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Privacy

Art. III, Sec. 3:


(1) the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) any evidence obtained in violation of this shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

Basis - The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a
facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizures. (But the Court
acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc.)
The right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving
of constitutional protection. [Disini v. Secretary of Justice (2014)]

Ople vs. Torres


Q: Is there such an animal as constitutional right to privacy?
A: Yes. Griswold vs. Connecticut speaks about ―zones of privacy‖. Constitutional provisions which
recognize zones of privac: Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8 and 17.

IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO PRIVACY?


ANS – No specific guarantee but the constitution provides for several zones of privacy like
Section 1 –life, liberty, property
Section 2 – Right against unreasonable searches and seizure
Section 3 – Privacy of communication and Correspondence
Section 6 – Liberty of Abode and travel
Section 8 – Right to Form Association
Section 17 – Right Against Self Incrimination
It has also indicated that zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws:
(1) Civil Code
(2) RPC
(3) Anti-Wiretapping Law
(4) Security of Bank Deposits Act
(5) Intellectual Property Code

WHAT ARE THE TWO CATEGORIES OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY?


ANS - (1) DECISIONAL - means the independence in making certain important decisions.
The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom…The concept of liberty would be
emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to
privacy and interference demands respect. [Morfe v. Mutuc 22 SCRA 424 (1968)]
(2) INFORMATIONAL – Interest in avoiding of disclosure of personal matters and freedom
from surveillance as enunciated in the case of DISINI vs SOJ
What is the 3rd kind?
(3) Locational/Situational
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his
or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for
instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its
privacy level at ―Only Me‖ or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo

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would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo‘s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it
would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines
of his or her private space. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R.No. 202666, Sept. 29, 2014)

Q: Respondent argues there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in AO 308. (Ople vs Torres)


A: SC answered there are 2 tests…..
1. Whether by his conduct, he has shown an expectation of privacy
2. Whether this expectation is one which the society recognizes as reasonable.

Requisites of Existence of Privacy Right (Test of Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy)


(1) Subjective:A person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; and
(2) Objective:The expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. [Pollo v.
Constantino-David (2011)]

WHAT ARE THE TEST TO DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS OF A PERSON’S


EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY?
Ans – In the case of Ople vs Torres, it was stated that there are factors to consider like customs, physical
surroundings, and practices of a specific activity.

INTRUSION, WHEN ALLOWED


(1) By lawful order of the court
Probable cause in Sec. 2, Art. III should be followed for the court to allow intrusion. Particularity
of description is needed for written correspondence, but if the intrusion is done through wire-taps and the
like, there is no need to describe the content. However, identity of the person or persons whose
communication is to be intercepted, and the offense or offenses sought to be prevented, and the period of
the authorization given shouldbe specified. or
(2) When public safety or public order requires otherwise, as may be provided by law.

When may information be disclosed?(Ople vs Torres)


1) Rational connection
2) Compelling state interest involved in the disclosure
3) Law must be narrowly drawn

Zulueta vs. CA
Q: Are pictures guaranteed under Section 3? Are they correspondence?
A: yes

Q: What is the difference between privacy under Section 2 and Section 3?


A: Privacy of papers under Section 2 cannot be applied against private intrusions. Section 3 extends even to
private intrusions.

Q: What if in Marti, there is a letter containing information as to the disposition of hashish,


admissible?
A: If contents of letter, apply Section 3. If letter in itself (as an object evidence),
apply Section 2.

Q. RECONCILE PEOPLE VS MARTI and ZULUETA VS COURT OF APPEALS


ANS – In the case of Marti, Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals. In the Case
of Zulueta, the right to privacy is upheld. In the case of Marti, It is object evidence while in the case of
Zulueta, it is documentary evidence.
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RA 4200
Q: What defines the character of communication?
A: (1) Place and (2) presence or absence of other people. Controlling factor: Intent of parties. Majority if
larger group, both if there are parties.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200 PROTECTS COMMUNICATIONS WHICH ARE INTENDED TO
BE PRIVATE. Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited. (Navarro vs CA)

Public Figure – a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doing, his affairs and his character,
has become public personage. Why?
• They had sought publicity and consented to it, so they could not complain.
• Their personalities and their affairs had already become public and could no longer be regarded as
their own private business.
• The press had a privilege, under the constitution, to inform the public about those that have
become legitimate matters of public interest.

Gaanan vs. IAC


Q: What if private communication is intercepted thru use of telephone line?
A: No. RA 4200 enumerates instances/modes of violation. Enumeration exclusive.
Q: Supposing 2 public officers privately communicating thru cellpone was intercepted without use
of any tapping device but thru airwaves?
A: No violation. Enumeration in Section 1, RA4200 exclusive.

Exclusionary Rule
Stonehill vs. Diokno
Q: Reason for inadmissibilty?
A: Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials knows that it cannot profit by
their wrong, will that wrong be repressed. (Judge Learned Hand)
Q: Can Exclusionary Rule apply to principal as well as to secondary evidence?
A: Exclusionary Rule applies to principal evidence. Fruit of Poisonous Tree Doctrine applies to secondary
evidence. (People vs. Allicando)
Q: Is the fruit of the poisonous tree the same as the exclusionary principle?
A: No. Under the exclusionary principle, it presupposes that the primary evidence was obtained in
violation of constitutional principles. Fruit of the poisonous tree refers to derivative evidence, which
means it was derive from a poisonous tree which refers to the primary evidence which was obtained in
violation of the constitutional principles.
Justice Frankfurter: Evidence excluded would be considered as the primary evidence and any evidence
derived therefore is also excluded.
*Prior to its inclusion to the Constitution, the exclusionary principle is only applied in case law.
Judge Learned Hand ( Stonehill v. Diokno)
―Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will the wrong be repressed.‖
Q: Is it not enough that sanctions will be imposed on erring law enforcement officers?
A: It is not enough in order to procure the violation of the constitutional guarantee. The courts must
exclude in order to strengthen the constitutional guarantees.

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Ramirez vs CA
ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW (R.A. 4200); MAKES NO DISTINCTION AS TO WHETHER
THE PARTY SOUGHT TO BE PENALIZED OUGHT TO BE A PARTY OTHER THAN OR
DIFFERENT FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRIVATE COMMUNICATION. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any."
The word communicate comes from the Latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to
impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation, or signifies the "process by which meaning or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)."

Zulueta vs. CA
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

Navarro vs CA
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.

Ople vs Torres
THE USE OF BIOMETRICS AND COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT ASSURE
THE INDIVIDUAL OF A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY. — We reject the
argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to
the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a
person's expectation of privacy depends on a twopart test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes an
reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation.
However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may
serve to create or diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No.
308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As technology advances, the level
of reasonably expected privacy decreases. The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation
diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. The security of the computer data file
depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and
software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
―The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable
information base through the electronic linkage of the files . The data may be gathered for gainful and
useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal
information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great
for some of our authorities to resist.
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name,
address and other basic personal information about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will
not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and
categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control
and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.‖
―The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-tograve dossier on an
individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer
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revolution. The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of
information given at different times and for varied purposes. It can continue adding to the stored data and
keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored data is simple. When information of a privileged
character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject. Once
extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.‖

Disini vs SOJ
The Cybercrime Law does not regard as crime private communications of sexual character between
consenting adults
The deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on Sec.4(c)(i) of the law show a lack of
intent to penalize a private showing between and among two private persons although that may be a form
of obscenity to some. The understanding of those who drew up the
cybercrime law is that the element of ―engaging in a business‖ is necessary to constitute the crime of illegal
cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor
and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, e.g., by webcam.
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as ―spam‖ is entitled to
protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech
is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is constitutional. The Court agrees
with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has
an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation.
Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes ―aiding or abetting‖ libel on the cyberspace is
a nullity. The terms ―aiding or abetting‖ constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who
express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in
a fuzzy way.

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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Sec. 4. Art. Ill: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.‖

Speech, expression, and press include:


(1) Written or spoken words (recorded or not)
(2) Symbolic speech (e.g. wearing armbands as symbol of protest)

But violation of the Hotel‘s Grooming Standards by labor union members constitutes illegal strike
and therefore an unprotected speech. [NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter v. CA
(2008)]
(3) Movies

Any and all modes of protection are embraced in the guaranty. It is reinforced by Sec. 18(1), Art. 3.
J. Holmes: It is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us.

Scope of Right
Speech, expression, and press include every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc
recorded. It also includes movies as well as what is referred to as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an
armband as a symbol of protest.
But the right is not absolute and may include certain exceptions such as pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action and danger to national security

Q: What are the different constitutional guarantees in Sec.4 Art.3? (SEPAP)


1) Freedom of speech
2) Freedom of expression
3) Freedom of the press
4) Freedom of assembly
5) Freedom of petition

Q: Are these important constitutional guarantees?


A: Yes. As the Supreme Court said in the case of Bayan v. Ermita, ruled that the right of the people to
peaceably assemble and right of people free speech, expression and the press is included among the rights
that are given the preferential status and a right that enjoys the primacy in the realm of constitutional
protection. These rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all other
rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

Q: The Supreme Court said that all other rights depend on these rights, without which all other
rights will fall. Why?
A: Without free speech, the right of due process is a meaningless right. Without free speech, the
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures will be meaningless without the
guarantees of free speech.

Q: Why are they lodged in only one constitutional provision?


A: In the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, it was not by accident or coincidence that these rights were coupled
in a single guarantee because these rights although not identical, they are inseparable and they co exist.

Four aspects of freedom of speech and press


1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint –. refers to official governmental restrictions on the press
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.Freedom from prior
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restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship,
and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.
They carry a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality but not all prior restraints are invalid.
2. Freedom from subsequent punishment to publication
3. Freedom of access to information regarding matters of public interest – Official papers, reports
and documents, unless held confidential and secret by competent authority in the public interest, are public
records. As such, they are open and subject to regulation, to the scrutiny of the inquiring reporter or editor.
Information obtained confidentially may be printed without specification of the source; and that source is
closed to official inquiry, unless the revelation is deemed by the courts, or by a House or committee of the
Congress, to be vital to the security of the State.
4. Freedom of circulation – Refers to the unhampered distribution of newspapers and other media
among customers and among the general public. It may be interfered with in several ways. The most
important of these is censorship. Other ways include requiring a permit or license for the distribution of
media and penalizing dissemination of copies made without it, and requiring the payment of a fee or tax,
imposed either on the publisher or on the distributor, with the intent to limit or restrict circulation. These
modes of interfering with the freedom to circulate have been constantly stricken down as unreasonable
limitations on press freedom. (Chavez v. Gonzales G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008)

Free Speech Theories


1. Deliberative democracy – includes the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the
right to criticize government actions.
2. Market place of ideas – free speech should be encouraged
3. Self-expression – free speech enhances human dignity and is a means of assuring individual
selffulfillment
4. Marker for group identity
5. Protection for individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses
6. Safety valve – nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence (Diocese of
Bacolod v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 205728, Jan. 21, 2015,

Paradigms of Free Speech


1. Equality-based approach – politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation but regulation
promoting political equality prevails over speech. This view allows the government leeway to redistribute
or equalize ‗speaking power,‘ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices
often systematically subdued within society‘s ideological ladder. This view acknowledges that there are
dominant political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that
may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is
part of the majoritarian world like ours.
2. Contrary approach – considerations of equality of opportunity or equality in the ability of citizens as
speakers should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine. Under this view, ―members of the public are
trusted to make their own individual evaluations of speech, and government is forbidden to intervene for
paternalistic orredistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas are best left to a freely competitive ideological
market.‖ This is consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of viewpoint as well as content to
evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of speech.‖ (Ibid.).

Q: Criticisms on official conduct, does the truth matter?


ANS – No. it suffices if he believes it to be true. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern.

Q: Does freedom of expression in general cover criticisms?


A: Yes. Right to criticize is comparable to scalpel

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Freedom of expression exposes abuses/social ills perpetrated by public officers. It is a necessary
consequence of a democratic institution.

Q: Does freedom of expression allows citizens to discuss any subject matters without censorship
or punishment?
A: Allows only of matters of public concern does not allow discussions beyond the realm of public
concern (private matters).

Q: Does the freedom of expression in general exist for the protection of majority group or popular
group?
A: The freedoms of press, expression, speech, assembly and petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people. In the rhetorical aphorisms of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that
we abhor or hate more than the ideas that we cherish. According to Socrates, not only to protect the
minority who want to talk but also the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently
stresses, liberties of one are liberties of all. Liberties of one are not safe unless liberties of all are protected
It does not exist for the majority group, for they not need protection. What needs protection is the
minority. So much this constitutional guarantees exist according to Justice Holmes, for the ideas that we
abhor or hate with more than the ideas that we cherish.

Q: What is the importance of free movement of ideas in a democratic institution?


A: Liberty of the expression of thoughts in so doing, the Constitution values the public opinion.

Q: Does the constitution protect criticisms on the conduct of public officers?


A: Yes. As held in the case of U.S. v. Bustos, The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.

Q: How about criticisms on judicial officers?


A: Yes. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject to proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of peace or a
judge the same as any public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of
public opinion on the part of judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the
hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a
citizen and to stand up bravely before any official.

Q: Can judicial officers be criticized like all other public officers?


A: In People v. Alarcon, Criticisms of judgment of courts are protected by the freedom of speech, but
criticisms on matters still pending with the court constitutes contempt. As stated, the rule imported into
this jurisdiction is that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the case is ended.

Q: Are there any group of public individuals that can be subjected to public criticisms in the
exercise of constitutional guarantee of free speech?
A: Public figure. A public figure is defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame or mode of
living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a public personage. He is, in other words, a celebrity. (Ayer v.
Capulong)
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Q; What are the three reasons that the Supreme Court have given in the case of Ayer v. Capulong
in subjecting public figures to public discussions?
1) They had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complain when they received it
2) That their personalities and their affairs had already become public and could no longer be regarded as
their own private business
3) That the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have
become legitimate matters of public interest.

Q: May a citizen in his exercise of free speech discuss the lifestyle of Janet Lim Napoles? Can she
be a subject of public discussion without violating her constitutional right to privacy?
She is neither a public officer nor a judicial officer?
A: Yes. Applying the case of Borjal v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court sustaining the validity of the
petitioners commentaries because he is a private individual involved in a public issue or national issue. So
there are three groups of individuals that can be subjected to public discussion, criticisms a) public officers
b) public figures c) individuals who are involved in national or public issues.

Q: How about motion pictures? Are they protected speeches? Does it matter that the motion
pictures are for historical purposes or for entertainment?
A: Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of
the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public
figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is considerable. The importance of motion pictures as an
organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There
is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction
were sustained, there is diminution of the basic right of free expression.

Types of Privileged Communications:


1. Absolutely privileged communications—those which are not actionable even if the author acted in
bad faith. An example is found in Article VI, Section 11 which exempts a member of Congress from
liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications—those contained defamatory imputations are not actionable
unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong ―private
communications‖ and ―fair and true report without any comments or remarks.‖

Q: What are the unprotected speeches?


A: Nude, obscene, profane and fighting words, libelous and which will bring about the danger or risk in the
society.

Q: What is obscene according to Supreme Court in Pita v. Court of Appeals?


A: In Miller v. California, the Court specifically laid down the guidelines on the test of obscenity.
A)Whether an average person, applying contemporary standards, would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest
B)Whether the work depicts or describes, in patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law
C)Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious, literary, artistic, political, or scientific value

2 Tests
1) Whether speech is political or commercial
2) Whether regulation is content-based or content-neutral

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Political Speech
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. ―x x
x and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy." (GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 205357, Sept. 2, 2014).
Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action. It
is concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of power whether through the election of
representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. We
evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium
because the quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic
society. (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled
to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. (Disini v. Secretary
of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 18, 2014)
Communication which ―no more than proposes a commercial transaction‖. Advertisements of
goods or of services is an example of this.
To enjoy protection, commercial speech:
1. Must not be false or misleading. (Friedman v. Rogers, 440 US 1, 1979)
2. Should not propose an illegal transaction. (Pittsburgh Press Co. v Human Relations
Commissions, 413 US 376, 1973)
NOTE: However, even truthful and lawful commercial
speech maybe regulated if:
1. government has a substantial interest to protect;
2. the regulation directly advances that interest; and
3. it is not more than extensive than is necessary to protect that interest. (Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp v. Public Service Commission of NY, 447 US 557 (1980))

Restrictions on Free Speech:


1. Content-based Restrictions—are imposed because of the content of the speech itself; distort public
debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear how people will react to a
particular speech.
Subject to the Clear-and-Present danger Rule Test
In Sanidad vs. COMELEC, a rule prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from
campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it,
or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny.
These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional
invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.
2. Content-neutral Restrictions—are those which are not concerned with the content of the speech.
The clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional
validity of laws.

Doctrine of Fair Comment—


Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. It means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation
is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
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official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, it is immaterial that
the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably inferred from the facts. (Borjal
vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1)

Test to Determine Memoirs of a Woman of Miller vs California


Obscenity: Pleasure vs Atty. Gen. of
Roth vs US Massachusetts
The question is, whether to A work is obscene if: A work is obscene if:
the average person, applying (1) The dominant theme of (1) Whether the average
contemporary community the material taken as a whole person, applying
standard, the dominant theme appeals to prurient interest in contemporary community
of the work taken as a whole sex; standards, would find that the
appeals to PRURIENT (2) Material is patently work, taken as a whole,
INTRESTS. offensive because it affronts appeals to the prurient
contemporary community interest;
standards relating to the (2) Whether the work depicts
description or representation or describes, in an offensive
of sexual matters; way, sexual conduct or
(3) Material is utterly without excretory functions,
redeeming social value specifically defined by
applicable state law; and
(3) Whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value

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Note: The Memoirs test was abandoned because it was nearly impossible to prove that a work was utterly without
redeeming social value [Miller v. California].

Q: Are they conclusive?


A: No. The determination of the character of the article or literary depends on the Court. Definition of obscenity
is a judicial question which was to be determined by the factual circumstances of every case.

Q: In Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court applied O’Brien test as distinguished
from other test in determining valid regulation of the free exercise clause, what is the difference of this
test among the other test particularly the clear and present danger rule, dangerous tendency test and
balance of interest test?
A: It is the most influential test to determine whether the regulation is content based or content neutral. It must
be considered as the canonical test according to the Supreme Court.

Q: What are the factors that must be determined in weighing the validity of government regulation
under the O’Brien test?
1)It is within the constitutional power of the Government.
2)If it furthers an important or substantial government interest
3)If the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4)If the incidental restriction on alleged First amendment freedoms of speech,expression and press is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest

Test Definition
Dangerous Tendency Doctrine Limitations on speech are permissible once a
rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the
dangercontemplated.
Balancing of Interests Test When particular conduct is regulated for public
[Soriano v. Laguardia] order, and the regulation results in an indirect
abridgment of speech, the court must determine
which of the two conflicting interestsdemand
greater protection.
Factors to consider:
(1) Social value of the freedom restricted;
(2) Specific thrust of the restriction, i.e. direct or
indirect, affects many or few;
(3) Value of the public interest sought to be
secured by the regulation;
(4) Whether the restriction is reasonably
appropriate and necessary for the protection of
the public interest;
(5) Whether the necessary safeguarding of the
public interest may be achieved by a measure
less restrictive of the protected freedom.

Clear and Present Danger Rule Speech may be restrained because there is a
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead
to an evil the government has a right to prevent.

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Requires that the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ―extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.‖

Diocese of Bacolod vs Comelec


COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens. COMELEC cites the
Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither
do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
Every citizen‘s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. We have also
ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. Speech
with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this court.

US vs Bustos
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. — Qualified privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. "A
communication made bona �de upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contain criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable."
Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness
and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Personal
injury is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in
intemperate terms. Finally, if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to
the respective functions of various officials, such an unintentional error would not take the case out of the
privilege.

People vs Alarcon
As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that "newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is other wise after the case is ended."

Ayer Productions vs Capulong


COMMERCIAL MEDIA NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE EXERCISE THEREOF. — The
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary
profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. In our community as in many
other countries, media facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector but the private sector-
owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being devoted in whole or in part to revenue
producing activities. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and
hence to exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected
freedom of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in
our country.

Page 13 of 178
Borjal vs CA
FAIR COMMENTARIES ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST ARE PRIVILEGED AND
CONSTITUTE VALID DEFENSE IN AN ACTION FOR LIBEL OR SLANDER. — To reiterate, fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed, malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.

Reyes vs Bagatsing
All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation
placed on the exercise of the right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health, of other legitimate public interest
Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for
gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes
of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its signi�cance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such
utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of
reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered
that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views,
even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be
availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly.
One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
REFUSAL OR MODIFICATION OF APPLICATION FOR PERMIT SUBJECT TO CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER TEST. — The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be �led
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view
that there is such an imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

Pita vs CA
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its
protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right,
barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes
v. Bagatsing, "the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action . .
. lies on the . . . authorit[ies]." "There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existence of such clear and present danger." "It is essential for the validity of . . . previous restraint or censorship
that the . . . authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may

Page 14 of 178
require." "To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and
present danger test

SWS vs Comelec
To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means
other than the suppression of freedom of expression.

Q: The Supreme Court in the case of US v. Bustos, said that the right to assembly and petition is a
necessary consequence of a republican institution and complimentary in right of free speech, why?
A: The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and complement of
the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to
the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.

Q: Right to assembly and petition is not an absolute right. Supposing an ordinance authorizes the
municipal council to regulate the use of public plaza, public streets, parks in assemblies and petition.
Does the authority conferred with the ordinance on the local government unit to regulate includes the
power to prohibit outright?
A: No. In Primicias v. Fugoso, the power conferred on to the mayor may contemplate two things, a) deny
outright b) regulate the manner, time and place. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision of the said ordinance
only means that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant permit, but only discretion, in
issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or
the meeting may be held.
*in presence of clear and present danger in which the State has a right to prevent, the local government may
prevent a holding of assembly and petition.

Q: Do students have a right to exercise this constitutional guarantee, the right to assembly and petition?
A: Yes. In Malabanan v. Ramento, the Court citing Justice Fortas in Tinker v. De Moines Community School
District, ―Students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.‖

Q: Sec. 4 of Article 3 can only be invoked against the government because of the expressed
constitutional provision that says ―no law shall be passed abridging freedom of speech (sic) and when
we say no law it only applies to the government only. So why did the Supreme Court applied the freedom
of assembly and petition which is covered by sec.4 art.3 in a private institution Malabanan v. Ramento as
well as in the case of PBM Employees Association v. Philippine Blooming Mills?
A:The Supreme Court only discuss the provision in this cases in order to determine the gravity of the penalty. In
Malabanan v. Ramento, the penalty is too heavy to penalize an exercise a constitutional right. But nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the school to impose disciplinary sanctions only that it is too
heavy. In PBM Employees Association v. Philippine Blooming Mills, Supreme Court said that dismissal is too
grave a penalty on the exercise of the constitutional right. It is not in order to determine whether these private
institutions can regulate freedom of expression but in order to determine the penalty imposed by these private
institutions.

Page 15 of 178
Q: This right to assembly and petition is a right enjoyed by a group of people. Right to strike is a
concerted right. An individual cannot claim assembly and petition? Right to strike?
A: Yes

Q: When can we say that the persons are exercising a right to assembly and petition and right to strike?
A: In Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, concerted action was declared as a strike because they were raising their
issues about better pay, employment and they were engaged in strike against their employer, incidentally, the
government. The concerted action is to raise employer/employee relationship issues.
PBM Employees Association v. Philippine Blooming Mills, their petition is about the abuses of the police. If the
concerted effort is to bring about the issues in the government which refer to general welfare, the concerted effort
is the exercise of petition and assembly. Supreme Court held that in the hierarchy of rights, freedom of expression
is primary over the property rights of the owner.

Q: When property rights can be regulated? Right to assembly and petition?


A: Apply the two tests, lawful means and lawful subject. If these two rights concur then property rights can be
regulated. In assembly and petition, when there is a clear and present danger of an evil the State has a right to
prevent.

Q: What is public assembly according to B.P. 880?


A: Public assembly means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
concerted action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to
the general public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of grievances.

Q: Under B.P.880, may assemblies in private places be considered as public assembly?


A: No, but nonetheless exempted from getting a permit as long as there is consent of the owner. (the definition is
not within the contemplation of public assembly in B.P. 880)

Q: What are the other public assemblies which do not require a permit?
A: government owned and operated educational institutions which only require the compliance of the rules and
regulations of the school and assemblies in freedom parks in which under B.P.880; it must be constituted within
six months from the validity of the law.
In Bayan v. Ermita, after 20 years, there are only two freedom parks constituted by the ordinance. The Supreme
Court said, enough is enough, in order to compel them, after 30 days if the local government unit does not
establish a freedom park, all public parks within that local government unit can be used as Freedom Park and no
permit shall be required to hold public assemblies.

Q: Under B.P. 880 where should the permit be secured?


A: It should be filed in the mayor‘s office five working days prior to the assembly and should be acted upon two
to three working days otherwise the permit is deemed granted. But the action of the city government shall be
communicated to the applicant within 24 hours after the 2-3 days period otherwise they may conduct assembly
without a permit.

Q: Supposing the Office of the Mayor knows that when it accepts the application the two day period to
act on the application starts so the Mayor knowing this legal obligations under the law instructed his

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secretary saying ―whenever an application is filed for a permit to hold a rally do not accept it so the two
day period will not start to run.‖ So what is the recourse of the applicant?
A: The application must be posted in the office of the mayor and that will be considered as filed.

Q: Law discourages the participation of law enforcement officers in public assemblies. But the presence
may be contained in order to maintain the safety and security. Under the law, how far should the law
enforcement officers from the participants of public assemblies?
A: It should not be less than 100 meters.

Q: Supposing there was already a sign of violence, what should the police officers do?
A: Under B.P.880, after the police officers can disperse the rally there must be three notices that must be issued.
At the first sign of looming violence, the officer should notify the organizers. If the violence persist that causes
danger and damage to property, the officer shall issue a second warning to stop it but if it continues the third
warning and that warning is to disperse.

Q: Supposing the public assembly was attended by violence, does it make it unlawful?
A: No. It would only make the persons who committed violent act culpable of violation of law but assembly is
still lawful.

Q: Is B.P.880 content based or content neutral? Why?


A: It is content neutral. B.P.880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P.880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference lawful cause does not make it content based because assemblies really have
to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be ―peaceable‖ and entitled to protection. Neither are the words
opinion, protesting nor influencing in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words petitioning for redress of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
cannot be avoided.

Q: Supposing instead of the maximum tolerance mandated by law in regulating public assembly the
President mandates the law enforcement officers to use calibrated preemptive response can that pass
constitutional challenge?
A: The Supreme Court said in Bayan v. Ermita that CPR has no place in the legal firmament and must be struck
down as darkness that shrouds freedom.

Q: What is Assembly & Petition: (US vs.Bustos)


Right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably in respect to public affairs etc

Rules on assembly in public places


1. The applicant should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and
the time when the assembly will take place at least 5 days before the planned assembly. Within 2 days, the
mayor should rule on the application. If unacted, it shall be deemed granted.
2. The application should be filed ahead of time to enable the public official concerned to apprise whether
there are valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant, but in another public place. The grant
or refusal should be based on the application of the Clear and Present Danger Test.
3. If the public authority is of the view that there is an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicants must be heard on the matter within 24 hours.

Page 17 of 178
4. The decision of the public authority, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the
applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they may, if they so desire, have recourse to the proper
judicial authority. (Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L- 65366, Nov. 9, 1983)

Assembly in private properties


Only the consent of the owner of the property or person entitled to possession thereof is required.

Tests applicable to the exercise of the right to assembly


1. Purpose Test – Looks into the purpose of the assembly regardless of its backers. (De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 US 353, 365, 1937)
2. Auspices Test – Looks into the backers/supporters.

B.P. 880’s ―No permit, No Rally‖ policy is constitutional


BP 880 is constitutional. It does not curtail or unduly restrict the freedom. It merely regulates the use of public
places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, ―maximum tolerance‖ is for the
benefit of the rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
―permits‖ is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally sound ―clear and present danger‖
standard. (Bayan Karapatan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006)

Heckler’s veto – an attempt to limit unpopular speech. This occurs when an acting party‘s right to freedom of
speech is curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting party‘s behavior.

Primicias vs Fugoso
This court has adopted the second construction, namely, that said provision does not confer upon the
Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or
specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. The
ordinance cannot be construed as conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit,
which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and
void or violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Board is empowered only to regulate the
use of streets, parks and other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised
Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern and to restrain, but can not be
construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit" ,the Municipal Board cannot grant the Mayor a power
which it does not have.

Malabanan vs Ramento
RIGHTS GUARANTEED TO STUDENTS OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; GUIDELINES
TO BE OBSERVED IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF. — The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are
guaranteed to students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their
welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless
there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. As a
corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The
peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy, of disorder under the name of dissent,
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law.
If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from the school authorities, who are
devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be

Page 18 of 178
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel.

Dela Cruz vs CA
We again stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably
assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral
absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the
students for whose education the teachers were responsible.

PBMEO vs Philippine Blooming Mills


Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they
are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions

BAYAN vs Ermita
The Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
maximum tolerance, is null and void. CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum
tolerance [Sec. 3 [c] of B.P. 880], and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is
and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance.
B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. The law is not vague or overbroad. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since
the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus
readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
B.P. 880 provides that every city and municipality must set aside a freedom park within six months from
the law‘s effectivity in 1985. Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of
freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time. Without such
alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right to peaceably assembly

Page 19 of 178
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Sec. 5. Art. Ill: ―No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights.

Q: What is religion?
A: Religion is a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator. (Aglipay v. Ruiz)

Religion – reference to one‘s views of his relations to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence
for his being and character and of obedience to his will. [David v. Beason]

Religion is expanded to non-theistic beliefs such as Buddhism or Taoism. [Torasco v. Watkins]

Q: A system of belief that does not espouse a belief in the Supreme Being is not a religion?
A: Supreme Court cited a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court which espouses a non theistic concept of religion as
long as there are 4 factors that must concur in order that a system of belief may be considered as religion and
these are
1)Belief in God or parallel belief that takes a place in the believer‘s life.
2)Demonstrable degree of sincerity without delving in to the truthfulness of the belief.
3)It must involve a moral code
4)Associational ties (US vs Seager)

Ecclesiastical Affair—it involves the relationship between the church and its members and relates to matters of
faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation to which the state cannot meddle.

TWO STANDARDS USED IN DECIDING RELIGION CLAUSE CASES


(1) Separation – protects the principle of church-separation with a rigid reading of the principle
(a) Strict Separation
• The wall of separation is meant to protect the state from the church
• There is an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state
• There is hostility between the two
(b) Strict Neutrality or tamer separation
• Requires the state to be neutral in its relation with groups of religious believer; the relationship is not
necessarily adversarial
• Allow for interaction between church and state, but is strict with regard to state action which would
threaten the integrity of religious commitment
• The basis of government action has a secular criteria and religion may not be used as a basis for
classification of purposes
• Public policy and the constitution require the government to avoid religion-specific policy

(2) Benevolent neutrality and the Doctrine of Accommodation


BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY DOCTRINE
It protects religious realities, tradition, and established practice with a flexible reading of the principle of
separation of church and state.

Page 20 of 178
The Doctrine of Accommodation allows the government to take religion into account when creating
government policies to allow people to exercise their religion without hindrance. The effect they want to achieve
is to remove a burden on one‘s exercise. The government may take religion into account to exempt, when
possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would be infringed, or to crate without state involvement, an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise
may flourish.
The breach in the wall between church and state is allowed in order to uphold religious liberty, which is the
integral purpose of the religion clauses. The purpose of accommodation is to remove the burdenon a person‘s
exercise of his religion.
Although morality contemplated in laws is secular, benevolent neutralitycould allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. [Estrada v. Escritor (2003)]

Q: Section 5 of Art. 3 establishes two important religious clauses and these are?
A: Non establishment of religion clause and free exercise clause

3rd Part: Non-religious test clause

Lemon test
A test to determine whether an act of the government violates the non-establishment clause.
To pass the Lemon test, a government act or policy must:
1. Have a secular purpose;
2. Not promote or favor any set of religious beliefs or religion generally; and
3. Not get the government too closely involved (―entangled‖) with religion. (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, June 28, 1971)

Q: What does non establishment clause mean?


A: Non establishment clause prohibits the government from favoring one religion or favoring all religion and
discriminating one religion or discriminating against all religion..
The clause prohibits excessive government entanglement with, endorsement or disapproval of religion.
[Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union (1974)]

NOTE: The non- establishment clause means that the state should adopt a ―position of neutrality‖ when
it comes to religious.The nonestablishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules,
moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should be based on a
purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies,
morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose. (Perfecto v.
Judge Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015)

Basis
―[T]he principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot meddle
in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor
one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.‖ [Imbong v. Ochoa (2014), on the constitutionality of the
RH Law]

Page 21 of 178
Purpose of the non-establishment clause
1. Protects voluntarism
2. Insulation of political process from interfaith dissension

NOTE: Voluntarism, as a social value, means that the growth of a religious sect as a social force must come
from the voluntary support of its members because of the belief that both spiritual and secular society will
benefit if religions are allowed to compete on their own intrinsic merit without benefit of official patronage. Such
voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from religion and unless religion is
insulated from politics. Non establishment assures such insulation and thereby prevents interfaith dissention.

