Right to be Informed

People vs. Bayya

Facts:

Some time in 1994, when victim was still 12 years old, her father, the accused, forced her at the point of
a knife to have sexual intercourse with him. He repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a week
afterwards, and then later used her four (4) times a month, the last she remembered being on July 5, 1995.

During the trial, appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter twice but
theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he committed the incestous rape. In view of the facts
established, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate
penalty of death.

Upon appeal, appellant questioned thepenalty imposed under R.A. 7659, considering that the Information
filed against him was silent about the applicability of the same. He alleged denial of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that a careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant reveals a crucial
omission in its averments of the minority of the victim. The objectives of the defendant's right to be
informed are: (1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make the defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

The Information does not allege the minority of the victim although the same was proven during trial as
borne by the records. It matters not how conclusive and convincing evidence of guilt may be, but an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense not charged in the Complaint or Information on which he is
tried or therein necessarily included.

The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent is the special qualifying circumstances
of relationship and minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by degrees.
Right to be Informed

People vs. Malansing

Facts:

This is an automatic review for the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
convicting appellants of two counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death for each
count. Appellants are brothers. Joey Manlansing denied participation in the killing, but he admitted
boxing Jorja in the face to prevent her from shouting, while Mario was assaulting her husband. Mario
Mallansing claimed he alone was responsible for the deaths. In open court, Mario affirmed his confession
and insisted that his brother had nothing to do with the deaths He claimed that Joey woke up only after he
killed Magin and that Joey tried to unsuccessfully stop him from attacking Jorja. He said he killed the
couple out of anger after Jorja told him that he was going to be ejected as a tenant. Mario said Joey knew
nothing of his motive.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and taking advantage of night-time.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that none of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the informations nor
in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating either killing to
murder. Thus, conformably with Gario Alba, the offenses committed by appellants only constitute two
counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence both appellants to death. In evaluating the circumstances
that qualified the crimes to murder, the trial court considered, aside from evident premeditation, treachery,
nighttime, and use of a deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
dwelling The Supreme Court note that abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not alleged in the
informations. In accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
abuse of superior strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to convict the brothers. Further, should
there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of superior strength is absorbed by the former. We are thus left
to review only the allegation that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, and
nocturnity were present in the commission of the crimes.

At the outset, we shall discount nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the darkness
of the night was not purposely sought by the offenders to facilitate the commission of the crime nor to
ensure its execution with impunity.
Right to be Informed

Teves vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul
and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting them of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in
Valencia. Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the petitioners pleaded “not guilty.” On 23 February
1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the prosecution and
moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. On 29 July 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted
Exhibits “A” to “S” of the prosecution’s evidence but rejected Exhibits “T,” “U,” and “V.” It also denied
petitioners’ demurrer to evidence, as well as their motion for reconsideration On 16 July 2002, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision. The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious
and palpable errors in convicting them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention
of Mayor Teves in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is
essentially different from the offense with which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that
they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance
doctrine invoked by the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners'constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against them.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be convicted of second mode of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest considering that it was not
charged in the information.

In Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting
the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the
information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the
offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine
thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the
offense proved.