From Phenomenology to

Field Theory: Faraday’s

Visual Reasoning
David C. Gooding
University of Bath, U. K.

Faraday is often described as an experimentalist, but his work is a dialecti-

cal interplay of concrete objects, visual images, abstract, theoretically-in-
formed visual models and metaphysical precepts. From phenomena described
in terms of patterns formed by lines of force he created a general explanation
of space-ªlling systems of force which obey both empirical laws and principles
of conservation and economy. I argue that Faraday’s articulation of situated
experience via visual models into a theory capable of verbal expression owed
much to his strategy of moving—via conjectural visual models—between the
phenomenology of particulars (often displayed as patterns) and the general
features of dynamical phenomena which he depicted as structures.
Everyday human reasoning combines visual, auditory and other sensory
experience with non-sensory information and of course, with verbal and
symbolic modes of expression. Scientiªc reasoning is no different. Scien-
tists use a variety of images that visualize phenomena, visual representa-
tions of theories about phenomena and models that display structure and
connectivity. Such objects always combine visual and non-visual elements
because scientiªc work requires representations that are hybrid (that com-
bine verbal or symbolic expressions with visual and other sensory modali-
ties) and plastic, enabling the meaning of an image, word or symbol to be
negotiated and ªxed (Gooding 2004a, 2004b). A diagrammatic rendering
of a photograph of a fossil, X-ray, fMRI scan or bubble chamber track
moves the eye and the mind from a barely interpreted visual source to a
meaningful construct. This ‘move’ is motivated by the desire to under-
This work has been supported by grants from the Royal Society, London and by a
Leverhulme Research Fellowship. I thank Frank James and Ryan Tweney for many stimu-
lating discussions, and staff of the Royal Institution and the Institution of Electrical Engi-
neers for help with archive material and apparatus.

Perspectives on Science 2006, vol. 14, no. 1

©2006 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

40
 Perspectives on Science 41

stand and communicate understanding. It is informed by expert (often

tacit) knowledge about indicative features that need to be preserved or
highlighted in the diagram abstracted from the source. Labelled dataplots,
block diagrams and process models use labels, legends, index numbers and
other annotations to integrate different kinds of knowledge. In the ªnal
stages of model-based theorising complex structural models are reduced to
diagrammatic abstractions that include just those features essential to a
theoretical explanation. For example, Watson and Crick’s ªrst published
diagram of DNA is a schematic abstraction of their more complex struc-
tural DNA model (Watson and Crick 1953). Recent work in psychology
and science studies shows that these features of representations remain as
important to industrial-scale, technology-based science as they were to the
more personal, bench-top science of Faraday’s time (Galison 1997,
Goodwin 1995, Gorman 1997, Henderson 1999, Hutchins 1995).
Most philosophical discussion selects just one element of this activ-
ity—statements about facts, entities, laws and formulae—as if these ver-
balized, public forms of expression are the only generators and carriers of
meaning. The advantage of verbal formulations is that they can conform
to semantic or logical rules, but a preoccupation with syntactical features
of representation means that we still lack an understanding of how visual
thinking works in conjunction with language-based reasoning (Giere
1999, p. 119). A further limitation of standard views is due to the as-
sumption that science is a search for regularities, preferably expressed as
laws that relate measurable quantities. This quantitative-empirical model
of science prioritizes concepts, theories, experiments and explanations “in
which causes are only allowed to act singly, and effects can only be ob-
served in one dimension at a time” (Ziman 1968, p. 47). Experiments that
demonstrate a regularity or isolate a dependent variable do have an impor-
tant epistemic role. But new knowledge is rarely produced by methods as
linear or one-dimensional as this model assumes. As the physicist John
Ziman points out:
A photograph, a tape-recording, an electronic device, can react to
many causes simultaneously, and yet record the consequences as a
complex pattern, accurately and reproducibly. It thus permits us to
entertain theories and explanations whose workings and conse-
quences cannot be represented by symbols placed in order on the
page (1968, p. 48.).
This is why scientists design surrogate sensors that can present informa-
tion in a form—usually visual—that lends itself to human interpretation.
This aspect of science draws on two features of human cognition ne-
glected by traditional theories of science. The ªrst is our ability to recog-
42 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

nize regularities as visual or auditory patterns—not just as Humean con-

junctions of events. Most representations of facts are static, momentary
glimpses into a complex and dynamic world of change. To focus on de-
scriptions and ignore their role in the search for process is to miss much of
what science is about. The second is our ability to integrate different kinds
of sensory information into a single representation—not just consider one
variable at a time. These abilities underlie the use of patterns and the con-
struction of phenomenal and explanatory models (Gregory 1981, Ball
1999). The search for objects and laws is motivated by the search for a
general, intellectual understanding of processes that produce our sensory
experience. Visualization—making and manipulating images—is central
to this intellectual objective in most areas of science.
Images convey directly features of experience that humans are biologi-
cally disposed to recognize as patterns (Clark 1997, Giere 2003). Regular
arrangement or symmetry may appear to direct inspection, but be inher-
ent in the images. Scientists rarely just ‘look at’ patterns. They infer the
existence of more complex regularities and causal mechanisms. Scientists
manipulate what they are looking at to induce changes that generate new
information about hidden structures and processes. In this way science
extends knowledge by playing to human cognitive strengths and lim-
itations, as well as by using cultural resources, social conventions and
techno-scientiªc systems. For example, W. L. Bragg manipulated the ge-
ometry of his X-ray diffraction setup to deform patterns, generating new
insights about how to solve the problem of crystal structure (Bragg 1913,
Gooding 2004a). To integrate cognitive processes into the emerging view
of techno-science as networks of culturally situated practices we need to
locate visualization in the context of other sensory practices without
which it is blind.
Faraday’s work is particularly relevant to this problem. Creative think-
ing involves a dialectical play of mental representations and material
artefacts. The latter are not simply externalised representations of the for-
mer, they are as essential a part of the world in which Faraday thought and
worked as a partially crafted lump of stone is to a sculptor. This endorses
an early insight of Herbert Simon, that much of the interesting complex-
ity of the “inner environment” of human thought and behaviour is located
not within the mind, but in the environment that we transform in order
to understand (Simon 1969, pp. 157–59). The feature of Faraday’s many
discoveries most important to philosophy and psychology is the fact that
he recorded them in such detail and over a long period of time. Alongside
his many discussions in letters, these record his many transformations of
images and objects. They are a valuable source of information about how
new knowledge was envisioned and verbalized by an embodied, tech-
 Perspectives on Science 43

nically sophisticated, socially networked investigator. They provide

glimpses of the close interplay of the senses (sight, hearing and proprio-
ception), the hands, imagination, systematic and critical reasoning and
also at times the institutions and politics of science.
The need for ªne-grained accounts of the interplay of mental images,
material artefacts and procedural knowledge is further highlighted by a
recent critique of the semantic conception of theories. This recognizes the
importance of non-verbal, procedural and material aspects of scientiªc
practice argued in many sociological and historical studies (Galison and
Stump 1996, Pickering, ed. 1992). The working content of scientiªc
knowledge consists not of universal truths but rather in the sets of model-
ling practices and methods of approximation that scientists use to relate
general and abstract theoretical claims to real observational situations
(Baird 2004, de Chadarevian and Hopwood 2004, Morgan and Morrison
1999). These are always particular and concrete. The more abstract and
general the statement of a theory, the less it actually applies to the world
as engaged by practicable methods of observation and measurement. The
converse is also true: a low level representation of the phenomenology of a
domain can achieve representational adequacy or a good ªt to data, but it
lacks generality. There is always a trade-off between abstraction and
generality, on the one hand, and the concrete achievement of empirical ad-
equacy, on the other (Gooding 2003). So how is local knowledge general-
ized? Sociologists and historians of science argue that it is made transfer-
able via human expertise and technological implementation (Latour 1987)
and is made communicable via abstractions such as the models which me-
diate between theories and the phenomenal world and material embodi-
ments of discoveries (Gooding, Pinch and Schaffer 1989, Pickering 1992).
Scientiªc knowledge resides as much in material techniques and technolo-
gies as it does in intellectual understanding (Baird 2004, Ihde 1991).
Analysis of work such as Faraday’s also helps clarify the notion of sci-
ence as distributed cognition (Giere and Moffat 2003). Since the mid
20thC most science has been conducted by teams and networks of practi-
tioners. Established knowledge is viewed as a distributed property of net-
works of humans, institutions, machines, representation systems, etc.
However, one of science’s most distinctive features is that established
views embodied in its practices and institutions can nevertheless be chal-
lenged and replaced. While established knowledge is readily explained as
a distributed property of networks, the production of new knowledge can-
not be assimilated entirely to what is ‘known by’ a distributed system.
This model requires a way of explaining those innovations that challenge
the assumptions and empirical methods of a scientiªc tradition (Kuhn
1962, p. 142) by changing the representational conventions, procedures
44 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

and technical standards that sustain these methods (Galison 1997, Ras-
mussen 1997).
These arguments underline several connected reasons for Faraday’s im-
portance. First, Faraday’s records provide a rich, closely observed record of
the knowledge-producing activity that managed the tension between ab-
straction (in his aspiration for a general, synthetic theory of forces) and the
practicalities of obtaining robust empirical results in experimental terrain
that often lacked precursors or guides. Thus he prefaced the ªrst edition of
his ªrst book with Trevoux’s slogan “C’est n’est pas assez de savoir le principes,
il faut savoir MANIPULER” (Faraday 1827).1 Second, Faraday produced a
powerful, general new approach to understanding electricity, magnetism
and other ‘powers of matter’ using visual methods that Maxwell later de-
scribed as mathematics “of a very high order” (Maxwell 1890, vol. 2,
p. 360). These visual aspects of Faraday’s work offer insights into an im-
portant feature of scientiªc thinking. His visual reasoning strategies are
typical of those used by many scientists before and since (Gooding 2004a,
2005), making his records a valuable source of information about the
wider cognitive function of visual imagination and of external representa-
tions such as sketches, diagrams, physical models, simulations and experi-
ments. Third, the survival of many of his instruments has made it possible
to trace, depict and even quantify aspects of the intertwined processes of
theoretical articulation and technological implementation (Gooding
1990a, 1990b). It is often possible to trace the development of his appara-
tus from exploratory, error-probing prototypes into reliable, visually com-
pelling demonstrations (Gooding 1985, 1990a). Reconstruction of experi-
ments can also recover un-recorded practicalities of using certain materials
and instruments and knowledge that is implicit in procedures (Tweney
(2004), Tweney (this volume), Tweney and Gooding (1991).
When viewed through these means of accessing it Faraday’s work reca-
pitulates a central point of C. S. Peirce’s semiotics, in which the world is a
dynamical object invoked by science through mediating objects which are
manifested as signs (Gooding 1990b, pp. 177–88).2 The detail of Fara-
day’s records allows us to investigate mental processes in relation to the

1. The published researches develop this agenda by describing the practical details of
his experiments so as to disseminate the procedures that generate new knowledge.
2. Cartwright and others have abandoned the semantic distinction between theories (as
representations) and the world (as what is represented) in favor of models as mediating rep-
resentations. Cartwright argues that theories are true not of real phenomena but only of the
models abstracted from them (Cartwright 1999a, p. 241–242 ; 1999b, p. 34). Since many
pragmatic decisions are involved, the epistemic value of a theory cannot be determined in
isolation either from its use in the laboratory or in communicating and evaluating results
(De Regt 2004).
 Perspectives on Science 45

actions and objects that engender them and which they are about. His
work provides many examples of the art of eliciting, manipulating and in-
terpreting complex phenomena in the search for simple explanations that
uniªed different sensory domains. This work produced representations,
artefacts and procedures whose cognitive (generative) and social (commu-
nicative and critical) functions combine to produce knowledge that can be
networked. New empirical evidence emerges from the interaction of vi-
sual, tactile, kinaesthetic and auditory modes of perception together with
existing interpretative concepts that integrate different types of knowl-
edge and experience. Mental models that develop purely “in the mind’s
eye” (without physically engaging the world) would lack this power to in-
tegrate (Tallis 2004). Visualisation works with other senses and capacities
and with deliberative experimental manipulation to produce a phenomen-
ology of interpretative images, objects and utterances.3 Thus we can iden-
tify some of the cognitive strategies that Faraday is using over a long span
of nearly four decades.
Rather than chronicle a particular discovery (for examples see: James
1985, Gooding 1990a, Steinle 2002 and Tweney (this issue) I will show
how his use of visual representations identiªes some local- and long-term
strategies. This account will locate one of Faraday’s most famous images—
the lines of magnetic force, Figure 1—by showing how they express rela-
tionships between manipulated objects, sensory experience and knowledge
gained from different phenomenal domains.

Modeling Phenomenology
When investigating electrical and magnetic phenomena Faraday could
have adopted the established method based on forces that act in straight
lines between bodies that have electrical, magnetic, gravitational or other
properties. This approach was taken by Ampère, Biot, Savart and others
schooled in the Newton-Laplace tradition and by some of Faraday’s Eng-
lish contemporaries (Caneva 1980; Steinle 2003). Ampère argued that the
true phenomenon or ‘fait primitif’ is determined jointly by physical as-
sumptions and the requirements of mathematical analysis. Nearly all his
electromagnetic experiments were designed to establish and quantify laws
of interaction, not to analyse phenomena. By contrast Faraday embraced
phenomenal complexity as a source of information about processes. So he
explored the phenomenological possibilities afforded by experiment in
minute detail. He developed instruments and techniques to tame, dissect

3. I call these experiential hypotheses construals (Gooding 1990b, chapters 1–3),

Magnani describes them as manipulative abductions (Magnani 2001, pp 53–59).
46 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

Figure 1. A. Patterns formed by magnetism in iron filings, engraving made for

an encyclopaedia article by John Barlow (Barlow 1824, plate 7 figs. 68-69).
B. Faraday’s earliest published image of magnetic lines around a cylinder magnet
(1832). Note the attempt to render this in three dimensions (from Faraday 1838-
55, vol. 1, plate I, fig 25).

and order aspects of phenomena that Ampère and others rejected as too
complex to handle with the existing mathematical methods.
Faraday’s methods of generating and investigating patterns show that
to him, a pattern can indicate either an arrested process, a structure that is
being transformed by some process or the structuring effects of a process.
He analysed motile phenomena by methods that slowed or ªxed the un-
derlying process, so as to expose patterns. He then modelled these as con-
sequences of processes that can be held in abeyance. Conversely, where a
static pattern could be seen or made visible by manipulation, he devised
methods to explore the phenomenology of its motile form. In this way
Faraday devised procedures that could maximize the capacities of ordinary
modes of perception and also transcend their limitations. As Tweney puts
it, Faraday placed a “relatively slow acting perceptual system, the ‘eye’, in
a position to see what might be (and turned out in fact to be) fast acting
events.” (Tweney 1992, p. 164). Faraday was just as concerned to show
how and why unaided perception can be deceived. This shows that the
goals of his experiments were complex, motivated by larger concerns, am-
bitions and values (Cantor, Gooding and James 1996).
Aware that human expectations regularly and easily mislead perception
Faraday’s visual method was designed not to copy apparent features of the
world, but to analyse and replicate them.4 Consider the way that Faraday
deprived aquatic rotifers of their wheels. When seen through the regular
4. This goal remained constant from the early concern with optical illusions in his
1831 paper to the argument of his 1855 essay on mental education, that since expectations
 Perspectives on Science 47

Figure 2. Optical illusions. A. Leeuwenhoek’s aquatic animalculae. Each appar-

ently bears two rotors (Leeuwenhoek 1705, figs. 1, 5). B. Faraday’s simulation,
designed to produce and transform patterns. C. Sample patterns reproduced by
the simulator (Faraday 1831a, plate III).

vertical bars of an iron fence, carriage wheels display a variety of patterns

which often take the form of elegant curves. Though static, these curves
are clearly produced by rapid motion. Developing methods used by Roget
(1825) and by Wheatstone (1823) Faraday created many versions of these
phenomenon to determine the conditions in which they appear to the eye.
He then devised a physical simulation that could reproduce the phenom-
ena (Figure 2B). This device made it possible to vary continuously the rel-
ative frequency of the occlusion of slits in one rotating disc by those in an-
other, anticipating the cinematic technology that has made such
phenomena commonplace. He was able to simulate every feature of the
various phenomena, concluding that the appearance of both static and
moving patterns is a side-effect of a previously unrecognized parameter:
the frequency at which constituent, overlapping parts of two ªlamented
surfaces intersect (Figure 3A), Faraday 1831a). He then applied this
method of analysis to a long-standing problem. In 1705 Leeuwenhoek,
the great pioneer of microscopy, had described the movement of the ap-
pendages of microscopic aquatic rotifers as a wheel-like rotation (Leeuw-
enhoek 1705, see Figure 2A). For over a century Leeuwenhoek’s anoma-

often mislead perception, scientiªc methods require a disciplined application of judgement

(Faraday 1855, pp. 465–469).
48 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

Figure 3. Application of the simulation to the rotifer phenomenon. A. Simula-

tion based analysis (top) of a stable pattern (bottom) produced by the relative mo-
tion of rotors. B. Faraday’s proposed structure for the rotifer ciliae. C. Faraday’s
re-drawing of a rotifer, showing rings of fixed ciliae (Faraday 1831a, plate III).

lous image of rotating ‘wheels’ had been tolerated for lack of a biologically
plausible explanation. Faraday’s pattern-simulator explained the phenom-
enon, removing the need for the anatomically implausible rotating
propellor.5 His argument consists of a thought experiment informed by
the earlier simulation ªndings. In it he imagines a physical analogue
model of the arrangement, ªxing and elasticity of the ciliae of the rotifer,
shown in Figure 3B. Together with the known illusion reproduced by the
simulator this explains the phenomenon “without requiring any powers
beyond those which are within the understood laws of Nature, and known
to exist in the animal structure” (1831a, p. 309). There are no wheels, and
his own drawing (Figure 3C) shows ªxed ciliae rather than a rotating
structure implied by Leeuwenhoek’s. The image of motile patterns pro-
duced by the simulator provided the crucial link between phenomenon
and explanation.
The method of analysing phenomena by simulation is a variation on
techniques he had used earlier with Humphry Davy. Like Leeuwenhoek’s
rotifers, electrical and magnetic effects are mixed in a way that the eye
simply cannot see. Davy and Faraday’s method of “accumulation” com-
bined temporally discrete images into a single geometrical structure and
conversely, it could assemble spatially distributed effects into a single im-
age. They devised experimental methods that integrate discrete experi-
mental events—or more precisely—that integrate the images that depict

5. Biologists now believe that about half of known bacteria have at least one rotating
ºagellum, a means of locomotion driven by a protein-based induction motor.
 Perspectives on Science 49

Figure 4. Analysing complex phenomena. A. An excerpt from Faraday’s notes of

his May 1821 electric arc experiment with Davy. This is a typical illustration of
the integration of sketches from different viewpoints, symbols and verbal descrip-
tion in Faraday’s laboratory notes. The bell jar is drawn at left. The luminous cur-
rent is shown in section above the two horseshoe magnets. Arrows indicate the ac-
tion exerted when the polarity of the current is reversed (Courtesy of the Royal
Institution of Great Britain, Faraday MS). B. Magnetised needles used in 1821
to explore the magnetism of a constant current (from Gooding 1990b, p. 49).
C. Part of the phenomenology of electromagnetism: demonstration device based
on needles arranged to ‘capture’ the pattern of magnetism of electricity dis-
charged through the wire (from Faraday 1821-22, fig. 11).

discrete events. For example, they passed a current through a vacuum to

produce a luminous glow discharge. In May 1821 they observed the dis-
tributed and ªlamented character of this electric arc, showing that it pos-
sessed magnetic properties (see Figure 4A). Faraday’s notes show that he
attempted to describe the relationship between the orientation and direc-
tion of the current and its magnetic effects (Figure 4B). In order to ‘ªx’ a
magnetic image of the current, Davy and Faraday discharged a current
through a cardboard disc on which they arranged steel needles (Gooding
1990b, pp. 46–58). This displayed the magnetising effects of the current
as a pattern (Figure 4C), analogous to the arrangement of iron ªlings near
a bar magnet (as in Figure 1), but on a much larger scale (Faraday 1821a).
The disc displays an ephemeral structure as a ªxed pattern. By September
of 1821 Faraday had shown how this structure yields a process. He ex-
plored the motive properties of the magnetic ªeld of a constant current,
showing in a series of increasingly abstract images (Figure 5A) that these
properties can be arranged to produce motion in a circle around the wire
(see Figure 5B). He then designed a device to produce continuous me-
chanical effect from electricity and magnetism (Figure 6A, Faraday
1821b). The new process was shown by an apparatus that exploited a
50 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

Figure 5. A. Faraday’s sketches recording how he moved from discrete observa-

tions with needles and currents (top two rows) to images that integrates his obser-
vations of the needles’ tendencies to motion near a wire (next two rows) to the cir-
cle heuristic (bottom image). Each row of images accumulates information
contained in those above it. B. The circle heuristic applied to possible designs;
from Faraday’s Diary (Martin 1932-36), vol. 1, pp. 49-50.

Figure 6. A. Sketch of a possible electromagnetic rotation device. Faraday’s first

sketch of the design of the prototype rotation motor. The letters ‘c’ and ‘z’ denote
contacts to the copper and zinc plates of the battery. From Faraday’s Diary (Mar-
tin 1932-36), p. 50. B. A compact demonstration version Faraday mailed to a
number of European scientists in 1821. To us this is a protean electric motor; to
Faraday it was a kinaesthetic demonstration of the phenomenon Faraday wanted
to disseminate. From Faraday 1838-55, vol. 2, plate IV, fig. 5.
 Perspectives on Science 51

Figure 7. A. Powdered material transferring from a fixed surface (top) to a sur-

face made to vibrate by the application of a bow at ‘X’, from Faraday 1831b, p.
320. B. Sketch of the air currents created by vibrations of the plane, which he
made visible using smoke. The currents act on particles to produce patterns.
From Faraday’s Diary (Martin 1932-36), vol. 1, p. 331, para. 45. C. Patterns
whose form (see top ‘Fig. 6’) is affected when vertical blocks are introduced (indi-
cated as the dark line left of centre in the middle figure (‘Fig. 7’) and at top right
in ‘Fig. 8’. From Faraday 1831b, p.321.

structural property of the magnetic ªeld of a current—the ªrst electric

motor (Figure 6B, Faraday 1821c).
In 1831 Faraday investigated the phenomenon of acoustical Figures (or
Chliadni patterns). These form in granular material distributed over a
glass or metal plate which is made to vibrate, e.g. by a violin bow (Faraday
1831b, Tweney 1992, Ippolito and Tweney 1995). Patterns form at reso-
nance nodes and are characteristic of particular frequencies. The size of the
particles and the density of the ambient medium also affect the patterns.
Faraday doubted that these distinctive patterns are produced by direct ac-
tion of the vibrating surface on the particles (as Felix Savart had argued),
suspecting instead that they are caused by the vibration imparted to
the ambient medium in which the particles become suspended (Faraday
1831b, p. 318). He made the behaviour of this medium visible by using
much ªner powders. To test Savart’s hypothesis of direct mechanical ac-
52 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

tion he placed powdered silica on a ªxed, solid surface (see Figure 7A). He
found that it migrates onto an adjacent vibrating plate “as if in the midst
of all the agitation of the air in the neighbourhood of the two edges, there
was still a current towards the centre of vibration, even from bodies not
themselves vibrating” (ibid., p. 320). Having dismissed the alternative ex-
planation his experiments were “[g]uided by the idea of what ought to
happen, supposing the cause now assigned were the true one” (ibid.,
p. 319). These experiments were also ‘guided’ by the need to determine
empirically the effect of varying each parameter of a sophisticated process
model that relates frequency and amplitude of vibration, density of the
ambient medium, and particle size.
As with many of his investigations Faraday arrived at this model by im-
aging the process from different viewpoints (see Figure 7B and note simi-
lar changes of viewpoint in Figures 4A and 5A). The model relates pat-
terns and variations in patterns to the interaction of the acoustical
vibrations of the plate, the induced vibration of the medium and its inter-
action with the particles. He then tested his air-current model (Figure 7B)
by inventing ways of obstructing the formation of air currents. These ex-
periments showed that obstructing the currents alters the form of nodal
lines produced on an elongated plate (see Figure 7C). This use of instru-
ments to manipulate invisible, high-frequency processes shaped Faraday’s
experimental approach to electromagnetism when he returned to it in
1831. There too he construed patterns elicited by experimental manipula-
tions as spatio-temporal snapshots of complex, high-frequency processes.

Structural Models that Integrate Pattern and Process

These three examples display the same underlying visual logic. Faraday
inferred from patterns the processes that produce them, by modelling or
simulating the structures by which they are arranged. This pattern of in-
ference could start from different phenomena. Given patterns, he created a
structure used to analyse and simulate the process that produces the pat-
terns (Figures 2B, 3A). Given a pattern produced directly by a force (e.g.
magnetism, in Figures 1 and 4C), a pattern whose direct cause was in dis-
pute (Figure 7), or a pattern elicited by analysis of a process (electromag-
netism, Figures 4B, 5A) he produced a new structural model that repro-
duced or simulated a process (Figure 3C, Figure 6B). In some cases it is
evident that patterns involve process (Figures 2A, 4A, 7A). The result is a
process-explanation of a known phenomenon (often a pattern), or a new
phenomenon-producing device (Figures 2B, 6B). With suitable manipula-
tion and analysis via apparatus he could show sometimes that what is seen
is misleading as to its cause (Figures 2A and 3C) or has an unambiguous
 Perspectives on Science 53

Figure 8. Dynamical model of the interaction of electricity, magnetism and mo-

tion, March 1832. A. This image integrates felt (proprioceptive) experiences of
how magnets and currents interact with visual observation of the behaviour of
iron filing patterns. B. Faraday’s memo explaining how to animate the diagram
(from Faraday’s Diary (Martin 1932-36), vol. 1, p. 425).

explanation (Figure 7A). The simulation explanation (Figure 2B), the

demonstration device (Figure 6B) and experiments (such as Figure 7C)
show more than the eye could ever see. They produce images that visualize
features of phenomena.
This visual logic has a second feature already noted in connection with
his explanation of acoustical patterns (Figure 7B). To work out structures
Faraday sketched phenomena both from the side (e.g. in Figure 4A, to in-
dicate ªlamentation and conduction in the electric brush) and as viewed
from above (to indicate the forces acting between current and magnet).
These views feature different aspects of a phenomenon. He had used this
method of rendering a phenomenon from different points of view to estab-
lish the geometry of electromagnetism that led to the ªrst electric motor
(Figures 5A, 5B, 6A). This method of observation involves integrating
sensory information from vision with the kinaesthetic ‘feel’ of current-
magnet interactions. Hearing was also an important source for under-
standing the acoustical patterns and the electric brush (see below).
Faraday’s method integrates sensory information into a few simple but
powerful images. This has four related aspects: integrating many observa-
tions into a few images (as in Figure 5A), envisaging or making observa-
tions from different viewpoints (Figures 4A, 5A, 7A-B), combining obser-
vations made in different sensory modalities and by different methods
(Figure 2B, 4) and fourth, to reach a uniªed theory, integrating the infor-
54 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

mation-bearing images into a single visuo-temporal model which can ex-

plain most of the phenomena.
Two examples of theorising with visualizations of phenomena reveal the
development of his electromagnetic theory. The ªrst is a 3-D process
model of March 1832, sketched in Figure 8. On paper the 1832 sketch
looks like a 3-D structural model such as Faraday’s well known image of
lines of magnetic force (Figure 1). However when animated by his verbal
instructions (see Figure 8) this image becomes a visual theory that inte-
grates and generalises what he had learned from many experiments about
the interactions of electricity, magnetism and motion. This image repre-
sents experiential knowledge obtained through the modalities of sight,
touch and proprioception yet it is more abstract and general than the
better-known visualization of lines of force (Figure 1). By 1832 the image
of a ‘bundle’ of lines had come to represent both the magnetic lines and
the physical independence of a system of lines from a magnet or the circuit
in which current is induced. Faraday demonstrated this independence in
an experiment designed via a thought experiment in which he imagined
the system of magnetic lines to rotate around a cylinder magnet (Martin
1932–36, vol. 1, pp. 402–404). He soon realized this thought experiment
by making a cylinder magnet rotate within a conducting circuit of which
it formed a part, producing the new phenomenon of unipolar induction
(Faraday 1832b). The second example is an image of interlocking rings.
This generalizes from his visual models of electromagnetism and from ex-
periments speciªcally designed to operationalise models (Figure 11a, see
Gooding 1990b). The image (Figure 11b) enables expression of the law
that “the sum of power contained in any one section of a given portion of
[magnetic] lines is exactly equal to the sum of power in any other section
of the same lines . . . ” (Faraday 1851a, reproduced in Faraday 1838–55,
vol. 3, p. 329, para. 3073). He expressed this quantitative law visually in
June 1852.
In all these discoveries setups and procedures support visual inferences
by producing and organizing phenomena into phenomenological models.
These models are complexes of material things, active manipulation, ef-
fects and visualized interpretations of the outcomes. They generated new
phenomena which Faraday inspected for features which in turn offer clues
about process. As visual hypotheses they showed the dynamical or process
equivalent of the static structure implied by images of ªling patterns (Fig-
ure 1), electromagnetic interactions (Figure 5A) and retrospectively, the
manipulation of objects, forces and images in May 1821 (Figure 4A) and
September 1821 (Figure 5A). As I show below, they also support the ana-
logical transfer of learned properties of phenomena from one domain to
another.
 Perspectives on Science 55

Figure 9. The lines in the right-hand image denote surfaces of equal electro-
static induction (equipotential surfaces) near a copper boiler. This 2-D pattern ac-
cumulates in a single image many discrete observations (denoted by dots, left)
made in the space around the boiler, from Faraday’s Diary (Martin 1932-36),
vol. 2, pages 412-14.

Visual Analogical Models

Analogical conjectures may be expressed by new images which guide ex-
ploration of structures hidden from ordinary vision. An example is the ex-
planation of several interconnected phenomena observed in the electric arc
experiment of May 1821 (see Figure 4A). Where Davy construed the ªla-
mentation as indicating a structure for conduction Faraday went further.
This feature suggested a relationship between electricity, magnetism and
motive action, as indicated by the arrows in Faraday’s sketches in Figure
4A. By March of 1832, following his discovery of electromagnetic induc-
tion, he expressed this as the unifying model shown in Figure 8b. This
deªnes the relationship between the four variables he had shown to be in-
volved in electromagnetic induction: magnetism (e.g. of an iron bar), elec-
tro-magnetism (of a current), magnetically induced current, and motive
effects. It provides the basis for his explanation of the ‘rotating’ effect of
a magnet on the electric arc (1821) and the ‘dragging’ effect of a non-
magnetic conducting disc (discovered by Arago in 1825). Another exam-
ple is Faraday’s application in 1835–36 of another aspect of this phenome-
non to the analysis of electrical discharge. Here visualization assists the
analogical transfer of ideas between what others still regarded as distinct
phenomenal domains. Faraday attempted to reproduce in the electric
brush the same structuring or ‘striation’ ªrst seen in the luminous electric
arc observed with Davy in May 1821. The work with strobes in 1830–31
to analyse patterns and movement enabled him to approach electrical phe-
nomena in the same way. In 1836 Faraday mapped the structure of elec-
trostatic potential around large conductors. Recording and plotting many
discrete observations made with an electroscope (these are the dots in Fig-
56 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

ure 9) he built up a picture of lines of equal potential. These ºat images

(Figure 9) represent a structured set of phenomena produced by explora-
tion of a 3-D electriªed space. Like so many scientists before and since,
Faraday construed the 2-D patterns as sections through a 3-D structure.
Again, like every other scientist Faraday was not satisªed with the
static image. The structure is electrostatically charged so it must have the
potential to produce a current and, therefore, magnetism as well. He ana-
lysed luminous discharge in air, using ‘process-freezing’ strobe devices to
produce the images in Figure 10 (Faraday 1831a, Wheatstone 1834).
These show how variations in parameters such as conductivity, electric in-
tensity, density of the medium and the positioning of terminals produce
distinct, repeatable variations in the form and distribution of electric lines
(Figure 10). Just as important was the fact that these variations correlate
to changes in the pitch of an electric brush: pitch rises or falls as conduc-
tivity increases or decreases. Changing frequency indicated the vibration
of a medium, suggesting a possible application of the same model Faraday
had developed to explain acoustical patterns such as those in Figure 7. It
also hinted at a way of dealing with the paradox that electricity appears
both as discontinuous (as static charge on discrete bodies and the electro-
chemical combining force of atoms and molecules) and as continuous cur-
rent.6 The dynamic patterns imaged in Figure 10 extend to electrostatics
the same dynamical geometry Faraday had already worked out for acousti-
cal patterns (Figure 7), electromagnetic motions (Figures 5 and 6) and for
electromagnetic induction (Figure 8). Much later, encouraged by William
Thomson’s campaign of displaying imprints of iron ªling patterns at the
British Association (Gooding 1990b, pp. 251–52), he adopted the same
demonstrative approach with these patterns (see Figure 12).

Images that Integrate

An important feature of creative processes is the ability to maintain sev-
eral lines of inquiry and transfer ideas and methods between them (Gruber
and Davis 1988). In many cases the transfer involves analogies achieved in
several ways and at different levels of abstraction. The most concrete and
intuitive would be ‘direct’ recognition of a similarity at the perceptual level.
This would rely on fast cognitive processing that is closely coupled to
evolved neural structures. At a more abstract, conceptual level are similari-
ties whose signiªcance derives from being features implied by a model
that links different phenomenal domains. Images of lines making struc-
6. Since discovering the effect of freezing on the conductivity of an electrolyte in 1833,
Faraday had been perplexed by the need to understand this transition, via the conditions
that can be varied to make a continuous transition between static and current electricity.
 Perspectives on Science 57

Figure 10. Making electric lines visible. A. Sketch of Faraday’s mental image of
static tension prior to luminous electric discharge, from Faraday’s Diary (Martin
1932-36), vol. 2, paras. 3435-3436. B. an engraving of the variable form of the
“electric brush” as viewed via a stroboscope, from Faraday 1838-55, vol.2, plate
X, figures 119-121.

Figure 11. An instrumental definition of a quantitative relationship between

electricity and magnetism (left) and its visual statement (right). A. Apparatus of
1851 designed to measure the quantity of electricity induced by a conducting
loop (labelled ‘L’) that cuts a defined quantity of magnetic lines as the crank is
turned (from Faraday 1851a, reproduced in Faraday 1838-55, vol. 3, p. 333). Far-
aday wanted to establish that “the sum of power contained in any one section of a
given portion of [magnetic] lines is exactly equal to the sum of power in any other
section of the same lines . . .” (from Faraday 1851a, reproduced in Faraday 1838-
55, vol. 3, p. 329, para 3073). B. This quantitative law of electromagnetic induc-
tion is expressed visually in June 1852. This image integrates and quantifies most
of the phenomenal properties of electricity and magnetism known to Faraday. It
construes forces as fluxes (quantities of action measured across a unit area or sec-
tion). A change in the area of one circle (magnetic flux) implies a contrary and
equal change in the area of the other (electromotive force); from Faraday 1852, re-
produced in Faraday 1838-1855, vol. 3, p. 418, para. 3265 and plate IV.
58 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

tures that are involved in processes enabled Faraday to compare features of

the phenomena he observed and to make analogies at the highest level of
generality that his skills of material and mental manipulation could sup-
port. Examples include his recognition of the signiªcance of relationships
between the behaviour of electric ªlaments (Figures 4A and 10B), electro-
static lines (Figures 9 and 10A) and magnetic lines (Figures 1 and 12).
The sketch of March 1832 (see Figure 8) expressed what Faraday had
learned by active manipulation of magnets and currents. Its ªnal, most ar-
ticulate and general statement appeared in June 1852 (Figure 11B, Fara-
day 1852). This ‘animated’ image of the interactions of electricity, magne-
tism and motion captures the ªndings of prolonged and systematic
experiments to establish a quantitative relationship between the sectional
density of magnetic lines, the rate of ‘cutting’ of lines by a conductor, and
the quantity of electricity produced. Faraday established this using the ap-
paratus in Figure 11A. Like his sketch of 1832, it is a unifying visual
statement that generalizes over the larger set of phenomena that it brings
together (Faraday 1851a, 1851b).
This visual-verbal formulation (Figure 11B) formed a starting point for
Thomson and Maxwell’s mathematical theory of the ªeld (Wise 1979).
The image expresses the relationship between electric and magnetic action
as vector quantities by construing them as ºuxes (quantities of action
measured across an area; Faraday 1852, pp. 417–19). At a similar level of
abstraction is his recognition of the signiªcance of changes in the appear-
ance of high frequency processes such as the rotifer phenomenon (Figure
2A) and acoustical patterns (Figure 7) with changes such as frequency and
the density of the ambient medium (e.g. pitch of the sound made by the
electric brush, Figure 10B). The ability to see the signiªcance of similari-
ties that are perceived ‘directly’ and with different senses depended on rea-
soning with and about visual-verbal models of inferred processes, guided
by experimental trials.

Visualization as Situated Cognition

Faraday accomplished this process of theorizing as much through his ma-
nipulation of images as by the many words that he wrote. We can now see
Faraday’s well known magnetic lines (Figures 1 and 12) not only as de-
picting phenomena but also as generative elements of the experiential
knowledge that produced them. The examples discussed here show that,
far from working in isolation from other modes of perception or from
other persons as sources of experience, visualization integrates different
types of knowledge and experience. Much of the cognitive power of im-
ages resides in this integrative capability, which is central to inference in
many sciences. It follows that the use of any particular image cannot be
 Perspectives on Science 59

Figure 12. Iron filing patterns made by ferro-magnets (figure 12A), diamagnets
(figure 12B, left) and paramagnets (figure 12B, right). These images are produced
by laying a sheet coated with gum or shellac over the iron filings. This fixes the
pattern and makes it transportable. It is then reproduced by an engraver. From
Faraday 1851b, reproduced in Faraday 1838-55, vol. 3, plate III.

understood independently of the way it is generated from and used with

other images. Verbalization is but one part of this context.
We have seen that many of Faraday’s sketches are far more than depic-
tions of observations, they are tools for reasoning with and about phenom-
ena. Visualized phenomena are attempts to image complex 3-D phenom-
ena which cannot be seen directly, are produced by active manipulation
and sometimes by a simulation model or other imaging technique. Thus,
many of his sketches represent something that is dynamic and emergent.
This is because he is trying to visualize a set of changing relationships.
The sketches are early manifestations of a process of establishing an
epistemic basis in shared experience and for communication about that ex-
perience. The more familiar, depictive role of a set of images or their ver-
bal counterparts is developed during many days or weeks work. Some
images are more abstract and general than others, standing for an accumu-
lation of perceptual, practical and theoretical knowledge.7 The meaning
and function of an image varies, depending upon how it is used in relation
to others that represent earlier and later work. Some of his images repre-
sent particulars such as the details of an experimental apparatus or the
structure of a process while others state generalizations about phenomena,
often observed through more than one sensory mode. Use of an image in
one context implies a particular cognitive mechanism is at work while the
same image in another context may imply that a different underlying cog-
nitive process has been invoked. For example, Faraday’s initial sketches of

7. On sketches as short-hand for accumulated experiential knowledge see Gorman

1992, pp. 213–17.
60 From Phenomenology to Field Theory

magnet-needle interactions (Figures 4A and 5A) owe more to embodied

perceptual interaction with objects and forces and less to rational delibera-
tion about physical meaning than the electromagnetic disk (Figure 4C)
which is used both evidentially and to enable others to interpret the phe-
nomenon. Function also varies for images that are entirely in the social do-
main of published representations. The magnetization patterns (Figure
12) and intensity plots (Figure 9) were at ªrst a cognitive resource for inter-
pretation and modelling. These were crafted into an epistemic resource that
could provide pictorial evidence for the visual theory constructed from
them, and aid intellectual comprehension of it.
We have seen that Faraday’s constructive method involved moving
from 2-D patterns to 3-D structures which could then be animated either
as thought-experiments in time or as material, bench-top simulations of
the invisible processes. Images of lines making up structures involved in
processes also enabled Faraday to compare and make analogies between
features of phenomena in different domains. These multiple functions are
essential to the process of discovery which requires many moves between
what makes sense and what can be demonstrated, both for innovators and
their audiences.

Visual Reasoning
The received view of scientiªc inference is that it is accomplished in lan-
guage capable of preserving consistency, both in the use of signs and in re-
lationships between propositions. Does this mean that Faraday’s visual and
material manipulations were not really reasoning, or that what these pro-
duced was not knowledge? On the contrary, while successful science does
require a stable linguistic formulation, creative research cannot be con-
ducted solely with well-formed linguistic representations.8 There are non-
visual ways of forging an isomorphism of words, images or symbols to
what they denote, but images are particularly conducive to the essential,
dialectical movement between the creative stages of discovery and the de-
liberative, rational stages in which rules and evaluative criteria are intro-
duced to ªx meanings and turn images from interpretations into evidence.
Visual perception is an established metaphor for intellectual under-
standing (Kemp 2000). Faraday’s work allows us to show in some detail
why this should be. The co-evolution of his powerful physical concepts
and his experimental procedures shows him creating a cognitive landscape
in which, by getting things to work experimentally and locally, aspects of
the world are made accessible to the senses and subsequently to verbal ex-
8. Word-pictures emerge alongside drawn images in the development of Faraday’s
magnetic ªeld theory between 1845 and 1852, (Gooding 1981).
 Perspectives on Science 61

pression, generalization and intellectual understanding. Similar examples

of the dialectical play of phenomenology, mental imagery, models and the-
ories can be found throughout the sciences (see Ball 1999, Ziman 2000).9
Far from being mere illustrations of reasoning that had been accomplished
verbally, Faraday’s sketches and engravings are integral to his process of
investigation. He did not ªrst produce new knowledge and then verbalize
or image it. Words and images emerged in a context which they jointly
helped to generate. Faraday’s sensual images express his theoretical aspira-
tions and intentions just as much as the many words that he wrote.

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