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Amal, Syria, and the War of the Camps

Meanwhile, regional conflict and the divisions within the Palestinian movement continued to be reflected
in Lebanon after 'Arafat's withdrawal from Tripoli. Indeed, Palestinian camps in Lebanon became one of
the prime arenas within which such tensions would be fought out.

Even before the split in the PLO, Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut had seen the gradual
reestablishment of a Palestinian armed presence since 1982. In part this was the product of deliberate
Palestinian efforts to reestablish a Lebanese infrastructure. But for the most part it stemmed from the
rearming in self-defense of Palestinian camp populations, and from the gradual return of evacuated
personnel to their families and homes in Lebanon.

This process accelerated in the wake of the split in the PLO, as competing Palestinian organizations
scurried to bolster their presence and win support from the local Palestinian community. By the end of
1984, numerous Lebanese sources reported a substantial resurgence of the Palestinian political and
military presence in the capital.30 The following year, Israel's withdrawal from Sidon (February) and
Tyre (March-April) initiated a similar reemergence of Palestinian guerrilla groups in local camps there.
Indeed, by the spring of 1985 Palestinian militias in the Sidon area were strong enough to repel attacks
by the Phalange and SLA against the al-Miya wa-Miya and 'Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camps.

Such developments were viewed with concern by Syria. Given the importance of the Lebanese arena to
Damascus, it was loath to permit the reestablishment of a semi-autonomous Palestinian base of
operations in Beirut and the south, particularly one loyal to the PLO. At first it encouraged its own
Palestinian clients to compete in the process, facilitating the entrance of Sa'iqa, PFLP-GC, and Abu
Musa's Fateh-Provisional Command into these areas. In camps under direct Syrian control (Nahr al-
Barid and Baddawi in the north, Wavell in the Biqa') these groups quickly gained the upper hand. But in
areas beyond Syria's writ it soon became apparent that the independent Palestinian organizations-
Fateh, the PFLP and DFLP-enjoyed far stronger popular support.31 Consequently, other means had to
be found to restrict the PLO's resurgence.

Amal also viewed the reestablishment of a Palestinian political and military presence in Beirut and the
south with concern. Hostility towards the Palestinians stemming from Shi'ite-PLO conflict in the late
1970s and early 1980s was reinforced by fears that a resurgent Palestinian presence would threaten the
powerful political position that Amal had established for itself in post-1982 Lebanon. When Amal and the
PSP seized control of West Beirut in February 1984, the former established military posts in and around
the camps. As the IDF withdrew, it did the same in Tyre and Nabatiyya in the south. To consolidate their
control over West Beirut, Amal and the PSP had jointly suppressed the Nasirite Murabitun militia-one of
the few Sunni militias, and one of few groups in Lebanon to still support a Palestinian armed presence.
Shortly thereafter, encouraged by Syria, Amal turned its attention to the Palestinian camps directly.

The first round of what was to become known as the "war of the camps" began 19 May 1985, with an
incident between Palestinians in the Sabra camp in Beirut and Amalmilitiamen.32 Heavy fighting quickly
erupted between the approximately one thousand armed Palestinians in the Sabra, Shatila and Burj al-
Barajina refugee camps and Amal's more than three thousand fighters, the latter supported by over a
thousand soldiers of the (predominately Sh'ite) Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese Army and even some
units of the (predominately Christian) Eighth Brigade stationed in East Beirut. Syria labeled the fighting
an "Israeli-US plot being implemented by Yasir 'Arafat," declaring that "Lebanese nationalists have the
right to refuse to allow 'Arafat and others to restore the anomalous state of affairs that previously
existed."33

On May 30, Sabra fell to its attackers. Amid Arab and Soviet political pressures on Syria and an
emergency meeting of Arab League foreign ministers scheduled to discuss the issue June
8, Amal declared a unilateral ceasefire the next day.

