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ABSTRACT This article sets out to resolve the contentious issue of the Alleanza
Nazionale's (AN's) relationship to Fascism by focusing on the party's first
official programme, the Theses published when it formally replaced the overtly
fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano in January 1995. Considered in the light of
a particular model both of generic fascism and ideological morphology, these
theses document the considerable extent to which the AN's vision of a new
political class and regenerated national community is rooted in historical
Fascism, even if care has been taken to express this vision in a 'modernized',
anti-Nazi and anti-totalitarian discourse. At the same time the party un-
equivocally commits itself to upholding the institutions and methods of liberalism
as the corner stone of Italy's 'Second Republic'. What results is a new
ideological hybrid, 'democratic fascism', one which could yet establish itself as
the ideology of the dominant faction in Italy's government coalition.
had withdrawn his support from Berlusconi, who by the end of the year had been
forced to resign as Prime Minister, but both these events only served to make
Fini seem an even more plausible candidate for future head of government.
The prospect of AN members exercising power in Italy and the EU caused a
considerable stir both at home and abroad. It had been set up by the Movimento
Sociale Italiano, which ever since its formation in December 1946 had made no
secret of the fact that its foundation myth lay in the ideals and achievements of
the Italian Social Republic (RSI), the territorially shrinking state set up in
Nazi-occupied Italy by 'intransigent' Fascists after the armistice was signed with
the Allies in September 1943. Though constituted officially as an electoral force
committed to the democratic 'rules of the game', the MSI had continued
throughout the First Republic to be closely associated with ideological circles
and terrorist groups pledged to the revolutionary overthrow of the liberal state.
Small wonder that the party was treated as a pariah by the other parties and
remained the 'excluded pole' 1 on the wings of Italian politics right up to the
1994 general elections, when, as the driving force behind the AN, it established
itself overnight not just as a legitimate actor in the reconstruction of the state,
but one playing a leading role.
The AN's electoral success would have provoked less concern had there been
clear evidence of a radical break with the MSFs once proudly declared Fascist
identity. However, even if on its formation it attracted some disaffected right-
wingers from the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) and the Liberal party, it neverthe-
less retained the organizational structure, membership, and programme of the
MSI intact. Moreover, 95% of AN candidates had previously stood as MSI
candidates, and as late as July 1991 its leader, Gianfranco Fini, still had no
qualms in declaring:
There is no need to embark on a relaunch of the Movimento Sociale Italiano based on
a new ideological definition. We have no need of this if it is true that all of us, whenever
we have to find a single bonding agent which unites us can say we are Fascists, the heirs
of Facism, post-Fascists, or the Fascists of the 21st century. We can all recognize
ourselves in that great reservoir of ideas, and it is clear what our matrix is, where we are
coming from.2
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horrors of Fascism and Nazism'. Meanwhile in Italy itself the President of the
Republic, Oscar Scalfaro, was sufficiently concerned to write an open letter to
the new Prime Minister, Berlusconi, reminding him of his duty to pursue policies
based on the principles of peace, respect for international treaties, and social
solidarity.
However, the categorization of the AN as a fascist party, and hence as a direct
threat to democracy, is far from unequivocal. Whenever challenged about his
Fascist credentials, Fini has been at pains to stress that he and his party are to
be seen as 'post-Fascist' in a sense at variance from the one implicit in the above
quotation. Fascism, he now claims in interviews, is a dead letter: it refers to a
historical period in Italy's history which, despite the anti-Fascist propaganda of
the First Republic, could claim major achievements in terms of national pride,
communal purpose, and social policy. It had been necessary to uphold its
principles only as long as Italian communism, which based its legitimacy
throughout the First Republic on the leading role it played in the Resistance,
continued to pose a threat to democracy. Since the ending of the Cold War
communism has showed itself to be a spent force, so that Fascism itself has been
superseded.
