Blue: CPR chapter|Green: Canon/Rule|Yellow: Case|Red: Hardcopyyy if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped
tively stopped and Respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
Canon 1 Promote and Respect Law and Legal Process
• In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 363, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 661 (1962)
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon
extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on
disbarment.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional,
and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not
reach the offense itself. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the
fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes
in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official
position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the
use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as
to justify his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure
up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the
admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe
a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them
or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He
is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the
very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and
sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements
of the body politic.
RULING: Gutierrez DISBARRED.
• Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578, October 7,
1988, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
Supreme Court is compelled to hold that the statements made by
respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this
Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the
respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the
Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of
justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had
some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly
demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen
(13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a
complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim
of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as
an act of reprisal against the respondent.
Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is
not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to
prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity
of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme
Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be
quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be
countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the
courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few
will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for
the stability of democratic government.
RULING: Atty. Gonzalez SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY.
Rule 1.01 – No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct
• Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil 350 (1933)
It is well settled that a member of the bar may be suspended or removed
from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. However, as
a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of
its officers for misconduct alleged to be committed in his private
capacity. The exception to the rule is that an attorney will be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him.
As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such
respect as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the
powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.
It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar,
attempted to engage in an opium deal in direct contravention of the
criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan
from succeeding was the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators.
The intention to flaunt the law was present even if consummation of the
overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of
professional ethics which govern the conduct of attorneys, the act was
as reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful culmination.
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme Court in the well known
case of Ex Parte Wall.
RULING: Abordo SUSPENDED for 1 year.
• Cordova v. Cordova, A.C. No. 3249, November 29, 1989, 179 Phil 680
(1989)
The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the
misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in
public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of
the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to
membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good
moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the
Bar in good standing.
It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer
to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
"a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage."
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the
general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family
which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After
a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman
not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter
to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations
before his own daughter and the community at large.
RULING: Cordova SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY.
• People v. Tuanda A.C. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 18 SCRA 692
(1990)
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by
the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved
moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public
order.
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also
import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey
the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not)
relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense.
RULING: DENIED the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent
shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further.
• Castillo vda de Mijares v. Villaluz A.C. No. 4431 (1997)
Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution of demanding respect and dignity. He himself asserts that at
the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court
annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Peña, had not yet
attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner,
respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after
making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his
previous marriage had been annulled.
Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a
"sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage
was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and
befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's
sense of social propriety and moral values.
It is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral
fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of
the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent
for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law. Under Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers.
However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his
life; that his impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation
1
reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to
advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years
of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment
would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case.
RULING: Villaluz SUSPENDED for 2 years.
• Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA
445 (1997)
These facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises
to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.
RULING: Petition DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer.
• Pimentel v. Llorente, A.C. No. 4680, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 154
(2000)
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined
as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as
a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath
or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows
moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a
member of the bar for such misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents
committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a
lawyer shall not engage in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to
lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated
their oath of office as lawyers to "do no falsehood."
As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater
obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public
office is a public trust.
RULING: Llorente and Salayon FINED (P10k) and WARNED.
• Ui v. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 38 (2000)
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the
bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates
of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; b. a resident thereof; c. at
least twenty-one (21) years of age; d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude,
are filed or pending in court; f. possess the required educational
qualifications; and g. pass the bar examinations.
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission
to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as
a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held —
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to
the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the
legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity
in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The
rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards." Respondent's act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true
civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that
she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of
the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit.
Any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an
attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In
attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the
defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members
nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest
degree of morality.
RULING: Bonifacio REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a
photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated
date thereof, with a STERN WARNING.
• Macarrubo v. Macarrubo A.C. No. 6148, February 27, 2004
The incontrovertible facts show that while respondent had a subsisting
marriage with Helen Esparza with whom he had two children, he entered
into a second marriage with complainant.
Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is
required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the
Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon
the basic social institution of marriage.
Respondent here has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple
marriages and then leaving them behind by the mere expedient of
resorting to legal remedies to sever them. The impact of respondent's
conduct is incalculable upon his ex-wives as well as the children he had
by them, their lives having been dislocated beyond recall.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions
of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the
rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening
of our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and
must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community.
RULING: Macarubbo DISBARRED.
• Stemmerik v. Mas A.C. No. 8010, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 114
(2009)
Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote
respect for the law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and
women entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the law functions
to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or deception.
Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal
profession and has been found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is
also guilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws
and to do no falsehood. That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor
hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept
inviolable at all times.
Lawyers are servants of the law and the law is their master. They should
not simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and
obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation.
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental
constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross
ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he
knew were void and illegal.
Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed
unethical act after unethical act, wantonly violating laws and
professional standards.
2
For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyer’s oath and Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, etc.
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and
uses his legal knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice
of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law and to the
legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays
everything that the legal profession stands for.
It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make
laymen support Dick the Butcher’s call, "Kill all lawyers!" A disgrace to
their professional brethren, they must be purged from the bar.
RULING: Mas DISBARRED.
• Freeman v. Reyes A.C. No. 6246, November 5, 2011
Complainant had sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross
dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance
proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should
be disbarred.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice
by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of
the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose
disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, it does not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as
such.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose,
the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use
the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately
return the money to his client.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The
returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered.
It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal
of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public
interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. Respondent's
repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming
conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking complainant's
finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance
proceeds that should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of
rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of
honesty and integrity required in the practice of law. This being so,
respondent should be purged from the privilege of exercising the noble
legal profession.
RULING: Reyes DISBARRED.
• Ventura v. Samson A.C. No. 9608, November 27,2012, 686 SCRA 430
(2012)
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of
members of the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order
to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behavior
on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities,
which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when
it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s
sense of decency.
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the
admissions of respondent himself, we find that respondent’s act of
engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee,
constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent
not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also
showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing
wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his
wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage
and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured
the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost
moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and
the ethics of his profession.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by
complainant, then a 13-year-old minor, who for a time was under
respondent’s care. Whether the sexual encounter between the
respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s consent is
of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly
immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression
of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should
be disciplined accordingly.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
Respondent’s gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly
shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual
exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms.
All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place
the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for
strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
RULING: Samson DISBARRED.
• Ecraela v. Pangalangan A.C. No. 10676, September 8, 2015
The Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that
Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the
evidences offered.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. Good
moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must
also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the
other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. When
the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on
which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against
the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence
required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on
several adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own
wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages,
as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD
and CCC by preponderant evidence. Respondent's main defense against
the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's
petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and,
instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting
documents.1âwphi1 Due to respondent's own failure to attend the
hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence of
respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a
mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his
legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing
to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.