Despite this, small-scale fighting continued for weeks. In Shatila, Palestinian defenders retained control
of a small area around the camp's mosque, despite repeated efforts to dislodge them. Burj al-Barajina
was not penetrated at all, but nevertheless remained under siege as Amal prevented supplies from
entering or its population from leaving. Finally, after fighting that had claimed more than six hundred
dead and two thousand wounded, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Amal and representatives of
the Palestine National Salvation Front in Damascus on June 17.
Under the terms of the Damascus Agreement, the PNSF committed itself to the removal of medium and
heavy weapons from the camps; Amal to withdraw from the camps and the release of detainees. The
Lebanese Internal Security Force would assume policing responsibility inside the camps, while a joint
coordinating committee would be formed by Amal, the PNSF, Syria, and the "Lebanese National
Democratic Front."34 Reflecting its Syrian sponsorship, the ceasefire agreement recognized the PNSF
as the "national political leadership of the Palestinians in Lebanon until the Front manages to take over
the PLO."

Not surprisingly Fateh criticized the agreement, emphasizing that only the PLO could negotiate
agreements regarding the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. But it accepted the ceasefire nonetheless,
labeling it a "tactical step of retreat" by Damascus.35 Certainly, despite heavy Palestinian
casualties, Amal and its Syrian sponsor had been politically and militarily rebuffed. Amal had been
forced to retreat, having gained only the promise that the Palestinians would surrender nonexistent
medium and heavy weapons and allow an ineffectual Lebanese police presence in the camps. The
Damascus Agreement's rhetorical endorsement of the PNSF notwithstanding, Fateh's foothold in
Lebanon remained intact.

Yet the tensions which had sparked the camps war had not been resolved, and they would soon be
manifest elsewhere. In Sidon, Palestinian (and particularly Fateh) reorganization attracted stern
warnings from Amal, the local Popular Nasirite Organization, and influential Sidon Deputy Dr. Nazih
Bizri.36 Clashes between Amal and Palestinians in the camps erupted again in Beirut briefly in
September, and once more for a week from 29 March 1986.37 Then, on 19 May-one year to the day
after the first round of the camps war-a second round began. Once again Amal was unable to penetrate
the camps, despite a supply of T-54 tanks provided it by Damascus after the previous fighting. After the
failure of more than a dozen ceasefires, the fighting finally died down with the deployment of Lebanese
Army units and Syrian military observers around the Beirut camps June 24.38

This set the stage for the third and most severe round of the camps war. It began with an incident
September 29 at the Rashidiyya refugee camp on the outskirts of Tyre in which Palestinians allegedly
fired on an Amal patrol. Amal immediately surrounded the camp, demanding the surrender of all arms
inside it. The demand was refused.39 By late October, the fighting had spread to Sidon and Beirut. In an
effort to relieve pressure on Rashidiyya, Palestinian forces in Sidon broke through Amal lines November
24 to seize the strategic hilltop village of Maghdusha, overlooking the coastal highway south of the city.
As Amal's military weaknesses became evident, Syrian special forces reportedly aided it in the battle for
Shatila. At Sidon, Israel launched multiple air-strikes against Palestinian positions around the city.

As before, the clashes led to an emergency session of Arab League foreign ministers, and diplomatic
intervention to halt the fighting. Iranian mediation secured a partially effective ceasefire
between Amal and the PNSF on December 15. But while pro-Syrian groups withdrew from around
Maghdusha, Fateh (excluded from the negotiations) refused. It insisted that it would not turn over its
positions around Maghdusha without a ceasefire in Beirut, guarantees of security in the Sidon area, and
the lifting of Amal's siege around the Tyre refugee camps.40

Some of these positions were subsequently vacated to Hizb allah and Popular Nasirite Organization
militiamen in January, and some supplies allowed into the beleaguered camps. But for the most part the
sieges continued, and new fighting soon erupted. In Beirut, the shelling of the camps was compounded
by a blockade of food and medical supplies that resulted in sickness, starvation or death for thousands
of trapped residents.

Finally, on February 21, the first of seven thousand Syrian troops were deployed in West Beirut to
maintain order. On April 7, following an agreement with the PNSF, Amal lifted the siege as Syrian forces
took up positions around the camps. That same month, negotiations between Amal and the PNSF took
place with the aim of achieving a ceasefire in the south.

