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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STRATRGIC STUDIE0S INSTITUTE
4'ARLISLE BARRACKS. PENNSYLVANIA 17013
F dlllATIIUm
IOS OP
AWCI 9 March 1981
SUBJECT: Declassification of the BDM Study, "The Strategic Lessons Learned in

•, Vietnam"
Defense Technical, Information Center

ATTN: Ms. Betty Weatherholtz
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
1. Your organization was on the distrlbution list for the BDM study, "The
Sttategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam." The study was assigned AD numbers
B048632L through 641L.
2. In December 1980, the Army War Colloge Security Office notified all
recipients of the study by telephone that it contained classified information
and phould be secured.
3. BDM now has revised the appropriate pages of the study to delete all
classified information and has conformed to all other requirements required by
the clearance review.
4. A revised copy of the study which is unclassified and approved for public
release is inclosed. DTIC Form 50's are inclosed for assignment of new AD
numbers.
Incls ANDREW C. REI4SON,

as Colonel, CE
Director, Strategic Studies Instite
THE]
CORPORATION - ' *,
7915 Jones Branch Drive

McLean, Virginia 22102
Phone (703) 821-5000
November 30. 1979
&BOM/W-8-128-TR-YO
.4.
.A TUDY OF,,TRATEGIC4 ESSONS

,!ARNED IN ;IETNA*
I.ouc
NAM
SJ LUE 10MY 1 •---- -- ---
This draft report is submitted to DAMO-SSP. r.t Ep~c)_L4 .
4541178W
THE BDM CORPORATION
FOREWORD
This Study is a final draft yubmitted to DAMO-SSP in accordance with

the provisions of Contract No. DAAW39-78-C-0l20.
The task is to "dentify and analyze lessons that should be learned
from two decades of ceirect US involvement in the affairs of South Vietnam.
This is Volume I of the study.
* h Volume I The Enemy
Volume II South Vietnam
Volume III US Foreign Policy and Vietnam 1945-1975
Volume IV US Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam

War Policy Making
Volume V Planning the War
Volume VI Conduct of the War
Volume VII The Soldier
Volume VIII Results of the War
NOTE: Through.out this study the lillowing terms will be used when
referring to Vietnamese Communist (or Communist Vietnamese) organizations:
PAVN instead of NVA, PLAF instead of VC. The term Viet Minh is used to
identify the organized indigenous forces in Vietnam that opposed the
Japanese and then the French. See Glossary for further definition.
The views of the authors do not purport to reflect the positions of
the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.
lti
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I1
THE BDM CORPORATION
PREFACE
A. PERSPECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The BDM Corporation is honored to have been selected for a major role
in this pioneering US Army Study on the Strategic Lessons of Vietnam. This
massive study effort is very sensitive and complex, but its potentia, value
is substantial.
The time har come for an introspective and objective analysis of the
major decisions taken and tha results which ensued during our protracted
and costly struggle in Southeast Asia, while memories are still relatively
fresh and key participants are still alive. It is entirely appropriate
that this effort be undertaken by that institution which carried the
heaviest burden during this struggle - the US Army.
The following remarks, made by MG DeWitt C. Smith, Jr. at the initial
meeting of his Study Advisory Group (SAU), established the proper philoso-
phical framework for this challenging enterprise:
It
Basically, as far as Vietnam is concerned, we

won practically all the battles but, by any sensible
definition of strategic objectives, we lost the war.
This is a new experience--harrowing, sorrowful, but
true. Thus it's absolutely imperative that we study
how it is that you can win so frequently, and so
well, in a war-fightinng sense, and yet lose a war in
a strategic or political sense. It's unique; and
it's not something that we want to duplicate!
It appears that the Army established manageable limits on the scope
and direction of this enormous task by concentrating the fotus for the
multiple analyses on the US Army (or military) perspective. This guideline
is int,.rpreted to mean that each of the sub-studies' (chapters) must deter-
mine what significant impact the specific area urnder analysis had on the
war ,f'1ortand specifically on the US Military and vice versa.
The insights which resulted from the various topical analyses are de--
rived from and related directly to America's twenty-five year involvement
irn Southeast Asia; they provide the essential b3sis for the lessons which
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THE BDMV CORPORATION
were, or should be, learned from the war. To be useful to future civilian
and milit~ry leaders, the "lessons learned" have to have application well
beyond the unique situation that prevailed in V/ietnam, and thus must be 4
broad and quite general in nature. This approach to lessons, meshes well
with General Smith's observations on the subject.
I would emph~asize my belief that it is most

useful if one gets a force ready for an uncertain
future rather than a certain futur(.,.. There is-great
danger in being too certain about what the future
will bring, and there's much grc~ater assurance in
preparing for a future which you frankly admit you
cannot precisely define. So I think the lessons of
Vietnam ought to help us to move, not toward a rigid,
final, unassailable doctrine, find certainly not a
narrow doctrine, and not to assume that there's a
point-to-point relationship between the lessons of
Vietnam and what we would do "the next time," but
toward an open, professiona.lly stimulated and
informed leadership corps, believing that anyone
would be delinauent not to learn from all the blood
of Vietnam and all the treasures spent there, and all
the mistakes made, and all t',ie good things that were
done as well.
BOM does not pretend that the various studies provide finite and
definite answers to the numerous complex and controversial issues raised by
the US experience in Vietnam; however, the data, analyses, and insights/
lessons in this study should prove to be of significant value to the US
Army War College study effort. Those volumes submitted for review prior to
the completion of the study are "working papers" subject to revision and
refinement as research and analyses uncover additional data and insights,
Volume I describes those factors that influenced the Communist Viet'-
namese luring the conflict. Volume II examines the key elements that
shaped South Vietnam's response to the Communist threat, and Volumes III
and III examine the important international and domestic factors that in- 4
fluenced US decision and US decision makers. Together these four volumes

are an examination of the key factors in the war. Volumes V and VI
describe the planning and conduct of the war, and Volume VII examines the
factors which influenced the US soldier during the war.
vi
bA;M
THE BDM CORPORATION
Volume VIII examines the results of the war insofar as those results
can be identified at this time.
B. PURPOSE OF VOLUME I. THE ENEMY
Volume I examines the goals, characteristics, and organization of the

Communist Vietnamese to define, on the basis of available information, the
"nature of thq enemy the United States was facing. The volume also examines
aspects of toe communists' conduct of the war and the constraints under
which they operated. During the war, the American actions were often
predicated on inaccurate understanding of who the enemy was and what his
motivation was. Often our matching of strategy to the objective situation
proved to be inappropriate. Through analysis of the Communist Vietnamese
organization, this volume lays a basis for examining of the discrepancies
between US understanding Lf the enemy and his true nature. Later volumes
of this study will describe and analyze the response of the United States
to events in Southeast Asia. This volume examines the following topics:
a
. The long'--ange goals cf the Communist Vietnamese, 1954-1975.

e The DRV leacdership,and the factors that influenced their char'a-
cter and will to continue their struggle for two decades to reach
p their objective.
s The civil and military organizations in North Vietnam, the com-
munist structure in the South, and the relationships between
Vietnamese Communist organizations.
* The Communist Vietnamese mobilization of the slender resources at
their disposal to meet the challenges posed by the South Viet-
namese government and the US
* The system of bases, sanctuaries, and lines of communication
established to support war activities.
* The nature and extent of outside support the Communist Vietnamese
received from their major allies.
* The major domestic and internationa, constraints on DRV policies
U" 'J and courses of action, and the DRV's reaction to those con-
strai nts.
vii
THE BDM CORPORATION
C. THEMES THAT EMERGE FROM VOLUME I: :HE STUDY OF THE COMMUNIST VIET-
NAMESE
In all chapters of this volt,•,e five t.-Ies are evident. Tne first is
the consistent goal the Comm,unist Vietnamese had of unifying Vietnam under
their rule. That goal was never compromised by any of the political and
m-litary initiatives of the communists, and they were implacable in their
devotion to it. They met many severe setbacks in their progress toward
ultimate victory, and they showed thenselves flexible and willing to alter
their strategies to reach their goal when those strategies proved ineffec-
tive or mistaken.
The second theme that emerges is the continuing tactic of the Hanoi
leadership of depicting th,,mselves is the rightful heirs to the atiti-
colonialist heritage and the nearly equally constant refusal of the
majority of the people of South Vietna.m to see the communists in that role.
The communists sought to defeat the .south Vietnamese and United States by
marshalling the kind of xenophobic nationalism that drove the French out.
They were unsuccessful in this effort and were unable to elicit a nationa-
list response from the South Vietnamese that would sustain the struggle to
conquer South Vietnam.
The third theme is that the struggle in Vietnam was intensely politi-
cal and military. From the beginniig tho communists understood that
reality. The policies the United State-; and Suuth Vietnamese followed were
not always based on a complete and agrecd recognition of this sophisticated
mix of factors.
The fourth theme is the absolute dependence of the Communist Viet-
namese on outside support to continue ;heir struggle and the skill they
- exhibited in obtaining required support from their principal allies despite
the Sino-Soviet split.
The final theme evident in this stidy is the careful management of
manpower and other resources the Communist Vietnamese exercised throughout
the War.
viii
THE 8DM CORPORATION
0. SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS THAT AFFECTED THE COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE
Volume I analyzes aspects of communist activity in Vietnami without

recounting the historical development of communist plans and programs. To
provide a reference to that history, Figure I-1 indicates some of the sign-
ificarit events that occurred in Vietnam between the years 1945 and 1977.
The support the Communist Vietnamese received from the People's Republic of
China and the Soviet Union was of immense importance to their war effort.
As will be described in Chapter 6. the flow of that support was related to
the deterioration of Chinese and Soviet relations that took place during
the Vietnam conflict. To provide the historical context for that dis-
cussion, Figure I-1 also indicates significant and relat~ed events that
occurred in China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and the United States during
that period.
ix
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THE BDM CORPORATION
YEAR 194 I941941949_ 195011951

I94 192 19531 1954 19575 15 5 981959 1
US PRESIDENTS TRM NEISENHOWER
jAPANESE DIEN BIEN PHU DRY CALLS DR 3YR DRY

OCUFTIN ALSFOR PREP. PLAN BEGINS PAECY
OF INDOCHINA ARATIONS ('58-'60) DC
TERMINATED CONFERENCETE 196AU OfR
TO UNITE
HANOI DECIDES
SIGNIFICANT FRENCH U EISCNEEC ITA OEPN
EVENTS IN ilEOCCtIPY AID THROUGH ON VIETNAM VIENA NOEXPAMND
NRH VIETNAM FRENCH VPU CIXOMRIH
NORTH ~ ~I USG DiCIDES V IO RI
AND VN ARMED NOT TO HELP VISITS RYN
SOUTH FORCES FRENCH AT RVN
VIETNAM FORMALLY DIEN BIEN PHU CONSTITUTION
CRETEDSEATO PROMULGATED
FRANCE TREATY DIEM'S PARTYI
RECOGNIZES VN ASSUMES SIGNFD FRENCH HIGHI WINS PARLIA14
VIETNAM AS LEADERSHIP IN COMMAND IN ELECTIONS I
AN ASSOCIATED OF RVNAF MANILA RVN ABOLISHED us S9
US CONTINUES MAO TSE TUNG PRC ENTERS FIRST 5-YEAR ASUSIRVE

SUPPORT OF DEFEATS CHIANG KOREAN WAR PLAN APPROVED. BANDUNG FAILUE
SIGNIFICANJT CH~IANG KAI-SHEK WHO FLEES TO SOVIET SUPPORT CONFERENCE. CAUSEDq
SOCIO.POLIT. I TAIWAN. PROVIDED. CHINA SEEKS LEAP ANI
I PRC ESTABLISHED. BROADER OF SOVIEI
EVENTS IN I KOR ANTI-IMPERIALISM
ANDNATIONALISTS AND CE ANER POLICY
AFFECTING 10 AGREE ON Ph ' RECOGNIZES
THE PRC COALITION SOViT. THE ORV PC8
SECOND CIVIL WAR UMY PR-SR
CLASH9
BEISTENSION CRISIS WITH INV
BEGINS I I I
TREATY WITH CLWAUSR 19th PARTY ThNSIONS
CRAN'S E BEGNSRECGIE
A CONGRESS. USSR RETURNS OVER SOVIET A
SGIIAT NATIONALIST EA GN] RCNIS"CAPITALIST * PRATHRW. BERLINREAL
SOIOPOIT GOVERNMENT FAL OF TEDRY NICE E T TO MAO. FROM Ff
IN
EVENTSAN BERLIN AIRLIFT. TREATY WITH DRAWN UP USSR VETOES VISITS PEKING EISENHEOWER.KHRU,
YLA ONEENE PRC FOR THAILAND'S CAMP DAVID MEEt
ADYLACNEEC.MUTUAL REQUEST IN USSR-PRC NUCLEAI
AFFECTING STALIN GAINS ASSISTANCE UN TO 20th CPSU FACT BROKEN OFF,
TERRITORIALINETGT COGES SPTKLADG
THE USSR CONCESSIONS INPACIFIC STALIN DIES. KHRUSHCHEV SINETIGATEO COGESS.S TINILADN
PUINZ
FOR PROMISE TO ENTER CONSOLIDATES POWER IN 19516. SITULATON UNEISTLENDI
WAR AGAINST JAPAN BEGINNING OF "DESTALINI NZAT ION," INLOSUVELD
SOVIET TROOPS ENTER F. GERMANY -HUNGARY INVADED Sl
YEAR~ 194M51948 1347 1948 1949 [1950 1951 1952 193 9b 95 1 19571 1958 1959
4541/78W
Figure 1-1. Siqnificant Event

Policyv and the Il
V5j 1956 I1951 1958 1959 I1950 1961 1962 1963 1904 1965 1966 1957 1968 1969 11970 1971 1972. 1913 1974 1975
EISENHOWER KENNEDY JOHNSON_ _ THIEU
NIXON OR
M, N 0-N ¶JE IP~ - H IEUDUAN,
A TRUONG CHINH
POLITBORO CDLEADERS
•DRy CANCELS PEACE TALKS

KENNEDY, HANOI RE-EQUIPS TET '58 PEACE TALKS
DRV 3.YR DRV LAO DONG
OR PREP- PLAN BEGINS PARTY MEETS. DIEM It NHU I AND BEGINS
IRATIONS ('*5-'160 DECIDES TO ASSASSINATED REINFORCING COMMUNISTS
SUPPORT WAR NLFIPLAF, ATTACK OVER IN PARIS. CONCLUDE.
OI 1956
1LECTIONS r- OF NAT-L LIBERATION r DIRECTS ATTACKS 100 CITIES ORV EASTER DRV LAUNCHES
0ETNAM
UNITE HANOI DECIDES I PLAF DEFEATS ON US INSTALLATIONS WITH ROCKETS OFFENSIVE. FINAL CAMPAIGN.
HTOECPANDE RVNAF AT AP BAC J b MORTARS LINEBACKER I GVN FALLS.
HO (HI MINH 1st BATTLE OF 2d MAJOR DRV LBJ ANNOUNCES BEGINS HAIPHONG
VP NIXON TRAIL NLF OF SVN INDOCHINA WAR OFFENSIVE HE WON'T WIN MINED. I LINEBACKER I1.
VISITS RVN FORMED BUDDHIST 10 SPLIT RVN ITNAMIZATION THIEU 8.52 CHRISTMAS
NDIEM AND TH UPRISING THIEU eSi RE.ELECTEC BOMBING
FOREMD BUDINT TO ISI 'NG W!THOUT
CONSTITUTION ELECTED BY IN RVN E lECED.
PROMULGATEVASTAJORITY DIEM STARTS PRES T ENDS US b RVNAF OPPOSITION RVNAF ATTACKS
ROU T DIEM's PARTY STRATEGIC ROLLING VIES. bE FORCES INVALE INTO LAOS
FRENCH HIGH WINS PARLIAMENTARY PROMRAM THUNDER VIEPRS CAMBODIA L OUSTPEAIN
COMMAND IN ELECTIONS I GULF OF BEGINS. I _"j , US SENATE I OPERATIONS
RVN ABOLISHED " IS C TONKIN USV RESCINDS
HRUNAS'.... INLAOS, b
US SPECIAL FORCES USMACV US GROUND GENERAL CAMBODIA
TOYIN
IETAM ESTABL. INCIDENT ICOMBATFORCES MBLZ TIONTON1N GULFCES
I
64 I I ARRIVE IN RVN ' I RESOLUTION
MASSIVE CROP L GnEAT

ýDUNG FAILURE SETBACKS PRC EXPLODES CULTURAL DtINSPIIAD
FERENCE. CAUSED BY GREAT FIRST NUCLEAR REVOLUTION DES
"ASEEKS LEAP AND WITHDRAWAL DEVICE NIXON
"DER OF SOVIET AID VISIT
VI
II•IMPERIALISM SINO.INDIAN
ANTI-SOVIET PRC
WAR DEMONSTRATION
PRC
IN PEKING SEATED
PRC.USSR PRCASHES
BORDERIRS DISPUTES PRC
H BOMB ARMED BORDER INUN FORD AND
KISSINGER
TENSSO QUEMOY 'AH DISPUTH BOMB CONFLICT BETWEEN VISIT PRC
TENSION CRISIS INDIA WITH USSR EXPLODEr PiTHANDI
BEGINS I -
TENSIONS USSRj' RESULTS
USSR RETURNS OVER SOVIET ADVISORS EXPULSION SERIOUS GRAIN CROP
PORT ARTHUR W. BERLIN RECALLED
MRV USSR AND TENSIONS WITH OF CHINESE TALKS FAILURE. MASSIVE
TO MAO. FROM PRC SIGN TRADE PRC BECOME STUDENTS PURCHASES AFFECT
KHRUSHCHEV AND AID EXTREME FROM USSR USSR INVADES WORLD PRICES
VISITS PEKING EISENHOWER-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENTS CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CAMP DAVID MEETING. ATTEMPTS TO SALT I
USSR.PRC NUCLEAR IMPROVE SINO, RATIFIED
20th CFSU PACT BROKEN OFF. SOVIET
CONGRESS. SPUTNIK LANDING CUBAN FAIL.2 RELATIONS ARAB-ISRAELI
DE-STALINIZATIONBAOFPGCRSSLSE UZ
UNVEILED. U.2 PLANE KHRUSHCHEV USSR AID TO DRY VISITS
HIINGARY INVADED SHOT DOWN OUSTED HAS TO BE RE.ROUTED
19716
1956~~~7
15 99 91 16 93 16 95 1966 1957 1968 1969 F1970 1911 11972 1197311914 17
i-1. Significant Events Relating to US Foreign xi/x1i

Policy and the Indochina Region
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
FOREWORD iii
PREFACE v
TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii

LIST OF FIGURES xix
LIST OF TABLES xxi

LIST OF MAPS xxiii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EX-1 to EX-1l
1. THE ENEMY'S GOALS 1-1 to 1-32
A. Introduction 1-1
B. The Relationship of Communist Vietnamese Goals
and Strategies 1-2
A. Communist Strategies
C-3 1954-1959
2. Communist Strategies 1959-1963 1-8
3. Formation of the National Liberation
Front/Peoples Revolutionary Party
(NLF/PRP) 1-10
4. DRV Strategies 1964-1968 1-13
5. The General Offensive and General Uprising
Strategy, 1968 1-16
6. DRV Strategies 1969-1972 1-19
7.
8. The 1972 Main Force Attack Strategy 1-21
Communist Strategies 1973-1975 1-22
C. Summary 1-23
D. Analytical Summary and Insights 1-25
E. Lessons 1-26
2. CHARACTER AND WILL 2-1 to 2-26
A. Introduction 2-1
B.
S Identification of the DRV Leaders 2-2
1. Characteristics of North Vietnamese Leader-
ship 2-2
2. Key DRV Leaders 2-5
3. Leadership of the NLF 2-9
xiii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
Chapter Page
C. Debates Within the Leadership 2-10

0. Elements Supporting the Tenacity of
Communist Vietprmipe Leaders 2-12
1. The Correct ýalution 2-12

2. Under'standin.I the Cuntradictions 2-13
3. Morale and W-" I the Soldiers
-. 2-14
4. Morale and Will of the North Vietnamese
People 2-18
L.. Analytical Summary: Insights 2-19

F, Lessons 2-21
3. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF V.TNAM

(DRV) AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) 3-1 to 3-49
A. Introduction and General Overview 3-2

B. Principles of Revolutionary Organization 3-3
1. Principles Governing the Party Control

Apparatus 3-4
2. Mass Organization Strategy 3-7
3. The Military Organization 3-10
C. Historical Perspective 3-12
1. Party Development and the Front

Organizations 3-12
2. Party Development and the Provisional
Government 3-15
D. The Organization of the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (DRV) 3-16
1. Organization for the Dang Lao Dong Party 3-17

2. The Government Organization of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam 3-17
3. Organization of the Armed Forces of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 3-20
4. Summary Analysis: A Triad System of
•v~rern~rIt 3-22
E. The Organization of the National Liberation

Front of South Vietnam (NLFSVN) 3-22
xiv
I,
....... S-- • .• ;i•%'•'•L• " • .• A •~* " !••'''•...•- ...
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Chapter Page
1. The Party Organization in South Vietnam;
the Core of the Struggle Movement 3-24
2. The Organization of the National Liberation
Front 3-26
3. The Military Command Structure: The People's
Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), The
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and
Guerrilla Popular Army 3-28
4. Summary Analysis: Organizational
Relationships 3-29
F. Provisional Revolutionary Government 3-34

I 1. The Background 3-34
2. The PRG Emerges 3-34
G. Summary and Insights 3-35
H. Lessons 3-38
4. MOBILIZATION 4-I to 4-36
A. Introduction 4-1
B. Communist Vietnamese Mobilization: Background 4-2
C. Mobilization in the North 4-6
1. Military Personnel Requirements 4-6
2. Civilian Manpower Requirements in the
North 4-7
3. Impact of Mobilization on the North
Vietnamese Economy 4-10
4. Motivation Efforts in the North 4-15
D. Mobilization in the South 4-17
E. Analytical Summary--Insights 4-28
F. Lesson 4-29
5. BASES, SANCTUARIES, AND LOC 5-1 to 5-58
"A. Introduction 5-1
B. Evolution of the Viet Minh Logistical
Structures 5-2
1. The World War II Years 5-2
2. The First Indochina War 5-2
3. Dien Bien Phu 5-8
4. Significance of Early Viet Minh
Logistics 5-9
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Chapter Page
C. Consolidation 1954-1959 5-9
1. The Chinese Connection 5-9
2. The Soviet Connection 5-10
3. Viet Minh Strongholds in RVN 5-10
4. Logistical Preparations for Insurgency 5-i4
5. Significance of the Consolidation Period 5-12
0. Logistics in the Revolutionary Struggle
k 1959-1964 5-12
1. The Fateful DRV Decision 5-12

2. Infiltration Routes 5-14
3. Logistics Organizations 5-16
4. Logistical Significance 1959-1964 5-23
E. PAVN/PLAF Logistics 1965-1975 5-25'
1. The Buildup 5-25

2. Foreign Support 5-25
3. Expanding Lines of Communication and Base
Areas 5-26
4. Synopsis of PAVN/PLAF Combat Operations 5-37
5. Significance of PAVN/PLAF Logistics
1965-197b 5-42
F. Strategic LOC 1965-1975 5-43
1. The Three Strategic LOC's 5-43

2. Vulnerabilities of the Strategic LOC 5-44
3. Assessing the Strategic LOC 5-46
G. Analytical Summary and Insights 5-46
H. Lessons 5-49
6. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 6-1 to 6-46
A. Introduction and Overview 6-1
B. Ideological/Political Support Proviaed by the
Penpli's.Republic of China (PRC) 6-5
1. Background 6-5
2. Points of Agreement and Disagreement Between
Peking and Hanoi 6-5
3. Support Provided to the NLF by the People's
Republic of China 6-16
xvi
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Chapter Page
C, Ideological-Political Support Provided by the
Soviet Union 6-17
1. Background 6-17
2. Sino and US Influences on Moscow's Aid to
the DRV 6-19
3. Ideological-Political Support Provided by
the USSR to the NLF 6-24
D. Actual Support (Military, Economic and
Technical) Provided to the DRV-NLF by the
Soviet Union, People'.i Republic of China
and Others Sympathetic to the DRV-NLF Cause 6-25
1. Introduction 6-25
2. Economic and Technical Aid to the DRV/NLF 6-26
3. Military Assistance Provided to the DRV/
NLF 6-Z7
E. Analytical Summary and Insights 6-27
F. Lessons 6-31
Appendix A 6-35
Appendix B 6-37
Appendix C 6-38
Appendix 0 6-39
7. CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY 7-1 to 7-28
A. Introduction 7-1
B. Major Goals and Policies of tha Leaderships of
North Vietnamn and the National Liberation
Front 7-1
C. Long-Standing International and Oomestic
Constraints on Policy 7-2
I. Interna ional Constraints 7-2
2. Domestic Constraints 7-4
3. Military Constraints 7-8
0. Major Changes in Constraints - Conflict
Ernvironment 7-10
1. 1954-1956 7-10
2. 1965 7-11
3. 1968 7-12
4. 1972 7-14
5. 1973-1975 (final reversal) 7-16
xvii
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ChapterPage
E. Summary 7-17
F. Summary Analysis and Insights 7-20
G. Lessons 7-21
BIBLIOGRAPHY B-i to B-21
GLOSSARY G-1 to'G-3
xviii
A
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1-I Significant Events Relating to U.S. Foreign
Policy and the Indochina Region xi/xii
1-1 Illustration of DRViNLF Goals 1-4
3-1 Communist Organizational Development/History
• in North and South Vietnam 3-13/14
3-2 Dang Lao Dong Party Organizbtion 3-18
3-3 Government Organization of The DRV 3-19
3-4 DRV Military Organization 3-21
3-5 Elements of Party Control Over Civil and
Military Organization in North Vietnam 3-23
3-6 PRP Party Committee Organization in South
Vietnam 3-25
3-7 Civil Structure of Nationdl Headquarters
NLFSVN 3-27
3-8 The Communist Military Forces in South
t Vietnam 3-30
* 3-9 Typical Structure--Interprovincial Level 3-31
3-10 Interrelationship of NLF/PRP Organizations 3-32
3-11 Method of Communist Control of Civil
Organizations within the NLF 3-33
* 4-1 The Spectrum of Techniques of Repression 4-23
4-2 Communist Recruiting Methods 4-25
5-1 Auxiliary Service and Movement Tables 5-5
5-2 PAVN Logistics Structure 5-17
5-3 Representative Binh Trams 5-18
xix
THE BDM C(RPORATION
LIST OF FIGURES (CONTINUED)

Figure Page
5-4 COSVN Logistics Organization 5-22
5-5 Guerrilla Logistics 1959-1964 5-24
6-1 Chronological Timeline of Important Events
Influencing Support Provided to the DRV-NLF 6-3/4
'..
xx
ON, - - .* M-
THE BDM CORPORATION
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
4-1 Personnel Change--An Illustration 4-6
4-2 PAVN Armed Forces 1970-1971 4-7
4-3 Percentage of DRV National Capacity
Destroyed - Rolling Thunder 4-14
4-4 A Summary of Results of Linebacker II 4-16

4-5 The Spectrum of Techniques of Repression 4-23
4-6 Communist Recruiting Methods 4-25
5-1 PAVN Infiltration from North to South
Vietnam 1959-1964 (Number of Individuals) 5-13
5-2 Chinese and Soviet Aid to North Vietnam
1954-1971 5-27
5-3 DRV Manpower Requirements 5-28
6-1 Chinese and Soviet Aid to North Vietnam,
1954-1971 6-13
6-2 Delegation Exchanges Between Peking, Hanoi
and Moscow, 1964-1971 6-14
6-3 Estimates of Equipment Deliveries Received
by the DRVN, 1965-June 1967 6-28
xxi
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LIST OF MAPS
Maps Page
5-1 Viet Minh Supply Routes 1950-1954 5-6
5-2 Viet Minh Strongholds in RVN 1954-1959 5-11
5-3 Infiltration Routes 1959-1964 5-15
5-4 The Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trail Sytem 5-29
5-5 DRV Command Structure in RVN 5-32
5-6 Pipeline Systems 5-33
5-7 New Route 14 or Truong Son Corridor 5-35
5-8 The Enemy Base Area System and Additional
Lines of Communication 5-36
xxi i i
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VI
EXECUTIVE SU!MARY
The chapters of this volume describe several key insights concerning
I! the Communist Vietnamese in the period 1945-1975. These insights r'.late to

decisions that were made and events that occurred, from which can be
derived lessons concerning the Vietnam War. By their very nature, insights
are specifically focused on the people, places, and historicaT events
as.ociated with Southeast Asia in general and, in this volume, particularly
witN the Communist Vietnamese. Lesions, on the other hand, must have a
more general application if they are to be of value in the future.
The lessons from Vietnam are not new to warfare. In the main they are
lessons from earlier conflicts that were forgotten, misunderstood, or
misapplied. Not surprisingly, however, a few lessons were applied prop-
erly.
Because lessons are general in nature they usually appear to be
platitudes. So, too, do the principles of war or the observations of von

Clausewitz, or Napoleon, or Sun Tzu.
This executive summary sets forth some insights and lessons that
emerge solely from this volume -- The Enemy.
4 t
i" EX- 1
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INSIGHTS
Long-Range . The Vietnamese Communists held steadfastly to their
Goals: long-range goal of national unification under control
of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party (Dang Lao Dong,
or Vietnamese Worker's Party). That ultimate goal was
never negotiable, but strategies for achieving that
goaT were altered, based on the changing internal and
extErnal real i ties.
0 The Vietnamese Communists demonstrated flexibility in
developing political-military strategies for meeting
short-range objectives which could contribute to
achieving the ultimate goal of national unification.
0 The Vietnamese Communists recognized the importance of
seemingly different goals for the range of organiza-
tions involved in the struggle against the Saigon
government. The variety of goals allowed the com-
munists to attract a wide international audience and to
manipulate some South Vietnamese groups.
0 The goals of the principal supporters of the DRV, the
USSR and the PRC, shifted and diverged over time which
createl a delicate and potentially critical problem for
the Lao Dong leadership.
LESSONS
The stated long-range goals of an enemy,
a.ctual or potential, and especially a
communist enemy - may provide valuable
clues as to the adversaries strategic, and
even tactical, intentions. When the enemy
has allies, thei;. separate national goals
may be widely divergent, thereby providing
an opportunity for exploitation.
Even in a communist nation, the enduring
aspirations of the people and their leaders
will tend to be nationalistic; in some 9
cases the influence of a nearby major

communist power may prevent overt manifes-
tations of nationalism within a small,
dependent nation, but it is doubtful that
the desire for freedom, as the indigenous
population perceives freedom, can be
erased.
S• Es^-2
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k
INSIGHTS
t Character and
Will:
e The character and determination of the communist Lao
Dong Party leadership in North and South Vietnam were
shaped by their common experience and philosophy and
matured over an extended period.
0 The Vietnamese Communists established a leadership
system that largely overcame the Vietnamese nationai
traits of internecine conflict and even loyalties to
family and village. This system provided continuity of
leadership thruugh three decades of struggle.
0 Until too late, some U.S. leaders seriously underesti-
mated these critical characteristics, and particularly
the strength and determination of the DRV/NLF leadevs,
and thus sometimes developed ineffective - and often
counter-productive - policies and strategies.
* The fiercely nationalist character of the revolution-
aries who comprised the leadership, and their excep-
tional -bility to organize and discipline their fol-
lower in the face of massive bombardment and pro-
tracted warfare, were underestimated by President
Johnson and his advisers when they formulated and
implemented the strategy of gradual military escala-
tion.
LESSONS
Thorough and unbiased analyses of a people's history,
society, politics, and leaders should produce useful
insights into their national character and will.
Without this knowledge, strategies and political
"signals" are likely to be ineffective or even
counterproductive.
The will of a people to resist an enemy and the ii
ability to endure prolonged hardship and danger have
a direct relationship to their perception of the
justice of their cause and confidence ,in their
leaders.
To destroy a people's will to resist requires that
one or more of the following ba accomplished:
* Threaten their national survival. This is
40 construed to mean political and economic
defeat as well as military defeat
0 Destroy their confidence in the "Justice"
of their cause and/or the quality and
effectiveness of their leaders.
a Demonstrate the improbability of their
achieving their objectives, assuming that
this capability exists.
EX-3
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Organization: 4 Before and du.ring the'r war with the French, the Lao
Dong leadchlp developid effective political-military
organizatiotis. which were based on general Leninist and
Maoist principlez., b;+ moti'1ied to meet the unique his-
tory and environment of Vietnam; in 1960 they created a
ioew organizational Atructure (NLF) in the South and
refined it over time (PRP, PRG, etc.)
0 One of Ho Chi Minh's greatest skills was his ability to
design, and to use effectively, organizations tailored
for the existing - or predicted- environment.
* The Vietnamese Communists established counter organiza-
tions that sought to oppose the South Vietnamese
government at every societal level. Thoie org.aniza-
0ions were designed to provide the people of South
Vietnam with an apparently legitimate alternative to
the Saigon government which the communist3 were working
to discredit.
0 The Vietnamese Communists were aware that achieving
t1-ir goal of unifying their country under communist
4-i.ership would be a long-term effort. They worked
patiently to establish the base for the long struggle
of attrition against their enehbies.
e The Vietnamese Communists established a complex command
structure in the South that gave the appearance of
having strong regional autonomy, thus gaining sub-
stantial international and Indigenous noncommunist
support. In fact, that structure was controlled from
0
the North by the Communist Lao Dong Party.
The Vietnamese Communists manipulated their domestic
and international support and opposition by seeming at *
times to advocate an independent, Southern-nýýtionalist,
political alternative to the existing South Vietnamese
govornment.
EX-4
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LESSONS
In a revolutionary context, communist
organizations invariably turn to "front"
organizations as a means for capturing the
support of other non-communist entities
that share some common dissatisfaction; a
knowledge and understanding of the indi-
genous situation and existing grievances
provides an opportunity for infiltrating a
front or exploiting or crEating schisms
between communist and non-communist ele-
ments within a front; however,the com-
munists' organizational techniques are
often so well developed that opportunities
for exploitation may be rare and fleeting
or May depend on an incumbent non-communist
governmental apparatus making substantial
changes to oliqr a better alternative than
the communists appear to offer.
To defeat a Communist threat requires
thorough understanding of the political-
military organization, or infrastructure,
which sustains and controls it, followed by
the planning and coordination of appro-
priate "attacks" - political, psychologi-
cal, economic, police, and military - on
its points of vulnerability.
- I
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EX-5
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INSIGHTS
Mobilization: . The psychological and organizational techniques and
skills, tested under fire against the French, were
refined and employed with success against the far
stronger combination of the US and South Vietnam.
* From their decision in 1959 to support the war of
national liberation in the South until theit final
victory in 1975, the DRV leaders saw the struggle in
the North and the South as one, undivided effort.
• The Vietnamese Communist leadership capitalized on the
US air attacks in the North as a means oa developing
and maintaining popular support for the mobilization
effort in the North.
* The Vietnamese Communists relied upon outside aid to
supplement and complement their own production capacity
in ways that permitted flexible response to US bombing
initiatives.
LESSON
The keys to effective mobilization of

popular support in an insurgency situation
lie in dedicated, intelligent leadership,
effective organization from top to bottom,
sound long-range goals, a aplatform" that
appeals to a broad segment of the popu- •i
lation, and a military strategy that
supports and reinforces political aims.
Since neither opponent will be absolutely
effective across the spectrum, the one
which is relatively more experienced,
unified, determined, realistic, and
consistent wi 11 be more successful.
0-
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INSIGHTS
Bases, Sanctu- * The Vietnamese Communist logistics system was initi-
aries & LOC: ated during the Japanese occupation and was gradually
but significantly expanded and refined in their
struggle against the French. From 1949 on, China
provided them with a secure sanctuary and a needed
source of supply.
0 Strong communist enclaves were established in South
Vietnam during the First Indochina War against the
French, and the inhabitants maintained strong Party
ties with the DRV, thereby providing sanctuaries, safe
havens, and operating bases in support of anti-GVN
activities; the DRV became the "strong rear" to support
the struggle in the South.
0 The DRV's military high command, especially Giap and
Dung, excelled in logistical planning and execution,
particularly in using the sanctuaries of Laos and
Cambodia in which they ultimately established all-
weather roads and POL pipelines to support their combat
forces in the South. Further, during most of the
K
Second Indochina War the DRV made effective use of the
Sekong River and RVN coastal waters, as well as the
maritime lines of communication into Haiphong and
Sihanoukville. pe
* The US government announced publicly and repeatedly
that no invasion of North Vietnam was contemplated.
Fear of possible PRC and USSR reaction combined with
hopes for a negotiated settlement, however, led the
president to self-imposed restrictions on US interdic-
tion operation against the DRV homeland.
0 Use of privileged sanctuaries generally enebled Com-
munist units to avoid combat and limit attrition to
their forces as it suited them, thereby making it
possible for them to wage a protracted war.
* The closing of Sihanoukville to the DRV in 1970, and
the mining of their harbors and waterways in 1972 ex-
posed their near total dependence on, and the vulnera-
bility of their external LOC.
0 The Paris Agreements granted PAVN defacto permission to
remain in their bases/sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos,
and even RVN as well as the opportunity to expand,
vastly, their LOC to and within the RVN.
EX-7
THE BDM CORPORATION
LESSONS
Bases, Sanctu- The nature, extent, and politico-military
aries & LOC: implications of an enemy's actual or poten-
tial sanctuaries must be studied, analyzed,
and understood in order to be in a position
to deny him the important advantages con-
ferred by the existence of such
sanctuaries.
Sanctuaries can consist of:
• Cooperative people, whether
motivated by loyalty or fear
* Remote areas within a country
that defy intrusion by opposition
forces
• Havens in adjacent "neutral"
countries that encourage, permit,
or suffer the presence of revo-
lutionary forces.
The initiative, and thus control of the
pace of an armed struggle, often lies with
a party making use of "privileged sanc-
tuaries" (those areas gratuitously placed
"off limits" by a protagonist).
"Privileged sanctuaries" are more likely to
exist in a limited war than in a total war.
In a limited-war situation a democratic
power is likely to establish self-imposed
constraints that may contribute to the
existence of one or more sanctuaries.
Conversely a totalitarian power is unlikely
to impose on itself any limits.
Because of combat-power ratios and other
important factors, revolutionary forces are
usually dependent on sanctuaries, at least
during early phases of their development,
and on more sophisticated base areas and
lines of communications as hostilities
escalate.
In cases where an enemy's use of "'privi-
leged sanctuaries" figures promineritly in
the nature and duration of a war, appro-
priate politico-diplomatic, psychological,
economic, and military means must be
employed in concert to neutralize or
restrict such sanctuaries.
EX-.8
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INSIGHTS
Outside Sup- * Support from the PRC was a major factor in the shift-
port: ing of the balance of forces in favor of the Viet Minh
in the First Indochina War, but as magnitude and nature
of war escalated in the Second Indochina War, ORV
dependence on thne USSR increased dramatically.
0 In spite of the intensifying conflict between Peking
and Moscow, the Vietnamese Communists were able to "x'
tract adequate military and economic aid in the appro-
priate mixes to meet the gradually escalating challenge
posed by the US
* The US attempted to bring pressure to bear on North
Vietnam through negotiations with both Peking and
Moscow, while at the same time trying to establish
detente with the two major powers. The Vietnamese
proved capable of outmaneuvering US efforts and
exploiting the Russian and Chinese rivalry to obtain
their objectives.
Though in military and economic terms the Vietnamese
Communists were absolutely dependent on external sup-
port for accomplishing their objectives in the face of
the US presence, their independence of action was not
threatened until the following events occurred: The
PRC drastically slowed the flow of Soviet materiel
4 * passing through China; Lon Nol seized control of Cam-
bodia and closed the port of Sihanoukville to DRV
shipments.; and the US mined Haiphong and river LOCs.
LESSONS
Major communist powers such as the USSR and
PRC have certain vested interests in sup-
porting and ensuring the success of lesser
communist nations; this suggests that an
oppontent of one of their surrogates would
be advised not to elect a strategy of
attrition unless there was a reasonable
assurance of a quick victory or of influ-
encing the external supply of resources
and/or use of geographic sanctuaries over a
long haul.
A locally based insurgency normally
* requires extensive external support to
offset an adverse balance of military and
economic power; this dependence may produce
inherent contradictions which, if identi-
fied and understooo, can present opportuni-
ties for exploitation.
EX-9
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INSIGHTS
Constraints e The Vietnamese Communists were able to overcome most of

on Policy: the significant domestic and international constraints
on their activities through their strong leadership
commitment to ultimate victory and the flexibility they
demonstrated in their efforts to achieve that victory.
* The Vietnamese Communists wel'e strongly aware of the
constraints on their actions, and they showed them-
selves capable of reviewing and altering strategies in
order to reach their ultimate objective.
* The Vietnamese Communists showed themselves to be
keenly aware of the constraints on US and South Viet-
namese actions and they attempted to manipulate those
factors to obtain relative advantages on the battle-
field, in the war for international public opinion, and
at the peace table.
0 The massive and essentially unconstrained bombing of
North Vietnam in May-October and again in Decer tr,
1972, brought the DkV leaders to the peace table and
was instrumental in enabling the US to achieve its
principal contemporary goals of recovering US POWs and
comipletlng its military withdrawal from South Vic'.am;
that withdr.mwal ultimately removed the single most
important constraint which had helped prevent comi,,nist
military victories in 1972 and thereafter.
0 After the 1973 "ceasefire" the constraints in the ORV's
freedom of action were minimal, while those facing the
South Vietnamese multiplied in every important aspect;
by March 1975 both tha GVN and the RVNAF in fact were
"defeated" before the first shot of the final offensive
was fired.
LESSON
All participants in a sustained political-
military struggle are faced with a varying
mix of internal and external constraints.
Successful politicians/strategists develop
ways and means to minimize or circumvent
the restrictions on their freedom of action
while exacerbating and exploiting those
facing their opponent(s).
EX-10
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4k rhe following summary lesson, while superficially, obvious and simple,

is one that has been - or should have been - relearned over and over again
by political and military leaders throughout recorded history. In rPumerous
cases it has been ignored or misapplied by the physically stronger opponent
in a struggle with serious consequences.
OVERALL LESSON
Incomplete, inaccurate, or untimely knowledge of one's
enemies (his history, goals, organization, leadership,
habits, strengths and weaknesses, and above all, his
* character and will) results in inferior policies and
strategies; raises the cost in time, treasure, anguish
and blood; and increases the possibility of the ulti-
mate defeat of one's initial objectives.
KNOW YOUR ENEMY!!!
EX-11
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a=
CHAPTER I
THE ENEMY'S GOALS
Experience of other countries and of our national

history shows us that: The huerican Revolutioi, for
national liberation was successful after eight years of
struggle; the French Revolution lasted five years, the
Russian Revolution six years and the Chinese Revolution
fifteen years.
Our forefathers fought against foreign aggression for
five years under the Tran dynasty and ten years under
the Le dynasty before winning victory. Therefore, if
France sincerely recognizes the unity and independence
of our country, our Government and people are ready to
cooperate with her, but if the French colonialists
maintain their policy of strength and plot to divide
us, we are resolved to continue the Resistance War
until we win unity and independence.
Ho Chi Minh
September 2, 1947
Second Anniversary of Independence Day
A. INTRODUCTION
Ho Chi Minh's speech in 1947 on the second anniversary of Independence

Day reflected the tenacity that is characteristic of the leaders of the
Democratic Republic of Vie•tnam (DRV). That leadership persevered for
nearly eight years against the French in the First Indochina War (1946-
1954).1/ After consolidating their victory, communist perseverance was
again put to the test against the South Vietnamese and later the Americans
in the Second Indochina War which ended in 1975; the bcginning date is
variously suggested as 1956, 1959, 1960, and later.2/ For purposes of
Volume I, the Second Indochina War is considered to have begun in 1961 when
the newly formed, Hanoi-controlled, National Liberation Front (NLF)
announced a guerrilla offensive against Diem's Governfent of South Vietnam
(GVN) and when President Kennedy offered to join with the South Vietnamese
"..... in an intensified endeavor to win the struggle against communism... "3/
The intervening period, 1955-1960, began quietly but soon spawned a well
: I.
THE BDM CORPORATION
orchestrated insurgency. Both sides -Ae serious mistakes, but the com-
munists showed themselves to be resili. kiid persistent; they were able to
admit their errors and develop new rýcics to achieve their unchanging,
long-term goal -- unification of Vietnam under the Communist Lao Dong
Party.4/
The tenacity of Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants was a major factor in
the victory of the Communist Vietnamese. Extensive support from the Soviet
Union and from the People's Republic of China contributed significantly to
Ho Chi Minh's ability to wage war. Ousting the foreigners, first the
French, then the Americans, provided an invaluable rallying point for the
communists. The latter captured the anticolonial initiative, and success-
fully appealed to the nationalist pride of the Vietnamese people. Partic-
ularly effective, as well, was the ability of the communist leadership to
rally support for their cause. This, they claimed, could only be accomp-
lished under the Lao Dong Party.
B. THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE GOALS AND STRATEGIES
The classic Maoist guerrilla struggle program, modified by Vo Nguyen

Giap, was divided into three distinct phases. The first was withdrawal to
remote areas for the organization of popular support. On the base that was
established in that phase of activity, the movement was supposed to shift
over to assumption of the offensive in the second phase, using guerrilla
methods, until superiority of strength had been achieved. The third phase
was to be a general offensive by mobile units supported by a general
uprising of the population to destroy the South Vietnamese government and
its armed forces.
The Vietnam war did not follow the phases indicated in the program.5/
Nevertheless, communist propaganda continually presented the im&ge of a
g idually rising tide of popular opposition to the Saigon government. The
,'itimate and long-term goal of the Vietnamese Communists, reunification of
hourth and South Vietnam under the Lao Dong Party leadershii, remained
constant. In the pursuit of that ultimate goal, short-range goals were
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THE 8DM CORPORATION
identified in the periods of the war. Figure 1-1 outlines the evolution of
Vietnamese Communist goals during the Vietnam War, the ultimate goal and
the ostensible or tactical, short-range goals.
To achieve the short-range objectives anid goals that they established
in different periods of the war, the Communist Vietnamese leadership
employed a range of strategies that included:
* Political struggle which meant not only political opposition but
also small-scale terrorism to achieve political ends.
0 Combinations of political struggle and armed struggle to meet the
growing strength of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
and to frustrate efforts by the Saigon government to strengthen
its political base in the rural areas.
0 Armed struggle involved both "revolutionary guerrilla war" and
also large unit war by forces associated with the National Libera-
tion Front (NLF).
a Armed struggle also included the use of - its North Vietnamese
regular army, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). (Sometimes
shown NVA).
0 Negotiations and promises of negotiations were used to provide
relief from Allied attacks and to allow regrouping of communist
forces for the next stage of struggle.
0 Diplomatic and international progaganda offensives were lainched
in conjunction with foreign allies to weaken the resolve of the
United States and to isolate the South Vietnamese government.
The Vietnamese Communist leadership employed various combinations of
these strategies to achieve their short-range purposes and to provide a
basis for ultimately reaching their long-range goal of reunifying the North
fand South. Trhis chapter examines the strategies that were employed by the
communists and identifies lessons the United States can learn from examina-
tions of that activity.
1. Communist Strategies 1954-1959
In South Vietnam, the period after Geneva was relatively peace-
ful for nearly three years. The communists believed that the national
1-3
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THE BDM CORPORATION
referendum scheduled for 1956 would provide them with a mandate to reunify
the country under their leadership. The communist forces that had been
active in the South up to 1954 were generally withdrawn to the North and
formed into special regroupment units (the 305th, 324th, 325th, 330th, and
338th Divisions of the North Vietnamese Army).6/ Some dedicated, hard-
core; cadres, estimated to number about 5,000 or 6,000, remained behind and
maintained an underground network in the South.7/ In the 1954-1957 period
the objective of the communists in the South was defined in a Party policy
paper as the consolidation and reformation of Party organisms and popular
groups on a clandestine basis, based upon "vigilance and revolutionary pro-
cedures to safeguard our forces. "8/
The hope that the 1956 referendum would hand South Vietnam over
to the Lao Dong Party was dashed when President Ngo Dinh Diem, with Ameri-
can support, refused to participate in it on the grounds that "The regime
of oppression" established by communist control of the North made free
elections impossible._9/ Between 1956 and 1958 the Vietnamese Communists
were faced with the unexpected prospect of President Diem building a strong
political base in the South and destroying their own political-military

support. In May 1956 Diem announced a campaign to destroy communist in-
fluence in the South. In his ten-month campaign, more than 94,000 former
Communist Party members "rallied" to the government, and 5,613 other cadres
surrendered to government forces.,0/ The program was intensified in 1958

and 1959. In the province of An Xuyen alone, for instance, a five-week
campaign was conducted in early 1959 that resulted in the surrender of
8,125 communist agents and the denunciation of 9,800 "other" agents and
29,978 sympathizers.l1/
The impact of Diem's efforts was described in one of the more
important and revealing documents captured during hostilities.
From 1957 to 1958 the situation gradually changed.

The enemy persistently sabotaged the implementation
of the Geneva Agreement, actively consolidated and
strengthened the army, security service, and adminis-
trative aparatus from the central to the hamlet level,
crudely assassinated the people, and truly and
1-5
efficiently destroyed our Party. By relying on force

the American-Diemist regime was temporarily able to
stabilize the situation and increase the prestige of
the counter revolutionaries. At this time the polit-
ical struggle movement of the masses although not
defeated was encountering increasing difficulty and
increasing weakness; the Party bases although not
completely destroyed were significantly weakened and in
some areas quite seriously; the prestige of the masses
and of the revolution was lessened. 12/
Another document, captured in 1974, corroborated the difficulties
outlined in the earlier document:
The revolutionary movement suffered heavy losses.