RULING: Pangalangan DISBARRED.
• Cobalt Resources v. Aguado A.C. No. 10781, April 12, 2016
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had
participation in the crime as charged in the complaint, from the planning
stage up to its execution. These falsified documents found in his
possession, as certified found in his possession, as certified as evidenced
by the PASG, were used to facilitate the commission of the crime.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden
with conditions, and granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers as instruments
in the effective and efficient administration of justice. As officers of the
courts and keepers of the public’s faith, lawyers are burdened with the
highest degree of social responsibility and so mandated to behave at all
times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. They are expected
3
to maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Atty. Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable
to faithfully discharge his bounden duties as a member of the legal
profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting standards
demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to
practice law. As vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected
at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal professor and
to refrain from any act or omission which might diminish the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.
RULING: Aguado DISBARRED.
Rule 1.02 – No to Counseling to Defy Law
• In re Terell 3 Phil 266 (1903)
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the
purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such
misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as
amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which
he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.)
The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be
dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the
United States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has
not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he
is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be
condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the
ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell
from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands.
RULING: Terrell SUSPENDED for one year.
• Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 159486-88, November 25 2003,
416 SCRA 465 (2003)
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his
client’s case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his
assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
from making such public statements on any pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia
may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially
dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce
criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can
truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith
in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by
it to practice law in the Philippines.
In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert
the dispensation of justice.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary
sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and
as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take
heed.
RULING: Paguia SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY.
• Kupers v. Hontanosas AC No. 5704, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 325
(2009)
In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent
violated the Attorney’s Oath and several canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an
attorney-at-law is to "obey the laws of the Philippines." This duty is
enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath and in Canon 1, which provides that
"(a) lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes." Rule 1.02 under Canon 1
states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at decreasing confidence in the legal systems."
RULING: Hontanosas SUSPENDED for six months and WARNED.
• Coronel v. Cunanan AC No. 6738, AC No. 6738, August 12 2015 766
SCRA 258 (2015)
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes. He shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; 17 or counsel or abet
activities aimed at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence
in the legal system. He should advise his client to uphold the law, not to
violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not recommend to his client
any recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public
order, and public morals.
Although the respondent outlined to the complainant the "ordinary
procedure" of an extrajudicial settlement of estate as a means of
transferring title, he also proposed the option of "direct registration"
despite being fully aware that such option was actually a shortcut
intended to circumvent the law, and thus patently contrary to law. The
proposal of "direct registration" was unquestionably unlawful, immoral
and deceitful all at once.
RULING: Cunanan SUSPENDED for one year and ORDERED to return
P70k
Rule 1.03 – Not to Encourage Lawsuit or Proceedings
Rule 1.04 – Encourage Client to Avoid Controversy
• Castaneda v. Ago G.R. No. 28546, July 30, 1975, 65 SCRA 505 (1975)
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead
of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso
of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of
the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his
client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we
do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the
patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his
case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable.
RULING: Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and
Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M.
Luison.
Canon 2 Provide Efficient and Convenient Legal Services
Rule 2.01 – Not to Reject or Oppress Defenseless or Oppressed
Services
• Ledesma v. Climaco G.R. No. 23815, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 473
(1974)
What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly
mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known
that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It
could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the
profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For
those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of
repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even
more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of
service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high
degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: "There is need
anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental
postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to
live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or
a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the
administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in
the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without
remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the
contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do
compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That
circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has
to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases.
Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be
fulfilled."
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, where
respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson
making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates
the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when
negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in
delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." Justice Sanchez
in People v. Estebia reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true
that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such
counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed
and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he
must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the
person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The
accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little
less of self-interest."
RULING: Petition DISMISSED.
4
 Rule 2.02 – Not to Refuse to Give Legal Advice
Rule 2.03 – No Solicitation
• In re Tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929)
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels
between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the
penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was
disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been
provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind
statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession
and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by
himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice
of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a
great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works
against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members
of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife
otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted
facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in
defiance of the law and those canons.
The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify
permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances
working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that
he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar
mistake in the future.
RULING: Tagorda SUSPENDED for one month.
• Ulep v. Legal Clinic Bar Matter No. 553, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 378
(1993)
7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. — Anent the issue on the
validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should
not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such
as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT.
— We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client
as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs
no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR
SKILL. — The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The first of such exceptions is
the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include
only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches
of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.." . . The use of an ordinary
simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm
or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. — The law list
must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes.
For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical
and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely
to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or
standing of the profession.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Verily, taking into
consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of
the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered,
we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,
subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc.
is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved
in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
RULING: Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and
from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein.
• Linsangan v. Tolentino A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA
133 (2009)
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents
as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his
talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the
profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar
is called.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in
order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.
A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and
conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address; (d) telephone number and (e) special branch of law
practiced.
RULING: Tolenino SUSPENDED for one year and STERNYL WARNED.
• Villatuya v. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012, 676 SCRA 37
(2012)
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the
business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to
advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule
2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the
purpose of profit.
5
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful
occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a
nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the
lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when
the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of
professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak
for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if
handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of
prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm the
recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and
15.08 of the Code.
RULING: Tabalingcos:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and
solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a
grossly immoral conduct.
Rule 2.04 – No Rates Lower than Customarily Charged
Canon 3 Information on Legal Services that is True, Honest, Fair,
Dignified, and Objective
Rule 3.01 – No False or Unfair Claim re: Qualifications
• Khan v. Simbillo A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003 and G.R. No. 157053,
409 SCRA 299 (2003)
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.
It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be
the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-
product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration
of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their
practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of.
He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising
himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly
or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four
to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers,
the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication
in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative
data is likewise allowable.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of
the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession,
is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.
RULING: Simbillo SUSPENDED for one year and STERNLY WARNED.
Rule 3.02 – No False or Misleading Firm Name
• In re: Petition of Sycip G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 1
(1979)
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners
advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective
firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of
individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such.
• Dacanay v. Baker and Mckenzie A.C. No. 2131, May 10, 1985, 136
SCRA 349 (1985)
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice
law in the Philippines. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are
members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm
name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in
foreign trade and investment". This is unethical because Baker &
McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.
RULING: respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
• Nebreja v. Reonel A.C. No. 9896, March 19, 2014, 719 SCRA 385
(2014)
Respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among others, and then
completely neglected his client’s cause. Moreover, he failed to inform
complainant of the true status of the petition. For all of respondent's
acts - failure to file the contracted petition for annulment of marriage in
behalf of the complainant, his misrepresentation on its status and his
use of a fictitious office address, he deserves the penalty imposed upon
him by the IBP.