Rooted in the separation of Church and State. Relevant provisions of the Constitution:
(1) Art. II, Sec. 6: ―The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.‖
(2) Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(5): ―Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered [as political parties].‖
(3) Art. VI, Sec. 5(2): ―For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from […] sectors
as may be provided by law,except the religious sector.‖
(4) Art. VI, Sec. 29(2): ―No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.‖

Constitutionally created exceptions to the non-establishment clause


1. Art. 6, Sec.29 (prohibition on appropriation of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of any
religion)
2. Art. 6, Sec. 28 (3) (exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious purposes
3. Art. 14, Sect. 3 (3) (optional religious instruction in public elementary and highschools)
NOTE: Religious instruction in public schools:
a. At the option of parents/guardians expressed in writing;
b. Within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by religious authorities
of the religion to which the children belong;
c. Without additional costs to the government
4. Art. 14, Sec. 4 (2) (citizenship requirement of ownership of educational institutions, except those established by
religious groups and mission boards)
5. Art. 6, Sec. 29 (2) (appropriation allowed where ecclesiastic is employed in armed forces, in a penal institution,
or in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium)

The non-establishment clause states that the State cannot:


1. Set up a church
2. Pass laws which aid one or all religions or prefer one over another
3. Influence a person to go to or stay away from church against his will
4. Force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion

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Constitutional provisions which express the nonestablishment clause
1. Art. VI, Sec. 29 No public money/property given to religious sect or minister/religious personnel (except for
those assigned to army, penal institution, government orphanage and leprosarium)
2. Art. II, Sec. 6 Separation of church and state is inviolable
3. Art. IX(C), Sec. 2 (5) No religious sects can be registered as political parties

Q: Any use of public funds or property with some religious color is prohibited by the Constitution?
A: No. In Aglipay v. Ruiz, the stamps were made for a secular activity in which the Supreme Court ruled that it
only tends to promote the site of National Eucharistic Congress and not any religious activity. It only used the
activity in order to promote a secular activity to promote tourism.

Q: Is the purchase of the wooden image of patron saint violates the principle of the Church and State?
A: No. In the case of Garces v. Estenzo, the funds used for the acquisition of the image was from private funds
and does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for
the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman.

The Free Exercise Clause affords absolute protection to individual religious convictions. However, the
government is able to regulate the times, places, and manner of its exercise [Cantwell v. Connecticut]. ―Under the
Free Exercise Clause, religious belief is absolutely protected, religious speech and proselytizing are highly
protected but subject to restraints applicable to non-religious speech, and unconventional religious practice
receives less protection; nevertheless conduct, even if it violates the law, could be accorded protection.‖ [Estrada
v. Escritor (2003)]

Q: What are the two aspects of religious freedom according to the Supreme Court in Iglesia ni Cristo v.
Court of Appeals?
A:
1)Freedom to Believe- the individual is free to believe or disbelieve as he pleases concerning the
hereafter.(absolute as long as it remains within the realm of thought)

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own
theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion;
acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality
of his soul -- in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit.
However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full
freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his
inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Everyone has
a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes. (Iglesia ni
Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996)

2)Freedom to act on One’s Beliefs- where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect
the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the regulation and authority of the State.

The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And
this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the
purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave
religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law
because of religious dogma.

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Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human
sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and multiply"
are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot
refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any authority except
that of God alone. An atheist cannot express in his disbelief in act of derision that wound the feelings of the
faithful. The police power can validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee, born of deep religious
conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband
(Ibid.).

Q:In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, petitioner contends that its shows cannot be reviewed by
MTRCB because they are merely exercising their religious freedom, did the Supreme Court agree?
A: Supreme Court citing Justice Frankfurter, the constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom
from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. Mere
invocation of religious freedom will not exempt the activity from governmental regulation.

Q: Petitioner contends the issue regarding on attacks on another religion is between the two religions so
the State should not interfere. Did the Supreme Court agree?
A: No. When religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still. In Taruc v. Dela cruz and
Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that there is only one aspect of religion that the State
cannot interfere, that is doctrinal and disciplinary. In Fonacier case the issue there is who among the two groups is
the duly elected leader. The Court interfered because it involves property rights. In Taruc case, the issue is the
validity of the expulsion of the member who disobeyed the order of the elders, the Court did not interfere
because the disciplinary matters are governed by internal rules.

Q: What would be the test to be applied in order the religious freedom be regulated by the State?
A: Clear and present danger test and Compelling State interest test can be applied simultaneously.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals and American Bible Society v. City of Manila, in these two cases they apply
clear and present danger test because apart from religious freedom there are other constitutional rights involve,
religious freedom is invoked in conjunction with another constitutional rights like freedom of speech, press and
expression.
In Estrada v. Escritor case pure and exclusive use of religious freedom. The Compelling State Interest test is
applied because where the conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different interest;
some effects may be immediate and short term while others delayed and far reaching.

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST


The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. (Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 1919)
NOTE: The test can be applied with regard to the Freedom of Religion when what is involved is
religious speech as this is often used in cases of freedom of expression.

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Q: What are the three questions that must be asked in applying the COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST TEST?
A:
1)Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?
2)Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty?
3)Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?

NOTE: The Compelling State Interest test is used in cases involving purely conduct based on
religious belief.

Conscientious objector Test


An "individual who has claimed the right to refuse to perform military service on the grounds of freedom of
thought, conscience, and/or religion. (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 18)

Requisites for one to be considered a conscientious objector


1. The person is opposed to war in any form
2. He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief
3. And he must show that this objection is sincere. (Clay v. United States, 403 U.S.698
(1971)

In the RH Law
Sections 7, 23, and 24 of RA 10354(Reproductive Health Law) impose upon the conscientious objector the duty
to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner.
A conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he is
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-
coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
The Court found no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. Only
the prevention of an immediate danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement
of religious freedom. Also, respondents failed to show that the means to achieve the legitimate state objective is
the least intrusive means. [Imbong vs. Ochoa (2014)]

Q: In Estrada v. Escritor, may these objectives of the laws be able to be achieved other than prohibiting
the religious beliefs of the respondents?
A: In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. The state has never sought to prosecute respondent nor her partner.
The state‘s asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of unenforced prohibition.

Q: Can the government prevent the distribution of religious articles?


A: In the case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila, imposing tax on religious activity violates the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Supreme Court ruled that the power to tax in exercise of privilege is
power to control or suppress the enjoyment of a right. The right becomes meaningless, useless and at times
burdensome if the government imposes the same in the enjoyment of the right.

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Prohibition against taxation of religious, charitable entities, and educational entities
Basis: Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation (Art. IV, Sec. 28 [3]).
---
Q: What is the coverage of tax exemption?
A: It covers real property taxes only. Accordingly, a conveyance of such exempt property can be subject to
transfer taxes.

SUMMARY RULES ON Covers real property tax


EXEMPTION OF only. The income of
PROPERTIES whatever kind and
ACTUALLY, nature from any of their
EXCLUSIVELY AND properties, real or
DIRECTLY USED FOR personal or from any of
RELIGIOUS, their activities for profit
EDUCATIONAL AND regardless of the
CHARITABLE disposition made of
PURPOSES Coverage of such income shall be
constitutional subject to tax.
provision
Requisite to avail of Property must be
this exemption “actually, directly and
exclusively used” by
religious, charitable and
educational institutions.
Test for the grant of Use of the property for
this exemption such purposes, not the
ownership thereof

NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution, the doctrine of exemption by incidental purpose is no longer
applicable. Such doctrine is only applicable to cases where the cause of action arose under the 1935
Constitution. Under the 1987 Constitution, it must be prove that the properties are ACTUALLY,
DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for the purpose of institution for the exemption to be granted
(Sababan, 2008)

Rules on taxation of non-stock corporations for charitable and religious purposes


1. For purposes of income taxation
a. The income of non-stock corporations operating exclusively for charitable and religious purposes, no part of
which inures to the benefit of any member, organizer or officer or any specific person, shall be exempt from tax.
However, the income of whatever kind and nature from any of their properties, real or personal or from
any of their activities for profit regardless of the disposition made of such income shall be subject to tax (Sec. 30
[E] and last par., NIRC).
NOTE: An organization may be considered as non-profit if it does not distribute any part of its income to
stockholders or members. However, despite its being a tax-exempt institution, any income such institution
earns from activities conducted for profit is taxable, as expressly provided in the last paragraph of Sec. 30
(CIR v. St. Luke‘s Medical Center, Inc., G.R. No. 195909, September 26, 2012).
b. Donations received by religious, charitable, and educational institutions are considered as income but not
taxable income as they are items of exclusion.
On the part of the donor, such donations are deductible expense provided that no part of the income of
which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual in an amount not exceeding 10% in case of

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individual, and 5% in case of a corporation, of the taxpayer‘s taxable income derived from trade or business or
profession (Sec.34 [H], NIRC).

2. For purposes of donor’s and estate taxation - Donations in favor of religious and charitable institutions are
generally not subject to tax provided, however, that not more than 30% of the said bequest, devise, or legacy or
transfer shall be used for administration purposes (Secs. 87[D] and 101, NIRC).

Q: Religious organizations are exempt from taxation?


A: Incidental use not exempted

Q: Can the government require the priests and ministers to pass the government qualification test?
A: No because no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.

Q: Compensation of priest exempted from taxation?


A: Privilege of accepting the compensation (excise tax) not exempted to tax. Lladoc v. CIR

Q. What is the purpose of the prohibition of religious tests?


A. The purpose of this provision, which is but a corollary Of the freedom and non-establishment clause, is to
render the government powerless "to restore the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing
religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly, profess to
have a belief in some particular kind of religious concept." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961). For, indeed, to allow religious tests would have the effect of "formal or practical 'establishment' of
particular religious faiths . . . with consequent burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of
non-favored believers."

Aglipay vs Ruiz
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious
freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality,
its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event
of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim
and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated.

Garces vs Estenzo
The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is
entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering
with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the
image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as

Page 27 of 178
illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained
tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of
worship and banning the use of public money or property

American Bible Society vs City of Manila


The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent."
It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of
the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which
requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of general merchandise, cannot be applied to
plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as wel as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals


Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past
and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.
We reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television
is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of
public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can
be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and
continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today.
Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including
religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails
to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER; RULE APPLY TO SPEECHES AND ATTACKS AGAINST
OTHER RELIGIONS. — It is suggested we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the
case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear and present danger test undergone permutations. Presently
in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value speeches such as obscene
speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech:
speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court
contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. Hence, even following the drift of American
jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar which concerns speech
that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that
religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.

Page 28 of 178
RULE APPLIES TO VIDEO TAPES THAT ARE PRE-TAPED. — It is also opined that it is
inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of
speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot
be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The
contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotape that are pre-taped and hence, their speech
content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to
assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the
substantive evil feared by the law.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Cebu


RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP; FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ENTITLED TO
HIGHEST PRIORITY AND AMPLEST PROTECTION: TWO-FOLD ASPECT THEREOF. — Religious
freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator "The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare.
After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not
only the arts, science, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and
be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and
duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the
curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this
Court had feared in Gerona.
Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. The test
of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Estrada vs Escritor
Benevolent neutrality is an approach that looks further than the secular purposes of government action and
examines the effect of these actions on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of
the Filipino people and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that
government must pursue its secular goals. In pursuing these goals, however, government might adopt laws or
actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives
room for accommodation of these religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It allows these
breaches in the wall of separation to uphold religious liberty, which after all is the integral purpose of the
religion clauses.

Imbong vs Ochoa
The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers.
There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The
protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all
medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not
taken off even if one acquires employment in the government

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LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
Sec. 6. Art. Ill: ―The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. ‖
Rights guaranteed under Sec. 6 of the Bill of Rights
1. Freedom to choose and change one‘s place of abode; and
2. Freedom to travel within the country and outside.

Liberty of abode
Right of a person to have his home or to maintain or change his home, dwelling, residence or habitation in
whatever place he has chosen, within the limits prescribed by law.

"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "liberty regulated by law."

Q: What is right of Liberty of abode?


A: The right to choose once residence and to leave it whenever he pleases.

Q: How would it be impaired?


A: The liberty of abode may be impaired only:
a. Upon lawful order of the court and;
b. Within the limits prescribed by law.

Q: What is hamletting?
A: It is the herding of people into a military quarantined sanctuary within rebel areas to force them to relocate
because of the limitation of resources necessary to sustain life. In other words, it is the compulsory relocation of
residents because of military operations.

Q: Supposing A purchase a lot in city of manila but unfortunately the City of Manila classified the area
as highly industrialized area. Can A insist to build his home in spite the classification of the local
government unit?
A: No. Law may limit the guarantee of liberty of abode

Q: In Villavicencio v. Lukban, is the liberty of abode violated?


A: Without a law implementing that, although with noblest intention the conduct of mayor is illegal. For ours is
government of laws and not of men.

Q: Right to travel within the Philippines is covered by the constitutional right to travel?
A: Yes

Right to travel
Right of a person to go where he pleases without interference from anyone.
The limitations on the right to travel
a. Interest of national security;
b. Public safety;
c. Public health.
NOTE: With respect to the right to travel, it is settled that only a court may issue a hold departure order against
an individual addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, administrative authorities, such
Page 30 of 178
as passport-officers, may likewise curtail such right in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.

Q: Can a servant be prevented by leaving her master’s house due to unpaid debts?
ANS – No. Caungca vs Salazar. The issue is about as to Whether or not an employment agency has the right to
restrain and detain a maid who has not yet paid the advance payment it made. Its is in the negative. An
employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely
no power to curtail her freedom of movement.
The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not
make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to
another, freedom to choose one‘s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded
or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not
blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of
another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally
deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. (Caunca vs Salazar, 82 Phil 851)

Watch-list order (WLO)


Order issued to prevent an individual from travelling. It may be issued by the Secretary of Justice motu
proprio or upon request, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Against the accused, irrespective of nationality, in criminal cases pending trial before the RTCs or
before courts below the RTCs.
2. Against the respondent, irrespective of nationality, in criminal cases pending preliminary investigation,
petition for review, or motion for reconsideration before the DOJ or any of its provincial or city
prosecution offices.
The Secretary of Justice may likewise issue a WLO against any person, either on his own, or upon the request of
any government agency, including commissions, task forces or similar entities created by the Office of the
President, pursuant to the "Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" (R.A. No. 9208) and/or in connection with
any investigation being conducted by it, or in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. (Sec.
2, DOJ Circ. 41, s.2010)
NOTE: A WLO is good for 60 days (Sec. 4, DOJ Circ. 41, and s.2010).

The Watch List Order may be lifted or cancelled under any of the following grounds:
1. When the validity period of the WLO has already expired;
2. When the accused subject of the WLO has been allowed by the court to leave the country
during the pendency of the case, or has been acquitted of the charge;
3. When the preliminary investigation is terminated, or when the petition for review, or
motion for reconsideration has been denied and/or dismissed.

Hold Departure Order (HDO)


An order issued to prevent an individual from travelling. It may be issued by the Secretary of Justice motu proprio
or upon request, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Against the accused, irrespective of nationality, in criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of
courts below the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs):
i. If the case against the accused is pending trial, the application under oath of an interested
party must be supported by (a) a certified true copy of the complaint or information; and (b) a
Certification from the Clerk of Court concerned that criminal case is still pending.

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ii. If the accused has jumped bail or has become a fugitive from justice, the application under oath of an
interested party must be supported by (a) a certified true copy of the complaint or information; (b) a
certified true copy of the warrant/order of arrest; and (c) a Certification from the Clerk of Court
concerned that the warrant/order of arrest was returned unserved by the peace officer to whom the same
was delivered for service.
2. Against the alien whose presence is required either as a defendant, respondent, or witness in a civil or labor case
pending litigation, or any case before a quasi-judicial or an administrative agency of the
government.
The application under oath of an interested party must be supported by
a) a certified true copy of the subpoena or summons issued against the alien; and
b) a certified true copy complaint in civil, labor or administrative case where the presence of
the alien is required.‖
The Secretary may likewise issue an HDO against any person, either on his own, or upon the request by the Head
of a Department of the Government, the head or a constitutional body or commission, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court for the Judiciary, the Senate President or the House Speaker for the Legislature, when the adverse
party is the Government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health.‖ (Sec. 1, DOJ Circ. 41, s.2010)
NOTE: A HDO is valid for 5 years from issuance. The Hold Departure Order can be lifted or cancelled as
follows:
1. When the validity period of the HDO has already expired;
2. When the accused subject of the HDO has been allowed to leave the country during the pendency of
the case, or has been acquitted of the charge, or the case in which the
warrant/order of arrest was issued has been dismissed or the warrant/order of arrest has been recalled;
3. When the civil or labor case or case before an administrative agency of the government
wherein the presence of the alien subject of the HDO/WLO has been dismissed by the court or by
appropriate government agency, or the alien has been discharged as a witness therein, or the alien has
been allowed to leave the country.
Note: A watch-list order doesn‘t totally bar a person from travelling. A person listed in the WLO must obtain a
clearance to be able to travel. In contrast, a holddeparture order totally prevents a person from traveling

Issuance of WLO and HDO is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for lack of an enabling law


Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must derive its
life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness
test and sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish the existence of the enabling law that will
justify the issuance of the questioned circular.
It is clear from the foregoing that the liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of the court and, on
the one hand, the right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or
public health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for a limitation on the right to travel, the Congress
must respond to the need by explicitly providing for the restriction in a law. This is in deference to the primacy of
the right to travel, being a constitutionally-protected right. (Genuino vs. De Lima, 2018)

Q: Is the right to return to One’s country covered by Bill of Rights?


ANS – No. It is considered as a generally accepted principle of international law. And thus, part of the law of the
land.

Q: What activities are covered by the restrictions?


A: One‘s freedom of movement and Right to Travel. It may be classified either as:

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a) travel within the country; b) travel form the Philippines to another country

Q: Right to return to one’s country is covered by the international human rights and on political and civil
rights?
A: Right to return to one‘s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only one of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well considered view that the right to
return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international laws and under our Constitution, is
part of the law of the land. (Doctrine of incorporation)

Q: Why did the Supreme Court make a distinction if the right to travel and right to return is both an
exercisable right in our Constitution?
A: It is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys different protection under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Q: What kind of power was exercised by the President?


ANS - Residual Powers. It belongs to the government but DOES NOT belong to any of its branches. It is an
inherent power of the government which is exercised by the President being the HEAD of the State

Q: What is a residual power?


A: Excess powers granted by the Constitution to the President. Powers that are neither executive, legislative nor
judicial in character and inherent in the government.

Q: May the right to travel be impaired? What are the factors that can impair right to travel?
A: Yes. Right to travel may be impaired by the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may
be provided by law.

Q: Restrictions on the Right to Travel?


1. LIMITATIONS on the right to travel: interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law
a) A lawful order of the court is also a valid restriction on the right to travel.
b) Sec. 6, Art III of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that whole the liberty to travel may be
impaired even without court order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretions o impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of ―national security,
public safety or public health and as may be provided by law.‖
c) Art. 13(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provide that everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.
d) Art. 12(4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provide that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right
to enter his own country.

Q: What is the meaning of the phrase ―as may be provided by law‖?


A: Law. There must be a law impairing the right to travel. The impairment in the case of Marcos v. Manglapus
would be invalid if there is no law conferring such impairment.
Administrative officers have no right to impair. There must be a law.

Had the Supreme Court considered the difference between right to return in the country and right to travel, the
order of the President impairing the right to return is invalid because there is no law conferring the President to
impair in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. Since it is not included but covered by a
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different protection under the international law, this order is a valid impairment to return to one‘s country
because while right to return to one‘s country is accorded in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
these rights cannot be impaired arbitrarily. These rights can be impaired only if there‘s legal basis. The impairment
of the right to return to one‘s country imposed by the President is valid as long as there is a legal basis or grounds.
As different from right to travel that can be impaired only in interest of national security, public safety or public
health or as may be provided by law.

Q: Supposing a former President wishes to seek medical attention in France, Italy, Singapore and Japan.
But there are pending criminal complaints against her before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office
of the Ombudsman is conducting preliminary investigation in order to determine whether there is a
probable cause to initiate information against the former President. There was no information filed yet
for violation of law. But because of the intention of the President to leave the Philippines, Secretary of
Justice issued a department secular prohibiting her to leave the Philippines. On the basis of secular no.
41, she issued a hold departure order or lookout order. Is the right involve include the right to travel? Is
the order of Justice Secretary a valid impairment of right to travel? (Arroyo v. De Lima)
A: Yes. It is invalid because there is no law conferring the Secretary of Justice to impair the right to travel.

Q: What is the basis why the authority of the courts to impair the right to travel was recognized by the
Supreme Court notwithstanding the fact that the 1987 Constitution no longer includes the phrase ―lawful
order of the court.‖?
A: In Silverio v. Court of Appeals, Art 3 sec.6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.

Q: May a person released on bail cannot leave the country? Is this a valid impairment?
A: Yes the right to travel is impaired. The person is prevented to leave the Philippines.

Q: What is the remedy if the right to travel is impaired?


A – Violation or impairment of said right is a proper ground for habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court; a ground for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and a ground for damage suit under the Civil
Code

Aliens and right of entry


While the right to travel of citizens covers both exit from and entry into the country, aliens cannot claim the same
right. ―It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to
admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.‖ As a result, norms of
admission of aliens into the country are political matters virtually beyond the reach of judicial review. (Bernas)

Sylverio vs Gaviola
RIGHT TO TRAVEL RESTRICTED BY CONDITIONS OF BAIL. — The condition imposed upon
an accused on bail to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction of his right to travel . A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from
leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return.
LIMITATION ON THE RESTRICTION ON THE RIGHT. — Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court

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Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health"
and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text.
NOT A LIMITATION ON THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT TO USE
ALL MEANS TO CARRY THEIR ORDERS INTO EFFECT. — Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the
Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by
law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Marcos vs Manglapus
BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY, NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS
GUARANTEED. — The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
RIGHT TO RETURN CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW. — It is the court's well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as
a generally accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art.
II Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
RIGHT TO RETURN, DISTINCT AND SEPARATE FROM THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. — It is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof.
The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the speci�c powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
PRESIDENT'S RESIDUAL POWER TO PROTECT THE GENERAL WELFARE OF
THE PEOPLE; THE POWERS INVOLVED. — The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not
forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The President is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in ful�lling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any
way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.

Manotoc vs CA
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising,
61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at
all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction
of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction
of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding
force outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of
a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

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Genuino vs De Lima
Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right
to travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit
provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment. The requirement for a legislative
enactment was purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the person's right to travel by administrative
officials who may be tempted to wield authority under the guise of national security, public safety or public health.
This is in keeping with the principle that
ours is a government of laws and not of men and also with the canon that provisions of law limiting the
enjoyment of liberty should be construed against the government and in favor of the individual.
It is clear from the foregoing that the liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of the court
and, on the one hand, the right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public
safety or public health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for a limitation on the right to travel, the
Congress must respond to the need by explicitly providing for the restriction in a law. This is in deference to the
primacy of the right to travel, being a constitutionally-protected right.

Page 36 of 178
Right to Information
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Rationale
The purpose is to promote transparency in policymaking and in the operations of the government, as well
as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. Armed with the
right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper
functioning of any democracy. (IDEALs v. PSALM, G.R. No. 192088, Oct. 9, 2012)

Three categories of information:


1. official records;
2. documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and
3. government research data used in formulating policies. (Section 7, Article 3, 1987 Constitution).

NOTE: The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to
inspect and copy them at his expense. The exercise is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the
integrity of public records and to minimize disruption of government operations.

Policy of Full Public Policy of Full Public Disclosure Right to Information on Matters of
Disclosure v. Right to [Art. II, Sec. 28] Public Concern
Information[See [Art. III, Sec. 7]
IDEALS v. PSALM,
G.R. No. 192088;
October 9, 2012]
All transactions involving public interest, including any Matters of public concern.
matter contained in official communications and public [Public Concern: no exact definition and
documents of the government agency. adjudicated by the courts on a case-by-
Matter case basis, but examples abound in
jurisprudence (e.g. peace negotiations,
board exams, PCGG compromise
agreements, civil service matters).]

Duty to disclose of the government, pursuant to the Duty to permit access to information on
What is Asserted policy of full public disclosure. matters of public concern.

Demand or request required to gain


Demand to Access access.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operation of
the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional
rights. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public official ―at all times x xx accountable to the people‖,
for unless the citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything.
[Chavez v. PEA and Amari (2002)]
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―Public concern‖ like ―public interest‖ embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. [Legazpi v. CSC (1987)]

Q. What rights are guaranteed by Section 7?


A. They are (1) the right to information on matters of public concern and (2) the corollary right of access to
official records and documents. These are political rights available to citizens only. But this is without prejudice to
the right of aliens to have access to records of cases where they are involved.

Q. What are the limits on these rights?


A. They are "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."

Q. What are the limits on the authority to curtail these rights?


A. It is submitted that the standards that have been developed for the regulation of speech and press and of
assembly and petition and of association are applicable to the right of access to information.

Q: In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, The public respondent contends that there is a need for
implementing legislation before this constitutional right be exercised. Did the Supreme Court agree?
A: The right to information on matters of public concern is a self executing right. They supply the rules by means
of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information.

Q: Petitioner contends that they are not self executing because of the phrase ―as may be provided by
law‖ that can be found in sec.2, art.3 and sec.28 art.2, what does ―as may be provided by law‖ means?
A: It means that the legislature may provide reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded
which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.

Q: In Province of Cotabato v. The Government of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, the
Supreme Court ruled that the right to information is in splendid symmetry with the constitutional
guarantee of public disclosure, why?
A: The Supreme Court ruled that the policy of full disclosure enunciated in sec.28 art.(people‘s guarantee)
complements the right to access information on matters of public concern because the right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information while sec.28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await
the passing of a statute.

Q: If the guarantee of the government is not present do you think that the right to information is still
meaningful?
A: No. if the individuals claim the right and that there is no guarantee that the government would disclose such
information then it would be meaningless.

Q: In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, there must be questions asked and be answered and these
questions are?
1)Being a public concern or one that involves public interest
2)Not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee

Page 38 of 178
LIMITATIONS
GR: The access must be for a lawful purpose and is subject to reasonable conditions by the custodian of the
records.
XPNs: The right does not extend to the following: (NTCO)
1. Information affecting national security, military and diplomatic secrets. It also includes intergovernment
exchanges prior to consultation of treaties and executive agreement as may reasonably
protect the national interest
2. Matters relating to investigation, apprehension, and detention of criminals which the court may not
inquire into prior to arrest, prosecution and detention
3. Trade and industrial secrets and other banking transactions as protected by the Intellectual Property Code
and the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act
4. Other confidential information falling under the scope of the Ethical Safety Act concerning classified
information. (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, Dec. 9, 1998)

PUBLICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS


General Rule: Full publication is a condition for law‘s effectivity.
Scope: All statutes (includes those of local application and private laws), presidential decrees and executive
orders by President acting under power either directly conferred by the Constitution or validly delegated by the
legislature, and administrative rules and regulations for implementing existing laws, charter of a city, circulars by
Monetary Board.
Exception: Internal regulations and letter of instructions concerning guidelines for subordinates and not
the public are not included.
Effectivity: Fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature [Tañada v.
Tuvera (1986)]
Note: Tañada v. Tuvera explains that the publication of laws and regulations is also a due process concern.

Q: Does the right to information include the right to demand copies or to demand summaries?
A: In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Supreme Court ruled that although citizens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to access to official records, the constitution does not accord them
a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern. It is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant
has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is imperative duty of defendant
to perform the act required.

Q: Only law or legislative act can exclude a particular information or transaction from public inspection?
A: Yes and does not cover administrative regulations. Administrative agencies which are the custodian of the
information has only the authority to regulate access in order to end that damage to or loss of public records may
be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented and the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other person shall be assured.

ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS


Decisions are matters of public concern and interest.
Pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or
interest. They are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or a
judgement affecting their rights and interest.

Page 39 of 178
Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective powers
of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious
prejudice to any of the parties. [Hilado, et al v. Judge (2006)]

Q: As you said earlier, there must be a law in order to prohibit the release of information but in the case
of In Re: Production of court records and documents and the attendance of court officials and
employees as witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10,2012 and the various letters for the
impeachment prosecution panel dated January 19 and 25 2012, does it mean that the ruling of Supreme
Court is unconstitutional because in this case the Court prohibit outright the release of information?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot disclose the information because of deliberative process
privilege; it is not based on law but is based on legal principle, the Principle of Comity. Any information that is
within the internal judicial function is not subject for a subpoena. Apart from the restriction of the Congress,
there are other restrictions that are imposable. There are acceptable restrictions.

Q: May an administrative agency which is a custodian of an information issue a regulation that only
certified true copies can be inspected and not the original?
A: Yes. In order to end that damage to or loss of public records may be avoided.

Q: May an administrative agency impose a regulation that the inspection of the materials can be viewed
only at 8-12 noon? What purpose?
A: Yes. The purpose is undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented.

Q: How about the viewing of the said material is one hour per person?
A: Yes. So that exercise of the same constitutional right by other person shall be assured.

Q: Why are criminal matters excluded?


A:Criminal matters such as those relating to apprehension, the prosecution and detention of criminals are
excluded because efforts and effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to,
for example, police information regarding rescue operation, the whereabouts of the fugitives, or leads an covert
criminal activities.

Q: Congress can prohibit some information from the exercise of right of information. So whenever there
is a law exempting an information or transaction from public disclosure, the right to information can no
longer be exercised? Is the right to information can be defeated by any legislative act?
A: No. any law which restricts or impairs the right to information is issued in the exercise of police power because
it regulates liberty we should apply the two test, lawful subject and lawful means. In the case of Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled that the requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual
even with respect to the convict is unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict should he so
desire to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern which the public
may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen

Page 40 of 178
RIGHT TO INFORMATION RELATIVE TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government, and should not
cover recognized exceptions. [Chavez v. PEA and Amari (2002)]

Definite propositions
While evaluation of bids or proposals is on-going, there are no ―official acts, transactions, or decisions.‖ However,
once the committee makes an official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition. From this moment, the
public‘s right to information attaches, and any citizen can assail the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite propositions. [Chavez v. PEA and Amari (2002)]

Q: sec.28 art.2 and sec.7 art.3 both cover transactions, does transaction as a guaranteed right to
information covers not consummated transactions?
A: Yes. In the case of Chavez v. PCGG and Province of Cotabato v. RP peace panel on Ancestral domain, the
court ruled that it is not required that the transaction shall be fully consummated so that the people can exercise
their right to information and have access to this information. If the people have to wait for the consummation of
the transaction, it would be too late for them to nullify or to rescind or voice out their concern regarding the
transaction.

Q: Does the right to information include the steps leading to the consummation? Are they allowed to
have access in the information?
A: Yes. In Chavez v. PCGG, the Supreme Court ruled that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with ostensible owners and holders of ill gotten wealth.

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS
There is a distinction between the text of the treaty and the offers and negotiations. They may compel the
government to disclose the text of the treaty but not the offers between RP and Japan, because these are
negotiations of executive departments. Diplomatic Communication negotiation is privileged information.
(Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008)

GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE
Executive Privilege
Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the
deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of executive officials . The first is rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second on common law
privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to
documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a
consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to
greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.
Requisites of presidential communications privilege:
(1) The communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President
(2) The communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President.
(3) There is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
(Neri v. Senate Committee On Accountability Of Public Officers And Investigation, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008)

Page 41 of 178
Judicial Privilege.
While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC cited above speaks only of the confidentiality of court deliberations,
it is understood that the rule extends to documents and other communications which are part of or are
related to the deliberative process. The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations that are component parts of the process for
formulating governmental decisions and policies. Obviously, the privilege may also be claimed by other court
officials and employees when asked to act on these documents and other communications.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show that the
document is both (1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.
A document is ―predecisional‖ under the deliberative process privilege if it precedes, in temporal
sequence, the decision to which it relates. In other words, communications are considered predecisional if
they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion.
A material is ―deliberative,‖ on the other hand, if it reflects the give and- take of the consultative process.
The key question in determining whether the material is deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the
information would discourage candid discussion within the agency. If the disclosure of the information
would expose the government‘s decision-making process in a way that discourages candid discussion among the
decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts‘ ability to perform their functions), the information is deemed
privileged.
Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for denying access to court records, as well as preventing
members of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process: (1) the disqualification by reason of
privileged communication and (2) the pendency of an action or matter.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules on confidentiality that apply to justices and
judges apply to them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions
taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session, and (3) the deliberations
of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it. They are subject as well to the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication and the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules extend
to documents and other communications which cannot be disclosed.

"A resolution is considered officially released once the envelope containing a final copy of it addressed to the
parties has been transmitted to the process server for personal service or to the mailing section of the Judicial
Records Office. Only after its official release may a resolution be made available to the public." (Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court [IRSC], Rule 11, Sec. 5)

To summarize these rules, the following are privileged documents or communications, and are not subject
to disclosure: (RD-PC-PCS)
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court on each case
included in the agenda of the Court's session on acts done material to pending cases, except where a party litigant
requests information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending
before the Court;
(3) Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature, in particular, documents and other
communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers,
internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.
(4) Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in the course of their
official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their term of office.

Page 42 of 178
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except
only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by the court to the general public.
(6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest officials of each
department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other departments.
(7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her
individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or
judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception without the consent of the Court.
(Per Curiam Decision of The Supreme Court in Connection with the Letter of the House Prosecution Panel to
Subpoena Justices of the Supreme Court, February 14, 2012)

Court Hearings
Right of accused over right to public information: With the possibility of losing not only the precious
liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a
verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether
open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind unbridled by
running emotions or passions. [Re: Request for Live Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the
Plunder Cases against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001]

Q: What is the remedy of a person who is unlawfully denied the right to information, or the right to
access to official records?
A: The aggrieved party may file a Petition for Mandamus. A civil action for damages may also be availed of under
Art. 19 or 27 of the New Civil Code.

Legaspi vs CSC
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford
access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may
be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a
recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the same way that free
discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time , access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues
confronting the nation.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public.