Hundreds of thousands of cadres and people were
arrested or massacred. The self-defense organizations
in the countryside were broken up. The armed forces in
the resistanc~e bases had to be reduced. In particular,
the resistance army of the religious sects dwindled
into a mere token force...
Naturally, the more the people's self-defense
organizations shrank, the more aggressive the cruel
agei .s in the localities became and the bloodier the
crimes they perpetrated. More and more cadres were
arrested and many more revolutionary organizations in
the villages and hamlets were broken up. The South
Vietnamese people call this the "darkest period."13/
In the period between the summer of 1956 and the fall of 1957, it
became apparent to the DRV leadership that the Geneva Agreements were not
leading to reunification and that peaceful change offered only remote
prospects for success. The 014's strategies of the previous period were
reassessed. The ultimate goal of reunification remained, but there was an
intense debate in Hanoi as to the best means for achieving it. The Lao
Dong Party set out to resolve this question and, in the process, concen-
trated its immediate efforts in achieving two essential goals which had
been retained from the previous period:
* Economic and political consolidation of North Vietnam
* Increased economic assistance to North Vietnam from external
allies, especially from the Soviet Union and China.
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By the summer of 1956, the leadership in Hanoi faced an internal

crisis over its failure to achieve reunification along the line established
Sby the Geneva Agreements. The DRV's Land Reform Campaign backfired with
extremely serious consequences. An estimated 50,000 to 100,000 peasants

and antiregime people were killed.14/ The DRV entered the most vu''ierable
stage of its existence. The DRV leadership showed considerable pragmatism
and removed Truong Chinh, who had directed the land reforms, and called off
any further reforms. On August 18, 1956, Ho announced the successful
completion of Land Reform and admitted to errors on behalf of the Lao Dong
Party. In his announcement, Ho appealed for unity in the North:
Unity is our invincible force. In order to consolidate

the North into a solid base for the struggle to reunify
our country our entire people should be closely and
widely united on the basis of the worker-peasant alli-
ance in the Vietnam Fatherland Front. 15/
In 1957, Ho recognized the importance of the Soviet and Chinese
contribution to the consolidation of the North:
In completely liberated North Vietnam, power is in the

Speaceful "hands of the people; this
reunification of isVietnam,
a firm abasis the
taskforwhich
receives ever-growing and generous help from the Soviet
Union, China, and brother countries. Thanks to this
assistance, the consolidation of the North has scored
good results. 16/
However, not all in the Lao Dong Party agreed with Hoas position
on the importance of a "peaceful" reunification. For example, Le Duan, who
later became Secretary General of the Lao Dong Party, advocated in 1956 the iJ
forcible overthrow of the Diem regime; he is reported to have been eager to
invade South Vietnam and to feel that the time for armed struggle had
arrived.17/ As a leader of the communist elements in the South, Le Duan
also idvocated an immediate increase in North Vietnamese military supplies
to the southern resistance forces.
Ho Chi Minh himself recognized that under certain circumstances
the Vietnamese Communist leadership would have to resort to force to
1-7
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achieve its purposes. On April ?4, 1956, Ho Chi Minh Issued a statcment in
which he warned:
Whilc recognizing that in certain countries the road to

socialism may be a peaceful one, we should be aware of
this fact: In countries where the machinery of state,
t.'e armed forces, and the police of the bourgeois class
z'.re still strong, the proletarian class still has to
prepare for armed struggle.18/
This appears to have been a response to the Soviet position on
"peaceful competition." Ho related his rebuttal to the "principal enemies"
of Vietnam who were frustrating his goal of unification.
While recognizing the possibility of reunifying Vietnam

by peaceful means, we should always remember that our
people's principal enemies are the American impe-
rialists and their agents who still occupy half our
country and are preoaring for war; therefore, we shouid
firmly hold aloft the banner of peace and enhance our
vigilance. 19/
The consolidation of the economic position of North Vietnam and
the challenge posed by Diem's aggressive attack on the communist position
in the South dictated a change in strategy if the Lao Dong was going to be
able to achieve its objective. By 1958 Party sentiment favored armed
struggle:
The majority of the party members and cadres felt that

it was necessary to launch immediately an armed strug-
gle in order to preserve the movement and protect the
forces. In several areas the party members on their
own initiative had organized armed striggle against the
enemy. (Yet at the same time, there were others who
were hesitant to push the armed struggle)... These
people did not fully appreciate the capabilities of the
masses, of the Party and of the movement and therefore
did not dare mobilize the masses in order to seek every
means to oppose the enemy. 20/
Interrogation of a communist infiltrator indicated that in late
1958 Le Duan returned to North Vietnam and reported his observations on the
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situation in the South. The Cert -ecutive Committee of the Lao Dong
Party in Hanoi convened a meeting ail i-,sued Resolution 15 in January 1959.
That resolution included a determination to alter the line of struggle in
the South to center on the establishment of a National Liberation Front

under the communist leadership. (The organizations of this Fr-ont, its
goals, and manner of operating will be jiscussed in detail in Chapter 3 of
this volume). Most importantly Resol-.aion "11 5 " dictated that armed force
would be used to support the political struggle movement.21/
One important captured document described the change in strategy
that followed this decision.
In opposing such an enemy, simple political strug-

gle was not possible. It was necessary to use addi-
tional armed struggle, but not merely low level armed
str,;ggle such as only armed propaganda which was used
to support the political struggle. The enemy would not
allow us any peace and in the face cf the enemy opera-
tions and destructive pursuit, thi- armed propaganda
teams, even if they wished to avoid losses, would never
be able to engage the enemy in warfare and would never
be able to become an actual revolutionary army. This
is an essential fact of the moveirent and the actual
mo-vement in South Vietnam illustrates this fact.
Therefore at the end of 1959 when we launched an addi-
tional armed struggle in coordination with the polit-
ical struggle against the enemy it immediately took the
form in South Vietniai of revolutii-onar.wa:fare, A long
range revolutionary warfare. The-ef:,re accoi'-ing to
some opinions at the beginning ol' ',95'., we or.'(It used
heavy armed propaganda and later developed "t,,-ional
guerrillas. "22/
For several years, from 1959 to the end of 1963, the communist
leadership applied a combination of military and political pressures on the
South Vietnamese government in an effort to bring down Diem.
An important goal of this perird for the DRV was the expansion of
its sphere of influence in Laos, including control over the territory
adjacent to South Vietnam which contained the Ho Chi Minh trail. Although
it was not until December 1960 that the DRV announced to foreign diplomats
in Hanoi its decision to intervene in Laos, two battalions of regular North
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Vietnamese troops had occupied Tchepone in 1958.23/ The United Nations

dispatched observers to Laos to monitor Vietnamese actions. The US
responded by sending Special Forces "White Star" mobile training teams to
train Laotian soldiers to counter the North Vietnamese effort. Construc-
tion of the Ho Chi Minh trail by North Vietnamese engineers of the 559th
North Vietnamese Division, had begun in May 1959.24/ The nature of the
"trail", initially a combination of minor roads and footpaths, is described
in detail in Chapter 5 of this volume.
The unstable situations in Laos and South Vietnam were among the
major international problems that were to be discussed at the Summit Con-
ference in May 1960, between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
collapse of'the conference and the subsequent chilling of relations between
the United States and the Soviet Union were attributed to the U-2 incident
and Presider~t Eisenhower's subsequent acceptance of full responsibility for
having approved the reconnaissance ovorflights of the USSR.25/
3. Formation of the National Liberation Front/People's Revolutionary
Party (NLF/PRP).
In early September, 1960, the Lao Dong Party passed a resolution
which stressed the need for intensified struggle in the South. While
endorsing "peaceful" reunification, attention was drawn to the need for
"promoting to the highest degree the revolutionary fighting spirit."
The common task of the Vietnamese revolution at present

is:
... to accelerate the socialist revolution in North

Vietnam while at the same time stepping up the National
People's Democratic Revolution in South Vietnam;...
During this process we must pay special attention to
the work of organizing and educating the people...
promoting to the highest degree the revolutionary
fighting spirit of the various strata of our patriotic
countrymen...26/
The Lao Dong resolution also called on the communist elements in
South Vietnam, which later formed the People's Revolutionary Party of the
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National Liberation Front, to "bring into being a broad national united

front directed against the U.S.-Diem clique."27/
As will be described in Chapter 3, the NLF was from its inception
controlled by the communist leadership in Hanoi. However, the Front
existed to promote and support widespread opposition to the Saigon govern-
ment in South Vietnam and also to project an image of Southern Front
autonomy to the world at large. This posture was dictated by the assertion
that the war in South Vietnam was an indigenous expression of the South
Vietnamese people to overthrow the Saigon government. Thus, throughout ihe
war, the NLF propaganda statements were couched in language that -:'odJ1ctt.
an image of Southern autonomy.
In December of 1960, the NLF issued a Ten-Point Manifest, st;'ing
its goals and programs.28/ An examination of the Manifesto reveais tt in
place of the 1954-1960 goal of self-government in South Vietnam, the NLF
presented itself in its propaganda as being willing to consider unification
with the North given the requisite conditions, which would have the NLF
sharing political authority with Hanoi.
Unification remained synonymous with the goal of internal politi-
cal control throughout the 1960-1963 period. The "step-by-step" approach
outlined in the 1961 NLF program was dependent upon the establishment of a
"national democratic coalition administration" in South Vietnam.29/ In a
Four-Point Manifesto issued on July 20, 1962, unification was not men-
tioned; instead, establishment of South Vietnamese authority "to solve
their own internal affairs" was stressed. 30/
The 1962 Manifesto is significant in light of the establishment
of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) in January of that year. The PRP
was explicitly the "Marxist-Leninist Party of South Vietnam" and was under
the direct control of Hanoi. Its purpose was to enable the Lao Dong to
maintain tight control over the NLF. Aicording to a PRP training manual
dated October 1965, the Party objective was to "...overthrow imperialism,
colonialism, and feudalism, to build a life of peace, prosperity and happi-
ness without oppression and extortion...Once independence is obtained, the
next step is unification, constructed and consolidated in every way to make
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the country powerful and rich, a stronghold of peace."31/ This objective

conformed with Hanoi's policy in the South and omitted the earlier NLF goal
of a "coalition government".
In the period between +he autumn of 1960 and November 1963, DRV
strategy was heavily influenced by the situation in Laos.
The tactical goal of a strengthened, well-organized and disci-
plined Southern resistance movement was pursued by "our people there" who
established the PRP in January 1962. US willingness to accept a "neutral-
ized" Laos, raised hopes briefly in Hanoi for a "neutralized" South Vietnam
on the order of tre Laotian model. The July 1962 Geneva Agreement for
Laos, (1) called for the withdrawial of US military personnel; (2) left the
Pathet Lao (Laotian communists), who had been trained, organized and guided
by Hanoi, as members of a coclition government; (3) left the Pathet Lao
in control of the strategically significant eastern portion of Laos where
the Ho Chi Minh trail from North Vie)tnam to South Vietnam was located;
and (4) removed SEATO as a vehicle for intervention in future Laotian
developments. 32/
When it became evident by mid-1963 that the United States would
not agree to a neutralized South Vietiram, Hanoi once again intensified
its attacks by the NLF in the Hoc T North Vietnam's Party
Journal, increased the severity of ýts criticism of "revisionism" (a refer-
ence to "peaceful" reunification) and stressed the super-o.-!ty of armed
struggle. 33/
As 1963 drew to a close, two major events o,:.. urred th!td were to
have impact on al of the protagonists. Ho was presented urfth rone'aed hope
when the Diem regime was toppled, followed shortly by th(,, ajsafisination of
President John F. Kennedy.
In the months before the fa-. ,f Diem, the position of the com-
munists in Vietnam was growing stronger aiid Diem's political ba5e was being
weakeied, mainly by tne Buddhist opposition and Ngo Dinh Nhu's brutal and
counterproductive response to that opposition. Durini this time the scale
of US aid and participation in the war was inrreasing. The build-up in
American suppoýrt forces began in December 1961 wich the arrival of the
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first helicopter units. There were soon five Army helicopter companies and
one Squadron of Marine helicopters in South Vietnam which created a need
for armed helicopters and increased air support.34/
By 1963 there were some 16,000 American forces in South Vietnam,
and the United States Government had made a major military commitment to
maintaining the independence of South Vietnam. The political crisis in
South Vietnam in 1963 led several key figures in the US to question whether
the war could be won under Diem's totalita"ian leadership. The Kennedy
Administration tried to increase verbal pressure on Diem, but in the
absence of any effective US leverage he continued the policies that the
Americans considered repressive. As a result, the US Government actively
supported the generals' coup d'etat in which Diem and Nhu were killed. 35/
4. DRV Strategies, 1964-1968
The assassination of Diem on November 2, 1963 created political
disorder that the communists sought to exploit. For ten days, the Ninth
Central Coummittee Plenum of the Lao Dong Party met in Hanoi to consider the
opportunity that had been created by the removal of Diem. Three strategies
were adopted: 36/
(1) To confine the war within the boundaries of the South,
(2) To intensify aid from the North,
(3) To adopt an offensive strategy on both the political and military
fronts.
To increase the military activity Giap took three steps which
were to influence the progress of the war: (1) efforts were made to stand-
ardize the weapons used in the South by the communist forces, (2) native
Northerners were sent to fight in the South whereas previously the commu-
nist forces had been drawn from the regroupees who had gone north after the
Geneva Accords were signed, and (3) terrorist activities were directed
against US advisors and installations. 37/
The changes in strategy that the communists adopted provoked not
unly the increase of the US military presence in the South but also the
bc.nbirng of the North. The conflict was greatly expanded in 1964 and 1965,
and the Vietnamese Communists considered carefully the changes that had
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taken place in order to d-termine which strategies were most appropriate

for the circumstances. The communists sought to understand American terms
used to define the phases of the war. The transcript of a 1966 talk by
General Nguyen Van Vinh, Chief of Staff ýf the North Vietnamese High Com-
mand and Chairman of the Lao Dong's Reunification Department indicated the
communist perception of the change.
The special war is just a typeof limited war, but

its scope is inferior to that of the limited war. And
i ~since
bears the
the special war of
character takes
a place in South
conflict Vietnam,
between the it
two •
camps, gradually becomes a limited war, and will dev-

elop to a higher intensity and larger scope. It is now
obvious that the war has become a limited war, since
the enemy has increased the number of his troops to
more than 200,000.38/
Thus, the communists referred to the 1961-1964 effort of the US

* as a "special war", and the 1964-1968 effort as a "limited war" to denote
expansion of military activity.
In a letter written in 1966, Le Duan indicated th/'communist per-
ception of the differences between the US effort and the French military
activity. He wrote:
The special war or regional war is merely the U.S.

imperialists' war of aggression along the pattern of
neo-colonialism, but a noteworthy thing is the special
war is a war of aggression in which the puppt adminis-
tration and a equipped and commande b
used as a major tool to repress the , -'tae
nateonal lbrareon
mo-vement.. .although the U.S. imperialists have sent
U.S. expeditionary troops to participate directly in
the war in South Vietnam, they continue to pursue the
goals of neo-colonialism, and the "special" character
of the war still exists and is still an important
factor. In the war along the pattern of old colonial-
ism, the-" a - 6-- t or combat--operations is
e'pedltolnary aaagre t ,-r__Et in the special
s_-
tar, the ma or object for co at op'erationsis puppet
troops.-t -present, a-thouFghthe U.S. impieril'Vists
have sent 200,000, 300,000, or 400,000 U.S. troops,
their war of aggression in the south is still a neo-
colonialist war because their political and military
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objectives are not merely to invade South Vietnam, but

to maintain a powerful puppet administration and army
under the cloak of false independence serving as a
shield for them.39/
Thus, Le Duan argued that the "special war" the United States was
waging was different in kind from that of the French because of the place
accorded the South Vietnamese. For Le Duan that difference exposed a weak-
ness in the US plans. He argued that a defeat of the ARVN would result
in the fall of the South Vietnamese government and eliminate the basis
for US participation in the war. If the US sought to carry on the war
without ARVN it would have been reduced to fighting the same kind of
old colonial war as the French. Because of this perceived vulnerability
Le Duan concluded:
That is why the object for combat operations of

the southern armed forces and people is not mainly U.S.
troops but both U.S. troops and puppet troops: We
should not glvie t consderit•-on to anyone of these
forces.40
General Vinh concurred with this argument. He observed:
To defeat the enemy in the South is to basically

defeat the puppet army and to defeat part of the Ameri-
can troops, and, thereby, smash the Americans' aggres-
sive will. If we fail to see the role of the puppet
army and administration, we will fail to use our own
forces to a certain extent to basically smash the
puppet forces, and, thereby deprive the Americans of
their military and political base. Likewise, without
defeating an important part of the American forces we
cannot crush their aggressive will. In reality, today
the relations between fighting the Americans and fight-
ing the puppets have become increasingly clearer. In
the old colonialist period, only by defeating the
aggressive army would the imperialists consent to being
defeated. With neo-colonialism, after defeating a
greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part
of American troops, we can push the Americans out of
South Vietnam by coordinating the political struggle
with diplomacy.41/
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General Vlnh concluded that the ARVN forces were the main target
of the communist attack and that at the same time, "a pairt" of the American
forces should also be defeated.42/ He asserted that when these conditions
were realized, the stage would be set for the withdrawal of US forces and
the reorganizatior, of the government of South Vietnam.
5. The General Offensive and General Uprising Strategy, 1968
I: By mid-1967 allied firepower was wreaking havoc with PAVN and
PLAF forces and their supplies. The National Liberation Front was suffer-
ing financial' distress, its men were deserting in increasing numbers, and
the village infrastructures were in disarray. The US bombing campaign con-
tinued to disrupt transportation and communication centers in North Viet-
nam. It was in this milieu that the DRV had to assume an increasingly
greater burden of the fighting in South Vietnam. General Giap's response
was the "1967-1968 Winter-Spring Campaign. ".43/
The DRV and NLF counted on a "General Uprising" in conjunction
with a "General Offensive" to be the deciding blow in the 1967-1969 Winter-
Spring campaign. Presumably, after having their revolutionary conscious-
ness raised by selective terror or other motivating factors, the villagers
of South Vietnam would rise en masse when PAVN and PLAF armed forces
attacked throughout the countryside. This strategy was described in numer-
ous captured documents including one dated 1963:
The common strategic task of our armed force in

this all-people, all-sided war is to destroy the enem
military force, and in coordinationw1ith the political
force, dis ntegrate th-e lackey Ar-., which is the main
instrument of the enemy's regime, and create favorable
ontcions for our forces to launch the General
Offensive and Upr-'isng -to over throw the reactionary
9ovme-nt Tn-South Vietnam .4-
deespite having suffered very heavy casualties in 1967, the com-

tunists claimed many significant victories over t-heir enemies. A captured
communist document detailed the kind of successes the communists were
reporting.
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The following remarks are noted: We win great and

continuous victories. We are in an offensive position
and are launching continuous attacks against the enemy.
The situation in Gia Lai promises many favorable devel-
opments this year. In Phu Yen, the recent difficulties
are gone and 80% of the local population has been
liberated. Our main forces now operate in the low-
lands. The enemy is on the defensive. He has aban-
doned 70 strong points in Quang Nam and ten in Binh
Dinh. Only about two Special Forces C's (companies)
* are left to protect the defensi e positions. The polit-
ical movement becomes stronger in all areas and is
ready (possibly for uprising). Many successes have
been obtained by the coordination of political and
military activities conducted in towns and cities, such
as in Loc Ninh and Ben Tre or in Saigon where we are
the masters in many streets.45/
The purpose of the general uprising was to create mass confusion
in the urban centers which were to be removed from the political control of
the South Vietnamese government while mobile communist forces attacked ARVN
units. The combination of popular revolt and military defeat was calcu-
I .ýed to destroy the will and ability of the Saigon government to respond.
Thereafter without GVN support the United States forces wculd be isolated
and forced to withdraw from Vietnam. Captured documents indicated that the
communists had long been planning this outcome of the war effort:
When the South Vietnam cities, particularly Saigon-

Cholon, are able to rise up in coordination with the
rural areas the South Vietnam revolution will have the
capability of overthrowing the enemy through the means
of a geeral uprising. At this time we are unable to
affirm how the general uprising will evolve. But it is
certain that it will be an uprising of the rural masses
moving into the cities, composed of armed forces which
* have been organized and have been in combat for nany
* years and of political forces of the rural and city
masses which will at that time rise up in armed revolt
with every type of weapon at their disposal.46/
The success of the plan depended on the acumen with which the
communists predicted the spirit of the people of Vietnam. If they did not
rise, the mobile communist units which had come out of hiding would be
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THE BDM CORPORATION
exposed to ARVN and US counterattacks, Captured documents indicate the

confidence the leadership tried to develop in their forces that were com-
mitted to this enterprise on the basis of Party analysis of the political
situation in South Vietnam. One document read:,
Our victory is close at hand. The conditions are

right. Our Party has carefully judged the situation.
We must act and act fast. This is an opportunity to
fulfill the aspirations of the entire people, of cadre,
of each comrade, and of our families...
This opportunity is like an attack on an enemy
post in which we have reached the last fence and the
enemy puts up d fierce resistance. We only need to
make a swift assault to secure the 'target and gain
total victory.47/
A week before the 1968 Tet offensive began, RVNAF forces captured
a high-ranking prisoner, the political commissar of tne communists Military
Region 6. That region, essentially comprising Binh Thuan Province, lies
east of Saigon. The prisoner revealed that North Vietnam was switching its
strategy from protracted warfare to general offensive - general uprising.
Hanoi anticipated military success. The communists hoped to exploit "two
strategic opportunities and one tactical advantage."48/ The strategic
opportunities were:
0 The forthcoming US presidential elections in 1968 made the
Johnson adminstration particularly sensitive to its domestic
opposition
* A communist victory in Vietnam would make international and
internal US opposition grow stronger and more widespread and
ultimately might force the US to terminate its involvement in
Vietnam.
The tactical advantage was the opportunity to achieve surprise by
opening the offensive durirng the Tet holidays.
In spite of initial successes, the general offensive anl general
uprising strategy that was embodd.J in the 1968 Tet offensive resulted in a
severe military defeat for the communist forces in South Vietnam. In most
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cities the communists were forced to retire tG the hinterlands with terri-
ble losses. Details of the Tet offensive will be provided in Volume VI of
this study. Ironically, with PAVN forces bloodied and PLAF forces and
their political infrastructure decimated, the communists achieved a psycho-
logical coup, they "...still won the political victory in the United
States."49/ But to credit the DRV and NLF with having planned for such an
outcome would be wrong. Their psychological victory was an unexpected
fallout of an otherwise disastrous campaign.
6. DRV Strategies 1969-1972
The communist leadership in Vietnam sought to overcome the nega-
tive effects of the tactical defeat of their 1968 Tet offensive by these
strategies: 50/
* Denial that the strategy had been a failure. Through propagenaa
and altering organizational frameworks, the communists souqht to
project the notion that the offensive had achieved its purposes.
* Exploit the political vulnerability of the United States, which
unexpectedly had been demonstrated by President Johnson's reac-
tion to the antiwar sentiment that followed the Tet offensive.
* Use the promise of peace negotiations to weaken remaining US
resolve to isolate South Vietnam internationally, and to develop
the international anti-Vietnam War movement.
* Use the bombing halt to prepare for a new assault on South
Vietnam when the United States' forces had been largely withdrawn.
* Use the bombing halt to rebuild the damaged economy of North
Vietnam with Soviet and Chinese assistance.
The coimnunists sought to create the impression that their offen-
sive had created " new political realities" that had to be recognized with
the creation of a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) to govern the
"liberated" areas of South Vietnam.51/
On May 23, 1969, the National Reunification Committee of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam National Assembly issued a report which
stated that NLF gcals with respect to unification were in harmony with
- Hanoi's. On June 6th-lOth, members of the NLF, the PRP, the Alliance of
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National Demccratic and Peace Forces of South Vietnam, a,id other revolu-
tionary organizations, met to form the Provisional Revolutionary Government
of the Republic of South Vietnam. With Hanoi's support, the PRGi was estab-
lished to "...create conditions for the formation of a provisional coali-
tion government in order to organize free general elections, elect the
National Assembly, promulgate the constitution, and designate the South
Viet-Nam official government. `52/ During the period, the PRG was the tool
of the Hanoi government to achieve their goal of political control in South
Vietnam.
The events of 1968 led the US and the DRV to the peace talks in
Paris. Unofficial discussions began soon after Tet, but the communists
continued fighting in an effort to impede the military and civilian recov-
ery of South Vietnam and to keep pressure on the Americans until the
results of the elections in November of 1968 were knowi.. The Nixon
Administration announced its Vietnamization Program as an aspect of the
so-called "Nixon Doctrine." Secretary of Defense Laird's public report on
his visit to Saigon in 1969 led Hanoi to conclude that American troop
withdrawals would begin in earnest. In the face of a diminishing US
military presence, but with greatly accelerated delivery of military arms
and equipment to the South Vietnamese armed forces, the DRV recognized the
need to adjust its military and its political posture.
Saigon refused to accede to the formation of a coalition govern-
ment, an interim step favored by both the DRV and its Southern voice, the
PRP. C'0,]June 10, 1969 the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of
South Vietnam had been formed by the communists to place additional
pressure on the US and to challenge the legitimacy of the Thieu government
The Provisional Revolutionary Governmert of South Vietnam was regarded as a
temporary measure. However, it replaced the earlier short-term goal of
participation in - coalition government.
During the period 1969-1971, the communist forces suffered a
setback from the US/RVNAF attec|ks into Cambodia in 1970, but PAVN forces
severely mauled the RVNAF attack towards Tchepone, Laos in LAMSON 719 in
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1971. Otherwise, many PAVN forces withdrew to North Vietnam, where they
refitted and retrained in preparation for the 1972 Easter offensive.
The GVN's Vietnamization and Pacificaticn programs were improv-
ing, and the communists in the South were hard pressed. US combat forces
had been reduced to two brigades by 1972; their role was to protect the
withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.b3/
7. The 1972 M&n Force Attack Strategy
In July 1969, the Central Office South Vietnam issued resolution
Number 9, which was designed to provide guidance for the conduct of com-
munist forces during the US withdrawal period and in the face of the
Vietnamization effort. The resolution stated that there were five objec-
tives: attacking American troops to crush US will to continue fighting;
attacking the ARVN to force its collapse; building up political and mili-
tary strength, especially in the cities where they had been demonstrably
weak; attacking the civil administrative system of the South Vietnamese
government; forcing the US to accept a political solution that involved
recognition of an "independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral South
Vietnam with a national, democratic coalition government working toward
unifying Vietnam. "54/
The massive losses suffered by the communists in the South arid
the successes that were scored by the Vietnamization effort had seriously
weakened the communist forces in the South. In addition, it was evident
that the strategy employed in Tet '68 was not workable. In order to
achieve the objectives set out in the COSVN Resolution No. 9, the communist
leadership had only one credible instrument, the regular North Vietnamese
forces. To defeat the ARVN, the DRV leaders decided that the PAVN would
have to be armed with the most sophisticated weapons available. In 1971
communist-bloc ships brought huge quantities of cargo to North Vietnam. The
equipment included 130-mm long-range artillery and 'T-54 mediuir tanks.55/
As a result of the Soviet's armament efforts, in overall amounts of heavy
equipment at hand, Northern troops would have strong superiority.
The timing of the communist attack was dictated by the US troop
withdrawal schedule. In the early months of 1972 it was evident that the
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US would not have significant ground fighting capability in Vietnam and at

the same time a defeat of ARVN could expose remaining US troops to serious
humiliating defeats.
Again, as in 1968, in spite of early successes, the communist
attacks failed dramatically. A combination of US air strikes throughout
Vietnam, the mining of Haiphong harbor, and, most importantly, the strong
military showing of the ARVN, stopped the communist attack and rolled it
back. The communist leadership in Hanoi would have to find new strategies
to reach their objectives.
The struggle in Vietnam centered on diplomatic efforts in 1972
and 1973. In January 1973 the Paris Peace Accords were signed which ter-
minated US participation in South Vietnamese military affairs. The
communists used the peace accord's provisos to rebuild their strength and
prepare for the final assault which would bring down the Saigon government.
The attack by North Vietnamese main forces against ARVN began in January
1975 and culminated with the fall of Saigon in April of that year. In the
attack the sd-called "Southern insurgency" played no recognizable part,
their "liberation forces" long since having been manned mainly by PAVN
infiltrators. The ARVN was defeated by a better armed and perhaps better
motivated force using classic large unit maneuver tactics. Ironically, the
US had initially trained and equipped the RVNAF for defense against a
conventional attack across the OMZ at a time when the principal threat in
the South was from. guerrilla forces. In that early period the GVN's
counterinsurgency assets were not properly structured, and the GVN was
unable to liquidate or control the insurgency. When the final assault was
launched by the DRV, PAVN forces were better equipped, better supplied, and
better supported. At this point the RVNAF faced the conventional threat
for which they had initially been trained, but they were no longeri up to
the task.
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C. SUMMARY
Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants had a clear vision of their ultimate
goal. Whether representing the Indochinese Communist Party in the 1930's,
the Viet Minh in the 1940's, or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam after
1945, these dedicated communists sought to "liberate" all of Vietnam under
their leadership. They sought, also, to assure that friendly and coopera-
tive communist governments were established in neighboring Laos and Cam-
bodia. Their intent to rule Vietnam with at least suzerainty over the rest
of Indochina appears never to have wavered.56/ They made mista as along
the way. Those mistakes cost them significantly in terms of time, lives,
and 'treacure.
The Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954 brought an end to
the First Indochina War. The French proposal for a demarci.'$Jon line at the
17th parallel was finally accepted, but only after Chou En-lai and Molotov
prevailed on GRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to accept the "temporary"
partition with the assurance that general elections would take place in two
years. 57/
While waiting for nationwide elections to unify Vietnam, the DRV
leaders embarked on what was ostensibly a land reform program. In
actuality that program was designed to gain firm control over the popula-
tion.ý The US and GVN failed to capitalize on the resulting serious unrest
in the North and the iRV safely passed through its most vulnerable period.
The communist.- underestimated the leadership abilities of President
Diem, whose aggressive police efforts made serious inroads on the clandes-
tine apparatus established by the Viet Minh stay behinds. Further, Diem's
refusal to permit general elections dashed any hopes for a peaceful take-
over of South Vietnam.
The ORV began sending cadres and iupplies South in 1959, probably to
otfset US aid to the GVN. Both sides escalated their activities. Direct
military support was furnished to Diem by the US in the form of helicopter
units and a greatly increased advisory effort. The DRV began deploying
regular PAVN combat forces to RVN in 1964 while Southern guerrilla units
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THE BDM CORPORATION
launched attacks against US personnel and installations. The communists

seriously miscalculated the US reaction to these developments, particularly
in view of the alarming weakness of the coup-ridden GVN at that time.
In 1968, confusing anti-American and anti-GVN sentiments with procom-
r:unism, the DRV gambled that the people of South Vietnam would respond to
the call for a general uprising and assist the general offensive. The
result was the destruction of much of the VC cadre strength that had been
established over the space of a decade. In 1972 the Hanoi leadership again
misjudged US capabilities and will when they launiched their Easter
offensive. The result was a costly and humiliating military defeat for the
PAVN forces. In short, it would be a mistake to view the North Vietnamese
military strategies as "brilliant" or "insightful."
Nevertheless, in the end the Vietnamese Communists were victorious.
Unquestionably their greatest asset in achieving their victory was their
persistence and astute perception of what it would take to win. That
tenacity was rooted in their common dedication to a cause and was sustainE,'
by the collective leadership style that dominated North Vietnamese decis-
ionmaking. It is most striking that in spite of the serious miscalcula-
tions and errors that sometimes marked the selection of strategies, the
chief communist leaders remained seemingly irmnune from the kinds of purges
found in other communist parties. Certainly when a given strategy failed,
there must have been a weakening uf power for whomever had espoused the
strategy. But to their credit, the communists were exceptionally flexible
and though they changed strategies they did not repeat unsuccessful
strategies.
Serious differences of opinion did occur within the collective leader-
ship of the DRV. Giap occasionally embarked on military operations that
proved costly and likely drew censure from his colleagues. Le Duan urged
airect intervention in the South lorg before the Politburo endorsed that
approach. Truong Chinh was the scapegoat for the 1956 land reform fiasco,
but he returned to power after a decent interval. The top-level leadership
sucessfully controlled their disagreements and prevented any public airing
of their disputes. Public admissions of incorrect policies, such as land
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TrHE 8DM CORPOR 1%TION
reform were made-- when it suited the Central Committee's purpose. Low-
level comrades with "erroneous thoughts" were arrested and deported to
retaote mines, according to the Hungarian Embassy in Hanoi, but there were
no purges in the DRV's Politburo, which continu.d to maintain 4ts extraor-
dinary record of cohesion.58/
General Giap credits the final victory to the strategic leaoership of
the Lao Dong Party. Giap claims that the party correctly assessed the
"situation
* in 1974, seized the historic opportunity, made the strategic
decision, and successfully consummated the "democratic revolution".59/
Clearly the organizational integrity of the Central Committee, the
nationalist foundation on which the Lao Dong Party was based, the clear-cut
goals espoused by the leaders and perceived by the rank and file, and the
iron discipline demonstrated by the hard-core cadres were deciding factors
in the conduct of the war and its final outcome.
D. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS
The Vietnamese Communists held steadfastly to their long-range goal

of national unification under their Par'ty Leadership -- initially the
Indochinese Communist Party and finally the Lao Dong Party. That ultimate
goal was never negotiable, but strategies for achieving that goal were
altered, based on the changing internal and external realities.
The Vietnamese Communists demonstrated flexibility in developing
political-military strategies for meeting short-range objectives which
could contribute to achieving the ultimate goal of national unification;
they studied their mistakes and did not repeat strategies that had proved
unsuccessful.
The V-ietVrnatfes7--C-omuni sts recognized the importance of having
seemingly different goals fcr the range of organizations involved in the
"struggle against the Saigon government. The variety of goals allowed the
communists to attract a wide international audience and to manipulate some
South Vietnamese groups.
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The goals of the DRV's principal suppo;-ts, the USSR and the PRC,
shifted and diverged over time, which created a delicate and potentially
critical problem for the Lao Dong Party leadership; that leadership proved
itself to be remarkably adept at retaining the support of both the Soviets
and the Chinese throughout hostilities ard until the ORV opted in favor of
the Soviets after their 1975 victory in South Vietnam. (See Volume VIII
for further discussion 'n this issue).
E. LESSONS
The stated long-range goals of an enemy, actual or potential, and

especially a communist enemy, may provide valuable clues as to the adver-
sary's strategic, and even tactical intentions.
When an enemy ha• allies, their separate national goals may be widely
divergent, thereby providing an opportunity for exploitation -- but only if
the disparity is known to, and understood by, friendly leaders.
The leaders of any significant political-ideological movement must
develop ard articulate their professed or actual goals in such fashion as
to harmonize with important needs and desires of their natural and
potential constituencies if they are to gain widespread support arid
establih the base necessary for ultimate 5uccess.
Even in a communist nation, the enduring aspirations of the people and
their leaders will tend to be nationalistic; in some cases the influence of
a nearby major communist power may prevent overt manifestations of
I
nationalism within a small, dependent nation, but it is doubtful that the
desire for freeaom, as the indigenous population perceives freedom, can be
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CHAPTER 1 ENONOTES
Bernard B.S1.
Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (N.Y.: Frederick Praeger Publishers,
1966), p. 120. Sometimes referred to as the French-Vietminh (or Viet
Minh) War.
2. The following documents refer to the Second Indochina War; the begin-
ning date frequently diffe,-s: Southchay Vongsavanh, BG, RLA, RLG
Military0perations and Activities in the Laotian Panhandle.
Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program. Prepared for the Depart-
ment of the Army, Office of Chief of Military History, by General
Research Corporation, McLean, Va. February 1978, p. 9, and Marcus G.
Raskin and Bernard B. Fall eds., The Viet-Nam Reader (N.Y.: Vintage
Books, 1965), P. 91, show i956 as the beginning date for the Second
Indochina War. Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co. 1972), p. 165, prefers 1960. U.S. Department of Defense
United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967 (Book 2 of 12, IV. A.5.
Tab 3) pp. 29-32 reflects 1959 as the year in which the Second
Indochina War began. This is Book 2 of the official series popularly
known as the Pentagon Papers. The Senator Gravel Edition, entitled
The Pentagon Papers is a four-volume series. The New York Times pub-
lished a single volume, also entitled The Pentagon Papers. Although
much of the information is duplicated, none of these documents is com-
pletely subsumed by any of the other Pentagon Papers versions. The
De.partment of Defense series will be cited hereafter as DOD-US/VN
Relations Book No., Part No., Section No., Tab, and Page.
3. Whether or not the NLF was controlled by Hanoi may be argued by his-
torians, but the authors of this volume found the extensive collection
of captured documents on this subject to be persuasive. Radio Hanoi
broadcast the results of the Third Congress of the Communist Lao Dong
Party's Central Committee on September 5; 1960 in which Hanoi called
for formation of the Front and clea.iy showed that the NLF was
initiated by and would be controlled by the Lao Dong Party. Quoted in
JUSPAO message No. 114, January 28, 1967, The quotation is from a
letter of May 8, 1961 from President John F. Kennedy to President Ngo
Dinh Diem.
4. Many sources reflect the willingness of key Party officials to admit
errors. One such example is an article in Nhan Dan (The People), a
"Vietnamese-language newspaper, No. 3955, Hanoi, 28 January 1965, which
mentioned that the Tenth Assembly of the Central Committee of the Lao
Dong Party had discussed the errors in land reform and took corrective
* action.
5. The theoretical works of Truong Chinh, especially his "The Resistance
Will Win" predated Giap's works and were the model followed by North
Vietnam.
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6. Interrogation of Le Van Thanh, Viet Cong signal platoon leader, who

stated that from 1955 to 1959 these five new divisions were comprised
of regroupees from Southern Viet Minh forces. In 1959 the DRV began
enforcing the Military Service Law (Hanoi's draft) ;-nd by 1960 had
replaced half of the Southerners with Northerners. The displaced
Southerners either transferred to farms or infiltrated back to South
Vietnam where they occupied command positions or filled political
roles within the ranks of the staybehinds. This document is included
in a se$ of translations of documents and interrogation reports held
by the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Item No. 84.
Hereafter reference to this category of translated captured documents
or interrogation reports will cite the original document, unless it is
identified in the text, and further identify the translation as DOS
Historian, Item (No.).
7. The figures 5,000 to 6,000 can be found in U.S. Army Attache Situation
Report, Saigon, July 1956, quoted in DOS Historian item 25, and
Bernard B. Fall, "How the French Got Out of Viet-Nam", The Viet-Nam
-§ar, p. 88. In his book Honorable Men, (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster,
S/J-'p. 142, Willian Colby,-former Director of Central Intelligence
(and CIA Deputy Chief of Station in Saigon in 1959) refers to 5,000 to
10,000 staybehind cadre and guerrillas. In Viet Cong, (Cambridge,
Mass.: M.I.T Press, 1966) p. 5 fn., Douglas-Te-TITends the 10,000
figure to be probably correct. DOD-US/VN Relations, Book 2, IV.A.4
pp. 7-8 and IV.A.5. pp 16-17 settles cn 5,000 armed and 3,000 polit-
ical guerrillas.
8. Viet Minh Policy Paper on Post-Geneva Strategy, probably issued by the
Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party to the Eastern Interzone of
Nambo (South Vietnam) DOS Historian, Item 200.
9. Allan B. Cole (ed.) Conflict in Indochina and International Repurcus-
sions: A Documentary History, 1946-1955 (N.Y.: Cornell University
Press) pp. 226-228, and J. J. Zasloff. Origins of the Insurgency An
South Vietnam 1954-1960: The Role of the Southern Vietminh Cadres.
Rand Corp. RM 5163/2 ISA/ARPA May 1968, p. 7. Another factor to be
considered in the DRV's refusal to give the International Control Com-
mission (ICC) free access to North Vietnam to supervise any elections.
For a detailed accounting of ICC activities in Indochina, see Anita
Lauve Nutt Troika on Trial Vol.I September 1967, prepared under con-
tract to Office of Int tional Security Affairs, Department of
Defense. This point was also made by another source, with the addi-
tional comment that the North Vietnamese leaders..." likely calculated
that SVN would collapse after 1954."
10. King C. Chen, "Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Viet-
nam War" Political Science Quarterly, Volume 90, Number 2, Summer 1975,
p. 243.
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11. Ibid.
12. The CRIMP Document. DOS Historian, Item 301, p. 9. The CRIMP Docu-
ment is a 23,000-word review entitled "Experience of the South Viet-Nam
Revolutionary Movement During the Past Several Years." The document,
written in about 1963 by an unidentified communist cadre was captured
*by the U.S. Ist Infantry Division in January 1966 during Operation CRIMP
in the Iron Triangle area near Saigon.
13. Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began-in South Viet Nam," Viet Nam
Caourier, No. 22, March 1974, p. 22.
14. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, p. 24, indicates that 50,000 to 100,000 were
killed. A wider spread of 50,000 to 200,000 is provided by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, in
Viet-Nam Information Notes, No. 3, Revised May 1967.
15. DOD-US/VN Relations, Book 2, IV.A.5 Tab 3, p. 48.
16. Ibid.
17. _Interrogation of a defector and at least two captured documents, circa
1956, describe Le Duan's eagerness to have the DRV invade South Viet-
nam, DOS Historian Items 18, 19, and 204. In the New York Times ver-
sion of The Pentagon Papers (N.Y.: Bantam Bookb, 1971) p. 75, Neil
Sheehan refers to Le Duan's return to Hanoi in 1957 and urging mili-
'tary pressure after a two-year stay in the South.
18.- OOD-US/VN Relations, Book 2, IV.A.5 Tab 3, p. 46.
19. Ibid. pp. 46-47.
20: DOS Historian, Item 301, (The CRIMP Document) p. 10.
21. Captured document, "The Revolutionary Mission in South Vietnam," DOS
Historian, Item 36.

22. DOS Historian, Item 301 (The CRIMP Document), p.2.
23. Vongsavanh, p. 38.
24... Denis Warner, Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War, (Kansas City:
SheetAndrews and McMeel, Inc. 1978) p. 115.
25. Dwight 0. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
Co. Inc., 1965) pp. 543-559.
26. OOD-US/VN Relations, Book 2, IV.A.5 Tab 3, p.66.
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27. Ibid.
28. "Ten Point Manifesto of the National Liberation Front," reprinted in
Douglas Pike, The Organization and Techniques of the National Libera-
tion Front of South Vietnam, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press,
1§66), pp. 344-347.
29. "Program of the National Liberation Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam," February 11, 1961, reprinted in Bernard B. Fall, The Two
Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis, (New York and London:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 216-223.
30. "Four Point Manifesto of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-
nam" reprinted in Vietnam: Matters for the Agenda (Los Ange ýs:
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, June 1968), Vol. 1,
No. 14, p. 61 (DS 557 .A5 C39), and Pike, The Organization etc.,
pp. 350-351.
31. Douglas Pike, War, Peace, and the Viet Cong, (Cambridge, Mass.: The
M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 15-16.
32. The 1962 Geneva A0rt,•E for Laos, reprinted in John Norton Moore,
Law and the Indo-Cina r, (Princeton, N.J.:. Princeton Univ. Press,
1972), pp. 711-723.
33. Donald ýagoria, Vietnam Triangle, Moscow, Peking Hanoi (N.Y.: Pegasus,
1967), p. 102.
34. John J. Tolson, LGen. Airmobility 1961-1971. Vietnam Studies.
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), pp. 1, 15-16, 20.
35. U.S. connivance in and support for the coup is treated in detail in
Volume III. An authoritative and readable account is found in the New
York Times version of The Pentagon Papers, pp. 191-233.
36. A talk by General Nguyen Van Vinh, Chief of Staff of the North
Vietnamese High Command and Chairman of the Lao Dong Reunification
Department, made before the Viet Cong Fourth Central Office (COSVN) in
April 1966. (Document captured in early 1967.) DOS Historian, Item 303,
p. 5.
37. Chen, p. 253.
38. Vinh talk, DOS Historian Item 313, p. 4.
39. Translation of a letter dated March 1966, presumably written by Le Duan,

First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee. Document
captured in January 1967. DOS Historian, Item 302, pp. 11-12.
40. Ibid. p. 12.
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STHE BDM CORPORATION
4
41. Vinh talk,, DOS Historian, Item 303, p. 5.

42. Ibid.
43. Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong. pp. 111-118 and 124-127. Accord-
ing to Pike, Phase I of the offensive began in October 1967 and
included the battles of Loc Ninh, Oak To, and Con Thien, ending in
December. Phase II came in January, February and March and is more
common y known in the US as the Tet '68 offensive.
44. "The Viet-Nam Worker's Party 1963 Decision to Escalate the War in the
South", 1963. DOS Historian, Item 96, p. 23.
45. "Final Phase of the Revolution at Hand," January 1968, p. 10. DOS
Historian.
46. DOS Historian, Item 301 (The CRIMP Document), p. 38.
47. Captured document, "The Oecisive How: Two Directives in Tet," April
1968, pp. 2-3. DOS Historian, Document No. 28-29.
4-6. Hoang Kgoc Lung. The General Offensives of 1968-69. Indochina
Refugee Authored Monograph Program. Prepared for the Department of
the Army, Office of Chief Military History, (McLean, Va.: General
Research Corporation, 27 June 1978), pp. 20-25.
49. Don Oberdorfer. Tet. (N.Y.: Avon Books, 1971), p. 344. This is an
authoritative. weT••documte , and highly readable account of Tot 68;
aW Sir lart Tomnm. "lr Bases and Sanctuaries" in The Lessons
of Vietw es.W Scott Thmpson and Donaldson D. Frizzell. (N.Y.:
from'. ms 4 C. 19771. p. 100-101.
5 MSVN ft"1 * a 1),. )u 9P VA opy provided from the private
51 41 a l• W R 6ve otmw Conference of the PRG." U.S.

W•uw ,t.w-\'* •'ts &W Research Notet. Document
is 1r !v* .wd t•el. Viet Cong, pD. 19-20.
•3 ' fotft r Invasion Repulsed." The The F.

,2g&, ~•* d by Crown Publishers Inc.,
total U S ground force strength, in
tst
• : % SLU of uw Situation and Prospects", DOS
1-31
Q. 4.4,
4)•
THE 8DM CORPORATION
55. Ngo Quang Troung, LGen, ARVN. The Easter Offensive of 1)72. Indochina
Refugee Authored Monogrtph Program. Prepared for the Department of
the Army, Office of Chief of Military History, by General Research Cor-
poration, McLean Va., 31 August 1977. p. 8.
56. Former GVN Ambassador to the U.S., Bul Diem, pointed out that in the
1920's the name of Ho Chi Minh's "Indochinese Communist Party" (ICP)
told the whole story -- Ho intended that the ICP (later the Dang Lao
Dong) would control all of Indochina. 8DM Interview with Umbassador
Bui Diem in Washington, D.C. on June 8, 1979.
57. Interview with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson at the BDM Corporation,
September 13, 1978. Ambassador Johnson was a participant in the
talks and personally observed the exchange between the key communists
delegates.
58. Janos Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality (South Bend, Ind: Gateway Edi-
tions Ltd., 1978, p.-188.
59. Generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung, How We Won the War
(Philadelphia: RECON Publ., 1976), pp. 24-29. '
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CHAPTER 2
CHARACTER AND WILL
In turning away from two of the basic hypotheses of

factional analysts--that factions would probably behave
in "pro-Chinese" or "prn-Soviet" ways, and that factions
could be "categorized" into opposing "pro-conquest"
versus "pro-negotiations" groups--it is important to
appreciate the amount of inconsistency and confusion
that have accompanied this analytic approach.
John J. MacDougall I/
Analysis of Vietnamization: North Vietnamese Leadership.
A. INTRODUCTION
The quotation above underlines the conflicting American understanding

of the character and will involved in the decision-making process in North
Vietnam. This confusion was directly related to the imprecise understand-
ing of communism as an international movement. Some analysts saw key
leacers as engaged in "factional struggles4 '; others argued that attempts to
characterize such "factions" would lead to confusion. At the root of this
disagreement was the absence of hard information. The published material
had been carefully prepared so as to maintain the appearance of unity on
the part of the collective leadership. The need for unity through collec-
tive consensus stemmed from many elements in the Vietnamese situation, but,
in particu1ir, from the clandestine character of Vietnamese politics.2/
Clandestine political activity is a centuries-old tradition in Vietnam,
nurtured by long perioti,: of foreign domination, in which the penalty for
political opposition to the central ruling authority could be prolonged
imprisonment or death.
This chapter describes the character and will of political leadership
groups in North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. The character
and '.ill of the Vietnamese people who followed or were influenced by these
leaders, and the political and military leadership at lower levels in the
political hierarchy are discussed where appropriate to provide additional
* insights.
ji2-1
THE BDM CORPORATION
In examining the character and will of the leaders of North Vietnam

and of the National Liberation Front (NLF), this chaptfcr will:
(1) Identify the origins and formative expericnce!. of the principal
leaders, comparing their family background, education and train-
ing, associations and political development.
(2) Examine the differences that existed among the Communist Viet-
namese leadership.
(3) Identify weaknesses that were. r',monstcnted in the leadership
group.
(4) Identify external elements which s;.re<-;i,-,ened the leaders' deter-
mination to continue fighting.
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE DRV LEADERS
Since 1946, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was declared inde-
pendent by Ho Chi Minh, the Communist Party, offically called the Dang Lao
Dong Viet Nam (Worker's Party of Vietnam),
has dominated the political
scene. The Party was more than a political constellation; it served as the
government of the country, functioning as the source of law and power.3/
The Party's most important and powerful body was, and remains, the Polit-
buro. The eleven members of the Politburo shaped the policy of North
Vietnam and supervised its execution. References to the "leadership" or
"leaders" of North Vietnam, when made in this chapter, refer to the members
of the Politburo. The North Vietnamese Politburo was the universally
recognized locus of power of the Communist Vietnamese. Through the organ-
ization of the Peoples' Revolutionary Party (PRP) and NLF they extended
their leadership into South Vietnam.

I. Characteristics of North Vietnamese Leadership
The leadership of North Vietnam has evinced five principal char-
acteristics:
a Stability
* Dedication to the goal of reunification of Vietnam;
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THE BDM CORPORATION
e Adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles;

* A high degree of education and training;
* Adherence to collective responsibility for decisions taken by the
Politburo in accordance with the principle of democratic cen-
tralism.
What is most impressive is the stability of the Conwr•inist Viet-
namese leadership. It has remained in power with only two changes (neces-
sitated by death) for over thirty years since 1946, when the DRV was
created. In contrast to other communist countries, the closest the North
Vietnamese came to a purge in the Politburo was the demotion, in late 1956,
of Truong Chinh, the Secretary-General of the Lao Dong Party, for "excesses"
committed during the 1953-1956 Land Reform Campaign.4/ But Truong Ching
remained a member of the Politburo and, since 1960, has been ranked third
or even second within the Politburo by Western analysts. 5/
An advantage which this stability of leadership conferred on the
North Vietnamese was the opportunity to benefit from shared experience at
the highest level of authority. The development of a sharp, detailed
corporate me.mory was possible, and an enormous amount of time was devoted,
at all levels of leadership, to examining past policies and actions in order
to correct :mistakes and improve future performance.
The presence of the remaining characteristics listed above can be
attributed to the historical evolution of the Indochinese Communist Party
(1930-1951) and its successor, the Lao Dong Party (formed in 1951). Both
parties were inspired and shaped by the forceful leadership of Ho Chi Minh;
most of the leaders on the Politburo had served with him in the Indochinese
Communist Party. The political orientation of these leaders appears Lo have
been as much Vietnamese nationalist as communist.6/ The Politburo leaders
were all active fighters for Vietnam's independence from France.
Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap had been intimately
associated with Ho since 1941.7/ Although Le Duan did not share in this
close working relationship with Ho, he had been a member of the party's
Central Committee since at least 1939, was a leader of the southern resist-
ance in 1946-1952 and again in 1956, before being selected by Ho as the
First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party in 1959.8/
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THE BDM CORPORATION
By 1960, when the National Liberati..')n Front was formed, Ho Chi

Minh had already instituted a collective leadership in North Vietnam by
dividing the bases of power in the government among his close c associates
on the Politburo.9/ Le Duin was given control over the party; Truong Chinh
control over the National Assembly and de facto control over the Viet Nam
Fatherland Front; and Pham Van Dong was assigned control over the govern-
ment machinery.l0/ In 1975 it was still the triumvirate of Le Duan, Truong
Chinh, and Pham Van Dong which controlled the party and state government.
This was a considerable achievement in terms of continuity of the leader-
ship at the highest level.
The Vietnamese Communi:st Party elite has proven to be the
most durable leadership group in the communist world, having ruled North
Vietnam for three decades. The revolutionary leaders of the early Viet
Minh, with only minor exceptions, became the rulers of the new Democratic
Republic of Vietnam. Their balance of nationalism and ideological fervor
with tight organizational control appears to have been a major reason for
their successful performance.
The men n,.on~j in 1960 as members of the Politburo formed a
power elite that held rcw r, throughout the entire Vietnam War. Except for
two members who died, ilo Chi Minh and Nguyen Chi Thnh, the structure went
unchanged for twenty--'.ive years. Thus, continuity can be claimed to be a
* major characteristic of North Vietnam's leadership.
A second characteristic was similar class background of the
top communist leaders. The majority were not even from the middle class,
but rather came trom nand.irin, gentry or intellectual/professional back-
grounds. Ho Chi Minh came from a prominent family distantly related to
Vietnamese royalty;, Pham Van Dong came fram a mandarin family; and Truong
Co~inh and Vo Nguyen Giap received fir more education than most
Vietnamese.ll/ The majority of the members of the Politburo had some
formal education, and Pham Van Dong and General Giap had received uni-
versity level training. Several leaders were educated in Freice, and
others went to China or Hong Kong for their education. In addition, a
number of the leaders received communist training in France, the Soviet
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THE BDM CORPORATICN
Union, and Communist China. Among

the members of the Politburo who
received communist training in Moscow were Ho, Le Duan, and Hoang Van Huan
S(a specialist on foreign affairs). Truong Chinh and Nguyen Chi Than' (who
commanded the communist forces in the South until his death in 1S67)
received communist training in the Soviet Union and China. 12/
The leaders of North Vietnam were remarkably similar in
formative background and outlook. All were members of the Communist Party
at an early age, and as a group they emerged as a tightly-knit leaders'.:p.
Although they were probably affected by personal rivalries and ambitons,
they maintained remarkable unity and common dedication to the independence,
unification, and modernization of Vietnam. They were revolutionary leadeBrs
with determined character and will that reflected their fierce nationalism
and belief in communist ideology as the scientific guide to the way in
which independence should be achieved in Vietnam. Brief biographical sum-
maries of DRV leaders illustrate these common characteristics.
2., Key DRV Leaders
a. Ho Chi Minh
Ho was born in 1890 in Nghe An Province, Central Vietnam.
Information about his life tends to he sketchy and contradictory, partly .n
keeping with the Vietnamese tradition of clandestine politics.13/ It is
known that Ho'. education and training included the study of communism in
Paris, Moscow and later in Peking in the 1920's. He became an agent of the
Comintern and was chiefly responsibile for the creation of the Indochinese
Communist Party in 1930. The most important factor in shaping the
chara;cter and will of the man was his intense nationalist zeal for an inde-
pendent Vietnam, free of foreign domination. He argued forcefully but
unsuccessfully for the independence and self-determination of the Viet-
namese people at the Versailles Peacc Conference in 1919. He deidicated his
life to the fulfillment of that goal.
As it became increasingly clear that an independent and uni-
fied Vietnam would not emerge without political and armed struggle, he
became a violent, impassioned revolutionary, actively seeking the help of
like-minded, nationalist Vietnamese to evict the existing foreign
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occupation forces--the French, Chinese, British, Japanese, and

Americans--and subvert the Government of South Vietnam, which he and the
other members of the Politburo regarded as an American puppet regime.
Ho Chi Minh was a "first among equals" in the Politburo
until his death in September 1969. There were rumois of poor health and
senility several *years earlier, which would imply that the leadership of
North Vietnam fell increasingly to a group of other individuals in the
Politburo shortly before his death.
b. Le Duan
Le Duan was seccnd to Ho Chi Minh in the power hierarchy of
the Politburo. According to one student of North Vietnamese politics, Phan
Thien Chau, Le Duan became "first among equals" after Ho's death.
Le Duan was a founding member of the Indochinese Communist
Party, but little is known .. vut his background in part because he con-
cerned himself primarily with sub rosa communist activity and internal
party organizational matters. Le Duan was born in 1908 in Quang Tri Pro-
vince, North Vietnam. He was a leader of the Viet Minh forces in southern
Vietnam until 1951, when he was recalled to North Vietnam and evaded all
publicity urtil the end of the war. When Ho removed Truong Chinh as Secre-
tary-General of the Lao Dong Party, Le Duan performed those duties, though
he was not formally appointed to the posc until 1960 when his title was
changed to First Secretary. 14/
c. Truong Chinh
Truong Chinh was born in 1908 in Nam Dinh Province, North
Vietnam.15/ Truong Chinh, like Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan, was a founding
member of the Indochinese Communist Party, although he did not rise to the
top ranks of the party until 1941. Truong Chinh became familiar with
Chinese communism through close contact with the many Chinese who assisted
the resistance movement in Vietnam, and by reading Chinese political
material which had been translated into Vietnamese. Ho was impressed
enough with Truong Chinh's ability to appoint him Secretary-General of the
Party. From 1953 to 1956, Truong Chinh presided over the notorious
agrarian reform L.'mpaign to collectivize agriculture in North Vietnam,
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based on Chinese Communist methods and supervised by Chinese cadres. The

purpose of the Land Reform programs, which occurred in two phases, was the
liquidation of the landowning class and the subsequent establishment of a
"dictatorship of the proletariat", which meant communal ownership of land
and Communist Party control of local government.16/ Initially, land was
redistributed to the poor peasants. But within months, all of their pri-
vate property was collectivized, which meant that the peasants owned no
land of their own.
In the first phase of the Land Reform from 1953 to 1954,
money, jewels and other precious objects were confiscated from the wealthy
* landlords: in the second phase, from 1954 to 1956, rich and middle-level
peasants were forced to give up their land, houses, furniture and personal
belongings.17/ Landlords were killed by the thousands. M. Gerard Tangas,
a French professor who remained in Hanoi up to 1959, claimed: "this
indescribable butchery resulted in one hundred thousand deaths."18/ The
communists' maxim during the land reform was reportedly, "It is better to
kill ten innocent people than to let one enemy escape."19/ The reforms
were implemented by North Vietnamese Communist Party cadres who had been
secretly trained in China and who came to each village disguised as pea-
sants.20/ Eventually, outraged peasants rebelled throughout the country
and even the loyalty of the militia was in doubt.21/ Fearful of losing
political control over North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh forced Truong Chinh to
resign his post of Secretary-General and to engage in public self-
cri ti ci sin. 22/
The aggressive land-reform campaign exposed the ruthless
character of the North Vietnamese leaders in their pursuit of goals--in
this instance, the communist goal of collectivizing North Vietnamese agri-
culture. But, equally, Ho's subsequent action against Truong Chinh demon-
strated the willingness of the North Vietnamese leadership to correct past
errors and corrupt practices. It also demonstrated the flexibility and res-
ponsiveness of the leadership to political realities in the North, though
admittedly out of necessity rather than design.
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Truong Chinh's subsequent return to power was assured by the

support he received from the Chinese, whose military and economic assist-
ance North Vietnam courted. In 1960 he was placed in control of the
National Assembly and the Vietnam Fatherland Front by Ho Chi Minh.
d. Pham Van Dong
Pham Van Dong was born in 1908 in Quang Ngai Province, Cen-
tral Vietnam.23/ Dong was a long-time associate of Ho Chi Minh. He was
first introduced to communism by Ho in 1925. A former schoolteacher and
journalist. Pham Van Dong played a prominent part in directing the party
affairs of the Indochinese Communist Party in its early years, though after
1945 he focused on governmental matters and administration rather than on
party activities. Pham is believed to have maintained outwardly friendly
relatiomis with all the other leaders on the Politburo, and was considered
valuable, for his diplomatic skills at bringing together other Politburo
members who engaged more fre-uently in disputes over policy.24/ Pham had a
very balanced temperament, which was useful in a Politburo with characters
as volatile as those of Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap.
e. Vo Nguyen Giap
Vo Nguyen Giap was born in 1912 in Quang Binh Province,
North Vietnam. Giap became a history teacher after graduating in law from
Hanoi University. It was Giap's study of history in his ciarly life which
gave him an an abiding pride in Vietnam and the Vietnamese people, coupled
with a deep resentment of his country's past suffering at the hands of the
Chinese and, later, the French.25/ Giap's resentment of the French turned
to intense hatred when his wife and her sister died in a French prison
after their arrest for political activities. During Ho's visit to France
in 1956, Giap governed North Vietnam. As Commander of the Vietnamese
Pnople's Army, Giap's direction of the war against the French and his vic-
tory at Dien Bien Phu made him a hero in Vietnam, second in prestige and
popularity only to Ho Chi Minh. But this popularity also seems to have pro-
duced opponents in the Politburo, who were determined to insure that he did
not translate his popularity into lasting political power. The most formi-
dable of these opponents appears to have been Truong Chinh.26/
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3. Leadershin of the NLF

The Communist Vietnamese leadership was faced with a particularly
paradoxical challenge in assigning leadership roles in South Vienam for the
National Liberation Front (NLF), formed in 1960, and the People's Revolu-
tionary Party (PRP), formed in 1962. On the one hand the DRV leaders
sought to exercise close contol of those groups and at the same time they
were required by the force of their own propaganda posture to promote the
organizat'ons as independent and fully autonomous. The solution to the
dilemma was twofold. First, dependable South Vietnamese were advanced to
leadership positions. Trusted individuals were assigned key posts and from
all documentary evidence remained loyal to the dictates of the Lao Dong
"Party in those capacities.27/ Second, the identity of NLF and PRP leaders,
like the organizational lines of those groups themselves, remained indis-
tinct. An example of this kind of purposeful imprecision ,nay be found in
examinilng the identity of Tran Nam Trung. His name means "Loyal Souther-
ner" and there was a running argument for years whether Tran Nam Trung was
a person or a position. Some assert that it was a position occupied by no
less than three individuals. In another instance, there was the question
as to whether Trung and General Tran Van Tra were not one and the same.28/
That particular argument was settled when they both appeared in Saigon at
the end of the war.29/ Biographical sketches of some of the key alleged
leaders of the communist forces in the South are presented below.
* a. Tran Nam Trung
Tran Nam Trung was an important but little-known leader in
the National Liberation Front.30/ He was born in 1913 in Quang Ngai
province, Central Vietnam. His official biography states that he served as
a militant revolutionary throughout the 1930's and 1940's, was jailed
several times by the French, and served in the Viet Minh. He was not
listed on any rosters of the NLF or PRP before 1964. Police offic'ils for
the South Vietnamese Government maintained that Tran Nam Trung spent the
1954-1963 period in the DRV as an officer in the North Vietnamese army. He
later became a high-ranking military officer in the South, handling mili-
tary affairs of the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) and performing
liaison work with the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).31/
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As the war escalated, the Central Office for South Vietnam

(COSVN) took control of the fighting, and Pham Hung assumed direction of
military operations through the COSVN organizational structure. In that
role he was directly responsible to Hanoi.32/
b. Pham Hung
Pham Hung was born in 1912 in Vinh Long province, South
Vietnam.33/ He was a founder of the Indochinese Communist Party. Pham
Hung was imprisoned by the French from 1931 to 1945 for complicity in the
death of a French official. Upon release from prison, he began to ris.e
both in the Party and in the government. During the Indochina War with the
French, Pham served directly under Le Duan and Le Duc Tho, and, in 1951,
became a member of the first Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. In
1955, he was expelled from Saigon for allegedly using his diplomatic func-
tions to promote political subversion. He returned to Hanoi. In 1958, he
became deputy p'ime minister and, in 1961, served as acting prime minister
in the North Vietnamese Government. In 1967, Pham replaced General Nguyen
Chi Thanh as Commanding Officer in South Vietnam and he remained in that
position until the final victory of the Communist forces in 1975.34/
c. Vo Chi Cong
Vo Chi Cong was born in 1912 in Quang Nam province, Central 14
Vietnam.35/ He began clandestine revolutionary activity in South Vietnam

in 1930, opposing the French throughout t, 1930's and upon their return
after World War II. He fought the Japanese during their occupation of
Indochina. Unlike most Southerners, Vo Chi Cong stood for militancy in
revolution. After joining the NLF in 1960, he organized the People's
Revolutionary Party. He also served as vice-chairman and security chief of
the NLF.
C. DEBATES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP
Chapter 1 examined the range of strategies open to the Communist Viet-

namese leadership for accomplishing their purposes. There is only fragmen-
tary evidence concerning the strategy debates conducted by the DRV leader-
ship. Available evideioce indicates that important Politburo debates
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focused on the concepts of protracted warfare and negotiated settlement.