RULING: Reonel SUSPENDED for one year.
Rule 3.03 – Partners Assuming Public Office
• Samonte v. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292, February 20, 1999, 303
SCRA 756 (1999)
Respondent is guilty of an infraction. The complainant by her failure to
appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it was
the respondent who gave her calling card "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera Law Offices" and that he tried to convince her to
change counsels. We find however, that while the respondent
vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that
his name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which
admittedly came into the hands of the complainant.
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of
every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at
all times must only be characterized by propriety and decorum but
above all else must be above suspicion.
RULING: Gatdula REPRIMANDED for engaging in the private practice of
law and WARNED; ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the
firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.
Rule 3.04 – Not use Media to Attract Legal Business
• Cruz v. Salva 105 Phil 1151 (1959)
SC was greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of
respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous
error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or
satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond
the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to
have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by
the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity
and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing
becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of
justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent
against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure,
even a penalty to the one liable.
RULING: Salva PUBLICLY REPREHENDED and CENSURED for the
uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to
and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and
find to be contempt of court; and WARNED
Canon 4 Participate in Improvement of the Legal System: Support Law
Reforms and Administration of Justice
Canon 5 Participate in Legal Education Program
6
• Rivera-Pascual v. Spouses Lim, G.R. No. 191837, September 19,
2012, 681 SCRA 429 (2012)
Consolacion’s counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number as required under Bar
Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacion’s verification and
certification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any
competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from her community
tax certificate.
The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing
Consolacion’s petition before it on the ground of petitioner’s unexplained
failure to comply with basic procedural requirements attendant to the
filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the
opportunity afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While
there was compliance, this took place, however, after the CA had
ordered the dismissal of Consolacion’s petition and without reasonable
cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel
claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the
circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the
requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules
appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw
no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules. Neither does
this Court see any.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
• Rodriguez Manahan v. Flores, A.C. No. 8974, November 13, 2013, 709
SCRA 297 (2013)
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order
to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several
opportunities given him.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full
devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of
law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within the context of the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at
the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be
done within the confines of reason and common sense.
It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also,
we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-
year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested
before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a
century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years.
RULING: Flores fined (P5k) and STERNLY WARNED.
Canon 6 Canons Apply to Lawyers in Government Service
• Collantes v. Romeron, A.C. No. 3056, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 584
(1991)
Whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be
disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The
answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public
officials and employees to process documents and papers and prohibits
them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in
any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars
them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of
any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office,
the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, or delay any man's
cause "for any corrupt motive or interest”.
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable,
and reliable" may practice the profession of law for every lawyer must
pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling".
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron
committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to
practice the high and noble calling of the law.
RULING: Renomeron DISBARRED.
• Office of the Court Administrator v. Ladaga, A.M. P-99-1287, January
26, 2001, 350 SCRA 326 (2001)
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession,
specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not
pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one's self to the public as a lawyer.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case
No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law
profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not
amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written
permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this
Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules.
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on
numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998
and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that
he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in
court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of
the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent
is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.
RULING: Ladaga REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING
• Ali v. Butong, A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 1 (2005)
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a
lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact,
by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as
a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a
lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official,
he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.
Respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his
qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the
rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives,
respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform
the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on
this matter.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in
the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of
the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the
intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his
privilege to practice law.
RULING: Bubong DISBARRED.
• Pimentel v. Fabros, A.C. No. 4517, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA
346 (2006)
The records reflect, and respondents admit, the discrepancy between
the questioned certificate of canvass and the statement of votes of the
Province of Isabela in the 1995 elections. While there was no question
that the municipal/city certificates of canvass were not tampered with,
the tabulation of the figures on the statement of votes was anomalous.
For this, respondents were responsible.
As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them. As
lawyers, they were found to have engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct. They also violated their oath as officers
of the court to foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express
provision of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
avoidance of such conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in the
government service:
CANON 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even
greater obligation to observe the basic tenets of the legal profession
because public office is a public trust.
RULING: Fabros and Paas FINED (P10k each) and WARNED
7
• Berenguer-Landers v. Florin, A.C. No. 5119, April 17, 2013, 696 SCRA
589 (2013)
Cited case: in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, the Court already ruled that
if a misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as
a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of
his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer,
then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
x x x x A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed
his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern
the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including
those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity
to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject
to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any
act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of
the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is
a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. X
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of
our government, performs official functions of a RARAD that are akin to
those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be likened
that of a judge whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is
made subject of an administrative complaint.
It is the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable.
Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the
commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the
fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to the
Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of execution and
writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an
obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
RULING: Florin SUSPENDED for three months. Complaint against
Jornales and Vega DISMISSED.
Rule 6.01 – Primary Duty: That Justice is Done
• People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748 (1967)
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or
circumstance, we are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with
abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated
murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with
homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder and
frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion should not
be controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby
granted; the orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31,
1966 are hereby set and declared null and void, and, in consequence,
the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent
insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent
Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate
Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were
commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.
Rule 6.02 – Not to Use Public Position for Private Interest
• Misamin v. San Juan, A.C. No. 1418, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 491
(1976)
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account
respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a
police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension
or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor
proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of
the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police
Commission and the Civil Service Commission." As a matter of fact,
separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are under
investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police
Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with
complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having'
received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it
is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended
that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint
cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in
re Tionko, decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by
Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment
or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance
of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty
as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." The Tionko
doctrine has been subsequently adhered to.
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever
violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of
respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain
in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the
Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed,
still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the
suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of
a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of
whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen
could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the
beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also
to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest,
is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future
actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself
open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the
position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not
worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even
take care that his honor remains unsullied.
RULING: admin complaint against San Juan DISMISSED.
• Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 172 (2003)
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed
his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern
the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including
those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity
to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject
to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring
the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of
his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one
occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected
not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross
misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent
deserves disbarment.
RULING: Dasig DISBARRED.
• Huyssen v. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 244
(2006)
It is undisputed that respondent admitted having received the
US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures in the petty
cash vouchers and receipts he prepared, on the false representation that
that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which
bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.
Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a
high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard
of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private
practice.
8
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed,
he went on committing another by issuing several worthless checks,
thereby compounding his case.
Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate
the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts
with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his
misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being a member of
the bar.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble
profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all
times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which
includes suspension and disbarment. More importantly, possession of
good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is
a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is
not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also
to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and
the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal
profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have
proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar. These pronouncement gain practical significance in
the case at bar considering that respondent was a former member of
the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that
government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public
service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct
is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed
to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal
profession.
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the
need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the
faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the
ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers.
RULING: Gutierrez DISBARRED and ordered to return money of
complainant. Case referred to Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the DOJ for
appropriate administrative action.
• Ramos v. Imbang, A.C. No. 6707, August 23, 2007, 530 SCRA 759
(2007)
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.
More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be
more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants
who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely
to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is
prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with
their official function.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for
they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their
respective offices.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes
the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated
by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the
private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases
and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived
the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the
Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done),
respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an
action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases
were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees"
for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a
violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A
government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a
high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
practice.
RULING: Imbang DISBARRED and ordered to return money to
complainant.
Rule 6.03 – Not to Accept Employment after Government Service
• Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio Buffe, A.M. No. 08-60352-RTC, August
19, 2009, 596 SCRA 378 (2009)
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and
transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2)
prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee
can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following
conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution
or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to
conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year
after the public official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except for the private practice of
profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken
even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this
exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any
matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work
with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public
office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or
imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a
former government official or employee and his or her former
colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the
observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed
office hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A.
No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon
3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter
provision provides the definitive rule on the "outside employment" that
an incumbent court official or court employee may undertake in addition
to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it
complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity
that practices law before the courts or conducts business
with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of
normal working hours and is not incompatible with the
performance of the court personnel’s duties and
responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice
of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render
services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law
schools, review or continuing education centers or similar
institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the
court personnel to disclose confidential information acquired
while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative
or executive branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or
where the outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the
Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside employment.
9
RULING: Buffe FINED (P10k) and STERNLY WARNED
• PNB v. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995, 243 SCRA 1 (1995)
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force
and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive
of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the
opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction
which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in
violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse
influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express conflicting consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in
behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose.
RULING: Cedo SUSPENDED for three years.
• PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005, 455
SCRA 526 (2005)
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions,
and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21,
1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general
structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed
upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable
to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of
Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.
0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan.
Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a "congruent-interest conflict"sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning
of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds
of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the
"matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover,
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court
abstract principles of law. in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type
of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is "advising the determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual
even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, court litigator protecting the interest of government.
the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank
on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03.
Canon 7 Uphold Dignity and Integrity of the Profession
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of
the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means,
viz.: • In re: 1989 Elections of the IBP, Bar Matter No. 491, Oct. 6, 1989,
178 SCRA 398 (1989)
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or
circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey
(Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect
.) for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule
1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush
aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that
may affect the interests of others.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency
of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word
spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
"intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene" includes
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has
public's esteem.
no effect or little influence. Under the second interpretation,
"intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings. We hold that this second meaning is
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions,
more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of
denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the
the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils
witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing
sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government
conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed
x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."
to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold
vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during
the campaign.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant.
Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer "should
not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such
1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar
office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase
Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a
"which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust
representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the
disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted
selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has
matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service,
attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted
had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further
"power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have
constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer
caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the
shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which
participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct
the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public
which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by
officer or employee."
this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in
revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For
stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and
one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading,
honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
10
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled (court’s decision among other things)
• Fernandez v. Grecia, A.C. No. 3694, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 425
(1993)
By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them
on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel
Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of
"dirty tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an
instrument to advance the ends of justice."
The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a
lawyer's equipment in the practice of his profession has been stressed
by this Court repeatedly.
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has
demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his
moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of
lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
RULING: Grecia DISBARRED.
• Santos Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 529
(2000)
By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP
dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness
to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the
law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice
of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.
RULING: Llamas SUSPENDED for one year, or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later.
• Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, Bar Matter No. 1370, May 9, 2005, 458
SCRA 209 (2005)
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification
of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of his annual dues. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
noble objectives and purposes of integration.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
RULING: EXEMPTION request DENIED
• Velez v. de Vera, A.C. No. 6697, Bar Matter No. 1227, A.M. No. 05-5-
15-SC, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 345 (2006)
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or
property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of,
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs
the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice
of law.
It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account
and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only
to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and
confidence. Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all
good fidelity to his client.
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning
to the term "Malpractice." That meaning is in consonance with the
elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a
business.
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on
ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that
profession.
RULING: De Vera SUSPENDED two years
 2009 IBP Elections, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 14, 2010, 638
SCRA 1 (2010)
Further, in its report, the Committee declared that the high-handed and
divisive tactics of Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan and his group of Governors,
Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and
Raymund Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of
business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter
disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost disintegrated the Integrated
Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct which should be
appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition in the
future.
It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility [16] that (a) lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Added to this, Rule
7.03, Canon 7 requires that (a) lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. In the case at bar, such canons find application.
Bearing the above in mind, what Attys. Vinluan, Estrada, Barandon, Jr.,
Escalon and Mercado conspired to do was truly high-handed and divisive
that must not pass unsanctioned. Otherwise, future leaders of the IBP,
Governors at that, might be similarly inclined to do what they did, much
to the prejudice of the IBP and its membership. Surely, this should be
addressed without much delay so as to nip-in-the-bud such gross
misconduct and unprofessionalism. They all deserve to suffer the same
fate for betraying as well the trust bestowed on them for the high
positions that they previously held.
RULING: Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon,
Jr., Evergisto Escalon and Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of
grave professional misconduct arising from their actuations in
connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last April
25, 2009 and May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as national
officers of the IBP in any subsequent election. While their elections as
Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer be annulled as this has
already expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to hold the position of
IBP Executive Vice President for the 2007-2009 term and therefore
barred from succeeding as IBP President for the 2009-2011 term
Rule 7.01 – No False Statement
• In re: Diao, A.C. No.244, March 29, 1963, 7 SCRA 475 (1963)
Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was
thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained
under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he
hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential..
11
RULING: The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of
attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to
return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days.
Rule 7.02 – Not to Support Unqualified Bar Applicant
Rule 7.03 – No Conduct Adversely Affecting the Profession
• Tan v. Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA473
(1992)
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the
Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the
free patent title over property which he could not but have known was
public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well
of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in
the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the
case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his
guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised.
What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of
his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan,
mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the
mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a
finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was
eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor
and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the
civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was
submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his
lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But
these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any
criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the
Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore,
outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral
character.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter
of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad
dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common honesty".
It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is
more important than truthfulness or candor.
RULING: Sabandal UNFIT to become a member of the Bar; prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is denied.
• Tapucar v. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 331
(1998)
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16]Exacted from him,
as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand
as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of
decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer needs
to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession,
and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.
The record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this
Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than
lawfully-wedded wife.The report of the Commissioner assigned to
investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from
contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even
arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of
Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges
extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter
against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds
against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as
abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the
lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly
shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to
scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established
norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and
place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the
need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
RULING: Tapucar DISBARRED.
• Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003, 398 SCRA 659
(2003)
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree
or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not
his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he
previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore,
respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.
RULING: Castillo SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY.
• Advincula v. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 604
(2007)
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Lawyers
have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral
character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in the
Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral
character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to
the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no
less than the highest degree of morality.
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career,
in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred
for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor.
In Bar Matter No. 1154, good moral character was
defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral
character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the
public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect
prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.[12]
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the
lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion
because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being
kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message,
respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant
also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages
between complainant and respondent bears this out.
RULING: Macabata REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in
his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING
• Guevara v. Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007, 517 SCRA 600 (2007)
From respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous
relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall
have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man
who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if
the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is havingflaunted such relationship, he maintaining
that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families."
Respondent's denial is a negative pregnant: Where a fact is alleged
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
12
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact
itself is admitted.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly
immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case
at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was
carried out discreetly.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging
in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and
despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.
RULING: Eala DISBARRED.
• Tiong v. Florendo, A.C. No. 4428, December 11, 2011, 662 SCRA 1
(2011)
It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral
character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a
continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal
profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the
highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his
public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
his suspension or disbarment.
In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married
woman not his wife, and worse, that of his client.
Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital
vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for
the ethics of his profession. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship
with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct
warranting disciplinary action from the Court. Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among
others.
RULING: Florendo SUSPENDED for 6 months with a STERN WARNING
• Velasco-Tamaray v. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868, January 26, 2016
Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when
she allowed the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and
notarized.
Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed
before a court is tantamount to consenting to the commission of a
falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon 10.
RULING: Daquis DISBARRED
Canon 8 Courtesy, Fairness, Candor Towards Professional Colleagues
• Bugaring v. Español, G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA
687(2001)
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the
petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor please." For, after using said
phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent
utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and
should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and
maintained during court proceedings.
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary
evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and
the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant
of the court's system for an orderly proceeding and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent
in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative of
justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily
without hearing.
RULING: RTC ordered to return 1k to BUGARING (direct contempt 2k
only)
• Reyes v. Chiong, A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 212 (2003)
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with
courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of
their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their
professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they
must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling
between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and
demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract
from the dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of
their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased,
perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of
sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates
solely from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable
performance of professional duty.
RULING: Chiong SUSPENDED for two years.
• Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA 408
(2005)
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers
language must be dignified and choice of language is important in the
preparation of pleadings. In the assertion of his clients rights, a lawyer
even one gifted with superior intellect is enjoined to rein up his temper.
As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by
respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-feelings towards
Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does
not extend. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and
promote unseemly wrangling should be carefully avoided.
Respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another. The language vehicle does not
run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
RULING: Javier SUSPENDEd for one month and STERNLY WARNED
Rule 8.01 – No Abusive and Improper language
• Alcantara v. Pefianco, A.C. No. 5398, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA
247 (2002)
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers
to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their
fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal
profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each
other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.
In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no right
to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an
explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or
could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the
matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way
he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by
another injustice.
RULING: Pefianco FINED (P1k) and REPRIMANDED
• Dallong-Galicinao v. Castro, A.C. No. 6396, October 25, 2005, 474
SCRA 1 (2005)
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands
that lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the
dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves without
reproach at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent did not categorically deny the charges in the complaint.
Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case
as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact
that respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had
accepted it.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the
esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased,
perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of
sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates
solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable
performance of professional duty.
RULING: Castro FINED (P10k) and WARNED
13
• Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 5766, March 26, 2010, 616 SCRA 529
(2010)
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers
to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their
fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Specifically, in Rule 8.01.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence
shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay
Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with
pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified
and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a
proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against
a fellow lawyer.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and
misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer
of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression
of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
RULING: Ferrer, Sr. SUSPENDED for one year
• Canlapan v. Balayo, A.C. No. 10605, 17 February 2016, 784 SCRA 135
(2016)
Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and
restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession. Although the remark was allegedly made in response to
undue provocation and pestering on the part of complainant, respondent
should have exercised restraint. Notwithstanding his personal opinion
on the merits of complainant's claims (in light of the defective
notarization in the Memorandum of Agreement dated June 7, 2014), it
was improper for respondent to state that even if complainant brought
10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper in his
claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as this tend to
create and promote distrust in the administration of justice, undermine
the people's confidence in the legal profession, and erode public respect
for it. "Things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be
taken back."
Ill feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed
to influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor towards each other
or towards suitors in the case. As officers of the court and members of
the bar, lawyers are expected to be always above reproach. They cannot
indulge in offensive personalities. They should always be temperate,
patient, and courteous both in speech and conduct, not only towards the
court but also towards adverse parties and witnesses.
RULING: Balayo SUSPENDED for one month and WARNED
• Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice
of the cause with which he is charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further
emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8
provides: "A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically
demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which
has necessitated lawyers to use strong language in the advancement of
the interest of their clients.27 However, as members of a noble
profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent
their clients' cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter
in court, with courage and zeal but that should not be used as license
for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language -
spoken or in his pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer
is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the administration of
justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his clients,
the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the
Legal Profession.
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty.
Martinez should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should have
been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA
where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct
that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the
offensive and improper language by asserting that the phraseology was
not per se uncalled for and improper. He explained that he had sufficient
cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a
mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion
does not excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He
could have easily been respectful and proper in responding to the letter.
RULING: Aguilos FINED (P10k) for misrepresenting his professional
competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of
offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the offense shall be severely
punished. + return money to complainant
• Belo-Henares v. "Argee" Guevarra, A.C. No. 11394, 01 December
2016
Respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of
publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant
through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant
and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is
bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or
private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner
befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent.
Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words
unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an
aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and
BMGI's reputation.
"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their
private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of
probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance
of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not
confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance
of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—
albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their
license and the law invest in them."
RULING: Guevarra SUSPENDED for one year and STERNLY WARNED
Rule 8.02 – Not to Encroach on Professional Employment
• Camacho v. Pangulayan, A.C. No. 4807, March 22, 2000, 328 SCRA
631 (2000)
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then
already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case.
Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware
that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney
proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents
without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer,
herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-
30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of
oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics
and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell
short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of
the Bar.
RULING: Pangulayan SUSPENDED for three months
Canon 9 Unauthorized Practice of Law
• Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997, 268 SCRA
639 (1997)
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has
already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar
are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to
the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-
at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the
term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The
ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
RULING: Alauya REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
14
• Spouses Suarez v. Salazar, G.R. No. 139281, September 29, 1999,
315 SCRA 502 (1999)
Considering respondents Motion to expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty.
Filemon A. Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and
to Dismiss the Petition and said Atty. Manangans admission that he is
not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and that he is the
same Filemon A. Manangan who was found by this Court to be in reality
Andres Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine Bar, but despite
these facts he has continued to misrepresent himself to be an attorney-
at-law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in this case, Atty.
Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is hereby
declared guilty of indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is
hereby sentenced to three (3) months imprisonment
• Aguirre v. Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 342
(2003)
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge
of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held
himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine
Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer
of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without
a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
RULING: Rana DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
 Exception CASE: Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007,
522 SCRA 387 (2007)
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule
138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as
an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the
latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent
or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule
138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that
petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a
quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner
for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners
appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts
by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law
student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.
RULING: MTC DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under
the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
Rule 9.01 – Not to Delegate Work
Rule 9.02 – Not to Divide Legal Fees
• Halili v. CIR, G.R. No. L-24864, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 113 (1985)
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the
court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration
of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant
or their witnesses during litigation
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a
willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct
as tends to bring the authority of 'the court and the administration of
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice.
This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice.
In the matter of exercising the power to punish contempts, this Court
enunciated in the Slade Perkins case that "the exercise of the power to
punish contempts has a twofold aspect, namely (1) the proper
punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order;
and (2) to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him
by the court which he refuses to perform. Due to this twofold aspect of
the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as
civil or criminal. A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered
to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party
therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing
or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing
a duly forbidden act. Where the punishment imposed, whether against
a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or
vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine payable to
the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a judgment
in a criminal case. Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid
to a party in the nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by
imprisonment as a coercive measure to enforce the performance of
some act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or
decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if made
before final decree, be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order,
or, if made after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be
reviewed only on appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as
is appropriate to the review of judgments in civil cases. ... The question
of whether the contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect
the jurisdiction or the power of a court to punish the same.
The Union officers were aware that Atty. Espinas was the principal
counsel even after Atty. Pineda's assignment. They also knew of the
original contract for 20% attorney's fees which was increased to 35%
by Atty. Pineda upon the arrangement that with the increase, he would
answer for the payment of Attys. Espinas and Lopez' fees and for
necessary representation expenses.
RULING: Pineda IMPRISONED and to SHOW CAUSE
• Lijuaico v. Terrado, AC. No. 6317, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 301
(2006)
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they
possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed,
lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct and are mandated to serve their clients with
competence and diligence. They shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith shall
render them liable.
Respondent’s admission that he divided the legal fees with two other
people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.
RULING: Terrado SUSPENDED for six moths and STERNLY WARNED
and ordered to return money
THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
Canon 10 Observe Candor, Fairness and Good Faith
• Masinsin v. Albano, G.R. No. 86421, May 31, 1994, 232 SCRA 631
(1994)
What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident
predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings,
one after another, from which not even this Court has been spared. The
utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the
deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable
execution of a decision that has long become final and executory.
Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to
nullify the same MTC decision before different branches of the court,
trifling with judicial processes. Never, again, should this practice be
countenanced.
The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement
in dedicating ourselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of
15
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold and keep
inviolable.
We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the
part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct,
pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is
contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and
warranting application of the contempt power.
RULING: case dismissed, counsel STRONGLY CENSURED and WARNED
• Ting Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 108
(2004)
The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and
legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the
legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten
his sworn pledge as a lawyer.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to
dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and
keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become
guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair
and impartial dispensation of justice. This oath is firmly echoed and
reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal
system. When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal
profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this
covenant, respondent miserably failed.
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." This Rule was
clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted
Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima
and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of
the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer
of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like
the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. For this reason,
any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of
justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against
him.
Respondent’s information was misleading because he presented
evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the
letter.31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the
part of the respondent.
Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless
bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession.
RULING: Torres DISBARRED.
Rule 10.01 – Truthfulness Towards the Court
• Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis, AC No. 10868, January 26, 2016 supra
*REPEAT
Canon 32, Code of Professional Ethics
• Young v. Batuegas, A.C. No. 5379, May 9, 2003, 403 SCRA 123 (2003)
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the
Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court
and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his
high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts
of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their
oath when they resorted to deception.
RULING: Batuegas and Llantino SUSPENDED for six months and
WARNED
Rule 10.02 – Not to Misquote or Misrepresent Contents of Paper
• Insular Life Employees Co. v. Insular Life Association, G.R. No. L-
25291, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244 (1971)
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment
for contempt against the respondent Judge and the respondents'
counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a
result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the
respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many
pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine
that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work,
clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the
respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation
as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim,
and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the
underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's
decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the
particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the
acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar
to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the
act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless
an activity inimical to the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this
Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges
and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and
salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants,
take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8
of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort.
Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted,
the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct
meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who
may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar
meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of
authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other
sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to
the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded
from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in
finding out whether the citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there
was no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling
which they cited.
RULING: for their mistake, they should be ADMONISHED to be more
careful when citing jurisprudence in the future.
• Hipos, Sr. v. Bay G.R. Nos. 174813-15, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA
674 (2009)
It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely
misleading this Court, in violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he
intends to make it appear that the passages are the exact words of the
Court. Furthermore, putting the words "Underscoring ours" after the
text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful
reproduction of the original.
Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows
that the insertion of the word "no" in the above dispositive portion was
a mere clerical error.
As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated
that the court found probable cause against the petitioners, but likewise
provided an adequate discussion of the reasons for such finding. Indeed,
the general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive
portion or the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls.
However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision
is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion,
the body of the decision will prevail.
RULING: Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar
Plagiarism Cases – Re: Letter of the U.P. Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10-
4-SC, October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 418 (2010); March 8, 2011, 644
SCRA 543 (2011), June 7, 2011
16
– In the Matter of charges of Plagiarism against Assoc. Justice Mariano
C. Del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011, 642 SCRA 11
(2011)
– c f. Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010;
• In re Lozano, A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC & 109-9-SC, June 15, 2012 (not in
SCRA)
We found Atty. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano guilty of
grave professional misconduct when they misquoted or misused
constitutional provisions in their pleadings[2] in order to impute unjust
acts to members of this Court.
Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional
provisions for the purpose of insulting Members of this Court is a serious
breach of the rigid standards that a member of good standing of the
legal profession must faithfully comply with. Thus, the penalty of
indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the past two years
during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly
expressed his willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and
standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he
should be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not been
informed of any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in
any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a member of the bar.
While this Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will
not prolong a penalty after it has been shown that the purpose for
imposing it had already been served. From Atty. Lozano’s letters-
petitions, we discern that his suspension had already impressed upon
him the need for care and caution in his representations as an officer of
this Court.
