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2.1.

Noscitur a sociis ("a word is known by the company it capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for
keeps") compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at
When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance
reference to the rest of the statute. contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a
Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)] conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the
Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its crime must be alleged and proved. After going over the records of this
authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the case, we are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that
beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.”
during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with
the aforementioned policy. DAI-CHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad vs.
Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional
violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila and ADONIS C.
acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing LIMJUCO, respondents.
thecertificate of authority from the office of the This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of Rules of Court of the following orders of the RTC, Branch 156, Pasig,
true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 63448: 1) Order dated September20,
that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had 1993, dismissing the complaint of petitioner on the ground of lack of
called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. On July 29,
was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to 1993, petitioner Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. filed a
renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and complaint for damages with the RTC, Branch 156, against ADONIS C.
sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment LIMJUCO, a former employee for violation of par. five of their Contract
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 of Employment dated August 27, 1990, which provides: That for a
August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate period of two (2) years after termination of service from EMPLOYER,
court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on EMPLOYEE shall not in any manner be connected, and/or employed,
22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor be a consultant and/or be an informative body directly or indirectly,
General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna with any business firm, entity or undertaking engaged in a business
may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER. Petitioner
Insurance Act. claimed that LIMJUCO became an employee of Angel Sound
Philippines Corporation, a corporation engaged in the same line
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the of business as that of petitioner, within two years from his resignation
scope or intent of the Insurance Act from petitioner's employ. Petitioner sought to recover liquidated
damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of (P100,000.00), as provided for in their contract.RTC dismissed the
the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases case. In its Order dated September 20, 1993, it ruled that it had no
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy because the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the complaint was for damages arising from employer-employee relations.
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. Citing Article 217(4) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended
In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a by R.A. No.6715, respondent court stated that it is the Labor
person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or Arbiter which had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring matter of the case.
a certificate of authority so to act from the InsuranceCommissioner;
while the second paragraph defines who is aninsurance agent within ISSUE: Is petitioner's claim for damages one arising from employer-
the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the employee relations?
penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that
the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of HELD: We answer in the negative.
Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the Article 217, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 6715, provides as
definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 follows:
and 2 of Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as
shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.” Without otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have
proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30)
insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for
have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. “Under the Texas decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without non-agricultural:
a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, xxx xxx xxx
failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the case of Bolen vs. arising from the employer-employee relations; (Emphasis supplied)
Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of In San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted 161 SCRA 719 (1988), we had occasion to construe Article 217, as
as insurance solicitorswithout license, and while acting in such amended by B.P. Blg. 227. Article 217 then provided that the Labor
Arbiter had jurisdiction over all money claims of workers, but the 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government
phrase "arising from employer-employee relation" was deleted. We Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of
ruled thus: casino for the general welfare.
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is Issue: WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.
not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims Held: No. CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been indicated in the LGC. However, ordinances should not contravene a
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National
In the first place, paragraph 3 should be read not in isolation from but Government.Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred
rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers
labor practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling.
conditions of employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating to household As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
services, a particular species of employer-employee relations), and
paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to employees or to 2.2. Ejusdem generis ("of the same kinds, class, or nature")
employers). It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by
through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to cases or more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the
disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any,
relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the rule of the specific words that precede them. For example, where
of noscitur a sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of "cars, motor bikes, motor powered vehicles" are mentioned, the
paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor word "vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense
Code, as amended. We reach the above conclusion from an (therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes).
examination of the terms themselves of Article 217, as last amended
by B.P Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the
Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION vs CA, August 8, 2000;
Arbiters and the NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee Purisima, J:
relations," which clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, FACTS:On July 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment from
in Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot be presumed that money the CIR for the
claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their paymento f d e f i c i en c y a m us e m e n t t a x i n t h e a m o u n t o f
employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within P 5 , 8 6 4 , 2 6 0 . 8 4 ( i n c l u d i n g 7 5% surcharge and 25% interest for
the general jurisdiction of regular courts of justice, were intended by 2 years). The petitioner contested the assessment but it was denied
the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the by the CIR. The Court of Tax Appeals also dismissed the subsequent
courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The petition of PBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the CTA
Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of so the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari. Petitioner’s arguments:
workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money -Jurisdiction to collect amusement taxes of PBA is vested
claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee with the local government and not the national government. It
relationship or some aspect or incident of some relationship. Put a argues that they should be included in the enumeration provided
little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within the by Section 13 of the Local Tax Code of 1973.
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money -Commissioner’s issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR
claims which have some reasonable causal connectionwith the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 8-88 -- both upholding
employer-employee relationship (Emphasis supplied). the authority of the local government to collect amusement
taxes -- should bind the government or that, if there is any
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP revocation or modification of said rule, the same should operate
FACTS: P.D. No. 1869 authorized PAGCOR to centralize and regulate prospectively.
all games of chance. -Income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI
LGC of 1991, a later law, empowers all government units to enact should not be subject to amusement taxes
ordinances to prevent and suppress gambling and other games of -In case they are made liable to pay the deficiency
chance. amusement tax, they should not be charged with the 75%
STACON: These two should be harmonized rather than annulling one surcharge.
and upholding the other. Court said that the solution to this problem is
for the government units to suppress and prevent all kinds of gambling ISSUES:
except those that are allowed under the previous law 1. WON the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA
games a local tax –NO2.WON BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and
MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE G.R. NO. 111097, JULY 20, 1994 BIR RMC No. 8-88 binds the government – NO3.WON income
Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI
City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties is subject to amusement taxes - YES4.WON the
Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to petitioner should be charged with amusement tax – YES
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season. HELD:
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed 1. Sec 13 of the Local Tax Code indicates that the
the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting province can only impose a
the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business taxo n a d m i s s i o n f r o m t he p r o p r i e t o r s , l e s s e e s ,
permit to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and o r o p e r a t o r s o f t h e a t e r s, cinematographs,
Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and concert halls, circuses and other places of
providing a penalty for its violation. amusement. The authority to tax professional
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that basketball games is not therein included, as the
they both violated Presidential Decree No. same is expressly embraced in PD 1959, which amended
PD 1456, wherein it is clear that the "proprietor, lessee group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G.
or operator of. . . professional basketball games" is Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of
required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a
fifteen per centum(15%) of their gross receipts to the permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development As a
Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax. consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an
While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with
places of amusement", professional basketball games Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree
are definitely not within its scope. Under the No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial
principle of ejusdem generis Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch and docketed as Criminal Case No.
In determining the meaning of the phrase 2602 On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment
"other places of amusement", one must refer to finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond
the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00
concert halls and circuses with artistic expression
as their common characteristic. Professional basketball ISSUE : WON charitable purposes can be construed in its broadest
games do not fall under the same category as theaters, sense so as to include a religious purpose
cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the
latter basically belong to artistic forms HELD : Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that
of entertainment while the former caters to sports and the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
gaming. Also, a historical analysis of pertinent laws does excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
reveal the legislative intent to place professional "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms,
basketball games within the ambit of a n a t i o n a l is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
tax. Previous laws (PD 871 by PD 1456 and construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the
P D 1 9 5 9 ) s h o w s a recognition that the amusement premise that the legislature would not have made specified
tax on professional basketball games is a national, enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
and not a local, tax.2 . C o m m i s s i o n e r ’ s i s s u a n ce meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned All
of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR contributions designed to promote the work of the church are
M e m o r a n d u m Circular No. 8-88, both upholding the "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for their support
authority of the local government to collect amusement on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not
taxes cannot bind the government. The government interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose Accordingly,
cannot be never in estoppels, particularly in matters the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude
involving tax. It is a well-known rule that erroneous solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the
application and enforcement of the law by public fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that
officers do not preclude subsequent correct application of such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused It
the statute, and that the Government is never estopped by does not follow, therefore from the constitutional guaranties of the free
mistake or error on the part of its agents.3 . P D 1 4 5 6 exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be
provides that for the purpose of the tolerated. It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate
a m u s e m e n t t a x , t h e t e r m g r o s s receipts’ governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with
embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a
operator of the amusement place. That definition of gross detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the
receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not
advertising and streamer spaces as the same involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay
embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection,
operator of the amusement place.4.The issue on the even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation
payment of surcharge was never posed as an issue would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free
before the respondent court so it must necessarily fail. exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its
exercise
2.3. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express
mention of one thing excludes all others") SARIO MALINIAS, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Items not on the list are impliedly assumed not to be TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and
covered by the statute or a contract term.[3] However, VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002
sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not
FACTS: On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who
exclusionary. This is usually indicated by a word such
were candidates for governor and congress representative positions,
as "includes" or "such as." respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department
against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 MARTIN CENTENO, violation of the following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646;
petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding and2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.Dominguez was then
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine
National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then the
FACTS : In the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The
known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were
fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, deprived from participating in the canvassing of election returns as
Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course of their way to
the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio uniusest
Mountain exclusio alterius.The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
Province. Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilags formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is
ubmitted their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is
ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province to implied. Expressium facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its
enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
to COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site. Also, The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a
they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is
prevent some groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium
the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
fact, the petitioners were among them. be extended to other matters.
COMELEC’s Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORP. vs CIR Statutory
petition against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to Construction – Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius
establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied
for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon. Not satisfied with San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) was assessed a 3%
the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this tax on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products – this
case. is pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Said corn and edible
oil products were sold to United Coconut Chemicals (UNICHEM) who
ISSUE: Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing in turn exports these products and sell them abroad.
the complaint for lack of probable cause? SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same
Section of the 1987 Tax Code which provides in part:
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC: No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of xxx Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut
COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or
case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm
this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for
there is nothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller
of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines,
of certiorari. whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully manufactured article or products: xxx (underscore added by
presented by the petitioner is the mass-affidavits of his supporters, uberdigests)
which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by the
court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims. Also, the SPMC’s interpretation of the law is as follows:
allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec.1. That there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products;
232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as2. But that said tax exempts manufacturers who export these edible oil
punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and products;
Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. Here, Sec. 253. That SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil
merely highlights one of the rights of a political party or candidate products to UNICHEM, its purchaser, who then exports the oil
during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232,which enumerates products.
the persons who are not allowed inside the canvassing site, can only ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC’s interpretation is correct.
be subjected to an administrative disciplinary action and cannot be HELD: No. The legal maxim “Expressio Unius est Exclusio
punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264 of the same Alterius” applies. Nowhere in the law was “corn oil” included in the
law. Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they enumeration of tax exempt exported products. Nor did it mention to
did not violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil
officer or employee of political offices or police force from intervening products nevertheless sells said product to a purchaser who does
in any election campaign or from engaging in any partisan activity export. Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which
except to vote or maintain public order. In the said defense, the it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those
respondents said that setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom
2968 and not to prejudice any candidate from participating in the and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the
canvassing. As such, the actions of the respondents are deemed very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule
lawful and not in excess of their authority. proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict
Ruling related to Statutory Construction its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius estexclusio
alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute
private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232of B.P. Blg.
881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act."

