Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |1
THIRD DIVISION petitioner's unjustifiable abandonment bringing with her their children without the
G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016
PHILIP YU, Petitioner, v. VIVECA LIM YU, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated September 30, 2011 and
Resolution2 dated January 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111414
which granted the petition for the annulment of the Decision3 dated August 20, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 10, Balayan, Batangas.
The factual antecedents are as follows.
Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married on November 18, 1984.
They had four children and maintained their conjugal home at Room 1603 Horizon
Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila. In 1993, however, Viveca left the
conjugal home with their four children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against
Philip before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 261, for repeated physical violence, grossly
abusive conduct against her and the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life.
She prayed for permanent custody over the children, support, and the dissolution and
distribution of their conjugal partnership valued at approximately
P5,000,000.00.4chanrobleslaw
Philip denied the accusations against him claiming that it was Viveca who actually attacked
him a few times. He narrated that his marriage to Viveca was arranged according to the
Chinese tradition and that it was much later when he discovered Viveca's excessively
jealous, cynical, and insecure behaviour. He countered that since she abandoned the
family home, taking their four children away, she was not entitled to support. She was,
likewise, unqualified to become the administrator of their conjugal funds, which had
outstanding obligations. Thus, Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage due to Viveca's psychological incapacity, rendering her incapable
of complying with her marital obligations.5chanrobleslaw
On April 24, 2007, however, Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage revealing that he no longer had the desire to have his marriage
declared void. Despite Viveca's fervent opposition, the Pasig RTC granted the
motion.6chanrobleslaw
On July 1, 2009, the RTC of Pasig City rendered a Decision7 dismissing the Petition for
Legal Separation in the following wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
From the facts obtaining in this case, the Court finds that the parties are in pari
delicto warranting a denial of this petition. Respondent's illicit relationship with Linda
Daet and his repeated verbal and physical abuses towards petitioner come within the
purview of pars. 8 and 1 of Art. 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines whereas
knowledge and consent of respondent and her assaulting respondent with a 10-inch knife
are those contemplated in pars. 10 and 9 of the same code.
Notwithstanding the foregoing Court's findings, the same becomes moot with the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties, on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of petitioner, Viveca Yu, pursuant to the Decision of
Branch 10, RTC of Balayan, Batangas, which attained its finality on October 13,
2008. Since the marriage of the parties was declared a nullity there is, therefore, no legal
basis to issue a decree of legal separation to the spouses whose marriage has already
been declared of no force and effect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED, for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of Balayan,
Batangas, nullifying her marriage with Philip on the ground of her psychological incapacity,
Viveca filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment9 before the CA seeking to annul the
Decision dated August 20, 2008 of said court. According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her
person did not properly vest since she was not duly served with Summons. She alleged
that she was deprived of her right to due process when Philip fraudulently declared that
her address upon which she may be duly summoned was still at their conjugal home,
when he clearly knew that she had long left said address for the United States of America.
Viveca likewise maintained that had Philip complied with the legal requirements for an
effective service of summons by publication, she would have been able to rightly
participate in the proceedings before the Batangas court.
On September 30, 2011, the CA granted Viveca's petition ruling as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage affecting the personal status of private
respondent is in the nature of an action in rem. This is so because the term "personal
status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.
With this premise in mind, it is beyond cavil that the court a quo was justified in resorting
to Summons by publication. Petitioner is a nonresident defendant who left the Philippines
with her children way back in 1997 and has now been living in the United States of
America. The court a quo validly acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide the case given
that as adumbrated, in a proceeding in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.
Still and all, there is more to this case than meets the eye. Private respondent
knew that petitioner left the conjugal home on account of their marital

