Canon 13- A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND

REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR

GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
A lawyer must not display or boast of being influential to the court. This will erode the confidence
of the public on the fair admission of justice.

Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.

Rationale: To protect the good name and reputation of the judges and the lawyer.
Lawyers should not seek for opportunity to cultivate familiarity with judges. A lawyer who resorts
to such practices of seeking familiarity with judges dishonors his profession and a judge who
consents to them is unworthy of his high office.

Austrica vs Masaquel
Facts: After trial, Judge Masaquel rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the 3
parcels of land in Pangasinan and ordering the defendant to vacate the lands and pay the
damages. Plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate execution which was granted and sheriff placed
them in possession of the lands. Atty. Sicat, former assistant or associate of Judge Masaquel,
entered his appearance as the new counsel for defendant. He filed a motion for new trial and to
set aside the judgment and, over the vigorous objection of plaintiffs, Judge granted the said
motion. Before the opening of the court’s session in the morning, Atty. Macaraeg, counsel for
petitioner, saw Judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of petitioner that
Judge Masaquel to inhibit himself for further hearing the case upon the ground that the new
counsel, Atty. Sicat, was his former associate. Judge Masaquel rejected the request because,
according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for
disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court.

Issue: WON the request for inhibition is tantamount to direct contempt

Held: While We consider it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk
to him about a matter related to the case pending in the court of said judge, in the case now before
Us we do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel
to see respondent Judge in his chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a
ground which respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing to act not in
accordance with the rules, and another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a
disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge. We believe that the circumstances that
led respondent Judge to declare petitioner in direct contempt of court do not indicate any
deliberate design on the part of petitioner to disrespect respondent Judge or to cast aspersion
against his integrity as a judge. On the contrary, it may be said that petitioner wanted to avoid
cause for any one to doubt the integrity of respondent Judge. This is so because when a party
litigant desires or suggests the voluntary disqualification of a judge, it is understood, without
saying it in so many words, that said litigant — having knowledge of the past or present
relationship of the judge with the other party or counsel — feels that no matter how upright the
judge is there is peril of his being unconsciously swayed by his former connection and he may
unwittingly render a biased or unfair decision. Hence, while it may be conceded that in requesting
the disqualification of a judge by reason of his relation with a party or counsel there is some
implication of the probability of his being partial to one side, the request can not constitute
contempt of court if done honesty and in a respectful manner, as was done by petitioner in
the present case.
Gallo vs Cordero
Facts: Judge Cordero issued a subpoena to complainant requiring him to appear and to testify
regarding his affidavit and to bring with him documents attesting to his ownership of the land. The
complainant appeared as directed in the office of Judge Cordero. According to the complainant’s
affidavit, “when I said I want them ejected from our land the Judge said: ‘No, you cannot eject
tenants now under the law.’ I countered that the four accused are not tenants, but the Judge said,
‘Even then, nobody can eject them.’ That disappointed at his answer which clearly were biased
for the accused, I asked permission to leave, which was granted. But he added that I should see
him again”. The following day, when Roger Gallo, son of the complainant, went to Judge’s office
to deliver his letter, Roger saw judge conversing with the accused in the criminal case. The
respondent judge claims that he merely tried to advise them of their right to a counsel de oficio in
case they could not afford to hire a lawyer. With regard to complainant's demand for his inhibition,
respondent alleges that there was no basis for complainant to say that could not expect justice
from him because the case had just been set for the arraignment of the accused.

Issue: WON there is a sufficient ground for Judge Cordero to inhibit himself

Held: Respondent judge also opened himself to charges of partiality and bias by meeting privately
with the four accused. He says that he merely wanted to apprise them of their constitutional right.
Whatever his purpose was, it was improper for respondent judge to meet them without the
presence of complainant.

Bar Exam Question (2000)

Q: Atty. J requested Judge K to be a principal sponsor at the wedding of his son, Atty. J met Judge
K a month before during the IBP- sponsored reception to welcome Judge K into the community,
and having learned that Judge K takes his breakfast at a coffee shop near Judge K’s boarding
house. Atty. J made it a point to be at the coffee shop at about the time that Judge K takes his
breakfast. Comment on Atty. J’s acts. Do they violate the CPR?