Page 43 of 178
Valmonte vs. Belmonte
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION; EFFECT OF DENIAL THEREOF. — The cornerstone
of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied
access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power,
would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
NOT RESTRICTED BY THE EXERCISE OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE
PRESS. — The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But
this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the
exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with
the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance
the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government.
GOVERNMENT AGENCY PERFORMING PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS, NOT EXCLUDED
FROM THE COVERAGE. — The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some
business, discharges the same function of service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the
loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage
and scope of the right to information.
LIMITATION. — The consideration in guaranting access to information on matters of public concern
does not however, accord to citizen the right to compel custodian of public records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire such information.

Province of Cotabato vs GRP


Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of
public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of
the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court
has categorically ruled: . . .
[T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction ". Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one
is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.

T h e policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of
access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to
give information even if nobody demands.
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and
essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.

Echegaray vs. SOJ


FREE ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF PUBLIC CONCERN; A RECOGNITION OF
ESSENTIALITY OF THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION. — The incorporation in the
Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the

Page 44 of 178
free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the
contents of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the
convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public
concern "which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."

Chavez vs. PCGG


In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be
accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed
at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the
government are honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants. Undeniably,
the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought; but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that
the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as
participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by
ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well informed public that a government
remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.
INCLUDES DISCLOSURE ON ANY PROPOSED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PCGG AND
OSTENSIBLE OWNERS AND HOLDERS OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS.
— Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG
and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to
intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier — such
as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.

Per Curiam Decision of The Supreme Court in Connection with the Letter of the House Prosecution
Panel to Subpoena Justices of the Supreme Court, February 14, 2012
In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records ―create a hierarchy of rights that protect
certain confidential relationships over and above the public‘s evidentiary need‖ or ―right to every man‘s
evidence.‖ Accordingly, certain informations contained in the records of cases before the Supreme Court are
considered confidential and are exempt from disclosure. To reiterate, the need arises from the dictates of the
integrity of the Court‘s decision-making function which may be affected by the disclosure of information.
Court records which are ―predecisional‖ and ―deliberative‖ in nature are thus protected and cannot be the
subject of a subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved.

Page 45 of 178
Right to Association
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, association, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

The right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law. It is therefore an aspect of
the general right of liberty. More specifically, it is an aspect of freedom of contract; and in so far as
associations may have for their object the advancement of beliefs and ideas, freedom of association is an aspect
of freedom of expression and of belief.

Origin: Malolos Constitution

Interpretation of ―for purposes not contrary to law‖: same as clear and present danger rule, only such may justify
abridgement to the right to form association or society. [Gonzales v. COMELEC (1969)]
The government must comply with the heavy burden of showing that the organization in fact presents a clear and
present danger of substantive evil which the state has the right to protect. (Bernas)

NOTE: Freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate, or, if one is already a member, to
disaffiliate from the association.

Q: Under sec.8 of art.3 applies to all persons whether working or jobless?


A: The right is recognized as belonging to people whether employed or unemployed, and whether employed in
the government or private sector. (Bernas)

Q: Is the right to association in private sector the same in public sector?


A: The right to strike is not available in public sector. In the case of SSS Employees Association v. Court of
Appeals, memorandum circular no. 6 series of 1987 issued by the civil service commission in relation on executive
order no. 1, prohibits the conduct of strike regardless whether proprietal or governmental function.

The right to strike is not included in the right to form unions or freedom of assembly by government employees.
Their employment is governed by law. It is the Congress and administrative agencies which dictate the terms and
conditions of their employment. The same is fixed by law and circulars and thus not subject to any collective
bargaining agreement.

Pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government
Employees to Self-Organization, the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any of
its instrumentalities, political subdivision and government owned and controlled corporations with original
charters, are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes thereof (SSS Employees Association v. CA, GR. No. 85279, July 28, 1989).

The only available remedy for them is to lobby for better terms of employment with Congress. The right to
unionize is an economic and labor right while the right to association in general is a civil political right.

Q: Why does the law prohibit government employees the right to strike?
A: As held in the case of Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor, the Court ruled that since the
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. In private sector,
Page 46 of 178
industrial peace cannot be secured by compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on essentially voluntary basis. The terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private
sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, it is the legislature and
where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment.

Q: Right to associate includes the right not to associate, is this absolute?


A: No. The legal protection granted to such right from not joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a
labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop. By virtue thereof, of a closed shop agreement before
enactment of R.A. no. 3550 if an employee who wishes to be still an employee regardless of religious beliefs, he
must be a member of the collective bargaining union. However, RA 3550 introduced an exception that it excludes
ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization.

Q: What if a member of the union does not agree to the CBA and if he will not sign he’ll lose his job,
how can you cure this defect?
A: CBA is contract between the union officers and the management. All CBAs are required to be ratified by the
members.

Q: Is Closed shop agreement a violation of the right to associate?


ANS – No. One is free to accept the employment or not contract containing the agreement.

Q: May the right to Association be bargained through a medium of contract?


ANS – No, because it is a fundamental right.

The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism. Workers may also form or join an association for mutual
aid and protection and for other legitimate purposes. (Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard v. Bureau
of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 211145, Oct. 14, 2015)

Labor Unionism
(1) Legal personality as pre-condition for effective association action
The right to form associations does not necessarily include the right to be given legal personality.
However, if the law itself should make possession of legal personality a pre-condition for effective associational
action, involved would be not just the right to have legal personality but also the right to be an association.
[Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor (1969)]

(2) Eligibility to join, assist or form union expressly denied by law


The right of association of managerial employees is denied because of Article 245 of the Labor Code
which provides that managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. This is
because Art III Sec 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise is for the purposes not contrary to law. [United
Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma (1998)]

Page 47 of 178
Q: As we said earlier, in the case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union, the right to associate
includes the right not to associate and that is the premise, however in the case of In re: Matter of the IBP
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edilion, the petitioner herein invoked the premise
enunciated in the case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s Association, how did the Supreme Court
ruled?
A: The Supreme Court ruled that integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He become a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.
Atty. Gabriel: I beg to disagree. A person automatically becomes a member of the Bar upon passing the examination, but he does not
become automatically a member of an integrated bar. Membership in the Bar and Integrated Bar are two different things. Before you
can get your roll of attorney’s number, you should be a member of the Integrated bar. For you to be a member, you should pay
membership dues. Is that tantamount in compelling or coercing one to join?
Atty. Gabriel: The Supreme Court should have attacked the issue in this tenor, like any constitutional right, right to associate is not
absolute. It may be regulated by the state. Supreme Court is given the authority under sec.5 par.5 of Art.8 of the Constitution to
regulate the Integrated bar or practice of law. In that regard, even if the right to associate includes the right not to associate, this right
may be impaired by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its rule making power as guaranteed by the Constitution instead of skirting
in the issue.

If a land buyer who buys a lot with an annotated lien that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of a
homeowners‘ association thereby voluntarily joins the association. [Bel-Air Village Association vsDiokno (1989)]

As lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the association. No application for membership is necessary x xx
PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It could have avoided such membership by not buying land
from TDC. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the condition, and thus, join the
association. [PADCOM Condominium Corp. v. OrtigasCenter Assoc. (2002)]

Q: What is the remedy of the owner if he likes to free himself from the burden of becoming a member of
the association?
A – Sell or dispose of his lot.

SSS Employees Association vs CA


While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether or not government employees may
strike, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1987 of
the Civil Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the
right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress
for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If
there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council
for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary
work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands

Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers Union


The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act
is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation
Page 48 of 178
of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may
employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the
union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs.
To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an
exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the
closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot
be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from
affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate,
with labor union.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON
INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW
NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice
— as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege
must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. The
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"
COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-de�ned
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Page 49 of 178
Non-impairment clause.
Sec. 10, Art. Ill: ―No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed‖

Q: What are the purposes of the constitutional prohibition against the passage of a law impairing
obligations of contracts?
ANS - The basic purposes are:
1. To implement the freedom of contracts
2. To protect property rights
3. To safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State.

Q: Why did the Constitution guarantee that it will not interfere in contractual relationship? What is the
interest of the government in maintaining the integrity of the contracting parties?
A: They should be respected by the legislature and not tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the
intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations to respect the integrity of valid contractual
agreements entered into by the contracting parties. Right to non impairment of contract does not preclude the
government from introducing a change, as long as it is reasonable.

Q: What is the contract that is protected by the non-impairment clause?


ANS - Only contracts which are legal and lawful are protected (Lozano vs. Martinez)

Q: When is there impairment of contract?


A: In the case of Victoriano vs. Elizalde, According to Black, the law impairs the obligation of contracts if:
1. It changes the terms and conditions of a legal contract either as to the time or mode of performance
2. It imposes new conditions or dispenses with those expressed if it authorizes for its satisfaction something
different from that provided in its terms

NOTE: Mere technical change which does not change the substance of the contract, and which still leaves an
efficacious remedy for enforcement does NOT impair the obligation of contracts. A valid exercise of police
power is superior to obligation of contracts.

Q: What is the degree of impairment required in order that there may be impairment?
ANS - The degree is immaterial. The real test of impairment is the diminution of the value of a contract. There is
an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by law from its performance. However, not all
impairment are prohibited. Only those unreasonable are prohibited.

Q: Is there impairment of obligation of contracts if there is (1) a change of means to enforce the contract
(2) a change of tenancy relationship? Why?
(1) if there is change of remedy to enforce the contract, there is no impairment. This is so because there is still a
remedy available. (2) the change in tenancy relationship does not impair the obligations of contracts because it is
intended to promote the general welfare. (Vda. De Ongsiako vs. Gamboa)

Q: Is the freedom of contract absolute? Explain.


ANS - No, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of
the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must
be subject to change from time to time as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code, contracts
of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are
impressed with public interest.
Page 50 of 178
Q: Does non impairment of contract prohibit all changes?
A: No. Permissible changes are reasonable changes.

Q: What impairments may be validly introduced into existing contracts by legislation?


ANS – in the exercise of inherent powers, laws and reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read
into contracts agreed upon by the parties.
In every contract, there are two (2) implied elements aside from the stipulation of the parties that:
1. A future date or a future time, a state may exercise its inherent powers that may validly change the terms of
their contract.
2. All existing laws are deemed included in the contract. (Rutter vs Esteban)

Q: What are the limitations on the non-impairment of contract clause?


ANS - The limitations are:
1. the police power of the State
2. power of eminent domain; and
3. the reserved power of the State to impair, for even if it is not expressly made, it can still be exercised.

Exercise of Police Power


Q: Are moratory laws valid impairment of a contract?
ANS - Generally, YES, it is valid.

Q: What is a Moratorium law?


ANS: postponement of fulfillment of obligation decreed by the state through the medium of legislation; the
essence of which is the application of the sovereign power.

Q: What are the conditions and limitations of moratorium?


ANS – definite as to the period of suspension; reasonable period. It should be reasonable to both parties.

Q: In Rutter v. Esteban, the Supreme Court exercises the police power in interfering to the contractual
relationship by virtue of moratorium law. Generally, are all moratorium laws valid as an impairment of
obligations and contracts? Moratorium laws are constitutional?
A: Yes, provided that the period of extent is definite and reasonable.

Q: Applying these conditions in the case of Rutter v. Esteban, did the Supreme Court sustain the validity
of moratorium law?
A: No. The period of the suspension is unreasonable. While the purpose of congress is plausible and should be
commended, the relief accorded works injustice to the creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the
debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured and the
injustice is more patent when, ender the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation
of relief. Nonetheless the Supreme Court sustained that the authority of the government in interfering in the
exercise of police power in Rutter v. Esteban and Ortigas v. Feati Bank are examples of police power that may
validly interfere in contractual relationship.

Q: Is a statute providing for regulation of public utilities violative of the non-impairment clause? Why?
ANS - No, because it is a police measure. It does not only apply to existing public utilities at the time of its
passage, but also to those already existing and in operation (Pantranco vs. PSC 70 phil 221)

Page 51 of 178
Example in exercise of Eminent domain
A entered in a contract of lease with B of 10 years. Government conducted expropriation proceedings on the land
of B with payment of just compensation, the parties cannot invoke their contractual stipulations.

Power of taxation
A entered on contract of lease with B, payment of 5000 a month and 10% vat for ten years. Congress enacted a
law increasing the vat from 10% to 12%. The parties cannot invoke their stipulations on the contract.

Q. Does the contract clause protect public contracts?


A. Yes, the clause protects contracts with the government. Moreover, franchises are contracts and therefore are
covered by the clause. However, the obligation arising from franchises are subject to modification by police
power. Besides, with reference to public utilities, Article XII, Section 11 says: "Neither shall any such franchise or
right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires."

Q. Is a license protected by the contract clause?


A It is one of the first principles in the field of administrative law that a license or a permit is not a contract
between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in any constitutional sense, as to
which the constitutional prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is
rather in the nature of a special privilege, or a permission or authority to do what is within its terms. It is not in
any way vested, permanent, or absolute. A license granted by the State is always revocable. As a necessary
consequence of its main power to grant license or permit, the State or its instrumentalities have the correlative
power to revoke or recall the same. And this power to revoke can only be restrained by an explicit contract upon
good consideration to that effect. The absence of an expiry date in a license does not make it perpetual.
Notwithstanding that absence, the license cannot last beyond the life of the basic authority under which it was
issued."

Q. Is the obligation of contracts superior to religious freedom?


A. As to freedom of religion, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974) the Court also ruled that
the free exercise of religion is superior to contract rights.

Applicability of the provision


Q: Under Sec.10 of Art.3 it is specifically stated that ―no law impairing obligations and contracts shall be
passed‖ does the term law refer only to legislative acts?
A: No. The ―law‖ includes statutes enacted by the national legislature, executive orders and administrative
regulations promulgated under a valid delegation of power, and municipal ordinances passed by local legislative
bodies. It does not include judicial decisions or adjudications made by administrative bodies in the exercise of
their quasi judicial powers.

Q: In the case of Ganzon v. Inserto, the court promulgated a decision, changing the security from
mortgage to surety because it is not covered by constitutional guarantee, is it a valid exercise of judicial
discretion?
A: No, all laws passed by Congress, issuance of orders by virtue of the ordinance power of the President,
decisions of the Courts are included. The substitution would in effect change the terms and conditions of the
mortgage contract, thus will invalidly impair it.

Q: Law under section 10, is taken in its generic sense including other governmental acts, why?
ANS – In the case of Ganzon, the SC applied even in judicial decisions.

Page 52 of 178
Rutter vs Esteban
"Although conceding that the obligations of the mortgage contract were impaired, the court decided that
what it thus described as an impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution,
within the police power of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency
which the legislature had found to exist." But the ruling in the Bleisdell case has its limitations which should not
be overlooked in the determination of the extent to be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon
the enforcement of a monetary obligation; if these bounds are transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of
the power, for the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts would assert itself. Here are
instances by which these bounds may be transgressed:
(1) The impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right;
(2) The protective power of the state, the police power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in
nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision
against impairment of contracts;
(3) "A different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow;
(4) The decision in the Bleisdell case is predicated on the ground that the laws altering existing contracts will constitute an
impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances
occasioning their enactment

Ortigas & Co. vs FEATI


The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a "legitimate
response to a felt public need," not whimsical or oppressive, the nonimpairment of contracts clause of the
Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it
aptly when he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to succumb to the challenge that thereby
contractual rights are rendered nugatory."
Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General that
laws and reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts
agreed upon by the parties.
Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, that ". . . the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in those
cases where such exclusion is allowed."

Lozano vs Martinez
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT NOT IMPAIRED CHECKS NOT CATEGORIZED AS
CONTRACTS. — We find not valid ground to sustain the contention that B.P. 22 impairs freedom of contract.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts
which contravene public policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has become a convenient substitute
for money; it form part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the
state.

Ganzon vs Inserto
Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00 note would in
effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the
contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency, and dispensed
with a primary condition.

Page 53 of 178
Free Access Clause
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.

Q: Is the free access to be construed without any fee?


ANS – No. But only reasonable fee.

Q. What is the significance of this provision?


A. Under the 1973 Constitution the counterpart of this provision simply read: "Free access to the courts shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty." This constitutional provision is the basis for the provision of
Section 17, Rule 5 of the New Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis. Those protected include low
paid employees, domestic servants and laborers. They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported
at public expense. "It suffices that plaintiff is indigent... And the difference between 'paupers' and 'indigent'
persons is that the latter are 'persons who have no property or sources of income sufficient for their support aside
from their own labor though self-supporting when able to work and in employment.'
The new Constitution has expanded the right so that in addition to giving free access to courts it now
guarantees free access also to "quasi judicial bodies" and to "adequate legal assistance" as well.

Republic Act 6034 (An Act Providing Transportation and Other Allowances for Indigent Litigants), has defined
the term "indigent" to refer to a person "who has no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for
the subsistence of his family."

Even on the assumption that petitioner owns property he may still be an indigent considering his sworn
statement that he had no income. Under the standard set forth in Acar v. Rosal as well as the recent legislations
heretofore adverted to, it is the income of a litigant that is the determinative factor. For, really, property may
have no income. It may even be a financial burden. (Enaje v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-22109, January 30, 1970)

Indigent party
They are those:
1. Whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly
minimum wage of an employee; and
2. Who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration of more
than Php 300,000.00 shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees (Sec. 19, Rule 141 as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC).

He is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family (Sec. 21, Rule 3).

Rule on indigent litigants


If the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Sec. 19, Rule 141, then the grant
of the application is mandatory.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to
enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has ―no money or property sufficient and available for food,
shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family‖, as provided in Sec. 21, Rule 3. In that hearing, the adverse
party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the
trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced.

Page 54 of 178
In addition, Sec. 21, Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority
at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not
obtained at the time the application was heard (Algura v. LGU of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006).
Exemption from fees
Authority as an indigent party includes an exemption from the payment of:
1. Docket fees and other lawful fees;
2. Transcript of stenographic notes (Sec. 21, Rule 3).
NOTE: The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a
lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless otherwise provided (Sec. 21, Rule 3).

Q: Under Sec.11 Art.3, the Constitution guarantees that persons shall be given a right to free access to
court. Does it mean when people go to court to seek legal remedies they cannot be assessed any filing
fees because Constitution says, ―free access to courts‖?
A: No. It only means that without discrimination, any person can go to court to seek legal remedy. Free access
does not imply that courts cannot assess fees.

Q: Does free access apply to appellate litigation?


A: Yes. The rule has been amended to apply to appellate legislation.

Q: May the rules of court and laws exempting indigent litigants to from paying filing fees can be applied
to corporate entities?
A: No. In the case of In Re: query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi, the Supreme Court ruled that Good Shepherd
Foundation, being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that
of its members. It has a power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations. As a
juridical person, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent clients. For the
reason that they are working for underprivileged and indigent is of no moment. The Constitution has explicitly
premised the free access clause on a person‘s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer.

Page 55 of 178
Custodial Investigation
Art. III, Sec. 12
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

In Miranda v. Arizona: The Federal Supreme Court made it clear that what is prohibited is the "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police dominated atmosphere, resulting in self- incriminating statements without
full warnings of constitutional rights.‖

Miranda Rights
(1)The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to
remain silent.
(2) After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used against him in court.
(3) He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The investigators should tell him that he has the
right to counsel at that point.
(4) He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also that if he is indigent, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
(5) Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the moment he asks for a
lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
(6) If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have been observed by the
prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against him.

Q. When do the above rights begin to be available?


A. These rights begin to be available where "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out
a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964). As our Supreme Court has put it, these rights are available "after a person has been taken into custody
OR otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." People v. Loveria, G.R. No. 79138,
July 21,
1990, citing People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2,9 (1980).

The rights enumerated are not available before police investigators become involved. Thus the protection is not
available to a person undergoing audit because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer. Navallo v.
Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175 (1994). Nor for that matter does it apply to a situation where a person, not being
under investigation, presents himself to the police and in the process makes his admissions. People v. Taylaran,
108 SCRA 373,378-9 (1981).

Page 56 of 178
Q: Applying this in the case of Gamboa v. Cruz, wherein the petitioner participated in a police lineup in
the custody of the police, which means that custodial investigation, has begun?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused herein was not interrogated yet

Q: Applying the definition of custodial investigation in the case of People v. Judge Ayson and part when
custodial begins in People v. Bolanos, we can say that there are two conditions wherein custodial
investigation is deemed to have been complied on when?
A: Law enforcement takes custody over the suspect and the officers starts to ask question involving the subject of
offense and focus on suspect as person of interest.

Q: Supposing officer A is investigating an incident involving the death of B, B died of stab wounds on
February 1, 2014 at 10 in the evening, and all leads in the investigation points to C as the suspect. Police
officer A when to the house of C introduce himself as an officer and said that he is investigating the
death of B and all said that all the information that he has gathered may have something to do with the
incident. A asked C if he could come in to the house of C and ask questions that may shed light to the
incident. C said ― yes but do you mind because I still have to finish my chores while you are conducting
your investigation‖ , A agreed. Under the factual circumstances, Officer A conducted an investigation
and because of his effectiveness he was able to obtain a confession from C without benefit of a counsel
and without informing him of his Miranda rights. Is the confession admissible? Is that part of custodial
investigation?
A: It was already part of custodial investigation because the officer already started to ask questions pertaining to
the crime that occurred and ceases to be only a general inquiry. It is not admissible as evidence for it violated Sec.
12 Art.3, confession was made during in a custodial investigation without the benefit of a counsel.

Q: Officer A is conducting an investigation of the death of B who died because of stab wounds on
Feb.1,2014. C was invited to the police precinct in order to shed light on the death of B. Is the invitation
part of custodial investigation? What does Art. 7438 provides regarding the custodial investigation?
A: It provides that custodial investigation includes the practice includes the issuing of invitation. The person
suspected of crime in connection of the investigation of which is suspected to have been committed. It is not
required that the taking custody of the person is mandatory or compulsory it may be made through voluntary
action on the part of the suspect.

Q: Continuing the factual circumstances, C went to precinct voluntarily and Officer A started to ask
questions, so the first question is ―how are you this morning? How’s the crime rate in your baranggay?
Where were you at 10:00 in the evening of Feb.1,2014?‖ based on these three questions when can we say
that the custodial investigation begun?
A: Custodial investigation begins when police officers started to ask specific questions regarding the crime.

Q. What is the reason for making the rule applicable to investigations?


A. It is but a recognition of the fact that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations,
in the absence of proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Q. Is the right to have counsel present during investigation intended Jo stop the accused from saying
anything that may incriminate him?
A. No. "The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth." People v. Layuso, G.R. No. 69210, July 5,1989.

Page 57 of 178
Q. Accused was made to undergo a paraffin test of his hands to determine whether he had recently fired
a gun. Accused claims violation of his constitutional right as it was not conducted in the presence of his
lawyer.
A. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined as in this case. People v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 91374, February 25,1991.

Q. When did these guarantees in favor of a person under investigation take effect?
A. They took effect only upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17,1973. In Magtoto v.
Manguera, L-37201- 02, March 3,1975, the Supreme Court ruled that the provision has no retroactive effect.

Q: In People v. Judge Ayson Supreme Court divided these proceedings in two phases and after dividing
these two phases the Supreme Court supplant the specific constitutional rights pertaining to these two
phases so first what are the two phases in legal proceedings?
A: First phase: Before the case is filed in court (custodial investigation phase)
Second phase: After the case is filed court (Sec.14)

Q: Right of a person under custodial investigation is deemed to be incorporated through importation,


the Miranda Rights which is penned by Justice Warren. Is the Miranda Rights in the case of Miranda v.
Arizona co extensive (same span of protection) of a rights of a person under custodial investigation?
A: Art. 12 Art.3 of the 1987 Constitution is broader than the Miranda rights because the exclusionary principle
under the Constitution is different from the Miranda rights because in the Constitution it is broader.

Q: What are the constitutional rights subjected in the custodial investigation? Section 12
A: 1)Right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice
2)Right to be informed of his rights (non-waivable)
3)Not to be subjected to violence, force, threat or intimidation or any means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary in communicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited. (non-waivable)
4)To have evidence obtained in the violation of these rights excluded as evidence

Requisites for properly informing the accused of the nature and cause of accusation
1. Information must state the name of the accused
2. Designation given to the offense by statute
3. Statement of the acts or omission so complained of as constituting the offense
4. Name of the offended party
5. Approximate time and date of commission of the offense
6. Place where offense was committed
7. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information

Q. May the rights under custodial investigation be waived?


A. Yes, but the Constitution says: "These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel."

Q: Can you waive inadmissibility of evidence? Yes. If not objected to during trial, deemed waived.

Page 58 of 178
Q: Are the rights available during administrative investigation?
No. Administrative investigations are not part of the custodial investigation (People v. Judge Ayson).
Such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

Q: Are the rights under custodial investigation a waivable right?


A: Right to remain silent. After the warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement.

Q. Does the law cover both "confessions" and "admissions?"


A. Yes. The 1987 text covers both "confessions" and "admissions." The difference between confession and
admission is found in Rule 130 of the Ruses of Court.
Admission is the "act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact" (Rule 130, Section 26) whereas
confession is the "declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein."

Q. Is a person in a police line-up entitled to the right to counsel?


A. No, if no questions are asked. However, "the moment there is a move or even an urge of investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time,
from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right; but the waiver shall
be made in writing and in the presence of counsel." Gamboa v. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988).
But a person already under custodial investigation who is placed in a police line-up is entitled to Section 12 rights.
People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 566 (1994).

Police line-up.
General Rule: It is not part of CI
Exception: if made after accusatory process.

Q. Does the protection apply to one who presents himself to the police to surrender?
A. No. It can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the surrenderee is already 'under investigation', within
the meaning of the constitutional provision.

Q: In the Ayson case, why is the investigation not considered a custodial interrogation?
ANS - The persons who were involved in this case are not law enforcement officers. Custodial investigation is
defined as ―questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.‖

Q: Can immigration officers be considered Law enforcement officers?


ANS – Yes. They are considered (Ho Wai Pang)

Q: Who are the law enforcement officers under the contemplation of Section 13?
ANS - PNP, NBI, other police agencies, others charged with prosecution and investigation of offenders

Q: Is a Mayor a law enforcement officer?


ANS – Yes. A law enforcement officer is a person charged with prosecution and investigation of offenders.
Barangay Captains and Barangay Tanods are law enforcement officers

Page 59 of 178
Q: How about public investigations are these part of custodial investigation?
A: No. In the case of Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court ruled that a person under a normal audit
examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in Sec.12.

Q: Is the spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning is part of custodial investigation?
A: In the case of People v. Dy, the Supreme Court ruled that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against him. Any person, otherwise competent as a witness,
who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood
all of it. Any vitiated consent including confession and admission without voluntariness cannot be admitted in any
courts of justice because of the lack of consent. This was the issue in the case of People v. Andan wherein the
accused confessed to the Mayor. The Supreme Court ruled that when the appellant talked with the mayor as a
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement not elicited through questioning by authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having committed the crime.

Q. What are the fundamental requisites for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence?
1) the confession must be voluntary;
2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3) the confession must be express; and
4) the confession must be in writing."
5) Signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write, thumbmarked by him.

Res Gestae
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received
as part of the res gestae.

Independently relevant statements


These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They are neither hearsay
nor an exception to the hearsay rule as the purpose thereof is not to prove the truth of the declaration or
document . It merely proves the fact that a statement was made and not the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement

Q: One of the constitutional rights under custodial investigation is that he must be informed of his
rights meaning the right to remain silent and to counsel. Is it enough to read only the rights enshrined in
Sec.12 Art.3?
A: In People v. Pinlac, the Supreme Court ruled that when the Constitution requires a person under investigation
―to be informed‖ of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.

Q: Does custodial investigation include reenactment? In People v. Pinlac, the accused was forced to
reenact the crime. The prosecution contends that the reenactment was voluntarily made although
without a counsel.

Page 60 of 178
A: Yes. Any uncounselled re enactments are inadmissible as evidence. Before requiring an accused to reenact the
incident, he must be accorded with the constitutional right under custodial investigation.

"This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, but this has since
been extended to any evidence 'communicative in nature' acquired under circumstances of duress. . . . Thus, an
act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the
inhibition of the Constitution." People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525-526 (1987).

Likewise, photos of reenactment are not admissible where accused was not provided with counsel. People v.
Jungco, 186 SCRA 714 (1990).

Q: What is the difference between exclusionary principle and fruit of poisonous tree?
A: In People v. Alicando, primary evidence is the confession is the tree and the derivative evidence is the fruit.

Fruit of poisonous tree connotes that evidences that can only be excluded are secondary evidence. How
about evidences obtained from secondary evidence?
A: Yes. The principle that will be applied is the exclusionary principle. Once tainted with illegality, it
cannot produce admissible evidence.
Burden on Prosecutor to establish that all constitutional rights here been accorded even w/o objection

Q: Is reading to the accused his constitutional rights sufficient?


ANS - No. The reading is not sufficient. The officers must likewise explain these rights (Pinlac). There must be
understanding on the part of the accused.
.
Q: Is Confession/admission to private individuals/media, admissible in all circumstances?
ANS - No, not in all circumstances. Admission/confession is admissible provided it is free from undue influence
from police authorities. If the reporters were under the control of the police officers, confession made to them
would be inadmissible.

Q. What are the fundamental requisites for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence?
A. " 1) the confession must be voluntary;
2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3) the confession must be express; and
4) the confession must be in writing."
5) Signed, or if the confessant does not know how to red and write, thumbmarked by him.
Important Points:
- Rights to be informed of custodial rights – not waivable
- Custodial Investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer.
- Failure to object to presentation of witness testifying as to custodial investigation is a waiver.

Q. When is a lawyer provided by the investigators deemed engaged by the accused?


A. When the accused "never raised any objection against the [lawyer's] appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer

Q. What does the phrase "preferably of his own choice" mean?


A. It does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of

Page 61 of 178
the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest. Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford
theservices of counsel — or where the preferred lawyer is not available — is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another
one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any
objection against the counsel's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer

Q. Who are not deemed independent counsel?


A. (1) Special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose
interest is adverse to that of the accused. People v. Fabro, G.R. No. 95089, August 11,1997,277 SCRA 19.
(2) A mayor. People v. Taliman, G.R. No. 109143, October 11, 2000. ^
(3) A barangay captain. People v. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004.
(4) Any other whose interest may be adverse to that of the accused.

Q. Is the right to counsel imperative in administrative investigations?


A. No, "because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignify of government
service

Q. When does the protection of Section 12(1) end?


A. The criminal process includes the investigation prior to the filing of charges, the preliminary examination and
investigation after charges are filed, and the period of trial. The Miranda rights or the Section 12(1) rights were
conceived for the first of these three phases, that is, when the enquiry is under the control of police officers. It is
in this situation that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the absence of
proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 448-58. Outside of this situation,
Section 12(1) no longer applies. But Sections 14 and 17 come into play.
Conceivably, however, even after charges are filed, the police might still attempt to extract confessions or
admissions from the accused outside of judicial supervision. In such situation, Section 12(1) should still
apply. But outside of such situation, the applicable provisions are Section 14 and Section 17. It is for this reason
that an extrajudicial confession sworn to before a judge even without assistance of counsel enjoys the mark of
voluntariness.

HO WAI PANG , vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,


Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against himself
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the
customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 31 of Article III of the
Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as
evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.

Gamboa vs Cruz
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false
or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of
an offense.

Page 62 of 178
People vs Macam
After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up
is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims
before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds
of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their
faces.
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION, ADMISSIBLE; REASON. — However,
the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants' identification at the police line-up. Hence, the
exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can
not be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification made by the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up
at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as
being tainted by the illegal line-up.

People vs Ayson
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED BEFORE AND AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN THE COURT. — A person
suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following
rights in that matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant
way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the
free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — a) to refuse to be a witness; b) not to have any
prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c) to testify to his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by
the persecution; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate
him for some time other than that for which he is prosecuted
RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DOES NOT ENCOMPASS STATEMENTS MADE
DURING AN ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY; CASE AT BAR. — Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights
of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry

People vs Pinlac
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED; CONTEMPLATES THE TRANSMISSION OF MEANINGFUL
INFORMATION. — When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right
to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule,
therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is
entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms. In other words, the right of a person under
interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain,
and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there
is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights..

Page 63 of 178
People vs. Bolanos
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station
where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional
rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution

People vs. Andan


Under the circumstances in this case, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the
mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and
are admissible in evidence. Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue
influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed
appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police.

Navallo vs Sandiganbayan
A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can
hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of
his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by
his own testimony.

People vs. Dy
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against
him (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is
that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance.

People vs. Alicando


We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the " fruit of the poisonous tree. According to
this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is
obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the " fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the
same illegal act. The " fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but
it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not
be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained.
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a
confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution
to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has
to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence.

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RIGHT TO BAIL
Sec. 13, Article III
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released or recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Bail
The security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned
upon his appearance before any court as required. (Sec. 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court)

Rationale behind the right to bail


Bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accused‘s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society‘s interest in assuring the
accused‘s presence at trial. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015)

Q. Why is bail awarded to the accused?


A. (1) "to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt;" and (2) "to
enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction."

NOTE: For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, ―such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.‖ It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed
when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution. The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,
ibid.)

Application for bail in relation to challenging the arrest


The application or admission of the accused to bail shall not bar him from challenging both the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, provided that he raises them before he enters his plea. It
shall not likewise bar the accused from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him provided the same is raised before he enters his plea. (Rule 114, Sec.
26, Rules of Court)

Who May Avail


General rule: All persons under custody of the law
Exceptions:
(1) Those charged with capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong
(2) Military men [People v Reyes, 212 SCRA 401]
Military men who participated in failed coup d‘état because of their threat to national security. [Comendador v.
De Villa (1991)]

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Q: Is right to bail to available to members of Armed Forces?
A: No, in the case of Commendador v. De Villa the right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military
where the right to bail does not exist because of the unique structure of the military should be enough reason to
exempt military mean from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Right to bail to members of AFP are not accorded to them because of their pecuniary structure, they carry
firearms and operate within the government therefore they cannot demand for the same right as any private
citizen entitled to.
Note: In Commendador v. De Villa, the accused herein are under court martial proceedings. Right to bail are not
entitled if the offense is administrative or under court martial but when it is a criminal in nature they can post bail.

