A SHORT GUIDE TO “DIAGONAL METHOD AND DIALECTICAL LOGIC”

* * *
PRELIMINARY DRAFT

UWE PETERSEN

Contents
1. Introduction 1
1.1. General remarks 1
1.2. A quick overview of the contents of the book 2
2. Logic and Dialectic: Hegel vs. Kant 3
2.1. Kant’s transcendental philosophy and the Antinomy of Pure Reason 3
2.2. Hegel’s idea of dialectic and speculative philosophy 4
3. Antinomies: (higher order) logic vs. (axiomatic) set theory 4
3.1. Collection and abstraction 5
3.2. Unrestricted abstraction as the source of antinomies in (higher order) logic 5
3.3. What I make of it 6
4. Freeing the conflicts of reason with itself 6
4.1. Restricting classical logic 6
4.2. Gentzen’s sequential formulation of logic, cut elimination, consistency, and the role of
contraction 6
4.3. On the descriptive power of contraction free logic with unrestricted abstraction 7
4.4. The fixed point property 7
5. The foundations of mathematics and logic revisited 8
5.1. Hilbert’s proof theory and Gödel’s incompleteness results 8
5.2. Infinity, mathematical induction, and a limited recovery of contraction 8
References 9

1. Introduction
Admittedly, a 2000 page treatise is a bit much,1 even if its topic is something as challenging as a
combination of foundations of mathematical logic and dialectic in the tradition of transcendental
idealism. That’s why I feel the need to provide some guidance as to how to approach this monster
of a tome—hoping to prevent it from turning into a tomb.
Right from the start it should be clear that this is not a treatise to be read from the beginning
to the end. Two thirds of it, i.e., the first two books, are meant to serve essentially as reference
books for the third book.
The theory I am trying to develop in the third book is new and unfamiliar and a lot has to be
understood to be able to appreciate it.

1.1. General remarks. My “Diagonal Method and Dialectical Logic” (DMaDL) is an attempt
at re-assessing Cantor’s diagonal method on the basis of a non-classical logic with the aim of
making room for a theory of dialectic and speculative philosophy somewhat inspired by Hegel’s
“Wissenschaft der Logik”.
It cannot be expected that such an undertaking will be greeted with enthusiasm or at least
cautious approval. Too many entrenched preconceptions are at stake.

1
I am speaking of [3].

1
2 UWE PETERSEN

Apart from the prejudices that may stand in the way to understanding the aim of DMaDL,
an undertaking of this kind requires quite some in-depth knowledge of both, Cantor’s diagonal
method as well as Hegel’s idea of dialectic, including their environments and ramifications. This
should explain why two thirds of my DMaDL are devoted to philosophical and mathematical/logical
tools and background materials.
Cantor’s diagonal method is a highly developed mathematical tool that reaches from transfinite
numbers in set theory to the incompleteness and undecidability results in metamathematics. In
its original appearance, the proof of the impossibility of enumerating the real numbers, it is often
regarded as counter-intuitive.
On the other hand, Hegel’s idea of dialectic and speculative philosophy is not only extremely
challenging to common sense but to make things worse, it is written in a language that few philoso-
phers are familiar with theses days and on top of that it was written 200 years ago so even German
speakers may find it difficult. Philosophically it is buried in an incredible jumble of opinions,
doctrines and positions and probably no two Hegel scholars will agree on what it consists in. Nev-
ertheless, there is no shortage of Hegel scholars telling you what Hegel had in mind. On the one
hand, I dismiss this kind of Hegel scholarship, but on the other I still need it in order to keep those
at bay who tell you that if dialectic is anything then it is this or that. That’s another reason why
I feel the need to provide some background as to what kind of dialectic my DMaDL is aiming at.
Roughly, the relevant issues can be characterized by the following catch words:
• set theory (Cantor, diagonal method, transfinite numbers, antinomies)
• logic (Frege, symbolic, mathematical, Gentzen, sequential)
• metamathematics (Gödel, incompleteness, Church, Kleene, recursive functions, undecid-
ability)
• transcendental idealism (Kant, negative dialectic, antinomies)
• speculative philosophy (Hegel, positive dialectic, thought determinations)
Simultaneous familiarity in all of these fields is rare. For a start, this is not a common combination.
But apart from that, it is also very unbalanced: mathematical logic is a fairly new but theoretically
highly developed discipline whereas transcendental idealism after its inception in the late 18th
century has not managed to mature to anything that could be called a “theory”. Representatives
of transcendental idealism and speculative philosophy commonly shun mathematical methods and,
vice versa, practitioners within the mathematical disciplines despise Hegelian philosophy.

