Timoner v.

People

G.R. No. L-62050; November 25, 1983

FACTS: On December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two
uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls
along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these
laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the
sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of
Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness,. and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These
establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for
noncompliance with certain health and sanitation requirements. Hence, a civil case was filed against
petitioner along with a criminal charge for grave coercion along with the two policemen he was with.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling convicting petitioner; hence, his appeal to the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner Jose Timoner is guilty of grave coercion as charged against him; NO.

RULING: Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of
violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something
against his will, either it be right or wrong." (Article 286, Revised Penal Code.) The three, elements of
grave coercion are: (1) that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited
by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; (2) that the prevention or
compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce
intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and (3) that the person who restrained the will
and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right (Justice Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code,
Book II, 1976, p. 1392.)

In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation
of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty,
petitioner incurred no criminal liability. The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner
cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.
People v. Faigano

G.R. No. 113483; February 22, 1996

FACTS: On the night of 5 January 1993 Nely was in her house at Mangahan, Barangay Commonwealth,
Quezon City, with her 4-month old son and 3-year old niece. At eleven o'clock Nely and the children
went to sleep. Her husband Rolando Ojina was then in Pampanga where he was working. At one-thirty
in the morning of 6 January 1993 Nely was suddenly roused from her sleep by a man whom she later
identified as appellant Carmelo Faigano, a worker at a nearby construction project. With a 29-inch
balisong and no pants, appellant threatened to kill Nely and the children if she makes a sound; he
proceeded to rape Nely afterwards. After he climaxed, he demanded Nely to bring out her money.
Fearing for her life she reluctantly pointed to their closet. He took Nely's money amounting to P200.00,
her husband's wristwatch valued at P2,000.00, and two (2) rings worth P760.00. He warned Nely not to
move. Nely reported appellant to a barangay tanod the morning after which led to appellant’s
conviction in the RTC; hence, his direct appeal to the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not appellant Carmelo Faigano is guilty for the special complex crime of robbery
with rape despite his original intention being rape; NO.

RULING: The court a quo erred in convicting accused-appellant of the special complex crime of robbery
with rape. Under the circumstances, the Court is convinced that when accused-appellant entered the
victim's house he only had in mind sexual gratification. The taking of the cash and pieces of jewelry
against Nely's will appears to be an afterthought. In People v. Dinola we held that if the intention of the
accused was to rob but rape was also committed even before the asportation the crime is robbery with
rape. But if the original plan was to rape but the accused after committing the rape also committed
robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the offenses should be viewed as separate and distinct.
To be liable for the special complex crime of robbery with rape the intent to take personal property of
another must precede the rape.
People v. Concepcion

G.R. No. 200922; July 18, 2012

FACTS: According to the prosecution, at around 11:00 o'clock a.m. of May 25, 2004, while private
complainant Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of Mother Ignacia Street, Quezon City and at another
street which she could not remember and seemed to be deserted at that time, a male person riding at
the back of the driver of a motorcycle whom she later identified in open court as accused Cesar
Concepcion, snatched her brown Avon bag with black strap which at that time, was placed on her left
shoulder.

Meanwhile, Joemar de Felipe was driving his R & E Taxi, in the same vicinity, he witnessed the subject
snatching incident. As the accused was waving the bag at Jennifer, he blew his horn. Ogardo drove faster
so that de Felipe gave a chase and kept on blowing his horn. Eventually, Ogardo lost control of the
motorcycle and it crashed in front of his taxi, sending its two occupants to the pavement. De Felipe
immediately alighted from the taxi with the intention to arrest the snatchers. At that juncture, some
policemen from the Kamuning Police Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, arrived. Seeing that the
snatchers were badly injured, the policemen brought them to the East Avenue Medical Center, Quezon
City where Ogardo later expired. The accused Cesar Concepcion was then found guilty of robbery with
homicide by the RTC, which the CA affirmed; hence, this appeal.

ISSUES: Whether or not the act of snatching may be considered as robbery and not mere theft; NO.

RULING: Article 293 of the RPC defines robbery as a crime committed by "any person who, with intent
to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything." Robbery with homicide occurs when, by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. In Article 249
of the RPC, any person who shall kill another shall be deemed guilty of homicide. Homicide, as used in
robbery with homicide, is to be understood in its generic sense to include parricide and murder. The
penalty for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death.

Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another
without the latter's consent. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods is
imposed upon persons guilty of theft, if the value of the thing stolen is more than P200 but does not
exceed P6,000.

The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching
Acampado's shoulder bag. Acampado herself merely testified that Concepcion snatched her shoulder
bag which was hanging on her left shoulder. Acampado did not say that Concepcion used violence,
intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts, Concepcion's snatching of
Acampado's shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery.
People v. Jaranilla

G.R. No. L-28547; February 22, 19747

FACTS: In the evening of January 9, 1966, Heman Gorriceta, was driving a Ford pickup truck and was
hailed by Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. Jaranilla requested Gorriceta to bring them
to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. They then proceeded to steal 6 chickens from
Valentin Baylon who discovered the next morning that the door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops
was broken.

During the accused’s getaway, they were intercepted by Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin
Castro. Jabatan fired a warning shot and asked the four to alight from their vehicle. They did not heed
the injunction of the policeman. Instead, Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did
nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta. He
immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the
city. Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan who later died in the hospital.

Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with the aggravating
circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state witness. Hence, the case was dismissed
as to him. The trial court convicted Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes of the crime charged; hence, the
appeal to the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused were rightfully convicted of robbery with homicide; NO.

RULING: One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under articles 299 and 302 is that the
malefactor should enter the building or dependency where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299
and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building (casa habitada o lugar no
habitado o edificio ). If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon
things.

In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a building
within the meaning of article 302. Not being a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered the
same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five circumstances enumerated in article
302.

As may be seen from the photographs, Baylon's coop, which is known in the dialect as tangkal or
kulungan, is about five yards long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has wooden stilts and bamboo
strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a person of average height like Baylon. It is
divided into six compartments or cages. A compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard. A
person cannot be accommodated inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person
should go inside that compartment. The taking was effected by forcibly opening the cage and putting
the hands inside it to get the roosters. Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should
be characterized as theft and not robbery.
People v. Pulusan

G.R. No. 110037; May 21, 1998

FACTS: In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Eduardo Pulusan and
Rolando Rodriguez, together with Rolando Tayag and one John Doe were charged with the crime of
highway robbery attended with multiple homicide and multiple rape for robbing a passenger jeepney on
January 20, 1986, killing four of the passengers therein and raping the only female passenger repeatedly.
Thereafter, herein appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After trial, the court a quo
rendered a decision finding Pulusan and Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In their
appeal before the Court, appellants contend that the court a quo erred in giving credence and credibility
to the evidence and testimonies presented by the prosecution.

ISSUES: Whether or not the accused committed highway robbery instead of mere robbery with
homicide; NO.

RULING: The crime charged in the information was "highway robbery attended with multiple homicide
with multiple rape." Highway robbery or brigandage is de􀀷ned in Sec. (2) of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974," as: (t)he seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another
by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means,
committed by any person on any Philippine Highway. As manifest in its preamble, the object of the
decree is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby
disturbing the peace and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the
people. A conviction for highway robbery requires proof that the accused were organized for the
purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. There is no such proof in this case. Neither is there
proof that the four men previously attempted to commit similar robberies indiscriminately.
Valenzuela v. People

G.R. No. 160188; June 21, 2007

FACTS: While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the
accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them
where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket,
and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started
loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the security guard asked
Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the
crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should
only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft; NO.