Q: Are members of the PNP entitled to bail?


ANS – Yes. The principle in the case of Comendador is only applicable when members of the AFP are
undergoing court martial proceedings. If AFP members and officers are charged before regular courts, then they
are entitled to bail.

Q: May an accused who is not arrested can apply for bail?


A: Yes. When a person is in custody of law, custody of law does not mean that he is being arrested.

Q: Ordinarily, bail is posted by an accused. The right to bail in criminal proceedings can be availed only
by an accused. May the court impose bail to a person who is not an accused?
A: Yes. Under Sec. 14 of Rule 119, ―When the court is satisfied, upon proof or oath, that a material witness will
not testify when required, it may upon motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may
be deemed proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies or is legally
discharged after his testimony has been taken.

Constitutional provisions connected to right to bail


a. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not impair the right to bail.
b. Excessive bail is not required.

Q. What is the meaning of strong evidence of guilt for purposes of denying bail?
A. This means "proof evident" or "presumption great." "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection
means clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the
offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished
capitally if the law is administered. "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such
that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased
judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there is a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is
guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused. In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes
guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such,
the court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show evident
guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above. People v. Judge Cabral, G.R. No. 131909, February 18,1999.

Duties of a trial judge in case an application for bail is filed


(1) In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 as amended);
(2) Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8)

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(3) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19)
Otherwise petition should be denied

Q: It appears that this four fold obligation applies only when bail is a matter of discretion. When bail is a
matter of right it does not apply?
A: No, another reason why hearing for petition for bail was for the fixing of amount of bail. After the hearing, the
court‘s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of evidence for the prosecution. On the basis
thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong
enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Q: Supposing an accused charged with an offense punishable by Prision Mayor, the name of the
accused is Juan Zobel De Ayala, information was transmitted to court, the court noted that the name of
the accused is striking with the impression that the latter is a very rich person. The court thinks that it is
proper to impose an amount of P100,000,000.00 considering he is a Zobel De Ayala, in that regard I am
rest assured that he won’t jump bail. Is that a valid interpretation in amount of bail?
A: No. First the court must conduct a hearing for the determination of the bail bond that will be imposed.
Summary hearing is mandatory even if bail is a matter of right.

Forms of bail:
1. Corporate surety - It is an obligation under seal given by the accused with one or more sureties and made
payable to the proper officer with the condition to be void upon performance by the accused of such acts as he
may be legally required to perform;
2. Property bond
3. Cash deposit - It is deposited by the accused himself or any person acting in his behalf;
4. Recognizance - An obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take
it with the condition to do some particular act. It is an undertaking of a disinterested person with high credibility
wherein he will execute an affidavit of recognizance to the effect that when the presence of the accused is
required in court, the custodian will bring him to that court. This is allowed for light felonies only.

Q. May a judge require a strictly cash bond and disallow petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for
his provisional liberty?
A. No. Such a requirement is abhorrent to the nature of bail. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance
of the accused. It has neither punitive nor revenue raising purpose. Cash bond is allowed in this jurisdiction only
because our rules expressly allow it. Were this not the case, cash bond could not be countenanced because the
nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered.
Moreover, the burden imposed by requiring a cash bond can make the bail constitutionally "excessive." Almeda v.
Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (August 6,1975).

Q. Is the right to bail suspended when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended?
A. The new Constitution now says that the right to bail is not thereby suspended.

Q. Why does the Constitution prohibit excessive bail?


A. Obviously, the requirement of excessive bail can amount to a denial of bail.

Q: Is bail required to comply with the3-day notice rule?


ANS – Yes, in the case of Baylon vs Judge Sison

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Q: What are the three (3) circumstances under section 5, Rule 114?
ANS – offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment

Q: In determining whether accused is admitted to bail, are aggravating circumstance considered?


ANS – No, The presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is not a consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused‘s favor. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No.21384, August 18, 2015)

Q: What is a three (3) day motion rule?


ANS – In the case of Baylon - it is mandatory in order to allow the prosecution to secure reasonable time to
adequately prepare for the case.

Q. Are "life imprisonment" and Preclusion perpetua" the same?


A. A distinction must be made between the penalty of "life imprisonment" and reclusion perpetua. (1) Life
imprisonment is a penalty in special laws while reclusion perpetua is imposed
by the Revised Penal Code; (2) life imprisonment does not carry accessory penalties, whereas reclusion perpetua
does; (3) life imprisonment is indefinite, whereas reclusion perpetua is for 30 years after which the convict is
eligible for pardon.
The distinction is important because under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure a person charged with an
offense punishable by "life imprisonment" was entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, effective October 1,
1994, Rule 114 was amended placing "life imprisonment" on the same level as
death and reclusion perpetua. Cardines v. Rosete, 242 SCRA 557, 562 (1995).

Instances when bail is a matter of right or of discretion


1. Bail as a matter of right
a. Before or after conviction by the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, and
b. Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. (Sec. 4, Rule 114)
c. Before final conviction by all children in conflict with the law for an offense not punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
2. Bail as a matter of discretion
a. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment
b. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, a person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is not strong; and
c. A child in conflict with the law charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong. (Sec. 28, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC)
NOTE: The prosecution cannot adduce evidence for the denial of bail where it is a matter of right. However
where the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution may show proof to deny the bail

Q: How about after conviction of the RTC?


A: No. In People v. Fortes the Supreme Court ruled that the accused is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by trial court and sentenced to suffer such penalty, bail is neither a matter of right
or discretion on the part of the court. The court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is
strong, sufficient to deny bail even before conviction. It would have likewise ruled that the accused‘s guilt has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
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Supposing that the penalty for the offense charged is reclusion perpetua, and the evidence of guilt is
lacking, is the person entitled to bail as a matter of right?
A: In the case of People v. Judge Donato, bail is a either a waivable right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua regardless of the weight of
evidence. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. But once
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
But under the Rules of court there are two circumstances when bail is a matter of right;
a)Before or after conviction by the MTC
After conviction by the MTC, which the court‘s jurisdiction are to cases wherein the offense charged is
punishable by 6 years and below. Bail is matter of right, condition pending appeal.
b)Before conviction of the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

Q: Where does the discretion lies?


A: The discretion lies is limited to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Lord‘s Mansfield
―discretion when applied to court of justice means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule,
not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and regular.
Atty. Gabriel: If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, the court has discretion to determine the
weight of the evidence of guilt, if it is strong the court ceases its discretion and have no choice but to deny bail. If
it is weak then the court ceases its discretion and has no choice but to grant bail.

Section 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. — No bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide.

When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribe for the
offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the
maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.

A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged,
without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of the court.

Section 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. — No bail shall be allowed after the judgment of conviction has become final. If before
such finality, the accused has applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or the
accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the
community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence.

Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. — An application for or admission to bail shall
not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the
regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before
entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

Bail in Extradition Cases


1. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the constitution.
2. While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it still entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extraditee and furthermore, the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law.
3. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases; hence, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases.

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4. The main purpose of arrest and temporary detention in extradition cases is to ensure that the potential
extraditee will not abscond.
5. Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Philippines must honor the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with other countries. Hence, as long as the requirements are satisfactorily met, the extraditee must not be
deprived of his right to bail. (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, G.R. No.
153675, April 19, 2007)
NOTE: The required proof of evidence is ―clear and convincing evidence‖ and not preponderance of evidence
nor proof beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof lies with the extraditee. (Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007)

Q: What is a three (3) day motion rule?


ANS – In the case of Baylon - it is mandatory in order to allow the prosecution to secure reasonable time
to adequately prepare for the case. A: Yes. The Supreme court ruled that the reason given by the respondent judge
that the non observance of the three day motion rule is justified because of the urgent motion for the petition for
bail and time is of the essence is untenable. Such raciconation, which espouses and reveals distorted notion as to
the true nature and conditions does violence to the well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right
and requires hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment

Q: What are the two (2) issues in extradition court?


ANS – 1. Whether it was filed in accordance with extradition treaty
2. Whether the offense is extraditable.

Q: What is the reason given by the Supreme Court in limiting the application of right to bail in criminal
proceedings and not to extradition proceedings?
A: The extradition proceedings do not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The court only determines
if there is an extradition treaty or the case is extraditable.

Q: Is the penalty of the offense charged in the requesting jurisdiction relevant in extradition
proceedings?
A: No. The penalty for the offense charged in the court of origin is irrelevant as well as the weight of evidence of
guilt.
Q: What are the five postulates of extradition proceedings as enumerated in the case of Government of U.S. v.
Puruganan?
A:1)Extradition is a major instrument for suppression of crime
2)The requesting State will accord due process to the accused
3)The proceedings are sui generis
4)Compliance shall be in good faith
5)There is underlying risk of flight

Q: Did the Supreme Court abandon the ruling in the case of Puruganan in the case of Govt. of Hong
Kong v. Hon. Olalia?
A: No. as stated in both cases right to bail does not apply to criminal proceedings. Even in extradition also in
deportation because the penalty for the offense charged and weight of guilt is irrelevant. In both cases the right to
bail under sec.13, are not applicable. The right to bail granted in the case of Govt. of Hong Kong v. Hon. Olalia is
not grounded on Sec.13 but on Sec.1 of Art 3, the due process clause and the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty.

Page 70 of 178
Q: What is the required quantum of evidence?
A: Clear and convincing evidence

Rule regarding bail in deportation proceedings


It is available; however, bail in deportation proceedings is wholly discretionary.

Q: How about in applying for bail in deprtation proceedings and quarantine, what are the 2 factors to be
considered?
ANS – (1) Risk of flight and, (2) Under compelling reasons and Humanitarian reasons.

Q. Does a person admitted to bail necessarily have the right to leave the Philippines?
A. No. A court, as a necessary consequence of the nature of a bail bond, may prevent a person admitted to bail
from leaving the country. A bail bond is intended to make a person available any time he is needed by the court.
Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149,153-4 (1986).

Grounds for denial of bail


If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail,
or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances:
a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of
his bail without valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the RTC after notice
to the adverse party in either case. (Sec. 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court)
NOTE: The right to bail is available from the very moment of arrest (which may be before or after the filing
of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final judgment (which means after appeal). No charge
need be filed formally before one can file for bail, so long as one is under arrest. (Heras Teehankee v. Rovira,
G.R. No. L-101, Dec. 20 1945)
*Even when the accused has previously jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail before conviction if it is a
matter of right. The remedy is to increase the amount of bail.

Scenarios where the penalty of the person applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years
1. Absence of the circumstances enumerated in 3rd par., sec. 5 of Rule 114. In this scenario, bail is a matter of
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Sec. 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application
for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph
are absent.
NOTE: The discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal does not mean that bail should automatically
be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. (Jose Antonio Leviste v. CA, G.R.No. 189122, March 17, 2010)
2. Existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any
of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny

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or revoke bail pending appeal. (Ibid.)
In bail application, if the prosecutor interposes no objection to the accused charged with capital
offense, the judge may not grant the application without court hearing
Judges are required to conduct hearings if the accused is being charged with a capital offense. Absence of
objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to
presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. (Joselito v. Narciso v.
Flor Marle Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000)
NOTE: A hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. (Baylon v. Judge Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, Apr. 6, 1995)

Whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given the
prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his recommendation, because in fixing the amount of bail,
the judge is required to take into account a number of factors. (Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387,
Sept. 10, 1997)

Reason why capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong are not bailable
Due to the gravity of the offenses committed, the confinement of a person accused of said offenses insures
his attendance in the court proceedings than if he is given provisional liberty on account of a bail posted by
him.

Q: Character of bail shall be determined when?


A: In the case of People v. Judge Donato, the Supreme Court ruled that the character of bail shall be determined
by the law in force at the time that the application is pending.

Q: Is the right to bail a waivable right?


A: Yes. In the case of People v. Judge Donato, Supreme Court held that it is a waivable right provided that it is
not contrary to law, public policy, public order, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.

Q: In the case of People v. Judge Donato, the prosecution that the accused impliedly wiaved his right by
remaining in custody but the accused said that the waiver must be express and explicit. Did the
Supreme Court agree with the accused?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused herein impliedly waived his right to bail and an implied waiver
is allowed in right to bail.

Factors to be considered in setting the amount of bail


1. Financial ability of the accused to give bail
2. Nature and circumstances of offense
3. Penalty for offense charged
4. Character and reputation of accused
5. Age and health of accused
6. Weight of evidence against the accused
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial
8. Forfeiture of other bonds
9. Fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested
10. Pendency of cases in which the accused is
under bond. (A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, March 18, 2014)

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Nature of bail proceedings
The hearing of an application for bail should be summary in nature or otherwise in the discretion of the court.
NOTE: 'Summary hearing' means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
the evidence for purposes of bail. (Ocampo v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-439, August 20, 1946)

Where to file bail


Bail shall be filed:
1. In the court where the case is pending;
2. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any RTC judge, MTC judge, or MCTC judge in the
province, city, or municipality;
NOTE: When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the
bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the
case is pending. (Sec. 19, Rule 114)
Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the
application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation,
trial, or on appeal.
3. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also
be filed with any RTC of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any MTC judge, MCTC therein; or
4. Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city,
or municipality where he is held. (Sec. 17, Rule 114)

Basco vs Rapatalo
FUNCTION THEREOF. — In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at
the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is
to assure his presence at the trial. In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the
verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to
the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution.
WHEN THE GRANT IS DISCRETIONARY; REQUIREMENT FOR THE PROPER EXERCISE
THEREOF. — When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.

People vs Judge Donato


GOVERNED BY THE LAW AT THE TIME THE COURT RESOLVED THE PETITION FOR BAIL. —
At the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for bail were filed before
the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent was charged was reclusion
perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the
President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the
petition for bail.

People vs Fortes
Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc
Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that: "Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an
accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be

Page 73 of 178
entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this court since his conviction clearly imports that
the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

Comendador vs. De Villa


We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist."
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate
within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the
discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other
insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system. National security
considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a
damaging precedent.

Baylon vs. Judge Sison


The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death, such as murder, bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and
a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution‘s evidence of guilt is strong.
Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused, before the
court resolves the motion for bail. It is accordingly settled that an order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence offered by the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.
In fact, such a summary with his evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.

Manotoc vs CA
PROHIBITION AGAINST LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES, A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE
THEREOF. — A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released
thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to
keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original
imprisonment.

Govt of HongKong vs Olalia


If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justi�cation why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for
bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

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While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution

Enrile vs Sandiganbayan
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.

Page 75 of 178
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Art. III Section 14.

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Due process in criminal cases

Q. Explain the requirement of due process in criminal cases.


A. The requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without "due process of law"
simply that the rules prescribed by Section 14 and all other provisions related to criminal prosecution are
followed.

Q: What are the constitutional rights of the accused in sec. 14? (PHI-SIP-CON-COM)
A: 1. right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
2.right to be heard by himself and counsel,
3. right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
4. right to have speedy, impartial and public trial, (SIP)
5. right to confrontation and
6. right to compulsory process.

Q: What is the part that is not relevant?


A: Trial in absentia. This is a right of the prosecution

Q: What is the difference of the guarantee of due process in sec.1 par.1 of Art.3 and Sec.14 par.1 Art.3?
A:The due process granted in Sec.14 par.1 is procedural in nature for criminal proceedings. While in due process
in Sec.1 Art.3 are both substantive and procedural and covers all proceedings.

Q: What are the rights granted to the accused after a case is filed in court as enumerated by Supreme
Court in the case of People v. Judge Ayson?
A: 1)To refuse to be a witness
2) Not have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal
3)Testify in his own behalf, subject to cross examination by the prosecution
4) While testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime

Q. May a judge who replaces another judge validly render a decision although he has only partly heard
the testimony of witnesses?
A. Yes. "This rule is rooted in practical considerations. Sometimes it is an impossibility for the judge who tried the
case to be the same judicial officer to decide it. The judge who tried the case may die, resign or retire from the
bench, before he could render judgment thereon"

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Q. Batas Big. 22, a penal law, was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette which,
however, was officially released for circulation only on June 14, 1979. May acts committed prior to June
14,1979, be prosecuted under Batas Big. 22?
A. No. The penal statute was made public only on June 14, 1979. Prior to such date the prohibition of the law did
not exist. People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523 (October 12,1984).

Q. May criminal penalties be imposed by administrative agencies?


A. Since administrative agencies are not bound to follow the rules of criminal procedure they may not impose
criminal penalties.

Q. When does publicity prejudice due process?


A. The rule is that "to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity."
"Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publici t y . . . because these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing." People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. No. 111206-08, October 6,1995.

Q. May military commissions or tribunals have jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses allegedly
committed during martial law when civil courts were open and functioning?
A. No. Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987), explicitly reversing Aquino, Jr. v. Military
Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 264 (1975) and all decided cases affirming the same.

Q. The rule is that jurisdiction over a person is acquired only upon arrest. Does this apply to military
jurisdiction?
A. No. This is a rule for ordinary courts. See Article of War 2 and Section 8 of Manual for Courts Martial, AFP.

Requisites of criminal due process


1. Accused is heard by a Court of competent jurisdiction
2. Jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused
3. Accused is given Notice and Opportunity to be heard
4. Judgment must be rendered after lawful hearing (Allonte vs Savellano)

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor part of due process. It is a mere statutory right, but once given,
denial constitutes violation of due process.

Q: Elements of due process were taken in the concept on the law of the land was the early form due
process. What is the relevance of preliminary investigation to a right of the accused in a criminal due
process?
A: In Aniag v. COMELEC the respondent contends that preliminary investigation is not an essential element in
criminal due process because it is statutory in its inception. The Supreme Court ruled that preliminary
investigation is essential because regardless of its origin once the procedure is provided for, that procedure must
be complied with otherwise there is a violation in criminal due process.

Q: Which is better: delay in preliminary investigation or lack of preliminary investigation?


A: Lack of preliminary investigation. The Supreme Court ruled in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan that the long delay in
the termination of preliminary investigation by Tanodbayan as violative of the constitutional

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the requirements of law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation including the substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of procedural
due process constitutionally granted by the fundamental law.
Lack of PI is a correctible defect but the delay is not a correctible defect. This principle is also applied in the case
of Perez v. Sandiganbayan.

Q: What is wrong with a presiding justice of Sandiganbayan attending a meeting called by the President
together with the prosecution to discuss a case before a pending case in Sandiganbayan?
A: In the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court ruled that any avowal of independent action or
resistance to presidential pressure become illusory from the very moment they stepped inside the Malacanang
palace. The Supreme Court cannot permit such sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified.
The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity.

Doctrine of Operative Fact- Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional
remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the declaration of unconstitutionality.

Tatad vs Sandiganbayan (radical relief - dismissal)


DELAY OF THREE YEARS IN THE TERMINATION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, A
VIOLATION THEREOF. — We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights.

Galman vs Sandiganbayan
ACQUITTAL; DECLARED UNLAWFUL AND VOID AB INITIO; CASE AT BAR. — The Supreme Court
cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to
be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who
seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock
trial - the non-trial of the century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio.
VOID WHERE DENIAL OF RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS APPARENT. — "The cardinal present is that
where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation
of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will.
A claim of double jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused

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Alonte vs Savellano
The existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a
waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.

Presumption of innocence

Basis
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.(Sec. 14(2), Art 3)

Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. (People v.
Austria, G.R. No. 55109, Apr. 8, 1991)

It can be invoked only by an individual accused of a criminal offense; a corporate entity has no personality to
invoke the same.

The criminal accusation against a person must be substantiated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court should steadfastly safeguard his right to be presumed innocent. Although his innocence could be
doubted, for his reputation in his community might not be lily-white or lustrous, he should not fear a conviction
for any crime, least of all one as grave as drug pushing, unless the evidence against him was clear, competent
and beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence in his favor would be rendered empty.
(People v. Andaya, G.R. No. 183700, Oct. 13, 2014)

Rules regarding presumption of innocence


1. The prosecution has the burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not in the weakness of the defense.
3. Conviction of an accused must be based on the strength of the prosecution evidence and not on the weakness
or absence of evidence of the defense.
4. The prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. If the prosecution fails to discharge this
burden, the accused deserves a judgment of acquittal.
5. Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of
guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to
defend himself and assert his innocence. It has been held, however, that non-flight may not be construed as an
indication of innocence either. There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence, for the
Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee. In
Cristina's case, she explained that she took flight for fear of her safety because of possible retaliation from her
husband's siblings. The Court finds such reason for her choice to flee acceptable. She did not hide from the law
but from those who would possibly do her harm.

Equipoise rule
When the evidence of both sides is equally balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
scales in favor of the accused .

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In order that circumstantial evidence may warrant conviction, the following requisites must concur:
(1) There is more than one circumstance
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The presumption of regularity (in official duties) cannot by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence of the
accused. But where it is not the sole basis for conviction, the presumption of regularity of performance of official
functions may prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. [People v. Acuram (2000)]

Q: What is the right to be presumed innocent?


A: Person is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Q: Disputable or conclusive?
A: It is a disputable presumption or prima facie presumption.

Q: How is this prima facie presumption disputable?


A: it can only destroyed by guilt of evidence of proof of beyond reasonable doubt.

Q:Does proof of beyond reasonable doubt required absolute certainty?


A: It only requires moral certainty.

Q: What does reasonable doubt mean according to People v. Dramayo?


A: Is meant that which of possibility may arise but it is doubt endangered by an investigation of the whole proof
and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest easy on certainty of guilt.

Q: Reasonable doubt cannot co exist with judgment of conviction. A person cannot be convicted with an
iota of reasonable doubt?
A: No. to doubt is to acquit. But there is one doubt that can co exist with judgment of conviction, when there is
unreasonable doubt. If there is unreasonable doubt, the court has no choice but to render a judgment of
conviction.

Q: Is accusation the same as guilt?


A: No, the Supreme Court ruled that in the case of Dumlao v. COMELEC and People v. Dramayo, that a person
merely charged with an offense cannot be treated like a person who has been found guilty to an offense.

Q. What is the principal effect of the guarantee of presumption of innocence?


A. Its principal effect is that no person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has proved him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.

Q. Does preventive suspension pendente lite violate the right to be presumed innocent?
A. No, because preventive suspension is not a penalty.

Q. Does presumption of innocence preclude the State from shifting the burden of proof to the accused?
A. The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a right
to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of
guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention.

Page 80 of 178
Q: How can presumption of innocence be overcome?
a. When there is the strongest evidence that removes all doubts about one‘s guilt
b. When the accused pleads guilty in open court.
c. When the guilt of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Q. When does presumption of innocence end?


A. Moreover, where the conviction by a lower court is still on appeal, it has not yet reached finality and the
accused still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a
presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence continues.

Q: What is a reverse trial?


A: A reverse trial happens if the accused admits the killing but claims self-defense. He must first establish the
elements of self-defense in order to overturn the presumption that he was guilty of the offense.

Q: But in the case of Marquez v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court said that limitation of the definition of
―fugitive from justice‖ from those already convicted after trial is unduly circumscriptive. The Supreme
Court said that fugitive from justice was likewise be applied to persons who flee to avoid prosecution. In
that regard, the Supreme Court is saying that the persons who are already convicted should be treated
the same manner as to persons who are merely charged. In that regard is it a violation of presumption of
innocence?
A: No

People vs. Dramayo


ACCUSATION NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. — Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. The prosecution
must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this
standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal
could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED. — By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise,
but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to
let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict
of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense. We feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable
doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a
person who may be innocent.

Dumlao vs Comelec
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19,
1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The

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challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction
is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on
the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the sentence.

Marquez vs Comelec
The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente), that Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term
"fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is
a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The
omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis
instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not
being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.

Corpus vs People
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly
balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by
the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy.

Feeder International Line vs CA


SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT REQUIRED IN
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. — Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods
illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the
imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture
of the goods.
RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT; NOT AVAILABLE TO JURIDICAL PERSONS. — A corporate
entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an
individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

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Right to be heard and to counsel

Q. What are the elements of the general right to be heard?


A. It includes: (1) the right to be present at the trial; (2) the right to counsel; (3) the right to an impartial judge; (4)
the right of confrontation; (5) the right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses.

Q: What does ―the right to be heard‖ mean?


A: It means that the accused must be given the opportunity to present his case either by way of oral or verbal
arguments, or by way of pleadings.

Q. What is the scope of the right to be present at the trial?


A. It covers only the period from arraignment to promulgation of sentence. However, this has been modified by
Section 14(2) which says that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."

Q. What are the conditions for waiver of the right to be present at the trial?
A. The right may be waived "provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of
identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after
his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. Reason for > requiring the
presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceeding
without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his defense say that he
was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to acquittal."

Q. When an accused waives his appearance in further proceedings and says that "he may be identified
by witnesses even in his absence," may he still be compelled to appear for purposes of identification?
A. Yes. In order for him to be excused completely from appearance it is not enough that he allows himself to be
identified by witnesses in his absence. He must further unqualifiedly admit that every time a witness
mentions a name by which he is known the witness is to be understood as referring to him.

Q. Why must an accused enjoy the right to counsel?


A. This is a realistic recognition of the obvious truth thatt the average defendant does not have the professional
skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the
prosecution is represented by an experienced and learned counsel.

Q. What are the pre-arraignment duties of the trial judge? "


A. Under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the four-fold duties are:
"(1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned;
(2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel;
(3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and
(4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend
him." (People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756 [1950])

Q: If upon compliance on the second requirement, if the answer of the accused is in the negative the 3rd
and 4th will no longer be operative? Is the right to counsel during trial waivable? As we learned that in
custodial investigation an accused may waive his right to counsel as long as the waiver is in writing and
expressly made and made in the presence of a counsel.
A: The four fold duties mentioned in People v. Holgado is already modified. It was taken on the old rules of
criminal procedure. The court must appoint counsel de officio under two circumstances;

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1)If the accused afford the services of a counsel the court must appoint him one
2)If the accused doesn‘t want to appoint a counsel, then the court must appoint a counsel de officio
The ruling in People v. Holgado that the right to counsel is not a waivable right, is already modified by the rules
of criminal procedure particularly rule 115 sec 1 par.c
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless
his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable
cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under
custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him
is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that
he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
.
Q: In People v. Agbayani, the accused contends that the four fold obligations of the court was violated
because of the transcript or the minutes therein the judge failed to comply with the four fold obligations.
Did the Supreme Court agree?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the failure of the records to disclose that the accused was informed of his
right to counsel does not violate his constitutional rights because of the presumptions that the law has been
obeyed and the official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court. It is incumbent upon the accused to
prove otherwise, without any evidence presented by the accused that his right to counsel has been violated then
the court may rely on the presumption on the regularity in the performance of public function. The Supreme
Court likewise noted that often times it is easier to do things correctly than to put it in record.

Q. The accused contends that the judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio deprives him of his
constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice. Decide.
A. The 'preference in the choice of counsel' pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation
[Art. Ill, §12(1)1 rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution [Art. Ill, §14(2)].
Amion v. Judge Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22,1999. Even if we were to extend the application
of the concept of ―preference of his own choice‖ to an accused in criminal prosecution, such preferential
discretion cannot partake of discretion as absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer
exclusively to the predilection of the accused.

Q: Distinguish the right to counsel during trial from right to counsel during custodial investigation?
A: Right to counsel during trialmeans the right of the accused to an effectivecounsel. Counsel is not to prevent
the accused from confessing but to defend the accused. On the other hand, right to counsel during custodial
investigation requires the presence of competent and independent counsel who is preferably the choice of the
accused. The reason for such right is that in custodial investigation, there is a danger that confessions can be
exacted against the will of the accused since it is not done in public.

Q: May the right to counsel during trial be waived?


A: Yes. It can be waived when the accused voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and
proceeds with his defense. The accused may defend himself in person only if the court is convinced that he can
properly protect his rights even without the assistance of counsel. The defendant cannot raise the question of his
right to have an attorney for the first time on appeal. [Sec. 1(c), Rule 115].
―Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel‖

Q: May an accused defend himself without the assistance of counsel?


A: Yes, but only when it sufficiently appears that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of
counsel [Sec. 1(c), Rule 115].
Page 84 of 178
A bill of attainder is an act of a legislature declaring a person or group of persons guilty of some crime and
punishing them, often without a trial.

People vs. Holgado


The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that
the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his
right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de officio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time
to procure an attorney of his own.

People vs Agbayani (omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium)
PRESUMPTION OF REGULAR PERFORMANCE OFFICIAL DUTY; TRIAL COURT PRESUMED TO
HAVE COMPLIED WITH ITS DUTY TO INFORM ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. — The
trial court's order of 22 December 1994 states that said de officio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with
the consent of the accused." Since appellant miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to
counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial
court stand.

Amion vs Judge Chiongson


PREFERENCE IN THE CHOICE OF COUNSEL, CANNOT PARTAKE OF A DISCRETION SO
ABSOLUTE AND ARBITRARY AS WOULD MAKE SUCH REFER EXCLUSIVELY TO THE
PREDILECTION OF THE ACCUSED; RATIONALE. — An examination of related provisions in the
Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains
more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal
prosecution. Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to
an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and
arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. As held by
this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina, (229 SCRA 450), withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1),
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated
by the framers of the charter." Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the
accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him
a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels from representing
him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the
eventual resolution of the case.

Page 85 of 178
Right to be informed

Q. What is the purpose and scope of the right to be informed?


A. The object of the written accusation is —
first, to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make
his defense; and
second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime
is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (People vs Quitiong citing
U.S. v. Karelsen,).

Requisites for properly informing the accused of thenature and cause of accusation
1. Information must state the name of the accused
2. Designation given to the offense by statute
3. Statement of the acts or omission so complained of as constituting the offense
4. Name of the offended party
5. Approximate time and date of commission of the offense
6. Place where offense was committed
* Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information

NOTE: The purpose of an Information is to afford an accused his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. It is in pursuit of this purpose that the Rules of Court require that the
Information allege the ultimate facts constituting the elements of the crime charged. Details that do not go into
the core of the crime need not be included in the Information, but may be presented during trial. The rule that
evidence must be presented to establish the existence of the elements of a crime to the point of moral certainty is
only for purposes of conviction. It finds no application in the determination of whether or not an
Information is sufficient to warrant the trial of an accused (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 160619)

It is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude
unless such date and time are essential ingredients of the offenses charged. (People v. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424,
June 15, 2015)

Determination of the real nature of the crime


Description, not designation of the offense, is controlling. The real nature of the crime charged is determined
from the recital of facts in the information. It is neither determined based on the caption or preamble thereof
nor from the specification of the provision of the law allegedly violated.

NOTE: The accused cannot be convicted thereof if the information fails to allege the material elements of the
offense even if the prosecution is able to present evidence during the trial with respect to such elements.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation cannot be waived. However, the defense may
waive the right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of ―not guilty‖.

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Variance doctrine
In spite of the difference between the crime that was charged and that which was eventually proved, the
accused may still be convicted of whatever offense that was proved even if not specifically set out in the
information provided it is necessarily included in the crime charged. (Teves v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154182,
Dec. 17, 2004)

An offense charged NECESSARILY INCLUDES the offense proved when some of the essential ingredients or
ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter.
An offense charged NECESSARILY INCLUDED in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
XPN: Where the facts supervened after the filing of information which changed the nature of the offense.(Sec. 5).

Q: An accused can be convicted only on the offense charged stated on the complaint and proven during
trial. An accused cannot be convicted other than that stated or alleged in the complaint. In the same
manner the accused cannot be convicted of an offense not proven. The general rule is: an accused can
be convicted only of the offense charged in the information and proven in trial. Supposing there is a
variance between in the complaint charged in information and not proven at trial. Shall it mean that the
accused shall be acquitted?
A: The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Pecho v. People, the accused was not convicted of the crime charged,
the violation of Sec.3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended because the said section penalizes only consummated
offenses and the offense charged in this case was not consummated. He could nevertheless, be convicted of the
complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, which is
necessarily included in the crime charged. Applying Sec 4 and Sec 5 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter (Rule 120, ROC)

Q: Supposing the offense charged is homicide and the offense proved is murder, the accused shall be
convicted of?
A: Homicide, because if the accused shall be convicted of murder his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation will be violated. If he is only informed that he is charged with homicide, then he will be convicted
only of homicide. That is the rule when there is a variance with the offense charged and the offense proved.

Q: Supposing the variance is between the title and the designation of the offense and the recital of the
acts or omissions in the information. Which will prevail?
A: In the case of Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, the designation of the offense is violation of RA3019 Anti Graft and
corrupt practices act but the recital of acts of omission make out of bribery. The Supreme Court ruled that it is
obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction. A
reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly make out a case for bribery hence the
petitioner cannot claim of deprivation of right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation.

Q: What is the relevance of arraignment to the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation?
A: In Borja v. Mendoza the Supreme Court ruled that during arraignment, it is the stage, wherein an accused for
the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. He must be fully aware of
Page 87 of 178
possible loss of freedom even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least,
he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. It is not a useless
formality, much less an idle ceremony.

NOTE: Void for vagueness and strict scrutiny


The doctrine of strict scrutiny is different from void for vagueness rule Strict scrutiny and overbreadth are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their face" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called
in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal
statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been
pointed out, Vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied'
to a particular defendant.m The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes maybe hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing
a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the
doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially,
force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of
a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State's ability to deal with crime. If warranted,
there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State's power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is
clear as applied to him. (Spouses Romualdez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 167011, December 11,2008.)