1.2. A quick overview of the contents of the book. My DMaDL consists of three Books,
divided into altogether seven Parts.
• Book One aims at providing those tools from mathematics and formal logic that will play
a relevant role in the second part of the Book Three.
– Its first part (Part A) provides intuitive mathematical notions of basic set theory,
algebra, and arithmetic which reappear in formalized guise in the second part of the
third book.
– Its second part (Part B) provides mathematical-logical tools, from different formula-
tions (axiomatic, sequential) of sentential logic to axiomatic set theory.
Neither of the foregoing is meant to be read as an introductory text. The point is to provide
a reference book to be consulted in the context of the third book.
• Book Two provides philosophical materials which are in one or another way related to my
enterprise.
– Its first part (Part C) aims at presenting philosophical materials somewhat relating
to metaphysics, from the Ancient Greeks roughly through to Hegel’s closure of the
transcendental tradition.
– Its second part (Part D) aims at collecting materials from the (philosophical) founda-
tions of mathematics.
– Its third part (Part E) collects issues from analytic philosophy and other issues that
are not directly related to my enterprise.
• In Book Three I finally present a theory of dialectical logic and speculative philosophy
which is grounded in the attempts at a foundation of the notion of number in the late 19th
century through to the metamathematical results of the Thirties of the last century.
 A SHORT GUIDE 3

– Its first part (Part F) aims at developing the underlying ideas for the theory that is
to be presented in the second part.
– Its second part (Part G) is a step by step presentation of a contraction free logic with
unrestricted abstraction with sufficient arithmetical strength.
In a nutshell, what I am trying to do is consider antinomies of the kind that emerged in set
theory, semantics and logic in a non-classical logic where they don’t lead to triviality and use their
differences to establish (laws of) thought determinations.
Speculative logic, as envisaged here, is a theory of concepts, roughly in the tradition of Frege’s
Grundgesetze, which aims at a definition in purely logical terms, and a derivation by purely log-
ical means of thought forms like those of modality, quantity, time, and space, to name the most
immediate ones.
The principal possibility of ever coming to envisage such an ambitious project is provided by the
emergence of paradoxes in the foundations of logic, semantics, and set theory which sank Frege’s
original project of a logical foundation of arithmetic. In other words, what brings set theory and
transcendental philosophy together are the so-called “antinomies”.

2. Logic and Dialectic: Hegel vs. Kant

Logic and dialectic both have their roots in Ancient Greek philosophy. Aristoteles is commonly
viewed as the father of logic and Zenon is commonly (apparently on the authority of Aristoteles)
called the inventor of dialectic. These roots notwithstanding, I take little from them. Some historical
material can be found in chapter XIV of DMaDL.
Like the notion of the atom was not brought to clarification by reading what has been handed
down to us from Leukippos and Demokritos, reading Aristoteles and Zenon cannot be expected to
bring clarity into the relation of dialectic and logic. In particular not because the term ‘dialectic’
acquired a new meaning with Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” and it is this new meaning that
became central to Hegel’s philosophy. And with Frege logic entered a new age.

2.1. Kant’s transcendental philosophy and the Antinomy of Pure Reason. Kant’s start-
ing point was the endless trouble of metaphysics. His “Critique of Pure Reason” can be understood
as a broadly laid out reductio ad absurdum to show that we can never transcend the limits of
possible experience, or, differently put, we do not know things as they are in themselves but only
as they appear to us. For that purpose he set out to map the faculty of human knowledge. One
cornerstone of this map is the analytic nature of logic and the synthetic apriorical nature of arith-
metic. This is of great interest for my enterprise because it marks the beginning of the notion
of dialectic that my DMaDL aims at. The relevant place is Book II of Kant’s “Critique of Pure
Reason” which is entitled “The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason” and its second division is
called “Transcendental Dialectic”.
Kant was not favorably disposed towards dialectic. For him dialectic was a “logic of illusion”; but
the way he articulated his rejection suits me well: “General logic, when . . . treated as an organon,
is called dialectic.” I am happy to take that over from Kant, only that I do not take it negatively.
To cite Kant:
the principles of logic cannot lead to any material knowledge. Since logic, that is
to say, pure logic, abstracts from the content of knowledge, the attempt to cull
a real object out of logic is a vain effort and therefore a thing that no one has
ever done. If the transcendental philosophy is correct, such a task would involve
metaphysics rather than logic.2
Now, this is just what I want to do. And it is indeed metaphysics and quite a lot has to be explained
in order to make this idea palatable.
In accordance with his anti-dialectical disposition, Kant’s view of the Antinomy of Pure Reason
was negative in the sense that he proposed to restrict the transcendental ideas to a regulative use
in order to avoid them.
It must be clear that I do not endorse Kant’s transcendental philosophy and even less his
solution to his Antinomy of Pure Reason, but it is the starting point for Hegel’s idea of dialectic

2 [5], p. 253.
4 UWE PETERSEN

and speculative philosophy and that’s why it occupies a prominent place in the BOOK TWO of
my DMaDL.
Remark 2.1. Chapter XV in BOOK TWO of my DMaDL provides material regarding Kant’s
transcendental philosophy; chapter XVII collects a bit of what the epigones are saying.
2.2. Hegel’s idea of dialectic and speculative philosophy. Hegel did not regard Kant’s rea-
soning as conclusive and, in particular, he did not draw the negative conclusion as Kant did, i.e.,
he did not regard the dialectic of pure reason as a refutation of the possibility of transcending the
limits of possible experience.
First of all, he maintained against Kant that it wasn’t just the four ideas of reason which were
responsible for antinomies, but that contradictions were ubiquitous.
Kant wanted to give his four cosmological antinomies a show of completeness by
the principle of classification which he took from his schema of the categories. But
profounder insight into the antinomial, or more truly into the dialectical nature of
reason demonstrates any Notion whatever to be a unity of opposed moments to
which, therefore, the form of antinomial assertions could be given.3
Furthermore Hegel objected to Kant’s solution of the antinomies, calling it (in translation) “an
excessive tenderness towards the world to remove from it the contradictions”.4 Hegel’s idea was
to take the contradictions as constitutive for knowledge and to employ them for a foundation
of thought forms. With Hegel there emerged a notion of dialectic that assigns cognitive value to
contradictions. Through dialectic, Hegel treated logic as an organon.
Here is a sample of Hegel’s writing:
The method of absolute cognition is to this extent analytic. That it finds the fur-
ther determination of its initial universal simply and solely in that universal, is the
absolute objectivity of the Notion, of which objectivity the method is the certainty.
But the method is no less synthetic, since its subject matter, determined immedi-
ately as a simple universal, by virtue of the determinateness which it possesses in
its very immediacy and universality, exhibits itself as an other. 〚. . .〛
This is no less synthetic than analytic moment of the judgement, by which the
universal of the beginning of its own accord determines itself as the other of itself,
is to be named the dialectical moment.5
This may sound unpalatable to many people and, not surprisingly, Hegel is often dismissed as
an apostle of obscurity. But the point here is that attention is directed towards thought as an
activity which is linked to its object in such a way as to make it impossible to fully separate them
(“entanglement”). Thought conceived in this way is constitutive for the cognition of its object. In
this understanding the contradictions that thought runs into carry information about the way in
which thought and its object are entangled. The further going idea is then that is is the source of
intensional determinations and in this sense metaphysics becomes logic.
No doubt this is a difficult line of thinking and without the help from foundational studies in
mathematics and logic I would have despaired long ago.
Remark 2.2. Chapter XVI in BOOK TWO of my DMaDL provides material regarding Hegel’s
speculative philosophy: again, chapter XVII collects a bit of what the epigones are saying.

