GKBHAT

2nd SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S.
RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT

LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION
TEAM CODE:
BEFORE
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT DELHI
CIVIL CASE NO._xx /2019
ORIGINAL PECUNIARY JURISDICTION
(THE DELHI HIGH COURT ACT, 1996)
In the matter of
.WILSON…..............................................................PLAINTIF
v.
RACHEL…………….…………………………….DEFENDANT I
SARTAJ SINGH…………………………………..DEFENDANT II
QUIBBLER TV…………………………………….DEFENDANT III
Memorandum on behalf of the Plaintiff
Counsel for Plaintiff Plaintiff
Sd/ (Signature) Sd/
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

2nd SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S. RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF ABBREVATIONS ii
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ix
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1
ISSUE I: Whether the Defendants are liable for defaming Wilson?
6
ISSUE II: Whether Sartaj Singh can take the defence of freedom of press,
speech and expression?
9
ISSUE III: Whether Quibbler TV is vicariously liable?
13
ISSUE IV: Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for damages and a public apology?
16
PRAYER

ii
INDEX OF ABBREVATIONS
AIR All India Reporter
All Indian Law Reports, Allahabad
AP Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
B&C Barnwell & Creswell
Cal. Indian Law Reports, Calcutta
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
Lah. Indian Law Reports, Lahore
L.J. Lord Justice
L.R. Law Reports
L.T Law Times
Ltd. Limited
Mad Madras
No. Number
Ors Others
Para Paragraph
pg. Page
SC Supreme Court
Sec. Section
TV Television
U.O.I. Union of India
V.\ Vs. Versus

iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
I. TABLE OF CASES
Sl. No. Name of the case Relevant Citation
1 Advocate General, AP v. RamanaRao ILR, (1968), AP 12

.
2 Allen v. Plood (1898), AC 196
3 Ashby v.White (1704)2LdRaym 938
4 Bala Ram v. SukhSampatLal AIR1975 Raj 40
5 Barton Shill coal co. v. McGuire (1858), 3 Maq, 300 (306)
6 Brij Bhushan v. State ofDelhi AIR1950,SC , 129
7 Bromage v. Prosser (1825),4 B&C, 247
8 Calder v.H Kitson Vickars Ltd (1988)ICR 232
9 Challa Subrayadu v. Darbha Ramkrishna Rao, (1968) 2Andh LT 101
10 Chamberlain v. Boyd 11 QBD 407
11 Chellapan Pillaiv. R.K. Karajia 1961 Ker LJ 1212
12 Collins v. Hertfordshire Country Council (1947) KB 598 at 615 per

Hilbery J
13 D.F. Marion v. Minnie Davis 217 Ala16 (Ala 1927)
14 D.P. Choudhary &Ors v. Kumari Manjulatam AIR1997 Raj 170
15 Davies v. New England College at Arundel (1977) ICR 6
16 Ferguson v. John Dawson & Partners (1976)1 W.L.R 1213
17 Gertz v. Wlech 41 Led 2d 789 (730)
18 Global Plant Ltd v. Secretary of state for social (1972) 1Q B 139

services
19 Golab Chand v. Jeeban (1875)24 WR437
20 Harishankar v. Kailash Narayan AIR 1982 MP 47 at p.48
21 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Shatwal (1965) AC 695 (685)

iv
22 Johnson v. Coventy Churchill International Ltd. (1992) 1 Q.B 139
23 K. V. Ramaiah v. Special Public Prosecutor AIR 1961 AP 190
24 Kashee Nath v. Deb Kristo (1871) 16 WR 240
25 Lane v. Shiree Roofing co. (1995) IRLR 493
26 Lee v. Cheung (1990) 2 AC 374
27 Leetham v. Rank (1912) 57 Sol J 111
28 Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd (1936) 2 All ER 151
29 Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof. M. (1992) (3) SCJ 84

D. Shah
30 M.B. Kanwar v. State 1964 Punj LR 1074 AIR
1938 Punj 201
31 Market Investagstions Ltd v. Minister of Social (1969) 2 Q B 173 at 185
Security
32 Namkee v. Ah Fong (1934) ILR 13 Ran 175
33 Ogilvie v. The Punjab Akh Bharat & Press co. (1929) 11 ILR Lah 45
34 Prabha Dutt (smt) v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 6
35 Purshottam Lal Saval v. Prem Shankar AIR 1966 All 377
36 Raghav Chadha v. State and Ors MANU/DE/3314/2017
37 Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy AIR 2006 Del 300
38 Ramakanth v. Devilal 1969 Jab LJ 968
39 Ratcliffe v. Evans (1892) 2 QB 124
40 Ray v. Citizen- News Co (1936) 14 Cal. App 2d 6
41 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v. (1968) 2 QB 497