Arraignment
It is the formal mode of implementing the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him. (People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 171020, March 14, 2007)

Arraignment is the proceeding in a criminal case, whose object is to fix the identity of the accused, to inform him
of the charge and to give him an opportunity to plead, or to obtain from the accused his answer, in other words,
his plea to the information.
NOTE: Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process.

Note: RA 8493 provides a 30-day arraignment within the filing of the information or from the date the accused
appeared before the court; trial shall commence 30 days from the arraignment, as fixed by the court. The entire
trial period shall not exceed 180 days, except as otherwise authorized by the SC Chief Justice.

Different rules on arraignment


1. Trial in absentia may be conducted only after valid arraignment.
2. Accused must personally appear during arraignment and enter his plea (counsel cannot enter plea for accused)
3. Accused is presumed to have been validly arraigned in the absence of proof to the contrary.

Absence of arraignment
GR: Judgment is void if accused has not been validly arraigned.

Page 88 of 178
XPN: If accused went into trial without being arraigned, the procedural defect was cured. The active participation
in hearing is a clear indication that the accused is fully aware of the charges against him. (People v. Pangilina, G.R.
No. 171020, March 14, 2007)

People vs Quitiong
INFORMATION; MUST SET FORTH THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE A BEARING
ON THE CULPABILITY AND LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED. — In embodying the essential elements of
the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.
One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy.

Pecho vs People
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION;
ORIGIN Such right, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill of Rights which the
people of Great Britain demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688. It
was adopted by the Constitution of the United States and was extended to the Philippines by Act No. 235, or the
Philippine Bill of 1902. It was later carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately, enshrined in the Constitutions of
1935, 1973, and 1987.
What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in
the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. An incorrect
caption is not a fatal mistake. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the
one charged, is necessarily included in the latter as provided by Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The
succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or is included in another.

Soriano vs Sandiganbayan
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so
would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so
that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

Borja vs Mendoza
It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse
position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side,
he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so
immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that he be fully
acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly
committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much
less an idle ceremony.

Page 89 of 178
Right to speedy, impartial, and public trial

Right to speedy trial


The term ―speedy‖ means free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

Q: What is speedy trial?


A: Means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. (People v. Tee)

Q: Speedy trial is a relative concept and the right to speedy trial can be violated when?
A: 1)The proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays
2)When unjustified postponements are asked for and secured
3)When without cause or justifiable motive of long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried (People v. Tee)

Q: What are the factors as to determination as to whether the right has been violated?People v. Tee
A: 1)Duration of the delay
2)Reason for the delay
3)The conduct of prosecution and accused
4)Efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right and failure to assert it
5)Prejudice and damage caused to the accused

Note: There is no violation of the right where the delay is imputable to the accused.

Q: Applying these factors, can we say that there was a violation to right to speedy trial in People v. Tee?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled to 20
hearing days, there is no showing whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratique‘s absences as to vex
or oppress appellant and deny him his rights. Under the rules, appellant could have moved the trial court to
require the witness to post bail to ensure that the latter would testify when required. Appellant could have moved
to have Abratique found in contempt and duly sanctioned. Appellant did neither. It is a bit too late in the day for
the appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.

Speedy Disposition of Cases


The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial to the extent that the former
applies to all cases, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative cases (Art. III, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution);
whereas, the latter applies to criminal cases only. [Art. III, Sec. 14 (2), 1987 Constitution]

The right to speedy trial [Sec. 14 (2)] particularly refers to criminal prosecutions which are at the trial stage, while
the right to speedy disposition of cases (Sec. 16) applies to all cases before judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies.

Q: Right under Sec.14 is the right to speedy trial. Can we say that this right is only applicable during
trial?
A: No. The Supreme Court in the case of Flores v. People citing Justice Laurel, ―An accused is entitled to a trial at
the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable
length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed.

Page 90 of 178
Q: How about on appeal?
A: No. Right to speedy trial applies to the proceedings anterior to the trial. Delay in the appeal is covered by a
different constitutional guarantee covered by Sec.16 Art.3.

Q: In the case of Conde v. Rivera, for a period of one year she was required to a dance attendance to the
Court. Why?
A: She is required to attend at the trial whether the trial is postponed. The Supreme Court dismissed the case
because of the violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused.

Q. What is the remedy for violation of the right to speedy trial?


A. The accused is entitled to dismissal of the case, and, if he is under detention, to release by habeas corpus.
(Conde vs Rivera)
Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.

Q: What are the remedies available to the accused when his right to speedy trial is violated?
A:
1. Ask for the trial of the case;
2. Unreasonable delay of the trial of a criminal case as to make the detention of defendant illegal gives ground for
habeas corpus as a remedy for obtaining release;
3. Mandamus proceeding to compel the dismissal of the information; or
4. Ask for the trial of the case and then move to dismiss (Gandicela v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-4069, Mar. 5, 1951).

Right to impartial trial


Impartial trial means that the accused is entitled to cold neutrality of an impartial judge, one who is free from
interest or bias.

Q: What is an impartial trial?


A: Hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal and that every litigant is entitled nothing less than the
cold neutrality of a judge.

Q: In Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz, described an impartial judge. Who is an impartial judge?


A: A cerebral man deliberately holds in cheek the tag and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which
he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals.

Q: is it enough that the trial judge impartial? Supposing the judge is indeed impartial and renders
decision based on evidence. Is that enough? What if he is seen socializing with one of the party in a case
he is handling after work?
A: No it is not enough. The judge or justice of Courts must appear to be impartial. Even if they penned their
decision based on evidence they must have semblance of impartiality. They cannot just associate with any parties
in the case because it will bring a semblance of partiality.

Q: Mateo Jr. in Vilalauz, the respondent judge is the one who attested to the affidavit of one of the
witnesses. But when the witness is presented, he reacted and said that he was forced to sign the
affidavit,. After the claim made by the witness,the defendant immediately filed for an inhibition of the

Page 91 of 178
respondent judge. According the defense they cannot longer expect an impartial and cold neutrality on
the presiding judge. Why?
A: The Supreme Court ruled that having the extrajudicial statement was attested before him, such repudiation was
hardly flattering to the judge. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence
of the requisite of due process element is thus noticeable.

Q: In our judicial system, are trial court judges required to leap lie hermits detached with world?
Because in the case of People v. Teehankee, the accused contends that his right to impartial trial is
violated because of the pervasive publicity of the case.
A: In People v. Teehankee, the Supreme Court ruled that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right
of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day to day, gavel to gavel, coverage
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of a trial judge and impaired his impartiality.
Our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our
judges are learned in law and trained to disregard off court evidence and on camera performances of parties in
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts do not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

Right to public trial


GR:
1. Trial must be public in order to prevent possible abuses which may be committed against the accused.
2. The attendance at the trial is open to all, irrespective of their relationship to the accused.
XPN: If the evidence to be adduced is ―offensive to decency or public morals,‖ the public may be
excluded.
NOTE: Under Sec. 21, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure it is provided that the judge may motu
proprio exclude the public from the court room when the evidence to be adduced is offensive to decency and
public morals.
In a constitutional sense, public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial. The right to a public
trial belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of the members of
the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed. The accused‘s right to a public
trial should not be confused with the freedom of the press and the public‘s right to know as a justification for
allowing the live broadcast of the trial. The tendency of a high profile case like the subject case to generate undue
publicity with its concomitant undesirable effects weighs heavily against broadcasting the trial. Moreover, the fact
that the accused has legal remedies after the fact is of no moment, since the damage has been done and may be
irreparable. It must be pointed out that the fundamental right to due process of the accused cannot be afforded
after the fact but must be protected at the first instance. (In Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the
Multiple Murder Cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, Oct. 23, 2012)

Q. When is a trial "public?"


A. It is public when attendance is open to all irrespective of relationship to defendants. However, when the
evidence to be presented may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals," the proceeding may be
limited to friends, relatives, and counsel. Garcia v. Domingo, L-30104, July 25, 1973.

Q. What is the purpose of the guarantee of a public trial?


A. The purpose of this guarantee is to serve "as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as
instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the
forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power."

Page 92 of 178
Q: In the case of Garcia v. Domingo, this right to due process in order to offset any danger of
conducting it in an illegal or unjust manner. The right to public trial in order to ship the accused form
the arbitrariness of the judge, how can it protect the accused form arbitrariness?
A: Based on experience. Public officers are more prudent when the trial is witnessed by the public.

Q: Right to public trial is a right that belongs to the accused. Can an accused waive it? Meaning can he
exclude the public from the witnessing his trial?
A: Prosecution can invoke the right to public trial by the virtue of the due process clause.

Q: Would the proceedings in the chamber of the judge considered as public trial?
A: No. The Supreme Court in the case of Garcia v. Domingo, ruled that there is no showing that the public was
excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted by the Judge would reduce the number of those
who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not
of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover as what Justice Black opined, it suffices to satisfy
the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no
matter what offense he may be charged.
In the case of In re: Petition for radio and television coverage of multiple murder case against Maguindanao
Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, the Supreme Court discussed the evolution on the right of impartial trial on the one
hand and right to information on the other hand. From the outright denial in the case of Aquino to the filming
for the purposes of recording in the case of Estrada and to a restricted and to regulated public airing in the case of
Maguindanao massacre, but note as well in the decision of the SC in the case of In re: Petition for radio and
television coverage of multiple murder case against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan was modified in its
resolution because in its decision it allowed the TV and radio coverage of the trial under restrictive and more
prohibitive procedure. But in its resolution modified its , by denying live TV and radio coverage and allowing only
live streaming from an extension in the premises of the court because of the balancing interest of the accused and
the people. Note as well and the resolution and decision of the SC in the Maguindanao case is a pro hac vice case
meaning it cannot be considered as judicial precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis. Applicable in that
particular case only.

Waiver of public trial


Section 21. Exclusion of the public. — The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the
evidence to be produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public morals. He may also, on motion of the
accused, exclude the public from the trial, except court personnel and the counsel of the parties

Q: What is the rule regarding trial by publicity?


A: The right of the accused to a fair trial is not incompatible with free press. Pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right to a fair trial. To warrant the finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegations and
proof that judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be due to the barrage of publicity
(People v. Teehankee, G.R. Nos. 111206-08, Oct. 6, 1995).

Q: Is the rule that the trial should be public absolute?


A: No. The court may bar the public in certain cases, such as when the evidence to be presented may be offensive
to decency or public morals; or in rape cases, where the purpose of some persons in attending is merely to ogle at
the parties.

Page 93 of 178
People vs Tee
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; DEFINED AND CONSTRUED. — A speedy trial means a trial conducted
according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that "where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom." The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether
the right has been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for
the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his
right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.
ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DEEMED VIOLATED. — The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period
for criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1)
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified
postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

Flores vs People
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the absence of any valid
decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to
dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to
be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that
should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put
an end to suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the
resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional
safeguard. That is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us — considering the controlling doctrine
announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again.

Conde vs Rivera
WHERE A Prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty,
by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

Mateo vs Villaluz
Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental requisite of impartiality for
due process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision on disqualification when revised three years later in 1964
contains this additional paragraph:
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above." Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside
of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there
may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he
might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.

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He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflect the probability that a
losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales
of justice against him. That passion on the part judge may be generated because of serious charges misconduct
against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men.
He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit
where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by
another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result
of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary.

Garcia vs Domingo
There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted
the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any
transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover,
as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he
may be charged.

People vs Teehankee
RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A FAIR TRIAL NOT INCOMPATIBLE TO A FREE PRESS. — We cannot
sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the
print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal
trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be
sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press
has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . .
. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." Pervasive
publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind
of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the
trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged
the burden.

In Re: Request for Live Radio and TV Coverage of Former President Estrada
REASONS FOR TELEVISED RECORDING. — There are several reasons for such televised recording. First,
the hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is
under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know
how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education
and civic training of the people. Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for
documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that
the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily
for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan

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is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can
be checked by reference to the tapes.

Re: Petition for Radio and TV Coverage against Zaldy Ampatuan


In a constitutional sense, public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial. The right to a public trial belongs to
the accused. The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of the members of the public and the
press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed. 24 The accused's right to a public trial should not
be confused with the freedom of the press and the public's right to know as a justification for allowing the live
broadcast of the trial. The tendency of a high profile case like the subject case to generate undue publicity with its
concomitant undesirable effects weighs heavily against broadcasting the trial. Moreover, the fact that the accused
has legal remedies after the fact is of no moment, since the damage has been done and may be irreparable. It must
be pointed out that the fundamental right to due process of the accused cannot be afforded after the fact but
must be protected at the first instance.

People vs Mapalao
JUDGMENT; SECTION 6, RULE 120 OF THE 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE
MODIFIED TO READ THAT ACCUSED WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL IF UPON
PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT HE FAILS TO APPEAL WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE. —
Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure should be modified to read that if upon
promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails to appeal without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him, his
bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal. However, if within the fifteen
(15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the
right to appeal within said period of appeal.

People vs Valeriano
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; WHEN AVAILABLE. — The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could
be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found,
hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio
jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section
14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned provided he has
been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a
justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can
render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal
docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the
promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.

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Right to meet witness face to face

Q: What is right to confrontation?


A: Right of the accused to see the witness face to face

Q. What is the purpose of the right of confrontation?


A. The right has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of
the witness by cross-examination, and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportation of the
witness. (US vs Javier)

Q. A witness in a criminal prosecution testified at the preliminary investigation and was extensively
cross-examined by the defense. When trial came, the witness could not be found in spite of the
combined efforts of national and local law enforcement agencies. May the transcripts of the witness'
testimony at the preliminary investigation be admitted in evidence?
A. Yes , since admission will be for the same criminal case and extensive opportunity for cross-examination was
already given, and the witness is not merely refusing to testify but is actually missing. People v. Villaluz, G.R. No.
33459, October 20,1983.

Q. May extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating another be used against the latter even if not
repeated in open court?
A. No, because that would violate the right of confrontation.

Q. May an affidavit executed by a witness be admitted in evidence even if the witness is not produced in
court?
A. No, because that would violate the right of confrontation.

Rule 115. Sec 1. (f)


(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the
Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-
examine him.

Q. What are the principal exceptions to the right of confrontation?


A. (1) The admissibility of "dying declarations." (2) Trial in absentia under Section 14(2).

Dying declaration
The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such
death. (Sec. 37, Rule 130)

Q. Is the right of confrontation available in preliminary investigation?


A. No. It is a right available during trial which begins only upon arraignment.

NOTE: "From Section 5 of Rule 112 it is clear that unlike in the preliminary investigation proper, an accused is
not entitled as a matter of right to be present during the preliminary examination nor to
cross-examine the witnesses presented against him before his arrest, the purpose of said examination

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Q. Must an informant who led the police to the arrest of the accused be presented for cross examination?
. No. There is no right of confrontation against informants who
are not witnesses.

Q: What does the right of the accused to confront and cross-examine a witness against him
contemplate?
A: Confrontation is the act of setting a witness face-to-face with the accused so that the latter may make any
objection he has to the witness which must take place in the court having jurisdiction to permit the privilege of
cross-examination.

In addition, the accused is entitled to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witness and
production of other evidence in his behalf [Sec. 1 (g)].

Note: The main purpose of this right to confrontation is to secure the opportunity of cross examination and the
secondary purpose is to enable the judge to observe the demeanor of witness.

Q: Does the right to confrontation cover witnesses who did not appear or was not presented at the trial?
A: No, the right to confrontation applies to witnesses who appear before the court; the witness must be present
for the right to confrontation to attach. What is important is that the accused is given the right to cross-examine
the witness presented (People v. Honrada, G.R. Nos. 112178-79, Apr. 21, 1995).

Q: What is the rule with respect to the testimony of a witness who dies or becomes unavailable?
A: If the other party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness before he died or became unavailable, the
testimony may be used as evidence. However, if the other party did not have the opportunity to cross-examine
before the death or unavailability of the witness, the testimony will have no probative value.

The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right anchored on due process. It is a statutory
right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused
has the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always
been understood as requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise
the right to cross-examine if desired. What is proscribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the
absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. The right is a personal one and may be waived expressly or
impliedly. [People vs. Escote Jr. (2003)]

The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said
right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be expressed.
Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the
opposing party who should move to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses [Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals et. al.,
(1990)].

Q: Substantively these are the two reasons why the affidavit cannot be admitted without presenting the
affiant as a witness. Procedurally, what is the basis of the exclusion? An ex parte cannot be presented as
evidence because?
A: Intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon deposition or ex parte affidavits.

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Q: Supposing A was presented a s a witness during his testimony he produced the affidavit of B in order
to prove that he is telling the truth. Can the defense object to that evidence?
A: Yes. The affidavit would be considered as a hearsay evidence.
Procedurally, ex parte affidavits cannot be admitted because on the rule of hearsay evidence.

Q: Supposing the accused are tried separately on the same criminal information on the same acts or
omissions. Supposing A B C tried on the same criminal information may the testimony of a witness in
the case of A who was a exhaustively cross examined by the accused can be used as a witness to other
cases without presenting the witness in the other case. D was presented as a witness in the case of A can
D be presented as a witness in the case of B and C without presenting as witness in B and C’s case?
No. It would deprive the court to observe the deportment of the witness during the trial. If we say automatically
that the second court will admit the evidence of the witness who is presented in another case would not that be a
deprivation of the right of the second court to determine whether the witness is lying or telling the truth? Even if
theparties are the same if the court trying the parties are not the same the right to confrontation requires that the
witness presented in one case be presented in the other case.

US vs Javier
CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES. — There are two principal reasons for the provision of the Philippine
Bill of Rights which says: "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the
witnesses face to face." The first reason is the right of cross-examination, and the second is that the tribunal may
have before it the department and appearance of the witness while testifying

Talino vs Sandiganbayan
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-
examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is
any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who
cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits
are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by
the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration.

Compulsory process

Q. Compare the right to compulsory process in the 1935 Constitution with that in the 1973 and 1987
versions.
A. The 1935 version speaks of the right to compulsory process "to secure the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf" whereas the 1973 and 1987 versions add the right "to have compulsory process to secure... the production
of evidence in his behalf."

Subpoena
It is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his deposition (Sec. 1, Rule 21).
NOTE: Subpoena is a Latin term which literally means ―under the pain of penalty.‖

Subpoena Summons
An order to appear and Writ notifying of action brought against
testify at the hearing or for defendant.
taking deposition.
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May be served to a non- Served on the defendant.
party.
Needs tender of Does not need tender of kilometrage and other
kilometrage, attendance fees.
fee and reasonable cost of
production fee.

Means available to the parties to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense of a case
1. Subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum
2. Depositions and other modes of discovery
3. Perpetuation of testimonies

Ad Testificandum Duces Tecum


A process directed to a person The person is also
requiring him to attend and to required to bring
testify at the hearing or trial of an with him any books,
action, or at any investigation documents, or other
conducted by competent things under his
authority, or for the taking of his control.
deposition.

NOTE: The subpoena duces tecum shall contain a reasonable description of the books, documents or things
demanded which must appear to the court as prima facie relevant.

Before a subpoena ducestecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites
are present:
(1) The books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the
controversy (test of relevancy), and
(2) Such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). [Roco
v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005]

Requirements for the exercise of the right to secure attendance of witness


1. The witness is really material
2. The attendance of the witness was previously obtained
3. The witness will be available at the time desired
4. No similar evidence could be obtained
NOTE: Right to cross-examine is demandable only during trials. Thus, it cannot be availed of during
preliminary investigations.

Q: May a subpoena ad testificandum be issued by the court without issuing subpoena duces tecum?
A: Yes. Subpoena duces tecum cannot be issued by the court without subpoena ad testificandum but subpoena ad
testificandum can be issued without Subpoena duces tecum. It is not enough that the documents which is the
subject of subpoena duces tecum to just bring it before the court. It must be testified and authenticated by the
custodian. In that regard, the complete term for subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum

Page 100 of 178


Roco vs Contreras
We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why this Court must have to disbelieve
the factual findings of the appellate court. In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to
compel the attendance of Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap of Cal's Corporation or their duly authorized
representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and documents desired by the petitioner, would serve
no purpose but to further delay the proceedings in the pending criminal cases.

Trial in Absentia

Trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial. (Lavides v. CA, G.R. No. 129670, Feb. 1, 2000)

Elements of trials in absentia


1. Accused has been validly arraigned
2. Accused has been duly notified of the dates of hearing
3. Failure to appear is unjustifiable

The presence of the accused is mandatory in the following instances


1. During arraignment and plea
2. During trial, for identification, unless the accused has already stipulated on his identity during the pre-trial and
that he is the one who will be identified by the witnesses as the accused in the criminal case
3. During promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense

NOTE: While the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of judgment, the absence of his counsel
during such promulgation does not affect its validity.

Promulgation of judgment in absentia is valid provided the following are present


1. Judgment be recorded in the criminal docket
2. Copy be served upon accused or counsel
NOTE: Recording the decision in the criminal docket of the court satisfies the requirement of notifying the
accused of the decision wherever he may be. (Estrada v. People, G.R. No. 162371, Aug. 25, 2005)

Q: Sec. 14 Art.3 enumerates the rights of the accused expect for one which is?
A: The provision on trial by absentia. This right favors the prosecution so that the trial won‘t be delayed.

Q: What is the consequence of trial in absentia?


A: The accused waived his right to appear in the trial. He cannot present evidence.

Q: The presence of the accused is needed during arraignment the presence of the accused is mandatory
during trial and during the promulgation. Does that mean that the court cannot during trial during trial
in absentia if the purpose of the trial is to identify the accused?
A: During trial, the accused can expressly waive his appearance through his counsel by making a manifestation,
that whenever a witness is to be presented to identify the accused, the defense is admitting that the accused will be
identified by the witness. In that regard to be dispense with the appearance of the accused in identification
purposes. On the third instance, during the promulgation of the judgment, it is the issue in the case of People v.
Valeriano, whether the court can promulgate a decision when the accused flee from justice. The Supreme Court
ruled that the accused jumped bail after he had been arraigned just before the retaking of evidence commenced,
one who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non appearance during trial. Accordingly, after the

Page 101 of 178


trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and the promulgation may be made by simply
recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel provided that the
notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
Only during the arraignment, the presence of the accused is not waivable but only to the two instances it is
waivable.

Q: May an accused tried in absentia be convicted in absentia likewise appeal in absentia?


A: This is one the issue in the case of People v. Mapalao, the Supreme court ruled that the accused while at large,
cannot seek relief from the court as he is deemed to have waived his right and has no standing in court. Upon
promulgation of the judgment, he failed to appear without justifiable cause although his bondsmen and counsel
were given notice, he is therefore waived his right to appeal.

Q. Does the provision on trial in absentia preclude forfeiture of bail bond under the Rules of Court for
one who jumps bail?
A. No, the new provision "does not lend itself to a latitudinarian construction."

Q. What is the reason for allowing trial in absentia?


A. To speed up the disposition of criminal cases.

HOW IS A JUDGMENT PROMULGATED?


 The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered.
 When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court.

CAN THERE BE PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ACCUSED?


 As a general rule, judgment must be promulgated in the presence of the accused.
 However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative.
 Also, if the accused fails to attend the promulgation, even if he was notified thereof, or if he jumped
bail or escaped from prison, judgment may be validly promulgated in absentia

WHAT HAPPENS IF THE ACCUSED FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF PROMULGATION


OF JUDGMENT DESPITE NOTICE?
 In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall
be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
 If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to
appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment
and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be

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allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice

WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES THAT THE ACCUSED CANNOT AVAIL OF WHEN
JUDGMENT IS PROMULGATED IN ABSENTIA?
1. Appeal
2. Probation
3. Parole
4. Motion for new trial or reconsideration
5. Suspension of sentence

WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES WHEN JUDGMENT MAY BE PROMULGATED


DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ACCUSED?
1. When the accused has been convicted of a light offense. Judgment may be promulgated in
front of the counsel or representative of the accused
2. When the trial was held in absentia because either the accused jumped bail or escaped confinement

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Writ of Habeas Corpus
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases
of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

The writ of habeas corpus (to produce the body) is a writ directed to the person detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of the detainee at a designated time and place,
and to show the cause of his detention.
(Hence, an essential requisite for the availability of the writ is actual deprivation of personal liberty).

Called the ―great writ of liberty‖, the writ of habeas corpus ―was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.‖ The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law‘s
―zealous regard for personal liberty.‖ (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo,
G.R.
No. 197597, April 8, 2015)

Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus


The right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.

Q. What may be suspended, the writ or the privilege of the writ?


A. The writ is never suspended. It always issues as a matter of course. What is suspended is the privilege of
the writ, i.e., once the officer making the return shows to the court that the person detained is being
detained for
an offense covered by the suspension, the court may not enquire any further.

Q. Who may suspend the privilege?


A. The President.

Q. When may the privilege be suspended?


A . " . . . in cases of invasion or rebellion OR when the public safety requires it."
Article III, Section 15. Hence, for the validity of the suspension, two requisites must concur:
(1) the existence of actual invasion or rebellion;
(2) public safety requires the suspension.
The new Constitution has removed "insurrection" and "imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion as grounds for the suspension.

Q: What is the difference on the suspension of the privilege writ of habeas corpus and writ of
habeas corpus?
A: Writ of Habeas Corpus- application for habeas corpus is filed and the court finds the petition in proper
form, it will issue the writ as a matter of course, ordering the production of the person allegedly detained
and requiring the respondent to justify the detention.
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus- where the return of the respondent shows that the person in
custody is being held for a crime covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege and in a place
where it is effective will the court dismiss the petition.

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When Available
Q: What are the two instances wherein writ of habeas corpus can be issued or available?
A: 1) In cases of illegal detention in order to test the validity of detention.
Reckoning period: as of the filing for the petition of the writ of habeas corpus at the earliest time and if
there are supervening events that will supersede the petition of the writ of habeas corpus and bar his
release from custody.
2) Speedy trial

For a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful
process and is continuously being illegally detained. (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan
Malang Salibo, ibid.)

It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of
abode
It may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of
finding out
who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. When forcible taking and
disappearance – not arrest and detention – have been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus
proceedings, but criminal investigation and proceedings.

Habeas corpus generally applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.
(Martinez v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 153795, Aug. 17, 2006)

Q. Does the suspension of the privilege also suspend the right to bail?
No. Art. Ill, Sect. 13.

Q: Consequence in the petition for bail of a person who filed a petition for habeas corpus?
A: This is the issue in the case of Jackson v. Macalino, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that by offering
of the petitioner to post bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he was under custody of CID and
voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of CID.

Q: Can the court continue to hear the petition of writ of habeas corpus after the petitioner filed for
bail?
A: If the accused applied for bail, it is an expressed admission or recognition of the validity of his
detention and would render the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic.

Q: How about imminent threat of rebellion or invasion? Is this a valid ground of suspension?
A: Yes, in the case of Lansang v. Garcia interpreting the 1935 Constitution. Under 1987 Constitution,
mere threat of rebellion is not a valid ground.

Q: Sec.18 Art. 7 enumerate the powers of the President. Supreme Court in the Sanlakas case said
that the enumeration in Sec.18 Art.7 was deliberately made from an order, to the most benign to
the least benign. (Can be used although not in succession)
A: 1)Calling out power
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2)Suspension of the privilege of the writ Habeas Corpus
3)Declaration of martial law
NOTE: Sec. 18 only enumerates the power wherein the President may call martial law or suspend the
privilege in invasion when public safety requires it and in cases of rebellion when public safety requires it.

Q: Can the President exercise or proclaim martial law without the presence of rebellion, invasion
or lawless violence?
A: Even if there is no actual rebellion, invasion or lawless violence the President may exercise his calling
out power in order to avert or to stop it from happening.

Q. What are the limitations on the power to suspend the privilege?


A. See Article VII, Section 18.

Q: What are the constitutional limitations in the suspension of the privilege of the writ?
A: He may for a period not exceeding sixty days suspend to privilege and only the Congress can extend it.
Upon the suspension of the privilege his duty is to submit a report within 48 hours from the suspension in
person or in writing.

Q: Prior to the 1987 Constitution, whether the Supreme Court can review the sufficiency of the
factual circumstances in the suspension. Can the Supreme Court review?
A: In the case of Lansang v. Garcia, the Supreme Court ruled that Art. 7 vest the executive the power to
suspend, but not absolute, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances under which the
Executive is supreme as regards to the suspension of the privilege but only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Basic law, authority to determine whether he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department. Check only and not to supplant.

Q: What are the offenses covered by the suspension of the privilege?


A: Rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

Test for valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: arbitrariness and not correctness

Q: Under Sec. 15 art.3 constitution provides that the privilege of writ habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. The use of
term invasion and rebellion are they taken within the context of criminal law?
A: No. They are only used as a sense of a state or condition of the nation and not in concept of statutory
offense.

Q: For how long a person may be suspected to have committed an offense of rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion be detained?
A: Person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days of otherwise he shall be
released.

Q: Supposing A was arrested for being a suspected rebel at the time that he was arrested the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended. On the 3rd day of his arrest, police officers
who arrested him filed a criminal complaint before a public prosecutor for preliminary
investigation, would that suffice to bar the 3 day period in order to be said that the detention of A
is justified?

Page 106 of 178


A: A must be judicially charged. Mere filing criminal complaint before a public prosecutor for preliminary
investigation is not sufficient to bar the running of the 3 day period. It can only be interrupted by filing
criminal information before the court.

Q: What happens to the person who post bail in suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus?
Can he still exercise the right to bail? What is the purpose for the suspension?
A: The purpose is to quash or stop rebellion or invasion.

Q: Let’s assume that the penalty for rebellion is reclusion temporal. Supposing after the President
suspended the privilege, all the members of a group were arrested being suspected rebels.
Supposing there are 100 rebels can they post bail? As we said earlier right to bail is a matter of
right if the penalty of the offense is lower than reclusion perpetua regardless of the weight of the
evidence of guilt? Remember, right to post bail shall not be impaired in the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A: This is the issue in the case of In re: The issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for Dr. Aurora
Parong, et.al. Ponce Enrile, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that transcends in the importance that if
these person would be given the right to bail, after they are released, they may rejoin the rebels and
continue their furtherance of invasion or rebellious activities. The constitutional guarantee provided in
Sec.13, does not apply in offenses of rebellion or offenses inherent or directly connected with invasion.
They cannot post bail as a matter of right, regardless of the penalty and the weight of evidence of guilt.

Scope of the writ


Habeas corpus extends to:
1. Cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty; and
2. Cases by which the rightful custody of the person is withheld from the person entitled thereto (Sec. 1,
Rule 102).

Contents of the petition


A party for whose relief it is intended, or some person on his behalf, may apply through a verified petition
for a writ of habeas corpus and should contain the following:
1. That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;
2. The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; or, if both are unknown
or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is
served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;
3. The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
4. The cause of his detention; and
5. The verified petition must be signed.

Kinds of Writ of Habeas Corpus


1. Preliminary citation is issued when a government officer has the person in his custody, the illegality of
which is not patent, to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus should not issue.
2. Peremptory writ is issued when the cause of the detention appears to be patently illegal and the non-
compliance therewith is punishable

In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the
hearing of the petition. The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention.
However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered
by the remedy. Thus, the Court‘s order to the CA to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of
the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus
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Grounds for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus as a consequence of judicial proceeding
1. There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in restraint of person;
2. The court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
3. An excessive penalty has been imposed, the sentence being void as to excess;
4. Where the law is amended, as when the penalty is lowered
5. Denial of right to a speedy trial (since it is jurisdictional);
6. Where the results of post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict;
7. Enable the parents to regain custody of a minor child, even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of her own free will;
8. In determining the constitutionality of a statute
9. When testing the legality of an alien‘s confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines 10. In
permitting an alien to land in the Philippines
11. In determining the legality of an extradition

Who may grant the writ


The RTC, CA, and SC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus. The MTC, by virtue of
special jurisdiction under BP. 129, can issue the writ in case there is no available RTC judge. Hierarchy of
courts is not observed.
The writ issued by the RTC is enforceable within its territorial jurisdiction. While the writ issued by the CA
or SC is enforceable anywhere in the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 102). )
The Sandiganbayan may issue writs of habeas corpus only if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction (Sec. 4, P.D.
1606, as amended by RA 8249).
Family Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors.

Restraint of Liberty
Not only physical restraint but any restraint on freedom of action is sufficient i.e. (1) curtailed freedom of
movement by the condition that he must get approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila,
(2) abridged liberty of abode because prior approval of respondent is required in case petitioner wants to
change place of residence, (3) abridged freedom of speech due to prohibition from taking any interviews
inimical to national security, and (4) petitioner is required to report regularly to respondents or their reps.
[Moncupa v. Enrile (1986)]
This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty
[Ampatuan vs. Macaraig (2010)].
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither
actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for. [Ampatuan vs. Macaraig (supra)].
Note: The fact that the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. [Villavicencio v.
Lukban (1919)]

Voluntary restraint
GR: Writ is not available if restraint is voluntary
XPN: Writ will lie to enable the parents (or person having substituted parental authority) to recover
custody of a minor child although she is in custody of a 3rd person on her own volition. (Tijing v. CA, G.R.
No. 125901, March 8, 2001)
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NOTE: Voluntariness is viewed from the point of view of the person entitled to custody.

When prisoner may be removed from one custody to another


1. By legal process;
2. Prisoner is delivered to an inferior officer to carry to jail;
3. By order of proper court or judge directing that he be removed from one place to another within the
Philippines for trial; or
4. In case of fire, epidemic, insurrection or other necessity or public calamity (Sec. 18, Rule 102).

Q. Released temporarily, petitioner was nevertheless subjected to certain conditions limiting his
movements. Is habeas corpus still a proper remedy?
A Yes. "A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which
is free from involuntary restraints." Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233,238 (1986).