Despite the public appearance of unity in strategic thinking, there were
three "points of view" within the Politburo on these subjects, though no
"factions" can be positively identified since individual members of the
Politburo changed their views at various times. The first point of view
emphasized the use of regular military force, applied as quickly as possi-
ble in South Vietnam, in order to achieve unification. The most consistent
advocates of this position were General Giap, General Van Tien Dung, Pham
Van Dong, Ho Chi Minh, and Le Duan.36/ They were joined by elements within
the National Liberation Front, probably including Tran Nam Trung and Vo Chi
Cong. Negotiations for tactical objectives were considered useful if they
reduced the enemy's military advantages in firepower or manpower. Negotia-
tions at the strategic level without victory on the battlefield were con-
sidered dangerous and unacceptable. 37/
At the othar end of the spectrum was a point of view which sup-
ported the "negotiated settlement strategy." Those expressing this point
of view believed that protracted warfare could exhaust resources which
should be spent on building socialism. It was argued that unification
could only be achieved if socialism were first built up in the North.
The third viewpoint advocated revolutionary or neo-revolutionary
warfare. The most consistent adherent,: of this opinion were Truong Chinh,
Le Thanh Nghi, Pham Hung, possibly Le Duc Tho, and the few remaining NLF
"cadres.38/ Truong Chinh was the leading strategic th'eoretician in •his
group, arguing strongly in favor of protracted conflict. Like the regu Ir
force strategists, the members of this school believed that the main burden
of the struggle in South Vietnam must be borne by the military forces. How-
ever, they saw more value in the use of negotiations than the regular force
strategists, and argued for a close integration of guerrilla warfare with
diplomacy and the political struggle in the South. 39/
The major policy debates within Hanoi were focused on how, much
emphasis should be accorded to political versus military forms of struggle
(with the former including negotiations) and on which military form of
struggle (regular-force or revolutionary-guerrilla warfare) would bring uni-
fication. The debates were not simply over protracted warfare versus
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negotiations. Negotiations could, in fact, be used in a tactical sense to

support an overall strategy of protracted conflict.
There was no consistent support in the Politburo for negotiations,
unless it could be shown that such negotiations would lead to the
unification of Vietnam. The North Vietnamese leaders remembered the
disastrous results they had experienced on unification during the 1954
negotiations in Geneva. They did not want to repeat that disaster. The
abandonment in 1974-1975 of the negotiated settlement strategy in favor of
a regular force strategy culminated in the collapse and defeat of the South
Vietnamese forces and the unification of Vietnam demonstrated the effective-
ness of their strategy and the strength of their will. As Pike explained
in 1969,
Over the years the DRV leaders have evaluated each pro-
posal for a political settlement--whether it came from
U Thant, Pope Paul, or the U.S. State Department--in
terms of their fundamental objective, namely unifica-
tion. In effect, Ho Chi Minh has asked himself of each
proposal or offer: Will it move us, even in a small
way, toward unificatTon. Tf the answer was yes, then
he was interested, If the answer was no, as it was in
most cases, then he was not interested.40/ K
D. ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THE TENACITY OF COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE LEADERS
1. The Correct Solution

The leaders of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front
persevered during the Vietnam conflict in the face of enormous difficulties.
At the heart of North Vietnamese tenacity was the belief of its leadership
in the justice and inevitable attainment of the goal of unification under
Lao Dong controi.41/ This did not imply that victory would come without
hard work. But there was a belief that for every problem a "correct" L
solution could be found by the creative application of Marxist-Leninist
theory. Victory belonged to the organization that correctly understood this
theory and applied it appropriately to the situation at hand.
Studies of the morale and will of the enemy, conducted by Konrad
Kellen, indicate that the leadership in Hanoi saw the American attitude
towards the war as lacking an entire dimension: "it deals seriously only
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with weapons aad strategies."42/ The leadership in Hanoi, on the other

hand, appreciated the moral and political dimension. In Giap's words:
Our military science does not treat lightly the

material and technical factors, but it pays great atten-
tion to the moral and political factors.. .Our military
science not only pays attention to developing the
strength of each force, of each form of struggle, and
of each separate combat form, but it also pays great
attention to developing the combined strength of forces
"* and forms of struggle which are closely related to each
other. 43/
2. Understanding the Contradictions
The central concept in Marxist-Leninist theory is "dialectical
materialism", which posits the existence of certain inevitable contra-
dictions in capitalist society. These contradictions are inherent
inconsistencies that work against the capitalists' ability to achieve their
goals. The North Vietnamese leadership saw five main sets of contradic-
tions which, if properly exploited, would eventually force the United
States to withdraw from Vietnam.44/
a. Contradictions in the Imperialist Camp
The Vietnamese Comaiunists noted the lack of cohesion in the
Western camp, particularly in the multilateral organizations such as NATO,
SEATO, and CENTO. They believed that the "imperialist blocs" would dis-
integrate and leave the UIS isolated and less able or willing to cdl'ry on
the war.
b. Contradictions of the US Involvement
The Vietnamese Communists indoctrinated their people and
military forces with the belief that they were fighting a "just war" while
the US and GVN were fighting an "unjust war." The US effort was pictured
as neo-colonialist. American technological superiority was considered to
be a contradiction because the DRV viewed US forces as tactically infei'ior
in terms of foot mobility and knowledge of the terrain. The DRV leadership
considered that US bombing in the North was a desperation effort, and it
tended to increase cohesion in the socialist bloc.
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c. Contradictions in American Society

The DRV leaders believed that the American people wanted
peace and did not support the war. The communists recognized that the
American public had a psychological aversion to protracted war. They fur-
ther anticipated that the US government would be unable to sustain the war
indefinitely as its cost in lives and money increased.
d. Contradictions in US and GVN Relations
The GVN had been unable to consolidate a viable power base
and was looked on as a lackey of the Americans. The ma.ssive US presence
and foreign aid, without which the GVN could not survive, led to widespread
corruption and economic dislocation within South Vietnam. That contradic-
tion was expected to re!sult in the collapse of the GVN and the ultimate
withdrawal of US forces.
e. Contradictions Between the US - GVN and the People
While recognizing that the US posed a major immediate mili-
tary threat to them, the DRV leaders believed that American presence and
apparent control of the GVN antagonized the people of South Vie-Vnam.
3. Morale and Will of the Soldiers
The capacity of the leaderships of North Vietnam and of the NLF
to sustain a high level of morale and motivation among their soldiers
appears to have been a function of several factors. A senior South Viet-
namese general concluded that the frugal existence and more difficult life
made the northern people "harder." He described them in these terms:
Used to the perversity of nature and the frequent pri-
vation of insufficient food, the North Vietnamese have
a quite different attitude toward life than we do in
the South. They work harder, endure more, and know
less of creature comfort. It is no wonder that they
were able to fight so courageously and continuously
over so many years while living an austere and cheer-
less existence.45/
Communist indoctrination played a major role in conditioning
soldiers for the long, difficult struggle. The indoctrination progr-m
included an emphasis on criticism and self-improvement at all levels of the
military and political organization, a systematic elimination of concerns
over hardship and fear of death, and the soldiers' own belief in the
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justice and inevitable victory of the cause for which they were
fighting.46/ There were almost daily criticism and self-improvement ses-
sions, at which the soldiers' worries and guilt feelings were exposed and
discussed.47/ This amounted to a system of group therapy that lent
enormous resilience to the soldiers' morale. According to Kellen, who
interviewed many prisoners and defectors for the RAND Corporation's "Moti-
vation and Morale Project" in the mid-1960's:
Resilience, rather than more strengrth, describes the
morale of the NVA and VC forces. The NVA soldiers have
indeed learned to "bend like bamboo in the wind," as
they like to put it.48/
The cadres appear to have been tireless in their attempts to root
out fears of death among the soldiers, and to instill a fervent belief in
their cause. Captured documents reveal notations by cadres to the effect
that "he still fears death", and "I was still afraid of death," which
indicate the importance attached to eradicating such fears.49/ NVA
soliders also revealed in interrogations that they saw themselves as
fighting "defensively". According to Kellen:
There seems to be no doubt in the mind of NVA soldiers

that the Americans are entirely at fault in this war
and must be made to leave the country whatever it costs
and however long it takes. To our objection that they
invaded the South, they reply that North and South are
one country, inhabited by one people, so how could they
invade it? That is always the most important element
in an army's high morale.50/
In spite of the real accomplishments of the cadres in developing
martial enthusiasm among the communist forces fighting in the South, r
tured NLF documents, including diaries, personal letters and district memoE
indicate that will and morale were major problems especially when the
communist forces were under US and ARVN pressure. The 23,000-word CRIMP
document, "Experience of the South Vietnam Revolutionary Movement During
the Past Several Years," written in about 1963 and captured in 1966,
includes a letter that notes a growing "skepticism aod non-confidence in
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the orientation of the struggle" in 1963.51/ A March 1966 #istrict

document urges both civilian and military groups neither to give in to fear
of a protracted war nor to compare man-made capacities. Instead, thcse
groups were to concentrate on attacking US and South Vietnamese hol'-,tgs at
every point. The statement urges creative attack and counterattack to
frustrate all enemy movement. 52/
As American involvement in the war increased, pressure on the
communist soldiers and guerrillas increased. Large ground attacks in
addition to constant bombing caused attrition of unit members and leaders.
US military successes at times severely weakened confidence in the Party
and belief in ultimate victory.
A captured communist decision directive categorizes most of the
problems as passive disobedience; problems that were listed included
soldiers failing to capitalize on opportunity, excessive complaints, and
bureaucratic rather than sincere responses to cadre training. 53/ The mem~o
speaks of a lack of a "sense of political responsibility". Other problemns
included excessive independence of Party members; and failing to put the
needs of the Revolution before thei- own desires. Severe behavioral
problems included "licentiousness" and "negligent self-critique."
A National Front for Liberation of SVN circular captured in
October 1968 spelled out the case for weakened morale in much sharper
language. The "regrettable errors" included:
Their unit members shirked combat activity, feared
death and urged each other to escape (in large groups)
from their units and go to Khe Sanh, to Tay Ninh, or
other units (bK13 Lnit, for instance). Such cases were
usually premeditated; the soldiers made secret prepar-
ations (plotting among themselves, reserving food, even
trying to take weapons with them...). The commanders,
if not alert, would never discover these plans to
escape. When captured by the enemy (the members of
these units) were unable to suffer tortures and
supplied information to the enemy. In the latter
cases, the faulty persons were considered traitors for
they had committed a tremendous crime in that they pro-
vided information to the enemy who took advantage of it
to sabotage our agencies and kill our compatriots and
dear comrades.54/
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The problems are the problems of individuals or small groups of

soldiers less loyal to the Party. For these farmers cum soldiers, the
Revolutionary cause had ceased to be an absolute necessity. To this type
of soldier, enemies looked like friends, Party propaganda looked doubtful,
and the cost seemed too high for uncertain, impersonal outcome.
Tta circular goes on to blame this problem on ineffective leader-
ship. Mass indoctriiation, not programmed for the individual nor sustained
within the unit, often led to poor performances and desertion. Following
the Tet offensive; when massive numbers of field leaders were killed, large
groups of soldiers were left without the consistent role-model they had
been trained to follow. The field leaders were urged to:
Playdown the counter activities of the enemy's "psywar"
scheme; counter the enemy's propaganda activities; and
at the same time condemn the erroneous ideology of all
soldiers ('loving to live and fearing to die') which
leads them toward bad actions.55/
Advice to field leaders on the issue of strengthening their

soldiers' will and morale was extensive. Indoctrination was the key. The
soldier was to be drilled in the following areas: 1) Party strategy
2) ultimate victory 3) investment (fighting) for the future 4) unit pride
and responsibility 5) class bigotry 6) goals of foreign oppression and
7) gallantry - to maintain silence if caught, at all costs.56/
In addition to these objectives of indoctrination, cadre
commanders were specifically directed to train the troops to accept the
realities of protracted war. Methods such as setting and meeting constant
short-term objectives were used to encourage high morale within the unit.
The Open Arms ("Chieu Hoi") program was also to be degraded as vicious
enemy propaganda at every instance. 57/
Morale problems among communist forces were indicated by
increasing numbers of defections.
In April 1969 the effects of an intensified "Chieu Hoi" program
were clearly being felt by the communists. One captured document states
that problems in liberated areas were increasingly severe as the growing,

number of defectors could move about without restriction while maintaining
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contact with friends and family. This "leave without authorization" caused
the amount of weapons available in civilian communities to grow, which, in
turn, substantialy increased crime. All of which lessened the reduction of
revolutionary bonds. 58/
The cadre attemped to deal with the deserters. Those t.at
they were able ta find, however, often proved resistant to further
indoctrination.
Due to fear of hardships, sacrifice, air and artillery

fire, and protracted war, and the fear of dying without
seeing their loved ones, they resolutely refuýed to
join the army.59/
Because of the attrition suffered by the PLAF in the militarily

abortive 1968 Tet Offensive and the GVN's success in the Vietnamization
campaign, the communist leaderships increasi:agly had to rely on units of
the North Vietnamese Army, the PAVN. Those units were better disciplinpd,
trained, and equipped than their PLAF counterparts. Unlike the PLAF, the
PAVN had not sustained particularly heavy casualties in the Tet Offensive.
The combination of the discipline and the morale of those soldiers was vne
of the key elements in the defeat of the ARVN in 1975.
4. Morale and Will of the North Vietnamese People
An additional factor which contributed to the perseverence of the
leadership of North Vietnam was its sustained support from well-organized,
carefully indoctrinated North Vietnamese people. Control of propagande
organs allowed the DRV leadership to encourage the North Vietnamese popula-
tion to believe that victory was inevitable. Most of the population, par-
ticularly after the initiation of the American bombing of North Vietnam,
regarded the United States as the aggressor that had to be defeated. This
sentiment helps to explain why the concept of protracted conflict was not
totally discouraging to the North Vietnamese. According to Kellen, "...to
the extent that we know, the soldiers and people are resigned to fighting
on as long as it takes against the Americans, due to their deep-seated view
that the war is purely defensive."60/ As to whethur alternative approaches
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in psychologicF,l warfare by the United States could have altered such a

view, Kellen argues,
From the interrogations at hand, that would appedr next
to impossible; neither the psychological makeup of the
NVA forces nor of the people in North Vietnam show any
psywar vulneIul)ilities in the ordinary sense, i.e.,
while they do of course show the toll taken by the
hardships inflicted upon them, they do not reveal any
susceptibility to alternate appeals.61/
The contradictions believed to exist on the American side, the commu-

nist perception of the just nature of the North Vietnamese and NLF cause,
and the high morale, motivatiorn, aiid support of the North Vietnamese people
and North Vietnamese and NLF soldiers, appear to have combined as specific
elements which strengthened the will of the communist leadership to perse-
vere in the Vietnam war.
F. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY: INSIGHTS
The character and determination of tr.e Lao Dong leaders in North and
South Vietnam were shaped by their common experience and philosophy and
.atured over an extended per',od. They proved they were not puppets of
either the Soviet or Chinese Communists, contrary to early assessments by
some Western analysts.62/ Instead, Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants demon-
strated inflexible determination to achieve their agreed-upon nationalist
goals.
The Vietnamese Communists established a leadership system that largely
overcame the Vietnamese trait of internecine cGnflict. They motivated the
peasants to support the central government, successfully overcoming the
traditional Vietnamese loyalties to family and village that otherwise might
have fractionalized their socie•ty, as it continued to divide the South.
The Vietnamese peasants in the North and the Revolutionaries in the South
were convinced that theirs wa's a "Just Cause," that, the GVN was a puppet of
the Americans, and that the latter were colonialists like the French had
been.
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DRV's Lao Dong Party leadership system provided continuity of leader-

'hip through three decades of struggle and survived the death of Ho Chi
Minh without any apparent divisiveness.
The DRV/NLF leaders clearly identified their goals and unquestionably
appreciated the costs involved in achieving those goals., They demonstrated
their strength and determination by their implacable efforts to unify Viet-
nam in the face of great odds. Until too late, some US leaders seriously
underestimated those characteristics, and this sometimes developed
ineffective -- and often counter-productive -- policies and strategies. It
was assumed, for example, that the United States could coerce the leader-
ship of North Vietnam into abandoning its political and military struggle
in South Vietnam by gradually escalating the conflict, militarily, until a
breaking point was reached in the North Vietnamese leadership, at which
point the leadership would sue
for peace on US terms. The fiercely
nationalist character of the revolutionaries who comprised the leadership,
dnd their exceptional ability to organize and discipline their followers in
the face of massive bombardment and protracted warfare, were underestimated
by President Johnson and his advisers when they formulated and implemented
the strategy of gradual military escalation.
Indeed, the North Vietnamese leadership believed
that the United
States, not North Vietnam, would reach a breaking point owing to the
inherent co.,.radictions in the "imperialist camp" and in the society of the
United States. The course of events after the 1968 Tet Offensive supports
the North Vietnamese interpretation; despite having inflicted a military

defeat on the communist forces, American support for the war eroded precipi-
tately, and in 1969 the US withdrawal began.
The US and GVN failed to compel the DRV to alter or modify its long-
range goal of unification; the national survival of the DRV was never
seriously threatened.63/ The US failed to block the massive and increas-
ingly sophisticated support provided to the DRV by the USSR and PRC. The
civilian population of North Vietnam, as a whole, was never turned against
its leaders, nor was their support of the war ever seriously eroded by US
and GVN actions. Because of these factors and beciuse the DRV leadership
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had prepared themselves and their people for a protracted struggle "in a
just cause," the long-range qoal of the Dang Lao Dong did not change -- and
it appears to have been achiev%;.d
F. LESSONS
The character of a nation's people can be evaluated by studying arid

analyzing the history, society, politics, and leadership of that nation.
Without this knowledge, strategies and political 'signals" directed against
an enemy are likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive.
The will of a people to resist an enemy and the ability to endure
prolonged hardship and danger have a direct relationship to their perception
of the justice of their cause and confidence in their leaders.
To destroy a people's will to resist requires that one or more of the
following be accomplished:
0 Threaten their national survival. This is construed to mean
political and economic defeat as well as military defeat.
* Destroy their confidence in the "justice" of their cause and/or."
the quality and effectiveness of their leaders.
* Demonstrate the improbability of their achieving their objectives,
assuming that this capability exists.
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CHAPTER 2 - ENDNOTES
1. John J. MacDougall, Analysis of Vietnamization: North Vietnamese

Leadership (Ann Arbor: Applied Science and Technology, Bendix Aero-
space Systems Division, March 1973), p. 7-3.
2. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the

National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge: The M.I.T.
Press, 1966), pp. 8-11.
3. Harvey H. Smith et al., Area Handbook for North Vietnam (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1966), pp. 182-185.
4. Ho Chi Minh
1967), On Revolution,
pp. 304-306. ed. Bernard
A succinct B. Fall
description (Newland
of the York: Praeger,
reform
campaign is also found in United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense (GPO) 1971), Book 2 of 12,
IV, A.5. Tab 3, pp. 9-14. A muv detailed account of land reform in
North Vietnam is in Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime (New York:
Ir.5titute of Pacific Relations, 1956), pp. 11L-135.
5. Ph in Thien Chau, "Leadership in the Viet Nam Workers Party: The Proc-
es; of Transition," Asian Survey (September 1972), p. 773.
6. Ibid., p. 773. Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness 'i953-1966 (New York:

Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 96-102 discusses the land reform
efforts and suggests that Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap repre-
sented the "national Communist" wing of the Lao Dong Party.
7. Chau, p. 772.
8. Ibid., pp. 772-774.
9. Ibid. V
10. Ibid. V
11. Douglas Pike, History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976 (Stanford:

Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 67.
12. John C. Durr, Stephen Peters, and Charles N. Spinks, The North Vietna-
mese Regime: Institutions and Problems (Washington, D.C.: The
American University Press, April 1969), p. 2.
13. P. J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge: The N.I.T. Press

1963), pp. 24-26 and Pike, History..., pp. 55-60.
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14. Honey, Communism_.., pp. 35-37 and Pike, History..., pp. 61-62.
15. Chau, p. 773 and Honey, Communism..., pp. 29-35.
16. Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism (London: Pall Mall Press,
1961), pp. 163-245. The author was born in North Vietnam. He joined
the French Socialist Party in 1936 to promote Vietnamese nationalism
with French Progressives. Later he joined the Viet Minh resistance in
the struggle against France. His family suffered extensively in the
land reform terror, and he escaped to the South in 1955. Hoang Van
Chi complained of curtailments in freedom of the press in RVN, where
he was a free-lance journalist, and he moved to Europe.
17. Ibid, pp. 163-166.
18. Gerard Tongas L'enfer communiste du Nord Vietnam (Les Nouvelles Edi-
tions Debress, Paris, 1960), p. 222, cited in Hoang Van Chi, op. cit.,
p. 166.
19. Nguyen Manh Tuong to the National Congress of the Fatherland Front in
October 1956, cited in Hoang Van Chi, p. 166-167.
20. Dennis j. Duncanson Government and Revolution in Vietnam (Londor.:
Oxford University Priess, 198,pp. 173-174.
21. Pike, History..., pp. 110-116.
22. P. J. Honey, "The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to
Ho Chi Minh," P. J. Honey (ed) North Vietnam Today (N.Y.: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962), p. 55.
23. Chau, p. 773. Other sources, such as Pike, Historian p. 63 show his
birth as 1906.
24. Chau, p. 773.
25. Honey, Communism, pp. 28-29.
26. Ibid., pp. 29-32.
27. COSVN Training Bulletin written in 1962 and captured in 1963. U.S.
Department of State, office of the Historian, Item 38 and "Working
Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam" Pre-
pared by the U.S. Department of State, 1966. (Office of the Historian).
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28. Interrogation of a former officer of the Viet Cong 5th Division, who
rallied to the GVN in 1966. DOS Historian, Items 56 and 110.
29. Pike, History... pp. 164-165, states that General Tran Van Tra and
Tran NamTrung appreared on the reviewing stand together in May 1975.
30. Pike, Viet Cong p. 433. See also Pike, History... p. 125.
31. Pike, History..., p. 125. Tran Nam Trung is described as the Libera-
tion Frant's military chief by the Australian Communist journalist
Wtifrl G. Burchett, Vietnam: Inside story of the Guerrilla (sic) War
(N.Y.: International Publishers, 1965), p. 184.
32. Pike, History... etc, p. 125.
33. Pike, Viet Cong, p. 434.
34. Chau, p. 773.
35. Pike., Viet Cong, p. 434 and Pike, History... pp. 124-125.
36. Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong, pp. 133-167.
37. Ibid., pp. 149-151.

38. Ibid., pp. 142, 166.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 150. Emphasis in the original.
41. Melvin Gurtov, "Hanoi on War and Peace," Vietnam and American Foreign
Poc. edi. John R. Boettiger (Lexington. Reath and Co., 1968),
H.
pL 52.
42. Konrad Kellen, "1971 and Beyond: The View From Hanoi." Indochina In
Conflict: A Political Assess•'ent ed. Joseph J. Zasloff and Allan E.
Goodman (Lexingtoni O.C. Heath and Co., 1972), p. 102.
43. Vo Nguyen Giap, "The Party's Military Line is the Ever Victorious
Banner of People's War in Our Country." Nhan Dan and Quan Doi Nhan
Dan, 14-17 December 1969 (FBIS No. 31, 13-February 1970, supp, 5)
cited in Kellen, op. cit.
44. The discussion of the five contradictions is based on Gurtov, "Hanoi
on War and Peace" pp. 53-55 and Kellen, "1971 and Beyond: The View
From Hanoi," pp. 101-102.
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TH
E BDM CO RPO RA T IO N STH
45. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War (San Rafael, Calif: Presidio Press, 1978),
p. 6. General Tran Van Don was one of the prime movers in organizing
the November 1963 coup that overthrew President Diem.
46. Konrad Kellen, A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy
Camp (declassified) (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, October 1967),
passim, based on interrogations of 86 prisoners and 85 defectors. Also
John Paul Vann, an AID official and retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel,
addressed a small audience of academicians at the University of Denver
in October 1965 (sponsored by Dr. Vincent Davis). Vann stated that in
over 200 interrogations of Chieu Hoi (ralliers) he had never found one
who had rallied for a positive reason, i.e., to join the GVN and to
fight the communists. They gave as their reasons fear of bombing and
artillery, low VC pay, and separation from families and hardship. Vann's
remarks were tape recorded by Professor Vincent Davis. The tapes were
made available to BDM for purposes of this study.
47. Kellen, "1971 and Beyond," pp. 103-104. Also see Kellen, A view
of the VC, passim.
48. Kellen, "1971 and Beyond," p. 104.
49. Ibid., p. 105. Similar concern is reflected in a captured document
translated
Notes, "On in U.S. Department
Political of State,
and Ideological Viet Nam, Documents
Indoctrination Against and Research
Desertion
and Surrender," Oncunent No. 46, October 1968.
50. Kellen, A View of the VC, p. 105.
51. The CRIMP Document, DOS Historian, Item 301, p. 2. See Endnote 11,
Chapter 1 for elaboriton...
52. Translation of a letter dated March 1966, presumably written by Le Ouan,
First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee. Document
captured in January 1967. DOS Historian, Item 302, p. 22.
53. Translation of a document capturedI by elements of III Marine Amphibious A
Force on July 20, 1966 in Quang TrA Province. DOS Historian, Item 66,
p. 3.
54. National Front for Liberation of SVN, Doan Dong Nai Secret Circular of
October 1968, "On Political and Ideological Indoctrination Against
Desertion and Surrender," p. 3 in DOS Historian, Documents and
Research Notes, Document No. 46, October 1968.
55. Ibid., p. 4.
* 56. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
57. COSVN Directive #271/T3-1 (Flash) April 1969 DOS Historian, Documents
and Research Notes, Document No. 55, A COSVN Directive for Eliminating
Contacts witV Puppet Personnel and Other "Complex Problems."
58. Ibid.
59. COSVN Unit H 207 "Report the Status of Deserters" dated April 1969.
DOS Historian, Document and Research Notes, Document No. 56.
60. Kellen, "1971 and Beyond:" p. 108.
61. Ibid.
62. Another source commented that many analysts never held the simplistic
view that the ORV leaders were puppets of either the USSR or the PRC,
but that the analysts holding contrary views were ignored, particularly
during the early period. The tendency by senior officials to self-
delusion in this area squares with perceptive comments made during a
BOM Senior Review Panel meeting. Former Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas L. Hughes referred to the inability "to sell" the idea that a
puny nation like North Vietnam could stand up to the US. There had to
be a major enemy. The USSR, and more particularly the PRC, conveniently
provided the image of that major enemy. BDM Senior Review Panel Meeting,
February 14, 1979. Tape No. 6.
63. In a letter to The BDM Corporation, dated June 21, 1979, General Fred
C. Weyand, US Army (Ret) and former COMUSMACV and later Chief of Staff
of the Army, made the following comment:
As for lessons learned, I've concluded that the
fatal flaw in our strategy was in failing to
threaten the.survival of the enemy and As system.
Some may argue that the Christmas bombing in 1972, "Linebacker II,"
seriously threatened the DRV's survival. In essence, perhaps it did,
but by that point it was clear to the DRV leadership that the princi-
pal goal of the US was no longer to ensure a "free, viable, and inde-
pendent South Vietnam," but rather to recover its prisoners and
extricate its combat forces from RVN. The air campaign was designed
to punish the DRV and force its hand.
Henry Kissinger provides selected insights into this aspect of the war
in his White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Compahy, 1979),
pp. 1452T1"48.
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CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV)
AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF)
The Revolutionary Organization is the highest one of

the population; it aims at concentrating those people who
are interested in the Revolution, and have a spirit of union
with other people in their surroundings in order to collec-
tively fight against the enemy and to resolutely overthrow
the enemy. The people in this organization are considered
as a force which conducts a daily struggle against the enemy
with the various forms of a higher level of the Revolution;
moreover, it's a key-force constituted by the people of the
legal and semi-legal organizations.
People's Revolutionary Party Documentl/
The battleground of Vietnam wus the scene of confrontation between

two, significantly different political philosophies. The Vietnamese Com-
munist leadership saw their military and political operations as
inextricably linked; for a number of years, the United States, oDerating
within its historic traditions, saw political and military operations as
separate, compartmented aspects of the Vietnam problem.
The American
approach was the product of a functional perspective that emphasized
specialization and division-of-labor; the Vietnamese Communist approach was
born of a political revolutionary perspective that took account of the
peasant background of Vietnamese society, limitations in skills, and
experience developed through several generations of conflict. While
Vietnam represented the longest period of warfare in American experience,
it was brief in comparison to the communist involvement in the conflict,
which dated from the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in
1930. By virtue of their Party organization, careful preparation,
excellent timing, exploitation of the national united front, and possession
of a firm resistance base, the Viet Minh took over the Vietnamese national-
ist movement in the political vacuum that existed in Vietnam in 1945.2/
Thirty years later, after having fought the French, South Vietnamese,
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Americans, and other Free World forces, the Party accomplished its goal of
uniifying Vietnam.
A. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL OVERVIEW
The primary emphasis of the communist leadership of the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam has been on the mobilization, indoctrination, and
organization of the Vietnamese people for "revolutionary struggle". Over
the years, the Lao Dong Party became the principal vehicle for institution-
alizing the "struggle" through a combination of indoctrination, agitation,
direction of resources, and political command-and-control. The leadership
of the communist movement in the Democratic Republic utilized the Lao Dong
Party to accomplish the following intermediate political-military objec-
tives..3/
0 Establish absolute unity of action, unity of structure, and unity
of purpose.
* Create an effective administrative mechanism that tied tcgether
diverse civilian organizations.
* Infuse discipline and obedience into the decisions of Party
leaders.
* Provide the flexibility essential for the successful prosecution
of a protracted war.
While the history of the Lao Dong Party and the leadership of the DRV
reflects occasionz! disputes over tactics and priorities, tnese differences
were not permitted to weaken the 61an and cohesion of the P&rty. Through-
out its evolution, strict emphasis was placed on unity, hierarchy, cen-
tralism, faith, and dedication. In the end, the Party leadership achieved
its primary goal, that of command over the humanl resources needed to con-
duct a lengthy and costly conflict in the South.
By contrast, hard-core communist leadership in South Vietnam was
covert and the revolutionary organization less will-defined than in the
DRV.
U
The active presence of other antigovernment organizatons not
directly associated with the Communist Party added to the political insta-
bility of the area, as well as to uncertainty over political affiliations
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and loyalties. The material presented in this chapter sorts out these or-
ganizations and:
9 Provides an understanding of the principles of communist politi-
cal-military organization and Party control.
o Describes and analyzes the civic and military structure of the
ORV in the conduct of the war.
o Identifies the several organizations involved in the insurgency
in South Vietnam and evaluates meaningful differences in approach
between North and South.
e Assesse.; the communist organizations and techniques in terms of
tl",eir effectiveness in influencing the outcome of the war.
B. PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION
To appreciate communist organizational mechanisms in North and South

Vietnam, the principles which governed their evolution must be understood.
Prior to 1955, the DRV leadership was prepared to engage in what is
referred to as "legal struggle," under the terms of the plebiscite called
for by the Geneva Agreement of 1954. The leadership in the North was
willing to rely temporarily on their interpretation and manipulation of the
Geneva Accords to achieve control of the South.4/ However when the leader-
ship of South Vietnam, under Diem, refused to consider participation in the
plebiscite, the DRV Politburo reverted to the approaches called for under
the strategy of "dau tranh", a comtination of political and armed
struggle. 5/
The DRV leadership was heavily influenced by its experience in
defeating the French and, in particular, by its successful adaptation of
Mao's Three Steps for revolutionary warfare.6/ In Step One, a nucleus is
positioned to establish bases for political and military action. The
nucleus, or cadre, works from these bases to create its own political
idministration in adjacent areas, protected by its military or guerrilla
forces which also act to ensure compliance with the political organization.
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THE BOMV CORPORATION
Step Two is to organize a political structure and conduct guerrilla opera-

t~ions throughout the countryside. Step Three is to transform guerrilla
forces 'Into regular forces for positional warfare, to destroy the existing
government, and t~o defeat that government's armed forces. Geographically,
Mao hat4 put the phases as "first the mountains, then the countryside, then
the cities." The North Vietnamese leadership had added an extra dimension
to Mao's strategy when fighting the French: undermine the enemy's hk'me
base. Antiwar sentiment in metropolitan France had led to a stridently
antiwar campaign by *the French press, students, and political spokesmen.
Ultimately, the French government fell because of the issue concerning the
further prosecution of the war.7/ The later experience of the French
government in Algeria which led to domestic turmoil and the collapse of the
Fourth French Republic in 1958 merely reinforced the DRV conviction that
their struggle should be pursued on many fronts, including the inter-
national.
Step One was ready for initiation in 1955 by communist cadres who had
remained in South Vietnam despite the provisions of the Geneva cease-fire
agreement, signed in 1954. Caches of arms and ammunition had also been
established in the South. As early as 1955, selected regroupees in the
North were trained as cadres and infiltrated back to South Vietnam.8/ By
the time the National Liberation Front was formed in December 1960, enough
progress had been made to initiate Step Two. As 1964 ended, large units of
regular forces were put into the field for conventional warfare.9/ A new
family of weapons was introduced, using one cal ber of ammunition, to
rttplace the heterogeneous guerrilla assortment, 4.-.d more modern support
weapons were issued. Step Three appeared to be underway. The arrival of
US combat forces frustrated and blunted the successful implementation of
Step Three strategy, for a time.
1. Principles Governingj the Party Control Apparatus
The Communist Lao Dong Party (Dang Lao Dong) was, and is today,
the core of political-military organizations in North and Soutri Vietnam.
To maintain its control, the Party developed an organizational structure
based on classic communist strategy. These principles included democratic
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THE BDM CORPORATION
centralism, reverse representation, cellular hierarchy, the party cell, and

the individual cadre. 10/
a. Democratic Centralism
The concept know as "democratic centralism" is applied at
all levels of military, governmental and party organization. Essentially,
democratic centralism means that decisions are made at committee meetings
by majority vote. Various communist documents describe this process in
these terms: "...minority should yield to the majority, lower echelons
should comply with higher echelons, the whole Party shall obey the Central
Committee."ll/ The most important aspect of this process is participation.
Meetings are organized and members freely participate in group discussions
but once a majority decision is reached, it is binding on all participants.
Of course, the skillful cadre directs the discussion to achieve the desired
result. This process occurs on all levels of organization and is extremely
important for maintaining party unity.
This concept formed the basis for a layered organizational structure
with the highest authority at the national level, the Central Committee of
the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam, and the Central Committee of the
National Liberation Front People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) in South
Vietnam. Party policies initiated at these levels were transmitted to
Central Committees on lower levels from the interprovincial to the village
central committees. 12/
b. Reverse Representation
As a corollary to the principle of "democratic centralism,"
reverse representation requires that the leader at each level assure com-
pliance with party policies and directives. In brief, the leader serves as
virtual delegate from the next higher level in the structure; his main re-
sponsibility is to assure higher authorities that their wishes are being
obeyed. Communist control of Party members is maintained by strict sur-
veillance through a system of inspectorates at various command levels. The
inspecting teams have full authority to intervene in the conduct of any
local program. 13/ Careful attention is paid to security and counterintel-
ligence.
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This system of checks was maintained through the delegation

of responsibility to the heads of committees on the lower levels who were,
in turn, responsible to each other depending on their position in the hier-
archical structure (i.e. , responsibility at the provincial level was
directed from the interprovincial committee, the provincial committee to
the district :.ommittee and so forth). As a result authority and initiative

were centralized (limited to the national headquarters) while responsibil-
i ywas decentralIi zed. 14/
C. The Cellular Hierarch!,, and The Party Cell
Application of the principles of democratic centralism and
reverse representation resulted in a cellular hierarchy with multiple chan-
nels of communication from higher to lower echelons and vice versa. At the
base of this structure was the Party cell. The cell, usually consistir' of
three members, was used to establish a brotherhood among Party members. All
activities of the member's life were conducted within the cell. The cell
provided the framework by which intellectual, physical and emotional com-
mitment were ensured. The concept of the cell in its political and mili-
tary application was described in a captured PRP document dated 1970:
Political and ideological fields: The three-man cell is

based on the solidarity of tFi ((working)) class and the
mutual affection among comrades. The cell members should
help one another. They should primarily help one another to
heighten their political and ideological awareness, increase
their fighting spirit, promote their working zeal, and
maintain the good qualities, ethics, and behavior of revolu-
tionary cadre and soldiers. They should take care of one
another's mental and physical lives. The three-man cell
should maintain the unity of thought and action for its mem-
with assistance to overcome all difficulties. It should
make them thoroughly understand one another's situations
when they are to work independently, under advantageous or
disadvantageous conditions, so that they can successfully
carry out 'their assigned missions.
In the military ((field)): The three-man cell is an organi-
zationt suitable to meet the requirements of applying all the
types of tactics of our army. Every comhat and tactical
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THE BDM CORPORATION
initiative cani be cleverly and skillfully applied through

the three-man cell. Therefore, in combat it is instrumental
in making every squad, platoon, or company able to fully
* ~develop its combat effecti'.aness, mobility, resourcefulness,
flexibility, and determination to successfully carry out
every combat mission.15/
d. The Cadre 16/
The cadre was the essential human element to successful
4Party organization-building. The cadro acted as a recruiting device for
loca' Party members. Usually operating among the rural population, the
cadre was required to endure whatever privations were necessary to be
* totally committed to Party ideology, arid follow without question all Party
directives. The principal function of the cadre was to imbue people with
revolutionary ardor, a willingness to make significant personal sacrifices
in the cause of the revolution, and to :subordinate themselves to the guid-
ance and discipline of the Party leadership. The cadre was repeacedly
directed to provide propaganda to the people in order to bolster their
martial spirit and to intensify their resentment- against "the er~emy." The
process was viewed as a constant one, which had to unfold over a lengthy
period of time rather than be initiated "at the last moment."
r
2. Mass Organiz~ation Strategy 17/
The civii structure, particularly in South Vietn.,m, was uised as a
means to enlist popular support for the movement and establish a base that
provided legitimacy to the party organization. The civil organization was
not viable as a separate unit. Party control was maintained through a
system of parallel hierarchies on all levels of the~ civil structure. Thus,
* ~popular support was obtained through the guis;e of civil representation but
was controlled by the Party element within it.
a. The Front Organizations 18/
Every party to a revolutionary war wants and needs "popular
* support" in the form of men, political allegiance, material goods, and
services. The purpose of the popular front is mobilization (i.e. 9, tho
raising of required political and economic support from the people).
Mobilization begins by drawing on volunteers and contributions from diverse
groups; when these are exhausted, the political art of co-option begins, In
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THE BDM\A CORPORATION
Vietnam the Popular Front strategy was used by the Communist Party leader-
ship ostensibly to unite all rnationalists agaitnst a common enemy, that is,
foreign "imperialists". The official party line on the Front states:
the essentiai factor in the realization of such unity is

the consolidation of the National United Front. The policy
of the party must be flexible.., if we persist in retaining
the title Communist, a certain number of landed proprietors
and adepts of religious sects would refuse to taollow us. 19/
It was this flexibility which led to a series of subsequent policies

specifically designed to enlist the support of religious sects (Cau Dai and
Hoa Hao), miiiority ý"oups (Catholics and Montagnards) and the intellectuals
and bourgeoisie. Once this coalition was formed and firmly anchored, the
Party leadership worked from within to establish itself as the guiding
force. Throughout, however, the Communist Party leadership continued to
maintain a low public profile to sustain the appearance of a spontaneous,
general nationalist effort. The DRV used the popular front strategy on
several occasions. 20/
b. Mass Organizations: People's Liberation Committees/
Liberation Associations
The popular front strategy emerged in South Vietnam in the
guise of the various People's Liberation Associations. Disaffected profes-
sional, intellectual, labor or special interest groups ?re recruited and
subjected to the discipline of democratic centralism. Typical of this
discipline were the precepts of The Liberated Labor Association: 21/
* Every member is given the right to discuss "democratically" and
decide unanimouslý.
0 However, the individual must yield to the will of the collec-t-
ivity.
0 Lower echelons must obey the decisions of higher echelons.
* Regional committees must obey the dictates of the Central Commit-
tee.
In a typical "liberated" village, the Liberation Associ-
ations were functional organizations which appealed to specific special
3-8
THE 8DM CORPORATION
interest groups. These were loosely controlled with no real hierarchical

chain of command.
On the other hand, the People's Liberation Committees were
administrative bodies composed of Party ind non-Party members. The Libera-
tion Committee governed the village and was tightly controlled with a
vertical line of command to the NLF/PRP Central Committee. This tight
control was maintained thr.)ughout the war; upon formation of the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in 1969, these committees were
renamed Revolutionary Committees. The table below summarizes the role of
each organization. 22/
ýsop.eo s Liberation Committees* Liberation Associations
a administrative function; * socio-political organiza-

governing body in village tions grouped by special
interest
0 tight hierarchy with vertical * loose control. Horizontal
command lin k to NLF/PRP communication with People's
headquarters Liberation Committee or
lower levels. National level
organization was insignificant
0 small in membership with perhaps * mass membership: farmers,
3 Party and 10 non-Party members women, youth, students,
intellectuals, etc.
' With the formation of the PRG in 1968, these became Revolutionary
Committees. t
This permitted the Party to maintain a vertical as well as a
horizontal line of communication, with the NLF/PRP Central Committee serv-
ing as the highest authority.
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c. The Provisional Government

Establishment of an interim government is one of the classic
hallmarks in the strategy of nationalist or revolutionary movements. The
DRV followed this convention in South Vietnam as well. However, certain
conditions had to be met prior to the establishment of such a government,
notably, the peimacy of the Communist Party had to be assured, the politi-
cal and military position of the enemy had to be at low ebb, and popular
opinion had to be disposed to recognize these realities and to accept the
provisional government as the only viable alternative. In 1969 these con-
ditions were nmet and the Party leadership concluded that a provisional
revolutionary government should be established.23/
3. The Military Organization
Ths military forces of the NLF were modeled after the Chinese
Revolutionary Armed Forces. They were composed of: the main force of
well-trained full-time soldiers, and the paramilitary force comprised of
regional or territorial guerrillas at provincial level and local guerrillas
at district level. These elements supported each other. The main force
provided combat-experienced veterans in support of gueiilla harassment
activities; the guerrilla force provided an available manpower reserve and
locai logistical support.24/
a. The Political Goals of the Military Organization
The prime objictive of communist forces, guerrilla and con-
ventional, was political in nature -- to destroy public confidence in the
capacities and legitimacy of the government in Saigon. Armed strugglL, as
pointed out earlier, was to attain the political objective of Communist
Party supremacy throughout a united Vietnam. While the military served as
the cutting edge, its purpose was not necessarily to annihilate enemy
forces but to confuse their leaders, reduce morale and undermine confidence
in the purposes and staying power of the leadership in Saigon, and to
Liberate the South._25/
b. The Buildup of Military Forces
The Party's revolutionary goals underscored the need to
fashion a military force led and supported by highly motivated and fully
"3-10
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indoctrinated personnel. To achieve this, the Party organized its insur-

gency forces slowly and with careful attention to the political outlook and
dedicuition of leadership cadres. In its time-phased approach the Party
er•rhasized the follcwirg:26/
0 Formation of armed propaganda teams in the countryside.
• Recruitment and conscription (after indcctrir.'tion) of additional
personnel to form regional units.
• Organization of workers (on a mass basis where possible) who, in
turn, activate part-time village militia.
* Formation of main operational forces from seasoned regional
units.
* "Promotion" of village personnel into regional forces to maintain
regional strength levels.
The tactical and command-and-control advantages of this ap-
proach are obvious. Each phase is under constant scrutiny by the leader-
ship. As cadres develop and experience grows, so the level of assigned
responsibility mounts. The cycle begins with the local "activist" w; i'is
ultimately transformed into the professional political soldier, one condi-
tioned by the stress of battle and exposure to plans and objectives that
can be met through training, dedication and support from an all-wise Party
leadership.27/
c., The Party Control Mechanism
The Party controlled and directed all military operations.
Each command level was responsible to its headquarters element which, in
turn, was responsible to the resne:tive Party committee. This arrangement
was reinforced by the existence of Party cells which promoted the political
aw&reness of the soldier. 28/
On the national level, Party control is maintained through
two known channels: dual memv'ý,--h-p in high Party and military offices and
a central control cormeiittee within tUe Party organization specifically
authorized tc uirect military act`vities. The latter will be examined in
detail as it applies to DRV/NLF organization.
3-11
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C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Figure 3-1 charts the c-ganizational evolution in North and South

Vietnam. Several aspects of this development are worthy of note, specifi-
cally those which apply to the principles discussed previously.
1. Party Development and the Front Organizations
Since its inception in 1930, the Communist Party in Vietnam, then
known as the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), had one primary o•bjective,
the establishment of a government in Vietnam under the control of the
Party. Figure 3-1 traces the manipulation process using the popular front
strategy to consolidate non-communist nationalist factions. The consoli-

dation process wis particularly Jffective during the early years with the
formation of the Viet Minh Independence League. Although it came to have a
larger meaning during the war against the French, it was a front organi-
zation conceived and directed by the ICP. To maintain a low profile, the
ICP was; dissolved in November 1945 only to reemerge in 1951 as the Viet-
namese Workers Party or the Dang Lao Dong. In 1976, the final goal of
unification was achieved under the Vietnamese Communist Party. From 1946
to 1951, the Party not only increased in size but perfected the strategy of
control from wihin the popular front, the Lien Viet, after having seeminc'-"
ly disbarded itself.-
After the reappearance of the Communist Party in 1951, the Dang

Lao Dong, the popular front took on new meaning. With the Party in power,
front organizations became a means of mass movement control, The Party
also felt a ieed tj expand the front to enlist the religious sects and
political parties which had previously opposed the Communists.29/
Ultimately the North Vietnamese Fatherland Front was created (in 1955)
replacing tine Lien Viet in the mass organization effort.
Tke front movement in South Vietnam paralleled that of the North
with one notable adlition - it was initiated and controlled by the Lao Dong
Party in the North. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF)
was officially proclaimed on December 20, 1960 as the "only genuine
representativ,.i of the South Vietnamese people.130/ Like the Viet Minh
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Independence League which had organizedanti-French factions, the NLF

united nationalist groups opposing the Diem regime and US support for the
Diem government. 32/
The Party control apparatus was reinforced in 1962 with the for-
nation of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). in the early period
after its creation PRP propaganda minimized its Hanoi connection, referring
to itself as the Marxist-Leninist Party of South Vietnam, the heart of the
National Liberation Front, and the engine of struggle against Diem. While
acknowledging a connection with the Lao Dong Party, it referred to the
latter as a fraternal organization. Nevertheless, the PRP continued to use
the same channels of communication and liaison net, and employed the same
chain of command. 33/
The final phase of front development in South Vietnam was the
establishment of the Alliance of the National Democratic Peace Forces of

Vietnam. The Alliance, as it was sometimes known, grew out of the factions
which surfaced during the winter-spring offensive of 1967-1968 which cul-
minated in the '68 Tet offensive. Alliance propaganda portrayed a non-
communist coalition of va.ious divergent groups !vith the purpose of
negotiating with the S:iigon regime to bring peace to Vietnam. This stance
was contrary to that of the NLF which continuously fought to overthrow the
Thieu government. According to an interrogation report dated 1968, the'
Alliance was a front organization conceived and Arected oy the NLF 34/ in I.,:
keeping with the strategy of the popular f -, thus creating a front
within a front.
2. Party Development and the Provisional Government
After World War II, the country entered into a political void
wit.1 the evacuation of the Japanese, the timporary occupation by an allied
force and the expected return of the French. Cit-cuirstances provided the
perfect opportunity for Ho Chi Minh and the ICP. The Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV) was proclaimed as a provisional government on September 2, I:
1945. That action established the ICP's claim to legitimate political
power.
3-15
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The August (1945) Revolution was a successful undertaking for the

communists, whose histeri..ns later attributed the outcome to several fac-
tors. In particular, the,.; success was predicated on: (a) proper timing
on the part of a patient Party leadership; (b) detailed advanced planning;
(c) a disciplined resistance base to fall back on, which adled to the
confidence of the participants; (d) selection of the rignt instrument, the
National United Front, which "harnessed the energies of the people and
raised their revolutionary consciousness"; and (e) precedent-making use of
psychological warfare tactics, such as the binh van ("action amonq the
military),. which was in effect a proselyting effort.
In the South, the Provisional R",,olutionary Government of the
Republic of South Vietnam (PRGRSVN or, simply, the PRG) waFc announced on
June 10, 1969. Unlike the DRV, which had been formed under near)y ideal
circumstances, the PRG came into being when Party primacy was not assured
and the combined US/GVN military forces were at peak strength, Further-
more, the indigenous communist apparatus in the South had suffered severe
setbacks in the Tet offensive of 1968. Some observers have concluded that
the PRG served primarily as a cabinet with a small staff, one that func-
tioned independently from the revolutionary commnittees in liberated
areas.35/ The evidence ;s inconclusive on this question. However, it was
clear that the PRG did present a direct challenge to the government at
Saigon and was used by the North as a diplomatic wedge within the inter-
national community.36/
D. THE ORGANIhATI0N OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (G-RV)
The governing process in the DRV followed the communist principle of

decision-by-committee guided by a sound leadership. That collective
decision-making process extends from the national to the local level organ-
ization. At the core of the structure was the Party and the Party com-
mittee system.
3-16
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1. Ov-ganization for the Lao Dong Party

Figure 3-2 illustrates the organi"itional structure and function
of the high- evel party organization in the DRV. The hier,'chy and func-
tions of each body are listed as described in the DRV 'institution.
However, close study nf Party practices reveals a divergence .n constitu-
tional power.
One such difference was the role of the National Delegates Cong-
ress. In theory, the Congress was the highest authority in the system,
upholdina the principle of democratic centralism and the will of the col-
lective majority. In practice, however, major decision-making powers
rested in the Politburo on the advice of the Central Committee. The Secre-
tariat translated these decisions into policy directives and transmited
them to lower offices.
Below the national level, Party offices were similarly struc-
tured. On the provincial, municipal and autonomous 38/ levels, the Party
committee includes a central committee, a standing conmmittee, a sepawate
control committee and a Party secretary. The structure on the district
level and below resembles that of the provincial, municipal and autonomous
with one addition, the Party Chapter. The Party Chapter is usually a very
small unit designed to implement party policies within the population.
2. The Government Orqanization of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Figure 3-3 graphically displays the civil organization of the

DRV. In many respects, the hierarchy and functions of civil offices paral-
leled those of the Party. Close interaction between functionally similar
agencies within these twe organizations did exist.
the National Assembly is corstitutionally vested with legislative
powers. But, like the National Delegates Congress, that is merely a facade
to project a democratic image. The true legislative power rests in the I.
Standing Committee whose chairman and vice-chairman are normaaly high-
ranking Politburo members. 'Although the 1960 constitution de'fines the
powers of the presidency, there is little evidence that these presidential
powers were, actually exercised during the term of Ho Chi Minh.40/ Since
his death, the office has been largely ceremonial. The Council of
3-17
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ffi-,isters and its respective ministries and commissions perform the major
administrative tasks within the organization. Although many positions were
held by non-Politburo members, the two most important ministries, Foreign
Affairs and National Defense, were invariably headed by Politboro memoers.
in any event, all ministries were responsive to Party control.
3. Orgaiiuation of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic if
Vietnam
Control of the military apparatus was of utmost importance to the
Party. The nature of the Indochinese war and, later, the Southern insur-
gency required strict political supervision of military operations.
General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander-in-chief of the People's Army of Vietnam
(PAVN) recognized the need for an integrated political and military
struggle. In 1967 he described the people's war in these terms:
Another outstanding success of our Party consisted

in creating and developing to a very hiygi level the
combined strength of people's war, of revolutionary
war, using military attacks by mobile strategic ar-,y
columns as main striking forces, combining military
attacks with popular uprisings, combining military
struggle with political struggle and agitation among
enemy troops, wiping out and disbanding large enemy
units, completely liberating large strategic regions in
the mountainous, rural and urban areas, and winning
total victory by means of a general offensive and
uprising right in the "capital city" of the puppet
administration.41/
Figure 3-4 shows the command structure of the DRV military organ-
ization. Particularly noteworthy was the means of Party control of the
organization. The Central Military Party Committee (CMPC) acted as the
intermediary between the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party and the
General Political Directorate of the General Staff Department. Although
the CMPC was outside the military organization (see Party organization), it
directed the Party activities within the armed forces. Members of the CMPC
were high-ranking military (all Party members) and Politburo officials.
The CMCP's operational subordinate, the General Political Direc-
torate, was a military office. The General Political Directorate directed
3-20
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the activities cf the Party committees which were attached to all subordin-
ate levels of the military command.
4. Sumuary Analysis: A Triad System of Government 43/
The Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam functioned in a cell-
ular structure of three parallel organizations. Each was integrated with
the Party serving as the central, controlling organization.. Figure 3-5
.,um•marizes the Party control mechanisms within the civil, or governmental,
and military organizations.
The structure of each parallel urganization encompassed the basic
principles of communist revolutionary organization: democratic centralism
in the committee-based process of decision-making, reverse reoresentation
in the functional Party committee on the lower levels and the Party cell as
the basic organizational unit.
E. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