difficulties. She temporarily resided at her parent's house in Greenhills, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila. But during the pendency of the Legal Separation case, she lived in
Quezon City. This much was revealed by private respondent himself in
the Amended Answer with Counterclaim filed in the Legal Separation suit-
"10. After abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August 1993, petitioner resided
at her parent's house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, until she moved to her present address in October
1993. x x x x
This knowledge notwithstanding, private respondent declared before the court a
quo that the "last known address" of petitioner was still her conjugal abode at
Unit 1603 Horizon Condominium, Mcralco Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. While
private respondent knew that it was well-nigh impossible for petitioner to
receive Summons and other court notices at their former conjugal home, still, he
supplied the aforesaid address.
We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that private respondent moved for the
dismissal of his counterclaim for nullity of marriage in the Legal Separation case
in 2007 as he had by then had the sinister motive of filing the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the court a quo. Private respondent
knew that if he breathed a word on the filing and pendency of the latter Petition,
petitioner would vigorously resist it as revealed by her tenacious opposition in
the proceedings before the RTC-Pasig.
The deceitful scheme employed by private respondent deprived petitioner of her
constitutional right to due process which ensued in her failure to participate in
the proceedings before the court a quo. To Our mind, this compelling justification
warrants the annulment of judgement.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Resolution dated January 5, 2012, the CA denied Philip's Motion for Reconsideration
finding no cogent and persuasive reason to revise or reverse its Decision. Hence, this
petition invoking the following grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY
DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DESPITE ITS ACCURATE FINDINGS THAT THE COURT A
QUO PROPERLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION IN REM THROUGH
SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION.
II.
THE PUBLICATION OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO, SUMMONS, THE COMPLAINT AS
WELL AS THE DECISION RENDERED THEREIN IS NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD
INCLUDING RESPONDENT. RESPONDENT WAS THEREFORE CONSTRUCTIVELY NOTIFIED
OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS HAVING BEEN DULY
NOTIFIED BY PUBLICATION.
III.
Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |2
RESPONDENT HAS BEEN DOMICILED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR MORE
THAN TEN (10) YEARS AND WHOSE ADDRESS IS UNKNOWN TO PETITIONER. AS FAR AS
PETITIONER IS CONCERNED, UNIT 1603 HORIZON CONDOMINIUM, MERALCO AVENUE,
PASIG CITY IS THE LAST KNOWN ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT, BEING THE CONJUGAL
HOME.
IV.
PETITIONER IS CURRENTLY NOT A RESIDENT OF THE CONJUGAL HOME.
V.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF BALAYAN, BATANGAS, APPEARED AS COUNSEL FOR THE STATE AND
FULLY PROTECTED THE INTEREST OF THE STATE INCLUDING THE INTEREST OF
RESPONDENT.
VI.
PETITIONER CANNOT BE FAULTED FOR MOVING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS
COUNTER-CLAIM FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, WHICH IS ALLOWED BY
SECTION 2, RULE 17 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT AS AMENDED, AND SAID
WITHDRAWAL WAS EVEN APPROVED BY THE RTC OF PASIG.
VII.
THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF DECISION FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS
WAS DEFECTIVE AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 47 OF THE NEW RULES OF
COURT, AS AMENDED, FOR HAVING FAILED TO STATE AND ALLEGE THE DEFENSES THAT
RESPONDENT HAS AGAINST PETITIONER.
VIII.
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE DEFENSES THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO
RESPONDENT ARE THOSE THAT WERE PRESENTED IN THE LEGAL SEPARATION CASE
THAT WAS DISMISSED BY THE RTC OF PASIG CITY, SAID GROUNDS ONLY BOLSTER THE
FACT THAT THE DECISION DATED AUGUST 20, 2008 OF THE RTC OF BALAYAN,
BATANGAS, CORRECTLY NULLIFIED THE MARRIAGE DUE TO RESPONDENT'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
IX.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT OBSERVE AND FOLLOW SECTIONS 6 AND 7 OF RULE 47
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED.
In essence, Philip questions the appellate court's judgment of setting aside the decision of
the Batangas RTC despite its own finding that said court validly acquired jurisdiction when
Summons was duly served on Viveca by publication. He maintains that since service of
summons was properly accomplished by publication thereof in a newspaper of general
circulation as well as its personal service on Viveca at her last known address, it logically
follows that any and all resolutions rendered by the trial court are valid and binding on the