Minister of Pensions and National Insurance
42 Rose v. Plenty (1976) 1 All ER 97 (CA)
43 Sreedharamurthy G. v. Bellary Muncipal AIR 1982 Knt 287

Council
44 Sopan Vithal Shinde v. State of Maharashtra 2008 (2) Bom CR (Cri) 463
45 State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern of Civil Appeal no: 14 of 2007

Governance Trust

v
46 Suresh Chandra Banargee (dr) Pundit Golala 55 Cal WN 745
47 Suri v. Strech (1936) 2 All ER 1237
48 Tosiba Appliances co. Pvt Ltd v. Kabushi MANU/DE/1184/2017

Kaisha Toshiba & Ors
49 Waite v. San Fernando Rib vo. (1918) 178 Cal 303
50 Wharton v. Moona Lal (1866) 1 Agra HC 96
51 Yewens v. Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 530 at 530 -

533
52 Young & Woods Ltd v. west (1980) IRLR 201
II. BOOKS REFERRED
1. Constitution of India; Dr. L.M. Singhvi, Third edition Volume-1
2. Constitutional law of India; J.N.Pandey
3. Indian Constitutional law; M.P.Jain
4. Indian Penal Code; K.D.Gaur, Sixth Edition
5. Law of Defamation and Malicious Prosecution Civil and Criminal; V. Mitter,
Thirteenth Edition
6. Law of Damages and Compensation; C.Kameshwara Rao 5th Edition
7. Law of Fundamental Rights; Chaudhari & Chaturvedi, 4th Edition
8. Law relating to Sexual Offences; R.P.Kataria and S.K.A Naqvi
9. Law of Torts; R.K. Bangia
10. Law of Torts; Ratanlal and Dirajlal
11. Law of Torts; Wienfield and Jolowicz
12. Law of Torts; Dr. S.K.Kapoor
13. Law of Torts; Butterworths Common law series, Second Edition

vi
III. RESEARCH AND DATA BASE
1. Manupatra Online Resources, http://www.manupatra.com
2. Lexis Nexis Academic, http://www.lexisnexis.com/academica
3. Lexis Nexis Legal, http://www.lexisnexis.com/in/legal
IV. STATUTES
1. Constitution of India, 1950
2. India Penal Code, 1860
3. Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal)
Act, 2013
4. The Delhi High Court Act, 1966

vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Section 5 (2) of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 prescribes the jurisdiction of the Delhi High
Court as follows:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the High Court of
Delhi shall also have in respect of said territories ordinary original civil jurisdiction in every
suit the value of which exceeds rupees five lakhs.”

viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wilson was the founder of Essex Corporation. Umbrella Corporation had been negotiating the
takeover of Essex Corporation for several weeks. If the acquisition were to go through then at
the age of 31, Wilson would be the country’s youngest billionaire. The deal was to be finalised
on 24-11-2018. On 23-11-2018, Quibbler TV aired an interview of Rachel wherein she alleged
Wilson of stalking and sexual harassment. Based on this, the news anchor of Quibbler TV,
Sartaj Singh carried out a 2-hour story on Prime time. The TV channel started a twitter
campaign with the #wilsonthepervert. Umbrella Corporation did not want to be seen as a
company that does business with anyone who is under media trail. The deal was called off.
Rachel joined Wade Enterprises in the securities and investment division, headed by Wilson.
He developed feelings for Rachel but did not tell her as he feared rejection and this would bring
complications in work as well as in friendship. At the New Year’s Eve office party, Rachel was
too drunk and Wilson dropper her home. Rachel was intoxicated. She invited him over but he
declined and left. She hugged and kissed him goodbye. The next morning, Rachel was petrified
to see Wilson proposing to her with a ring in front of the entire office. Rachel denied any
feelings for him. In spite of this, Wilson persuaded her several times but Rachel avoided him.
Considering the awkward situation Wilson thought it would be best if they did not work at the
same place. The next day Rachel received a mail that she would be reporting to the marketing
team henceforth. Rachel disappointed and escalated the issue by filing a complaint against
Wilson alleging stalking, unwelcomed physical advances and detrimental treatment at
workplace. An internal committee was set up. Wilson in order to precipitate the matter,
tendered his resignation. Rachel quit Wade Enterprises after a couple of months. Many
companies did not want her on board as they feared that any negative feedback about her during
employment would invite serious repercussions.

