SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V.
Chan | 2-S
Cases
Liban v Gordon
Senator Gordon and the PNRC
files a motion for
reconsideration in the case
decided by the SC, declaring
that Senator Gordon did not
relinquish his position in the
Senate when he accepted
chairmanship of the PNRC,
but at the same declaring that
RA 95, the law which created
the PNRC as an separate
incorporation only serving as
an auxiliary to the
government, as
unconstitutional, asking it to
register itself under SEC the
Corporation Code.
Boy Scouts of the Phil. V
COA
COA released a resolution
ordering the BSP to submit to
its auditing process, but BSP
argues that although it was
originally a public corporation
under CA No. 111, has an
overwhelming public interest,
and is currently attached to the
DECS as an “attached
agency”, it has become a
private entity given the fact
that amendatory laws have
lessened government
participation in its executory
board and that it’s funds are
sourced not from the
appropriations of government.
Doctrine
General Principles
The issue of constitutionality was not raised so the Court resolves to rescind its earlier decision
declaring RA 95 unconstitutional.
PNRC is a sui generis institution, shown by several laws which amended the original charter
despite the fact that Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution proscribes the creation of
corporations via special law. National Societies of the Red Cross are sui generis in character,
regulated directly by international humanitarian law in contract to other private entities.
In Feliciano v COMELEC, the court said that the purpose of the constitutional ban is to prevent
grants of special privileges to families, groups, etc. PNRC was created not to grant special
privileges but for the common good. The PNRC, though created by law, is not an
instrumentality of the state, so as not to lose its character of neutrality. It is an auxiliary.
COA has jurisdiction.
1) BSP under the NCC is classified as other corporations, institutions, entities for
public interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they
have been constituted according to law. The original charter states that the BSP is a
public corporation.
2) It is an attached agency according to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. In
Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(3), attachment means “lateral relationship between
the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes
of policy and program coordination.” Having a DECS representative in its board, it
makes it a public corporation, although there is no direct supervision and control.
3) Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution provides that there shall be no formation,
organization or regulation of private corporations for business purposes mandated
by a special law. The BSP, although created by a special law, was created in order
for it to pursue youth and social development.
4) It is not subject to the test of Government ownership or control and Economic
viability. BSP cannot justify that it is not a government corporation using these tests,
because a third class of corporations exist- public corporations, which are neither
private nor government owned or controlled. Hence, absence of government in its
board does not make it a private corporation. Further, economic viability cannot be
used as basis because it only applies to corporations created for business purposes.
Notes:
In Veterans Federation of the Philippines v Reyes, the Court said that the fact that no budgetary
appropriations are granted to an institution, it does not make it a private corporation.
Criteria to be followed by business corporations.
1) Corporations must prove that they are efficient in the areas of their proper functions
2) They should not go into activities that the private sector can do better.
Definitions:
1) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and GOCCs.
2) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies
or objectives. This term includes the SUCs and monetary authority of the State.
3) GOCCs refer to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested
with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by government directly or through its instrumentalities either

Phil. Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v COA
COA ordered PETA to submit
to its auditing team since it
was allegedly a juridical entity
created by law (Act No. 1255).
PETA argues that its creation
preceded the Security and
Exchange Law and the
Corporation Code, so it was
impossible for them to
incorporate under such
general laws, but it does not
mean that they were part of
government. Further, they say
that their privileges of
arresting violators and
receiving half of the fines
obtained from violators have
been stripped off from them by
law, making them lose their
government character.
Province of North Cotabato
v Gov’t of the RP Peace
Panel
GRP and MILF was about to
sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. The Province of
North Cotabato filed a writ
questioning the MOA-AD
The main body of the MOA-
AD is divided into four
strands, namely, Concepts
and Principles, Territory,
Resources, and Governance.
I. Concepts
The MOA-AD proceeds to
refer to the "Bangsamoro
homeland," the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in
the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of
occupation.[32] Both parties to
the MOA-AD acknowledge
that ancestral domain does not
form part of the public
domain.[33]
The Bangsamoro people are
acknowledged as having the
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at
least 51% of its capital stock. Provided, that GOCCs may be further categorized by
the DB, CSC, and COA for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective
powers.
PETA cannot be subject to COA audit:
1) Charter test is inapplicable in this case. Such was only a creature of the 1935
Constitution and the latter laws. The statute which created PETA antedates the 1935
Constitution and it cannot be applied retroactively. More so, the amendments under
C.A. No. 148, removing their powers to appoint agents who can arrest violators
clearly show that there was an intent to treat them as a private corporation.
2) A reading of the charter also shows that it is not subject to the control or supervision
by any agency of the State.
3) The employees are registered under the Social Security System.
4) There mere fact that it is endowed with public purpose or public interest cannot alone
make it a public corporation. This class of corporations can be considered quasi-
public, which is a species of private corporations.
“The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found
in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the
State as the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental
functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Provinces,
chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations.
5) Reports to the President does not make one a public corporation. Corporations can
be checked and reviewed by the State (Bataan Shipyard v PCGG).
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES,
and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the
MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical
entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a
structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions
with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall
be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the
Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates
certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international
status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence. x x x[150]
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally
have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity
extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil
aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is
obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which
it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government.
It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the
UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying
status of independence. It is a transitional device to independence. Back to the MOA-AD, it
contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of
association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the
BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies,
and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover,

right to self-governance,
which right is said to be rooted
on ancestral territoriality
exercised originally under the
suzerain authority of their
sultanates and the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw. The
sultanates were described as
states or "karajaan/kadatuan"
resembling a body politic
endowed with all the elements
of a nation-state in the modern
sense.
II. Territory
The Parties to the MOA-AD
stipulate that the BJE shall
have jurisdiction over all
natural resources within its
"internal waters," defined as
extending fifteen (15)
kilometers from the coastline
of the BJE area;[42] that the
BJE shall also have
"territorial waters," which
shall stretch beyond the BJE
internal waters up to the
baselines of the Republic of
the Philippines (RP) south east
and south west of mainland
Mindanao; and that within
these territorial waters, the
BJE and the "Central
Government" (used
interchangeably with RP)
shall exercise joint
jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural
resources.[43] Notably, the
jurisdiction over the internal
waters is not similarly
described as "joint."
The MOA-AD further
provides for the sharing of
minerals on the territorial
waters between the Central
Government and the BJE, in
favor of the latter, through
production sharing and
economic cooperation
agreement.[44] The activities
which the Parties are allowed
to conduct on the territorial
waters are enumerated, among
which are the exploration and
utilization of natural
resources, regulation of
shipping and fishing activities,
and the enforcement of police
and safety measures.[45] There
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of
water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the
right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S.
government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution
I. BJE is a far more powerful entity than an autonomous region
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,[154] namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming that association is covered by an autonomous status, the BJE is still infirm
for it included several provinces even without plebiscite. Such is not allowed.
II. MOA-AD did not comply with Article X, Section 20
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD
would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere
passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision
would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-
AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance,
to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate
paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such
relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President
who has that power.
III. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts
the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land."
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood
not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the
question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the
Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC had occasion to
acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in
international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond `convention' and is
considered a general principle of international law."
The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of
a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of
its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

is no similar provision on the the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme
sharing of minerals and of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
allowed activities with respect
to the internal waters of the Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does
BJE. not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated
state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
III. Resources
“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or
The MOA-AD states that the person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the
BJE is free to enter into any United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
economic cooperation and dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
trade relations with foreign sovereign and independent States.”
countries and shall have the
option to establish trade
missions in those countries.
Such relationships and
understandings, however, are
not to include aggression
against the GRP. The BJE may
also enter into environmental
cooperation agreements.

The sharing between the

Central Government and the
BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources
is to be 75:25 in favor of the
BJE.[49]

The BJE may modify or

cancel the forest concessions,
timber licenses, contracts or
agreements, mining
concessions, Mineral
Production and Sharing
Agreements (MPSA),
Industrial Forest Management
Agreements (IFMA), and
other land tenure instruments
granted by the Philippine
Government, including those
issued by the present
ARMM.[51]

IV. Governance

The MOA-AD describes the

relationship of the Central
Government and the BJE as
"associative," characterized
by shared authority and
responsibility. And it states
that the structure of
governance is to be based on
executive, legislative, judicial,
and administrative institutions
with defined powers and
functions in the
Comprehensive Compact.
Principles of Local Authority
Basco v PAGCOR The contention of Basco is without merit:

PAGCOR was established to
be the amusement and gaming
department of the government,
becoming the third largest
source of government revenue
aside from BIR and the BOC.
Basco questions the
constitutionality of the law on
the ground that it is contrary to
public morals and public
policy enshrined in the
Constitution, and that it
constituted a waiver of the
right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees,
violating the principle of local
economy.
Lina v Pano
Tony Calvento, an employee
of PCSO, was tasked to install
Terminal OM 20 for the
operation of lotto in San
Pedro, Laguna, but this was
opposed by Mayor Cataquiz
armed with a resolution of the
Sangguinang Panlalawigan,
denying him a business
permit. Calvento filed a case
before the lower court, and
Judge Pano ordered the
Sanggunian not to implement
or enforce the said resolution.
Petitioner Lina of the
Sanggunian now argues that
firstly, local governments
should have the right to deny
the giving of business permit if
they consider lotto as illegal
and secondly, there was no
consultation made by the
PCSO, which is required
under the Local Government
Code.
Limbona v Mangelin
Sultan Alimbusar Limbon was
appointed a member of the
Sangguniang Pampook of the
Regional Autonomous
Government of Region XII,
representing Lanao del Sur.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
1) Manila has no inherent right to impose taxes. The charters of cities must plainly
show an intent by the legislature to grant it the right. Hence, the power to tax must
always yield to a legislative act which is superior for having been passed upon by
the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax”
2) Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress since the power to
create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers
belongs only to the Congress. Hence, it has the power of control over local
governments.
3) City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked
by PD 771.
4) Local governments as instrumentalities of the National Government have no
inherent power to tax. PAGCOR, being a GOCC with an original charter, is owned
by the National government. Its role is not merely to operate gambling casinos but
also to regulate the gambling business, hence, putting it within the ambit of an
agency or instrumentality. By this basis alone, it must be exempted from taxes even
without legislative fiat.
The doctrine of supremacy of National Government over local governments is the bedrock of
this decision. Otherwise, “Mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise
using the power to tax as a “tool for regulation.
“Local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make
the LGUs sovereign within the state or imperium in imperio.
5) Even the Local Government Code which grants each LGU power to create sources
of revenue is subject to the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide.
The petition is without merit.
There is no issue that the resolution, a mere signification of the dissent of the Sanggunian, is
valid. However, it does not have any force and effect. What the national legislature expressly
allows by law, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance, more so by a mere resolution.
The power of LGUs to legislate and enact ordinance or resolutions was merely delegated by
the legislature. In Magtajas v Pryce Properties Corp, the court said: “Municipal governments
are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national law making body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.”
“It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy.” The new provisions of the Constitution expanded the power of local
governments, such as granting them the right to tax, but such cannot be the basis to defy or
modify the will of the legislature. In a unitary form of government, any autonomy granted to
the local governments is subject to the central state.
The court has jurisdiction to look into his removal as speaker.
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by PD
1618, where the internal autonomy was granted within the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution.
Internal administration was granted to them except those left to the jurisdiction and
competence of the national government:
1) National defense and security

He was elected Speaker of
Assembly. Congressman
Matalam invited him to go to
the Congress in order to be a
resource person as regards the
proposed creation of the
Regional Consultative
Commission, so he asked the
assembly to not hold any
session while he is out. When
he went to Congress, the
assembly decided to hold
session, remove him from
speakership, then remove him
as a member, on the ground
that he disbursed assembly
funds as salary and
emoluments to several
members even though they
allegedly never requested for
the disbursements.
Disomangcop v There is no need to settle the constitutionality of either law, because respondent acted with
Datumanong
In accordance with the
Organic Act (RA 6344) which
was ratified by plebiscite by
Lanao del Sur, Tawi-tawi,
Sulu and Maguindanao (later
by Basilan and Marawi),
President Aquino signed EO
426 which placed the control
and supervision of offices of
DPWH in ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional
Government (ARG).
However, DPWH issued
Department Order 119, which
created a Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office which
shall have jurisdiction over all
infrastructure projects in
Marawi, taking the
jurisdiction away from
DPWH-ARMM under the
control of ARG. This was
followed by RA 8999 signed
into law by President Estrada,
which created the First
Engineering District of the
Province of Lanao del Sur,
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
2) Foreign relations
3) Foreign trade
4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking and
external borrowing,
5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural
resources;
6) Air and sea transport
7) Postal matters and telecommunications
8) Customs and quarantine
9) Immigration and deportation
10) Citizenship and naturalization
11) National economic, social and educational planning
12) General auditing
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
1) Administration- central government delegates powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and make local governments more
responsive and accountable. President exercises general supervision but cannot
exercise direct control such as substituting his judgements for theirs.
2) Decentralization of power involves the abdication of the political power in favor of
local governments. They are free to chart their own destiny and shape their future.
There is self-immolation by the national government, where the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authority but to the constituents.
Court will not resolve whether the autonomy of Muslim Mindanao is one or the other because
the local government in question was given autonomy previous to this Constitution. PD 1618
persuades the court that the autonomy given to the Sangguniang Pampook is merely
decentralization of administration, so the court must assume jurisdiction. The sessions insofar
as they declare Limbona ousted are void.
If an act is precisely made by the other branches to render the issue moot and academic to pre-
empt the court, the act will not make it academic.
grave abuse by implementing them, considering that the law was inoperative or repealed. The
Organic Acts of ARMM devolving the powers to the ARG were affirmed by plebiscite, and
hence, any amendatory law would require another plebiscite. They do not par with a
constitutional provision and were merely enacted under the original legislative powers of
Congress, but cannot be subsequently repealed by a mere act of Congress. Further, RA 8999
is antagonistic with the objects of the Organic Acts, which is decentralization- the true essence
of regional autonomy and a necessary prerequisite.
“Autonomy, as a national policy, recognized the wholeness of the Philippine society, in its
ethnolinguistic, cultural and even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society of
the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist approach. Policies emanating from the
legislature are invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for minority
representation. As a result, democracy becomes an irony to the minority group.”
“The creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establish of a sovereignty distinct
from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government vis-
à-vis the central government. It is not the right to political separation. “Regional autonomy
refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a particular area or
region with lease control and supervision from the central government.
“Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether
geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves
decision-making by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger
government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments. Federalism
implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also decentralize.

which is directly accountable
to the national office of
DPWH. Petitioner
Disomangcop who is part of
the DPWH-ARMM filed a
case against Secretary
Datumanong of DPWH,
arguing that RA 8999 and
D.O. 119 are unconstitutional
for violating the autonomy of
ARMM. Respondents argue
that the autonomy given to
ARMM did not diminish the
powers of Congress.
Batangas CATV, Inc. v CA
Batangas CATV increased its
rates for cable subscription
from P88 to P180, but the
municipality of Batangas
opposed such move. They
cancelled the permit to operate
of Batangas CATV, but
Batangas CATV argues that
only the NTC has the right to
regulate the rates of CATV.
The trial court enjoined the
Municipality from their
cancellation of the business
permit, but the CA reversed.
Respondent argues that local
governments under the
General Welfare clause
(Section 457, paragraph 3[ii]
of RA 7610) have the right to
regulate rates due to public
policy.
Dadole v Commission on
Audit
Judge Dadole of Mandaue
City, along with other judges
of the MTC and RTC of the
same, were granted
allowances by Mandaue City
upon approval by the
Sanggunian (P1, 260 which
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that have been
authorized to act do not possess any claim of right against the central government.”
It comes in two forms- deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is administrative in
nature. Devolution connotes political decentralization, or transfer of powers, responsibility and
resources for the performance of certain functions from the certain government to local
governments units.
LGUs today enjoy administrative decentralization, while autonomous regions enjoy political
decentralization (Cordillera Board Coalition v COA).
Self-determination refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the autonomous
people’s uniqueness and grant them sufficient room for self-expression and self-construction.
Petition is impressed with merit.
President Ramos issued EO 436 which prescribed policy guidelines to govern CATV
operations, and Section 2 provides that the NTC is solely vested upon the regulation and
supervision of the television industry. Within these areas, the local government cannot
supersede.
Section 16 of RA 7610 provides that local governments can exercise powers for the general
welfare, and Section 458 arms them with ordinance powers to do so, but this cannot be contrary
to the express legislative will. Resolution No. 210 by the Sanggunian is an act of an agent of
the national legislature. “Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its
principal. To test its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as
laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.”
In US v Abenda, Court said that an ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an act of the legislature.
Since EO 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations be exercised
by the NTC, a resolution cannot contravene such. This does not mean that the local
governments units do not have the power to govern CATVs, it just cannot govern those that
are expressly reserved by the legislature.
Further, the Resolution contravenes the deregulation policy of the State under EO 436. There
must be minimal government regulations. The devolution of powers to the LGUs, pursuant to
the Constitutional mandate of ensuring their autonomy has bread jurisdictional tension
between said LGUs and the State. “LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the
whole.”
Notes:
Under the General Welfare Clause, LGUs can perform just about any power that will benefit
their constituencies. LGUs can exercise powers that are: 1) expressly granted, 2) necessarily
implied from the express grant, 3) necessarily appropriate or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and 4) essential to the promotion of the general welfare of their
inhabitants
Magtajas v Pryce Properties, Inc.- the legislature is the principal of the local government units.
Power of President the President over LGUs
We find for petitioner judge. LBC No. 55 is null and void.
In Pimentel v Aguirre and Drilon v Lim, the clear distinction between supervision and control
was provided. It was said that supervision does not cover the right of the superior to order the
undoing or redoing of the act of the subordinates in their discretion. It merely allows them to
check the acts of their subordinates on the ground that they follow the rules and guidelines.
Clearly in this case, the President may only exercise supervisory powers, and he or his alter
egos cannot interfere with the local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts
within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. If they seek to alter the wisdom of a
law, the order will become a patent nullity.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

later became P1, 500 for each

judge). However, DBP issued
a Local Budget Circular No.
55, which mandated that only
a maximum amount of P1, 000
may be given to national
government officials and
employees assigned in
provinces and cities (P700 for
municipalities). Hence, COA
decided to give a notice of
disallowance to the public
officials, ordering them to
give back the excess. Judge
Dadole argued that LBC 55
was void for infringing the
autonomy of Mandaue City,
despite the clear provision of
the Local Government Code
allowing LGUs to set an
amount for allowances. COA,
on the other, argues that
constitutional and statutory
authority of a city government
is subject to the will of
Congress. The President may
check the legislative
limitations under its
supervisory powers.
Pimentel v Aguirre Article X, Section 4 of the Constitution allows the power of supervision. However, clearly,
this only means the power to see that subordinates perform their duties. If the latter fail or
Petitioner filed a petition for neglect to fulfil them, the officers may take action to make them perform their duties. Control
certiorari and prohibition on the other, gives the right to alter or modify or nullify or set aside the act of the subordinate
seeking to annul officer.
Administrative Order No. 372,
insofar as it requires local “Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
governments to reduce their members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
expenditures by 25% of their subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
authorized regular from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contracts, heads
appropriations for non- of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
personal services, and as it electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
withholds a portion of the IRA President’s supervision only, not control. So long as their acts are exercised within the sphere
of LGUs. of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given by the Constitution and the law.

Local governments have the administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, and
they also enjoy fiscal autonomy. “Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the
power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities.”

They enjoy fiscal autonomy, and the President may intervene only when:
1) There is an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government
2) Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House, and president
of various local leagues.
3) Corresponding recommendation of Sec. of Finance, DILG, and DBM.

AO 372 merely recommends and advises LGUs on what to do with their fiscal budget. It does
not order them to follow the President, because there is no legal sanction anyway.

However, withholding a part of IRA is unconstitutional. A basic feature of local autonomy is

the automatic release of the shares of the LGUs in the National internal revenue.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Province of Batangas v The LGSEF is anathema and subversive to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
Romulo Constitution.

Province of Batangas as Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines automatic as involuntary either wholly
represented by its government or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature;
Hermilando Mandanas files a without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton, etc. As such, LGU are not
petition for certiorari arguing required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers,
that the provisions on the which is 40% of the national budget. The LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without
General Appropriations Act the prior approval of the Oversight Committee. It requires them to identify projects, submit
for 1999, 2000, and 2000 are proposals to the DILG, then submit it for approval of the Committee. The entire process is
unconstitutional. President constitutionally impermissible.
Estrada issued EO 48 to
facilitate the enhancing of the The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control over the distribution of a portion
capacities of LGUs by of IRA is “anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
creating the Oversight Constitution.” Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. A basic
Committee. Such was tasked feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally mandated automatic release of the
to handle the “Devolution shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.
Adjustment and Equalization
Fund”, which later became the “The respondents argue that this modification (of the LGC) is allowed since the Constitution
Local Government Service does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall only be determine by the Local
Equalization Fund (LGSEF). Government Code of 1991. That is within the power of Congress to enact other laws, including
Every GAA, P5 billion worth GAAs, to increase or decrease the “just share” of the LGUs. This contention is untenable.”
of money shall be withheld The LGC is a substantive law. The Congress may not amend it via appropriation laws or
from the IRA and can only be GAAs. It must be done in a separate law.
disbursed upon application by
any LGU before the Oversight
Committee. Subsequently, the
Committee issued resolutions
to properly manage the fund.
Petitioner now argues that the
provisions on LGSEF and the
resolutions created therefor
are unconstitutional for it
violates the mandate of the
Local Government Code to
automatically release the
funds for LGUs. Respondent
Executive Secretary, on the
other, argues that the “just
share” which LGUs are
entitled to receive are subject
to Congressional amendment,
despite the fixed 40%
requirement.
Alternative Center for As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of
Organizational Reforms and local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might
Development, Inc. prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may
(ACORD) v Zamora disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of
statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute- a proposition which is
President Ejercito Estrada, in patently absurd. Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of
2000, submitted the National local government is qualified by the words “as determine by law”, and not the release thereof,
Expenditures Program, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede
wherein the IRA amounted to the automatic release of the IRA. Otherwise, the Constitution should have been worded in a
P12,778,000, and it became manner showing that the automatic release may be subject to exceptions as may be provided
the GAA upon the sponsorship by law.
of Sen. John Osmena. Aside
from the programmed IRA Hence, the ruling in Pimentel v Aguirre is expanded to include a prohibition against even the
allotment, there was another legislature itself. It cannot impose conditions on the automatic release.
P10 billion provided in the
GAA for local government
units classified under the
unprogrammed funds. This
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was, however, only releasable

only when the revenue
collections of government
exceed the original revenue
targets submitted by the
President of the Philippines
before Congress. Hence,
petitioner NGO assailed such
provision in the GAA, arguing
that it reduces the autonomy of
LGUs over their budget.
Respondents, however, argue
that the constitutional
provision mandating
automatic releasing of LGU
IRA is addressed not to the
legislature but to the
executive. Hence, the
legislature may impose
conditions as may be provided
by law. Respondent Executive
Secretary cited the exchanges
during the ConComm, where
Comm. Davide and Comm.
Nolledo seemed to mean that
the mandate to automatically
release LGU funds was
directed to the budget officer
or any officer under the
executive.
Kida v Senate of the I. RA 9333 and RA 10153 are not amendments to RA 9054
Philippines
As an examination of these laws, both only provide the the scheduled dates of subsequent
Congress passed RA 10153 elections, because RA 9054, the latest ARMM Act, only provided for the first election date.
which provided for the They merely filled in the gap. Hence, being separate from Organic Acts, no plebiscite, nor a
synchronization of the 2/3 majority of the members in the Senate and the House is required.
elections in ARMM relative to
the national elections. Instead But even when both are considered amendatory, a 2/3 vote is not required, for it will make RA
of the scheduled August 8, 9054 in the character of an irrepealable law. Present legislatures cannot bind the actions of
2011 elections, it was future legislative bodies. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a
postponed to May 2013, and legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of
hence, the law gave the the enactments labors under delusion of omniscience (City of Davao v GSIS). Further, a
President power to appoint plebiscite can only be required when the amendatory law pertains itself to the creation of the
OICs during the paid period. autonomous region, e.g. 1) basic structure of the regional government, 2) region’s judicial
This law was passed after RA system. Date of elections is not included.
9333, mandated the election in
2005 to be held on the second II. Constitutionality of RA 10153
Monday of May, and set the
next election to be on the 8th of The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the
August, 2011. Both were not terms of the Constitution and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect
ratified by plebiscite. due to the concept of autonomy. Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in
the Philippine legal landscape. The Constitution's Transitory Provisions themselves
collectively provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the new[46] and for the
introduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective terms
and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the Transitory
Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough, particularly
into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the
present problem is with us today.

We rule out the first option - holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative
positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term - as an option that Congress could have
chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel
COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature.

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for
the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except
when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details
in the execution of that power

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date - May 13, 2011 - for regional elections synchronized
with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has
made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special
elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other
elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in
contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to
enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.[65]
Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless
pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP
881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is
limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for
in the law (election violence, fraud, etc).

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold
special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials
shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall
have assumed office.

In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based
on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be
exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress. Even
Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms
of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and
the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same
power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority
to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the
constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would directly contravene Section
8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the
ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the "term" means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another, while the "tenure" representsthe term during
which the incumbent actually holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term,
neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM
officials. They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they
do so.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Villafuerte, Jr. v Robredo
COA conducted an
examination on the manner
LGUs utilized their IRA. It
showed that at least 20% of the
IRA of some LGUs were not
used for development as
required by law, but was
diverted to Maintenance and
Other Operating Expenses
(MOOE). This led to DILG
Sec. Angelo Reyes and DBM
Sec. Romulo Neri to publish
guidelines on the
appropriation and utilization
of the 20% development fund.
Subsequently, Sec. Robredo,
in his capacity as DILG
Secretary in 2010, issued MC
No. 2010-83, which mandated
LGUs to publish their annual
budget, cash flows, receipts
and expenditures, among
others pursuant to the Local
Government Code. Further, it
reiterated that the 20% of the
IRA of every LGU should be
utilized for desirable, social,
economic and environmental
outcomes. A list was provided
in the MC indicating which
expenses the fund must not be
utilized for (administrative
expenses, salaries, travelling
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.[74]
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite
requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures
that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read - in the
manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.[75] Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments
that the synchronization requires.
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power
of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to
foster a government that is not "democratic and republican." For then, the people's right to
choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of
fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the "elective
and representative" governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in
RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance - both
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 - will not systemically be
touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern
unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only
for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
The Secretary of DILG in issuing the MC did not substitute his own discretion with that of the
local legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects
that the 20% component of the IRA should fund.
Verily, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization. The respondent, by threatening sanctions,
merely reiterated what was already required by law. The mere reiteration under the
Memorandum Circular was a reminder for the LGUs to faithfully observe the directive
pursuant to the Local Government Code. It was merely an advisory to prioritize development
projects insofar as the 20% is concerned. “Development” was characterized as the “realization
of desirable social, economic and environmental outcome” does not operate as a restriction of
the term so as to exclude some other activities that may bring about the same result. The LGUs
were merely guided to be able to rectify their previous wrongdoings. The expenses which must
be not the object of spending the 20% as enumerated in the MC, again, were merely examples
of how the development fund must generally be used. The enumerations exclude other options
which the LGU might take.
As regards the sanctions, the issuance did not provide for such. It did not establish a new set
of acts or omissions which are deemed violations. These are already provided by law.
Notwithstanding the local autonomy, the President still has supervisory powers over LGUs,
and it also has the responsibility to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. “Fiscal autonomy
does not leave LGUs with unbridled discretion in the disbursement of public funds. They
remain accountable to their constituency.
As regards the publication requirement, fiscal autonomy is not harmed. According to Pimentel
v Aguirre, fiscal autonomy means that “local governments have the power to create their own
sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities.” It is inconceivable that publication of expenditures, contracts and budgets
would infringe fiscal autonomy. Discretion is still present. Only transparency is the required.

expenses, repairs, purchase of
office furniture and
equipment, purchase of motor
vehicles, etc). This was
followed up by MC No. 2011-
08, directing strict adherence
to Section 90 of RA 10147
requiring the posting in
conspicuous places or
websites of the disbursements
of the LGUs. Non-compliance
will result to sanctions as
provided by the law.
Petitioner, who is Governor of
Camarines Sur, argues that the
memorandum circular violates
the autonomy and fiscal
independence of LGUs.
Sema v COMELEC
Maguindanao, a province of
ARMM, is comprised of two
legislative districts. The first is
comprised of Cotabato and 8
municipalities from
Maguindanao. Cotabato,
despite being in the first
legislative district, is not part
of the province having voting
against the plebiscite. A law
was passed vesting the power
to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays
to the Regional government.
Pursuant to RA 9054, Shariff
Kabunsuan was created,
carving out the 8
municipalities from the first
district of Maguindanao, and
eventually some other
municipalities from the
second district. In 2007,
COMELEC stated that the 1st
district of Maguindanao will
be comprised only of Cotabato
which it retracted, maintaining
status quo. The district was
then called Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City. Bai
Sandra Sema is a Petitioner cites the case of Felwa, which stated that “when a province is created by statute, the
Congressional candidate for
the 1st district. She argues that
Cotabato should be granted a
separated district, and that
votes therefrom be separated
from that of Shariff
Kabunsuan, deserving of an
additional congressional post
by virtue of its creation as a
province. Congress maintains
that the legislative district
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Municipal Corporations
Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution provides that no province, city, municipality,
barangay may be created, divided, merged or abolished except in accordance with the criteria
established under the local government code and subject to a majority vote in a plebiscite. The
requirements are:
1) Compliance with local government code
2) Must not conflict with the Constitution
3) A plebiscite must be held.
There is no express prohibition nor express grant for Congress to delegate the power to create
an LGU. However, this must be interpreted in light of the Constitution. There is no provision
in the Constitution which conflicts with the delegation of power to create municipalities and
barangays. However, in creating provinces and cities, it is another matter. Section 5(3), Article
VI provides that provinces created, or any city with an increase of 250,000 in population shall
be entitled immediately to one member of the House of Representative. Hence, these concepts
are tied together. A province cannot be created without a legislative district. To delegate the
power to create a province is to inherently delegate the power to create a district. It is not
possible to create a province without a legislative district. Such is unconstitutional because the
legislative seat is granted by operation of the Constitution.
1) Section 5(1), Article VI mandates that the number of representatives shall be fixed
by law. This only refers to a national law because it would be anomalous for regional
or local legislative bodies to reapportion the national body. “An inferior legislative
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.”
2) Creation of ARMM did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
legislative districts. Section 20, Article X does not provide for creation of legislative
districts as one of the devolved powers.
3) It is incongruous for a regional legislative body co create a national office when its
legislative powers extend only to its regional territories. This violates Section 20,
Article X which limits their power within their jurisdiction.
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute-
which cannot provide otherwise- nor by apportionment but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment”
To create a representative district, it can either be:
1) Indirect- through creation of a province
2) Direct- creation of several representative districts within a province
To allow ARMM to create districts would create the following effects:
1) Inferior legislative bodies like ARMM can create more than 100 provinces

could not have been
reapportioned by virtue of a
regional law.
League of Cities of the
Philippines v COMELEC
(November 18, 2008)
Penned by Justice Carpio
The 16 cities subject of the
controversy were created by
the Cityhood Bills which
lapsed into law between
March and July 2007 under the
Arroyo administration. The
LCP filed a case seeking to
declare the conversion of the
municipalities into cities as
unconstitutional for failing to
meet the income requirement.
This happened after RA 9009
was passed into law in 2001,
which provides that
municipalities, in order to
become cities, must fulfil the
P100 million income
requirement (2001 prices),
thereby amending the Local
Government Code. However,
Congress, in Joint Resolution
No. 29, sought to exempt 16
cities from the coverage of the
law, and allow them to only
satisfy the old income
requirement, which is P20
million (1992 prices). This is
due to the fact that the
Cityhood Bills were already
pending even before the
passing of RA 9009, so the
Congress passed the
resolution in order to ease the
requirements needed by the 16
municipalities.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
2) Proportional representation in the House based on one representative for at least
every 250,000 residents will be negated. ARMM need not comply with the
requirement according to Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7610
3) Representatives of ARMM can become majority in the house
Note: the requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the
territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do
not apply to the first method.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local
Government Code.[18] The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion
of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a
city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent
of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow
the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on
30 June 2001 . Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even
though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The
Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must
be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as
shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress
did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such
exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent
municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section
450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the
conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all
be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or
exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city
through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local
Government Code.
Congress is not a continuing body.[22] The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th
Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the
hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also
became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and

League of Cities of the
Philippines v COMELEC
(December 21, 2009)
Penned by Justice Velasco, Jr
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deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13 th or subsequent
Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one
Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew
in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood
bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going
through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the
approval.
Equal protection clause
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with
pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is
still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based
solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11 th
Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled
and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality
from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual
income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification
criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to
the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting
into cities.
As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political
subdivisions "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code,"
subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the
verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450
of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that
these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute.
Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude
that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled
out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned
plenary power of Congress to create political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the
vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of
requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation.
Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress
alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria.
It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC,
the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of
1991.[34] Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they
would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the
enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3[35] of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government
code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of
uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding
to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the
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same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement
from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws
is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a
particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the
exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.

Petitioners' theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any
other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical
conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way,
also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not
question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the
alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis[37] or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.[38] To obviate
this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the
law itself,[39] resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.[40]

Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of
several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the then
obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally
noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President
Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income
threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that
have pending cityhood bills

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute.
In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the
fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.[43] In fact, any interpretation that runs
counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.

In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the
enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP's claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be
substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would
not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is
presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if
it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities
that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly
invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city
will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.

As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the
cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected
only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income
requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities
desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills
before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference. And years before the
enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had already met the income
criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances,
however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As aptly observed
by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech sponsoring H. Joint Resolution
No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw themselves confronted with the "changing
of the rules in the middle of the game."

To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom
of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the
classification.[54] By the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of
the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of
the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither
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curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.

The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent
LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the
inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009. While the equal protection
guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without justification, inherent in the
equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or
reducing existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an
attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs.
League of Cities of the Requirements must only be found in the Local Government Code
Philippines v COMELEC
(August 24, 2010) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one
Penned by Justice Carpio Local Government Code.[1] The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion
of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws.

The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on
30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even
though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The
Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must
be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.

Operative Fact Doctrine

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of
the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter
of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission
that the law is unconstitutional.

However, the minority's novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the
enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities
with new sets of officials and employees operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional
Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely
dangerous precedent.

Under the minority's novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its
implementation must be continued despite being unconstitutional. This view will open the
floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their
immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is
an open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation
be stopped by the Court.
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The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to
the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects.

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law.

Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the
effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or
modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

Equal Protection Clause

Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique
advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the
11th Congress - as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the
effectivity of RA 9009.
League of Cities of the Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino
Philippines v COMELEC Pimentel, there were 57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities.
(February, 15, 2011) During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001), 33 of these bills were enacted into law, while
24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities that were converted
Penned by Justice Bersamin into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.

While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency
of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws,
desiring to become component cities which qualified under the P20 million income
requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC.

Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood
bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement
of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009,
the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such were
incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.

Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood
bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were
carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption
clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to
exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power.
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them.[10] The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The
legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest.

It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate President
Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to
stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities" and the apprehension
that before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It should be
pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the
creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence or
empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of
a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to
make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities.

Navarro v Ermita (April
2010 Decision)
Penned by Justice Peralta
RA 9355 was passed, creating
the Province of Dinagat
Islands. Navarro et al are
residents of the Province of
Surigao del Norte, serving as
Vice-Governor. They filed a
petitioner arguing that the
creation of the Province did
not comply with the statutory
requirements under the local
government code.
Surigao del Norte was
composed of 1) Mainland and
Surigao City; 2) Siargao
Island and Bucas Grande and
3) Dinagat Island. Under the
Local Government Code. In
2003, the Provincial
Government of Surigao
conducted a special census, to
determine the population (371,
576). But, in 2001, the official
census certified by the NSO
was only at 106, 951. The
Bureau of Local Government
Finance also said that the
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes
obvious, especially considering that 33 municipalities were converted into component cities
almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood
Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged
position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009,
acknowledging the "privilege" that they have already given to those newly-converted
component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same
footing or "class" as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity
and readiness of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective
provinces
Apropos is the following parable:
There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his vineyard. After reaching
an agreement with them for the usual daily wage, he sent them out to his vineyard. He came
out about midmorning and saw other men standing around the marketplace without work, so
he said to them, "You too go along to my vineyard and I will pay you whatever is fair." They
went. He came out again around noon and mid-afternoon and did the same. Finally, going out
in late afternoon he found still others standing around. To these he said, "Why have you been
standing here idle all day?" "No one has hired us," they told him. He said, "You go to the
vineyard too." When evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman, "Call the
workmen and give them their pay, but begin with the last group and end with the first." When
those hired late in the afternoon came up they received a full day's pay, and when the first
group appeared they thought they would get more, yet they received the same daily wage.
Thereupon they complained to the owner, "This last group did only an hour's work, but you
have paid them on the same basis as us who have worked a full day in the scorching heat."
"My friend," he said to one in reply, "I do you no injustice. You agreed on the usual wage, did
you not? Take your pay and go home. I intend to give this man who was hired last the same
pay as you. I am free to do as I please with my money, am I not? Or are you envious because
I am generous?”
Section 461 of the Local Government Code provides that to create a province, it must have an
average annual income as certified of the Department of Finance of not less than P20 eimillion
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
1) A contiguous territory of at least 2000 sq/km as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; OR
2) A population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO.
Provided, that the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the
original unit to less than that of the minimum requirements. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises of two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city of cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province.
The lands need not be contiguous if it comprises of 2 or more islands. However, the counting
will not include the water between the land mass (Tan v COMELEC).
The territorial requirement was adopted in the IRR of the Local Government Code. It provided
that the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is comprised of
one or more islands. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by law. Nowhere was it said
that the land area requirement can be dispensed with just because the territory is comprised of
several islands.
Respondent argues that the IRRs have the force and effect of law so long as they are germane
to the object and purpose of the law, arguing that the more liberal IRR will allow smaller units
to become provinces and be more reliant. But, in this case, the IRR did not only “fill in any
detail”, it instead added an exemption to the standard prescribed by law. This makes the IRR
provision void.
Thus, the creation of the province cannot be allowed because the territory requirement was
complied with. Further, the population requirement was also not hurdled, the proof of having
a population of 371,000 merely a result of a special census in 2003, which was not certified
by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

income of Dinagat Islands was Note: There is no proof that the creation of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering in
at P82, 696, 433.23, and its favor of Congresswomen Glenda Villaroman. Gerrymandering is defined by Fr. Bernas as “the
area 802. 12 square formation of territories for the purposes of favouring a candidate or a party.” The Constitution
kilometres. Petitioner argues proscribes gerrymandering because it mandates each district to be contiguous, compact and
that it failed to qualify to the adjacent, as far as practicable.
population or land
requirement, despite
complying with income
requirement.

Navarro v Ermita (May Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007
2010 Resolution) Census of Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total
population of only 120,813, which was still below the minimum requirement of 250,000
Penned by Justice Peralta inhabitants.

In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with
the population requirement. However, he contends that the Province of Dinagat Islands did not
fail to comply with the territorial requirement because it is composed of a group of islands;
hence, it is exempt from compliance not only with the territorial contiguity requirement, but
also with the 2,000-square-kilometer land area criterion in Section 461 of the Local
Government Code, which is reproduced for easy reference:

SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in paragraph (a) (i) above is
the one being referred to in the exemption from the territorial requirement in paragraph (b).
Thus, he contends that if the province to be created is composed of islands, like the one in this
case, then, its territory need not be contiguous and need not have an area of at least 2,000
square kilometers. He asserts that this is because as the law is worded, contiguity and land area
are not two distinct and separate requirements, but they qualify each other. An exemption from
one of the two component requirements in paragraph (a) (i) allegedly necessitates an
exemption from the other component requirement, because the non-attendance of one results
in the absence of a reason for the other component requirement to effect a qualification

Navarro v Ermita (2011
Minute Resolution)
Penned by Justice Nachura
Miranda v Aguirre
The city of Santiago, Isabela
was converted into an
independent component city
by RA 7720, and was further
converted into a component
city under RA 8528. RA 8528
is now being questioned by
petitioner (mayor of Santiago)
for it was made effective
without a plebiscite duly
approved by the people of
Santiago. They argue that such
was in violation of Article X
Section 10 of the Constitution.
Respondent Executive
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There are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the
land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in the creation of a province is at least
2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of the Local Government Code .
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver
basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income,
population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress,
in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria,
placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of
barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the
creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability
and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided
for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one
(1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration
of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form
part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section
442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly
provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the
congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC - and to reflect the true legislative intent. It
would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain
decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas
Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is
more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This
accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government units
composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC,
with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section
461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in
by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
“A close analysis of said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator- material change in the political and economic rights of the local government
units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reasn that the
Constitution requires the approval of political units directly affected” It is one instance where
the people decided on a matter affecting them and not through representatives. The “mere re-
classification” creates a lot of changes:
1) Benefits the provincial government of Isabela because its IRA allotment will
increase
2) Taxes like sand, gravel, quarry tax, professional tax, amusement tax, will now be
shared with Provincial government
3) Registered votes of Santiago will vote and be voted as provincial officials
4) City mayor will be under the administrative supervision of the Governor
5) Resolutions of the Sangguniang Panlunsod will now be subject to review by the
Provincial Board.
Justice Mendoza argues that a plebiscite will only be required when there is a change in the
income, population and land area of the LGU. But the provision is clear: No province, city

Secretary, on the other, argues
that what was merely done by
the law was to allow the
citizens of Santiago, Isabela to
vote for the provincial
elections, and its people to be
allowed to participate in
running for provincial
positions.
(Factual milieu of this case
happened after the decision by
the court on Alvarez v
Guingona upholding RA
7720)
Samson v Aguirre
RA 8535 as signed by
President Fidel Ramos created
the City of Novaliches out of
the 15 barangays of Quezon
City. Moises Samson,
Councilor of Quezon City
First District, argues that such
was unconstitutional. He
argues that the criteria were
not met, and that the
Constitution was violated. He
argues that no certifications as
to income, population and
land area were presented
before the Congress, and that
no certification from the
mother LGU, Quezon City,
was given to prove that the
mother city would not be
affected by the change.
Alvarez v Guingona
The Municipality of Santiago,
Isabela has been converted
into an independent
component city under RA
7720 signed into law by
President Fidel Ramos.
Petitioner Senator Heherson
Alvarez filed a case arguing
that the municipality has not
met the minimum average
income required under Section
450 of the Local Government
Code in order to be converted
into a component city called
City of Santiago.
Mariano v COMELEC
A case was filed by Juanito
Mariano et al against the
Commission on Elections,
arguing that the conversion of
the City of Makati to the
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municipality, or barangay may be created, altered, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC AND subject
to the approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
There are two conditions required by the Article. These two requirements have two purposes:
1) Economic purposes insofar as the income, population and land area is concerned
2) Political purposes insofar as the plebiscite is concerned. It ensures that
gerrymandering will not be made, and promotes the local autonomy of local
government units.
Note: To be a city, the average income of the municipality for the past 2 years must be equal
or greater than P20,000,000 based on 1991 prices.
Petitioner argues that no requirements were submitted to the Congress, citing in particular
public hearing by the Senate Committee on Local Government. However, the bill originated
from the House of Representatives, and clearly, public hearings were made where NSO,
Bureau of Local Government Finance, Land Management Bureau, and Department of Budget
and Management, aside from officials of Quezon City itself. Their official statements “could
serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring the certificates. Their affirmation as
well as their oath as witness in open session of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification submitted to either chamber
routinely.”
Petitioner further argues that the law does not provide for a prospective seat of government.
But, clearly, the seat of government can be decided upon after its creation (Section 12, Local
Government Code). Clearly, the creation of Novaliches City will not violate the Constitution.
The presumption of constitutionality (Basco v PAGCOR) will stand. Petition dismissed.
IRA forms part of the income of LGUs. It is true that for a municipality to be converted it must
first have an average annual income of P20 million as certified by the Department of Finance.
Adequate resources have been provided in their favor. They are vested the:
1) Right to create and broaden its own source of revenue
2) Right to be allocated a just share in the national taxes,
3) Right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of utilization and development
of the national wealth.
Section 450(c) of the Local Government Code provides that the average annual income shall
include the income accruing to the general fund exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-
recurring income. IRA is a regular fund.
Petition is bereft of merit.
I. Technical description was complied with
Section 2 of RA 7854 provides that the territory of the City of Makati shall comprise of the
territory of the old City of Makati, indicating that it was “bounded on the northeast by Pasig
River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast

Highly Urbanized City of
Makati was unconstitutional
because it failed to identify the
land area of the territorial
jurisdiction of Makati with
technical descriptions, that it
altered the three-term limit for
local elective officials, and
that it increased the legislative
district of Makati via special
law (as opposed to a general
reapportionment law required
by the Constitution) and
despite the fact that the
population was only at
450,000.
Cawaling, Jr. v COMELEC
RA 8806 created the City of
Sorsogon out of the
municipalities of Bacon
Sorsogon and Sorsogon,
Sorsogon Province.
COMELEC ordered for the
conduct of the plebiscite and a
majority ratified such creation.
Cawaling argues that the
plebiscite was conducted
beyond the 120-day period
requirement, and also that the
creation of a city through two
municipalities is not allowed
by law, there being an express
statement in Section 450(a)
providing that “a municipality
or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component
city.”
Aquino v COMELEC (G.R.
No. 189793, April 7, 2010)
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The law requires a description by metes and bounds, with technical description. The
importance of drawing precise strokes the territorial boundaries of an LGU cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the jurisdiction of
the LGU. It can only legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction. Outside, its acts are ultra vires.
The description was valid and enough because there is no change from the previous territory
of Makati anyway. It shows that no exact numbers are provided in the law because it was
recognized that there was an ongoing boundary dispute between the City of Makati and Taguig
over Fort Bonifacio. The presence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty preventing Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the
territorial jurisdiction of an LGU. In this case, the legislature complied with the requirement.
II. Three-term rule not violated
The creation of a new corporate existence will allow those officials who have served before to
run again three times consecutively, but since the petition was crafted to argue that the law
will benefit Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, the court resolves to deny the issue because of the
absence of an actual case of controversy. There is no showing that Mayor Binay will run again,
nor is there a showing that he would seek re-election for the same post.
III. Addition of legislative district was valid
In Tobias v Abalos, it has already been ruled that a special law may cause the creation of an
additional legislative district.
To force that only a general reapportionment law can add legislative districts would be to deny
legislative representation to a province for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable
situation will deprive the people of a new city or a province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole
or it is not sovereignty.
Further, the fact that only 450,000 residents were registered in Makati does not preclude an
additional legislative district. So long as the minimum requirement of 250,000 is met, then
they are entitled to at least one representative.
Criteria for creating a component city under Section 450 provides that a municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income
of at least P 20,000,000, and if it has either of the following:
1) A contiguous territory of at least one hundred square kilometres.
2) Population of not less than 150,000
Petitioner is not concerned of the requisites, but rather the mode of creation. He contends that
two municipalities merged into one component city is not allowed by law.
Petitioner’s constricted reading is erroneous. The phrase is not a criterion but simply one of
the mode by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides
that the merger of LGUs to create a province, city, municipality, or barangay in accordance
with the criteria prescribed by the Code is allowed. Verily, the creation of an entirely new
LGU through a division or merger of existing LGUs is recognized under the Constitution,
provided that it complies with requirements under the LGC.
Note: abolition of the two municipalities is but a logical consequence of the creation of a
component city. The one-subject-one-title rule is not violated.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard.[6] The provision reads:

Senator Noynoy Aquino and
Mayor Jesse Robredo of Naga
filed a petition challenging RA
9716, which reapportioned
Districts 1 and 2 of Camarines
Sur and created a new
legislative district. There were
4 districts before, but a 5th
district was created.
Petitioners argue that for a
fifth district to be created,
there must be a minimum of
250,000 population in that
new district.
Tan v COMELEC
BP 885 created a new
Province of Negros del Norte.
Petitioners are residents of the
Province of Negros
Occidental assailing the law.
In this case, only the
prospective residents of
Negros del Norte were
admitted into the plebiscite,
and petitioner argues that this
is in direct contravention of
the Local Government Code
(Section 197). Respondents
argue that in light of the
plebiscite, the issue became
moot. They also cite the case
of Parades v Executive
Secretary, which provides that
several barangays which
intend to separate from a
parent municipalities should
alone decide whether they
should form a new
municipality or stay to prevent
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(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province
is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The use by the
subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion
than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement
for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district
within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of
its creation and regardless of its population.
"SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there
be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration
of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing
province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries
would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the
area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to
respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in
the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the
President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a
plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court
upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the
barangay that would constitute the new municipality.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

the parent municipality from Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the present
frustrating the will of those Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly
who intend to leave. considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local autonomy would be better
promoted. However, even this consideration no longer retains persuasive value.

consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In

the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is the smallest political
unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are
involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit
comtemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros
del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent
province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4
square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be
consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects of
the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate
areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of
the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for
the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will
be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.