Under these circumstances, this Court decides to grant Atty. Lozano’s
letters-petitions with the expectation that he shall now avoid going to
the extreme of employing contortions of and misusing legal provisions
and principles to justify his positions, and instead focus his energies and
talents towards a lawyer’s primary aim of promoting the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
RULING: LIFTED the indefinite suspension from the practice of law of
Atty. Oliver Lozano and REINSTATED him to the status of a member in
good standing
Rule 10.03 – Observe Rules of Procedure
Canon 11 Respect Courts and Judicial Officers
• In re Sotto 82 Phil 595 (1949)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness
or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten
the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but
if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way,
influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the
respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our
decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is
not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the
original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that
case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final
disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial
notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both
Houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or
inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any
particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the
respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying
said act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He
not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices
from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which
decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision
of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty
and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the
Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of
justice
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to
say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during
the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their
own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like
any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the
press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of
liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty
in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance
of the independence of the judiciary.
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under
special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to
the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct .
RULING: Sotto FINED (P1k) and to SHOW CAUSE
• Guerrero v. Villamor, G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989, 179
SCRA 355 (1989)
As the terms connote, the word direct" would relate to an act stemming
immediately from a source, cause or reason and thus, the rule under
the law that it be done in the presence of or so near a court or judge
while "indirect" would signify an act done not straight to the point and
thus, legally speaking would pertain to acts done out or not in the
presence of the court.
this Court sustains petitioners' contention that the alleged derogatory
language employed in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 did not
constitute direct contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect
contempt subject to defenses that may be raised by said, petitioners in
the proper proceedings.
Stress must be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not
submitted to respondent judge nor in the criminal cases from which the
contempt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by
another judge and involving a separate action
While technically, to rule on whether or not the statements under
consideration are contemptuous would be premature in the absence of
any contempt proceedings against petitioners, we deem it wise to do so
to avoid circuity of action in view of our finding that the statements
complained of are not contemptuous. We agree with petitioners that the
same are merely descriptive therein plaintiff's cause of action based on
his reaction what he perceived as a willful infliction of injury on him by
therein defendant judge. Strong words were used to lay stress on the
gravity and degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner Carlos as a
result of the dismissal of the subject criminal cases to justify the award
of damages being sought.
We have consistently held that the power to punish for contempt should
be used sparingly, so much so that judges should always bear in mind
that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised
for purposes that are impersonal the power being intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they
exercise.10 Any abuse of the contempt citation powers will therefore be
curtailed and corrected.
Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their
basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers and ...(to) insist on similar conduct by
others." 11 This respectful attitude towards the court is to be observed,
"not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance." 12 And it is "through a
scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best
demonstrates his observance of the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers ...
RULING: Order of Direct Contempt NULL and VOID
• Bueno v. Raneses, A.C. No. 8383, December 11, 2012, 687 SCRA 711
(2012)
In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the
adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit the required
memorandum would have amounted to negligence. However, as noted
by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her allegations with
court documents that she could have easily procured. This omission
17
leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are insufficient to prove Atty.
Rañeses’ negligence.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As
explained below, he committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same
time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated
by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his
case; he practically disregarded its processes and even lied to one of
the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about
the case.
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating
commissioners reveals his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some
extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false
and fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is false because no bribery apparently took
place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the
professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond
these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression
that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means
– a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least,
Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude
towards its disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge
allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of
which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses
such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all –
to all lawyers, their clients and the general public – that the Court will
not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the
interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions
composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by
unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.
RULING: Raneses DISBARRED.
• Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the Judiciary,
A.M. No. 13-11-09-SC, Resolution, dated 12 August 2014
*HARDCOPYYYYYY
RULING: NOTED
• Floran v. Ediiza, A.C. No. 5325, 09 February 2016
The Court issued numerous Resolutions requiring Atty. Ediza to comply
with the 19 October 2011 Decision and show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or be held in contempt for his failure to abide
by the Court's orders. However, Atty. Ediza repeatedly and blatantly
disregarded and obstinately defied these orders from the Court.
The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders
is a great disrespect to the Court which cannot be tolerated. Atty. Ediza
willfully left unheeded all the warnings imposed upon him, despite the
earlier six-month suspension that was meted out to him for his
administrative liability.
The failure of Atty. Ediza to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak
in his character, but also disrespect for the Court's lawful orders and
directives.
As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey
the orders and processes of this Court without delay and resistance.
In the present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended
from the practice of law for six months. Despite the suspension, Atty.
Ediza is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit
to stay in the legal profession for failing to protect the interests of his
clients but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which
has administrative supervision over him.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties
not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of
the court. To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must adhere
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintain the highest degree of
morality, and faithfully comply with the rules of the legal
profession. Clearly, Atty. Ediza's conduct has made him unfit to remain
in the legal profession.
RULING: Ediza DISBARRED
• PHILCONSAT Holdings Corp. v. Lokin, Jr. & Labastilla, A.C. No. 11139,
19 April 2016
As members of the Bar, respondents should not perform acts that would
tend to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as
the subject checkbook entry which contumaciously imputed corruption
against the Sandiganbayan. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers
of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without
this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky
foundations.39This is the very thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others." Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty
violate the aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held
administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as in this case.
In this case, respondents compromised the integrity of the judiciary by
maliciously imputing corrupt motives against the Sandiganbayan
through the subject checkbook entry. Clearly, respondents also violated
Canon 7 of the CPR and, thus, should be held administratively liable
therefor.
RULING: Lokin SUSPENDED for three years. Labastilla SUSPENDED for
one year. Both WITH STERN WARNING
Rule 11.01 – Proper Attire
Rule 11.02 – Punctuality
Rule 11 .03 – Proper Language and Behavior
• In re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562
(1970)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and
duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal
profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward
the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity
... to the courts; and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance."
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer
and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and
the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible
bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but
to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself
and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into
disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of
passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic
example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and
gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be
allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from
criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the
Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the
Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function
as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism
is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant
striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the
quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and
infused by philosophy.
RULING: Almacen SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY.
• Soriano and Padilla v. CA, G.R. No. 100633 and G.R. No. 101550,
August 28, 2001, 363 SCRA 725 (2001)
Snide remarks or even sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily
assume that level of contumely actionable under Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Judges generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere
hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with
simply a reproof. In the natural order of things, when a case is decided,
one party wins and another loses, and oftentimes, both sides are equally
confident and sanguine. Thus, disappointment is great for the party
whose action or view fails. It is human nature that there be bitter
feelings which often reach to the judge as the source of the supposed
wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything
which appears as but a momentary outbreak of disappointment.
