Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS return to the Scallon spouses the 800 shares of stock of Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and 180 shares of stock of
152. WILLIAM B. BORTHWICK vs HON. FLORELIANA Trans-Pacific Development Management Corporation and all
CASTRO-BARTOLOME, JOSEPH SCALLON, AND JEWEL SCALLON stock dividends, cash dividends accrued from the said shares of
GR No. 57338 | July 23, 1987 | Narvasa, J. | I.E.B.Z. stocks.
· Borthwick still did not reply, up until the moment the CFI
amended the decision stating that the sums due under the
FACTS: Hawaii decision be paid by Borthwick to the Scallons in its
· Joseph Scallon alleged that William Borthwick, an American Philippine Peso equivalent.
citizen living in the Philippines, owned real property interests in · This time, the notice of the amendment was personally
Hawaii where he last resided and transacted business. received by Borthwick.
· The business dealings of Borthwick which transpired in · Borthwick moved for a new trial stating that the summonses
Honolulu, Hawaii had given rise to four promissory notes that were previously sent to his Greenhills address were
amounting to $104,826.48. received by his “on and off itinerant gardener”. And that Daniel
· That Borthwick failed to pay the sums he owed upon maturity failed to remit the summonses to him.
of the notes and upon demand. · Borthwick also contended that the judgment sought to be
· The promissory notes were supposed to be paid in Palos enforced was invalid for want of jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court
over the cause of action and over his person.
Verdes, Los Angeles, California but also contains the following
terms:
"in the event that payment . . . shall not have been made in full on RTC:
or before the maturity date . . . at . . . (such) place . . ., payee may · The Trial Court denied the motion for new trial stating the
select, at his option, Manila, Philippines, or Honolulu, Hawaii as
Daniel is a responsible person to have remitted the summonses
additional places for payment . . . and . . . any court in any of said
to Borthwick.
places having jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be a proper
Court for the trial of any action brought to enforce payment of this · As to Borthwick's attack on the validity of the Hawaiian
note and the law of the place in which said action is brought shall judgment, the Trial Court ruled that "under the . . . (Hawaii
apply." Revised Statute) cited by Borthwick, the Hawaii Court has
· Summons was served upon Borthwick personally in Monterey, jurisdiction" because the factual premises upon which the
exercise of such jurisdiction was based "had not been refuted
California. This is at the time when he was still located in
by the Borthwick" although he "appears to be a lawyer, and the
California. This is pursuant to Hawaiian law allowing service of
summons in the Hawaii case was served personally on him."
process on a person outside the territorial confines of the State.
· Hence, this petition for review at the SC.
· Borthwick, ignored the summons.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
HAWAIIAN COURT:
Whether or not the Hawaiian Court acquired jurisdiction over the
· [April 30, 1987] Default was entered against Borthwick having
case rendering the default of Borthwick valid?
the courts of Hawaii ordering him to pay Scallon the amount he
owed.
· One of the judgment at the Hawaiian court is that aside from HELD:
the money, the ownership of real estate situated in Hawaii be YES. It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely
recovered by Scallon from Borthwick.
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties," and
· However, Scallon’s attempt to have the judgment executed in rejection thereof may be justified, among others, by "evidence of a
both Hawaii and California failed since Borthwick did not have want of jurisdiction" of the issuing authority, under Rule 39 of the
any assets in both states. Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
of Hawaii hinged entirely on the existence of either of two facts in
accordance with its State laws, i.e., either Borthwick owned real
· [March 15, 1980] Scallon and his wife went to the Philippines property in Hawaii, or the promissory notes sued upon resulted
and brought a suit against Borthwick at the CFI of Makati from his business transactions therein.
seeking the enforcement of the judgment of the Hawaii court.
· Summonses were sent to Borthwick at his Greenhills residence,
Scallon’s complaint clearly stated the two facts. Borthwick had the
but he was always “out on official business”. In which case, his
opportunity to impugn the two facts, but he didn’t do so when he
house caretaker, Fred Daniel was the one who received such
failed to appear and was then, declared in default.
summonses.