The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the other
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.
In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political
subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was
involved was no 'birth' but "amputation."

It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements
in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the
reasons already here expressed, We now state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases
sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the
new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose
of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.

The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void
and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not,
however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to
do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and also
because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation
of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.

Note:

 No plebiscite will render the issue of the validity of the creation of an LGU moot
and academic. To submit that the case is fait accompli will result to a passive
acceptance of a possible illegal creation of an LGU.

 It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted

by them petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has
a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to
negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot
be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only
about 2,856 square kilometers taking into account government statistics relative to
the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. Res-
pondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of the
territory of the province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500
square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also the land
and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the
submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three
mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new
province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious.

Dela Cruz v Paras
Bocaue Bulacan issued an
Ordinance which prohibits in
all forms night clubs, cabarets,
dance halls in the municipality
in light of public welfare and
morality. License or permits to
operate were ordered not to be
renewed to such
establishments. Petitioner dela
Cruz as operators of the
business argue that such was
in violation of due process
because they never allowed
hospitality girls to engage in
immoral acts. Judge Paras (the
late Justice Paras) decided to
uphold the power of the LGU
not only to regulate but to
prohibit the establishments by
stating that “those who lust
cannot last.”
Binay v Domingo
Qualified Makati beneficiaries
where admitted to the Burial
Assistance Program, provided
that the gross family income of
their families does not exceed
P2000 a month. They were
given P500 cash relief by the
Municipality. Metro Manila
Commission approved such
and disbursed P400,000 as
budget for the program.
However, COA disallowed
such disbursement on the
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The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein
the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word
territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last
sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass
of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous". Contiguous means (a) in
physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, next, or adjacent
(Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an
adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a
touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute
may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute
(Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the
sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" - - the physical mass of land
area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had
intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters.
General Powers and Attributes of LGUs
Police Power
Section 39 of the Municipal Code allows the council to enact ordinance and make regulations
as may be necessary to ensure the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, etc.
of the locality
Note:
The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinance and regulations as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law.
The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the
council which are enumerated by law. It authorized ordinances necessary to provide the for
the health and safety, morality, etc.
The Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of a
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot
be said that such sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its
face is characterized by overbreadth.
The power granted to LGUs remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is a wide gap
between the exercise of a regulatory power and prohibiting. It is clear that municipal operations
cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their businesses.
Police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born
with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims “sic utere tuo et ahenum non
laedas” and “salus populi est suprema lex”
Police power is inherent but not in municipal corporations. There must be a valid delegation
first.
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is no perceptible connection or relation
between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60. Apparently, COA re-
defines the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to public safety, general
welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati. COA’s additional objection is based on its contention
that Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby
should be for a public purpose… should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of
the inhabitants.

ground that the disbursement
did not have a real, substantial
or rational relation to the
public health, safety, morals,
and general welfare.
Tano v Socrates
The Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Puerto
Princesa City enacted an
Ordinance to ban the outward
trade of all live fish and lobster
except sea bass, catfish,
mudfish. Furthermore, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
also enacted a Resolution
which prohibits the catching,
gathering, possessing, buying
and selling and shipment of
live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms. This was
crystallized in an ordinance,
which also criminalized the
acts prohibited. Petition in this
case was charged criminally
under such ordinance, but
argues that he was merely
doing so as a lawful means of
livelihood, and the right
granted to the Mayor to
arbitrarily cancel or issue a
permit was given without
standards, hence,
unconstitutional. They cite
Section 7 Article XIII of the
Constitution, protecting the
rights of subsistence
fishermen. Charged in this
case is Governor Socrates of
Palawan.
White Light Corporation v
City of Manila
Mayor Alfredo Lim signed
into law the Ordinance passed
by the Sanggunian of the City
of Manila, prohibiting short
time admissions in hotels and
motels around Manila. Short
time was defined as
admittance for less than 12
hours, or allowing individuals
to rent a room twice a day.
Petitioner is a group of motel
operators arguing that not only
their right to property was
violated, but also the right of
their patrons to liberty in
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COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. The drift towards social welfare
legislation is already part of the police power. The care for the poor is a public duty.
Note:
There is reasonable classification because paupers are indeed short on welfare programs. This
is not a go signal, howver, for politicians to embark on a philantrophic orgy of inordinate dole-
outs for motives political or otherwise.
Firstly, there is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as subsistence or
marginal fishermen. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers is described as a private
association. Spouses Lim are also merchants, while petitioner Tano is a fisherman, without
claim as to his status.
But what must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution
regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. The General Welfare Clause
expressly mentions in Section 16 that ordinances may be passed to “enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology”
This allows the LGUs to protect municipal waters not being the subject of private ownership
and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or
fishery reserves. Municipal waters include as well marine waters included between the two
lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of
the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general
coastline and fifteen kilometres from it. Under PD 704, marine waters included in municipal
waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline using the above
perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.
The Ordinances have two principal objectives:
1) Establish a closed season for a period of 5 years
2) Protect corals of the marine waters from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities
These are well within the devolved powers to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters.
Petition granted.
The Local Government Code confers powers to LGUs to regulate the establishment, operation,
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, motels, inns, pension houses, etc. However, this
must pass the test of valid ordinance (City of Manila v Laguio):
1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2) Must not be unfair or oppressive
3) Must not be partial or discriminatory
4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5) Must be general and consistent with public policy
6) Must not be unreasonable
The goal of the ordinance is to eliminate illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. However,
it fails the due process tests provided by jurisprudence. The rights in this case fall within the
fundamental rights to liberty.

booking motels for wash up
rates. RTC declared void the
ordinance but the CA
reversed.
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“We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than
twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or a hotel whilst the
power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest
between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed, any
person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours
with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in
a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.”
The ordinance must appear that the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evidence that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist, otherwise,
the curtailment is arbitrary.
Notes:
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best
tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in
U.S. v. Carolene Products.[51] Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that
the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete
and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."[52] Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of
the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for
economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender[53] and legitimacy.[54]
Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,[55] after the Court
declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.[56] While the test may have first been articulated in equal
protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process
cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges.[57] Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.[58] Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures
is considered.[59] Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms.[60] Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.[61] The United States Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as
suffrage,[62] judicial access[63] and interstate travel.[64]
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect
only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law
which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an
injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard - the rational basis
test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons - those persons who would be deprived of availing short
time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial
since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished
rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of
Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms -

Social Justice Society v The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent mayor the duty to “enforce all laws
Atienza
The former Mayor of the City
of Manila signed into law
Ordinance No. 8027, which
converted the Pandacan area
from an Industrial II to a
Commercial I area. As a
consequence, the operators of
the Pandacan Oil Depot
(Petron, Caltex and Shell)
were ordered to remove the
depot as soon as possible.
However, Mayor Atienza
subsequently entered into with
the companies a
Memorandum of
Understanding, which allows
them to stay provided that they
remove 28 tanks and create
green and buffer zones.
Petitioner, as a political party
where majority of the
members are Manila residents,
filed a case for mandamus.
Social Justice Society v Lim
Ordinance No. 8119
effectively allowed the
resumption of operations of
the Pandacan Oil Depot, by
enacting a zoning and
comprehensive land use plan.
The Oil depot, connected to
the Batangas depots of
Chevron and Shell through an
underground pipeline system,
was designated as a Planned
Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD), acting
seemingly as an implied repeal
of the initial reclassification
under Ordinance 8027. In fact,
Ordinance No. 8187 (signed
by Mayor Lim) amended it
further by allowing Medium
Industrial Heavy Zones and
Heavy Industrial Zones in the
Pandacan Area, instead of just
the Light Industrial Zone
allowed under Ordinance No.
8119. In Ordinance No. 8187,
it was expressly provided that
the depots may stay.
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which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence - that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people.
Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten
Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an
atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as
they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them
as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do
so.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila
from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals.
No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the “general welfare” of the city does not
after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one
way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the members who sit in the council
as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.
As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire Pandacan Terminal has already
decommissioned twenty-eight out of sixty-four tanks. Speaking for Shell alone, its LPG
Spheres, which it claims is the only product that may cause explosion, was part of those
decommissioned, thereby allegedly removing the danger of explosion. Safety buffer zones and
linear/green parks were likewise created to separate the terminal from the nearest residential
area. Shell’s portion of the oil depot is likewise allegedly equipped with the latest technology
to ensure air-quality control and water-quality control, and to prevent and cope with possible
oil spills with a crisis management plan in place in the event that an oil spill occurs.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the depots
where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of
whether or not the composition may cause explosions, has no place in a densely populated
area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever
origin or otherwise, would definitely cause not only destruction to properties within and among
the neighbouring communities but certainly mass deaths and injuries.
Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of police power against the assailed
ordinance. Suffice it to state that the objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
promote the constituents’ general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the
very basic rights to life, security and safety of the people.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

The councillors of Manila

approved Ordinance No. 8283
reclassifying the area where
the oil depot was located as a
High Intensity
Commercial/Mixed Zone,
which could have effectively
allowed industrial operations
except the oil depots. Mayor
Lim vetoed the ordinance.
Taxing Power
Manila International MIAA is not a GOCC
Airport Authority v CA
GOCCs must either be stock or non-stock corporations vested with functions governmental or
Petitioner MIAA was created proprietary in nature. There is no dispute that they do not have tax exemption privileges. But
under EO 903, a charter clearly, MIAA is an instrumentality of government. It’s not a stock corporation because it has
granting it the power to no capital stock divided into shares unlike normal corporations. Furthermore, it is not a non-
administer the land, stock corporation, which is defined under the Corporation Code as one “where no part of its
improvements and equipment income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees, or officers.” The entity does not
within the NAIA Complex in have members, because it is solely owned by government.
Paranaque City. The law
transferred approximately 600 It is therefore, a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. Under the
hectares of land from the then Administrative Code, an instrumentality is:
Bureau of Air Transportation “any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
to MIAA, with a provision vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
prohibiting MIAA from powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
disposing the lands through charter.”
sale or any other mode unless Having corporate powers does not make an instrumentality a corporation. The test is to see if
approved by the President. it is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. But MIAA is an instrumentality still
exercising both governmental and corporate powers. It can exercise the power of eminent
The Paranaque City domain, police authority, and levying of fees and charges.
Government, upon consulting
Opinion No. 061 of the Office The LGC under Section 111 provides that local governments cannot impose levies to the
Government Corporate following:
Counsel which stated that the
Local Government Code of (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
1991 withdrew the exemption instrumentalities and local government units.
granted by Section 21 of EO
903 in 1983, decided to levy There is no point allowing a local government to tax the national government, and the only
real estate taxes against the exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the
MIAA. MIAA did not choose delivery of essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations.
to pay arguing that it cannot be
subject of a real estate tax. An Furthermore, lands owned by the Republic are part of public domain, outside the commerce
auction was ordered by the of man, unless declared alienable by the President of the Philippines. They are exempt from
Paranaque government. real estate taxes. The only exception is when the land is leased to private entities (as held in
the case of Lung Center of the Philippines v Quezon City). What was granted to MIAA was
MIAA filed a petition for only the beneficial ownership of the properties.
certiorari before the CA, but
lost. Petitioner now files a case
before the SC, arguing that the
real owner of the lands was the
Republic of the Philippines,
and 2) that Section 21 of the
MIAA Charter exempts
MIAA from paying real estate
tax, and that the Local
Government Code did not
withdraw such statutory
privilege. Respondent on the
other argues that MIAA is a
Government Owned and

Controlled Corporation,
which were already stripped
off their tax exemptions under
Section 193 of the LGC.
Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority v Judge
Marcos
MCIAA was created under
RA 6958, which mandated it
to undertake the economical,
efficient and effective control,
management and supervision
of Mactan Airport and Lahug
Airport. Under Section 14 of
said law, it was exempted
from paying real property
taxes imposed by the National
Government or any of its
political subdivisions.
However, the City treasurer of
Cebu, Eustaquio Cesa,
demanded payment on several
parcels of land. The City
government argues that any
exemption granted by Section
14 of RA 6958 was already
withdrawn under Section 193
and 234 of the LGC. On the
other, petitioner argues that it
is an agency and
instrumentality of the National
government, and hence, was
exempted even under Section
133 of the Local Government
Code. Respondent did not
believe petitioner and
contended that it was merely a
GOCC which under Section
193 was not exempted under
any tax levy.
The RTC decided to rule in
favor of respondent city
treasurer
City Government of Quezon
City v Bayan
Telecommunications
Congress enacted RA 3259
which granted respondent
Bayan Telecommunications
franchise to operate radio
stations for domestic
telecommunications. Section
14 of the law provides that the
grantee shall be liable to pay
the same taxes on its real
estate, buildings, and personal
property, exclusive of the
franchise, as other persons or
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in
its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse it to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature. Tax statutes, hence, are strictly construed against the
government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are what we pay for civilized
society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation
and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
The power to tax is primarily vested in Congress. However, LGUs can exercise it “no longer
merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by
Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.”
Section 193 exempts the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs
from taxes, fees or charges from the taxing power of LGUs. However, this must be construed
with Section 232 and 234 of the LGC which tackle specifically realty tax. Section 234 provides
for the institutions exempted from paying real property taxes, and it provides therein that all
GOCCs shall not anymore be exempted from real property taxes, except those enumerated.
Petitioner is undoubtedly a GOCC, and does not anymore enjoy the exemption granted to it
under its charter.
Section 234(a) provides that “real properties owned by the Republic or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof had been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person” are exempt from realty tax. Even granting that MCIAA is an
agency and instrumentality, it does not fall to under Section 234(a), because the concept of the
Republic of the Philippines is narrower.
Lastly, the lands of MCIAA are not merely transferred to it for its beneficial use, but clearly
involved the transfer of ownership of the lands from the Republic to the MCIAA. Given the
absolute conveyance, the land not becomes taxable because it is owned by a GOCC.
Notes:
 Regardless if the GOCC performs proprietary or governmental functions, its
privilege of tax exemption was already withdrawn under the LGC.
 Also, Section 133 exempts agencies and instrumentalities from tax and charges
“unless provided herein”. This must be construed to mean “unless provided in this
code”
 Categories of exemptions of real property:
1) Ownership exemptions
2) Character exemptions
3) Usage exemptions- actual, direct and exclusive use
The legislative intent expressed in the phrase “exclusive of this franchise” means that there are
2 sets of properties:
1) Those actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications
business,
2) Or those properties not so used.
Clearly, the phrase aimed to exempt the respondent from paying taxes connected with the
franchise, and the LGUs cannot overturn such legislation.
“As may be recalled, the taxing power of local governments under both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law.” With the 1987 and the Local
Government Code’s taking effect, the LGUs not have a power to tax and any exemption before
was already withdrawn. However, RA 7633 amended the original franchise, reproducing the
original Section 14 of RA 3259. Thus, the exemption was restored.
The power of LGUs to tax is still limited because the power to tax is primarily vested in
Congress. In case of a clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature and the

corporations are now or
hereafter may be required by
law to pay. The Local
Government Code was
subsequently passed. Months
after the LGC took effect, RA
7633 was enacted, which
provides the same provision in
Section 14 of RA 3259.
Petitioner, using its Revenue
Code and the LGC as basis,
charged real property tax
against respondent Bayan
Telecomm, arguing that the
privileges granted to it has
been withdrawn by the Local
Government Code. Further,
Section 232 explicitly states
that levying real property was
one of the powers granted to
LGUs in the Metropolitan
Manila Area not hereinafter
specifically exempted.
Drilon v Lim
Section 187 of the Local
Government Code is the issue
in this case, where the
Secretary of Justice may
review on appeal the
constitutionality or legality of
tax ordinances or revenue
measures. Pursuant to such,
four oil companies and a
taxpayer, asked that
Ordinance No. 7794 or the
Manila Revenue Code be
declared null and void for non-
compliance with the
prescribed procedure.
Secretary Drilon agreed, but
upon appeal of his decision
before the RTC, the RTC
revoked his resolution,
holding that the procedural
requirements of the law were
observed, and that Section 187
was unconstitutional.
Batangas City v Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum
Corporation
Petitioner Batangas City is an
LGU with the capacity to sue
and be sued under its Charter
and under section 22 of the
LGC. Petitioner in this case
levied business taxes against
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution, that of the Congress shall
prevail. In fact, Section 232 granting LGUs in Metro Manila to tax real property has an “not
hereinafter specifically exempted” clause. This means that when Congress exempts an entity,
it will prevail over the LGUs power to tax.
In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the
inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality
of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When
he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon
did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what
the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for
its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was
that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was to determine if the petitioners
were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary
Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control
but of mere supervision.
Section 143 of the Local Government Code grants to LGUs the power to tax any commerce
under its jurisdiction. However, this must be viewed in light of exceptions provided under the
same law. Section 133 of the LGC in paragraph (h) provides that LGUs cannot impose:
(h) excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges
on petroleum products.
Clearly, there are two classes. The second class refers to petroleum products, and there is
blanket bank on any taxes, fees or charges. The ban on excise tax applies only to products
enumerated under the NIRC.

Corporation as a manufacturer
or distributor, and additional
assessment to pay for its
Mayor’s Permit Fee.
Respondent argues that as a
manufacturer and distributor
of petroleum products, it
cannot be taxed even though it
has petroleum products in the
jurisdiction of the LGU. The
RTC ordered the payment of
the business tax but not the
Mayor’s Tax. Upon appeal to
the CTA, the CTA ordered
that no payment be made.
City Government of Quezon
City v Judge Ericta
Quezon City passed
Ordinance No. 6118 which
demanded that at least 6% of
the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are
paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at
least 5 years prior to their
death (Section 9). Quezon
City Engineer wrote to
Himlayang Pilipino that it
must comply with such
requirement. However, private
respondents argue that such is
in violation of the
Constitution.
City of Cebu v Spouses
Apolonio and Dedamo
City of Cebu filed for
expropriation of parcels of
land occupied by Spouses
Apolonio and Dedamo before
the RTC. It argued that the use
of the locations will be for the
construction of a public road
which shall serve as
access/relief of Gorordo
Avenue. Petitioner deposited
15% of the fair market value
before the PNB in order to
take possession of the property
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
The omnibus grant of power to LGUs under Section 143 of the LGC cannot overcome the
specific exception or exemption in Section 133(h) of the same Code. This is in accord with the
rule on statutory construction that special and specific provision prevail over general ones. A
special and specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective of their relevant
positions in the statute. Generalia specialibus non derogant.
Eminent Domain
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of
power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The
respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's
police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance
per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the
city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes
the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside
certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell
to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities
with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are
made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
Note:
"The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 Phil.
33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396).
A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It’s in a
nature of a compulsory sale to the State of private property for public use or purpose.
Government must pay just compensation.
In the case at bar, the LGC is the applicable law. RA 7160 Section 19 expressly provides that
the basis of the valuation must be at the time of actual taking.
The ruling in NAPOCOR v CA, which provides the filing of the complaint shall be the basis
of the valuation, applies as a general rule, but not in this exception. When the court fixed the
value of the property as of the date it was taking, the decision of the court must be upheld.

pursuant to Section 19 of RA
7160. Initially, respondents
did not agree, but a
compromise was entered into.
Trial court appointed three
commissioners (1 from each
party and 1 appointed by the
court). The commissioners
used as basis the fair market
value of the land during the
time of taking in 1994.
Petitioner argues that the basis
must be at the time of the filing
of the complaint in 1993.
Republic v Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 146587, 2002)
Petitioner instituted
expropriation proceedings
against Luis Santos in order to
condemn a parcel of land
located in Bulacan, which is
contiguous to MacArthur
Highway to be utilized for the
Philippine Information
Agency. A provisional deposit
was made in 1969. In 1979,
the trial court issued an order
approving the condemnation
proceedings, ordering
payment of P6.00 per sq/m
with interest from 1969.
However, it appears that the
national government failed to
pay. Meanwhile, President
Estrada issued Proclamation
No. 22, transferring the part of
the property to the Bulacan
State University, and another
part for carabao propagation.
Heirs of Luis Santos argued
that petitioner be made to pay
at P5,000 per sq/m or regain
possession over the land. The
RTC granted the petition to
ask for the return of the land.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public
use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property.[10]
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving
balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand,
by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.[11] In determining
“public use,” two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the actual use by
the public, and the second is public advantage or benefit.[12] It is also useful to view the matter
as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon
the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the
individual may be devoted
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a
significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State
University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by
petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose
originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no
moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely,
petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter
and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which,
decidedly, it is.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the
pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya [14] where the
unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in
question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of
Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of
limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under
Republic Act No. 7160[15] cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing
power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to
wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but
even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of
eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would
want it to be.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides
not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the
property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are
bound.[20] Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised
dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it
as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the
1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-
execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents
ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller
in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem
proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.[21] After condemnation, the paramount title
is in the public under a new and independent title;[22] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title
against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Reclassification of Lands
Department of Agrarian Banana and coconut lands are ordered to be distributed.
Reform v Saranggani
Agricultural Co, Inc. As regards the second issue, DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997, or the Omnibus
Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses
Respondents are owners of prescribes the guidelines for land use conversion:
lands in question which have
V. POLICIES AND GUIDELINES
been covered by the
reclassification made by the
“Conversion may be allowed if at the time of the application, the lands are reclassified as
municipal zoning ordinance
commercial, industrial, residential or other non-agricultural in the new or revised town plans
and comprehensive land use
promulgated by the local government unit (LGU) and approved by the Housing and Land Use
plan by the Municipality of
Regulatory Board (HLURB) or by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988, in
Abel. The municipality, being
accordance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, as implemented by MC No. 54, and Executive
the new seat of the provincial
Order No. 72, Series of 1993[17] of the Office of the President.”
government, experienced
reclassification of some of its
In connection with the afore-stated administrative order, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160,
lands from agricultural to non-
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, empowers the local government
agricultural. Hence,
units to reclassify agricultural lands:
respondent in this case filed
for a land use conversion of a
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance
total of 1,005 hectares of
passed by the Sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the
lands. The Sarangani Agrarian
reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or
Reform Beneficiaries
disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
Association opposed such
sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where
land use conversion
the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or
application stating that they
industrial purposes, as determined by the Sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
were forced to sign a waiver of
reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area
rights, and that at least
at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
158.0672 hectares were
planted with bananas and
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%);
coconuts, hence, must still be
subjected to the CARL. SACI
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent (10%), and
on the other, argues that the
land use conversion be
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%); Provided further, That
approved so that it can align
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act No.
itself to the development plan
6657, otherwise known as “The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,” shall not be affected
of the municipality, planning
by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be
to build a socialized housing
governed by Section 65 of said Act.
subdivision and power
generation facilities. DAR
(c) The local government units shall in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their
denied approval insofar as the
respective comprehensive land use plans enacted though zoning ordinances which shall be the
158.0672 hectares are
primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the
concerned, and also deferred
requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken
approval for the rest. CA
into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
reversed the trial court’s
decision and said that the
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any
conversion order must be
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
issued.
Memorandum Circular No. 54 “Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No.
7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and
Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses” issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the scope and limitations on the power of
the cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all
ordinances authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and
approval of the province in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB
for highly urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with Executive Order No.
72, Series of 1993, thus:

Sangalang v IAC
Mayor Nemesio Yabut of
Makati City ordered the
opening up of Jupiter Street
and Orbit Street to vehicular
traffic, and necessarily the
demolition of the gates used
by Bel Air village to make the
roads exclusive to its
residents. The mayor justified
the act by invoking the public
welfare, but petitioners argue
that their property rights have
been violated without just
compensation. The property
was initially owned by Ayala
Corp and donated to the Bel
Air Villagers Association.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
SECTION 4. Use of the comprehensive land use plans[19] and ordinances as primary
reference documents in land use conversions. - Pursuant to RA 6657 and EO 129-A, actions
on applications for land use conversions on individual landholdings shall remain as the
responsibility of DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference documents the
comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinance passed upon and approved by the
LGUs concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy.
The CA is correct in declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and
the ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents which is included in the
comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be automatically granted non-
coverage.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands explicitly states that
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.” Thus, where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.
Closure and Opening of Roads
As we asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of
the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. [13] We also uphold
the opening of Orbit Street for the same rationale.
There is no merit in BAVA's claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets
amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just
compensation.[14] There is no taking of property involved here. The act of the Mayor now
challenged is, rather, in the concept of police power. In the case of Philippine Association of
Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,[15] we said:
Unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just
compensation:
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of
health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he
can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified.[
However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably.[18] But the burden of showing that it
is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.[19
Our considered opinion is that BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Street
was unjustified, or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. The fact that it has led to the loss of
privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipality's effort to ease vehicular
traffic in Makati. Certainly, the duty of a local executive is to take care of the needs of the
greater number, in many cases, at the expense of the minority.
The next question is whether or not the Mayor, by himself, is vested with the power to order
the demolition so questioned, without the backing of a proper ordinance. On this score, the
Mayor submitted in evidence Municipal Ordinance No. 17, as amended by Resolution No.
139, dated November 21, 1948, requiring a Mayor's permit to erect construction anywhere in
Makati.
The Court is convinced that Ordinance No. 17 is a valid justification for the questioned act of
the Mayor. The fact that some time had elapsed before the Mayor acted, can not render the
ordinance uneforceable or void. At any rate, the gate, the destruction of which opened Orbit
Street, has the character of a public nuisance, in the sense that it "hinders or impairs the use of
property," which the Civil Code disposes of as follows:
Article 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
1) Prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance
2) Civil action
3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

MMDA v Bel Air Village
Association
MMDA through its Chairman
sent a letter to the Bel Air
Village Association, asking
that they open Neptune Street
to the public, and that the
MDDA is planning to
demolish the wall separating
the subdivision from Kalayaan
Avenue. Petitioner filed a case
before the court, arguing that
the MMDA has no authority to
do so. MMDA submits that it
is an agent of the State
endowed with police power,
invoking the cases in
Sangalang v IAC where the
power to open up roads was
upheld.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
In addition, under Article 701 of the Code, summary abatement may be carried out by the
Mayor himself.
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local
political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said
services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila."[26]
There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the
following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste
disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal,
zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection
and pollution control; and (7) public safety. Transport management includes the following:
"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination,
and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and
promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass
transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration
and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services
and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in
Metropolitan Manila;"[27]
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic
services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and
monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of
persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of
road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering
services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system
in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized
"to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single
ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority."[30] It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar.
Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the
MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained
in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its
president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street.
Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of
roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing
the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and
traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an
express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree
(P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers
which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc. v JAC Liner
The Sangguniang Panlunsod
of Lucena and its Mayor
enacted Ordinance No. 1631
and Ordinance No. 1778,
establishing a Lucena Grand
Terminal, granted a franchise
to construct and operate a
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following
powers:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and provide
services common to the area;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities and
municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any violation
thereof which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both
such fine and imprisonment for a single offense;
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan.
This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay
captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President. The
Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances,
resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers.
All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were
subject to the MMC's approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the
power to appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully
possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities
and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for
the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was
limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local
boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local
government units technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any
semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by
the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the
comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments
accordingly."[49]
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority
to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bill's
presentation to Congress. Thus:
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political
subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.[56] R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted
to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an
official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a
cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned
to him by the President,[57] whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises
supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject
ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the local government may be considered as having
properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise
stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.[18]
As in De la Cruz[29] and Lupangco,[30] the ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.

common bus-jeep terminal in
the city of Lucena. It was
granted for a period of 25
years, and prohibited the City
Government of Lucena from
granting to any third party any
privilege similar to what was
granted to the Grand
Terminal. As for Ordinance
No. 1778, it prohibited all
buses, mini-buses, out-of town
passenger jeeps from entering
the city, and can only unload
and load passengers outside
the city proper. Respondent
JAC Liner in this case argues
that the grant of the sole
franchise to Lucena was
invalid, that the prohibition to
the City Government to grant
any other franchise is a
violation of the Local
Government Code, and that it
is invalid and oppressive.
City of Manila v Laguio, Jr.
The City of Manila enacted an
ordinance which prohibits the
following from operating in
the Ermita, Malate area:
1) Sauna Parlors
2) Massage Parlors
3) Karaoke Bars
4) Beer houses
5) Night Clubs
6) Day Clubs
7) Super Clubs
8) Discotheques
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject
the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly
found by the appellate court. [31] What should have been done was to determine exactly where
the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
From the memorandum[33] filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate
loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the
conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the
city streets
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the
outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court
has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled
to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same
denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the
outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court
has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled
to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same
denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate
business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or
comfort of the community. But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged
indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se.
Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without
judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[37] this Court held:
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of
copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance
per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a
nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Note: The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited (Lim v Pacquing).
Legislative Power
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.[37]
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the
Constitution and to the laws.[38] The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass
muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.
That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to
the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

9) Cabarets legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate
10) Dance Halls cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.[39]
11) Motels
12) Inns Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due
They were made to convert to process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action.[54] Case
the following kinds of law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very
business, despite the fact that much on the level of scrutiny used.[55] For example, if a law is in an area where only rational
the Ermita, Malate area was basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related
declared to be a commercial to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as
zone: for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only
1) Curio or antique if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose
shop
2) Souvenir shops There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs
3) Handicrafts display when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking
centers occurs when the government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the
4) Art galleries property.[80]
5) Records and music
shops What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is
6) Restaurants a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that
7) Coffee shops interferes with reasonable expectations for use.[84] A regulation that permanently denies all
8) Flower shops economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent
9) Music lounge and to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner
sing along acquired the land make the use prohibitable.[85] When the owner of real property has been
restaurants called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that
10) Theaters is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.[86]

The Malate Tourist
Development Corporation
(MTDC) which operates
Victoria Court in Malate
questioned the ordinance for
violating the Constitution and
the General laws granting
police power to LGUs
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall
short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred,
depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations and the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the
purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole.[87]

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to
a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without
just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes
may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in
the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which
have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this
particular taking.

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No
reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as
it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the
Ordinance.

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment
or amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is
provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod,
as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22
of this Code, and shall:

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or

amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public
dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants,
or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement
or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to
legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still
withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court
in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila[106] that:

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means
and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be
construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to
regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the
mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. [107]

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public
dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as
found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend
"such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend
to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"
are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers
of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to
emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in
which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify
being put together in a single enumeration or paragraph.[111] These powers, therefore, should
not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power
of regulation, suppression and prohibition

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or

entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public
dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be
included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly
those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of
amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those
which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited
powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt
or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against
the City Council.[113] Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all
others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and
the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such
statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come
under the rule of strict construction.[114]

Social Justice Society v On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city
Atienza
Refer to previous discussion
on this case.
Provisions applicable to Elective and Appointive Local Officials
Republic v Rambuyong
Alfredo Chu filed a case for
collection of a sum of money
against the National Power
Corporation which was raffled
to the RTC of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. Atty. Rambuyong,
who was then Vice Mayor of
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay,
appeared as the counsel for
Chu. Republic assails the
appearance of Atty.
Rambuyong and argues that he
could not do so, because RA
7160 prohibits sanggunian
members to appeal as counsel
before any court wherein any
office, agency, or
instrumentality of the
government is the adverse
party.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate
business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention.[119]
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That
these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section
of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned
proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels
and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same
Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment,"
"synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include
"theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can
be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities.
It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different
parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place,
its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous,
even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under
consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same
principle applies.[120]
mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." [20] One of
these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the
courts.[21] He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,[22] we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.[23]
Local Officials
The provisions of law relevant to the present case state:
Sec. 90.[10] Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation, other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours:
Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party;
Sec. 5.[11] Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
(e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal provision or
jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where the
controversies take place. (Emphasis supplied.)

Catu v Rellosa
Complainant Wilfredo M.
Catu is a co-owner of a lot
erected in San Andres, Malate,
Manila. His mother and
brother, Regina Catu and
Antonio Catu, filed an
ejectment case against
Elizabeth Diaz-Catu and
Antonio Pastor, one of the
tenants in the building. Prior to
such, they underwent
conciliation proceedings
before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, headed by
Punong barangay Rellosa, the
private respondent. The
conciliation failed so the case
was filed. Rellosa represented
the defendants in the case, so
complainant argues that he
violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility of
lawyers, and RA 6713 which
prohibits officials to practice
law while serving in office.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Sec. 2.[12] General Terms Defined. — Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a
whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:
(4) "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
(10) Instrumentality — refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and unambiguous. It categorically
provides that the term "instrumentality" includes government-owned or controlled
corporations. Hence there is no room for construction. All that has to be done is to apply the
law as called for by the circumstances of the case. It is not disputed that the NPC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Therefore following Section 2 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the NPC is clearly an instrumentality of the government.
It is also significant to point out that in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.[14] the Court stated that "[t]he
NPC is a government instrumentality with the enormous task of undertaking development of
hydroelectric generation of power and production of electricity from other sources, as well as
the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve the quality of life of the
people pursuant to the State policy embodied in Section [9], Article II of the 1987
Constitution."
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service
and in connection “with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.” In PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting “engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service.”
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession “unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions.” This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees. For
elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 [12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. – (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members
of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or
any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective
local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by
elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general
law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex
specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are
the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan

Flores v Drilon
Mayor Richard Gordon was
appointed as the chief
executive officer of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority,
because the law expressly
provides that for the first year
of its effectivity, the mayor of
Olongapo shall be the CEO of
SBMA. Petitioner in this case
who claim to be taxpayers and
employees of the US Facility
in Subic Zambales, filed a case
arguing that he is prohibited
from being appointed as a
member of the SBMA, being
an elective official.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the
sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the
sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service.
They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official
duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours. While, as already discussed, certain local elective
officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly
subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the
sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the Department
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission
of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel
for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do. He is guilty for violating no Canon 6.03 but Rule
1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code.
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
"No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
“Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.”
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services.
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a
local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
office. But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the the
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the
fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not
the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on
its validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its
validity.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording
of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official
to other government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g.,
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be
appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of
Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary,

This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making
the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of
Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex
officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio"
would have been used.

Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso was stated,
Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that "if the Conference Committee just said 'the Mayor shall
be the Chairman’, then that should foreclose the issue. It is a legislative choice.” The Senator
took a view that the constitutional proscription against appointment of elective officials may
have been sidestepped if Congress attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City
instead of directing the President to appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this view
of Senator Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to be appointive, thus
nibbling in the bud the argument that they are ex officio.

Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the
President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman
of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under
the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress)
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power
of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the
discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the
officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or
indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications
prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the
first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly
an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other,
can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a
perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an
encroachment on his prerogative.
Qualifications/disqualifications
Dominador Jalosjos v The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction
COMELEC (G.R. No. by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition
193237/193536, Oct. 9, 2012) under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void
from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his
Dominador Jalosjos and certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for
Agapito Cardino were Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio,
candidates for Mayor of Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del position of Mayor.
Norte for the May 2010
elections. Jalosjos ran for the The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the
third term but Cardio argues COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc.
that he is not eligible, because The dissenting opinions erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to disqualification under
his certificate of candidacy Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and apply the rule on succession under the Local
was void due to material Government Code.
misrepresentation committed

in violation of Section 78 of
the OEC. Jalosjos argues that
although he was convicted for
robbery and sentence to
prision mayor, he has been
granted probation. Cardino
refutes and argued that he has
not yet served his sentence,
and the probation is
immaterial, considering that a
conviction of a crime
punishable by prision mayor
also includes the accessory
penalty of perpetual special
disqualification.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy “that he is
eligible for said office.” A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public
office.[14] If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a
criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section
40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is
also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,[15] the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of “deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of the temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article
32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that “the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,”
which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering
from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so
run.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term
of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification.
The word “perpetually” and the phrase “during the term of the sentence” should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word “perpetually” refers to the
perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase “during the term of the sentence”
refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the
temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging
their durations into one period, states that such duration is “according to the nature of said
penalty” — which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary
special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict
is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him
to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word “eligible” means having the right to run
for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to
run for public office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,[17] the false
material representation may refer to “qualifications or eligibility.”
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which perpetual
special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a petition under
Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as
crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only to election offenses under the Omnibus
Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised Penal Code. There is absolutely nothing
in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the crime of robbery as one of the
offenses enumerated in this Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to
offenses under the Omnibus Election Code.
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four statements: (1)
a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement
that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a
statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement
of the candidate’s allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. [20]

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of

candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.[21] Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for
Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate
from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility
existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only
one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received the
highest number of votes.

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-
placer is disqualified or declared ineligible[22] should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had
to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took
effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a
candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If
a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the
election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. [23] If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes
for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from
the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for
the same position.
Romeo G. Jalosjos v Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with those
COMELEC (G.R. No. already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize
205033, June 18, 2013) and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.

Romeo Jalosjos was convicted
of rape, and was sentenced to
imprisonment with the
accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification.
However, Gloria Arroyo
commuted his sentence to 16
years, 3 months and 3 days. He
was discharged in 2009. He
again registered as voter in
Barangay Tetuan,
Zamboanga. In 2013, he filed
for candidicay for the
mayoralty position of
Zamboanga City.
On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates,
provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce
the following effects:

He argues that COMELEC
cannot deny and cancel due
course his COC without a
valid petition. Furthermore, he
submits that his perpetual
absolute disqualification has
been amended by Section 40
of the Local Government
Code, which allows official to
run for office again 2 years
after the end of their sentence.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be
elected to such office.
Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes that
the conflict between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while
Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse
of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed
to cover cases wherein the law[26] imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,[27]
which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.
In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run
for elective office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based
on the presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other
base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office,[30] as the same
partakes of a privilege which the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most
likely to exercise it for the common good.[31]
Accordingly, Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general application
and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of
lex specialis derogat generali – general legislation must give way to special legislation on
the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the
special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefor should prevail
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Notes:
T]he term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially
management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the
execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity
to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution
thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which applies to the action,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature. (Villarosa v COMELEC)
The foregoing matter is not without established precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the
Court held that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in
view of a candidate’s disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is
subsumed under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of
elections. Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu
proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-
judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not
exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume
jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its
divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in
cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact
of which had already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the
COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need
for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.
Lest it be misunderstood, while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one’s CoC
generally necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions commenced
through a petition based on either Sections 12[20] or 78[21] of the OEC, or Section 40[22] of the

Aratea v COMELEC
Romeo Lonzanida and Estela
Antipolo were mayoralty
candidates of San Antonio,
Zambales in 2010. Antipolo
filed a petitioner under Section
78 to disqualify Lonzanida
and to deny due ourse or to
cancel his COC on the ground
that he had serve for 3
consecutive terms, and
committed material
misrepresentation by stating in
his COC that he was eligible to
run for office. COMELEC
cancelled his COC. Lonzanida
filed an MR which was
pending when the 2010
elections were held. He
garnered the highest number
of votes. Meanwhile,
petitioner Aratea became the
Vice Mayor. After the
elections, Lonzanida’s MR
was denied on the ground that
he had served three
consecutive terms already, and
was in fact also convicted by
final judgement of 10 counts
of falsification. Aratea asked
for legal opinion from the
DILG, and the DILG said that
he can be sworn in as the
mayor in light of the vacancy.
Antipolo, however, argues
that because the remedy
sought was cancellation of the
COC, Lonzanida should not
have been considered a
candidate. The votes cast upon
him being stray, Estela
Antipolo, though the 2nd
placer, should have been
declared the mayor.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final and executory
judgments – as when a candidate’s disqualification to run for public office is based on a final
conviction – such exercise falls within the COMELEC’s administrative functions, as in this
case.
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
A candidate for mayor in the local elections, was thus required to provide 12 items of
information in the certificate of candidacy:[22] name; nickname or stage name; gender; age;
place of birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil status; residence/address;
profession or occupation; post office address for election purposes; locality of which the
candidate is a registered voter; and period of residence in the Philippines before 10 May
2010. The candidate also certifies four statements: a statement that the candidate is a natural
born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident
of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the candidate is eligible for the
office he seeks election; and a statement of the candidate's allegiance to the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines.[23] The certificate of candidacy should also be under oath,
and filed within the period prescribed by law.
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks
election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing x x x is eligible for said office." The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate's freedom of choice, [29] is
found both in the Constitution[30] and the law.[31] After being elected and serving for three
consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same
office in the next regular election[32] because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to
run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word
"eligible"[33] means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.
The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was
discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections[40] with respect to the applicable prescriptive
period. Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify
petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional Vice-Governor of the Autonomous
Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age. The petition was filed
16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the last day
of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalum's petition was one based on
false representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under Section 68. Hence,
the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78 should be strictly applied:
It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to he stated in
a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of
the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who
discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate
committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap
between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after
the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation
of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who
would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for
the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting
candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission
sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and
should be remedied.
The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification
under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars
him from running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section
39 of the [Local Government Code]." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law
what is not found in the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification
under said Section. The grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under Section 68 are

Japzon v COMELEC
Petitioner Manuel B. Japzon
and private respondent Ty
were candidates for the Office
of the Mayor of the
Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon filed a petition to
disqualify/cancel Ty’s COC
on the ground of material
misrepresentation, arguing
that Ty became a US citizen
for 25-years and abandoned
her domicile of origin, and
never became domiciled to the
Philippines despite his
reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225.
Japzon argues that Ty had
been going back and forth the
US even within the alleged 1-
year residency he submits to
have been complied with. Ty,
on the other, argues that when
he applied for passport, she
already indicated that he lived
in Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur. She also
filed and signed his
Community Tax Certificate.
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specifically enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to the specific enumeration in
Section 68 and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the dissenting opinions add to the
enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term limit rule and falsification under the
Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in the enumeration in Section 68.
The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanida's possession of a disqualifying condition (violation
of the three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification under Section 68. Section 68
is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited
acts under the Omnibus Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or immigrant
status in a foreign country. Any other false representation regarding a material fact should be
filed under Section 78, specifically under the candidate's certification of his eligibility. In
rejecting a violation of the three-term limit as a condition for eligibility, the dissenting opinions
resort to judicial legislation, ignoring the verba legis doctrine and well-established
jurisprudence on this very issue.
Note:
Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is
under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual
special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The
final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the
convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public
office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close
scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of
the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes
no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does
it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats
citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general
intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the
same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991, Section 39 of which lays down the following qualifications for
local elective officials:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where
a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may
be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."[18]
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice). In Coquilla,[19] the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to
acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself
admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily
abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile
of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.

Sobejana-Condon v The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of
COMELEC
Petitioner is a natural-born
Filipino who became a
naturalized Australian citizen
by virtue of her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas
Condon. She filed an
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As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty's reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily
regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty
merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his
residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it
shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are
synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner
Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980's in Barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of
the EDSA People's Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until
favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an
abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention
to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Ty's intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted
himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his
address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A,
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007
local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has
previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually
present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine
of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a
place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support
and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Finally, when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an
elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law
would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate
should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate,
the will of the voters
candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo
warranto before the RTC.
if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition
within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another
chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within

application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship before
the Philippine embassy
pursuant to Section 3 of RA
9225. However, she only filed
an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship. She ran in the
2007 elections for mayor of
Caba, La Union but lost. She
ran for Vice Mayor in 2010
and won. Private respondents
argue in a quo warranto before
the RTC that she is not eligible
to hold the position of mayor,
for failure to file a
renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenhip before any
public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
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ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code.[17]
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic.
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same
was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,[21] we
declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot
run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also
expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to
administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign
citizenship.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural- born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
The “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” must be deemed a formal requirement only
with respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the
effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their
citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court
to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office
has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or
thing, that one’s statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making
the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The
legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false.[28]
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial
purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from
government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise.
Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already
deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the
existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an
expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates
wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the
time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held

Cordora v COMELEC
Gaudencio Cordora argues
that Gustavo Tambunting
lacked the citizenship and
residency requirements under
the law. Tambunting argues
that he was born out of an
American father and Filipino
mother, and was granted US
citizenship in Honolulu
Hawaii merely because he had
acquired it by birth. He argues
that his possession of
American passport did not
mean renunciation of Filipino
citizenship.
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by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the
acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed
and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
“satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.
This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do
so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we
were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No.
9225, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require.
To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of
this Republic
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the
filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship,[33] such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition
of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Note: See effect of the underlined phrase in the last paragraph to the doctrine laid down in
Mercado v Manzano. Did RA 9225 really supersede the doctrine in Valles v COMELEC and
Mercado v Manzano? (as cited in footnotes).
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither
does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative)
because of his father's citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents' differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that
Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento's observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The
process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which
Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is
Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of
candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not
disqualify him from running for public office
Instances where one may be born with dual citizenship at birth:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. “it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.”
The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and
COMELEC,[13] Velasco v. COMELEC,[14] and Japzon v. COMELEC,[15] all of which involve
natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter
ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born
Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

Kida v Senate of the
Philippines
See facts from previous
discussion of this case.
Term of Office
Abundo v COMELEC
Abundo vied for the position
of municipal mayor of Viga
Catanduanes. In 2001 and
2007, he emerged as the
winner. However, in 2004, he
initially lost because Jose
Torres won the ballot.
However, upon filing of an
electoral protest, he won and
served the remaining period of
a little over one year and one
month. In 2010, Mayor
Abundo and Jose Torres faced
each other again, but Torres
filed a case of quo warranto
against Abundo, who won
against him by 219 votes.
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Cordora's reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover,
residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing
in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,[16] and is not dependent upon
citizenship.
Manner and Date of Elections
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among
others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number
of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections - whether national or local - to
once every three years.[12] This intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms
of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local
Government."
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of
time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law
“does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service
that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit
rule.”[32]
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of
disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected
and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they
view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive
as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these
events or causes: succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive
suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest,
declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation
of a non- candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of
law, and other analogous causes.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr.
finds application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to
the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and he was
only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the
election protest.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of
disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared loser during
the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the
rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

both unseated toward the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted
his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term.

The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the “monopolization of
political power” and prevent elected officials from breeding “proprietary interest in their
position”[60] but also to “enhance the people’s freedom of choice.”[61] In the words of Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, “while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of
power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly
curtailed.”[62]

There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the
decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May
9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and
one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot
be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was
otherwise entitled.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until
May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold
office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve
the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold
such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and
exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the
protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year
and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The
reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.