(NFFSVN)
The organization of the Southern insurgency was of critical importance

to Hanoi's political objectives. In order to survive the daily strains of
protracted war, it had to possess seviral qualities:
* Ability to recruit suffici',nt nersonnel to fill the rank and
file.
0 Ability to survive th- organizational constraints caused by the
heavy casualties sustained in a guerrilla conflict.
* Ability to exercise complete operational control of the rank and
file membership from higher headquarters through decentralized
responsibility.
• Ability to function in a ho.-tie and clandestine environment.
• Ability to organize the masses into a unified whole and subjugate
the will of the individual to the will and "good" ol the social-
ized comminity.
These activities were always present in the Sotuthern struggle. In
addition, the concept of a people's war in a protracted conflict offered
exceptional organizational requirements. The enemy's literature repeatedly
3-22
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called for a "general uprising" on the part of the urban and rural popula-
tion in support of the communist insurgency.45/ That kind of offensive
called for a graduated response extending over a prolonged period, and
therefore, required complete loyalty and dedication from the rank and file.
1. The Party Organization in South Vietnam; the Core of the
~rule Movement
As pointed out earlier, the Lao Dong Party "is organized on the
concept of democratic centralism. Its discipline is very strict for the
purpose of maintaining within the Party a.unity of thoughts and actions,
eliminating opportunist and partial tendencies fronm its ranks".46/ This
unity of purpose was the basis for the Communist Party structure in South
Vietnam.
Various intelligence reports and defector interrogatiorns leave
little doubt that the PRP was merely an organizational change maripulated
by the North. One such document states: "there is only one Communist
Party in Vietnam. Tne Lao Dong Party serves both North and South Viet-
nam."47/ The PRP, as the Southern branch of the Lao Dong Party, was
created for the purpose of organizing th3 Soutn under Northern direction
with the ultimate goal of unification and domination by the Lao Dong Party.
The structure of the Party was based on i hierarchy of committees
at the interprovincial or regional, provincial, district and village
levels. At the base of this structure were the Party cells under the
Secretariat or Central Committee within the NLF/PRP headquarters. Figure
3-6 outlines the function and structure of the local committees.
The Party call was the basic unit in each structure designed to
maintain 'the Party's unity of purpose. Within the cell, 'criticism--self-

criticism" sessions were a general practice. Members were encouraged to
admit weaknesses (i.e., individual ambitions, fear of the enemy, etc.) while
their co.1rades were enjoined to offer additional criticisms based on the
performance of their' duties. This practice strengthened the bond of dis-
cipline and absolute obedience to the Party and furthered unquestionifig
support for Party policies and goals.
3-24
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2. The Orpanizaveion of The National Liberation Front

The Natinal Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) as it was
originally formed it)Decsmber 1960, was a front organization established by
Hanoi for the purpose (,f creating a federation of popular associations
under a democratic front barner.47/ Understanding the true purpose and
role of the NLF is crucial in answerinq the key question posed in the
introduction to this volume: was the war in South Vietnam a bona fide
civil war? some popular factions in Solith V ctnam were pre-
Undeniably,
pared to revolt against the Diem regime or several successor governments.
In that sense they wer'e revolu,.ýionaries. Most of these factions, however,
were not pro-communist.; indeed, many were as viu.ently anticommunist as
they were anti-Diem. The NLF wis created to marshal the full range of
opposition to Diem into a force that could be 6irected by Hanoi. The
communists later described their clever tactics in these terms:
On the basis of keeping firm in strategy, our Party

cleverly applied its tactics: on the one hand, it.
cleverly took advantage of the. regional and temporary
contradictions of the enemy to sow division among him.,
On the other hand, it united with anyone who could be
united, won over anyone who could be won over, neutral-
ized anyone #;io should be neutralized, completely
isolated the imperialists and their most dangerous
lackeys, and concentrated the spearheads of the attacks
on them to overthrow them. 50/
Throughout mnost of the NLF's history, the nationalist cause provided stra-
tegic cover for communist objectives in t.he South. Figure 3-7 outlines the
organization of the headquarters element of the NLF. Central direction of
the NLF was conducted by L'ie Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party
through the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), their cperatives in
the South. COSVN was the tip Communist command headquarters for the war in
the South. With an established commari-1 link to the Politboro in the North,
COSVN received directives and implemented policies in accordance with the
tactical Si Luation.
COSVN's history dates back to 1951, when it was a six-man office
with Le Duan as First Secretary ard Le Duc Tho as his deputy. Both nren
3-26
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were high-ranking members of the Politboro.52/ After the war against the
French, COSVN was phased out and replaced by the Nam-Bo Regional Committee
composed of seasoned Viet Minh cadres.
in 1961, COSVN was re-established as the "central orge, for the
Southern branch of the Lao Dong Party."53/ COSVN directed the poliries ind
actions of the NLF/PRP through an interlacing organization stru-ture and

common leadership. Furthermore, a former political officer of COSVN who
defected it, 1968 stated: "there is no such organization as a PRP with a
Central Committee, a Standing Committee, etc., this organization only
exists in name."54/
The organization on the interprovincial, prodincial, district and
village levels paralleled those of the party. Mass Liberation Associations
,41're o' ,m-nized into a Central Committee with a corresponding Secretariat
and Current Affairs Section. While the Central Committee maintained a
semblance of a democratic front (i.e., its rmembers were elected from within
the mass orgarizations), the Secre-ariat and Current Affairs Office were
Party-dominated. Each respective smcretariat received direction from the
echelon above, the initial directives having eman-ateed from COSVN or the
Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party.
3. The Military Command Structure: The People's Liberation Armed
Forces (PLAF), Tner of er YA
Popular Army
Unlike other po.ul'r f.•ont or.-nizations in the history of North
end South Vietnam, the NLF had its own -inuigenous armed force etement, the
People's Liberation Arme,, Forces (PLAF), previously known as t..e Liberation
Army. The PLAF ;ubscribjd to fundamental party doctrine in its organiza-
tional makeup:
0 Organization must b,; in lir,•, with political goals.
a Democratic centralism must be strictly observeo, that is, disci-
pline mus%.. be maintained with subordinates obeying superior's
commands.
4 Unity of purpose must be sustained between the army and the
people.
3-28
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For Che PLAF, political success was more important than military victory.
Figure 3-8 describes the characteristics of the communist mili-
tary fcrceS in Suuth Vietnam as they were structured during most of the
period of US involvement.55/ The people's army consisted of three differ-
ent elements, each with different functions and control channels. The PLAF
included the Main Force and the Pav-amilitary Forces comprised of Regiunal
Forces and the Guerrilla Popular Army. With-in each element a Party contrnl
unit was implan~ed to direct the political activities of each unit and
assure its .-omplianc ,with Party directives.
fhe PA\/N, (in the other hand, consisted of North Vietnamese units
with • direct c3pmunication channel to Hanoi. These elements were com-
pletehy independei't of the NLF organization. In the early stages of the
insurgency, circa 1965-67, personnel from Main Forces and Regional Units
were often used as fillers for PAVN units. After Tet 1968 the reverse was
true and PAVN personnel frequently h&d 0 fill the depleted ranks of indig-
enous units.
The command and staff organization incorporated the Party
principle of decision by committee. Figure 3-9 shows a typical structure
on the interprovincial level. This illustrates the direct relationship
between the local Party committee and the military command. On tile lower
levels, the Party control apparatus corresponded to tiiose of the military
staff via overlapping contro] agencies.
4. Summarv Arnalysis: Or.:.yinizational Relationships
'This section has dealt with each important component of the
southern organization. The intricate communist system comes into focus
only when viewed as a totally integrated system. Figure 3-1C shows the
horizontal arJ vertical command and control links between the civil, Party
and military organizations in South Vietnam. It also demonstrates the
ultimate purpose of the southern organization.
Figure 3-*11 depicts the maiiner in whicli the. popular movement was
controlled through associ.'tions within the NLF structure. The communists
paid close attention to all elements of South Vietnamese society--intellec-
tual, professional, labor, -,h,iith and minority groups. The liberation
3-29
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association concept ihighlights the political appeal of

the NLF as a
counterforce in South Vietnam; the Party control mechanism depicts the
ultimate strategy of the NFL and capitalized on that appeal. Finally the
addition of the guerrilla forces combined the political struggle with the
armed struggle, the latter in support of 'he former.
F. PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
The Background
1.
As early as 1966 COSVN had directed tne PRP to concentrate on
improving its organization. In the aftermath of the 1968 Tet offensive, it
appeared desirable for COSVN to establish "democratically elected" local
governments to consolidate territorial gains made during Tet and help
prepare for future operations. In March 1968, COSVN directed that People's
Liberation Councils be estabished in liberated rural and urban areas with
the ultimate objective of broadening the liberation structure and estab-
lishing a coalition gavernment at the top.58/
Such a coalition government was to be only a step on the way to
total Lao Dong Party control of Vietnam; this is suggested by the lecture
notes (circa 1967 - pre-Tet) of an important Viet Cong cadre.
. the National Democratic Coalition Government which

is the immediate goal of our struggle is not a type of
coalition government which is bought at any cost. It
must be a coalition government established under the
fol"lowing conditions:
1. The U.S. aggressors must withdraw their troops.
2. The coalition government must have the NLFSVN as
the core. 59/
2. The PRG Emerges
On June 10, 1969 the clandestine Liberation Radio annour'ced that
a Provisional Revolutionary Government had been formed at a "Congress of
National Delegates of South VieW,-Nam."62/ 3stensibly, after holding dis-
cussions with the Central Comin.,tee! of the NLF, the PRG decided to replace
the NLF delegation to the Paris Conference on Vietnam and to designate
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Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, Minister of Foreign Affaris of the PRG, as head of
that delegation.63/ The DRV Party Journal, Hoc Tap, was quick to state the
DRV's recognition of the PRG as a "legal" government. 64/
An urgent COSVN circular issued in June 1969 described the stra-
tegic significance of the PRG in terms of a political campaign in coordi-
notion with military operations and a diplomatic offensive.65/ The PRG
gave a semblance of legitimacy to communist claims that they controlled
large areas in the South and that local elected officials in "liberated
areas" were represented by the PRG. In fact, the Provisional Revolutionary
Government was nothing more than another front organization.66/
Although the PRG "took over" the Paris negotiations from the NLF,
the change was cosmetic rather than substantive. The Lao Dong Party pulled
all of the strings, but the Provisional Revolutionary Government continued
to serve a useful purpose for the DRV for two years after the Paris accords
were signed and US forces withdrew from RVN. After the DRV's victory in
April 1975, the process of unification began in earnest.67/ By the summer
of 1976, the organizations that had proved useful as Southern entities
ceased to exist. The PRG was absorbed into the new Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, the NLF merged into the Fatherland Front, and the PLAF was drawn
into the PAVN.68/ Seldom has the communist "front tactic" been more
clearly at work than it was in Vietnam, and rarely has such organizational
skill beern demostrated as was shown by Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants.
G. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS
This chapter addresses the complexity and durability of the communist

organizations in North and South Vietnam. In reviewing the nature of
these organizations and the obstacles which they overcame, (i.e., protracted
warfare, heavy attrition and traditional, societal standards), one can
derive several meaningful insights:
a The communist organization in Vietnam was by no means unique. It
subscribed to the Marxist-Leninist principles of revolutiootry
organization and the Maoist application of guerrilla warfare.
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0 The Vietnamese Communists devoted 16 years (1930-1946) to organ-

izing a loyal, disciplined, united, and thoroughly reliable Party
apparat before committing their forces in open combat against the
French, thereby acquiring remarkable conesiveness and singleress
of purpose which made them an exceptionally formidable enemy.
* Hanoi and its Southern cadres devoted six years (1954-1960) to
remodel the stay-behind Viet Minh apparatus in the South before
seriously taking up armed action against the GVN.
a The DRV devoted two years (1973-1975) to reorganizing its pro-
fessional army, the PAVN, without materially improving or
strengthening the indigenous Southern political or military
apparatus, preparatory to the final assault on the RVNAF:
clearly a deliberate move to ensure the take-o~ver of the GVN
militarily by Northern forces without having to share power with
any Southern element.
0 Serious differences of opinion surfaced over the years within the
Party Central Committee, but the organizational principle of
"democratic centralism" was strictly adhered to, and differences
were resolved internally without exposing the North Vietnamese
leadership to public disharmony.
* The People's Revolutionary Party in the South was tightly organ-
ized and rigorously disciplined, enabling tne Party to manipulate
the iarger NLF organization in line with Politboro directives
without revealing their direct ties to Hanoi.
0 DRV leaders were long-time students and practitioners of com-
munist dialectics and organization.
* Communist organizational development in North and South Vietnam
reflected the fundamental principles of revolutionary develop-
ment, thus the organizational techniques and Party tactics should
have been no surprise to US and GVN authorities.
4 The sequential buildup in South Vietnam of the Party and the
Front was designed and directed to achieve the DRV's goals.
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* Differences between the communist organs in North and South

Vietnam were more apparent than real; for propaganda purposes the
Southern faction carefully avoided any open signs of subservience
to the North.
0 Initially, the noncommunist anti-Diem factions that comprised a
large part of the NF'-s manpower participated in the Presidium,
the Central Ccmmittee, and the subordinate staffs and mass
organizations of the NLF; at that time, at least until 1965 and
possibly later, there may have existed the opp'.rtunity for the
US/GVN to exploit the noncommunist elements of the front, but
that was not done.
S The goals of the communist leaders in the North and the South
coincided; the goals of antigovernment noncommunist factions
differed.
* The main objective of the Communist Party in Vietnam was politi-
cal power through a combination of internal organizational
manipulation and armed struggle. The US/GVN response relied
mainly on application of military power untii relatively
successful
I Pacification/Vietnamization programs were introduced
in about 1969. (See Chapter 5, Volume V).
After Tet, the existence of a Southern-directed insurgency was
clearly no more than a pretext.
The Communist Vietnamese were mastev, of organization. Redundant

lines of command and control reached from Hanoi down to three-man cells in
the Delta of South Vietnam. Organization was vital to the survival and
ultimately the success of the DRV's drive for unification. But organiza- V
tion only provided a means for success. Motivation was also required. The
DRV neededl a popular cause: they had one in nationalism and anticolonia-
lism. The DRV also needed correct policies and dedicated and intelligent
lea.ders at all levels; apparently they had a greater share than did the
Republic of Vietnam. These latter factors were examined in Chapters 1 and
2 of this volume and in Volume II.
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H. LESSONS
0 In a revolutionary context, communist organizations invariably

turn to "front" organizations as a means for capturing the
support of other non-communist entities that share some common
dissatisfaction; a knowledge and understanding of the indigenous
situation and existing grievances provides an opportunity for
infiltrating a front or exploiting or creating schisms between
communist and non-communist elements within a front. However, the
communists' organizational techniques are often so well developed
that opportunities for exploitation may be rare and fleeting or
may depend on an incumbent non-communist governmental apparatus
making substantial changes to offer a better alternative than the
communists appear to offer.
* To defeat a communist threat requires thorough understanding of
the political-military organization, or infrastructure, which
sustains and controls it, followed by the planning and coordina-
tion of approriate "attacks" - political, psychological,
economic, police, and military on its points of vulnerability.
3
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VOLUME I
CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES
1. Essay on the Five Steps in the Operation of a Revolution, as reprinted
in Michael Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South
Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy (Washington, D. C.:
The American University, 1967), p. 339.
2. For a description of the World War II period and its immediate after-
math see Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), Volume I "From Colonialism to The Viet-
minh," pp. 227-372. Buttinger describes the August 1945 nationalist
revolution in these terms, "Although prepared since the beginning of
the century by thousands of patriots of all possible shades of national-
ism, it was in the end made and won by a determined minority group -the
Communists at the head of the Vietminh." Also see Alexander B. Wood-
side, Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam. East Asian Research
Center, Howard University, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), pp.
225-234.
3. These objectives were derived by BDM analysts from a series of documents
on this subject. One source of interest is the "Declaration of The
Policy of The Provisional Coalition Government (January 1, 1946)" in
Ho Chi Minh On Revolution, ed., Bernard B. Fall (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Publ., 1967), pp. 160-161.
4. U.S. Department of State, Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role
in the War in South Vietnam, 1966, p. 2.
5. Allan B. Cole, ed., Conflict in Indochina and International Repercus- H
sions: A Documentary History, 1946-1955 (New York: -Cornell University
Press), pp. 226-228.
6. Mao's three steps are described in Buttinger, Volume II, pp. 1041-1043
(fn. 18 of chapter IX). Buttinger also provides several other sources
that deal with Giap's use of Mao's writings. Also see Walter Laqueur J
Guerrilla (Boston: LtLae brown and Company, 1976), pp. 267-275.
7. Buttinger, Volume II, pp. 797-799, 1071-1073. He cites Jean Lacouture
and Philippe Devillers, La Fin d'une Guerre: Indochine 1954, p. 42,
and reference to a French public opinion survey that showed 65% of the
persons questioned (in 1953) favored an end to the war and 19% were
for outright withdrawal. Department of Defense U.S.-Vietnam Relations
1945-1967 (Washington, D.C.: US Goverrment Printing Office, 1971), 12
Bricks. Book 1, 11, C.l.p. C-9 describes the Laniel government as "
cracking 3t the seams," in May-June 1953 which enabled the DRV to
take a harder line at Geneva. Hereafter DOD US/VN Relations.
8. Interagency study, "The North Vietnamesi Role in the Origin, Direction,
and Support of the War in South Vietnam," referred to in DOD US/VN
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7;,lations, Book 2, IV. A.5. Tab 3. p. 34. Early infiltration was on

a small scale involving only a few hundred persons. Significant numbers
of regroupees did not travel south until 1959 and thereafter.
9. Commander in Chief Pacific and Commander US Military Assistance Command

Vietnam, Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968) (Washington,
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 95, and William C.
Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), p.
126. Also see the papers of Joseph A. McChristian, MG US Army (Ret.)
at the Military History Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa., Box 3, 3-ring notebook, p. 17 which describes the movement of the
95th Regiment into Laos in Dec2moer 1963 and its return to North Vietnam
in April 1964 where it underwent pre-infiltration training. Finally
in November 1964 the regiment accompanied the 32nd and 101st Regiments
of the 325th Division into RVN. Eight additional regiments infiltrated
into RVN during 1965.
10. afessor William Lewis, described the principles of Party organization
the the BDM study team on 1 March 1979.
11. "Regulations of the Communist Party and Communist Youth Organizations
in South Vietnam" as reprinted in Michael Conley, The Communist
Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy
(Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1967), p. 242. Also see
Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.AT. Press, 1968),
p. 149. To the description Pike adds, "There is one shout and a thousand
echoes . . ." In short, democratic centralism means participation in
de- ,n making, followed by obedience to the decisions made, even though
th. lecisions may have been steered by a skillful c&dre.
12. Doug Pike, History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976 (Stanford,

Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 120-127. Also see United
States Mission, Vietnam, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, Document
No. 101, "The PRGRSV" Part _1 Preparing to Form the PRG," pp. 1-11.
Hereafter US Mission, Vietnam material is referred to as Vietnam Documents
and Rc 'rch Notes.
13. Conley, pp. 47, 53-57.
14. Ibid.
15. "Guidance on Strengthening the Organization and Activities of the
Three-Man Cell," translation of a PRP document dated IS70. Document
No. 5 in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, Document No. 102, "The
PRPSVN-Part II, COSVN's attempt to revitalize the PRP."
16. Fur various descriptions of the communist cadres see: Dennis J.
Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), pp. 168-470; and Vietram Documents and
Research Notes. "North Vietnam's Role in the South," Document Nos.
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36-37 dated June 1968. Pike, History of Vietnamese Communism, pp. 67-71
provides a succinct description of the Party cadre. He states that
the "Party cadre quality was at its zenith during the Viet Minh war
and has gone downhill steadily ever since." But " . the cadre system
&.es work." (p. 71).
17. "Essay on the Five Steps in the Operations of a Revolution" document

E-5, reprinted in Conley, pp. 333-347.
18. Andrew P. O'Meara, Jr., Mdjor US Army, Infrastructure and the Marxist
Power Seizure: An Anyalysis of the Communist Models of Revolution (New
York: Vantage Press, 1973), pp. 91-99. Conley, pp. 77-116, offers a
detailed treatment of the strategic utility of civil mass work tinder
the conditions of protracted guerrilla warfare, communist control of
mass organizations, and communist strategy of fronts in insurgency
operations.
19. Translation of a communist document captured in South Vietnam and dated
November 1951. The document has been accurately translated and it
appears authentic. Its exact origin and addresses are unknown, US
Department of State, Office of the Historian, Itew,i 2, paragraph C.l.
Hereafter items in the State Department Collection will be cited DOS
Historian. Also see George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warare
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publise-e,- 6) pp. 126-35.
20. For an interesting discussion of The National Liberation Front tNLF)
see Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1963), pp.'356-366.
21. "Liberated Labor Association's Program and Statute," pi°esented to the
2nd Congress of The NFLSVN. Appendix D, Document D-2, in Conley, p.
278.
22. "Policies on the Organization and Working Procedures of the People's

Liberation Committees at Various Levels, Section III of Vietnam
Documents and Research Notes, Document No. 101, "The PRGRST/--arL I
"Preparing to Form the PRG," pp. 23-33. Format for the table was
suggested by Myrna Pike, who also made available to The BDM study team
numerous original documents from the Pike's personal )ibrary. The PRG
is discussed briefly in Section F of this chapter.
23. Ibid., Document No. 101, Part II, "The Founding Conference of the PRG,"
January 1972, pp. l-18.
24. Conley describes the military structure somewhat differently. In
addition to the professional forces of the People's Army of (North)
Vietnam, PAVN, he describes the (NLF) structure as consisting of the
main force units, the territorial armies, and the local guerrilla units,
pp. 117. Douglas Pike in Viet Cong, pp. 232-240 describes the NLF's
military structure also, but he uses the term Guerrilla Popular Army
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which should not be used in the later stages of hostilities, as Pike

himself pointed out.
25. Pike, Viet Cong, p. 234 quotes indoctrirnation work by the NLF that de-
picts t•e main duty of PAVI, (circa 1966) as defending thie territory of
The North, the safe base, whereas the main duty of the Liberation Army
was liberation of The South.
26. Conley, p. 119.
27. Gerard Tongas, a French .x-communist, contends that for the Vietnamese
Communists. ". . . the words cultu'e, education, and teaching have only
one meaning, namely indoctrination." Quotod in Fall, The Two Viet-Nanms.,
p. 183.
28. U.S. Department of State, "Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role
in the War in South Viet-Nam." Released in May 1968. Vietnam Document:,
and Research Notes, Document No. 37. P'ub'lished as Document Nos. -317
see Vike, History of Vietnamese Communism,
zT~o pp. 134-147.
29. Interrogation in 1958 of a prisoner wvho had been active "n the resistance
since 1945. The prisoner was captured by GVN forces in 1956. DOS
Historian, Item 12.
30. Douglas Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong (Cambridge, MA.: The M.I.T.
Pr..,-s, 1969), p. 5.
31. Figure 3-I is based on BDM ;•tudy team analysis of the documentation
reflected in the endnotes to this chapter.
32. A former high-ranking offlcial reviewed a copy of an earlier text of

this volume at the request of the Strategic Studies institute. in fis
nine-page "Comments on "A Study of Strategic Lessons Learnei in Viet
Nam - Volume I The Enemy," he takes exception with the eariier draft,
comanenting that a misunderstanding Qf the true relationship between
tha Vietnamese Communist Party (OLD or Dang Lao Dong) and its instru-
ments for carrying on the war in the South adversey affects the
analysis in the first four chapters. He goes on to say:
The National Liberation Front was not, as the study

suggests, a viable, autonomous orgaiiazation with a life
of its own; it was a facade, a myth, a "front," by means
of which the OLD sought to mobilize the people in the
south to accomplish its ends, and to garner international
sympathy and support. The OLD party -- through its
"southern branch' created and directed the NLF, and acted
in its name while sustaining the myth of the Front's
existence as a non-Communist, southern liberation movement
functioning independently of Hanoi's control. It had
no structure of its own in an operational sense, no armed
forces of its own; it existed largely only on paper.
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Upon receipt of a copy of the foregoing comments; BD)M asked

Ambassador William Colby, former Director of' Central Intelligence,
to review them. Ambassador Colby did so on September 8, 1979 and,
without further written comment, noted that the nine-page document
was "An excellent paper " Myrna Pike, an authority in her own
right on the communist apparat ii Vietnam, was asked for her eval-
uatioa of the NLF. She responded:
Two schools of thought exist on the character, of the
NLF. Was it a vile organization, a social phenomenon
with a li(e of its own, albeit conceived and directed
.y the Jr•nq Lao Dong? Or was it a paper facade, mean-
ingless and therefore unworthy of consideration in stra-
tegic thinking as well as unworthy of retrospective study?
• No student of social science could or would discount
the effectiveness, the viability of an entity wnhch is
seen to exist by those whom it was meant to influence.
Like all front organizations, the NLF was a tool. It
existed in South Vietnam; it was effective; it was, in
fact, the tool until big unit-war came to dominate the
scene.-Tt is hard to see, from a social science view-
point, why this brillant execution of the front concept
cannot be viewed as a viable entity and a tool manipu-
lated by Hanoi at one and the same time. . . One thing
is certain: the NLF was no myth. To disregard it as
unreal would be to disregard the quintessential element
in mobilizing the southern insurgency, that is, social
organization.
This view is borne out by the noted Bernard B. Fall in The Two
Viet Nams. Fall points out that during World War II the British
Special Operations Executive (SOE) so completely controlled the
French Resistance thac De Gaulle could not land a single agent in
occupied France without Gritish permission, and then could only
communicate with them using British-controlled codes. Yet once
back on his native soil, despite his total dependence on British
and American supplies, De Gaulle steered his own political course.
Bernard Fall likens that situation to the one in Vietnam. He
states:
S• In other words,
political shouldtheno-t---e
entity then, real whether, in NLF
test of the the as a or
sixth
,eighth
4 (depending on when one considers the insurgency
to have begun) year of its struggle, it must draw on
Chinese ammunition or PAVN divisions to stay alive, but
whether or not it is willing and able to steer a "South-
erni' course. There was some solid evidence in 1964 and
1965 that the latter was the case then, as the NLF
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changed secretaries-general three times and offered a

five-point negotiatiun program that not only differed
from Hanoi's Four Points but actually was changed in
thirty-nine different places when Hanoi rebroadcast it..
(pp. 359-360).
For a list of the 39 changes see "National Liberatiun Front on
U.S. Escalation of War," March 26, 1965 witI, "Notes on NFLSV
Central Committee Statement" in The Viet-Nam Reader, Marcus G.
Raskin .and Bernard B. Falt, eds.'(New York: Vintage Books, 1965),
pp. 232- 252.
33. Pvý..it announcemert of the formation of the PRP was made in early 1962.
U.v. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media
Services Vietnam Information Notes Number 3, Revised May 1967, p. 3
presents a very brief descriptio f the PRP and the COSVN, NLF, PRP
chain of command. A Senior Lieutenant in the North Vietnamese Navy,
captured in The Gulf of Tonkin in 1966, stated that the PRP . . . "is
nothing but the South Vietnamese branch of the LD (La3 Dong) Party."
He believed, correctly it turns out, that once South Vietnam had been
liberated, the NFLSVN and PRP would disappear; See. DS Historian, Item
42.
34. NIC Field Cxploitation Team, National Alliance Democratic and Peace
Forces (Saigon: National Chieu Hoi-Lenter, 1968), p. 2.
35. Pike, Histoa of Vietnamese Communism, p. 125.
36. )ch Viet Conc Political lIfrastructire in South Vietnam, a SEATO Short
Paper -55(angkok:
ai TheRTsearch Office South-East Asia Treaty
O,-ganization, 1972), pp. 30-40. This SEATO paper points out that the
PRG wus an NLF effort to create an alternative apparatus to Thieu's
government, to provide a rallying point for waverinq elements of the
NLF by providing a sign that a communist victory was at hand, and to
enhance communist presitge internally and externally while establishing
an apparently legitimate basis for equal status with the GVN in any
coalition government. Paper made available by the History of the
Vietnam War on Microfilm, the extensive library maintained by Douglas
and Myrna Pike.
37. Autonomous zones are, by definition, self-governirg areas. However,

this arrangement was merely a ploy on the part of the Party to enlist
the support of the highland tribes.
38. Michael Lent, Decisionmaking in the Democratic Republic of Victnam
(Maryland: American Institute for Research, 1973), passim.
39. Ibid.
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40. Ibid., p. 22.

41. General Vo Nguyen Giap and General Van Tien Dung, How We Won the War
(Philadelphia! Recon Publications, 1976), p. 40.
42. Harvey H. Smith, et. al., Area Handbook for North Vietnam (Washington,
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1967) and Lent, op. cit.
43. The term "Troika" is often used instead of Triad. Troika, an associ-
ation of three in authority, comes from the example of the Russian
vehicle drawn by three horses. For an interesting description of the
Troika and its political application see Anita Lauve Nutt. Troika on
I Trial: Control or Compromise, a three-volume work prepared-iT1 September
1967 under contract numberr-s-220 for the Office of International
Security Affairs, Department of Defense. The author, now Anita Lauve
Richardson, was a foreign service officer in Vietnam and later a Rand
Corporation consultant.
44. Lent, passim.
45. See for example Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961). Several c ptured documents
reflected in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes also refer to the
"general offensive-general upriG-ng." See Document No. 28-29 "The
Decisive Hours': Two Directives for Tet," dated April 1968; Document
No. 45, "The Process of Revolution and The General Pprising," dated
October 1968; Document No. 64, "Summer 1969: A Viet Cong Study of the
Situation and Prospects"; and COSVN Resolution No. 9 of July 1969.
46. "Regulations of the Communist Party and Communist Youth Organization
in South Vietnam," reproduced in Conley, pp. 239-240, supra note 11.
47. Intelligence report on command relationships between the Lao Dong Party 4
and COSVN, based on interrogation of an iptellectual proselyting cadre
arrested in Spring, 1967. DOS Historian, Item 207.
48. Conley, passim.

49. On January 29, 1961 Hanoi announced that the NLF had been formed the
50.
previous month, (on 20 December, 1960).
Hanoi, Hoc Tap, September 1966. Hoc Tap is a Lao Dong Party Journal
that parrots the official Party position and propaganda.
k
51. Pike, Viet Cona, passim and Conley, p. 111. These two authors use
.differe-nitterms (translations) for some of the organizations, such as
Conley's staff agency "Invalids and Heros" is Pike's "Central War-
Deceased Heros Committee."
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52. A biographic summary issued in 1961, based on agents' reports compiled

during First Indochina War, 1946-1954. DOS Historian, Item 11.
53. Albert E. Palmerlee, The Central Office of South Viet-Nam (Saigon: US
Mission, August 1968). Vietnam Documents and Resarch Notes, Document ial
No. 40. This excellent document traces the evoluion of COSVN from
its inception in 1951 when it replaced the Nam Bo (South Vietnam) Regional
Committee, through its dissolution in 1954 after the Geneva Accords
were signed and its functional existe.,ce once again as the Nam Bo Com-
mittee, and finally its reemergence as COSVN in 1961. Thereafter COSVN
became the Central Committee of the PRP, in short, the Southern Branch
of Hanoi's Lao Dony Party.
54. US Mission in Vietnam, Hanoi's Central Office fo'" South Vietnam (•aigon,
July 1969), p. 2.
55. The retired official, supra note 31, who reviewed an earlier draft of
this volume contends that:
There was no simple distinction between PAVN and PLAF
forces and military commands. Most "PAVN" units operated
under commanas controlled directly by Hanroi; most so-
called PLAF units operated under the military commuand
of COSVN; but this distinction was not clearcut. Indeed,
most units which were initially "southern" were nor .hern-
ized after 1968, and local units operating in areas i-ito
which major PAVN force- were introduced came under con-
trol of PAVN regional commands. All forces in the south --
including PAVN -- were encompassed in the term "People's
Liberation Armed Forces" as used by the Communists.
Conley, on the other hand, refers to the " ... four indenti-
fiable elements of the Communist insurgent military potential in
South Vietnam: (1) the professional forco of the People's Army
of (North) Vietnam (PAVN); (2) the main force units; (3) the ter-
ritorial armies; and (4) the local guerrilla units." (p. 117).
In Vie9Cong, Pike describes the structur:e of the armed forces in
funT7on~al terms, and he considers that the (Guerrilla) Popular
Army consisted of the village guerrilla (du kich xa) and the combat
guerril*.a (du kich chien dau). Pike cautions that the term "full
military" or Main Force is likely to mislead since these units
thought and fought like guerrillas. He divides the full military
arm of Lhe NLF into two basic entities: the Regionals or Terri-
torials and the Main Force or "harm hats." (pp. 233.-240). With
respect to chains of command, Pike states in his Histor of Viet-
namese Communism (p. 125) that throughout the war-the PAVN chain
of command went directly to Hanoi and did not go thruugh the PRP
svstem beyond nominal liaison. The Australian communist-sympathizer,
.Ifred G. Bu-chett, Vietnam, Inside Story of the Guerilla (sic)
War (New York: Internaton'-al POlishers, 1965), p. 188 refers to
3-46
I"TH THE BDM CORPGtRATION
the Front's armed forces as being of three types: "self-defense

guerillas, regional guerillas, and regular army.."
56. This figure is based mainly on Conley, pp. 117-119 and Pike, pp.
233-2A3.
57. Conley, passiwi.

.58. Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, "The People's Revolutionary
Councils in Rural Areas," Document No. 35.
59. Vietnam Documents and Research Notes "The Process of Revolution and
the GeneraT Upiing." Document No.45
60. Figure 3-10 was derived from textual material mainly in Pike, Viet Cong
and Conley, passim.
61. Ibid. Figure 3-11 provides a simple, general view of the urganization
and structure of civil operations within the NLF, illustratioig how they
were controlled by the communists.
62, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, "The Founding Conference of the
PRG." Part II, Document No. 101, "The PRGRSV," p. 1.
63. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
64. Hoc Tap, Hanoi, June 1969, reprinted in Vietnam Documents and Research
N•tes, Document No. 101, pp. 70-71.
55. COSVN Circular 99/CTNT, June 1969, "Activation of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government to the Republic of South Viet-Nam." (Classi-
fied by the Vietnamese as Urgent - To be kept absoiutely secret).
Document 2, pp. 19-25, in Vietnam Documents and Research Note5, The
"PRGRSV,", The First Nine Months of the PRG," Documentf-No.T11, Part
III.
66. The retired official previously cited, supra notes 31 and 54, describes
the apparat in these terms:
... the PRP never existed as an autonomous southern Com-
munist party, nor did the PRG exist as a viable autonomous
governmental entity with an apparatus of its own. The
so-called NLF, PRP and PRK were called into their amor-
phous being when it suitf•d Hanoi's interests to do so:
the NLF to provide an ap!>arent (but mythical) nationalist,
non-Comwunist aura for the beginning of the armed struggle
against Oiem ir., 1959; the PRP to assuage the concerns
of some soutern Communists about the North's domitiant
role in the insurgency; and the PRG to conjure up a
"government" which could balance the corner opposite
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I~I I
THE BDM CORPORATION
[I
the GVN at the peace table when negotiations began in
Paris. There was one enemy political-military apparatus
in the south, created and largely staffed by the DLD,
and responsive to Hanoi's direction through the OLD party
entity initially called COSVN.
It must be noted that at least twr authorities on the South-
ern communist apparatus (Fall and Pike) credit the NLF with having
had some organic political initiative apart from its admitted ties
to Hanoi, at least inte the idid 1960s. Supra endnote 31. The
PRG, on the other hand, was created to present the facade of an
"elected" government that might ultimately claim its share in a
coalition government -- as an interim step on the road to unifica-
tion. The PRG was not a government; rather it was a small staff
directly responsive to the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party
in Hanoi. Day-to-day politico-military operations in RVN were
directed by the Party apparatus either directly from Hanoi (for
PAVN) or through COSVN (for PLAF). Later, in 1966-1968, counter-
parts to COSVN wei'e established to provide tighter control over
operations in the northern half of South Vietnam. Hanoi directed
operations north of Hai Van Pass through Military Reg-on Tri-Thien-
Hue; the coastal areas north of Cam Ranh Bay through their Military
Region 5; and the Central Highlands through their B-3 Front. See
USMACV, Combined Intelligence Command, Vietnam (CICV) study ST
67. Generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tier Dung, How We Won the War. It is 4
interesting to note that these victorious generals give no credit to
the NLF, PRP, or PRG; rather they refer to people's support or uprising
only in general terms and obviously laud the accomplishments of the 4
PAVN. The appendices to this small book purport to be PLAF policies
in liberated areas, but of the two docuiments cited, one is dated April.
1975 and the second appears to be dated April 30, 1975, claiming credit
for a PLAF general offensive into Saigon. Little was heard from the
PRG thereafter.
68. Pike, History of Vietnamese Communism, p. 134. The sparse treatment
given the PGby key figures is illustrated to some degree by these
authors:
Henry Kissinger refers to the PRG only oice in his 1500-page book.
White House Yeavs (Boston: Lit'le Brown and Co., 1979), p. 281.
3Simiarly Nguyen Cao Ky, Twenty Years and Twenty Days (New York:
Stein and Day, 1976), p. 191 makes only one comment about the PRG:
I was not deluded into believing that the Paris accord
would bring permanent peace. By the time of the cease-
fire agreement in JIanuary 1973, the NLF had already
restyled itself the Provisional Revolutionary Government.
Our foreign minister, Tran Van Lanm, signed agreements
LV 3-48
THE BDM CORPORATION
only with North Vietnam's negotiator, Xuan Thuy, but

there was a further session later in the day at which a
modified agreement mentioning the PRG was signed by the
Americans, the North Vietnames,3, and Mme. Binh, foreign
minister of the PRG. We refused to occept copies of
that text, but there was no doubt that the NLF had won
its biggest victory.
And Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam (New Ycrk: Oxford University
Press, 1978), pp. 214-215, neatly sums up the Lao Dong Party's
strategy and organizational imperatives: i
Minh, who was sworn in as president on 28 April, to the

last hoped to be able to negotiate a coalition government
with the PRG as provided under the Paris accords, but
the North Vietnamese had no intention of sharing power
with anyone, including the PRG, whose propagandistic
usefulness had now come to an end. On 30 April, 1975,
as North Vietnamese tanks entered Saigon, Minh announced
the unconditional surrender of the government of the
Republic of Vietnam.
"3-49
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CHAPTER 4
FF MOBILIZATION
To conduct a people's war, it is necessary to mobilize

the entire people. ..... Since our Party's birth, the
method of its revolutionary campaign has been to direct
propaganda, to organize and lead the masses to
struggle, from the lower to the upper levels, and to
motivate them to rise up and regain administrative
power through revolutionary violence. Because of the
widespread mobilization and organization of the masses
to fight vigorously in the 1930-31 revolutionary move-
ment, in the 1936-39 democratic campaign period, and in
the 1940-45 national liberation campaign period, the
great forces of the entire people wqre ab!e to rise up
to fight aggression during the Augut Revolution as
well as during the anti-French resis.ance and the
present anti-U.S. resistance. 1/
Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap

A. INTRODUCTION
Revolutionary and guerrilla wars have been fought throughout history.

Unconventional tactics have been used by weaker peoples against invading or
occupying armies, by regular soldiers in rearguard a,:rions and by groups
rising against unpopular landholders or government. Indeed, such tactics
were used in the American War of Independence. Nevertheless, the popular
notion persists that unconventional war is a 20th century phenomenon.

Marxist-Leninist philosophers quickly recognized the important role
played by a revolutionary elite in mobilizing the masses for such
revolutionary ort¾uerrilla struggles. It followed that emphasis had to be
placed on the use of propaganda to promote the mobilization, and close
attention had to be paid to the organization of both material and manpower
resources, a task th&t wds performed with remarkable success by the
communist cadres. Because of severe resource limitationý, establishing
effective mobilization techniques loomed large in the Communist Vietnamese
strategy and therefore, warrants close attention.
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This chapter examines the system that was developed by the Communist
Vietnamese to accomplish their overall goal of reunifying their country
under communist leadership. Their effort required extraordinary commitment
for four reasons:
* The resources of Vietnam as a whole and the North in particular
were limited.
o It was important to establish a strong mobilization system to
support political-military objectives not only in the relatively
secure North but also in the South, in the face of the enemy.
e The struggle in which they were engaged consumed more than three
decades; and even toward its conclusion, there was no apparent
end in sight.
o It was necessary to adapt mobilization efforts to meet circum-
stances that were dictated by US intervention in the war. This
included both the need to adapt tr; air strikes and the need to
meet manpower and materiel
p quirements for the fighting in the
South.
B. COMMUNIST vIrENAMESE MOBILIZATION: BACKGROUND
For several centuries, the actual fighting of wars (in Europe) was
largely the preserve of the professional soldier, with civilians being left
to foot the bill through taxes, confiscation, billeting, and pillaging.
The French Revolution altered the traditional separation of civilians
and soldiers by involving all the people in the defense of the Revolution
and the nation. Through Lhe levee en masse, all rFrenchmen were liable to
be called up to defend the nation, and those not serving in the military
forces were expected to con~tribute indirectly to the success of the armies
through sacrifices of labor, money, and luxuries at home.2/
In the twentieth century, the traditions of "total war", war involving
all strata of society and every aspect of economic life, grew. During
World War I, most nations involved in the conflict were mobilized to meet
the demands of total war. Through this process the meaning of mobilization
4-2
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THE BDM CORPORATION
extended from its original narrow reference to calling up reserves and

preparing them for immediate combat to include the nation of focusing all
the political and economic assets of a nation on accomplishing wartime
goals. For that effort, marshalling and maintaining the enthusiastic
support of all elements in the society has proven to be crucial. Convincing
the general populace that their lives are directly threatened by the enemy
contributes directly to the success of that effort.
There are two major components in a total war mobilization effoct.
The first of those components is meeting manpower requirements and main-
taining the morale of the people involved in tie mobilization effort. The
second is finding the material resources to fight the war. At the front,
the first component takes the shape of military forces who are directly
committed to the war effort. Behind the lines, personnel requirements
include providing a work force that is appropriate for maintaining agricul-
tural and industrial production levels to support the military effort. The
second component also has both front line and home front aspects. Arms
sufficient to accomplish the military objectives must be supplied to the
fighting forces, and at the same time, the requisite materials for maintain-
ing agricultural and industrial production must be found and transported.
In the development of their mobilization doctrine, the Communist Viet-
namese had the advantage of using both the example and writings of the
Chinese Communists. In addition, the Vietnamese had the opportunity during
the Viet Minh war against the French to refine their adaptation of Chinese
doctrine. Some maintain that the Vietnamese succeeded in extending and
refining the Maoist strategy of people's war.3/ The principal manifzs-
tations of the Vietnamese model were terrorist activities like assassin-
ations and kidnappings; armed struggle, including guerrilla and main force
warfare; and intensive organizational and motivational efforts among Viet-
namese.4/ The Vietnam War demanded that this intensive organizational and
motivational effort extend all the way from villages in the South to cities
* in the North. Taken together, this effort defined the scope of the
* Communist Vietnamese mobilization effort.
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THE BDM COPPORATION
Ir,addition to whatever influence the rrench example of levee en mas3

may have had, the communists in Vietnam took inspiration in their mobili-
zation effort from Lenin. He h'ad written:
To wage war properly, it is necessary to possess a
firmly organized rear base area.5/
The mobilization doctrine that the Vietnamese developed on this basis
pictured North Vietnam as the "Rear", producing for and supplying the
"Front," South Vietnam, where the actual fighting occurred.6/ The Commu-
nist Vietnamese extended this doctrinal base beyond its narrow military
meaning to include intense political activity. In setting out the general
mobilization objectives for the rear, General Giap wrote:
As far aj the revolutionary war is concerned, in the
process of bulilding our strongholds and rear bases by star-
ting from nothing, the creation of the first strongholds is
only an initial success. To strengthen and develop this
success, to help strongholds and rear bases stand fast
against all challenges and to develop ever more strongly
their impact toward the war, it is absolutely necessary to
strengthen constantly and cbmprehensiveiy our strongholds
and rear bases.
According to the viewpoint of people's war, the

strengthening of the strongholds and rear bases primarily
depends on political, economic, military, and geographical
factors, of which the most important are the political and
human factors and the nature of the social regime. There-
fore, the building of the rear bases must be comprehensive
and must include the vario'is political, economic, military,
and cultural aspects.
It is first necessary to build a sound political posi-
tion, to strengthen the political and moral consensus among
the people; to strive constantly to develop the supremacy of
the new tocial rerime in various aspects--political, eco-
nomic, and cultural; to achieve democratic reforms gradually
and actively; to improve the material and spiritual life of
the people; and to develop constantly the latent potentials
of the rear bases, with which they will be able to defend
themselves and, at the same time, develop comprehensively
their great contributions toward the war. The strongholds
and rear bases of peop"e's w•r pose a constant threat to the
enemy, and thus are the objectives of the enemy's repeated
and violent attacks.7/
4-4
THE BDM CORPORATION
Thus, the communist leadership viewed the itruggle in Vietnam as one

extended conflict with two aspects. The mobilization effort extended
through both the rear in the North and the front in the South.
The challenges presented in the front and the rear, however, were very
different. In the South, the objective was to mpintai', the cohesiveness of
the organization, described in Chapter 3, in 'tFhe face of a determined and
sophisticated enemy, the United States and the Souch Vietnamese government.
The challenge provided strong motivation for the communist forces in the
South to carry on. The relative security of the North, however, demanded
special efforts to motivate the people to contirnue their protracted
struggle. This difference between the front and the rear illustrates an
important distinction between the mobilization efforts of the Viet Minh war
and the conflict of the 1960's and 1970's.
tech-
In the Viet Minh war (1946-1954) the communists developed their
niques for organizing and motivating the .vilian population. Ho Chi
Minh's mobilization order issued in 1946 was simple and straightforward.
It read:
Regardless of sex and ag,, religious creed, party or nation-
ality, if you are Vietnamese, stand up and fight the French
colonialists to save the fatherland. He who has a gun uses
i a gun; ,o has a sword, uses a sword, or if he does not
have a ~
body , ;triv
sttt
uses a hoe, shovel, or bamboo stick. Every-
to fight the colonialists to save the
Icouh,
Spontaneous popular opinion had supported the Viet Minh attack on the
French. In the Vietnam War, support for the communist goals was a more
cuntrived and carefully organized expression in both the North and the
Sou~h. The key element for the Party in both parts of the country was to
present the US and ARVN forces as threatening the livelihood of all Viet-
namese. In the Sz,• '., c,. 1ists were attempting to convince the popu-
lation that they were the saviors from Allied brQuality who would overthrow
the corrupt, puppet regime. The 1965-1968 and 1972 US bombings provided a
focus for communist motivatio-" 1 propaganda, but through most of the war
the North, or the "rear area" the conflict, was relatively secure from
destruction.9/ The relative protection enjoyed by the rear area in the
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THE BDM CORPORATION
1960's and 1970's was distinctly different from the Viet Minh War exper-
ience when French military forces occupied strategic locations throughout
the country. This chapter will describe the methods that were used by the
communists to take advantage of this difference and to offset mnotivational
problems that were associated with living and working in a relatively
secuire area far from the front.
C. MOBILIZATION IN THE NORTH
1. Military P. ;'sonnel Requirements

The demands on the communist leadership to meet personnel require-
ments shifted in the course of the war. Initially, war fighting demands in
the South were met by the 90,000 Southerners who had gone to the North for
regrouping after the Viet Minh war.l0/ Gradually, through the early
1960's, the numbers of Southerners returning to fight in the South declined
and their contribution to the total effort of the NLF shrank accordingly.
As an example of the changes that were taking place, an NLF documerit
detailing personnel striengths in Quang Tr! province (South Vietnam) illu-
strated the shifting percentages of personnel contribution:
TABLE 4-1. PERSONNEL CHANGE - AN ILLUSTRATION

Type of Personnel Percentages
1961 1962 1963
Conscripts from North Vietnam -- 5 50
North Vietnamese Army soldiers 1 5 20
Returnees from regroupment 99 90 30
In the 1968 Tet Offensive, it was primarily the NLF units that
were decimaated. The percentages of Southern "returnees" were further
reduced and the NLF filled its ranks with Northerners, many of whom were
draftees. As a consequence, the continuation of the struggle depended on
the North's ability not only to provide fighting men for the war in the
Sovth, but also to provide personnel to fill the places of the workers who
were being inducted into the armed forces. '12/
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Of a total population of about 18 million in the DRM, there were

approximately four million men between the aiges of 15 and 49. Of those,
two million men were fit for military service. Each year, approximately
175,000 men reached military consc-'iption age, but only about 100,000 of
those were considered fit for military servic,.13/ In 1970, the armed
forces of the DRV were estimated to be disposed as follows:
TABLE 4-2. PAVN ARMED FORCES 1970-1971.14/

Total Armed Forces: 432,750
Army: 223,000 ii North Vietnam

85,000 in South Vietnam
67,000 in Laos
40,000 in Cambodia.
TOTAL 425,000
On the basis of these figures it was estimated by the US Defense
Department that about 90,000 men would be available to deploy to the South
in units or as replacements or fi1 ers should that number be needed. 15/
rhe communist forces in the South maintained their strength H
because of this ability to replenish the PLAF/DRV units after each
offensive. In addition, to some extent through their ability to choose
when and where to engage US forces, the communists were able to exercise a
degree of control over their casualty rates. As a consequence, they could
generally limit their losses to what they were willing to suffer.16/ The
ability of the communist forces to meet their military manpower require-
ments for their protracted war meant that the Allies would not be able tj
win a war of attrition by eliminating communist military forces in the
South faster than they could be replaced. 17/
2. Civilian Manpower Requirements in The North
While the communist military personnel requirements in the South
could be met, there was the belief that US bombing could seriously weaken
the rear base, and thus, the support for the war. This goal could be
accomplished if the bombing destroyed the economic base of the North, or if
4-7
THE BDM CORPORATION
it seriously weakened the morale of the North Vietnamese. The DRV govern-
ment sought to frustrate these two threats and to turn them to its advan-
tage. This effort required the total mobilization of the people and
resources of the North. 18/
There were 'two elements to the manpower squeeze that was being
exerted on the North. First, there was the problem of compensating for the
drain of workers moving to fight in the South. Second, there was the prob-
lem of overcoming the impact of the bombing on the economy. 19/
The direct drain of manpower caused by the war did not itself
create a serious problem for the Northern economy. In 1967, after more
than two year:s of heavy American troop involvement in the war, tihe number
of PAVN troops in the South was less than two percent of the North Viet-
namese mal! labor force, and less than three percent of the male agri-
culture force. (By comparison, the US forces in Southeast Asia at the time
amounted to about one percent of the U.S. male civilian labor force).20/
At the same time, there was the problem of meeting manpower
requirements in the agricultural and industrial sectors. There was a
tendency in US military circles to overestimate the impact of our bombing
onthe North's economy. In Congressional testimony, Admiral Ulysses S. G. ij
Sharp, Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, stated in 1967:

As a result of the incr'eased weight and efficiency of
our attacks, the Hanoi regime faces mounting logistic,
management, and morale problems. Repair, reconstruction,
and dispersal programs dre :onsuming increasing human and
material resources which otherwise would contribute to the
Communist's combat capability in Soth Vietnam. We believe
about 500,000 mern have been d-iverted to such activities. As
a matter of fact, the latest estimate that I have seen is
500,000 to 600,000. The e)ýv.ensive defense programs are
heavy users of manpower. The drawdown on farm labor has
reduced food production, and large amounts of food now have
to be imported. The ports are congested by an almost four-
fold expansion of sea imports necessitated by disruption or
destruction of domestic sources of cement., steel, and other
bulky materials. Ship unloading time is believed to have
tripled since March.21/
At the time of that statement, another analysis downplayed the
impact that the bombing was having on the North. A Rand Corporation study
4-8
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THE BCM CORPORATION
completed in December 1966 estimated that as much as 15 to 20 percent of

the agricultural labor force may have been diverted to other tasks, but the
men were replaced by even more women.22/
The introduction of women in large numbers to the labor force
served not only the immediate goal of meeting labor requirements in agri-
culture and industry both, but it also provided a means for accomplishing
the long-term objective of changing the social role of Vietnamese women.
In the spring of 1965, when the mobilization of every element of Vietnamese
society vas advancing rapidly, the Party issued a general directive giving
each woman three responsibilities:
(1) Replace the men who were -.alled from the fieids and factories fnr
combat dut;es.
(2) Take charge of their familiEs, so that husbands -ould leave for
the front, knowing that the family would be well taken care of.
(3) Join militia units to take part in combat when necessary.23/
In spite of male resistance, women began to take a more active
role in the economy. Most womn in the labor force remained on the farms.
In 1967 it was estimated that about 70 percent of the 6,500,000 farm work-
ers ware women. By 1967, some 1,290,000 wcmen were working in non-farm
jobs.24/ Thus, the women presented a pool of labor that could more than
make up for the drain of maipower on the North Vietnamese ecooomy being
caused by the war effort.
Additional labor to maintain the economy came directly from
China. It is estimated that in 1966, 40,000 Chinese were working on the
railroads.25/ They played a vital role in keeping the flow of goods coming
into North Vietnam from its communist allies.
The aid provided by the communist states, particularly the USSR
and the PRC, served indirectly to meet Vietnamese *,ndustrial manpower
needs. As plants anid tactories were bombed, the labor t-rces associated
with those facilities were freed for other work. The economy continued to
function as long as the goods were supplied from outside. Thus, even
though, as Admiral Sharp indicatea above, a half-million men were engaged
in meeting problems that arose from the US bombings, in fact the Vietnamese
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THE BDM CORPORATION
economy continued to operate. Mr. McNamara recognized that fact in his

Congressional testiwony:
North Vietnam is a nation of 18.5 million people, and
the dive-sion of 500,000 from agricultural pursuits to the
defense, dispersal, and repair of the lines of communication
I do not believe is a severe penalty. It simply requires
that their outside sources of supply increase their support
by the equivalent of 500,000 man-years, and very clearly the
-Soviets and Chinese are capable of this, and as a matter of
fact have acted to so increase their support.26/
3. Im.act of Mobilization on the North Vietnamese Economy