18
 Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said
in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that
the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous
language. While judges must exercise patience, lawyers must also
observe temperate language as well.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
A lawyer is an officer of the Court, bound by the law. It is a
lawyers sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. It is
peculiarly incumbent for lawyers to support the courts against unjust
criticism and clamor.
It may happen that counsel possesses a greater knowledge of
the law than the judge who presides over the court. It may also happen
that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their
decision. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the
bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. Malicious attacks on courts have in some
cases been treated as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as
a sufficient ground for disbarment. However, mere criticism or comment
on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be
tolerated.
This is not to say that courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an
officer of the court, a lawyer may criticize the court. He must do so in
a bona fide manner, uberrima fides. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism on the one hand, and abuse and slander of the courts and of
the judges thereof on the other. Unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or creates or promotes distrust
in judicial administration is proscribed.
RULING: counsel to observe strictly the strictures of the ethics of the
profession.
• Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 206
(2006)
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly
exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause.
We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent
nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner,
and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process.
Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the
most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made
by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face,
the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case
according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s
language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in
the courts and trust in judicial administration.
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely
enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the client’s cause
through fair and honest means.
RULING: SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba two years. SUSPEND Atty.
Olivia Velasco-Jacoba for two months + STERN WARNING
• Baculi v. Battung, A.C. No. 8920, September 28, 2011, 698 SCRA 209
(2011)
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position
and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule,
demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.[13] that it is the
duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution would
be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely
disregards the latters role, stature and position in our justice system.
When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge
Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against
the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode
the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to
decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be
handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of
Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that
puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
RULING: Batung SUSPENDED for one year and STERNLY WARNED
Rule 11.04 – Not to Attribute to Judge Motives
• Embido v. Pe, Jr., A.C. No. 6832, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 1
(2013)
In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of
authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed
and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim
reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the
real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in
a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree
of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal
status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.
Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court
whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity. The
test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the
conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court.
RULING: Salvador DISBARRED
Rule 11.05 – Grievances Against Judge
• Maceda v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993, 221 SCRA 464
(1993)
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable
to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the
Court has the necessary records to make such a determination .
RULING: Abiera’s complaint DISMISSED
• Pantanosas v. Pamatong, A.C. 7330, 14 June 2016
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to
"observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05
of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a
judge to the proper authorities only."
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused
the holding of a press conference where he made statements against
the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case
No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge
Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail
out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold
Star Daily.
19

In closing, we find it befitting to reiterate that lawyers have the right,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. However, closely linked to such rule is the cardinal condition
that criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. To that end, the duty of a lawyer to his client's
success is wholly subordinate to the administration of justice. True,
lawyers must always remain vigilant against unscrupulous officers of the
law. However, the purification of our justice system from venal elements
must not come at the expense of decency, and worse, the discrediting
of the very system that it seeks to protect.
RULING: Pamatong SUSPENDED for two years and STERNLY WARNED
Canon 12 Assist in Speedy and Efficient Administration of Justice
Rule 12.02 – Adequate Preparation (in connection with Rule 18.02)
Rule 12.02 – Forum Shopping
Rule 12.03 – Not to Delay Case
• Chua v. Castro, A.C. No. 10671, November 25, 2015
Collection case took more than five years
RULING: De Castro SUSPENDED for three months and STERNLY
WARNED
Rule 12.04 – Court Process
• Malonzo v. Principe, A.C. No. 6289, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 1
(2004)
*About contingent fees, representation thru SPA as discussed with org’s
president only
process issue: IBP only relied on a “consensus”, not thru formal voting:
considered a procedural transgression by IBP Board
RULING: case against lawyer dismissed
• Plus Builders, Inc. v. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009,
578 SCRA 432 (2009)
*poor clients, hence lawyer was filing several motions, request for TROs,
etc.
but lawyer is sub counsel, protecting client’s interests, almost pro bono,
breadwinner
over-zealous, misguided desire
RULING: Revilla SUSPENDED for six months
• Saa v. IBP-CBD, G.R. No. 132826 September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 6
(2009)
belated filing of partial and full comments, because busy, typhoon, lost
files, misplaced
RULING: Venida SUSPENDED one year and STERNLY WARNED
Rule 12.05 to Rule 12.07 – Proper Behavior
Rule 12.08 – Not to Testify on Behalf of Client
• PNB v. Uy Teng Piao, 57 Phil 337 (1932)
law does not forbid an atty to be a witness, BUT courts prefer that
counsels DO NOT unless necessary hence they shall withdraw from the
mgmt. of the case
RULING: defendant to pay plaintiff
Canon 13 Refrain from Act Giving Appearance of Influence
• Nestle Phil. v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 75209, September 30, 1987, 154
SCRA 542 (1987)
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not
knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They
are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly
are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse
thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor
did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice
constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their
counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called
by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability
of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder
to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of
the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and
proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the
importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
RULING: the contempt charges against herein respondents are
DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to
pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other
on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the
premises of any and all courts.
• Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001, 360
SCRA 248 (2001)
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made
thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks
posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio
broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues
stirred by a case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity
of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated
cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have
subsided.
RULING: an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made
• In re de Vera, A.C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003, 385 SCRA 285
(2003)
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted
to have made said statements but denied to have uttered the same "to
degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into
disrepute." He explained that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the
statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to
decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera
immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does
not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines cited in Villaber v. Commission
on Elections, the Court defines moral turpitude as "an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The
determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual
issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the
violation of the statute.
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion
on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity.1âwphi1 Respondent De Vera did not bring
suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced
his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent
De Vera’s alleged immorality.
RULING: petition to disqualify DISMISSED
Rule 13.01 – No Extraordinary Attention
Rule 13.02 – No Public Statements to Media
• Cruz v. Salva, 105 Phil. 115 (1959)
*REPEAT
• Foodsphere, Inc. v. Mauricio, A.C. No 7199, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA
367 (2009)
Batas Mauricio; CDO liver spread
20
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be
underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr. the therein complainant
engaged therein-herein respondent’s services as "she was impressed by
the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media
personality," only to later find out that after he demanded and the
therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any
pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.

On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening

to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be
gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales
of complainant.

Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s

motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was
motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against
the therein complainant.

RULING: Mauricio SUSPENDED for three years

Rule 13.03 – Not to Invite Outside Interference

• Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990, 190 SCRA 306
(1990)

We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the
Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our government
system — the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive,
and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty. Castellano. We
therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that
"the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great department of
government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate
with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other
department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them
'unjust.'" Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the
President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on
any of the Court's acts.

RULING: Catellano FINED (P1k) and SUSPENDED 6 months and

WARNED

21