The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend
themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll
body’s determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as
mayor during the pendency of the election protest. It cannot be overemphasized that pending
the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary
constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the
mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004— the start of the
term—until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office,
Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest.
Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1,
2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest,
Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.

We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the
instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or
disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening period
of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said
to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly
proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office.
For another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title
to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not
have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest
accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to
the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective
interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the
remaining term.

As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the “law contemplates a

rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular
local government unit.”[75] Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question

Borja v COMELEC
Private respondent Jose Capco
was the vice-mayor of Pateros
in 1988, with the term ending
in 1992. In September 2, 1989
he became mayor by operation
of law because of the death of
Cesar Borja. He was elected
for mayor once in 1992, and
again in 1995. He sought to
run again in 1998, but
petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr.
sought for his disqualification,
on the ground that he had
served for three consecutive
terms. Capco won for mayor
in that election, hence, this
petition.
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that during the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or
authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes.
Notes:
Issues concerning the jurisprudence discussed:
1) assumption of office by operation of law
2) recall election
3) conversion of a municipality into a city
4) period of preventive suspension
5) election protest
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness
of terms and/or involuntary interruption:
1.When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed
the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position
is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued
stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although
he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his
term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for
any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said
official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not
constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
The purpose of which is to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only
policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of
enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office
regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election or by
succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional
provision in question.
The members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that
after serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for

Aldovino v COMELEC
Asilo has become the
councilor of Lucena City for
three consecutive terms
(1998-2007). However, in
2005, he was preventively
suspended for 90 days upon
order by the COMELEC
because of a criminal case
field against him. However,
the Sandiganbayan ordered
the lifting of the suspension
order. In 2007, he again filed a
certificate of candidacy for the
same position, despite the
three-term limit. Petitioner
Aldovino argues that he
cannot run for a fourth term, as
his candidacy for a fourth term
allegedly violated the three-
term limit rule under Section
8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b)
of RA 7160. COMELEC
dismissed the case stating that
because of the preventive
suspension, Asilo was not able
to serve his third term.
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local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner
Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in
the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned
against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of the
proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution provision
recognizing peoples power.
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the
accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea
of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they
wish to govern them be preserved.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars
members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three
terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired
term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the
purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the
House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or
is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On
the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional
provision is to limit the right to be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired
term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment
of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds
another confirms the theory.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to
be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
To be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official,
has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.[2] Doctrinally,
however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with
the application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official acquired by
succession.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - three years - during which
an official has title to office and can serve.
The "limitation" under this first branch of the constitutional provision provision is expressed
in the negative - "no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This
formulation - no more than three consecutive terms - is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to "serve. . . three
consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is clear - reference is to the term, not to the
service that a public official may render. In other words, the limitation refers to the term.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of service
for a full term" for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of
what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase "voluntary
renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional intent.
The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies an act of
surrender based on the surenderee's own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to
office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not
considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the
application of the term limitation.
We conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-
term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for

Adormeo v COMELEC
Petitioner Raymundo
Adormeo and Ramon Talaga
filed their respective COCs for
mayor of Lucena City in 2001.
Talaga was then incumbent
mayor. Talaga was elected in
1992 and 1995. In 1998, he
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an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X
and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official's continuous stay
in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an
example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Section 8, Article X - both by structure and substance - fixes an elective official's term of office
and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no
less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should
be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full
continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The "voluntary renunciation"
it speaks of refers only to the elective official's voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of
title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of power or
authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of
them.
Preventive suspension - whether under the Local Government Code,[17] the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman Act[19] - is an interim remedial measure to
address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally,
where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or
liability.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing
the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate
and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual
finding of guilt or liability.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office beyond
three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the
suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the
lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary
act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have
voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this
perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary
renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to
office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective
office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is - by its very nature - the exact opposite
of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual
delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by
nature, different and non-comparable.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat,
however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let
it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as
it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires
an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective
interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation
that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that
private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly
two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat
in the 1998 elections.

lost to Bernard Tagarao.
However, a recall was ordered
to he ran again and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao
until June 30, 2001.
Adormeo argues that Talaga
had served three consecutive
terms, but private respondent
argues that his term from
1998-2001 only lasted for 13
months and 18 days.
Socrates v COMELEC
Mayor Edward Hagedorn of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan has
served from 1992, 1995 and
1998 as mayor. He did not run
for any position in 2001, so
Mayor Socrates was elected as
such. However, in September
7, 2002, a recall resolution was
ordered against Mayor
Socrates. Hagedorn filed a
COC for mayor, but Socrates
argues that he is barred from
doing so.
Latasa v COMELEC
Petitioner Arsenio Latasa was
elected mayor of the
municipality of Digos, in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998. During his third term,
Digos was declared a
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Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs.
COMELEC, we said:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers
of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance
with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
“Section 43. Term of Office. –
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.”
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the
service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for
a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election
like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive
terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity
of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits
is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as
the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate re-election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run
in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The
immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the
regular elections in 2001.
An elective local official is not barred from running again in for same local government post,
unless two conditions concur:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the
same local government post, and
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The Supreme Court notes that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did
not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos and

component city, to be known
as the City of Digos. Upon the
change, he stopped from
serving as municipal mayor of
Digos. However, the charter
provided that he was
authorized to hold over as the
new city mayor of Digos. In
the 2001 elections, he ran
again as mayor of Digos. But,
respondent Romeo Sunga,
also a candidate for mayor,
argued that he cannot run
anymore for that particular
election.
Ong v Alegre
Joseph Stanley Alegre and
petitioner Francis Ong filed
their respective COCs for the
position of mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in
2004. Alegre argues that Ong
must be disqualified for
violating the three-term limit.
Ong has already become
mayor from terms 1995, 1998
and 2001 for the same
position. However, in 1998-
2001, the RTC of Daet
declared his election void for
said term. The decision was
promulgated after Ong had
already served as mayor from
1998-2001.
Melanio Mendoza v No. The victor of a recall election who dislodged the incumbent merely serves the unexpired
COMELEC (2002)
Leonardo Roman was elected
Governor of Bataan in 2001.
Petitioners Mendoza and
Ibarra seek to have him
disqualified for violating the
three-term limit. Roman
apparently has served as
Governor from 1986-1988 as
the appointed OIC Governor,
and 1998-1992 as duly elected
Governor. He did not run in
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also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their
powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal
mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
The Supreme Court believes that Petitioner Latasa did involuntarily relinquish his office as
municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion.
However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as
city mayor.
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes
are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to
be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes to be declared elected. The same merely results in making the winning
candidates election a nullity. In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private
respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa. The second placer is
obviously not the choice of the people in that particular election. In any event, a permanent
vacancy in the contested office is thereby created which should be filled by succession.
The RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in the election protest case that it was the opponent
of Ong (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and was the legally elected mayor of
San Vicente. However, the decision was promulgated after the term of the contested office has
expired. Ong’s proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of functions thereof from start to finish of the term should legally be taken
as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The difference between the case at bar and Lonzanida v. COMELEC is at once apparent. In
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of
“failure of election” and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-
elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of the Mayor. Also,
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary
severance from office as a result of legal processes. Hence, there was an effective interruption
of the continuity of service.
The “failure of election” factor does not apply in the present case. There was no interruption
or break in the continuity of service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Ong
was never unseated during the term in question. He never ceased discharging his duties and
responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the
1998-2001 term.
portion of the incumbent’s term. It is not a full “three-year term” as contemplated by the
Constitution. The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription
can apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the
office. If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable
to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one
term” for purposes of applying the three-term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the
term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to
be one term in reckoning the three-term limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the
elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official
following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year term set by
the Constitution.

the 1992 synchronized
elections. However, when a
recall election was held in
1993, he ran for the same
position and won.
In 1995-1998 and 1998-2001,
he was then elected for the
same gubernatorial position.
Petitioners argue that he had
served three terms already,
because the first term from
1993-1995 must be counted as
one term.
Rivera III v COMELEC
In the 2004 elections, Marino
“Boking” Morales ran for
mayor in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Petitioner Rivera
filed a disqualification case,
arguing that Morales has
served three consecutive terms
already.
Morales admits that he was
mayor of Mabalacat from
1995-1998, and 2001-2004.
He also won in the 1998
elections, but he was
preventively suspended by the
Ombudsman for a graft case,
and the RTC declared his
election as void when it
promulgated a decision on
August 2001 (months after his
second term has expired and
during his incumbency for his
third term). Hence, he argues
that from 1998-2001, he was
merely a “caretaker” or a “de
facto officer”.
Dizon v COMELEC
In the May 2007 elections,
Marino “Boking” Morales ran
for mayor of Mabalacat
Pampanga. Dizon, a taxpayer,
questions his qualification,
considering that Morales had
already served as mayor from
1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-
2004. He also won in the 2004
elections, although the
Supreme Court disqualified
him in the case of Rivera v
COMELEC.
Morales argues that since he
was disqualified by the
Supreme Court in the 2004
elections, it was already an
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Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B.
Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be
counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for
only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually
only his third term for the same position.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was
mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest
case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as mayor (because the trial court’s ruling
was promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now
serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since
1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve
(12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for
the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three--term
limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials
from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some
safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms.
Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him should
not be counted and must be considered stray votes.
As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the
Local Government Code.
The Court reiterated its decision in the Rivera Case, that Morales had been elected to the same
office and had served three consecutive terms, and wherein we disqualified and removed
Morales during his fourth term.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four
consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to
30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy
in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem,
interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term
of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.
Due to his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007
term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales
cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate
his post before the expiration of the term. Morales occupancy of the position of mayor of

interruption in the
consecutiveness of his terms,
thereby allowing him to run
again in the 2007 mayoralty
elections.
Bolos, Jr. v COMELEC
Bolos was elected as Punong
Barangay of Barangay Biking,
Dauis, Bohol in 1994, 1997
and 2002. In the 2004 national
and local elections, during his
incumbency as barangay
chairman, he ran for municipal
councillor and won, thereby
forfeiting his seat as Punong
Barangay. He served as
councillor from 2004-2007.
In 2007, he filed a COC for the
position of Punong Barangay
once more. Respondent Rey
Angeles, the incumbent
Punong Barangay who
replaced Bolos when he won
as councilor, argues that
petitioner cannot anymore run
for barangay chairman
because he had served for
three consecutive terms.
Bolos, on the other hand,
argues that when he won for
municipal councillor in his
third term as chairman, it
operated as an involuntary
interruption. Reyes counters
this by saying that the act was
purely voluntary.
COMELEC v Cruz
RA 9164 was enacted, which
mandated a synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. The law
reiterated that the three-term
limit mandated by the
Constitution is also applicable
to barangay elective officials
and SK officials. It added
another provision which states
that the reckoning point of the
counting of the three-term
limit of barangay elective
officials shall start from the
1994 barangay elections.
Respondents are barangay
officials during the passage of
RA 9164. They do not
question the validity of the
imposition of a three-term
limit to barangay officials, but
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Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served
as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June
2010 term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
David v. Commission on Elections elucidates that the Constitution did not expressly prohibit
Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials, thereby leaving to the
lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service.
The discussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that the term of office of barangay
officials would be [a]s may be determined by law, and more precisely, [a]s provided for in the
Local Government Code.[6] Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that
barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c)[7] thereof states
that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The Court held that two
conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner
was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for
disqualification.
As to whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position as
Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang Bayan
member and assumed said office. The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was
voluntary renunciation by petitioner of his position as Punong Barangay. Petitioner was
serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and,
upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily
relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary
renunciation of said office.
RA 9164 is a good law.
According to the respondents, section 2 of RA 9164 is unconstitutional because it provides for
the retroactive application of the “three-term limit rule” because of the phrase “the reckoning
of the three (3) consecutive term limit of barangay elective officials beginning from the 1994
barangay elections”. However, the respondents disregarded the fact that previous laws have
been consistent in inserting the term limit rule applicable to barangay officials. In fact as early
as 1988 by virtue of 6653, there is 2 term limit rule.
The issue also being contended in this case is whether or not there is a term limit rule provided
in the LGC, because respondents are contending that there is none. The basis for the
respondents claim is section 43 of the LGC because according to them, paragraph (a) of the
said section governs the term limit of elective local officials with the exception of barangay
officials because of the word “except”. And paragraph (a) should be read together with
paragraph (b) which exclusively applies to all elective local officials except barangay
officials because the paragraph governing barangay officials is paragraph (c). Hence
according to them the three term limit rule provided in paragraph b does not apply to
barangay officials. But such interpretation of section 43 is erroneous. The correct perspective
is to view Sec. 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as independently standing and
self-contained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus,
Sec. 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials, except barangay officials whose term
of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). And Sec. 43(b), by its express terms, relates
to all local elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all

argue that the reckoning point
of counting cannot retroact to
the 1994 elections. They plea
that the law be applied
prospectively, so officials who
have been elected served for
three consecutive terms prior
to the passing of the law shall
not be prejudiced.
Talaga v COMELEC
Ramon Talaga and Philip
Castillo filed their respective
COCs for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City in the
May 2010 elections. Castillo
filed with the COMELEC a
Petition to Deny Due Course
the COC of Ramon Talaga,
arguing that he has already
served three consecutive
times. Ramon Talaga argues
that during his second and
third terms, he was
preventively suspended.
Meantime, the court
promulgated the ruling in
Aldovino v COMELEC. On
election day, Ramon Talaga’s
name was still printed on the
ballots, but votes cast for him
were credited in favor of
Barbara Ruby, his substitute
candidate. It was only after
elections where Barbara
Ruby’s COC was approved to
replace Talaga. Philip Castillo
argues that the votes cast in
favor of Ramon should be
stray because his COC was
void in the first place.
Gamboa v Aguirre
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local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification. To justify that the latter way of
reading section 43 is correct: this is the reason to back it up:
The separate topics discussed in (a) and (b) additionally strengthen their distinction; Section
43(a) refers to the term of office while Section 43(b) refers to the three-term limit. These
differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be read together as one organic
whole.
As to the issue of retroactivity, Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a
constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, not the Constitution. The closest the
issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive
application will impair vested rights (if a right has already vested in an individual and a
subsequent law effectively takes it away). That vested right should be a vested right to life,
liberty or property, and it must be understood that there is no vested right to public office.
Rules on Succession
The substitution was invalid. The existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a
valid substitution. The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing
the time limit for filing them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days
prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom they are to make the choice;
and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law
does not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as
many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or
fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in
the same election.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One
is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections; A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on
a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also
have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited
to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under
Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
are separate and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or denying due course to a
COC, the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya that the following circumstances may
result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:
(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid
CoC;
(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid
CoC; and
(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled.
Whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate,
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official candidate
of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be
clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted,
because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as
any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
No. Under R.A. 7160, the Governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and is
no longer considered a member thereof. 10 This is clear from the law, when it provides that

In the 1995 elections, Rafael
Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo
Gamboa, Jr., and respondents
Marcelo Aguirre and Juan
Araneta, were elected
Governor, Vice-Governor,
and Sangguniang
Panglalawigan members,
respectively. Coscolluela went
abroad and designated Romeo
Gamboa as acting governor.
Respondents in this case
argued that he should be
incapacitated to preside the
Sangguniang considering that
he became the acting
governor. However, 7 SP
members voted that he be
allowed to do so, 4 of them
voted to prohibit him, with 1
abstention. Respondents filed
a petition for declaratory relief
and prohibition. The court
declared that Gamboa was
legally incapacitated to
preside the Sanggunian. The
issue was mooted because
Coscolluela came back to the
country. SC decided the case
to guide the bench and the bar.
Ganzon v CA
Various city officials filed
administrative complaints (10
of them) against Mayor
Ganzon of Iloilo which
involve charges of abuse of
authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, culpable
violation of the constitution
and arbitrary detention.
Amidst two successive
suspension orders by the
DILG Secretary, he filed a
petition for prohibition. He
was granted the writ.
However, the DILG Secretary,
on May 3, 1990, issued
another order preventively
suspending him for 60 days
(3rd in 20 months). He comes
before the court arguing that
the Secretary of DILG cannot
suspend local officials.
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"local legislative power shall be vested in the SP," which is "the legislative body of the
province," and enumerates therein membership consisting of the:
1.) Vice-Governor, as presiding officer,
2.) regular elective SP members,
3.) three elective sectoral representatives, and
4.) those ex-officio members, namely:
a.) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay,
b.) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan,
c.) president of the provincial federation of sangguniang members of municipalities and
component cities.
None being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded applying the rule
in legal hermeneutics that when the law enumerates, the law necessarily excludes.
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor
by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an "inability" on the part of the
regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls
for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code —
concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting
Governor's (Vice Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he
is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), "(i)n the event of the inability of the regular
presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a
quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.”
Disciplinary Actions on Elective Officials
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against
local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break
Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend,
for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal
corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local
Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of
local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and
commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such
answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior
to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If
preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive
suspension shall be lifted. 24
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister
of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial
governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor
if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
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(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there
is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained
of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or
when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension
shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office
without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination.
However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the
time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is
held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a
presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
Joson v Torres
Nueva Ecija Governor
Eduardo Joson is being
charged before the
Ombudsman with grave
misconduct and abuse of
authority. Private respondents
are provincial board members
of Nueva Ecija who allege that
Joson belligerently barged
into the hall during a board
meeting, uttering threatening
words at the board. Joson
allegedly came with armed
men with him. Respondents
argue that the incident was a
result of their opposition to a
legislative measure supported
by Joson, where the province
will get a loan of P150 million
from PNB. They resisted the
measure because Nueva Ecija
had an unliquidated obligation
of about P70 million without
approval of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
President Fidel Ramos was
asked to suspend Governor
Joson, so he acted on it and
instructed to DILG Sec.
Robert Barbers to investigate.
Sec. Barbers notifed Joson of
such and asked him to file a
sworn answer. Private
respondents and Joson were
made to settle the issue in a
conference, but it did not
become fruitful. So, Joson was
ordered to submit an answer
but he delayed the submission
through excuses like busy
schedule, Christmas break,
inability of competent
counsels. Undersecretary
A. Sec. 60, Chapter 5, Title II, Book I of the LGC enumerates the grounds for which an
elective official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office. When an
elective official commits an act that falls under the such grounds, the administrative
complaint must be verified and filed with any of the following: (1) Office of the
President – for elective officials of the province and cities; (2) Sangguniang
Panlalawigan – for elective officials of municipalities; (3) Sangguniang
Panglungsod/Bayan – for barangay officials.
In the instant case, Joson is an elective provincial official of Nueva Ecija. Thus, the
letter-complaint against him was properly filed with the Office of the President.
Joson alleges that the letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal
requirements of the LGC. He alleges that it was not verified and supported by
affidavit. This contention has no merit. The lack of these entries may constitute proof
of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer. They do not indubitably prove that
the verification was inserted or intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with
the Office of the President. Although it was not verified, the President has waived
the same when he acted on the complaint.
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. It is mainly intended to secure
an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and
correct and not mere speculation. The lack of verification is a mere formal defect.
B. AO No. 23 provides that jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against
local elective officials is lodged into two authorities: a) DISCIPLINING
AUTHORITY; and b) INVESTIGATING AUTHORITY. The Disciplining
Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through
the Executive Secretary. The Investigating Authority is the Secretary of the DILG.
The Disciplining Authority may also designate a Special Investigating Committee
in lieu of the DILG Secretary.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary elective officials is
derived from his power of general supervision over local governments under Sec. 4,
Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. Supervision means overseeing or the authority of
an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. It is not
incompatible with discipline. It means no more than the power of ensuring that laws
are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. The President
has derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials.
AO No. 23 delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee. This is not undue delegation. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, NOT THE POWER TO
DISCIPLINE.
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Sanchez, acting as secretary at Furthermore, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is
that time, declared him in based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
default. Sec. Barbers Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
suspended him for 60 days, the Executive Department. This is corollary to the control of Power of the President.
but Joson argued that DILG Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. The President, as
had no jurisdiction, and that head of the executive department, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
the Secretary cannot members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the
preventively suspend him. exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.

The LGC and AO No. 23 discuss how the Disciplining and Investigating Authority
should exercise their powers. When an administrative complaint is filed, the
Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his
verified answer within 15 days. The Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to
the Investigating Authority for Investigation. In the case at bar, the letter-complaint
was filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG Secretary who
ordered the petition to answer. The OP did not comply with the provisions of AO
No. 23. However, this procedural lapse is not fatal.

C. Sec. 63(1b) of the LGC provides that preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Disciplining Authority at any time a) after the issues are joined; b) when the evidence
of guilt is strong; and c) given the gravity of the offense, there is a great probability
that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

DILG Sec. Barbers recommends that Joson be placed under preventive suspension
considering that all the requisites justify the same are present. Joson’s failure to file
his answer despite several opportunities given to him is construed as a wavier of
his right to present evidence in his behalf.

D. The preventive suspension of Joson was made WITHOUT FORMAL

INVESTIGATION as required under Rule 7 of AO No. 23. Joson has the right for
the conduct of formal investigation. He filed a motion for the same. The denial of
Joson’s Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. AO No. 23
requires that after a preliminary conference, the Investigating Authroity shall issue
an order reciting the matters taken up thereon and shall schedule the formal
investigation within 10 days from its issuance, unless a later date is mutually agreed
in writing by the parties concerned.

Usec. Sanchez treated Answer Ad Cautelam of Joson as a position paper. The

rejection of Joson’s right to a formal investigation is a denial of procedural due
process.

Sec. 5 of AO No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating

Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion
to determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted.

Sec. 65 of the LGC provides for the RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENTS. These are:
1) right to appear and defend himself in person
or by counsel
2) right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him
3) right to compulsory attendance of the
witnesses and production of documentary
evidence

Joson’s right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against
him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the LGC that
provide that administrative cases against elective officials can be decided on the
basis of position papers.

Salalima v Guingona
Several complaints were filed
against petitioners who were
elective officials of Albay
before the Office of the
President. An Ad hoc
committee was created, and
upon its recommendation,
Administrative Order 153 was
promulgated, which
suspended Salalima et al for
12-20 months, although their
unexpired term was only 7
months. They argue that this
amount to removal from
office.
The cases involve 1) Refusal
of Governor Salalima to remit
to the municipality of Tiwi the
proceeds of the payment made
by NPC for real estate taxes,
for those establishments
located in Tiwi, 2) hiring a
private law firm Cortes &
Reyna Law Firm to represent
the Province, and 3)
suspending Mayor Corral of
Tiwi without grounds.
Berces v Executive
Secretary
Petitioner Berces filed an
administrative case (abuse of
authority for non-payment of
accrued leave benefits,
dishonesty for installing a
water pipeline which is being
paid for by the municipality to
service her private residence
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Assuming all decisions of the Office of the President was correct, suspending them for 12-20
months as the aggregate of all penalties of suspension not exceeding six months each is not
tantamount to removal of office. However, some of the grounds are no longer tenable.
This provision sets the limits to the penalty of suspension it should not exceed six months or
the unexpired portion of the term of office of the respondent for every administrative offense.
An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission which amounts to, or
constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action.
Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in each of the
subject four administrative cases are correct, it committed no grave abuse of discretion in
imposing the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and
the unexpired portion of the petitioners' term of office. The fact remains that the suspension
imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express
provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion
of the term of office of the petitioners. Their term of office expired at noon of 30 June 1995.
And this Court is not prepared to rule that the suspension amounted to the petitioners' removal
from office.
We agree with the petitioners that Governor Salalima could no longer be held administratively
liable for the execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago
and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public officials cannot be subject to
disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term as held in
Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija and Aguinaldo vs. Santos: "Offenses committed,
or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this
is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal
shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for
the term for which the officer was elected or appointed."
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the re-election
to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. A public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
Office of the Solicitor General maintains that Aguinaldo case does not apply because the case
against the official therein was already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
his reelection bid. It is of the view that an official's reelection renders moot and academic an
administrative complaint against him for acts done during his previous term only if the
complaint was filed before his reelection. The fine distinction does not impress us. The rule
makes no distinction. As a matter of fact, in Pascual case the administrative complaint against
Pascual for acts committed during his first term as Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, was filed
only a year after he was reelected.
We rule that any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the
execution of the retainer contract in O.P. Case No. 5469 are deemed extinguished by his
reelection in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. This is, however, without prejudice to
the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant
circumstances.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becoming final or executory."
As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing
officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that
the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If
the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could
have used more direct language expressive of such intention.
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of

and medical clinic) against
Mayor Naomi C. Corral of
Tiwi, Albay, with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Albay, and obtained
favourable decision to
suspend her. Corral appealed
before the Office of the
President pursuant to Section
67(b) of the LGC, which
provides that appeals must be
made, within 30 days upon
receipt, before the OP in case
of decision by Sanggunians of
highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities.
The Office of the President
stayed the execution, the
authority to do so allegedly
emanating from Section 68 of
the LGC and Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18.
Malinao v Reyes
Petitioner Virginia Malinao is
the Human Resource Manager
of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. The
mayor of Marinduque filed a
case against her before the
Ombudsman for gross neglect
of duty, inefficiency and
incompetence. During
pendency, the mayor replaced
Malinao by appointing
another HR manager. Hence,
petitioner filed an
administrative case of abuse of
authority against the mayor
before the executive session of
the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, which voted 5-
3 finding the mayor guilty.
Copies were sent to the mayor
and the Governor as well. The
mayor argued that the decision
was only signed by Rodrigo
Sotto, Presiding Chairman of
the Blue Ribbon Committee of
the Sanggunian, and therefore
not binding to him. DILG
Secretary Rafael Alunan said
that Section 66 of the LGC
provides that the Blue Ribbon
Committee’s resolution, to be
binding, must be submitted
before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for it to decide
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execution, such authority can be provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals
of elective officials in administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration
of the entire provision in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow
from construing it one way or the other (De Mesa v. Mencias). In the case at bench, there is no
basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang
Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public
interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay
of the execution of the decision is in order.
Notes:
SEC. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming
final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive
suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the
appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during
the pendency of the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).
SEC. 6. Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed upon the filing of the appeal within the
period prescribed herein. However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency of the appeal,
the Office of the President may direct or stay the execution of the decision/resolution/order
appealed from upon such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order
No. 18).
What petitioner claims to be the September 5, 1994 Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
bore the signature of only one member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed the Decision as
Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Contrary to
petitioners claim, what the minutes only show is that on August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian took
a vote on the administrative case of respondent Mayor and not that it then rendered a
decision as required by 66(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)*. The decision
of the Sanggunian must thus be in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons
for such decision. What the Sanggunian, therefore, did on August 12, 1994 was not to render
a decision.
Neither may the so-called Decision prepared by Sanggunian Member Rodrigo V. Sotto on
September 5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of
the requisite majority. Like the procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting following the
deliberation of the members of the Sanggunian did not necessarily constitute their decision
unless this was embodied in an opinion prepared by one of them and concurred in by the others,
in the same way that the voting following the deliberation on a case in the Supreme Court
becomes its decision only after the opinion prepared by a Justice is concurred in by others
composing the majority. Until they have signed the opinion and the decision is promulgated,
the Justices are free to change their votes.
Indeed, in his comment in this case, Member Sotto admits that the draft decision he
prepared had only his signature due to the reluctance of some Kagawads to affix their
signatures. Consequently the draft never became a decision. This fact led the DILG to
conclude that the draft was simply the report and recommendation of the Blue Ribbon
Committee to the Sanggunian. Now, as already stated, the Sanggunian, at its session
on October 21, 1994, took another vote and, 7 to 2, decided to dismiss the case against
respondent Mayor. This time its decision was made in writing, stating the facts and the law
on which it was based, and it was signed by the members taking part in the decision. This,
and not the so-called decision of September 5, 1994, is the decision of the Sanggunian.
At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of the expiration of
respondents term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed, and further
proceedings against respondent Mayor are barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995.
Pursuant to 66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the unexpired
term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense. On the
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on. Petitioner sent a letter to
the Governor, asking him to
implement the decision right
away because it has become
final and executory on
September 5, 1994. The
governor refused. Meanwhile
on October 21, 1994, the
Sanggunian, voting now 7-2,
acquitted the mayor with their
signatures affixed.
Sanggunian Barangay of
Don Mariano Marcos v
Martinez
Punong Barangay Martinez
was administratively charged
with graft and corruption
through a complaint filed
before the Sangguniang
Barangay of Don Mariano
pursuant to Section 61 of the
LGC. Petitioner filed a case
against Martinez alleging that
he failed to remit the funds to
the Barangay Treasurer the
income of the solid waste
management project when
fertilizers and recyclable
materials were sold, using the
barangay garbage truck for
private persons without
monetary benefit for the
barangay, unliquidated travel
expenses, and failure to attend
a seminar where his expenses
was funded.
other hand, any administrative disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the
meantime he is reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of whatever
misconduct he might have committed during his previous term.
The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the
courts. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed
and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must
exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official
but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage.
Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining
authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the
power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to
remove.
During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, the legislative intent to
confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts,
jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident. Congress
clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a trial before the
appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure impartiality and
fairness and protect against political maneuverings. Elevating the removal of an elective local
official from office from an administrative case to a court case may be justified by the fact
that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also, in effect, deprives
the electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted. Congress itself saw it fit
to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government
units are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are
prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.

The case was conveyed to the

Municipal Mayor of
Bayombong, Severino
Bagasao, who said that the
Sanggunian does not have the
power to order his removal.
However, he did not reverse
the initial suspension ordered
by the barangay. Hence,
Martinez filed a writ for
certiorari against the
Sanggunian and Mayor
Bagasao, arguing that neither
the Mayor nor the Sanggunian
may remove a local official.
Lingating v COMELEC We stated in Reyes v COMELEC:

Petitioner Lingating filed a
disqualification case against
respondent Sulong, pursuant
to Section 40 of the LGC
which disqualifies from
running for an elective
position anyone who has been
“Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public
official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his
reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the
petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be
decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired.
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was

removed from office due to an
administrative case. Sulong
won as mayor of Lapuyan on
1998. He was re-elected in
1992 and 1995. However, he
was removed in 1991 after the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga found him guilty
of violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Lingating argues that the
decision was not final and
executory yet, since he filed an
MR/Notice of Appeal and has
not yet filed a comment on the
case. COMELEC was not able
to rule on the disqualification
case, so Sulong yet again won
as mayor. COMELEC ruled
not to disqualify him, since he
was re-elected. It cited
Aguinaldo v COMELEC,
which ruled that an
administrative complaint is
mooted after the candidate
wins.
Hagad v Gozo-Dadole
Administrative complaints
were filed against Mandaue
City Mayor Alfredo Ouano,
Vice Mayor Paterno Canete,
Sangguniang Panlungsod
Member Rafael Mayol, all
public officials of Mandaue
City, by Mandaue City
Councilors Magno Dionson
and Gaudiosa Bercede with
the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas.
They both allege that the
abovementioned officials
acted in conspiracy to falsify
an Ordinance by increasing
the allocated appropriation
therein from P3, 494, 364.57
to P7, 000,000 without
authority from the SP.
Dionson and Bercede move
for their suspension, but
private respondents argue that
the Office of the Ombudsman
was bereft of jurisdiction to try
the case, since according to
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer
be removed if he is thereafter reelected [for] another term. This is the rationale for the ruling
in the two Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, . . . the decision in the administrative
case, . . . was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because
petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from
office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running
for reelection.”
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision
similar to 40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the
ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the 1992 decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification and
malversation of public funds, has not until now become final. The records of this case show
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur rendered judgment in AC No. 12-
91 on February 4, 1992, a copy of which was received by respondent Sulong on February 17,
1992; that on February 18, 1992, he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal;
that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required Jim Lingating, the
complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment; and that the complainant in AC No. 12-91 has not
filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolved respondents motion. The
filing of his motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan
from becoming final.
While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. Thus, it was held that a party in a disbarment proceeding under Rule 139-
B, 12(c) can move for a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
although Rule 139-B does not so provide
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. Quite interestingly,
Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the
provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61 and Section 63 of the precursor local
Government Code of 1983, under the heading of "Suspension and Removal," read:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. — Verified complaints against local elective
officials shall be prepared as follows:
(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local
Government.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or
municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when
there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the
offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after
the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its
termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault,

Section 63 of the LGC, only
the Office of the President has
the power.
Office of the Ombudsman v
Rodriguez
An administrative charge of
dishonesty, oppression, grave
misconduct, and neglect of
duty was field against Rolson
Rodriguez, punong barangay
in Brgy. Sto. Rosario,
Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental. It was filed before
the Ombudsman in Visayas.
A similar case was filed before
the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binalbagan through Vice
Mayor Jose Yulo. Rolson
Rodriguez alleged complaints
of forum shopping. When the
Ombudsman asked him to file
his answer, he argued that
there was already a litis
pendentia before the SB.
Complainants filed a motion
for withdrawal before the
Sanggunian so the one filed
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension
over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local
Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No.
6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what
already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the
Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.
Respondent local officials also contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay
under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive
suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its
application. The two provisions govern differently.
In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770,
1) the evidence of guilt should be strong, and
2) (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charges should warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him.
The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials,
whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation.
Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension
prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time
after the issues are joined), it would be enough that:
(a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of,
(b) the evidence of culpability is strong,
(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or
(d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative
cases against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27. The
Court held that the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings,
not to administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the
sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private respondent, they did not violate the
rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative
case.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance
of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.
In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted
to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsman exercise of jurisdiction is to the
exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
Note:
Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove
an elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do
so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring
public official other than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only
by impeachment.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

before the Ombudsman can be

prioritized. The Sanggunian
decided to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to request.

Meanwhile, CA said that the

Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction to hear the case
and ordered the SB to rehear
the case.
Talaga, Jr. v Sandiganbayan
Elan Recreation, Inc. filed a
case against Mayor Ramon
Talaga with the Office of the
Ombudsman as mayor of the
City of Lucena alleging that he
had unlawfully granted favors
to a third party with respect to
the operation of bingo games
in the city.
Ombudsman dismissed the
administrative case but
retained the criminal case,
filing three criminal charges of
RA 3019. The two
informations were quashed,
except the one which alleged
that Mayor Talaga gave favors
to Jose Sy Bang by granting
him local franchise to operate
bingo.
Ombudsman filed a Motion to
Suspend Pendente Lite against
Mayor Talaga. Petitioner
questions his suspension
under Section 13 of RA 3019,
and argues that it was not a
mandatory law and his
suspension was ordered
without basis.
Aguinaldo v Santos
Rodolfo Aguinaldo was
elected provincial governor of
Cagayan. When a coup d’etat
was crushed in 1992, he
received a telegram from the
DILG Secretary ordering him
to show cause why he should
not be suspended or removed
for his alleged disloyalty.
Apparently, mayors of
Cagayan filed a complaint
against him, arguing that he
had a hand in the failed coup.
He said that he was not privy
to the rebel plans, although he
was a sympathizer. Secretary
The Sandiganbayan correctly issued the resolution preventively suspending petitioner for
ninety (90) days.
The Court's pronouncements in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, are germane:
The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper
his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, to
prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
In Beroña v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explicitly ruled:
Section 13 is so clear and explicit that there is hardly room for any extended court
rationalization of the law. Section 13 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public
official from office pending a criminal prosecution under R.A. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving public funds or property or fraud on
government. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and
there are no "ifs" and "buts" about it.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive
suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court,
all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions - including preventive suspension
- should be acknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance
thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that
acknowledgement. As earlier mentioned, the court must first determine the validity of the
information through a pre-suspension hearing. But once a proper determination of the validity
of the information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith
issue the order of preventive suspension.
Doctrine of Condonation
Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administrative case at bar moot and academic. After the canvassing of votes, Aguinaldo
garnered the most number of votes among the candidates. As ruled by the court in Aguinaldo
v Comelec, the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to
office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for
the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against Aguinaldo
for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

Luis Santos of DILG
suspended him for 60 days
pending investigation. During
the pendency of the
investigation, he filed a COC
for the position of Governor
and won. He was ordered
removed by the DILG
Secretary thereafter. A
disqualification case was filed
against him, arguing that he is
disqualified since he was
previously removed from
office. COMELEC En Banc
dismissed the disqualification
case, since the administrative
case for disloyalty was still
pending before the Supreme
Court.
Salumbines, Jr. v Office of
the Ombudsman
Salumbides and Glenda were
appointed as Municipal Legal
Officer and Administrator and
Municipal Budget Officer,
respectively, of Tagkawayan,
Quezon. Herein respondents
Ricardo Agon, Ramon
Villasanta, Elmer Dizon,
Salvador Adul, and Agnes
Fabian, all members of the
Sanggunian, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint against Salumbides
and Glenda, including the
mayor, Coleta, Jason and
Aquino. The administrative
case alleged a violation of the
COA rules and the Local
Government Code. They
asked that Salumbides et al be
placed in preventive
suspension. The Ombudsman
dropped the mayor and also
Coleta, since they were
elective officials who were re-
elected, pursuant to the
doctrine of condonation. Jason
and Aquino were absolved,
but Salumbides and Glenda
were found guilty of Simple
Neglect of Duty. Petitioner
argues that they were unfairly
treated and the doctrine of
condonation violates the equal
protection clause.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elected a man to office, it must
be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine to
appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law. The electorates
condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be
extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule
being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is
neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of,
in the case of reappointed coterminous employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim
of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an
administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the
mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full
knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective
official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated
in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if they conspired
to act negligently, their infraction becomes intentional. There can hardly be conspiracy to
commit negligence. Petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for
failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal
soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their
superior.
The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides failed
to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying
out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised the
mayor to proceed with the construction of the subject projects without prior competitive
bidding. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is
tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law
he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related to upholding the rule of law.
Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action without any legal basis
becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government
funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not
relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection as
municipal budget officer. Aside from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court,
pointing to the improper itemization of the expense, held that the funding for the projects

Ombudsman Carpio-
Morales v CA and Binay
Atty. Renato Bondal and
Nicolas Enciso filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman a
case against Junjun Binay, and
other officials of the City
Government of Makati,
accusing them of plunder and
violation of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft. This was in connection
with the construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking
Building. The Ombudsman
created a Special Panel of
Investigators to conduct the
fact-finding, and the
investigators charged Binay et
al with 6 adminsitrative cases
of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, etc, and 6 criminal
cases for violation of RA
3019. Binay was suspended
for 6 months without pay
pending investigation. Binay
filed a case before the CA
arguing that the suspension
order was not in place
considering that the acts were
allegedly committed in his
past terms and by virtue of the
condonation doctrine he
cannot anymore be suspended
on his present term. The CA
granted his petition.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
should have been taken from the capital outlays that refer to the appropriations for the purchase
of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to
the assets of the local government unit.It added that current operating expenditures like
MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of
normal local government operations within the fiscal year.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure.
In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, the Court explained the distinction, stating that its
purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers
and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records
which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
Under Sec. 24 of R.A. 6770, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to
justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty;
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
If it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint was indeed
committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can
no longer be administratively charged. Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as
"[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the
offender as if there had been no offense."
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of
liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential
creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva
Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to
American authorities and "found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably,
to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of
views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones
the prior misconduct." Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases,
it proceeded to state that:
The weight of authorities seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one
from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public
officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct,
thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and
character of candidates, of their right to elect officers
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia,
and Governor Garcia, Jr. would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing
constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. The basis for condonation, as
jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own
state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of
condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an
administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in
our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing
legal norms.

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided
within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust.

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and
adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." More
significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the
people at all times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this
Court to the conclusion that THE DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION IS ACTUALLY
BEREFT OF LEGAL BASES.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution,
is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability
for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned
bv the President.
In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically
implies condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would
perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under
our governing legal mechanisms. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be
said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official,
are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded
or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such
presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human
experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds.
Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always
unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.
That being said, THIS COURT SIMPLY FINDS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO
SUSTAIN THE CONDONATION DOCTRINE IN THIS JURISDICTION. As can be
seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in
1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the
assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. Thus,
by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time,

De Rama v CA
Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,
petitioner Conrado L. de
Rama wrote a letter dated July
13, 1995 to the Civil Service
Commission (or CSC),
seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14)
municipal employees. He
argued that the employees
were midnight appointees of
former Mayor Abeja in
violation of Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Three of the employees,
namely: Elsa Marino, Morell
Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel,
filed with the CSC a claim for
payment of their salaries,
alleging that although their
appointments were declared
permanent by Conrado Gulim,
Director II of the CSC Field
Office based in Quezon, but
the payments were withheld
by Mayor de Rama. They
contested it before the Quasi-
Judicial Division of the CSC,
and the division ruled in their
favor, arguing that since they
performed their positions and
duties, they must be given
salaries and benefits.
The CSC disapproved the
recall of the 14 employees as
well, arguing that the
appointments were effective
immediately and cannot be
unilaterally revoked by the
mayor until the CSC acts on
the request for recall. It also
argues that the prohibition for
midnight appointments in the
constitution applies only to the
President and an Acting
President, not to local
officials. A motion for
reconsideration was submitted
but dismissed for lack of
evidence. The CA also
affirmed the CSC decision.
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unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse
of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the Writ of Prohibition and
Injunction against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
However, we hereby reverse the CA’s decision.
Disciplinary Actions on Appointive Officials
The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments
of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his
action was that these were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said
prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor
who made the appointments.
A thorough perusal of the records reveal that the CSC's ruling is supported by the evidence
and the law. The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings of the
Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There is no showing that any
of the private respondents were not qualified for the positions they were appointed to.
Moreover, their appointments were duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at
Lucena City. By virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even
before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor. Consequently, their
appointments took effect immediately and cannot be unilaterally revoked or recalled by
petitioner.
It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee's assumption of
the position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either
by revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and
hearing."[17] Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service
under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position.
This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot
be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid
cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing
Clearly, it was petitioner who acted in undue haste to remove the private respondents without
regard for the simple requirements of due process of law. In doing so, he overstepped the
bounds of his authority. While he argues that the appointing power has the sole authority to
revoke said appointments, there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority to do so.
Neither can he question the CSC's jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the recall.
Notes:
Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code, Section 20 of Rule VI
provides:
Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on
any of the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency's Merit
Promotion Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees
relative to promotion; or
(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
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Plaza v CA The Court rules that private respondents’ claim for back salaries is untenable because their
suspension was authorized by law and they have not been absolved of the administrative
Democrito Plaza became charges filed against them.[38] In Gloria v. Court of Appeals,[39] this Court had the occasion to
governor of Agusan Del Sur in clarify that the payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not
1992 and received several allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his
administrative complaints suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.
against private respondents
Budget Officer Gil Pol Tan Stated otherwise, the preventive suspension of the private respondents is authorized by R.A.
(cash advance without pre- No. 7160. Section 85 (a) of the LGC of 1991 states:
audit and beyond cash bond),
Provincial Planning and SEC. 85. Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and Employees. — (a) The local
Development Coordinator chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days any
Emmanuel Quismundo subordinate official or employee under his authority pending investigation if the charge against
(inappropriate disbursements such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
amounting to technical the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of the
malversation), and Provincial charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
Accountant Elisa Gilsano
(neglect). Clearly, the law provides for the preventive suspension of appointive local officials and
employees pending investigation of the charges against them. The suspension given to private
The case was investigated by respondents cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of those sacrifices which
the Provincial Investigation holding a public office requires for the public good.[40] To be entitled to back salaries, private
Committee (PIC) created respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their suspension must likewise
under Section 86 of the Local be unjustified.
Government Code. Petitioner
Samson, the Chair of the PIC,
notified of such complaints,
but respondent complainants
argued that his appointment
was not approved by the
Sanggunian (instead of
responding to administrative
charge) Meanwhile, Plaza
ordered their preventive
suspension for 60 days.
Private respondents filed a
case before the RTC
challenging the suspension.
Plaza wrote a letter to them
saying that the petition for
certiorari before the RTC
haulted the counting of the 60-
day suspension, so they cannot
go back to work even after 60
days. After 60 days,
respondents ask that they be
allowed to work again, but the
RTC dismissed the case on the
ground that administrative
remedies were not exhausted.
Upon appeal, CA reversed and
ordered that they be reinstated
pending administrative
investigations because an
indefinite suspension is not
allowed by law, and ordered
the Municipal Government to
pay them backwages.
Atienza v Villarosa First issue:

Occidental Mindoro Governor LGC was enacted to implement the constitutional mandate to “provide for a more responsive
Jose Villarosa issued a memo and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
concerning the procurement of with effective mechanism of recall, initiative and referendum, allocate among the different

supplies, materials,
equipment, repairs of the
Sanggunian Panlalawigan,
stating that all requests must
be signed first by the
Governor. The Vie Governor
Ramon Atienza argued that
such power pertained to him,
based on DILG Opinion No.
96 and COA opinions. He also
cited Sec. 466 and 468 of the
LGC, creating a separation of
powers between the executive
and the legislative. Villarosa
responded by issuing a
memorandum terminating the
casual and job order
employees recommended or
hired by Atienza. These
employees included 28 plus
clerks, 30 utility workers, and
an x-ray technician. Atienza
respondent that the two
memoranda were breaches of
the separation of powers.
CA dismissed and stated that
under LGC 344, the governor
has authority to approve the
purchase orders on question,
since the provision states in
part that approval of the
disbursement voucher by the
local chief executive himself
shall be required whenever
local funds are disbursed.
Case became moot due to
expiration of their term.
Supreme Court decided on the
case to guide the bench and the
bar.
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local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units”.
Under the LGC, local legislative power at the provincial level is exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (SP) and the Vice Governor is its Presiding Officer. The SP enacts ordinances
and resolutions, and appropriates funds for the general welfare of the province in accordance
with the LGC.
LGC 466(a)(1) provides that the Vice Governor shall be the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and can sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all
expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan
LGC 344 provides: Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers. – No money shall be
disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has
been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and
the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls
shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has
administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety and legality of the claim
involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring administrative
expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water,
telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as the
GSIS, SSS, LBP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the DBM and others,
approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required
whenever local funds are disbursed. In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be
approved by the administrator of the fund. In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the
department head or chief of office, the officer next in rank shall automatically perform his
function and he shall be fully responsible therefor.
CA’s reliance on the “approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive…”
clause is misplaced. This clause cannot prevail over the more specific clause which provides
that “Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department
or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety and
legality of the claim involved”. As presiding officer of the SP, it is the Vice Governor which
has administrative control over its funds. Accordingly, the authority to approve disbursement
vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the SP rests with the Vice
Governor. While the LGC is silent on the matter, the authority granted to the Vice Governor
to sign warrants and approve disbursement vouchers relating thereto includes the authority to
approve purchase orders covering such vouchers, applying the doctrine of necessary
implication.
Chua v. CSC: Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as
may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, or
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis.
When an authorized person approves a disbursement voucher, he certifies to the correctness
of the entries therein; that the expenses were necessary and lawful, and that the supporting
documents are complete and cash is available therefor. The person who performed the service
or delivered the goods becomes entitled to payment. Thus, the express authority to approve
disbursement vouchers in effect is also an authority to approve the payment of money claims
for supplies, materials and equipment; and from this authority, the authority to approve
purchase orders to cause the delivery of the supplies, materials, and equipment is necessarily
implied.
Second issue:
LGC 465(b)(v) provides: For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the provincial governor shall appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and
wages are wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose appointments are not

People v Sandiganbayan
(G.R. No. 164185, July 23,
2008)
In 1998, Villapando ran for the
position of municipal mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan.
Orlando Tiape, who is a
relative of Villapando’s wife,
also ran for mayor of
Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte.
Villapando won but Tiape
lost. As a result, Villapando
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otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint.
As for the Vice Governor, LGC 466(2) provides: Subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the sangguniang panlalawigan, except those
whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code. Therefore, the appointing
power of the Governor does not extend to officials and employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan because the authority to appoint them is vested in the Vice Governor. This
includes casual and job order employees.
The Vice Governor’s authority to appoint the officials and employees of the SP is based on
the fact that the salaries of SP employees are derived from the SP’s appropriation. The budget
source of their salaries is what sets apart SP officials and employees from other provincial
employees and officials. The appointing power of the Vice Governor is thus limited to
employees of the SP and the Office of the Vice Governor whose salaries are paid out of the
SP’s appropriated funds. An employee who is detailed or assigned in the Office of the Vice
Governor but is paid out of provincial funds is still within the Governor’s appointing authority.
It must be noted that RA 7160 altered the balance of powers at the LGU level. Under BP 337
the governor was also presiding officer of the SP, in effect uniting executive and legislative
powers in the governor. RA 7160, dissolved this union and separated the legislative from the
executive. According to Sen. Pimentel, this was the intent behind making the Vice Governor
and the Vice Mayor the presiding officers of their respective Sanggunian.
Notes:
 COA’s New Manual on the Government Accounting System for LGUs even
provides: x x x Disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the
operation of the Sanggunian shall be approved by the provincial Vice Governor, the
city Vice Mayor or the municipal Vice Mayor, as the case may be.
1. Warrant – an order directing the treasurer of the municipality to pay money out of
funds in city treasury which are or may become available for purpose specified to
designated persons (Protest of St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.). Warrants of a
municipal corporation are generally orders payable when funds are found. They are
issued for the payment of general municipal debts and expenses subject to the rule
that they shall be paid in the order of presentation (Shelley v. St. Charles County
Court).
2. Voucher - a document which shows that services have been performed or expenses
incurred. It covers any acquittance or receipt discharging the person or evidencing
payment by him. When used in connection with disbursement of money, it implies
some instrument that shows on what account or by what authority a particular
payment has been made, or that services have been performed which entitle the party
to whom it is issued to payment (First National Bank of Chicago v. City of Elgin).
3. Purchase order - an authorization by the issuing party for the recipient to provide
materials or services for which issuing party agrees to pay; it is an offer to buy which
becomes binding when those things ordered have been provided (Smyth Worldwide
Movers v. Little Rock Packing). Contains the terms and conditions for the
procurement of supplies, materials or equipment, in particular. The tenor of a
purchase order basically directs the supplier to deliver the articles enumerated and
subject to the terms and conditions specified therein.
Supreme Court maintains that legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code
simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing
candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in the government
or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
In this case, the Sandiganbaya disregarded basic rules of statutory construction, and acted with
grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal disqualification in Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification cannot be read as
“excluding temporary disqualification” in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions

designated Tiape as the
Municipal Administrator of
San Vicente for 6 months.
Solomon Maagad and Renate
M. Fernandez charged both of
them for violating Article 244
of the RPC for unlawful
appointment before the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. They argue that a
losing mayoralty candidate
cannot be appointed within 1
year after elections. The
Sandiganbayan said that
temporary prohibition is not
synonymous with absence or
lack of legal qualification as
contemplated by Article 244.
Tiape’s death intervened, and
Villapando was acquitted due
to lack of evidence.
Sales v Carreon
Respondent Rodolfo Carreon
defeated Mayor Joseph
Cedrick Ruiz of Dapitan City,
who was running for re-
election. In his last month,
Dapitan Mayor Ruiz issued 83
appointments. When Carreon
assumed office, he revoked all
83 appointments, arguing that
it violated CSC Memo
Ciruclar No. 7, prohibiting
appointments during
elections. Sales was the
president of the Dapitan City
Government Employees
Association, wrote a
complaint before the CSC.
Ruiz backed the complaint and
said that the appointments
were urgent matters. The CSC
upheld the appointments.
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under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Supreme Court
reiterates that the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void,
does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.
Each appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the
individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the same. It is only when the
appointments were made en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been
made through hurried maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality,
and propriety that this Court has struck down "midnight" appointments.
Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7041 are clear and need no interpretation. The CSC is
required to publish the lists of vacant positions and such publication shall be posted by the
chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government units in the designated places.
The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after they have been
reported to the CSC as vacant and only after publication.
Here, the publication of vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually
became vacant. Clearly, respondent’s action violated Section 2 of R.A. No. 7041 cited earlier.
Moreover, the CSC found that there was no first-level representative appointed to the
Personnel Selection Board, which deliberated on the appointments to first-level positions.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1988, as amended, provides that the Personnel
Selection Board shall be composed of the following:
a. Official of department/agency directly responsible for personnel
management;
b. Representative of management;
c. Representative of organizational unit which may be an office, department,
or division where the vacancy is;
d. Representative of rank-and-file employees, one (1) for the first-level and
one (1) for the second-level, who shall both be chosen by duly
registered/accredited employees’ association in the department or agency. The
former shall sit during the screening of candidates for vacancy in the first-
level, while the latter shall participate in the screening of candidates for
vacancy in the second level. In case where there is no employees’ association
in the department or agency, the representative shall be chosen at large by the
employees through a general election to be called for the purpose.
Section 20(d), Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V-A of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (also known as the Civil Service Law), provides: Notwithstanding the initial
approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds:
d) violation of other existing civil service laws, rules and regulations.”