To demonstrate the AN's commitment to democracy, Fini went out of his way
after his electoral success to condemn totalitarianism during a vote of confidence
debate, and made a symbolic visit to the Fosse Ardeantine to pay homage to the
335 victims of the Nazis' reprisals for a Partisan killing of 32 of their troops on
the eve of Rome's liberation. Equally symbolic of a renunciation of any sort of
'nostalgic' Fascism, at the Congress of the MSI held in Fiuggi in January 1995
the party was officially dissolved and replaced by the AN, presented specifically
as 'a new political movement'. To underline this 'strappo al fascismo' (break
with Fascism), the 'political theses' adopted at the congress systematically refer
to the AN, not as a Fascist party with revolutionary goals rooted in the
experience of the Italian Social Republic, but as a party of the democratic Right
bent on purging many of the ills of Italy's doomed First Republic as to lay the
foundations of a healthy Second Republic, and act as the custodian of the
country's first 'true' democracy. Meanwhile, there is no shortage of MSI
hardliners who vociferously endorse Fini's claim that he has renounced Fascism,
though in their eyes this makes him a traitor to the cause to which they have
devoted their lives. Giorgio Pisano, for example, once special agent of the Black
Brigades in Salo and luminary of the current of revolutionary (and terrorist)
Fascism since 1945, told an interviewer that the Fini of the AN is a 'a trickster',
a 'con-man', and a 'Judas'. He then qualified this verdict by adding 'but the
more time passes the more I am convinced that it is wrong to call him that,
because he is not like me, he is not a Fascist. Fini is a liberal democrat'4 (the
equivalent of calling a Marxist a capitalist).
Clearly the ambiguities over the AN's relationship to Fascism and generic
fascism raises a taxonomic issue which is more than a simple matter of academic
nicety, but one which has an important bearing on how politicians of other
parties and the public at large should respond to its presence as a factor in
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more ephemeral peripheral ones. The core concepts can be treated as 'inelim-
inable' in that if they are missing then another (perhaps as yet unclassified)
ideological construct is involved. It is the adjacent and peripheral concepts which
flesh out the skeletal/abstract core ones to make them applicable to the concrete
historical, social, and political context in which the ideology operates. The nature
of the core of an ideology is by no 'means unproblematic. In his article Freeden
is at pains to stress that in the case of political concepts and ideologies, such a
core is not to be treated as some sort of discrete or logical matrix of political
theories. Ideologies have cores which are ineliminable only in the sense that 'an
empirically-ascertainable cultural consensus ascribes to them some minimal
element or elements'.6 We are dealing not with Platonic essences but with the
conventional usage of language, of prevailing discourse. Moreover, the core may
well be formed by a cluster of political concepts not all of which are necessarily
present for permutation of political thought to be recognizable as belonging to
a generic ideology. He cites the example of liberalism in which liberty, human
rationality, and individualism can be inferred from conventional political dis-
course as forming the nexus of ineliminable core concepts. Should any two of
these be missing or peripheral then the ideology in question will not be
liberalism, even if it shares some adjacent concepts with it (e.g. a commitment
to private property, which can be upheld by conservatism).
Once Freeden's model is accepted, ideologies can no longer be approached as
fully rationalizable, static, neatly delineated, and logically coherent entities. On
one level they have something in common with myths in the way they blend
rational propositions, emotional inclinations, cultural values, and Utopian goals.
They also share certain properties with organic phenomena in that they are
essentially protean in their capacity constantly to adapt to different cultural
environments and changing political circumstances, readily producing mutations
which deviate from earlier species. At the same time their morphological
formation is akin to modular construction processes, in as far as different genera
of ideologies can share some of the same constituents, though arranged in a
different relation to the core. Moreover, circumstances can cause them to weld
components from traditionally distinct genera of political thought within their
core, thus forming hybrids (e.g. conservative liberalism or social liberalism)
which a crude 'either-or' taxonomic grid will fail to identify as such.
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the power and moral virtues of the army; totalitarianism (used in a positive
sense); corporativist economics; and the pursuit of imperialist expansion. Since
the war there has been increasing recognition on the part of fascism's more
intellectually challenging ideologues and tacticians that it was necessary for it,
while retaining its 'local' ultra-nationalist dimension, to coordinate on a pan-
European or pan-Aryan scale to rescue 'the West' from terminal decline, and
single issues such as ecology, immigration, abortion, and genetic engineering
have been given a palingenetic or ultra-nationalist gloss. Nevertheless, in all its
permutations, facism is axiomatically committed to the ultimate goal of the
overthrow of liberal democracy, since its pluralism is held to foster the very
forces of dissolution which it seeks to combat and transcend.