Between 1985 and 1987, the camps war had claimed more than 2,500 lives. Palestinian refugees
camps had been devastated, and thousands of refugees had fled the fighting to seek uncertain refuge in
the coastal strip north of Sidon.41 Yet those same two years had also wrought a significant shift in the
PLO's position in Lebanon in several important respects.

First, the camps war had seen a significant weakening of Amal. Many Lebanese actors had reacted
negatively to the political and military assertiveness of both Amal and Syria evident in the camps war. In
the first round, Amal's only (half-hearted) support had come from the Lebanese Forces. The PSP had
reaffirmed its alliance with Amal, but in practice opposed the attacks on the camps. It sheltered
Palestinian refugees fleeing the fighting, and had not prevented Palestinian artillery units in the hills
surrounding Beirut from firing on Shi'ite areas of the city during the fighting. The Sunni community,
already alarmed at the suppression of the Murabitun and other Sunni political forces, also refused to
support Amal. Common concern with rising power of Amal underpinned all such attitudes.42 Amal's
continuing efforts to exert political hegemony in West Beirut and the south, coupled with the camps war
itself, had by the third round led to a serious deterioration of relations between it and the PSP and LCP.
In the latter half of 1985, several clashes erupted between the PSP and Amal fighters in Beirut. By
February 1987 such friction escalated to the point of open fighting between the PSP, LCP on one side
and Amal on the other. Indeed this provided one of the major reasons for the deployment of Syrian
troops in the capital that same month.

In this dynamic political context, various Palestinian groups had found themselves able to forge or
reforge various internal alliances, albeit often of a tactical, temporary and opportunistic nature.
Lebanese actors as diverse as the Sunni elite, Lebanese Forces, President Jumayyil, local Sunni
militias, Hizb allah, the PSP and LCP were at one time or another reportedly aiding the Palestinians.43

Second, the fighting had allowed the Palestinians to mobilize a significant diplomatic coalition in support
of their position, a fact evidenced in the convening of emergency meetings of the Arab League during
the first and third rounds. Even such important Syrian allies as Libya, Iran, and the USSR had criticized
the attacks on the camps, and had exerted significant diplomatic pressure on Damascus to bring them
to an end.

Finally, Syrian support for Amal had served to seriously weaken Syrian influence in the Palestinian
movement at large. Palestinian public opinion grew strongly anti-Syrian, and groups tied to Syria (such
as Abu Musa's Fateh-Provisional Command) lost further credibility. Both the DFLP and PFLP criticized
Syrian policy, despite being based in Damascus and consequently highly vulnerable to Syrian
pressure.44 At the same time, the fighting had led to greatly increased cooperation among otherwise
divided Palestinian groups. During the first round Fateh, the DFLP and PNSF had cooperated in
defending the camps. Even Abu Musa's Fateh-PC, elements of which played a role that many
Palestinians considered treasonous, provided artillery support for the Beirut camps from positions east
of the city. During the first round ceasefire negotiations, the PFLP had flatly rejected an Amal proposal
that the PNSF disarm Fateh and DFLP forces in the camps. By the third round, it was tacitly
coordinating its negotiating position with Fateh, and refusing to accept Syrian demands that blame for
the fighting be placed on 'Arafat's shoulders.45

Reunification
Throughout the history of the PLO's presence in Lebanon-in 1969, in 1973, during the civil war and
Israeli invasion-serious external threats had always engendered a defensive unity among the major,
mass-based contingents of the Palestinian movement. The post-1982 situation would be no different.
The fighting with Amal and the practical unity forged between Fateh, the DFLP and PFLP in defending
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon would make a vital psychological contribution towards the overall
reunification of the PLO.

Moreover, while Syria and Amal were providing an important catalyst to the reunification of the
Palestinian movement, further impetus was being provided by Israel and Jordan. In the occupied
territories, social and political conditions deteriorated through the 1980s. The introduction by Israel of
what it termed an "iron fist" policy in the territories in August 1985, the growth of Palestinians protests
and the acceleration of arrests, detentions, deportations, use of lethal force and other Israeli
countermeasures over the next two years underlined the practical need for overall Palestinian political
unity.46 Meanwhile, the PLO-Jordanian joint approach envisaged in the 1985 Amman Accords
encountered serious obstacles. In February 1986 King Husayn announced the suspension of Jordanian-
PLO cooperation and indirectly called upon Palestinians to produce an alternative political leadership.
Jordan also encouraged another rebellion against 'Arafat's leadership from within Fateh, this time by
former head of Fateh military intelligence Colonel 'Atallah 'Atallah. In March revisions were made to the
structure of the Jordanian parliament (increasing the number of West Bank seats) and to Jordan's
electoral law. When Fateh criticized these moves as contrary to the PLO's status as sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, Fateh offices in the country were ordered closed and a number
of cadres (including Khalil al-Wazir) were deported. In August, Jordan announced a five-year, $750
million development plan for the occupied territories, a move that was widely seen as aimed at
increasing Hashemite influence on the West Bank.47

By the fall of 1986 such developments, coupled with Algerian, Soviet and Libyan mediation, had led to
active discussions between the major Palestinian groups on convening a new session of the PNC. In
meetings in Moscow and Prague in September Fateh committed itself to cancellation of the Amman
Accords, thus removing a major obstacle to reconciliation. In March, Fateh, the PFLP, DFLP, Palestine
Communist Party and ALF agreed in Tunis to convene a meeting of the PNC the following month.
On 20 April 1987, the 18th session of the Palestine National Council did indeed open in Algiers, with the
participation of all but Sa'iqa, Fateh-PC, PSF and PFLP-GC. Political differences remained, but with the
PNC the almost four year split in the PLO came to an end.

The "Session of the Steadfastness of the Camps and the Masses of the Occupied Territories" (as the
18th PNC had been appropriately titled) adopted a number of resolutions regarding the PLO's position in
Lebanon. Specifically, the political resolutions adopted by the Council called for "reinforcing the unity of
action regarding the situation in our camps in Lebanon," "rejecting the attempts to expel and disarm our
people," "insisting on our people's rights in Lebanon regarding residence, work, movement, and the
freedom of political and social action." They stressed the PLO's right to defend the camps and struggle
against Israel in accordance with the Cairo Agreement and its annexes, and reiterated the PLO's
commitment to the Lebanese National Movement. Moreover, the PNC agreed to a series of
organizational reforms designed to restructure, democratize, and strengthen the PLO's decision-making
structure. Meeting in early October 1987 the PLO Central Council endorsed a series of specific
measures aimed at improving relations with Syria and easing tensions in Lebanon. A new joint
command for PLO forces in Lebanon was established to bolster coordination and cooperation among
groups.48

The PLO and Lebanon: Continuing Challenges

In the five years following the Lebanese war and the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut, the immediate
pressures facing the Palestinian movement in Lebanon had prevented it from reacting to post-1982
Lebanese events on anything other than a tactical basis. Despite a widespread debate about the
successes and failures of the pre-1982 "Beirut era," efforts to evaluate and restructure PLO policy had
soon been aborted by the internal divisions and the pressure of events. Now, the reunification of the
PLO held out some hope that these issues would be once more addressed, and that the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon could be reconstructed on a new and firmer basis. As George Habash noted in the
wake of the 18th PNC:

[The Palestinian movement] must answer the following question: What do we want from Lebanon? Why
do we insist on maintaining a Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon? How do we perceive our
relations with the LNM? If the Palestinian revolution fails to provide a clear answer to these questions,
the Palestinian presence in Lebanon will not grow the way we hope. To be exact, we ought to make
clear that we do not wish to flaunt our Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon nor do we wish to set up
a Palestinian authority in Lebanon to impede or to fly in the face of the Lebanese National Movement
program. During its presence in Lebanon throughout the seventies and until 1982, the Palestinian
revolution made mistakes. A bold reexamination process is in order. These mistakes must be identified,
acknowledged, and rectified.49

Habash himself went on to identify Palestinian domination of the LNM and "excesses and misuse of
arms" as the PLO's two major mistakes of the past. Other senior PFLP leaders condemned pre-1982
cross-border shelling (rather than infiltration) as counter-productive. DFLP spokespersons offered
similar analyses, although they extended their criticism to include pre-1982 Palestinian military pressure
on Amal, and past Palestinian violations of ceasefires and freezes on military activity in south Lebanon.
Fateh leaders, on the other hand, were much more likely to stress the impact of organizational disunity
and the role of external (Arab and Israeli) intervention. Some(such as Salah Khalaf), however, included
a critique of the tolerance of "incompetence" within Fateh itself.50