ix
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE – I
WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE FOR DEFAMING WILSON?
ISSUE – II
WHETHER SARTAJ SINGH CAN TAKE THE DEFENCE OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH?
ISSUE – III
WHETHER QUIBBLER TV IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE?
ISSUE – IV
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECIEVE DAMAGES AND A
PUBLIC APOLOGY?

x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUEI: WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE FOR DEFAMING WILSON?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Defendants are liable for defaming
Wilson as their statement has led to irreparable damages to the Plaintiff’s reputation, amounting
to defamation and character assassination.
ISSUE II: WHETHER SARTAJ SINGH CAN TAKE THE DEFENCE OF FREEDOM
OF SPEECH?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Sartaj Singh, the second defendant cannot
take the defence of freedom of speech under Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India as
Defamation is a restriction on the said Article.
ISSUE – III: WHETHER QUIBBLER TV IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that Quibbler TV is vicariously liable for the
actions of Sartaj Singh.
ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECIEVE DAMAGES
AND A PUBLIC APOLOGY?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive
damages and a public apology as the statement of the defendants have caused Wilson
irreparable damages to his reputation and also lost him a deal which would have made him
the country’s youngest billionaire.

1
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE I : WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE FOR DEFAMING

WILSON?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Defendants are liable for defaming
Wilson as their statement has led to irreparable damages to the Plaintiff’s reputation,
amounting to defamation and character assassination.
Defamation is defined as “The tort of publishing a statement which tends to bring a person
into hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to lower his reputation in the eyes of right-thinking
members of society generally, or which tends to make them shun or avoid that person” by
Blackburn and George, in their Elements of Law of Torts
1.1 The statements and acts of the Defendants were defamatory
A defamatory statement is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of
right thinking members of society generally to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to
expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or
injurious to him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business.1It is not necessary, in
order to constitute defamation, that the statement must have been either orally made or made
in writing. A person can be defamed by some acts. The question, however, in all such cases,
is whether the words spoken or written or an act of the defendant would tend to lower the
plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society, generally.2
1
Halsbury, 4thEdn., Vol.28, para 10, p.7.
2
ChallaSubrayadu v. Darbha Ramakrishna Rao,(1968) 2 Andh LT 101

2
In order to determine whether a statement is defamatory or not, the first rule to be followed is
that the whole of the statement complained of must be read and not only a part or parts of it.
The second rule is that words are to be taken in the sense of their natural and ordinary meaning
as popularly understood. This method of determination has been elucidated and explained in
Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd.3The determination lies in the answer of the question, “would the
words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society?4
The First Defendant here levelled various allegations against Wilson in an interview that was
aired on Quibbler TV on 23.11.2018. Her statement is directly referred to the Plaintiff alleging
him of stalking and harassment for which the Defendant hasn’t produced any proof whatsoever.
Alleging the Plaintiff to be guilty of stalking and harassing women hampers his reputation and
character. Hence the statement made by the Defendant is defamatory.
The Second Defendant carried out a 2 hour story on prime time based on the statements of the
First Defendant. Thereafter, the Third Defendant called for viewers on vote on “Whether
Wilson should be allowed to get away with harassing women?” and also started a twitter
campaign with the #wilsonthepervert. These acts of the Second and Third Defendant also
constitute defamation as they tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking
members of the society.
The statements and acts of the Defendants are prima facie defamatory, which is openly and in
terms an allegation defamatory to the plaintiff.
1.2 There was publication of the defamatory statement
3
(1963) 2 All ER 151, followed in Ramakant v. Devilal, 1969 Jab LJ 968
4
Suri v. Stretch, (1936) 2 All ER 1237, followed in Ramakant v. Devilal, 1969 Jab LJ 968