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R. GRIFFIN
on America, the importance of education for creating a new political elite, and
the need to renegotiate the borders with Austria and Yugoslavia, all unmistak-
ably topoi of Fascist discourse.10 The unresolved tension between a systemic,
constitutional solution to the country's ills and extra-systemic, revolutionary one
was summed up in a speech made by Almirante's declaration on the eve of the
1970 elections, held in the midst of mounting social unrest. He declared that
MSI did 'not want Italy to relapse into the climate of armed confrontation or
civil war', while at the same time, as the 'national Right'11 it refused to stand
by while Italy succumbed 'to a violent minority' (i.e. the communists). The MSI
alone was 'in a position to offer a right-wing opposition which stimulates change
and modifies the condition of society.'12
This ambivalence of the MSI towards the rule of law and liberal democracy
has been graphically illustrated by a study of the propaganda it deployed in its
electoral and referendum campaigns. As Luciano Cheles has convincingly
shown, it repeatedly produced posters which have a non-fascist, 'legalitarian',
and democratic text, but a Fascist subtext created by direct allusions (at least for
the trained or initiated eye) to the slogans, layout, or iconography of posters
which appeared when Mussolini was in power.13 In this way the significance of
the catch-phrases 'nostalgia for the future' and 'neither deny nor restore' is laid
bare. The MSI leadership was forced, as Almirante himself once commented, to
sail the frail vessel of neo-Fascism on the unknown sea of democracy towards
its ultimate destination, the inauguration of a Fascist new order, which involved,
not the restoration of Mussolini's form of it longed for by the 'nostalgics', but
a recreation of it in a new guise appropriate to the post-war period. To this end,
he claimed, anything was permissible except passing beyond the neo-Fascism's
'Pillars of Hercules' (the Straits of Gibraltar) to renounce its fundamental
rejection of liberal democracy. Giorgio Pisano, co-founder of the MSI, makes no
bones about the fact that the party was always only 'a cover for Fascism', going
on to claim that Almirante, once minister in the Salo Republic's Ministry of
Popular Culture, co-founder of the MSI, and now its leader, was a 'true
revolutionary. He knew we had inherited the Fascist legacy and had the duty to
preserve it so as to build on it in the future. This was anything but nostalgia!'.14
In the event, Almirante's bid to enter the centre-right of Italy's political arena
by offering an alternative 'national right' to the DC came to nothing. By the
early 1980s extra-parliamentary violence had ebbed away, and both social peace
and economic stability returned. Despite, or maybe because of, its complacency
and inertia, the DC had weathered the storm of an all-pervasive legitimacy crisis.
To make matters worse for the MSI, the death of Almirante in 1988 led to a
major scission between the 'entryist' and reformist faction headed by Gianfranco
Fini (party secretary from 1988 to 1990, and after 1991), and the followers of
the hardliner and former terrorist Pino Rauti (party secretary 1990-1991), who
still spoke vaguely of the MSI as a 'community party'. In the meantime the
threat of militant communism was evaporating with the end of the Cold War,
a point underlined by the dissolution of the arch-enemy on which early
and post-war Fascism symbiotically depended, the Italian Communist Party.
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Moreover, a new anti-socialist protest party had emerged in the north, the Lega
Nord, stealing some of the MSI's fire by also attacking the corruption of the
party-ocracy and promising the regeneration of Italy, albeit on a regionalist and
Thatcherite basis anathema to right-thinking fascists. No wonder if in 1990 one
of Italy's foremost experts on the MSI, Roberto Chiarini, could write that the
MSI had 'returned to a political and electoral limbo' and that 'its prospects
of escaping from it seem slim'.15 However, a conjunctural crisis was about to
break which would not only release the MSI from limbo, but cause its core
ideology to undergo a significant mutation.