Yet if past experience was to prove any guide, the rectification of shortcomings and weaknesses in PLO
policy in Lebanon would prove far from a simple and painless affair. References to the (obsolete) Cairo
Agreement were hardly sufficient, nor were appeals to the (largely-defunct) Lebanese National
Movement. It was difficult to see how, in the chaotic and multipolar context of Lebanese and regional
politics, the PLO could reestablish a firm base of internal and external alliances. The temptation to
deploy the PLO's considerable finances and military potential in pursuit of an active and assertive role in
the Lebanese balance-of-power was substantial. Yet patterns of alliances founded upon opportunism
alone, however useful in the short-term, seemed likely only to reinforce Lebanese (and Syrian)
suspicion of Palestinian motives. Similarly, the strengthening of Palestinian "unity of action" required
considerably more than mere PNC resolutions. It required substantial reform of the structure and
process of Palestinian decision-making. The obstacles to this-the inherent tensions between democratic
debate and revolutionary authority; the competing cross-currents of Palestinian and inter-Arab politics;
the firm entrenchment of a leadership style and political dynamic-continued to be severe. Indeed, they
seemed so severe that, paradoxically, the day-to-day defense of the camps appeared easier to secure.

Yet the military defense of a siege perimeter comprised "security" only in the narrowest and most
fleeting sense. Promoting an atmosphere within which Palestinians in Lebanon would enjoy real security
represented the more important and difficult task. And, if the PLO's successful defense of its position
during the camps war was a tacit admission by its opponents of the tenacity of Palestinian resistance
and the strength of its hard-won military skills, other developments would soon resignal the magnitude
of the challenges the Palestinian movement continued to face in Lebanon. Indeed, as if to underscore
the point, within weeks of the 18th PNC (and in what many saw as a Syrian-encouraged response to it)
the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies voted on 21 May 1987 to abrogate the Cairo Agreement of 1969
(see Appendix). The following month, Lebanese President Amin al-Jumayyil officially confirmed the act.

Of the various challenges to the PLO in Lebanon, Israel continued to be among the most important.
Israeli intervention in Lebanon had far from ceased. The IDF continued its proxy occupation of the SLA
security zone in the south. At sea, ships en route to and from Lebanon were regularly searched for PLO
personnel and supplies. Periodic attacks (some three dozen in 1987-89) continued to be directed
against Palestinian installations. But in other respects, the magnitude of the Israeli challenge had
sharply declined. The military and political costs borne by Israel during and after the 1982 war
disinclined Israeli decision-makers to take further large-scale action north of the border enclave.
Moreover, the PLO's political institutions and leadership were no longer found in Lebanon, but farther
afield. While these were hardly immune from Israeli military action (as evidenced by Israel's 1985
bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunisia, the February 1988 car-bombing of three senior Palestinian
officers in Cyprus, and the assassination on 16 April 1988 of Deputy PLO Commander-in-Chief Khalil al-
Wazir in Tunis), Israel had clearly lost the opportunities for coercive diplomacy against the Palestinian
movement it had enjoyed in the pre-1982 period.51

A second declining threat to the PLO in Lebanon was that posed by Amal. The summer of 1987 saw a
brief and inconclusive renewal of the camps war in the south. It ended with a new agreement
September 11, this time between the PLO and Amal-a tacit recognition by Syria and Lebanese actors of
their failure to block the resurgence of the mainstream PLO. Further obstacles, however, delayed
implementation.52 In January 1988 Amal leader Nabih Berri, having failed to overcome the camps'
resistance after more than two and a half years of trying and now entangled in growing military conflict
with Hizb allah, announced a formal end to the camps war as a "gift" to the then one month-old
Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. But even this gesture was not sealed for almost a year,
until a formal Fateh-Amaldisengagement agreement for the Sidon area was signed on December 23.
The new accord was praised by local PLO officials as a "new leaf in our relations with Amal."53