3
Publication is the communication of the words, or doing the defamatory act in the presence of
at least one person other than the person defamed. Communication to the plaintiff himself
would not be enough because defamation is an injury to one’s reputation and reputation is what
other people think of a man, and not his own opinion himself. Publication of the defamatory
act or statement, therefore, is an essential element of constituting defamation.5 By publication,
the necessary information is made accessible for public scrutiny.
The publication must cause ill-effect of lowering down the person, about whom such writing
is published, in the esteem of others.6 In ChellapanPillai v. R.K Karanjia7 the accused was
prosecuted for having published a photograph with a false caption with the intention of harming
the reputation of the complainant. It was held that publication of a photograph with a false
caption would amount to defamation.
In RaghavChadha Vs. State and Ors.,8 attention has been drawn upon Ray v. Citizen-News
Co9wherein it was held that repetition of a false statement is also libellous and also relied on
Waite v San Fernando Pub. Co.10, a decision of the Supreme Court of California, which reads
as :"...a defamatory article which would be libellous per se, if its matter was directly stated,
does not lose its quality in this regard because it is couched in the form of an interview with
another person, or because it seeks to avoid its otherwise obvious character as a libel per se by
the statement that it is reported or asserted or believed to be true". This throws clarity on the
fact that defamatory statements made in an interview leads to publication of the same.
5
ChallaSubarayudu v. Darbha Ramakrishna Rao, (1968) 2 Andh LT 101
6
SopanVithalShinde v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 (2) Bom CR (Cri) 463
7
1961 Ker LJ 1212
8
MANU/DE/3314/2017
9
(1936) 14 Cal. App 2d 6
10
(1918) 178 Cal 303

4
The Third Defendant being a National TV Channel aired and interview of the First Defendant
wherein she made the allegations against the Plaintiff, hence the publication of the defamatory
statement took place. On 23.11.2018, exactly one day prior to the most important meeting of
Wilson’s life, Quibbler TV called for viewers to vote questioning Wilson’s integrity. Also,
Twitter being one amongst the most popular social networking sites, has scope for reaching
millions of people at once. The channel started a campaign on twitter as well. All these events
occurred during the prime time, reaching large number of audience and hence proving that the
publication of the defamatory sentence and act took place and the Defendants intended the
publication of the same.
1.3 Presence of Malice
The legal meaning of malice is ‘ill-will’ or spite towards a party and any indirect or improper
motive in taking an action”. When the defendant does a wrongful act with a feeling of spite,
vengeance or ill will, the act is said to be done “maliciously’. If a man has stated what is false
and defamatory, malice is assumed.11 Malice includes any motive other than a honest desire
and intention to fulfil the purpose which makes the occasion privileged. The defendant is not
entitled to protection if he uses the occasion for some indirect or wrong motive. The language
used may be violent or insulting as that it is suffice to infer malice.12
The allegation of malice means nothing more than that the defendant published a defamatory
statement without lawful excuse. 13Malice may be proved by extrinsic evidence or it may be
inferred from the language used. The extrinsic evidence consists in the circumstances under
which the statement came to be made. The plaintiff has to show what was in the defendant’s
11
Ogilvie v. The Punjab Akhbarat& Press Co., (1929) 11 ILR Lah 45
12
Odgers on Law of Libel and Slander, at p.284.
13
Bromage v Prosser (1825) 4 B&C 247

5
mind at the time of publication, and of that no doubt the defendant’s acts and words on that
occasion are the best evidence. Every unjustifiable intention to inflict injury on the person
defamed, or any indirect motive other than a sense of duty may be held as proof thereof.
In the instant case, it has been established that the statements made by the defendants are
defamatory in nature, the proof that these statements are also false lies in the fact that Wilson
was never found guilty of the charges that were alleged against him by the Internal Complaints
Committee. The interview took place on 23.11.2018, exactly one day prior to the day that
would make Wilson the country’s youngest billionaire.
It is evident from the date of the interview that the motive of the defendant was to deprive
Wilson of this turning point in his professional life. Also the usage of the word ‘pervert’ in the
Twitter campaign by the TV Channel is rather insulting. There is no excuse or justification by
the channel as to why the interview had to be aired on 23.11.2018 during prime time, prior to
the acquisition that was scheduled on 24.11.2018, hence proving the presence of malicious
propaganda on the defendant’s side.

6
ISSUE II: WHETHER SARTAJ SINGH CAN TAKE THE DEFENCE OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Sartaj Singh, the second defendant
cannot take the defence of freedom of speech under Art 19 of the Constitution of India.
2.1 Defamation as a restriction of freedom of speech and expression
It was stated in a prominent case Gertz v. Welch14that “the people shall not be deprived of
their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish anything but false facts affecting
injuriously the life, liberty, or reputation of others…”
Freedom of speech under Art 19 (1) means expression of views through words, spoken,
written or printed or through any other channel like radio, television or other media. But is
subject to restrictions imposed under Art 19(2) of the Constitution. But it is subject to
restrictions imposed under Art 19(2) of the constitution. 15
K.V. Ramaniah v. Special Public Prosecutor16, the proposition of law has been succinctly
described by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as: “It is therefore impossible to accept the
argument that freedom of speech in Art 19 (1) must be taken to mean absolute freedom to say
or write whatever a person chooses recklessly and without regard to any person’s honour and
reputation. The right guaranteed by the constitution, it must be borne in mind, is to all the
citizens alike. The right in one certainly has a corresponding duty to the other and judged in
14
41 L ed 2d. 789 (730)
15
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof. M.D. Shah, 1992 (3) S.C.J. 84: AIR 1993 S.C. 171 at p. 177
16
AIR 1961 AP 190