In February 1992 came the first of a series of public revelations of corruption
at the heart of the state apparatus and deals between the public and private sector
which demonstrated that not a single level of government and not a single major
party which had exercised power in Italy since 1945 could claim to have 'clean
hands'. The state itself came to be referred to as 'Tangentopoli' an nick-name
meaning literally 'Kick-back City' or 'Bribesville' in which the suffix 'opoli'
(which in Italian connotes the topography of Mickey Mouse comics), underlined
the gap between the idealized image of Milan in the 1980s and the corrupt
reality. As arraignments rained down on politicians small and great (including
several former prime ministers, among them the 'Socialist' Craxi and the
'Christian Democrat' Andreotti) a sense of public outrage soon gave way to a
generalized sense of that the whole political system urgently needed a drastic
overhaul. It was a situation which created an undreamt of opportunity for the
MSI to move its Trojan Horse, so long stranded in no-man's-land before the city
gates, into the Citadel of Power.
Down through the years a constant theme of the MSI's entryist tactic had been
an attack, not on democracy per se, but on the way the established parties so
flagrantly abused their power in an undemocratic spirit. Suddenly attacks on the
corruption of the Italian party system were the order of the day, as it became
clear that the self-interest of politicians and their hangers-on in the public and
private sectors had prevailed over the general good on a scale which surprised
and nauseated an Italian electorate already deeply cynical about every aspect of
the state which was meant to represent it. Not only did the anti-party rhetoric of
the MSI find a sounding-board in the mood of the general public, but the very
fact that it had never been allowed to put its fingers in ministerial pies now
worked to its advantage. It meant that for the whole of the post-war period it
could claim to have kept its hands clean (the campaign to reveal corruption was
called operation 'Clean Hands') by wilfully staying aloof from a governmental
and state system which systematically betrayed its mandate and responsibility
towards the 'Italian people' whose interests it alone had consistently champi-
oned. Furthermore the party which suffered most from the Tangentopoli revela-
tions was the DC, the very party which had held power throughout the post-war
era and which since 1969 had been the MSI's rival for the centre-right space.
Now it was the MSI, which true to its Fascist legacy, had always claimed to
attack materialism, incarnate healthy 'pro-life' values of the family and youth (it
had campaigned with the DC against divorce and abortion when referenda were
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R. GRIFFIN
held in the 1970s), and to defend the function of the state as the guarantor of
morality, that could claim to be the true bastion against decadence, hedonism,
communism, and paganism. The discrediting of the DC had thus left a vacuum
the MSI was ideally placed to fill.
Two other aspects of MSI's modernized neo-Fascism also came good in its
bid to appear a responsible alternative to the parties of the old system, and not
an unequivocally 'fascist' one. Firstly the MSI had been in the forefront of
giving post-war fascism a pro-European dimension, one which directly dissoci-
ated itself from the official spirit of the Common Market and Maastricht in its
attack on the 'American' values of consumerism and its stress on the need for
each ethnic group to fight for its unique sense of 'cultural identity'. Thus it had
no problem presenting itself, unlike the British National Front in the 1970s or the
German Republikaner in the 1980s, as a party with an idealistic pro-European
stance. Secondly, in marked contrast both to these parties and to Europe's largest
and best-entrenched far right party, Le Pen's Front National, the MSI had in the
late 1980s deliberately veered away from an overtly racist 'anti-immigrant'
platform by adopting the 'differentialism' preached ever since the late 1960s by
the French Nouvelle Droite. Ironically, its espousal of an approach to race which
attacked the multi-racial and -cultural purportedly in the name of the preser-
vation of 'difference' and hence of all 'ethnies' was the outcome of a very public
debate in the late 1980s between the party's new leader Fini, who had started to
woo Le Pen, and Pino Rauti, hardliner, former head of the terrorist Ordine
Nuovo, and rival for leadership of the party after Almirante's death (indeed he
replaced Fini as its secretary between 1990 and 1991). This sophisticated
position, which brands anti-racists as the true racists since their policies allegedly
show no respect for cultural difference, underlies the MSI's stance on the ever
more pressing issue of immigration from the Maghreb countries in the 1990s.