parties. Thus, the decision of the Batangas court which acquired jurisdiction over
the res should be immutable as it is already final and executory.11chanrobleslaw
Philip also questions the appellate court's choice of supporting jurisprudence alleging them
to be inapplicable to the instant case. He asserts that the teachings in Spouses Belen v.
Judge Chavez,12Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank,13 and Ancheta v. Judge
Ancheta14 fail to be instructive simply because they involve substituted service of
summons whereas the mode of service in this case is by publication. Philip further asserts
that said jurisprudential doctrines even teach us that in proceedings in rem or quasi in
rem, such as the case at hand, jurisdiction over the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court for as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Thus, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the
court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements, which in
this case was duly complied with when Viveca, who is a non-resident, not found in the
Philippines, was served with summons by publication.15chanrobleslaw
Hence, Philip faults the CA in finding that due to his bad faith in maliciously supplying the
Batangas court with an erroneous address wherein Viveca may supposedly be summoned,
she was deprived of her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of
the subject judgment. According to him, as far as he was concerned, Viveca's last known
address was their conjugal home. This is because the addresses supplied in the
proceedings of the Legal Separation case before the RTC of Pasig City were merely
temporary in nature.16 Philip recalled that when Viveca left their conjugal abode on August
24, 1993, she temporarily stayed at her parents' house in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, for
less than two months then, thereafter, stayed at her temporary residence at Domingo
Street, Cubao, Quezon City, in October 1993. Considering that said addresses were merely
temporary, Philip claims that he should not be faulted for using their conjugal abode as
Viveca's "last known address." According to him, what is mandated by the rules as the
defendant's "last known address" is his or her last known permanent address, and
certainly not one of temporary nature.17chanrobleslaw
The petition is bereft of merit.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule 47 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.18 The objective of the
remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or
final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to
ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire
proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the
proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely
motion for new trial had been granted therein.19chanrobleslaw
Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |3
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.20 Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by means of fraud or deception, as by keeping him away from
court, or by a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at
his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in
the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set
aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.
Ultimately, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.21chanrobleslaw
In the present case, We find that Viveca was completely prevented from participating in
the Declaration of Nullity case because of the fraudulent scheme employed by Philip
insofar as the service of summons is concerned.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.22 As a rule, Philippine
courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court. Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, however,
enumerates the actions in rem or quasi in rem when Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over
the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.23 Said section
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiffor relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under
section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons
and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address
of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order
granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60)
days after notice, within which the defendant must answer. (17a)
Thus, under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in
the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates

to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines.24chanrobleslaw
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication
and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the
defendant's last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the
judge may consider sufficient.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
In the present case, it is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, an action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing
in the United States of America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons under Section
15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is the proper mode by which summons may be served on
Viveca, a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In compliance
therewith, Philip claims that Viveca was duly served summons because: (1) copies of the
summons, complaint, and order of the Batangas court were published in Tempo, a
newspaper of general circulation on March 27, 2008 and April 3, 2008;26 and (2) the
sheriff served copies of the summons, complaint, and order of the Batangas court on
Viveca at their conjugal home in Pasig City, her last known address.27 Thus, he contends
that the second mode of extraterritorial service of summons mentioned above - by
publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail
to the defendant's last known address - was sufficiently complied with. The Court finds,
however, that such service of summons on their conjugal home address cannot be
deemed compliant with the requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception
warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment.
Philip fervently asserts the propriety of their conjugal home address as Viveca's "last
known address," well within the true meaning and intent of the rules. But as borne by the
records of the instant case, not only is he mistaken, factual considerations herein belie his
claims of good faith. First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties herein are also
parties in a Legal Separation case, previously filed by Viveca way back in 1994. There was,
in said case, a disclosure of their basic personal information, which customarily includes
their respective local addresses, wherein they may be served with court papers. In fact, as
pointed out by the appellate court, Philip knew that Viveca had already left their conjugal
home and moved to a different local address for purposes of the pendency of the Legal
Separation case, as shown by his stipulation in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim
that "after abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August 1993, petitioner resided at her
parent's house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, until she moved to her present address in October 1993." Thus, Philip cannot be
allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had already intentionally abandoned
their conjugal abode and that of all the addresses that Viveca resided at, their conjugal
Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |4
home in Horizon Condominium is her least recent address. In fact, it may very well be
considered as the address she is least likely to be found considering the circumstances in
which she left the same. Note that from the very beginning of the Legal Separation case in
1994, all the way up until the promulgation by the Pasig RTC of its decision thereon in
2009, there is no showing that Viveca had ever received any document in relation to said
case, nor is there any proof that Philip had ever sent any pertinent file to Viveca, at the
conjugal address. There is, therefore, no reason for Philip to assume, in good faith, that
said address is in truth and in fact Viveca's "last known address" at which she may receive
summons. His contention that the rules require the defendant's "last known address" to be
of a permanent, and not of a temporary nature, has no basis in law or jurisprudence.
In addition, the Court is curious as to why Philip filed the instant Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage28 before the RTC of Batangas City on February 15, 2008 when less than
a year before filing the same, he had motioned the RTC of Pasig City on April 24, 2007 to
withdraw his counterclaim for the same declaration of nullity of marriage.29 In his petition
before the Court, Philip explained that he withdrew his counterclaim in the Legal
Separation case in his "desire to explore the possibility of having a so-called 'universal
settlement' of all the pending cases with respondent and her relatives for the sake of his
love for his four (4) children."30 Yet, in an apparent, direct contravention of this so-called
"desire," he filed an identical action which sought the same nullity of his marriage with
Viveca. Thus, while there may be no outright admission on Philip's part as to a sinister
motive, his inconsistent actions effectively negate his claims of good faith.
It is interesting to note, moreover, that as pointed out by Viveca, Philip does not even
reside in Batangas, the city of the court wherein he filed his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage. In a Certification31issued by Ricardo V. Bautista, Barangay Chairman of
Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas, it was categorically stated that "the name Philip Yu is
not a resident of Barangay Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas." Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, otherwise known as the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he
may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is, therefore, evident that not only did Philip contradict his previous Motion to Withdraw
his Counterclaim for the Declaration of Nullity of marriage, he even violated a basic
mandate of law so as to be able to file the same action before a different court in a city he
was not even a resident of.
Thus, while individually and in isolation, the aforementioned doubtful circumstances may
not instantly amount to extrinsic fraud, these circumstances, when viewed in conjunction
with each other, paint a deceitful picture which resulted in a violation of Viveca's
 Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |5

constitutional right to due process. True, the service of summons in this case is not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process. But because of Philip's employment of deceptive
means in the service of summons on Viveca, said purpose of satisfying the due process
requirements was never accomplished. To this Court, when Philip declared before the
Batangas court that Viveca's last known address was still their conjugal home with full and
undisputed knowledge that she had already intentionally abandoned the same and had
even established a more recent, local residence herein evinces a clear lack of good faith.
As a result, Viveca never had knowledge of the filing of the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage suit, only finding out about the same when the Pasig City RTC had promulgated
its decision on the Legal Separation case. It is clear, therefore, that because of the service
of summons at the erroneous address, Viveca was effectively prevented from participating
in the proceedings thereon.