7
that manner also the right guaranteed cannot but be a qualified one. Indeed, the right has its
own natural limitation reasonably limited alone, it is an inestimable privilege.”
Just as every person possess freedom of speech and expression, every person also possesses a
right to his reputation which is regarded a property. Hence, nobody can so use his freedom of
speech or expression as to injure another’s reputation. The word ‘defamation’ covers both
crime and tort; and in Art 19(1)(a), it means the entire law of defamation, civil as well as
criminal, and although the former is unwritten, yet the protection of Art 19(2) is not confined
to statutory law as enacted in Sec 500 of the IPC.17
On the basis of the statements made by Rachel, the news anchor of Quibbler TV- Sartaj
Singh (the second defendant) carried out a two-hour story on prime time, the contents of
which constituted to defaming Wilson (the plaintiff) as they lower the reputation of the
plaintiff in the minds of the right-thinking members of the society.
Hence the acts and conduct of the second defendant are defamatory to the plaintiff.
2.2 Restriction under freedom of press
The expression ‘freedom of press’ in Art 19 of the constitution of India has been declared by
the Supreme Court to be included in Art 19 (1) (a) which guarantees freedom of speech and
expression18 Under our constitution there is no separate guarantee of freedom of the press. It
is implicit in the freedom of expression which is conferred on all citizens. The extent of
freedom of press, under our constitution is not higher19 than the freedom of an ordinary
citizen20. It is subject to the same limitations as under art 19(2) since the rights under Art 19
17
PurshottamLalSayal v. Prem Shankar, AIR 1966 All. 377
18
BrijBhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129
19
Suresh Chandra Banargee, (dr) v. Pundit Golala, 55 Cal WN 745: 52 Cr LJ 1422, AIR 1951 Cal 176
20
Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh v. V RamanaRao ILR 1968 Andh.Pra 12; MB Kanwar v. State, 1964 Punj
LR 1074 AIR 1963 Punj 201

8
(1) (a) is not absolute21.The constitutional right to Freedom of Speech and Expression
conferred by Art 19 (1) (a) of the constitution which includes the Freedom of Press is not an
absolute right and does not confer any right on press to have an unrestricted access to means
of information. The press is entitled to exercise its freedom of speech and expression by
publishing a matter which does not invade the rights of other citizens and which does not
violate the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state, public order, decency
and morality22
The press is not accordingly immune from liability for exceeding the limits of fair reporting
and fair comment, under the law of defamation or contempt of court. Art 19 does not give a
free hand under the guise of free expression and freedom of press of right to go on publishing
defamatory matter which is a criminal act23 as well as an offence under tort.
The acts of the second defendant of carrying out the two-hour story on prime time
questioning the plaintiff’s character resulted in defaming him. This invaded the right to
reputation of the plaintiff. Based on these acts and conduct of the defendants, the Umbrella
Corporation cancelled the deal between them and the plaintiff as they did not want to be seen
as a company that does business with anyone under media trial. It is evident that reputation of
the plaintiff had come down in the minds of the people which led to the deal being called off.
Hence it is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Sartaj Singh, the second defendant,
should not be given immunity under freedom of press, speech and expression.
21
KV Ramaniah v. Special Public Prosecutor AIR 1961 AP 190
22
PrabhaDutt (Smt) v. Union of IndiaAIR 1983 SC 6
23
Hari Shankar v. Kailash Narayan AIR 1982 MP 47 at p. 48

9
ISSUE III :WHETHER QUIBBLER TV IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Quibbler TV, the third
defendant, is vicariously liable for the actions of Sartaj Singh, the second defendant.
3.1 Liability by relation
It may be thought that the starting point of the inquiry should be to ask whether the parties
themselves have expressly assigned their contractual relationship to one category or another,
but such a declaration can in fact never be conclusive as to the legal classification of the
relationship, though it is one factor to be taken into account by the court 24. Megaw L.J. in
Ferguson v. John Dawson & Partners25case at 1222 would have been prepared to go further
and say that the parties’ declaration ought to be wholly discarded26.
At one time it was generally accepted that the test of the relationship of master and servant
was that of control27, and a contract of service was thought to be one by virtue of which the
employer “can not only order or require what is to be done, but how it shall be done”28. But in
modern conditions the notion that an employer has the right to control the manner of work of
all his servants, save perhaps in the most attenuated form, contains more of fiction than of
fact. Nowadays it is common to take a ‘composite’ approach in which the various elements of
the relationship are considered as a whole. The privy council has said29 that the matter has
never been better put than by Cook J. in Market Investigations Ltd. v.
Minister of Social Security30:

