NOTES ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS and CITIZENSHIP

Excerpts from the 2017 Decisions of the Supreme Court

Compiled by
CARLO L. CRUZ

Police Power

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power,
which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police
power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government
agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which
remains under the control of the State. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons" was enacted,
codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs. Thereafter, on April 30, 2007, R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending
R.A. No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is the insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which
enumerates the other privileges and incentives of PWDs, including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines. Similar to R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim the discounts given to PWDs as tax
deductions from the gross income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.

The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the
community and even private entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens
patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its
people especially those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her
country, and refers to the State in its role as "sovereign," or the State in its capacity as a provider
of protection to those unable to care for themselves. In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort
to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.
(Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017)

It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, the
laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs.
It is also in further exercise of this power that the legislature opted that the said discount be
claimed as tax deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments. (Southern Luzon
Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25,
2017)

To begin with, the issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it had
already been made clear in Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by the State in the
imposition of senior citizen discount was its police power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, just compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is precisely
because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden. (Southern Luzon Drug
Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the legislature to
implement the declared policies of the subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on the medical
services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax

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deduction rather than tax credit. The measure is fair and reasonable and no credible proof was
presented to prove the claim that it was confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory, there must
be taking of property without just compensation. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Still, the petitioner argues that the law is confiscatory in the sense that the State takes away a
portion of its supposed profits which could have gone into its coffers and utilizes it for public
purpose. The petitioner claims that the action of the State amounts to taking for which it should
be compensated. To reiterate, the subject provisions only affect the petitioner's right to profit,
and not earned profits. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the right to profit is not a vested right
or an entitlement that has accrued on the person or entity such that its invasion or deprivation
warrants compensation. Vested rights are "fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable." (Southern Luzon
Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25,
2017)

Right to profits does not give the petitioner the cause of action to ask for just compensation, it
being only an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be
claimed as one's own. An inchoate right is a mere expectation, which may or may not come into
existence. It is contingent as it only comes "into existence on an event or condition which may
not happen or be performed until some other event may prevent their vesting." Certainly, the
petitioner cannot claim confiscation or taking of something that has yet to exist. It cannot claim
deprivation of profit before the consummation of a sale and the purchase by a senior citizen or
PWD. Right to profit is not an accrued right; it is not fixed, absolute nor indefeasible. It does not
come into being until the occurrence or realization of a condition precedent. It is a mere
"contingency that might never eventuate into a right. It stands for a mere possibility of profit
but nothing might ever be payable under it."

The inchoate nature of the right to profit precludes the possibility of compensation because it
lacks the quality or characteristic which is necessary before any act of taking or expropriation
can be effected. Moreover, there is no yardstick fitting to quantify a contingency or to determine
compensation for a mere possibility. Certainly, "taking" presupposes the existence of a subject
that has a quantifiable or determinable value, characteristics which a mere contingency does not
possess. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development,
G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Indeed, regulatory laws are within the category of police power measures from which affected
persons or entities cannot claim exclusion or compensation. For instance, private establishments
cannot protest that the imposition of the minimum wage is confiscatory since it eats up a
considerable chunk of its profits or that the mandated remuneration is not commensurate for
the work done. The compulsory nature of the provision for minimum wages underlies the effort
of the State; as R.A. No. 6727 expresses it, to promote productivity-improvement and gain-
sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the workers and their families; to
guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of production; to enhance employment
generation in the countryside through industry dispersal; and to allow business and industry
reasonable returns on investment, expansion and growth, and as the Constitution expresses it,
to affirm labor as a primary social economic force. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

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Similarly, the imposition of price control on staple goods in R.A. No. 7581 is likewise a valid
exercise of police power and affected establishments cannot argue that the law was depriving
them of supposed gains. The law seeks to ensure the availability of basic necessities and prime
commodities at reasonable prices at all times without denying legitimate business a fair return
on investment. It likewise aims to provide effective and sufficient protection to consumers
against hoarding, profiteering and cartels with respect to the supply, distribution, marketing
and pricing of said goods, especially during periods of calamity, emergency, widespread illegal
price manipulation and other similar situations. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

More relevantly, in Manila Memorial Park, Inc., it was ruled that it is within the bounds of the
police power of the state to impose burden on private entities, even if it may affect their profits,
such as in the imposition of price control measures. There is no compensable taking but only a
recognition of the fact that they are subject to the regulation of the State and that all personal or
private interests must bow down to the more paramount interest of the State. (Southern Luzon
Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25,
2017)

This notwithstanding, the regulatory power of the State does not authorize the destruction of
the business. While a business may be regulated, such regulation must be within the bounds of
reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A
lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered
with even by the exercise of police power. After all, regulation only signifies control or restraint,
it does not mean suppression or absolute prohibition. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Here, the petitioner failed to show that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, under the guise of regulation,
allow undue interference in an otherwise legitimate business. On the contrary, it was shown
that the questioned laws do not meddle in the business or take anything from it but only
regulate its realization of profits. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social
Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Eminent Domain

Case law states that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete - such as in
this case, where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled - just
compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under Republic Act No.
(RA) 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988."

For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when
the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is
transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section
17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like
properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the
owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government
assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers,

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and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.

However, it bears pointing out that while Congress passed RA 9700 on August 7, 2009, further
amending certain provisions of RA 6657, as amended, among them, Section 17, its
implementing rules, i.e., DAR AO 2, Series of 2009, clarified that the said law shall not apply to
claims/cases where the claim folders were received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009. In such a
situation, just compensation shall be determined in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, prior to its further amendment by RA 9700.

In LBP v. Kho, the Court had succinctly explained the "cut-off rule" in the application of RA
9700:

It is significant to stress, however, that DAR AO 1, series of 2010 which was issued in line
with Section 31 of RA 9700 empowering the DAR to provide the necessary rules and
regulations for its implementation, became effective only subsequent to July 1. 2009.
Consequently, it cannot be applied in the determination of just compensation for the
subject land where the claim folders were undisputedly received by the LBP prior to July
1, 2009, and, as such, should be valued in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to
its further amendment by RA 9700 pursuant to the cut-off date set under DAR AO 2,
series of 2009 (cut-off rule). Notably, DAR AO 1, series of 2010 did not expressly or
impliedly repeal the cut-off rule set under DAR AO 2, series of 2009, having made no
reference to any cut-off date with respect to land valuation for previously acquired lands
under PD 27 and EO 228 wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners.
Consequently, the application of DAR AO 1, series of 2010 should be, thus, limited to
those where the claim folders were received on or subsequent to July 1, 2009. (Emphases
and underlining supplied)

Following the above dictum, since the claim folder covering the subject land was received by
the LBP on December 2, 1997, or prior to July 1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just
compensation using pertinent DAR regulations applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its
amendment by RA 9700 instead of adopting the new DAR issuance. While the RTC, acting as a
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the DAR
since the valuation of property or the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the courts, and not with administrative agencies, it must explain
and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and the
applicable formula. (Heirs of Pablo Feliciano Jr. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215290,
January 11, 2017)

To this end, the RTC is hereby directed to observe the following guidelines in the remand of the
case:

1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, in this case, when emancipation patents were
issued in the names of the farmer beneficiaries in 1989.45 Hence, the evidence to be presented by
the parties before the RTC for the valuation of the subject land must be based on the values
prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.

2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC is reminded that

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while it should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving at the just
compensation for the subject land, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do
not warrant their application. In any event, should the RTC find the said guidelines to be
inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other
factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the acquired property.

3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on
prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in
expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the
landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest on
the unpaid balance shall be pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking in 1989 when
Emancipation Patents were issued, until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1,
2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new
legal rate of 6% p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-
Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.

For guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the
DAR's expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider the
factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR
formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties covered by the said law.
If, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas
is not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or
depart therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned
explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess the
power to make a final determination of just compensation. (Heirs of Pablo Feliciano Jr. v. Land
Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215290, January 11, 2017)

The Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are not compensable
since they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of man." It relies chiefly on this
Court's 1991 Decision in White Plains Association, Inc. v. Legaspi, which pertained to "the
widening of the Katipunan Road in the White Plains Subdivision in Quezon City." More
specifically, it capitalizes on the following statement in the 1991 White Plains Decision that
shows a compulsion for subdivision owners to set aside open spaces for public use, such as
roads, and for which they need not be compensated by government:

Subdivision owners are mandated to set aside such open spaces before their proposed
subdivision plans may be approved by the government authorities, and that such open
spaces shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public and the subdivision
owner need not be compensated for the same. A subdivision owner must comply with
such requirement before the subdivision plan is approved and the authority to sell is
issued.

Under this compulsion, the dispositive portion of the 1991 White Plains Decision proceeds to
state:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of respondent judge

dated July 10, 1990 and September 26, 1990 are hereby reversed and set aside. Respondent
QCDFC is hereby directed to execute a deed of donation of the remaining undeveloped portion of
Road Lot 1 consisting of about 18 meters wide in favor of the Quezon City government, otherwise,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel the registration of said Road Lot

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 1 in the name of respondent QCDFC under TCT No. 112637 and to issue a new title covering
said property in the name of the Quezon City government. Costs against respondent QCDFC.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Department of Public Works and Highways is in grave error.

Petitioner's reliance on the 1991 White Plains Decision is misplaced. The same 1991 Decision was
not the end of litigation relating to the widening of Katipunan Road. The owner and developer
of White Plains Subdivision, Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation (QCDFC),
went on to file motions for reconsideration. The second of these motions was granted in this
Court's July 27, 1994 Resolution. This Resolution expressly discarded the compulsion
underscored by the Department of Public Works and Highways, and the dispositive portion of
the 1991 White Plains Decision was modified accordingly. As this Court recounted in its 1998
Decision in White Plains Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:

[T]he dictum in G.R. No. 95522, White Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi[,] that the
developer can be compelled to execute a deed of donation of the undeveloped strip of
Road Lot 1 and, in the event QCDFC refuses to donate the land, that the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City may be ordered to cancel its old title and issue a new one in the
name of the city was questioned by the respondent QCDFC as contrary to law. We agree
with QCDFC that the final judgment in G.R. No. 95522 is not what appears in the
published on February 7, 1991 decision in White Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi.
[Rather, it] is the following resolution issued three (3) years later, on July 27, 1991 [sic],
which states, inter alia:

". . . (T)he Court is constrained to grant the Instant Motion for Reconsideration but only
insofar as the motion seeks to delete from the dispositive portion of the decision of 07
February 1991 the order of this Court requiring the execution of the deed of donation in
question and directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in the event that such deed
is not executed, to cancel the title of QCDFC and to issue a new one in the name of the
Quezon City government. It may well be that the public respondents would not be
aversed [sic] to such modification of the Court's decision since they shall in effect have
everything to gain and nothing to lose.