OTHER ISSUE:
CFI:
Whether or not the Hawaiian Court’s judgment is enforceable in
· orthwick filed no answer to the complaint, hence he was
B
the Philippines?
declared in default by the CFI.
· The decision of the CFi states that Borthwick should return the
$104,826.48 to Scallon. An alternative to this is the rescission of HELD:
the original agreement between the two and to have Borthwick
YES. When the Scallon spouses filed the case at the CFI, Borthwick HELD:
failed to appear, hence, he was also declared in default. ● "The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change
with the circumstances. The first decree awarded the
Failing to appear at the Hawaiian Court, Borthwick failed to dispute custody of the child to the father, prohibiting the mother
from taking the child to her (Margaret's) home because of
the said court’s competence.
her adulterous relationship with another man. The decree
was amended when Margaret was not in Los Angeles.
Borthwick may may have challenged the jurisdiction of Hawaii over ● Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be
implemented in the Philippines. Where the judgment is
him only if he succeeded in showing that the declaration of his
merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by
default was incorrect. He has unfortunately not been able to do that
the Court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge
since he failed to show at the CFI. Hence, the verdict must go against
finally the rights of the parties.
him.
● In general, a decree of divorce awarding custody of the
child to one of the spouses is respected by the Courts of
DISPOSITIVE: other states "at the time and under the circumstances of
its rendition" but such a decree has no controlling effects
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied, with costs against in another state as to facts and conditions occurring
petitioner. subsequently to the date of the decree; and the Court of
another state may, in proper proceedings, award custody
otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree
which justify the decree to the interest of the child.
153. Querubin vs. Querubin, G.R. No. L-3693, 29 July 1950 ● In the case at bar, the circumstances have changed.
Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan, Ilocos
Sur, under her father's care. It is a long way from one place
FACTS: to the other. Neither can Margaret prove that she can pay
the cost of passage for the minor. She is not a packet of
● In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner cigarettes one can send by mail.
Margaret Querubin New Mexico. They had a daughter, ● Neither can she answer for Querubina's support, care and
Querubina. education. In comparison, the father has shown both
● Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental interest in the child and capacity to provide for the needs
cruelty." of the child."
● Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Margaret's
infidelity. Dispositive: The judgment appealed is upheld. The appellant shall
● In 1949, the Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the
bear the costs.
divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child.
○ Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home
subject to reasonable visits by both parties. 154. Philippine International Shipping vs. CA,172 SCRA 810
○ Both parents were restrained from taking
Querubina out of California without the
permission of the Court. 3 Philippine International Shipping Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
● On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre
under an interlocutory decree (although the child was still G.R. No. 77085, April 26, 1989
kept in the neutral home) because at the time of the trial,
Margaret was living with another man.
● Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was FACTS
modified. Since she had then married the man she was Petitioner PISC leased from respondent Interpool several
living with and had a stable home, the Court granted
containers under its Membership Agreement and Master
custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations on the
Equipment Leasing Agreement. Other 9 petitioners-guarantors
part of the father.
guaranteed to pay all monies due.
● Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on
November of the same year, went to the Philippines and
stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the intent of protecting Having failed to pay, respondent filed a case against PISC before
the child from the effects of her mother's scandalous
the US District Court, Southern District of New York. Default
conduct. He wanted the child to be raised in a better
judgment was rendered.
environment.
● In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a
petition for habeas corpus for the custody of Querubina Due to unjustifiable failure and refusal to pay, including its
urder the interlocutory decree of the California Court.
guarantors, PISC filed a complaint with RTC-QC to enforce the
○ She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the
Default Judgment of the US Court against PISC and the guarantors
decree of the Los Angeles Court, granting her the
under the Continuing Guaranties. They were duly summoned.
child's custody, must be complied within the
Declared in default. PISC and guarantors were ordered to pay,
Philippines.]
jointly and severally.
ISSUE:
WON the decree of a foreign court may be complied with in the
Philippines. PISC filed with CA a Petition to Annul Judgment. Denied.