Quirog v Aumentado
On May 28, 2001, Bohol
Provincial Governor Rene L.
Relampagos permanently
appointed Liza M. Quirog as
Provincial Government
Department Head of the
Office of the Bohol Provincial
Agriculture (PGDH-OPA).
The appointment was
confirmed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Director of the Civil Service
Commission for Region VII
invalidated Quirog's
appointment as PGDH-OPA
upon finding that the same was
part of the bulk appointments
issued by then Governor
Relampagos after the May 14,
2001 elections allegedly in
violation of Item No. 3 of the
CSC Resolution No. 010988
dated June 4, 2001. The Order
pointed out that the
prohibition against the
issuance of midnight
appointments.
Quirog and Relampagos argue
that when Quirog took the oath
on June 1, 2001, the CSC
Resolution was not yet
effective as it only took effect
on June 4. The appointment
was made days before the
expiration of Relampagos’
term, and Quirog was already
acting Provincial Agriculturist
for about a year. They argue
that Quirog had already
acquired a legal and not
merely an equitable right
which cannot be taken away
by revocation or removal for
cause without notice and
hearing.
When Relampagos was
replaced by Governor
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In deliberating and recommending to former Mayor Ruiz the appointments of herein
petitioners to the vacant positions sans the required representation, the Board violated the
above CSC Rules. Hence, the appointments he issued are not valid. They may be recalled. In
Mathay, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the SC upheld the authority of the CSC to take
appropriate action on all appointments, including its authority to recall appointments made
in disregard of the applicable provisions of Civil Service Law and regulations.
In sum, for being in violation of Section 2, R.A. No. 7041, CSC Memorandum Circular No.
18, as amended, and Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V-A of
the Administrative Code of 1987, the appointments of the petitioners are declared void.
In the recent case of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court declared that both the
appointing authority and the appointee are equally real parties in interest who have the requisite
legal standing to bring an action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment. Quirog
had the right to ask for reconsideration of, or to appeal the adverse ruling of CSCROVII. In
contrast, Relampagos, by reason of the expiration of his term as governor, had lost the legal
personality to contest the disapproval of the appointment.
Item No. 3 reads:
3. All appointments, whether original, transfer, reemployment, reappointment, promotion or
demotion, x x x which are issued AFTER the elections, regardless of their dates of effectivity
and/or date of receipt by the Commission, x x x shall be disapproved unless the following
requisites concur relative to their issuance:
a) The appointment has gone through the regular screening by the Personnel Selection Board
(PSB) before the prohibited period on the issuance of appointments as shown by the PSB report
or minutes of its meeting;
b) That the appointee is qualified;
c) There is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately in order not to prejudice public service
and/or endanger public safety;
d) That the appointment is not one of those mass appointments issued after the elections.
The CSC ruled that the promotional appointment extended to Quirog by Governor Relampagos
was not violative of the aforesaid CSC Resolution. This interpretation by the CSC of its own
rules should be given great weight and consideration for after all, it is the agency tasked with
interpreting or applying the same.
Records disclose that on May 28, 2001, the PSB of the Human Resource Management and
Development Office of Bohol, issued a certification that Quirog was one of two candidates
qualified for the position of PGDH-OPA. On the same day, Quirog was appointed by then
Governor Relampagos and on June 1, 2001, she took her oath of office. CSC Resolution No.
010988 was issued three days later, or on June 4, 2001. Having no provision regarding its
retroactive application to appointments made prior to its effectivity, CSC Resolution No.
010988 must be taken to be of prospective application.
It cannot also be said that Quirog's appointment was a midnight appointment. The
constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically, those made within
two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
The Court, however, hasten to add that the aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison
d' etre behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made
by chief executives of local government units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely
designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments
merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity
to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies.
The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment. For it is beyond
dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the
subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that she
was only permanently appointed to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting
Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately shows that the filling up of the position resulted

Aumentado, he filed before a
CSC a response, aguing that
Quirog had no personality to
question the removal by the
CSC, since the right was only
granted to the appointing
officer. The CSC disagreed
but the CA reversed the
decision of the CSC.
Montuerto v Ty
Municipal Mayor Supreme
Sabitsana of Almeria, Biliran
appointed petitioner
Montuerto as Municipal
Budget Officer. It was
approved as permanent by
Gerardo Corder, acting Civil
Service Commissioner Field
Officer. The Sangguniang
Bayan passed an SB
Resolution asking for the
revocation of the appointment
of Melanie Montuerto, for
failure to secure required
concurrence of the SB. The
CSC Regional Office
withdrew her appointment.
Montuerto field a case against
the CSC Regional Office
arguing that she had legal title
because she had served for 10
years already.
Provincial Government of
Aurora v Marco
Governor Ong of Aurora was
permanently appointed Marco
as Corporate Development
Specialist II 5 days before the
end of her term. There was a
certification, along with 25
others, that there were
available funds for the
position. These were revoked
by the incoming Governor
based on the recall made by
the Budget Officer that there
are no available funds. Marco
sought reconsideration from
the CSC Regional Office but it
was denied. Upon appeal, the
CSC upheld her appointment
by stating that the recall was
not based on evidence. The
Province filed a petition for
relief instead of filing an MR,
so it was dismissed because it
was not allowed. When the
province filed an MR, it was
beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.
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from deliberate action and a careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee's qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial Agriculturist
since June 2000 all the more highlights the public need for said position to be permanently
filled up.
Yes. The law is clear. Under Section 443(a) and (d) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 or the
Local Government Code, the head of a department or office in the municipal government, such
as the Municipal Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the
majority of all Sangguniang Bayan members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
Per records, the appointment of petitioner was never submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for
its concurrence or, even if so submitted, no such concurrence was obtained.
Moreover, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the verbal concurrence allegedly given by
the Sanggunian, as postulated by the petitioner, is not the concurrence required and envisioned
under R.A. No. 7160. The Sanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance.
Absent such resolution of concurrence, the appointment of petitioner failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of Section 443(a) and (d) of R.A. No. 7160. Without a valid
appointment, petitioner acquired no legal title to the Office of Municipal Budget Officer, even
if she had served as such for ten years.
The court ruled that the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to
presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.
Nevertheless, the Civil Service Commission has the power to promulgate rules and regulations
to professionalize the civil service. It may issue rules and regulations prohibiting local chief
executives from making appointments during the last days of their tenure. Appointments of
local chief executives must conform to these civil service rules and regulations in order to be
valid.
The effective resolution by the CSC for the case of Marco is the Resolution No. 030918 dated
August 28, 2003 which superseded the Resolution No. 010988 which is applicable to the
Nazareno case, the only difference in the two resolutions is that, the Resolution no. 010988
prohibits mass appointments issued after the election which is absent in Resolution No.
030918.
Resolution No. 030918 provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission, pursuant to its constitutional and statutory
mandates as the central personnel agency of the government, hereby issues and
adopts the following guidelines:
2. Action on Appointments issued by Elective and Appointive Officials After the
Elections Up to June 30
2.1. All appointments issued by elective appointing officials after elections up to
June 30 shall be disapproved, except if the appointee is fully qualified for the
position and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban as
shown in the Promotion and Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.

Petitioner, thus, went to the
CA arguing that the midnight
appointments were done
outside authority, but Marco
argues that he passed the
Personnel Selection Board.
MMDA v Viron
Transportation Co., Inc.
MMDA ordered the closure of
provincial bus terminals along
the EDSA and major
thoroughfares in Manila. EO
179 was issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
which provided establishment
of Greater Manila Mass
Transport System, which
allowed the MMDA to close
terminals to decongest Metro
Manila. Viron, a domestic
corporation engaged in the
business of bus transportation,
filed a petition for declaratory
relief.
MMDA v Garin
MMDA Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001,
authorizing the confiscation of
driver’s license in the Metro.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Days before the end of Governor Ong's term, Marco was fully qualified for the position and
had undergone regular screening processes before the election ban. Assuming without
conceding that Governor Ong's 26 appointments were issued in bulk, this per se does not
invalidate the appointments. Unlike Resolution No. 010988, Resolution No. 030918 does not
prohibit appointments that are large in number. Marco's appointment was valid. The Civil
Service Commission correctly approved his appointment.
Intergovernmental Relations
Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the President’s authority to undertake
or to cause the implementation of the Project. They assert that the authority of the President is
derived from E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes," her residual
power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add
that the E.O. is also a valid exercise of the police power.
Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and
projects for transportation, it follows that the President may exercise the same power and
authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one for transportation.
Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the
President may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty.
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the
designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained.
It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and
not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one
subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of
the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific
grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924. It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA
are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there
is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to ‘enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare’ of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
‘development authority.’ It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been
validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot
validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals. Even then, for reasons which bear
reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents’ terminals not only because no
authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been
delegated to it, but also because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards
of a valid police power measure.
The RTC judge erred in holding that driver’s license is a property right which cannot be
confiscated summarily without violating due process. A license to operate a motor vehicle is
not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked
by the state in the exercise of its police power.

The CA declared it
unconstitutional on the ground
that it violated due process.
Atty. Garin was in Binondo,
Manila when his driver’s
license was confiscated for
illegal parking. He was given
a traffic violation receipt
which will serve as his
temporary license for 7 days.
Atty. Garin wrote a letter
asking for the return of his
license.
Province of Rizal v Proclamation No. 635 is illegal. The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was
Executive Secretary
Proclamation No. 635 sets
aside parts of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation for use
as a sanitary landfill and
similar waste disposal
applications for the solid
wastes of Quezon City,
Marikina, San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig,
and Taguig.
Petitioners object to such
Proclamation arguing that it is
harmful to ecological balance
and environmental factors.
President Estrada later ordered
the closure of the dumpsite on
December 31, 2000. Hence,
the petitioners, including the
MMDA and the Presidential
Committee on Flagship
Programs and Projects,
entered into a MOA, which
allowed the use of the
dumpsite until the declared
deadline.
However, in January 11, 2001,
President Estrada ordered the
reopening of the San Mateo
Landfill.
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Police power is inherently lodged before the legislature, hence it can only be exercised by the
legislature unless delegated to another entity. As already settled in the case of MMDA vs Bel-
air village that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone
legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
Upon review of the contested provision of Sec. 5(f) it provides that MMDA shall install and
administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and
confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws
and regulations. Hence MMDA may only enforce, but not enact, ordinances. The power of
MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any other
legislative enactment, is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
Therefore, only when there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or
those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this
case), that the petitioner will not be precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
management.
passed also violates Rep. Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code. Section 16 allows
every local government unit to exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare,
which involve, among other things, promot(ing) health and safety, enhancing the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, and preserving the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
All the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the
rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in
their province.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the
project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
projects implementation is illegal.
Note:
Despite the MOA, President Estrada directed the reopening of the San Mateo dumpsite on 11
January 2001. Were it not for the TRO, then President Estradas instructions would have been
lawfully carried out, for as observed in Oposa v. Factoran, the freedom of contract is not
absolute.
-End of The Law on Public Corporations-

Moya v Del Fiero
Petitioner Irineo Moya and
Respondent Agripino del
Fiero are candidates for mayor
in Paracale, Province of
Camarines Sur. Petitioner
argues that some of the ballots
credited by the Court of
Appeals in favor of Del Fierro
are contrary to rules
established by jurisprudence
in the appreciation of vague
ballots. Del Fierro, as declared
by the CA, won by three votes
against Moya, who initially
led by 102 votes.
Ex:
1) Primo del Fierro or
Pimo de Fierro
2) Alcalde Punong del
Fierro
3) Name written on the
space for Vice
Mayor, but a word
“mayor” was
printed on the left
side of the name
Badelles v Cabili
Both Mariano Badelles and
Camili Cabili were candidates
for the position of mayor in
Iligan, Lanao del Norte.
Respondent was declared
winner by the Board of
Canvassers, but petitioner
argues that there were
irregularities in the election,
namely: 1) no publication of
the list of votes was made, 2)
more than 200 individuals
were allowed to vote per
precinct, exceeding that
allowed by law, 3) no
identification cards were
given to several voters and
they were not listed as well, 4)
list of votes delivered late to
the precinct, so many were not
able to vote. The RTC
dismissed the case arguing
that the failure of election
officials to follow the rules
should not be the cause for
invalidation of votes. Further,
it argues that there was no
allegation that the
irregularities committed will
have affected the outcome of
the election.
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As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever
may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great
reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people
through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever
possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when called upon to act in justifiable cases, to
give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule
that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.
Counsel for both parties have called our attention to the different and divergent rules laid down
by this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us to
engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although this may perhaps
be undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be exactly the same in factual or legal
environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that whatever might have
been said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat
the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Rationally,
also, this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation
of ballots which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth
Act No. 357).
To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility
attaching to the line of reasoning thus pursued by the lower court. We are not unaware of the
undeniable fact that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in their drafting or precision
in their terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have
the elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to
doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to
be stressed, would have to be accepted at their face value for the purpose of determining
whether there is a cause of action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission
of facts thus pleaded. We cannot in law and in conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.
Time and time again,[11] we have stressed the importance of preserving inviolate the right of
suffrage. If that right be disregarded or frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a
myth.
As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: "As long as popular government is an end to be
achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must
continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good
government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a
representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle
of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority."
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the
people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter
counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established
authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election
law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression
of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to
taint the electoral process.

Tolentino v COMELEC
Arroyo upon assuming office
in 2001 nominated Sen.
Teofisto Guingona as Vice-
President. He was confirmed
as such, so Senate passed a
Resolution (No. 84)
confirming the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate. A
special election was to be held
with the upcoming regular
election. The first 12 was to
serve a 6-year term, and the
13th highest will serve the
vacant post, to end on June 30,
2004. In the 2001 elections,
COMELEC provisionally
proclaimed 13 senators even
without canvassing Lanao del
Norte’s tally of votes. Recto
and Honasan ranked 12th and
13th. Petitioner Tolentino
argues that the 13th candidate
cannot be proclaimed because
1) there was no notification to
the electorate of the position to
be filled in the special
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It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure
to observe the mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left
remediless. Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly serves that
purpose.
It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from
entirely satisfactory manner. That in itself is no reason for the courts to slam the door against
any opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order of dismissal
complained of were not set aside. Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our
decision must not be misinterpreted however. All that it directs is that the protestees in both
cases be required to answer. Thereafter, if, as is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious
imputations made as to the alleged irregularities, the lower court could properly inquire into
what actually transpired. After the facts are thus ascertained in accordance with the accepted
procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be applied.
Note:
In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec
may not tread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek
annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle
emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v. Commission
on Elections,[9] assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and
honest manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil" did not rest with the Commission
on Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government." More specifically, with
reference to provincial and municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to the courts."
Then came this express affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily
includes the power to determine the validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the
contestants."
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence,
whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
indispensable to the election’s validity.[26] In a general election, where the law fixes the date
of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the
election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an
election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by
law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.[28] This is because the right and duty
to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some
authority[29] and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the
election.
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition
precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure
to do so will render the election a nullity.[
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the
Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate
arising from Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not

election, 2) the senatorial
candidates did not indicate
whether they were running for
the regular or special election.
Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Puno in Tolentino v
COMELEC
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be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice
and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it.
Note:
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice
of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient
number of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice
misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election
to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void
Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is “impossible to
distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result
whatever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation,
and threats from exercising their franchise.”
Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired
three-year term in the special election. All the senatorial candidates filed the certificates of
candidacy for the twelve regular Senate seats to be vacated on June 30, 2001 with a six-year
term expiring on June 30, 2007. COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents such
as the Voter Information Sheet, List of Candidates and Sample Ballot. The List of Candidates
did not indicate a separate list of candidates for the special election. The Sample Ballot and
the official ballots did not provide two different categories of Senate seats to be voted, namely
the twelve regular six-year term seats and the single three-year term seat. Nor did the ballots
provide a separate space for the candidate to be voted in the special election and instead
provided thirteen spaces for thirteen senatorial seats.
In the ancient days, democracy was dismissed by thoughtful thinkers. Plato deprecated
democracy as rule by the masses. He warned that if all the people were allowed to rule, those
of low quality would dominate the state by mere numerical superiority. He feared that the more
numerous masses would govern with meanness and bring about a “tyranny of the majority.”
Plato predicted that democracies would be short-lived as the mob would inevitably surrender
its power to a single tyrant, and put an end to popular government. Less jaundiced than Plato
was Aristotle’s view towards democracy. Aristotle agreed that under certain conditions, the
will of the many could be equal to or even wiser than the judgment of the few. When the many
governed for the good of all, Aristotle admitted that democracy is a good form of government.
But still and all, Aristotle preferred a rule of the upper class as against the rule of the lower
class. He believed that the upper class could best govern for they represent people of the
greatest refinement and quality.
John Locke provided the philosophical phalanx to the Glorious Revolution. For this purpose,
he wrote his Second Treatise of Government, his work with the most political impact. In his
monumental treatise, Locke asserted that the basis of political society is a contract whereby
individuals consent to be bound by the laws of a common authority known as civil
government. The objective of this social contract is the protection of the individual’s natural
rights to life, liberty and property which are inviolable and enjoyed by them in the state of
nature before the formation of all social and political arrangements. [4] Locke thus argues that
legitimate political power amounts to a form of trust, a contract among members of society
anchored on their own consent, and seeks to preserve their lives, liberty and property. This
trust or social contract makes government legitimate and clearly defines the functions of
government as concerned, above all, with the preservation of the rights of the governed.
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Even then, Locke believed that the people should be governed by a parliament elected by
citizens who owned property. Although he argued that the people were sovereign, he
submitted that they should not rule directly. Members of parliament represent their
constituents and should vote as their constituents wanted. The government’s sole reason for
being was to serve the individual by protecting his rights and liberties. Although Locke’s
ideas were liberal, they fell short of the ideals of democracy. He spoke of a “middle-class
revolution” at a time when the British government was controlled by the aristocracy. While
he claimed that all people were equally possessed of natural rights, he advocated that political
power be devolved only to embrace the middle class by giving Parliament, which was
controlled through the House of Commons, the right to limit the monarchical power. He
denied political power to the poor; they were bereft of the right to elect members of
Parliament.

But although Jefferson espoused Locke’s version of the social contract and natural law, he had
respect for the common people and participatory government. Jefferson believed that the
people, including the ordinary folk, were the only competent guardians of their own liberties,
and should thus control their government. Discussing the role of the people in a republic,
Jefferson wrote to Madison from France in 1787 that “they are the only sure reliance for the
preservation of our liberties.

Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 adhered to Alexander

Hamilton’s view that democracy was little more than legitimized mob rule, a constant threat
to personal security, liberty and property. Thus, the framers sought to establish a constitutional
republic, in which public policy would be made by elected representatives but individual rights
were protected from the tyranny of transient majorities. With its several elitist elements and
many limitations on majority rule, the framers’ Constitution had undemocratic strands.

We may define a republic to be a government which derives all its power directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding offices
during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a
government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion, or a favored class of it. It is sufficient for such government that the person
administering it be appointed either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they
hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified.[16]

An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of the democratic space
giving the people greater power to exercise their sovereignty. Thus, under the 1987
Constitution, the people can directly exercise their sovereign authority through the
following modes, namely: (1) elections; (2) plebiscite; (3) initiative; (4) recall; and (5)
referendum.

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think as a lawyer, the Commissioner knows that one of
the manifestations of republicanism is the existence of the Bill of Rights and periodic elections,
which already indicates that we are a democratic state. Therefore, the addition of “democratic”
is what we call “pardonable redundancy” the purpose being to emphasize that our country is
republican and democratic at the same time. . . In the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
“democratic” does not appear. I hope the Commissioner has no objection to that word.

MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word “democratic” because of the provisions that we are
now adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have
provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and
other instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people through people’s
organizations.
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MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept “republican state,” we are stressing the
participation of the people. . . So the word “republican” will suffice to cover popular
representation.

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view of
the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it
was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism, of representative
democracy as well. So, we want to add the word “democratic” to emphasize that in this new
Constitution there are instances where the people would act directly, and not through their
representatives.[27] (emphasis supplied)

The right to vote or of suffrage is “an important political right appertaining to citizenship. Each
individual qualified to vote is a particle of popular sovereignty.” In People v. Corral,[34] we
held that “(t)he modern conception of suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The
right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted
by the State to such persons as are most likely to exercise it for the public good.”

Other noted political philosophers like John Stuart Mill conceived of the “marketplace of
ideas” as a necessary means of testing the validity of ideas, viz:
(N)o one’s opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had
forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which could
have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents.

The electorate’s right to information on public matters occupies a higher legal tier in the
Philippines compared to the United States. While the right to information in U.S.
jurisdiction is merely a statutory right, it enjoys constitutional status in Philippine
jurisdiction. The 1987 Constitution not only enlarged the democratic space with provisions on
the electorate’s direct exercise of sovereignty, but also highlighted the right of the people to
information on matters of public interest as a predicate to good governance and a
working democracy.

Although there is not unanimity of judicial opinion as to the requirement of official notice, if
the vacancy is to be filled at the time of a general election, yet it appears to be almost
universally held that if the great body of the electors are misled by the want of such notice
and are instead led to believe that no such election is in fact to be held, an attempted
choice by a small percentage of the voters is void.

Similarly, in Griffith v. Mercer County Court, et al.,[122] it was held, viz:

There is a clear distinction between the case of a vacancy which is to be filled at a special
election to be held at a time and place to be appointed by some officer or tribunal, authorized
by statute to call it, and a case where the statute itself provides for filling a vacancy at the
next general election after it occurs. In such case nearly all the authorities hold that if the
body of electors do in fact know the vacancy exists, and candidates are regularly
nominated by the various political parties to fill it, and the candidates receive most of the
votes cast, such election is valid, even though no notice thereof was published in a manner
provided by the statute. It would be hypertechnical and unreasonable to hold that a failure to
comply literally with the statute in such case would avoid the election.

The choice must be based on enlightened judgment for democracy cannot endure the
rule and reign of ignorance. This principle was stressed by the Court in Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections. The issue before the Court was whether the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 had the power to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of
a partial constitutional amendment. The amendment was the proposal to lower the voting age
to 18 but with the caveat that “(t)his partial amendment, which refers only to age qualification
for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended
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Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.” The Court ruled in the negative,
emphasizing the necessity for the voter to be afforded sufficient time and information to
appraise the amendment,

SR. TAN. Mr. Presiding Officer, I think one of the drawbacks of our political system,
especially in the campaign, is that many of us vote by personality rather than by issue. So I am
inclined to believe that in the elections by district, that would be lessened because we get to
know the persons running more intimately. So we know their motivation, their excesses, their
weaknesses and there would be less chance for the people to vote by personality. I was
wondering whether the Commission shares the same observation

MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, if it would be by province, the vote would no longer
be personalities but more on issues, because the relationship is not really very personal.
Whereas, if it would be by district, the vote on personality would be most impressive and
dominant.

In Hassan v. COMELEC, et al.,[137] we ruled that constituents could not be charged with
notice of a second special elections held only two days after the failure of the special
election. This case involved the May 8, 1995 regular local elections in Madalum, Lanao del
Sur. Due to the threats of violence and terrorism in the area, there was a failure of election in
six out of twenty-four precincts in Madalum. A special elections was set on May 27, 1995
but the Board of Election Inspectors failed to report for duty due to the threats of violence.
The Monitoring Supervising Team of the COMELEC reset the special elections to May 29,
1995 in a school 15 kilometers away from the designated polling places. In ruling that the
May 29 special elections was invalid, the Court ruled, viz:
We cannot agree with the COMELEC that petitioner, his followers or the constituents must
be charged with notice of the special elections to be held because of the failure of the two (2)
previous elections. To require the voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly
impracticable. In a place marred by violence, it was necessary for the voters to be given
sufficient time to be notified of the changes and prepare themselves for the eventuality.

It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form,
either actual or constructive of the time, place and purpose thereof. (Furste v. Gray, 240
Ky 604, 42 SW 2d 889; State ex. rel. Stipp v. Colliver (MO) 243 SW 2d 344.) The time for
holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance. The requirement of notice even
becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was called by some authority after the
happening of a condition precedent, or at least there must be a substantial compliance
therewith so that it may fairly and reasonably be said that the purpose of the statute has been
carried into effect. (State ex. rel. Stipp v. Colliver, supra). The sufficiency of notice is
determined on whether the voters generally have knowledge of the time, place and
purpose of the elections so as to give them full opportunity to attend the polls and
express their will or on the other hand, whether the omission resulted in depriving a
sufficient number of the qualified electors of the opportunity of exercising their
franchise so as to change the result of the election. (Housing Authority of County of Kings
v. Peden, 212 Cal App 2d 276, 28 Cal Rptr, other citations omitted). ...even in highly
urbanized areas, the dissemination of notices poses to be a problem. In the absence of proof
that actual notice of the special elections has reached a great number of voters, we are
constrained to consider the May 29 elections as invalid...

Rule by the ignorant majority is a sham democracy - a mobocracy -for in the words of
Jefferson, a nation cannot be both free and ignorant. If there is anything that democracy
cannot survive, it is the virus of ignorance.

The ponencia concedes that a survey of COMELEC’s resolutions relating to the conduct of
the May 14, 2001 elections would reveal that they “contain nothing which would amount to a
compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
as amended.” Nowhere in its resolutions or even its press releases did COMELEC state that it
would hold a special election for a single Senate seat with a three-year term simultaneously
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Nor did COMELEC give official notice of the
manner by which the special election would be conducted, i.e., that the senatorial candidate
receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the election would be declared winner in the
special election. Still, the ponencia upheld the holding of the May 14, 2001 special election
despite “the lack of ‘call’ for such election and ... lack of notice as to the office to be filled and
the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined.”

With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to the ponencia’s position for it leaves the purity
of elections and the ascertainment of the will of the electorate to chance, conjecture and
speculation. Considering that elections lie at the heart of the democratic process because it is
through the act of voting that consent to government is secured, I choose to take a position that
would ensure, to the greatest extent possible, an electorate that is informed, a vote that is not
devalued by ignorance and an election where the consent of the governed is clear and
unequivocal.

With due respect, this is not the intention of R.A. No. 7166 for despite its paragraph 1, Section
7 that “in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously
with the succeeding regular election”, the law nevertheless required in paragraph 3 of the same
section that “(t)he Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding
of the election to its provincial election supervisors and election registrars for
dissemination, who shall post copies thereof in at least three conspicuous places
preferably where public meetings are held in each city or municipality affected.”

The Duquette case cited by the ponencia does not lend support to its thesis that statutory
notice suffices. In Duquette, it was held that in the absence of an official notice of the special
election mandated by law to. be held simultaneously with the general election, there
should be actual notice of the electorate. Actual notice may be proved by the voting of a
significant percentage of the electorate for the position in the special election or by other acts
which manifest awareness of the holding of a special election such as nomination of
candidates. In the case at bar, however, the number of votes cast for the special election
cannot be determined as the ballot did not indicate separately the votes for the special
election. In fact, whether or not the electorate had notice of the special election, a candidate
would just the same fall as the 13th placer because more than twelve candidates ran for the
regular senatorial elections. Nobody was nominated to vie specifically for the senatorial seat
in the special election nor was there a certificate of candidacy filed for that position. In the
absence of official notice of the time, place and manner of conduct of the special election,
actual notice is a matter of proof. Respondents and the ponencia cannot point to any proof of
actual notice.

With respect to the lack of notice of the manner by which the special election would be
conducted, i.e., that the 13th placer would be declared winner in the special election, there can
be no debate that statutory notice will not operate as notice to the electorate as there is no law
providing that a special election held simultaneously with a general election could be
conducted in the manner adopted by the Senate and the COMELEC. Instead, the ponencia
buttresses its holding by stating that the petitioner has not claimed nor proved that the failure
of notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special
senatorial election. It relies on “actual notice from many sources, such as media reports of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign” but without even
identifying these media reports and election propaganda. Suffice to state that before the
ponencia can require proof that a sufficient number of voters was misled during the May 14,
2001 elections, it must first be shown that in the absence of official notice of the procedure for
the special election, there was nevertheless actual notice of the electorate so that the special
election could be presumed to be valid. Only then will the duty arise to show proof that a

Purisima v Salanga
Gregorio Cordero won the
voting for the Provincial
Board Member of Ilocos Sur.
However, petitioner Amante
Purisima questions this by
arguing that the words and
figures for Cordero’s votes
were erased and
superimposed. The
Nacionalista Party’s copies
were different from that of the
copy of the Provincial
Treasurer, but the request for
suspension of canvass and
recount was dismissed on the
ground that it was not
ascertainable as to whether or
not the discrepancy will affect
the result. Cordero edged by
1,857 votes, so petitioner
argued that the 5,042 vote
difference between the copies
should be investigated in light
of possible tampering.
COMELEC still declared
Cordero as winner, and the
respondent judge dismissed
the case.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
sufficient number of voters was misled to rebut the presumption of validity.
The models to follow in the conduct of special elections mandated by law to be held
simultaneously with a general elections are the special elections of November 13, 1951 and
November 8, 1955 to fill the seats vacated by then Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P.
Garcia, respectively. In these special senatorial elections, election activities prior (i.e., filing
of certificate of candidacies), during (i.e., the act of voting for a special election candidate
distinct from the candidates for the regular election) and after the election (i.e., tallying and
canvassing of results) were conducted simultaneously with, but distinctly from the regular
senatorial elections. This procedure minimized voter confusion and allowed the voter to freely
and accurately speak his mind and have his will truly ascertained.
The latter law provides that when a permanent vacancy occurs in the Senate at least one year
before the expiration of the term, “the Commission (on Elections) shall call and hold a
special election to fill the vacancy...” Since under R.A. No. 7166, it is the power and duty of
the COMELEC, and not the Senate, to call and hold the election, the Senate cannot, by mere
resolution, impose upon the COMELEC the procedure for the special election that it intended
such that “Comelec will not have the flexibility” to deviate therefrom. As a constitutional body
created to ensure “free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections”, it was the duty of
the COMELEC to give to the electorate notice of the time, place and manner of conduct of the
special elections and to adopt only those mechanisms and procedures that would ascertain the
true will of the people.
Passing on to the next point, the basis of the petition for recount was not merely a discrepancy
between the Nacionalista Party's copies and the Provincial Treasurer's copies of returns.
Paragraph 8 of said petition shows that, in addition, the Commission on Elections' copies were
relied upon:
"That as a result of the aforesaid erasures, tamperings and apparent falsifications, there exist
discrepancies between the Provincial Treasurer's copies (the basis of the canvass) of the
election returns in the precincts in question, on one hand, and the copies pertaining to the
Commission on Elections, on the other, and that said discrepancies materially affect the result
of the elections as between herein petitioner and respondent Gregorio Cordero;"
Accordingly, even assuming for the nonce—a point we do not here decide—that the the
Nacionalista Party's copies are not copies that may be the basis of a petition for recount, the
fact remains that the Commission on Elections' copies were said to reflect the same
discrepancy with the Provincial Treasurer's copies. It is settled that the Commission on
Elections' copies are authentic copies within the meaning of Section 163 of the Revised
Election Code (Lawsin vs. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964; Matanog vs. Alejandro, L-
22502-03, June 30, 1964).
The trial court, however, ruled that the Commission on Elections' copies had no application to
the petition for recount because they were not submitted to the board of canvassers. The record
definitely shows that the reason why Purisima was not able to submit to the board said
Commission on Elections' copies was because the board declined to suspend the canvass and
proclamation.
It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of patent irregularity in
the election returns. In the present case, there were patent erasures and superimpositions in
words and figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board of can vassers. It
was therefore imperative for the board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification
of authentic copies and recourse to the courts (Javier vs. Commission on Elections, 121 Phil.
168). A canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding such patent defects, without awaiting

Cauton v COMELEC
Lucas Cauton, Pablo Sanidad
and Godofredo S. Reyes were
candidates for the position of
Representative of the 2nd
District of Ilocos Sur. During
the canvas, Sanidad filed a
petition for the opening of the
ballot box and a recount, on
the ground that the election
returns used by the Provincial
Treasurer did not match with
those in possession of the
Liberal Party. This involved
the votes in the precincts of
Candon, Santiago and Sta.
Cruz, and the COMELEC
agreed to the existence of the
discrepancies. Petitioner
Cauton argues that the
COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion by
ordering the opening of the
ballot boxes. Petitioner said
that Section 157 of the
Revised Election Code only
allowed for the opening of
ballot boxes in connection
with an investigation
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
proper remedies, is null and void (Ibid.). In fact, as stated, the Commission on Elections
declared the canvass and proclamation, made by respondent provincial board of canvassers,
null and void.
Since the board of canvassers presented Purisima from securing the Commission on Elections'
copies of the returns to establish a discrepancy between them and the Provincial Treasurer's
copies the failure to submit the Commission on Elections' copies to said board should not
prejudice Purisima's right to petition for recount before the court. It was therefore grave abuse
of discretion for respondent court to refuse to consider the Commission on Elections' copies,
regardless of the patent and admitted irregularities on the face of the Provincial Treasurer's
copies and the alleged discrepancy amounting to thousands of votes sufficient to affect the
results.
Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate. Patent
erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election returns
strike at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison
with the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to remove grave
doubts as to the correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will
of the people.
Note:
First of all it is not disputed that a candidate affected can file the petition for recount, even if
he does so alone, without the concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers (Cawa vs. Del
Rosario, 108 Phil., 520). From the fact, therefore, that the provincial board of canvassers has
not petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were not convinced a discrepancy
existed.
We cannot sustain the stand of the petitioner. We believe that in issuing the resolution in
question the Commission on Elections simply performed a function as authorized by the
Constitution, that is, to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections and x x x exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law." The Commission has the power to decide all administrative
questions affecting elections, except the question involving the right to vote. [
What the respondent Commission on Elections did in the case now before Us is just what is
contemplated in the abovequoted ruling of this Court. The power of the Commission on
Elections in this respect is simply administrative and supervisory - intended to secure the
proclamation of the winning candidate based on the true count of the votes cast. When the
Commission on Elections exercises this power the purpose is not for the Commission to help
a candidate win the election but to bring about the canvass of the true results of the elections
as certified by the boards of election inspectors in every precinct. The object of the canvass is
to determine the result of the elections based on the official election returns. In order that the
result of the canvass would reflect the true expression of the people's will in the choice of their
elective officials, the canvass must be based on true, genuine, correct, nay untampered,
election returns. It is in this proceeding that the Commission on Elections exercises its
supervisory and administrative power in the enforcement of laws relative to the conduct of
elections, by seeing to it that the canvass is based on the election returns as actually certified
by the members of the boards of inspectors. Once the Commission on Elections is convinced
that the election returns in the hands of the board of canvassers do not constitute the proper
basis in ascertaining the true result of the elections, it should be its concern, nay its duty, to
order the taking of such steps as may be necessary in order that the proper basis for the canvass
is obtained or made available.

conducted for the purpose of
helping the prosecution of any
violation of election laws or
for the purely administrative
purpose but not when the sole
purpose is, as in this case, to
assist a party in trying to win
the election.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
The election law requires the board of inspectors to prepare four copies of the election return
in each precinct - one to be deposited in the ballot box, one to be delivered to municipal
treasurer, one to be sent to the provincial treasurer, and one to be sent to the Commission on
Elections. In the case of the canvass of the election returns for candidates for provincial or
national offices, the election returns received by the provincial treasurer from the boards of
inspectors are used. It is the duty of the provincial treasurer to turn over to the provincial board
of canvassers the election returns received by him from the boards of inspectors. If the
Commission on Elections is duly informed and it so finds, in appropriate proceedings, that the
election returns in the hands of the provincial treasurer are tampered, then the Commission
should afford the candidate adversely affected by the tampering an opportunity to show that
there exist authentic copies of the same election returns which are not tampered. A recourse
may be had to the copies received by the Commission on Elections and to the copies received
by the municipal treasurer. If it is shown, that the copies in the hands of the Commission on
Elections and of the municipal treasurer are similarly tampered as the copies in the hands of
the provincial treasurer, then it becomes evident that all the three copies of the election returns
outside the ballot box do not constitute a reliable basis for a canvass. The only copies left to
be checked, whether they are also tampered or not, are the ones inside the ballot
boxes. Certainly, the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power to administer and
enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections, may order the opening of the ballot boxes
to ascertain whether the copy inside each ballot box is also tampered like the three copies
outside the ballot box, corresponding to each precinct. The Commission on Elections may do
this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the proper party. Once it is found that the copy
of the election return inside the ballot box is untampered, the Commission on Elections would
then have accomplished two things, namely: (1) secured a basis for the prosecution for the
violation of the laws relative to elections, and (2) afforded the party aggrieved by the alteration
of the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a judicial recount of the votes as
provided for in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code. Thus, the Commission on Elections
has thereby made available the proper and reliable basis for the canvass of the votes that will
lead to the proclamation by the board of canvassers of the true winner in the elections. In so
doing the Commission on Elections, as We have said, had performed its constitutional duty of
administering and enforcing the laws relative to the conduct of elections with a view to
promoting clean and honest elections - the very purpose for which the Commission on
Elections was created by constitutional mandate.
An order to this effect does not affect the right to vote or the validity of any vote cast, so that
it is perfectly within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue such an order in the
exercise of its exclusive power to administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of
elections. It would indeed be absurd to say that the Commission on Elections has a legal duty
to perform and at the same time it is denied the necessary means to perform said duty.
As We have adverted to, the Commission on Elections has the power to inquire whether there
exist discrepancies among the various copies of the election returns.[11] Of all the copies
prepared by the board of inspectors the copy least susceptible to being tampered with is the
one deposited in the ballot box. Where the three copies outside the ballot boxes appear to have
been uniformly altered, there is no plausible reason why the copy deposited in the ballot box
may not be used to determine whether discrepancies exist in the various copies. Inasmuch as
the Commission on Elections has the right to determine whether said discrepancies exist, it
must also have the right to consult said returns, which cannot be done unless the ballot boxes
are opened. It is noteworthy that the Revised Election Code does not provide that it is the
courts that have the power to order the opening of the ballot box in a situation like this.
Section 157 of the Revised Election Code, on which petitioner herein relies in support of his
stand in the present case, authorizes the opening of the ballot box whenever it is the subject of
an official investigation. It provides:

Roque v COMELEC
Penned by Justice Velasco
COMELEC, in view of the
2010 elections, implemented
the AES (Automated Election
System) nationwide. It
consisted of three phases: 1)
voter registration, 2)
automated counting and
canvassing system, 3)
electronic transmission. A
Joint Venture Agreement with
SMARTMATIC and Total
Information Management
(TIM) was approved by the
COMELEC as the sole
capable bidder. It was first
tested and implemented in
ARMM in 2008. Petitioner
Harry Roque questions the
constitutionality of the
automation system, arguing
that automation cannot happen
without a previous test run,
and that it constituted an
abdication of COMELEC’s
responsibility to administer
electoral laws.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
"The municipal treasurer shall keep the boxes unopened in his possession in a secure place and
under his responsibility for three months, unless they are the subject of an official
investigation, or a competent court or tribunal shall demand them sooner, or the competent
authority shall order their preservation for a longer time in connection with any pending contest
or investigation."
In a democratic system of government, the people's voice is sovereign. Corollarily, choosing
through the ballots the men and women who are to govern the country is perhaps the highest
exercise of democracy. It is thus the interest of the state to insure honest, credible and peaceful
elections, where the sanctity of the votes and the secrecy of the ballots are safeguarded, where
the will of the electorate is not frustrated or undermined. For when the popular will itself is
subverted by election irregularities, then the insidious seeds of doubt are sown and the ideal of
a peaceful and smooth transition of power is placed in jeopardy. To automate, thus breaking
away from a manual system of election, has been viewed as a significant step towards clean
and credible elections, unfettered by the travails of the long wait and cheating that have marked
many of our electoral exercises.
Petitioners' beef against the TIM-Smartmatic JVA is untenable. First off, the Comelec knows
the very entities whom they are dealing with, which it can hold solidary liable under the
automation contract, should there be contract violation. Secondly, there is no requirement
under either RA 8436, as amended, or the RFP, that all the suppliers, manufacturers or
distributors involved in the transaction should be part of the joint venture. On the contrary, the
Instruction to Bidders--as petitioners themselves admit[60]--allows the bidder to subcontract
portions of the goods or services under the automation project.
The respondents' thesis on pilot testing and the logic holding it together are well taken. There
can be no argument about the phrase "pilot test" not being found in the law. But does it
necessarily follow that a pilot test is absolutely not contemplated in the law? We repair to the
statutory provision petitioners cited as requiring a pilot run, referring to Sec. 6 of RA 8436, as
amended by RA 9369, reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Authority to use an Automated Election System.- To carry out the above stated-policy,
the [Comelec], x x x is hereby authorized to use an automated election system or systems in
the same election in different provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording electronic
election system as it may deem appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises: Provided,
that for the regular national and local elections, which shall be held immediately after
the effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities
and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao to be chosen by the [Comelec]:
Provided, further, That local government units whose officials have been the subject of
administrative charges within sixteen (16) month prior to the May 14, 2007 elections shall not
be chosen. Provided, finally, That no area shall be chosen without the consent of the
Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned. The term local government unit as used
in this provision shall refer to a highly urbanized city or province. In succeeding regular
national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented. (Emphasis and underscoring added.)
RA 9369, which envisages an AES, be it paper-based or direct-recording electronic, took effect
in the second week of February 2007 or thereabout.[63] The "regular national and local
elections" referred to after the "effectivity of this Act" can be no other than the May 2007
regular elections, during which time the AES shall, as the law is worded, be used in at least
two highly urbanized cities and provinces in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The Court takes
judicial notice that the May 2007 elections did not deploy AES, evidently due to the mix of
time and funding constraints.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

As may be noted, Sec. 6 of RA 8436 may be broken into three essential parts, the first partaking
of the nature of a general policy declaration: that Comelec is authorized to automate the entire
elections. The second part states that for the regular national and local elections that shall be
held in May 2007, Comelec shall use the AES, with an option, however, to undertake
automation, regardless of the technology to be selected, in a limited area or, to be more precise,
in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao to be chosen by the Comelec. On the other hand, the last part, phrased sans reference
to the May 2007 elections, commands thus: "[I]n succeeding regular national or local
elections, the [automated election system] shall be implemented." Taken in its proper context,
the last part is indicative of the legislative intent for the May 2010 electoral exercise to be fully
automated, regardless of whether or not pilot testing was run in the 2007 polls.

To argue that pilot testing is a condition precedent to a full automation in 2010 would doubtless
undermine the purpose of RA 9369. For, as aptly observed during the oral arguments, if there
was no political exercise in May 2007, the country would theoretically be barred forever from
having full automation.