MSI policy was henceforth to defend the rights of those immigrants already in
Italy, while advocating a proactive role in giving aid to the countries whose
populations were so keen to become economic refugees in Europe so as to
preserve both their and the Italians' 'cultural identity' (a buzz word in New
Right fascism).16
However, though the MSI were better placed than ever before to appear a
credible, responsible, and modern political party, their ability to break into
legitimacy was severely compromised by the prospect of a wave of electoral
reform which would sweep away the proportional representation on which its
toe-hold on the governmental system had always depended. It was also in direct
competition for protest votes with the Lega Nord where its radical anti-
regionalism excluded it as a direct alliance partner. The deus ex machina in this
constitutional drama was the media magnate Silvio Berlusconi, who on founding
Forza Italia in January 1994 hastened to forge an alliance with the Lega Nord
and with what was now the Alleanza Nazionale to create a counterweight to the
alliance of 'Progressives' made up of six highly variagated leftist parties. It was
as part of the 'Pole of Liberties and Good Government' thus formed that the AN
more than doubled its vote and finally fulfilled the 'entryist' dream in March
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THE ALLEANZA NAZIONALE
1994. The anomalies of the winning alliance (which won 58% of the seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and 49% in the Senate) were clear for all to see. The
country was in the hands of two new parties, both committed to Thatcherite
values and very much products of the anti-Fascist post-war world (even if they
harboured deep divisions over the issue of regionalism), yoked to a much older
one which in its previous incarnation had always advocated some sort of
corporativist, socializing solution to the country's ills based on an unmistakable,
even if cleverly euphemized, Fascist blueprint for a regenerated nation. But was
the MSFs new incarnation still based on the original Fascist blueprint? To
answer this question it is necessary to examine the 'political theses' approved at
the Fiuggi Conference entitled Pensiamo VItalia. II domani c'e gia (Let us think
Italy. Tomorrow is already here.)
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R. GRIFFIN
all too plausibly presented as a corrupt system which was the travesty of any true
liberal democracy. Yet at a subtextual level self-evident to any fascist, the
party-ocracy was a code-name for liberal democracy per se: the taunts against
it reverberated with the anti-systemic rhetoric which had found such an echo in
the immediate aftermath of the First World War when Fascists portrayed not just
the Giolittian administration, but the whole of Western liberalism as a corrupt,
anti-democratic, played out ideology. It is significant in this respect that Fascism
started out as a revolutionary movement, only to be transformed into an
'anti-party' political party with the formation of the Partito Nazionale Fascista
in 1921. The PNF formed the basis for Mussolini's successful entryist policy—
albeit reinforced by the threatened coup d'etat of the March on Rome of October
1922-—which culminated in his appointment as head of a coalition government
till January 1925- with the blessing of the king and many rightist liberal
politicians.
The 'anti-party-ocratic' line of thought is taken up in the Fiuggi Theses in a
number of passages, Tangentopoli being treated as the manifestation of how the
state had not only become corrupt, functioning as a 'totalitarian tyranny'
imposed on the people (the paradoxical use of such terms to characterize a
parliamentary system is clearly part of a revisionist attempt to relativize the
'evils' commonly attributed to Fascism by liberals):
The principle of the Fascist regime, 'nothing outside the State', was never fully
overcome with the return of democracy and the establishment of the multi-party system.
Very soon another principle manifested itself: 'nothing without the intervention of the
parties'. This led to the formation of a 'creeping totalitarianism' which gave rise to the
party-ocracy and produced the degeneration of politics into a business using votes to buy
favours (Tangentopoli)(8).17
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R. GRIFFIN
But Rocco was not just a jurist, but the leading theorist of the Italian Nationalist
Association (which merged with the PNF in 1923) and architect of the legal
framework for the regime's Syndical Laws of 1926 which laid the foundation of
the Fascist corporativist and 'totalitarian' state.
Two other themes of AN nationalism as set forth in the Fiuggi Theses point
to its Fascist roots. One is implicit in the commitment to 'the strengthening of
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the new dimensions acquired by the links between mother-country and the
community of Italians who have assumed positions of prime importance to the
political, social, and economic life of the countries where they have established
themselves, especially in those of North America and Australia, and the more
ancient ones of Latin America'. This evokes Mussolini's creation of Fasci esteri
(Foreign Fasci) among emigre communities abroad specifically to coordinate
political and cultural activities and thereby integrate 'all Italians' into the dy-
namic national community which Fascism was so keen to create at home.19 The
other relates to the pledge to renegotiate the Osimo Treaty which established the
present frontiers with Slovenia and Croatia. The plan to reintegrate the ethnic
Italians of Istria, Fiume, and Dalmatia within redrawn borders not only perpetu-
ates a well-established MSI policy, but cannot help but awaken memories of
D'Annunzio's occupation of Fiume in 1919, widely regarded as a dress-rehearsal
for the Fascist conquest of power, not to mention Italy's occupation of Croatia
during the Second World War. The promise to professionalize Italy's armed
forces and turn them into a truly effective fighting force can also be seen as a
toned-down version of a well-established Fascist preoccupation intimately bound
up with the bid to achieve world-power status.