In Acance v. Court of Appeals,33 where the extraterritorial service of summons on the non-
resident, US citizen, defendants therein were held to be defective due to the absence of
proof that the summons, complaint, and order of the court were duly served at their last
known correct address, the Court ruled that the failure to strictly comply correctly with the
requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order
for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.34Citing Dulap, et al. v. Court
of Appeals, et al.,35 it elucidated as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is the duty of the court to require the fullest compliance with all the requirements of the
statute permitting service by publication. Where service is obtained by publication, the
entire proceeding should be closely scrutinized by the courts and a strict compliance with
every condition of law should be exacted. Otherwise great abuses may occur, and the
rights of persons and property may be made to depend upon the elastic conscience of
interested parties rather than the enlightened judgment of the court or
judge.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified
and given an opportunity to defend those interests.37 When defendants are deprived of
such opportunity to duly participate in, and even be informed of, the proceedings, due to a
deceitful scheme employed by the prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists a
violation of their due process rights. Any judgment issued in violation thereof necessarily
suffers a fatal infirmity for courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected
to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting
within their jurisdiction.38 This Court, therefore, deems as proper the annulment of the
Batangas court's judgment issued without proper service of summons.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated September 30, 2011 and Resolution dated January 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 111414 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED
 Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |6

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court Antecedent Facts
Manila
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for
legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). [3] Subsequently, the
SECOND DIVISION RTC rendered a Decision[4] dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, G.R. No 176556
Petitioner, WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment
Present: is hereby rendered declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao
and defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION, As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from
PEREZ, each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ. Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall
QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
their mother RITA QUIAO, Promulgated:
Respondents. July 4, 2012 Further, except for the personal and real properties already
foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
DECISION
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
REYES, J.:
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the
in Tungao, Butuan City;
family where children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares
or troublemakers in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to
located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
separate and fight over properties, without regard to the message they send to their
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
children.Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case
Tungao, Butuan City;
involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;

shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner]

The Case
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.
This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order [2]dated
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
said order, we are asked to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the
forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal separation in accordance with the provision of
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of
Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of
[P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
Article 176 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.[5]
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period
provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.[6]
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution[7] which the
trial court granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby
granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for the immediate enforcement
of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution [9] which
reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the
[petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made the sums stated in
the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your lawful fees in the
service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to
satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then we command you that of
the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you make the said sums in
the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section
9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in
consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.[10]
On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the
respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing the following payments:
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;
(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]
Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |7
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, [12] asking the RTC to
define the term Net Profits Earned.
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an
Order[13] dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes
the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each [of the] spouse and the debts.[14] The Order further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because
the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. [15] The dispositive
portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends
to forfeit all the remaining properties after deducting the payments of the
debts for only separate properties of the defendant-respondent shall be
delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the
Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[17] on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another
Order[18]dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10,
2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification
because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net profit
earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby
ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in
favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to be computed in
accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.[20]
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[21] praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated November
8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,[22] the trial court had changed its ruling again
and granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration whereby the Order dated
November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.

Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007
this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
I
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE
COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF
THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE
AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE
AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION WITHOUT
IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE
SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS
A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?[23]
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain
laws, we are well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the
Decision dated October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was
filed.[24] Thus, we are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |8
The Decision dated October 10, 2005
has become final and executory at the
time the Motion for Clarification was
filed on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial
or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] we clarified that to standardize the appeal
periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
we held that it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.[26]
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We
also said, The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. [27] In other words,
a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt
of the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion
for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The
petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December
16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the
respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had
lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been
partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his
Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net profits earned. From the foregoing, the

petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10,
2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had
already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for
clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes
final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is
perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate
unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became
final.[28]
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being
such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed
from the issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that a
void judgment is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any
right nor any obligation.[29] But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When
does a judgment becomes void?
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to
grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. [30] In
other words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram
non judice.[31]
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For
sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions
relating to marital status and property relations of the husband and wife or those living
together.[32] The Rule on Legal Separation[33] provides that the petition [for legal
separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or
the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner.[34] In the instant case, herein respondent Rita is found to reside
in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to the date of filing of the petition;
thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition below.Furthermore,
the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that
summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein
petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the
Complaint on January 9, 2001.[35] Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the
questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial
court is clearly not void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's
jurisdiction. Being such, the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is
meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. [36]In
Persons and Family Relations Legal Separation Page |9
fact, we have ruled that for [as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any
error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an
error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.[37] Granting without
admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's
remedy should be an appeal filed within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the
petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's
decision, which has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to clarify
the very question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the
October 10, 2005 judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with
a woman who is not his wife;[38]
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;[39]
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;[40]
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership;[41]
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;[42]
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent
spouse by intestate succession;[43]
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will
of the innocent spouse;[44]
(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of
gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during the
marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved;[45]
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while
they were living together;[46]
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
foreclosed;[47]
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and
liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the
administration of these properties;[48]
 Persons and Family Relations
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included
under Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall
be charged to the income generated by these properties;[49]
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had
separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family;[50]
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);[51]
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall
therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without prejudice
to the children's legitime;[52]
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;[53] and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum
of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.[54]
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005,
we will discuss the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at
large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies
to the present case since the parties'
property relation is governed by
the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of
the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies
because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7)
of the Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the
record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on
January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was
the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 10
settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.[55] Article 119 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime.In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property
relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And
under this property relation, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits
of their separate property and the income from their work or industry.[56] The husband and
wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.[57]
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant
case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the
Family Code [t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.[58]
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties
of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his
children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing:
As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal
properties, the same being owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the
Family Code are to be given retroactive application to the point of authorizing the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code.[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between
the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil
Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All
property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal
 Persons and Family Relations
partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the
promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code
may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested
right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on
stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[61] we define and explained vested right in the
following manner:
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and
not dependent upon a contingency. The term vested right expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice,
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto
the present or future enjoyment of property.[62] (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List
Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita,[63] we also explained:
The concept of vested right is a consequence of
the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations
created after the right has become vested.Rights are considered vested
when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional,
and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.[64] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested
right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law
and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he
was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 11
properties be awarded to her.[65] In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10,
2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting
what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family
Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's vested
right is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of
the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said
provision says:
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded
to the children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall
not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled
to all the net profits.
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal
partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation
case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his
evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code
since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-standing ruling
that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each
spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into
title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of
the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the
net remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the
right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not
 Persons and Family Relations
vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or
after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.[69] (Citations
omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision
dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family
Code.[70] The petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal.
Thus, the petitioner is now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it
has become final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final
judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final
and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.[71]
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the
present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has
attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal
partnership of gains are all the fruits
of the separate properties of the
spouses and the products of their
labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the
Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article
102 of the Family Code applies.
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of net profits
earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits
earned in the absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the
property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of net
profits. As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property
relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and the succession of events will
follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 12
net profits, we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article
43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.[72] Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes used under
the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code,
and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under
Article 129 of the Family Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute
community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and
the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property
each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except
those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the
couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.[73]
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is
prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive
properties of each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out
of the absolute community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance.
Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net
remainder of the absolute community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the
husband and the wife; and for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture,
said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of
its dissolution.[74]
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that we first find
the market value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the
totality of the market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of
the absolute community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the
 Persons and Family Relations
properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the market value of the
properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits.[75]
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see
what will happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no
separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the
absolute community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the absolute
community constitutes the market value at dissolution.
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all
the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the
community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from the market value at
dissolution.
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total
assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And from
such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining properties, the
market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality
constitutes the net profits.
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing
would be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply
the net profits. However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited
the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the
instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since both
parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make
it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes
only of defining net profit. As earlier explained, the definition of net profits in Article
102(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal
partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to
the provisions on Legal Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of
gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund
the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.[76] From the
foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law
does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.[77]
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 13
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code,
Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the
event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each
spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of
personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the
conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her
exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the
conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be
paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article
121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source,
the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family,
belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to
said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and
wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
 Persons and Family Relations
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years
are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the
properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the
couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial
court found that the couple has no separate properties when they
married.[79] Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila
de Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in
Tungao, Butuan City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80]
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership;[81]and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate properties
of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective owners
shall be made.[82]
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 14
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid
from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient
to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be
solidarily liable.[83]
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and
of the wife shall be returned to each of them.[84] In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties,[85] there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the
above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs.[86] However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his
share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the
conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be
accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not
entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10,
2005 of the trial court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order
dated January 8, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7,
2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
 Persons and Family Relations L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 15