24
Ferguson v. John Dawson & Partners [1976] 1 W,L.R. 1213; Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v.
Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 Q.B. 497; Global Plant Ltd v. Secretary of State for Social
Services [1972] 1 Q.B. 139; Davies v. New England College at Arundel [1977] I.C.R. 6; Young & Woods Ltd
v. West [1980] I.R.L.R. 201; Calder v. H. Kitson Vickers Ltd [1988] I.C.R. 232; Johnson v. CoventyChurhill
International Ltd. [1992] 3 All E.R. 14; Lane v. Shiree Roofing Co. [1995] I.R.L.R. 493
25
[1976] 1 W,L.R. 1213
26
Winfield &Jolowicz On Tort, fifteenh edition, W.V.H. Rogers, page 697
27
For an early statement of the control test, see Yewens v. Noakes (1880) 6 Q.B.D. 530 at 530-533
28
Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council [1947] K.B. 598 at 615, per Hilbery J.
29
Lee v. Cheung [1990] 2 A.C. 374
30
[1969] 2 Q.B. 173 at 185

10
“the most that can be said is that control will no doubt always have to be considered, although
it can no longer be regarded as the sole determining factor; and that factors which may be of
importance are such matters as whether the man performing the services provides his own
equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of financial risks he takes, what
degree of responsibility of investment and management he has and whether and how far he has
an opportunity of profiting from sound management in the performance of his task”.
Taking into consideration the above said case, it can be understood that Sartaj Singh, the second
defendant, and Quibbler TV, the third defendant, shared a relationship of employer and
employee and this relation is in the nature of master and servant.
There are three reasons a master is held liable for the torts committed by his servant in doing
his business even when his conduct is not blameworthy and he has used the greatest possible
care in choosing the servant. One reason is historical. “The status of a servant maintains many
marks of the time when he was a slave. The master was liable for the tort of the servant because
of the notion that servant’s personality was merged in that of his master31.
Another reason is grounded on public policy that “There ought to be a remedy against someone
who can pay the damages32”, and the master is expected to be in a better position for paying
damages than the servant since the master these days is very often a firm or a corporation with
cover of insurance.
In Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Shatwell33, LORD PEARCE observed: “The doctrine
of vicarious liability has not grown from any clear or logical or legal principle but from social
convenience and rough justice. The master having employed the servant, and being better able
31
HOLMES Common Law pp. 179 (180)
32
HOLMES Common Law p. 9
33
(1965) AC 656 (685) : (1964) 2 All ER 999 (HL)

11
to make good any damage which may occasionally result from the arrangement is answerable
to the world at large for all the torts committed by the servant within the scope of it.”34
A third reason is expressed in the maxims Respondent Superior and qui facit per aliumfacit per
se. In the words of CHELMSFORD, L.C.: “It has long been the established law that a master
is liable to the third person for any injury or damage done through the negligence or
unskilfulness of a servant acting in the master’s employ. The reason of this is, that every act
which is done by a servant in the course of his duty is regarded as done by his master’s orders,
and, consequently it is the same as if it were the master’s own act35.
In the case at hand, it is obvious that the second defendant was acting as the servant of the third
defendant. And from the above stated case, it makes it clear that the third defendant is
vicariously liable for the acts of the second defendant for not only one but three different
reasons.
3.2 Liability by abetment
In actions of wrong, those who abet the tortious acts are equally liable with those who commit
the wrong36. A person who procures the act of another is legally responsible for its
consequences (1) if he knowingly and for his own ends induces that other person to commit an
actionable wrong, or (2) when the act induced is within the right of the immediate actor and,
therefore, not wrongfully as far as the actor is concerned, but is detrimental to a third party and
the inducer procures his object by the use of illegal means directed against that third party37.
34
See further Rose v. Plenty (1976) 1 All ER 97 (CA)
35
Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire (1858) 3 Macq, 300 (306)
36
KasheeNath v. Deb Kristo (1871) 16 WR 240; Golab Chand v. Jeeban (1875) 24 WR 437; Wharton v.
MoonaLall (1866) 1 Agra HC 96
37
Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 96; Nam Kee v. Ah Fong (1934) ILR 13 Ran 175

12
In the case at hand, the third defendant abetted the acts of the second defendant. When the
second defendant started the program on prime time, his conduct on the show led to defaming
the plaintiff. The third defendant encouraged the acts and conducts of the defendant by calling
for viewers to vote on “Whether Wilson should be allowed to get away with harassing
women?” and also started a twitter campaign with the #wilsonthepervert. Hence the acts of the
third defendant also constitute to defamation.

13
ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECIEVE
DAMAGES AND A PUBLIC APOLOGY?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive damages
and a public apology as the statement of the defendants have caused Wilson irreparable
damages to his reputation and also lost him a deal which would have made him the country’s
youngest billionaire.
4.1 The Plaintiff is entitled for General Damages
General damages are those which the law presumes in every case of defamation, as having
been suffered by the party defamed, even though no pecuniary loss has been sustained. They
are generally granted for the loss of reputation, character and credit, and for the inconvenience,
annoyance, mental pain and anxiety. Publication of statements which are false and injurious to
the character of another gives rise to an inference of malice in law and makes the publisher
liable in damages to the person affected. It may be recalled in the case of Ashby v. White38that,
“Whenever the defendant violates any absolute legal right of the Plaintiff general damages to
at least a nominal amount will be implied”
Thus, it is obvious that the Court should grant substantial damages in the case of injury to the
reputation of person. As it has been decided in the case Sreedharamurthy. G. v. Bellary
Municipal Council39,the High Court held that they ought to have granted substantial damages
even though there was no evidence regarding damages adduced by the Plaintiff.
38
(1704) 2Ld Raym 938
39
A.I.R.1982 Knt.287

14
In D.P. Choudhary and Ors v. KumariManjulata40, it was held that all defamatory words are
actionable per se and in such a case, general damages will be presumed. She was held entitled
to an award of Rs. 10,000/- by way of general damages.In Ram Jethmalani v.
SubramaniamSwamy41, the statement made by the defendant was held to be ex facie
defamatory. The Delhi High Court awarded damages of Rs.5 lakhs.Hence, it is humbly
submitted that the Plaintiff is entitled for General Damages as there has been loss of reputation,
character and credit.
4.2 The Plaintiff is entitled for Special damages
Special damages means damages awarded to compensate the Plaintiff for quantifiable financial
loss related to the incident. It is of such a kind that it will not be presumed by law and must
therefore be explicitly alleged in the pleadings so that the defendant may have due notice of
the nature of the claim. The Rajasthan High court held in Bala Ram v. SukhSamaptLal42, in
respect of a loss resulting directly from a defamatory allegation against a person engaged in a
business it will by and large depend on the nature of one’s business. If the person concerned is
dealing with a particular category of customers who regularly approach him, then it may very
well in a given case, fall under the category of special damage.
As held in Lynch v. Knight43, Where the words are actionable per se these matters may be taken
into consideration by the jury when awarding special damages. In the case of Chamberlain v.
Boyd44, it is the law in England that where the words are not actionable in themselves the special
damages necessary to support the action must be the loss of money or some other material
40
A.I.R.1997 Raj.170
41
AIR 2006 Del 300
42
AIR 1975 Raj 40: 1975 Raj LW 215: ILR (1974) 24 Raj 149
43
(1861) 9 HL Cas 577 (598)
44
11 QBD 407

15
temporal advantage, capable of being assessed in monetary value. As held in Ratcliffe v Evans45
Bowen LJ, in one of his well-known judgements pointed out that under circumstances, a
slander of trader eg, in a public place or in the presence of a large number of people, may lead
to repetition by others resulting in loss of credit and the costume which might be pleaded as
special damages.
In the instant case, due to the twitter campaign, this lost the plaintiff the deal which would have
made him the youngest billionaire of the country. It is evident that there has been irreparable
and special damage caused to him and hence he is entitled to claim special damages.
4.3 Whether Plaintiff if entitled to receive a public apology
It has been established in Tosiba Appliances Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba and
Ors46, Disposing of a two-decade old defamation suit, the High Court of opined that public
apology is a more fitting relief than monetary damages in defamation cases. Justice Rajiv Sahai
observe “…the harm done by defamation being to the reputation of a person, a direction to
issue a public apology or a direction to correct the errors, if any, particularly in defamation
arising out of libel by media appears to be a more appropriate relief than a relief of monetary
damages.”
Thus, it is evident on the part of the plaintiff that there has entitled to recover general damages
as well as special damages along with a public apology as the twitter campaign started by the
Quibbler TV injured the reputation of Wilson and also cost him a deal which would make him
the youngest billionaire of the country so he is entitled to receive the public apology.
45
(1892) 2 QB 124; cfLeetham v Rank (1912) 57 Sol J 111
46
MANU/DE/1184/2017