3. Antinomies: (higher order) logic vs. (axiomatic) set theory

Were it only for the formulation of antinomies and contradictions in the work of Kant and
Hegel, the prospects for developing a theory of dialectic and speculative philosophy as a theory of
contradictions emerging in thought and being reconciled in thought would look very dim, indeed. I
would never have started to undertake this project of a foundation of dialectic had it not been for
the emergence of antinomies in the foundations of set theory, (higher order) logic and semantics.
So I consider these antinomies a godsend for my enterprise. But a thorough engagement with them
requires a technical expertise which is not easily found amongst philosophers.
3 Cf. quotation 64.8 (2) on p. 855 in DMaDL.
4 Cf. quotation 64.6 (3) on p. 853 in DMaDL.
5 Cf. quotation 66.22 (2) on p. 891 in DMaDL.
 A SHORT GUIDE 5

In mathematical logic antinomies arose in an attempt at providing a logical (or set theoretical)
foundation of arithmetic.
I begin with the set theoretical paradigm although it will not play a role in my theory apart
from being a suitable foil against which to develop my own position.
What follows is inevitably technical and not meant to to do more than provide more than a first
rough idea.
3.1. Collection and abstraction. At the most basic level set theory and higher order logic look
deceptively similar which is particularly obvious when it comes to the formulation of Russell’s
paradox. In set theoretical terms this is an almost immediate consequence of a basic axiom of the
(set theoretical) form
(CP) t ∈ {x : F[x]} ↔ F[t].
This may look innocent enough but this impression is deceptive. Substituting u ∈/ u for F[u], where
u is x or t gives:
t ∈ {x : x ∈/ x} ↔ t ∈/ t
and further substituting {x : x ∈/ x} for t:
{x : x ∈/ x} ∈ {x : x ∈/ x} ↔ {x : x ∈/ x} ∈/ {x : x ∈/ x}.
If we write R for {x : x ∈/ x} this is
R ∈ R ↔ R ∈/ R,
i.e., a contradiction of the form A ↔ ¬A which leads to A ∧ ¬A in a few steps of classical logic.
But, as set theorists would have it, {x : x ∈/ x} is not a set. A set collects previously given objects
into a whole. That’s the basic idea of axiomatic set theory and in that sense the paradoxes are
avoided somewhat in a Kantian spirit.
In the case of axiomatic set theory, this finds expression in the axiom of regularity which implies
that no set can contain itself as an element. As a result, there can be no universal set, because a
universal set would be an element of itself. Every set is well-founded, i.e., has a least element.
3.2. Unrestricted abstraction as the source of antinomies in (higher order) logic. Frege
maintained, against Kant, that arithmetic is analytic. In order to carry out his logical foundation
of arithmetic Frege developed a (higher order) logic approach which has to be distinguished from
a set theoretical one.
In modern notation Frege introduced the following axiom of abstraction which corresponds in
an obvious way to CP above:
(λ -abstraction) s ∈ λ xF[x] ↔ F[s],
where λ xF[x] is called an ‘abstraction term’, or just ‘λ -term’.
Now the same strategy as in the set theoretical case gives a contradiction. Take the term
λ x(x ∈/ x), abbreviate it by R (Russell’s term) and apply λ -abstraction:
R ∈ λ x(x ∈/ x) ↔ R ∈/ R,
i.e.,
(Russell’s paradox) R ∈ R ↔ R ∈/ R.
As before, if classical logic is available, this leads to a full blown contradiction of the form that
R ∈ R as well R ∈/ R are both provable. Given the logical principle ex contradictione quodlibet we
have triviality, i.e., every formula becomes provable.
But, as logicians would have it, λ x(x ∈/ x) is not well-formed; it violates a type distinction: no
predicate can apply to itself.
So the reactions to the possibility of formulating Russell’s paradox are actually very similar,
despite the fact that the underlying notions are different. But when it comes to proving a contra-
diction the predominant reaction is that the language has to be restricted. I am happy to accept
that for the case of sets, but in the case of (higher order) logic, i.e., λ-abstraction, I want to pursue
a different strategy.
Remark 3.1. Chapter XVIII in DMaDL has some materials regarding the reduction of the notion
of number to (classical higher order) logic and its failure.
6 UWE PETERSEN