Th•e mobilization effort accelerated the communist economic pro-
gram in North Vietnam. In the late 1950's there was considerable under-
employment of the labor force, and the repressive effort led by Truong
Chinh to collectivize North Vietnamese farming had caused enormous dissat-
isfaction among the peasants. Thousands of people were killed in the
tiurmoil that accompanied the effort, and a rebellion brake out toward the
end of 19•6. In 1958 the government undertook a new drive to gath-r the
farming population first into cooperatives, Pnd then into communes. Indi-
vid-jal farmers found it nearly impossible to continue tneir work outside
the cooperatives.27/ US bombing caused the North Vietnamese leaders to
embark on an integrated three-way assault on the problems; of flood control,
transportation, and agriculture. In effect, the bombings necessitated
massive reorganization of the North Vietnamese countryside, an effort that
brought the country under closer control by the Party. It was assumed by
the DRV government that eventually' US bombs would be directed toward the
dams, dikes, and irrigation systems on which North Vietnamese agriculture
producti on depended.
There were two distinct periods of US bombing of the DRV. 28/
* "Rolling Thunder," March 065 to October 1968, punctuated by
frequent bombing halts, and
* "Linebacker I" May to October 1972 and "Linebacker II" in
December 1972.
Rolling Thunder was designed by tfhe Johnson Administration to
raise morale in the South and convince the North Vietnamese to halt their
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THE BDM CORPORAT!ON
aggression against the South.29/ In February 1965, when the systematic

Rolling Thunder bombings started, the transportation and communications
systems were the princip&l targets. A vast campaign was organized to meet
not only the immediate threat to the transportation network, but also to
face the less immediate threat of attack on the agricultural system. The
answer to both of these threats was the creation of secondary and tertiary
dike and irrigation systems.30/ The earth and rock removed from the dikes
and canals were used to provide a new raised road system, especially in the
-vulnerable Red River Delta. In the same process, fields were leveled out
to make the irrigition systems more efficient. The countryside was changed
from the traditional terraces bordering tiny rice fields, to big rec-
tangular fields bordered by massive road-topped dikes.31/ The b gger
fields resulted in more efficient cultivation. North Vietnamese propaganda
stated that the per-acre yields steadily increased. Thus, for instance,
rice production for 19S57 was said to be 11 percent higher than in 1966 and
two percent higher than in 1965.
The industrial section of 4orth Vietnam's ecoromy was similarly
affected by the bombings. The preliminary plans to build a developed
economy around industrial output based nn a Stalinist model was set aside
because of the vulnerability of the large plants to bombings. According to
the communist-journalist Wilfred Burchett, orders for heavy-industrial
equipment were canceled, and the government led the way in decentralizing
industry to create many small plants with the goal of making every province
and every district as economically self-supporting as possible.32/ The US
bombers destroyed the main centralized industries, but there were scores of
smaller plants turning out war and consumer goods in each province. In
effect a sizeable portion of the DRV's small, war-essential manufacturing
capacity was beyond the effective reach of any but the most indiscriminate
and inefficient air attacks.33/
Oleg Hoeffding suggests that the growing dependence upon outside
support for supply of goods vital to the economy also helped to increase
4-11
9
THE BDM CORPORATION
government control over the economy and hence to extend Party control over
North Vietnamese society. He wrote:
"...war creates new lines of dependence on the esta-
blished authorities for goods and services essential to
survival (rationed food, civil defense, medical care,
and so on). Ability to supply or withhold them becomes
an important, inst'ument of control. Even when a govern-
ment becomes una)le to meet these needs adequately or
4ffectively this instrument may be strengthened rather
than weakened. If the government controls whatever
supply remains aý,ailaible it can offer the consumers an
easy choice between not enr)ugh or nothing. In an acute
shortage situation the government acquires the addi-
tional instrument uf discriminatory distribution,
favoring those who are loyal, cooperative, and useful
and deprivir'g those wi:o are uncooperative and nonessen-
tial. The siege of Leningrad provides a classic
example of the exercisq of potency of these control
devices.
Even in an economy like North Vietnam's,

where the gre.-t majority of consumers grow their own
food and are close to decentralized traditional sources
of other essentials, there should be important lines of
dependence by the rural population on centrally con-
Zrolled resources, and a substantial part of the popula-
tion is fully dependent on them.
Should North Vietnam become increasingly

dependent on foreign aid for essential consumer's
goods -- because of food shortage and industry
bombing -- the exercise of these control instruments
would become easier and more effective, because govern-
ment imports are the most heavily centralized of all
sources of supply and are most easily controlled by an
efficieant government. 34!
During the period of the Rolling Thunder operations, North Viet-

namese vulnerability to air attack was not a critical feature. The DRV's
industrial-agricultural-transportation infrastructure was comparatively
simple. Because it lacked sophisticicn, that infrastructure was easily
decentralized and it continued to perform its necessary functions despite
thQ bombing. The US inventory of air-to-ground weapons in that period
(1965-1968) did not include "smart bombs." Consequently, bombing was not
essentially accurate, ana even to interdict a bridge in daylight required
4-12
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THE 8DM CORPORATION
hundreds of sorties. It wds not until guided air-to-ground munitions

became available in the 1970's that precision bombing beczme possible. 35/
fn 1965, when Rolling Thunder began, the North Vietnamese air
defense sytem was primitive. By the summer of 1966, that system was
expanded greatly, with Soviet help, and included the combination of
fighters, surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery, radars, and an
effective command and control system.36/
Despite the growing North Vietnamese air defense system and the
Presidentially imposed restrictions under which US airpower had to operate,
considerable damage was suffered by the enemy in the North. Table 4-3
presents data on the accomplishments of the Rolling Thunder campaign as of
15 July 1967.37/ It should be noted that bombing halts gave the communist
forces time to repair damage.38/
In short, the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign created difficul-
ties for the DRV and greatly increased their dependence on their communists
allies. However, the North was still able to continue its own efforts.
In contrast to the Rolling Thunder campaign, the effects of the
1972 Linebacker bombings upon North Vietnam and specifically upon its
capability to mobilize, were far more devastating. In a sense, the North
had built up a resistance to the Rolling Thunder style of US air war.39/
Despite reports that 30% of the war materiel supplied to the North had been
destroyed en route to Hanoi during Rolling Thunder, the North managed to
mobilize masses of laborers in efforts to repair damaged facilities
rapidly.40/ Further, the North Vietnamese adjusted well to the air war by
moving essential POL supplies and munitions to areas in which US bombing
was restricted, and by moving supplies at night in order to avoid
detection.
The communist's Easter Offensive of 1972 was met by Linebacker I,
a sudden and devastating air interdiction program that used guided bombs.
When the US unilater&lly halted the operation in October, the DRV quickly
mobilized the necessary labor force and began to repair the damage to lines
of communication ý,,u 'nstallations. Linebacker II was initiated in
December to bring the b1* to the negotiating table and to assure the GVN of
continuing support.41/ Navy and Air Force aircraft and B-52s from the
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THE BDM CORPORATION
TABLE 4-3. PERCENTAGE OF DRV NATIOJNAL CAPACITY DESTROYED - ROLLING

THUNDER
PERCENT DESTROYED
TARGET SYSTEM (AT LEAST TEMPORARILýY
MILITARY BARRACKS 26
A•MMUNITION DEPOTS 76
POL STPRAGE 87
SUPPLY DEPOTS 18
POWER PLANTS 78
MARITIME PORTS 12
RAILROAD YARDS 36
RAILROAD SHOPS 22
EXPLOSIVE PLANTS 100
IRON AND STEEL PLANTS 100
CEMENT PLANT 90
AIRFIELDS 23
NAVAL BASES 20
COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATIONS 20
BRIDGES TARGETED 56
4-i1
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Strategic Air Commend struck North Vietnam with devastating results in an

ll-day air campaign.
The air strikps focused on trp.n~port systems and military
supplies in tU Hanoi and Haiphong areas. An interested observer in Hoa Lo
Prison in Hanoi, Cdr. James B. Stockdale USN, (now VAdm Stockdale) des-
cribed the impact of Linebacker II on enemy morale and will, which trans-
lated irto enemy capacity to mobilize its people:
A totally contrasting atmosphere swept the city on that
December night in 1972 when the air raids didn't last 10
minutes but want on and on - when the B-52 columns rolled
in, and the big bombs impacted and kept on impacting in the
distance - when the ground shook, and the plaster fell from
the ceiling, and the prisoners cheered wildly, and the
guards cowered in the lee of the walls...42/
Linebacker II was a tremendous assault on North Vietnamese will: it
resulted in the lage-scale destruction of principal war-making facilities
of the country. The selection of targets was accomplished in Saigon by
senior US military officers and not by officials in Washington who were
Pesponding so!ely to political arguments and restraints.43/ Table 4-4
presents data from Admiral Sharp's account of the extent of the prhysical
damage to the DRV. Linebacker II brought the Northern war effort to a
halt, and in January 1973 the DRV came to the peace table. So, too, did
the GVN. •
4. Motivation Efforts in The North
Maintaining enthusiasm among the general population for mobiliza-
tion and its sacrifices has presented problems for all governments at war.
There is a direct relationship between that enthusiasm and tha threat that.
is perceived to people's lives. In North Vietnam, before the systematic
bombings began in 1965, the war was experienced most directly through the
government propaganda machine. The beginning of the bombings coincided
with the increase in the numbers of Ncrthern soldiers moving to fight in
the South.44/ The DRV government moved to turn the people's heightened
sense of crisis to its benefit through a carefully orchestrated propaganda
campaign. The mobilization order that was issued to characterize the
campaign read:
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THE BDM CORPORATION
TABLE 4-4. A SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF LINEBACKER !I
TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENf

RAILROAD S),J'EM ENTIRE RAIL COMPLEX OF COUNTRY WAS
CRIPPLED
SUPPLY STORAGE AREAS NINE MAJOR AREAS STRUCK
VEHICLE REPAIR FACILITIES CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE
PORTS AND WATERWAYS CONSIDERABLE

ALL NINE TARGETS O STRIKE LIST
DAMAGE
NVN ELECTRIC POWER GRID SHARPLY COMPROMISED AS HANOI TRANS-

FORMER STATION WAS INOPERATIVE AND
THREE LARGE POWER PLANTS WERE
HANOI RADIC COMMUNICATIONS :SUCCESSFULLY STRUCK.
MAIN CONTROL BUILDINGS
WHERE TRANS-
CENTER MITTERS LOCATED - DAMAGED
AIRFIELDS AND SAM SITES TEN PRINCIPAL TIELDS IN HANOI AREA

WERE STRUCK TO ENSURE THAT AIRCRAFT
OPERATIONS FROM THESE
BE INTERDICTED, AND A FIELDS
NU14BER WOULD
OF
SAM SITES WERE PUT OUT OF COMMISSION
4-16
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THE BDM CORPORATION
"Everybody is against the enemy, each citizen is a

soldier, each village, street, plant is a fortress, each
party branch a command post on the national salvation anti-
American battle front. Build up the rear zone into a self-
exerting soiritual source, a source of material for the
fronti ine. "45/
lo bring home the tireat tc each citizen, the following activi-
ties were recommpnded:
(1) Shoc .t p1 nes with -ifles.
(1) Capt -ing downed American pilots.
(3) , s.isting antiaircraft gunners and replacing them when neces-
sary.
(4) Maintaining a vigilant eye for spies and commandos sent north by
the United States and South Vietnam.
(5) Building fortifications to protect against invasion.
(6) Drawing tip detailed battle plans to counter such invasions.
(7) Keeping the lines of communication and transportation open.46/
The propaganda cimpaign with its attendint abuse of US pilots,
"witch hunts" for suspected traitors and spies, and massive pep rallies
succeeded from 1965 to 1968 in raiding the war fervor of the Mnrth Viet-
namese people.47/ From Vr68 to 1972, between the bombing attacks, that
motivational factor was absent. Thp 1972 bombings, especizlly the December
attacks, so paralyzed the North that there was little possibility of
turning the bombings to domestic propaganda advantage. See Table 4-4 for a
summary of The December 1.l72 Linebacker II campaign.48/
D. MOBILIZATION IN THE SOUTH
The South was viewed by the Viet.namese commun.ists as the "front area
of this struggle.. Because they were in the midst of their enemies, the
communists in the South required different types of support from the
populace than was needed in the North, or "rear area.'
Mobilizing materiel support in South Vietnam was not particularly
difficult -for the communists. were occasional interruptions in
There
supply and serious teiimporary shortages of materiel and ammunition, but on
balance, the needs of the PLAF, and later the PAVN, were accommodated.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
In Cochinchina, the communist veterans of the French-Viet Minh war had

long maintained power centers in Camau, the Plain of Reeds, the mouths of
the Gassac and Mekong rivers, and in War Zones C and D north of Saigon.49/
Thus, a series of logistic-supported base, and safe havens existed from
which military and political activities could be launched. Residual commu-
nist sympathy could be found in Annam, but it was not until experienced
cadres were infiltrated in from the North that communist proselyting began
there in earnest.50/
The bases in the South that were mobilized for the support ;f the war
effort consisted of five types of villages and towns. The roles assigned
to the towns were dictated by the perceived loyalty of the people in those
areas. in the first category were the villages and towns that had been the
Viet Minh bases against the Japanese and French. Some of those areas had
strong, long-established ties with the communists. Those base areas served
vital roles as dependable supply, intelligence-gathering, and recruiting
centers.
After the villages and towns that were unquestionably under the con-
trol of the communists, came the population centers and rural areas that
provided limited support. In those areas, some individuals consistently
supported the NLF, and their presence was tolerated by the other people.
Never'.heless, strong support could not be expected from the village or area
as a whole.
The third category consisted of villages and towns where dependable
followers were scattered and where South Vietnamese government efforts were
concentrated. In these areas "taxes" and assessments of all kinds inclu-
ding recruits could be maintained only through repeated threats of vio-
lence.
The fourth type of village or population center included those that
were firmly in the control of elements opposed to the communist cause.

Here the most resistant villages proved to be those with strong Catholic
ties. These villages were hardly immune from attack and intimidations.
Thus, while transitory support might be obtained through violence or threat
of violence, these areas were the least dependable for the communist
forces.451/
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THE BDM CORPORATION
The fifth area included the towns and urban centprs that were in South
Vietnamese government control. Through the operation of cadre cells in the
towns, financial and material support was obtainable from individuals and
groups, either willingly provided or obtained through short or long-term
threats. These centers also provided vital sources of intelligence about
Allied intentions and capabilities. They also provided recruits for the
communist forces.
From these five categories, or zones of loyalty, the population could
provide escsential services and goods & t communist forces. Mobilizing
4 ,hese a.ýets, especially in the face V•," their fluctuating nature, created
specie, challenges f 1.-,,e commur-sts. TIhe most easily obtainable and and
first tapped support from all the population areas was money. The next
source of support was food or materials valuable in the war effort. These
goods were of great importance in reducing the demands on the trans-
portation system that was funnelling supplies from the North. "Taxes" in
;,,oney and kind were assessed in "liberated" areas and areas that were only
temporarily in communist control or threatened by communist attacks. In
those areas, percentages of harvests were exacted as well as percentages of
aid received from the government or the US. Thus, for instance, a ccrtain
portion of cement provided for a village irrigation system might be hanued
over to communist "tax officials" for use in tunnelling operations.
Secure villages could serve as centers for communist forces,
especially the guerrilla units of the PLAF. The activities of the village
were a vital camouflage for guerrilla operations, and the peasants could
aid the guerrillas through building booby-traps arid providing storage areasl
for arms and other requisite supplies.
The dependable population could also serve as a vital link between the
guerrilla forces and the isolated garrisons of the South Vietnamese govern-
ment troops who were willing to "buy" immunity from attack. Through the
peasants, the government forces could provide a regular supply of ammuni-
Stions and arms o t.he co,-kunists.
These services were of course limited in scope and were appropriate

for met.ting the demands of small units, especially guev'rilla units. They
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THE BDM CORPORATION
were far less effective in maintaining and supporting the needs of large
units of the North Vietnamese Army after they began to appear in the South
in late 1964.
Mobilizing communist fighting forces in the South proved to be a
difficult task from the outset. In 1954, the anti-colonialism and unifica-
tion themes voiced oy the DRV had little appeal in the South where the
Party organization was compaoative&y weak and where the new status under
Ngo Dinh Diem, and ostensibly Bao Dai, seemed an improvement over Japanase
and French occupation. The ranks of the ccmmunist guerrilla and political
cadres were reduced substantially by Diem's anti-VC campaigns, although
many of the non-communists among the former Viet Minh might have allied
themselves with the Diem governirent had it been more selective in targeting
the Viet Minh.52/ By 1955, all of the Viet Minh were called the Viet Cong,
-egardless of the actual political inclinations of the men who had fought
against the French.
The combination of attrition from Diem'3 anti-VC eftorts and the
endemic shortage of skilled, technically trained cadres, and company and

battalion-level leaders, caused the Lao Cong Party's Central Committee to
take steps to augment the Southern cadres. Ne,,. y hall' o7 the estimatei
90,000 regroupees who had gone North in 1954 were i nf•ltrated back to the
South between 1959 and 1964.53/ They often operated in the villages from
which they had migrated, an important factor in establishing th'eir bona
fides and gaining them access to local populace. Many disbanded Binh Xuyen
and Hoa Hao eersunnel joined the communist ranks which seemed to promise
more than did their arch enemy, President Diem. The old Asia-hand, Dennis
J. Duncanson, described a key feature that mrde it possible for the
communists to enlist the support of entire villages without disrupting the
everyday lives of their new adherents: "...the essential feature of the L
Viet Cong adaptation of the revolutionary method was that they did not set
up a zone apart from government te,"ritory this time; as 3 result,
supporting them entailed no definite and irrevocabls. act like taking to the
hills 'to join the resistance'."54/ In this fashion, the villager could
play both sides of the street. he did not appoa-r to oppose the government,
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THE BDM CORPORATION
while at the same time he avoided the enmity or reprisal of the communists.
Later, when the fighting became widespread, his choices were generally
Himited to choosing one side or the other.
From 1961 to 1964, the NLF recruiting cadres coerced, or shamed, young
men to join their ranks. The GVN recruiting drives became more difficult
in 1964; the NLF cadres offered the same limited three-year period of
obligated service that was offered by the government. "Finally, since
1965 -- sporadically in earlier years -- the Viet Cong have secured
recruits by pressgangirig, thoee already tied to the guerrilla force having
no compunction about visiting the same fate on others in a midnight swoop
on an adjacent village."555/
As the nature and tempo of operations increased in the South, the
Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) was reestablished. That office had
succeeded the Nam Bo (South Vietnam) Regional Committee in 1951, and direc
ted Southcrn operations until it disbanded at the end of the first Indo-
china War. The new COSVN directed the mobilization of materiel and
personnel and the overt and clandestine operations throughout RVN.r_6/ In
performing these tasks, COSVN used a wide range of separate para-military
and political-civilian elements. For example, the guerrilla popular army,
a group of organizatior.s "'tied to the village or hamlet area and directly
controlled by the lcal party chapter," and groups from the Central
Research Agencies," an intelligence and secret policy organization well
versed in the use of terrorism" participated in the unconventional side of
the war.57/
By 1964, in conjunction with the December 1963 Lao Deng Party decision
to expand political and military activities in the South, a cor•prehensive
party-conceived insurgent offensive was underway. A plan drafted by the
Kien Giang provirce party committee for August, September and October 1965,
demonstrates the intended direction of insurgent actions in the South.
(1) The development of heightened ideological convictions
among party members, soldiers, and the civil popula-
tion.
(2) The conduct of attrition against the enemy to destroy
hs military forces and "New Rural Life Hamlet," com-
bined with the building of insurgent combat villages
and the expansion of t0e insurgent base area.
4-21
THE BDM CORPORATION
(3) The intensification of political struggle to be imple-

mented via civil mass organizations and to in,.lude,
"each month at least twenty minor incidents, including
terrori sin."
(4) Utilizing the dependents of soldiers in the ranks of
the insurgent 3rmed forces to carry out military prose-
iytizing to penetrate hostile security units and break
morale.
(5) The building up of the insurgents' military forces, the

recruitment of youths, and the thwarting of the con-
scription policies of the Republic of Vietnam.
(6) The strengthening of insurgent rural areas, the sale of
troop support bonds, improved security, the protection
of crops, personal economy, and the frustration of
American economic policies.58/
It was intended that such activity would lead to the full mobilization of
the South, occurrinq initially in the countryside and then in the cities.
This was called the General Offensive - General Uprising.
In accomplishing this task, the Vietnamese Communist forces employed a
range of techniques including the use of repression, propaganda dissemi-
nation, and proselytizing designed to persuade, and coerce the masses in
the South to support their goals. Table 4-5 presents the spectrum of tech-
niques used to accomp,'ish this purpose. The idea of the "people's war"
entailed eliciting peasant support for the war effort by presenting the
communist objectives so that they appeared to be a nationalistic redistri-
bution of money and power. The ideological concepts behind the strategy of I.
'people's war' were enfovced with constant propaganda and terrorism. Acts
of terror or repression were focused on anyone or any system that might
dissuade the village from assisting the communist forces. Terrorism was
directed especially at teachers, leaders on all levels, social workers, and
all government employees. The communist cadres worked to pull the peasant
into greater party involvement by intensive indoctrination and by
recruiting him into various local party orgdnizations (e.g., Lberation
Labor Association, Liberation Women's Association, Liberation Fai'mer Associ-
ation, Liberation Youth Association, South Vietnam Vanguard Youth, High
School and University Liberation Student Associations.59/). These associa-
tions and other similar interest groups enabled the Vietnamese Communists
4-22
iI.
THE BDM CORPORATION
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-23
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THE BDM CORPORATION
to concentrate their indoctrination activities in order to eliminate any

popular opposition to the communist party. Guenter Lewy, in his book
America in Vietnam, points out that VC qiolence was directed against the
best and the worst government officials, the former to weaken the GVN and
the latter to appear like Robin Hood to the peasants suffering under those
corrupt officials.60/ Others describe communist coercion in these terms::
When the populace of an area is under the disciplined con-
trol of the pai-ty, it is expected to repay its "liberators,"
not merely with sympathy, but with positive support in the
form of food, shelter, intelligence, work parties, and sons
for the army.61/
Often, the Party would set terrorism quotas for local

cardres to fuifill, literally demanding a certain number of
warnings, incidents .,nd executions. Anyone connected with
local, district or state leaderships, any officers of his
family, and any other person suspected of operating against
the interests of the Party, was to be punished. Indictment
by a local cadre was a guilty sentence, because innocence
was rarely a part of the judicial system.62/
In addition to the use of terror to exact support from the popul.tion
of the South, the communists conducted political indoctrination of the
masses and recruitment of .young people who could serve as new cadres or
guerrillas. The methods of recruitment employed by the PRP cadres ranged
from persuasive to coercive. Three basic recruitment systems were used and A
Table 4-6 illustýrates the variety of techniques available to the communist
forces.63/ Recruitment of new cadres was a seric-Js requirement to the
continuation of the war and often the Party assigned quotas of recruits to
the communist cadres.
In spite of the extensive organization of the communist insurgent
offensive in the South, there is evidence that COSVN and later the PRP had
encountered serious problems in the pursuit of the communist goals. This
information is gathered from examination of such reports as the CRIMP
document, speeches delivered by North Viatnamese officials, and captured
cadre notebooks and interrogation reports. The principal problems addres-
sed were the following: 64/
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THE BDM CORPORATION
TABLE 4-6. COMMUNIST RECRUITING METHODS 65/
COMMUNIST RECRUITING METHODS
PERSUASIVE METHODS
1. NATIONALISM THE GYN IS A US LACKEY
2. REVENGE THE RICH URBANITES, LANDOWNERS AND
FOREIGNERS WERE PORTRAYED AS DENYING TO
THE PEASANTS LIVELIHOOD AND LEGITIMATE
RIGHTS TO ADVANCEMENT
3. GROUP PRESSURE EVERYONE IS DOING IT, HOW CAN YOU REFUSE-
4. ADVANCEMENT HELP THE PARTY AND THE NEW SYSTEM WILL
REGARD YOU WITH EQUALITY.
5. MATERIAL ENVY WITH COMMUNISM THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WILL
HAVE TECHNOLOGICAL AND MATERIAL ADVANCE-
MENT, LIKE THE REST OF THE WORLD.
6. FAMILY PRESSURE (TO THE PARENTS OF THE POTENTIAL RECRUIT)
IN RETURN FOR LAND, YOUR SONS MUST FIGHT
FOR THE CAUSE.
THE VOLUNTEER
1. FAMILY ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE FAMILY JOINLD AND HE
IS FOLLOWING SUIT.
2. PROPAGANDA PERSONAL AND MEDIA PROMISES ARE BELIEV"Fn
3. GVN ERRORS ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE GVN ARE SAID TO BE
ILLOGICAL OR TO HAVE BACKFIRFD
IMPRESSMENT i
1. KIDNAPPING
2. SELECTIVE ASSASSINATION
(SELF EXPLANATORY)
3. EXTORTION
4. COERCION
4-25
THE BDM CORPORATION
All
* Insu~fficient number of new recruits and inadequate civililal
proselytizing
* Shortcomings of -ndividual cadre members
* Low morale among guerrilla/cadre forces
0 Economic problems
* 'Loose' leadership of Party chapter committee members
* Adverse impacts on communist activities from Allied presence in
the South.
Vietnamese Communist failures to meet specific recruitment quotas were
a matter of serious concern to the Party by 1967. Further, US military
analysts were noting a drop in country-wide recruits in mid-1967. In order
to compensate for this reduction, a trend was noted toward the introduction
of North Vietnamese troops as replacements in VC units which formerly were
manned by Southerners. In complating reporting requirements on the status
of local recruiting efforts, "ietnamese Communist province headquarters
noted that many districts were failing to meet recruitment t&sks.
The cadre's civilian proselytizing efforts were also subject to criti-
cism. In the mid-to-late 1960s, there was criticism of the cadre's
apprvach to and attitude toward his work.
*he fact was that the civilian proselytizing task has not
been properly carried out yet. Poor organization was not as
prejudicial as the cadres' dissociation from the masses and
the cadres' lofty and imperial attitude toward them.66/
On another occasion the notebook of a communist recruiter revealed that the
cadre had been criticized for failing to recognize the true importance of
the proselytizing operation to the larger Party goal. Emphasizing the
requirement for the simultaneous advance of the political and military
communist arms in the South, civilian proselytiziig was "an important and
indispensable operation in South Vietnam."67/ Thus, the shortcomings of
individual cadre members and their inability to relate to the masses became
3 serinus threat to the overall mobilization effort of which political
mobilization was a part.
Guerrilla and cadre force morale were of concern to the Party leaders.
Desertion among guerrilla units was a constant problem. Poor morale ind
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THE BDM CORPORATION
desertion resulted in "fear of hardships, sacrifice, air and artillery

fire, and protracted war, and the fear of dying without seeing their loved
ones..."68/ The communist explanation for those individuals who had become
fearful of sacrifices and who were demoralized was to identify them as
having 'rightist and passive tendencies'. Further it was noted that some
insurgents had become too individualistic, by placing their own interests
above those of the Party ana Revolution. 699/
Not only were the communists beset with manpower problems, but there
were cunsiderable fiscal, food and supply concerns that had to be faced
particularly in the 1966-1968 period and after the 1968 Tet offensive.
With the increase in Allied activity in South Vietnam, the relocation of
citizens to more secure areas and the flight of people from Allied military
actior, the former communi- . tax base in the South was diminished. It is
also likely that the flight of some nf the people occurred in order to
escape burdensome communist taxation.70/ Related problems include the
adverse effects of the US/GVN military action upon communist food supply,
procurement centers and supply routes. The communists also had difficulty
in recruiting sufficient laborers to maintain their highly labor-intensive
logistical operations in the South. 71/
Closely related to those problems were problems of leadershio. Often
the shortcomings of the guerrillas and cadres were attributed to inade-
quate, "loose" leadership of the Party Committee authorities. "In many
municipalities and provincial towns, Party Comiittee authorities did not
pay enough attention to the assignment of cadres responsible for providing
leadership to the people's movement in support of the general offensive-
general uprising."72/ In a speech attributed to the late North Vietnamese
Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, head of COSVN between 1965 and 1967, the
importance of good leadership is stressed.
Combat activities are efficient whenever and wherever there
is the presence of the Party Chapter Committee members.
Guerrilla forces are in need of leadership. Therefore, the
Party Chapter committee members must be in close coordina-
tion with the guerrillas. In some localities, 95% of the
guerrillas have proven inefficient. This is due to the lack
of leadership of the Party Chapter Committee members.73/
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Finally, the Allied military presence posed many problems for the
Vietnamese Communists. There are numerous references in the captured
communist documents to Party members' lack of ielf-confidence and tenden-
cies to overestimate the enemy in the face of the US economic, military and
technological might. 74/
E. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY -- INSIGHTS
From the beginning of the war, the Vietnamese Communists saw their
struggle as a unified effort, geographically, militarily, and politically.
It was a struggle for coitrol of the population more than for territory and
wateripl. Organization of, and coordination between, the various segments
of the overall struggle were considered extremely important, and refine-
ments of organizational and psychological techniques, tested under fire
against the French, were continuously and successfully executed.
Psychological warfare was aimed at maintaining and strengthening
resolve in the North and improving and sreading support in the South. The
American bombing of the North aided the tormer. Careful organization, a
persuasion campaign backed by coercion, and the advantages conferred by the
'home court' (at least vis a vis the Americans) aidid the latter.
Personnel mobilizaLion was accomplished with remarkable effectiveness
by the Lao Dong Party apparatus, despite American bombing in the North and
almost insuperable odds in the South. Their success appeirs to stem from
their extraordinary organizational efficiency and the fact that their
cadres included a high percentage of loyal, dedicated, and extremely
competent middle-grade leaders and technicians. Of equal importance, was
their ability to "capcure" the nationalist cause, a factor that mobilized
substantial international support in their behalf in addition to its appeal
to the rank and file Vietnamese, both North and South, particularly after
the introduction of American ground combat forces.
The V'ietnamese Communist leadership was able to minimize the damage
done to their industrial and agricultural mobilization capabilities by the
American bombing, though Linebacker II in particular inflicted significant
4-28
THE BDM CORPORATION
setbacks. The decentralized nature of industry anj war-support activities

in an underdeveloped country like North Vietnam mvant that limited bombing
of limited areas could be only partially effective at best. In addition,
the bombing, or thrcat of bombing, accelerated the decentralization of the
North Vietnamese economy and strengthened Party control over the country.
Further, supplies that were lost in the bombings were largely replaced by
imports from the USSR and PRC, and new transportation and communication
lines had already been developed or were established during bombing halts.
Thus, while the bombing did unquestiona;ble damage, it did not prove to be
the coup de grace, militarily or psychologicalIly, that had been hoped for
or predicted.
Thus, though it suffered reverses in both the North and South, the
North Vietnamese mobilization effort remained organized and flexible on its
many fronts.
F. LESSON
The keys to effective mobilization of popular support in an insurgency

situation lie in. dedicated, intelligent leadership, effective organization
from top to bottom, sound long-range goals, a "platform" that appeals to a
broad segment of the population, and a military strategy that supports and
reinforces political aims. Since neither opponent will be absolutely
effective across the spectrum, tVee one which is relatively more experi-
enced, unified, determined, realistic, and consistent, will be more
successful.
4-29
THE BOM CORPORATION
CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES
1. Vo Nguyen Giap, Banner of People's arL The Partxbs Military Zone

(London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), p. 26, 27.
2. Lynn Montross, War Throutgr the___A•s (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers Publishers,
1946) Revised and enlarged edition, op. 450-458. The author discusses
"France's Levy en Masse" and the triumph of the French Revolution. He
describes August 23, 1793 as one of the most memorable dates in the
chronicles of war when the revolutionary committee on Public Safety
issued a decree announcing universal conscription for the first time
in modern history. The proclamation stated:
The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge weapons
and transport supplies; the women will make tents and serve in the
hospitals; the children will make up old linen into lint; the old men
will have themselves carried into the public squares to rouse the
courage of the fighting men, and to preach hatred of kings and the
unity 3f the Republic. The public buildings shall be turned into
barracks, public squares into munitions factories; the earthen
floors of cellars shall be treated with lye to extract saltpptre. All
suitable firearms shall be turned over to the troops; the interior
shall be policed with fowling pieces and with cold steel. All saddle
horses shall be seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed
in cultivation will draw the artillery and supply wagons. (p. 452)
The French levee en masse is referred to here because it was the first
modern mobilization and therefore provided a model for other nations
faced with the need to mobilize all of their human and material re-
sources. Tne Vietnamese, who were strongly influenced by French cul-
ture and education, could hardly have been unaware of that historic
event and the importance to the'r cause of effective mobilization.
3. Douglas Pike, History of Vietnamese Comminism, 1925-1976, (Stanford,

California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 76.
4. Ibid.
5. Nikolai Lenin, Collected Works, XXVII, pp. 54-55, quoted in Giap, p.

42.
6. Jon M. VanDyke, North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival, (Palo Alto,
California: Pacific Books, Publishers, 1972-, p. 89.
7. Giap, p. 49
8. Van Dyke, p. 79.
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THE BDM CORPORAT!ON
9. Air operations against North Vietnam are presented in Chapter 6, Book

1, Volume VI of this study. "Rolling Thunder," the slow-squeeze
policy, or escalating air campaign, against targets in the North began
in March '1965 and terminated in Octcber 1968. Air Force historian
Bernard C. Nalty "The air war against North Vietnam," The Vietnam War
(N.Y.: Crown Publisher-., Inc., 197S) pp. 88-95 attributes the failure
of Rolling Thunder to underestimation of North Vietnam's determination
aiid overestimiation of their vulnerability, the lack Gf worthwhile
strategic targets, and the US self-imposed restrictions against closing
Haiphong and other ports and severing the rail links with China. In
this sense, the North was not subject to destruction until 1972 when
the "Linebacker I and II" iir campaigns were initiated.
l1. In 1954, when an estimated 90,000 Viet Minh fighting men (regroupees)
left South Vietnam to resettle in the North, some 5,G00 to 10,000
hard-core political cadre and guerrillas remained in the South. These
staybehinds were decimated by Ngo Dinh Diem's anti-VC camipaigns by
1959. Their political and military ranks had to be augmented to
reconstitute an effective politico-military capibility. Accordingly,
the DRV directed the infiltration to South Vietnam of about. half of the
re-groupees, an effort that spanned the years 1959-1954. Also, see
Endnote 6, Chapter 1 and Chapter 5.
11. it estimated that in 1972, only 20 percent of the NLF/PLAF forces were
veteran guerrilla fightars. The rest were North Vietnamese troops--many
of them posted to traditional PLAF, units. Thomas C. Thayer, "We
Could Not Win the War of Attrition We Tried to Fight," in The Lessons
of Vietnanm, edo W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzel (N.Y.:
Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 86f. It should be noted that Quang Tri is
not presented as a representative province, only as an illustration of
the changing nature of the communist presence in South Vietnam.
12. Interrogation of Le Van Thanh, Viet Cong signal platoon leader who
stated that the DRY began enforcing the Military Service Law in 1959.
This was a compulsory military service program for all able-bodied
males from 16 to 45 years of age. DOS Historian, Item No. 84.
13. Area handbook for North Vietnam, 1967, pp. 409-410. L

14. Military Balance, The Institute for Strategic Studies. (London: Adlard
and Son Ltd, 1970), pp. 69-70.
15. LTC Lance J. Burton, USA, North Vietnam's Military Logistics System:
Its Contribution to the War, 1961-1969, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US
Army Command and General Staff College, 1977), pp. 27-39. Burton's
statistics, drawn from RAC Technical Paper TP-251 and Smith, Area
Handbook for North Vietnam, differ slightly from those shown iTn•this
text. He shows a total population for the North, Circa 1966, at 17
million with an annual growth of 350,000 of whom 150,000 would be
eligible for induction. This would enable the DRV to send 90,000 men
South each year.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
16. Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American
Militar Policy in Viet Nam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 19751, pp 121-122, points out that a DOD analysis of engagements
in 1966 concluded that it was the enemy who chose to engage US forces
in 80 percent of the cases. A similar statistic was used by a USAID
official (and former US Army advisor in Vietnam) John Paul Vann, in a
seminar at lhe University Denver on 27 and 28 November 1967, but he
put it in a different way - 80 percent of the enemy's casualties re-
sulted from actions they initiated against US forces. Contained in
Prof. Vincent Davis's tapes, made available to bJM for purposes of
this study. Also see Thayer, p. 86F.
17. It was not until after Tet 1968 that US field operations began to
focus on population security rather than "search and destroy" operations
that were essentially attrition-oriented.
18. John Gerassi, "U.S. Bombs Cannot Demoralize the Vietnamese People,"
They Have Been in North Vie'-.am (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1968), p. 112, a US journalist and professor of social science,
New York University, made a two-week visit to North Vietnam. This
article, while obviously communist-inspired propoganda, includes a
statement that appears to be reasonably accurate, "'4ith every bomb
dropped on Viet Nam, the Vietnamese people, already firmly dedicated
to fight any and all aggressions - as they have done for centuries
-become firmer and even more dedicated."
A Senate staff study concluded that the North Vietnamese were successful
in using the bombing issue to extract larger commitments of economic,
military and financial assistance from the Russians and Chinese. In
addition, some 33,000 factory workers and 48,000 women were made a-
vailable for work on roads and bridges in the countryside because of
the destruction of industry and evacuation from cities. Bombing as a
Policy Tool in Vietnam: Effectiveness. A staff study based on The
Pentagon Papers...for the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), October 12,
1972, pp. 6,9.
19. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 316 Vols., (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1945-47) provides an assessment of allied
bombing during World War II. The survey provides data which in some
cases suggests that allied air power was decisive and in other cases
indicates that German industrial production increased during the war
until overrun on the ground. See Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor,
pp. 162-163 (notes).
20. US Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. Parl 1, 90th Cong.,
Ist sess., August 9 and 10, 1967 (WashfiTn -D. C.: US Government
Printing Office, 1967), p. 6. Hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings.
4-32
THE BDM CORPORATION
21. Van Dyke, p. 9'.

22. Ibid., pp. 95-96. Also see endnote 18.
23. Ibid., p. 96.
24. Oleg Hoeffding, Bombing North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic and

Political Effects, Memorandum RM-5213-l-ISA. (Santa Monica, California:
The Rand Corporation, 1966). pp. 16.
25. Van Dyke, p. 98.

26. Ibid., p. 177. A
27. Wilfred Burchett, "The Vietnam War: Past, Present, Future," New World
Review, Spring, 1968, p. 5. Harvard Professor Alexander B. Woodside
Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1976), pp. 251-260 provides an intcres'cing discussion of the
origin and evolution of the cooperatives in North Vietnam. He reports
that by the end of 1968, 95 percent of all farm families in the North
had become members of cooperatives with 80% of the 22,360 farm coopera-
tives considered to be "high category" or fully socialistic. (p. 251).
28. See Chapter 8, Book 2, Volume VI for a mare detailed discussion of air
operations against the DRV. One of the more readable and well
illustrated books on this subject is Carl Berger, ed. The United
States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1951-1973 (Washington: Office of
Air Force History, 1977).
29. Raising GVN morale and dissuading the DRV's aggression were cited by
Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor and Deputy Ambassader U. Alexis Johnson
ab the principal reasons for their recommending air strikes against
the North. Interrupting the Southward flow of men and stpplies ranked
third in priority. Interviews with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson
September 13, 1978 and January 9, 1979 at BDM and with General (former
Ambassador) Maxwell D. Taylor July 11, 1979, by BDM analysts at General
Taylor's home in Washington, D. C.
30. Burchett, p. 6.
31. Van Dyke, p. 164.
32. Burchett, p. 5. Also see Statistisckes Bundesamt, North-Wietnam 1973

(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1973), p. 5, which shows that important
industrial installations were moved to the countryside and some of the
urban population was also relocated. Translated at BDM by Dr. John
Tashjean. Also Woodside, pp. 260-267, describes the origins in 1955
of North Vietnam's industrialization drive. He states, "Nothing
distinquishas northern Vietnam more from its neighboring Southeast
Asian states than its intense dedication to the goal of industriali-
zation..." (p. 261)
4-33
)
, THE BDM CORPORAIION
33. Hoeffdiig, pp. 16-17.
34. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

35. General John W. Vogt, USAF (Ret), comment during BDM Senior Review
Panel meeting on Volume I, Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in
Vietnam, February 13, 1979. General Vogt served in a variety of
positions during the Vietnam War, on the DOD and NSC staffs, as J-3
and Director of The Joint Staff and finally as DEPCOMUSMACV and Commander
7th Air Force. In response to the question, "Did air action impact on
their ability to mobilize troops and fight a war?" General Vogt commented
that (During Rolling Thunder) the North Vietnamese "...weren't as,
vulnerable as we thought." He added that they were not sophisticated
at that time, but had become very sophisticated, and therefore more
vulnerable, by the time Linebacker I was launched in May 1972.
36. General William W. Momyer, USAF (Ret.) Airpower in Three Wars (Washington:
Department of The Air Force, 1978), pp 1 i8-125.-
37. Senate Hearing•, p. 25.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 257.
40. Ibid., p. 163.
41. General Vogt, then DEPCOMUS and Commander 7th Air Force, stated that
the GVN leadership needed assurances that the US would place -nctions
on the North. SRP Tape 4.
42. Senate Hearings, p. 258.
43. During President Johnson's tenure the final decision on target selectinn
and sortie numbers was made by The President at the weekly Tuesday
luncheon attended by The Secretaries of State and Uefense, the Presiden-
tial Assistant (Walt Rostow) and the Press Secretary. Described in
Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, §trategy for Defeat (San Rafael, Calif.:
Presidio Press, 1978). pp. 86-87.
45. Ibid.
46. Senate Hearings, pp. 253-254.

48. The DRV publicized the capture of several American airmen and paraded
them through the streets of Hanoi, probably as much to bolster North
Vietnamese morale as to provide evidence of US air attacks The
4-34
THE BDM CORPORATION
leadership treatened to try captured pilots as war criminals. After

considerable US and international pressure, Ho Chi Minh, responding to
questions submitted by a representative of The Columbia Broadcasting
System, stated that there was "... no trial in view." New York Times
25 July 1966, p. 1. Thereafter, the prospects of such war crim*s
trials subsided.
49. Dennis J. Ouncansun Government and Revolution in Vietnam (London:

Oxford University Press, 1968) Issued undci the auspices of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, pp. 391-302.
50. Ibid., p. 302.
51. Dennis J. Duncanson, "How--and Why - The Viet Cong Holds Out," in
Vietnav.: Anatomy of a Conflict, ed. Wesley R. Fishel, (Itasca, Illinois:
F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 427-428.
52. Bernard B. Fall Viet-Nain Witness 1953-66 (New York. Fraderick A.

raeger, Publishers, 1966), pp. 137-T39-provides a scathing analysis
of American foreign policy vis a vis Vietnam for the yeers 1954 to
1966 and points out that President Diem's police state methods drove
anyone disagreeing with his policies into self-imposed exile, total
silence, or armed resistance.
53. United States - K,.etnam Relations 1945-1967 (Washington, 0. C.: Depart-
ment of Defense (GOý, 1971), Book 2.of 12, (Pentagon Papers). Part II
Section A. 5. Tab 3 p. 36.
54. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam p. 297.
55. Ibid., p. 298.
56. Albert E. Palmer-lee, "The Central Office of South Vietnam" Vietnam

Documents and Research Notes, Document No. 40, August 1968.
57. Michael
Vietnam: Charles
A StudyConley, The Communist
of Orgn-nization Insurgent Infrastructure
and Strategy. in South
Processed for Defense
Documentation Center, Defense Supply Agency. (Washington, D.C.:
American University, 1967), p. 163.
58. Ibid., p. 169.
59. Douglas Pike, The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror (Monograph prepared in
"Saigon for the Un ed States Mission, Vietnam, February 1970). pp.
18-20, 25-35, describes the use of systematic terror by the communists.
60. Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press,
1978), p. 273.
61. Hammond Rolph, Vietnamese Communism and the Protracted War, (American
Bar Association, 1972), p. 41.
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THE BOM CORPORATION
62. S. T. Hosmer, Viet Con. Repression and its Implications for the Future
(Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books, 1970), p. 15.
63. Figure 4-1 is based on material contained in Pike, The Viet Cong
Strategy of Terror pp. 29-80 and Douglas S. Blaufarb The CouNter-
insurgency Era (London: Collier Mac Millen Publishers-,T7'77,pp
28-74.
64. Based on analysis of captured documents set forth in United States
Mission in Vietnam, "Captured Documents Point to Viet Cong Recruitment
Problems," Mission Press Release, December 21, 1967; The CRIMP Document
"Experience of the Soutlo Viet-Nam Revolutionary Movement During the
Past Several Years," DOS Historian, Item 301.
65. Figure 4-6 is ba-ed on material contained in Pike, Viet Cong

(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp 109-194; and Blaufarb,
pp. 28-74.
66. Translation of a notebook belonging to a COSVN cadre captured by
elements of the US 101st Airborne Division in January 1967, apparently
based on a speech given by the late North Vietnamese Senior General
Nguyen Chi Thanh, head of COSVN 1965-1967. DOS Historian, Item 65.
67. Interrogation of a Viet Cong recruiter who was captured by ARVN forces
in 1964 in Hau Nghia Province, DOS Historian, Item 37, p. 3.
68. COSVN Unit H 207 "Report The Status of Deserters" April 1969. Vietnam
Documents and Research Notes. "It Is Better to Return Home and'Cultivate
the Land Than to Join the Revolutionary Army." Document No. 56-57, p. 3.
69. Translation of a document capured by elements of III MAF in July 1966

in Quang Tri Province, DOS Historian, Item 66, p.3.
70. Viet Cong Economic Problems. A compilation of selected data., February
1968, p. 1. DOS Historian.
71. Ibid.
72. Captured document, author unknown, which provides the orthodox theore-
tical basis for instructions for coordinating the politico-military
struggle. Documents and Research Notes, "The -)rocesses of Revolution
and the General Uprising," October 1968. DOS Historian, Document 45.
73. Translation, DOS Historian, Item 65.

74. Translation, DOS Historian, Item 66.
4-36
,,,AF BDM CORPORATION
CHAPTER 5
BASES, SANCTUARIES AND LOC
There is general agreement with the JCS statement, "The

enemy, by the type action he adopts, has the predomi-
nant share in determining enemy attrition rates."
Three fourths of the battles are at the enemy's choice
of time, place, type and duration.... With his safe
havens in Laos and Cambodia and with carefully chosen
tactics, the enemy has been able during the last four
years to double his combat forces, double the level of
infiltration and increase the scale and intensity of
the main force war even while bearing heavy casualties.
National Security Study Memorandum 1
February 1969
A. INTRODUCTION
Int.:.ired by Ho Chi Minh and led by General Vo Nguyan Giap, the Viet
Minh survived Japanese occupation in World War II and defeated and evicted
the French colo;iialists. Subsequently, the Communist Vietnamese leadership
outlasted AmJerica's eight-year effort in Southeast Asia, and finally re-
united Vietnam .y force of arms. A major factor contributing to their
success was the remarkable logistical support structure they created in an
integrated networyA of bases, sanctuaries and lines of communication.
Indeed, the san,.tujaries gave them a trump card that enabled them to fight a
protracted war and outlast the United States' commitment to the Republic
of Vietnam.
Logistical management by the North Vietnamese proved to be one of the
keys to their success against the French and the Americans. After US with-
drawal from Vietnam, the bases and sanctuaries that Giap had established
during the war gave the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces a superior
geostrategic position which enabled them to defeat the South Vietnamese
mil1 tary foGrces,
5-1
- -. . .. ...---- . , .• .:.• ,.. .' 4i

THE BDM CORPORATION
B. EVOLUTION OF THE VIET MINH LOGISTICAL STRUCTURES
1. The World War II Years

The Viet Minh guerrilla forces commanded by Giap during World War
II conducted some anti-Japanese operations and prcvidad valuable intelli-
gence services `rr the US and allies. The Viet Minh also assisted downed
allied aviators to evade the Japanese and facilitated their return to
friendly areas. For that assistance the US parachuted in small quantities
of food, arms, and ammunition, funnelhng its support through OSS detach-
ments in Indochina.
In their battles against the Japanese the Viet Minh established
themselves in secure "liberated" areas. One of the principal strongholds
for Giap's forces was created in the Viet Bac Autonomous Region, in the
northern highlands. By 1944 Viet Bac had been well organized as a training
and operating base.l/ (See Map 5-I on page 5-6) Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van
Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap were associated with a second major base area
near Cao Bang.2/ Operations against the Japanese were directed from that
headquarters; later, the Viet Bac Autoncmous Region served as the main
communist bastion in their war to oust the French.
At the time the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed in
August 1945, Vietnamese armed forces were reported to number about 40,000,
with sufficient weapons to arm 75% of the force.3/ Most of those weapons
had been captured from the Japanese earlier in the war and not gratuitously
provided by the Japanese after they disarmed the Vichy French in Indochina
during March 1945 as some claim.4/ Other stores had been bought from the
Nationalist Chinese.5/ During the next three years some arms were shipped
in from Thailand and the Philippines.
2. The First Indochina War
Open warfare broke out between the French and the Viet Minh in
1946. Initially the Viet Minh lacked outside help and it became necessary
for them to develop a rudimentary system for producing weapons and ammuni-
tion.
5-2
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THE BDM CORPORATION
a. Viet Minh Factories

Small factories were established in "liLtrated" areas, each
employing up to 500 men to turn out small arms, cartridges, rocket
launchers, grenades, and mines. In contested areas smaller shops were set
up to meet local needs. Those small shops generally were manned only by 10
to 15 men who relied mainly on manpower, although occasionally they were
equipped with an old automobile engine or similar power source. Their
limited assets made it easy for them to relocate and avoid advancing French
forces. Working with primitive equipment in small, scattered shops through-
out the country the Vietnamese were able to produce astonishing an:ounts of
arms and ammunition The shops in one intersector reportedly produced
within six months, 38,000 grenades, 30,000 rifle cartridges, 8,000
cartridges for light machine guns, 60 rounds for a bazooka (rocket
;auncher) and 100 mines.6/
Ro!tket launchers were manufactured solely in Tonkin, where
the heaviest fighting took place. Factorics in thf Snmth, mainly in the
Plaine des Joncs and near Ampil, Cambodia, produced grenades and mines for
use against the French in guerril'ia attacks and ambushes. The Viet Minh
also established a prica list reflecting the bounties in national land that
they would pay for weapons, ammunition, and other military stores.
b. Gaining Chinese 5upport
Beginnii. 9 in January 1950, Viet Minh and French battalions
fought each other for control of the French border posts abutting the
People's Republic of China. The Vietnamese opened their campaign in the
northwest near the Red River and spread eastward along the frontier. Four
Viet Minh battalions which had been training at Ching-hsi in China,

departed their sanctuary and converged on a French battalion-sized outpost
near Cao Bang. The French lost that post for two days in May; they lost it
permanently five months later. The struggle for the border posts ended in
October 1950, leaving the Viet Minh in control of most of the northern half
of North Vietnam.7/ The DRV had gained direct access to PRC logistics
support, which began as a trickle of only 10-20 tons per month in 1950 and
increased to about 4,000 tons per month in 1954.8/ It is important to note
5-3
THE BDM CORPORATION
that the PRC had been existence for only a few months when their s,,,oly
support to the DRV b 4 a,. -- before PRC entry into the Korean War.
c. Early Supply Transport
Chinese deliveries generally stopped at border stations,
requiring the Viet Minh to provide on-going transportation. Clearly their
vehicular inventory was insufficient to move the massive tonnages required.
Accordingly., the high command organized 2n "auxiliary service" comprised of
coolies to man-pack supplies from storage areas to forward supply duri,• or
troop units.
Thi coolies were essentially a local labor forca o±rtatin,;
within prescribed geographical areas. Auxiliary service companies were re-
sponsive to orders only from the General Staff, the General Directorate of
Food, interzone commands, and other high eci~elons.9/ Figure 5-1 depicts
the organization ..nd prescribed movement tables for the coolie units.
Fifteen-man groups of supply coolie, could move virtually
undetected through the hinterland, successfully avoiding attacks by the
Fench Air Force. The coolies' journeys began near Lang Son and Cao Bang
in the no-theast and occasionally at Lao Cai cr Ban Nam Coum in the north-
west.' Map 5-1. Supplies entering from the northeast usually moved
southward throucd; Bac Kan to Thai Nguyen and then west to the Viet Minh
redoubts, skirting the French-held Red River delta. Vast *iuarntities of
Amer'l, .i guns and equipment captured by the Chinese Communists from the
Chinese Nationalist forces entered North Vietnam in that way. The contra-
band was then carried, pushed or pulled and sometimes driven along back
country trails, foot paths, and dirt roads unti 7 it reached supply dumps in
the liberated areas of North Vietnam.
The French Air Force intermittently attempted-to interdict
Vie- Minh supply efforts, principally by bombing bridges and by armed
reconnaissance strikes along lines of communication Their aircraft wei'e
hard pressed to find and attack the i5-man groups oa coolies that padded
through familiar terrain. Damaging or destroying bridges also failed to
interrupt the logistics flow. Underwater bridges were constructed to span
water barriers, or bamboo rafts were concealed near river banks so that the
5-4
I,
THE BDM CORPCRATION
AUXILIARY SERVICE
(PRIOR TO 1953)
AUXILIARY SERVWCE"
GECTIONSETOSCIN
3 SECTIONS PER COMPANY

3 GROUPS FPR SECTION
15 COOUES PER GROUP
APPROXIMATLEY 140 MEN PER CO.
TYPICAL VIETMINH PORTER (COOLIE)

TRANSPORT COMPANY
MILES
TYPE PER 24HR WEIGHT SUPPLY
CONVEYANCE TERRAIN PERIOD CARRIED MOVED
COOLIE PLUINS.LEVEL 15.5 DAY 56 LBS RICE

LAND.MINIMAL 12-4 NIGHT 33 TO 44 LBS ARMS
___________________________ OBSTACLES ____________ ________________________
COOLIE MOUNTAINS 9 DAY 28.6 LBS RICE

7.5 NIGHT 22 TO 33 LBS ARMS
"BUFFALO CART AREAS

ALL PASSABLE 1.1ARMS, 7.5 770 LBS RICE &
-HORSE CART ALL PASSABLE 12.4 "4,73 L.BS RICE &

AREAS ARMS ¼
"BASED ON GEORGE K. TANHAM. COMMUNIST REV.OLUTIONARY WARFAR
PP W970.
4541/17&W
Figure 5-1. Auxiliary Service and Movement Tables
55-
- 2-
... • .' ., . : • ,.• 2