WHEREFORE the second motion for reconsideration is hereby partly granted by

MODIFYING the dispositive portion of this Court's decision of 07 February 1991 and to
now read as follows:

'WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of respondent

judge dated July 10, 1990 and September 25 1990 are hereby reversed and set
aside. Costs against respondent QCDFC.

SO ORDERED."' (Emphasis supplied)

The 1998 White Plains Decision unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains Decision's
allusion to a compulsion on subdivision developers to cede subdivision road lots to
government, so much that it characterized such compulsion as an "illegal taking." It did away
with any preference for government's capacity to compel cession and, instead, emphasized the
primacy of subdivision owners' and developers' freedom in retaining or disposing of spaces
developed as roads. In making its characterization of an "illegal taking," this Court quoted with
approval the statement of the Court of Appeals:

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 Only after a subdivision owner has developed a road may it be donated to the local
government, if it so desires. On the other hand, a subdivision owner may even opt to
retain ownership of private subdivision roads, as in fact is the usual practice of exclusive
residential subdivisions for example those in Makati City. (Republic v. Sps. Llamas, G.R.
No. 194190, January 25, 2017)

The Department of Public Works and Highways makes no claim here that the road lots covered
by TCT No. 179165 have actually been donated to the government or that their transfer has
otherwise been consummated by respondents. It only theorizes that they have been
automatically transferred. Neither has expropriation ever been fully effected. Precisely, we are
resolving this expropriation controversy only now.

Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of Parañaque to
acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain their private character
(albeit all parties acknowledge them to be subject to an easement of right of way). Accordingly,
just compensation must be paid to respondents as the government takes the road lots in the
course of a road widening project. (Republic v. Sps. Llamas, G.R. No. 194190, January 25, 2017)

Repetitive as it may be, the SAC is reminded that the valuation shall be based at the time of
taking of the subject property, not the date of the filing of or period of pendency of the suit, or
the rendition of judgment. While the valuation may prove outdated, it should be stressed that
the purpose of payment is not to reward the owners for the property taken but to compensate
them for the loss thereof. (Mateo v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 186339, February 15,
2017)

Although the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function, the RTC,
sitting as a SAC, must consider the factors mentioned in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. The RTC is
bound to observe the basic factors and formula prescribed by the DAR pursuant to Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657. Nonetheless, when the RTC is faced with situations that do not warrant the strict
application of the formula, it may, in the exercise of its discretion, relax the formula's
application to fit the factual situations before it. In such a case, however, the RTC is duty bound
to explain and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and
formula. In the recent case of Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court stressed that:

For the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard
for the DAR's expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth
consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the
applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties
covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find that a
strict application of said formulas is not warranted under the specific circumstances of
the case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided that this departure
or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record.
In other words, courts of law possess the power to make a final determination of just
compensation. (Emphasis supplied)

Though the Court is fully aware that the subject properties have been taken by the government
since 1972, it has no option but to affirm the CA order of remand to the RTC for the
computation of the just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 because
the basis for the RTC determination of just compensation was not clear. (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Jose Tapulado, G.R. No. 199141, March 8, 2017)

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In the determination of just compensation, the RTC should be guided by the following:

1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, that is, the date when the title or the
emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer-beneficiaries.

2. Just compensation must be determined pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section
17 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. Nevertheless,
while it should take into account the different formulas created by the DAR in arriving at
the just compensation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not
warrant their application. In which case, the RTC must clearly explain the reasons for
deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or formulas in arriving at a reasonable
just compensation.

3. Interest may be awarded as warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on
prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court had allowed the grant of legal
interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the
part of the State. Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be fixed at the rate of 12% per
annum from the time of taking and 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until
fully paid.

The Court is not unaware that the properties have been awarded to the farmer beneficiaries in
1978. Since then the Tapulados have not received any compensation for their lands. Remanding
the case to the RTC would further delay the payment of just compensation due them. So as not
to prolong the agony of the Tapulados, the RTC should conduct a preliminary summary
hearing to determine the amount that the LBP is willing to pay and order the payment thereof
to the Tapulados pendente lite. Thereafter, the R TC should proceed to conduct the hearing
proper to determine the balance due to the Tapulados.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The case is ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Davao City, for the immediate determination of just compensation in the
foregoing. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Jose Tapulado, G.R. No. 199141, March 8, 2017)

In an analogous case of National Power Corporation v. Elizabeth Manalastas and Bea Castillo, where
the bone of contention is the inclusion of the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso in determining
the just compensation due to therein respondents, the Court ruled that valuation of the land for
purposes of determining just compensation should not include the inflation rate of the
Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of expropriated land is sufficiently
recompensed through payment of interest on the market value of the land as of the time of
taking from the landowner.

The rationale for imposing the interest is to compensate the respondent for the income it would
have made had it been properly compensated for its properties at the time of the taking. The
need for prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest is to compensate for any
delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken.

The award of interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment which makes
the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance to ensure prompt payment of
the value of the land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner. Therefore, there is no need for

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the payment of 1% interest per annum to cover for the increase in value of real properties. (Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Phil-Agro Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 193987, March 13, 2017)

In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Alfredo Hababag, Sr., the Court reiterated its
ruling in Apo Fruits Corp., et al. v. Land Bank of the Philippines that the substantiality of the
payments made by therein petitioner is not the determining factor in the imposition of interest
as nothing less than full payment of just compensation is required. The value of the
landholdings themselves should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation
due, and that interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this
principal sum after the taking has been completed. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Phil-Agro
Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 193987, March 13, 2017)

As to the proper reckoning point of the legal interest, it is fundamental that just compensation
should be determined at the time of the property's taking. Here, the date of the taking of the
subject landholdings for purposes of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the
issuance dates of the CLOA. A CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted
or awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions
provided for in R.A. No. 6657 and other applicable laws. Since the CLOA in this case had been
issued on September 16, 1992, the just compensation for the subject landholdings should then be
reckoned therefrom, being considered the time of taking. This is based on the principle that
interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as
good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking.

In sum, the respondent has waited too long before the petitioner could fully pay the amount of
just compensation due to it. It is clear that the respondent voluntarily offered its subject
landholdings to be included in the CARP. The respondent submitted to expropriation and
surrendered its landholdings. Although it initially contested the valuation that the government
made, the respondent accepted the amount finally fixed by the appellate court. From the time of
taking on September 16, 1992 to the present, it has already been 25 years but the respondent has
not yet received the full amount of just compensation that was due. Thus, the long delay entitles
them to the payment of interest to compensate for the loss of income due to the taking.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated September 30, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75045-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
follows:

1. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines is ordered to pay respondent Phil-Agro Industrial
Corporation ₱l1,640,730.68 representing the just compensation of the subject landholdings; and

2. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, reckoned from the
time of taking on September 16, 1992. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, just
compensation shall earn interest at the new legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum. (Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Phil-Agro Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 193987, March 13, 2017)

In consonance with the above rule, it has also been repeatedly emphasized that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any
valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle
or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Thus, this
Court has held that the courts are not bound to consider the standards laid down under Section

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5 of RA 8974 because the exact wording of the said provision is that "in .order to facilitate the
determination of just compensation, the courts may consider" them. The use of the word "may"
in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. In the absence of
a finding of arbitrariness, abuse or serious error, the exercise of such discretion may not be
interfered with. In the present case, the Court finds no arbitrariness, abuse or serious error in
the findings of the RTC. Considering that the determination of the amount of just compensation
by the RTC was even affirmed by the CA, which had the opportunity to examine the facts anew,
this Court sees no reason to disturb it. (Republic v. Heirs of Eladio Santiago, G.R. No. 193828,
March 27, 2017)

The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a function of the courts. Section 57 of

R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the State's agrarian reform program.
However, this Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprise, underscored
that, in the exercise of the essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the
RTC-SAC is not granted unlimited discretion. The factors under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657
were already translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. The said factors and the DAR formula provide the uniform
framework or structure by which just compensation for property subject to agrarian reform
should be determined. Hence, aside from considering the factors provided by law, the courts
should apply the formula outlined in DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998, in the computation of just
compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Antonio Marcos Sr., G.R. No. 175726, March
22, 2017)

The LBP's valuation of lands covered by the CARP Law is considered only as an initial
determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC-SAC that could make the final
determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors provided in R.A. No.
6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. The LBP's valuation has to be substantiated during an
appropriate hearing before it could be considered sufficient in accordance with Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR regulations.
Since it is the RTC-SAC that could make the final determination of just compensation, the
supposed acceptance of the LBP's valuation cannot be considered as consummated contract.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Antonio Marcos Sr., G.R. No. 175726, March 22, 2017)

In a number of cases, such as Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Natividad, Lubrica v. Land Bank of
the Philippines, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Gallego, Jr., Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of
Jvfaximo and Gloria Puyat, and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, Jr., we definitively ruled
that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation due the
landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be determined, and the process
concluded, under Section 17 of RA 6657, which contains the specific factors to be considered in
ascertaining just compensation, xxx. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Chu, G.R. No. 192345,
March 29, 2017)

We also agree with the LBP's stance that the award of compounded interest is not proper. In
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Chico, we held that "when just compensation is determined
under R.A. No. 6657, no incremental, compounded interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall
be assessed x x x as the same applies only to lands taken under P.D. No. 27 and E.0. No. 228,
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. [13-94], x x x and not Sec. 26 of R.A. No. 6657 xxx."