A: Yes, his actions violate the CPR Canon 13 which provides that a lawyer shall reply upon the
merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or hives the
appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 of the same Code provides that a lawyer shall
not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity
with judges. Atty. J obviously sought opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judge K by being
at the coffee shop where the latter takes his breakfast, and is extending extraordinary attention to
the judge by inviting him to be a principal sponsor at the wedding of his son. (2000 bar question)

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

Rationale: Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere

with a fair trial in the courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. However, if
the extremity of a particular case justifies a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it
anonymously.

Subjudice Rule - a matter is before the court for consideration and, hence, should not be
discussed in other fora. It restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. The rule is aimed at, among others, shielding the court from outside
influence, and ensuring a fair trial – one based on facts, and not on public opinion.

Q: When can there be prejudicial publicity?

A: There must be an allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
that they might be, by barrage of publicity.

Note: The restriction does not prohibit issuances of statements by public official charged with the
duty of prosecuting or defending actions in court.

Q: What is the test to determine whether public statements are contemptuous?

A: The character of the act done and its direct tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of
official duty.

In re: Lozano
Facts: Sometime ago, the complaint of an attorney against a judge of First Instance was referred
to the Attorney- General for investigations, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor- General
was designated to conduct the investigation of the charges, and pursuant to said designation,
proceeded to the Municipality of Capiz, to take the testimony of certain witnesses. The
investigation was conducted secretly, as is customary in cases of this character. Notwithstanding,
El Pueblo, a newspaper published in Iloilo and edited by Severino Lozano, printed an account of
the investigation written by Anastacio Quevedo, said to be an employee in the office of the Judge
under investigation.

Issue: WON the editor and reporter of the newspaper be punish for contempt

Held: newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also
regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matters which their policy
requires should be kept private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in
camera. he administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct,
are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The right of legitimate publicity
must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impringing upon it. On the
other hand, the courts must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of their business in an
orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of their constitutional functions.

Martelino vs Alejandrino
Facts: It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the
disqualification of the president of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that
he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the case had
received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being
exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969
as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.

Issue: WON the publicity prejudice the right of the petitioner to a fair trial

Held: the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but
rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim
trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the
Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court martial to protect the accused from
massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure
to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until
the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided.

Strebel vs Figueras
Facts: That on September 14, 1949, defendant Figueras "by making use of his official and political
connections," was able to induce the Secretary of Justice to transfer temporarily, from the Bureau
of Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons, one Dr. Manuel Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff's
step daughter. Plaintiff alleges that, "with a view to further injuring" him "and besmirching his good
name in the community and waging a cleavage in the harmonious relation between Eustaquio &
Co. and its laborers," defendants Felipe E. Jose and Cornelio S. Ruperto issued a press statement
to the effect that plaintiff Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio had flagrantly violated the provisions
of the Eight-Hour Law and that said Criminal Case No. 11005 had been dismissed by the court
on a flimsy ground; and that this statement had "caused moral and mental suffering to the herein
plaintiff and damage to his business in the amount of P5,000.00," which he prays "that the
defendants, particularly Felipe Jose and Cornelio S. Ruperto be condemned jointly and severally
to pay" to him. The aforementioned statement is allegedly contained in the following news item.

Issue: WON the news items are actionable

Held: This news item mentions, neither the number of the case referred to, nor the names of the
persons accused therein. Moreover, it merely contains a criticism of the action taken by the court.
The reference, therein imputed to the Director of Labor, to the flagrant violation of the eight-hour
labor law by the accused, was a mere reiteration of the theory of the Bureau of Labor, which the
prosecution had adopted by filing the information in said case. Being a matter of court record,
which had been taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled in a decision already
promulgated, said theory was open for public consumption, and, hence, an allusion thereto or
statement thereof, in order to justify said criticism, is not actionable.