The Fiuggi Theses expatiate on two further issues with a distinctly Fascist
resonance for the historically literate: youth and the ethical state. MSI youth
groups, eventually merged into the Fronte della Gioventu (Youth Front), were
always considered by the leadership a vital forum for recruiting new members
and providing future cadres. It is no coincidence, then, if Fini himself was head
of the FdG for 10 years (with Almirante's blessing) before becoming party
secretary in 1987. Here we are told that 'Only the boys of the Fronte della
Gioventu have represented through their militancy, often operating in isolation
and paid for at a heavy price, and example of rootedness in values and of
dignified commitment to challenge the dominant conformism' (18). Deprived of
such a movement Italian youth is vulnerable: it was the existential poverty of
youth in the 1980s which drove them into football hooliganism and into the
'pseudo-political violence' of left- and right-wing terrorism. The Theses
specifically associate this diagnosis with a condemnation of the 'nazi-skin' or
skinhead Nazism, again a recurrent MSI theme which has always distanced itself
officially from neo-Nazism and biological racism.
As for the typically fascist concept of the state as an ethical entity underpin-
ning the meaning of individual existence, the neo-Hegelian version of this
principle pioneered by Giovanni Gentile under Mussolini has in the Theses been
given a Christian gloss, a move made all the easier by Italy's debt to Fascism
as the basis of the 1929 Concordat between the Church and the nation. Now that
the DC has collapsed, the AN is keen to purloin its mantle as the 'defender of
the faith' and the upholder of the 'values of life'. Thus the Fiuggi Theses assure
the reader that 'We feel heirs and are the cultivators of Roman civilization and
of the Christian civilization which has its roots in the message taken by Peter to
Rome and spread throughout the world' (there are distinct echoes here of the
Fascist cult of 'Romanita'). They go on to attack secularization, to embrace the
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R. GRIFFIN
Encyclical Centesimus Annus with its diatribe against relativism and agnosticism
as the basis of democracy, and to approve of the Church's doctrine on society,
the principal points of which are solidarity (maximum collaboration of social
groups) and subsidiarity (the maximizing of autonomy at every level of the
social and political hierarchy).
However, by openly confessing a rejection of the secularism and relativism
(and, by implication, of individualism and pluralism) which are among the
defining features of all modern democracies, the AN shows that in a typically
Fascist spirit it still cultivates a nostalgia for an organic national community of
shared values centred in the family and underpinned by a stable social hierarchy.
The evidence that the commitment to values is hardly conceived in a liberal
spirit is clear when the Theses state that 'the AN wants to be considered part of
a great, libertarian, pacific 'conservative revolution' (10), a code-word in New
Right circles for non-Nazi fascists such as Moeller van den Bruck who wanted
to stem what he saw as the West's collapse into relativism and materialism.20
The subtext of all the themes we have surveyed so far is the AN's vision of
itself as the political force called upon to put an end to 'the degeneration of a
system which declined into corruption' (12). In the palingenetic mindset, the
reverse of an obsession with degeneration is the vision of imminent renewal.
Hence there is talk of 'a new Risorgimento' (55), and 'the renewal of the
political class' (56). For the AN it was 'not a coalition of parties which won but
the new Italy, it was not a political programme which prevailed but a new social
bloc, an unprecedented alliance between social groups, values, interests which
previously had been divided, and even in conflict' (6). Throughout the dark years
of the First Republic 'there was another Italy which, in spite of everything, was
taking form but which lacked an adequate representation'. This representation it
has now found in the AN, the protagonist of the 'radical renewal' (6) which will
'give life to a new phase of Italian politics on the threshold of the 21st century'
(8) and lay the basis of the 'new Republic'. 'For the Right, if the First Republic
is no more, the New Republic does not yet exist: hence, in this transitional time
between the old and the new that the discussion is taking shape about the quality
of the democratic system of tomorrow and that the end game is played out' (12).