3.3. What I make of it. As far as I am concerned the message is simple: we don’t have to worry
about provable contradictions, antinomies. They are there in abundance. Negative dialectics has
already manifested itself in the foundations of mathematics and higher order logic—in the form of
antinomies much more precisely formulated than philosophy has ever managed. Now the question
is how to bring the idea of positive dialectic, or speculative logic, into a mathematical-logical form.
So what strategy do I propose?
The first step is simple to determine: since I take unrestricted abstraction as one of the cor-
nerstones of dialectical logic and unrestricted abstraction is not compatible with classical logic,
I have to develop a non-classical logic which allows unrestricted abstraction without becoming
inconsistent and/or trivial.
This is where my project of Diagonal Method and Dialectical Logic really starts: break the step
from A ↔ ¬A to A ∧ ¬A, i.e., replace classical logic by a non-classical logic.

4. Freeing the conflicts of reason with itself

It’s a matter of giving the conflicts of reason their due.

4.1. Restricting classical logic. The possibility of restricting logic so as to be able to allow
unrestricted abstraction without running the risk of triviality is crucial for my enterprise. Again
it is a point of contention. There is no shortage of people who claim that this is, if not impossible
then, at least, emaciating reason to a point of being useless. Restricting classical logic to achieve
that goal is actually very simple—given the right tools. A particular suitable tool is Gentzen’s
sequential formulation of logic. This is not just an invaluable tool for proof theory (proving the
consistency of formalized theories of arithmetic, for instance) and theoretical computer science,
but also for designing non-classical logics. Trying to get this point across is another reason why
DMaDL has become so bulky.
Three features in Gentzen’s sequential formulation of logic are of relevance for the proof theory
of non-classical logic
(1) The first lies in the possibility of cut elimination. Consistency is a simple consequence of
cut elimination.
(2) The second lies in the separation of operational and structural rules: non-classical logics
are easily characterized by restriction of the structural rules.
(3) The third lies in the fact that cut elimination proof in a system without contraction does
not require an induction on the length of the cut formula.
I want to look a little bit more closely at these features in the next section.

4.2. Gentzen’s sequential formulation of logic, cut elimination, consistency, and the
role of contraction. Gentzen’s formulation of logic has only rules apart from one type of initial
sequents: A ⇒ A.
The rules are divided into logical (or operational ) and structural rules. The logical rules introduce
a logical constant; the structural rules don’t involve any logical constants, but may be viewed as
regulating the way in which assumption can be handled, like swapping them or replacing two
occurrences of the same assumption by just one occurrence.6 The cut rule
Γ ⇒A A, Π ⇒ B
Γ, Π ⇒ B
is the only one where a formula can “get completely lost”. If there is a contradiction in a formal
system, then the empty sequent is provable by means of a cut:
⇒A A⇒
⇒
So a proof of consistency can be achieved by proving that cuts are eliminable: the empty sequent
is not provable without cut. If there were a contradiction, the empty sequent would be provable by
means of a cut.
6 Needless to add, I suppose, that this is not generally appreciated and there are a lot of people out there who
prefer to dress structural rules in logical constants, for instance.
 A SHORT GUIDE 7