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of


one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
2.4. DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO petitioner in the event she won in the election.
The courts may distinguish when there are facts and – On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as
circumstances showing that the legislature intended a
distinction or qualification. against private respondent’s votes of 76. In accordance with the May
2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers
did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION – On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed
OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San
PIPO, respondents. Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was “without
G.R. No. 124893 prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any
Subject: Public Corporation other interested party.”
Doctrine: Qualification of Elective Officers (SK) – On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng
FACTS: Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos
order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent COMELEC en banc Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected
suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the SK officials of the Pederasyon.
of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
– On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member ISSUES: 1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on
and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo. the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not pubcor)
The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the 2) WON cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that
ground that she being then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of
exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan the SK is valid
as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
– On April 2, she filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered HELD: 1) Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
Kabataang Member and Voter” with the MCTC. In a decision dated provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision
April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election
her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs
The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court. the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited candidacy.
himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
petitioner. provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
– On April 23, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department
of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false
Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard
23, 1996, Election Officer Rios, per advice of Provincial Election and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC
Supervisor, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself and that
to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies
Director Asperin who set aside the order of respondent Rios and with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a
allowed petitioner to run. Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the
– On May 2, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to
her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC
– Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the
respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election
the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a cases.
“Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted
in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.
National Office, Manila. The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the
On May 2, 1996, the same day acting on the facsimile, respondent petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings
Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every pleading before the
issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size
Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must
be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC the SK elections.
personally, or, by registered mail. Section 424 of the Code sets a member’s maximum age at 21 years
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have
two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC.[19] Also, turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that
the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old “on the day
petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail. of his election.” The addition of the phrase “on the day of his election”
2) The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years
1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the
composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be
but less than 18 years of age. RA 7160 changed the Kabataang more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is
Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the understandable considering that the Code itself provides more
age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the
than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts
administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that
chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.
ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more
of the Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local
term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the
permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be
Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the
resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the
than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-
Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of day cycle begins. The phrase “not more than 21 years of age” means
the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It
Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year
Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. “Not more than
year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not 21 years old” is not equivalent to “less than 22 years old,” contrary to
more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read petitioner’s claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less
and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate
moral turpitude. possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible.
424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office.
becomes a qualified voter and an elective official… voter must be born Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of succession of the SK Chairman.
the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it
barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member
A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo,
of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The
immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write. member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
the Sangguniang Kabataan. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette
Petitioner’s age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan,
Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang
beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The
Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from
the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay
that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of
twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
2.5. CASUS OMISSUS
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person,
object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This
needs two laws. In expressio unius, it’s just the
enumeration you are looking at, not another law.

COA V. PROVINCE OF CEBU, G.R. NO. 141386. NOVEMBER 29,


2001;
FACTS:In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on
Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and
personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province
for the extension classes were charged against the provincial
SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship
grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of
Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the
salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the
provincial SEF.
ISSUE:Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of
public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in
connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension
classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, may
be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local
government unit concerned.
HELD:Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the
compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies
the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the
corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and
indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension
classes.
Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is
lodged principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended
only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers
appointed by the local school boards in connection with the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes. With
respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the
pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said
grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the
SEF may be appropriated.