Such language has unmistakable echoes of a recurrent theme of Fascist rhetoric
in the early 1920s, that it represented the forces of a 'new Italy' come to replace
the corrupt, debilitated 'old Italy' embodied in Giolitti's gerontocracy and
putting the interests of the whole nation above class interest.
The impression that the ineliminable core of generic fascism still lurks within
the AN mindset is reinforced by the section which disclose its ideological
mentors. We have already seen that the Theses contain allusions to the Con-
servative Revolution and the New Right, both of which have fed some currents
of neo-fascism. The section on 'Values and Principles' shows that such allusions
are far from fortuitous. In the same breath as claiming as one of its intellectual
precursors de Toqueville, emblem of liberal democratic theory, it associates the
AN with the individualism of Ernst Jiinger, doyen of non-Nazi German fascism
and of the Conservative Revolution, the decisionism of 'Schmidt' (i.e. Carl
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Schmitt, the apologist of Hitler's 'legal' and racial legislation and major juridic
philosopher of the Conservative Revolution); the political sociology of Pareto,
Mosca, and Michels (all important for the Fascist theory of society and political
elites). It also invokes D'Annunzio, Giovanni Gentile, Ugo Spirito, Giuseppe
Prezzolini, and Giovanni Papini, key rationalizers of Fascism's ultra-nationalism,
its ethical state, or its corporativist order; Marinetti and Soffici, two important
contributors to Fascist aesthetic politics; Gramsci, the Marxist theorist whose
concept of the primacy of cultural hegemony over political hegemony has
become so vital to neo-fascism, especially the New Right;21 and last but not least
Julius Evola, bitter critic of liberalism in all its manifestations and by far the
most prolific and influential of all neo-Fascist ideologues, leaving an imprint on
the most intellectual currents of neo-fascism as well as the most terroristic
ones.22 Almost as disconcerting to a liberal mind is the assertion that 'You do
not need to have read de Maistre to conclude that freedom and authority are the
basis of western democracy' (9), since de Maistre was the arch-conservative
theorist and implacable enemy of the French Revolution and all it stood for: he
looked not to constitutions but to the executioner as the guarantor of social
stability and harmony.
The invocation of ultra-nationalist and arch-conservative thinkers, when taken
together with the general critique of materialism, secularization, and pluralism,
and the dream of a revitalized national community based on the forces of family,
work, youth, hierarchy, and leadership, make it clear that not just the inelim-
inable core of generic fascism, but also many of its adjacent concepts inform the
Fiuggi Theses. The very title of the document, 'Let us think Italy, Tomorrow is
already here' could be taken as a modernization of the well-known MSI slogan
'Nostalgia for the future'. It implies that a 'new Italy' is being born drawing on
the vital forces of the national community and history, and that the AN, a party
fully conscious of its Fascist legacy, is destined to act as its midwife.
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Accordingly the AN has come not to bury liberal democracy but to praise it. Its
aim is 'to contribute right from the outset to determining the form and rules of
the Second Republic'. By promoting constitutional and institutional changes it is
pledged to establishing for the first time 'the sovereignty of the people and
giving back the sceptre of power to citizens'. This will be achieved through such
processes as creating effective coalitions, promoting the decentralization of
power and increasing local autonomy, achieving efficient public administration
based on the competence of officials, and ensuring the transparency of policy-
making processes.