RULING: Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for
its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be
present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of
persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the
deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.
Matrido v. People

G.R. No. 179061; July 13, 2009

FACTS: On June 10, 1999, petitioner, as a credit and collection assistant of private complainant Empire
East Land Holdings, Inc., received amortization payment from one Amante dela Torre in the amount of
P22,470.66 as evidenced by the owner's copy 2 of Official Receipt No. 36547, but petitioner remitted
only P4,470.66 to private complainant as reflected in the treasury department's copy 3 of Official
Receipt No. 36547 submitted to private complainant, both copies of which bear the signature of
petitioner and reflect a difference of P18,000.

On private complainant's investigation, petitioner was found to have failed to remit payments received
from its clients, prompting it to file various complaints petitioner paid private complainant the total
amount of P162,000, drawing private complainant to desist from pursuing some related complaints. A
few other cases pushed through, however, since the amount did not sufficiently cover petitioner's
admitted liability of P400,000. Eventually, the case reached the RTC which found here guilty of qualified
theft, which the CA affirmed.

Petitioner posits that despite her indictment for qualified theft, the prosecution was trying to prove
estafa during trial, thus violating her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her; hence, this appeal.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Court’s decision should be set aside since the crime charged against
petitioner Sheala Matrido is different from what the prosecution was trying to prove; NO.

RULING: The Court finds no rhyme or reason in petitioner's contention that what the prosecution tried
to prove during trial was estafa through misappropriation under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC.

The appellate court correctly explained that conversion of personal property in the case of an employee
having material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to
whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same
property constitutes estafa. xxx

That petitioner did not have juridical possession over the amount or, in other words, she did not have a
right over the thing which she may set up even against private complainant is clear. In fact, petitioner
never asserted any such right, hence, juridical possession was lodged with private complainant and,
therefore, estafa was not committed.

A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the

material possession of the employee. 28 The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason
of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical
possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed
remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.
Dimat v. People

G.R. No. 181184; January 25, 2012

FACTS: Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben
Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado's wife, Sonia, bought from accused
Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the
vehicle's engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.

On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the
Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping
and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its
chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen
vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen
from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Petitioner Dimat was later found guilty of violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law by the RTC which was affirmed by the CA despite his claim that he bought the vehicle
in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner Dimat’s claim of lack of criminal intent excuse him from liability of
violating the Anti-Fencing Law; NO.

RULING: The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who
took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.

Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law
and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of
course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he
acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain
some gain out of his acts.

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari
to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and
official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and o􀀷cial
receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. xxx

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But
this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no
documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new
documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still,
Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado.
Lee v. People

G.R. No. 157781; April 11, 2005

FACTS: At the instance of Atoz Trading Corporation (ATC), 10 separate Informations were filed, on
September 27, 1994, in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, against petitioner in his
capacity as marketing manager of ATC. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 107020 to
107029. All these cases involve the failure of petitioner to remit the payments of his employer’s client
Ocean Feed Mills. The RTC found petitioner guilty of 9 counts of estafa which the CA affirmed; hence,
this appeal. The petitioner contends that demand is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a criminal
complaint for estafa. He posits that demand must be made formally.

ISSUES: Whether or not the lack of demand from Atoz Trading Corporation (ATC) of the unremitted
payments by its client Ocean Feed Mills from petitioner Robert Crisanto Lee excuses him from liability of
the crime of estafa; NO.

RULING: The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender; or denial on his part of such
receipt; c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.

The words "convert" and "misappropriate" as used in the aforequoted law connote an act of using or
disposing of another's property as if it were one's own or of devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon. To "misappropriate" a thing of value for one's own use or benefit, not only the
conversion to one's personal advantage but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without a right. Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or
by circumstantial evidence.

Demand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a criminal complaint for
estafa. Indeed, the accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the
money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary
where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion. However, failure to account upon demand,
for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. Moreover, demand
need not be formal. It may be verbal. In Barrameda v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that even a
query as to the whereabouts of the money is tantamount to a demand.