Hence, this petition. PISC contends that both the Default Judgment Existence of liability duly established
are null and void on jurisdictional grounds: Since the liability of PISC has been duly established in the US case,
1. US District Court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons it was proper to implead the other 9 petitioners-guarantors herein
as they had not been served with summons and copy of the as defendants in the action to enforce said foreign judgment in
Complaint; Philippine courts, even if they were not impleaded in the US case.
2. Such jurisdictional infirmity effectively prevented RTC-QC from
The nine (9) other petitioners-guarantors are considered as
persons “against whom a right to relief in respect to or arising out
taking cognizance and from enforcing the Default Judgment,
of the same transaction or series of transaction [has been] alleged
plus the non-service of notice or summons in the PH case
to exist,” as contemplated in the Rule on permissive joinder of
3. Assuming valid, the same may be enforced only to PISC and parties.
not to the other 9 petitioners-guarantors not having been
impleaded in the US case.
155. Asiavest Merchant Bankers vs. Court of Appeals, supra at
9.
ISSUE
FACTS:
1. Whetherthe Default Judgment in the US case may be
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad is a corporation
recognized in our courts
organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent
2. W
hether RTC-QC acquired jurisdiction over PISC Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly
3. Whether the other 9 petitioners-guarantors may be ordered to
incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
pay by the PH courts, despite not being impleaded in the US petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent,
case then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur
entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP
HELD Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development Corporation of the
1. Y
es.
Philippines.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance
bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the
US District Court had validly acquired jurisdiction over PISC under completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it
the procedural law of that forum. extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh
· Copies of Summons and Complaints were stamped indicating
Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
that service had been made upon and acknowledged by PISC The High Court of Malaya rendered decision in favor of petitioner
office in Manila and issued an order directing the respondent to pay petitioner the
· It
was likewise served (actual notice) upon Prentice-Hall Corp. sums covered by the said judgment
(NY), PISC’s agent expressly designated in the Master Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private
Equipment Leasing Agreement with Interpool (for purpose of respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint
accepting service in cases of claim). before RTC to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya
· PISC, without, however, assailing the jurisdiction of the U.S. Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case contending
District Court over the person of petitioner, had filed a Motion that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be
to Dismiss which was denied. denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted
with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent,
collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact.
Judgment imposing upon petitioner PISC a liability of in favor of
Dismissal was denied by the trial court considering that the
Interpool, is valid and may be enforced in this jurisdiction.
grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to
Foreign judgment had become final and executory, no appeal dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court
having been made. Thus, it is considered as presumptive evidence the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary
a subsequent title. There was no showing that Default Judgment
submission to the courts jurisdiction through its appointed
was vitiated by “want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondents
clear mistake of law or fact.”
counsel waived any and all objections to the High Courts
jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
2. Y
es. TC: dismissed petitioner’s complaint; CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
When petitioners filed their motion for extension of time to file WON both the TC and CA erred in denying recognition and
answer and for bill of particulars, they voluntarily submitted enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment (YES)
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Quezon City court, hence they
are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of said court.
HELD:
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is
3. Y
es.
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity,
utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among
civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered Court judgment
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private
countries.
respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of the
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and
may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit
underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is for collection initiated by petitioner.
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on.
of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
notice in the foreign forum.
service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the
Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the
was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or
the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against the internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the service
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
of court process on private respondent as well as other matters
The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
raised by it.
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a
duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then
Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its
what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it,
jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment
the assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a
is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with
corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the
the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must
of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the stand
evidence it offered. On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen
Vinayak Prabhakar Pradhan, presented as petitioners sole witness, and Gledhill to represent private respondent, not only did the
testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law private respondents witnesses admit that the said law firm of Allen
profession in Malaysia;that he was connected with Skrine and and Gledhill were its counsels in its transactions in Malaysia,but of
Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, greater significance is the fact that petitioner offered in evidence
then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the relevant Malaysian jurisprudence to the effect
Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the appellate courts
Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur;that the writ of summons were served on
conclusion that the conditional appearance of private respondents
March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and
counsel who was allegedly not authorized to appear and represent,
on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of
cannot be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the
the High Court of Malaya, inasmuch as said conditional appearance
filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and
was not premised on the alleged lack of authority of said counsel
Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan
but the conditional appearance was entered to question the
Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for
regularity of the service of the writ of summons. Such conditional
private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the
appearance was in fact subsequently withdrawn when counsel
writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it
realized that the writ was properly served.