For the Right, if the First Republic is no more, the New Republic does not yet exist:
hence it is in this transitional time between the old and the new that the discussion is
taking shape about the quality of the democratic system of tomorrow and that the end
game is played out. (12)
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Democratic fascism
The AN's disavowal of any sort of revolutionary or authoritarian project to
create a post-liberal new order, and its commitment to renewing the democratic
system rather than overthrowing it, pose a taxonomic dilemma to fascism-
watchers. It is, of course both arguable and tempting to dismiss of the Fiuggi
Theses as neo-Fascism's umpteenth exercise in camouflage, in masquerading as
a liberal democratic party, and the clear evidence certain passages within them
provide for the fact that AN's ideological tap-root is still thrust deep into
historical Fascism lend strength to such a verdict.23 However, it is also possible
to maintain that the AN does indeed, as the Theses claim, represent a radical
break with the MSI position. As we have seen, some hardliners such as Pisano
are convinced that Fini is at heart a liberal democrat. Meanwhile Almirante's
widow, Donna Assunta, suggests an alternative explanation, namely that Fini's
espousal of democracy is a sham. Pointing out that her husband would never
have called himself 'postfascista', she adds 'and anyway, what does it mean? Is
it just a way of coining a new word or does it have a meaning? Is it a way of
saying that once you were a Fascist, but no longer? It is ridiculous. At the right
moment, just before dying, someone can say, "I am converting to Christianity,
I am going close to God, and even if I was a criminal before I am now a
respectable person". But is this a conversion?'24
I would like to suggest that both Pisano and Donna Assunta are wrong. Fini
is not a 'true' liberal democrat, since he and his entourage have demonstrably
retained their commitment to many core Fascist values, but, paradoxically, his
conversion to the democratic system is genuine. The AN's political discourse is
thus indeed 'a language which is simultaneously old and new' as the Theses
claim (4). This approach endorses the observation of one commentator that 'after
the body, the spirit itself of neo-Fascism is trying to adapt itself to the
double-breasted suit'.25 Its ideology systematically fuses into a new compound
components taken from two ideologies with theoretically incompatible inelim-
inable cores: the palingenetic ultra-nationalism of generic fascism and the
commitment to the rules of the game of liberal democracy. The possibility of
such a fusion, no matter how logically incoherent, not to say absurd, is entirely
consistent with Freeden's dynamic model of ideological morphology discussed
earlier. The constitutionalism of the MSI originated as a pragmatic concession to
a post-war climate which precluded the emergence in Italy of a mass-movement
bent on realizing an ultra-right agenda of revolutionary nationalism, and hence
remained an adjacent concept. At the Fiuggi Congress it was formally absorbed
into the party's core ideology to become an integral part of the cluster of
ineliminable components with which the AN now characterizes its charter myth.
What results is a form of politics which is not crypto-fascist, pretending to
play party politics in order eventually to destroy the system, but a genuine
hybrid: a reformist or democratic fascism. The hybridization of originally anti-
democratic ideologies to produce democratic variants is, of course, nothing new.
Since the 16th century it has happened to monarchism (constitutional monarchy),
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delivered precisely the type of 'alternation' between right and left which had
been impossible under the DC-dominated First Republic. Nevertheless, the AN
obtained 15.7% of the vote, a scale of penetration and legitimation which the
MSI could only have dreamed of, while Fini continues to enjoy the reputation
of being Italy's most intelligent and believable statesman. He is also one of the
youngest. Though the new coalition government intends to remain in power for
the full term of five years (which would ensure its place in the Guiness Book of
Records as the most durable liberal administration in post-war Italian history), it
is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Italian public (and voyeuristic
political scientists) will sooner or later have the opportunity to observe how
'democratic fascism' translates into concrete policies, legislation, and practice.
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25. De Cesare, op. cit., Ref. 2, p. 5. In Italian it is common to distinguish between the Fascism of the
manganello (the cudgel, symbol of Blackshirt violence) and of the doppio petto (double-breasted suit,
symbol of bourgeois respectability).
26. Ignazi, op. cit., Ref. 8, pp. 118-119.
27. The Chamber of Deputies in the Italian Parliament.
28. Predictably, the AN bookshop in Rome, Libreria Europa, even now continues to sell hard-core material
celebrating inter-war and post-war Fascism and fascism (e.g. Nazism, the Romanian Iron Guard, Evola,
the New Right) alongside publications promoting the new incarnation of the MSI as the 'Right of
Government' for which Fascism is to be regarded as no more than a 'parenthesis' in Italian history (though
clearly not in the sense meant by Benedetto Croce, author of the 'Anti-Fascist Manifesto' of May 1925
who first used this expression in this context).
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