In Re: Lansang vs Garcia


COURTS MAY LOOK INTO COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS THEREFOR. — Far from
being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined
and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as
regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned
setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power,
beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law
upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds,
be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be
meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful
exercise in futility.
PROPER STANDARD TO TEST VALIDITY OF ACTS OF CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE.
— Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our constitutional system,
seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis
mutandis,
fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard
is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

Jackson vs Macalino
HABEAS CORPUS; A WRIT OF INQUIRY
AND IS GRANTED TO TEST THE RIGHT UNDER WHICH A PERSON IS DETAINED. —
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that "except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto." The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person
from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is
detained.
EVEN IF THE ARREST OF A PERSON IS ILLEGAL, SUPERVENING EVENTS MAY BAR HIS
RELEASE OR DISCHARGE FROM CUSTODY. — Even if the arrest of a person is illegal,
supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained
person.
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BURDEN OF PROVING ILLEGAL RESTRAINT RESTS ON THE PETITIONER WHO
ATTACHES SUCH RESTRAINTS. — As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the
respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process
where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege
and prove new matter that
tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process.

In Re: Parong vs Enrile


SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; LEGAL BASIS FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT ORDER TO VALIDATE ARREST
WITHOUT WARRANT AND CONTINUED DETENTION THEREUNDER. — The function of the
PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for any of the offenses covered by
Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant. Its legal effect is to render the writ
unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for
continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as
the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of public
safety continues.
FUNCTION OF THE COURT AS INTERPRETED IN THE LANSANG CASE. — "The function of
the Court is merely to check--not to supplant—the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
wisdom of
his act." (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488).
CARRIES WITH IT THE SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL. — The suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the
government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to
bail may be demanded
during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof
will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeoparding
the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
RULING IN LANSANG CASE COMPARED WITH RULING OF BARCELON VS, BAKER AND
MONTENEGRO VS. CASTAÑEDA. — in Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil. 87, a 1905 decision, and
Montenegro vs. Castañeda (91 Phil. 882, 1952), the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled ruling
was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of the Court is merely to check-not to
supplant — the Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him to determine the wisdom of his act." Judicial
interference was thus held as permissible,
and the test as laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted
arbitrarily.

Lagman vs Medialdea
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the wit of habeas corpus and/or declaring
martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it.
The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of
sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible
nullification by the Supreme Court."
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the
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extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision
was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive
Department.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen on the ground of lack of suffcient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
The President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing
that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed." The standard of proof of
probable cause does not require absolute truth. Since "martial law is a matter of urgency x x x the
President x x x is not expected to completely validate all the information he received before declaring
martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power,
which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power, with the
military's assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being
are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the control of the State.
I n David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo , 127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's
(Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under
a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and
seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and
agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x.

Lagman vs Pimentel (2018)


In Lagman, We emphasized that this Court's jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII is special and specific, different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII. It was further stressed therein that the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the
respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Hence, the Court
concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper
tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. We held that to apply the standard of review in a petition for
certiorari will emasculate the Court's constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely
meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
With regard to the extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ, the same special and specific jurisdiction is vested in the Court to review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. Necessarily, and by parity of
reasoning, a certiorari petition invoking the Court's expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress' extension of the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.
Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the Congress' extension of such
proclamation or suspension is limited only to a determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. By its plain language, the Constitution provides such scope of review in the exercise of the Court's
sui generis authority under Section 18, Article VII, which is principally aimed at balancing (or curtailing)
the power vested by the Constitution in the Congress to determine whether to extend such proclamation
or suspension.
Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the Congress had no power to review or limit the
Executive's exercise of the authority to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
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corpus. Borne of the country's martial law experience under the Marcos regime, such power was
subsequently established in the
1987 Constitution as part of a system of checks and balance designed to forestall any potential abuse of an
extraordinary power lodged in the President as Commander-in- Chief of the country's armed forces.
When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as described
during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a "joint executive and legislative act" or a
"collective judgment" between the President and the Congress.
The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the
President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.
Such silence, however, should not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or deficiency in the provision. While it
does not specify the number of times that the Congress is allowed to approve an extension of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only
limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are
that the extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the persistence
of the invasion or rebellion and
the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual
basis upon the petition of any citizen

Writ of Amparo (to protect)


A remedy available to any person who‘s right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Sec.1, Rule on Writ of
Amparo)

Applicability
Applicable even though petitioners already escaped detention
In case were the victims of abduction were able to escape, it should be stressed that they are now free
from
captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors.
Understandably, since their escape, they have been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty and security.

Extralegal killings
Killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.

Enforced disappearance
Arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty committed by agents of the State
or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which places such person outside the protection of the law. [Sec. 3(b), R.A. 10353]

Nature of writ of amparo


An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—
the writ does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil

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or administrative under the applicable substantive law (Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155,
September 7, 2010).
It partakes of the nature of a prerogative writ that does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance
(Razon, Jr. v. TagitisG.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009).

State participation
State participation is an indispensable element for the issuance of a writ of amparo. Proof of disappearance
alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the
direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. While the writ may lie if the
person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity,
still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. This hallmark of
State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person
(Navia et al v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012)

Q: We said earlier that the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to test the validity of the arrest
and detention of the accused and ultimately retain the liberty of the person. Aside from the writ of
habeas corpus there are other high prerogative writ that produce the same effect like writ of
amparo. Five types of writ of amparo as enumerated in the case of Secretary of defense v. Manalo
A:
1)amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ;
(2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes;
(3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision;
(4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and
(5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants‘ rights derived from the agrarian reform process

Out of these amparo cases one is equivalent to habeas corpus and it is amparo libertad.
Supposing that the privilege was suspended by the President can it be vailidly obtained through
this writ of amparo?
A: No. although the constitution provides only for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, all similar
writs are also suspended because if it is allowed then the provision in the constitution would be useless.

Writ of Habeas Data


The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one‘s
right to the truth and to informational privacy.

There must be a nexus between right to privacy and right to life, liberty and security.

Right To Informational Privacy v. Legitimate State Interest


The determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may
be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of an
individual and the relevant state interest involved.

Reliefs available in the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data


1. Updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent;
2. In case of threats of the unlawful act, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of.
3. A general prayer for other reliefs that are just and equitable under the circumstances is also allowed.

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Writ of Kalikasan
A remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people‘s organization,
nongovernmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).

Nature of the writ of kalikasan


The Writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy which may be issued depending on the magnitude of the
environmental damage. The environmental damage must be one which prejudices the life, health or
property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces, or that which transcends political and territorial boundaries.
It is also a remedy which enforces the right to information by compelling the government or a private
entity to produce information regarding the environment that is within their custody.

Persons who may file a petition for a writ of kalikasan


The Writ of Kalikasan may be availed of by any of the following:
a. Natural or juridical persons;
b. Entities authorized by law; or
c. People‘s organizations, non-governmental organizations, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency.

Persons against whom a petition for a writ of kalikasan is filed


a. A public official or employee; or
b. A private individual or entity.

Where to file the petition


a. The Supreme Court; or
b. Any station of the Court of Appeals.
NOTE: The rationale for this is that the jurisdiction of both tribunals is national in scope which
corresponds
with the magnitude of the environmental damage contemplated by the Rules.

Docket fees: None

When is writ issued?


Within three (3) days from the date of filing of the petition, if the petition is sufficient in form and
substance
Reliefs: Permanent cease and desist order against the respondent, directive to respondent to protect,
preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment; to monitor strict compliance with the decision and
orders of ther court, to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment, and other reliefs.
[Sec. 15, Rule 7]

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Speedy disposition of cases.
Sec. 16. Art. Ill: ―All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. ‘

Speedy disposition vs speedy trial


The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial to the extent that the
former
applies to all cases, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative cases and pertains to all
stages of the trial (Art. III, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution);
whereas, the latter applies to criminal cases only and involves trial proceedings and only and those
anterior to it. [Art. III, Sec. 14 (2), 1987 Constitution]

Violation
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried (Roquero v. Chancellor of
UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010).

Q. Explain the concept of "speedy disposition of cases."


A. The concept of "speedy disposition of cases," like "speedy trial," is a relative term and must necessarily
be a flexible concept. In the determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that
may be
considered and balanced are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert
it, and prejudice caused by the delay.

Q: Speedy disposition of cases covers proceedings previous to trial or those after trial?
A: speedy disposition applies to all stages of the trial.

Q: During trial, how to determine which would be applied?


A: – It basically depends on whose right was violated. If it is the right of the prosecution that was violated,
refer to the right to speedy disposition of cases. But if it is only the accused, resort to sec. 14.

Q:Which means that there are two rights operating during the trial stage, the right to speedy trial
and right to speedy disposition of cases. Both of which prohibits any unreasonable delay. How
can we identify which operates?
A: Right to speedy trial applies to trial proper and proceedings anterior to the trial. Right to speedy
disposition applies to all stages of the criminal proceedings. The latter covers criminal administrative, civil,
quasi judicial proceedings while the former covers only criminal proceedings. Prosecution is not entitled in
speedy trial while in speedy disposition the prosecution and the accused.
If the trial is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays caused by prosecution the accused
may claim the right to speedy trial. If the right claimed is speedy disposition of cases, the only objective is
to expedite the disposition the case.

Q: Supposing the trial is attended with vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays at the instance
of the accused. What right may be invoked by the prosecution?
A: Sec. 16. Right to speedy trial and speedy disposition operates during the trial but the person invoking
should be different.
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Q: Does the right to speedy disposition of cases apply to military personnel?
A: Yes, they cannot be denied the same fundamental right.

Padua vs Ericta
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; SHOULD NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF RIGHT TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE OR TO BEING NON-SUITED. — The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases
should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party s right to present evidence and either in
plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment

Flores vs People
The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, "means
one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, . . ." Thus, if the person accused were innocent,
he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a
prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a
period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. As was also pointed out in
Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the
accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final
dismissal of the case

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SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The self-incrimination clause is meant to avoid:


(1) placing the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury; and
(2) extorting a confession by force.

Q: What is the common law basis of this right?


A: nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare (no man is bound to accuse himself)
It is considered as a revolt against as a thumbscrew and a rock (inquisitorial devices applied in order to
extract a confession in the defendant)

Q: According to the Supreme Court in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, this constitutional
guarantee is founded upon the broad basis of public policy and humanity. Why?
A: Public policy because the witness is placed in the strongest temptation to commit perjury and humanity
because to extract a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law
abhors.

Q: Substance of this guarantee?


A: Stated in the case of US v. Tan Teng citing Justice Holmes, the prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it
may be material.

Effect of Denial of Privilege


Exclusionary Rule (under Sec. 17, Art. III in relation to Sec. 12): When the privilege against self-
incrimination is violated outside of court (e.g. police), then the testimony, as already noted, is not
admissible.
Ousted of Jurisdiction: When the privilege is violated by the Court itself, that is, by the judge, the court is
ousted of its jurisdiction, and all its proceedings, and even judgment are null and void. [Chavez v. CA
(1968)]

This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, but this has
since been extended to any evidence ―communicative in nature‖ acquired under circumstances of duress.
(People
v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, Sept. 30, 1987)

What is prohibited is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness
or
to otherwise elicit evidence which would not exist were it not for the actions compelled from the witness.
The right is available in:
1. Criminal cases
2. Civil cases
3. Administrative cases
4. Impeachment
5. Other legislative investigations that possess a criminal or penal aspect
NOTE: It does not apply to private investigations done by private individual (BPI v. CASA,
GR.No.149454, May 28, 2004).

Page 117 of 178


When the privilege against self-incrimination is violated outside of court, say, by the police, then the
testimony, as already noted, is not admissible under the exclusionary rule. When the privilege is violated by
the court itself, that is, by the judge, the court is ousted of its jurisdiction, all its proceedings are null and
void, and it is as if no judgment has been rendered. (Chavez v. CA, G.R. No. L-29169, Aug. 19, 1968)

Incriminating question
A question tends to incriminate when the answer of the accused or the witness would establish a fact
which
would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by the accused or the
witness.
NOTE: The privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must
be
claimed. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.
The privilege against self-incrimination can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually addressed to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness
the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed. (Rosete v.
Lim,
G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006)

Q. At what stage of an enquiry may the right against self-incrim- ination be asserted?
A. A person who is the accused in a criminal case may assert the right from the moment he is asked to
testify, i.e., an accused has an absolute right to be silent; a person who is a witness but not the accused,
may assert the
right only when the incriminating question is asked.

Right against self-incrimination of an accused vs. Right against self-incrimination of a witness


ACCUSED - Can refuse to take the witness stand altogether by invoking the right against self-
incrimination
WITNESS - Cannot refuse to take the witness stand; can only refuse to answer specific
questions which would incriminate him in the commission of an offense
NOTE: For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to
incriminate him.
The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person
―to
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction‖. (Chavez v. CA, G.R. L-29169, Aug. 1968)

Q: Does that mean an accused may be compelled under pain of contempt tom produce evidence
as long as it is not testimonial in character without violating the constitutional guarantee on right
against self incrimination? Supposing the accused is charged with homicide. The prosecution
moved for the production of the knife used by the accused to kill the victim. Can the prosecution
compel the accused to produce as such?
A: No. It means that the constitutional guarantee does not cover only testimonial evidence but also object
and documentary evidence.

Q: What are the documentary evidence that the accused must produce even against his will?
Supposing the person is charged with tax evasion can he be compelled to produce income tax
return?
Page 118 of 178
A: Even if he will be incriminated he is required to produce such documents. This are reportorial
documents which are required for every tax payers therefore this documents are needed to be filed to
government agencies are not covered by constitutional guarantee of right against self incrimination.

Q: In the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals prosecution believes that they can call the accused as
witness and the court believes the prosecution. Did the Supreme Court agree?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the court may not extract from a defendant‘s own lips and against
his will an admission of his guilt. Nor a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or
indirectly of facts usable against him as confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the
commission of a crime. Because it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to
take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his free genuine will.

Q: What is the extent of the constitutional protection as to the witness?


A: A witness can be compelled to testify against his will and can invoke only such right when an
incriminating question is asked.

Q: Is the right against self incrimination available during preliminary investigation before the
public prosecutor?
A: Yes. In Beltran v. Samson the Supreme Court ruled that if the prosecutor will be allowed to compel the
respondent to produce incriminating evidence which later on be introduced as evidence in trial proper
itself, then this constitutional guarantee will be a meaningless protection.

Q: How about in administrative proceedings? Is this constitutional guarantee available?


A: Yes. In the case of Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners , the Supreme Court ruled this right does
not apply to all administrative proceedings and similar proceedings. Applies to Administrative and civil
proceedings but with qualification, constitutional guarantee applies with administrative and civil
proceedings which are penal in character or where there is an attached penalty.
*Constitutional guarantee does not apply in all proceedings. Rule 25, rules of court (Modes of discovery)

Q: Can the Court compel the accused to write the fiscal’s dictation for the purpose of comparison
allowed?
A: No. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not purely
a mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention. In Beltran v. Samson, the
Supreme Court rule that privilege is not limited to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence. The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony but embraces as
well as the furnishing of evidence by other means than by the word of mouth, the divulging in short of any
fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.

Re-enactment of a crime
A person who is made to re-enact a crime may rightfully invoke his privilege against self-incrimination,
because
by his conduct of acting out how the crime was supposedly committed, he thereby practically confesses
his guilt by action which is as eloquent, if not more so, than words. (People v. Olvis, G.R. No. 71092, Sept.
30,
1987)

Handwriting is covered by the right against selfincrimination


Under Sec. 17, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, ―no person shall be compelled to be a witness against

Page 119 of 178


himself.‖ Since the provision prohibits compulsory testimonial incrimination, it does not matter whether
the
testimony is taken by oral or written. Writing is not purely a mechanical act because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention. The purpose of the privilege is to avoid and prohibit thereby the
repetition and recurrence of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction. (Bermudez v. Castillo, July 26, 1937; Beltran v. Samson, G.R. No.
32025,
Sept. 23, 1929)

Q: Does that mean an accused may be compelled under pain of contempt tom produce evidence
as long as it is not testimonial in character without violating the constitutional guarantee on right
against self incrimination? Supposing the accused is charged with homicide. The prosecution
moved for the production of the knife used by the accused to kill the victim. Can the prosecution
compel the accused to produce as such?
A: No. It means that the constitutional guarantee does not cover only testimonial evidence but also object
and documentary evidence.

Q: What are the documentary evidence that the accused must produce even against his will?
Supposing the person is charged with tax evasion can he be compelled to produce income tax
return?
A: Even if he will be incriminated he is required to produce such documents. This are reportorial
documents which are required for every tax payers therefore this documents are needed to be filed to
government agencies are not covered by constitutional guarantee of right against self incrimination.

Q: Can the Court compel the accused to write the fiscal’s dictation for the purpose of comparison
allowed?
A: No. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not purely
a mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention. In Beltran v. Samson, the
Supreme Court rule that privilege is not limited to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence. The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony but embraces as
well as the furnishing of evidence by other means than by the word of mouth, the divulging in short of any
fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.

Inapplicability of the right against self-incrimination to juridical persons


It is not available to juridical persons as ―it would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state having
chartered a
corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these
franchises had been employed, and whether they have been abused, and demand the production of the
corporate books and papers for that purpose.‖ (Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v. PCG,
GR. No.
75885, May 27, 1987)

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION?


> The right cannot be invoked when the State has the rights to inspect documents under its police
power, such as documents of corporations.

SUPPOSE THAT X WAS A WITNESS IN A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING. THE COUNSE


L ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS WHEREABOUTS DURING A CERTAIN DATE. X WAS
ACTUALLY TOGETHER WITH A WOMAN IN A
Page 120 of 178
MOTEL DURING THAT DATE. REVEALING HIS WHEREABOUTS WOULD
RESULT TO A DOMESTIC TURBULENCE. CAN X RIGHTFULLY INVOKE HIS RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION?
> X cannot invoke the right. He can only invoke the right if there is
only a possibility of criminal prosecution but not in cases of possible embarrassment.

SUPPOSE X WAS A WITNESS ASKED ABOUT BEING CHARGED WITH


PERJURY TWO YEARS AGO. HE INVOKES HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION. CAN THIS BE TAKEN AGAINST HIM?
> It depends. If in the prior charge of perjury against him, the case has already been terminated through
his acquittal, conviction, or dismissal of the complaint, he couldn't invoke the right anymore.
But if it is the case that he could still be charged with this past criminality, then he could invoke
said right.

Q: In cases where a constitutional issue is involved it is always a balancing of interest of the state
and an individual. Insofar as issues involving right against self incrimination it is a conflicting
interest of the state to penalize the violation of laws. It is the interest of the accused to keep to
himself an information that may incriminate him. Does that meaning given this conflicting
interest, there is no way the state can compel a person to incriminate himself?
A: No, by granting immunity of the State to the person.

Used-and-derivative-use Immunity
A witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used
against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
* Only prevents the prosecution from using the witness' own testimony, or any evidence derived from
the testimony, against him. However, should the prosecutor acquire evidence substantiating the supposed
crime— independent of the witness's testimony—the witness may then be prosecuted for the same.
* Does not protect the witness quite as much, because here the witness is only protected from future
prosecution based on exactly what he or she says on the witness stand, and not from any evidence the
prosecutor finds to
substantiate the witness‘ crime.

Transactional Immunity
A witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
(Mapa v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994)
* Completely protects the witness from future prosecution for crimes related to his or her testimony.
* Gives the witness the most protection from prosecution because that witness can never be prosecuted in
the future for any crimes related to his or her testimony.
*Also known as blanket or total immunity.

Q. What "persons" are protected by the self-incrimination clause?


A. Only natural persons. Thus, a corporation may be compelled to submit to the visitorial powers of the
State even if this will result in disclosure of criminal acts of the corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).

Q. May a corporate officer prevent the production of corporate papers on the ground that they
may incriminate him personally?
Page 121 of 178
A. No. That would not be self-incrimination but incrimination by the corporation. Hale v. Henkel, supra.

Q. Petitioner was a defendant in a civil case for the annulment of the provincial budget, the
reimbursement of disbursements already made, and the payment of damages in the amount
equivalent to the amount already disbursed. When petitioner was called by the plaintiff to be a
witness in
the annulment case, petitioner objected on the ground of self-incrimination. The judge, however,
ruled that since the case was civil in character, the time to raise the right against self-
incrimination was
when the incriminating questions were asked and not before. Decide.
A. This is a civil case; the petitioner must wait until the incriminating question is asked. Bagadiong v.
Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906 (December 28,1979).

US vs Tan Teng
The prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The prohibition contained in the Philippine
Bill (sec. 5) that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.

Villaflor vs Summers
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in England in
early days is a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised against odious
inquisitional methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the
ever present temptation to commit the crime of perjury. The principle was taken into the American
Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as States was
brought to the Philippine Islands, in exactly as wide — but no wider — a scope as it existed in old English
days
The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination.

Beltran vs Samson
IN the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or hand, or fingers; writing is not
purely mechanical act; it requires the application of intelligence and attention; writing means for the
petitioner here to furnish, through a testimonial act, evidence against himself.

Chavez vs CA
CONCEPT OF COMPULSION. — Compulsion as it is understood does not necessarily connote the use
of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his
will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would
in our
opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant."
WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; MEANING;
REQUIREMENTS OF WAIVER. — "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and
intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver follows only where liberty of choice has been
fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and

Page 122 of 178


uncertain evidence. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege.

People vs Gallarde
The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act,
is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners


APPLICABILITY THEREOF IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. — Where petitioner was the
respondent in the malpractice charge filed against him with the Board of Medical Examiners, the said
Board cannot compel him to take the witness stand as a witness for the complainants. The principle
against self-incrimination is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the
privilege
to practice the medical profession.

Mapa vs Sandiganbayan
Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to
testify despite his plea of the right against selfincrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use-derivative-use
immunity, a heretofore discussed. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from
government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it — the surrender of their
precious right to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right against self-incrimination and
the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to erode the force
of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The
government has a right to
solve crimes but it must do it, rightly.

Page 123 of 178


INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Art. III, Sec. 18
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted.

Involuntary servitude
Condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for
another,
whether he is paid or not.

GR: No involuntary servitude shall exist.


XPNs: (P-S-E-C-O-M)
1. Punishment for a crime for which the party has been duly convicted
2. Personal military or civil service in the interest of national defense
3. In naval enlistment, a person who enlists in a merchant ship may be compelled to remain in service
until the end of a voyage
4. Posse comitatusor the conscription of able-bodied men for the apprehension of criminals
5. Return to work order issued by the DOLE Secretary or the President
6. Minors under patria potestas are obliged to obey their parents

Q: Under Sec. 18 Art. 3 is a constitutional guarantee is more specific in political beliefs and
aspirations. Supposing a person believes that all governments are evil because it restricts the full
liberty an individual. In order to attain his belief, he is urging people to arms against government.
Can that person be prosecuted to inciting rebellion?
A: If such belief would be allowed then it would disturb the peace and would be detrimental to the public
and to the State.

Q: What are two aspects of involuntary servitude?


A:1)Compulsion to perform or work in consideration of debt against his will
2)concept of slavery

Q: Like in the case of Caunca v. Salazar it is a case wherein a habeas corpus was filed by a house
helper who was being detained and required to render domestic services in payment for the
money advanced for her transportation from the province. Is this allowed?
A: No. A person cannot be compelled to work against his will in payment of a debt.

Q: What are the two (2) types of involuntary servitude?


ANS –
1. SLAVERY – that civil relation in which one man has absolute control or power over the life, fortune,
and liberty of another.
2. PEONAGE – a condition of enforced servitude by which the individual is restrained of his liberty and
compelled to labor in liquidation of home debt or obligation, real or pretended, against his will.

Political Prisoners
If the petitioners are political prisoners subject to the civil jurisdiction of ordinary courts of justice if they
are to be prosecuted at all, the army has no jurisdiction, nor power, nor authority, from all legal
Page 124 of 178
standpoints, to continue holding them in restraint. They are entitled, as a matter of fundamental right, to
be immediately released, any allegation as to whether the war was ended or not. [Raquiza v. Bradford (1945)]

Sec. 19 of CA No. 682 authorizes that the political prisoners in question "may be released on bail, even
prior to the presentation of the corresponding information," and this may be done "existing provisions of
law to the contrary notwithstanding." We must assume that the discretion granted must be construed in
the sense that the same may be exercised in cases wherein it was not heretofore granted by law. And it is
reasonable to assume that the discretion granted is to the effect that the People's Court may exercise
jurisdiction to order the release on bail of political prisoners "even prior to the presentation of the
corresponding information." [Duran v. Abad Santos (1945)]

Philippine Refining Company Worker’s Union vs Philippine Refining Co.


Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 does not offend against the constitutional inhibition
proscribing involuntary servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment after said law went
into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among
which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the
employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or
arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee,
tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the court after
hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return
to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or
when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled. . . ." (Italics supplied.) The
voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment — he has a free choice
between entering into it or not — with such an implied condition, negatives
the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.

In Re: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Segifredo Aclaracion


POWER TO COMPEL TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES IN AID OF ITS
APPELLATE JURISDICTION. — An appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to
transcribe his stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and
is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction
and essential to the due administration of justice
THE SAME DOES NOT CONSTITUTE INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. — Compelling a court
stenographer who had ceased to work with the court, to transcribe his stenographic notes does not
constitute involuntary servitude. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory
service of one to another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment
and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not.

Page 125 of 178


PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT
Art. III, Sec. 19. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law.

Coverage
It has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form
or
character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like.
Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. It takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.
NOTE: The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual.
(Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014)

Cruel and Inhuman penalty


A penalty is cruel and inhuman if it involves torture or lingering suffering (example: being drawn and
quartered).

Degrading penalty
A penalty is degrading if it exposes a person to public humiliation (example: being tarred and feathered, then
paraded throughout town).

Q: What are the prohibited punishments?


A: Excessive fines, cruel, degrading, inhuman punishment

Q: Does the constitution prohibit excessive punishment?


A: This is the issue in the case of People v. Estoista, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
excessiveness of the penalty shall not refer to the duration but to the method or mechanism of imposing
the penalty. Not the term but the method. Excessive penalty is not prohibited.

Q: What is the obligation of the court whenever the court feels that the penalty imposed by law is
excessive?
A: The Court can give the copy of the decision be furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of Justice,
with the recommendation that the imprisonment imposed be lowered.

Q: Is death penalty or death by lethal injection a cruel punishment?


A: No. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice is that the cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment
not necessary the suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

Q: Does the constitution prohibit unusual punishment?


Page 126 of 178
A: No. It may impose new punishment as long as long it is not cruel, degrading, inhuman.

Q: Does the 1987 constitution prohibit death penalty?


A: Only a limitation on the imposition of death penalty

Q: In the cases of People v. Valeriano and People v. Mapalo, we have learned that a person who
without justifiable reason fails to appear during trial may be tried in absentia. What if the accused
is convicted of a crime with a penalty of death? Does it mean that he waived his right to appeal?
A: No it is not waivable. The Supreme Court will have an automatic review of the judgment.
NOTE : The role of the trial court only acts as a commissioner and all judgment of trial court are merely
recommendations. Which needs the approval of the Supreme court in order to attain the character of
finality.

Q. When is a penalty "cruel, degrading or inhuman?"


A. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not
make it
cruel and unusual." Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under thS ban, the punishment
must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community," People v. Estoistaf 93 Phil. 647 (1953) or when they involve
torture or lingering death. People v. Puda, 133 SCRA 1 (October 31,1984). The following may be used as
guides for determining whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual:"
(1)A punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.
(2) It must not be applied arbitrarily.
(3) It must not be unacceptable to contemporary society.
(4) It must not be excessive,

Q. Why did the new Constitution abolish the death penalty?


A. SOT various reasons:
(1) it inflicts traumatic pain not just on the convict but also on the family, even if the penalty is not carried
out;
(2) there is no convincing evidence that it acts effectively as a deterrent of serious
crime;
(3) penology favors reformative rather than vindictive penalties;
(4) life is too precious a gift to be placed at the discretion of a human judge;
(5) the law itself, by imposing so many safeguards before a death penalty is carried out, manifests a
reluctance to impose the death penalty.

Q. What happens to death penalty already imposed?


A. It is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Q. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its
mavimiim period to death. In effect this penalty consisted of three grades: (1) reclusion temporal in its
maximum, (2) reclusion perpetua, (3) death. What is the effect of Section 19(1) on this?
A. The effect is that the penalty is reduced to only two grades, 1 and 2. This conclusion is reached on the
reasoning that the language of the provision does not abolish the death penalty but merely prohibits ,$he
imposition of death. (This conclusion was first reached in People J$: Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327.

Page 127 of 178


NOTE: The court however departed from this in People v. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113 and People v. Atencio,
156 SCRA 242, and People v. Intino, G.R. No. 69934, September 26,1988, which divided the remaining two
grades into three new grades.) People v. Munoz, G.R. No. 38968-70, February 9,1989; People v.dela Cruz, 216
SCRA 476 (1992).

Q. Now that the Constitution has abolished the death penalty, may the legislature restore it in the
future?
A. Yes, if it finds "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Conversely, Congress may also abolish
the death penalty even after it has reimposed it.

Q. Is the power of Congress to re-impose the death penalty subsumed under its plenary legislative
power?
A. No, because "it is subject to a clear showing of 'compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."' People v.
Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7,1997, 267 SCRA 682, 714.

Q. What does the constitutional exercise of the Congress' limited power to re-impose the death
penalty entail?
A. It entails the following: "
(1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
(2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly
proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description
set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penally bill be singularly motivated by 'compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes.'" People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997, 267 SCRA 682, 715.

Q. What are "heinous crimes?"


A. R.A. No. 7659 ("Death Penalty Law;" December 31, 1993) provides that crimes are heinous "for being
grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." The Court finds this definition or descriptions "to be a
sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime." People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472,
February 7, 1997, 267 SCRA 682, 715.

Q. In order for a death penalty bill to be valid must it positively be proved that death penalty is a
true deterrent and require that death penalty be the last resort?
A. No. "Nothingin [Article III, Section 19(1)] imposes a requirement that for a death penally bill to be
valid, a positive manifestation in the form of higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically
proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the
death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate
criminality in society." People v. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7,1997, 267 SCRA 682, 725.

Q. Are there instances when the death penalty will not be imposed?

Page 128 of 178


A. Yes. Art. 47 of the Revised Penal Code says: "The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it
must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at
the
time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy (70) years of age or when upon appeal or
automatic review of the case bv the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the
imposition of the death penalty shall be reclusion perpetual People v. Roque, G.R. No. 130659 & 144002,
August 14, 2002 and People v.
Purazo, G.R. No. 133189, May 5, 2003 used this provision as occasion for reducing the penalty to reclusion
perpetua.

Q. Is the death penalty "cruel and unusual?"


A. The old (1973) Philippine Constitution, by recognizing the death penalty, in that it made the imposition
of the death penalty automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court, Art. X, Section 5, implicitly admitted
that per se it is not cruel and unusual. See People v. Villctnueva, 128 SCRA 488 (April 2, 1984). Similarly, the
new Constitution, by allowing the possibility of its restoration, implicitly admits that it need not be cruel
and inhuman. However, the circumstances under which a specific law may allow the death penalty may
make it cruel and unusual under such
law.

Q. Is death by legal injection cruel and unusual punishment?


A. No. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. Punishment is so if it involves torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

Q. Does the death penalty violate international law under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights?
A. Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6(2) of the
Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject
to the limitation that it be imposed for the 'most serious crimes.' Pursuant to Article 28 of the Covenant, a
Human Rights Committee was established and under Article 40 of the Covenant, States Parties to the
Covenant are required to submit an initial report to the Committee on the measures they have adopted
which give effect to the rights recognized within the Covenant and on the progress made on the
enjoyment of those rights within one year of
its entry into force for the State Party concerned and thereafter, after five years. On July 27,1982, the
Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating
that '(while) it follows from Article 6(2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty
totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish it for other than the 'most serious
crimes.'
The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15,1989. The
Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document. Evidently, petitioner's assertion of our obligation
under the Second Optional
Protocol is misplaced." People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29,2000.

Q. Does the death penalty violate equal protection since it is most often used against the poor?

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A. This statement is too sweeping to merit further serious consideration. Anyone, regardless of his
economic status in life, may commit a crime. While there may be perceived imbalances in the imposition
of penalties, there are adequate safeguards in the Constitution, the law, and procedural rules to ensure due
process and equal protection of the law

Q. What is the duty of the judge when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense?
A. He must not immediately impose the penalty but must first look into the
evidence to see if death is the proper penalty. People v. Vinuya, G.R. No.
125925, January 28,1999.
NOTE: Review of death sentences first by the Court of Appeals and next by the Supreme Court is now
automatic and mandatory. It may not be waived by the court or by the accused. People v. Lagua, G.R. No.
170565, January 31, 2006; People v. Flores, G.R. No. 170565, January 31, 2006.
(But review of reclusion perpetua may be waived.) Rep. Act No. 9346 now disallows imposition of the death
penalty.

Q. When is a fine "excessive?"


A. It is excessive when under any circumstance it is disproportionate to the offense.

Q. Petitioner claims that under his conviction on twelve counts he would be made to serve 92
years, a cruel and unusual punishment. Decide.
A. Nonsense. By Article 70(4) R.P.C., petitioner would not be made to serve more than three times the
most severe penalty.

Q. If a court finds a punishment attached to a law cruel, degrading or inhuman, or a fine


excessive, may a person be convicted under such law?
A. No. Without a valid penalty, the law is not a penal law.

People Vs Estoista
RULE AUTHORIZING DISMISSAL OF APPEAL WHEN APPELLANT JUMPS BAIL, NOT
APPLIED WHERE DEATH PENALTY WAS IMPOSED No litigant can repudiate this power which is
bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure
the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in
crimes that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.

People vs Esparas
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against in�iction of cruel and unusual
punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment, confinement from
5 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent
conditions which the law proposes to curb.