II
aF OEMNACAIN ING
Mae
Ma
4541176W~~~~~~~VE-. Ve ihSpl otSA15-15C
J
5-6
'*Tift
- "
r THE BDM CORPORATION
coolies could move without interruption. Supplies were moved from sector
to sector with little difficulty. It should be noted that 2,000 miles to
the northeast, Chinese and North Korean forces were using identical means
in another war; and they,, too, successfully countered an aerial interdic-
tion effort aimed at their rear area.
d. Origin of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
Viet Minh forces operated througho,' the country, with the
major clashes taking place in the Red River Delta in the North ani the
Mekong Delta in tha South. Providing replacements, arms, and ammunition to
their units in South Vietnam (Cochin China) presented a unique challenge at
the outset. Movement by sea was difficult because Frerich naval activity
denied them effective use of coastal waters and French ground forces con-
trolled most of the coastal highway. The alternative was to make use of
back country paths, trails, and dirt roads in eastern Laos and Cambodia.
By adopting that alternative the Viet Minh were able to provide some logis-
tical support to their southern cadres and to establish en important degree
of control over strategically important areas in Laos and Cambodia. Those
areas soon became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 12/
The Ho Chi Minh Trail remained a primitive transportation
system throughout the Viet Minh War, but it was adequate to meet the needs
of the insurgency. Small-sized troop replacement units made the 50-to-lOO-
day journey south on foot, woile coolies walked supply-laciýn bicycles or
drove creaking animal carts down separate narrow paths. Former ARVN Major
General Nguyen Duy Hinh described the foot path system as having kept the
Viet Minh resistance in South Vietnam alive with fresh troops, weapons and
ammunition.13/ The Trail network provided the Viet Minh with the following
advantages:
0 The needed courier routes were established in safe areas
. The logisti'cal linkage between PAVN and VC was created
* The insurgency in South Vietnam received essential support
0 The logistical concept was tried and proven successful
* The physical structure of the Trail network was established
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THE BOM CORPORATION
* The North Vietnamese domination of parts of Laos and Cambodia was

cementod.
3. Dien Bien Phu
The decisive siege of Dien Bien Phu ended on May 8, 1954. That
brief campaign illustrated the remarkable logistical system whith Giap had
engineered. Four Viet Minh divisions were committed in that battle, sup-
ported by over 70,000 Vietnamese coolies of the auxiliary service and at
least 20,000 Chinese army personnel.14/ A 30-mile long road was carved
mainly by coolie labor through the hills from Tuan Giao to heights over-'
looking the 15,000-man French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. American artil-
lery pieces that had been captured in Korea were hauled along the new road
and placed in firing positions bearing directly on the French defenses.
Coolies carried food and ammunition to the Viet Minh fighters in sufficient
quantities to sustain them in their 55-day siege.
While effectively using their own main supply routes, the Viet
Minh struck at the French supply system. Truck con,,oys enroute from the
port of Haiphong to Hanoi were under daily attack, disrupting the major
logistical effort upon which several large units depended. Viet Minh
infiltrators entered Haiphong's Cat Bi airport through the sewage system
and daringly blew up 38 cargo aircraft that were desperately needed to
resupply the remote and gravely threatened frontier post at Dien Bien
Phu. 15/
During late 1953 - early 1954, the official French view showed
the Red River delta to be reasonably secure. The Viet Minh were credited
with controlling only four small pockets south of the Hanoi-Haiphong main
supply route. The French believed, or so they stated publicly, that they
exerted rnor-: than 50% control over about a third of the delta and up to 30%
control over all but the acknowledged Viet Minh pockets of resistance.. The
real situation became apparent when Dien Bien Phu fell and 40,000 Viet Minh
soldiers were freed for an all-out attack on the Hanoi-Haiphong lifeline.
The French quickly abandoned the entire southern part of the delta includ-
ing the Catholic bishoprics of Bui Chu and Phat Diem.l6/ Within two-and-a-
half months North Vietnam belonged to the DRV.
5-8
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1A
THE BrM CORPORATION
4. Significance of Early Viet Minh Logistics

The remarkable ability of the Viet Minh to procure armaments and
distribute them to combat units in significant quantities reflects their
appreciation of the importance of logistics. Reliance on small, mobile
shops to manufacture arms and ammunition to meet specific local needs
throughout Viet Nam attests to their ingenuity and determination.
The Viet Minh moved supplies long distances over rugged terrain
in the face of French aerial reconnaissance and armed attack. That exper-
ience would prove vitally important in the Second Indochina War.
Strategic supply routes from the People's Republic of China were
opened. Soviet trucks appeared in the DRV's inventory in the early 1950s.
They could only have been delivered overland through China, suggesting that
the USSR was at least mildly interested at that time in establishing links
with the North Vietnamese.. The precedents for USSR/PRC military and eco-
nomic aid were established. Within North Vietnan., embryonic logistical
mechanisms for receiving and handling outside support were established, as
were the commo-liaison routes that would be needed later to support the
southern cadres.
I C. CONSOLIDATION 1954-1959
Vo Nguyen Giap has generally been recognized as a master logistician

and a sometimes successful tactician. In his writings, Giap has often
stressed the importance of a strong rear, pointing out that it is always a
decisive factor in revolutiongry warfare.17/ The first step for the newly
victorious Viet Minh after ousting the French was to build the strong rear
they would need later. Outside support was essential, particularly after
the Bao Dai regime in South Vietnamn closed the border to trade.
1. The Chinese Connection
Throughout the Korean War, the Chinese Communist People's Libera-
tion Army had funneled captured American arms back to mainland China and
thence to North Vietnam.18/ That supply relationship continued after the
5-9
THEBDM CORPORATION , ' .
two wars ended, the Korean in July 1953 and the First Indochina War in July
1954. With -%he French gone and Haiphong open to international shipping,
the Chinese were rio longer restricted solely *to road and rail deliveries
through the southern provinces of China. Ships could now offload at berths
in the port, city and Chinese military and economic aid to the DRV increased
steadily during the period.
2. The Soviet Connection
The Lao Dong Party leadership moved toward closer ties with
Moscow in 1957, partly because additional aid was sorely needed to bolster
a weak economy, and partly because the Soviets were far to the north, not
looking over their shoulder as was the case with their Chinese neighbor.
Soviet Marshal Voroshilov visited Hanoi in May 1957. Within a year the
USSR replaced China as the principal source of economic aid.19/
3. Viet Minh Strongholds in RVN
In the South, President Diem undertook a strong anti-Viet Minh
campaign to eliminate a significant threat to his government. Communist
and noncommunist Viet Minh who had stayed behind in 1954 were arrested, and
some were executed. Hardcore communists were driven to take refuge in Viet
Minh strongholds such as the Plain of Reeds, U Minh Forest, and Rung Sat in
the Delta; War Zones C and D north of Saigon; Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh
Provinces; the mountains near Nha Trang; the northern part of Tay Ninh
Province; and smaller scattered -oastal or mountain redoubts.20/ (See Map
5-2).
4. Logistical Preparations for Insurgency
The Viet Minh War ended on July 21, 1954. French and Vietnamese
troops loyal to them together with nearly a million northern refugees
boarded American ships and sailed for Saigon. Most of the Viet Minh
soldiers and their families south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) sailed
north in Polish and French ships.
A hardcore of dedicated Communist Viet Minh remained in the
South. Those elite guerrillas buried large quantities of well-greased Viet
;4inh weapons, ammunition, radios, and other military equipment-- just
5-10
- .:CORPORATION
THAILAND
STRONGHOLD IN
GUANO NGAI PRUVANCE
Qui Nha.
A
CAMBODIA
MAOUNTA:N AREA
NEAR NNA TRANG
Nho Tramn
Casi uAh*
WAR ZONE C WAR ZONED0
OFAIRIEON
TRAINGLE
RUNG !AT
U mI?!HSPECIAL ZONE
o 2 1 750 7 M ia
'/7 W
2'5 50 75
Map 5-2. Viet Minh Strongholds in RVN
1943-1959
5-11
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THE BDM CORPORATION
case they had to fight another day, and just in case the promised 191
elections did not go their way.
The Ho Chi Minh Trail fell into disuise. Except for a few secrt
couriers who might have passed along its tortuous trails between the tv
Vietnams, the trail was abandoned from 1954 until 1959.22/
5. Significance of the Consolidation Period
The DRV acquired substantial military and economic aid from tth
USSR and PRC. A strong rear was being formed. The DRV's repressive popu
lation control efforts, carried out under the guise of land reform, provid
ed them with an obedient population in the North. Unification remained th
principal communist objective, but there does not appear to have been an,
significant logistics support from the DRV to southern cadres in the now
truncated southern branch of Lao Dong Party during the 1954-1959 periol
because the Party program called for political rather than military actiol
in the South. Political and administrative control of the Party mnembershiF
in the South was maintained, however, by the Lao n'ong Party in Hanoi.23/
D. LOGISTICS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRJGGLE (1959-1964)
1. The Fateful DRV Decision

The Lao Dung Party's Central Committee met in Hanoi in May 1959,
and the Politburo approved launching a "People's War" "inthe South t.
topple President Diem and seize the government. The Party had at its
disposal about 90,000 politically indoctrinated former Viet Minh soldiers,
"regroupees", and their families who had chosen to move North in 1954.24/
Regroupees designated to return South to augment and provide
leadership to the "staybehinds" were first sent to special training centers
for further political indoctrination. Following their training, they were
formed into infiltration units and moved into the Republic of Vietnam by
the REar Services Department. An estimate of the magnitude of the infil-
tration during this period is in Table 5-1.
5-12
THE 3DM CORPORATION
TABLE 5-1. PAVN INFILTRATION FROM NOr(H TO SOUTH VIETNAM

1959-1964 (NUMBERS OF INDIVIDUALS)
YEAR CONFIRMED (1) PRCBABLE (2) TOTAL

1959-60 4556 26 4582
1961 4118 2177 6295
1962 5362 7495 12357
1963 ' 4726 3180 7906
1964 9316 3108 12424
28'8 15,986 44,064
(1) A confirmed unit/group is one which is determined to exist on the

basis of accepted direct information fvom a minimum of two
prisoners, returnees or captured documents (any combination, in
addition to indirect evidence).
(2) A probable infiltration unit/group is one believed to exist on

the basis of accepted direct information from one captive,
returnee, or captured document, in addition to indirect evidence.
Extract from United States Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, Study Prepared by

the Departmenr of Defense. Book 2 of 12 (Pentagon Papers), (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1971), Part II Section A5 Tab 3, p.36.
*0
5-4
-'i 5-13
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THE BDM CORPORATION
2. Infiltration Routes
In 1959 three routes were available for deploying troops and
supplies to Soith Vietnam: (See Map 5-3)
* The sea route, generally embarking at or near Haiphong
* The route from Vinh to Dong Hoi, then through the western portion
of the DMZ and southward along the Annamite Chain within RVN.
* The primitive route through Laos, abandoned in 1954, which soon
came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail; the point of origin
for this LOC was also Vinh.
The sea route was believed to carry 70% of the supplies bound from the DRV
to cadres in the South prior to 1965.25/ Quang Ngai province contained the
only suitable communist-cuntrolled landing beaches and secure reception
areas along the central coast, some 250 miles south of the DMZ. Additional
landing sites were available in the Mekong Delta Region. The Republic of
Vietnam's small but growing naval strength gradually increased the hazard
of moving by sea, although maritime infiltration continued sporad:ically
throughout the war. The US Navy established routine patrols along the
coast in 1964, significantly reducing routine DRV junk traffic. The DRV
responded by exercising tighter control over seaborne infiltration and by
employing heavier craft in the 100-ton displacement category which enabled
them to cruise in international waters enroute to their destinatioris.26/
Other smaller craft, blended in with the thousands of South Vietnamese
sampans and fishing boats and often passed through the patrols without
detection.
The route through the DMZ became increasingly more difficutlt for
the movement of large troop units as additional ARVN forces were assigned
to protect the northern reaches of the South Vietnam, but a CIA intelli-
gence memorandum showed that infiltration through the DMZ waG still being
accomplished in 1967 when an estimated 6,000 to 10,000 NVA (PAVN) replace-
ments passed through the zone. 27/
Finally, there was the long-unused network of foot paths and
secondary roads -n Laos that had been used by the Viet Minh during their
5-14
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THEBDMCORPORATION
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THE BDM CORPORATION
war against the French. Significant improvements were required to accom-

modate the anticipated flow of personnel and materiel along that trail
system. Interrogation of several prisoners of war revealed that as early
as 1958 selected personnel were trained in the techniques of establishing
way stations and guide systems in Laos and South Vietnam.29/ In 1959, at
about the time of the Central Committee meeting, a transportation group was
established to direct and control the total infiltration effort and to
improve and maintain the lines of communication passing through Laos.
3. Logistics Organizations
The basic logistics structure that was to provide service through-
out the Second Indochina War was created mainly in the 1959-1964 period,
although considerable improvements and refinements were made in later
periods. The 559th Transportation Group was formed on May 5, 1959,
directly subordinate to the General Logistics Directorate. The subordinatp
70th battalion was created almost immediately and sent to southern Laos
where it was responsible for manrning 20 way stations for infiltration into
and evacuation from Thua Thien province. The 603rd Battalion, formeld in
June, was responsible for maritime infiltration (See Figure 5-2). Addi-
tional transportation units were added as the main supply route through
Laos was expanded.
A second Transportation Group, the 500th, was formed later in
1959. Its responsibilities included logistical support if units in North
Vietnam and transportation for personnel and supplies moving through North
Vietnam to infiltration departure points on the coast or in Laos (See
Figure 5-2).
The task of establishing, maintaining, and defending logistical
base areas and commo-liaison sites or way stations was assigned to several
Binh Trams. A Binh Tram was roughly equivalent to a logistics regimental
headquarters. The number and types of battalions assigned to a Binh Tram
depended on its location and mission. See Figure 5-3. Those units were
generally referred to by name by the Communist Vietnamese. US and ARVN
intelligence de3ignated the Binh Trams according to an arbitrary numbering
system. By 1970 the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) had
5-16
. •'" • '• ', " . ' • : • -' L.i'• • m • L,.

THE BDM CORPORATiON
E HIGH CONEAD
LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE
GENERAL
rkANSPORtTATION TRANSPORTATION TRANSPORTATO
Formed May 1959 For md Jine 1959 Formed in mid-1969

Mission: Move troops Mission: Non-comaarcial M•ssion: Logistics functions
and supplies through sea Infiltration into within Norto Vietnam and
Laos to RVN, and RVN. delivery of troops and
latet to Cambodia. Estimated to have 250 supplies to Infiltration
Est'imet,-dto have personnel (Initially) departure points within
50.000 troops and and to operate 11 7.wth Vletn.vi.
100,O00 laborers by infiltration cells
1973.
L- TI 1 IWO r- 1IN 1
I BATTALION ILIAISON I R S
170 BATTALIONS
Operated 20 Way Stations Pers ,nneui moveient Maintain Base Areas
in Laotian PorA4andle Mess',g1 Proviue air/ground defense
Quartiting Ruad maintenance
Medica 1 support 1, Binh Trams identified
50 Como-Liaison in Laotian Panhandle

Brttalions were by 1970
identi •ied ty 197.
FINAL DELIVKAY i,iTO RN'
MASEAREA MILITARY 'IE(.i REGIONAL TRANSPOTATION UNIT
604 & 611 TRI-THIEN-iUC (1968) K-12 TRANSPORTATION BATTALION

607 i 614 MIR5 240 TRANSPORTATION REGIMENT
609 B-3 FRONT 250 T;iNSPtORTk.iLIN REGIMENT
609 COSVN EIGHT (8) REAR

(34 Way SERVICE GROUPS
Stations)
ih
A Vinh Tram Is believed to be the equivalent of a regimental logiistics
headquarters. Binh Tram operated and defended base areas. which were
principal logistics complexes, and comeo-liaison sites or way statio-s.
Rinh Trams were task organized according to their specific locations and
mission requirhuLn~s.
NOTE: Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung of ARVNIntelliqence refers to the 559th

Logistics Corps (in 1974) with five subordinate logistics divisions:
the 470, 471, and 473 in RVN, and the 472 and 571 at Ban Karai and
Mu Gta Passes.
45&4/78W
Figure 5-2. PAVN LogisticsStructure
5-17
- "t
THE 8DM CORPORATION
IBINHI
ORGANIZAIION
*BINH TRAM HEADGUARTZP.S

*TRANSPORTATION BATTALION
*SIGNAL BATTALION
*TWO ENGINEER BATTALONS
THREE A ARTINLLRY BATTALONS
RAIRCRAF
LOCATION: DEPLOYED NEAR ROUTE 0 IN THE VICINITY OF TCHEPONE, LAOS.

MISSION: PROVIDE SERVICE SUPPORT TO TROOPS MOVING EAST IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN
PROVINCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
BINH
TRAM
ORGANIZATION
o BINH TRAM HEADQUARTERS

o TRANSPORTATION BATTAUON
o ENGINEER BATTAUON
o INFANTRY BATTALION
LOCATION: DEPLOYED IN LAOS NEAP THE A $HAU VALLEY.

MISSION:
1 OPERATE BASE AREA 807
4541/78W
Figure 5-3. Representative Binh Trams

5-18
THE 8DM CORPORATION
identified eleven Binh Trams in Laos suboidinate to the 559th Transporta-

tion Group, in addition~ to numerous other Binh Tramns in Cambodia and RVN,
subordinate to COSVN ioiitially. Beginning in 1966 the Binh Tramns and base
areas in the northern half of RVWI were assigned to three new field head-
quarters that reported directly to the High Command's Logistics Direc-
torate.L
Communist base areas shared certain common features. The bases
were normally esta~blished neat- a populated area but in heavy jungle which
afforded overhead screening against aerial reconnlaissance. Invariably the
bases w,,re located on a stream and were serviced b~y a single read1 or trail,
which was protected by mines or boot~y traps. Secret exits were elabarately
prep~ared, a.nd numerous tunnels provided secure agre~s in the event of a
major attack. Subterranean chambers were used as storage are..,s, hospitals,
classrooms, -- nd barracVk.32/ Base areas such as the "Iron Triangle" north
of Saigon often covered 40 or more square iniles of caves, tunnels, and
fortifications and accomm~odated several thousand personnel, particularly
when regular units were being hosted while in transit.-3/
Antiaircrdft artillery began to appcar along tho Ho ý-hi Minh
Trail1 as early as 10,65. Heavy concentratlo~r's of antiaircraft discouraged
air attacks or MuGid incI Bar, K~arai Passes. After the 1973 cea~ie fire, PAVN
cortrolled antiaircraft weapons, such as 37mem and 57mm gua~s, were deployed
south where they covered much of the Central Highlands a,.id virtually all of
MR-3, whi~ch incluided Saigon.
a. PAVNj .jjsticalStruc:ture iii Laos I
In 1959 the 70th Battalio~n c? the 559th Transportation Group
began development of troop. shelters in ¶..aos in thp variuus way stations
which were located at int6rvals of about 50 kilomneters or one day's march
*along existing footpaths, trails, an%; seL~ondrxry roads. The roads leading
through the. mountain passes- inro Laos were improved during 1961 and 1962
under D.RV aid agreiements with theo Ryal Laotian Government.34/ Roads in
the souithern panhandle, however, traversed an area which received 120 to
140 inches of rainfall annually -- the wette-3t part of Laos; those rcad's
5-19
THE 80M CORPOfHATION
needed extensive maintenance and many new roads had to be built.36/ Traf-
fic along the trail was heaviest during the northeast monsoon, October to
May, when Laos was comparatively dry. It must be noted that the trail
system included rivers, such as the Sekong running from A Shau through
Attopeu and into Cambodia where it joins the Mekong near Stung Treng.
During the 1959-1964 period, the Ho Chi Minh Trail system
remained close to the Laos-Vietnam border, an area so remote that the
Lao government made no effort to control it; the French had a'iso ignored
that area. By the end of 1964 the Ho Chi Minh Trail was believed by US
i.,tellIgence analysts to comprise approximately 200 miles of roads -within
Lao5, extending to the tri-border area opposite Kontum in the Vietnamese
Central Highlands.37/ No Pathet Lao units were authorized to operate
within the inffltration corridor. Even local tribes were excluded from
the area.
In October 1964 the Royal Laos Air Force (RLAF) began a
aesultory and ineffective air interdiction effort against the Ho Chi Minh
Trail using T-28 aircraft. Within five years even that small effort was
called off because of the effectiveness of PAVN antiaircraft artillery
defenses of the Trail.38/ US air interdiction of the Trail network is
discussed in a followiig section.
b. PAVN Logistical Structare in Cambodia
As early as 1962, PAVN forces began to infiltrate into the
tri-border area and the northern border provinces of Cambodia.39/ By t~e
end of 1964, three regular PAVN regiments were in or near the Central
Highlands of South Vietnam, and more were on the way. In all, eight North
Vietnamese arm), regiments made their presence known in RVN by November
1965.40/ Significantly, a network of caves and underground installations
already existed on both side,. of the CambediAn-South Vietnamese border, a
legacy from the Viet Minh and the basis for PAV,4's logistical
infr-estructure.
It was rot until after 1965 that an elaborate supply system
was developed in the eastern half of Cambodia, one that remained virtually
immn . from outside interference for five years.
5-20
L . . ,.. ", .
THE BDM CORPORATION
c. PLfF(VC) Logistics in RVN

The People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF, but often collo-
quially known as the Viet Cong or VC) sought the support of the civilian
populace in South Vietnam for a wide variety of direct and indirect
support. Former Viet Minh strongholds provided sanctuary, and arms caches
yielded weapons and ammunition. Rural settlements were taxed in money,
food, or goods, and the people were repeatedly called for working parties
to dig tunnels, prepare fortifications, carry supplies, and evacuate the
killed and wounded. Effective mobilization of the people, whether on a

cooperative basis or through coercion, gave the PLAF a uniquely responsive
logistical system. More than three-fourths of the logistics support
appeared to come from the civilian population.40/
1) Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)
In 1951, just after the Lao Dong Darty was created, the
Southern communist apparatus known as the Nam Bo Regional Committee was
dissolved and replaced by COSVN, which served as the top command post under
the Lao Dong Party for all communist activities in South Vietnam.41/ The
six original members of the COSVN Party Committee included Le Duan as
Secretary and Le Duc Tho as Deputy Secretary.42/ COSVN di banded in 1954,
but was reestablished in 1961. The headquarters was located in Cambodia
initially, but it deployed to the Ca Mau Peninsula of South Vietnam and in
tihe 1960's was reported to be in War Zone D, next in War Zone C in Tay Ninh
Province, and finally, after US operation Cedar Falls-Junction City, the
COSVN headquarters together with bases, hospitals, training centers ard
supply depots returned to Cambodia.43/ As tactical and logistical require-
ments inc-eased beyond the command capabilities of a single headquarters,
COSVN's area of tactical and logistical responsibility was shared by three
new major headquarters. During the period 1962-1964, however, COSVN estab-
lished the increasingly sophisticated logistics system that supported
insurgency in the South. See Figure 5-4.
2) Guerrilla Logistics
COSVN's logistics role was principally to support PAVN
and main force PLAF units. The irregulars, or guerrillas, often had to
5-21
THE BDM CORPORATION
ECOERYT:UNCl
90'm6TRV3QER
REIMNT SUPLIE • ECRIMN
SEAR ENUE SUPPORT COMSAT * CONTROL CIL
OPLOGISTICS SYSEM ORKSHO • MAPO

eMAPRONLEY
1STOE ASSTI
•MEDICALUTED
AIDFOPRTONA C.ADRESILDI
e BURIAL
FORCESEIMAINLY WITHIN THEIR
MOEACH00 FUNCTONE RECONA PRVNE MAINLY
RT COTOHARIPCORE
MAINLY POLITICAL AW-IGNED OPERATIONAL CADRE SKILLEDIIIN
AND CIVIIAN PORTION
OF LOGISTICS SYSTEM AREAS
GROUPS 8 REAR SERVICES INDOCTRINATION AND
ITAXATION
DISTRICREVAND DISTRIBUELEEORGON STOCKE
A ONEDUCMONDSUPPLYIPAL LSES *ORECALLEN
EACH FUNCTIONED AT REGION, PROVINCEA

DISTRICT AND VILLAAE LEVEL. REGION STOCKED
A ONE-MONTH SUPPLY OF ALL CL.AiSBES FOR ALL
TWO-THIRDS O REGION: ONEATHIRD

FORCEWIN THE
DISPERSED IN DEPOTS
AMONG CIVILIANS IN
VILLAGE.S AND HAMLETS,
*IN JULY 198 TWO ADDITIONAL STRAGGLER

RECOVERY AND REPLACEMENT REGIMENTS
WERE FORMED (THE ý_J AND INITH) FOR POLICING
DESERTERS AND STRAGGLERS AND RECRUITING.
INDOCTRINATING, AND• TRAINING LOCAL CON-
SCRIPTS.
PLAF DIVISIONAL LOGISTICS
MED SN
IREAR SERVICES STAFF DEPOTS FIEO LD
* QM-WEAPONS Et AMMO e IN RUGGED AREA
* MEDICAL SECT. * NEAR POPULACE
* FINANCE SECTION
I ___. . . .____
eNEARPOPULACE
_________ FO)OT TRANSPORTATION
4"41/7W
Figure 5-4. COSVN Logistics Organization
5-22
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THE BDM CORPORATION
fend for themselves, stealing or capturing their own weapons and ammuni-
tion. Local guerrilla mi I.La were not usually armed.45/ Their weapons
were sticks or an occasional grenade. They were not consumers of insurgent
logistics; rather they were guides, guardians, and providers. See Figure
!;-5. ,Guerrillas were required to salvage expended car Lridge casings for
'.eloading at one of the local weapons work sites. The work sites also
fabricated mines, booby traps and grenades, and they repaired weapons.
4. Logistical Signi-fcance 1959-1964
In May 1959, the Lao Dong Central Committee publicly announced
its decision to transform their political efforts in the South into a
combination of political and military activities. Concomitantly, the
logistical infrastructure ne-essary to sustain such a maj,,.: insurgency
began to evolve. Former Viet Minh enclaves became PLAF and guerrilla base
areas within South Vietnam, increasing the internal threat. The rapidly
growing logistics system in Laos and Cambodia presaged the development of
the external threat. Bases, sanctuaries, and improved lines of communica-
tion endowed the insurgents with a powerful weapon -- sustainability. The
sanctuary aspects of Laos and Cambodia were reinforced during this period
by the following events:
. The 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos established the neutrality of
Laos, a status that would seriously hamper IS/GVN operations and
which the DRV would ignore.
e Prince Norodom Sihanouk declared the neutrality of Cambodia in
1955 after the Bandung Conference, thereby effectively renooncing
the protection gratuitously proferred in a protocol to the 1954
Manila Pact that created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO). The Prince broke off diplomatic relations with Saigon
in August 1963, and with the US in May 1965.
The serious potential threat posed by the embryonic bases, sanctuaries and
LOCs was noted by several informed individuals including Brigadier General
Edward G. Lansdale USAF. In January .961 General Lansdale reported to the
5-23
*iT7
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THE BOM CORPORATION
GUJERRILLA
LOGISTICS
GUERRILLAS*FILL-TIME
DISTRICT/PROVINCE INDEPENDENT ANDCOMPNIES
PtATOONS
*PROVIDESECURITY FORLOC
SUPPLYSUPPORTFROMLOCALREAR
REBFCEIVE
SERVICEORCANIZATIOM
GUERRILLAS
AHLtET/VILLAE aPART-TIME LOCALGUARDSPROVIDE~
WARNING
FORMSQIADSANDPLATOONS
*FILL-TIME PERSONNEL
*ESTIMATEDTHATONLY I OUTOF 5 ARCAMID
*GENERAILLY LOGISTICALLY
SELF-SUPPORTING
ANDSCREENIWG
* PUVIDE INTELLIGENCE
FORCES *
MILITIA/SELF DEFENSE PROVIDESECURITYA'lD POLICEFUJNCTIONS
* FARMDURINGTHE DAY, GUIANO ANDSPREAD
PROAGAMDAAT NIGHT
a ARMED
WSO~TIMES WITHGRENADES, SELDOMWITH
RIFLES
SECRETGUERRILLAS * IN CITIES ANDCONTESTEDVILLAGES
* LOGISTICALLYSELF.TppTgiN
* AFTERAN INITIAL ISSUEOf A RIFLE ANDSMALLAMOUNTOF ARRIYIUON, THE
GUERRILLAMAYSE RESPONSIBLETHEREAFTERFORBUYING,STEALING,ORCAPTURING
ANYADDITIONAL SUPPIIES
I WEREREQUIRED
GUERRILLAS
DURINGTHEEARLYYEARSOF THEINSUJRGENCT, TO
RECOVER CASINGSOTHAT THEYCOULD
EMPTYCARTRIDGE BE LELOADED
- v LAS COULD
FULL-TIMEGUERRII DRAWON THECOSYNSUPPLYSYSTEMIBY REQUESTING
SPECIFICSUPPLYSUPPORTTHROUGHTHERESIDENTCOMO-LIAISON AGENTS. THE
THESUPPLIESFROMMhE DISTRICTMILITARY
AGENTS,IN TUAN.REQUISITIONED
lttIO aCOSYN REARSERVICES 83 WASBELIEVED

GROUIP BY US INTELLIGENCE
SUPPLY TO PURCHASE VIRTUALLYALL PLAF(VC) NONFOODRCQUIREMENTS.
MAINLYIN THE AREA.
SAIGON-CHOLON WEREMOVEDWITHIN
SJPPLIET.
THE CITY BY BICYCLEANDFROM THE CITY BY WATERt.RAFT.
FOOD a QUOTAS ATEDSAT VILLAGE,

TO MEETPROJECTED
WEREESTABLISHED
SUPPLY ANDREGIONAL
DISTRICT. PIkOVINCE LEVELS
* STORAGE REQUIREMENTS ANDAEýPOINSIBILITIES
WERECALCULATED
AND0
STOCKAGE LEVELSWEREASSIGNED
*FOO WASOBTAINED BY FARHRG, TADATION.FUNDDRIVES,AND
0 AVERAGE STOCKAGELEVELSAPPEARro HAVEBEEN:
Pe SOLDIER: TUODAYSROASTED RICE. FIVE DAYSNOKIA~.
R'CE
os REGIMENRTS: 10 TO 13 DAYSSUPPLY,REPLENISH AT HALFLEVEL L
es DIVISIONS: 30 DAYSSUPPLY j
* FOODSUPPLYWASRARELY A PR03LEM ANDTHENONLYBECAUSE OF I
SOW,UNEXPECTEDCIRCMSTA4CE THATDEVIATEi)FROY*HE PLAN
RATIONS 1IRFANTPY MOUNSTAINS LOWLANDS

____________ BIVOUACCOMAT BIVOUAC COMBAT
GRMS RICE/OAT 500 750 700 7rO
RTAT T AYL
MS SLNSTRUETED
GRNP So H JISIO TO COE 0 7W50RWL
ES/DAYIII.
GPMILIETABY RO0ETHAN BYIleNADOAT
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MILGITARY IV. S PZER
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* NXORTERS WREAUS DNANL'CORED E D CADRSIES
BYARID
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MARTICLAWNLY MCRATWEE DIOSGIE
FISING BATS A NOTHEYPCOULDM
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ATROOPSTINA
FEWMIUTSSYPORTATION*ABR ATALON
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Secretary of Defense on the infiltration of regular PAVN personnel via Laos

ind Cambodia. 47/ Later, the thre..t would increase markedly and in the end
would contrihu*.e to bringing down the Republic of Vietnam.
E. PAVN/PLAF LOGISTICS l1955- 1975
For purpuses of this study, guerrilla locistics are considered to have

been subsuv;ed by the COSVN logistical apparatus after 1965. In any event,
the relative importance of seif-support'ng guerrillas was minimal when com-
pared to the burgeoning logistical organization created by COSVN to support
PAVN and main force PLAF units in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.
1. The Buildup
Viet Minh regroupees comprised the bulk of the infiltrators who
passed from North Vietnam into the southern Republic from 1959 to 1964.
More US advisors, and helicopter and naval support to the South Vietnamese
military impelled the Lao Dong Party to begin deploying egular PAVN regi-
ments and divisions to RVN beginning late ir.1964.48/
2. Foreign Support
The DRV required foreign support for war materiel and food
suprlies. As previous':y mentiuned, the 2'oviet Union -urpassed the People's
Reputlic of China in 1958 as the principal supplier of aconomic and mili-
tary aid. Until the US committed ground combat forces in RVN, most sup-
p~ies from the USSR came from Black Sea por'ts through the Sut. Canal and
thence to Haiphong, In 1966 the Cambodian port of Sihanoukviille 1Kompong
Som) began to accept North Vi'tnamese-chartered vessels and Chinese, ^ovlet
ard bloc cargoes destined fcr PAVN fcv'c'-s in eastern Cambodia ana •he
southern half of South Vietnan. By that time the Sihanouk Tr~ail had boer,
completed as an extension of the Ho Ch' Minh Trail, and a labyrinth of
trails and roads serviced the bo-der sanctuaries in Camnodia.49/
The Arab-Israali Six-)ay War in 1967 interrupted Soviet deliver- .
ies when the Suez Canal was closed. Acccv-ing to Professor Richard
Thornton of George Washington University, the Soviets had no viable alter-
native to shipping from Black Sei ports, through the Medit,3rranean and
5-25
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THE BDM CORPORATION
around the African Cape. The earlier split with the PRC had caused the
Soviets to build up military forces along the Sino-Soviet border, fully
committing the Trans-Siberian Railroad to th&a. buildup and the resupply of
the 40-odd divisions along the border.50/ Department of State statistics
reflected in Table 5-2 reflect a decline in military aid flowing to the DRV
from both the USSR and PRC. If these data are accurate, that shortfall may
be attributed to the acrimonious relationship which had developed bet.weel)
the two giants and the PRC's dilatov.y tactics concei'ning transshipment of
Soviet supplies bound for North Vietnam via overland routes theough main-
land China. The communist buildup for let G8 and for the 1972 Easter
offensive suggest that the da&a on foreign aid to the ORV for this period
should be reevaluated.
From 1967 to 1970 Sihanoukville and Haiphong shared the honors as .•
receiving ports. Supplies coming into Haiphong or over Chinese road and
rail nets fronf the North were used to support PAVN for•.es in Ncrth Vietnam, .'
Laos, and RVN's Military Regions I and II. Sihanoukville provided most of :.
the logistical needs PAVN and PLAF forces in 'rhe southern provinces of
RVN's Military Region Ii and in MR's III and IV until its use was denied to
the communists in 1970. In his. recent book Decent. Interval, former CIA
agent Frank Snepp referred to the discovery by the CIA and the Pentegon
that 80% of the supplies for the southern half of South Vietnam flowed
through Sihanoukville during that period.51/
Amo-rican military authorities suspected that materiel was being
del"`,ered to PAVN/PLAF via Sihanoukville as early as 1967, but the magni-
t&r'e of that supply effort was not appreciated until after Prince Sihanouk
was deposed and official Cambodian records became available to U.S.
intel 1igence.
3. EApanding Lines of Commurication and Base Areas
The Ho Chi Minh Trail system initially extended on'ly to the
southern -"ip of the Lao Panhandle. In lqS5 the North Vietnamese began
hl i1ing the Sihanouk Trail as an extension of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The
Silhan( k Trail ran south from Attopeu along the strategic Bolovens Plateau
and met the newly emerging road and trail network in eastern Cambodia.
-26
1 HE 8DM CORPORATION
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(See Map 5-A). The trail opened in May 1966 and PAVN troons and supplies
flowed in increasing numbers to Cambodia. MotLorboats c, ied supplies
down the Sekong River to augment the road system. Accordi: o Brigadier
General Soutchay Vongsavanh, formerly of the Royal Lao Army, rice was en-
cased in plastic sacks and floated down the river day and night, hardly a
lucrative target for aerial in-i.erdiction, but a simple and effective way to
deliver supplies.53/ It was an equally effective way to deliver sealed
drums of POL.
The North Vietnamese had substantial manpower requirements for
repairing, maintaining, and protecting the vital land LOCs both within the
DRV and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Ceotral Intelligence Agency's
Office of Current Intelligence estimated in December 1967 that several hun-
dred thousand personnel were engaged in those activities!
TAeLE 5-3 - DRV Manpower Requirements 54/
TASK THOUSANDS OF PERSONS

FULL TIME PART TIME
LOC repair/construction 72 100-200
Transport/dispersal 100-200 25
Civil defense 150
Air defen3e 83 25-30
Coast defense 20-25 -
TOTAL 275 300 300-405
The Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp testi-

fied before the Senate Committee of the Armed Services on August 9, 1967
and referred to a then recent intelligence estimate which reflected that
500,000 to 600,000 North Vie~tnamese had heen diverted to repair, reconstruc.-
tion and dispersal programs, thus tending to confirm the data in Trble
5-3.56/
5-28
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The DRV also received manpower assistance from the ?eople'r

Republic of China. Some 34,000 Chinese engineer troops and *1,3,000 ait
eefense person'nel deployed to North W"ietnam in 1966 t-n repair and protec
thc! tra) ar; rail lines th*.t ,-onnected with the Chinese rail system.57/ l
'JS air irteroiiction nf the DRV's logistics nietwork began in Marcl
1.965 when Operation Rolling Thunder cow-inced. 5_8/ As the intensity of aif,
attacks by Air Force fixed-wing aircraft and, Army helicopter gunship.j

ircreasel and spilled over into the 1c 11rvi ,inh Trail area, that tangle o.
-igads and trails began to edge ti tt, wcst. 14hen B-52 bombers wert
unleashed to attack the Trail networks in iaos and Cambodia in March '969;
the DRV beian to shift the LOCs even farther west to the Bolovens Plateah 1
and the Mekong Delta near dense pnpulations to ii,,., the air strikes.60,..
Ultimately the Trail Denptrat.d Uq tk 50 miles into Laoý, and Cambodia..

Roads were hacked out of the jungle, but the overlt'aLS cinopy was retaineý
to provide concealment. Some sect-ions of road rar along shallow rive),
bottoms. Off-road revet.ments were often provided. Repair facilities war,
estabi :he'. within key base areas.
By January 7968 the logistics system, then suppo7,ting nearly 20C.
PAVN and PLAF combat battalions ii, South Vietnam, was at the peak of .tc
efficiency. The stage was set for the late-January Tet offensive. The
Central Intelligence Agency warned of evidence s.uggesting attacks on provin-
rial and district seats and key urban area6 suc'ý as Hue, Pleiku and Saigon,'
but the simultaneous assaults on over three-fourths of tht provincial'
capitals and major cities were not anticipated and could not have be.er
determined based on the intelligence available.61/
Even though it backfired militarily for the PAVN and particý-larly,
for the PLAF, the 1968 Tet Offensive demonstrated a well-developed logis-
tical capability. Substantial amounts of food and ammunition had bee,
introduced in the base areas ringiig RVN's border to support the 84,000-ma6
assault forces. Slffizient materiel and supplies remained to suppnrt a'
nuwber of sporadic atWacks later during 1968.
5-30 -
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"THE BDM CORPORATION
Pe3rhaps contemplating the coming Tet offensive, the North

V:•etnamese High Command forraed three politico-military-logistic head-
quarters in 1966-68 as counterparts to COSVN. (See Map 5-5). The new
commaod structure in the South had the following responsibilities:62/
M Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue-diirected military operations from
the CiMZ south to Hai Van Pass with Hue as a primary objective.
* Military Region 5 - spanned over 200 miles or coastline from
"Danang to Cam Ranh Bay and included the communist controlled
beach anid hinterland areas in Quang Ngai province.
* B-3 Front - responsible for operations in the strategic Central
Highlands of Kontum, Pleiku, and Odrlac provinces.
* COSVN - responsible for all politico-military operations in sou-
thern half of RVN. COSVN maintained liaisAn with the other head-
quarters, but they received their directives from Hanoi.
The tactical nature of the war' was changinC The Soviets provid-
ed increasingly more sophisticated military aid. Heavy caliber mortars,
rockets, and artillery arrived. Soviet PT-76 tanks were encountered at
Lang Vei in February 1968 and at Ben Het in 1969.63/ By the 1972 Easter
Offensive, the PAVN were equipped with Soviet T-54 tanks: by 1975 they had
about 600 mairn battle tanks in or near RVN.64/
A POL pipeline was completed in 1968, linking Vinh with Mu Gia
Pass; in 1969 the pipeline extended to Muong Nung and led to A Shau Valley
"in RVN.65/ B-, 1974 two separate diesel fuel pipeline systems were
installed. One ran across the DMZ splitting the provinces of Quang Tri,
-Thua Thien and Quang Nam; the second connected Vinh to the Ho Chi Minh
Trail and terminated in Quang Duc Province in RVN's MR-3.66/ (See Map
.5-6). The pipes were cleverly camouflaged and often were laid in stream
beds where detection was nearly impossible. The pipelines should have
provided stratagic warning that mobile, combined-arms warfare was in the
offing.
Rolling Thunder air interdiction operations against North Vietnam
were terminated by President Johnson in October 1968, and most of the
effort was redirected against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Despite the awesome
i 5. 31.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
"2 MILITARY REGION
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MILITARY
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.';•• .•- " •" •," , .,__ ... :.7*... ,
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Map 5-5. DRV Com.and Structure in RV
5-32
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tonnage of bombs, rockets and napalm used against the logistics network,
PAVN unit. in the South were well supplied. In addition, they sponsored
the Khmer Rcuge, which grew from 12-15,000 men in 1970 to 35-40.000 in i972
when they began to operate as battalions and regiment-, under LOSVN direc-
tion. Finally, by 1975 Kh' r Rouge or FUNK divisions appeered, and they,
too, received operatioiial, logistical, and poiitico-military guidarce from
COSVN.69/
The North Vietnamese constructed a major highway across the DMZ
piercing the RVN and providing direct access to several strategic areas of
the South. (See Map 5-7) The architect for the final campaign, PAVN
Senior General Van Tien Dung, described the new Route 14 or Truong Son
Corridor in his article "Great Spring Victory" as foilows:
Tha strategic route east of the Truong Son Range, which was
completed in early 1975, was the result of the labor of more
than 30,000 troops and shock youths. The length of this
route, added to that of the other old ant! new strategic
routes and routes used during various campaigns built during
the last war, is more than 20,000 kms. The 8-meter wide
route of more than 1,000 kms., which we could see now, is our
pride. With 5,000 kms of pipeline laid through deep rivers
and streams and on mountains more than 1,000 meters high, we
were capable of providing enough fuel for various battle-
fronts. More than 10,000 transportation vehicles were put
on the road. 70/
Several senior South Vietnamese officers described the DRV's
vastly improved logistics posture after the Paris Agreements of 1973 in
these terms: 71/
0 Soviet aid to the ORV doubled - to 1.5 billion dnllars.
* 100,000 cadres had infiltrated South Vietnam.
* Major equipment sent to PAVN units in RVN included about 600
tanks, 500 heavy cannons, 200 antiaircraft weapons, and many
additional SA-7 rockets.
0 Every week 1500 trucks moved on the expanded Ho Chi Minh Trail,
day and night. (See Map 5-8)
5-34
THE BDM CORPORATION
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0 Supply by sea became more important and a daily average of 10

Hong Ky (Red Flag) Chinese ships were uhserved using Cua Vi.At,
the strategic port in South Vietnam north ot Quang Tri which PAVON
forces had captured -in the final days before the 1973 cease fire.
4. Synopsis of PAVN/PLAF Combat Operations
This chapter deals with bases, sanctuaries, and LOCs. It wuuld
serve no useful purpose here tc catalog the hundreds of battles that
occurred in Vietnam duriny the period of US invoivl~ennt in Southeast Asa,
but it is essential that the general ebb and flow of combat operations i;n
Vietnam be related to the use of sanctuaries, bases, an-i LOCs in and near
South Vietnam.
a. Prelude: The Peoples' War - 1956-1964
Leftover Viet Minh strongholds in South Vietnam, Laos and
northeast Cambodia provided the communists with operational bases during[
the earliest stages of the insurgoncy against the Diem government. At the
same ti.me, the DRV made a concerted effort to upgrade the foot path and
trail net-work through Laos that had been used to good effect during the
First Indochina War.
During 1964 communist successes caused the US to increase
its advisory complement significantly and to step up its helicopter and
naval support. ,PLAF (VC) forces controlled most of the countryside at
night, largely because their base areas inrcountry were virtually impreg-
nable against the RVNAF and they enjoyed the adva~itage of being able to
select their targats. 1he Ho L;hi Minh Trail had been reactivated for
deiivering arms and ammunition, and some 44,000 regroupees had infiltrated
sack to South Vi4lnam. The latter provided leadership, guidance, and
irstructions to the stay behinds, Viet MInh who had either remained loyal
to Ho Chi Minh or were significantly anti-Diem.
The defensive integrity of the communists' major base areas
within and abutting RVN made it extremely difficult to reduce cr neutralize
them. In late 1964, thrue regular PAVN regiments began to walk down the Ho
Chi Minh Trail.74/
5-37
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b. The Hature of Combat 1965-1975

The year 1965 began with the first PLAF (4C) division-sized
battle of the war raging at Binh Gia, 40 miles east of Saigon. That battle
marked the beginning of what the enemy apparently believed was the final,
mobile phas-,e of the war to destroy the military forces of South Vietnam.
Significantly, by February 1965 the 'three infiltrating PAVN regiments were
in Kontum Province in South Vietnam's Central Hign",cnds. Guerrillas and
PLAF main force u:its dxnonstrated that they were well suoplied and that
they had the ability to appear suddenly from hiding, strike a specific
target, and fade away or stand and fight the South Vietnamese if they
chose. The South was iosing about a battalion a week.75/ American combat
forces entered RVN in increasing numbers ;And occasionally caught the enemy
where he niad to stand and fight; more often, however the PLAF or PAVN units
\-ere able to evade or break contact and fall hack on their sanctuaavies in
country, across the DMZ, or beyond the western border.
Among the logistical accomplishments of the DRV ioi 1966 was
the provision of AK-47 assault rifles to the PLAF local and guerrilla
forces and introduction of 12.7mm antiaircraft guns, long-range 120mm
mortars, and 122mm rockets. The AK-47s gave the enemy a decided adventage
over RVNAF forces, who used M-1 rifles or carbines; even many U.S. troops
continued to u.se the M-14 rifle until 19,67 when sufficient M-16s became
availatle.76/ PAVN forces in division strength infiltrated threugh Laos
and across the DMZ into the two provinces north of Hai Van Pass anid initi-
ated the main force combat that was to continue in the north until the
final collapse of the GVN in 1975.
In the meantime local guerrillas posed a difficult problem
for COMUSMACV by harrassing American and SoutL. Vietnamese installations
throughout RVN with rockets, mortars and sappers.. 7 7/
Patrol clashes and battalion-sized assaults characterized
much of the combat throughout 1967. The PLAF had been forced tr, evacuate a
few of its base areas in RVN in the face of multi-battalion i-ssaults such
as Operation JUNCTION City in February 1967 against the Iron Triangle, but
5-3e
,E, G1.1M COPA
L PORATION
convenient sanctuaries lay across the Cambodian and Laotian borders. The
reloc-ation process was not particailerly difficult.
On the US side, offensive land and air action combined
with interdiction of the enamy's base camps, sanctuaries and LOCs described
most of the actions from 1966 until the communists' 1968 Tet Offensive. It
was a period of relative stability. Pacification and search-and-destroy
operations made the security picture seem bright.
During that same period the PAVN increased their strength in
RVN by more than 20,000 men (estimate).78/ The Ho Chi Minh Trail network
expanded markedly as did the main sunply routes leading from Sihanoukville
to the numerous bcrder sanctuaries. Then came Tet. The Commarider-in-
Chief, Pacific described the offensive that began on January 29, 1968 as
". major offensive, well planned and executed, with a highly effective
logistics organization that had been prepare. in obviiusly successful
secrecy. "79/
The offensive fai ed to stimulate the hoped-for general
uprising. The PAVN wi.,s hurt, th~e PLAF w•as decimated, and the American
public was critically disenchanted.
A military objectives study undertaken by USMACV J-52 in

September 1968 des:ribed the post-Tet. situ&tion in these terms:
}T
It has already been suggesteL thpt population control is the

most significant i.id.x oi progress. From that standpoint
the control and in~uenc• ercica by the VC/VCI aie sign,-
ficant. Vast arn.• of tL:e country arm either dominated by
the enemy or remain *ina contested status. Many lines of
communicalions )u'side of populated and ,military base areas
are interdicted ty the enemy and are rot safa for unescorted
travel. Infiltraoiqn of supplies and personnel continues.
About the same perccnt.qe of the population, but less terri-
tory, is under GVN control ,,(,w than was the case in 1965,
this by virtue of refugees and movement to urban areas.80/
In October 1968 President Johnson halted all bombing of

North Vietnam. The halt was continued by President Nixon for over three
years, creating a sanctuary of sorts in the North. Bombing contiued in
Laos and Cambodia, but men and supplies continued to flow down the Ho Chi
Minh Trail.
5-39
...... . . .. . .
THE BDM CORPORATION
A senior ARVN 'intelligence officer contends that progress in

Vietnamization, and cross-border incursions in Cambodia and Laos to disrupt
activities alotng tike Ho Chi Minh Trail, was among the many causes that
cimpoiled the enemy to launch his generia offensive of 1972.81/ That
offensive inc'ided usa of1new, heavy-caliber. Soviet howitzers and field
guns, T-34 ard T-54 tank.i, and ZU 23 and SA-2 antiaircraft weapons, prima
facie evidence of a ,massiv• and successful logistics effort in whIch the
LOCs, baces, and sanctuar*,as in Laos and Cambodia had fully come into use.
Despite dramatic k rly successes, the DRV's offensive cost them heavy
casualties. They did not defeat the South. The -invasion failed, but PAVN
forces managed to seize much aaditional territory, including the area north
of t.,e Cua Viet river, giving them a -port within South Vietnam, for use
later.
iS all powei had been a Key factor in interdicting the
battlefields and providing essential direct-fire support fc' the South
Vietiamese. Sigr,if-e.antly, PAVN forces had become quite vulnerable to air
attack because they now depended on POL for their tanks and other vehicles,
and they n-e~ed great quantities of ammunition for their modern heavy
weapons. Equally significant was the use by (ISair forces of "smart bombs"
which maoe it possible to interdict the North with precise effect in
Operations LINEBACKER I and II.
After the January 1973 cease-',ire, the North Vietnamese
turned to rebuilding the damage wrought by the December air attacks. Roads
and rail lines were repaired, and, thanks to the US Navy, the northern
ports were swept of mines. The PRC and USSR provided massive quantities of
war materiel and economic support. The DRV initiated a campaign called
"logistic guneral offensive" to increase movement of supplies into South
Vietnam, particularly into the northern area of MR"l.82/ Concurrently with
tile movement of supplies, some 40,000 Nortii Vietnamese civilians infil-
trated southward as a supplement to the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
mernt (PRG) population base.83/ Several reguler PAVN divisions returned to
Norto Vietnam to refit and rearm. In March 1974 US intelligen.e estimated
thnt PAVN strength in the South had reached 185,000, men 500 to
5-40
THE BDM CORPORATVON
700 tanks, arid 24 regiments of antiaircraft troops.84/ That buildup had

,.ecn accomplished over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It was not until 1975, just
before the final collapse of GVN that the new Truong Son highway was
LO'npl~ted across the DMZ and into RVN.
Senior General Van TiLi Dung commanded the 1975 invasion of
RVN. Like General Vo Nguyen Giap, he considered the rear base to bo a
deciding factor in revolutionary war. Early in February 1975, General Van
Tien Dung flew to Dong Hoi to meet the commander of the 559th Troop Command
(also referred to as a Transportation Battalion and, ty some ARVN per-
sonnel, as a corps). He was assured by the rear services staff that they
could provide any amount of rice, ammunition, gas and vehicles needed for
the fortncoming attack in the Central Highlands. The general also noted
that beginning in 1973 the National Defense Production Branch oversaw
production of heavy guns and ammunition in North Vietnam.85/
During the "Great Spring Victory," drive, PAVN divisions
deployed south on both sides of the Truong Son mountains, using the Ho Chi
Minh Trail system and the new Truong Son Road. Combat suppl'ei and
materiel had already been delivered to the base areas in Laos and Cambodia
that nurtured the atac•ing forces when they struck in March 1975 at Ban Me
Thuot and then Konturi and Pleiku. The DMZ sanctuary was a springboard for
three PAVN divisions that poured into Quang Tri province and joined other
PAVN/PLAý units already in place for a drive on Hue.
During, the final drive, routes, riverways, sea lanes, rail-
roads and a'ijfields were used to advance combat troops and their logistical
tail. In thei, victory, the North Vietnamese, demonstrated the impressive
sophistication and effectivene cf t Thrnistic support system. They
In:r
made use of the bases and LOCs that had served them so well before the
cease-fire. They reconnoitered and planned carefully the use of a variety
of land and water routes within RVN that would give PAVN firzes a tactical
advantage as the campaign unfolded. Delivery of supplies, ammunition, and
POL during the swift operations of March and April was remarkable, par-
ticularly in light, of increased demands placed on the supply system by the
modernized combined arms PAVN.
5.41
7-7
THE BDM CORPORATION
5.
Significance of PAVN/PLAF Logistics 1965-1975
Froml 1965 to 1975 the PAVN/PLAF combat service support capability
changed from a s 4mple and often field-expedient system to one of consider-
able sophistication. Significant logistical developments in that decade
included:
* Developitig North Vietnam as the rear service base capable ;f
supporting multi-division combined arms forces
0 Developing logistical tactics and techniques that overcame the
massive (but restricted) US air interdiction programs:86/
6e ROLLING THUNDER 1965-1968 in North Vietnam
se STEEL TIGER 1965-73 in the Laotian Panhandle
9e FREEDOM DEAL 1970-73 in Cambodia
ee ARC LIGHT 1965-73 (B-52s) in Stouth Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia
* Restoring its badly damaged log'stical base and LOC aft*.r
LINEBACKER I (May-October 1972). Note: The damage t:aused by
LINEBACKER II in December 1972 was devastating and contributed to
the two-year delay before the final major campaign was launched.
* Expanding and modernizing the Ho Chi Minh Trail system to accomo-
date hong-haul trucks, and providing effective ground and air
defense for that system.
a Developing the combat service support capability to 5upply and
maintain a substanitial tank, artillery, antiaircraft, and vehicu-
lar arsenal that was wiaespread.
* Developing extensive POL pipelýie systems adjacent to and into
the combat zone.
* Anticipating, planning for, and effectively using captured South
Vietnamese facilities during the final campaign to include major
and minor ports, airfields, roads, railways, and streams.
Providing combat service support for PLAF, P:thet Lao and Khmer
*
Rouge forces throughout Indochina.
The general failure of the DRV's 1972 Easter Offensive cannot be
attributed to any significant logistical failures on their part. Rather,
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THE BDI: CORPORATION
it was US airpower coupled with resolute action by some of South Vietnam's

better commanders and better units that defeated the offensive. In the
finai campaigns of March-April 1975. the logistica) accomplishments
revealed the DRV to be very effective in planning and supporting mobile,
combined arms warfa,'e.
F. STRATEGIC LOC 1965-1975
1. The Three StrategicLOC's

In this secion a strrAtegic LOC is defined as one external to the
nRV over which foreign aid moved to DRV users. Ouring the Viet Minh War
only one LOC complex merited this sorategic designation--the roads and rail
lines in southern China connecting Kunming and Nanning with Viet Mi h
border stations. Those LOC continued to be important logiscically to the
DRV throughout the I etnam War when they carried up to 30% of the materiel
supplied by the USSR and PRC.
Expulsion of the French in 1954 freed the port of Haiphong,
raking possible the second strategic LOC complex. Sea LOCs now connected
Haiphong to the PRC, USSR, and bloc nations, and massive quantities of
supplies and materiel could be shipped directly to North Vietnam. Haiphongi
wa-• the principal point of entry for outside aid during the Second Indo-
coina War. It was estimated that about 80% of the imports required' in
North Vietnam came through that port.87/ Despite numerous recommendations
that the President of the United States authorize mining and blockading
Haiphong, it was subjected only to occasional, tightly controlled, aerial
attacks until 1972. President Johnson had rejected the JCS recommendation
in August 1967 that air power be used to close Haiphong and knock out part
of the Red River dike system. His reason was the ribk of Chinese or Soviet
irnvolvement and fear of heavy civilian casualties.88/
Cambodian Prince Noro1om Sihannuk ••iade possible the third stra-
tegic LOC complex when he ag,'eed to permit PAVN/PLAF supplies to be off-
loaded at Sihanoukville. Beginning ,n 1965 vast quantities of PAVN war
materiel arrived at that port city in commercial cargo ships that were
5-43
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1HE BDM CORPORATION
engaged by the North Vietnamese. Two Cambodian trucking firms hauled the
cargo from the ships to one of COSVN's eight rear service groups in the
various border sanctuaries. The groups, in turn, delivered the materiel to
PAVN/PLAF rear service units farther forward. The Silhanoukville LOC
supported communist forces in RVN's Military Region III and iV as well as
the southern provinces of MR II until March 1970, when Lon Nol deposed
Prince Sihanonk and closed the port to DRV use. By that time, ,iowever,
extensive bases, sanctuaries, and lOCs had been established in a connec-
ting, redundant network which gr.eatly increased the through-put capacity of
the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
2. Vulnerabilities of the Strategic LOC
a. The China Routes
The road and rail LOCS in southern China enjoyed complete
immunity from outside interference. They lay in a privileged sanctuary.
Use of those LOCs to supply the DRV was a PRC option When Sino-Soviet
relatii~nz were good, the USSR could ship goods across China to the DRV.
When those relations cooled, the Chinese procrastinated and created bureau-
cratic roadblocks to embarass the Soviets and slow their military aid to
the DRV. For example, Soviet personnel were not allowed to escort
shipments through China. Instead, the DRV had to furnish the escorts, but
only after considerable haggling. Furthermore, the anouun. of war materiel
ciossing the border into North Vietnam wab easily controlled by -the PIC.
Other than military actions the only option available to the US
to influence the overland flow of materiel was action in the diplomatic
arena. Serious US overtures to China did not begin until after the Nixon
administration took office, and US withdrawal from Vietnam was well under-
way before the Kissinger/Nixon visits to Peking.
b. The Cambodian Routes

Unlike Haiphong, the port of Sihanoukville was in neutral terri-
tory. The US was restrictod to surreptitious operations against base areas
inside Cambodia, having elected not to blockade or attack the port thn;ough
which the war materiel flowed,
b-44
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."' ,,:.. •" • ",. •'. : . . . ;:. , •F •'.• ,:, '• '
THE BDM CORPORATION
The US had little influence on the communist suppliers.