Lest it be overlooked, an AES is not synonymous to and ought not to be confused with the
PCOS. Sec. 2(a) of RA 8436, as amended, defines an AES as "a system using appropriate
technology which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing
and transmission of election results, and other electoral processes." On the other hand, PCOS
refers to a technology wherein an optical ballot scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots
marked by hand by the voter are inserted to be counted.[65] What may reasonably be deduced
from these definitions is that PCOS is merely one of several automated voting, counting or
canvassing technologies coming within the term AES, implying in turn that the automated
election system or technology that the Comelec shall adopt in future elections need not, as a
matter of mandatory arrangement, be piloted in the adverted two highly urbanized cities and
provinces.

While the underscored portion makes reference to a "2007 pilot exercise," what it really exacts
is that, for the automation of the May 2010 and subsequent elections, the PCOS or any AES
to be procured must have demonstrated its capability and success in either a local or a foreign
electoral exercise. And as expressly declared by the provision, participation in the 2007
electoral exercise is not a guarantee nor is it conclusive of the system's fitness. In this regard,
the Court is inclined to agree with private respondents' interpretation of the underscored
portion in question: "The provision clearly conveys that the [AES] to be used in the 2010
elections need not have been used in the 2007 elections, and that the demonstration of its
capability need not be in a previous Philippine election. Demonstration of the success and
capability of the PCOS may be in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction." [66] As
determined by the Comelec, the PCOS system had been successfully deployed in previous
electoral exercises in foreign countries, such as Ontario, Canada; and New York, USA,[67]
albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily the system provider. But then, RA 9369 does not call
for the winning bidder of the 2010 automation project and the deploying entity/provider in the
foreign electoral exercise to be one and the same entity. Neither does the law incidentally
require that the system be first used in an archipelagic country or with a topography or a voting
population similar to or approximating that of the Philippines.

At any event, any lingering doubt on the issue of whether or not full automation of the 2010
regular elections can validly proceed without a pilot run of the AES should be put to rest with
the enactment in March 2009 of RA 9525,[68] in which Congress appropriated PhP 11.301
billion to automate the 2010 elections, subject to compliance with the transparency and
accuracy requirements in selecting the relevant technology of the machines
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

PCOS Meets Minimum Capabilities Standards

SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. - The automated election system must at least have
the following functional capabilities:
(a) Adequate security against unauthorized access;
(b) Accuracy in recording and reading of votes as well as in the tabulation,
consolidation/canvassing, electronic transmission, and storage of results;
(c) Error recovery in case of non-catastrophic failure of device;
(d) System integrity which ensures physical stability and functioning of the vote
recording and counting process;
(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;
(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the
correctness of reported election results;
(g) An election management system for preparing ballots and programs for use in the
casting and counting of votes and to consolidate, report and display election result
in the shortest time possible;
(h) Accessibility to illiterates and disabled voters;
(i) Vote tabulating program for election, referendum or plebiscite;
(j) Accurate ballot counters;
(k) Data retention provision;
(l) Provide for the safekeeping, storing and archiving of physical or paper resource
used in the election process;
(m) Utilize or generate official ballots as herein defined;
(n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has
registered his choice; and
(o) Configure access control for sensitive system data and function.

No Abdication of Comelec's Mandate and Responsibility

The first function of the Comelec under the Constitution [86]--and the Omnibus Election Code
for that matter--relates to the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relating to the conduct of elections to public office to ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral
exercise. And how did petitioners come to their conclusion about their abdication theory? By
acceding to Art. 3.3 of the automation contract, Comelec relinquished, so petitioners claim,
supervision and control of the system to be used for the automated elections. To a more specific
point, the loss of control, as may be deduced from the ensuing exchanges, arose from the fact
that Comelec would not be holding possession of what in IT jargon are the public and private
keys pair.

SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater track record in automated
elections, shall be in charge of the technical aspects of the counting and canvassing
software and hardware, including transmission configuration and system integration.
SMARTMATIC shall also be primarily responsible for preventing and troubleshooting
technical problems that may arise during the elections. (Emphasis added.)

The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture partner in charge of the technical
aspect of the counting and canvassing wares does not to us translate, without more, to ceding
control of the electoral process to Smartmatic. It bears to stress that the aforesaid designation
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

of Smartmatic was not plucked from thin air, as it was in fact an eligibility requirement
imposed, should the bidder be a joint venture.

With the view we take of the automation contract, the role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is
basically to supply the goods necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to
the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related equipment, both
hardware and software, and the technical services pertaining to their operation. As lessees of
the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators would provide
assistance with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of the day,
will be conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.

And if only to emphasize a point, Comelec's contract is with Smartmatic TIM Corporation of
which Smartmatic is a 40% minority owner, per the JVA of TIM and Smartmatic and the
Articles of Incorporation of Smartmatic TIM Corporation. Accordingly, any decision on the
part or on behalf of Smartmatic will not be binding on Comelec. As a necessary corollary, the
board room voting arrangement that Smartmatic and TIM may have agreed upon as joint
venture partners, inclusive of the veto vote that one may have power over the other, should
really be the least concern of the Comelec.

A view has been advanced regarding the susceptibility of the AES to hacking, just like the
voting machines used in certain precincts in Florida, USA in the Gore-Bush presidential
contests. However, an analysis of post-election reports on the voting system thus used in the
US during the period material and the AES to be utilized in the 2010 automation project seems
to suggest stark differences between the two systems. The first relates to the Source Code,
defined in RA 9369 as "human readable instructions that define what the computer equipment
will do."[99] The Source Code for the 2010 AES shall be available and opened for review by
political parties, candidates and the citizens' arms or their representatives;[100] whereas in the
US precincts aforementioned, the Source Code was alleged to have been kept secret by the
machine manufacture company, thus keeping the American public in the dark as to how
exactly the machines counted their votes. And secondly, in the AES, the PCOS machines found
in the precincts will also be the same device that would tabulate and canvass the votes; whereas
in the US, the machines in the precincts did not count the votes. Instead the votes cast appeared
to have been stored in a memory card that was brought to a counting center at the end of the
day. As a result, the hacking and cheating may have possibly occurred at the counting center.

Additionally, with the AES, the possibility of system hacking is very slim. The PCOS
machines are only online when they transmit the results, which would only take around one to
two minutes. In order to hack the system during this tiny span of vulnerability, a super
computer would be required. Noteworthy also is the fact that the memory card to be used
during the elections is encrypted and read-only--meaning no illicit program can be executed
or introduced into the memory card.

Separate Concurring Thus, the petitioners interpret the word shall in the first proviso of Section 5, RA 8436, as
Opinion of Chief Justice amended, to support their thesis that the pilot exercise of the AES is a condition precedent
Puno in Roque v prior to its full implementation. The proviso states that "the [automated election system] shall
COMELEC be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao."[
Similarly, the respondents interpret the word shall in the last sentence of the provision, which
states that "in succeeding regular national or local elections, the [automated election system]
shall be implemented nationwide,"[12] and submit that the pilot exercise of the AES is not a
condition precedent. Further, they contend that the use of the AES in at least two provinces
and two highly urbanized cities each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao refers only to the
national and local elections immediately following the passage of RA 9369, i.e., the May 2007
national and local elections. They argue that this was just an acknowledgment by Congress
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that there was not enough time or funds to conduct a full nationwide automation of the May
2007 election.

In this light, Section 5 should be interpreted to mean that the COMELEC is authorized to use
an AES as long as the following requisites are complied with: (1) for the regular national and
local elections, which shall be held immediately after the effectivity of the Act, the AES shall
be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao; (2) that local government units whose officials have been the subject of
administrative charges within sixteen months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections shall not be
chosen; and (3) that no area shall be chosen without the consent of the Sanggunian of the local
government unit concerned. And, when the above conditions are complied with, the AES shall
be implemented nationwide in succeeding regular national and local elections.

Pushing to the limit their argument that pilot testing is not a condition precedent to the conduct
of an AES, the respondents rely on Section 12 of RA 8436, as amended, which provides thus:

SEC. 12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials. - To achieve the purpose of this Act, the
Commission is authorized to procure, in accordance with existing laws, by purchase, lease,
rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities and other
services, from local or foreign sources free from taxes and import duties, subject to accounting
and auditing rules and regulations. With respect to the May 10, 2010 elections and
succeeding electoral exercises, the system procured must have demonstrated capability
and been successfully used in a prior electoral exercise here or abroad. Participation in
the 2007 pilot exercise shall not be conclusive of the system's fitness.

With due respect, the respondents have a murky understanding of the last sentence of Section
12. It merely states that "[p]articipation in the 2007 pilot exercise shall not be conclusive of
the system's fitness." It does not say that participation of the procured system in the 2007 pilot
exercise is not a condition precedent to the full nationwide implementation of the AES. The
section says in unadorned language that as long as the system procured -presumably for the
May 2007 elections - has been shown to have demonstrated capability and has been
successfully used in a prior electoral exercise here in the Philippines or abroad, the system
may also be used in the May 2010 and succeeding elections. In fine, the subject of the section
is the fitness of the system procured for the May 2007 automated pilot exercise; it has no
relation to the issue of whether the pilot exercise is a condition precedent to the implementation
of full nationwide automated elections.

The respondents also have an erroneous reading of the use of the word "pilot exercise" instead
of "pilot testing." They claim that the use of the word "pilot exercise" instead of "pilot testing"
is indicative of the intention to only initially use or employ the AES in the 2007 elections
rather than make it a condition precedent. Again, this submission is not sustained by the
deliberations of the Senate. "Pilot-exercise" was used in the law instead of "pilot-test" to avoid
the notion that a test must first be passed in the 2007 elections in order to continue with the
use of the AES as a mode of conducting the succeeding elections. The lawmakers wanted to
avoid the use of the word "test," so that in case the AES to be used in the 2007 elections did
not well perform as planned, still, the automation of the elections in the next elections would
proceed. This intent is reflected in the debate between Senator Richard J. Gordon (Senator
Gordon) and Senator Manuel A. Roxas II (Senator Roxas) over an amendment to Section 5 of
RA 8436, proposed by the latter. Senator Roxas proposed to add the words "on a test basis" to
refer to the use of an AES.

Senator Roxas' amendment which contained the word "test," was rejected. The reason is not
because the partial use of the AES in the 2007 election was not considered as a condition
precedent to its full implementation in the 2010 elections. Rather, it was because the use of the
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word "test" would have implied that Congress would still have to decide whether the conduct
of the AES had passed its requirements; whether an AES should still be continued in the
succeeding elections; or whether, based on the "test," the conduct of the elections should revert
to manual.

Section 2. Use of Funds. - The amounts herein appropriated shall be used for the purposes
indicated and subject to: (i) the relevant special and general provisions of Republic Act No.
9498, or the FY 2008 General Appropriations Act, as reenacted, and subsequent General
Appropriations Acts, and (ii) the applicable provisions of Republic Act No. 8436, entitled:
"An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in
the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in subsequent National and Local Electoral
Exercises, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes", as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369: Provided, however, That disbursement of the amounts herein appropriated or
any part thereof shall be authorized only in strict compliance with the Constitution, the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9369 and other election laws incorporated in said Act so
as to ensure the conduct of a free, orderly, clean, honest and credible election and shall adopt
such measures that will guaranty transparency and accuracy in the selection of the relevant
technology of the machines to be used on May 10, 2010 automated national and local election.
(Emphasis supplied.)

During the September 9, 2008 hearing of the Joint Committee on AES, Senator Edgardo
Angara had an exchange with Chairman Melo. It was unmistakable from the exchange that
not only did the Congress contemplate a full nationwide automation of the May 2010 elections,
but also that the approval of a budget of P11.3 billion was meant for the conduct of a full
nationwide automation of the 2010 elections, and not a partial or a pilot of the AES in selected
areas.

The Comment-in-Intervention of the Senate of the Philippines also affirmed the

congressional intention to implement a full nationwide automation of the elections this May
10, 2010. It categorically stated that the approval of the supplemental budget of P11.3 billion
for the upcoming May 10, 2010 elections was not merely for a pilot test, but for a full
nationwide implementation of the AES.

In the case at bar therefore, there is unmistakable evidence of the legislative intent to
implement a full nationwide automation of the May 2010 elections. It is impossible to give
effect to this intent and at the same time comply with the condition precedent of conducting
pilot exercises in selected areas. The irreconcilability between Section 5 of RA 8436, as
amended, and Section 2 of RA 9525 is apparent for Congress could not have maintained the
requirement of a pilot exercise as a condition precedent to full automation when it had made
it absolutely clear that it wanted to push through with a full nationwide AES this May 2010.

Any remaining doubt as to the need for incorporation is dispelled by Bid Bulletin No. 19 [43]
and Bid Bulletin No. 22,[44] issued by the COMELEC-SBAC to provide clarifications to
prospective bidders. Both documents acknowledge that a bid by a joint venture may be made
either through a joint venture corporation (JVC) or an unincorporated joint venture (UJV).

Petitioners also contend that the joint venture agreement of TIM and Smartmatic violates the
Filipino-foreign equity ceiling, the Anti-Dummy Law and COMELEC's own bidding
requirements.

I concur fully with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Velasco on this point. There is no constitutional
or statutory provision classifying the lease or provision of goods and technical services for the
automation of an election as a nationalized activity. To be sure, Section 12 of RA 8436, as
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amended by RA 9369, explicitly authorizes the COMELEC to procure supplies, equipment,

materials, software, facilities, and other services from foreign sources, as follows:

SEC. 12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials. - To achieve the purpose of this Act, the
Commission is authorized to procure, in accordance with existing laws, by purchase, lease,
rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities and
other services, from local or foreign sources free from taxes and import duties, subject to
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. With respect to the May 10, 2010 elections and
succeeding electoral exercises, the system procured must have demonstrated capability and
been successfully used in a prior electoral exercise here or abroad. Participation in the 2007
pilot exercise shall not be conclusive of the system's fitness. (Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioners also refer to COMELEC Bid Bulletin No. 10,[107] which was made an integral
part of the Automation Contract by virtue of Articles 21.1 and 21.4 of the contract.[108] Bid
Bulletin No. 10 provides that the "digital signature shall be assigned by the winning bidder to
all members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BOI) and the city, municipal, provincial or
district Board of Canvassers (BOC)." Since Smartmatic would have access to the digital
signatures and would have the authority to assign the access keys to the BEI and BOC, the
petitioners readily conclude that the COMELEC has abdicated its constitutional mandate to
enforce election laws. What the petitioners failed to consider is that, although the digital
signature shall be assigned by the winning bidder, Bid Bulletin No. 10 further provides that
the certificate of authority for the digital signatures must still be approved by the COMELEC.
Thus, the COMELEC retains control over the process of generation and distribution of
the digital signatures.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), through its Bids and Awards Committee (BAC),
is currently accepting bids for the lease, with an option to purchase, of an automated election
system (AES) that will meet the following needs:

6. A complete solutions provider, and not just a vendor, which can provide experienced and
effective overall nationwide project management service and total customer support (covering
all areas of project implementation including technical support, training, information
campaign support, civil and electrical works service, warehousing, deployment, installation
and pullout, contingency planning, etc.), under COMELEC supervision and control, to
ensure effective and successful implementation of the Project. (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, the power and duty of the COMELEC to administer election laws and to have control
and supervision over the automated elections is not incompatible with the decision to
subcontract services that may be better performed by those who are well-equipped to handle
complex technological matters with respect to the implementation of the AES. The
subcontractor cannot act independently of the COMELEC.

Roque v COMELEC Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis-à-vis the possibility of Comelec going
(February 2010 Resolution) manual, have attributed certain statements to respondent Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for
the purpose a news item on Inquirer.net, posted September 16, 2009.[7]
Penned by Justice Velasco
Private respondents' observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions of
what has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading
conclusion. The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning may be deliberately attached to
innocent views or even occasional crude comments by the simple expediency of lifting them
out of context from any publication.
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Petitioners next maintain that the Comelec abdicated its constitutional mandate[9] to decide all
questions affecting elections when, under Article 3.3[10] of the poll automation contract, it
surrendered control of the system and technical aspects of the 2010 automated elections to
Smartmatic in violation of Sec. 26[11] of RA 8436. Comelec, so petitioners suggest, should
have stipulated that its Information Technology (IT) Department shall have charge of the
technical aspects of the elections.

Petitioners' above contention, as well as the arguments, citations, and premises holding it
together, is a rehash of their previous position articulated in their memorandum[12] in support
of their petition. They have been considered, squarely addressed, and found to be without merit
in the Decision subject hereof. The Court is not inclined to embark on another extended
discussion of the same issue again. Suffice it to state that, under the automation contract,
Smartmatic is given a specific and limited technical task to assist the Comelec in implementing
the AES. But at the end of the day, the Smarmatic-TIM joint venture is merely a service
provider and lessor of goods and services to the Comelec, which shall have exclusive
supervision and control of the electoral process. Art. 6.7 of the automation contract could not
have been more clear:

6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the Commission En
Banc, the entire process of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing
of votes shall [still] be conducted by COMELEC's personnel and officials and their
performance, completion and final results according to specifications and within specified
periods shall be the shared responsibility of COMELEC and the PROVIDER. (Emphasis
added.)

Petitioners' posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to guide Comelec in
the appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count should PCOS machines fail,
cannot be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the continuity and back-up plans that would
be implemented in case the PCOS machines falter during the 2010 elections. [13] The overall
fallback strategy and options to address even the worst-case scenario--the wholesale
breakdown of the 80,000 needed machines nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved units--have
been discussed in some detail in the Decision subject of this recourse. The Court need not
belabor them again.

Roque, et al., in their petition, had questioned the certifications to this effect, arguing that these
certifications were not issued to respondent TIM-Smartmatic, but to a third party, Dominion
Voting Systems. Resolving the challenge, the Court, in effect, said that the system subject of
the certifications was the same one procured by Comelec for the 2010 elections. And besides,
the Licensing Agreement between Smartmatic and the Dominion Voting Systems indicates
that the former is the entity licensed by the latter to use the system in the Philippines.

Presently, petitioners assert that the system certified as having been used in New York was the
Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.

Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong indications that
Private Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication facilities for areas
without these facilities."[27] This argument, being again highly speculative, is without
evidentiary value and hardly provides a ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract.
Surely, a possible breach of a contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to prematurely
rescind, much less annul, the contract.

Arroyo v DOJ (2012 Decision) Fact-finding committee

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of
Penned by Justice Peralta the Comelec. Paragraph (6) thereof vests in the Comelec the power to:

Petitioner Mike Arroyo, Benjamin
Abalos, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
and other individuals were the
subject of an investigation for
electoral sabotage involving fraud
and manipulation. The COMELEC
and DOJ decided to form a joint
team for fact-finding purposes, and
another team for purposes of filing
the necessary case against Arroyo et
al. It involved the investigation of
the 2004 and 2007 elections, where
petitioners were alleged to have
manipulated the results in provinces
like North Cotabato and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao. The
committee decided to file a case
against petitioners under the
Omnibus Election Code, but
petitioner argues that the creation of
the joint committee is invalid under
the law.
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(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion
or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
This was an important innovation introduced by the 1987 Constitution, because the
above-quoted provision was not in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as
an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable
the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The failure of the Comelec to exercise this power could result in the frustration
of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty
of every qualified citizen to vote.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section
265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal [public
prosecutor], or with the Ministry [Department] of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted.
Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was amended by Section 43 of R.A. No.
9369,[71] which reads:
SEC. 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the
government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same.
Equal Protection and Due Process
Unlike the matter addressed by the Court’s ruling in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it
singles out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal
protection clause. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for
the purpose of investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo
Administration since Executive Order No. 1[77] specifically referred to the “previous
administration”; while the Joint Committee was created for the purpose of conducting
preliminary investigation of election offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While
GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were
investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
Thus, as the constitutional body granted with the broad power of enforcing and
administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall,[80] and tasked to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections,[81] the Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform
such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the Comelec issues various
resolutions prior to every local or national elections setting forth the guidelines to be
observed in the conduct of the elections. This shows that every election is distinct and
requires different guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to
existing circumstances.
Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel does not possess the required cold neutrality of an
impartial judge because it is all at once the evidence- gatherer, prosecutor and judge.
They explain that since the Fact-Finding Team has found probable cause to subject them
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to preliminary investigation, it is impossible for the Joint Committee to arrive at an

opposite conclusion. Petitioners likewise express doubts of any possibility that the Joint
Committee will be fair and impartial to them as Secretary De Lima and Chairman
Brillantes had repeatedly expressed prejudgment against petitioners through their
statements captured by the media.

It must also be emphasized that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created two bodies, namely:
(1) the Fact-Finding Team tasked to gather real, documentary and testimonial evidence
which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint
Committee; and (2) the Joint Committee mandated to conduct preliminary investigation.
It is, therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only one body which acted as evidence-
gatherer, prosecutor and judge.

Separation of powers
Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel is a new public office as shown by its
composition, the creation of its own Rules of Procedure, and the source of funding for
its operation. It is their position that the power of the DOJ to investigate the
commission of crimes and the Comelec’s constitutional mandate to investigate and
prosecute violations of election laws do not include the power to create a new public
office in the guise of a joint committee. Thus, in creating the Joint Panel, the DOJ and
the Comelec encroached upon the power of the Legislature to create public office.

Undoubtedly, it is the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of Court and not the assailed
Joint Order which give the DOJ and the Comelec the power to conduct preliminary
investigation. No new power is given to them by virtue of the assailed order. As to the
members of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, they perform such functions
that they already perform by virtue of their current positions as prosecutors of the DOJ
and legal officers of the Comelec. Thus, in no way can we consider the Joint Committee
as a new public office.

Independence of COMELEC
Petitioners claim that in creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec has effectively abdicated
its constitutional mandate to investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of
violation of election laws including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices in favor of the Executive Department acting through the DOJ
Secretary. Under the set-up, the Comelec personnel is placed under the supervision and
control of the DOJ. The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly
surrendered its independence to the DOJ and has acceded to share its exercise of
judgment and discretion with the Executive Branch.

Clearly, the Comelec recognizes the need to delegate to the prosecutors the power to
conduct preliminary investigation. Otherwise, the prompt resolution of alleged election
offenses will not be attained. This delegation of power, otherwise known as deputation,
has long been recognized and, in fact, been utilized as an effective means of disposing of
various election offense cases. Apparently, as mere deputies, the prosecutors played a
vital role in the conduct of preliminary investigation, in the resolution of complaints filed
before them, and in the filing of the informations with the proper court.

In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment for the creation of a Joint
Committee. While the composition of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is
dominated by DOJ officials, it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec is inferior.
Under the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec, though it acts jointly with the DOJ,
remains in control of the proceedings. In no way can we say that the Comelec has thereby
abdicated its independence to the executive department.

The text and intent of the constitutional provision granting the Comelec the authority to
investigate and prosecute election offenses is to give the Comelec all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.[101] The Comelec should be allowed considerable latitude in

Arroyo v DOJ (2013 Resolution)
Penned by Justice Peralta
Ongsiako Reyes v COMELEC
(June 2013 Resolution)
Penned by Justice Perez
Petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes
was a candidate for the position of
Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. Respondent Joseph
Socorro Tan filed a petition to
cancel or deny due course her COC
on the ground that she was not a
resident of Marinduque, and that
she was an American citizen. He
anchors his petition on the fact that
Ongsiako Reyes is the wife of
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devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective
for which it was created.[102] We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless
these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this Court should not
interfere.[103] Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the
constitutional body’s independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of
ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Note:
In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the DOJ is governed by the Rules of Court,
while the Comelec is governed by the 1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure. There is,
therefore, no need to promulgate new Rules as may be complementary to the DOJ and
Comelec Rules.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the
Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws. In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections,[38] the constitutionality of Section 43[39]
of RA 9369[40] had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court.
While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is
thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369.
Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the
government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation
and prosecution of election offenses.
Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution
No. 3467[41] dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, dated August 15,
2011, creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004
and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. However, GMA
seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were promulgated by the Comelec.
It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as
Comelec Resolution Nos. 8733[42] and 9057[43] mentioned in the assailed decision but
missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of
RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government the
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses.
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of
the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved
by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. [45] With more
reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an
abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications,
as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with
said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,[21] the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a
candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

Congressman Herminaldo
Mandanas of Bauan, Batangas.
Petitioner argues that their marriage
was void ab initio, and that she
never became a permanent resident
of the United States by simply
marrying an American citizen.
Petitioner won the election, was
proclaimed and took the oath of
office, but cannot yet assume office
until June 30. COMELEC took
cognizance of the case and declared
her COC void ab initio. Petitioner
argues that the COMELC is devoid
of jurisdiction because it rightfully
belongs to the HRET.
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As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,[22] citing Aggabao v. COMELEC[23] and Guerrero v.
COMELEC,[24] the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives
because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said,
the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.”[28] Thus, until such time, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported
Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this
is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or
affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of “newly-discovered evidence” without the same having been testified on
and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli
Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process
of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical
rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure “shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission.” In view of the fact that the proceedings in
a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
then the “newly discovered evidence” was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC:[31]
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require
a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely
by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable
than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
Notes:
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Time and again, We emphasize that the “grave abuse of discretion” which warrants this
Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a well-defined meaning. Guidance is found
in Beluso v. Commission on Elections[39] where the Court held:

x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged
and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning.
It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Ongsiako Reyes v COMELEC The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner’s
(October 2013 Resolution) submission. The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18
May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18
Penned by Justice Perez May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18
May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner’s oath of office is likewise baseless,
and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of
office.

Within that five (5) days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a
restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of
her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may remove the
barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner
did not move to have it happen.

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being
proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as respondent. Her certificate of candidacy
has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding
against her by the COMELEC.[3] She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court
to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became
executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She
would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order,
which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and
demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In
this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt
at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner
did was to “take the law into her hands” and secure a proclamation in complete disregard
of the COMELEC En Banc decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and
executory five days thereafter.

Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has
exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written
constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a
Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the
rightful winner in the election for such membership.[5] Indeed, the action for cancellation
of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable
determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the
COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally
decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the
COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the
COMELEC regarding petitioner’s ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of
Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner’s proclamation. The bar remained
when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five
days from 14 May 2013.

Macalintal v COMELEC
Petitioner Romulo Macalintal
challenges the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 for being
unconstitutional. Macalintal argues
that 1) Section 5(d) of RA 9189
violates Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, 2) that Section 18.5 of
the same law empowering
COMELEC to proclaim winning
candidates for absentee votes
violate the provision mandating that
only the Congress can proclaim the
votes for President and Vice
President, and 3) that the ability of
the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to overhaul the IRR
promulgated by the COMELEC as
regards absentee voting violates the
independence of COMELEC.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET
insofar as the petitioner’s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The
COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course
or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally
proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before
the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for
grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no
longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the
HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who
becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable
step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds
de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been
terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will
determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the
risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the
House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are
had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is
not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between
the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet
no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
Note:
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility
Voters
A. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section
1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election.
Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals[12] to
support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a “green card” holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and
residence in the Philippines.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
is a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions.
Thus, he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives[16] wherein the
Court held that the term “residence” has been understood to be synonymous with
“domicile” under both Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have only one
“domicile” but he can have two residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other
temporary;[17] and that the definition and meaning given to the term residence likewise
applies to absentee voters. Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC[18] which
reiterates the Court’s ruling in Faypon vs. Quirino,[19] the Solicitor General maintains that
Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent residents abroad may have in fact never
abandoned their Philippine domicile.[20]
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be
exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3)
at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting
is an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country
unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration under said Act
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the
impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned
the Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a provision in
the law enfranchising those who do not possess the residency requirement of the
Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intent to return to
the Philippines within a given period, risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However,
the risk is more apparent than real.

To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the significance
of absentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. It is viewed thus:

The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct from
the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting from that
previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting. The
right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely
statutory; absentee voting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the common law.

Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions devised to

accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it impracticable
for them to attend their polling places on the day of election, and the privilege of absentee
voting may flow from constitutional provisions or be conferred by statutes, existing in
some jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the casting and reception of ballots
by soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent on election day from the district
or precinct of their residence.

Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right.
When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with equality
among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may be limited in
their application to particular types of elections. The statutes should be construed in the
light of any constitutional provisions affecting registration and elections, and with due
regard to their texts prior to amendment and to predecessor statutes and the decisions
thereunder; they should also be construed in the light of the circumstances under which
they were enacted; and so as to carry out the objects thereof, if this can be done without
doing violence to their provisions and mandates. Further, in passing on statutes
regulating absentee voting, the court should look to the whole and every part of the
election laws, the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and
try to give effect to every portion thereof.

Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee.[30] However, under our election laws and the
countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with
domicile.

Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress

the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as
stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the
reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad
with respect to the system of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed
by Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos
abroad, the assumption is that they have the “qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to vote.”

It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that
they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have
not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2

immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional

provisions,[37] the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared
that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though
they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an
immigrant or permanent resident who is “recognized as such in the host country” because
immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one’s
residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and
permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit
to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that “all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law” must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that
Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling
or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in
fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of
the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes “provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise.”

The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders are
disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application to the present case because
the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of
Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.

It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise
to “resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
years from approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that
they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the
Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for the removal” of their
names “from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.”

Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter permanently

residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise disqualified by law, who
has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her
intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register
and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of
the place which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her
address for purposes of the elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.

The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas
absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His
having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not
necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the
Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that
he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit
required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

B. The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with
paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to

People v Corral
Petitioner is charged for having
voted illegally at the general
elections held on June 5, 1934. He
was convicted on the ground that he
voted during the election in
violation of Section 2642 in relation
to Section 432 of the Revised
Administrative Code. He submits
that he should be allowed to vote in
the elections because the offense
that disqualified him has been
served starting August 1898, and
the period of such was only 8 years
and 1 day.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list
representatives but not the President and Vice-President
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates
for the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to
canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions.” The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the
land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
C. He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into
the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not
under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of
government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and
regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its
members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any
law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option
but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The
right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege
granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the
public good; In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of
government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of
the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise
in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the adult male population. For
reasons of public policy, certain classes of persons are excluded from the franchise.
Among the generally excluded classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons of the right of suffrage by reason of their having
been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions
upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered
infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is
unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this
reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for
punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense
had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the
general election held on June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly without merit. The
disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code
having once attached on the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a
plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general
elections of 1934.
Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that the
disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the
expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of
the disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct
view is that it is imposed "for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a

Yra v Abano
Marcos Yra filed a petition for quo
warranto against Maximo Abano,
who recently won as the President
of the municipality of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Yra argues that Abano
went to Manila and registered as a
voter their when he pursued his
education. In 1927, he considered
himself a resident of Meycauayan.
In April 3, 1928, he asked for the
cancellation of his registration in
Manila, but this was denied by local
official on the grond that his request
was not deposited in the mails
before the deadline (April 4, 1928).
Petitioner argues that Maximo
Abano is not a “qualified elector” as
required by law, since he was not
registered in Meycauayan.
Akbayan Youth v COMELEC
Akbayan Youth and other youth
groups clamored for the conduct of
a special registration process for
new votes ages 18-21 before the
May 2001 Elections. According to
petitioners, 4 million youth failed to
register after the December 27,
2000 deadline set by the
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
privilege and not the denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation and long
established administrative practice are against such a view.
Registration of Voters
Senator Jose P. Laurel in his Law of Elections of the Philippine Islands, pages 32, 33,
summarizes the law on the subject in the following language:
"One, of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is
that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term
'qualified' when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as
an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431
and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate
failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to
become a candidate and to be voted for."
It is not at all easy to disregard the forcible argument advanced by counsel for the
appellant to the effect that when the law makes use of the phrases "qualified elector" and
"qualified voter" the law means what it says. It is contended that it would be an absurdity
to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his municipality. At the
same time, the contemporaneous construction of the law by two departments of the
Government—one the legislative branch responsible for its enactment, and the other the
executive branch responsible for its enforcement—while not controlling on the Judiciary,
is entitled to our respectful consideration. For the orderly and harmonious interpretation
and advancement of the the courts should, when possible, keep step with the ier
departments.
But we are not without other authority. The law of Kentucky provided that "No person
shall be eligible to any office who is not at the time of his election a qualified voter of
the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding his election." One Wood
was elected a commissioner of the sinking fund. His eligibility was protested upon the
ground that he was not, at the time of his election, a qualified voter of the city of
Louisville since he had not registered as a voter in that city. The Supreme Court of
Kentucky, considering the law and the facts in the case of Meffert vs. Brown ([1909],
132 Ky., 201), speaking through its Chief Justice, held that under the Kentucky statutes
requiring officers in certain cities to be qualified voters, one's eligibility is not affected
by his failure to register. It was said that "The act of registering is only one step towards
voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. * * *
One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not
confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right."
It is but fair to say that if the question were strictly one of first impression in this
jurisdiction, we would be more impressed with the potent points made by the appellant.
In view, however, of the authorities hereinbefore mentioned, we are loath to depart from
them, particularly as the language which goes to make up these authorities, on close
examination, is found to rest on reason. The distinction is between, a qualified elector
and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified elector and the respondent is such
although not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to
be their local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be
respected.
Petition is denied. In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage,
although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental
law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution
and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which
statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished
right from ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so
long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all
absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all

COMELEC. Commissioners
Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph
Lantion took their cause to the
COMELEC En Banc, but the body
outvoted them and denied the
petition. The body decided to deny
it on the ground that Section 8 of
RA 8189 prohibits registration
during the 120-day period before
the elections in order to allow
COMELEC to prepare.
Akbayan youth filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus arguing
that their right to suffrage has been
violated, and asked the court to
declare Section 8 of RA 8189
(Voters Registration Act)
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in
our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
…The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should
not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from
the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important
end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent and so far
removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing registration, is
explicit, to wit:
"SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The Personal filing of application
of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer
during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety
(90) days before a special election."
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period
within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent
voter's list, provides:
"SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List - Any registered voter,
representative of a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days
prior to a regular election xxx."
COMELEC said:
“In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter's registration is conducted, then
the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a
later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voter's list since we would already
be well into the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of the
principles of due process, this would open the registration process to abuse and seriously
compromise the integrity of the voter's list, and consequently, that of the entire election.”
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called "standby" powers
or "residual" powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of
Section 29, Republic Act No. 6646[7] and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of Republic
Act No. 8436,[8] thus:
"SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - If it should no
longer be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-
election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure
accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to
suffrage."
It is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may validly and
legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the letter of
Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would
come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within
the available period prior to election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of
R.A. 8436 is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain "pre-election
acts" are still capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period
before the date of election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required
under the law.
COMELEC indicates that the provision of another registration period will delay all their
other responsibilities, such as releasing a complete Project of Precincts (total number of
precincts and votes for each), publishing the Book of Votes which must be inspected,

Kabataan Party-list v
COMELEC
Petitioner Kabataan Party-list and
other youth organizations assail the
constitutionality of RA 10367 or the
Biometrics Registration System
Act, which mandate registered
voters to be submitted for
validations, on pain of deactivation
from the registry list. Petitioners in
this case argue that the No Bio-No
Boto Publci Information Campaign
by the COMELEC violates the right
of voters to vote as it adds a
substantial qualification prohibited
by the Constitution, that it unduly
restrains a particular class from
exercising the right to vote, that it
fails the strict scrutiny test, and that
a stringent registration system will
produce negative effects.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
verified and sealed, printing of the official voters list, and the distribution of the Voters
Information Sheet.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible
be done.[15] The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim,
nemo tenetur ad impossible.[16] In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible
thing. Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to
require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally,
coincidentally[17], it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an
interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible.
Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given must be such that it
is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are
of the considered view that the "stand-by power" of the respondent COMELEC under
Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of,
and not otherwise.
As to petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that this Court
cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without
transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because
it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
Notes:
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has issued
Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 19, 2001, to allow
the conduct of Special Registration of new voters. House Bill No. 12930 has been filed
before the Lower House, which bill seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to the 120-day
prohibitive period provided for under said law. Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276 [24] was
filed before the Senate, with the same intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect,
allow the conduct of special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections. This
Court views the foregoing factual circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both
the executive and legislative departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way
of the conduct by the Commission on Elections of a special registration before the May
14, 2001 General Elections
Rights beget responsibilities; progress begets change
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to
exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be
disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one
(1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of
suffrage. The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory
disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount to, as per
the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other substantive
requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the limitation is geared
towards the elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-economic
considerations that have no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote
and to further the public good.
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Ordoñez
First of all, was the property requirement. There were times in the English
constitutional history that it was common to say as an answer to a question, "Who are
entitled to vote?" that the following cannot vote - - criminals, paupers, members of the
House of Lords. They were landed together at the same figurative category.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Eventually, with the wisdom of the times, property requirement was eliminated but the
last remaining vestige which bound the members of the community to ignorance, which
was the persistence of this requirement of literacy remained. And this is again preserved
in our Constitution, in our Election Code, which provides that those who cannot prepare
their ballots themselves shall not be qualified to vote.

Unless you remove this literacy test, the cultural minorities, the underprivileged,
the urban guerrillas will forever be outcasts of our society, irresponsive of what is
happening. And if this condition were to continue, my friends, we cannot fully
claim that we have representative democracy. Let us reverse the cycle. Let us
eliminate the social imbalance by granting to these persons who are very responsible
the right to participate in the choice of the persons who are to make their laws for them.
(Emphases supplied)

As clarified on interpellation, the phrase "other substantive requirement" carries the

same tack as the other standards alienating particular classes based on socio-economic
considerations irrelevant to suffrage, such as the payment of taxes. Moreover, as
particularly noted and as will be later elaborated on, the phrase did not contemplate any
restriction on procedural requirements, such as that of registration.

A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such as

fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or
office, or to perform a public duty or function."[76]

Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on

suffrage is concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which
is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to
vote is determined. In Yra v. Abaño,[77] citing Meffert v. Brown,[78] it was stated that
"[t]he act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the
elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a qualified voter
without exercising the right to vote."[79] In said case, this Court definitively
characterized registration as a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right
of suffrage:

Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification

for such right.[

RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration" as "the

act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified
voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the [ERB]." [83] As
stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to systematize the present
method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated
list of voters."

Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally

applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the law creates artificial class of
voters[86] is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an "obedient group."
If anything, non-compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully results into prescribed
consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the
laws, which only works "against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."[

With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed
under RA 10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the
exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of
which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant
to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing
Voter's Registration Act of 1996.

Poe-Llamanzares v COMELEC
Grace Poe Llamanzares ran for the
position of President of the
Philippines in the 2010 elections.
Upon filing her COC, a petition to
deny due course was filed, arguing
that she committed material
misrepresentation when she stated
that she was a Filipino citizen, and
that she was able to satisfy the 10-
year residency requirement. The
COMELEC En Banc decided to
cancel her COC. Hence, this
petition.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard
for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify
the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity
of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.[92] As
pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and
interstate travel.[93]
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest,[94] and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.[95]
In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under
RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate
the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing - if not eliminating,
the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants.
According to the sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective
of the law was to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud
and ensure that the results of the elections were truly reflective of the genuine will of
the people.[96] The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state
interest.
Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries - i.e., Guatemala, Britain,
Cote d'lvoire, Uganda, and Kenya - in implementing biometrics registration should
serve as warning in adhering to the system. They highlighted the inherent difficulties in
launching the same such as environmental and geographical challenges, lack of training
and skills, mechanical breakdown, and the need for re-registration. They even adrnitted
that while biometrics may address electoral fraud caused by multiple registrants, it does
not, however, solve other election-related problems such as vote-buying and source-
code manipulation.[110
Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper. Clearly,
petitioners' submissions principally assail the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the
biometrics registration system in curbing electoral fraud. In this relation, it is significant
to point out that questions relating to the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes
are policy matters that should not be addressed to the judiciary.
Candidates
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner
should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she
made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the
ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from
going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if,
as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper
authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide
the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En
Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation
in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15,
1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation
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of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in

the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution,
cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters.

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for

ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for
a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already
stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is
to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its
progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office.

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized

proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate (Romualdez-
Marcos v COMELEC)

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there
is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast,
whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts
constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission
of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest
he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought.
That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are
established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the
votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation
will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending
in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to
the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy.
That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if
candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are
elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases

in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House
of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.

Hence, the rule was amended:

 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is

declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is

suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution,"
neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on
grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a
prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority
being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be
found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of
unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither

unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there
is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were
aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners
born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born
in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born
in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her
part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and
1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734
foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970,
the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there
were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male
aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1,
190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino
males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not
dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during
the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority
of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the

fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the

1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there
was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also
foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of
a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international
law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in
the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to
create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that
it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument
that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the
records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to
deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to
use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the
constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this
across the board marginalization."

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the
Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer
to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who
may be adopted.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by

this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations
on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance
with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every
child "to acquire a nationality:"

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their
principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
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Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the

Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the
UDHR.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the
1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent
with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the
PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of naturalborn
citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must
perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only
plain "Philippine citizenship.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as
follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in
several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's
Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on
Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he
will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be

continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase
"from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the
time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's
citizenship.

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not
petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in her
COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good.
These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival
on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled
abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006
with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items
weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine
Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for
petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued
in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April
2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S.
acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 email to the U.S.
Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final
statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire

submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been
a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe
(attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her
family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and
Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the
U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).

In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.

COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments,
the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot
be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires
Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being
insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa)
until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24
May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very
different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence
presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his
declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v.
COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence
prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing
that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence.
In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work
was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had
not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue.
On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said
that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of

petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence
before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006.
In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the
sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the
evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would
include her passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as
a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made
in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period
of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if
petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May

Maquiling v COMELEC
In the May 2010 elections,
respondent Linog Balua filed a
petition to deny due course the COC
of Rommel Arnado, who was
running for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte. The petition
argues that he was not a Filipino
citizen despite reacquiring
citizenship, because he continued
using his US passport several times
in 2009. Further, it said that the one-
year residency period was not
satisfied. The COMELEC granted
the cancellation on strength of the
citizenship issue. Petitioner
Maquiling, who gartnered second
highest number of votes, argues that
he be declared the winner.
However, the COMELEC En Banc
reversed the decision and argued
that the mere use of a US passport
will not revert Arnado to US
citizenship because RA 9225 treats
a repatriate as if he never lost his
nationality.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012
COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency.
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto
Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds
provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. “[T]he application of the more assimilative principle
of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a
person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires
to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes
or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of
his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of
expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of
citizenship.”
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented,
thus: [R]espondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned
his allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the
afore-mention[ed] citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only
his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was
obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July
2008 when he applied for repatriation before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado reacquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time,
however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a
dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship
by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for
eligibility to run for public office
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is
open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can
simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American
citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US
passport.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the
foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45
which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer

Arnado v COMELEC
For the May 2013 elections,
Rommel Arnado ran again for the
position of mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte where he won with
by 84% of the votes. Florante
Capitan, his sole rival, argues that
he must be disqualified againt in
light of the ruling in Maquiling v
COMELEC. The ruling in
Maquiling was promulgated after
the filing of the COC for elective
positions for the May 2013
elections has lapsed. It was only
after the promulgation of the
decision, well after the deadline for
registration, that he was able to
swear an Oath of Renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine
must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address
the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible
candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
Let us examine the statement:
“x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.” (Topacio v
Paredes)
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in
the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the
will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in
favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total
expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected
Note: for Naturalized Citizens, the reapplication of a foreign passport after the grant of
Filipino citizenship will revert them back to their foreign status (Will Yu v Defensor-
Santiago).
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that
when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules
affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in
upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from
running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification
to run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without total and
undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered
to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of
discretion had it departed therefrom.
Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the opportunity to
correct the deficiency in his qualification because at the time this Court promulgated its
Decision in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for local elective
office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D. Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion,
"[t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a replacement oath of
renunciation in 2013, then there was an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity
equivalent to grave abuse of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's
April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially complied
therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with
the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office of
a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of
the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport
amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue
being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have divined the
possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court in Maquiling did not
act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that
matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied
with. Otherwise stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue
as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run for
public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his qualification by
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this case, we
should similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for local elective
office.

The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during
the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same.
Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in
his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and
up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in
his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case following
the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.[48] Under the doctrine,
"[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are
substantially the same."[49] It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation
of the same issue

It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a petition to
disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a
problem to his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012,
he was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport after he had executed the
Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact on his qualification and candidacy. In
fact, at that time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But despite the petitions filed
against him questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010, Arnado filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in his candidacy
for the 2013 elections and without executing another Affidavit of Renunciation. In short,
the argument that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his
CoC since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of the period for filing a CoC for
the 2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling in
Maquiling, Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his inaction since he
could have remedied it at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 or even before
that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every
election period if only to avert possible questions about his qualifications.

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same position he had
taken in Maquiling that Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 is an isolated act justified
by the circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use his Philippine
passport in his travels abroad beginning December 11, 2009 and thenceforth. This,
according to J. Leonen, is borne out by Arnado's Philippine passport.

With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only reviving
an issue that had already been settled with finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also
going beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado's argument
in this case-that he is qualified to run for mayor as he has satisfied the requirements of
Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections- is premised only on the
alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not
claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated
act, as J. Leonen insists.

In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a
candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013
elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same "cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications."[61] In
Velasco v. Comelec,[62] this Court pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions
of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of
local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote cannot override
the required qualifications under Section 39,[63] a fortiori, there is no reason why the
Court should not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications enumerated
under Section 40[64] of the same law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section
39] are roughly half of the requirements for election to local public offices. The other

Caballero v COMELEC
Petitioner Rogelio Caballero and
Jonathan Nanud were candidates
for the position of mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes. Nanud argues
that he is a Canadian citizen and is
not qualified. He won the race but
respondent Nanud submits that he
lost his domicile of origin when he
became a Canadian citizen and has
yet to establish domicile again in
Batanes.
Frivaldo v COMELEC
Juan Frivaldo has been disqualified
to run as Governor of Sorsogon for
the past two elections prior to 1995,
but he ran again and garnered the
highest number of votes. However,
rival Raul Lee filed a case arguing
that he was not a Filipino citizen,
and the Board of Canvassers
declared Lee as the winner on June
29, 1995, so he was proclaimed as
governor on June 30, 1995, at 8pm.
Petitioner Frivaldo argues that he
took his oath of allegiance on June
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances that
disqualify local candidates."[65]
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he
was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple
of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter
and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends
that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad,
thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in
fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly
on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on the
acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare;
and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a
substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. [23] This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-
born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he
may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is
also a citizen.[24] However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for
an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, [25] that is, "the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi)."[26] A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is
usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in
the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.[27]
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus,
it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later
worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC[28] we ruled
that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is
required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.[29] Hence, petitioner had effectively
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in
Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that
after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as
such.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor
by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000
in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his
popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of
Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover,
he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor
General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this
time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition
to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance
under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence,
he insists that he--not Lee--should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of
Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

30, 1995, at 2pm, when the Special since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the
Committee on Naturalization elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
granted his request.
In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and
faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United
States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches
of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the
fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in
returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.

Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship
qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his
election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R.
104654[30] which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require
that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously, however,
this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization
was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his
naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be
a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly
rule on.

It will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least
twenty three years of age on election day).

Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo
re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995--the very day[32] the term of office of
governor (and other elective officials) began--he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our
law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too,
even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the
time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists?
Literally, such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of
age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official"
begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this
case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng
Giap & Sons,[33] if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people
and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to
another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the
elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument [34]
to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the
candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section
39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law[35] a "voter" must be a
citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter--much less
a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument[34]
to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the
candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section
39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law[35] a "voter" must be a
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter--much less
a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the
law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with
the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason
that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER,
even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to
reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN
THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected." It
should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration--not the
actual voting--is the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this
second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the
area he seeks to govern--and not anywhere else.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,1994.

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is
unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive
operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the
intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole,
or from the terms thereof."[45] It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to
"reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a
political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in
the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D.
725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute
must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted,
so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the
future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to
do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."[46] This
is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or
qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should
now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e.,
on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification-- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election
(May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would
become moot.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a

person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire,
or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."

But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as
a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against
and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the

Mercado v Manzano
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and
Eduardo Manzano were candidates
for the position of Vice Mayor of
Makati, and Manzano garnered the
highest number of votes. Petitioner
argues, however, that Manzano
committed material
misrepresentation by submitting
that he is a Filipino citizen, when in
fact, he has dual citizenship.
Manzano, on the other, argues that
such was only due to him being
born in the United States.
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law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with
Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Notes:
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a
suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a
suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a
statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D.
725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;[64] viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by
CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx
repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a
registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two
previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery.
The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects
there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections.
Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the
subjects of such previous rulings.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining
who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are
not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who
are its own citizens--not who are the citizens of other countries.[65] The issue here is: the
Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been
shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding
is binding and final.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such
a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered
a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution,
it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status,
for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship

is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of
other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is
considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." [12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws,
such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree
that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States.
However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in
1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship
under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation
of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner's contention that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the
age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made
upon majority age

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;

that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto
and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws
of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
Villaber v COMELEC "Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
Petitioner Pablo Villaber and insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty
Douglas Cagas were rival of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
candidates for a congressional seat disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
in the First District of Davao del plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
Sur, and Cagas won the race.
However, petitioner Villaber argues "The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
that Cagas has been previously the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
convicted of BP 22, and therefore removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
must be disqualified for moral unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified." (Emphasis ours)
turpitude, and for material
misrepresentation that he was As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in
eligible to run. Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."[

We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections[15] that "not every
criminal act involves moral turpitude," and that "as to what crime involves moral
turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine."[16]

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe
Tuanda[20] we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 "imports deceit" and
"certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person...."[21] The effects of
the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs.
Martinez,[22] through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the

Lonzanida v COMELEC
Romeo Lonzanida served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales. In 1995, he ran
again and won, but Juan Alvez
contested him on the ground that
there was a failure of elections.
Upon recount, Alvez was declared
winner and assumed the remaining
of Lonzanida’s term. In 1998,
Lonzanida ran again as mayor of
San Antonio, but Alvez argues that
he had already served three
consecutive terms. The COMELEC
agreed, and said that although
Lonzanida was unseated during his
3rd term, it should be counted as one
full term.
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welfare of society and the public interest."[23] Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a
drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes
his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.
Petitioner contends that this Court's pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[24]
insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not
apply to him since he is not a lawyer.
In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuanda's conviction for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 and, in addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections
27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of
her suspension was denied by this Court on the ground that the said offense involves
moral turpitude. There we said in part:
"We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, under
both of which she was bound to 'obey the laws of the land.' Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.
x x x."[25]
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which
is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an
absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same position
after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to
forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government
official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also
considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will
run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials
from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The mayor was compared by
some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief executive of his
political territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty.[1] The drafters however,
recognized and took note of the fact that some local government officials run for office
before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the
same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified
candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local
government official should be barred from running for the same post after three
consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same
office.[2]
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive
terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the
May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor
until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC
decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which
declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served
the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections,
and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested
ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in
the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared
null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly
held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at
all[5] and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes
office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
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Abundo v COMELEC As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the
LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any
Refer to previous discussion of this length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be
case. considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the
observation that the law “does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only
actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’
for purposes of the three-term limit rule.”[32]

While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host
of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were
elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated
by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their
opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to
result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by operation
of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an
election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election
contest, proclamation of a non- candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of
the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.

Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino,
Jr. finds application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose
title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office
and he was only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the
pendency of the election protest.

Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of
disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared loser
during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was
declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor
Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of their respective terms, Abundo was
the protestant who ousted his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term.

The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the
“monopolization of political power” and prevent elected officials from breeding
“proprietary interest in their position”[60] but also to “enhance the people’s freedom of
choice.”[61] In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, “while people should be
protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken
that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.”[62]

There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of
the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only
on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over
one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales
in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-
2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004
until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could
hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same
nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that
period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly,
Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his
declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May
2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the
legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be
said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that
Abundo actually served less.

The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not
commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear to

Marquez v COMELEC
Eduardo Rodriguez won the
election for the position of
Governor of Quezon Province, but
petitioner Bienvenido Marquez
argues that Rodriguez was a
fugitive of justice, and hence,
disqualified under Section 40 of
the OEC.
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understand the poll body’s determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to
discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency of the election protest. It cannot
be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo
was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive
victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost
two years or from July 1, 2004— the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during which
his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen
warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared
later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration
would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not
serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to
the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily
unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the
intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term,
Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at
that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume
and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo
cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title
which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the
belated declaration in the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the
start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest
was finally resolved in his favor.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective
interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of
the remaining term.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the “law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office
and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.”[75] Applying the said principle in the
present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the election protest,
Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga,
Catanduanes.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no
further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather
clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad" from seeking any elective local office. The Solicitor General,
taking the side of petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes that the phrase
"fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third
Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs.
Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980;
Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible
constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification
therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal
charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R.A.V. Saguisag who, during the
bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made
this reservation: “de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of
fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a."
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:
Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from
justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.

Dela Cruz v COMELEC
Carmina Dela Cruz, who was SB
member of Bugasong, Antique from
2001 to 2010, ran for the position of
vice mayor of Bugasong, She went
up against John Lloyd Pacete and
Aurelio N. Dela Cruz. In the May
2010 elections, Aurelio was
declared as a nuisance candidate,
and Carmina Dela Cruz asks that
the votes input by the voters in favor
of Aurelio be declared for her. She
petitioned that the proclamation of
John Llyod Pacete be enjoined
pending her protest. The 532 votes
cast in favor of Aurelio would have
made Carmina win the election
against Pacete, who led by only 39
votes (6428). She argues that when
the elections were still manual,
votes cast in favor of the nuisance
candidate with the same surname
shall be credited to the legitimate
candidate, and the failure of
COMELEC to grant her the votes is
a violation of the equal protection
clause. COMELEC did not agree,
arguing that since the full name of
the candidate is already written in
the ballot, there is no more reason to
assume that the votes can be cast in
favor of the legitimate candidate.
Respondent Pacete, on the other
hand, argues that the votes were
stray and cannot be considered in
favor of anyone.
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The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente
(expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it
confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has
been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on
COMELEC when it issued Resolution No. 8844 which is simply consistent with the rule
laid down in Section 211 (24), Article XVIII and Section 72, Article IX of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). Said
provisions state:
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment
shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification, the
votes cast for the disqualified candidate should result in considering the votes cast for
him as stray as explicitly mandated by Section 211(24) in relation to Section 72 of the
OEC.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and
not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections
69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false). Notably,
such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed “to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity
of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the
true will of the electorate” are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving
money or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials
performing electoral functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving
or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40[22] of Republic Act No.
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or
decisions in special action cases, provides:
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be
immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration
is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall
be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections.
On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been
considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC’s changing of the rule on
votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of
votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of
candidates for the same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or
disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter simply
shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown
in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before
the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates not just
from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use
will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from
list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the
cancellation of COC of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election
day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled
candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that

Atty. Risos-Vidal v COMELEC
and Estrada
President Joseph Estrada was
convicted of the crime of plunder,
while his son Jinggoy and others
were acquitted. However, President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo granted
him executive clemency, and wrote
in the clemency order that Estrada
was thereby restored his civil and
political rights. In 2010, he ran as
President and garnered only the
second highest number of votes.
Atty. Pormento filed a case but the
petition (arguing that Estrada was
already disqualified from re-
election since he already became
president before) lost because of
being moot and academic. Risos-
Vidal, on the other, argues that the
conviction of plunder disqualified
Estrada from becoming a candidate
because plunder is a crime
involving moral turpitude under
Section 12 of the OEC, and the only
way to remove such disqualification
was due to plenary pardon or
amnesty. In 2013, Estrada won as
mayor of Manila.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate,
petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance
candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated,
even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who
mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona
fide candidate they intended to vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to
correct the same.
Notes:
Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC
because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is
never considered a candidate.
QUESTION: What if the cancellation of the COC on the ground that the candidate was
a nuisance was only rmulgated by the COELEC after the elections? Can it still be
presumed that the votes cast inf avor of the nuisance candidate be credited in favor of the
legitimate candidate?
SECTION 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that the pardon granted
to former President Estrada was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s express
acceptance thereof. The “acceptance,” she claims, is an indication of the conditional
nature of the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of
the pardon, i.e., “WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office.” She explains that the aforementioned
commitment was what impelled former President Arroyo to pardon former President
Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been extended. And any breach thereof,
that is, when former President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President
and Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the condition of the pardon; hence, “he
ought to be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence x x x
and disqualifies him as a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of Manila.”
Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible requirements provided under
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. – A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon.
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. – The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and
Florentino P. Feliciano in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.[18] to endorse her position that “[t]he
restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason of
conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no
matter how intensely arguable, but must be stated in express, explicit, positive and
specific language.”

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which
the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases
that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of
election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by
way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon

by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an
overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected
a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the
form of “offenses involving graft and corruption” that would be enumerated and defined
by Congress through the enactment of a law.

The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos-Vidal that there was no
express remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold public office
in the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions must be
followed by the President, as they do not abridge or diminish the President’s power to
extend clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the coverage of the President’s
pardoning power. Particularly, he states:

Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They only provide
a procedural prescription. They are not concerned with areas where or the instances when
the President may grant pardon; they are only concerned with how he or she is to exercise
such power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to intervene to give it
full effect.

All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in the
pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission
of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, he or she should do so
expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her intentions clearly,
directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President retains
the power to make such restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner
by which he or she is to state it.

With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that Congress may dictate as
to how the President may exercise his/her power of executive clemency. The form or
manner by which the President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their
respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be interfered with unless it is so
provided in the Constitution. This is the essence of the principle of separation of powers
deeply ingrained in our system of government which “ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.”[33] Moreso, this fundamental principle
must be observed if non-compliance with the form imposed by one branch on a co-equal
and coordinate branch will result into the diminution of an exclusive Constitutional
prerogative.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
“[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the

Aratea v COMELEC
Refer to previous discussion of the
case.
Jalosjos v COMELEC (2012)
Refer to previous discussion of the
case
Quinto v COMELEC (2009
Decision)
Penned by Justice Nachura
Eleazar Quinto was an appointive
public official who intended to run
for an elective position, but Section
13 of RA 9369 provides for the ipso
facto resignation of appointive
officials who file their Certificates
of Candidacy. Quinto argues that
such violates the equal protection
clause since not the same rule
applies to elective officials, and that
they must not be considered
candidates until the start of the
campaign period.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective
office have been restored. This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term “civil and
political rights” as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually
introduced by the word “whereas.”[40] Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute
because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute.[41] In
this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon,
and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make
its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to
limit the scope of the pardon.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President is in
issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself.
From a detailed review of the four corners of said document, nothing therein gives an
iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso,
stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned
commitment not to seek public office will result in a revocation or cancellation of said
pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact or the prevailing situation at
the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a condition to the efficacy
or to delimit the scope of the pardon.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President is in
issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself.
From a detailed review of the four corners of said document, nothing therein gives an
iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation, proviso,
stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned
commitment not to seek public office will result in a revocation or cancellation of said
pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact or the prevailing situation at
the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a condition to the efficacy
or to delimit the scope of the pardon.
Note: there was a proposal in the Con-Comm which will effectively require legislation
as to which crimes can be covered by the executive clemency and which are not.
Note: This recent case clarified the ruling in Labo v COMELEC. A second placer can
already win an election if the candidate with the highest number of votes is declared to
be ineligible to run in the first place.
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by
R.A. No. 9369. The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.--Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of
appointive civil servants must have been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the
inclusion of the following during the period of amendments: "ANY PERSON WHO
FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY
BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN
PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."[18] The said proviso seems to mitigate the
situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed
their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered as resigned
at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers
and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision,
elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously
expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. (Farinas v Executive
Secretary)

However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fariñas, was intently focused on the
main issue of whether the repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally
proscribed rider, in that it unwittingly failed to ascertain with stricter scrutiny the impact
of the retention of the provision on automatic resignation of persons holding appointive
positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-à-vis the equal protection clause. Moreover, the
Court's vision in Fariñas was shrouded by the fact that petitioners therein, Fariñas et al.,
never posed a direct challenge to the constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC. Fariñas
et al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section
14 of the Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration in Fariñas may then
very well be considered as an obiter dictum.

It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two
fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association (Mancuso v Taft)

Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4
and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for the Court to strike down the said proviso for
being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions

of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public
officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for
excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.

The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.

First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a
utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he
files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable
how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office
are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated
for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is
universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in
the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and
basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the
pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of democracy.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing[39] sustained as constitutional a provision on the

automatic resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County Judges, County
Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and
Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and
Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys, County Attorneys, Public Weighers, and
Constables if they announce their candidacy or if they become candidates in any general,
special or primary election.

In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular

officials, as distinguished from all others, under a classification that is germane to the
purposes of the law, merits the stamp of approval from American courts. Not, however,
a general and sweeping provision, and more so one violative of the second requisite for
a valid classification, which is on its face unconstitutional.

On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we copied
the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being
unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too, should follow suit and, thus, uphold
fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to such freedoms.

Notes:

Remedies to avoid inefficiency, negligence- leave of absence, other less restrictive and
prophylactic measures.
Quinto v COMELEC (2010 We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution
Resolution) 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse
Penned by Justice Puno our December 1, 2009 Decision.

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates

Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy

Incumbent Elected Official. - Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006
or the Fair Election Act,[17] which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code[18]
and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected
official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the
positions for which they are running,[19] an elected official is not deemed to have resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without
forfeiting his seat.

These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.

But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes
apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the
constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that "[t]he
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."[21] This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office,
engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign
period.[22] Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective
positions included.[23]

In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned
provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.[25]
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected
to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office
in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.

Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy
an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it
may proceed "one step at a time."[39] In addressing a societal concern, it must invariably
draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included or
excluded.[40] Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice" are not exceeded,
the courts must defer to the legislative judgment.[41] We may not strike down a law merely
because the legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by expanding the
class.[42] Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is
underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.[43] There is no
constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it
might be applied;[44] that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating
all or none.

Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that
the law creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious."[45] He must refute
all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited
those bases as reasons for the enactment,[46] such that the constitutionality of the law must
be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly debatable."[

Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed
Decision adverted to, and extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.[52] This was a decision of
the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals promulgated in March 1973, which
struck down as unconstitutional a similar statutory provision. Pathetically, our assailed
Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:

(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two
fundamental freedoms - freedom of expression and association;
(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental
right must be subjected to strict equal protection review; and
(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and
impartiality of its public work force, the deemed-resigned provisions
pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render them
unconstitutional.

In United States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter

Carriers AFL-CIO, et al.[53] and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al.,[54] the
United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions
prohibiting federal[55] and state[56] employees from taking an active part in political
management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial
invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in dismissal from employment and
possible criminal sanctions.

Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively

overruled Mancuso. By no stretch of the imagination could Mancuso still be held
operative, as Letter Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-to-
run laws, and (ii) were decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme Court. It
was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals - the same court that decided
Mancuso - to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v. Lynch[65] that Mancuso
is no longer good law.

In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient
government, faithful to the Congress rather than to party. A second major governmental
interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger of a powerful political
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

machine. The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring
that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both
coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity.
In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in
nominally nonpartisan elections if political parties play a large role in the campaigns. In
the absence of substantial party involvement, on the other hand, the interests identified
by the Letter Carriers Court lose much of their force.

Accordingly, our assailed Decision's submission that the right to run for public office is
"inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms - those of expression and
association - lies on barren ground. American case law has in fact never recognized a
fundamental right to express one's political views through candidacy,[71] as to invoke
a rigorous standard of review.

The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i)

efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii)
avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the
danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve
advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of
favor from political activity). These are interests that are important enough to outweigh
the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective office.

i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Official's Position,

Valid

T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an
emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason
enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials
without further distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees or
the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.

ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid

Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus

Election Code, in conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that
these provisions are likewise not intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public
offices.

The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay
offices, since these are the only elections in this country which involve nonpartisan
public offices.[

Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the
present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy
found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of
Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the
overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.

In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are
general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth
challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained:

Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for
being overly broad, particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech"
is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep

In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth would entail,

among other things, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

the number of potentially invalid applications.[88] In this regard, some sensitivity to reality
is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as
one that is probable.[89] The question is a matter of degree.[90] Thus, assuming for the sake
of argument that the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a
statute which fails to make this distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the
overbreadth challenge presently mounted must demonstrate or provide this Court with
some idea of the number of potentially invalid elections (i.e. the number of elections that
were insulated from party rivalry but were nevertheless closed to appointive employees)
that may in all probability result from the enforcement of the statute. [91]

In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in
the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted
and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected
speech or conduct to go unpunished.[95] Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked
where a limiting construction could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there
are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the
alleged overbreadth of the statute

Notes:

Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned

provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an
adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as
obiter dictum.[29] This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and
resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision is predicated. [30]
For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because
the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same
if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did.

... A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely
because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another
question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has
been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two
(2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the
court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every
point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum,
and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more
dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition
make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta. (Villanueva v CA)

Also, The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial"
overbreadth in a closely analogous case. Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a
law has engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech)
and when the challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a
statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep." The plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a candidate,
and they were subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of activities,
including soliciting contributions for political candidates and becoming a candidate. The
Court found that this combination required a substantial overbreadth approach. The facts
of this case are so similar that we may reach the same result without worrying unduly
about the sometimes opaque distinction between speech and conduct.

The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial
overbreadth in a statute restricting partisan campaigning. Pawtucket has gone further,
banning participation in nonpartisan campaigns as well. Measuring the substantiality of
a statute's overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the number
of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. Some
sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve
as much weight as one that is probable. The question is a matter of degree; it will never

Joselito Mendoza v COMELEC
(2010)
Joselito Mendoza ran for the
position of Governor of Bulacan
and won against Roberto
Pagdanganan. However, upon
Pagdanganan’s electoral protest, the
Second Division of COMELEC
decided to annul the proclamation
of Joselito Mendoza and declare
Pagdanganan as the governor.
Hence, Mendoza went to the
COMELEC En Banc to file an MR.
The En Banc failed to come up with
a majority vote, and decided to deny
the MR of Mendoza. Mendoza
argues that since there was no
majority vote, the original case
against must be considered
dismissed, pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
be possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes a law
substantially overbroad. Still, an overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court
with some idea of the number of potentially invalid applications the statute permits.
Often, simply reading the statute in the light of common experience or litigated cases will
suggest a number of probable invalid applications. But this case is different. Whether the
statute is overbroad depends in large part on the number of elections that are insulated
from party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket employees. For all the record shows, every
one of the city, state, or federal elections in Pawtucket is actively contested by political
parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties play a major role even in campaigns
that often are entirely nonpartisan in other cities. School committee candidates, for
example, are endorsed by the local Democratic committee
The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after
the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondent's
Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A
and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
clear on this matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule
categorically provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is
equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or
motion shall be denied.
The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its literal tenor cannot be
gainsaid. As one pertaining to the election of the provincial governor of Bulacan,
respondent's Election Protest was originally commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to
its exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Although initially raffled to the
COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election protest on motion for
reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered an appeal. Tersely put, there is no appeal within the
COMELEC itself. As aptly observed in the lone dissent penned by COMELEC
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondent's Election Protest was filed with the
Commission "at the first instance" and should be, accordingly, considered an action or
proceeding "originally commenced in the Commission."
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission En Banc.
The dissent reasons that it would be absurd that for a lack of the necessary majority in
the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, the original protest action
should be dismissed as this would render nugatory the constitutional mandate to authorize
and empower a division of the COMELEC to decide election cases.
The Rule, in fact, was promulgated obviously pursuant to the Constitutional mandate in
the first sentence of Section 3 of Article IX(C). Clearly too, the Rule was issued "in order
to expedite disposition of election cases" such that even the absence of a majority in a
Commission En Banc opinion on a case under reconsideration does not result in a non-
decision. Either the judgment or order appealed from "shall stand affirmed" or the action
originally commenced in the Commission "shall be dismissed."
There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over
election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in
turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial
court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the
division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal
proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without
the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other

Socrates v COMELEC
Refer to previous discussion of the
case
Pamatong v COMELEC
Rev. Elly Pamatong ran for the
position of President in the 2004
elections, but he was declared a
nuisance candidate on the ground
that he could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or not nominated by
a political party or are not supported
by a registered political party with a
national constituency. He argues
that his rights to equal opportunities
for public office has been violated
(Section 26, Article 2 of the
Constitution).
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the
COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission,
the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is
continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no
majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be
dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.
It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two protests, one
as original action and the other as an appeal, if and when the protest process reaches the
COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no
completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If,
at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the
COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before
the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding that has resulted in
a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate
process is completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and
resultingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring “equal
access to opportunities for public office” is the claim that there is a constitutional right to
run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is
none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of
the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
“Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing,[2] and there is no plausible reason for according
a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.[3]
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.[
An inquiry into the intent of the framers[5] produces the same determination that the
provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II
had read, “The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public
dynasties.”[6] Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought
forth an amendment that changed the word “broaden” to the phrase “ensure equal
access,” and the substitution of the word “office” to “service.”
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification
of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to
divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are
rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the
practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate
these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly
election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in
our democratic institutions.
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of
“nuisance candidates” to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various
entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every polling place, [13]
watchers in the board of canvassers,[14] or even the receipt of electoral contributions.[15]

Timbol v COMELEC (2015
Resolution)
Joseph Timbol intended to run as
Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Caloocan in the 2013 elections.
However, even before the
clarificatory hearing, his name was
removed from the list of names in
the ballots. He argues that such was
a violation of due process of law.
Rulloda v COMELEC
Romeo Rulloda and Remegio
Placido were contending candidates
for the position of Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San
Jacinto, Pangasinan. Romeo
suffered a heart attack and passed
away. Petronilla “Betty” Rulloda
asked the COMELEC if she could
substitute for his late husband.
Board of Canvassers declared
Remegio Placido as winner with
290 votes, despite Betty Rulloda
getting 516 votes. This was because
of an order not to count any vote in
favor of Rulloda.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are
dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and
factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand
of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
We may no longer act on petitioner's prayer that his name be included in the certified list
of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari on March 15, 2013,
39 days after respondent began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May
13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already proclaimed.
That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth
"controlling and authoritative doctrines"[33] to be observed by respondent in motu proprio
denying due course to or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance
candidates. This motu proprio authority is always subject to the alleged nuisance
candidate's opportunity to be heard[34] — an essential element of procedural due process.[
Respondent's power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is
subject to the candidate's opportunity to be heard.
To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations imposed by law." [37]
Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."[43] In election cases, due process
requirements are satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand
We understand the "insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs
implications"[48] of reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of petitioner's
name in the certified list if candidates. The ballots already printed would have to be
recalled, leading to the waste of the ballots previously printed. It should be noted that
these ballots are special as the have the capability of being optically scanned by Precinct
Count Optical Scan machines. Reprinting another batch of ballots would, indeed, be
costly.
Still, "automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process."[49] Respondent
should also balance its duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly,
and peaceful"[50] with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to
run for public office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate.
The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 4801
dated May 23, 2002, setting forth the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy
in connection with the July 15, 2002 synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
elections, more particularly Section 9 thereof which reads:
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. – There shall be no substitution of candidates for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials
Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his Comment, arguing that since the barangay
election is non-partisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed. Moreover, petitioner
did not file any certificate of candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate for
Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, respondent Placido.
Respondents base their argument that the substitution of candidates is not allowed in
barangay elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. – If
after the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by the same political party may file a certificate
of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The

Federico v COMELEC
Edna Sanchez and Osmundo
Maligaya were candidates for the
position of mayor of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas. Maligaya was a candidate
of the Liberal Party. When the
Batangas gubernatorial candidate,
Armando Sanchez, husband of
Edna Sanchez, died, Edna
substituted and became candidate
for governor. Petitioner Renato
Federico in this case, as part of the
Nacionalista Party, decided to file a
Certificate of Nominate and
Acceptance (CONA) to substitute
as the mayoralty candidate.
Maligaya of the LP argues that the
deadline has already lapsed.
However, the ballots have already
been printed and Edna Sanchez
(represented by substitute Federico)
got the highest number of votes.
Maligaya then argues that upon the
printing of the Canvassing and
Consolidating System (declaring
who got the highest number of
votes), it was still Edna Sanchez
who was declared winner.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than
mid-day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between
the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in
the case of candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan, there
can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the
substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of
election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. [12] It
is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-
settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit
to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Federico argues that Comelec Resolution No. 8678 cannot prevail over the provisions of
Section 77 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),
prescribing the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party
who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of his
COC. The law provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-
day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in
the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted
for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
On January 23, 2007, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, An Act
Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing The Commission
On Elections To Use An Automated Election System In The May 11, 1998 National
Or Local Elections And In Subsequent National And Local Electoral Exercises,’ To
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness And Accuracy Of Elections,
Amending For The Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, As Amended, Republic Act
No. 7166 And Other Related Elections Laws, Providing Funds Therefor And For
Other Purposes. Section 13 of said law partially provides:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate
of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered
as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
effect only upon that start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or-controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec came out with Resolution
No. 8678. On substitution, Section 13 thereof provides:
SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of
another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy, an official

Engle v COMELEC
Petitioner Marcelina Engle ran for
the position of vice mayor of
Babatngon, Leyte, against Private
respondent Winston Menzon. Her
husband, James Engle, was the
original candidate but died due to
cardiogenic shock. Apparently,
James Engle was declared was an
independent candidate, despite
being indorsed by Lakas-CMD
President Martin Romualdez.
Lakas-CMD failed to file the
authorization of Romualdez to sign
the CONAs as representative of the
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
candidate of a registered political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
he may be substituted by a candidate belonging to, and nominated by, the same political
party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent candidate.
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as
herein provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered permanent incapacity or disqualified
by final judgment, may file his certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of election day. If
the death or permanent disability should occur between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day, the substitute candidate may file the certificate with any board
of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or in the case
of a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator, with the Law Department of the
Commission on Elections in Manila.
No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as substitute
candidate for any other position after the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification,
withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his
candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws
after the printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer be accommodated
in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be wasted.
To stress, the vacancy in the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was due to the
withdrawal of Edna as mayoralty candidate, not due to the death of Armando Sanchez.
Without question, the votes garnered by Edna could not be credited to Federico as he was
never a legitimate candidate. As there was an invalid substitution, there could not be a
valid proclamation. In effect, the second COCVP in his name had no legal basis. Granting
that those who voted for Edna had in mind to vote for Federico, nonetheless, the fact that
there was no compliance with the rules cannot be ignored.
It was alleged that the MBOC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, raised the hands of Federico as
the winner. As correctly pointed out by Maligaya, however, this was impossible because
the CCS printed the name of Edna Sanchez as the winner on the first COCVP. Thereafter,
the MBOC came out with a second COCVP, this time, with the name of Federico on it
with the same number of votes as that of Edna, and generated on the very same date and
the very same time as the first COCVP - a physical impossibility.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in
the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.
Verily, it was publicly known that James L. Engle was a member of Lakas-CMD. As
far as the party and his wife were concerned, James L. Engle, as a member of Lakas-
CMD, may be substituted as a candidate upon his death. There was no evidence on record
that the party or petitioner had notice or knowledge of the COMELEC’s classification of
James L. Engle as an independent candidate prior to February 22, 2013 when petitioner
filed her COC as a substitute for her deceased husband. The only document in the record
indicating that Lakas-CMD had been notified of James L. Engle’s designation as an
independent candidate is the Letter dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC Law
Department to Romualdez21 stating that James L. Engle was declared an independent
candidate due to the failure of Lakas-CMD
to submit the authority of Romualdez to sign James L. Engle’s CONA to the Law
Department as required under Section 6(3) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 and in
view thereof petitioner’s COC as her husband’s substitute was denied due course.
First, the COMELEC Law Department’s “ruling” was issued only after the filing of
petitioner’s COC. Second, with respect to the denial of due course to James L. Engle’s

party. Petitioner won the election as
vice mayor, but COMELEC denied
due course her CONA.
Chavez v COMELEC (2004)
Francisco Chavez ran for the
position of Senator in the 2004
elections, representing the political
alliance of PROMDI, REPORMA
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COC as a nominee of Lakas-CMD and to petitioner’s COC as his substitute, the
COMELEC Law Department’s letter is not binding and at most, recommendatory.
It is settled in jurisprudence that the denial of due course or cancellation of one’s COC
is not within the administrative powers of the COMELEC, but rather calls for the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
he COMELEC relies heavily on Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518, which
reads:
Section 6. Filing of Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance of Official Candidates
of a Political Party / Coalition of Political Parties. - The Certificate of Nomination
and Acceptance (CONA) of the official candidates of the duly registered political
party or
coalition of political parties shall be, in five (5) legible copies, attached to and filed
simultaneously with the Certificate of Candidacy. The CONA shall also be stamped
received in the same manner as the Certificate of Candidacy.
The CONA, sample form attached, shall be duly signed and attested to under oath, either
by the Party President, Chairman, Secretary- General or any other duly authorized
officer of the nominating party and shall bear the acceptance of the nominee as shown
by his signature in the space provided therein.
This Court recognizes that the COMELEC is empowered by law to prescribe such
rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of elections.27 However,
it is a long standing principle in jurisprudence that rules and regulations for the
conduct of elections
are mandatory before the election, but when they are sought to be enforced after the
election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they
are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any
fault on their part.28 Over time, we have qualified this doctrine to refer only to matters
of form and cannot be applied to the substantial qualifications of candidates. This
was discussed at length in Mitra v. COMELEC
The Court has likewise ruled in the past that non-compliance with formal
requirements laid down in election laws when not used as a means for fraudulent
practice will be considered a harmless irregularity.34 Allowing the belated
submission of Romualdez’s
authority to sign CONAs will not result in the situation proscribed by Section 77 of the
OEC – that an independent candidate will be invalidly substituted. In the case at
bar, neither the COMELEC nor private respondent contended that James L. Engle
was not in fact
a bona fide member of Lakas-CMD. The record is bereft of any allegation that the
authority in favor of Romualdez was inexistent, forged or in any way defective.
The only issue was that it was not submitted within the prescribed deadline.
Nonetheless, said authority was submitted as early as October 4, 2012 to the local
election officer and subsequently to the COMELEC itself in the course of the
proceedings on private respondent’s petition to deny due course to, or cancel
petitioner’s COC, thereby putting election.
officials on notice that such authority exists even before the conduct of the May 13, 2013
Elections.
To be sure, we have held that a political party has the right to identify who its members
are.36 From the evidence it can be concluded that James L. Engle was not an independent
candidate but indeed a nominee of Lakas-CMD and he may be validly substituted by his
wife, who was nominated by the same political party, in light of his unexpected demise
prior to the elections.
Campaign, Election Propaganda, Etc.
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to
prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public
office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and
lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying
undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.
The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power as held in National Press Club

and Aksyon Demokratiko. Prior to
such filing, he entered into private
contracts with 96°North (clothing
company), Konka International
Plastics Manufacturing Corp, and
G-Box. In line with these contracts,
his face was the subject of
endorsement billboards posted by
these different companies (three
billboards in Balintawak, one more
billboard at Roxas Boulevard for G-
Box, a gaming and amusement
corporation). COMELEC issued
Resolution 6520, and Section 32
provides that: “All propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and
other materials showing the picture,
image, or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or
on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person,
who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate
for public office shall be
immediately removed by said
candidate and radio station, print
media or television station within 3
days after the effectivity of these
implementing rules; otherwise, he
and said radio station, print media
or television station shall be
presumed to have conducted
premature campaigning in violation
of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.” COMELEC
ordered him to have the billboards
removed.
Penera v COMELEC (September
2009 Decision)
Penned by Justice Chico-Nazario
Rosalinda Penera and Edgar
Andanar were mayoralty candidates
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v. COMELEC,[2] wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b)
of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air
time “for campaigning or other political purposes,” except to the COMELEC. The
obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of
rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage
offered by huge campaign “war chests.” This Court ruled therein that this objective is of
special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme
disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and
by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty
line.
Under the Omnibus Election Code, “election campaign” or “partisan political activity” is
defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office. Activities included under this definition are:
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain
products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image
to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the
billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the
same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Similarly, an individual intending to run for
public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as
their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image
even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a
circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning:
Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. – It
shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the campaign period.
Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public.
The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and
again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can
be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it
entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount
police power.
Finally, petitioner contends that Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is invalid
because of overbreadth. A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when
it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only
disallows the continued display of a person’s propaganda materials and advertisements
after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period.
Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.
Notes: There is no ex post facto law because the resolution punishes the non-removal and
not merely the posting itself of posters, tarpaulins.
The dissenting opinion, however, raises the legal issue that Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides a new definition of the term
"candidate," as a result of which, premature campaigning may no longer be committed.
Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is "any person aspiring
for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself
or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties."

in Sta. Monica, a town in Caraga
Region. Andanar argues that Penera
violated the provisions prohibiting
premature campaigning, because on
the day she filed her COC on March
29, 2007, Penera and her partymates
conducted a motorcade on board a
convoy of 2 trucks with
motorcycles, laden with balloons,
ads, posters, and banners and a
sound system. Penera was
disqualified.
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RA 8436 authorized the automated election system, and it provides:
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one
hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is
holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed
resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for
which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign
period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline
for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice President,
Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as petitions for registration
and/or manifestation to participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998
while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on
March 27, 1998.
RA 9369 amended it by saying:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as
a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate
shall effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally,
That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members
of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or-controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso factor resigned from his/her office and must vacate
the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.
The Dissenting Opinion argues that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code can not be
applied to the present case since, as the Court held in Lanot v. Commission on
Elections,[34] the election campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the prohibited
premature campaigning, should be designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates. Under present election laws, while a person may
have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not
be considered a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Thus, prior to the start
of the campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate to public office
because there is no candidate to speak of.
To our mind, there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section
15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize
and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.
First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly
provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or
candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign
or partisan political activity, except during the campaign period." Very simply,
premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.
For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that "[w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code prohibits is `an election campaign or partisan political activity' by a
`candidate' `outside' of the campaign period,"[41] is clearly erroneous.
True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the
filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially
considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already
explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. The
commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.) can, thus,
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended
candidacy.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy,
his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the
filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she
may be disqualified. Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her
COC before the campaign period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said
period as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there
can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate, whose disqualification may
be sought, to begin with

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her
becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already
commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially
becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given
effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only
after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially
becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts,
constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to
the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate
who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart
in promoting his/her candidacy.

We cannot stress strongly enough that premature campaigning is a pernicious act that is
continuously threatening to undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections in our
country, no matter how great or small the acts constituting the same are. The choice as to
who among the candidates will the voting public bestow the privilege of holding public
office should not be swayed by the shrewd conduct, verging on bad faith, of some
individuals who are able to spend resources to promote their candidacies in advance of
the period slated for campaign activities.

This fear is utterly unfounded. It is the filing by the person of his/her COC through
which he/she explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming
elections. It is such declaration which would color the subsequent acts of said person to
be election campaigning or partisan political activities as described under Section 79(b)
of the Omnibus Election Code. It bears to point out that, at this point, no politician
has yet submitted his/her COC. Also, the plain solution to this rather misplaced
apprehension is for the politicians themselves to adhere to the letter and intent of the law
and keep within the bounds of fair play in the pursuit of their candidacies. This would
mean that after filing their COCs, the prudent and proper course for them to take is to
wait for the designated start of the campaign period before they commence their election
campaign or partisan political activities. Indeed, such is the only way for them to avoid
disqualification on the ground of premature campaigning. It is not for us to carve out
exceptions to the law, much more to decree away the repeal thereof, in order to
accommodate any class of individuals, where no such exception or repeal is warranted.
Penera v COMELEC (November Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after
2009 Resolution) the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign
period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the
Penned by Justice Carpio campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a
certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus,
such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start
of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign
period.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,[2] which held that a person who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period, We
explained in Lanot:

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act
is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3)
the act is done outside the campaign period.

Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of
candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots.

This legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress
was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436
and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate."

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the
second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which
cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The
Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second sentence, because to
reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.

The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second
sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is
unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the
Decision is self-contradictory -- reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of
the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is
irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third
paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

In layman's language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only
for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight -- any
election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be
committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for
premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the
assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law. The Decision
rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or
prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What
the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision
is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate
is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same
partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done
by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only
upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political
acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes
unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the
law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and
curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
SWS v COMELEC Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the
press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity (Ayer
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Productions v Capulong). Indeed, "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . The
non-profit social research Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
institution conducting surveys in such restraint.'"[3] There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that
various fields, including inheres in every legislation.
economics, politics, demography,
and social development, and

thereafter processing, analyzing,
and publicly reporting the results
thereof. On the other hand,
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila
Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation, which features
newsworthy items of information
including election surveys.
COMELEC issued Resolution
9006, which prohibits the
publication of election surveys 15
days before the election for national
candidates and 7 days before the
election for local candidates. SWS
and Manila Standard argue that
such is a violation of their right to
free speech because it is a form of
prior restraint even without proof of
a clear and present danger.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects as inappropriate the test of clear and
present danger for determining the validity of §5.4. Indeed, as has been pointed out in
Osmeña v. COMELEC,[6] this test was originally formulated for the criminal law and
only later appropriated for free speech cases. Hence, while it may be useful for
determining the validity of laws dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it
may not be adequate for such regulations as the one in question. For such a test is
concerned with questions of the gravity and imminence of the danger as basis for
curtailing free speech, which is not the case of §5.4 and similar regulations. Instead, MR.
JUSTICE KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of balancing by "weighing and
balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest [in free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections] is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
rights”
The dissent has engaged only in a balancing at the margin. This form of ad hoc balancing
predictably results in sustaining the challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech,
expression, and the press with little protection. For anyone who can bring a plausible
justification forward can easily show a rational connection between the statute and a
legitimate governmental purpose. In contrast, the balancing of interest undertaken by
then Justice Castro in Gonzales v. COMELEC,[7] from which the dissent in this case takes
its cue, was a strong one resulting in his conclusion that §50-B of R.A. No. 4880, which
limited the period of election campaign and partisan political activity, was an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of expression.
What test should be used? In US v O’Brien, the US Supreme Court said:
“A government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3]
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression
and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content-
neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of such laws."[9]
It is noteworthy that the O'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two
cases.[10] Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction
on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in question.
Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O'Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results
because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the
expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists,
radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers.
§5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction
be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated,
§5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be,
they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such
aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the

GMA Network Inc. v COMELEC
The five (5) petitions before the
Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
(Resolution) limiting the broadcast
and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for
national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred
twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes,
respectively. They contend that
such restrictive regulation on
allowable broadcast time violates
freedom of the press, impairs the
people’s right to suffrage as well as
their right to information relative to
the exercise of their right to choose
who to elect during the forthcoming
elections.
Before, the allotted minutes were
interpreted to mean the maxium
airtime per station. However,
COMELEC issued Resolution No.
9615, which provides that the
maximum airtime of 120 minutes
and 180 minutes shall be the
aggregate time for all stations.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
Note:
In National Press Club v. COMELEC,[1] a total ban on political advertisements, with
candidates being merely allocated broadcast time during the so-called COMELEC space
or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this Court.
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily
authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations
– or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it
feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have
discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and
intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it
has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it
has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime
should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations.
Senator Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime
allowed – that it should be on a “per station” basis.
This is further buttressed by the fact that the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually
repealed the previous provision, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646,[44] which
prohibited direct political advertisements – the so-called “political ad ban.” If under the
previous law, no candidate was allowed to directly buy or procure on his own his
broadcast or print campaign advertisements, and that he must get it through the
COMELEC Time or COMELEC Space, R.A. No. 9006 relieved him or her from that
restriction and allowed him or her to broadcast time or print space subject to the
limitations set out in the law. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 9006, felt that the previous
law was not an effective and efficient way of giving voice to the people. Noting the
debilitating effects of the previous law on the right of suffrage and Philippine democracy,
Congress decided to repeal such rule by enacting the Fair Election Act.
Section 9(a) of Resolution 9615 violates the right to free speech
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental
Law. “[F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties
and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.”[51] Accordingly, the same
must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest.
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 comes up with what is challenged as
being an unreasonable basis for determining the allowable air time that candidates and
political parties may avail of. Petitioner GMA came up with its analysis of the practical
effects of such a regulation:
Given the reduction of a candidate’s airtime minutes in the New Rules, petitioner GMA
estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for his political
advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days, or will only
have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he chooses to place his political
advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he will only have 27.27
seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates to 1 advertisement spot
on a 30-second spot basis in television.
Based on the data from the 2012 Nielsen TV audience measurement in Mega Manila, the
commercial advertisements in television are viewed by only 39.2% of the average total
day household audience if such advertisements are placed with petitioner GMA, the
leading television network nationwide and in Mega Manila. In effect, under the
restrictive aggregate airtime limits in the New Rules, the three 30-second political
advertisements of a candidate in petitioner GMA will only be communicated to barely
40% of the viewing audience, not even the voting population, but only in Mega Manila,
which is defined by AGB Nielsen Philippines to cover Metro Manila and certain urban
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

areas in the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, Rizal, Batangas and

Pampanga. Consequently, given the voting population distribution and the drastically
reduced supply of airtime as a result of the New Rules’ aggregate airtime limits, a national
candidate will be forced to use all of his airtime for political advertisements in television
only in urban areas such as Mega Manila as a political campaign tool to achieve
maximum exposure.

The Court agrees. The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on
the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-
cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance,
what the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its
wings.

Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is

violative of the people’s
right to suffrage

Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government,

necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as
the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and
whenever possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when called upon to act in
justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This, fundamentally, is
the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost,
with reasonable, liberality.

Prior hearing is required

While it is true that the COMELEC is an independent office and not a mere administrative
agency under the Executive Department, rules which apply to the latter must also be
deemed to similarly apply to the former, not as a matter of administrative convenience
but as a dictate of due process. And this assumes greater significance considering the
important and pivotal role that the COMELEC plays in the life of the nation. Thus,
whatever might have been said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals,[58] should also apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to
promulgating rules and regulations which adversely affect, or impose a heavy and
substantial burden on, the citizenry in a matter that implicates the very nature of
government we have adopted.

Further, the petitioner in G.R. No. 205374 assails the constitutionality of such monitoring
requirement, contending, among others, that it constitutes prior restraint. The Court finds
otherwise. Such a requirement is a reasonable means adopted by the COMELEC to
ensure that parties and candidates are afforded equal opportunities to promote their
respective candidacies. Unlike the restrictive aggregate-based airtime limits, the directive
to give prior notice is not unduly burdensome and unreasonable, much less could it be
characterized as prior restraint since there is no restriction on dissemination of
information before broadcast.

Comparing the original with the revised paragraph, one could readily appreciate what the
COMELEC had done – to modify the requirement from “prior approval” to “prior
notice.” While the former may be suggestive of a censorial tone, thus inviting a charge
of prior restraint, the latter is more in the nature of a content-neutral regulation designed
to assist the poll body to undertake its job of ensuring fair elections without having to
undertake any chore of approving or disapproving certain expressions.

In the same way that the Court finds the “prior notice” requirement as not constitutionally
infirm, it similarly concludes that the “right to reply” provision is reasonable and
consistent with the constitutional mandate.

Emilio Ramon “E.R.” Ejercito v
COMELEC
Incumbent Governor Ejercito
obtained 549,310 votes compared
with San Luis’ 471,209 votes when
they ran against each other in the
2013 local election. San Luis argues
that days prior to the election, ER
Ejercito ordered the release of
orange-cards funded by
government in favor of citizens for
their use in healthcare institutions.
Furthermore, San Luis argues that
Ejercito exceeded the P3.00 per
voter requirement imposed against
politicians, since he paid an
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair
and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a right to
reply.[66] Given that express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental
Law itself has weighed in on the balance to be struck between the freedom of the press
and the right to reply. Accordingly, one is not merely to see the equation as purely
between the press and the right to reply. Instead, the constitutionally-mandated desiderata
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections would necessarily have to be
factored in trying to see where the balance lies between press and the demands of a right-
to-reply.
We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First
Amendment problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503, 96 L Ed
1098, 72 S Ct 777. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has
received the most limited First Amendment protection. Thus, although other speakers
cannot be licensed except under laws that carefully define and narrow official discretion,
a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the Commission decides
that such an action would serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”
Similarly, although the First Amendment protects newspaper publishers from being
required to print the replies of those whom they criticize, Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 41 L Ed 2d 730, 94 S Ct 2831, it affords no such protection to
broadcasters; on the contrary, they must give free time to the victims of their criticism.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 23 L Ed 2d 371, 89 S Ct 1794.
The reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two have relevance to the present
case. First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves
confronts the citizen not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the
individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 25 L Ed 2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484.
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot
completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say that
one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language
is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may
hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional
immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place.
Given the foregoing considerations, the traditional notions of preferring speech and the
press over so many other values of society do not readily lend itself to this particular
matter. Instead, additional weight should be accorded on the constitutional directive to
afford a right to reply. If there was no such mandate, then the submissions of petitioners
may more easily commend themselves for this Court’s acceptance. But as noted above,
this is not the case. Their arguments simplistically provide minimal importance to that
constitutional command to the point of marginalizing its importance in the equation.
It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary
investigation because it merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, which deals with disqualification of candidates. In disqualification cases,
the COMELEC may designate any of its officials, who are members of the Philippine
Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay officials.[59]
As aforementioned, the present rules of procedure in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses in the COMELEC, which requires preliminary investigation, is
governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9386. Under said Resolution, all lawyers in the
COMELEC who are Election Officers in the National Capital Region ("NCR"),
Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys, Assistant Regional
Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and lawyers of the Law Department are
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses
under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed
to them by the COMELEC
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election

excessive amount of money to air
his commercials. Ejercito argues,
on the other, that the airing of the
commercials were without his
consent, and that “expenditure” is
not the same as “contributions”
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong
Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing
of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The
word “shall” signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose
a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC is left
with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election.
Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains
unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646
imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC
which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of
its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies
must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative
rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial
body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence,
in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative
ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the
investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the
election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified.
All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the
disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided
before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the
main intent and purpose of the law
Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and
Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without
his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even
assuming that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he should not be
penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his consent.
Citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission[83] decided by the US Supreme
Court, he argues that every voter has the right to support a particular candidate in
accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of expression, which
is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. [84] He believes that an
advertising contract paid for by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge and
consent must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail against the laws
suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advances the view
that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476[85] distinguishes between “contribution” and
“expenditure” and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution.[86]
He also stresses that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set
by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made
by third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on
campaign donations is presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the government.
We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and
Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and
consent. As found by the COMELEC First Division, the advertising contracts submitted
in evidence by San Luis as well as those in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his
hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must
because non-compliance is considered as an election offense
Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the
candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC,
and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate
concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political party.[88] Conformably
with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires that election
propaganda materials donated to a candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is
accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of
an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the description of the
items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts,
media purchase orders or booking orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or
by the duly authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should be
accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized
representatives.[89] COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states that it
shall be unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge
by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate without the written acceptance of the
said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the words “airtime for this
broadcast was provided free of charge by” followed by the true and correct name and
address of the donor

the rulings in Citizens United and Buckley find bearing only on matters related to
“independent expenditures,” an election law concept which has no application in this
jurisdiction. In the US context, independent expenditures for or against a particular
candidate enjoy constitutional protection. They refer to those expenses made by an
individual, a group or a legal entity which are not authorized or requested by the
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate; they
are expenditures that are not placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate,
his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate.[104] In contrast, there is no similar
provision here in the Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006 [105] and its implementing rules
and regulations[106] specifically make it unlawful to print, publish, broadcast or exhibit
any print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate without the
written acceptance of said candidate.

