentateuch,relegatingthe othersec-
tions of the scriptureto a secondaryor tertiarystatus.For this, in accordancewith
some claims for Moses made in the Torahitself (for example, Num 12:6-8, Deut
34:10-12), is exactly whatthe Jewishtradition,and certainlythe rabbinictradition,
does. In this, it distinguishesitself sharplyfrom historicalcriticism.For historical
criticsdatemuchof thePentateuchalmaterialrelativelylateandnotethatmost of the
literaturein theOldTestament/Tanakh knowsnothingof Moses ortheclaimthatGod
revealedanunchanginglaw to himin thesuprememomentof revelation.85 The place-
mentof thePentateuchfirstwithintheJewishBible is thustheresultof a long process
of what Childscalls "canonicalshaping." Thatthe canonicaland the historicalor-
ders of the books do not coincidehas importantinterpretiveconsequences.For the
rabbis,to interpretAmos or Isaiahas if he knowsof Pentateuchallaw andnarrativeis
as naturalas can be-however playfulthis may seem to those educatedon historical
criticism.For a historicalcriticto do the sameis to do violenceto thoseprophetsand
to producean absurdlyanachronisticview of Israelitereligionin the eighthcentury.

"Ibid., 111. Brueggemann even goes so far as to refer to the theory of John Murray Cuddihy
that, in Brueggemann's words (p. 724, n. 10), "Freudian slips are a peculiarly Jewish phenom-
enon when suppressed Jewishness will out. On such a notion, I suggest that the Bible is full
of such 'slips,' especially on the lips of [YHWH]." The ahistorical, essentialist assumption of
this observation would be breathtaking even if it did not come from the pen of a scholar who
expresses sympathy for postmodernism. Cuddihy's fascinating book (The Ordeal of Civility:
Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity [Boston: Basic Books,
1974]) is about the impact of emancipation and modernization on certain nineteenth- and
twentieth-century Jewish intellectuals, among whose number YHWH is not usually listed.
"8SeeHBOTHC, 10-15.
292 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Forall his insistenceon "theJewishnessof theOldTestament"andhis excoriation

of his fellow Christiansfor neglectingit, Brueggemannbreaksdramaticallywith the
ongoingJewishtraditionin thathe grantsno precedencewhatsoeverto the Torah.His
indexof scripturalreferencestells the story:8.5 columnsof referencesto the Psalms,
butonly 2.5 for Deuteronomyandless thanone forLeviticus. (Therearemorerefer-
ences to Job thanto Leviticus!) Thereare 4.5 columnsof referencesto Isaiah,but
only 2.5 for Genesis,and,needlessto say, Psalms,Isaiah,andJobarenot interpreted,
as they often arein rabbinicmidrashandeven medievalpashtanut,as commentaries
on Pentateuchalpassages.Theseprioritiesarenot at all surprisingin a Christiantheo-
logian.Afterall,PsalmsandIsaiaharethemostfrequentlycitedOldTestamentbooks
amongearlyChristianauthors.86 But this disregardfor the traditionalJewish priori-
ties is out of place in a scholarwho perceivesthe text as pervadedby "Jewishness"
andregardsthe Jewishcommunityas "aheededtruth-teller."
This is not at all to deny that there are contexts within which Brueggemann's
theological choices make sense. These choices are, in fact, eminently defensible
both on Christianand, mutatismutandis,on historicalcritical grounds.My point,
rather,is that Brueggemannfails to see how thoroughlyhis interpretivemethod
breakswith the history of Jewish readingand to acknowledge the enormousdif-
ference thatexists betweendiachronicand synchronicinterpretations.This failure
affects not only his approachto individualthemes,but also his view of the Israelite
ethic itself, where,again,certainimportantJewishperspectivesaresimply ignored.
One thinks,for example, of his bold claim that"if we are to identifywhat is most
characteristic and most distinctive in the life and vocation of this partner of
[YHWH],it is the remarkableequationof the love of God withlove of neighbor."87
Really? Wheredo we find thatfamiliarequationin the Old Testament/Tanakh?88
Thatcollection does, to be sure, enjoin Israelitesboth to love God (Deut 6:5) and
to love their neighbor(Lev 19:18), and the formerinjunctionis associated with
doing the commandments(for example, Exod 20:6), many of which, of course,
involve human relations. But where are the two loves equated and not merely
related? Behindthe equationof the two loves thatBrueggemannthinkshe finds in
the Old Testament/Tanakhdoubtless lies Jesus' discussion of the two greatcom-
mandments(Deut 6:4-5 and Lev 19:18) in Mark 12:28-34 and Matt 23:34-40,
thougheven there the two are not equated.

861 thank my colleague, Professor Gary A. Anderson, for reminding me of this.