The relaxation of tensions between the PLO and Amal did not, however, signal any corresponding
improvement of the hostile relations between the PLO and Amal's Syrian ally-the third and perhaps
gravest source of challenge to the PLO in Lebanon. In April 1988 the funeral of Khalil al-Wazir in
Damascus seemed to provide an opening for possible PLO-Syrian rapprochement. Indeed, later that
month Yasir 'Arafat and Hafiz al-Asad held in Damascus their first meeting since 1983. But the process
soon stalled. In Beirut, fighting erupted between 'Arafat loyalists and Abu Musa's Fateh-PC in May 1988.
The dissidents' assault on loyalist positions was backed by intense fire support from Syrian artillery that
left more than one hundred dead and five hundred wounded. After two months of fighting, Abu Musa
finally captured Shatila and Burj al-Barajina camps on June 27 and July 8. The remaining Fateh forces
there were evacuated to Sidon (despite the reluctance of the local Popular Nasirite Organization to
accept them) under the auspices of Libya, the PSP, LCP and SSNP.54

In 1989 further meetings took place between 'Arafat and Asad in May (at the Arab League Summit in
Casablanca) and September (at ceremonies marking the twentieth anniversary of the Libyan revolution
in Tripoli), and between Faruq Qaddumi and Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar'. That summer,
some 140 long-imprisoned Fateh fighters were released from Syrian custody. But despite rumours and
portents of a posssible thaw, there was no evidence of any real rapprochement between the PLO and
Syria. Although official Syrian criticism of the PLO leadership diminished, Syrian-supported Palestinian
groups remained vociferous in their condemnation of 'Arafat and his policies.

Indeed, enduring suspicions between Fateh and Syria continued to provide the grounds upon which the
former forged tactical alliances with a variety of groups-ranging from the Lebanese Forces to Hizb allah-
characterized by little in common (or with Fateh) other than their own differences with Damascus.
Similar reasoning appeared to motivate 'Arafat's support for Michel 'Awn, the Maronite army general
appointed head of a caretaker administration by out-going President Amin Jumayyil in September 1988
when the Lebanese parliament proved incapable of selecting a successor. Syria and its Lebanese allies,
in contrast, supported the rival cabinet of Prime Minister Salim al-Huss. In January, 'Arafat met with
'Awn in Tunis, despite strong criticism not only from Syria and its Lebanese and Palestinian allies, but
also from the PFLP and DFLP. 'Arafat's tacit support for 'Awn continued into the spring of 1989, when
'Awn announced a "war of liberation" to drive Syrian troops from Lebanese soil-to which Damascus
responded with a massive show of military force. Through the summer 'Awn's forces and those of Syria
and its Lebanese allies exchanged artillery barrages in heaviest fighting in Lebanon since Israel's 1982
invasion.
A final source of difficulties for the PLO in Lebanon continued to be rooted in the organization itself.
There were multiple signs that problems of fragmented and personalized decision-making,
organizational disunity, and other weaknesses which had plagued pre-1982 PLO policy in Lebanon had
yet to be overcome. Internecine fighting between Fateh loyalists and Syrian-backed Palestinian
dissidents was one such indicator. Certainly, most of the blame for the poor state of Syrian-PLO
relations could justifiably be laid at Damascus' door. Indeed, the fighting in Beirut in the summer of 1988
only served to confirm the marginality of Syrian proxy groups within the PLO.55 But while much of PLO
policy was driven by a widely-accepted need to preserve the independence of Palestinian decision-
making, Fateh (and 'Arafat in particular) did not shy from actions that only served to stoke Syrian
hostility.56 The continued existence of weaknesses in PLO policy in Lebanon was evident in other areas
too. This was particularly true in Sidon, beyond the direct reach of Syrian power. There a rash of
clashes, kidnappings, assassinations and other incidents signaled local power struggles and the
reemergence of tajawuzat.57

All these developments underscored the constant attention the PLO needed to devote to the
maintenance of its Lebanese sanctuary. Increasingly, however, issues of Lebanese policy were
overshadowed by the dramatic popular uprising underway in the occupied territories: the
Palestinian intifada.