10
The rationale for this is explained in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals to wit: that
DAR A.O. No. 13-94 aims to compensate the landowners for unearned interests because had
payment been made in 1972 when the GSP for rice was pegged at ₱35.00, and this amount was
deposited in a bank, it would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum:

xxx Thus, if the PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x ₱35
x x x) could be multiplied by (l.06)n to determine the value of the land plus the
additional 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972. However,
since the PARAD already increased the GSP from ₱35.00 to ₱300.00/cavan of
palay xxx, there is no more need to add any interest thereon, much less
compound it To the extent that it granted 6% compounded interest to private
respondent Jose Pascual, the Court of Appeals erred. (Emphasis supplied)

If upon remand of this case the LBP is found to be in delay in the payment of just compensation,
then it is bound to pay interest. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, Jr., we ruled that
interest may be awarded in expropriation cases, particularly where delay attended the payment
of just compensation. There, we categorically stressed that the interest imposed in case of delay
in payments in agrarian cases is in the nature of damages for delay in payment which, "in effect,
makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance." (Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Sps. Chu, G.R. No. 192345, March 29, 2017)

Be that as it may, the LBP is bound to pay interest at 12% per annum "from the time of taking
until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation
due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% per annum xxx. (Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Sps. Chu, G.R. No. 192345, March 29, 2017)

… the RTC may not award compounded interest on the PD 27- acquired land, considering that
RA 6657, which is now applicable even to landholdings covered by PD 27, does not itself
expressly grant it; what is allowed is the grant of interest in the nature of delay in payment of
just compensation. Hence, the LBP is obliged to pay interest at 12% per annum from the date of
taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July l, 2013 until fully paid, in the event it is
found to be in delay in the payment of just compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps.
Chu, G.R. No. 192345, March 29, 2017)

Jurisprudence teaches us that "taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, "occurs
not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his
property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material
impairment of the value of his property." As in Andaya, even though the Republic was not
legally bound to pay just compensation for enforcing its right of way, the Court nevertheless
found that its project to be undertaken - the construction of floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the
Lower Agusan Development Project - would prevent ingress and egress in Andaya's private
property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River,
effectively depriving him of the normal use of the remainder of his property. To the mind of the
Court, this resulted in a "taking" of what was left of Andaya's property, entitling him to
consequential damages, awarded by the Court in the form of just compensation. (Bartolata v.
Republic, G.R. No. 223334, June 7, 2017)

11
To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the property owner will be entitled to just
compensation for the remaining property under Sec. 112 of CA 141: (1) that the remainder is not
subject to the statutory lien of right of way; and (2) that the enforcement of the right of way
results in the practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the remaining
property, or in the property owner being dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the normal use
of the said remainder. (Bartolata v. Republic, G.R. No. 223334, June 7, 2017)

Guilty of reiteration, Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation
for the government's enforcement of its right of way. The contract allegedly entered by the
parties for the government's acquisition of the affected portion of the property in exchange for
just compensation is then void ab initio for being contrary to law. Consequently, petitioner has
no right to collect just compensation for the government's use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent
the Pl,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents, such amount paid shall be
governed by the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust enrichment. (Bartolata v. Republic, G.R.
No. 223334, June 7, 2017)

As discussed above, petitioner was never entitled to collect and receive just compensation for
the government's enforcement of its right of way, including the Pl,480,000 payment made by
respondents. For its part, the government erroneously made payment to petitioner because of
its failure to discover earlier on that the portion of the property acquired was subject to a
statutory lien in its favor, which it could have easily learned of upon perusal of petitioner's
Order of Award. These circumstances satisfy the requirements for solutio indebiti to apply. xxx.

In this case, petitioner was erroneously paid Pl,480,000 on August 14, 1997 when respondents
appropriated the amount in his favor. However, because of respondents' representation that the
amount was a mere down payment for just compensation, petitioner never objected to the
taking of his land and peacefully parted with his property, expecting to be paid in full for the
value of the taken property thereafter. As the events unfolded, respondents did not make good
their guarantee. Instead, they would claim for the recovery of the wrongful payment after
almost twelve (12) years, on July 9, 2009, as a counterclaim in their Supplemental Answer.
Indubitably, respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering from petitioner the amount
initially paid. A modification of the assailed CA ruling is, therefore, in order. (Bartolata v.
Republic, G.R. No. 223334, June 7, 2017)

We likewise rule that the RTC committed a serious error when it directed the Republic to pay
respondents consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other
taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property. xxx.

This is clearly an error. It is settled that the transfer of property through expropriation
proceedings is a sale or exchange within the meaning of Sections 24(D) and 56(A)(3) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, and profit from the transaction constitutes capital gain. Since
capital gains tax is a tax on passive income, it is the seller, or respondents in this case, who are
liable to shoulder the tax.

In fact, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), in BIR Ruling No. 476-2013 dated December 18,
2013, has constituted the DPWH as a withholding agent tasked to withhold the 6'% final
withholding tax in the expropriation of real property for infrastructure projects. Thus, as far as
the government is concerned, the capital gains tax in expropriation proceedings remains a

12
liability of the seller, as it is a tax on the seller's gain from the sale of real property. ( Republic v.
Sps. Salvador, G.R. No. 205428, June 7, 2017)

Besides, as previously explained, consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the

expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in
value. In this case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of
the subject property as a result of the expropriation. More significantly, given that the payment
of capital gains tax on the transfer of the subject property has no effect on the increase or
decrease in value of the remaining property, it can hardly be considered as consequential
damages that may be awarded to respondents. (Republic v. Sps. Salvador, G.R. No. 205428, June
7, 2017)

Due Process

Petitioners claim that there has been a lack of observance of due process; that "there has been no
trial or hearing"; and that "petitioners were shamefully never given an opportunity to show that
the questioned properties may have been lawfully acquired through other means." We find the
invocation of lack of observance of due process at this stage of the proceedings rather belated,
especially when it was never invoked before the Sandiganbayan. Needless to say, the various
pleadings petitioners have filed in this case and in other cases involving the Marcos properties
were countless occasions when they could have proven that the Malacañang Collection had
indeed been lawfully acquired as claimed. They allege that they were denied due process by not
being given any opportunity to prove their lawful acquisition of the Malacañang Collection.
This allegation cannot be given credence for being utterly baseless.

The complete records of Civil Case No. 0141 - a total of 35 volumes along with 2 envelopes
containing exhibits and 1 envelope containing the transcripts of stenographic notes - have been
forwarded to this Court by the Sandiganbayan. Pertinent parts of these documents annexed to
the 1991 Petition, along with the other pleadings filed before the Sandiganbayan relative to the
present petitions, have also been extensively quoted and reproduced verbatim in this
resolution. The purpose is not only to provide a clearer statement of the factual antecedents, but
also to confirm the veracity of the reference to these documents and to equally dispel any doubt
regarding them. (Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Republic, G.R. No. 213027, January 18, 2017)

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural
due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative
proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a
formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not
strictly applied. The Court's disquisition in Ledesma v. CA is instructive on this matter, to wit:

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a
trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to

13
 seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In this case, NPI essentially claims that it was deprived of its right to due process when it was
not notified of the proceedings before the LA and did not receive copies and issuances from the
other parties and the LA, respectively. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, NPI was
furnished via courier of a copy of the amended complaint filed by the respondents against it as
shown by LBC Receipt No. 125158910840. It is also apparent that NPI was also furnished with
the respondents' Position Paper, Reply, and Rejoinder. Verily, NPI was indeed accorded due
process, but as the LA mentioned, the former chose not to file any position paper or appear in
the scheduled conferences.

Assuming arguendo that NPI was somehow deprived of due process by either of the labor
tribunals, such defect was cured by: (a) NPI's filing of its motion for reconsideration before the
NLRC; (b) the NLRC's subsequent issuance of its Resolution dated August 30, 2013 wherein the
tribunal considered all ofNPI's arguments as contained in its motion; and (c) NPI's subsequent
elevation of the case to the CA. In Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission, the Court reiterated the
rule that "[a]ny seeming defect in [the] observance [of due process] is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration," and that "denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a
party who [was] afforded the opportunity to be heard xxx." Similarly, in Autencio v. Manara, it
was held that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the party has been afforded
the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Evidently, the foregoing shows that NPI was not denied due process of law as it was afforded
the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain its side. (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Puedan, G.R.
No. 220617, January 30, 2017)
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." "The party who seeks to avail of the
same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so the right to appeal is
lost." (Turks Shawarma Company v. Pajaron, G.R. No. 207156, January 16, 2017)

In fine, the CA unquestionably exceeded its jurisdiction in including PSALM within the
coverage of the TRO and the writ of injunction issued against NPC. There is no question that as
a provisional remedy to prevent irreparable injury pending the final determination of the
action, injunction can bind only the parties in the action, or their privies or successors-in-
interest. No person who has not been impleaded and duly served with the summons should be
adversely affected by the outcome of the action. The principle that a person cannot be
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which it has not been made a
party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Certiorari lies. (Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 194226, February
15, 2017)

In Diana v. Balangue, we held that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or
in excess of what is being sought by the party. It is improper for a court to enter an order which
exceeds the scope of relief sought in the pleadings in the absence of a notice which affords the
opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. Due process
considerations justify this requirement to prevent surprise to the defendant.

14
In this case, the MeTC did not inform Buen that the Comment/Opposition would be treated as
a motion for reconsideration of the April 11, 2006 Order. It thus came as a surprise to Buen that
the action would be dismissed with prejudice on account of the belatedly filed
Comment/Opposition. (Martinez v. Buen, G.R. No. 187342, April 5, 2017)

In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the thing in
litigation must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that interest. Thus, as the essence
of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the
defendant may have in support of her defense, she must be properly served the summons of the
court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due
process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an
issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, as will be discussed, it would seem
that the Constitutional right of the petitioner to be properly served the summons and be
notified has been disregarded by the officers of the trial court. xxx.

In the case now before Us, the summons was served on the petitioner by publication. Yet, the
circumstances surrounding the case do not justify the resort.

Consider: in July 2003, the sheriff attempted to serve the summons on the defendants, including
petitioner Carmelita, at Fumakilla Compound, i.e., the property already foreclosed, acquired,
and possessed by the respondent bank as early as August 2001. Immediately after this single
attempt at personal service in July 2003, the respondent bank moved in October 2003 for leave to
serve the summons by publication (and not even substituted service), which motion the RTC
granted.
Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her the
summons before the service by publication was allowed. Neither was it impossible to locate the
residence of petitioner and her whereabouts. (Borlongan v. Banco de Oro, G.R. No. 217617/G.R.
No. 218540, April 5, 2017)

It is true that fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first
time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial. However, before a
party may be barred from raising an issue for the first time on appeal, it is imperative that the
issue could have been raised during the trial. What escaped the appellate court‘s attention is
that the sale of the one-half undivided share in the subject property to Rafael was consummated
only on December 29, 2005, more than two after Rafael filed with the MTCC his answer to the
complaint for unlawful detainer on July 18, 2003. Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his
acquisition of Levi's share in the subject property as an affirmative defense in the answer he
filed with the MTCC. (Uy v. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017)

Presently, while Eugenio still provides much needed guidance in the resolution of issues relating
to the freeze and bank inquiry orders, the Decision in that case no longer applies insofar as it
requires that notice be given to the account holders before a bank inquiry order may be issued.
Upon the enactment of R.A. 10167 on 8 June 2012, Section 11 of R.A. 9160 was further amended
to allow the AMLC to file an ex parte application for an order allowing an inquiry into bank
deposits and investments. xxx.

The constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. 9160, as presently worded, was upheld by the Court
En Banc in the recently promulgated Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. CA.

