DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN VS SECRETARY OF LABOR

GR NO 91915
J. ROMERO

FACTS:
On Sept 6, 1984 the med-arbiter certified the Divine Word University Employees Union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. The union submitted its proposals on March 7, 1985. The
University’s reply requested that a preliminary conference be held on May 28, 1985. Before the conference the VP
of the union resigned and withdrew the proposals hence the PC was cancelled.

After three years, the affiliate of the union, Associated Labor Union, requested a conference with the University for
the purposes of continuing the bargaining negotiations. Not having heard from the university, a follow up request
was sent and warned the university from intereference. The university maintained it silence.

The union thereafter filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP, refusal to bargain,
discrimination and coercion. Conferences were held after the filing of the notice of strike and the parties came to
an agreement.

It was found however, that the university filed for a petition for certification election one hour before the
agreement was concluded.

The union then submitted proposals which were again ignored by the university. Marathon conciliations were held
to no avail.

The Sec of Labor assumed jurisdiction and directed that all striking workers to report back to work within 24
hours.

The med-arbiter issued an order directing the conduct of the certification election. To Which the Sec of Labor
directed to hold in abeyance. The Sec of Labor dismissed the cases of ULP filed by the union and the university.

ISSUE:
Whether or not certification election can be held after CBA was agreed upon after 5 years.

HELD:
An employer who is requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for certification election any time except
upon clear showing the existence of either:
1) petition is filed within one year from the issuance of a final certification election result OR
2) when a bargaining deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout.

Deadlock is the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of neutralization caused by
the opposition of persons or factions. There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting
from the action of equal and opposed forces.
 The records of the case shows that there was no reasonable effort at good faith bargaining on the part of the
university.

Procedure:
1) proposal
2) conference in case of differences
3) conciliation
4) the parties are prohibited from exercising acts which would impede or disrupt the early settlement of the case
5) exert efforts for amicable settlement

The union after submitting proposals which were ignored by the university, remained passive. Technically, the
university has the right to file the petition for certification election as there was no bargaining deadlock. However
such right was forfeited by its inaction.

Kiok Loy v. NLRC 141 SCRA 179 (1986)

Doctrine: Unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that the respondent employer, after having been
served with a written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union, did not even bother to submit an answer or
reply to the said proposal.

Facts:
· The Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently certified in a
resolution by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant.
· The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same
time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted upon
by the Company.
· Thereafter, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved
economic issues in collective bargaining.
· Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But all attempts
towards an amicable settlement failed.
· The case was brought to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended. But the Company requested for a lot of postponements. NLRC ruled
that respondent Sweden Ice Cream is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248
(now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended.

Issue: Whether the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

· Collective bargaining is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the
relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a
mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation.
· Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect
to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any
grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if
requested by either party.
· The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are
present, namely,
o (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of
the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code;
o (2) proof of majority representation; and
o (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code.

· A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may
indicate bad faith since the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. Besides, petitioner
Company's approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the
hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that
it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.

Rivera, et al vs Espiritu
GR No. 135547 January 23, 2002
FACTS
On September 17, 1998, PAL informed the Inter-Agency Task Force created to address the problems of the ailing
flag carrier, that it was shutting down its operations effective September 23, 1988, claiming that given its labor
problems, rehabilitation was no longer feasible.
The next day, the PAL Employees Association (PALEA) sought the intervention of the Office of the President to
prevent the imminent closure of PAL. On September 23, PAL ceased its operations and sent notices of termination
to its employees. Two days later, PAWLA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikes and similar actions and a waiver
of some of the economic benefits in the existing CBA.

On September 27, 2988, the PAWLA board again wrote the President proposing terms and conditions, subject to
ratification by the general membership. These include the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten
years, PAL’s continuing recognition of PALEA as the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank and file ground
employees of the company, respect for the “ union shop/maintenance of membersip” provision under the PAL-
PALEA CBA and no salary deduction with full medical benefits. The PAL management accepted the PALEA proposal
and the necessary referendum was scheduled. Of the votes cast, 61% of favored the PAL-PALEA agreement.