Echagaray vs SOJ
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT; DEATH
PER SE, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN. — The death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, this Court held
that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution .It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."
Page 130 of 178
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION, CONSTITUTIONAL; INFLICTION OF PAIN, MERELY
INCIDENTAL. — Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely in carrying out the execution of the
death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional prescription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain of suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishment are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,
not the necessary suffering involved in
any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT


Art. III, Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

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Debt
Any civil obligation arising from contract.

Poll tax
A specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain class without regard to property or
occupation
(e.g. Community tax).
NOTE: A tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law. Hence, its non-payment maybe validly
punished with imprisonment. Only poll tax is covered by the constitutional provision.

If an accused fails to pay the fines imposed upon him, this may result in his subsidiary imprisonment
because
his liability is ex delicto and not ex contractu.
Generally, a debtor cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt. However, if he contracted his debt
through
fraud, he can be validly punished in a criminal action as his responsibility arises not from the contract of
loan but
from commission of a crime. (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, Dec.18, 1986)

Q: Why does the constitution protects a faulting debtor by guaranteeing him that he will not be
subjected to imprisonment?
A: This provision is one of the social justice provisions. The inability of the person to pay is due to his
dismal contractual condition. In short the Constitution presumes good faith in part of the debtor.

Q: What does debt mean?


A: Civil obligation arising from contract, expressed or implied.

Q: What is the reason for the protection in Section 20?


ANS – The protection in non-imprisonment for debt and non –payment of poll tax is simply to promote
social justice. The presumption in dire financial condition is that not all debtors are in good faith.

Q: What is capias ad satisfaciendum?

This is a writ of execution which a party may issue after having recovered judgment against another in
certain actions at law. This post judgment writ commands the sheriff to imprison the defendant until the
judgment is satisfied. The effect of the writ is to deprive a person of his liberty until the award is satisfied.

Q: Under R.A. 9262, a man is under to support his wife and children. If he fails to provide support
to his family, the man can be convicted for violation of financial violence and violation of this law
can make the person imprisoned. Is the law unconstitutional?
A: No. In the case of Lozano v. Martinez, the Supreme Court ruled that the debt intended to be covered
by the constitutional guarantee are liabilities arising from ex contractu. Since this is an obligation arising
from law, the failure of the father to pay financial obligation may result in imprisonment.

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Q: In the case of Lozano v. Martinez petitioner contends that B.P.22 is unconstitutional because
it imposes the penalty of imprisonment of the failure of the drawer to pay the face value of the
check. Did the Supreme Court agree?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not the non payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation the law
punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.

Q: Supposing A is the drawer and B is the payee. A issued a check in payment for services
rendered by B. At the time a issued the check, he already knows that his checking account is
closed and when B will present the check for encashment, A knows that it will bounce or
dishonored. B deposited the check; the drawee bank dishonored the check. Under BP22 the payee
has the obligation to notify the drawer that his check bounce and the drawer is given 5 days to
make good of the face value of the check, otherwise he becomes criminally liable. So in the
example given, supposing b notified A that his check bounced, and A pays the check within 5
days, is he criminally liable?
A: If A does not issue a check he may not be criminally liable under an obligation based on contract. Since
he issues the check, he is subjected to the rules of bp 22, he has to make sure that it is sufficiently funded
on the date of due otherwise he runs the risk of being imprisoned.

Q: Under the law, the drawer has 5 days form notice of dishonor to pay the check. Is the
obligation of the drawer to pay the face value of the check arises from same obligation which is
the contract?
A: It is already an obligation arising from law which is BP 22.

Supposing A and B again, A is expecting a money from a business partner and issued the check
expecting that it will be funded when it becomes due. Unfortunately, the money did not arrive. So
when B deposited the check, it was dishonored. At the time A receives the notice of dishonor; he
exhausted all efforts to make the face value of the check but unfortunately failed to produce as
such. Is he criminally liable?
A: Yes. The obligation now is arising from law, which is not protected by this constitutional guarantee.

Serafin vs Lindayag
In admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the
complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly
baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to
perform his duties properly - which in this instance was to dismiss the complaint outright since it is
elementary that non-payment of an
indebtedness is not a criminal act, much less estafa; and that no one may be criminally charged and
punished for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.

Lozano vs Martinez
SHALL NOT ARISE WHEN PAYMENT IS MADE WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF
DISHONOR. — To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such
presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the
maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount
of the check.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Page 133 of 178
Art. III, Sec. 21.No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Q: What is Double Jeopardy?


A: When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or
in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same
or identical offense.

Q: Why does the constitution prohibits double jeopardy?


A: No one is tried twice . Under the common law principle of Ne bis in idem which means that not twice
in the same.

Q: What are the two kinds of double jeopardy?


A: 1) No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense(Double jeopardy for
the punishment of the same offense)
2)The act is punished by law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. ( Double jeopardy for the punishment of the same act)

Q: So far as the Double jeopardy for the punishment of the same act, the Supreme Court said in
the case of People v. Relova, the determining factor is the identity of the act. How can we
determine the same act which gives rise to two or more offenses are covered by constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy?
A: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or
have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have
given rise to the offense charged under the statute. (same criminal design)

Q. When does jeopardy of punishment attach?


A. Jeopardy attaches (a) upon a good indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d)
after plea. People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933).

Termination of Jeopardy
(1) By acquittal
(2) By final conviction
(3) By dismissal without express consent of accused
(4) By ―dismissal‖ on the merits

Q: What are the elements of double jeopardy in punishment of the same offense according to the
case of People v. Tampal?
A:1)A first jeopardy must have attached prior to second
It is attached upon valid complaint of information sufficient in form and substance sufficient to sustain
conviction and that it was file before a competent court 2)The first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated
There must be acquittal, conviction or dismissal
3)A second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first

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REQUISITES OF LEGAL JEOPARDY
(1) Court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) A Complaint/Information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(3) Arraignment and plea by the accused;
(4) Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of the case without the express consent, of the accused. [Rule 117,
Sec. 7]

Rationale behind the right


To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy for being punished for the
crime of
which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal
cases, the
full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the
accused for
the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained
and
repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to
fight. (Lejano v. People, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864, Dec. 14, 2010)

When Subsequent Prosecution Is Barred


(1) Same offense
(2) Attempt of the same offense
(3) Frustration of the same offense
(4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense (All the elements of the 2nd constitute some of the
elements of the 1st offense)
(5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense (All the elements of the 1st constitute some of the
elements of the 2nd offense)

Exceptions:
(1) The graver offense developed due to "supervening facts" arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge.
(2) The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the
former complaint or information.
(3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and the offended
party.

Valid Complaint or Information- an indictment is sufficient in form and substance if


a) It is in writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines
b) It is subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated
c) It complies with the elements of sufficiency of Complaint or Information, as provided in sec 6,
Rule 100 of the New Rules of Court

Q: Bestfriends A and B wanted to ensure they’ll win the case. the public prosecutor saying that I
have a best friend judge who sits in branch 1 of MTC, under the law the crime of concubinage are
cognizable by RTC, but A and B want to initiate the proceedings in the MTC in order to ensure
the victory of A. The complaint was initiated before MTC. Because of lack of evidence, the MTC
dismissed and acquitted D and C. Can A and B initiate a second complaint before RTC?
Page 135 of 178
A: Although the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case, A and B being estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the court because A and B knew that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case but
induced it to have a jurisdiction; hence they are barred from an appeal under the principle of estoppel.

Q: Supposing A is being indicted for homicide , he pleaded guilty for the offense charged and
when asked by the court if he is going to present any mitigating circumstances to which he said
yes. He produced an evidence of self defense; because of this the court acquitted him. Can the
judgment of acquittal be appealed in the appellate court?
A: In the case of People v. Balisacan, a new of plea of not guilty must be entered for him but it was not
done. It follows the effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its
acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to appeal herein.

When Defense of Double Jeopardy Is Available


(1) Dismissal based on insufficiency of evidence;
(2) Dismissal because of denial of right to speedy trial;
(3) Accused is discharged to be a state witness.

When the State Can Challenge the Acquittal of the Accused or the Imposition of a Lower Penalty
by a Trial Court
(1) Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to
a deprivation of due process;
(2) Where there is a finding of mistrial;
(3) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion. [Villareal v. People (2012)]

Double jeopardy provides three related protections:


(1) Against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
(2) Against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
(3) Against multiple punishments for the same offense. [People v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 1379-58, April 11,
2002]

Q: Is dismissal based on the right to speedy trial is dismissal on the merits?


A: Yes. The dismissal of a criminal case upon option of the accused because the prosecution was not
prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal
equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.
(Esmena v. Pogoy)

Q: What is the presumption why prosecution delays a trial?


A: They do not have evidence. They only fish for evidence.

Q: Punishment of the same offense presupposes that there are two charges against a complaint
based on the same offense that is the presumption when double jeopardy for the same act
becomes operative. Can double jeopardy of the same offense apply even if there is only one
charged? Supposing A is indicted for homicide and after the trial of the merits, prosecution failed
to present sufficient evidence to convict A. Can the prosecution appeal the judgment of acquittal?
A: No. The accused has the right of repose. The prosecution is barred from appealing judgment of
acquittals, the accused is entitled to rest. Therefore he may not be continuously or successively prosecuted

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by the State for the hope that the fate of the accused in the appellate court may be overturned. (Lejano v.
People)

Q: Can a person convicted by a court-martial be prosecuted again in the civil court?


A: NO. A person convicted by a court-martial cannot, for the same offense, be prosecuted again in the
civil court. A court martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is criminal, not
administrative; thus it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant
for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in double jeopardy. (Marcos v. Chief of Staff,
G.R. No. L-4663, May 30, 1951)

Grant of demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal


The general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer
to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The
verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

DISMISSAL WITH CONSENT OF ACCUSED


Rule 117, Sec. 8, par. 1. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with
the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
Exceptions: (1) insufficiency of evidence or (2) denial of his right to double jeopardy

When the case is dismissed other than on the merits, upon motion of the accused personally, or through
counsel, such dismissal is regarded as ―with express consent of the accused‖, who is therefore deemed to
have waived the right to plea double jeopardy.

The appeal of an accused operates as a waiver of his right against double jeopardy
When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard
against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon
to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant." In
other words, when appellant appealed the RTC‘s judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to have
abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate
court
to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment. Thus, appellant could not have been placed
twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with
homicide as
charged in the Information instead of murder. (People v. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, Sept. 22, 2014)

Motion for Reconsideration


At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may on motion of the accused, or
on its
own instance with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. (Rule 121, Sec. 1 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
NOTE: A motion for reconsideration is a motion generally filed by the accused whereby he seeks the
Page 137 of 178
modification of the conclusions of the court in the judgment of conviction on the basis of what is already
on
record. It does not call for the introduction of evidence unlike in new trial.

Appeal
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
(Rule 122, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)
NOTE: The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and
the CA is
solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting
on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

Q: Can a motion of reconsideration (same court will review its decision) be filed in order to review
its decision of acquittal?
A: Not allowed because of the right of final acquittal rule or right of repose.

Q: Supposing the judge before whom the case is filed was administratively charged for rendering
partial decisions, gross partiality and gross ignorance of the law. It was filed in the Supreme Court
, after trial the SC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. What the complainant did filed a
criminal complaint based on the same act or omission. Can the respondent judge invoke double
jeopardy?
A: No. Supreme Court ruled in the case of Icasiano v. Sandiganbayan, that double jeopardy does not
attach when the first action is administrative in nature. It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to
hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the SC case was
administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case is criminal in nature.

Q: Supposing after the filing of the criminal complaint after the dismissal of the administrative
complaint, the criminal complaint was also dismissed by the ombudsman for lack of merit. The
complainant initiated a second criminal complaint based on the same act or omission against the
respondent judge. Can he claim now double jeopardy?
A: No. double jeopardy does not attach in preliminary investigation. There is no arraignment so therefore
there is no first jeopardy that is attached.

Q: Supposing, A was indicted for killing B and after arraignment, A pleaded not guilty. After the
arraignment of A, second criminal information was initiated by the public prosecutor for killing B.
Can A claim double jeopardy?
A: No. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of People v. Pineda, the mere filing of two information
charging the same offense is not and appropriate basis for invocation of double jeopardy since the first
jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the
consent of the accused.

Q: Supposing upon the filing of the first information was for slight physical injuries, after the
filing of the criminal complaint the accused pleaded not guilty the prosecution noted that the
injury marks a deformity because of this discovery, the prosecution filed a second information
based on this act or omission for grave physical injuries. Is there double jeopardy?

Page 138 of 178


A: The ruling of Supreme Court in the case of People v. Adil, that the rule of identity does not apply,
however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple
reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted
of an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, were the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.

Q: Why not apply Pineda doctrine instead of doctrine of supervening event in the aforementioned
case?
Atty. Gabriel: The Sc applied the doctrine of supervening event in the cases of Melo and Adil but these are
the wrong application, the SC should invoked the Melo doctrine. Under rule 120 of the revised rules of
court, the doctrine of supervening event can be applied when the accused was convicted for the lesser
offense.

Q: What is the same evidence rule in the case of People v. Adil?


A: The offense 1 is considered as the same as to the offense 2 under the same evidence test if the evidence
is necessary to convict the accused in the first offense for the conviction of the accused to the second
offense. But the Supreme Court ruled in Adil that the same evidence test is not sufficient to under the first
jeopardy, because double jeopardy for the same offense is not only applicable to similar offense but also
covers offenses considered as an attempt or frustration or included or includes in the former complaint or
information.

Same offense
Q. When is the second offense charged the same as the first offense?
A- In order to determine whether the two charges are identical one test used is what is sometimes referred
to as "the same evidence test:" Whether the evidence needed in the one case will support a conviction in
the
other. E.g., U.S. v. Tan Oco, 34 Phil. 772, 783 (1916). Commentators note that this test was found to be
correct only in a general sense arid, hence, the Rules of Court have spelled it out more in detail in Section
9 of Rule
117.
The test now is whether one offense is identical with the other or whether it is an attempt or frustration of
the other or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other.
What this test shows is that identity of offenses does not require one-to-one correspondence between the
facts and law involved in the two charges. It is necessary, however, that one offense is completely included
in the other. Thus, while physical injury is not identical with attempted homicide, for purposes of double
jeopardy physical injury is "the same" as attempted homicide (which alleges inflicted injury) because
physical injury is necessarily included in such attempted homicide.

Q. What is the rule on "supervening facts?"


A. This is another exception to the requirements of sameness of offense. In Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766
(1950), Chief Justice Moran said that the rule for the determination of identity of offenses "did not apply . .
. when the
second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
a case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that
was then inexistent." Id. at 769. "[W]here after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and together with the facts

Page 139 of 178


existing at the time, constitute a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." Id. at 769-70 citing 15 AM.JUR. 66. People v. Buling, L-13315,
April 27,
1960, however, added the qualification that where the exact nature of the injury could have been
discovered, but was not, because of the incompetence of the physician, the subsequent discovery of the
real extent of the injury would not be a supervening fact which could warrant the application of the Melo
doctrine.

Tests in determining the identity of the offenses for the purpose of applying the rule on double
jeopardy
1. Same offense test – Whether the offense charged in the first information is the same offense in the
second charge, or whether the second offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
2. Same evidence test – Whether the facts alleged in the second information, if proved, would have been
sufficient to sustain the former information, or from which the accused may have been acquitted or
convicted.

Identity Rule
GR: There is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the
first, but also when the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the first offense or an attempt
or frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information.
XPNs:
1. The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge [Sec. 7(a), Rule 117];
2. The facts constituting the graver offense became known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information [Sec. 7(b), Rule 117];
3. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and the
offended party. [Sec. 7 (c), Rule 117]

XPN to the XPN: The plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made with the conformity of the prosecutor
alone because of the failure of the offended party to appear at the arraignment despite due notice. [Sec. 1(f),
Rule 116]
NOTE: In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. (Sec. 7, Rule
117)

The rule of identity does not also apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution for the simple reason that in such case, there is no possibility for the accused, during the
first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. (Melo v. People, G.R. No. L–3580,
March 22, 1950)

Doctrine of Supervening Fact


Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and
distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy, if indicted for the new offense.
(People v. City Court of Manila, G.R. No. L-36342, April 27, 1983)

Double jeopardy in quasi offenses


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The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. Whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense remains one and the same.

Dismissal vs. Acquittal


Acquittal
Dismissal
Does not decide on Always based on the
the merits, does not merits. Defendant is
determine the acquitted because
defendant‘s guilt or guilt was not proven
innocence. beyond reasonable
doubt.
Double jeopardy Double jeopardy
does not always always attaches.
attach.

Instances where dismissal of the case is tantamount to an acquittal


1. Dismissal based on insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution (demurrer to evidence); and
2. Dismissal due to violation of right to speedy trial (even if dismissal was upon motion of the accused or
with his express consent).

Rule on provisional dismissal of a case


GR: Where the case was dismissed provisionally with the consent of the accused, he cannot invoke double
jeopardy in another prosecution therefor or where the case was reinstated on a motion for reconsideration
by the prosecution.
XPNs: The dismissal amounts to an acquittal even if the dismissal was ordered at the instance of the
defendant if it is based on:
1. Lack or insufficiency of evidence;
2. If the same was predicated upon the violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, hence, even if
the accused gave his express consent to such dismissal or moved for dismissal, such consent would be
immaterial as such dismissal is actually an acquittal; and
3. There is variance between the proof and the allegations in the complaint or information.

Philippine Savings Bank vs Bermoy


The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in
two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been
convicted or acquitted of such offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case.
19 The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court 20 which provides that "[a]ny party may
appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for
insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the
Constitution 21 and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry
into the merits of the dismissal.

People vs Obsania

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REQUIREMENTS OF WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL. — Application of the two sister doctrines of
waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced
by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits
and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.

Paulin vs Gimenez
Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he is deemed to
have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon
motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach. This doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy
was examined and formally introduced in People v. Salico (84 Phil. 722 [19491), where Justice Felicisimo
Feria stated: ". . . when the case is dismissed, with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will
not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the
court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him."
INSTANCES WHERE DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACHES ALTHOUGH DISMISSAL WAS MADE
ON MOTION OF ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. — Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when
the dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made
on motion of the accused himself, to wit: 1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and
operates as an acquittal. 2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the
denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. (Caes v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54
[1989] at pp. 60-61.) Petitioners' motion to dismiss premised on procedural grounds cannot be considered
a demurrer to evidence nor was the dismissal sought by them predicated on the denial of their right to
speedy trial. Hence, the exceptions mentioned find no application in the instant case, especially so because
when the municipal trial court dismissed the case upon petitioners' motion, the prosecution still had to
present several witnesses.

Icasiano vs Sandiganbayan
DOUBLE JEOPARDY; PRINCIPLE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE ONE IS ADMINISTRATIVE
AND THE OTHER IS CRIMINAL. — It is correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy
does not apply in the present controversy because the Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner)
was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in
nature.
Lejano vs People
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime
of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal
cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute
the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State
for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources,
stamina, and the will to fight.

People vs Balicasan
In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he
testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-
defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead anew on the charge, or at
least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect
there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can
be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Page 142 of 178
People vs City Court of Silay
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was a
motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.

Esmena vs Pogoy
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL IN CASE AT BAR PLACES PETITIONERS IN JEOPARDY SINCE
FACT OF ACCUSED'S CONSENT THERETO IS NOT CLEAR. — On this case, the provisional
dismissal of the criminal case against petitioners has placed them in jeopardy, because it is not very clear
that they consented to such dismissal. The petitioners were insisting on a trial, They relied on their
constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not in court. Respondent judge on his own
volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the
provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy.

People vs Pineda
THERE IS NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY. — Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the
same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has
not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the
accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586 [1982]; Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 8 [1990]). . . .
Moreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous case for
estafa. Thus, there is that other
missing link, so to speak, in the case at bar which was precisely the same reason utilized by Justice Davide,
Jr. in Lamera vs. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 186 [1991]) when he brushed aside the claim of double
jeopardy of the accused therein who was arraigned in the previous case only after the judgment of
conviction was promulgated in the other case.

People vs Tampa
RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CANNOT BE INVOKED IN CASE RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL HAS NOT BEEN VIOLATED BY THE STATE. — It is true that in an unbroken line
of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an
acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed,
however, that these dismissals were
predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at
bench considering that the right of the private respondents to a speedy trial has not been violated by the
State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.

Melo vs People
SECOND OFFENSE NOT IN EXISTENCE; RULE OF IDENTITY OF OFFENSE DOES NOT
APPLY. — The rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at
the time first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the
accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

People vs Adil

Page 143 of 178


Indeed, when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in
which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or
consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had
already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity
became apparent.

People vs Relova
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a
municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the
acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two
offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.

EX-POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER


Page 144 of 178
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

An ex post facto law is any law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
(United State v. Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde, G.R. No. L-18208, Feb. 14, 1922)

Kinds of ex post facto law


It can be a law that:
1. Makes an act, which was innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action
2. Aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant
5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only. In effect imposes penalty or deprivation of
a right for something which when done was lawful
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan and People, Jan. 30, 1982)

Q: What are the three (3)CHARACTERISTICS of Ex post facto laws?


(i) It refers to criminal matters;
(ii) It is retroactive in application; and
(iii) It works to the prejudice of the accused.

Q. Does the ex post facto clause prohibit all retrospective laws?


A- No. It prohibits only retrospective penal laws.

Q. When is a law a penal law?


A. A law is penal when it prescribes a criminal penalty imposable in a criminal trial. However, a law is also
a penal law if it prescribes a burden equivalent to a criminal penalty {e.g., disqualification from the practice
of a profession) even if such burden is imposed in an administrative proceeding. Pascual v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1909).

Rationale behind the prohibition


Criminal laws cannot be applied retroactively because an accused cannot be held liable for an act which at
the time of its commission was not punishable. Nulla poene sine lege (there is no crime when there is no
law punishing it)

Q: Is suspension from public office a penalty?


A: No, as it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.

Bill of attainder
A legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial, its essence being the substitution of legislative fiat
for a
judicial determination of guilt. (People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, Dec. 27, 1972)

Page 145 of 178


NOTE: It is only when a statute applies either to a named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial that it becomes a bill of
attainder.

Rationale behind the prohibition


It goes against the principle of separation of powers as the legislative usurps a judicial function which is
the determination of guilt of the accused.

Two kinds of bill of attainder


1. Bill of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the death penalty)
2. Bill of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty)

Q. A law is passed requiring every lawyer who wishes to continue the practice of law to take the
oath that he or she has not committed an act of disloyalty to the Philippine government. Valid?
A. No. This is a bill of attainder. Depriving a person of the right to practice a profession is a penalty. And
when this is imposed by the legislature without trial there is a violation of the prohibition against bills of
attainder.

Q. To be a bill of attainder prohibited by the Constitution, must the law specify by name the
person being punished?
A. No, legislative acts, "no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial are bills
of
attainder prohibited by the Constitution." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 302 (1946).

Q. What then are the essential elements of a bill of attainder?


A. (1) There must be a law;
(2) the law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily ascertainable members of a group;
(3) the penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial.

Q. Is the Anti-Subversion Law or R.A. 1700 a bill of attainder?


A. No. No one is made to suffer under this law except after conviction in a trial by a proper court. People v.
Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972).

US vs Conde
Laws adopted after the execution of a-contract, changing or altering the rate of interest, cannot be made to
apply to such contract without violating the provisions of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of
a law "impairing the obligation of contract."

Concepcion vs Garcia
The criticism directed to the statute is not well founded. Act No. 3531 is an Act dealing exclusively with
remedies and modes of procedure. Such an Act is repugnant to no constitutional provision, and its legality
is beyond question. A person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on
the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure.
Statutes making changes in the remedy or procedure are laws within the discretion of the lawmaking
power, and are valid so long as they do not deprive the accused of any substantial right, or confliict with
specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution (6 R. C. L., p. 294). Moreover, the term "ex
post facto," as applied to statutes, in section 3 of our organic law, is a technical term, used only in
Page 146 of 178
connection with crimes and penalties. The term is never used to indicate the obnoxious character of
statutes dealing retroactively with civil rights. Of course retroactive statutes dealing with civil rights may
also be unconstitutional if they impair the obligations of contracts or deprive a person of a vested right,
but this remedial Act is not subject to criticism on
this ground.

Nasi- Villar vs People


R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and gave a new definition of the crime of
illegal recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There is no indication in R.A. No. 8042 that said
law, including the penalties provided therein, would take effect retroactively. A law can never be
considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively since its strictures would cover only offenses
committed after and not before its enactment.

Salvador vs Mapa
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of
penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this
definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61
merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative
Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is,
therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders
are ex post facto.

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CITIZENSHIP
Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

Citizenship
Membership in a political community, which is personal
and more or less permanent in character.

Citizenship vs. Nationality


Citizenship -A term denoting membership of a citizen in a political society, which membership implies,
reciprocally, a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and duty of protection on the part of the state.
Nationality- It has broader meaning, embracing all who owe allegiance to a state, whether democratic or
not, without thereby becoming citizens. Because they owe allegiance to it, they are not regarded as aliens.
More of a racial or ethnic concept.

WHO ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS


1. Those who are Filipino citizens at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution:
a. Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris;
b. Those declared citizens by judicial declaration applying the jus soli principle, before Tio Tam v.
Republic, G.R. No. L-9602, April 25, 1957.
c. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law (Act 2927).
d. Those who are citizens under the 1935 Constitution.
e. Those who are citizens under the 1973 Constitution.
NOTE: The first group of Filipino citizens under Art. 4 refers to those who have been considered
by competent authority as citizens of the Philippines before the adoption of the 1987 constitution.
This is a recognition of the doctrine of res judicata under the 1987 constitution because once a
person has been declared and considered as Filipino citizen before the adoption of the 1987
constitution, under the first group of Art. 4 sec 1 they are considered as citizens of the Philippines.
So under the 1973, 1943, 1935 and even the organic laws before the 1935 constitution they are
considered citizens of the Philippines.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
NOTE: Time to elect: within 3 years from reaching the age of majority.
4. Those naturalized in accordance with law. (Sec. 1, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution)

Page 148 of 178


MODES OF ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP
1. By birth
a. Jus sanguinis – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship.
b. Jus soli – acquisition of citizenship on the basis of the place of birth.
2. By naturalization – the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born
citizen.
3. By marriage - A foreign woman marries a Filipino husband, provided, she possesses all qualifications and
none of the disqualifications for naturalization. (via derivative naturalization)
4. By repatriation- Under CA 473, is available only to specific individuals, to those filipino citizens who have
lost their Filipino citizenship.

Citizenship of a Filipino woman who married a foreigner under the 1935, 1973, 1987 Constitution
Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission
they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. (Sec. 4, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution)
A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien shall retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by
her act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have renounced her citizenship (1973 Constitution).
Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law (1935 Constitution).
In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality (Commonwealth Act 63 Sec 1(7)).
NOTE: Jus sanguinis and naturalization are the modes followed in the Philippines.

What principle was applied under the 1987 constitution?


Jus sanguinis.

Is that absolute or is there any exception to that?


Yes. Foundlings. This is just establishes a presumptive citizenship.
According to the case of Poe llamansares vs comelec as well as David vs. Senate electoral tribunal, under
international code particularly under the international covenant on civil and political rights and under the
international covenant on human rights, children whose parents are known shall be considered as citizen
of the place where they are born or found. But this is just a presumptive conferment of citizenship which
means that notwithstanding the fact that the parents are unknown, may still be considered as an alien if the
child has the features of alien. The only reason why the SC recognized the citizenship of Senator Poe is
because of the concurrence of several factors, one was the fact that she was found in the Philippines, and
based on statistical records, it is almost an absolute certainty that a child born in the Philippines at the time
of the presumptive birth of Senator Poe is of Filipino parents 99.899999. The fact of being a 1) foundling
in the Philippines, 2) statistical data and more importantly the 3) physical features which are consistent
with the features of Filipino citizen. So in order to confer Filipino citizenship whose parents are unknown
and who are presumptively born in the Philippines the three conditions must concur. But again this is an
exception rather than the general rule. The general rule is citizenship by birth can only be conferred under
the 1987 constitution by birth.

Under the previous constitutions have we ever applied the Jus soli principle in the Philippines?
According to some legal scholars, April 11, 1899 and July 1902. April 11, 1899 is the cutoff to be
considered as a filipino citizen. To be considered as a filipino citizen the person must be a Spanish subject
as of that date.

Page 149 of 178


What is the status of the child born after April 11, 1899 until July 1902 which is the effectivity of the
Philippine bill 1902?
Jus soli was applicable. Any child born from April 11, 1899 until July 1902 regardless of alien parentage is a
Filipino citizen.

How about under the 1935 constitution? Was the Jus soli principle applied?
Yes. Under the second group of the 1935 constitution, children born in the Philippines of alien parents
who before the adoption of the constitution has been elected to public office. Which means that this is a
modified jus soli principle because for a person to be considered as citizen of the Philippines, he must be
born in the Philippines but there is also a qualification he must have been elected to public office before
the adoption of the 1935 constitution. which means place of birth and the election to public office
determines the citizenship of the Philippines.

How do we call this principle on Second paragraph of section 4 of the 1935 constitution?
Caram principle

Caram rule
Under the 1935 Constitution, those born in the Philippines of foreign parent, who before the adoption of
the Constitution had been elected to public office, are considered Filipino citizens.
NOTE: The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ had seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate. (Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, Mar. 3, 2004)

Why caram principle?


Because Caram is a delegate of the 1935 constitution representing Iloilo. He was born in the Philippines.
His parents are Syrians who are subject to persecution and in order to evade persecution they migrated to
the Philippines where Dr. Caram, was born. During the 1935 constitutional convention, he ran and he was
elected.
Why do the constitutional convention need to provide for specific provision in order to
accommodate one person?
Because it was intended to cure the anomaly at that time. Because there would be an anomaly where the
constitution which is the fundamental law of the land was written by the convention with the member
who is not a Filipino citizen.

Under the second group of Filipino citizen for a child to become a Filipino citizen, is it required
that both parents are Filipino citizens?
No because the provision use the word ―or‖ which means either of the parents can transmit their Filipino
citizenship without any qualification

We go to the third group, in the case of Tecson vs Comlec the SC discuss the evolution of children
belonging to the third group. What is the difference of the treatment of this group of children
under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitution? (Filipino mother + Alien father)
1935: Children born of Filipino mother of legitimate issue are considered as not Filipino citizen. A child
must elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (21)
1973: Children born of Filipino mother regardless of filiation legitimate or illegitimate will automatically
become a filipino citizen at birth
1987: The 1987 treats the child the same as 1973 but it does not only confer Filipino citizenship over a
child of filipino mother but it also bent backward by making those who elect Filipino citizenship during
the 1935 constitution as natural-born Filipino citizen. In order to equalize the playing field.
Page 150 of 178
Supposing the child was born on January 16, 1973 his mother is filipino citizen, the father is
Chinese citizen. What is the status of the child during his minority? This is before the 1973
constitution.
Not Filipino citizen. He can only become Filipino citizen when he elects Filipino citizenship at the time he
reach the age of majority.

Are all children born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers alien fathers require to elect
filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in order to become Filipino citizens?
No under Republic vs Lim, children born of Filipino mothers, Alien Fathers during the 1935 constitution
who are illegitimate, are Filipino Citizens at birth hence they do not need to elect Filipino citizenship.
Which means that only legitimate children of Filipino mothers, Alien Fathers during the 1935 constitution
need to elect Filipino citizenship to become Filipino.

What is wisdom behind this principle?


Because the illegitimate child is under the exclusive parental authority of the mother and the presumption
is it is the mother who will provide for the support of the child. They are Filipino citizens from birth.
Supposing the child was born of Filipino Father, the mother was American. The child was born during the
1935 constitution and the child was illegitimate. Under that example, the child is American because the
mother is an American and the child is illegitimate. Is FPJ an American?
FPJ is a Filipino citizen we cannot apply the principle in Republic vs Lim because under the 1935
constitution there is no qualification as to children born of Filipino mother the constitution only say of
―Filipino mother‖ nothing more. The constitution always presumes that the term Filipino mother, the
presumption is of legitimate issue. In the case of FPJ the SC said there is no qualification legitimate or
illegitimate. This only shows how are constitutions is so accommodating.

Is there a procedure in electing Filipino citizenship?


CA 625 which provides three conditions for a valid election of Filipino citizenship
❖ Made in writing and Sworn before the officer authorized to administer oaths
❖ Register in the nearest civil registry
❖ Oath of allegiance to support and defend the laws of the Philippines

Is there any other way of electing Philippine citizenship?


In the case of Ong vs HRET there is informal election of citizenship such as what Ong did the
performance of deliberate activities which indicate election of filipino citizenship which is no less binding
than that of the formal requirements hence no need to comply with CA 625.

But in the case of In re: Ching the facts are almost the same as that of Ong vs HRET, he
performed deliberate activities such as passing the bar, run for office and wa in fact elected.
However the SC said that Respondent Ching is not a filipino citizens because he belatedly file his
affidavit. Can we not say that Petitioner ching should be considered also as filipino citizen as that
of Ong? Why the difference?
Because the father of respondent Ong was naturalized while Ong was still 9 years old and under sec 15 of
CA 473 respondent Ong who was residing at the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the father,
Ong is considered as Filipino citizenship by derivative naturalization. Hence there is no need to comply
with formal election.
Formal election is required to those who are not yet citizen of the Philippines, petitioner Ching was never
a Filipino citizenship.
Page 151 of 178
Respondent Ong was only exempted to comply with the formal requirements but there is still a
need to elect although informally. Why? Why did the SC still need to determine whether
respondent Ong has informally elected Filipino citizenship when he was already a Filipino citizen
when he was still a minor?
If respondent Ong did not informally elect Filipino citizenship, the status of the child is only naturalized
citizen, the informal election of the respondent Ong was needed in order to convert his status as a natural
born citizen. Because under par. 3 sec. 1 of Art. 4 those who elect Philippine citizenship are natural born
citizens.