15
The Court therein ruled that the AMLC's ex parte application for a bank inquiry, which is
allowed under Section 11 of R.A. 9160, does not violate substantive due process. There is no
such violation, because the physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property is not
contemplated in any form by the law. The AMLC may indeed be authorized to apply ex parte
for an inquiry into bank accounts, but only in pursuance of its investigative functions akin to
those of the National Bureau of Investigation. As the AMLC does not exercise quasi-judicial
functions, its inquiry by court order into bank deposits or investments cannot be said to violate
any person's constitutional right to procedural due process. (Republic v. Bolante, G.R. No.
186717/G.R. No. 190357, April 17, 2017)

The COA received the petitioners' joint motion for reconsideration vis-a-vis the assailed Decision
No. 2012-269 dated December 28, 2012 following the submission of the petitioners' individual
letters seeking the reconsideration of the questioned issuances. Their joint motion and their
letters for reconsideration were considered by the COA in reaching the Resolution dated
December 4, 2014. As such, the petitioners had no factual and legal bases to complain. We
remind that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the guarantee of due
process, indeed, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of previous notice but the
denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as the party was afforded the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. (Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216538; Antonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
216954, April 18, 2017)
While this Court is mindful of cases where the private offended party was allowed to pursue a
criminal action on his or her own behalf - such as when there is a denial of due process - such
exceptional circumstances do not exist in this case. The OSG, in its Manifestation, expressly
stated that it will not file a reply to Lolita's comment on the petition for review on certiorari
considering that it did not file the present petition. (Bumatay v. Bumatay, G.R. No. 191320, April
25, 2017)

The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law xxx." It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from
an individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The dispossession of
property, or in this case the stoppage of the construction of a building in 'one's own property,
would violate substantive due process. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948,
April 25, 2017)

In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule
for that matter, that the construction of a building outside Rizal Park is prohibited if the
building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no
legal duty on the part of City of Manila "to consider," in the words of the Dissenting Opinion,
'the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for
the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the
boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the
area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is "not part of the
Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in 1995," and the Torre de Manila
area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I.
Diokno. Neither the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a "heritage zone, a cultural

16
property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure." (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes,
Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017)

In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to
morals, customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community.
On the contrary, the City of Manila determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set
under the pertinent laws and ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.

There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of
the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the
Rizal Monument. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017)

Section 47 of Ordinance 8119 specifically regulates the "development of historic sites and
facilities." Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is nothing in
Sections 47 and 48 of No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the
boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the background of a
historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal
Monument and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument." Likewise,
the Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an "anthropological or
archeological area" or in an area designated as a heritage zone, cultural property, historical
landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No.
213948, April 25, 2017)
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila
project cannot be considered as a "direct menace to public or safety." Not only is a
condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the
proper government agencies, complied with health and safety standards set by law. (Knights of
Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017)

On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens.

By definition, a nuisance per accidens is determined based on its surrounding conditions and
circumstances. These conditions and circumstances must be well established, not merely
alleged. The Court cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as established facts
as the KOR would have us do in this case. The KOR itself concedes that the question of whether
the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens is a question of fact.

The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their
force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus made. This Court is no such authority. It is not a
trier of facts. It cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as facts, more
so in this case where these allegations are contested by the respondents.

The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial courts. The question, then, of
whether the Torre de Manila project is a nuisance per accidens must be settled after due
proceedings brought before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent the
process in the guise of protecting national culture and heritage. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes,
Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017)

17
Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act
may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with
both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to
the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property.
Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps,
even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without
arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it.

The undisputed fact is that the petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to due
process of law.

As expounded by the Court, what it found to be primarily deplorable is the failure of the
respondents to act upon, much less address, the various oppositions filed by the petitioners
against the product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of the questioned
contraceptive drugs and devices. Instead of addressing the petitioners' assertion that the
questioned contraceptive drugs and devices fell within the definition of an "abortifacient" under
Section 4(a) of the RH Law because of their "secondary mechanism of action which induces
abortion or destruction of the fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb," the respondents chose to ignore them
and proceeded with the registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of several
contraceptive drugs and devices. (Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. v. Garin,
Resolution on Partial MR, G.R. No. 217872/G.R. No. 221866. April 26, 2017)
A reading of the various provisions, cited by the respondents in support of their assertion that
due process need not be complied with in the approval of contraceptive drugs or devices, all the
more reinforces the Court's conclusion that the FDA did fail to afford the petitioners a genuine
opportunity to be heard. (Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. v. Garin, Resolution
on Partial MR, G.R. No. 217872/G.R. No. 221866. April 26, 2017)

In the Decision, the Court found that the FDA certified, procured and administered
contraceptive drugs and devices, without the observance of the basic tenets of due process, that
is, without notice and without public hearing. It appeared that, other than the notice inviting
stakeholders to apply for certification/recertification of their reproductive health products,
there was no showing that the respondents considered the opposition of the petitioners.
(Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. v. Garin, Resolution on Partial MR, G.R. No.
217872/G.R. No. 221866. April 26, 2017)

The Court is of the view that the FDA need not conduct a trial-type hearing. Indeed, due
process does not require the conduct of a trial-type hearing to satisfy its requirements. All that
the Constitution requires is that the FDA afford the people their right to due process of law and
decide on the applications submitted by MAHs after affording the oppositors like the
petitioners a genuine opportunity to present their science-based evidence. As earlier pointed
out, this the FDA failed to do. It simply ignored the opposition of the petitioners. (Alliance for
the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. v. Garin, Resolution on Partial MR, G.R. No. 217872/G.R.
No. 221866. April 26, 2017)

As applied to certification proceedings at the FDA, "substantial evidence" refers to the best
scientific evidence available, "including but not limited to: meta analyses, systematic reviews,
national clinical practice guidelines where available, and recommendations of international

18
medical organizations," needed to support a conclusion whether a contraceptive drug or device
is an abortifacient or not. The FDA need not be bound or limited by the evidence adduced by
the parties, but it can conduct its own search for related scientific data. It can also consult other
technical scientific experts known in their fields. It is also not bound by the principle of stare
decisis or res judicata, but may update itself and cancel certifications motu proprio when new
contrary scientific findings become available or there arise manifest risks which have not been
earlier predicted. (Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. v. Garin, Resolution on
Partial MR, G.R. No. 217872/G.R. No. 221866. April 26, 2017)

In this case, records show that the Formal Charge against Gutierrez was issued following the
LTO's issuance of a Show Cause Memorandum. Under Section 16 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), a Show Cause Memorandum emanating
from the disciplining authority or its authorized representative is sufficient to institute
preliminary investigation proceedings, xxx.

A reading of the Show Cause Memorandum issued by the LTO shows that Gutierrez was
directed to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her. The latter then duly
complied therewith by submitting her letter-reply pursuant thereto. Evidently, Gutierrez was
accorded her right to procedural due process when she was given an opportunity to be heard
before the LTO found a prima facie case against her, which thus, necessitated the issuance of the
Formal Charge. In fact, even after the issuance of a Formal Charge, the LTO continued to
respect Gutierrez's right to procedural due process as it allowed her to file an Answer to refute
the charges of Gross Insubordination, Refusal to Perform Official Duties, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against her. (Disciplinary Board, Land Transportation
Office v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 224395, July 3, 2017)

Equal Protection

To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid

classification. The Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed
it a priority to address their needs. When the Constitution declared its intention to prioritize the
predicament of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children, it did not
make any reservation as to income, race, religion or any other personal circumstances. It was a
blanket privilege afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the vulnerability
of their class. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

The same ratiocination may be said of the recognition of PWDs as a class in R.A. No. 9442 and
in granting them discounts. It needs no further explanation that PWDs have special needs
which, for most, last their entire lifetime. They constitute a class of their own, equally deserving
of government support as our elderlies. While some of them may be willing to work and earn
income for themselves, their disability deters them from living their full potential. Thus, the
need for assistance from the government to augment the reduced income or productivity
brought about by their physical or intellectual limitations. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

There is also no question that the grant of mandatory discount is germane to the purpose of
R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, that is, to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health

19
development and make essential goods and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost, with special priority given to the elderlies and the disabled, among others. The
privileges granted by the laws ease their concerns and allow them to live more comfortably.

The subject laws also address a continuing concern of the government for the welfare of the
senior citizens and PWDs. It is not some random predicament but an actual, continuing and
pressing concern that requires preferential attention. Also, the laws apply to all senior citizens
and respectively, without further distinction or reservation. Without a doubt, all the elements
for a valid classification were met. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social
Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Probable Cause

The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal
evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination of
probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the determination of
probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive function. This Court clarified this concept in
Napoles v. De Lima:

During preliminary investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of probable

cause for filing an information in court or dismissing the criminal complaint. As worded
in the Rules of Court, the prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation
whether "there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial." At this stage, the determination of probable cause is an executive function. Absent
grave abuse of discretion, this determination cannot be interfered with by the courts. This
is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.

On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause
is a judicial function. No less than the Constitution commands that "no ... warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce[.]" This requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in Rule
112, Section 5 (a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure[.] …

Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that
for issuance of an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is filed in court, the
trial court acquires jurisdiction and "any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court."
(Citations omitted)

In De Lima v. Reyes, this Court further held:

The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor s conduct of a preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor s determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion. Prosecutors
are given a wide latitude of discretion to determine whether an information should be
filed in court or whether the complaint should be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)

Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors' conduct of preliminary investigation was
"incomplete" and that their determination of probable cause "has not measured up to [the]

20
standard," she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead of
determining probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary investigation. (Masa
v. Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017)

In Leviste v. Hon. Alameda, et al.:

[T]he task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and
on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard
the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. (Citations
omitted)

Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation, it was
incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused after a
personal evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the supporting documents. She could even
disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or require the prosecutors to submit
additional evidence. There was no option for her to remand the case back to the panel of
prosecutors for another preliminary investigation. In doing so, she acted without any legal
basis. (Masa v. Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017)

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

In a preliminary investigation, ...the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;] [i]t is not a trial on
the merits." Since "it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the
prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of
the accused," the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a
preliminary investigation. (Masa v. Turla, G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017)

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal action, is defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. It does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence
to procure conviction. Only prima facie evidence is required or that which is, on its face, good
and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's
claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.

21
The task of determining probable cause is lodged with the public prosecutor and ultimately, the
Secretary of Justice. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no right to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government. Thus, we have generally adopted a policy of non-interference with
the executive determination of probable cause. Where, however, there is a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion, courts are allowed to reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and
conclusions on matters of probable cause.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion is grave where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law.

In Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, we have ruled that the dismissal of the complaint by the
Secretary of Justice, despite ample evidence to support a finding of probable cause, clearly
constitutes grave error and warrants judicial intervention and correction.