Pursuing detente with the Soviets left little room for "arm twisting".
Apparently, the US also lacked influence with the shippers, mainly Chinese,
who carried weapons, equipment, and munitions to 5ihanoukville for the DRV.
Considerable debate took piace in US government clrcles con-
cerning whether or not Sihanoukville was being used by the communists, and
it was not until Prince Sicanouk was overthrown that the true role of that
port became known.89/
The Cambodian routes had enabled the PAVN/PLAF forces to
build up extensive war supplies, well beyond the capability of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail to provide. The road and trail system blanketed the border
sanctuaries and connected with the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.
The DRV lost the use of Sihanoukville in March 1970 when Lon
Nol deposed Prince Sihanouk. Loss of that pcrt slowed but did not cripple
the DRV's logistic buildup in the South.
c. The Haiphong Routes
Oil storage areas and ,ailitary targets in the Haiphong area
were bombed occasionally during the war, but not until 1972 was the harbor
mined. Commercial ships from the DRV's communist allies continued to
deliver essential war materiel until the mining in May 1972 when they
ceased t' use that port.
As long as the China routes and Sihanoukville were open,
Haiphong was not of crucial importance to the DRV. When Sihanoukville was
closed in 1970, after supplies crossing the PRC border had diminished sub-
stanrtially two years earlier, Haiphong assumed an exccpLional degree of V
importance, but the 1IS did not act for two more years.
Mining Haiphong in 1972 came too late to tip the balance in
favor of South Vietnam. Critical supplies continued to leak through to the
DRV. The unprecedented volume of surface-to-air missiles expendea by the
DRV during the December 1972 B-52 bombing attacks on Hanoi, however,
exhausted their supply. Those missiles could not have been replaced
quickly. Asian expert Sir Robert Thompson described the situation thus:
5-45
THE BDM CORPORATION
in my view, on December 30, 1972 ... you had won the war.
It was over! They had fired 1,242 SAMs' they had none left,
and ... their whole rear base was at your mercy. They
would have taken any terms. And that is why you actually
got a peace agreement in January. ... That cease-fire agree-
ment restored complete serurity to the rear bases in North
Vietnam, in Laos, in Cambodia, and in the parts of South
Vietnam that it held. It subjected the South Vietnamese
rear base again tc being absolutely open to military attack.
That is what the cease-fire agreement actuaily achieved.90/
3. Assessing the Strategic LOC
When all three strategic LOC were operab'le, the DRV was reason-
ably assured that its civil and military needs could be met readily. The
slowdown in shipments from and through China did not decisively affect the
DRV's war-making capability. When Sihanoukville was closed in 1970,
however, the US had its first promising opportunity to throttle the stra-
tegic LOC and seriously impair North Vietnam's logistic lifeline by
destroying, blockading, or otherwise severely limiting the last major entry
point for supplies. Judging from the PRC's attitude at the time, it
appears in retrospect that a golden opportunity to hurt the enemy was
overlooked by the US.
After the 1973 cease-fire, the last American forces withdrew from
South Vietnam. The DRV maintained its base areas, sanctuaries and LOC in
RVN Cambodia and Laos. After departure of the US forces, they used those
LOC with remarkable skill in positioning troops and supplies for the coup
de grace. The GVN was placed in a militarily untenable position because of
the geostrategic advantage which the DRV derived from its bases, sanc-
tuaries, anc€ LOC.
G. ANALYTICAL .'UMMARY AND INSIGHTS
Guerri la warfare does not require the massive logistics base needed
for modern combined arms operations. In the initial phases of the Vietnam
War the men and supplies necessary for PLAF operations were readily pro-
vided through local recruitment/procurement, capture of weapons from the
South Vietnamese, or infiltration by land or sea. Losses to interdiction
5-46
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THE BDM CORPORAT7ON
were minimal and had no measureable effect on combat operations. During

the period 1955-1968, the DRV sent nearly half a million men to the South
and lost perhaps 5 percent to bombing, plus a loss of supplies amounting to
10 percent. Guenter Lewy adds, "Over this same period, communist main
force strength increased about 75 percent, enemy attacks fivefold ana
overall activity levels ninefold."91/ Clearly the DRV was able to meet the
needs of PAVN and PLAF forces in the combat zone, though there is evidence
of food shortages in the North, and the communists had to dedicate
substantial personnel and materiel assets to the operation of their logis-
tics system. Lon Nol's closing of the port Gf 'iihanoukville was an impor-
tant turning point in the war in the South. Most supplies needed by COSVN
since 1966 had been funneled through that port., easing the burden on the Ho
Chi Minh Trail and protecting the supplies from interdiction. After March
1970, COSVN's supplies had to run the gauntlet along the Trail. The North
Vietnamese reacted by expanding their areas of control within Cambodia, but
they did not launch any major operations in South Vietnam until the 1972
Easter offensive. Obviously they needed that two-year period to build
their supply stockpiles in the face of losing Sihanoukville and
subsequently losing substantial supplies in the allied attacks in Cambodia
and Laos.
The Cambodian incursion and Lam Son 719 in Laos disrupted DRV's supply
system, but only temporarily. Without a permanent sealing off of the LOC,
the enemy could be expected to restore his stockpiles. Combat operations
might have been delayed, but they weren't prevented by short-iterm, limited
interdiction.
The US Government announced publicly and repeai,-dly that no invasion

of North Vietnam was contemplated. Having said so, an aerial interdiction
program was undertaken at the first reasonable opportunity. Fear of possi-
ble PRC and USSR reaction combined with hopes for a negotiated settlement,
however, led the President to self-imposed restrictions on US interdiction
operations against the DRV homeland, its coastal regions, and the base
areas that proliferated throughout Laos and Cambodia. North Vietnam,
therefore, was in itself a sanctuary for most of the war except for the
5-47
V THE BDM CORPORATION
H Panhandle below 200 North. Only during LINEBACKER I and Il were most
restrictions lifted on the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, and in those 1972 air
campaign the DRV was brought to its knees and agreed to complete the cease-
fire negotiations. In the final meetings held after the bombings, Dr.
Henry Kissitiqer, the National Security Advisor to President Nixon, received
ane of the warme4., and most cordial receptions he had y.t received from the
North Vietnamese negotiators.92/
The South Vietnamese faced two military threats. Within the South
there existed an originally small but disciplined insur.gent force that
operated from relatively secure base areas. That was the initial and most
menacing threat. When the successes of the reinfurced insurgent- threa-
tened the Saigon government, US forces were introduced in increasing
numbers. The second threat appeared in the form of regular North Viet-
namese units. Both the insurgents and the PAVN forces depended on their
base areas fcr logistic sustenance and sanctuary. The main force or "big-
unit" battles that occurred usually ended with an allied victory, due
mainly to the inherent mobility and massive firepower the allies commanded.
in retrospect, it should be clear that in a stand-up fight the enemy would
have been decimated. (Volume VI addresses this aspect in detail).
Instead he enjoyed the relative security of his sanctuaries and bases with
elaborate bna concealed urnderground facilities where he was safe from most
bombing and had Iittle fear of any major ground attack.
The nature of the clii,'ate and terrain of Indochina endowed the commu-
nists with the capability to infiltrate combat units close to the point of
attack, generally when and where they chose. Equally important, the
sanctuaries provided a place to rest, refit, train, and wait for instruc-
tions between battles. All the while, those forces constituted a threat to
nearby GVN villages and irstallations.
Because the communist bases in Laos and Cambodia were relatively free
from attack, the PAVN/PLAF were able to take sanctuary in them to avoid
combat for long periods. Thus they limited their -.asualties. They were
able to conduct a protracted war of attrition, whizh the US eventually was
not willing to sustain. Finally, when the Paris Agreements were signed in
5-48
AI,
THE BDM CORPORATION
January 197S, the PAVN/PLAF forces were allowed to retain their sanctu-
aries. They outflanked the South and retained a remarkable geostrategic
advantage. In- Korea nosuch sanctuaries existea, and the Republic has
endured for a quarter of
a century since hostilities ended. In Vietnam the
combination of extensive
internal LOC and bases/sanctuaries enabled the DRV
to outwait the US, to
reinforce and resupply, and thus eventually to
destroy South Vietnam's military forces.
H. LESSONS
The nature, extent, and politico-military implications of an enemy's

actual or potential sanctuaries must be studied, analyzed, and understood
in order to be in a position to deny him the important advantages conferred
by the existence of such sanctuaries.
Sanctuaries can consist of:
0 Cooperative people, whether motivated by loyalty or fear
0 Remote areas within a country that defy intrusion by opposition
forces
* Havens in adjacent "neutral" countries that encourage, permit, or
suffer the presence of revolutionary forces.
The initiative, and thus control of the pace of an armed struggle,
lies with a party making use of "privileged sanctuaries" (those areas
gratuitously placed "off limits" by a protagonist).
"Privileged sanctuaries" are more likely to exist in a limited war
than in a total war. In a limited-war situation a democratic power is
likely to establish self-imposed constraints that may contribute to the
existence of one or more sanctuaries. Ccnversely a totalitarian power is
uniikely to impose on itself any limits.
Because of combat-power ratios and other important factors, revolu-
tionary forces are usually dependent on sanctuaries, at least during early
phases of their development, and on more sophisticated base areas and lines
of communications as hostilities escalate.
5-49
THE BDM CORPORATION
In cases where an enemy's use of "privilege sanctuaries" tigures

prominently in the nature and duration of a wir, appropriate politico-
diplomatic psychological, economic, and military means must be employed in
concert to reutralize or restrict such sanctuaries.
55
5-50
{I
A j4..
THE BDM CORPORATION
CHAPTER 5 ENDHOTES
1. Army Area Handbook for North Vietnam, American University, (Wash~ngton,
.ZC.: GPO, 1967),-p. I99T
2. Ralph U. Smith, "The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of 9

March 1945", Journal of Southeast As(in Studies. IX, No. 2 (September
1978) p. 206.
3. Strategic Services Unit, War Department, Intelligence Dissemination
Number A-66557 of 25 March 1946, quoted in US Senate Hearings Before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong. 2d Sess, on Causes,
Origins and Lessor.s of the Vietnam War, May 9, 10, and 11, 1972, p.
4. Hoang Van Chi From Coloniaism to Communism (New 'fork: Frederick A.

Praeger, Pub!., ,•p. 67 state s:
Contrary to what some maintain, the Japanese never gave any
of their arms to the Vieminh. During the first days immediately
after their surrender, the Japanese inclined to the 'idea of
offering part of their arms and equipment to thie Vietminh, but
they changed their minds when Vo Nguyen Giap, en route from
Viet-Bac to Hanoi, attacked their garrison at Thai Nguyen on
August 17, 1945. The Japanese thereafter burnedi all their
commissariat t-tores and later on handed over to the Chinese at
Haiphong 4000,00O tons of arms and ammunition.
5. Gi.
Corr.., ; Vo
I Nguyen Giap,
University Unforgettable
Southei-ast Asia- Program DataandPaper
Months '.ar3 NG. (Ithaca,
99, May N.Y.:
1975)
p. 5,
6. George K. Tar, ha, Communist Revilutionary Warfare. (N.Y.: Praeger,
7. Berna'1, 1. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, (N Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, +

1963) pp. 108-111. ,
8. Tanham p. E8-69.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, pp. 69-70.

11. Tanham, pp. 69-72 describes t; + principal supply route from China
entering North Vietnam at Cao Bang and Lang Son. Bernard B. Fall
Viet-Nem Witness 1953-1966 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,
1966), pp. 30-40 discusses the failure of the Navarre plan and depicts
the general areas of Viet Minh operAtions, wnich reflect a rough trace
of the lines of communication used ýy the Viet Minh in the 1956-1954
period.
5-51
{I
THE BDM CORPORATioN',
12. Beg-inning in ]958, an elderly southern-born cadre lDd a team from

South Vietnam to the DRV, scouting the lines of comnunication in the
eastern p~art of the Laotian Panhandle and the western strip of upper
South Vietnam to select the best route for infiltr;tting men and supplies
into RVN. The infiltration route took its old name dating from the
First ]nd(china War - The Ho Chi Mind Trail. (Some cadres called it
"The Old ý.an Trail" as a tribute to the ,man who surveyed it). Col.
Hoang Ngoc Lung, ARVN. Strategy and Tactics. InJochina Refugee
Authored Monograph Proqram. Prepared for )epartnent of the Army,
Office of Chief of Military History. (McLean, VA : General Research
Corp., 10 July 1979), pp. 20-21.
13. MG Nguyen Duy Hinh, ARVN, Laf.ron 119, Indochina Refugee Authored
Monograph Program. Prepared for Department of .he Army, Office of the
Chief of Military History (V.Lea,,, VA: rcn•,:l Research Corporation.
July 31, 1977j, p. 9.
14. Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, Under-
auspices of the Royal-,Tt'tute of Internati7oria- Affair's(N.Y. and
London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 7`7 quoting Edgar O'Ballance.
Tt-e In.o-Chirna War, 1945-1954, London 13' , 2. 201.
15. Fall, vp. 125-127.
16. Military Review, October 1956, p. I,.
17. General Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, Peopla's Army, (Hanoi: Foreign
Language Publishing House, 1961) p. 184.
IS. Fal',, fn. 5 Chaptar 7, p. 472 states that iJS arms abandoned in Kr.ea
in October 1950 armed several Viet Minh divisions one year later. A
19. Wallace J. Thies, Coercion and Diplonacy/, Force and Foreign Policy ir
the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968, (Yale University PhD Dissertation,
1977) p. 316.
Tanham, pp. 68-69 describes the flow of Chinese aid during this period.
The Pentagon Papers, The Senator Gravel Edition, Volume I (2ostor:
Beacon Press, 1971), pp.ý 82-86 refers to thQ Chinese Communist support.
20. LTC Lance J. Burton USO, Norti. Vietnaut's Mil~tary l.ogistics System:
Its Contribution to the Wr_ .l-b69, (Fort Leav-nworth, Kansas,
-977)o. 18. also see Fall, p. 350, and Tanham, 116.
21. Viet t.inh stroargholds in RVN are described in Burton, p. 18; J.J.
Zas•lf Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960: The
Role of The Southorn Vietminh Cadres (Santa Monica: The Rand Corp.,
1968) p. 17; The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel Editiorn, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971), Volume I, 'pp. 123, 192: Fall, p. 129 (Also see
Fall for maps of the insurgency situation ii, 1962-63, p. 354 and 1965
pp. 381, 388).
5-52
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THE BDM CORPORATION
22, Various sources describing the Ho Chi Minh Trail refer to its use
during the first Indochina War. The existence of the trail at that
time is logical since some communications and loqistic supply lines
were needed to direct and sustain the Viet Minh forces operating in
the South. Most regroupecs returned to Lhe DRV by ship, but some
walked North 'through Laos and left cacheb of arms behind them. See LBG
Soutchay Vongsavanh, RLA. RLG Military Operations and Activities
in the Laotian Panhandle Indochina Refugee Authorcd Monograph Program,
upared for the Department of the Army, Office of Chief of Military
Hitory (McLean, VA.: General Research Corporation, February 21,
1973), pp. 4-9.
23. Michi-el C. Conley, The rommunist Insurgent Infrastrucuire in South
Vietnam: A Study of oanzation and Stratety, (Washington, D.C.:
TR-Tierican University), pp. 10-3 Also see Douglas Pike, History
of Vietnamese Communism 1925-1976. (Stanford. Caiif.. Hoover Institute
r-ess, 1978) pp. 120-122. Herafter OToD L'S/VN Relations.
24. Dc.partment 3f Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967. 12
vols. (Washington, D.C. GPO,° IqfM, Book 2, P-f-V, Sec A, Subs.ec 5,
Tab 3, p. 32. Hereafter DoD US/VN Relations.
25. CINCPAC/COMUSMACV (Co~mmander in Chief Pacific and Commander US Mili-
tary A•. istance Command, Vietnam), Report on the War in Vietnam,
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968) p. 128.
26. In February 1965 VNAF aircraft sank a 100-foot DRV patrol craft near
shore in Vung Ro Bay. The craft carried 80 to 100 tons of weapons and
about a million rounds of ammutition. Papers and documents showed
Haiphong as the departure point. Several caches of weapons and equipment
were found in nearby caves. US Information Service, Special Report,
February 23, The Evidence at Vung RoPa.
27. "A Review of the Situation in Vietnam", Intelligence Memorandum SC Nc.

08752/67, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
928. Map 5-3 is based on Vongsavenh RLG Militar, Operations pp. 4-9; General
Wiiliam W. Momyer, USAF (Ret) Airpower In Three Wars (Washington,
D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1978), pp. 8S, 193-196; and Carl
Be'rger, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961-1973
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Forc Hfystory, 1977), pp. 101-119.
29. DOD US/VN Relations Book 2, IV. A.5. Tab 3 pp. 34-35. In addition,
the DRV sent forces to occupy Tchepone in Laos in 1958. Tchepone had
been the crossroeds for Viet Minh activity in Laos during their war
against the French.
5-53
T DTHE6DM
CORPORATION
30. Burton, pp. 48-68 and Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung. Intelligence Indochina
Refugee Authored Monograph Program Prepared for Department of the
Army, Office Chief of Military History (McLean, Va.: General Research
Corporation, 1976).
31. Burton, P. 52.
32. "Vier Cong Base Camps and Supply Caches", USIIACV MACJ 313 Counterinsur-
gency Lessons Learned No. 68 (Unclassified)
33. David R. Palmer, Summu,;. of the Trumpt, (San Rafael, CA: Presidio
Press, 1978), p. 134, 135.
34. Vongsavanh, RLG Military Operations, p. 5
35. Ibid. pp. 5-8.
36. Ibid.
37. "A Review of the Situation in Vietnam", op. cit.
38. Vongsavanh, RLG Military Operations, pp. 23-28.
39. LG Sak Sutsakham, FANK Chief of the General Staff and last Chief of
State of the Khmer Republic, The Khmer Republic at War and the Final
Collapse, Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program, Prepared for
Department of Army, Office of Chief of Military History, (McLean, VA:
General Research Corporation., November 1978), p, 18.
40. L.P. Holliday and R.M. Gurfield, Viet Cong Logistics, Prepared by Rand
Corp. (RM-54231 ISA/ARPA, June 1968) for Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs and the Advanced
Research Projects Agency, p. 1.
41. Albert E. Palmerlee, The Central Office of South Vietnam, Vietnam

Documents and Research Notes, Department of State, Document No. 40,
August 1968.
4.2. US Department of State Biographic Intelligence Summary, DOS Historian,
Item 11, 1961, Based on agent reports cumpiled during the First Indo-
china War.
43. LTG Bernard William Rogers, USA, Cedar Falls-Junction City - A Turning
Point, (W~shington, D.C.: Department of the Army, GPO, 1974)T pp.
15,2-153.
44. Figure 5-4 is adapted from Holliday & Gurfield and Burton, passim.
45. Holliday and Gurfield pp. 16-49.
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THE BDM CORPORAT'3N
46. Ibid.
47. DOD US/VN Relations, Book. 2, A.5, tab 4, pp. 66-67, BG E.G. Lansdale
memo of January 17, 1951 to Secretary of Defense.
48. BDM analysts have cnncluded that the DRV would have deployed regular
PAVN forces to RVN in any event. The L~o Dong Party leaders obviously
recognized that despite the governmental chaos that existed since
Dium's death, American aid might continue to prop up the various
governments. US support may have caused the DRV to speed up its schedule,
but there is no eviden(.e to substantieite claims that the DRV woula not
otherwise hade ititervened in the South with regular forces. Indeed,
it is likely that the DRV leaders cronside:'ed it essential to seize RVN
by military force to preclude any power struggle in the South with
noncommunist elements. After the January 1973 ceasefire, Giap saw the
"...historic opportunity to liberate South Vietnam totally... thus
fulfilling the tasks laid down by the Third National Congress of the
Party (September 1960)." Generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung,
Hiw We Won The War (Philadelphia: RECON Publications, 1976), p. 26
49. Vongsavanh, RLG Military Operationo, pp. 14-16.
50. Interview with Professor Richard Thornton, BDM Corporation, October
.30, 19•78.
51. Frank Snepp, Deccent Interval, (N.Y.: Random House, 1977), pp. 19-20.
52. King C. Chen :'Hanoi VS Peking: Policies and Relations A Survey,"
Asian Survey Vol. XII., No. 9, Sept. 19727, pp. 806-817.
53. Vongsavanh, RLG Military Operations, p. 54.
54. "A Review of the Situation in Vietnam", op. cit.
55. Vongsavanh, pp. 4-17; Momyer, pp. 85, 193-196; Berger, 101-119.
56. Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, USN, CINCPAC, "Air War Against North Vietnam",
Hearings Before The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session.
August 9, 1967, Pt. 1, p. 6.
57. Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam, (N.Y.: Oxford University Press,
1978), p. 392,-and-eew of the Situation in Vietnam." Interestingly,
during the Ninth Session of the PRC-SRV pe&ce talks in Peking during
July 1979, the ChWise state. that more thagi 300,000 Chinese military
personnel had been sent to Vietnam during the war, a number that the
DRV angrily denied. Clearly the Chinese meant that a total of 300,000
,
* personnel rotated in and out of Vietnam to sustain the estimated
50,000-man force operating in North Vietnam. UPI-Peking, July 30,
1979, News Service Release UP-0O3.
-I5-55
THE BDM CORPORATION
58. CINCPAC/COMUSMACV Report On the War in Vietinam pp. 16-54.
59. Department of Defense, Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations In

Cambodia and Laos, September 10, 1973, pp. 25-27.
60. Vongsavanh, RLG M4ilitary Operations, p. 54.

61. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Cuerent: Intelligence, "The
Intelligence Background of the Current Communist Offnisive", February
15, 1968.
62. U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Combined Intelligence Center,
Vietnam (CICV), Study ST 70-05 pp. 3-4.
63. General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday & Company, 1976), p. 341.
64. Vongsavanh, RLG Military Operations, p. 54.
65. Hinh, Lamson 719, p. 12.

66. Lung, Intelligence, pp. 166-172.
67. CICV Study ST-70-05.
68. Lung Intelligence, pp. 170-172.
69. Sutsakhan, The Khmer Republic, p. 27.
70. Sen. Gen. Van Tien Dung, "Great Spring Victory", Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, APA-76-110, June 7, 1976, Vol. IV. No. 110, Supp.
38.
71. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen, Brian Jenkins, The Fall of South
Vietnam: Statements By Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, A
report prepared for Historian, Oifice of th.- Secretary of Defense
(Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporatior.,.December 1978), R-2208-OSD
(Hist), pp. 63-65.
72. Lung, Intelligence, pp. 166-172.
73. BG Tran Dinh Tho, ARVN The Cambodian Incursion. Prepared for Department
of the Army, Office of Chief of Military His ry (McLean, VA.: General
Research Corp; 1978 pp. 23-27 and Vongsavanh, RLU Militarv Lperations,
pp. 4-17.
74. CIA Memo SC No. 08753/67.
5-56
- . -
TIE 6DM CORPORATION
75. CINCPAC/COMUSMACV Report On The War I,-Vietnam, p. 98.

76. Westmoreland, p. 158.
77. Westmoreland, pp. 194-195.
78. Lewy, p. 75.
79. Sharp. p. 214.

80. US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Military Objectives Study,
"MACJ-52, October 16, 1968, pp, 18, 19. The term VCI refers to Vict
Cong Infrastructure which was/is construed to mean the :ommunist
political apparatus of the MLF/PRP.
81. Lung, Intelligence, p. 154.

82. Lung, p. 164.
83. Department of State Working Paper, "Hanoi's Efforts to Build up the
PRG", May, 1,4.
84. Drew Middleton, "Pentagon Cites Build-up by Hanoi", The New YorK
Times March 4, 1974.
, 85. Sen. Gen. Dung, Vol. I. pp. 13-17.
86. Air interdiction campaigns are treated in detail in Volume VI.

87. Lewy, p. 392.
88. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point, (NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1971), p. 3G9.
89. Ambassador William Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence,
stated that several intelligent, top-level people in the USG believed
that Sihanoukville was not being used by the DRV. Documentation made
available after Lon Nol took charge revealed the extensive use of thc
port. General John W. Vogt USAF (Re-') reinforced Ambassador Colby's
remarks by relating his conversation with the harbor master at
Sihai-. ukville who said, "Hell yes, Chinese and Russian vessels came by
the dozens." BDM Senior Review Panel meeting, February 14, 1979.
Tape 5. In his book Honorable Men (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1978), p. 299, Ambassador Colby describes Cambodia as "...both a natural
channel and a porous enough one to permit such a flow (of men and
supplies) whether the Prince agreed cr not."
5-57
* - -. . .
THE BDM CORPORATION
90. W. Scott Thompson and D.D. Frizzell, ed. The Lessons of Vietnam, (NY:
Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 105. Sir Robert's assessment of DRV vulner-
ability at that time may be accurate, but his comment that, "They
would have taken any terms" must be discounted. The US goal had
changed from that of assuring the existence of a free, viable and
independent Vietnam to one of recovering US POWs and extricating US
combat forces from Vietnam. The DRV leaders were certainly aware of
this fact. The USG had dropped its insistence that PAVN forces be
withdrawn from RVN, Laos, and Cambodia. By agreeing to continue the
cease-fire talks, the communists brought an end to the bombing and
paved the way for US withdrawal. It is important that US military
leaders not confuse the issue. The war was fought to decide who would
control South Vietnam. That *ar was mainly political in nature,
albeit with important military overtones. The DRV's "enthusiasm" to
stop Linebacker II and return to the peace talks was a successful
tactic on their part to eliminate US military power from the equation.
US military power had won nearly all its battles but US national
command authorities were constrained from using that power decisively
in the Vietnam war by their perception, or the reality, of US public
o'pinion. Any claims that the military "won" the war but that other
authorities "lost" ';' or "gave it away" are spurious. The final
victory belongs to the North Vietnamese and US military authorities
must share in the blame for not creating, suggesting, or forcing the
proper politico-military combination to win.
91. Lewy, p. 391.

92. Interview with Gen. John W. Vogt, USAF (7et.), BDM Corporation, November
30, 1978. Dr. Kissinge,- personally related to General Vogt the nature
of his reception in Paris by The DRV delegates after Linebacker II.
5-58
S" T - . .... . . . ..... : T L~ m•;•T ,•• - • . . - - • • -, - '-

THE BDM CORPORATION
CHAPTER 6
EXTERNAL SUPPORT
North Vietnam's ability to exact whatever material

assistance its socialist bloc allies are comparatively
advantaged to provide, and at the sarhe time to avoid
compromising its independence in policy making, remains
the signal achievement of the wartime Hanoi regime.
(Melvin Gurtov, "Hanoi on War and Peace",)

(Vietnam and American Foreign Policy,
196,, )I /
We are reaping today, in my opinion, and so are all
Vietnamese, Laotians, arid Cambodians, the tragedy of
our fixation on the theory of monolithic aggressive
communism that began to develop at this time and to
affect our objective analyses of certain problems.
(Statement by Abbot Low Moffat, Former Chief,
Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, 1972,)2/
A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The ability of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and its

protege, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) to pursue and
eventually redlize their goals during the Vietnam conflict was directly
depenaent upon exteral support provided by those sympathetic to their
cause. In fact, the role of the Scviet Union (IISSR) and the People's
Republic of China (PRC) was essential to the pursuit and satisfactory
realization, of DRV - NLF ambitions.
External support is defined as the outside aid providea to the DRV/
NLF, be it political-ideological, military, or economic. Although some
analysts would insist upon a further delineation of external aid, i.e., aid
directly provided to the National Liberation Front by the DRV, the purpose
of this chapter will be to focus on outside support from non-Vietnamese
participants. It is, however, pertinent to acknowledge the funnel-like
irterrelationship3 which existed between the primary sympathizers, namely
the USSR and PRC, and the DRV. Support was channeled by the USSR and PRC
6-1
- ~ -I
THE BDM CORPORATION
directly to the DRV which, in turn, was then disseminated by Hanoi to its
own forces and to the NLF.
In assessing the relevance of external support to the DRV/NLF, it is
paramount that the overall complexity of Sino-Soviet relations be ackrow-
Sledged, for although aid was continually forthcoming from both countries,
its dimensions were dependent upon the complexion of relations between the
two. In addition, US attitudes and actions regarding the bombing of Nirth
Vietnam influenced the extent of aid provided by the USSR and PRC.
Rather than trace the complex evolution of problems which developed
between the USSR and the PRC, this chapter will provide:
* an assessment of aid to Hanoi and the NLF
* indications o. how and why Sino-Soviet differences affected
support to the DRV-NLF
0 a discussion of the effects, if any, that the Sino-Soviet dispute
had on the attainment of DRV-NLF goals.
Figure 6-1 is a time-line depicting the chronology of. major events which
had an impact on Moscow-Peking-Hanoi interrelationships.
The information is broken down into three separate divisions: The
DRV, PRC, and the IJSSR. Listed under each of these countries are the major
events wt.ich influenced their interrelationships. Although not all the
events which transpired between the DRV, PRC and the USSR appear in the
figuta , those that do appear provide an adequate overview of their changing
relationships, in particular, the development of the sciism between the
USSR and PRC. The figure also provides a summary of major trends or impor-
tant themes which continually seemed to be relevant to the respective
country during the period tinder discussion. Therefore, by following the
progression of events provided in the figure, it is possible to envision
bath the progression of changing relationships and the important events
which influenced these changes over time.
6-2
F-
THE 8DM GOR2ORAT ION
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THE BDM CORPORATION
B. IDEOLOGICAL/POLITICAL SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA PRC)
1. Background
Relations between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists (the Viet
Minh) existed from the late forties-early fifties, when Peking provided
support, both economic-military and ideological, to the Viet Minh during
their struggle with the French.4/ While the intent of this chapter is not
to explore the extent of PRC aid to the Viet Minh, it is important to
acknowledge that contacts had evolved between these two communist powers
prior to the time of US involvement in Vietnam. The PRC also played a major
role in the Geneva Conference of 1954 at which an armistice was signed
betweeen Ho Chi Minh's forces and French forces. Aid from the People's
Republic of China to the DRV, both economic-military and ideological,
continued in varying degrees throughout the fifties and throughout the
course of the Vietnam conflict.
2. Points of Agreement and Dis2reement Between Peking and Hanoi
Although there certainly existed many ideological and political
similarities between Hanoi and Peking during the course of the Vietnam
conflict, i: would be fallacious to assume that Hanoi followed Peking's
model on all points concerning ideology and military strategy. Selected
Chinese Comm,unists had lived and worked in Vietnam during the 1930s-1950s
"time span and had enjoyed considerable success in shaping early Vietnamese
Communist party ideology, and, particularly, military doctrines.5/ The
Viet Minh's adaptatiorn of Mao's "protracted people's war" theory to their
own struggle for independence coupled with Ho's strong desire to promote
tight-knit PRC-Viet Minh relations during the early fifties illustrates the
*; DRV's acceptance of the PRC's experience and prowess in conducting and
winning wars of national liberation. Yet, however similar early PRC-Viet
Minh policies and approaches may have been, they must be considered con-
tiguously with several other important aspects of Vietnamese-Chinese past
interactions. In the first place, the Vietnamese people in general re-
garded the Chinese with a certain amount of suspicion, an outgrowth of
6-5S
I'
THE BDM CORPORATION
a series of Chinese invasions, including the Chinese Nationalist occupation

of Vietnam in the years 1945-46.6/ Hence, while the Chinese and Vietnamese
shared nationalist aspirations in the face of foreign domination, the
Vietnamese were conc:errned that one Chinese had hegemonic intentions w~th
reýoect to Vietnam.
From carly on, the DRV desired support from the PRC, but this
aid was not to provide a convenient pretext for the PRC to establish domi-
nation over North Vietnam. 7/ Nationalist sentiment, therefore, has been a
decisive factor in PRC-DRV relations during the last three decades and most
certainly influenced the degree to which the North Vietnamese Communists
were willing to yield to PRC acivice and pressure during the course of the
Vietna•n war.
Hanoi and Peking certainly embraced common ideological and polit-
ical goals. Both acknowledged the importance of Marxist-Leninist prin-
ciples of class struggle; both were committed to the revolutionary struggle
against imperialism, capitalism and colonialism, and both desired the
establishment of a society founded on the principles of socialist-
communist ideology. However, as Hanoi's self-confidence regarding its own
abilities and capabilities developed, its desire for greater autonomy from
the PRC party line became more clearly defined. Thus, by the latter half
of the fifties, Hanoi had reached a level of ideological-political maturity
that precluded mimicking Chinese prototypes or those of any other
country.8/ They consistently maintained that their revolutionary experi-
ence and struggle with imperialism was and would continue to be a uniquely
Vietnamese experience.
The PRC's rationiale for supporting the DRV's struggle was partly
predicated on the commonality of the two nations' Asian herit.ge and their
close geographical proximity. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung perceived similari-
ties between Hanoi's and Peking's revolutionary experiences. What he
envisioned was a "people's war" waged primarily by means of guerrilla tac-
tics, launched from the countryside.9/ Mao had successfully waged a
"1people's war" in his own ciuntry, and his prestige as an international
revolutionary and communist theoretician depended upon his ability to show
the world that his revolutionary theories could be successfully implemenited
6-6
THE BDM CORPORATION
by other countries struggling against imperialism. Hence, a certain amount

of the PRC's motivation and interest in the Vietnam conflict was based on
its desire to champion a revolutionary struggle which it perceived as a
reflection of its own.
The DRV Communists did attempt to adapt some of the PRC's
domestic reform programs to their own situation.lO/ The land reform pro-
gram utilized by the PRC was the model for che North Vietnamese land reform
program during the fifties; however the results were disastrous and the DRV
state planners were eventually forced to discard the PRC model.ll/ What is
important to note here is that although the ORV attempted to utilize some
of the PRC experiences (perliaps out of gratitude for its continued economic
support throughout the fifties), it eventually realized that it must steer
its own country according to its own unique needs.12/ Thus, while the DRV
continued to seek (and to receive) aid from the PRC from the early fifties
on, it also managed to ijlVow its own course without allowing PRC domina-
tion of either its domestic or fnrrign policies.
PRC and DRV attitudes concerning several aspects of the Vietnam ,
ccoflict did not consistently correspond, a,,d at times these divergencies
c&used Peking t' diminish its level of economic and military aid to the
ORV. L, add 4 acti' i of the Soviet Union and the Unitea States pre-
,ipitatcd - ,gin PRC responses which in effect were detrimiental to Hanoi's
overall aid ; rogram. The main points of contention between Peking and
Hanoi concerned: [3
a overall military strategy for the war V
* pea:E negoti ati ons
* the desirability for a united aid program to Hanoi from the
People's Repuo.' -r of ia and the Soviet Union. 13/
An examination of eacii of these three points follows.
a. Overall Military Strategy
The Peking and H~noi military leaders maintained different
orientations concerning which mo ds of warfare were best suited for the
Vietnam conflict. After t.-e WV's 1963 decision to adopt an offensive
posture towards the South, :ýhe PRC provided an increased amount of military
6-7
..
THE BDM CORPORATION
aid to tie DRV forces.14/ This offensive eventually prompted the United
States to increase its number of troops in South Vietnam as well as to
initiate bombing raids on North Vietnam. Until the US decision to commence
bombing the North, Peking and the DRV were basically in agreement con-
cerning the conduct of the war. In essence, both the PRC and the DRV
agreed that US aggression had to be halted and guerrilla warfare seemed the
most appropriate method for realizinq this goal. Lin Piao commented,
... if they are to defeat a formidable enemy, revolu-

tionar' armed forces should not fight with reckless
disregard for the consequences when there is a great
disparity between their own strength and the enemy's.
If they do, they will suffer serious losses and bring
heavy setbacks to the revolution. Guerrilla warfare is
the only way to mobilize and apply the whole strength
of the people against -he enemy, the only way to expand
our forces in the course of the war, deplete and weaken
the enemy, gradually change the balance of forces
between the enemy and ourselves.. .15/
Howevwr, as the boinbing raids were initiated and the number

of US troops committed increased over time the emphasis of the war changed
drastically. L6/ No longer were guerrilla methods solely suitable. The
Hanoi leadership, after ample discussion, indicated that in addition to
guerrilla activities, US military aggression would have to oe countered, to
a certain degree, with heavy military hardware similar to that utilized by
VS combat troops and pilots. Up to this point, the People's Republic of
China had been providing the DRV with small arms and other supplies. As US
commitment increased, the PRC's initial response was to attempt to supply
heavier military equipment, including MIG 15 and MIG 17 jets. 17/ Prior to
the bombing raids, the Peking leadership also stated that it would be
willing to commit Chinese combat troops in Vietnam. lS/ however, the k
realities of the Chinese internal situation, both economic and political,
imposed certain important limitations on the type and amount of aid it was
able to provide.19/ In addition, the turbulence resulting from the
Cultural Revolution imposed additional constraints on the PRC's abilities
to provide adequate, long-term technical support and advisors.
6-8
THE BDM CORPORATION
Hence, the PRC was simply not equipped economically or militarily to pro-
vide Hanoi with the types of military materiel it required to counter Lis
activities. Peking could only offer equipmtvnt that was best suited for a
struggle waged by means of guerrilla tactics.
Hanoi was thus caught in a dilemma. It needed the continued
support of the PRC for, conducting anti-US propaganda as well as for ob-
taining light arms and ammunition supplies; yet the Harnoi leadership also
needed heavy military hardware in order to counter US activities. Another
supply source had to be generated in order to meet future heavy equipment
needs. The Soviet Union was the only communist country which could meet
these needs. The implications of this increased Soviet aid were many. It
not only altered Hanoi's relationship with the PRC but also served to
increase the already heightened tensions that existed between the PRC and
USSR at that time. What is important to note here is that the ?RC was not
only incapable of providing Hanoi with u.:avy materiel, it was also not
particularly willing to chance a head-in collison with the US. If the
Peking leadership was incapable of supplyin(. Hanoi with heavy materiel, it
was certainly in no position to withstand a full'-scale conflict ,vith the
US. Thus, although the PRC's criticism of the US was continually ha-sh and
militant, in actuality verbal rhetoric was the only really teasibie weapon
available to the PRC in their attacks on the US. The loss of Soviet
military assistatice and technical expertise had had a decisive influence on
the PRC.
... we shall not attack the United States. As a matter

of fact, China is not strong enough to attack America.
To tell the truth, America is a little afraid of China
and China is somewhat afraid of America. I do not
believe that the Uioited ";tates would invade present-day
China... I do not take .aparticularly pessimistic view
of relations between the United States and China.
(Chen Yi, Chines,. Foreign Minister, in 1966)20/

The PRC therefore opted to continue supplying Hanoi with i
light materiel and supplies whle simultaneously calling for the Hanoi
leadership to prepare itself for a protracted war of national liberation
6-9
THE BDM CORPORATION
with little or no external support. (The PRC's final decis ion was not
made, however, without internal dissension among Peking's key military
planners, theeventual outcome of which was the ouster of Lo
Jui-ch'ing - Peking's "hawk" who maintained the staunchest anti-US
stance. )21/
b. Peking's Views Concerning Peace Negotiations
Throughout the Vietnam conflict, Peking consistently main-
tained that peace negotiations should not be initiated until final victory
by the DRV/NLF forces had been achieved. Why was the PRC so adamantly
opposed to peace negotiations? Several important reasons can be offered.

First of all, as has been noted, Peking had provided substantial military
and economic aid to the DRV. Hence, if peace negotiations were initiated
prior to a victorious outcome of the struggle, all a'd to date would appear
to have been in vain.
A second reason becomes apparent when the following Chinese
viewpoint is considered:
China hf,3lhis -he view that conditions for negotiations

are not % ripe...we should continue fighting to bug
down the ,.-n,-my, and s;hould wait urtil a number of
socialist Lountries acquire adequate conditions for
strengthening their m'iin force croops to launch a
strong, all-out, and ranid offensive, using all types_
(italics-the author's) of weapons and heeding nc
borders. 22/
In essence, this quots concedes one essential point: the Chinese were
themselves incapable of providing the type of materiel required by the DRV,

thus the need to wait until other ocialist countries could contribute more
fully to the cause. It is difficilt to imagine what other socialist cun-
tries the PRC had in mind. Obviously the USSR and Eastern Bloc already met
the criterion of "adequate conditions". Other than the U.SR ai'd Eastern
Bloc countries, no other socialist country at that time could conceivably
gain enough militar'y strength to alter the balance of forces substantially.
Thus, it appears that the PRC was, in essence, trying to bide time to
compensate for and perhaps improve upon its own low-level capabilities.
Therefore, negotiations, at a stage considered premature by the PRC, would,
I!0
THE BDM CORPORATION
-I
* in Peking's mind, indicate ill-preparation of their ally, the DRV, -nd

would thus be indicative of a sell-out to the enemy and a failure of the
"protracted war" theory. The Chinese thesis on national liberation wars of
a protracted nature would therefore he jeopardized if peace negotiations
were initiated before a military victory couid be realized. As the Chinese
were constantly emb!'oiled with the Soviet Union over ultimate leadership of
the worlWs comm'unist movement, its reputation and hitherto improved status
in this pursuit could be badly tarnished if peace talks were initiated.
"Second, as analyst Michael Tatu points out, it is possible
that Peking did not envision a unified Vietnam as particularly desirable.
Chapter I indicates that this was the overall, long-range goal Jf the Hanoi
leadership. In China's pursuit of increased influence in Indochina, a
Vietnam under the aegis of an independently-minded Hanoi might present some
difficulties.23/ While Hanoi had consistently maintained that its primary
desire was a unified Vietnam, Chito-•A(?leadership viewed the realization of
this goal as the first stepping st.le by which Hanoi could possibly assert
domination over the eitire Indochinese area.
Finally, Chinese suspicion of the improving relations bet-
ween the US and the Soviet Union and its deer antipathy for US imperialism
and USSR revisionism, provided little motivation for lauding a peace nego-
tiation proposal. A portion oT the letter sent to Moscow, in which the
Chinese Communist party states it would not attend the CPSU 23rd Party
Congress, illustrates the depth of Chinese antagonism. It accused the
Soviet Union of:
pursuing US-Soviet collaboration for the domination of

the world; of acting it, coordination with the United
States in its plot for peace talks, of vainly attemp-
ting to sell out the struggle of the Vietnamese people
against US aggression and... of dragging the Vietnam
question into the orbit of Soviet-LS collaboration. 24/
Although other factors may have influenced Peking to reject
peace negotitations entirely, these factors appear to have been the most
"influential. After the DRV disclosed its interest in peace negotiations,
, _-
6-'.11I
THE BDM CORPORATION
relations between the Hanoi and Peking leaderships were often strained;
this in part, influenced the amount of aid provided by the PR, as well as
the frequency of diplomatic exchanges between the two countries. (See
Tables 6-1 and 6-2.)
c. Peking's Rejection of a United Sino-Soviet A'id Program To
the DRV/NLF
Although supplies and materiel were almost consistently
forthcoming from both the PRC and the Soviet Union, neither the Hanoi
leadership nor Moscow could convince the PRC to develop a inified cohesive
supDo-t prograr, to North Vietnam. Prior to the US bombing of Vietnam, the
absence of a unified support program did not appear to precen÷ major diffi-
culties to the Hanoi leadership. However, once Hanoi decided that it was
inmperative to counter US heavy armaments and bombing raids with similar
miljta.'y means, the need for a coordinated aid campaign from the outside
ccmmunist wcrld was strongly felt. 25/
Following Kosygin's February 1965 visit to Hanoi, Moscow
suggested establishment of such a joint aid program. Thek Soviet proposal
consisted of the following:
* transit rights of Soviet military weapons throngh China
0 the use of one or two airfields in Yunnan and the right to sta-
tion 500 men at these air bases
0 an air corridor over China
• permission for 4,000 Soviet military personnel to pass through
China on the way to Vietnam
a trilateral talks among Russia, China and Vietnam to discuss
details of the proposal and "uture problem.26/
The Chinese leadership refused to accept this proposal as
well as proposals subsequent.ly suggested. It is likely that the PRC leader-
ship was not at all convinced of the sincerity of the Soviet Union's inten-
tions; the presence of Soviet military personnel in China would be only
too convenient, in Chinese minds, for the USSR to utilize their presence as
a pretext for "political assistance" to the PRC:s internal affairs.27/
Relentess diatribes continued to be exchanged between the Soviet Union and
6-12
THE BDM CORPORATION
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6-13
THE BDM CORPORATION
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THE BDM CORPORATION
the PRC concerning military and economic support to the DRV. Eacn side
accused the other of failure to fulfill its commitment to the Vietnamese
people's struggle.
China condemned the Soviet Union for the inadequacy of its
supplies and materiel to the DRV.
Both in quantity and quality, the aid the Soviet Union

gives to Vietnam is far from commensurate with its
strength. It should have been easy for a big power
like the Soviet Union to provide Vietnam with several
huidred thousands tons of military supplies. But it has
only given a few tens of thousands of tons, a
deplorably meager amount. ... most of the Soviet sup-
plies consisted of weapons...and even included soi.ie
that were worn out and cf no use at all.30/
The PRC offered it own suggqstion to the USSR for bettering its supply
links with the DRV.
... Malinovsky ought to know that besides ground and air

communicatiuns,troere are sea routes to lir,k various
countries.. Tihe Soviet Union has no common boundary
with Cuba...yet it could ship racket nuclear weapons
[there]... It is not even that far from Vietnam; why
can't it ship even conventional weapons there?31/
Donald Zagoria believes that the PRC was actively trying to force the
Soviet Union into a situation in which it would clash directly with the
United States. This assessment could be correct. As the USSR and US
gradually approached detente, the Cninese leadership spared neither side
its violent condemnations. When Moscow accused PeKing of delaying its
supplies in transit to Hanoi, Peking denied the allegation as totally
ill-founded. Finally in 1967, the PRC did agree to allow Soviet supplies
and weapons through its territory with the stipulation that all shipments
were to be escorted from the Sino-Soviet border by the North Vietnamese.32/
Ironically, although the Chinese consistently stressed its
dedication to the Vietnamese people's struggle, it continually disregarded
Hanoi's pleas for united action. Although Hanoi stressed its gratitude to
both Soviet Union and the PRC for their loyal aid and support, Chinese
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opposition to a united aid program could only have caused the DRV to doubt
the total sincerity of the Chinese commitment to its cause.
3. Support Provided To the NLF BBy the Peoples' Republic of China
"To assist Hanoi in masking the NLF's subordination to Hanoi,
Peking spent cons 4 derable time and effort in singling out the NLF as the
South's great hope for conducting and winning a "protracted people's war".
Moreover, it utilized the NLF as an audience for its relentless verbal
attacks on both the US and the USSR. During the NLF's early years, Peking
solicited NLF endorsement in the mounting verbal battle between itself and
the USSR. PeKing's Liao Ch'eng-chih, chairman of the Chinese Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity ,:,r,nmitte-, stated in 1963:
The modern revisionists (that is, the Soviet Union),

however, are not only pouring cold water on the South
Vietnamese people's just struggle and trying their
utmost to diparage its world significance, but are
trying to make a very despicahle deal with the II.S.
imperialists at the expense of the South Vietnamese
people... 33/
Much of the NLF's willingness to listen to the PRC's ample propaganda
efforts may have been prompted by the fact that the PRC was willing to
recognize and deal with the NLF which, since its inception in 1960, made
continual attempts to focus world attention on its cause aod .',L•-•..ge in
the posture of a front independent of North Vietnamese contrcl. As we
shall see in the discussion of Soviet support to the National Liberation
Front, the Front was just as capable of finding ample praise for the Soviet
Union at the appropriat- moment as it was for the PRC.
As noted earlier, it is not certain that the PRC fully desired to
see a unified Vietnam. Hence, to a certain degree, it may have had hopes
that the NLF would be encouraged to become a separate, PPC-oriented
group.34/ Although Douglas Pike finds this to ba a plausible assesment, it
is nearly impossible to draw a definitive conclusion.
Numerous messages of encouragement. ana appreciation were exchan-
ged between the PRC and NLF during the Vietnam conflict. In addition,
delegates were exchanged between the two. Perhaps the most significant
moment occurred on September 11, 1964, when the NLF permanent delegation
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arrived in Peking.35/ Of the many interactions between China and the NLF,
it appears that the most active of the Chinese participants, other than
state officials, were the China Peace Committee, the Chinese Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Committee (AAPSC), and the All-China Federation of
Trade Urnions.
As additional US troops were committed to South Vietnam, the
PRC's support of the NLF cause became increasingly more vocal and militant.
The PRC had stated earlier in 1965 that it was willing to allow Chines.-
troops to fight along side the NLF forces:
We now solemnly declare that we Chinese people finn3y

respond to the NLF statement and will join the people
of the world in sending all necessary materiai aid,
including arms and all other war mat2rials, tc the
heroic South Vietnamese people whio are battling fear-
lessly. At the same time we are ready to send nuw own
men, whenever the Soutii Vietnam.ese people want them, to
fight together with the South Vietnamese... 36/
Peking did indicate however, that the tactics employed by the NLF
forces wire not always to its liking. "The Chir.ese appfeared &j:a believe
that tne NLF should have L'sed as 4 ts model the ChirLse people's antifascist
war against Japan and felt that many of its methods - the use of terror,
for example - tended to turn Vietnamese against Vietinamesa rather than to
unite them against what Chire considered the sole enemy, the United $tates.
There seems to be little doubt that the Chinese Comnmunists were appalled by
many of the NLF activities and techniqJes."37/
C. IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL SUPPORT PROVIDED BY TH3 SOVIET UNION (USSR)
1. Back riu.
Soviet-North Vietnamese relations and the e;:tent to which the
USSR provided the DRV support, bath in teriis of military-economic aid and
verbal encouragement, directly dtpended upon the nature of the political

and ideological athosphere which existed between the Soviet ,nion, the
People's Republic of Ch4 na and the United States, The intent of this
chapter is not ý;. examination of tri-laterat relations between the US,
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THE BDM CORPORATION
USSR, an.d PRC prior to, during, and after the Vietnam confli:t. However,
it would be both unwise and imprecise to undertake an examination of Soviet
aid to the North Vietnamese, without acknowledging the importance of these
tri-lateral perceptions. Soviet-DRV interactions did. not take place within
a vacuum; fluctuations in US-Soviet-Sirto relations orompted certain Soviet
responses to the North Vietr, amese. Of critical import is the nature of
Sino-Soviet relaticns during the Vietnam conflict; Figure 6-1, above,
affords an overview of the chartging relations between China and the USSR,
the schism between these two powers, and the underlying causes which
prompted ooth countries to perceive one another with ample distrust and
hostility.
The Soviet Union's attitude towards the North Vietnamese Commun-
ists lies, to varying degre-es, revolved aro.;,d its own self-interests with
regard to its role as the world's leader of communism. Although the Viet-
namese Communist Party waN the; first communist party to clim victory in a
nationalist movement after World War II, the Soviet Union rearced coolly
and with minimal enthusiasm to its successes.38/ The Sokiet Union's
response to the Viet Minh accomplishment was under+t&ndably low-key. Overt
Soviet support of the Viet Minh would have damagea French Communist chance:
for winning the election, since the French Communists maintzined that
dissolution of the French colonial empire was not their intent. 39/
In &ddition, while the Scviet Union apparently channeled some
support to the Viet Minh in the mid- to late forttes, it can be conjectured
that the Soviet Union did not regard Indochina as a particularly important
H ~ region in which to extend its influence at that time.40/ Soviet aid to the
Vietn•mese Communists did not take on any sizeable importance or proportion
until the mid-fifties. The Soviet Union seemed willing to allow the PRC to
be the pri{iary benefactor of the Viet Minh. The USSR would contribute aid
as was needed, but it waf nGt until somewhat later that the importance of
! the Soviet Union's interaction with and support of the DRV grew..
VA Hanui's perception of the Soviet Union was colored by the USSR's
performance at the Geneva Conference. Hanoi, having postponed military
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victory to come to the conference table, witnessed the reshuffling of its

priorities in favor of big-power interests and pursuits. It is likel'y that
the DRV regarded the Soviet Union with a certain degree of hostility and
suspicion for what it perceived as a sellout or compromise of its own
hard-fought goals. 41/
Although the sixties saw increased interaction between the Soviet
Union and the 0i'V Hanoi's guard was continually up in order to prevent
another similar - i;ut.. Its relations with the Soviet Union were cordial
and ald was always forthcoming in varying degrees. But Hanoi pursued its
relations w-ih the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China with an
eye cautiously open for compromising situations. The Hanoi lealership was
careful to balance its relations between Moscow and Peking, especially as
relaticns between the two deteriorated. Yet even though it depended on the
good will of both powers for the continuati3n of its struggle with US
forces, it would not opt for a relationship with either power in which its
own needs and goals would be jeopardized.
2. Sino and US Influences on Moscow's Aid to the DRV
It is extremely important to appreciate the ideological-political
support provided by the USSR to the DRV. By assessing the political and
ideological interaction between these two countries, it becomes increas-
ingly evident that the actual aid provided was greatly influenced by the
Soviet Union's perception of the DRV, by its interactions with the United
S~ates and perhaps more importantly, by the PRC's attempts to undermine
Moscow's role as the leader" of world communism. Three broad themes will be
assessed in the foliowing section.
* National liberation wars and the theory of peaceful coexistence
0 Moscow's call for a united aid program to North Vietnam
0 Moscow's views concerning peace negotiations.
These themes can be utilized as a gauge to measure Moscow's commitment to
the DRV as well as to its primary cause--maintaining its leadership
position of world communism.
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a. National Liberation Wars and the Theory of Peaceful