realized that the writ was properly served; that because private
respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and
weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and law tainted the judgment of the High Court of Malaya, no clear
submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its evidence of the same was adduced or shown.
claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of The trial courts finding on the absence of judgment against
Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was
Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. is contradicted by evidence on record that
represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these
recovery was also sought against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. but the
proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.
same was found insolvent.Furthermore, even when the foreign
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner offered judgment is based on the drafts prepared by counsel for the
documentary evidence. successful party, such is not per se indicative of collusion or fraud.
Having proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the jurisdiction of a
foreign judgment must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not
authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys
controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is
presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who
rendered,or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or
disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove
would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a
otherwise.
chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious defense.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment
fell upon it to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds
is not enforceable in view of the absence of any statement of facts
and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum validity. The presumption of validity and regularity of the service of
governs matters of remedy and procedure.Considering that under summons and the decision rendered by the Japanese court must
the procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment stand.
may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every fact
and law upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be
accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot In the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption
invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply because our of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption
rules provide otherwise. may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is
presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the
156. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 241 Philippines.
SCRA 192, 1995
Understand first the nature of enforcing Foreign judgment Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. (Foreign judgment
Ø Comity dictates that final foreign judgments are reciprocally respected which is the subject of this case)
and rendered efficacious under conditions that may vary in different
countries · Fujiki filed a petition for “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Ø FJ for action in rem – deemed conclusive upon title to the thing Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).",
before the RTC praying that (1) the Japanese Family Court
Ø FJ for action in personam – presumptive of right between parties judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
Ø But both cases are impeachable for want of jurisdiction between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio
Ø To enforce foreign judgment here in Ph, filing civil action is usually
under the Family Code of the PH and (3) to direct the Local
proper but the cause of action (coa) is different from other oca. Likewise, Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the foreign
the matter of proof is different. judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the NSO.
Thus, in ordinary civil actions for tortious acts, the coa lies on the act itself
while for enforcement of judgment the coa lies on the judgment/award · RTC dismissed the petition ruling that it is in “gross violation”
itself. of Sec. 2[1] and 4[2] of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Knowing that, this action therefore is correctly not a claim against estate Nullity of Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
per se but one for enforcement of judgment. Yet, it is capable of pecuniary (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Only “the husband or wife” (either
estimation since it involves collection of money or recovery of damages as Maekera or Marinay), can file the petition to declare the
the root coa. However, computation of filing fees corresponds to the marriage void, and not Fujiki.
amount for other actions not involving property.
· Fujiki moved to reconsider, arguing the following:
The judge therefore was incorrect in adjudging that Petitioners failed to file
correct filing fees. o A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply as it
only applies to ordinary civil actions for
Even so, given the nature of foreign judgments, by international custom it declaration of nullity of marriage, and the
must be enforced. Unless contrary to public policy.
case he filed is a special proceeding.
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide
renown, points out:
o Fujiki also argued that Sec. 2 only applies to
void marriages on the ground of psych
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign incapacity. Applying the rule that “a
judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the petition may only be filed by the husband
reasonable expectations and demands of the parties. Where the
or wife” in a bigamy case would be absurd
parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one
state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they
as only the guilty parties would be
may fairly be expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to permitted to sue.
the enforcement of the judgment issued by the court. · RTC denied the MR for the following reasons:
PETITION GRANTED o A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies since the
petition filed, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage. And under
158. Fujiki vs. Marinay (GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013) such law, Fujiki is considered a “third
Doctrine: A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a person” in the proceeding since he was not
marriage void does not require re-litigation under a Philippine the husband in the decree of divorce issue
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of by the Japanese court; hence, he lacks
nullity of marriage. They cannot substitute their judgment on the personality to sue/file the petition.