Here, we find that Secretary Gonzalez committed grave abuse of discretion when he
disregarded evidence on record and sustained the Joint Resolution of Prosecutor Macabulos
dismissing the criminal complaints against petitioners. (Forietrans Manufacturing Corporation v.
Davidoff Et Cia. SA, G.R. No. 197482, March 6, 2017)

The determination of probable cause by the judge should not be confused with the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor. The first is made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, or for purposes of this case,
whether a search warrant should be issued. The second is made by the prosecutor during
preliminary investigation to determine whether a criminal case should be filed in court. The
prosecutor has no power or authority to review the determination of probable cause by the
judge, just as the latter does not act as the appellate court of the former. Here, as correctly
argued by respondents, Prosecutor Macabulos focused on the evidence submitted before Judge
Sunga to support the issuance of search warrants. He lost sight of the fact that as a prosecutor,
he should evaluate only the evidence presented before him during the preliminary
investigation. With his preconceived notion of the invalidity of the search warrants in mind,
Prosecutor Macabulos appeared to have completely ignored the evidence presented by
respondents during preliminary investigation. (Forietrans Manufacturing Corporation v. Davidoff
Et Cia. SA, G.R. No. 197482, March 6, 2017)

In this case, Secretary Gonzalez found no probable cause against petitioners for infringement of
the JTI trademarks based on his conclusion that no fake Mild Seven and Mild Seven Lights were
seized from FMC's premises during the raid. He already passed upon as authentic and credible
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest/Seizure presented by petitioners which did not list Mild Seven and
Mild Seven Lights cigarettes as among those items seized during the raid. In so doing, Secretary
Gonzalez assumed the function of a trial judge, determining and weighing the evidence
submitted by the parties.

Meanwhile, the Complaint-Affidavit in the JTI infringement case shows that, more likely than
not, petitioners have committed the offense charged. FMC, alleged to be without authority to

22
deal with JTI products, is claimed to have been manufacturing cigarettes that have almost the
same appearance as JTI' s Mild Seven and Mild Seven Lights cigarettes. (Forietrans
Manufacturing Corporation v. Davidoff Et Cia. SA, G.R. No. 197482, March 6, 2017)

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority
to barge into private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant.
While there are instances where arrests and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court
finds that the constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated in the case at bar. (Villamor v. People, G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017)

Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." The probable cause must be "determined personally by the judge, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." Probable
cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The
determination of the existence of probable cause is concerned only with the question of whether
the affiant has reasonable wounds to believe that the accused committed or is committing the
crime charged.

Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrarnt after deposing two
witnesses, namely PI Barber and SP03 Salamida. In particular, the disposition of SP03 Salamida
shows that he had personal knowledge of appellant's drug pushing activities which served as
basis for the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Thus, whether or
not PI Barber had personal knowledge of the illegal drug activities committed by appellant will
not adversely affect the findings of probable cause for the purpose of issuance of search
warrant. (People v. Gayoso, G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017)

In the issuance of a bank inquiry order, the power to determine the existence of probable cause
is lodged in the trial court. (Republic v. Bolante, G.R. No. 186717/G.R. No. 190357, April 17, 2017)

Arrests/Searches and Seizures

Even as the Court considers the alleged failure of the apprehending police officers to inform
Hirang of the Miranda rights upon his arrest, there is no sufficient ground for the Court to
acquit him. The CA correctly explained that any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured by
his voluntary act of entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the issue. In
People v. Vasquez, the Court held:

[T]he Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We
reiterated in People v. Tampis that [a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move
for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are
now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured
upon their voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction. xxx. (People v. Hirang,
G.R. No. 223528, January 11, 2017)

23
The buy-bust team had an entire day within which to coordinate with the persons required by
law to be present during the physical inventory of the seized drugs. The Chief of Police received
the confidential tip early in the morning. He immediately instructed SPO4 Morales to form a
buy-bust team and coordinate with agents from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. The
buy-bust team had ample time to contact an elected public official and representatives from the
media and the Department of Justice.

The prosecution established during trial and on appeal that the buy-bust operation had been
carefully planned by narrating the events with intricate detail. However, at the same time, the
prosecution relied heavily on the exception to the chain of custody rule. Worse, the prosecution
did not even offer any explanation on why they failed to comply with what was mandated
under the law. Indeed, if the police authorities had carefully planned the buy-bust operation,
then there was no reason for them to neglect such important requirements. They cannot feign
ignorance of the exacting standards under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Police officers
are presumed and are required to know the laws they are charged with executing.

This Court cannot merely gloss over the glaring procedural lapses committed by the police
officers, especially when what had been allegedly seized from accused-appellant was only
0.0604 grams of shabu. Recent cases have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of seized
drugs in the chain of custody when only a miniscule amount of drugs had been allegedly seized
from the accused.

In People v. Holgado, this Court held that "[c]ourts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent
with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving
miniscule amounts of drugs . . . [as] they can be readily planted and tampered."

Non-observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 casts
doubt on the integrity of the shabu supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This creates
reasonable doubt in the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165. (People v. Jaafar, G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017)

The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid
warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant
for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence
obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been
obtained in violation of the said right. (Villamor v. People, G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017)

In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, or
caught in the act of committing an offense. PD Peñaflor and his team of police officers claim that
petitioners were committing the offense of illegal numbers game when they were arrested
without a warrant.

We are not persuaded. xxx.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur,
namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just

24
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid
warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established that petitioners had just
committed, or were actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or
acts were done in the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi
and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners. xxx.

Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the
petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a
c1iminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even
admitted that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which
made it harder to see what was happening inside the compound. It appears that the police
officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on
personal knowledge that a crime had just been c01m11itted, was actually being committed, or
was about to be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers
witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding
the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could
not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers
and money on the table, he readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalias.
(Villamor v. People, G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017)

Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same
does not satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and
seizure of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there could be
no valid search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from Bonaobra's
house is inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree. (Villamor v. People, G.R. No. 200396,
March 22, 2017)

The Court is aware that any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be
raised before arraignment. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the
legality of the arrest especially when the accused actively participated during trial as in this
case. However, we have clarified that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest
and not on the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal arrest. In People v. Racho,
the Court held that:

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree', hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution, 'any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding'.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant's conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of
his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active
participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,

25
 warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of
illegal gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and as a coordinator, controller, or
supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. Under the said law, a collector or agent is "any
person who collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for any illegal
numbers game who is usually in possession of gambling paraphernalia." On the other hand, a
coordinator, controller, or supervisor is defined as, ''any person who exercises control and
supervision over the collector or agent." The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal
gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the
specific overt acts that constitute the offense.

All told, the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is inadmissible in
evidence since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
the Court acquits petitioners. (Villamor v. People, G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017)

While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates a case
of warrantless searches and seizures. Here, the police officers secured a search warrant prior to
their operation. They therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its
implementation. However, the police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic sachets of
shabu seized inside appellant's house in spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they
prepared while still inside the said house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with
the marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of
custody. (People v. Gayoso, G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017)

Likewise, without merit is the accused-appellants' contention as regards the validity of their
warrantless arrest. The accused-appellants never raised the supposed illegality of their arrest
prior to their arraignment. In fact, nowhere in any part of the proceedings before the R TC did
the accused-appellants assail the validity of their arrest. The accused-appellants only brought
up the supposed irregularity in their arrest for the first time in their appeal to the CA. It has
been ruled time and again that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with
regard to his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before his arraignment. Any objection involving the procedure by
which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
226475, March 13, 2017)

Right to Privacy

As regards the purported violation of the right to privacy, the Court recalled the
pronouncement in Eugenio that the source of the right to privacy governing bank deposits is
statutory, not constitutional. The legislature may validly carve out exceptions to the rule on the
secrecy of bank deposits, and one such legislation is Section 11 of R.A. 9160.

The Court in Subido emphasized that the holder of a bank account that is the subject of a bank
inquiry order issued ex parte has the opportunity to question the issuance of such an order after
a freeze order has been issued against the account. The account holder can then question not

26
only the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the freeze order, but also the finding of
probable cause for the issuance of the bank inquiry order. (Republic v. Bolante, G.R. No.
186717/G.R. No. 190357, April 17, 2017)

Freedom of Expression

This Court will not freely infringe on the constitutional right to freedom of expression. It may
interfere, on occasion, for the proper administration of justice. However, the power of contempt
should be balanced with the right to freedom of expression, especially when it may have the
effect of stifling comment on public matters. Freedom of expression must always be protected to
the fullest extent possible. In In re: Lozano:

The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass,
or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is
ended. It is also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matters
which their policy requires should be kept private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or
proceedings in camera (6 R. C. L., pp. 508-515).

An examination of the authorities discloses that little attention has been directed to facts like
those before us, and that in the few cases which have given consideration to the question there
exist divergence of opinions. The English courts are more stringent in prohibiting the publication
of their proceedings than are the American courts. Thus where the petitioner and her solicitor
published a copy of the transcript of the official shorthand notes in a case of a very delicate and
private character in contravention of an order directing that the cause be heard in camera, the
presiding judge in England found the petitioner and her solicitor in contempt of court but
accepted their excuses and apologies (Scott vs. Scott [1912], Am. Ann. Cas., 1912-B, 540). A
decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa inclines to the same view, for in this case it was said that if
by general or special rule the publication of testimony pending general or special rule the
publication of testimony pending an investigation has been prohibited, a willful violation of such
rule might amount to a contempt (State of Iowa vs. Dunham [1858], 6 Iowa, 245). But in a
California divorce case, although the trial court ordered that no public report of the testimony
should be made, and thereafter punished the editor of a newspaper for publishing a report of the
trial, on certiorari the Supreme Court of California annulled the proceedings of the court under
review. As explanatory of this judgment, it should be said that a fair and true report of the
testimony was published and that the result was influenced by the phraseology of the California
Law (Re Shortridge [1893], 99 Cal., 526; 21 L. R. A., 755). Along similar lines is the case of Ex parte
Foster ([1903], 60 L. R. A., 631), coming from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and holding
that merely publishing a true statement of the testimony adducted from the witnesses in the
course of a public trial in the courts of justice does not authorize a finding of contempt. To
conclude our review of the pertinent decisions, we desire to quote from the decision of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Bums vs. State ([1911], 145 Wis., 373; 140 Am. St. Rep., 1081),
where, in referring to the commendation meted out to the courts of England, it was said: "Judicial
proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper
administration of justice, should never be, while the case i son trial, given publicity by the press."

With reference to the applicability of the above authorities, it should be remarked first of all that
this court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely and unqualifiedly. What is best for the
maintenance of the Judiciary in the Philippines should be the criterion. Here, in contrast to other

27
 jurisdictions, we need not be overly sensitive because of the sting of newspaper articles, for there
are no juries to be kept free from outside influence. Here also we are not restrained by regulatory
law. The only law, and that judge made, which is at all applicable to the situation, is the
resolution adopted by this court. That the respondents were ignorant of this resolution is no
excuse, for the very article published by them indicates that the hearing was held behind closes
doors and that the information of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen and from
comments in social circles. Then in writing up the investigation, it came about that the testimony
was mutilated and that the report reflected upon the action of the complainant to his possible
disadvantage.