87TOT,424 (Brueggemann's emphasis).
8"ProfessorJoel S. Kaminsky points out to me that Prov 17:5 and 19:17 come close to the
equation of the two loves. Note, however, that love is not mentioned in either verse, nor is covenant
(which is the context of Brueggemann's remark). It seems to me that the first verse is connected
with notions of humanity as created in the image of God (compare Gen 1:26-28 and 9:6), and the
second, with notions that God rewards the charitable (compare Deut 15:10). I would still call this
relating, rather than equating, the service of God and the treatmentof one's fellow.
 JON D. LEVENSON 293

The rabbinicview is ratherdifferent.Beginningat least as early as the Mishnah,

the Jewish traditionhas actuallydistinguishedbetween "commandmentsbetween
a person and God" and "commandmentsbetween a person and his neighbor."89
God was thoughtto enjoin both sets of norms, of course, and the rabbis took an
exceedingly dim view of one who claimed to love God yet mistreatedother per-
sons. But the differencebetweenthe two sets of normsis clear,andrabbinicthought
stubbornlyresists any notion that Jews can exhausttheir obligations to God sim-
ply throughtheir treatmentof theirneighbors.
This is exactly as one would expect of a traditionthatputs the Pentateuchfirst
(in more senses thanone), for a largenumberof the commandmentsthereincenter
on questionsof sacrifice,purity,and the like-that is, "commandmentsbetween a
person and God." A traditionof this characteris unlikely to make the very equa-
tion that Brueggemanndeems "most characteristicand most distinctive"of the
scripturethat he thinks, ironically, is suffused with "Jewishness."This is not to
deny that Christiansmay appropriatethe Old Testamentin a way that sees those
laws of sacrifice, purity, and the like as voided by the Christ-event.Indeed, this
preferencefor the "morallaw"over the "ceremoniallaw,"to use the familiarChris-
tian terminology, is longstanding in the church and especially pronounced in
Protestantism.But to projectthe Christiansensibility onto the Old Testamentnot
only violates the principles of historical criticism; it is also incompatible with
Brueggemann'scommitmentto seeing "theJewish community[as] a heededtruth-
teller." Indeed, had Brueggemann sought to "heed" the rabbinic division of
commandmentsinto those "betweena personand God"andthose "betweena per-
son and his neighbor,"he might have backedoff from his unqualifiedequationof
the love of God with the love of neighborwithinthe Old Testament/Tanakhitself.
To do so might have led him to a reconsiderationof his whole manner of
relating the theology of the Old Testament/Tanakhto the concern with social
justice thathe places in the foregroundthroughouthis book. But this again raises
the question of just how open Judaismand Christianitycan be to implementing
the perceptions of the Hebrew Bible characteristicof the other community. A
suggestive case study in Brueggemann'sview of this is his handlingof the issue
of purity. "My own judgment,"he concludes, "is that... in Christianextrapola-
tions from the Old Testament,thejustice trajectoryhas decisively and irreversibly
defeated the puritytrajectory."90 Brueggemanndefends against one obvious cri-
tique-that the Old Testament does not generally set justice against purity at
all-by limiting his remarkto "Christianextrapolationsfromthe Old Testament."
The same limitationalso protectshim againstthe chargeof hegemonic discourse

89See, for example, m.Yoma 8:9.

"TOT, 196. I thank Professor Joel S. Kaminsky for drawing my attention to the problematics
of Brueggemann's handling of the matter of purity.
294 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

at least in regardto Judaism,for he here says nothing, at least explicitly, about

Jews who observe purity laws that Brueggemannregards as violations of jus-
tice.9l But the cost of this pluralismis the loss of "theJewish community[as] a
heeded truth-teller,"or at least of thatsegment of the Jewish communitythat still
esteems and observes the practicablelaws of purity, as all Jews did until a few
centuriesago. In this instance, "thetext itself' and Judaismboth give way to the
characteristicview of liberal Protestantism.Indeed, were that not the case, one
wonders how the liberalProtestanttraditioncould maintainits identity at all.

* Conclusion:The Limits of Commonality

The openness of Jews and Christiansto learningabouttheir common scriptureis
every bit as positive as Brueggemannthinks.It is essential to recognize, however,
thateven when agreementon the meaningof biblical texts is reached,an ineradi-
cable range of disagreementmust remain if the two communitiesare to survive
and give their distinctive testimonies-neither of which is the plain sense of the
common scripture.As Childs wisely puts it:
The real taskof theologicaldialoguebetweenChristiansandJews does
not lie in exploring the religious boundariesof a lowest common
denominatorwithin a secular society, nor does it consist merely in
engaging in commonethical causes-good as the latter may be . . .
Rather,true dialoguemust engage itself with the elementsof unique-
ness of each groupand focus on its highestcommondenominator.92
Whateverthe validityof Jewish,Christian,andhistorical-criticalmodes of read-
ing, and whateverthe degree and the value of the overlap among them, at their
deepest levels they are irreduciblydifferent.CritiquingBrevardChilds and me,
Walter Brueggemannspeaks of "the odd triangle of interpretationin which we
find ourselves concerningJewish, Christianand critical perspectives."93 A genu-
ine pluralismaccepts and attends
to "theodd triangle"anddoes not seek to minimize
or dissipatediversityby appealto commonalties,real or imagined.

9'But Brueggemann's pluralism does not seem to extend to Christians committed to con-
tinuing the Old Testament notions of purity, which he sees as "definitively and irreversibly"
superseded in the church.
92Childs, "Does the Old Testament," 64.
93TOT,94.