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is o The RTC also held that under Braza v The
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, the
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
of evidence. marriages in a special proceeding for
Facts: correction of entry under Rule 108.
· Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national, who · OSG filed its comment and agreed that Fujiki, as the spouse of
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare
the Philippines. Their marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s the bigamous marriage void.
parents so Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he o Itcontended that the petition to recognize
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. the Japanese court’s judgment may be
· In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara made in a Rule 108 proceeding, as its
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, object is precisely to establish a status or
Marinay and Maekara contracted her second marriage in right of a party or a particular fact.
Quezon City. o It also argued that the law requires the
· Due to their marriage, Maekara was able to bring Marinay to entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
Japan. Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status.
o S ince the Japanese court’s judgment directly However, Braza does not apply as Braza does not involve a
bears on the civil status of a Filipino recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
citizen, it should therefore be proven as a where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Issue 1: W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a
In this case, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108.
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of
Held 1: Yes. a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
A.M No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable in this case. For foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
courts to recognize a foreign judgment, the petition only needs to decided under foreign law.
prove the foreign judgment as a fact, through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is Article 26 of the FC confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
applicable is absurd as it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, this Court
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law, as 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
embodied by Art. 15 of the Civil Code. Thus, the Philippine State spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" under the laws
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over of his or her country.
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under
void does not require re-litigation under a Philippine court of the the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
marriage. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the spouse cannot remarry.
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence. Notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
The court merely exercises limited review on foreign judgment. contravene domestic public policy. In the recognition of foreign
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
"want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether
the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the Family Code. the comity of nations.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of
"validity of marriage[ x x x can be questioned only in a direct the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
action" to nullify the marriage.
2. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private ISSUE: W/N the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the
respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private judgment of the U.S. court?
respondent Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation under an
Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed
RULING AND RATIO: NO. CA reversed. Case remanded to
with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona
RTC-Makati
Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A.,
while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as
initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign
paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to
favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them
money from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat on grounds allowed under the law. This is because in this
from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat. distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of
a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule
3. As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the
39, §50 provides:
entire amount covered by the note became due and
demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
Issue 2: WON Toppen diluted the trademark of Panavision 1. There is personal jurisdiction under Missouri’s long-arm statute.
Held 2: Yes. He engaged in the commercial use of the trademarks ● The Missouri long-arm statute provides that: Any persons
and exposed it to the threat of dilution. or form whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
Toppen’s use of the trademarks can be considered as a commercial or any corporation, who in person or through an agent
does any of the acts enumerated in this section thereby
use because he engaged in a scheme wherein he registers well
submits such person, firm, or corporation, and, if an
known marks in the NSI as a domain name in order for him to profit
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
off of such trademarks by selling the use of the domain name to the
of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising
rightful owners. "Dilution" is defined as "the lessening of the
from doing any of such act:
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition (1) The transaction of any business within this state
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) -----
likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. By using the
trademarks as a domain name and registering it to Toppen’s name, (3) The commission of a tortious act within this state
he effectively diluted the trademark of Panavision. ● “Transaction of any business” within the state test ruled
A domain name is more than just a mere address of a website. It will that the requirement is satisfied when a party conducted
serve as a connection between the costumer and the company. A promotional activities directed towards recipients located
significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity that in Missouri (citing Danforth v. Reader’s Digest)
owns the website. "A customer who is unsure about a company's ● Applying such in this case, the activities of Cybergold
domain name will often guess that the domain name is also the meets the requirements. It maintains a website on the
world wide web which has presumably a server in ● A claim under the Act can exist even before Cybergold
California. The website is accessible to every opens the business, so long as the act are imminent and
internet-connected computer in Missouri and the world. impending.
● A violation of the Lanham Act is tortious in nature. ● The Court also concludes that it is imminent and
● Based on this, Missouri’s long-arm statute reaches impending that Cybergold will be fully operating its
Cybergold, as that even if the alleged infringing acts were internet advertising service in the near future. Both
wholly outside of Missouri, it will produce an effect in developing a mailing list and obtaining advertisers are
Missouri as it allegedly caused Maritz economic injury. integral to defendant's business. Maritz need not wait
until both are fully established before it can maintain an
action for violation of the Lanham Act.