Proceeding from the above, the Court shall now rule on Ejercito’s proposition that the
legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations. He vigorously asserts that
COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between “contribution” and
“expenditure” and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution made
by third parties in favor of the candidates, while the limit set by law, as appearing in
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies only to election expenditures of candidates.

The focal query is: How shall We interpret “the expenses herein referred to shall include
those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate” and “except the candidate, the
treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer”
found in Sections 100 and 103, respectively, of the OEC? Do these provisions exclude
from the allowable election expenditures the contributions of third parties made with the
consent of the candidate? The Court holds not.

In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said,
therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to
regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate but also of his or her
contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate limit of the former’s
election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase “those incurred or caused to be
incurred by the candidate” is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are
contributed or donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that
a contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as “any person authorized by such
candidate or treasurer.” Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. [126] (Where
the law does not distinguish, neither should We.) There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated.

The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of
election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech
and of expression under Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral
regulation,[127] the law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of the

Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC
The Diocese of Bacolod posted 2
tarpaulins with a size of 6ft. by
10ft., indicating a Team Buhay and
Team Patay, corresponding to
politicians and partylists which
either oppose or support the RH
Bill. COMELEC had the tarpualins
removed because it did not follow
the COMELEC size of 2ft by 3 ft.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and
among aspirants with “deep pockets” and those with less financial resources. Any
restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to
achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in
political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional
objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art.
XIII of the Constitution.[128] Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an
unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and
subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government.
Notes:
The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should be
disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in
character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may
be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal
aspect, and vice-versa. (Lanot v COMELEC)
In Bagatsing v. COMELEC,[62] the Court stated that the above-quoted resolution covers
two (2) different scenarios:
First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the
election which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining
whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results
in a finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's
disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the
COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the said complaint
to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the
election against a candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who
has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed
as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC
for preliminary investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed
with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending
and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt
is strong.
The tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate or political party.[125] There was no
allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin
regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their
advocacy against the RH Law.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts
which make it easier to view its messages from greater distances. Furthermore, a larger
tarpaulin makes it easier for passengers inside moving vehicles to read its content.
Compared with the pedestrians, the passengers inside moving vehicles have lesser time
to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger the fonts and images, the greater the
probability that it will catch their attention and, thus, the greater the possibility that they
will understand its message.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the
reader. From an ordinary person’s perspective, those who post their messages in larger
fonts care more about their message than those who carry their messages in smaller
media. The perceived importance given by the speakers, in this case petitioners, to their
cause is also part of the message. The effectivity of communication sometimes relies on
the emphasis put by the speakers and on the credibility of the speakers themselves.
Certainly, larger segments of the public may tend to be more convinced of the point made
by authoritative figures when they make the effort to emphasize their messages.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to
more opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want
to communicate. Rather than simply placing the names and images of political candidates
and an expression of support, larger spaces can allow for brief but memorable
presentations of the candidates’ platforms for governance. Larger spaces allow for more
precise inceptions of ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a
more educated and reasoned electorate. A more educated electorate will increase the
possibilities of both good governance and accountability in our government.

Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. [158] They are
fundamentally part of expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution.

The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates
and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate,
political party, or party-list group.

The right to freedom of expression is indeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected
speech are still subject to some restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on
whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.[223] Content-based regulations
can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the expression.

Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of the
tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in
their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.

If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will
not pass the three requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech.[249]
“When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a
substantial governmental interest is required for its validity,”[250] and it is subject only to
the intermediate approach.[251]

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into

speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political
party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken
as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet
the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering
the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive
means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place,
and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited
or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the
speech is made with or on private property.

Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present
law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for
election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the intended
average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet
could no longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech
meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from
their own property. The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the
unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s interpretation of its powers.

Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be
no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s
infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to
infringement on their fundamental right to speech.

Note:

In an equality-based approach, “politically disadvantaged speech prevails over

regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.”[273] This
view allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as
protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices often
systematically subdued within society’s ideological ladder.[274] This view acknowledges
that there are dominant political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity,
or status, have capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This is especially
true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world like ours

Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitution’s guarantee for more
substantive expressive freedoms that take equality of opportunities into consideration
during elections.

This is that considerations of equality of opportunity or equality in the ability of citizens

as speakers should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine.

Under this view, “members of the public are trusted to make their own individual
evaluations of speech, and government is forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or
redistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas are best left to a freely competitive ideological
market.”[297] This is consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of viewpoint as
well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of speech.

Schoolts of thought in the protection of free speech:

1) Deliberative democracy
2) Marketplace of ideas
3) Self-expression and human dignity
4) Market for group identity
5) Protect minorities from majoritarian abuses
6) Safety valve theory- reduction of violence

A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is

measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional
muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither
overbroad nor vague. (Chavez v Gonzales). Under this rule, “the evil consequences
sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.’”[230] “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear
and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles.

We have held, for example, that “the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to
protect and care for them, as parens patriae,[254] constitute a substantial and compelling
government interest in regulating . . . utterances in TV broadcast

Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other
religious make such act immune from any secular regulation.[324] The religious also have
a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law. This court also
discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it
has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it
does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

1-UTAK v COMELEC
Petitioner through its President
Melencio Vargas argues that the
Resolution of the COMELEC
prohibiting PUVs from posting
campaign posters, tarpaulins, etc in
their vehicles and/or their terminals
is a violation of their right to free
speech and to tell the public who
they want to be win in the election.
COMELEC responds by saying that
because they are given a Certificate
of Public Convenience, and because
of the public nature of PUVs, they
function like public places which
must be regulated for the sake of
equal opportunities for candidates
and minimizing campaign
spending.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
Instances where the Court may review COMELEC Division decisions not brought up to
the En Banc (ABS-CBN v COMELEC):
1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;
2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3) The issue involves the protection of labor;
4) The decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or
5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and
speedy remedy available.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly
infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the
prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport
terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election campaign material
in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs
and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their
preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of
their franchise or permit to operate. Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,[14] the Court struck
down the COMELEC's prohibition against the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile
places." The Court ratiocinated that:
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so
much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom
of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince
others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car
owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement
by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club
case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspaper or radio
and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly
paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the
prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief
by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
standards,[16] is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech,
provided that the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within
the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of
expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [17]
The COMELEC may only regulate
the franchise or permit to operate and
not the ownership per se of PUVs
and transport terminals.
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the
ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as
a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the
facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be
done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the
owner thereof. (Tatad v Garcia)
The franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is a privilege granted to certain
persons to engage in the business of transporting people or goods; it does not refer to the
ownership of the vehicle per se. Ownership is a relation in private law by virtue of which
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not
prohibited by public law or the concurrence with the rights of another.[23] Thus, the owner
of a thing has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law

A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to considerations

affecting the operation of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or zones
of operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and other charges, or,
in certain cases, nationality.[25] Thus, a government issuance, which purports to regulate
a franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the considerations affecting its
operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not on the franchise
or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of the vehicle used for public transport.

The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of election
campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the
operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate
in an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as such. Regulating
the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of an election campaign
material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation
on the very ownership of the vehicle.

On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on windows

of buses, because it hinders police authorities from seeing whether the passengers inside
are safe, is a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate. It has a direct relation to the
operation of the vehicle as a PUV, i.e., the safety of the passengers. Accordingly, Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated
power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for
public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but
also an act of ownership - it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the
PUV or transport terminal.

Notes:

The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter,
escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted.[30] The "captive-audience"
doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message
in circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided. [31]

A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which

undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that
they are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only
when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it
either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.[32]

Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be

justified if the supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise
intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced
or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport
terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the
posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find
the same unbearably intrusive.

Comparing this case to the case of National Press Club v COMELEC, Court said: “The
restriction imposed under Section ll(b) of R.A. No. 6646 has a direct relation to the
enjoyment and utilization of the franchise or permit to operate of newspapers, radio
broadcasting and TV stations, and other mass media, which the COMELEC has the
power to regulate pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. The print space
or airtime is an integral part of the franchise or permit to operate of mass media utilities.
Thus, the restriction under Section ll(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is within the confines of the

Veterans Federation Party v
COMELEC
Penned by Justice Panganiban
In the 1998 elections, 123 partylists
and political parties and
organizations ran for seats in the
partylist system. 13 party-lists
representatives from 12 different
political parties and organizations
were proclaimed for being able to
reach the 2% mark. PAG-ASA
(People’s Progressive Alliance for
Good Governance Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social
Advancement) filed a petition to
mandate COMELEC to proclaim
and fill all the 52 slots provided for
the partylist system. Hence, all 52
slots were filled by disregarding the
2% threshold.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution.”
As regards the equal protection challenge, court said: “As regards ownership, there is no
substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of
private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and
transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If
owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas
and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent
reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In
terms of ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification”
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with
this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties,
organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby
fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation
cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness,"
for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of
suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether
to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. [17] Our task now, as
should have been the Comelec's, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through
highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical
formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual
election process.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.[21] But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be
the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful
local representation.
The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to
the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered
at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House
of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem
is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit
further imposed by the law.
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion
of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat. [25]
Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be
entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats;
and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the
advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the
parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the
total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just
described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3
seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly
have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as
the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be
contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court
discarded it.

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of
distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying
the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by
that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the
qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of
additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:

𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠

𝑥 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those
obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present
set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in
an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would
violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list
system.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step:

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to,
in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.

𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 1𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first
party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats.
And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to
any additional seat.

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex fraction:

𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦

𝑥 1𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 1𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦

Notes:

4 parameters of the party-list elections:

1) 20% allocation of the total number of Representatives in the house
2) 2% threshold for one seat

Ang Bagong Bayani
COMELEC
Penned by Justice Panganiban
Petitioners in this case seek the
disqualification of some political
parties and organizations that do not
represent the marginalized sector,
but COMELEC approved the
candidacy of 154 organizations and
parties for the 2001 elections.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
3) 3 seat limit
4) Proportional representation
𝑁𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑠
To determine the number of PL representatives: 𝑥 .20
.80
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27] that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in
effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can
claim more than what it is entitled to x x x."
v We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or
fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.[34] He explained: “The
purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000
or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So,
they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list
system.”
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose
of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
“SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation
by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will “enable” the election to the
House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1) who belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector, organizations and parties, 2) who lack well-defined
constituencies, but 3) would contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
“marginalized and underrepresented” become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by
giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: “to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

members of the House of Representatives.” Where the language of the law is clear, it
must be applied according to its express terms.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words
employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained
by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.
Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those
in immediate association

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority,
they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their
economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one’s
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of
one’s bank accounts.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared
to a student dormitory “open house,” which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the
facilities. Obviously, the “open house” is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers
themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same
vein, the open party-list system is only for the “outsiders” who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who
already fill the ranks of Congress.

Guidelines for screening applicants for the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must
show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives.” In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties,
they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Third, in view of the objections[53] directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system.
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system,
the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated
by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal[60] and
unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected
to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 provides the requirements.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA
7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens “who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.” Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working

Barangay Association for
National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
COMELEC
Penned by Justice Carpio
Only 13 partylists made it to the 2%
mark in the 2007 elections. Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong (Buhay)
obtained the highest number of
votes and it got 3 seats in total.
Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela,
and APEC got additional 1 seats
each. BANAT filed a petition
before the COMELEC arguing that
55 seats be given to partylists
because the Congress was
composed of 220 district seats at
that time. BANAT asked for the
reversal of the decision of the court
in the case of Veterans.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that “the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district
Notes:
More to the point, the law defines “political party” as “an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.”
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The
two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off
of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There
are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one
party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down,
19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-
list system to the sectoral groups.[33] In defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding
the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and
the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang
Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate,
the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization's
nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity"[34] as there is no financial status
required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,[35]
that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the
nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the
law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3
above.

Atong Paglaum v COMELEC
Penned by Justice Carpio
Note: However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly
or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the
party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the
formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this
ponencia
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed
that “the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation.”

52 partylist groups were Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
disqualified in the 2013 elections include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

because they were not organized sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As
under sectoral lines. The explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in
disqualification was mainly the party-list system “[F]or as long as they field candidates who come from the
because of them not being different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.”
representative of the marginalized
Note: in the Constitutional Commission, Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was
voted down.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot
expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections,
at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district
elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of
Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative
district elections.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be “a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
The commas after the words “national[,]” and “regional[,]” separate national and regional
parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national
and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated “national and
regional sectoral parties.” They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to
make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties
or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally
be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-
list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first “three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution,” clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first
three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats
reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. To require all national
and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the
electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from
the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving
as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that “the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”[56] The sectors mentioned in Section 5
are not all necessarily “marginalized and underrepresented.” For sure, “professionals”
are not by definition “marginalized and underrepresented,” not even the elderly, women,
and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may “lack
well-defined political constituencies,” and can thus organize themselves into sectoral
parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to the sectors in
Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically “marginalized and
underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to
the “marginalized and underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented. Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does
not mean one must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.” It is sufficient that one,
or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
“marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.[58]

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give
rise to a multi-party system where those “marginalized and underrepresented,” both in
economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members
to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system
honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as “wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity,” even
as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they
neither lack “well-defined political constituencies” nor represent “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list
system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This
automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to
those who “lack well-defined political constituencies,” giving them the opportunity to
have members in the House of Representatives.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the “first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress” from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.[59] Thus,
major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major
political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral
wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority
of whose members are “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined
political constituencies,” will facilitate the entry of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined political constituencies” as
members of the House of Representatives.

Note:

A sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must
belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed
by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that “component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.”

New parameters:
1) Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2) National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3) Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in

Palparan v HRET
Daryl Grace Abayon is the wife of
an incumbent Congressman, and
she ran for a partylist position under
the partylist Aangat Tayo. They
won 1 seat and she assumed office
as first nominee, but private
respondents in this case argue that
the party was not qualified to run for
not representing the marginalized
sector, and Abayon herself did not
represent a marginalized sector
(case occurred before the Supreme
Court in Atong Paglaum allowed
political parties to run despite not
representing a marginalized sector).
Meanwhile, Jovito Palparan is the
first nominee of Bantay party-list
group. Private respondents also
argue that he is not a representative
of the marginalized, especially
since he committed human rights
violations against marginalized
sectors and organizations.
Abayon and Palparan argue that
HRET has no jurisdiction because
as nominee of their parties, the issue
of his eligibility is an internal
matter.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4) Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5) A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members
of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political
constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6) National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have
at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the
Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties
or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of
Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and
Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were
chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no
jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution,[5] identifies who the "members" of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x
who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." This means that, from the Constitution's point of view, it is the party-list
representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. These
representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the
Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their
votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated
in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They
can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or
sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum
of three consecutive terms

Roque v COMELEC
See previous discussion on this case
Archbishop Capalla v The Comelec did not exercise the option within the period stated in the above provision.
COMELEC
COMELEC approved a Resolution
to call for bidding for the 2010 Poll
Automation Project consisting of
the following projects:
1) Paper-Based AES
a) Election management
system
b) Precint count optical
system
c) Consolidation/canvassing
2) Provision for Electronic
Transmission of Election
Results
3) Overall Project
Management
The contract included an Option to
Purchase (OTP) in favor of
COMELEC. Before the 2013
elections, COMELEC issued a
Resolution authorizing itself to
purchase the PCOS machines, but
Fernando Capalla argues that the
sale and the acceptance of the
extension of the period to exercise
the OTP occurred without
competitive public bidding, and that
the machines were incapable for
future use.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections,[6] a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House
of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party,
such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the
qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated
him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and,
eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization
that nominates them.[8] But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had
chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the
lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of
the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Automated Elections
Smartmatic, however, unilaterally extended the same until its final extension on March
31, 2012. The Comelec, thereafter, accepted the option and eventually executed a Deed
of Sale involving said goods. Now, petitioners come before the Court assailing the
validity of the extension, the exercise of the option and the Deed of Sale. In light of the
AES contract, can Smartmatic-TIM unilaterally extend the option period? Can the
Comelec accept the extension? Yes.
It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that an instrument must be construed so
as to give effect to all the provisions of the contract.[34] In essence, the contract must be
read and taken as a whole.[35] While the contract indeed specifically required the Comelec
to notify Smartmatic-TIM of its OTP the subject goods until December 31, 2010, a
reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the parties are given
the right to amend the contract which may include the period within which to exercise
the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that
the contract is still effective.
Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves
procurement by a government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are
governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184. In this jurisdiction, public
bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government contracts. The award of
public contracts, through public bidding, is a matter of public policy. [40] The parties are,
therefore, not at full liberty to amend or modify the provisions of the contract bidded
upon.
The three principles of public bidding are: (1) the offer to the public; (2) an opportunity
for competition; and (3) a basis for the exact comparison of bids. [41] By its very nature,
public bidding aims to protect public interest by giving the public the best possible
advantages through open competition.[42] Competition requires not only bidding upon a
common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same subject matter, and
the same undertaking, but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest and not designed to
injure or defraud the government.[43] The essence of competition in public bidding is that
the bidders are placed on equal footing which means that all qualified bidders have an
equal chance of winning the auction through their bids.[44] Another self-evident purpose
of public bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the
execution of public contracts.[45]
A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the
contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material
amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a
denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms. [46] The
determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a contract bidded out
constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken as a whole,
would contain substantially different terms and conditions that would have the effect of
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

altering the technical and/or financial proposals previously submitted by the other
bidders. The modifications in the contract executed between the government and the
winning bidder must be such as to render the executed contract to be an entirely different
contract from the one bidded upon

One. Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not previously available
to the other bidders. Admittedly, the AES contract was awarded to Smartmatic-TIM after
compliance with all the requirements of a competitive public bidding. The RFP, Bid
Bulletins and the AES contract identified the contract as one of lease with option to
purchase. The AES contract is primarily a contract of lease of goods[54] listed in the
contract and purchase of services[55] also stated in the contract. Section 4.3 thereof gives
the Comelec the OTP the goods agreed upon. The same provision states the conditions
in exercising the option, including the additional amount that the Comelec is required to
pay should it exercise such right. It is, therefore, undisputed that this grant of option is
recognized by both parties and is already a part of the principal contract of lease. Having
been included in the RFP and the bid bulletins, this right given to the Comelec to exercise
the option was known to all the bidders and was considered in preparing their bids. The
bidders were apprised that aside from the lease of goods and purchase of services, their
proposals should include an OTP the subject goods. Although the AES contract was
amended after the award of the contract to Smartmatic-TIM, the amendment only pertains
to the period within which the Comelec could exercise the option because of its failure
to exercise the same prior to the deadline originally agreed upon by the parties. Unlike in
PSALM, wherein the winning bidder was given the right of first refusal which
substantially amended the terms of the contract bidded upon, thereby depriving the other
bidders of the terms and opportunities granted to winning bidder after it won the public
auction; and in Agan, Jr., wherein the Concession Agreement entered into by the
government with PIATCO contained provisions that substantially departed from the draft
Concession Agreement included in the bid documents; the option contract in this case
was already a part of the original contract and not given only after Smartmatic-TIM
emerged as winner. The OTP was actually a requirement by the Comelec when the
contract of lease was bidded upon. To be sure, the Extension Agreement does not contain
a provision favorable to Smartmatic-TIM not previously made available to the other
bidders.

Two. The amendment of the AES contract is not substantial. The approved budget for the
contract was P11,223,618,400.00[56] charged against the supplemental appropriations for
election modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they did not exceed
said amount. After the competitive public bidding, Smartmatic-TIM emerged as winner
and the AES contract was thereafter executed. As repeatedly stated above, the AES
contract is a contract of lease with OTP giving the Comelec the right to purchase the
goods agreed upon if it decides to do so. The AES contract not only indicated the contract
price for the lease of goods and purchase of services which is P7,191,484,739.48, but
also stated the additional amount that the Comelec has to pay if it decides to exercise the
option which is P2,130,635,048.15. Except for the period within which the Comelec
could exercise the OTP, the terms and conditions for such exercise are maintained and
respected.

Third. More importantly, the amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to
the Comelec and the public.

From the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, an option is only a preparatory

contract and a continuing offer to enter into a principal contract. Under the set-up, the
owner of the property, which is Smartmatic-TIM, gives the optionee, which is the
Comelec, the right to accept the former’s offer to purchase the goods listed in the contract
for a specified amount, and within a specified period. Thus, the Comelec is given the
right to decide whether or not it wants to purchase the subject goods. It is, therefore,
uncertain whether or not the principal contract would be entered into. The owner of the
property would then have to wait for the optionee to make a decision. A longer option
period would mean that more time would be given to the optionee to consider
circumstances affecting its decision whether to purchase the goods or not. On the part of
Smartmatic-TIM, it would have to wait for a longer period to determine whether the
subject goods will be sold to the Comelec or not, instead of freely selling or leasing them

Garcia v COMELEC
Petitioner Enrique Garcia was the
Governor of Bataan. Some mayors,
vice mayors and members of the
Sanggunian of 12 municipalities
initiated a preparatory recall
assembly (PRA). On the ground of
“loss of confidence”, they resolved
to put the future of Garcia’s
gubernatorial position for a vote of
the public. Garcia argued that his
right to due process was violated
because many members of the
Sanggunian and other local officials
were not given due notice to attend
to the PRA. Furthermore, he argues
that the PRA is not a valid mode of
recall, as it is partisan and can be
controlled by the political majority.
He thus argues that his right to equal
protection of laws as a member of
the minority is violated. Initially,
the PRA was declared void by the
Supreme Court on the ground of
violation of procedural due process
because of lack of notice, but
Dinalupihan Mayor Oscar delos
Reyes organized another PRA and
this time all officials were given
notice, and 87 out of 144 passed the
resolution.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
to other persons or governments possibly at a higher price. This is especially true in this
case as the terms and conditions for the exercise of the option including the purchase
price, had been included in the AES contract previously bidded upon. The parties are
bound to observe the limitations embodied therein, otherwise, a new public bidding
would be needed.
Recall
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term
of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their
sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in
all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the
proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a
fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy
Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory
recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which the
local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of
empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local
elective officials originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate. The
legislative records reveal that there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative
mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish
the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down
on its expenses. Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism of
initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the City of
Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former
Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of
the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement.
Consequently, our legislators added in the Code a second mode of initiating the recall
of local officials, i.e., thru a preparatory recall assembly. They brushed aside the
argument that this second mode may cause instability in the local government units due
to its imagined ease.
Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the Constitution that will sustain
this submission. To be sure, there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely
suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to
initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a
single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of
multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article
X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum x x x" By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the
power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The
power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall
elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not
straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the
Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to
be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted
discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall
elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people.
Congress has made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the
prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but
even then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines
the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.
Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall by the
PRAC. They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by
the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the
people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally
impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives. Nothing less

Claudio v COMELEC
Petitioner Jovito Claudio in this
case is the mayor of Pasay. Chairs
of several barangays asked for the
initiation of recall proceedings by
holding a PRA. This was done in
May 19, 1999, which is barely 1
year after his assumption of office.
However, the filing of the petition
itself was held in July 2, 1999.
Claudio argues that the recall
election should not be given due
course on the ground that it was
started before his first year in office.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their
representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a congressional
constituent assembly. The initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no
rhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected
representatives of the people. More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution
of recall is the recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of
recall merely starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the whole process.
This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the
COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise, a PRA resolution
of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the purpose bears no
effect whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official
concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be
allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the
official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to
question. This is clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which explicitly
states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the
election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes cast during the election on recall."
The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party and
that it may use its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political
persuasions, especially those belonging to the minority, is not a ground to strike down
the law as unconstitutional. To be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there
can be no escape from the reality that all powers are susceptible of abuse. The mere
possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the grant of power to an individual
or entity. To deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee is to render
government powerless and no people need an impotent government. There is no
democratic government that can operate on the basis of fear and distrust of its officials,
especially those elected by the people themselves. On the contrary, all our laws assume
that our officials, whether appointed or elected, will act in good faith and will regularly
perform the duties of their office. Such a presumption follows the solemn oath that they
took after assumption of office, to faithfully execute all our laws.
The proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As this
judgment has yet to be expressed, it is premature to conclude that the sovereign will of
the electorate of Bataan has been subverted. The electorate of Bataan may or may not
recall petitioner Garcia in an appropriate election. If the electorate re-elects petitioner
Garcia, then the proposal to recall him made by the preparatory recall assembly is
rejected. On the other hand, if the electorate does not re-elect petitioner Garcia, then he
has lost the confidence of the people which he once enjoyed. The judgment will write
finis to this political controversy. For more than judgments of courts of law, the
judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for "sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them."
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory,
recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of
a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition
with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date
of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date.[5] However,
as used in paragraph (b) of § 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or
petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of
times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the
purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the
power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the
preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of §74
seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date
of assumption of office of an elective local official.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be
found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on
the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of
assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place
within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of an elective local official. In the Bower case[8] cited by this Court in
Angobung v. COMELEC,[9] it was held that "The only logical reason which we can
ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall election
is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official
before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions."
The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the
Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall
be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months."
But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the
purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance
of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the
one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before
the end of the first year in office of a local official.

It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official
concerned has been in office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without
sufficient basis. As already stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall
resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is
the vote of the electorate in the Election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall election
is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be
judged on his performance prematurely.

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the
PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials
would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its
members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the
performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public
opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes
the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to
unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to
assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary,
they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year
period in paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose"
during which "[his] attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by
disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide
for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official
assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always
easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated and when it
is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics
is the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such shortcomings
of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may, have the incidental effect of
providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on
recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for
evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official.

Also, the prohibition for holding recall elections 1 year before the elections refer to the
date of the local election itself and the period for filing and campaign are not included.
Petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election
may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the
assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his
election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the
middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days,
more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the

Goh v Bayron
There was a petition for recall
election filed against Mayor Lucilo
Bayron of Puerto Princesa City, and
the Office of the Deputy Executive
Director of the COMELEC found it
to be sufficient in form and
substance. However, the
proceedings were suspended on the
ground that no financial budget was
available to hold the elecitons. This
is because the General
Appopriations Act for the year of
2014 did not provide for funds for
recall.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must
be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local
government units" more responsive and accountable."
The Commission is mandated to shoulder ALL expenses relative to the conduct of recall
elections. Expenses in recall elections, unlike the other exercises mandated by the
[C]onstitution to be administered by the Commission, is specifically treated in a special
law - the LGC. Section 75 of the LGC likewise requires the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA) to include a contingency fund at the disposal of the
Commission for the conduct of recall elections. This leads us to the crucial question: does
the 2014 GAA [Footnote 3 - Republic Act No. 10633] include such contingency fund in
the Commission’s appropriations?
A careful review of the Commission’s budget under the 2014 GAA reveals that it does
not have any appropriation or line item budget (line item) to serve as a contingency fund
for the conduct of recall elections. While the Commission has a line item for the
“Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites” under
the Program category of its 2014 budget in the amount of Php1,401,501,000.00, the
said amount cannot be considered as “an appropriation made by law” as required by the
Constitution [Footnote 4 – Art. VI, Section 29 (1)] nor a contingent fund provided under
the LGC considering that the said line item is legally intended to finance the basic
continuing staff support and administrative operations of the Commission such as salaries
of officials and employees as well as essential office maintenance and other operating
expenses. As such, it cannot be used for the actual conduct of recall elections.
In prior years, including election years such as 2007, 2010 and 2013, the Commission
had a line item for the “Conduct and Supervision of Elections and other Political
Exercises” under the Program category of its budget. However, the said line item was
never utilized for the actual conduct of any elections or other political exercises including
recall elections. Again, the said line item has been consistently spent for the basic
continuing staff support and administrative operations of the Commission. It is illegal to
proceed with any activity falling within the definition of “Project” by using the budget
intended to finance the activities within the scope of “Program.” The only instance when
the Constitution allows the budget intended for “Program” to be used for “Project” is
when there is a valid augmentation.
Clearly, there are three (3) requisites for the valid exercise of the power to augment,
namely:
1. There must be a law authorizing the Chairman to augment;
2. There must be a deficient existing line item in the general appropriations law
to be augmented; and
3. There must be savings on the part of the Commission.
While there is a law authorizing the Chairman to augment a deficient appropriation (Sec.
67, General Provisions of the 2014 GAA), there is no existing line item in the
Commission’s budget for the actual conduct of a recall elections [sic]. Thus,
augmentation is not possible in this case. An alternative solution is for persons interested
in pursuing recall elections to adopt actions that may lead to the passage by Congress of
a supplemental (special) appropriations law for the FY 2014 for the conduct of recall
elections. The same may be supported by the Commission by certifying that such funds,
which are presently lacking, are necessary to defray expenses for the holding of recall
elections, pursuant to Section 11, Art. IX(C) of the Constitution.
It is likewise unwise for the Commission to request the partial use of the One Billion
Peso (PHP1,000,000,000.00) Contingent Fund under the 2014 GAA [Footnote 11 - Page
853]. True, Special Provision No. 1 does say that the contingent fund may be used for
“new and/or urgent projects and activities that need to be implemented during the year.”
However, it also says that such fund “shall be administered by the office of the President.”
Given the circumstances, not a few may interpret the Commission’s request to use such
fund from the Office of the President as an affront to the independence of this
Commission. This may in turn lead some quarters to view any recall process funded by
the said Contingent Fund as tainted and biased. Going through with this proposal would
do more harm than good.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Note:

This brings us to the relevance of classifying an agency’s budget into two major
categories - Programs and Projects. Their definitions are found in the 2014 Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress
as required by the Constitution [Footnote 5 - Article VII, Sec. 22]. In the Glossary of
Terms attached to the 2014 BESF, a “Program” [Footnote 6 - Page 1015] is defined as
“a homogenous group of activities necessary for the performance of a major purpose for
which a government agency is established, for the basic maintenance of the agency’s
administrative operations or for the provisions of staff support to agency’s administrative
operations or for the provisions of staff support to the agency’s line functions.” On the
other hand, “Projects” are defined as “[s]pecial agency undertakings which are to be
carried out within a definite time frame and which are intended to result [in] some pre-
determined measures of goods and services.”
Failure of Elections, Postponement of Elections, Special Elections
Sison v COMELEC At the outset, we notice that petitioner exhibits an ambivalent stand as to what exactly is
the nature of the remedy he availed of at the time he initiated proceedings before the
Joseph Peter Sison filed a case for COMELEC in SPC No. 98-134. At the start, he anchors his initiatory petition under
failure of electons before the Section 6[6] of the Omnibus Election Code regarding failure of elections but he later
COMELEc, asking that the builds his case as a pre-proclamation controversy which is covered by Sections 241-248
canvassing of votes being held in of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7166. [7] In this respect, the rule
Quezon City be suspended on the is, what conjointly determine the nature of a pleading are the allegations therein made in
ground that election returns with no good faith, the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed, and the primary objective of
seal were included in the canvas, the party filing the same.
that copies of ERs were brought
home by BEIs, that highly Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three
suspicious persons sneaked in some (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any
ERs into the canvassing area, that polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence,
watchers were not allowed inside terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been
the area, and that there were some suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
ERs with no data on the number of majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and
votes cast for the position of vice during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
mayor. COMELEC still proclaimed canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
the winners and dismissed the case. violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes.We have painstakingly examined
Petitioner argues that his rights to petitioner's petition before the COMELEC but found nothing therein that could support
due process was violated, and that an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all that elections were
COMELEC erred in dismissing the either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as a
case despite his allegations. bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the failure
to elect came about.

With respect to pre-proclamation controversy, it is well to note that the scope of pre-
proclamation controversy is only limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243 [10]
of the Omnibus Election Code, and the enumeration therein is restrictive and
exclusive.[11] The reason underlying the delimitation both of substantive ground and
procedure is the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies should be
summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be
delayed as little as possible.[12] That is why such questions which require more deliberate
and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding
election protest.[13]

However, with the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested, the
question of whether the petition raised issues proper for a pre-proclamation controversy
is already of no consequence since the well-entrench rule in such situation is that a pre-
proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the more appropriate
remedies being a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto

We note that his citation of Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code as basis for his
right to present evidence is misplaced. The phrase "after due notice" refers only to a
situation where the COMELEC decides and, in fact, takes steps to either partially or
totally suspend or annul the proclamation of any candidate-elect. Verba legis non est
recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. The statutory
provision cannot be expanded to embrace any other situation not contemplated therein

Ampatuan v COMELEC
Datu Andal Ampatuan and Datu
Zacaria Candao went up against
each other for the gubernatorial
position of the Province of
Maguindanao. The slate of Andal
Ampatuan won. Candao asked that
the elections be annulled because it
was “completely sham and
farcical.” The ballots were filled-up
en masse by a few persons the night
before election day, and in some
precincts, the ballot boxes, official
ballots and other election
paraphernalia were not delivered at
all. COMELEC initially
suspendend proclamations but
eventually proceeded to do so.
However, COMELEC ordered a
random technical examination of 4
to 7 precincts per municipality on
the thumb-marks and signatures of
voters. Petitioner argues that upon
his proclamation, the proper case
filed should not be a petition to
declare failure of elections but an
election protest.
People v Ferrer
Andres O. Ferrer is a Forein Affairs
Officer of the DFA, who is being
charged with violating Sections 51
and 52 of the Revised Election
Code, particularly, the act of
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
such as the one at bar where the COMELEC is not taking any step to suspend or annul a
proclamation. Futhermore, presentation of evidence before the COMELEC is not at all
indispensable in order to satisfy the demands of due process.
Petitioners submit that by virtue of their proclamation as winners, the only remedy left
for private respondents is to file an election protest, in which case, original jurisdiction
lies with the regular courts. Petitioners cited several rulings that an election protest is the
proper remedy for a losing candidate after the proclamation of the winning candidate.
The authorities petitioners relied upon involved pre-proclamation controversies. In
Loong v. Commission on Elections,[26] we ruled that “a pre-proclamation controversy is
not the same as an action for annulment of election results, or failure of elections.” These
two remedies were more specifically distinguished in this wise:
“While, however, the Comelec is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination
of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind
them and investigate election irregularities, the Comelec is duty bound to investigate
allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes in actions for
annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus
Election Code denominates the same. Thus, the Comelec, in the case of actions for
annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct
technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters’
signatures and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed
been free, honest and clean.”[27]
The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of
its authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation.[28] In the case at bar, we
cannot assume that petitioners’ proclamation and assumption into office on June 30,
2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put
in issue by respondents in their petition for annulment of election results and/or
declaration of failure of elections.
We are not unmindful of the fact that “a pattern of conduct observed in past elections has
been the pernicious ‘grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest’ slogan of some
candidates or parties” such that even if the protestant wins, it becomes “a mere pyrrhic
victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire or has expired.”
Section 6. Failure of election.- If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns
or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after
due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election of failure to
elect.
Before Comelec can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two
(2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on
the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a
failure to elect; and second, the votes cast would affect the result of the election. In Loong
vs. Commission on Elections, this Court added that the cause of such failure of election
should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous cases.
Election Offenses
The trial court is also of the opinion that the defendant is not a classified civil service
officer or employee, because to be such it is necessary that he be assigned in the
Department of Foreign Affairs under section 6, Republic Act. No. 708 and if and when
thus assigned he will for purposes of civil service law and regulations, he considered as
first grade civil service eligible," and that even if the prosecution could establish that the
defendant at the time of the commission of the violation charged was assigned in the
Department of Foreign Affairs under the section just mentioned, still such assignment

delivering cigarettes and pamphlets
to voters to induce them to vote for
the Liberal Party, and
electioneering for the LP by way of
delivering a speech in a campaign
rally. The trial court quashed the
motion on the ground that Ferrer is
not a classified civil service
employee. Petitioner in this case
argues that the court erred by
deciding on the merits of the case in
a motion to quash, but respondent
further argues that the information
must be quashed on the ground that
it charges two offenses. Petitioner,
however, argues that one allegation
was merely used to commit the
other, so the Information must
stand.
Mappala v Nunez
Alejandro Angoluan, et al were all
charged with three separation
Informations, alleging them to hav
ecommitted frustraded murder,
illegal possession of firearms, and
violation of the Omnibus Election
Code for carrying a firearm within
50 meters of a precinct. Judge
Crispulo Nunez found them guilty
of frustrated murder and illegal
possession of firearms when
Angoluan et al shot petitioner
Jacinto Mappala inside an
elementary school in Santo Tomas,
Isabela during the barangay
elections. However, he acquitted
Angoluan on the ground that the
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would not make him a classified civil service officer embraced within the provisions of
section 54 of the Revised Election Code^ for, according to the trial court, section 670 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that the classified civil service embraces all
persons not expressly declared to be in the unclassified civil service and section 671
enumerates the persons embraced in the unclassified civil service; and concludes that the
defendant is in the unclassified civil service under section 671, paragraph b, of the
Revised Administrative Code, because the defendant was appointed by the President first
as Foreign Affairs Officer, Class III, Department of Foreign Affairs, and later on as Vice-
Consul, the last appointment having been duly confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, and that the assignment or detail in the Department of Foreign Affairs
would make him by mere legal fiction a first grade civil service eligible under .section 6,
Republic Act No. 708.
The reason advanced by the trial court are defense matters. The allegation in the
information that the defendant is "a classified civil service officer, duly qualified and
appointed as such, "for purposes of the motion to quash, is deemed
admitted. The trial court cannot go beyond the allegations of the information.
Nevertheless, the information is defective, because it charges two violations of the
Revised Election Code, to wit: section 51 to which a heavier penalty is attached, and
section 54 for which a lighter penalty is provided. And the prosecuting attorneys had that
in mind when at the end of the information filed by them they stated: "Contrary to
Sections SI and 54 in relation to Sections 183, 184 and 185 of Republic Act No. 180, as
amended." Causing cigarettes which are things of value to be distributed, made unlawful
by section 51 and punished by section 183, cannot be deemed a necessary means to
commit the lesser violation of section 54 were the penalty attached to it taken into
consideration. The rule in the case of People vs. Buenviaje, 47 Phil., 536, cited and
invoked by the State, has no application to the case, because there the defendant, who
was not a duly licensed physician, gave medical assistance and treatment to a certain
person and advertised himself and offered services as a physician by means of cards and
letterheads and advertisements in the newspapers, the latter being a means to commit the
former, and both violations are punishable with the same penalty, whereas in the present
case causing cigarettes or things of value to be distributed by the defendant to the people
who attended a political meeting is a violation distinct from that of electioneering
committed by a classified civil service officer or employee. The former has no connection
with the latter.
That a violation of section 51 is distinct from that of section 54 is further shown by the
fact that a violation of the former may be committed by any candidate, political
committee, voter or any other person, whereas a violation of the latter may only be
committed by a justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, officer or
employee of the Army, member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police
force, and classified civil service officer or employee.
Respondent acquitted Alejandro Angoluan of violation of Section 261(p) of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Said provision reads as follows:
"Deadly weapons. – Any person who carries any deadly weapon in the polling place
and within a radius of one hundred meters thereof during the days and hours fixed by
law for the registration of voters in the polling place, voting, counting of votes, or
preparation of the election returns. However, in cases of affray, turmoil, or disorder,
any peace officer or public officer authorized by the Commission to supervise the
election is entitled to carry firearms or any other weapon for the purpose of preserving
and enforcing the law."
In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot complainant herein inside Precinct
No. 2 located at the elementary school building in Santo Tomas, Isabela, during the
barangay elections on March 28, 1989. Respondent also found that Alejandro was the
one who surrendered the gun. To respondent, the surrender of the weapon was an implied
admission that it was the one used by Alejandro in shooting complainant. Inspite of all
these findings, respondent acquitted Alejandro of illegally carrying a deadly weapon

gun used was not seized from
Angoluan within 50-100 meters of a
precinct. Petitioner in this case, who
was the chief complainant, filed an
administrative case against the
judge.
People v Bayona
Cornelio Bayona is a police officer
who was tasked to render his duty
on the date of an election. He was in
his automobile with his handgun
when he was called out by a friend
who was within the fenced premises
of a voting precinct. He was caught
possessing the revolver so an
Information was charged against
him in violation of the Election Gun
Ban. The Solicitor General defends
Bayona by arguing that he must not
be held liable because the intent of
the law is to punish individuals who
carry guns only for the sake of
inducing electors to vote for certain
candidates.
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inside a precinct on the theory that the gun was not seized from him while he was inside
the precinct.
To support a conviction under Section 261(p) of the Omnibus Election Code, it is not
necessary that the deadly weapon should have been seized from the accused while he was
in the precinct or within a radius of 100 meters therefrom. It is enough that the accused
carried the deadly weapon "in the polling place and within a radius of one hundred meters
thereof" during any of the specified days and hours. After respondent himself had found
that the prosecution had established these facts, it is difficult to understand why he
acquitted Alejandro of the charge of violation of Section 261(p) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile
without the risk of losing it because he was alone, it is sufficient to say that under the
circumstances it was not necessary for the defendant to leave his automobile merely
because somebody standing near the polling place had called him, nor does the record
show that it was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that occasion.
The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not especially construct
buildings for electoral precincts but merely utilizes whatever building there may be
available, and all election precincts are within fifty meters from some road, a literal
application of the law would be absurd, because members of the police force or
Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in that prohibition and could not
use the road in question if they were carrying firearms; that people living in the vicinity
of electoral precincts would be prohibited from cleaning or handling their firearms within
their own residences on registration and election days. That if the real object of the
Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in question should
only be applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for
the purpose of using them directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors
(citing the decision of this court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon [G. R. No. 31536,
promulgated November 20, 1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had been sent
to a polling place to preserve order on the request of the chairman of the board of election
inspectors, was acquitted) ; that in the case at bar there is no evidence that the defendant
went to the election precinct either, to vote or to work for the candidacy of anyone, but
on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to go to the
electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building
where the election wasbeing held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict,
narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and
unreasonable to convict him.
We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the SolicitorGeneral for the acquittal of the
defendant. The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent
with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not
intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got
out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling
place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act
prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to
interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense.
Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to intimidate the voters.
The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty
in the enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road
on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision
of law in question, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same
thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition
extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle
their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they would not be carrying
firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People
vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia
(p. 169. ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board
of election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry
his arms.