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must
be protected in its fullest extent. The court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for
charges under given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Liberal Law which
come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the
citizen must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press
and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if
persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts.

In a recent Federal case (U. S. vs. Sullens [1929], 36 Fed. [2d], 230, 238, 239), Judge Holmes very
appropriately said:

The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct,
are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts
have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the
Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its
jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care
taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in
order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend
to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice,
this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt....

This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This
right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an
unprejudiced tribunal...

The power to punish for contempt is not exercised without careful consideration of the
circumstances of the allegedly contumacious act, and the purpose of punishing the act.
Especially where freedom of speech and press is involved, this Court has given a restrictive
interpretation as to what constitutes contempt.

In Cabansag v. Fernandez, this Court was asked to review a charge of contempt, which was based
on a remark in a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission. This Court
emphasized the importance of freedom of speech and press:

No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in relation to the
freedom of speech and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired

28
through the exercise of the power to punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that
the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.... A
judge may not hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him
unpopular or to belittle him.... The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications
concerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The
fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the
administration of justice." (Craig vs. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, syllabi.)

And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism
against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be
punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of public comment should in borderline
instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases." (Pennekamp vs.
Florida, 328 U. S. 331)

The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree (Schenck vs. U. S., supra).

The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme
difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of
courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the
basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right
to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They
are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against
contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which
the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U. S. 652.)

It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the
press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents
the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.... Reasonably limited, it was said by
story in the passage cited this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government;
without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic…

And, for yet more imperative reasons, a state may punish utterances endangering the
foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.
These imperil its own existence as a constitutional state....

... And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of a
given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to
measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A
single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a
sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting
arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures

29
 necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without
waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot
reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety
until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or
imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its
judgment suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra p.
35 (136 N. E. 605), it was aptly said: 'Manifestly the legislature has authority to forbid the
advocacy of a doctrine until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the
plan advocated. If the state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger
became certain, than its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with
the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor
courts for the enforcement of the law.' [(]Gitlow vs. New York, supra.)

In Cabansag, this Court reversed the contempt charges, considering that the allegedly
contumacious letter did not undermine or cause any serious imminent threat to the fair
administration of justice. This Court also noted that the intent behind sending the letter was not
to degrade the courts.

This was echoed in People v. Castelo, where this Court found that a news story, which was a
factual account of an investigation, and did not contain any words tending to affect the
administration of justice, was not contumacious. Although this case involved the freedom of the
press, it may be instructive in that, in determining whether the subject publication was
contumacious, this Court scrutinized its content, apparent purpose, and effect:

It should however be noted that there is nothing in the story which may even in a slight degree
indicate that the ultimate purpose of appellant in publishing it was to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice in connection with the Castelo case. The publication can be
searched in vain for any word that would in any way degrade it. The alleged extortion try merely
concerns a news story which is entirely different, distinct and separate from the Monroy murder
case. Though mention was made indirectly of the decision then pending in that case, the same
was made in connection with the extortion try as a mere attempt to secure the acquittal of
Castelo. But the narration was merely a factual appraisal of the negotiation and no comment
whatsoever was made thereon one way or the other coming from the appellant. Indeed,
according to the trial judge himself, as he repeatedly announced openly, said publication did not
in any way impede or obstruct his decision promulgated on March 31, 1955. As this Court has
aptly said, for a publication to be considered as contempt of court there must be a showing not
only that the article was written while a case is pending but that it must really appear that such
publication does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice (People vs.
Alarcon, 69 Phil., 265). Here, there is no such clear showing. The very decision of the court shows
the contrary.

In deciding Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of Appeals, this Court discussed various publications that it
deemed contumacious. This Court reiterated that an article which does not impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice is not contumacious:

With respect to the motion for contempt filed by Margarita Cojuangco against Rina Jimenez-
David, we believe that the article written by the latter is not such as to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice. The allegedly contemptuous article merely restates the
history of the case and reiterates the arguments which Rina Jimenez-David, together with some
other journalists have raised before this Court in their Brief for Petitioner Vitug. We do not find in
this case the contemptuous conduct exhibited by the respondent in In re Torres where the
respondent, being a newspaper editor, published an article which anticipated the outcome of a

30
 case in the Supreme Court, named the author of the decision, and pointed out the probable vote
of the members of the Court although in fact, no such action had been taken by the court; and in
In re Kelly where respondent, having been convicted of contempt of court, published a letter
during the pendency of his motion for a re-hearing of the contempt charge. In said letter, he
severely criticized the court and its action in the proceeding for contempt against him. In contrast
to the aforementioned publications, Rina Jimenez-David's article cannot be said to have cast
doubt on the integrity of the court or of the administration of justice. If at all, it was a mere
criticism of the existing libel law in the country. In view of the above considerations, we are
constrained to deny the motion for contempt.

Given these circumstances, citing respondents in contempt would be an unreasonable exercise

of this Court's contempt power.

On a final note, this Court is more resilient than as projected by the petitioner. We are aware of
the attempts of some parties - perhaps upon advice of their lawyers - to employ the media to
gain public sympathies for their case. Ultimately, this strategy is based on the hope that the
members of this Court will be swayed by the fear of vociferous criticism by columnists or
popular protagonists in social media. Unfortunately, such strategy is misguided.

Every resort to the media by one party invites the same effort from the opposing party.
Litigating cases in public may cause misunderstanding of the issues by the public, especially
since many opinion writers will usually infer motives and standpoints closer to fiction than
reality. Furthermore, there exists the real danger of slanting the focus of the public. Instead of
the important question as to whether our treaties allow custody of foreign military personnel in
transit through our territory, it has now become a battle of wits between counsel and the
spokesperson for the military. The public becomes invested in that issue, which, while
important for counsels, may be tangential to the more important public concerns.

Seasoned practitioners tend to approach their cases with more sobriety, dignity, and
professionalism. After all, after their years of practice, they discover that this Court is aware of
machinations using public opinion.

When a lawyer chooses to conduct his cases in as public a manner as in this case, it would be an
abuse of our contempt power to stifle the subject of his attention. A lawyer who uses the public
fora as his battleground cannot expect to be protected from public scrutiny.
Controversial cases of public interest cases can be challenging for lawyers. This Court is
cognizant of the hardships lawyers must face as they may continually be pressed by media for
details of their cases. Nonetheless, it must strike a balance between protecting officers of the
court from harassment on one hand, and the interests of freedom of speech on the other. Given
this case's factual milieu, the balance is served by denying the petition. In any case, this Court
harbors no doubt that Atty. Roque is an able lawyer who can carry himself with all the dignity
this profession requires to defend himself in the administrative proceedings against him. (Roque
v. AFP Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017)

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." "[A] statute or
act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance,
the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for

31
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.”

The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial challenge
is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of possible
'"'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person
who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law
may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The
overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence."

It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-speech cases.
They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017)

Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted.
Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights that may be facially challenged. What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. (Lagman
v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad
interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained. xxx.

The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other
rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas
clauses. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

Religious Freedom

Furthermore, as a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for
secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects-consistent with the non-
establishment clause. Hence, even if it is assumed that juridical persons are capable of
practicing religion, the Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from adopting,
much less exercising, any religion, including Islam.

The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded
that the Municipality of Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian." Yet it still proceeded to
attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This is manifest error on the
part of the Shari'a District Court. It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a
personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other
officers composing it. And under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on purely
religious considerations-as the Shari'a District Court has done-without running afoul the
inviolability of the separation of Church and State enshrined in the Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide
private respondents' complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.

32
Since it was clear from the complaint that the real party defendant was the Municipality of
Tangkal, the Shari'a District Court should have simply applied the basic doctrine of separate
juridical personality and motu proprio dismissed the case. (Municipality of Tangkal v. Balindong,
G.R. No. 193340, January 11, 2017)

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

The Court once pronounced that "our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the
state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
respective ends and aims."

Justice Isagani Cruz expounded on this doctrine, viz.:

The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good
neighbors." The idea is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and,
thus, avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the
limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities
to "render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's."

This, notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some
form of belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or
even an outright rejection of religion. Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity
and religiosity of our people as reflected in lmbong v. Ochoa, as follows:

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up
of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has
shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has
embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different
sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a
deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to Whom they called for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order
to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings
of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles
of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in

33
 government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools. [Emphases
supplied]

In Aglipay v. Ruiz (Aglipay), the Court acknowledged how religion could serve as a motivating
force behind each person's actions:

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed
unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344,
par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any
penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium xxx. Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed xxx. Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29,
Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial
moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain
crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of
the state xxx. [Emphasis supplied]

Thus, the right to believe or not to believe has again been enshrined in Section 5, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. xxx. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. xxx.

Free Exercise Clause

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."

"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect - freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare." Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two (2) concepts in
this wise:

34
 (1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He
may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none
at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being
that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul - in fact,
cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs
may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom
to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be
punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may
believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be
called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.

(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the
public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this
liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can
be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others.

It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State
and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can
be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if
such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the
purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on religious freedom

terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma."

Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State.
In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.

The State is aware of the existence of religious movements whose members believe in the
divinity of Jose Rizal. Yet, it does not implement measures to suppress the said religious sects.
Such inaction or indifference on the part of the State gives meaning to the separation of Church
and State, and at the same time, recognizes the religious freedom of the members of these sects
to worship their own Supreme Being.

As pointed out by Judge Lutero, "the Roman Catholics express their worship through the holy
mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their
religion. Our Muslim brethren, who are government employees, are allowed to worship their
Allah even during office hours inside their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are
exempted from rendering Saturday duty because their religion prohibits them from working on
a Saturday. Even Christians have been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in their own
offices. All these have been allowed in respect of the workers' right to the free exercise of their
religion. xxx"

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Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent to a fusion of Church
and State. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only
during noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not
being distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not
being adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has
been no detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state
interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.

In fact, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) was more lenient or tolerant. On November 13,
1981, the CSC came out with Resolution No. 81-1277, which provided, among others, that
"during Friday, the Muslim pray day, Muslims are excused from work from 10:00 o'clock in the
morning to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon." The Court struck this down as not sanctioned by the
law. It wrote:

To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m.
to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would
mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they would
be rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service rules for
each month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for
similar treatment.

The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those

belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the
public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from
compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.

Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures
may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right
does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right
would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise
their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. As Justice Brennan
explained, the "government [may] take religion into account ... to exempt, when possible,
from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs
and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."
[Emphases supplied]

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In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, the Court upheld the exemption of members of
Iglesia ni Cristo from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a
union, because it would violate the teaching of their church not to affiliate with a labor
organization.

In Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, the petitioners, who were members of
the Jehovah 's Witnesses, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge for it is their belief that those were acts of worship or religious devotion, which
they could not conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God. The Court
accommodated them and granted them an exemption from observing the flag ceremony out of
respect for their religious beliefs.

Further, several laws have been enacted to accommodate religion. The Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 has declared Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Christmas Day as regular
holidays. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9177 proclaimed the FIRST Day of Shawwal, the tenth month
of the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday for the observance of Eidul Fitr (the end of
Ramadan). R.A. No. 9849 declared the tenth day of Zhu/ Hijja, the twelfth month of the Islamic
Calendar, a national holiday for the observance of Eidul Adha. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, expressly
allows a Filipino Muslim to have more than one (1) wife and exempts him from the crime of
bigamy punishable under Revised Penal Code (RPC). The same Code allows Muslims to have
divorce.

As to Muslims in government offices, Section 3 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322,
provides:

Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in
the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-
thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch
break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages,
provided, that the employee who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this
provision.

Pursuant thereto, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277, dated November 13, 1981,
which reads in part:

2. During "Ramadan" the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service
official time of 8 o'clock to 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock is hereby modified to 7:30
AM. to 3:30 P.M. without noon break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as
undertime.

Following the decree, in Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City (Re:
Office Hours), the Court recognized that the observance of Ramadan as integral to the Islamic
faith and allowed Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30
o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon without any break during the period. This
is a clear case of accommodation because Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.0. No. 292, enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious
denomination, to render public service of no less than eight (8) hours a day or forty (40) hours a
week. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

37
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It
simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or
whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or
secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa. Its
minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M.
No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the other
hand, is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government
resources with the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State,
without being entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely exercise
their religion.

In a September 12, 2003 Memorandum for Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the Office of the
Chief Attorney recommended to deny, on constitutional grounds, the request of Rev. Fr. Carlo
M. Ilagan to hold a oneday vigil in honor of the Our Lady of Caysasay within the premises of
the Court. Such controversy must be distinguished from the present issue in that with respect to
the former, a Catholic priest was the one who requested for the vigil. Moreover, in that case, the
vigil would take one (1) whole working day; whereas in this case, the masses are held at the
initiative of Catholic employees and only during the thirty-minute lunch break.

Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. First,
there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly
mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when
judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they
are there on their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or
administrative officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings and
airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the
basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently
appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not
prejudiced other religions. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public money or property shall
be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any

38
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."

The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose." "Appropriate" means "to
prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for
a distinct use, or for the payment of a particular demand."

Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself
or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.
This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.

Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited is
the use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any
church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended
for the furtherance of a particular church.

It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of
public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely
incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general."
Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civic
parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be
used for a political assemblage.

In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation of
public money or property, not as to whether a particular act involves a direct or a mere
incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have placed
it before "use, benefit or support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the same provision
bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein public funds are
paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary because they
rendered service in the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. That a priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from
the money he received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds is
merely to compensate the priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will
perform the same services will also be compensated in the same manner.

Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. As such, the
foregoing interpretation finds support in the
Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is proscribed is the
passage of any law which tends to establish a religion, not merely to accommodate the free
exercise thereof.

39
The Constitution even grants tax exemption to properties actually, directly and exclusively
devoted to religious purposes. Certainly, this benefits the religious sects for a portion of what
could have been collected for the benefit of the public is surrendered in their favor.

In Manosca v. CA, a parcel of land located in Taguig was determined by the National Historical
Institute to be the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic then
sought to expropriate the said property. The exercise of the power of eminent domain was
questioned on the ground that it would only benefit members of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Court
upheld the legality of the expropriation, viz.:

The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains
to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. [Emphasis supplied]

Again, in Aglipay, the issuing and selling of postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress was assailed on the ground that it violated the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any church.
In ruling that there was no such violation, the Court held:

It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if
any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in
its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated. [Emphasis supplied]

Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the
sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics.

Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the exclusive use of its
faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciana. Judge Maceren reported that the basement is also
being used as a public waiting area for most of the day and a meeting place for different
employee organizations. The use of the area for holding masses is limited to lunch break period
from twelve (12) o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that
masses run for just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that no undue religious
bias is being committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily used by the
Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people and for
other purposes. Thus, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public
property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere
incidental consequence of its primary purpose. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-
19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Directing the Executive Judges of the RTC and MeTC to regulate and closely monitor the
holding of masses and other religious practices within the courts does not promote excessive
collaboration between courts and various religions. On the contrary, this is necessary to ensure
that there would be no excessive entanglement.

40
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice would set a dangerous
precedent and commence a domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent
neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the establishment of Shari'a courts, the
National Commission for Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims from the provisions
of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all be rendered nugatory because of strict
separation. The exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a union or the non-
compulsion recognized in favor of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain
gestures during the flag ceremony, will all go down the drain simply because we insist on strict
separation.

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend non-Catholics
is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional tolerance,
without regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the majority or to the
minority. It is emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship shall be without discrimination or preference." Otherwise, accommodation or
tolerance would just be mere lip service.

One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in reality,
refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the
same for others.

In fine, the Court denies the plea that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC
Hall of Justice be prohibited because the said practice does not violate the constitutional
principle of separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against
appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or
any other system of religion. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7,
2017)

Presumption of Innocence

It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The
burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of
evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal. (People v. Tionloc, G.R. No. 212193,
February 15, 2017)

While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a
person's very conscience. While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is
borne, not by a mere abstraction, but by constitutional necessity xxx. (Daayata v. People, G.R. No.
205745, March 8, 2017)

Respondent apparently maintains that because the petitioners' drug tests were conducted right
after their arrest, it was proven that drugs were used at the drug den itself. Moreover, the use of
drugs at a drug den automatically implies that the drug users were aware of the nature of the
place as a drug den before visiting it.

41
This position is untenable.

True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs some time before
their arrest. However, assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den before
their arrest, there was no showing how long petitioners were at the alleged drug den, or how
long the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no basis to assume that
petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before arrest, and thus, at the location of the
arrest.

Assuming that persons who test positive for drugs used them at the place of arrest is not
sufficient to show that they were aware of the nature of the suspected drug den before visiting
it, absent any other circumstantial evidence.

There was no attempt to show that petitioners knew the nature of the alleged drug den, or even
that they used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found to be in possession of any
drugs. When petitioners were arrested, nobody was found "in the act of using, selling or buying
illegal drugs, nor packaging nor hiding nor transporting the same." There were no acts alleged
or evidence found, which would tend to show a familiarity with the nature of the place as a
drug den.

The crime of knowingly visiting a drug den under Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9165
carries with it a minimum penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and one (1) day, and a
maximum of 20 years. It is not to be taken so lightly that its elements can be presumed to exist
without any effort to show them. Given the dearth of evidence in this case, we are constrained
to acquit petitioners of this particular charge. (Coronel v. People, G.R. No. 214536, March 13, 2017)

In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to explain why the inventory and
photograph of the seized evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at
the police station, as required by the IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of
the seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of Macapundag. It was also
silent on the absence of a representative from the DOJ, the media and an elected public official
to witness the inventory and receive copies of the same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of
inventory and photographs of the seized items. Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of
procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. It has been repeated in
jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.

With the foregoing pronouncement, the Court finds petitioner's acquittal in order. As such, it is
unnecessary to delve into the other issues raised in this case. (People v. Macapundag, G.R. No.
225965, March 13, 2017)

True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs some time before
their arrest. However, assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den before
their arrest, there was no showing how long petitioners were at the alleged drug den, or how
long the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no basis to assume that

42
petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before arrest, and thus, at the location of the
arrest.

Assuming that persons who test positive for drugs used them at the place of arrest is not
sufficient to show that they were aware of the nature of the suspected drug den before visiting
it, absent any other circumstantial evidence.

There was no attempt to show that petitioners knew the nature of the alleged drug den, or even
that they used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found to be in possession of any
drugs. When petitioners were arrested, nobody was found "in the act of using, selling or buying
illegal drugs, nor packaging nor hiding nor transporting the same." There were no acts alleged
or evidence found, which would tend to show a familiarity with the nature of the place as a
drug den.

The crime of knowingly visiting a drug den under Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9165
carries with it a minimum penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and one (1) day, and a
maximum of 20 years. It is not to be taken so lightly that its elements can be presumed to exist
without any effort to show them. Given the dearth of evidence in this case, we are constrained
to acquit petitioners of this particular charge. (Coronel v. People, G.R. No. 214536, March 13, 2017)

In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (People v. Claro, G.R.
No. 199894, April 5, 2017)

Nature and Cause of Accusation

It is apparent that there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime in the Information (rape
by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC) and the recital in the
Information (rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of the same provision of law).
However, this discrepancy does not violate appellant's right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. As ruled correctly by the RTC, the allegations in the
Information charged appellant with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of
Article 266-A of the RPC and said allegations or recital in the Information determine the nature
of the crime committed. "[T]he character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information." (People v. Tionloc, G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017)

Petitioner contends that, granting without admitting that he is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness, he should only be
held liable for the crime as penalized under the RPC and not under RA 7610. According to him, to be held liable
under the latter law, it is necessary that the victim is involved in or subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse,
and that the failure to allege such element constituted a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and the cause of accusation against him.

It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element constituting the offense must be
alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of the crime charged. This is to

43
apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against him, which is part and parcel of the
rights accorded to an accused enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

… the Court has consistently put more premium on the facts embodied in the Information as
constituting the offense rather than on the designation of the offense in the caption. In fact, an
investigating prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by
its formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against
an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or
preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
being conclusions of law. It then behooves this Court to place the text of the Information under
scrutiny. xxx.

The fault in petitioner's logic lies in his misapprehension of how the element that the victim is
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" should be alleged in the
Information. xxx.

Guilty of reiteration, the accusatory portion of the Information reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby accuses EDUARDO
QUIMVEL y BRAGA also known as EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, committed
as follows:

That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd and unchaste design, through force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, insert his hand inside the panty of [AAA], a
minor of 7 years old and mash her vagina, against her
will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. xxx.

To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one "exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the
phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse against children. xxx.

The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as
appearing in the Information. The designation of the offense is a critical element required under
Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in apprising the accused of the offense being
charged. Its inclusion in the Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to
afford him of the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. Its import is underscored in

44
this case where the preamble states that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610." (Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017)

Lastly, the Informations alleged that the accused-appellant was the stepfather of AAA. The
evidence, however, shows that the accused-appellant was merely the common-law spouse of
AAA's mother, BBB. There was no evidence adduced to prove that accused-appellant was
legally married to BBB. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that it was proven during trial that
accused-appellant was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, the same cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance for it was not specifically alleged in the Informations.
The circumstances of relationship and minority must be both alleged in the Informations and
proved during trial to be convicted of the crime of qualified rape. Therefore, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA for the conviction of accused-appellant for
two counts of simple rape as they were sufficiently supported by the evidence on record. (People
v. Amoc, G.R. No. 216937, June 5, 2017)

Cross-Examination

The right to cross-examine opposing witnesses has long been considered a fundamental element
of due process in both civil and criminal proceedings.

In proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, the right to cross-examine a deponent is an

even more vital part of the procedure. In fact, the Revised Rules on Evidence provide that
depositions previously taken are only admissible in evidence against an adverse party who had
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Because depositions are an exception to the
general rule on the inadmissibility of hearsay testimony, the process of cross-examination is an
important safeguard against false statements. As the Court explained in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan:

The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness

made on direct examination. The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as
an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the
right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against
whom a witness may be called. This right is available, of course, at the taking of
depositions, as well as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal
justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the
present adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the
premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard against
falsehoods and frauds.

Nevertheless, it is true that the right to cross-examination is far from absolute. Indeed, it may be
waived by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right; for instance, the failure of a party
to avail itself of the opportunity to cross-examine a deponent. In Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, the Court explained:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial

litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a

45
 party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it,
he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.

The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to
cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the
application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for
reasons attributable to himself alone.

In this case, we find that the conduct of petitioner cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to
cross-examine respondent. (Martinez v. Ongsiako, G.R. No. 209057, March 15, 2017)

Promulgation in Absentia

Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to promulgate a
judgment in absentia and gives the accused the opportunity to file an appeal within a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice to the latter or the latter's counsel; otherwise, the decision becomes
final.

Records show that respondent was properly informed of the promulgation scheduled on 15
December 2005. The RTC Order dated 30 November 2005 documents the presence of his counsel
during the hearing. It is an established doctrine that notice to counsel is notice to client. In
addition, the Return of Service states that the Order and Notice of Promulgation were
personally delivered to respondent's address.

During the promulgation of judgment on 15 December 2005, when respondent did not appear
despite notice, and without offering any justification for his absence, the trial court should have
immediately promulgated its Decision. The promulgation of judgment in absentia is mandatory
pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.

xxxx

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the
criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his
counsel. (Emphasis supplied)

If the accused has been notified of the date of promulgation, but does not appear, the
promulgation of judgment in absentia is warranted. This rule is intended to obviate a repetition
of the situation in the past when the judicial process could be subverted by the accused by
jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. The only essential elements for its
validity are as follows: (a) the judgment was recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) a copy
thereof was served upon the accused or counsel.

In Almuete v. People, petitioner's counsel informed the trial court that the accused were either ill
or not notified of the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment. The RTC, however, found

46
their absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled. The accused
went up to the CA, which acquitted them of the charge. This Court reversed the CA and upheld
the validity of the promulgation.

In Estrada v. People, this Court also affirmed the validity of the promulgation of judgment in
absentia, given the presence of the essential elements. (Javier v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 193150,
January 23, 2017)

Respondent was not left without remedy. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120, states:

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment
and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

However, instead of surrendering and filing a motion for leave to explain his unjustified
absence, respondent, through Atty. Benitez, filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC praying
that the promulgation be set aside. We cannot countenance this blatant circumvention of the
Rules. (Javier v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 193150, January 23, 2017)

Speedy Disposition of Cases

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. xxx.

The length of delay in the proceedings of Maliksi's case must first be determined. In People v.
Sandiganbayan, it was held that inordinate delay should be computed from the time of the fact-
finding investigation until the completion of the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman.
The Court expounded that "[t]he guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of III of the
Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by
the State is accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for
purposes of determining if the respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their cases had
been violated."

Applying the foregoing rule, the delay in Maliksi's case started from the fact-finding
investigation of the Ombudsman when he filed his counter-affidavit in (the) Remulla cases on
December 15, 2005 until the completion of the PCSO case on October 24, 2008, or a span of three
(3) years. At that point, the preliminary investigation began, until it was terminated on August
27, 2014 and the information was filed before the court in November 2014, or a period of six (6)

47
years. Thus, the Sandiganbayan observed that the delay incurred in the proceedings lasted for a
total period of nine (9) years. Even if the Court excludes the fact-finding stage of three (3) years,
there was still six (6) years of inordinate delay. (Remulla v. Maliksi, G.R. No. 218040, April 17,
2017)

The petitioners' contention about the violation of their constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of cases was similarly unwarranted. The right requires that proceedings should be
conducted according to fixed rules, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The
right is violated when unjustified postponements of the proceedings are sought and obtained,
or when a long period of time is allowed without justifiable cause or motive to elapse without
the parties having their case tried. Yet, none of such circumstances was attendant herein.

The petitioners cite the COA's issuance of the Notice of Disallowance only after 10 years from
the implementation of DBP's Board Resolution No. 0246 to support their insistence on the
violation of their right to the speedy disposition of the case. In our view, however, the timing of
the disallowance was material only to their contention on the COA being estopped from issuing
the disallowance instead of to their invocation of the right to speedy disposition of their cases.
The latter unquestionably pertained only to the conduct of proceedings actually commenced in
the COA. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216538; Antonio v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017)

The fact that the assailed Notice of Disallowance was issued only after 15 years from the
implementation of Circular No. 25, and only after 10 years from the implementation of
Resolution No. 0246 did not preclude the COA from acting as it did. The general rule is that the
Government is never estopped by the mistake or error of its agents. If that were not so, the
Government would be tied down by the mistakes and blunders of its agents, and the public
would unavoidably suffer. Neither the erroneous application nor the erroneous enforcement of
the statute by public officers can preclude the subsequent corrective application of the statute.
Exceptions to the general rule of non-estoppel may be allowed only in rare and unusual
circumstances in which the interests of justice clearly require the application of estoppel. For
one, estoppel may not be invoked if its application will operate to defeat the effective
implementation of a policy adopted to protect the public.

Here, however, no exceptional circumstance existed that warranted the application of estoppel
against the COA. Accordingly, the Court cannot declare the disallowance invalid on that basis.
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216538; Antonio v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017)

Right against Self-Incrimination

The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against self-incrimination
has no basis. As a judge, she was quite aware that the constitutional guarantee only set the
privilege of an individual to refuse to answer incriminating questions that may directly or
indirectly render her criminally liable. The constitutional guarantee simply secures to a witness
- whether a party or not - the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question.
The privilege did not prohibit legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters. At any rate, the rule
only finds application in case of oral testimony and does not apply to object evidence. As the
Court has pointed out in People v. Malimit:

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 [The right against self-incrimination], as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, "xxx
is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him
xxx" It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused] 's own lips,
against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore,
discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:

If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his]
own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it
would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools
and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence
anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling
the surrender of the evidential articles - a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is
not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, xxx but testimonial compulsion.

The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the constitutional proscription
against self-incrimination. She had not been subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she
could validly raise her right against self-incrimination. Worthy to recall is that she had herself
voluntarily waived her right to be present and to confront the complainant and her witnesses
and evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by CA Associate Justice Hakim
Abdulwahid. She was emphatically granted the opportunity to confront the complainant and
her witnesses but the voluntary and knowing waiver of her presence divested her of the right to
insist on the right to confrontation, if any. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B. Yu,
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)

Cruel and Degrading Punishment

The penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office may be properly imposed on a
candidate for public office who repeatedly fails to submit his Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures (SOCE) pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166. The penalty does not
amount to the cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment proscribed by the Bill of Rights.
(Maturan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017)

He contends that the failure to file the SOCE is an offense far less grave than the serious crimes
under the Revised Penal Code and the grave offenses under the civil service laws. Accordingly,
equating the non-filing of the SOCE with the latter offenses is irrational and unwarranted.

The petitioner's contention does not impress.

We have always deferred to the wisdom of Congress in enacting a law. We can only enforce a
statute like R.A. No. 7166 unless there is a clear showing that it contravenes the Constitution.
The petitioner has not demonstrated herein how R.A. No. 7166 could have transgressed the
Constitution. On the contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly indicates that perpetual
disqualification from public office has been prescribed as a penalty for the repeated failure to
file the SOCE and does not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.

We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights extends
only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of

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his humanity. The proscription is aimed more at the form or character of the punishment rather
than at its severity, as the Court has elucidated in Lim v. People, to wit:

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive
and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the
Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.

In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never
existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for
instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe
provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that
circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman. (Bold underscoring is supplied for
emphasis)

Moreover, that Congress has deemed fit to impose the penalty of perpetual disqualification on
candidates who repeatedly failed to file their SOCEs cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry.
Congress has the absolute discretion to penalize by law with perpetual disqualification from
holding public office in addition to administrative fines the seekers of public office who fail
more than once to file their SOCEs. Such penalty is intended to underscore the need to file the
SOCE as another means of ensuring the sanctity of the electoral process. (Maturan v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017)

Double Jeopardy

Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance." There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus
probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.
(Ramos v. People, G.R. No. 218466, January 23, 2017)

Grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents
double jeopardy from attaching.

In People v. Hernandez, this Court explained that "an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really 'acquit' and therefore does
not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment."

Considering that Judge Soluren's order of acquittal was void from the very beginning, it
necessarily follows that the CA ruling dismissing the Petition for Certiorari must likewise be
reversed and set aside. (Javier v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 193150, January 23, 2017)

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In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the
trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law."

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to modify accused-appellants'
convictions, as will be explained hereunder. (People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 225608, March 13,
2017)

… an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the
reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they
are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. (People v. Macapundag, G.R.
No. 225965, March 13, 2017)

The case of People v. Garfin, firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer
without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which
cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. (Maximo v.
Villapando, G.R. No. 214925/G.R. No. 214965, April 26, 2017)

We also uphold the CA's finding that double jeopardy does not exist in this case. Inasmuch as
the dismissal of the charges by the RTC was done without regard to due process of law, the
same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal or dismissal of the case at all, and the
same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy.

Also, it is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur:
(1) the accused is charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and
has pleaded; and (4) he/she is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his/her
consent. Thus, as found by the CA, double jeopardy does not attach in this case as the dismissal
was upon motion of the petitioner. To be sure, no fundamental right of the petitioner was
violated in the filing of the petition for certiorari before the CA by the respondent, as well as the
grant thereof by the CA.

In fine, the dismissal of the cases below was patently erroneous and as such, invalid for lack of
fundamental requisite, that is, due process. For this reason, this Court finds the recourse of the
respondent to the CA proper despite it being brought on her own and not through the OSG.
(David v. Marquez, G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017)

In all, since it is established that the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the Illegal Recruitment
and Estafa cases, and there being no violation of the double jeopardy doctrine, the prosecution
of the case may still resume in the trial court as held by the CA. (David v. Marquez, G.R. No.
209859, June 5, 2017)

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 CARLO L. CRUZ

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