2. The exercise of personal jurisdiction will not violate due process
● Due process requires that there be “minimum contact”
Motion to Stay
between the nonresident defendant and the forum of the
state before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over ● Cybergold has a pending registration of its CYBERGOLD
the defendant. trademark, CyberGold argues that this Court should stay
● Citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, sufficient its proceedings and await the outcome of any opposition
contacts exist when the defendant's conduct and proceedings regarding its recently published mark.
connection with the forum state are such that he should CyberGold argues that the outcome of the PTO
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and proceedings will determine, at least through prima facie
when the maintenance of the suit does not offend evidence, whether CyberGold has priority in the use of its
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In CYBERGOLD mark, and that the outcome of the PTO
assessing the defendant's "reasonable anticipation," there proceedings will affect whether plaintiff will be able to
must be some act by which the defendant purposefully succeed in its Lanham Act claim against CyberGold
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within ● Doctrine of Primary jurisdiction, a court can stay a
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits of its laws. proceeding to allow an administrative agency to make a
● Citing Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc., determination as to an issue important to the court
the five-part test of measuring minimum contacts: proceeding.
(1) The nature and quality of the contracts with the ● Factors to consider to stay proceedings and defer to an
administrative agency: 1) whether the relevant
forum state;
administrative agency has exclusive primary jurisdiction;
(2) The quantity of those contacts; (2) whether awaiting the decision of issues by the
(3) The relation of the cause of action to the contacts; administrative agency will be of importance in resolving
issues in the litigation before the district court; (3)
(4) The interest of forum state in providing a forum for whether the administrative agency has specialized
its residents; expertise and experience and the issues in dispute are not
(5) The convenience of the parties. within the conventional experience of judges; and (4)
whether deferring to an administrative agency is likely to
● Cybergold’s act of posting of information about its new, prolong the dispute rather than lead to a judicially
up-coming service throgfh a website seeks to develop a economical disposition.
mailing list of internet users, as such users are essential to ● In this case, the Court finds that the doctrine does not
the success of its services. Contrary to Cybergold’s apply. The action is for infringement and unfair
contention that it is maintaining a “passive website”, the competition under the Lanham Act. The decision of the
intent to reach all internet users is not passive. PTO will not be determinative of any issue in this case. A
● Through its website, Cybergold has consciously decide to decision to issued a registered trademark is only prima
transmit advertising information to all internet users, facie evidence of Cybergold’s right of priority use, it is not
knowing that such information will be transmitted a conclusive evidence.
globally. 169. CompuServe v. Patterson, No. 95-3452 / 89 F. 3d 1257, 22
● In addition, the information transmitted is clearly intended
July 1996;
as a promotion of Cybergold’s upcoming service and
solicitation for internet users. It is purposefully availing FACTS: Plaintiff-Appellant CompuServe, Inc. ("CompuServe"), a
itself to the privilege of conducting activities in Missouri. nationwide provider of both electronic network and information
● While CyberGold has not yet set up its service of sending services, has its headquarters in Ohio. Among the services
advertisements to internet users on its mailing list, provided by CompuServe is the opportunity for subscribers to post
CyberGold's acts of developing a mailing list through its and sell software in the form of "shareware." Shareware, provided
acceptance of addresses on its website are also part of the to the end user initially free of charge, allows the user to test the
allegedly infringing activity about which plaintiff software for a specified length of time, after which he or she must
complains. decide whether to pay the software's author for continued use, or
MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED terminate the use of the software. CompuServe accepted payment
for the shareware from purchasers and remitted that payment,
less a commission, to the authors of the software.
Additional: Richard S. Patterson ("Patterson"), a resident of Texas, subscribed
Subject Matter Jurisdiction to CompuServe. Patterson took advantage of CompuServe's
shareware service by posting Internet navigation software that he
● The action filed under the Lanham Act is not premature developed but marketed via his own corporation, Flashpoint
contrary to Cybergold’s claim. Development. Before use of the shareware service, Patterson
entered into a "Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA") that
provided that Ohio law governed the parties' relationship.
