Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
90027
G.R. No. 90027 March 3, 1993
After the execution of the contract, two (2) renter's keys were given to
the renters — one to Aguirre (for the petitioner) and the other to the
Pugaos. A guard key remained in the possession of the respondent
Bank. The safety deposit box has two (2) keyholes, one for the guard
key and the other for the renter's key, and can be opened only with the
use of both keys. Petitioner claims that the certificates of title were
placed inside the said box.
In due course, the trial court, now designated as Branch 161 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, rendered a
decision5 adverse to the petitioner on 8 December 1986, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
The above provision shall not apply to contracts for the rent
of safety deposit boxes.
After the respondent Bank filed its comment, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to simultaneously
submit their respective Memoranda.
We agree with the petitioner's contention that the contract for the rent
of the safety deposit box is not an ordinary contract of lease as
defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. However, We do not fully
subscribe to its view that the same is a contract of deposit that is to
be strictly governed by the provisions in the Civil Code on deposit; 19
the contract in the case at bar is a special kind of deposit. It cannot be
characterized as an ordinary contract of lease under Article 1643
because the full and absolute possession and control of the safety
deposit box was not given to the joint renters — the petitioner and the
Pugaos. The guard key of the box remained with the respondent Bank;
without this key, neither of the renters could open the box. On the
other hand, the respondent Bank could not likewise open the box
without the renter's key. In this case, the said key had a duplicate
which was made so that both renters could have access to the box.
There is, however, some support for the view that the
relationship in question might be more properly
characterized as that of landlord and tenant, or lessor and
lessee. It has also been suggested that it should be
characterized as that of licensor and licensee. The relation
between a bank, safe-deposit company, or storage company,
and the renter of a safe-deposit box therein, is often
described as contractual, express or implied, oral or written,
in whole or in part. But there is apparently no jurisdiction in
which any rule other than that applicable to bailments
governs questions of the liability and rights of the parties in
respect of loss of the contents of safe-deposit boxes. 22
(citations omitted)
Note that the primary function is still found within the parameters of a
contract of deposit, i.e., the receiving in custody of funds, documents
and other valuable objects for safekeeping. The renting out of the
safety deposit boxes is not independent from, but related to or in
conjunction with, this principal function. A contract of deposit may be
entered into orally or in writing 25 and, pursuant to Article 1306 of the
Civil Code, the parties thereto may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. The depositary's responsibility for the safekeeping of the
objects deposited in the case at bar is governed by Title I, Book IV of
the Civil Code. Accordingly, the depositary would be liable if, in
performing its obligation, it is found guilty of fraud, negligence, delay
or contravention of the tenor of the agreement. 26 In the absence of
any stipulation prescribing the degree of diligence required, that of a
good father of a family is to be observed. 27 Hence, any stipulation
exempting the depositary from any liability arising from the loss of the
thing deposited on account of fraud, negligence or delay would be
void for being contrary to law and public policy. In the instant case,
petitioner maintains that conditions 13 and 14 of the questioned
contract of lease of the safety deposit box, which read:
are void as they are contrary to law and public policy. We find
Ourselves in agreement with this proposition for indeed, said
provisions are inconsistent with the respondent Bank's
responsibility as a depositary under Section 72(a) of the General
Banking Act. Both exempt the latter from any liability except as
contemplated in condition 8 thereof which limits its duty to
exercise reasonable diligence only with respect to who shall be
admitted to any rented safe, to wit:
Since, however, the petitioner cannot be blamed for the filing of the
complaint and no bad faith on its part had been established, the trial
court erred in condemning the petitioner to pay the respondent Bank
attorney's fees. To this extent, the Decision (dispositive portion) of
public respondent Court of Appeals must be modified.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 102.
6 Id., 54.
8 Rollo, 100-101.
13 Id.
29 Supra.