Lozano v Yorac
Oliver Lozano filed a case against
Jejomar Binay for
Ong v Martinez
Petitioner Robert Ong and Maria
Teresita Herrera-Martinez are both
members of Liberal Parties. When
Councilor Saturnino Herrera (LP
member) of the City of Manila died,
both wanted to replace his position.
Martinez obtained the appointment
through approval of the council and
the party president, Jovito Salonga.
Petitioner Robert Ong, on the other,
was appointed upon
recommendation of both Mayor
Gemiliano Lopez and Vice-Mayor
Danilo Lacuna, with authority from
the LP Treasurer of the Third
District. Petitioner argues that he
should be the replacement because
the appointment of Martinez was
made during the election ban before
the barangay elections.
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'The Christmas gift-giving is an annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati
ever since the time of Mayors Estrella and Yabut in the spirit of yuletide season wherein
basic and essential items are distributed to the less fortunate and indigent residents of
Makati out of funds appropriated for the purpose duly budgeted and subject to audit by
the Commission on Audit and same were prepared sometime on October 1987 long
before I filed my certificate of candidacy and ceased to be the Acting Mayor of Makati,
x x x;
There is ample evidence to show that it was not respondent Binay who 'gave' the plastic
bags containing Christmas gifts to the witnesses who executed affidavits for the
petitioners. The 'giver' was in fact the Municipality of Makati.
We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by
respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent
Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed
engaged in vote buying. The traditional gift giving of the Municipality of Makati during
the Christmas season is not refuted. That it was implemented by respondent Binay as
OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that respondent was
trying to influence and induce his constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching
the interpretation of the law too far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift giving that
respondent was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere
tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote buying. There has to be concrete and
direct evidence or, at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that
respondent was indeed engaged in vote buying. We are convinced that the evidence
presented, as well as the facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not warrant such finding.
Sec. 50 of the Local Government Code specifically provides:
“In case of permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglungsod, sangguniang bayan, or sangguniang barangay, the President of the
Philippines, upon recommendation of the Minister of Local Government, shall appoint a
qualified person to fill the vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang
panglunsod of highly urbanized and component cities; the governor, in the case of
sangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang
barangay members. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from
the political party of the sangguniang member who caused the vacancy, and shall serve
the unexpired term of the vacant office.” (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, we quote the pertinent sections of the 1967 Liberal Party Revised Rules (1971
Reprint furnished by the Comelec):
"Rule 32. Approval of Resolution of District, Provincial, City or Municipal Government.
Resolutions adopted by provincial, district, city or municipal committee shall not be final
unless approved by the National Directorate, the Executive Committee, or the Party
President."
Logically and by analogy, the National Directorate or in its stead, the Executive
Committee or the Party President may choose and nominate the party's proposed
appointee, from among its members, to the position vacated by a deceased city councilor.
In the case of petitioner, however, a very different scenario took place. The letter dated
February 9, 1989 of Secretary Luis Santos informing Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer
Lacuna that he had appointed petitioner and three other appointees, carried a request that
due recognition be accorded to them, particularly petitioner as member of the Council.
Petitioner and the other appointees, as per minutes of the Council's session of March 9,
1989, were excluded from the session hall by reason of the seconded motion of the
Majority Floor Leader. In the subsequent session of the Council on March 14, 1989,
petitioner and his co-appointees were formally excluded from the session hall when
sixteen (16) members of the Council voted in favor of their exclusion and no one against
it. Significantly, such exclusion meant that the City Council refused to recognize their
appointments.
Both petitioner and respondent have invoked the election ban imposed under Sec. 261
(g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The election ban covered the period from February
11 to March 27, 1989 by reason of the Barangay election held on March 28, 1989. Both

Regalado v COMELEC
Dominador Regalado, as OIC
Mayor of Tanjay, is charged for
violating Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code, for
allegedly transferring private
respondent Editha Barba, a nursing
attendant, from Poblacion, Tanjay,
Negros Occidental to Barangay Sto.
Nino, at least 25 kilometers from
the original position. He defends by
saying that reassignment is different
from transfer.
Rey Aquino v COMELEC (G.R.
No. 211789, March 17 2015)
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parties have capitalized on the prohibitive provision for the purpose of having their
respective appointments declared illegal or null and void.
Sec. 261 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code provides thus:
"(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving
salary increases. - During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty
days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government
office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employees, whether
provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought
unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of
the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that
may influence the election.
The permanent vacancy for councilor exists and its filling up is governed by the Local
Government Code while the appointment referred to in the election ban provision is
covered by the Civil Service Law. For having satisfied the formal requisites and
procedure for appointment as Councilor, which is an official position outside the
contemplation of the election ban, respondent's appointment is declared valid.
The two elements of the offense prescribed under §261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code,
as amended, are: (1) a public officer or employee is transferred or detailed within the
election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was effected
without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and
regulations.
He contends, however, that he did not violate §261(h) because he merely effected a "re-
assignment" and not a "transfer" of personnel by moving Barba from one unit or place of
designation (Poblacion, Tanjay) to another (Sto. Niño, Tanjay) of the same office,
namely, the Rural Health Office of Tanjay, Negros Oriental. In support of his contention,
he relies upon the following portions of §24 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law):
(c) Transfer - a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank,
level, or salary without break of service involving the issuance of an appointment.
(g) Reassignment - an employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to
another in the same agency. Provided, that such reassignment shall not involve a
reduction in rank, status, or salary.
The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency: Provided,
however, That any movement from the non-career service to the career service shall
not be considered a transfer.
Thus, contrary to petitioner’s claim, a transfer under §24(c) of P.D. No. 807 in fact
includes personnel movement from one organizational unit to another in the same
department or agency.
Moreover, §261(h) of B.P. No. 881, as amended, provides that it is an election offense
for - Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any
officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the
election period except upon prior approval of the Commission. (Italics added). As the
Solicitor General notes, "the word transfer or detail, as used [above], is modified by the
word whatever. This indicates that any movement of personnel from one station to
another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during the election is covered by
the prohibition
It may well be that Barangay Sto. Niño in January 1988 was in need of health service
personnel. Nonetheless, this fact will not excuse the failure of petitioner to obtain prior
approval from the COMELEC for the movement of personnel in his office.
In Regalado, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court already clarified the interpretation of
the term whatever as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881 in relation to the terms transfer
and detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor General's position, this Court declared that the

Rey Aquino is the CEO of
Philhealth, who caused the
reassignment of several officials of
the GOCC prior to the star of the
election period. He was charged
with violating Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code, but he
argues that reassignment is different
from transfer and detail, which are
the ones prohibited by law. Further,
he posited that the reassignment
order is beyond the coverage of this
COMELEC resolution as he issued
it on January 8, 2010, or prior to the
start of the election period that
began on January 11, 2010.
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terms transfer and detail are modified by the term whatever such that "any movement of
personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during
the election period is covered by the prohibition."[34]
Thus, it is immaterial whether or not the personnel action has in fact been actually used
for electioneering purposes or whether there has been any allegation in the complaint to
this effect. The mere existence of such plausibility for electioneering is the reason that
animated the legal prohibition against any personnel action, including transfers and re-
assignments, during the election period.
Thus, to reiterate and emphasize - the election law's prohibition on transfer or detail
covers any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in
the same office or agency when made or caused during the election period.
As commonly understood, the term whatever means "anything at all: any of various other
things that might also be mentioned;" or "something similar but hard to identify with
certainty."[37] Based on this definition, whatever would have served no purpose were we
to accept Aquino's constrained interpretation. This is because any of the various other
forms of personnel action, under the laws governing the civil service that would have
been covered by the prohibition (with its use of the term whatever), will automatically be
excluded by Section 261(h)'s use of the terms transfer and detail.
In short, Aquino's interpretation will only render the term whatever a mere surplusage if
the legislature intended to limit the prohibition to transfer or detail only as defined by
the laws governing the civil service.
In this case, the COMELEC fixed the election period for the May 10, 2010 Elections at
120 days before and 30 days after the day of the election. We find this period proper as
we find no arbitrariness in the COMELEC's act of fixing an election period longer than
the period fixed in the Constitution and BP 881. For one, the COMELEC fixed the longer
period of 120-days-before-and-30-days-after pursuant to Section 9, Article IX-C of the
Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881.
Under Section 261(h) of BP 881, a person commits the election offense of violation of
the election transfer ban when he makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any
official or employee of the government during the election period absent prior
approval of the COMELEC.
By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its
exceptions. The elements are: (1) the making or causing of a government official or
employee's transfer or detail whatever, (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail
whatever was made during the election period; and (3) these acts were made without the
required prior COMELEC approval.
As this provision operates, the making or causing of the movement of personnel during
the election period but without the required COMELEC approval is covered by the
prohibition and renders the responsible person liable for the offense. Conversely, the
making or causing (of the movement of personnel) before or after the election period
even without the required COMELEC approval, or during the election period but with
the required COMELEC approval are not covered by the prohibition and do not render
the responsible person liable for this election offense.
Make is defined as "to cause to exist. To do, perform, or execute; as to make an issue, to
make oath, to make a presentment. To do in form of law; to perform with due formalities;
to execute in legal form; as to make answer, to make a return or report. To execute as
one's act or obligation; to prepare and sign; to issue; to sign, execute, and deliver."[44]
Cause, on the other hand, is defined as "each separate antecedent of an event. Something
that precedes and brings about an effect or result. A reason for an action or condition x x
x x an agent that brings about something. That which in some manner is accountable for
condition that brings about an effect or that produces a cause for the resultant action or
state."[45]

COMELEC v Tagle
Florentino Bautista ran for mayor of
Kawit, Cavite, against Mayor
Federico Poblete. Bautista filed a
case of vote-buying against Poblete,
et al and the latter were charged for
violating Article 261 of the OEC. 44
witnesses were submitted to give
testimony by admitting that they
themselves partook in the
transaction. The Law Department
issued Informations against the
inviduals. Meanwhile, the Special
Prosecutor of DOJ also filed a case
of vote-selling against the witnesses
provided in the previous case, but
COMELEC said that they cannot
already do so since the witnesses
were already protected under
Section 28 of RA 6646. A Motion
to Dismiss was filed, but respondent
Judge Lucenito Tagle said that it is
necessary that such person has
already performed the overt act of
voluntarily giving information or
testifying in any official
investigation or proceeding for the
offense to which such information
or testimony was given.
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When viewed in terms of how transfer or reassignments of government officers and
employees are usually carried into place, this act of making or causing often consists in
the act of issuing the transfer or reassignment order. To issue something means "to
discharge, produce, send out, publish, put into circulation, come out,"[46] "to send forth;
to emit; to promulgate; as an officer issues orders, process issues from a court."[47] In this
sense, the act of issuing entails the mechanical act of drafting or writing the order, by the
issuing official himself or through a subordinate; the signing of the order; and completed
with its release as addressed to the. concerned officer or employee. Once the transfer or
reassignment order is issued, the making or causing as the defining act that determines
whether a government official may be held liable under Section 261(h) is deemed
completed. The completion of this phase likewise ends the active role the issuing official
plays.
Thus, the transfer or reassignment process moves to the next phase the implementation
of the order. By definition, implement refers to "the act of fulfilling or performing."[48]
One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of
prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor
of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the recipient
or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and will ensure the
successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter. Congress saw the wisdom
of this proposition, and so Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying
and Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph:
The giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and
conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any person, otherwise guilty under said
paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any violation
thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and
punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were
given: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
However, to avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by
the latter’s opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn “vote-sellers” who denounce the vote-
buying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they not tell the
truth.
In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in
I.S. No. 1-99-1080, which was the basis of the informations for vote-selling, it, in effect,
withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor. Such withdrawal of the deputation
was clearly in order, considering the circumstances obtaining in these cases where those
who voluntarily executed affidavits attesting to the vote-buying incident and became
witnesses against the vote-buyers now stand as accused for the same acts they had earlier
denounced. What the Prosecutor did was to sabotage the prosecution of the criminal case
against the “vote-buyers” and put in serious peril the integrity of the COMELEC, which
filed the said case for vote-buying. If the Prosecutor had listened to the command of
prudence and good faith, he should have brought the matter to the attention of the
COMELEC.
Petitioner COMELEC found that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who executed
affidavits and turned witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99, voluntarily admitted that
they were the acceptors or recipients in the vote-buying done by the accused in said case.
It was precisely because of such voluntary admission and willingness to testify that the
COMELEC en banc, in its Minute Resolution No. 00-2453, declared null and void the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 and
held that the respondents therein are exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to the
last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Hence, it directed its Law Department to
file a motion to dismiss the criminal cases which the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
filed in court against the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080.
We agree with the petitioner and hold that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who
are the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, are exempt

Tapispisan v CA
Petitioner Tapispisan is a public
school teacher and has been
occupying the position of Teacher III
since September 1, 1992. She has
been teaching for the last thirty (30)
years and is currently assigned at the
Villamor Air Base Elementary
School in Pasay City. Respondent
Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug (Schools
Division Superintendent, Pasay City)
issued Division Memorandum No.
33 designating respondent Rumbaoa
as OIC-Head Teacher of P.
Villanueva Elementary School and
respondent Teves as OIC-Principal
of Don Carlos Elementary School,
both schools are in Pasay City. Such
was affirmed by DECS Secretary
Ricardo Gloria. Tapispisan went to
the CSC, but the CSC denied the
petition on the ground that mere
designation, temporary in nature,
cannot be subject of a protest or
recall.
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from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph
of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Respondent judge lost sight of the fact that at the time
the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the
respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 had already executed sworn statements attesting to the
corrupt practice of vote-buying in the case docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. It
cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-
buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 per petitioner’s
Memorandum filed with this Court.[14]
The appointing power is vested in the Department Head/Secretary.[12] Such power,
however, may be delegated to the regional director subject to the approval, revision,
modification and reversal of the Department Secretary.[13] It is not disputed that the
appointments of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master
Teacher II, respectively, had been made by the appropriate appointing authority. Further,
such appointments were duly attested by the CSC, which, under the Constitution, is the
central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining
questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. [14]
The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but
consecutively, make an appointment complete.
The CSC, in its Resolution No. 972501 dated April 14, 1997 dismissing petitioner
Tapispisan's protest, declared that "only appointments/promotions and not designation
can be the subject of a protest. Designation, being temporary in nature, does not amount
to the issuance of an appointment, but is a mere imposition of additional duties."[18] This
construction given by the CSC should be given great weight and respect. As this Court
has time and again ruled: "[a]lthough technically not binding and controlling on the
courts, the construction given by the agency or entity charged with the enforcement of a
statute should be given great weight and respect, particularly so if such construction ...
has been observed and acted on for a long period of time."[19]
Indeed, there is a marked difference between an appointment and a designation. The
Court had the occasion to expound the distinction in this wise:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually
with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen
unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on
the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties of an
incumbent official ... . It is said that appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it, likewise, involves
the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common
understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.
The designation of respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva
Elementary School and respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary
School merely imposed on them additional duties on top of those corresponding to their
incumbent positions at Villamor Air Base Elementary School. Such designation did not
confer upon them security of tenure in the positions which they occupy in "acting"
capacity. This point was underscored by Secretary Gloria as he explained that the
designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as OIC-Head Teacher and OIC-
Principal, respectively, was temporary in nature, not a permanent transfer nor a
promotion.
As a corollary, such designation did not violate Resolution No. 2731 dated December 5,
1994 of the Commission on Elections, which declared as a prohibited act the transfer of
officers and employees in the civil service during the election period from January 8,
1995 up to June 7, 1995. Transfer is defined as "a movement from one position to another

Causing v COMELEC
On May 28, 2010, Elsie Causing,
the civil registrar of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, received an order from
Mayor Hernan Biron ordering her to
transfer her office near the Office of
the Mayor. On the same date, Ms.
Catalino Belonio, Administrative
Officer III of the Office of
Municipal Mayor, was also
designated as the civil registrar of
the municipality but the designation
was not completed. Causing, hence,
filed a complaint arguing that the
transfer of office and the
designation were made against the
Election Appointment Ban.
COMELEC sided with Biron,
arguing that a mere physical
transfer is not contemplated as
included in the ban, and it was done
to strengthen the supervisory
powers of the Office of the Mayor
over the local civil registrar.
Romeo M. Jalosjos v COMELEC
(G.R. No. 192474, June 26, 2012)
Romeo Jalosjos won in the election
as Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte in 2007.
While serving, he built a house in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and began
occupying the same. He asked the
Election Registration Board (ERB).
Dan Erasmo opposed but the
opposition was dismissed. Hence,
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which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service involving the issuance
of an appointment."[21] The designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves did not
involve a movement from one position to another. Neither did it involve the issuance of
any appointment to the said positions in their favor. In fact, respondents Rumbaoa and
Teves retained their incumbent positions at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School.
As such, their designation could not be considered as a "transfer" within the meaning of
a prohibited act during the election period.
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were
transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement
from one government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical
unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an
appointment;” while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the
movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment.[33] Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer and detail must
be construed as such. Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to
either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only
thereby physically transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the
Mayor “some little steps” away.[34] We cannot accept the petitioner’s argument,
therefore, that the phrase “any transfer or detail whatsoever” encompassed “any and all
kinds and manner of personnel movement,”[35] including the mere change in office
location.
Moreover, Causing’s too-literal understanding of transfer should not hold sway because
the provisions involved here were criminal in nature. Mayor Biron was sought to be
charged with an election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election
Code.[36] It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor
of the accused.[37] This means that the courts must not bring cases within the provision
of a law that are not clearly embraced by it. In short, no act can be pronounced criminal
unless it is clearly made so by statute prior to its commission (nullum crimen, nulla
poena, sine lege). So, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can
be brought within them.
Equally material is that Mayor Biron’s act of transferring the office space of Causing was
rooted in his power of supervision and control over the officials and employees serving
in his local government unit, in order to ensure the faithful discharge of their duties and
functions.[38] His explanation that he transferred Causing’s work station from her original
office to his office in order to closely supervise her after his office received complaints
against her could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter continued to perform her
tasks, and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil Registrar even
after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
The issuance of Office Order No. 13 by Mayor Biron detailing Belonio to the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar was not proof of Mayor Biron’s “crystal clear intention” to
replace and transfer her during the election period.[39] As the COMELEC En Banc found,
Belonio did not receive the order, and Causing remained as the Municipal Civil Registrar,
leaving the detailing of Belonio uncompleted. Without the actual appointment of Belonio
as the Municipal Civil Registrar, it would be unwarranted to criminally charge Mayor
Biron of violating Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Election Adjudication System
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting
elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and
the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the
appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the
HRET.

he filed a petition to exclude
Jalosjos from the list of voters
before the MTC. The MTC found
that he did not abandon his
domicile. Jalosjos assailed such
before the CA, so the CA issued a
restraining order. Jalosjos filed his
COC for Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay for the 2010 elections, but
Erasmo filed a petition to deny due
course, on the ground that
indicating that he resided in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay is a material
misrepresentation. Jalosjos won the
election, and the CA ruled that he
was able to change domicile. The
COMELEC, however, decided to
cancel his COC on the ground that
since he was still a mayor, he could
not have changed his residency.
Lokin v COMELEC
Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) applied for the partylist
system during the 2007 elections. It
submitted 5 nominees, with Joel
Villanueva as the first, and Luis
Lokin, Jr as second, etc. On May 7,
2007, Villanueva withdrew Lokin et
al replaced them with Cruz-
Gonzales and Borje, as second and
third nominees, respectively. After
election day, CIBAC through its
counsel filed a petition before the
COMELEC asking that the old list
be followed, but Villanueva, the
partylist president, opposed. The
COMELEC eventually approved
the new list:
1) Joel Villanueva
2) Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
3) Armi Borje
Lokin comes to the court arguing
that COMELEC added new rules
that were not present in the Partylist
Act, by allowing substitution of
nominees.
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It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the proclamation
of Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated rule.[19] Since the COMELEC declared
him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his proclamation was void following the
ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia.[20] For Erasmo, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction
to issue its June 3, 2010 order based on Section 6 of Republic Act 6646:
Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as
yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal from the Second Division’s dismissal of the
disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting
Jalosjos’ name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last
standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELEC’s
Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En
Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of
his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding
his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely
for the HRET to consider and decide.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the
basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the
challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization
or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall
be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of
any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC
except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once
the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the
nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is
conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey.
Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some
other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes
of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which
the courts must not depart.[34] When the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application.[35] Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may
not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.
The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of
lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the
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list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern
itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list
organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements
prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in
newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list
organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they
still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization
are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general
circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and
informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees
through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the
submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters' demand for transparency. The
lawmakers' exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such
circumvention.

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list
organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been
submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee
withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated.
The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not
falling under any of the three exceptions.

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. - A party-list nominee may be substituted only
when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes
incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination.
In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list
of nominees.

Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the
fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." To reword means to alter
the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new
form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.

However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the
provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to
withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right
contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the
nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has
indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from
falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted
to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list
organizations.

Note: To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following
requisites to be valid:

1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;

2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure; and

Pimentel III v COMELEC
The Petition stemmed from the 14
May 2007 national elections for 12
senatorial posts. At the time of
filing of the Petition, around two
months after the said elections, the
11 candidates with the highest
number of votes had already been
officially proclaimed and had taken
their oaths of office as Senators.
With other candidates conceding,
the only remaining contenders for
the twelfth and final senatorial post
were Pimentel and private
respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri
(Zubiri). Because of the alleged
irregularities in Maguindanao,
COMELEC ordered the creation of
a Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers (SPBOC) in lieu of the
Board of Canvassers in the
province. Pimentel argues that there
were irregulartieis in the canvas
being made of the SPBOC as well,
since it used the Copy 2 (Copy that
is to be posted at the wall) of the
election returns, which is
substantially the same as those used
by the old Board of Canvassers.
Pimentel, therefore, went to the
National Board of Canvassers to
petition for the exclusion of the
election returns from Maguindanao,
but the petition was denied. Zubiri
also argued that pre-proclamation
cases cannot be decided by the
COMELEC. Zubiri was already
proclaimed. Hence, Pimental went
to the Supreme Court, but
respondent Zubiri argues that it
should be the SET that must decide
on any electoral protest.
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4. It must be reasonable.
Pre-proclamation cases to resolve pre-proclamation controversies are allowed in local
elections. According to Section 16 of Republic Act No. 7166:
SEC. 16. Pre-proclamation Cases Involving Provincial, City and Municipal Offices. –
Pre-proclamation cases involving provincial, city and municipal officer shall be allowed
and shall be governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 hereof.
However, as to elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the
House of Representatives, pre- proclamation cases are prohibited. Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7166, prior to its amendment, read:
SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. – For purposes of the
elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the
certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority
of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns
before it.
As Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 was then worded, it would appear that any pre-
proclamation case relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass, was prohibited in elections for
President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. The
prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which
delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. Proceedings which may delay the
proclamation of the winning candidate beyond the date[20] set for the beginning of his
term of office must be avoided, considering that the effect of said delay is, in the case of
national offices for which there is no hold over, to leave the office without any incumbent
The law, nonetheless, recognizes an exception and allows the canvassing body motu
proprio or an interested person to file a written complaint for the correction of manifest
errors in the election returns or certificates of canvass even in elections for President,
Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, for the simple
reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor
delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.[22] To be manifest, the errors must
appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected
and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. [23] The law likewise
permits pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, when these cases question the composition or
proceedings of the board of canvassers before the board itself or the COMELEC, since
such cases do not directly relate to the certificate of canvass or election returns.
Republic Act No. 9369 significantly amended Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 by
adding an excepting phrase to the general prohibition against pre-proclamation
controversies in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives. According to the amended Section 15, no pre-proclamation
cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass shall be allowed in elections
for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives,
except as provided by Section 30 of the same statute.
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, which was likewise amended by Republic Act No.
9369, provides:
SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President
and Vice President: The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for
the election of senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

of Canvass. – Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice-president and
senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local board of
canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and
thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted
or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains
the names of all of the candidates for president and vice-president or senator, as the case
may be, and their corresponding votes in words and figures; (3) there exists no
discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or in any of its
supporting documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by precinct
or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate; and
(4) there exists no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in
the certificate of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the
election returns of precincts covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That
certified print copies of election returns or certificates of canvass may be used for
the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.

When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province, city or district, appears to be incomplete the Senate President or the Chairman
of the Commission, as the case may be shall require the board of canvassers concerned
to transmit by personal delivery the election returns from polling places that were not
included in the certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns
shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.

When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by

city/municipality or by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to
the veracity of the number of votes stated herein and may affect the result of the election,
upon request of the presidential, vice-presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or
his party, Congress or the Commission en banc, as the case may be, shall, for the sole
purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-President or
senator, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to
it.

In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned

above, the procedure on pre- proclamation controversies shall be adopted and
applied as provided in Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20.

Any person who presents in evidence a simulated copy of an election return,

certificate of canvass or statement of votes, or a printed copy of an election return,
certificate of canvass or statement of votes bearing a simulated certification or a
simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense and shall be penalized in
accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. (Emphasis supplied.)

The highlighted portions in the afore-quoted section identify the amendments introduced
by Republic Act No. 9369, specifically: (1) the duty to determine the authenticity and
due execution of certificates of canvass is now imposed, not only on Congress acting as
the NBC for the election for President and Vice-President, but also on COMELEC en
banc acting as the NBC for the election for Senators; (2) the third criterion for the
determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass requires
the absence of discrepancy in comparison not only with other authentic copies of the said
certificates, but also with the supporting documents, such as the statements of votes; (3)
a fourth criterion for the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass was added, mandating the absence of discrepancy between the
number of votes of a candidate in a certificate when compared with the aggregate number
of votes appearing in the election returns of the precincts covered by the same certificate;
(4) pursuant to the exception now provided in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, permissible pre-proclamation cases shall adopt and
apply the procedure provided in Sections 17 to 20 of the same statute; and (5) the use of
a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of canvass, or statement of vote, or a
printed copy of said election documents bearing a simulated certification or image shall
be penalized as an election offense.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic
Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases
involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed
in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. The intention of Congress to
treat a case falling under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9369, as a pre-proclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of the said
provision which adopts and applies to such a case the same procedure provided under
Sections 17,[24] 18,[25] 19[26] and 20[27] of Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation
controversies.

In sum, in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are
recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2)
questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3)
determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided
in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.

The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings, properly refused

to allow Pimentel to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES
Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting evidence to
prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said MCOCs, for such would be tantamount
to a pre-proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, even
after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.

The SPBOC-Maguindanao, as its name suggests, was constituted to be of the same stature
and to perform the same function as the PBOC-Maguindano: to canvass the Maguindanao
MCOCs and prepare the Maguindanao PCOC to be submitted to the NBC. Undeniably,
the SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC en banc acting as the
NBC, specifically charged by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it in accordance with the four
given criteria. There is no ambiguity in the said provision, at least, as to whom it imposes
the duty, namely: (1) Congress as the NBC for the election for President and Vice-
President; and (2) COMELEC en banc as the NBC for the election for Senators. This is
a case where the law is clear. It speaks in a language that is categorical. It is quite explicit;
it is too plain to be misread. No interpretation is needed. All that is called for is to apply
the statutory command.[32]

The intent of the Legislature to confine the application of Section 30 of Republic Act No.
7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, only to Congress or the COMELEC en
banc acting as the NBC thus becomes even more evident, considering that the said
provision does not apply to elections for Members of the House of Representatives.

This Court can only conclude that the canvass proceedings before local boards of
canvassers in elections for Senators are unaffected by the amendment of Republic Act
No. 7166 by Republic Act No. 9369. They still remain administrative and summary in
nature, so as to guard against the paralyzation of canvassing and proclamation
proceedings that would lead to a vacuum in so important and sensitive office as that of
Senator of the Republic.

Boards of canvassers are ad hoc bodies that exist only for the interim task of canvassing
election returns. They do not have the facilities, the time and even the competence to
hear, examine and decide on alleged election irregularities, unlike regular courts or the
COMELEC itself or the electoral tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House), which are
regular agencies of government tasked and equipped for the purpose. While this Court
has time and again expressed its abhorrence of the nefarious "grab the proclamation and
prolong the protest" strategy of some candidates, nonetheless, it recognizes the very
limited jurisdiction of MBOCs and PBOCs. Unless Pimentel is able to show cogently
and clearly his entitlement to the summary exclusion of clearly unacceptable certificates

Tan v COMELEC
Petitioners Abdusakur M. Tan and
Basaron Burahan were the
gubernatorial and vice-
gubernatorial candidates,
respectively, of Sulu Province in the
May 10, 2004 national and local
elections. May 17, 2004,
petitioners, together with other local
candidates for congressman, mayor,
and vice-mayor, filed with the
COMELEC four (4) Petitions for
Declaration of Failure of Elections
in the towns of Maimbung, Luuk,
Tongkil, and Panamao, all of Sulu
Province. The COMELEC Second
Division ordered that the
canvassing and proclamation be
done in Manila. This prompted
Petitioner to file for the exclusion of
some electoral returns, but such was
denied. Private respondent
Benjamin Loong was proclaimed
governor of Sulu. COMELEC
denied the petition to declare failure
of elections, since the case did not
fall to the three circumstances
mentioned in Section 6 of the OEC:
1) no election is held, 2) election is
suspended, or 3) there is a failure to
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
of canvass, this Court must uphold the constitutional and legal presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions and authenticity of official documents.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao prepared all seven copies of the second Maguindanao PCOC.
It properly submitted the first copy to the NBC for national canvassing of the votes for
Senators. All the six other copies are in existence and have been distributed to the
intended recipients. There is no allegation or proof that there is a discrepancy among the
seven authentic copies of the second Maguindanao PCOC. Neither is it shown that the
second Maguindanao PCOC contains any discrepancy when compared with its
supporting documents. It would thus appear to this Court that the second Maguindanao
PCOC passed the third criterion for its authenticity and due execution as provided in
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. As for the
three other criteria, there is no sufficient allegation, much less proof, that the NBC did
not apply them to the second Maguindanao PCOC or that the second Maguindanao PCOC
actually failed to meet any of them.
It must be kept in mind that Zubiri was proclaimed the twelfth Senator-elect in the 14
May 2007 elections on 14 July 2007, and that he formally assumed office on 16 July
2007. In accordance with this Court’s ruling in Aggabao, Pimentel’s Petition must be
dismissed, for his recourse lies, not with this Court, but with the SET. That Pimentel filed
the present Petition prior to Zubiri’s proclamation is insignificant. Since Pimentel’s
prayer for a TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order had been denied, Zubiri was proclaimed
the twelfth winning Senator in the 2007 Senatorial Elections.
Pimentel further claims that he is not challenging Zubiri’s proclamation, but rather the
conduct of the proceedings before the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. This is just a
roundabout argument. Pimentel cannot deny that he assails the canvass proceedings
because he believes that the annulment and setting aside thereof would result in his
winning as the twelfth Senator in the 14 May 2007 elections; and if he is the rightful
winner, then logically and necessarily, Zubiri’s proclamation must also be annulled and
set aside.
In these three (3) instances, there must be a resulting failure to elect. As stated in Banaga,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections, "this is obvious in the first two scenarios, where the
election was not held and where the election was suspended."[70] As to the third scenario,
where the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the
consequence of failure to elect must, as mentioned earlier, be interpreted to mean that
nobody emerged as a winner.[71]
A scrutiny of the petitions filed before the COMELEC shows that petitioners never
alleged that no voting was held nor was voting suspended in the subject municipalities.
Neither did petitioners allege that no one was elected. Petitioners only allege that there
was a sham election and similar sham canvassing. As noted earlier, to warrant a
declaration of failure of election, the alleged irregularities must be proven to have
prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation and
transmission, custody, and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts should
have been clearly alleged by petitioners before the COMELEC en banc, but they were
not.
Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code[85] under which the petitioner anchors his case
provides as follows:
Section 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city
offices. — A sworn petition contesting the election of... any regional, provincial or city
official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. (Underscoring added)
Petitioner's basic posture may be accorded plausibility, except that it glossed over a
statutory provision which, in the light of certain proceedings as thus narrated, militates
against his stance. Under Section 248 of the Election Code, the filing of certain petitions
works to stop the running of the reglementary period to file an election protest, thus:

elect. This prompted an electoral
protest filed against Loong. Loong
argues that the protest must be
dismissed for being filed beyond the
10-day period, but COMELEC
argued that because there was a
pending pre-proclamation case
(exclusion of canvass/election
returns), the electoral protest was
not filed out of time. Meanwhile,
Tan’s petition for exclusion of
canvass certificates and election
returns was also rendered moot by
the COMELEC in light of the
proclamation of Loong.
Dumayas v COMELEC
Petitioner Rodolfo Dumayas and
Felipe Bernal were candidates for
the position of mayor of Carles,
Iloilo. Dumayas filed a case against
Bernal, for alleged acts of terrorism
and coercion during election day.
As such, some of the precincts were
excluded from counting, so private
respondent Bernal filed for a motion
for reconsideration. Dumayas was
initially declared winner. After
which, the Vice-mayor-elect,
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Section 248. Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation. — The
filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any
candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest
or quo warranto proceedings.
As may be noted, the aforequoted Section 248 contemplates two (2) points of reference,
that is, pre- and post-proclamation, under which either of the petitions referred to therein
is filed. Before the proclamation, what ought to be filed is a petition to "suspend" or stop
an impending proclamation. After the proclamation, an adverse party should file a
petition to "annul" or undo a proclamation made. Pre-proclamation controversies partake
of the nature of petitions to suspend. The purpose for allowing pre-proclamation
controversies, the filing of which is covered by the aforequoted Section 248 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is to nip in the bud the occurrence of what, in election practice,
is referred to as "grab the proclamation and prolong the protest" situation.
Correlating the petitions mentioned in Section 248 with the 10-day period set forth in the
succeeding Section 250, a petition to suspend tolls the 10-day period for filing an election
protest from running, while a petition to annul interrupts the running of the period. In
other words, in a Section 248 petition to suspend where the 10-day period did not start to
run at all, the filing of a Section 250 election contest after the tenth (10th) day from
proclamation is not late. On the other hand, in a Section 248 petition to annul, the party
seeking annulment must file the petition before the expiration of the 10-day period.
In the case at bench, the petitioner's arguments on the belated filing of the respondent's
election protest may merit consideration had the petitions against him been only for the
annulment of his May 24, 2004 proclamation. However, the numerous election-related
petitions, which were filed against petitioner Loong by the other Sulu gubernatorial
candidates, sought to suspend his then impending proclamation which, as turned out,
was eventually made on May 24, 2004. And as events unfolded, some of the petitions
adverted to resulted in the issuance on May 17, 2004 of an Order suspending the
proclamation of the governor-elect of Sulu.[87] Petitioner Loong himself admitted as
much: "x x x on May 17, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order
suspending the proclamation of the winning candidate for Governor of the province of
Sulu."[88]
Upon the foregoing considerations, the filing of the election protest ad cautelam on July
19, 2004 or fifty-six (56) days after the May 24, 2004 proclamation was contextually on
time. This is because the 10-day reglementary period to file such protest—which
ordinarily would have expired on June 3, 2004—did not start to run at all.
No rule or law prohibits simultaneous prosecution
For one, there is no law or rule prohibiting the simultaneous prosecution or adjudication
of pre-proclamation controversies and elections protests. Allowing the simultaneous
prosecution scenario may be explained by the fact that pre-proclamation controversies
and election protests differ in terms of the issues involved and the evidence admissible
in each case[95] and the objective each seeks to achieve.
Appeal and Other Election Issues
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes
the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment
of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and
pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The reason for this
rule is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the
case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion and conflict of
authority.
Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as where:
(a) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the
proper remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election
protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or

Arnold Betita, filed a petition quo
warranto against Dumayas. Bernal
was also co-petition in such case.
After receiving the complaint,
Dumayas asked that the previous
pre-proclamation case between him
and Bernal be dismissed on the
ground that a petition quo warranto
was already filed against him. On
September 18, 1998, petitioner filed
before the COMELEC en banc a
motion to expunge respondent
Bernal's motion for reconsideration
and motion to declare petitioner's
proclamation void ab initio, on the
ground that respondent Bernal
should be deemed to have
abandoned said motions by the
filing of Spl. Civil Action No. 98-
141 which, according to petitioner,
is a formal election protest via quo
warranto brought before the regular
courts.
Miranda v Abaya
Jose Pempe Miranda was the mayor
of Santiago City, Isabela when he
filed his COC for the same post.
Antonio Abaya filed for a petition
to deny due course, and it was
granted. The son, Joel Miranda,
filed for substitution and was
allowed to run, even winning the
election against Abaya. Abaya
argues that Joel Miranda should not
be considered a candidate because
the substitution was invalid.
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an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation
controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (e) the proclamation was null and void.[10]
An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita with the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City reveals that it is neither a quo warranto petition under the
Omnibus Election Code nor an election protest. In Samad vs. COMELEC[11], we
explained that a petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in
issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat
the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. An
election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground
of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation
of the returns. It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal
votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.
Although said petition is also denominated as a quo warranto petition under Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court, it is different in nature from the quo warranto provided for in the
Omnibus Election Code where the only issue proper for determination is either disloyalty
or ineligibility of respondent therein. Neither can it be considered as an election protest
since what was put forth as an issue in said petition was petitioner's alleged unlawful
assumption of the office of Mayor by virtue of his alleged illegal proclamation as the
winning candidate in the election.
Notes:
In Jamil vs. Commission on Elections,[8] we held that a decision becomes binding only
after its promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member of the
collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated office, his vote
on the decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the votes of
Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn for the
reason that their retirement preceded the resolution's promulgation. The effect of the
withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and only
the votes of the remaining commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose
of deciding the controversy.
However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as
votes for or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the decision a
nullity. In the present case, with the cancellation of the votes of retired Commissioners
Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners at
the time of the resolution's promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of respondent.
Noteworthy, these remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum. In our view, the
defect cited by petitioner does not affect the substance or validity of respondent
Commission's disposition of the controversy. The nullification of the challenged
resolution, in our view, would merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily.
Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:
SEC. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. -- If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy
to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the
day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the
day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or,
in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited
political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified
for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the
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person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of
the Code.

While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted,
there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification
but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing
rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a
nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled
may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so
easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been
denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.

More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any
person, but only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may
be substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court
explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy"
(p.13).

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in

much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all
can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but
logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file
a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult
him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that a
certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who
filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed no
certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose
certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at all. No
amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.

It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the
very core of the electoral process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and
chaos. Verily, this explains why the law provides for grounds for the cancellation and
denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.

Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as
"disqualification for any cause" in this case) follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class (such as the words "dies" and "withdraws" in the instant
case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned (see: Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379
[1979]). A deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of
candidacy, otherwise his political party would not be allowed to field a substitute
candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of
candidacy, the withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of
candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead.
Most reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid certificate of
candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a
disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the
two previous instances.

Nemo dat quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate pass on to his substitute?
Clearly, there is none because no one can give what he does not have. All told, a
disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy
in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably
filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a
candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to
allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy
beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal
protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

Luna v COMELEC
Joy Luna is the substitute of Hans
Roger for the candidacy for vice-
mayor of Lagayan, Abra. Hans
Roger withdrew his COC paving
the way for the substitution, but
private respondents Tomas Layao et
al argue that Joy Luna committed
material misrepresentation.
Furthermore, Hans Roger was
allegedly underage when he filed
his COC.
Cerafica v COMELEC
Kimberly Cerafica field her COC
for Councilor of City of Taguig. She
was about to be 20 years old on the
day of the elections, but the law
requires that they be 23. She was
summoned for a clarificatory
hearing regarding her age
qualification. Instead of attending,
she was substituted by petitioner
Olivia Cerafica. The COC of
Kimberly was ordered to be
cancelled, but Olivia argues that she
has already substituted Kimberly.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty
to receive and acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code
(Election Code) provides:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.- The Commission,
provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission
or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial
duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004,[6] the
COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Roger's
certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course
to Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy.[7]
On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election
Code allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior
to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. [8] There is no provision of
law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the
election.[9]
The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to
have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by
Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. [11] In Sanchez v. Del
Rosario,[12] the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate
for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his
certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition
to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
Election Code. It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to
or cancel Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy. For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans
Roger's certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at
all and there can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled and denied due course.[15] However, Hans Roger's certificate of candidacy was
never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC.
Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates[18] and its power to deny due
course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec
has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. [19]
In Cipriano v. Comelec,[20] we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or not to
give due couse to COCs. We emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to give due course
to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the Comelec may
look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their
face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual
and proper cognizance of the Comelec.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but only
“an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party” may be substituted.[21]
In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party;[22] thus, she can
be validly substituted.
Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora-Ladra in cancelling
Kimberly’s COC and denying the latter’s substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition
to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the Comelec once more
gravely abused its discretion. The Court reminds the Comelec that, in the exercise of it
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution[27] mandates it to hear and decide
cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc.
Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character,
but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer

Loreto-Go v COMELEC
Petitioner Catalino Loreta-Go is the
incumbent representative of the
Fifth District, province of Leyte,
whose term of office will expire at
noon on 30 June 2001. On 27
February 2001, petitioner filed with
the municipal election officer of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a
certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Baybay, Leyte. On 28 February
2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed
with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at
Tacloban City, another certificate of
candidacy for governor of the
province of Leyte. Simultaneously
therewith, she attempted to file with
the provincial election supervisor
an affidavit of withdrawal of her
candidacy for mayor of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The
withdrawal was not accepted
because it was supposed to be filed
in the municipal supervisor. The
withdrawal was received by the
municipal supervisor at 12:28am of
March 1. Respondent Felipe
Montejo filed a petition to deny due
course, arguing that petitioner filed
COCs for two different positions.
Divinagracia v COMELEC
Salvador Divinagracia, Jr.
(petitioner) and Alex Centena
(private respondent) vied for the
vice-mayoralty race in Calinog,
Iloilo during the May 14, 2007
Elections wherein petitioner
garnered 8,141 votes or 13 votes
more than the 8,128 votes received
by respondent. Private Respondent
Centena filed an electoral protest
before the court, but the court
denied. Hence, an appeal was field
before the COMELEC, but
respondent did not pay the appeal
fees properly. Petitioner did not
contest such failure, and the
COMELEC declared Centena as the
duly elected vice mayor. Petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground that respondent
did not pay the appeal fees required
by COMELEC.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.[28] As cancellation proceedings
involve the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division
should have first decided this case.
We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner
disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of
Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of
Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the
requirement of the law
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code,
provides that:
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and
if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for
any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare
under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be
filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed.
Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the
regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of
the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal
election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on
20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of
the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed,[16] such requirement is merely
directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An
administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply
a deficiency in the law.[17] Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed
to effectively withdraw such candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed
certificates of candidacy.
After clarifying the matter, the Court in Loyola warned that the cases cited therein would
no longer provide any excuse for such shortcoming and would now bar any claim of good
faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of filing fees
in election cases which may be filed after the promulgation of the decision in said case.
Shortly thereafter, in the similar case of Miranda v. Castillo[13] which involved two
election protests filed on May 24, 1995, the Court did not yet heed the Loyola warning
and instead held that an incomplete payment of filing fee is correctible by the payment
of the deficiency. The Court, nonetheless, reiterated the caveat in Loyola that it would no
longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election
cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997.
The Court was more emphatic in Zamoras in reiterating the Loyola doctrine. In that case,
the petitioner failed to fully pay the appeal fees under Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130
(September 18, 2002) which amended Section 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure by increasing the fees to P3,200. There the Court ruled:
“A case is not deemed duly registered and docketed until full payment of the filing fee.
Otherwise stated, the date of the payment of the filing fee is deemed the actual date of
the filing of the notice of appeal.
The payment of the filing fee is a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance is a
valid basis for the dismissal of the case. The subsequent full payment of the filing fee
after the lapse of the reglementary period does not cure the jurisdictional defect. x x x [17]
(Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)”
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

On May 15, 2007, the Court, by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, introduced the "Rules of
Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts involving Elective Municipal and
Barangay Officials," which superseded Rules 35 and 36 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure governing elections protests and quo warranto cases before the trial courts.[18]
Not only was the amount of the filing fee increased from P300 to P3,000 for each
interest;[19] the amount of filing fee was determined by the Court, not by the Comelec,
which was, to recall, the cause of confusion in Loyola, Miranda and Soller.

Another major change introduced by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC is the imposition of an appeal
fee under Section 9 of Rule 14 thereof, separate and distinct from, but payable within the
same period as, the appeal fee imposed by the Comelec under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, as amended by Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130.
Contrary to respondent's contention, the Comelec-prescribed appeal fee was not
superseded by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC

That if the appellant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or lower courts within the five-
day period, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 07-4-15) and his Appeal was given due course by the Court,
said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the Commission's
Cash Division through the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by
postal money order payable to the Commission on Elections through ECAD, within a
period of fifteen days (15) from the time of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the
lower court. If no payment is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be
dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

In the recent case of Aguilar v. Comelec,[21] the Court harmonized the rules with the
following ratiocination:

The foregoing resolution is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court's
decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected
upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the
court that rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period. The non-
payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the
COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not
result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule 22, Section 9(a)
of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section
18 of the same rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. In such a
situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.

On the Comelec's application of the doctrine of estoppel by laches, records show that
petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for his and private respondent's non-
payment of the appeal fee only after the Comelec appreciated the contested ballots and
ruled in favor of respondent, an issue which could have been raised with reasonable
diligence at the earliest opportunity. The Court finds the Comelec resolution well-taken.

That petitioner's filing of the appellee's brief was an invocation of the Comelec's
jurisdiction and an indication of his active participation cannot be refuted on the mere
asseveration that he was only complying with the Comelec's directive to file the same.
The submission of briefs was ordered precisely because the Comelec could not anticipate
the claims and defenses that would be raised by the parties. Moreover, in his Verified
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner once again pleaded to the Comelec to exercise its
jurisdiction by dismissing private respondent's appeal on the merits

In the case at bar, petitioner actively participated in the proceedings and voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. It was only after the trial court issued its
decision adverse to petitioner that he raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal with the COMELEC's First Division.

Santos v COMELEC
Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and
respondent Pedro Q. Panulaya were
both candidates for Mayor of the
Municipality of Balingoan,
Misamis Oriental in the May 14,
2001 elections. On May 16, 2001,
after the votes were counted and
canvassed, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed respondent
Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor.
Petitioner filed a protest before the
RTC and was declared the winner.
Petitioner filed a motion for
execution pending appeal of
respondent, but the COMELEC
issued an injunction. Thereafter,
COMELEC dismissed the case and
allowed the court to execute the
decision pending appeal. However,
respondent was successful in asking
for a STATUS QUO ANTE
ORDER.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
To allow petitioner to espouse his stale defense at such late stage of the proceedings
would run afoul of the basic tenets of fairness. It is of no moment that petitioner raised
the matter in a motion for reconsideration in the same appellate proceedings in the
Comelec, and not before a higher court. It bears noting that unlike appellate proceedings
before the Comelec, a motion for reconsideration of a trial court's decision in an election
protest is a prohibited pleading,[27] which explains why stale claims of non-payment of
filing fees have always been raised belatedly before the appellate tribunal. In appellate
proceedings before the Comelec, the stage to belatedly raise a stale claim of non-payment
of appeal fees to subvert an adverse decision is a motion for reconsideration. The
Commission thus did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not countenance the
glaring inequity presented by such situation.
More. Petitioner, guilty as he is of the same act that he assails, stands on equal footing
with private respondent, for he himself admittedly did not pay the appeal fee, yet the
Comelec similarly adjudicated his appeal on the merits, the resolution of which he
glaringly does not assail in the present petition. He who comes to court must come with
clean hands.
Note:
Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on July 15, 2008 of Comelec
Resolution No. 8486, and to further affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec which
it precisely articulated through the specific guidelines contained in said Resolution, the
Court now declares, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, that for notices of appeal
filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or
incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable.
In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse decision when his petition in SPR No.
20-2002 was dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration and a supplemental petition, praying for the nullification of the trial
court’s order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. Two days after filing the
supplemental petition, and while the same was very much pending before the
COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-
2002, wherein he pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the supplemental petition. This
is plainly evident from the respective prayers in the supplemental petition and the petition
for certiorari as reproduced hereinabove. In doing so, respondent, before allowing the
COMELEC to fully resolve the incidents in SPR No. 20-2002, both of which were at his
own instance, sought to increase his chances of securing a favorable decision in another
petition. He filed the second petition on the supposition that the COMELEC might look
with favor upon his reliefs.
The petition for certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the trial court’s orders for the
execution of its decision pending appeal. The grant of execution pending appeal was well
within the discretionary powers of the trial court. In order to obtain the annulment of said
orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court gravely abused
its discretion. He should show not merely a reversible error committed by the trial court,
but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. “Grave abuse
of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough.
However, the COMELEC set aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term
alone is not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending appeal. We disagree.
While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a
bond are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC
that:
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it
should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.” The following

Navarosa v COMELEC
Petitioner Charito Navarosa
("petitioner Navarosa") and
respondent Roger M. Esto
("respondent Esto") were
candidates for mayor of Libacao,
Aklan in the 14 May 2001 elections.
On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC
Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Libacao proclaimed petitioner
Navarosa as the duly elected mayor,
with a winning margin of three (3)
votes over respondent Esto. The
trial court, upon protest of
respondent, declared that private
respondent won (42 votes), so it
filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Navarosa filed a
petition to stay the execution
pending appeal through a application to Section 2. Only a more compelling contrary policy consideration can
superseadas bond, and the court
agreed by asking him to pay P600,
000. The COMELEC reversed the
decision of the court allowing the
superseadeas bond, hence this
petition.
SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S
constitute “good reasons” and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant
execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the
shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length
of time that the election contest has been pending.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the
words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC,[26] bring back the ghost of the “grab-the-proclamation-
prolong the protest” techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in
their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence,
lay to waste the will of the electorate
To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party; (2) there must be "good reasons" for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the
order granting execution pending appeal must state the "good reasons."[23] Petitioner
Navarosa concedes respondent Esto's compliance with the first and third requisites. What
she contests is the trial court's finding that there are "good reasons" to order discretionary
execution of its decision.
The trial court in the present case, relying on cases[25] reviewed in Ramas, invoked two
"good reasons" to justify its order allowing execution pending appeal. First, the order will
"give substance and meaning to the people's mandate." Second, "more than 10 months
or nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term" of the office in question had already lapsed. The
COMELEC found these "good reasons" sufficient. Being consistent with Ramas, we
find no grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the trial court or of the COMELEC.
Section 3 of Rule 39 Not Applicable
To Election Protest Cases
Thus, a primordial public interest — to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected
candidate as determined by the trial court — lies behind the present rule giving suppletory
prevent the suppletory application of Section 2. In insisting that the simple expedient of
posting a supersedeas bond can stay execution pending appeal, petitioner Navarosa
neither claims nor offers a more compelling contrary policy consideration. Instead, she
merely contends that Section 3 of Rule 39 ("Section 3") applies also in a suppletory
character because its "Siamese twin"[30] provision, Section 2, is already being so
applied. Such simplistic reasoning both ignores and negates the public interest
underlying Section 2's application. We cannot countenance such argument.
Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the
prevailing party in election protest cases. Section 3 provides:
Stay of discretionary execution. — Discretionary execution issued under the preceding
section may be stayed upon approval by the proper court of a sufficient bond, filed by
the party against whom it is directed, conditioned upon the performance of the judgment
or order allowed to be executed in case it shall be finally sustained in whole or in part.
The bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety.
(Emphasis supplied)
A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in
case of its affirmation.[31] Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the
interest of the prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of
protection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimate sentence of
Section 3 states: "[T]he bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice
to the surety." Consequently, it finds no application in election protest cases where
judgments invariably include orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such
as the right to hold office and perform its functions.
Note:
At no time did petitioner Navarosa ever raise the issue of respondent Esto's incomplete
payment of the COMELEC filing fee during the full-blown trial of the election protest.
 SBC Admin Law Case Doctrines | Compiled by John Psalmuel V. Chan | 2-S

Petitioner Navarosa actively participated in the proceedings below by filing her Answer,
presenting her evidence, and later, seeking a stay of execution by filing a supersedeas
bond. Not only this, she even invoked the trial court's jurisdiction by filing a counter-
protest against respondent Esto in which she must have prayed for affirmative reliefs.
Petitioner Navarosa raised the issue of incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee
only in her memorandum to respondent Esto's petition before the COMELEC Second
Division. Petitioner Navarosa's conduct estops her from claiming, at such late stage, that
the trial court did not after all acquire jurisdiction over the election protest. Although a
party cannot waive jurisdictional issues and may raise them at any stage of the
proceedings, estoppel may bar a party from raising such issues.

-End of Election Law-