People vs Teehankee
Facts: Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was convicted of the murder of Hultman and Chapman, and of
frustrated murder of Leino. The accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that
the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was
pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments
in the case (as no less than then Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon attended
some of the hearings and, President Aquino even visited Hultman while she was still confined at
the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and
disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases.

Issue: WON the right to an impartial trial of the accused was violated

Held: At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due
to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino
vs Alejandro, we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial
judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage
of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual
bias and he has not discharged the burden.

Q: Dumbledore, a noted professor of commercial law, wrote an article on the subject of letters of
credit, which was published in the IBP Journal. Assume he devoted a significant portion of the
article to a commentary on how the Supreme Court should decide a pending case involving the
application of the law on letter of credit. May he be sanctioned by the Supreme Court? Explain.

A: He may be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Rule 13.02 of the CPR provides that “a lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party”. The court in a pending litigation must be shielded from the
embarrassment or influence in its duty of deciding the case.

Q: Assume Dumbledore did not include any commentary on the case. Assume further after the
Supreme Court decision on the case had attained finality, he wrote another IBP Journal article,
dissecting the decision and explaining why the Supreme Court erred in all its conclusions. May
he be sanctioned by the Supreme Court? Explain.

A: He may not be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Once a litigation is concluded, the judge who
decided it is subject to the same criticism as any other public official because his decision
becomes public property and is thrown open to public consumption. The lawyer enjoys a wide
latitude in commenting or criticizing the judge’s decision, provided that such comment or criticism
shall be bona fide and not spill over the bounds of decency and propriety. (2008 Bar question)
Post Litigation criticisms
The right to criticize is recognized in concluded litigations because then the court’s actuations are
thrown open to public consumption and discussion (Strebel vs Figueras).
It has in fact, been called a duty of a lawyer to criticize. As a citizen and officer of the court, every
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges (In re Almacen)

Criticisms should be respectful and done in good faith

“ But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respects to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects lawyer to disciplinary action.” (In re Almacen)

Thus, disrespectful criticisms would be subject to disciplinary action even made in private
conversation or communication.

Disrespectful post-litigation criticisms

 A lawyer describing a ruling as an “absolutely erroneous” (Salcedo vs Hernandez)
 A lawyer stating through a local newspaper “that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency
or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members” and “ in the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, xxx the ONLY
REMEDY to put an end to so much evil, is to CHANGE the members of the Supreme
Court” (In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595)

Power of the court to punish for contempt

(in relation to freedom of speech and press)
Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish
for contempt of court UNLESS there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice (Cabansag v. Fernandez)

Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of
the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.

Rationale: To preserve the independence of the judges in the performance of their duties. As it
will be contrary to the principle of separation of powers.

Note: All lawyers must uphold, respect, and support the independence of the judiciary. This
independence from interference is made to apply against all branches and agencies of the
government.

Judicial Independence
The doctrine that decisions of judiciary should be impartial and not subject to influence from the
other branches of government or from private or political interests.
Institutional Independence
It means that the judicial branch is independent from the executive and legislative branches.

Decisional Independence
is the idea that judges should be able to decide cases solely based on the law and facts, without
letting the media, politics or other concerns sway their decisions, and without fearing penalty in
their careers for their decisions.

De Bumanlag vs Bumanlag
Facts: The clerk of court received a 1st indorsement from then Assistant Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora “requesting comment and/or appropriate action” on the therewith enclosed
petition of respondent to the President that he “promulgate a decree that the order of suspension
by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your humble self be allowed to become an active
member of the New Society”. In a 2nd indorsement received, then Assistant Executive Secretary
Zamora forwarded respondent’s letter of the same date to the President stating that “the
undersigned by now has come to realize that I made a big mistake by making said letter to you,
Your Excellency, because the Honorable Supreme Court may believe that I may be challenging
the decision which is already final and executory and as such do not observe the doctrine of
protocol of separation of powers”, and withdrawing and asking the President to disregard his first
letter.

Issue: WON the respondent should be punished

Held: The Supreme Court accordingly administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law
and of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision
which suspended him for two years from the practice of law.