Subsequent to the posting of Patterson's navigation software,
CompuServe itself began to market its own navigation software. FACTS:
Patterson believed that CompuServe's software was confusingly
similar to his own trademarked software and notified CompuServe. 1. Inset is a corporation organised under the laws of the
CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment action in the District state of Connecticut. Its office can be found also in
Connecticut. It develops and markets computer
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking a declaration that it
softwares and other related services around the world.
had not infringed Patterson's trademarks. Patterson filed a motion
2. Instruction Set or ISI is a corp organised and found in
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court
Massachusetts. It provides computer technology and
granted Patterson's motion.
support to thousands of organisations around the world.
CompuServe filed an appeal arguing that Patterson's repeated It does not have any employees, offices, nor conduct
availment of the shareware sales procedures constituted minimum business in Connecticut.
contacts with the forum state. CompuServe further argued that the 3. In 1985 - Inset filed for registration as the owner of the
existence of the Shareware Registration Agreement clearly federal trademark INSET. After a year, it received Reg
stipulating that Ohio law governed disputes regarding the number 1,414,031.
agreement meant that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 4. ISI obtained “INSET.COM" as its internet domain address,
comported with traditional notions of fair play and substantial which it uses to advertise goods and services. ISI also
justice. uses the tel number “1-800-US-INSET”
ISSUE: Whether an Internet service provider's home state can 5. In 1995 - Inset learned of ISI’s domain address when it
attempted to obtain the same domain address. Inset filed
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state author of software who
this action for damages and injunctive relief based upon
subscribes to the Internet service provider and receives
an alleged infringement of a trademark
commissions for software sold via the Internet service provider
HELD: Yes.To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a
defendant, federal courts apply the law of the forum state, subject Connecticut Long Arm Statute:
to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a
Amendment; the defendant must be amenable to suit under the
resident of this state ... on any cause of action arising ... (2) out of
forum state's long-arm statute and the due process requirements
any business solicited in this state ... if the corporation has
of the Constitution must be met.
repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers
The Ohio long-arm statute allows an Ohio court to exercise relating thereto were accepted within or without the state ...
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents of Ohio on claims arising
from, inter alia, the nonresident's transacting any business in Ohio.
It is settled Ohio law, moreover, that the "transacting business" Minimum Contact Rule:
clause of that statute was meant to extend to the federal ● "[Due Process] limitations require that a nonresident
constitutional limits of due process, and that as a result Ohio
corporate defendant have 'minimum contacts' with the
personal jurisdiction cases require an examination of those limits.
forum state such that it would reasonably anticipate
As always in this context, the crucial federal constitutional inquiry being haled into court there.
is whether, given the facts of the case, the nonresident defendant ● there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
has sufficient contacts with the forum state that the district court's avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
fair play and substantial justice." protections of its laws.
This court has repeatedly employed three criteria to make this ● Maintenance of the suit in the forum state cannot offend
traditional notions of fair place and substantial justice.
determination:
(1) The defendant must purposefully avail himself of the
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a ISSUES:
consequence in the forum state (purposeful
availment).
1. whether the Connecticut long-arm statute, C.G.S. §
(2) The cause of action must arise from the defendant's
33-411(c) confers jurisdiction over the defendant,
activities there.
Instruction Set, Inc.? YES
(3) The acts of the defendant or consequences caused
by the defendant must have a substantial enough
connection with the forum to make the exercise of ● Court found that ISI has been soliciting business in
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable Connecticut over the internet through advertisements.
(reasonableness requirement). The Court cites a case where it was held that posting
advertisements in the state is considered as soliciting
business. Thus, the Connecticut long-arm statute
conferred jurisdiction upon ISI.
170. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., No. CV-3:95 1. whether the statute's jurisdictional reach as applied to ISI
CV-01314 (AVC) / 937 F. Supp 161, 17 April 1996; meets the "minimum contacts" required to satisfy
constitutional due process? YES