When should the election be made during the 1935 constitution? when the mother is Filipino and
the father is alien?
Within reasonable time upon reaching the age of 21.

How did the SC interpret reasonable time? Is 7 years in the case of Cuenco vs Sec of justice
reasonable?
No it is unreasonable more so in the case of Ching 14 years.

Statutory formalities in selecting Philippine citizenship


1. A statement of election under oath;
2. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
3. Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
(Balgamelo Cabiling Ma v. Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010)

Registration of the act of election does not confer Filipino citizenship


It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No.
625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that
citizenship has been claimed. In other words, the actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for over half a
century by the petitioners is actual notice to the Philippine public, which is equivalent to formal
registration of the election of Philippine citizenship (Ibid.).

Registration of documents of election still allowed even beyond the time frame
It should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have been done publicly, consistently
and continuously. These acts constitute constructive registration (Ibid.).

The failure to register the election of citizenship in the civil registry will not defeat the election
and negate the permanent fact of having a Filipino mother
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship (Ibid.).

Supposing the child was born of filipino mother Chinese father under the 1935 constitution and
upon reaching the age of 21 the person declared that he is electing filipino citizenship, he
subscribed oath of allegiance but he only registered the documents 30 years after attaining the age
21, is that still a valid election? Because if 7 and 14 years is not reasonable, more so 30 years?
In Cabiling vs Fernandez the petitioner was allowed to complete the process eventhough the third
condition, the registration of the affidavit, was not complied with. Registration is not the operative fact for
the election and because in the meantime, the petitioner performed activities which are constitutive of
notice that they are electing Filipino citizenship.

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Naturalization
Act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the
privileges of a citizen.
Modes of becoming a citizen by naturalization
1. Administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139
2. Judicial naturalization pursuant to CA 473, as amended; and
3. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. (So v.
Rep., G.R. No. 170603, Jan. 29, 2007)

Qualifications for Judicial Naturalization (CA No. 473)


1. Not less than 18 years of age on the date of hearing the petition (as amended by RA 6809).
2. Resided in the Philippines for not less than 10 years; may be reduced to 5 years, if;
a. Honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the
provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof
b. Established new industry or introduced a useful invention
c. Married to a Filipino woman
d. Engaged as teacher in Philippine public or private school not established for exclusive
instruction of a particular nationality or race, or in any branches of education or industry for a
period of not less than 2 years; and
e. Born in the Philippines
3. Character
1. Good moral character
2. Believes in the Constitution
3. Conducted himself in an irreproachable conduct during his stay in the Philippines
4. Owns real estate in the Philippines not less than P5,000 in value; or has some lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation that can support himself and his family.
5. Speaks and writes English or Filipino and any principal Philippine dialects (as amended by Sec. 6
Art. XIV); and
6. Enrolled minor children in any public or private school recognized by the government where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught as part of the curriculum, during the entire period of
residence prior to hearing of petition. (18 RCOSE)

NOTE: It is not required that the citizen does not possess all the qualifications so long as he does not
labor in any of the disqualification

Disqualified from Judicial Naturalization (CA 473)


1. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons which
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments
2. Persons defending or teaching necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for
the success or predominance of their ideas
3. Polygamists or believers of polygamy
4. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease
5. Persons convicted of crime involving moral turpitude
6. Persons who, during residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or did not
evince sincere desire to learn and embrace customs, traditions and ideals of Filipinos
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof (no reciprocity)

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Procedure under CA 473
1. Declaration of Intention
NOTE: Must be done one year prior to the filing of petition for admission to Philippine
Citizenship
2. Petition for Citizenship
3. Notification and Appearance
NOTE: Publication of such petition in the Official Gazette and in one of the newspapers of
general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides
4. Hearing of the Petition
5. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization
NOTE: The petitioner shall also take an oath before the naturalization certificate is issued.
6. Record Books
7. Charging of Fees

Qualifications for Administrative Naturalization (RA 9139)


1. The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
2. The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;
3. The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the
Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as
well as with the community in which he/she is living;
4. The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or
private educational institution dully recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum
and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor
children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
5. The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she
derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of
his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but
are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
6. The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines;
and
7. The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.

Persons disqualified for Administrative naturalization (RA 9139)


1. Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
2. Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination
for the success or predominance of their ideas;
3. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
4. Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
5. Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
6. Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals
of the Filipinos;
7. Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.
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Procedure under RA 9139
1. Petition for Citizenship
2. Special Committee on Naturalization
3. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition
4. Decree of Naturalization
5. Charging of Fees

CA 473 vs. RA 9139


CA 473 RA 9319
Judicial Act Administrative act
Covers all aliens Applies only to aliens who were born in
regardless of class the Philippines and have been residing here.
Less tedious, less technical and more encouraging.
An alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139
may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473

Direct vs. Derivative Naturalization


Direct Naturalization Derivative Naturalization
Is effected: Is conferred:
1. By individual proceedings, usually judicial, under 1. On the wife of the naturalized husband
General naturalization laws 2. On the minor children of the naturalized parent
2. By specific act of the legislature, often in 3. On the alien woman upon marriage to a
favor of distinguished foreigners who have national
rendered some notable service to the local state 4. The unmarried child whether legitimate,
3. By collective change of nationality (naturalization illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age, of
en masse) as a result of cession or subjugation those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship
4. In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as upon effectivity of R.A. 9225 shall be
nationals of the State where they are born deemed citizens of the Philippines.
NOTE: Derivative naturalization does not always follow as a matter of course, for it is usually made
subject to stringent restrictions and conditions. Our own laws, for instance, provide that an alien woman
married to a Filipino shall acquire his citizenship only if she herself might be lawfully naturalized.

Who may be naturalized Filipino citizens under CA 473?


• • Resided in the Ph for a period of not less than 10 years

Before the filing of the petition is there a process mandated to allow the filing of petition?
1 year before the filing of the actual petition the petitioner must file a declaration or manifestation of his
intention to become a Filipino citizen before the OSG

Did the SC agree in People vs Dela Rosa that the requirements under CA 473 are just procedural
matters and therefore can be relaxed?
No because this requirements are jurisdictional which divest the court of any jurisdiction in the absence of
compliance with the requirements including the required allegations provided for by law

When does the decision granting the decree of naturalization final?

Page 155 of 178


The date of finality is after 30 days from receipt of the OSG granting the decree. The 2 year period refers
to executory manner of the order of naturalization. It is counted from the time the decision became final.

Why does the law required 2 years before the decree of naturalization may be executed?
❖ The court must satisfy that the petitioner did not leave the Philippines
❖ Dedicated himself continuously to a noble profession or calling
❖ Not been convicted of any offense or violation of rules
❖ Not committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to government- announced
policies

What is the condition for the wife and the minor children of the naturalized citizen may also be
deemed a Filipino citizen without performing any act? This is the issue in the case of Moy Ya
Lim Yao
The phrase who might herself be lawfully naturalized does not require that the wife to possess all the
qualification the only important condition is that the wife does not suffer any of the disqualification.

What is the rule on the minor children born in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of
the father?
They shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines

Minor children born outside the Philippines, residing outside the Philippines?
Citizen of the Philippines provided they start residing in the Philippines during their minority

Supposing during the minority they started to reside in the Philippines?


Citizens of the Philippines

Minor children born after the naturalization of the father who is residing outside the Philippines
Filipino citizen provided upon reaching the age of majority he must register in the consulate office where
he is residing otherwise he will lose his status as Filipino citizen.

Denaturalization
The process taken by a government to revoke the citizenship status of an individual.

Grounds for denaturalization


1. Naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently or illegally
2. If, within 5 years, he returns to his native country or to some foreign country and establishes residence
therein
3. Naturalization obtained through invalid declaration of intention
4. Minor children failed to graduate through the fault of parents either by neglecting support or by
transferring them to another school
5. Allowing himself to be used as a dummy

Effects of denaturalization
1. If ground affects intrinsic validity of proceedings, denaturalization shall divest wife and children of their
derivative naturalization
2. If the ground is personal; the wife and children shall retain citizenship.

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Grounds for loss of Philippine citizenship
1. Naturalization in a foreign country; or
2. Express renunciation of citizenship (expatriation);or
NOTE: The mere application or possession of an alien certificate of registration does not amount
to renunciation. (Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999)
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21
years of age; or
NOTE: Citizens may not divest citizenship when the Philippines is at war.
4. Rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country; or
NOTE: It shall not divest a Filipino of his citizenship
if:
a. the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country;
b. the said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory with its consent
provided that at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking
the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with its service to
said foreign country.
5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization (Denaturalization); or
6. Having been declared by final judgment a deserter of the armed forces of the Philippines in times of
war; or
7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband‘s
country, she acquires his nationality.

NOTE: Citizenship is renounced expressly (Ibid.).

Application of Res Judicata in Citizenship cases


GR: Res Judicata does not set in citizenship cases.
XPNs:
1. Person‘s citizenship is resolved by a court or an administrative body as a material issue in the
controversy, after a full-blown hearing
2. With the active participation of the Solicitor General or his representative; and
3. Finding of his citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme
Court. (Burca v. Republic G.R. No. L-24252, Jan. 30, 1967)

Ways to reacquire citizenship


1. Naturalization
2. Repatriation
3. Direct act of Congress

What is the effect of RA 9225 to the mode of losing citizenship? Did it repealed CA 63?
It did not. It only modified CA 63 to the extent that only naturalized Filipino citizen may lose its Filipino
citizenship upon naturalization to the foreign country. Because natural born citizens will not lose their
Filipino citizenship by subsequent naturalization in the foreign country as long as they comply with the
requirement of RA 9225.

What is the condition under RA 9225 for a natural born citizen who is naturalized in a foreign
country may be acquired or retain his Filipino citizenship?
By taking the oath of allegiance and have that oath of allegiance registered in the civil registry or consulate
office of the Philippines where he is residing.

Page 157 of 178


Note: Don‘t be confused with RA 8725 which was applied in the Frivaldo case. This is another
repatriation law

Repatriation
Recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino. (Bengzon v. HRET and Cruz, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001)
NOTE: Repatriation shall be effected by:
1. Taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and
2. Registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue
the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

Categories of Natural-Born Filipinos under RA 9225


(Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003)
1. Reacquisition
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Filipiino citizenship due to naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship; and
2. Retention
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of said RA, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship. (Section 3, R.A. 9225; David v. Agbay, G.R.
No. 199113, March 18, 2015)

There are two operative acts under RA 9225. Retention and Reacquisition. When does it apply?
Retention, Filipino citizenship never lost their citizenship. Which means it will be applied to those who
are naturalized in the foreign country after the effectivity of RA 9225
Reacquisition, applies to those who were naturalized in the foreign country before the effectivity of RA
9225. Because before the effectivity of RA 9225, a natural born citizen who is naturalized in the foreign
country will automatically lose his Filipino citizenship. In order to reacquire it they have to subscribe to
oath and register it and then they have considered to have reacquired it.

Supposing A is a natural born citizen, in January 2010 he was naturalized in the US and in January
2016 he subscribed to oath of allegiance to support and defend the Philippines and he had it
registered. What is the status of A from January 2010, to December 2015 before he subscribed to
the oath of allegiance? Supposing in January 2013 A purchase a real property in the Philippines, is
that a valid purchase?
The oath of allegiance that he subscribed will retroact from the time that he was naturalized in the US as if
he never lost it.

What is the character of repatriation laws according to the case of Altajeros vs Comelec?
Remedial in character. Retroactive in application
In the case of Frivaldo the SC said once citizenship was lost it cannot easily be acquired. The
person must show that he has complied with any of the modes of reacquiring Filipino citizenship. Either
by repatriation under CA 63, by naturalization/ direct act of congress, or by repatriation. The automatic
exercise of activities reserved for the Filipino citizens does not automatically revert or result in the
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.

Page 158 of 178


In Labo vs Comelec, the SC said the subsequent declaration of nullity of his marriage does not
automatically revert him back to his Filipino citizenship. Once it was lost even if the basis for losing it was
considered as null and void, by the adopting state, that does not concern the Philippines. He has to
reacquire Filipino citizenship either by naturalization, direct act of congress of repatriation.
The application of res judicata does not apply to naturalization cases. Citizenship of the Filipinos is
always open to attack. Res judicata in citizenship may only be applied when the latter is the 1) lis morta of the
controversy,2) when the case is with the active participation of the OSG or when 3) the citizenship was approved by the SC.

In Yu vs Defensor Santiago, the petitioner was naturalized in the philippines after which he used
his portugese passport. So what is the effect of the use of it to his naturalized Filipino citizen
status? While renunciation is a mode for losing citizenship must be categorical and express, the
acts of the petitioner, taken together constitute a renunciation of Filipino citizenship. Does that
mean use of foreign passport constitute loss of Filipino citizenship?
In the case of Maquiling this was the issue. The SC said that does not affect his Filipino citizenship, the
use of US passport is only deemed a withdrawal of his affidavit of renunciation of his American
citizenship. The use of US passport only means he regains his american citizenship in the eyes of the ph
law. So at that time he again resume as a dual citizen. But it did not result to loss of Filipino citizenship.

What is the effect of the repatriation? This was ruled in the case of Tecson vs HRET?
It reverts back to the status of the Filipino citizen.

Q. What is the effective date of the repatriation when approved?


A. In the case of former natural born citizens, the effective date is the date of application for repatriation
not the date when repatriation was approved.

Q: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine Citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority?
A: NO. The election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3)
years from reaching the age of majority .(Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar v. Vicente Ching,
B.M. No. 914, Oct. 1, 1999)

Supposing a law disqualifies dual citizen. Is that law constitutional?


This was the issue in Manzano vs Mercado The SC said dual citizen under the Local government code
means dual allegiance.
The SC said dual citizenship is possible in two scenarios
1. When a child is born to a Filipino parent in a country which applies Jus Soli
2. When a Filipino woman is married to an alien whose laws made the Filipino woman only a citizen of the
husband state
3. When a child is born to a Filipino mother alien father whose laws make the child also a Filipino citizen.

SCENARIO: In an electoral protest A challenges B and present B‘s American passport to prove B is not
a Filipino citizen. This the case of Aznar vs Comelec. SC said that proof that respondent Osmena is an
American citizen does not mean that he is not a Filipino citizen. Particularly because he is born of Filipino
parents.
The final act for naturalization is the taking of the oath of allegiance. Under RA 9225 a natural born citizen
who is naturalized in a foreign state may retain or reacquire his Philippine citizenship provided he take his
Page 159 of 178
oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Remember when a Filipino became naturalized in America he take his
oath of allegiance. When he reacquire his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 he also take an oath of
allegiance in the Philippines.

Dual citizenship vs. Dual allegiance


Dual Citizenship Dual Allegiance
Arises when, as a result of concurrent application of Refers to the situation where a person
the different laws of two or more States, a person is simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
simultaneously considered a citizen of said states. to two or more States
Involuntary and allowed Result of an individual‘s volition and is prohibited
by the Constitution.
NOTE: In Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, section 40(d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
(Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999)

Natural Born Citizens


1. Citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
2. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority
NOTE: The term ―natural-born citizens,‖ is defined to include ―those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.‖ (Tecson v.
COMELEC, GR. No. 161434, Mar. 3, 2004.

Rule regarding marriage of a Filipino to an alien


GR: The Filipino retains Philippine citizenship.
XPN: If, by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it (Sec.4, Art. IV,
1987 Constitution).

Government officials required to be natural-born Filipino citizens


1. President (Sec.2, Art VII).
2. Vice-President (Sec. 3, Art VII).
3. Members of Congress (Secs. 3 and 6, Art VI).
4. Justices of Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts (Sec. 7(1), Art VIII).
5. Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 8, Art XI).
6. Members of Constitutional Commissions
7. Members of the Central Monetary Authority (Sec. 20, Art XII).
8. Members of the Commission on Human Rights (Sec 17 (2), Art XIII).
NOTE: The fact that a person has dual citizenship does not disqualify him from running for public office.
(Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, Feb. 19, 2009)

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Oath of Allegiance and Renunciation of foreign citizenship
Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship) requires the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an
undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Sec. 3 thereof (oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the
legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225
to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their
foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in
Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, does not constitute the personal and
sworn renunciation sought under Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance
is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship. (Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, Nov.27, 2008)

Strict adherence to the Maquiling doctrine


The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel. Use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of
the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, the Court in Maquiling
did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters
dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the
Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying
with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in
his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that we should
similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for local elective office. (Arnado v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015)

Doctrine of Indelible Allegiance


It states that an individual may be compelled to retain his original nationality notwithstanding that he has
already renounced it under the law of another State whose nationality he has acquired.

Doctrine of Effective Nationality


A person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one – either the nationality of
the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in
the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
NOTE: Also known as Nottebohm principle
(International Court of Justice, Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 1955) or the Genuine Link Doctrine

Doctrine of Genuine Link


It states that the bond of nationality must be real and effective in order that a State may claim a person as
its national for the purpose of affording him diplomatic protection.

Poe-Llamanzares vs Comelec
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings
were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own

Page 161 of 178


making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a
member of the community of nations.

David vs SET
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an
express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a
reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there
is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal
instruments. This reading proceeds from several levels.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement from birth means that
private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born.
Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement
of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

Tecson vs Comelec
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322
B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.
Under the organic act (Philippine Bill of 1902), a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant"
was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.

Republic vs Lim
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to
legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required
to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an
illegitimate, child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the
age of majority.

Co vs HoR
There is no dispute that respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.
Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status
to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came
of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old.

In re: Ching
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that
the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true that this clause has been construed to
mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that
Page 162 of 178
three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision
adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14)
years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to
elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship.

Cabiling vs Fernandez
The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second
requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election
with the civil registry that was belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not
been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship
can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners' case, the
election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory
timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the
meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual
exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the
Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the
election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that
they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition
of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.

Yu vs Defensor-Santiago
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied
for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after
he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship
is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship

Maquiling vs Comelec
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
by using his US passport.
Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act
of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who
are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on

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the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but
also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

Frivaldo vs Comelec
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA
No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as
his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship,
such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of
his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.

Republic vs Dela Rosa


Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall
be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant
has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and
(4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government
announced policies.

Labo vs Comelec
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest
him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a
Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such
through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian
citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made
the Affirmation of Allegiance.
CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath
of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the
petitioner.
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was
found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship

Aznar vs Comelec
In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation
here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When
We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to
reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either
"express" or "implied ".

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Mercado vs Manzano
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen

Bengzon III vs HRET


Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commissioner of Immigration


The avowed policy of "selective admission" more particularly refers to a case where a citizenship is sought
to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply
the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to be come citizens. There is here a choice
between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application is cases
where citizenship is conferred by operation of law.
In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by
operations of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the cannot do
otherwise than to declare that he is a citizens of the Philippines.
We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section
15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of
the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Altajeros vs Comelec
The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in
addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the
Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was,
therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions
disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

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SEPARATION OF POWERS
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Legislation belongs to the Congress, implementation to the executive, and settlement of legal controversies
and adjudication of rights to the judiciary. Each is therefore prevented from invading the domain of the
others.

Purposes of Separation of Powers


1. Secure action;
2. Forestall over-action;
3. Prevent despotism; and
4. Obtain efficiency.
NOTE: To prevent the concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to
irreparable error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of republican institutions. The purpose was
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental
powers among the three departments, to save the people from autocracy.

Powers vested in the three branches of government


Executive –Implementation of laws (Power of the sword)
Legislative - Making of laws and power of the purse
Judiciary - Interpretation of laws (Power of judicial review)
NOTE: Legislative power is given to the legislature whose members hold office for a fixed term (Sec. 1,
Art. VI); Executive power is given to a separate Executive who holds office for a fixed term (Sec. 1, Art.
VII); and Judicial power is held by an independent Judiciary. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII)

Principle of Blending of Powers


Refers to an instance when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to
or shared by several departments.

Examples of the Blending of Powers


a. Power of appointment which can be exercised by each department and be rightfully exercised by each
department over its own administrative personnel;
b. General Appropriations Law – President prepares the budget which serves as the basis of the bill
adopted by Congress;
c. Amnesty granted by the President requires the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the
Congress; and
d. Power of the COMELEC to deputize lawenforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the government
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections in accordance with the
power granted to it by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative the
conduct of elections. [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(1)]

Is there any specific constitutional provision that requires the adoption of this fundamental
principle?
The SC said in Angara vs Electoral tribunal that: the separation of power does not obtain from
constitutional provision but it flows from the specific distribution of powers. Once the powers of the
constitution are distributed, the corollary effect is separation.

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Principle of Checks and Balances
Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses
committed by the other departments.

Executive check on the other two branches


– veto power on the legislative
- Through its power of pardon, it may set aside the judgment of the judiciary.
– power to appoint members of the Judiciary.

Legislative check on the other two branches


- Override the veto of the President
- Reject certain appointments made by the president
- Revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
- Impeachment
- Determine the salaries of the president or vice president
- Revoke or amend the decisions by either:
- Enacting a new law
- Amending the old law, giving it certain definition and interpretation different
from the old.
- Define, prescribe, apportion jurisdiction of lower courts:
- Prescribe the qualifications of lower court judges
- Impeachment
- Determination of salaries of judges.

Judicial check on the other two branches


It may declare (through the SC as the final arbiter) the acts of both the legislature and executive as
unconstitutional or invalid so long as there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction

Test to determine whether a given power has been validly exercised by a particular department:
G.R.: Whether the power has been constitutionally conferred upon the department claiming its exercise.
XPN: Doctrine of Necessary Implication
Exercise of the power may be justified in the absence of an express conferment, because the grant of
express power carried with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it.

Political Questions
Those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. (Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957)

Political Question Doctrine


The doctrine that the power of judicial review cannot be exercised when the issue is a political question. It
constitutes another limitation on such power of the judiciary.

Justiciable Questions Political Questions


Imply a given right legally demandable and Questions which involve the policy or the wisdom
enforceable, an act or omission violative of such of the law or act, or the morality or efficacy of the
right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned same. Generally it cannot be inquired by the courts.

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by law for said breach of right. Further, these are questions which under the
Constitution:
a. Are decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; and
b. Where full discretionary authority has been
delegated by the Constitution either to the
executive or legislative department.

Effect of the expanded definition of judicial power on


the political question doctrine
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review. Under the expanded definition, the Court
cannot agree that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court to review.
When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected is justiciable—the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to the SC. When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the delimitation as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.

Judicial supremacy is not an arrogation of the supremacy of the SC but the supremacy of the
constitution. The constitution however cannot assume jurisdiction at all time. There must be a justiciable
controversy.

In the case of Casibang vs Aquino, during the pendency of the electoral protest, the 1973 constitution
became effective. Under the 1973 constitution all incumbent public officer shall remain in office so theory
of the respondent is that since the constitution says that all shall remain in office and he is the incumbent
of an office, the electoral protest now becomes a political question. SC said no, what was affected was the
term to hold office and not the right to hold office. In order that a public officer may be entitled to that
indefinite term of office he must first show that he has a right to hold that office.

In the case of Tanada vs Cuenco, Daza vs Singson what was in issue in this cases is the discretion
of the congress in appointing members to the electoral tribunal and the commission on
appointments. Is this purely political question?
Not all because in the case of Pimentel the SC said that the power to choose and elect members of the
commission on appointments or the electoral commission representing the house rest on the house itself
not on the political party. The political parties can only nominate members of the electoral tribunal or
commission on appointments and the appointing authority still rest in the house. Is that a purely political
question? No. if the controversy involves the legality of the act, that remains to be a justiciable
controversy.

What is the effect of the expanded jurisdiction of the SC to the political question concept? Did it
do away with the doctrine of political question?
Because under the expanded jurisdiction of the SC the courts also have the jurisdiction to determine
whether there is grave abuse of discretion. No it did not totally abrogate the concept of political question
because in exercising its expanded judicial power, the SC will not determine whether the other 2 agencies
have discretion, the courts will determined whether they have abused their discretion which must be so
gross and so patent.

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There are two instances when Separation of powers is violated said the SC in the case of Ochoa
1. When one department unduly interferes with the exercise of the powers belonging to the other
department
2. When one department assumes the power belonging to another department

On PDAF (Pork Barrel)


The Pork Barrel System violates the separation of powers because it is a form of post-enactment authority
in the implementation or enforcement of the budget.
(1) By giving individual legislators the (a) power to determine projects after the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) is passed, and, (b) through congressional committees, authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment, the system encroaches on the Executive‘s power to implement the law.
(2) Furthermore, identification of a project by a legislator being a mandatory requirement before his PDAF
can be tapped as a source of funds, his act becomes indispensable in the entire budget execution process.
[Belgica vs Ochoa]

In Re: Manzano
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained
to deny his request. This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice.

Angara vs Electoral Commission


The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of various departments of government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is far made a check on the legislative power that his assent is required in the enactment of
laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the
refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the
National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever
he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to
define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly exercises to a
certain extent control over the judicial department. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of
trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY". — The Constitution is a definition of the powers
of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself
has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine confliicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument

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secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

Casibang vs Aquino
That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is
the period during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and
enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and
enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration
of length of time during which the occupant of an office is entitled to stay therein whether such period be
definite or indefinite.

Tanada vs Cuenco
The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the Government (16 C. J. S., 413). It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In the case at bar, the question for
determination is whether the election of two senators, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by another senator, who is a member and spokesman of the party
having the largest number of votes in the Senate, on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination *** of the
party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a
political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It
is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the
proceedings in connection therewith. Hence, this Court has, not only jurisdiction, but, also the duty, to
consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.

Sanidad vs Comelec
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially
true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such
act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the
contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether
the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

Daza vs Singson
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.

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DELEGATION OF POWERS
Non-delegation of power
GR: Delegata potestas non potest delegari – What has been delegated can no longer be delegated.
NOTE: Delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through
the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
XPNs: Permissible delegations: (PETAL)
1. Delegation to the People through initiative and referendum. (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1)
2. Emergency powers delegated by Congress to the President. [1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 23(2)]
Requisites:
a. There must be war or other national emergency;
b. The delegation is for a limited period only;
c. Delegation is subject to restrictions as Congress may prescribe; and
d. Emergency powers must be exercised to carry a national policy declared by Congress.
3. Congress may delegate Tariff powers to the President [1987 Constituion, Art. VI, Sec. 28 (2)]
NOTE: The Tariff and Customs Code is the enabling law that grants such powers to the President. Power
to impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent in the President but arises only from congressional grant.
4. Delegation to Administrative bodies– Also known as the power of subordinate legislation/
quasilegislative powers.
NOTE: Congress can only delegate rule-making power to administrative agencies. It is the authority
vested by Congress to the administrative bodies to ―fill in the details‖ which Congress cannot provide due
to lack of opportunity or competence. This includes the making of
supplementary rules and regulations. They have the force and effect of law.
5. Delegation to Local Governments – the grant of authority to prescribe local regulations.

Tests to determine whether the delegation of


legislative power is valid
a. Completeness Test – The law must be complete in all essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except
to enforce it.
b. Sufficient Standard Test – fixes a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or at
least determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
(Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997)
NOTE: The Sufficient Standard Test maps out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and indicating
the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. Its purpose is to prevent total transference
of legislative power.

Invalid delegation of legislative power


If there are gaps that will prevent its enforcement, the delegate is given the opportunity to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise discretion in order to repair the omissions.
NOTE: This is tantamount to an abdication of power in favor of the delegate, which is in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

What are policies and standards that may be considered as sufficient according to the SC in the
case of Eastern Shipping?
There are several. Public interest, public convenience and public welfare, national security, simplicity,
efficiency, economy.
Page 171 of 178
Can we nowvsay that in some future laws, when this are the same standards, can we say that the
future law has complied with the sufficient standard test?
The SC said in Eastern Shipping, no. The sufficiency of the standard can only be determined within the
factual circumstances of the law. We cannot apply the principle of stare decisis.
These are only applicable to delegation to administrative agencies. They do not apply to other delegation
of legislative power. So if the delegation is emergency power, we do not apply the tests, we apply Sec. 23.

If the delegation is tariff power, we apply sec. 28. If what is delegated is initiative and referendum, we
apply Sec. 32. For local governments apply Art. 10.
Tariff powers - There must be a law passed by the congress delegating the authority.

The congress authorizes the president to increase the VAT from 10-12% upon the determination
of the president of the existences of several factual circumstances. In the case of ABAKADA guro
vs Ermita the petitioner contends what the law allows to delegate is the tariff powers, VAT is not a
Trariff power it is a revenue tax. Is that an impermissible delegation?
There are two kinds of rulemaking power that may be exercised by the delegate.
1. Supplementary rules- those that fill in the gaps and those which provides for implementing detail
2. Contingent regulation- the determination or power to determine the existence of emergency in
accordance with which the law may be applied

In the case of ABAKADA guro what was delegated to the president is not the power to fix the tax but the
power to determine whether the standards enumerated are existing in order that the tax may be increased
from 10-12%. This is the contingent power.

Congressional grant of emergency powers to the President


Under Art. VI, Sec. 23(2), Congress may grant the President emergency powers subject to the following
conditions: (WaLiReN)
1. There is a War or other national emergency;
2. The grant of emergency powers must be for a Limited period;
3. The grant of emergency powers is subject to such Restrictions as Congress may prescribe; and
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a National policy declared by Congress.

President’s authority to declare a state of national emergency vs. President’s authority to exercise
emergency powers
Declare a status of national emergency - Granted by the Constitution, no
Legitimate objection can be raised.
Exercise Emergency powers- Requires a delegation from Congress. NOTE: Not mandatory on
Congress.

Rationale: Problems in times of emergency must be solved within the shortest possible time to prevent
them from aggravating the difficulties of the nation.
NOTE: Emergency powers are self-liquidating unless sooner withdrawn. They will automatically cease
upon the end of the emergency that justified their delegation.
Examples of other national emergencies:
a) Rebellion
b) Economic crisis
c) Pestilence or epidemic
d) Typhoon
e) Flood
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f) Other similar catastrophe of nation-wide proportions

Supposing threre is indeed a war but the congress failed to mustered the required 2/3 vote, can
the congress still delegate emergency powers because of war, although it failed to declare, the
existence of the state of war, answer is: YES, because war is also a national emergency. So again, in the
case of Rodriguez ve gella, the SC said may include manmade and natural disaster. So it may include
rebellion. With more reason that it includes war. So even if the congress failed to declare a state of war
because of the deficiency in number, he can still use war as a basis for declaration or delegation of the
national emergceny, and the congress will treat war as a national emergceny.

What are the limitations for the valid delegations of emergceny powers:
1) there must be a law authorizing the president to exercise the emergceny power,
2) the delegation must be for a limited period. The delegation must provide limitations for the
exercise of these powers and the power must be only to carry out powers necessary to declared
national policy.

Garcia vs Executive Secretary


Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills,
like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive
Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming
they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted
instead by the Congress of the Philippines. There is explicit constitutional permission (Section 28[2] of
Article VI of the Constitution) to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . . ." The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and
Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President
explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
GENERAL STANDARDS SET FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO
THE PRESIDENT. — Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with
which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that
authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security."
Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that
can be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local
industries" is the sum total or the alpha and omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or
national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the
legislative standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection
of consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as
important a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as the protection
of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of
protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected
and subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.

Araneta vs Dinglasan
EMERGENCY POWERS; JUSTIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF. — Emergency, in order to
justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency."
The period that best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general
context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment,
was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of
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that body. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law.

Rodriguez vs Gella
EXPRESS REPEAL UNNECESSARY. — Express repeal of Commonwealth Act No. 671 is not
necessary; otherwise it would be unconstitutional since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the
latter attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.
HOUSE BILL NO. 727 CONSIDERED CONCURRENT RESOLUTION. — Although House Bill No.
727, approved by the Congress, repealing the Emergency Powers Acts, had been vetoed by the President
and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution
formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers.
EMERGENCY RESULTING FROM LAST WORLD WAR. — Commonwealth Act No. 671 lasted only
during the emergency resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines when said
Act was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency terminated upon the ending of said war.

People vs Vera
THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER; PRESIDENT'S VETO NOT BINDING ON THE
SUPREME COURT. — In vetoing a bill, the President may express the reasons which he may deem
proper, but his reasons are not binding upon the Supreme Court in the determination of actual
controversies submitted to it for determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any
manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but
which happens to be at the same time pending determination before the Supreme Court is a question of
propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these
circumstances, however, cannot sway the judgment of the court one way or another and prevent it from
taking what in its opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case.
EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER. — The benign prerogative of mercy
reposed in the Executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like
power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of
government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of
the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly
provided for by the constitution. (20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.) Where the pardoning power is conferred on
the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither
exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise
thereof
PROBATION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH PARDONING POWER. — The Probation Act does not
conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving
their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted.
The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his
arrest and reimprisonment

Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA


POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION; PARTICULAR APPLICABILITY TO
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. — The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities
and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not

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have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known
as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the
new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

US vs Ang Tang Hao


THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If
Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the
law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. One the other hand, if the act within itself does not
define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it law or a crime,
the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and avoid.

Ynot vs IAC
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating
a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the
purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority
under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the
exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As
there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner
has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.

Tablarin vs Gutierrez
The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the
more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of
government, must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of
1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of
medicine in our present day world.

Pelaez vs Auditor General


REQUIREMENTS OF DUE DELEGATION OF POWER NOT MET BY SECTION 68 OF
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. — Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it
grants to the President the power to create municipalities, does not meet the well-settled requirements for
a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
ABDICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS IN FAVOR OF THE EXECUTIVE. — If the validity
of said delegation of powers, made in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, were upheld, there
would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything
which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would
be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total
collapse of the democratic system established by the Constitution.

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