Chairperson, Second Division

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
 Persons and Family Relations
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and
LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole
lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47
petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were
married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1)
Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9,
1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City
to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to
Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro
Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel
as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became
sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public
eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his
private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their
children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this
was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's
deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were
incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her
suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male
companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation
manifesting his affection for a male caller.9 She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw
Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left
their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. 12
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 16
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's
claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a
battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and
face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it
existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and
there. He, however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious.
The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their
professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the memorandum15 released by
Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own
lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King
Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In
other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied
maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for
him to return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his
siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel
pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her
very jealous and possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of
female friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But,
Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales
about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that
he usually stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He
was a witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and
sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife
relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw
Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular
date,22 he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person
with them at that time, except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his
own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with
the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all
its effects under the law null and void from the beginning;
 Persons and Family Relations
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with
forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose
legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its
finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of
Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to
cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective
Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the
Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances
of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support
thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally
incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this
jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively only
between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed
into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation
[Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is
of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats
himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal
heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as
a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity,
honor, and welfare of his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he
filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's
jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and
forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED.
The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132.
No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary
remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision
rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 17
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment
may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is
properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess
in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not
the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following
errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION
FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL
AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.30This is to prevent the party from benefiting from
one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions.
After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the
ordinary remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of
petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper
appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial
justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally
construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and
periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the
exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to
an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would
have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial
 Persons and Family Relations
justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules
governing appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this
Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the
lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not
the first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service
Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission
(CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school
teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during
the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On
appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the
Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised
Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court
instead of the Supreme Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the
inappropriate mode of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or
resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the
Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit.
Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of
the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed,
nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said,
where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar
the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.41(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a
wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial
or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac
vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed
grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause
petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 18
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice
would result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax
the same in the interest of substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to
the present petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule
65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines,
this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While
the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential
part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant
has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford
the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced
his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of
inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for
reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for
annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely
worked to the detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds
the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application
will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the
interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or
gross negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He
should not be made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice
and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the
rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of
gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's
being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in
court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case,
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to
present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the
lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to
parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their
clients, of their day in court.49(Emphasis supplied)
 Persons and Family Relations
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such
power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with
the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance
System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said
the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be
relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In
other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent
in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted
masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the
supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the
Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences,
incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices,
abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital
obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the
guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were
Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered
Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between
Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its
conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke
surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is
preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really
a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the
marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even
including his own close friends doubtedhis true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-
36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many
forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did
not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his
denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after
that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 19
time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting
more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him.
Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross
defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the
end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke
of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why
obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing,
plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous
over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if
a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife
(pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in
the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of
his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN,
14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-
lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered
underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity
becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be
the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry
advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the
question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the
expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is
a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The
lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and
interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot
appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage
may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,58 such as
concealment of homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage
and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality,
and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent
to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by
both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of
evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its
concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations62 of the
Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
 Persons and Family Relations
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on
the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article
46, they are talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal separation,
there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed
after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the
marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing
at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee
approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its
concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case
is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental
element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It
indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of
marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v.
Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife,
and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would
become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the
whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause
mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal
overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country.
Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not
sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a
ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more
than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent
was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of
consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent
schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of
the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We
affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence
compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground
that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several
incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is
so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of
L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 20
marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed,
appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-
defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x
xx
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by
appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married.
Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he
did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the
appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of
parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the
appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into
account petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the
marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The
State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these
social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their
community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
 Persons and Family Relations L e g a l S e p a r a t i o n P a g e | 21

A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime
of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and
enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of
Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of
the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution
and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the
joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice