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knowledge of its object, and this is nothing other than the sought answer, both of
which define themselves by reference to the existence of somethmg which underlies
the question and which is the object of the answer. This identical reality is what
makes the very question possible in order to have any meaning. It is its foundation
as much as the criterion of its identification as a question: what is questioned is
then identified as some what-ness, independently of the question raised about it.
What-ness has become assertorical and ceased to be essentially interrogative. This
something has been called "Idea" or "Essence." Knowledge will thus be
propositional, the concept of judgment being neutral as compared to those of
question and answer. A question is only the occasion for the appearance of the
proposition. Interrogation here is merely a rhetorical form for the proposition. The
proposition is an answer, but it is only an ancillary feature of what it really is, and it
is only so because it happens to result from an interrogation. A judgment has a
validity that is independent of the situation which brings it forth, whereas
interrogation is circumstantial; it ensues from a contingent occasion linkeid to given
individuals in a particular situation, and tmth cannot depend on it
For Aristotle the problem that Plato's dialectic poses necessitate a separation
between argumentation and logic. Dialectic ceases to be scientific in order to
confine itself within the domain of the rhetorical/argumentative. One cannot put
knowledge, which is objective, on the same level as interrogation, which is
subjective. The latter is individualistic, in that the questions that one poses are
based each time on ignorance, hence on the individual's knowledge. Ignorance
varies for each of us, as does each one's knowledge. The validity of this
knowledge does not rest on the dialectical game of the questions. If this were not
the case, one would have knowledge whose basis would vary according to
individuals. The condemnation of relativism excludes the fact that knowledge can
stem from questioning. However, what Plato does Avith dialectic is to connect that
which cannot be connected: he connects interrogation, which has a rhetorical role,
with Ideas, hence with judgement. Plato has given a way out, an issue to Socratic
questioning at the price of rendering impossible an unquestionable and indubitable
knowledge, as Descartes pointed out later. That is why Aristotle severs dialectic,
and its relationship to interrogation the thmst of book VIII of the "Topics", from
demonstration, thus compelling him to establish different theories for each one. If
rhetoric regains the freedom to be accepted, thanks to that theorizing, it cannot
really be said that it gains much esteem. The propositional model is well
established, and argumentation as compared to science provides weak
demonstrations. One can discem in argumentation the historical ancestor of the
concept of discovery, from which the idea of "inventio" stems, that one opposes to
conceived justification as really restrictive in what it can produce. Aristotle summed
it up well: a problem is only a proposition fonnulated in another fashion." The
difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the tum of
phrase." (Topics 1,4). One may even add that Aristotle codifies propositionalism
with his conception of subject and predicate. The syllogism will generate a
proposition from two others by "apodictic" means. However, there is also a
dialectical syllogism; this illustrates very well the universal character of
propositionalism, in spite of the diverse ways by which propositions are generated.
We have seen how the separation between logic and argumentation was
bom with Aristotle. The rhetorical function that we highlighted at the heart of
propositionalism preceded Aristotle and survived him. We too often forget that
Perelman rebels against logicism without radically changing its presuppositions.
134 Michel Meyer
He simply wants a space for rhetoric. Moreover, he does not change the definition.
It remains based on mere contradiction at the core of the propositional field. In
doing so, he does not see that the opposition does not exist of itself, because no
more does one toss a proposition as such in the air, with no problem in view, than
does one oppose a position without reference to a question to be debated. If there is
opposition, it is because the minimum of possible responses to a given question is
given by the altemative, which is the contradiction when its terms are considered
simultaneously. Similarly, if one speaks or writes, it is because one has a question
in mind, not an interrogative sentence, but a problem, as when one speaks of a
"question of life or deatfi," or of "that is not the question" with regard to a purely
affirmative statement, where no "question" was posed in the grammatical sense of
the term.
Clearly rhetoric is subordinated to the study of questioning, to the extent
that contradiction between propositions exists only in reference to problems, and
that the use of discourse in general is made with reference to questions that one has
in mind.
This idea is confirmed, moreover, on quite a number of levels. Linguistic
argumentation, as described by Anscombre and Ducrot, refers to the idea of
quetioning, though these authors do not recognize it. If one says, "ilfait beau mais
pas assez chaud" [the weather is nice but not warm enough], p but q, it is with
reference to a question R. For example, "allons-nous nous promenerT' (Are we
going to take a walk?) P goes in the direction of r (we are going to take a walk),
while q goes in the opposite direction. It is of little importance Aat the connector
"but" decides on non-r; it permits settiing a question, and that suffices to validate
my point.
One can cite more examples without having DuCTot's conception add much,
since it is often limited to the use of explicit argumentation markers. If I say, "It is
one o'clock," to signal that it is time to sit down for lunch, I proceed still to
argumentation, because I answer one question via another. In this manner I
continue to deal with a question and to propose a response too, because that is how
language usage functions.
Proceeding further, if I say: "There are good policemen," I suggest that
there are also bad ones, because I pose the question hence I simultaneously evoke
the altemative. If I say to someone, "The weather is nice," it is because of the
possibility that it noight not be so. If a husband on a business trip telephones his
wife and tells her, in the course of the conversation, that he is indeed faithful, he
siniultaneously reveals that a question of fidelity does arise, or did arise for him,
which may only serve to unsettle the faithful spouse remaining stoically at home.
In summary the information that an utterance conveys is a response to a
question; the question emerges for the interlocutor through the answer to it. The
argumentative effects of language can certainly be reinforced by the explicit markers
of an implicit problem, but it is not necessaiy that it is so because language by
nature and function refers to questions. A single proposition, therefore, has an
"argumentative value" as such. Someone saying something immediately raises the
question of knowing what he responds to, since to speak is to respond, even if his
speaking does not enunciate the question to which he is replying. He implies it
with a variable degree of forcefulness and presence. Just as a sentence such as, "It
is one o'clock," poses the question of what it is that it responds to in the context
where a knowledge of the exact time does not pose a problem, so in a comparable
manner one encounters the interrogative referral mechanism in the example that my
five year old son presented me with when I gave him a life-belt, that to my utter
constemation he wanted to drag everywhere.
Toward a Rhetoric of Reason 135
Michel Meyer
Institut de Philosophie
Universite Libre de Bmxelles
References
Anscombre J. Cl. and Ducrot O. L'argumentation dans la langue. Mardaga. Bruxelles, 1983.
(English translation: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming.)
Aristotle. Complete Works. Ed. J. Bames. Princeton University Press, 1985.
Meyer M. Meaning and Rhetoric. Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1983.
Meyer M. From Logic to Rhetoric. Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1986.
Meyer M. De la Problematologie. Mardaga, Bruxelles, 1986.
(English translation: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming.)
Perelman C. The Realm of Rhetoric. Notre Dame University Press, 1982.
Perelman C. The New Rhetoric and the Humanities. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979.