In the proof of cut elimination the rules of contraction are the only ones which introduce the
need for an induction on the length (or some other measure of complexity) of the cut formula. In
view of the fact that unrestricted abstraction may shorten a wff as is the case of Russell’s paradox:
R ∈ R is shorter than R ∈/ R from which it has been obtained. This suggests a very simple strategy:
abandoning contraction.
Cut elimination in the absence of contraction doesn’t require an induction on the length of the cut
formula.
This is the key to the possibility of allowing unrestricted abstraction without running into incon-
sistency.7. To see this, note that what unrestricted abstraction provides are paradoxes of the kind
A ↔ B, where A and B are logically incompatible like, for instance A and ¬A. Without contraction
one doesn’t get from A ↔ ¬A to A and ¬A.
Remark 4.1. Some material can be found in chapter XXI, in particular in § 85. I wish to emphasize
that my approach is not that of a paraconsistent logic nor a many valued logic. No tampering with
specific axioms, like tertium non datur (excluded middle) or contradictione quodlibet (excluded
contradiction) which involve logical constants nor with truth values.
4.3. On the descriptive power of contraction free logic with unrestricted abstraction.
It is no problem to restrict logic in such a way as to be able to allow unrestricted abstraction
consistently. But then there is the question of the strength of the resulting system. Again, this is
a question that needs careful investigation and not just the opinion of some senior academic who
can tell you straightaway that such a logic is too weak.
Much of the third book of DMaDL is dedicated to the formal system Li Dλ which can be said
to be based on two logical constants ∈ and ⊆ which represent the two notions of “is” that we have
in our (i.e., Indoeuropean) languages: Venus is a planet, and the whale is a mammal.8
Remark 4.2. Chapter XXXI, but particularly chapter XXXII are relevant in this respect. Some
aspects of contraction free logic may require getting used to it, in particular since classical thinking
is resilient. This applies above all to the notions of ‘and’ and ‘or’.
4.4. The fixed point property. Now how can we unfold the contradictions of thought?
We have already met a fixed point: Russell’s term. This can be generalized to every propositional
form:
F ↔ C[F ].
There is also a fixed point property for term forms:
f = Z[f ].
Like, for instance, the singleton: there is a term f= = {f= } which makes short work of well-
foundedness. Or, even more devastating, it seems, a fixed point for the complement: f∁ = ∁f∁ .
Here, perhaps, the division between classical and dialectical logic is most telling:
• in classical set theory there is a mapping g such that g[[x]] 6= x for all x;
• in dialectical (higher order) logic (property theory) there is no mapping g such that g[[x]] 6=
x for all x.
The point is a highly metaphysical one: is it possible, in principle, to divide “the world” (or “the
universe”, if you prefer) into two disjunct parts, the union of which is “the world”. The classical
position may be characterized as answering this question with “yes” (tertium non datur ). The po-
sition which I pursue in my philosophical work and which I label “dialectical” says “no”.9 According
to the fixed point property, there is a term fcp such that the complement λx (x ∈/ fcp ) of fcp equals
fcp itself. Differently put, the intersection between fcp and its complement λx (x ∈/ fcp ) equals fcp
itself: λx (x ∈/ fcp ) ∩ fcp = fcp . This fixed point cannot be shown to be empty, although nothing can
be established to fall under it either.
7 To the best of my knowledge, the consistency of a contraction free logic with unrestricted abstraction was first
proved in [1]. After that came [2] and [4].
8 There is, in fact, a third one: identity ≡, which, however, can be defined, or, alternatively can replace ∈ by
defining s ∈ t :≡ λ x(x ≡ s) ⊆ t.
9 To be sure, this is not the end of the story. The idea is that this moment which escapes division holds the key
for an extension.
8 UWE PETERSEN

Remark 4.3. In a sense, the fixed point property can now be said to take the place of contra-
dictions. Hegel’s claim that there are contradictions in every concept thus turns into the provable
claim that there are fixed points in every concept.
The fixed point property also provides the possibility of definition as a fixed point somewhat
along the following line:
W
add = λx1 x2 x3 ((x2 = 0  x3 = x1 ) ∨ y (x2 = y ′  x3 = add[[y]]′ )).10
Such a definition provides for the characteristic recursion equations of the respective function. In
the case of add we have
add[[s, 0]] = s, and
add[[s, t′ ]] = add[[s, t]]′ ,
which is the familiar s + 0 = s and s + t′ = (s + t)′ if we let s + t :≡ add[[s, t]]
This can be extended to k-recursive functions, k ∈ N.
But while the recursion equations can be easily established, a proof of the totality of the defined
function, i.e., the function has a value in the natural numbers for every input from the natural
numbers, requires induction and that’s where infinity proper comes into play.