16
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, it is most humbly prayed before the Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to
adjudge and declare that:
1. The Defendants are liable for defaming Wilson.
2. Sartaj Singh cannot take the defence of freedom of speech.
3. The Quibbler TV is vicariously liable for the actions of Sartaj Singh.
4. The Plaintiff is entitled to receive Rs.100 crores as compensation and a public apology.
The Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass any other order as it deems fit in the
interest of
Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Counsel for Plaintiff shall duty bound forever pray.
All of this is respectfully submitted.

GKBHAT

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2nd SURANA & SURANA AND Dr. M.S.

RAMAIAH NATIONAL TORT

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT DELHI

CIVIL CASE NO._xx /2019

ORIGINAL PECUNIARY JURISDICTION

(THE DELHI HIGH COURT ACT, 1996)

QUIBBLER TV…………………………………….DEFENDANT III

Memorandum on behalf of the Plaintiff

Counsel for Plaintiff Plaintiff

Sd/ (Signature) Sd/

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

All Indian Law Reports, Allahabad

B&C Barnwell & Creswell

Cal. Indian Law Reports, Calcutta

Lah. Indian Law Reports, Lahore

L.J. Lord Justice

L.R. Law Reports

L.T Law Times

U.O.I. Union of India

V.\ Vs. Versus

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

1 Advocate General, AP v. RamanaRao ILR, (1968), AP 12

3 Ashby v.White (1704)2LdRaym 938

4 Bala Ram v. SukhSampatLal AIR1975 Raj 40

5 Barton Shill coal co. v. McGuire (1858), 3 Maq, 300 (306)

6 Brij Bhushan v. State ofDelhi AIR1950,SC , 129

7 Bromage v. Prosser (1825),4 B&C, 247

8 Calder v.H Kitson Vickars Ltd (1988)ICR 232

9 Challa Subrayadu v. Darbha Ramkrishna Rao, (1968) 2Andh LT 101

10 Chamberlain v. Boyd 11 QBD 407

11 Chellapan Pillaiv. R.K. Karajia 1961 Ker LJ 1212

12 Collins v. Hertfordshire Country Council (1947) KB 598 at 615 per

14 D.P. Choudhary &Ors v. Kumari Manjulatam AIR1997 Raj 170

15 Davies v. New England College at Arundel (1977) ICR 6

16 Ferguson v. John Dawson & Partners (1976)1 W.L.R 1213

17 Gertz v. Wlech 41 Led 2d 789 (730)

18 Global Plant Ltd v. Secretary of state for social (1972) 1Q B 139

20 Harishankar v. Kailash Narayan AIR 1982 MP 47 at p.48

21 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Shatwal (1965) AC 695 (685)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

22 Johnson v. Coventy Churchill International Ltd. (1992) 1 Q.B 139

23 K. V. Ramaiah v. Special Public Prosecutor AIR 1961 AP 190

24 Kashee Nath v. Deb Kristo (1871) 16 WR 240

25 Lane v. Shiree Roofing co. (1995) IRLR 493

26 Lee v. Cheung (1990) 2 AC 374

27 Leetham v. Rank (1912) 57 Sol J 111

28 Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd (1936) 2 All ER 151

29 Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof. M. (1992) (3) SCJ 84

34 Prabha Dutt (smt) v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 6

35 Purshottam Lal Saval v. Prem Shankar AIR 1966 All 377

36 Raghav Chadha v. State and Ors MANU/DE/3314/2017

37 Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy AIR 2006 Del 300

38 Ramakanth v. Devilal 1969 Jab LJ 968

39 Ratcliffe v. Evans (1892) 2 QB 124

40 Ray v. Citizen- News Co (1936) 14 Cal. App 2d 6

41 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v. (1968) 2 QB 497

43 Sreedharamurthy G. v. Bellary Muncipal AIR 1982 Knt 287

45 State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern of Civil Appeal no: 14 of 2007

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

46 Suresh Chandra Banargee (dr) Pundit Golala 55 Cal WN 745

47 Suri v. Strech (1936) 2 All ER 1237

48 Tosiba Appliances co. Pvt Ltd v. Kabushi MANU/DE/1184/2017

50 Wharton v. Moona Lal (1866) 1 Agra HC 96