On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed operations. On the same date, seven officers and members of PALEA filed a
petition to annul the agreement on the following grounds:

1) Grave abuse of discretion by public respondents in actively pursuing the PAL-PALEA agreement on the
constitutional right to self-organization and collective bargaining cannot be waived nor the waiver ratified

2) Public respondents gravely abused their discretion and exceeded their jurisdiction in presiding over the
conclusion of PAL-PALEA agreement under threat of abusive exercise of PAL’s management prerogative to close
business used as subterfuge for union-busting.

ISSUES
1) WON the orginal action for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy to annul the PAL-PALEA agreement
2) WON the agreement is unconstitutional and contrary to public policy
HELD
1) No. The assailed agreement does not meet the essential requirements for certiorari under Rule 65. What exists
is a contract between a private firm and one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task
Force. The object of the action is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, the proper
remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly belongs to the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
2) No. CBA under Article 253-A of the Labor Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and
predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation,
said agreement satisfied the first purpose of said article. The other purpose is to assign specific timetable, wherein
negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from
waiving or suspending the mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.

REYES V. TRAJANO
FACTS: Public Respondent Trajano as OIC of the Bureau of Labor Relations sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter
of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one members of the “Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK), all employed in the same
company, at a certification election at which two labor organizations were contesting the right to be the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees
of Tri-Union Industries Corporation. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor
Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS).

The final tally of the votes showed the following results:

TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1, CHALLENGED 141

The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final
count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the
INK members should not be allowed to vote “because they are not members of any union and refused to participate
in the previous certification elections.”

The INK employees promptly filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it “was not fair” and the result
thereof did “not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees.” TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition
contending that the petitioners “do not have legal personality to protest the results of the election,” because “they
are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK” which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds,
from joining or forming any labor organization . . . .”
ISSUE: W/N employees who are not part of any union may validly exercise their right to vote in a certification
election
HELD: YES. Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the “right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist
labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.” This is made plain by no less than
three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of
two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes
of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection, i.e.,
the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests.
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from
exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by
law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has
opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such
membership.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative
case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the
workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may
properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the
employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The minority employees — who
wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining — can do nothing but wait for another suitable
occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should
not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority — who do not desire to have a union certified as
the exclusive workers’ benefit in the bargaining unit — upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being
denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining.

The respondents’ argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they “are not constituted into a
duly organized labor union” — “but members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from
joining or forming any labor organization” — and “hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole
and exclusive bargaining representative,” is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence
requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification
election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to
all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they “did not participate in
previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form,
join or assist labor organizations,” persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes
forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections.

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA

(SAMMA-LIKHA), Petitioner,

vs.

SAMMA CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner, SAMMA-LIKHA filed a petition for certification election in the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), which the respondent moved for the dismissal of said petition.

In an order, med-arbiter Arturo Cosuco ordered the dismissal of the petition on the following grounds:

(1) lack of legal personality for failure to attach the certificate of registration purporting to show its legal
personality;

(2) prohibited mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees and

(3) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.

Petitioner then moved for reconsideration where Labor Acting Secretary Manuel Imson, treating the motion as an
appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-arbiter. He ruled that the legal personality of a union
cannot be collaterally attacked but may only be questioned in an independent petition for cancellation of
registration.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Labor but the CA
reversed the same.

Hence, this petition.

The issues for resolution are the following:

(1) whether a certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for certification election;

(2) whether petitioner’s motion for reconsideration which was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Labor
should not have been given due course for failure to attach proof of service on respondent and

3) whether petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election.

RULING:

On the first issue. the CA erred in declaring that a certificate of non-forum shopping was required in a petition for
certification election.

Notably, under the Labor Code and the rules pertaining to the form of the petition for certification election, there is
no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping.

As to the treatment of Motion for Reconsideration as an Appeal, the motion was properly treated as an appeal
because it substantially complied with the formal requisites.

On the third issue, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the erroneous inclusion of one supervisory employee
in the union of rank-and-file employees was not a ground to impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor
organization which had the right to file a petition for certification election.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the office of origin, the
Regional Office IV of the Department of Labor and Employment, for determination of the status of petitioner’s legal
personality. If petitioner is still a legitimate labor organization, then said office shall conduct a certification election
subject to the usual pre-election conference.

SO ORDERED.