5. The foundations of mathematics and logic revisited

With a non-classical logic the perspective on metamathematical results changes and the resulting
changes bear on metaphysics.
5.1. Hilbert’s proof theory and Gödel’s incompleteness results. Cantor’s diagonal method
is not just a tool in set theory, it is also underlying various metamathematical results which are
often interpreted as limiting result for mathematics. It must be clear that I see this as a chance
for metaphysics, i.e., the expansion of knowledge beyond the empirical, i.e., a speculative step. If
anything is being limited it is the wishful thinking of classical theoreticians.
Just like Cantor’s diagonal method ruled out the possibility of enumerating the real numbers,
so it prevents formal system of a minimal arithmetical strength from being complete. What Gödel
showed was
(1) Any formal system Σ which contains some basic arithmetic is incomplete, i.e., there exist
formally undecidable sentences.
(2) These undecidable sentences can be decided in a suitably enriched formal system Σ1 , only,
however, at the expense of new formally undecidable sentences.
This is what Gödel called the incompleteability of mathematics.
Now the first point to observe is that whatever Gödel was doing with arithmetization can be
done in Li Dλ without the detour through numbers, by means of λ -terms.
But in logical respect, Cantor’s diagonal method heavily relies on contraction. So the question
is, what happens to the applications of contraction in metamathematical results based on Cantor’s
diagonal method?
The answer is in fact very simple: primitive recursive predicates contract, so there is little change
to be expected. The change comes with induction.
5.2. Infinity, mathematical induction, and a limited recovery of contraction. Abandon-
ing contraction is a safe way of making room for unrestricted abstraction. Without contraction,
however, the usual definition of the totality of natural numbers
V V
N :≡ λ x y (0 ∈ y → ( z (z ∈ y → z ′ ∈ y) → x ∈ y))
only gets us to 0′ ∈ N. The point is simply that the induction hypothesis still has to be available
after having been used, something which is usually managed by contraction.
This failure shouldn’t come as a surprise. The lack of contraction makes the system quite simple,
indeed. Its consistency can be established by a simple induction and thus we know that induction
cannot be provable in Li Dλ .
10 A note on logical symbols: I use V and W instead of the more familiar ∀ and ∃ because of their proximity to ∧
and ∨ of which they are infinite versions. The symbol  stands for the alternative conjunction of which the necessity
operator  is the infinite version.
 A SHORT GUIDE 9

So the question is: how can we make good for the lack of contraction in the definition of the
totality of natural numbers? The problem is not to have a term which comprises all natural numbers,
but one which provably doesn’t include more.
The approach I have taken is very much in the spirit of self-reference. Let γ̆[A] :≡ λ x(x ∈ x  A).
This gives:
γ̆[A] ↔ γ̆[A]  A
and eventually γ̆[A] ↔ A  . . .  A for very number of  -conjunctions. As a consequence the defi-
nition V V
Z :≡ λ x y (0 ∈ y → (γ̆[ z (z ∈ y → z ′ ∈ y)] → x ∈ y))
can be seen to be sufficient to encompass all natural numbers.
What is left is the task of showing that only natural numbers can be created in this way. With
this we enter proof theory proper and I don’t think this can be explained in a quick guide. All I
want to indicate is that this involves a step over a conceptual limit, which I consider a speculative
step.
Remark 5.1. Chapters XXXIII and XXXIV of DMaDL deal with this topic.

References
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E-mail address: uwe.petersen@asfpg.de