Co-existence
Khrushchev's theory of peaceful coexistence between states
with differing social and economic systems conflicted to a certain extent
with the PRC's (and Hanoi's) thesis of national liberation wars. While
peaceful coexistence was -obviously directed primarily at the West, and
particularly at the United States, it was with regard to North Vietnam that
this theory caused Soviet theoreticians certain difficulties. First,
although the Soviet Union did acknowledge t';e existence and importance of
national liberation wars for peoples struggling against imperialism and
colonialism, its support of this concept can only be understood witih,,, the
context of its support for peaceful coexistence. A Brezhnev policy address
published in Pravda in 1964 states:
Because we are for peaceful coexistence, we resolutely

and relentlessly oppose those who seek to violate this
peaceful ccexistence,...we rebuff the provocations of
the imperialists and any encroachments by them...on the
freedom and independence of the peoples of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America...we sapport in every way the
just struggle of these people.42/
By applaoding a theory supposedly originated by the "renegade" PRC, its own
prestige as the primary and leading formulator of communist ideology would,
in effect, be tarnished. In fact, the USSR's political theorists occasion-

ally asserted that it was in fact the Soviet Union which had oricinated and
imple.mented the world's first national liberation movement.43/ On one
hand, the Soviet Union felt compelled to support a struggle between a
fraternal communist country and the US imperialist aggressors. If it did
not, this would signify to the world's less powerful communist parties that
Moscow could not be depended upon for support, and Cherefore, that it was-
not s~nce.-e in its desire to engender worldwide communism. On the other
hand, by advocating a theory supported by the People's Republic of China
without justification, a power deliberately trying to undermine the pres-
tige of the USSR as the world's leader of communism, the Soviet Union would
in essence be demeaning its own position with regard to the world cci,,,,uiobt
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THE BDM CORPORATION
movement. Hence, the Vietnam conflict presented certain perplexing con-

tradictions to the Soviet leadership.
Yet another important question is that of the relation-

ship between the 3truggle of the international working
class and the national liberation movement of the
peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.. .These are
the great forces of our epoch. Correct coordinatirn
between them constitutes one of the main prerequisites
for victory over imperialism.
How do the Chinese comradeý. soI('k this problem? This is
seen from their new theory, a.m"crding to which the main
contradiction of our t-iv.i is not between socialism and
imperialism, but .etween the national liberation move-
ment and imperialism. The decisive forre in the strug-
gle against imperialism, the Chinese comrades maintain.
is not the world system of Socialism, not the struggle
of the international work cldss, but the national
liberation movement.
... The Chinese comrades regard as the main criterion of
revolutionary spirit recognition of the armed
uprising... (They are thereby in fact denying the possi-
bility of using peaceful forts of struggle for the
victory of the Socialist revolution...44/
(Open letter to the Chinese in Pravda, July, 1963)
Relations between the DRV and the USSR were colored to a certain
extent by their divergent points of view concerning the theory of national
liberation wars. As the Soviet leadership attempted to seek ditente with
the United States, one facet of which was the signing of the nuclear test
ban treaty in the summer of 1963, the North Vietnamese leadership could not
help but respond somewhat negatively. However, as the Vietnam conflict
evolved from a national liberation war to a local war, a situation which
was even more diametrically opposed to the theory of peaceful cuexistence,
the Soviet Union was compelled to reassess its support to Hanoi. While it
was hesitant te eoter a conflict ir which a head-on collision with thp US
might result, Moscow was tempted to use the conflict for- pursuit of its own
* interests in its dispute with the PRC. Since Hanoi desperately needed more
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THE BCIM CORPORATION
aid, of which a considerable amount would be heavy materiel, and since the
Soviet Union was the only communist country capable of fulfilling these
needs, an opportunity had developed in which the USSR could outdo the PRC.
The Moscow leadership opted to meet Hanoi's needs.
b. Moscow's Call For A United Aid Program To North Vietnam
The Soviet Union consistently called for a united
Sino-Soviet aid program in support of Hanoi's struggie with the United
States. The Peking leadership consistently rejected such a proposal. Why
was the Soviet leadership so intent on providing Hanoi with a coordinated
aid effort? Several explariations can be offered.
First. of all, if the Soviet Union could transport materiel
through Chinese territory, it cnuld thereby reduce the possibility of
interaction between the Soviet naval or merchant marine vessels and Ameri-
can vessels in the sea lanes providing access to North Vietnamese ports.
Second, by calling for a united aid program in the atmosphere of intense
hnstility which existed between the USSR and PRC, the Soviet Union, in
effect, could single out the Peking leadership as having somewhat ques-
tionable loyalties to the DRV cause. In proposing a united support camp-
aign, (realizing, most )ikely, that the PRC would reject the proposal), the
Soviet Union could achieve a more influential relationship with Hanoi as
well as indicate to the world's communist parties that it., rather than the
PRC, would do everything within its power to cssist a fraternal communist
country. Thc coviets admonished the Chinese in these terms:
The attitude of the PRC leadershir towards the struggle

of the DRV against US aggression is currently causing
great damage to the joint cause of -the countries of
socialism...The CPSU has proposed to the Chinese lea-
ders more than once that joint action to support Viet-
nam be organized, but the Chinese leadership opposed
such action...These proposals, which were received by
the Politburo of the Vietnamese Party of Labour with
approval, were not accepted by the Chinese leaders. At
the same time, t%.te PRC leadership hindered the imple-
mentatioo of the agreement of the Government of the
USSR with the Government oi the DRV on an immediate
increase in military aid for the DRV... From all this,
it becomes clear that the Chinese leaders need a
62
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THE BDM CORPORATION
lengthy Vietnamese war to maintain international

tensions... There is every reason to assert that it is
one o7 the goals of the policy of the Chinese leader-
ship on the Vietnam question to originate a military
conflict between the USSR and the United States... We
believe that the hegemonic activities of the Chinese
leaders are aimed c.t subordinating the policy of Socia-
list countries, the international Communist and
workers' movement, and the national liberation movement
to their great-power inter,,ýsts...It is not without
intention that the Chinese leaders, while criticizing
the other fraternal parties and Socialist countries
because of their alleged insufficient revolutionary
spirit and indecisiveness in the fight against imperi-
alism, show extraordinary caution in their own
I
I practical deeds... 45/
(Soviet letter to other Communist Parties, Feb, 1966)

By indicating to Hanoi that it was sincere in its desire to
provide a coordinated assistance program, it would then be possible to
exert a certain amount of pressure on the Hanoi leadership to discuss
peace, a goal which the Soviet Union also consistently maintained. How-
ever, while the Hanoi leadership was more than willing to accept aid from
the USSR and continually supported Moscow's call for a united progran, it
would not take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
c. Moscow's Views Concerning Peace Negotiations
Whereas the PRC staunchly refuspd t3 support any suggestion
of peacc% negotiations with regdrd to the Vietnam corflict, the reverse was
true of the Soviet Union. What motivated the Soviet 'eadership to persist
in promoting peace negotiations to the Hanoi Leadership?
j As the war in Vietnam intensified, Hanoi's needs for Soviet J
military assistance also increased. While in 1964 the possibility of a
communist victory seemed quite plausible, thereby prompting the Soviet
Union to consider providing more aid to the DRV/NLF, the situation that
* developed in 1965 altered the Soviet perspective. With the onset of US
bombing of North Vietnam and in the face of intensified disputes with the
People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union telt compelled to offer addi-
* ional, heavier materiel to the North Vietnamese. However, it can be
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conjectured that the Soviet Union, in its desire for improved US-Soviet
relations, was somewhat disgruntled by a more intensified situation in
Vietnam. Tne Soviet Union continued to display its displeasure with US
actions in Vietnam. Yet, it also tried to pressure Hanoi, with minimal
success, to clarify its ambiguous position regarding negotiations and to
consider resolving the conflict through peace niegotations.
Hence, the pursuit Gf detente was one important motivating
factor prompting the Soviet leadership to encourage peace talks. Another
plausible contributing influence was the Soviet Union's desire to appear as
a mediating influence and a peace-pursuing advocate, a stance which would
lend credence to its theme of peaceful coexistence. However, the USSR had
to contend simultaneously with PRC accusations that it was conspiring
against the Vietnamese people by selling out a communist cause to the
imperialist United States.
Although Hanc, did not accept the PRC viewpoint that peace
talks were an absolute impossibility, it was not to be pressured by Moscow
to begin peace talks either. Hanoi's suspicion of Soviet intentions
mitigated Soviet pressure to a certain extent. Therefore, the Soviet
Union, already. more
heavily committed to supplying North Vietnam, was
caught in a perplexirg dilemma. It did nct particularly want an open
confrontation with the US similar to the Cuban missile crisis, yet it could
not appear weak in the face of PRC allegations ana therefore lose face in
the eyes of the communist world.
3. Ideological-Political Support Provided By the USSR to the NLF
As was the case with PRC-DRV relations, so too did the Soviet
Union concentrate on the Hanoi-backed NLF as a readily attentive audience
fonP S;.propaganda efforts,
especially for those formulated to counter the
.,RC'-C. anti-Soviet attacks. The NLF, in its efforts tc muster support for
it!; cause, praised the Soviet Union as a great mcdel on which to base its
on-going revolutionary experience, however dibsimilar the USSR's model was
from its own.46/ The Soviet Union found the NLF ready to champion many of
its political ventures. The National Liberation Front willingly asserted
that the on-goi;ig conflict in Vietnam was a threat to worldwide peace and
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disarmament, a statement which the Soviet Union coula conveniently capital-

ize on in its peaceful coexistence campaign. The Soviet Union was also
interested in developing the propaganda position of the NLF as the repre-
sentative of the Vietnamese people's revolutionary mopient. By doing so,
the Soviet Union would appear as an ardent champion of revolution, a role
it desired to engender in the face of continual PRC accusations. The NLF
even went so far as to support the USSR's aecision with regard to the
nuclear test ban treaty, although a year later it was to reverse its
advocacy. 47/
According to Douglas Pike, the maior Soviet organizations in--
volved in providing support to the NLF were the Afro-Asian People's Soli-
darity Committee, the World Peace Council (Soviet Branch), and the
All-Union Central Council of Trade Uniotis of the USSR. In addition, the
Permanent Bureau of the International Ccnference for Solidarity with the
People of Vie-tnam played a substantial supportive role to the NLF, an
organization which was conveniently utilized to counter PRC charges of the
Soviet Union's sellout intentions.48/
D. ACTUAL SUPPORT (MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL) PROVIDED TO THE

DRV/NLF BY THE SOVIET UNION, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHERS
SYMPATHETIC TO THE DRV-NLF CAUSE
1. Introduction
Based on the above examination of the ideological--political
support provided by the PRC and the USSR to Hano; (as well as the NLF), it
becomes clear that certain factors influenced the relationships of those
involved. When examining actual figures for military, economic and
technical aid provided to Hanoi, it becomes even clearer that these poli-
tical-ideological interactions had a marked influence on the extent of aid
provided.
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact amount of aid prý,-
vided by one communist country to another, several reliablu estimates are
avails,>le which give a clearer picture of the extent and type of support
provided to the DRV/NLF by the USSR, PRC and by other countries or organi-
zations sympathetic to their cause.
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Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China offered
economic, technical and military assistance to the DRV. In addition, the
NLF was provided with certain aid, Itr.. majority of which appears to have
been channeled to them via Hanoi, although some medical support was pro-
vided directly by the PRC Red Cross as well as by other sympathetic coon-
tries and organizations.49/ The aid offered by the USSR and PRC was
usually provided on a long-term loan basis.50/
2. Economic and Technical Aid to the ORV/NLF
The Soviet Union's technical assistance, outside of the military
realm, consistea primarily of equipment for factories, oil and oil pro-
ducts, fishing trawlers, lorries, spare parts for machinery, tractors,
atitombiles, medical equipmnent and food (primarily wheat).51/ In addition,
the USSR provided specialists for training DRV technical personnel and
teachers.52/ Peking's economic and technical assistance consisted primarily
of machinery, road and rail construction materials, and foodstuffs.
Table 6-1 provides data oni the amount of economic (and military) assistance
provided to Hanoi by the PRC and USSR from 195,.-1971.
The nations of Eastern Europe and other Blor countries also
contributed economic and technical support to Hanoi. Although tital aid
provided by these countries did not come anywhere near the sums provided by
the PRC and the USSR, it is important to note their contributions to the
DRV's cause; Bernard Fall indicates that. Hungary provided city buses;
Poland offered sugar experts and meteorologists; the GDR sent medica,
personnel as well as a complete hospital and fishing trawler; Czechoslo-
vakia provided crop-dusting aircraft; and finally, Mongolia offered the
assistance of its cattle experts along with 100,000 head of breed
cattle.53/ These countries also provided diplomatic recognition of both
the DRV and the NLF. Later they recognized the PRG (Provisional Revolu-
tionary Goverrment of South Vietnam). ýppeihdices A, B, and C provide
information depicting those countries and organizations which maintained
diplomatic ties with the DRV, the NLF, and subsaquently the PRG.
Diplomatic exchanges between the DRV, the PRC, and the USSR were
common throughout the Vietnam conflict. Information on the number of
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THE BDM CORPORATION
exchanges which occurred trcm 1964-1971 irdicates that there were fluctua-
tions. (See Table 6-2 abo.,e). When a comparison is made of the timeline
appearing in Figure 6-1 and this table, it becomes obvious that excha1nges
diminished or increased according to the needs, goals and political moods
of these three countries.
3. Military Assistance Provided to the DRV/NLF
Figures for military aid provided by the PRC and USSR to the DRV
also appear in Table 6-1. In addition, Eastern Europe provided a -inall
amount of military assistance, althougli it was relatively insignificant in
comparison to Soviet and Chinese support. As has already been noted, the
Soviet Uniuon provided the DRV with heavy military hardware, specifica'ly
antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air missles (SAM), MIG-21 aircraft (and prior
to 1966, subsonic MIG-17 aircraft), tanks, ammunition, ships, several sub-
marines and fuel; the DRV also sent many of its military men to the Soviet
Union for pilot training.54/
In addition, Soviet military personnel were stationed in North
Vietnam in order to provide advisory assistance on the surface-to-air
Sjmissile sites.55/ The PRC provided complementary military equipment such
as semi-automatic carbines, rocket launchers, mortars, recoilless rifles,
pistols and flares.56/ Chinese military-engineers, estimated between
20,000-60,000 strong, also participated in rebuilding the DRV's airfield.;
and rail lines destroyed by US bombing raids.57/ Douglas Pike indicates
that, according to the GVN, Chinese officers assisted in combat activities
in the South; bodies of the enemy were often found decapitated (presumably
by DRV forces) in order to thwart GVN/US identification of Chinese partici--
pants.58/ Table 6-3 and Appendix D provide information on the types of
military assistance provided to the DRV forces by the USSR and the PRC
during the Vietnam conflict.
E. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS
Hanoi's capability to pursue its long-range goals in the face of

intensfied US involvement directly depended upon the external support
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provided by the USSR, the PRC, and to a certain extent, by others sympa-
thetic to its cause, Clearly, the ability of the DRV to sustain itself
both economically and militarily throughout the Vietnam conflict would have
been seriously undermined if not totally jeoparuized without this input.
Until 1972, when both the USSR and the PRC appeared suddenly more intent" on
pursuing detente with the US, Hanoi had little cause to be concerned that
outside aid would cease. The PRC and the USSR continued to provide aid
throughout the conflict. A competitive situation evolved wherein neither
the USSR nor the PRC would allow the other to outdo it in support. De-
creases in aid did occur as is evident in Table 6-1, but they were
generally shortlived. In reality, tensions existing between the USSR and
the PRC prevented overall withdrawal of support. In this context, the DRV
was in Pssence a barometer existi-ig Sino-Soviet tensions. Both the USSR
and the PRC sought to influence the DRV, each in their own way, but in the
finlal count, it was the DRV which was the least willing of the three to
yield to pressure. The DRV's adeptness in simultaneously walking the "thin
line" between its two powerful allies while, in effect, playing one power
off against the other, was indeed "the signal achievement of the wartime
Hanoi regime".60/
During the years of the Vietnam War, there vas a dramatic change in
the US perception of USSR and PRC interaction. The insight that has been
gained from observing the evolution of inter-Party relationships was 'that
communism is not monolithic. This statement appears as a truism now, but
it represents a major step forward in Western understanding of communism.
This insight serves as the foundation for current US dealings wi'h the
communist countries of the world. it may be said that the insight has been
gained and that one of the central misperceptions of the Cold War has been
corrected.
Closely related to the understanding of the workings of communism is
the appreciation of nationalism's strength as a sentiment and also as a
force that shapes people's reaction to ideologies, including communism.
The experience of the Vietnam 'conflict illustrated the vitality of nation-
alism in national communist parties. Viewing Indochina after the fall of
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the US-supported governments in South Vietnam ahd Cambodia and the neu-
tralist government in Laos, it is evident that the individual communist
parties which have replaced those governments are as thoroughly national-
istic as their predecessors. Because of this characteristic, those regimes
are determined to protect the interests of their respective nations, even
to the point of waging war. The insight recent events have provided for
the United States is as follows: even if nations are taken over by com-
munist governments, the geopolitical balance of an area may not be com-
pletely upset. There are, of course, differing degrees and kinds of affi-
liations between Lommunist regimes and Moscow or Peking. The experience of
the Vietnam conflict illustrates the importance of carefully examining the
nature of the communist party in a country and where that country fits in
the regional power equation in order to estimate accurately the impact a
government run by thLt Party might have on a region's political balance.
Another insight that can be derived from the examination of the out-
side support provided to the Communist Vietnamese is that the type of war
the United States waged was an important element in determining Hanoi's
relationship with Moscow and Peking. As noted above, the PRC was incapable
of providing the military hardware liorth Vietnam needed to answer the chal-
iengt that was posed by sophisticated American weaponry and large numbers
of US troops. As the United States increased the intensity of its assault,
the necessity of obtaining the requisite types of arnis prompted Hanoi to
draw closer to the Soviet Union. The lesson this insight-provides is that
the type of mili.iry response the United States makes to a military
situation like the Vietnam conflict may be a factor in shaping the politi-
cal outcome of a conflfit. There were many other variables that affected
the development of the close ties between the USSR and Vietnam, but Hanoi's
armament requirements in the latter part of the war must be recognized as a
significant factor in that evolution.
Throughout the conflict the United States sought to influence the sup-
ply of aid to the communist Vietnamese through negotiations with the USSR
and PRC. The thought was that the Communist superpowers might be willing
to alter their aid programs to the Vietnamese if they perceived that their
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own interests might be well served in other areas. The United States
efforts did riot have discernible, loog-term impacts an the flow of aid.
That fact provides another insight! the bargaining posrtion of the US in
the triangular relationship between the US, PRC, and USSR not was as
strong as we have at times believed. It seem% that the Russians and
Chinese respond more directly to t.he forces generated by their mutual
rivalry than to policy initiatives :-f the United States. A final insight
is that more should have been known about the roles of the USSR and PRC,
and better use should have been made of what was known.
F. LESSONS
Major communist powers such as the USSR and PRC have certain vested
interests in supporting and ensuring the success of lesser communist
nations; this suggests that an opponent of one of their surrogates would be
advised not tL elect a strategy of attrition unless there was a reasonable
assurance of a quick victory or of influencing the external supply of
resources and/or use of geographic sanctuaries over a long haul.
Close and continuous observation must be maintained over communist or
other potentially hostile states, and flexibility in interpretation is
essential to an understanding of their motives and likely courses of
action.
A locally based insurgency normally requires extensive external
support to offset an adverse balance of military and economic power; this
dependence may produce inherent contradictions which, if identified and
understood, can present opportunities for exploitation.
6-31
L.
CHAPTER 6
APPENDICES
jA
APPENDIX A
NATIONS CONSIDERED TO RECOGNIZE, DE JURE OR DE FACTO, THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM -AS OF JANUARY 9, 1973 61/
1. ALBANIA 27. IRAQ

2. ALGERIA 28. KOREA, DEM. PEOPLE'S REP OF
3. AUSTRIA 29. LAOS
4. AUSTRALIA 30. MALAGASY REPUBLIC
5. BANGLADESH 31. MALI
6. BULGARIA 32. MAURITANIA
7. BURMA 33. MONGOLIA
8. CAMEROON 34. NORWAY
9. CANADA 35. PAKISTAN
10. CHILE 36. POLAND
11. COINA, PEOPLE'S REP OF 37. ROMANIA
12. CONGO 38. SENEGAL
13. CUBA 39. SOMALIA
14. CZECHOSLOVAKIA 40. SRI LANKA
F15. DENMARK 41. SUDAN
16. EGYPT 42. SWEDEN
17. FINLAND 43. SWITZERLAND
18. FRANCE 44. SYRIA
19. GERMANY, DEM REP OF 45. TANZANIA
20. GHANA 46. TUNISIA
21. GUINEA 47. USSR
22. GUINEA, EQUATORIAL 48. YEMEN~, ARAB REPU!hLIC
23. HUNGARY 49. YEMEN, PEOPLE'S DEM. REP.
24. ICELAND 50. YUGOSLAVIA
25. INDIA 51. ZAMBIA
26. INDONESIA
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NOTES
A. The United Kingdom, which does not recognize the URV, has a Consulate
General accredited to the municipal authories of Hinoi.
B, The ICC maintains a mission in Hanoi with Canddiin, Indiani and Polish
represwntatives in it. India and Poland havw embassies there. Canada
has no other representation.
C. The DRV is recognized by Sihanouk's exile Royal Government of National

Union of Cambodia.
SOURCE: Douglas Pike, Personal Library and Files, Washington, D.C., 1978.
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APPENDIX B
COUNTRIES RECOGNIZING THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET-NAM
as of November 24, 1972 62/
1. Albania 15. Mali

2. Algeria 16. Mauritania
3. Bulgaria 17. Mongolia
4. Chile 18. Poland
5. China, People's Rep. of 19. Romania
6. Congo 20. Somalia
7. Cuba 21. South Yemen
8. Czechoslovakia 2Z. Sri L3nKa
9. Egypt 23. Sudan
10. Germany, Dem. Rep. of 24. Syria
11. Guinea, Equatorial 25. Tanzania
12. Hungary 26. Uganda
13. Iraq 27. USSR
14. Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 28. Viet-Nam, Dem. Rep. of*
29. Yemen, People's Dem. Rep. of
30. Yugoslavia
ATha Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam accredits the PRG Chief of Mission as

a "special representatives" rather than as an Ambassador.
NOTES
a. Denmark, Finland, France, Norway and Sweden have allowed the estab-
lishment of National Liberation Front for South Viet-Nam (NLF) infor-
mation offices in their capitals.
b. The PRG is recognized by Sihanouk's exile Royal Government of National
Union of Cambodia.
c. An NLF Mission exists in Jakarta, through Indonesia does not recognize
the PRG.
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APPENDIX C
NLF AND PRG RELATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC TIES: COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS 63/
Fifteen major parties and fronts (which are not in power) and 10
interratioral and national organizations have recognized the NLF (formerly)
and the PRG as the genuine and legal representative of the South Vietnamese
people.
The NLF (PRG) is a member of the following international organiza--
tions' central committees:
4 The World Council of Peace (WCP)
* The World Federation of Trade Unions (FTU)
* The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)
a The International Union of Students (IUS)
* The International Association of Journalists (IAJ)
. The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)
* The Afro-Asiar. Latin American Peoples's Solidarity Organization
* The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)
0 The International Teachers' Trade Union
* The NLF (PRG)
* Participates in 31 important international conferences including:
* The Third Congress of WFTU in Moscow (5 November 1961)
0 The Congress of the International Association Democratic Lawyers
(IADL) in Budapest (31 March 1964)
* The International Scientific Symposium in Peking (26 August 1964)
* The Congress of WCP in Helsinki (July 1965)
0 The Congress of Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity
Organization in Cuba (October 1965)
* The Fifth Congress of the WIDF in Finland (Jine 19G9)
* The Conference of WFDY in support .f thie Indochinese peoples in
France (July 1970)
* The %.,ummit Conference of non-aligned countript" in Lusaka
(September 1971)
Source: Hanoi, Vietnam Couriar
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APPENDIX D
A SUMMARY OF WEAPONS CAPTURED IN SOUTH VIETNAM PRIOR TO 1965 64/
1. Weapons and supplies of PRC origin

* 75-MM recoilless rifles
• 57-MM recoilless guns
0 Shells for 75-MM guns
* Shells for 57-MM guns
* 80-MM mortar
* 60-MM mortar
. Shells for 60-MM mortar
• 90- MM B-,zooka
* Caliber 2t-MM rocket laurichers
* Caliber 7.92-MM modal 08 Maxim machine guns
e MP-82 rockets
* TNT explosives
* Red phosphorus
* Potassium chlorate
* Cartridges for 7.92-mm. machine guns
• Detonating fuses for 60-MM mortar shells
2. Weapons and supplies of Soviet origin

0 MP-82 rifles
* Launching cartridges
* Mossin Nagant carbines (w/automatic bayonets)
0 Rifles
* Automatic pistnls
0 Grenades
* Rifle cartridges
* Submachine guns
6-39
",... . • "..f..... .!'"_,;a,•1,r,. • j, •• ".t•,•, '.,.. ,...,~~~

. , ~~~ ,x ~ ~~ *
',
THE BDM CORPORATION
3. Weapons and supplies of Czech origin

0 7.65-MM Automatic pistols
a K-50 Submachine guns
* Rifles
e Machine gun cartridges
* Grenade launchers
e 3.5" antitank bazookas
SOURCE: Aggv-ession froii the North. Washington, D.C. , Department of State
[I
6-40
THE BDM CORPORATION
CHAPIER 6 ENDNOTES
1. Melvin Gurtov, "Hanoi on War and Peace," in Vietnam and American

Foreign Policy, ed. J. R. Boettiger (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath &
Co., 1968). p. 59.
2. Causes, Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War, Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninety-Second Congress, 2nd Session,
May 9, lO, 11, 1972. (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, 1973), p. 177.
3. The important events listed in the chronology were selected by the BDM
Study Team from the documentation reflected in these endnotes, passim.
In particular, Keesing's Research Report. The Sino-Soviet 0p' te (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969) and Edgar Sn• w, Red Star Over
China (New York: Grove Press, 1961) prnvided excellent data for the
compilation of this figure.
4. King C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954, (Princeton, New Jersey:

Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 243, 252-260. and Douglas S.
Blaufarb. The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance.
(New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 11-13.
5. Ibid.
6. King C. Chen, "Hanoi vs Peking: Policies and Relations - A Survey,"
Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 9 (September 1972), p. 807.
7. Ibid.
8. Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle. Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, New York:
Pegasus, 1967), p. 104.
9. Michael Tatu, "Moscow, Peking and the Conflict in Vietnam," Vietnam
Legacy. The War, American Society and the Future of American Foreign
Policy, (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 23.
10. Melvin Gurtov, "Hanoi on War and Peace,' In Vietnam and American
Foreign Policy, ed. J. R. Boettiger (Lexington, Mass: 5. C. Heath &
Co., 1968), pp. 59, 67.
11, Geoffvey Jukes, The Soviet Union In Asia, (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1973), p. 208.
12. Raymond L. McGovern, "Moscow and Hanoi," In Vietnam and American
Foreign Policy, ed., J. R. Boettiger (Lexington, Mass.: DC. Heath &
Co., 1968), p. 74.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
13. Chen, pp. 809-813.
14, Ibid., p. 807.
15. Zagnria, p. 81.
16. General Willian C. Westmoreland Report on Operations in South Vietnam

January 1964 - June 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1968), p. 84 stated that in 1964 "Hanoi had determined that the time
was ripe to begin the final and decisive "mobile" phase of the war,
which would lead to the collapse of the government and 3 complete
Commu(ist victory. This unmistakably, is the significance of the
enemy decision in 1964 to Legin to form Viet Cong divisions and to
start the southward 6eployment of regular NVA forces."
17. Chen, p. 808.
13. Roger Swearingen and Hammond Rolph, Communism in Vietnam, (Chicago,
Illinois: American Bar Association, 1967), p. 149.
19. 'ucian W. Pye, "China in Context," Vietnam and American Foreign

"_olipy, (Lexington, M•ass: D. C. Heath & Co., 1968), p. 102; David P.
Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," in Vietnam and American
Foreign Policy. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1968), p. 88.
20. Zagoria, p. 97. Despite thtis and other indications that the Chinese
were nct likely to intervene with ground or air combat forces in
Vietnam, the US perception at the time (at least the perception of
President Johnson and the Secretaries of State and Defense) held
that PRC intervention was a possibility if US acticns were provocative
to China.
21. Ibid., pp 69-91.
22. U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian, "The Position of

North Viet-Nam on Negotiations," Vietnam Docdments and Research Notes,
Doc. No. 8, October 1967, P. 5.
23. Tatu, pp. 24-25.
24. Keesing's Research Report, p.88.
25. Chen, p. 813.

26. Ibid., p. 809.
27. Chen, p. 809 and Zagoria, p. 50.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
28. Table 6-1 is based on Chen, p. 815. For a highly interesting and
provocative commentary regarding CIA estimates of USSR and PRC aid to
North Vietnam during the 1967-1974 period, see Frank Snepp,
Decent Interval (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 161-162.
M. Stiepp contends that the agency's aid estimae4 •,ere "a travesty,
not only on the intelligence but also on their- irMtegyKLy.... The final
tabulation showed that while total foreign assistance to North Vietnam
had risen to unprecedented levels in 1974, the jump had been in
economic rather than military aid categories. If you were trying to
prove Hanoi's 'aggressive' intent ... , just the reverse resulted.
29. Table 6-2 is based on Chen, p. 814.
30. Zagoria, p. 54.

* 31. Ibid.
32. Tatu, p. 28.
33. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong. rhe Organization and Techniques of the
National Liberation Front ofTouth Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass., and
London, England: The-a.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 336.
34. Ibid., p. 330.
35. Ibid., p. 334.
36. Ibid., p. 338.
37. Ib 4 d., p. 339.
38. Zagoria, p. 27.
39. Ibid., pp. 27, 100.

40. Zagoria, p. 100. Jukes, :,v 205-206; and Evelyn Colbert, Southeast
Asia in International Poji s 1941-1956 (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1977), pp. 61-62, 80.
41. Ibid., pp. 41. Ambtssador U. Alexis Johnson described how Chou en-Lai
and V. M. Molotov drew DRV delegate Pham Van Dong aside at the 1954
Geneva Conference to prevail on him to accept the "temporary" parti-
tion of Vietnam until nationwide popular elections could be held in
1956. Interview at BDM 13 September 1978.
42. Claude Constant Gau, "Communist Wars of National Liberation and the
Sino-Soviet Dispute" (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University,
1967), p. 302, quote originally appeared in Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, December 30, 1964, p. 20.
6-43
THE BDM CORPORATION
43. Ibid. p.307.
44. The Zino-Soviet sp ite., p. 56.
45. Ibid., pp. 339.
46. Pike, p. 339.

47. Ibid., p. 341.
48. Ibid., p. 342.
49. Ibid., p. 337.
50. Bernard Fall. The Two-Vietnams. A Political and Military An~lyss,

revised ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), p.
175. It is important to remember that both the 'ISSR and the PRC, as
rivals for the leadership of the "wo-ldwide communist revolution," hrazý
a substantial interest in a North Vietnamese. victory so long as that
victory was achieved with their apparent support and guidance.
51. Ibid., pp. 175-176; Jukes, p. 212.
52. "Dimensions of Soviet Aid to North Vietnam," IRS/AF Vietnam Unit

Report, (August 1965, from the personal library of Douglas Pike), p.
2.
53. Fell, 175.

54. Tatu, p. 31; 7 agoria, p. 51; Maj Gen. A"N, L. Mikryukov and Col. V.
Babic2,. "Oevelopment of Fighter Aviation Tactics S~nce World War II,"
'r "nno-Istoricheskiy Zhitrnal, No. 5, May 1977, p. 32.
55. Zagoria, p. 51.
56. Pike, p. 337.

57. Tatu, p. 24. i
58. Piike, p. 338.
59. TaLlG S-3 is based on data in Central Intelligence Agency, Iatelli-

gnce Memorandum 8 December 1967 "A Review of the Situation in Vietnam,"
' No. 08753/67.
60. Gurtov, p. 59.

61. Appendix A was prepared by BDM analysts from a series of documents in
the personal library and files of Douglas Pike, Washington, D.C.,
1978.
6-44
" THE BDM CORPORATION
43. Ibid. p.307.

44. The Sino-Soviet Dispute., p. 56.
45. Ibid., pp. 339.
46. Pike, p. 339.

47. Ibid., p. 341.
48. Ibid., p. 342.
49. Ibid., p. 337.
50. Bernard Fall. The Two-Vietnams. A Political and Military Analysis,

revised ed. ,New York: Frederick A. Fraeger, Publishers, 1964), p.
i75. It is important to remember that both the USSR and the PRC, as
rivals for the leadership of the "worldwide conwnunist revolution," had
a substantial interest in a North Vietnamese victory so long as that
victory was achieved with their apparent support and guidance.
51. Ibid., pp. 175-176; Jukes, p. 212.
52. "Dimensions of Soviet Aid to North Vietnam," IRS/AF Vietnam Uniit

Report, (August 1965, from the personal library of Douglas Pike), p.
2.
53. Fall, p. 175.
54. Tatu, p. 31; Zagoria, p. 51; Maj Gen. AVN, L. Mikryukov and Col. V.
Babich. "Development of Fighter Aviation Tactics Since World War II,"
Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 5, May 1977, p. 32.
55. Zagoria, p. 51-

56. Pike, p. 337.
57. Tatu, p. 24.
58. Pike, p. 338.

59. Table 6-3 'isbased on data in Central Intelligence Agency, Intelii-
gence Memorandum 8 December 1967 "A Review of the Situation in Vietnam,"
SC No. 03753/67.
60. Gurtov, p. 59.
61. Appendix A was prepared by BDM analysts from a series of documents in
the personal library and files of Douglas Pike, Washington, D.C.,
1978.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
62. Appendix B, Ibid.

63. Appendix C is from the Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, (in English)
21 December 1970, p. 41.
64. Appendix 0 is from Department of State, Aggression From the North
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1965).
64
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THE BDM CORPOAATION
CHAPTER 7
CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the major domestic and international constraints

on the policies of the North Vietnamese and the NLF leadership. By the
term "constraint' is meant a condition which limited the freedom of a-ctions
of the North Vietnamese leadership in its attempts to gain political con-
trol in the South and which its leadership had to work around or attack
with diligence over an extended period of time. This chapter is organized
into three sections:
e The major goals and policies of the leadership
* Long-standing international and domestic constraints on policy
e Major changes in constraints - conflict environment
B. MAJOR GOALS AND POLICIES OF THE LEADERSHIPS OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
As explained in Chapter 1, the manjor goals of the North Vietnamese

leadership were first, to consolidate the North economically and politi-
cally and second, to reunify Vietnam under Lao Do.,, Party control.I/ The
major goal of the leadership of the National Liberation Front was to gain
political power in South Vietnam in any way possible.2/ There were three
basic a•nd distinctive types of policy options available to the leaderships
to'attain these goals, (1) political and diplomatic, (2) armed struggle,
and (3) the talk-fight strategy.
1. Among the many variations of political and dipiomatic options,
five stand out as having been major and distinctive:3/
0 Country-wide electierns
0 Assistance from the French iii enforcing provisions of the Geneva
Agreements of 1954
0 Political activity in South Vietnam to gain the support of the
population ard promote revolution in South Vietnam
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V~K*
THE BDM CORPORATION
* Accommodation with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam

(GVN), with provisions for creation of a coalition government
(with the intentior of gaining complete control as soon as
possible)
a Negotiated settlement with the GVN and United States.
2. Among the variants of armed struggle, three stand out as having
been major and d)stinctive. These were:
0 General uprising,
I
* Guerrilla warfare, and
* onventional military operations.
3. The third type of policy alternative, frequently referred to as
the "Talk-fight" strategy, consisted of engaging in negotiations with the
enemy while continuing to fight him on the battlefield with any combination
of the armed struggle options.
"The following sections of this chapter will examine the major domestic
and international constraints on the implementation of these policies by
the North Vietnamese and NLF.
C. LONG-STANDING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY
1. International Constraints
a. Geographical Realities that Required Obtaining Bases and
Sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia
Prior to the regularization of an American naval presence in
the South China Sea, the DRV was able to move supplies into South Vietnam
through coastal waters. However, lacking an amphibious w•arfare caoability,
the '.RV could ,iot expect to seize the RVN from the sea. An overt military
drive southward was possible but less attractive than a flanking movement
from the western hills of the Annamite Chain. Main force operations along
the coast were difficult throughout the period of American• presence in
Vietnam because of the effectiveness of air power and naval interdiction
and terrain compartmentalization. Concentrations of PAVN troops, supplies
and equipment in Laos and Cambodia, however, were subject only to air
attacks and minor ground-force incursions. The DRV treated Southeast Asia
7-2
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THE BDM CORPORATION
as a single theater of operations; therefore, Lacs and Cambodia formed part

of the Rear, to their thinking. An ineffective neutralist government in
Laos and the presence of friendly Patnet Lao forces along the Vietnam-Lao
burder allowed the North Vietnamese to overcome this constraint by means of
a fairly permanent presence of large and growing numbers of North
Vietnamese service troops operating the Ho Chi Minh Trail and its way
stations, supply dumps, rest areas, and eventually, POL pipelines.
Clearly the DRV leadership focused on consolidating their
position in North Vietnam as a matter of first priority; second they moved
towards unification of Vietnam while confining their activities in Laos and
Cambodia to those measures necessary to support their war effort. Hegemony
over all of the former colonies of Indochina wouid follow later.
The significance of the North Vietnamese long-term effort to
overcome their supply problems was that the DRV could not successfully have
waged its war in the South without the sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia.
Existence of the sanctuaries and of kAerica's "secret war" against them may
have been one of the war's worst kept secrets, but the United States was
alone in receiving criticism for operations against the sanctuaries while
the North Vietnamese suffered few international constraints because of
their activity in establishing and maintaining them.
b. Dependence on Foreign Aid
The DRV's overall ability to wage a protracted struggle was
determined both by the availability and the extent of aid recelved from
countries and organizations sympathetic to its cause. Without foreign aid,
the viability of Hanoi's military struggle in the South and economic
development in the North would have been seriously weakened or even
destroyed. Food, supplies, heavy and light arms., and technical equipment
and assistance were all essential elements of Hanoi's aid requirements. As
the war progressed two factors intensified this dependence. First, because
of the effects of the bombings, the North's economy became increasingly
dependent on outside aid and, second, the requirement for more sophisti-.
cated weapons to defeat the RVNAF on the battlhfield required larger
amounts and moie sophisiticated types of armaments. Although foreign aid
7-3
11,j.
THE BDM CORPORATION
and encouragement were received, Hanoi did have to deal with the realities
of an ever-changin(c internotional political scene, especially realities
affected by the Sino-Soviei. split described in Chapter 6. In particular,
Chinese refusal to provide a unified Sino-Soviet aid effort posed at least
a minor constraint on the military efforts of the DRV and the NLF. How-
ever, Hanoi was generally successful in its efforts to gain foreign support
and was able to formulate its policies without severe limitations or con-
straints due to outside interests or interference.
c. Limitations of Entry Points for International Aid
As pointed out in Chapter 5, North Vietnam relied strategi-
cally on three external lines of communication. First, the road and rail
network leading into the North from the PRC provided a secure means for the
transportation of urgently needed supplies. Second, they depended on
supplies funnelled through Haiphong and a few minor Northern ports. Third,
Kompong Som, better known as Sihanoukville, provided strategic access to
ýhe southern regions of South Vietnam; and Cambodian trucks moved supplies
from the port city eastward to the PAVN base areas controlled by the
Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN),
North Vietnam depended on the vital links with China and the
international shipping that offloaded at Haiphong. Both networks were
needed to meet cortinuing and long-range requirements, but the DRV could
subsist indefinitely, though at a reduced scale, as long as one of the
networks functioned.
2. Domestic Constraints
Major policy statements of high-level party and military leaders
during the Vietnam war reveal a repeated concern with domestic affairs.
This section will cvaluate the major domestic constraints upon the implemon-
tation of internai policies and program! within Vietnam.
a. Vietnamese ReQicnalism
Although the total population of the DRV was larger, by two
or more million, and was more homogeneous than was that of the RVN, the
options open to the cnmmunists "ere limited by strono Vietnamese
regional im.
7-4
THE BDM COPPORATION
While communist propaganda dwelt continually upon the unity

of Vietnam and the desire of the people for unification, historically there
has been great suspicion and distrost among the people of the three regions
of Viztnam; Tonkin (North), Annam (Center) and Cochin China (South).
According tV. his Tonkinese counterparts, the average Cochin Chinese was
lazy, ill-disciplined, carefree, and a spendthr'ift. The arrogance and
disdain of the Tonkinese created major problems for the communists as 0heir
proselytizing effort in the South became more dependent or Northerners.
The ethnic and religious mix of the people in the RVN was a
problem that was never really solved by the Viet Minh or the NLF. Except
for the Cathoiics and the other refugees from the North, few of these
sizeable minorities were enthusiastic about the Diem regime, but neither
were they very receptive to the communist programs. In 1965 it was esti-
-mated that there were over 1.5 million Catholics, 800-000 to 1.2 million
Chinese, 400,000 Khmers, 700,000 or more Montagnards, about 200,000
Protestants, 2 million Cao Dai, and 1.5 million Hoa Hao. Out of an
estimated poplation of 16.1 million, these minorities added up to a size-
able group J.f people, generally "off limits" to the Viet Minh and NLF
reci'ui ters. 4/
b. Manpower Shortages
j Many factors affected the enemy's continual need for replace-
my roops in the armed struggle. Heavy casualties, severe logistical re-
ouirements and population movements during the course of the war were among
the major constraints on maintaining an adequate manpower pool.
The big-unit battles, fought from mid-1965 through early
1969, took a heavy toll on both stdes, but especially of PAVN & PLAF main
-force units; US firepower and air mobility wer,- too potent for the latter
to overceime. Their replacements became increasingly younger, less well-
trained and indoctrinated.
The NLF never really recovercd from the catastrophic loss of
key cadres suffered during the '1968 Tet offensives. Experienced cadres
were the keystone of the communist effort in the South. Without large
numbers of well-trained, highly motivated cadres, the affort to organize
7-5
THE BDM CORPORATION
any kind of Scuthern insurgency against the GVN was doomed. 6?cause of the
extremely heavy casualties suffered by the PLAF during the 1968 Tet offen-
sive and the follow-up at',ack.s, most of the Southerners in PLAF main force
units were replaced primarily with Northerners because of the general
inability of the communists to recruit Southerners to fight for this cause.
This created a strain on manpower resources and eroded the once-strong
local ties to the family and village social structure.
c. Limitations in Mater i el Reiources
During both the first and second Indochina wars, the DRV
leadership experienced a continual strain in maintaining the flow of
essential supply items to the combat and logistical forces. The DRV had
neither the industrial nor agricultural bases sufficient to support a
large-scale p-otaracted war.
Many factors influenced the supply of foodstuffs (particu-
larly rice) to the population of North Vietnam. Agricultural methods,
weather conditions, transportation capabilities and land availability were
a few of the elements which affected the DRV's ability to maintain food
production, overtime.
The North Vietnamese leadership attempted to respond to
economic hardships by increasing the national output of secondary food
crops such as corn, sweet potatoes, cassava and peanuts. By 1965, the
production of these food staples had improved the food situation; however,
tney remained minor outputs and continued to require substantial capital
investment.
Depleted supplies of rice and other foodstuffs may have
resulted in a decrease of popular support for the party leadership. Esti-
mates of the rice deficit ran from approximately 200,000 tons to nearly
one-half mil]ion tons per year._5/ Inflation was rampant and black market-
eering flourished. By 1972, DRV press reports cited, among other abuses,
incidents of hoarding, economic speculation, illegal trade and economic
sabotage. 6/
The North Vietnamese leadership deviated sharply from its
overriding goal of economic self-sufficiency by dramatically increasing
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THE BDM CORPORATION
overt reliance on Soviet and Chinese "loans" of steel, cotton and yarn,
chemicals, medicines, and mechanical equipment. The Soviet Union sold pow-
er and electrotechnical equipment, ball bearings, cable, chemicals and
cloth to North Vietnam. The extensive trade agreements with the PRC and
the Soviet Union confirm the DRV's inability to expand e.conomic production.
d. Ideological Constraints
In a limited sense, doctrine is the application of ideology
in the decision-making process. The conduct of Hanoi's policy-making
during the course of the war reveals a pragmatic adjustment of accepted
doctrine, as required 4,o achieve goals. The cfmmunist leaders made
numero% , serious, costly military mistakes during the war. Those mistakes
usually oczurred because of faulty estimates of the situation or an
inability to evaluate the nature and strength of American reaction to some
communist action. These failures on their part can be traced to the
influence of their communist ideology and their politico-military philo-
sophy in which they believed whole heartedly. Conversely, having
experienced failure, the i.ommunists were generally able to reassess their
strategy and adopt a different course of action.
Examples of the impact of the constraint
communist of
ideology upon the Hanoi leadevs'iip reach back to the beginning of the
conflict. The communists believed they were the wave of the future, and
they could not believe that Diem would be able to establish a credible
government. Faced with the reality of growing ARVN strengths and GVN
internal growth, the Hanoi leadership turned to the combination of politi-
cal and armed struggle that had served them so well against the French.
The commu,,ists believed they would be the beneficiaries of the kind of
popular support they received in the Viet Minh war. They were not. They
believed the Southerners could be organized to overthrow the Saiqon govern-
ment. They seriously miscalculated the kind of support they would receive
and after 1964 had to commit increasingly larger numbers of Northerners to
maintain their campaign in the South.
Evidence indicates that the communist leaders continued to
select their strateýgies on the basis of their ideological beliefs up until
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the failure of the 1968 Tet Offensive.7/ The failure of the Southern
population to join the general uprising and tc support the general offen-
sive of the PLAF was a dramatic demonstration of the vast difference
between the objective situation in the South and the interpretation of that
situation dictated by communist ideology. That failure indicated clearly
that the communists were not goingk-o topple the Saigon government by
organizing the resentment and class hatred of the South Vietnamese masses.
Thereafter, the Hanoi leadership sought to accomplish its objective mainly
by the application of North Vietnamese military might, although efforts
were made by COSVN to revitalize the PRP and its military arm; the PLAF.8/
In ltunching the 1972 attack upon the ARVN, the communist
leadership did not rely on the so-called "southern insurgency" for any
significant contribution. The assault was a classic large unit military
attack against the ARVN. The communist leaders were ill-prepared for the
US response, but they also underestimated the strength and tenacity of the
South Vietnamese military. The Hanoi leadership had to change their
tartics until the North Vietnamese Army was better armed and when politics
would neutralize US power before they could accomplish their military
conquest of Sooth Vietnam in 1975. Vietnamese Communist nationalism was
the L:ief component in the Hanoi leadership's commitment to reunification.
As ;uch, it was the driving factor that led the communists to ultimate
victory. But while nationalism was the driving factor, it was communist
ideology and politico-military theory that were applied, often with
disastrous results.9/
3. Military Constraints
a. Tactical
The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) was structured along
conventional lines. The first five years of PAVN operations within RVN
were characterized by conventional light infantry tactics with a libera,
dose of guerrilla warfare. Lacking air support, heavy-weapons support and
helicoptir mobility, the PAVN were constrained from reling on conventional
military operations (Phase Three) to achieve victory. During the US
military presence in RVN, several costly, large-scale battles were fought
7-8
but superior US firepower and mobility handed the communists a series of

tactical defeats.
The People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) of the National
Liberation front consisted of main force units and guerrilla units. The
latter included paramilitary, regional-territorial, and local
guerrillas.lO/ The main force units included several full divisions and
independent regiments and battalions, but like their PAVN counterparts they
had limited heavy weapons support. They, too, were constained from direct,
large-scale engagements in the face of superior US firepower and helicopter
mobility except when it suited their purpose to fight such engagements.11/
In the guerrilla area, however, demonstrated their superior foot mobility
and capitalized on their knowledge of the terrain and the local situation.
b. Tactical/Logist'cal
A combination of political, physical, and organizational
factors lengthened the time needed by the DRV to implement a selected
strategy. In such a process, at least when implementation of a given
strategy depended upon new or additional materiel support from the USSR or
PRC, it was probably necessary to obl-ain the concurrence of either Moscow
or Peking with the strategy.l2/ Then appropriate weaponry had to be
obtained from the USSR or China, and after the weapons were obtained and
training in their use accomplished, they had to be moved to the South over
the transportation system developed in the course of the war. Aside from
these kinds of materiel problems that slowed the implementation of stra-
tegies, the communists also had signifirant organizational requirements
that were time-consuming. Thus, for instance, preparation for the general
offensive and general uprising required the careful organization and indoc-
'•rination of the forces that would be employed months in advance. These
iong lead times required to implement selected strategies necessarily
constrained North Vietnamese military plVnners.
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0. MAJOR CHANGES IN CONSTRAINTS - CONFLICT ENVIRONIMENT
Between the end of World War II and the fall cf Saigon 30 years later,
there were five distinct periods during which the Lao Dong leadership might
have achieved their primary long-range goal: an independent and unified
Vietnam under Party control. Each of these opportunities except the last
was missed due to a varying mix of external and internal constraints
inherent in the changing conflict environment, which consisted of politi-
cal, psyclhological, military and geographic elements. In this section,
those forces which significantly frustrated or restricted the policies of
the Party's central committee in the years between 1956 and 1975 will be
discussed.
1. 1954-1956
a. Background and Opportunity
The Geneva Accords called for nation-wide "free" elections
in 1956. Ho and the Viet Minh Comnmunists successfully associated them-
selves with nationalism and anti-colonialism; they appeared almost certain
to win any election.13/ There was a distinct possibility that unification
under Lao Dong might be achieved ever earlier through the collapse of the
weak Bao Dai regime. Actually, the leadership in the North benefited from
this enforced respite, since they had mo•'e time to consolidate their new
"base" and prepare for the expected takeover in the South.
b. External Constraints
Since the French were co-signers of the Accords, the Central
Committee expected them to exert diplomatic influence in the enforcement of
the agreements. This hope received a setback when the anti-French Ngo Dinh
Diem was appointed premier with US support; it was completely dashed in
1955 when he was elected president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and
later announced that there would be no elections in 1956.14/
The increasing US support, political, military, and eco- 1
nomic, for the rival RVN precluded a quick political takeover of the South,
and raised considerably the potential costs of a military effort. The 1955
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plebecite granted Diem's government (GVN) a basis for legitimacy and inter-
national recognition and support, especially from those nations fearful of
communism. Tte exodus from the North to the South of nearly ai million
people, the majority of them Catholic, provided the US and GVN wvth an
effective propaganda weapon to employ against the communists. The depar-
ture of this group was probably privately endorsed and encouraged by the
Lao Dong 'leadership since it removed a significant number of potentlal
res, sters to their programs. 15/
To the amazement of nearly every informed observer, Diem
brought more than a measure of order and unity out of the confused hetero-
geneous mix he inherited. As stated earlier, the communist posture in the
RVN was much weaker than it was in the North; under heavy pressures from
the newly created Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, the stay-behind cadres
became steadily weaker through desertion, capture, ard death until they
reached their nadir in 1959.16/
c. Internal Constraints
The inexperience, and too often overzealousness, of many of
the communist cadres in the DRV created resentment and even periodic open
resistance. This resistance to forced collecti-ization came to an armed
clash in Nghe An, Ho Chi Minh's nativi priv.it,.-e, in 1956; it took a full
PAVN division to suppress the uprising at the coc6 of perhaps 6000 farmers.
(This was little noticed in the world due to the closed society of the DRV
and the attention accorded the revolt in Hungary.) Extensive war damage,
inept administraturs, inefficient collectivization, and the loss of about
900,000 rice farmers of the Red River Delta, those who regrouped in the
South, created a large shortage of food; a major famine was averted only
through a rapid rescue effort by the USSR.
2. 1965
a. The Situation and Opportunity
The exclusion af the peaceful options for reunification plus
the decimation of the residual Viet Minh cadre in RVN during the late
1V.50's resulted in the 1959 Lao Cong decision to reinfor-ce the political
struggle with the military armn beginning in that year. The formation in
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THE BDM CORPORATION
1960 of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and of the People's Liberation
Armed Forces (PLAF) to carry out the anti-Diem and anti-US struggle in the
South committed the Lao Dong Party to the reunification-by-force policy.
(Although the tactics and means changed with circumstances, this policy
remained constant for 15 years). The increasing successes of the NLF and
PLAF in both the political and military fronts in the early 1960s pointed
out to keen observers the fragility of the Diem regime. After the United
States lost patience with Diem and his brother Nhu over the mishandling of
the Buddhist protest movement, the brothers were overthrown and killed by
RVNAF leaders. Political chaos followed, seriously degrading GVN's legiti-
macy as well as its military effort. By the end of 1964, the RVN was
losing, on the average, one battalion and one district capital per week.
The end was in sight. By the end of the year, three regular PAVN regiments
were in RVN or in Laotian base camps opposite the Central Highlands. Ho
and Giap wanted to ensure that they would be in a position of strength at
the collapse of the GVN.17/
b. External Constra, nts
The intervention of US ground, air and naval forces in the
war closed out, at least temporarily, the possibility of a military victory
in the South; it took the Central Committee three years to accept this
fact. The widening split between the USSR and the PRC required the DRV to
walk a narrow and delicate balance beam in order to ensure the essential
military and economic aid.
Except for some internal debate among the leadership of the
Party about overcoming the US effort, there were no significant restraints
on their freedom of action at this time.
3. 1968
a. The Situation and Opportunity
The decision to try to defeat the US forces in battle cost
PAVN and PLAF severe casualties. It created a situation where both
opponents were employing strategies of attrition. By the end of 1967 the
enemy main force units had been pushed back to or across the borders of the
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THE BDM CORPORATION
RVN. There they reinforced, re-equipped and planned for the next round.
There was a lengthy and spirited debate between various factions of tht?
leadership about whether to retreat to guerrilla or protracted war, or
continue the semi-conventional big battles. The decision resulted in the
bold and imaginative Tet Offensive, a simultaneous assault into the heart
of the major cities and government towns. Their intent was to bypass major
US forces - except for drawing them to the borders in War Zone C and at Khe
Sanh -, and unravel GVN by creati ig mass uprisings in the cities and engen-
dering wholesale desertions from RVNAF. ,8/ Had these events come to pass,
the US would have been in an untenable position.
As a result of the Tet debacle most of the enemy leadership,
reluctantly, had come to realize that the firepower and air mobility of the
US military made it too costly, if not-impossible, to overcome in direct
battle; the war would have to be won, if at all, in Washington as the
earlier French-Viet Minh war had been won in Paris.
The ever-expanding scope of the war made Hanoi increasingly
dependent on outside military and economic aid. Any major offensive or
increase in force structure required the blessings of both Moscow and
Peking well in advance if the essential materiel were to arrive in time.
The need to olacate both of these rival supporters became all-importanv and
more difficult.
The larger the units employed and the greater the supplies
needed, the more reliable the safe passage needed to be to the South. This
necessity demanded that the eastern portions of Laos and Cambodia be firmly
under PAVN control, which consumed a large number of men.
The air war over the DRV also tied up vast amounts of human
and material resources for air defense, reconstruction, and resupply.
(Ironically, this air compaign assisted the Lao Dong Party in unifying
their people and in mobilizing women.) Significant reserves had to be
retained in the DRV to counter possible airborne and amphibious
1andi ng3. 19/
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The 1967 elections in the RVN had provided the government

much needed stability and a sense of legitimacy, which was lacking since
the overthrow of Diem. Additionally, the intervention of large and power-
ful US forces provided RVNAF with the . 1,)ortunity to regroup and retrain.
(Apparently the full extent of these two turnabouts was not fully appreci-
ated in Hanoi.)
The rugged terrain and the climate (two opposing monsoons)
hi Indochina became an even greater impediment as the scale and nature of
the fighting escalated. Also, the US Navy and the expanding VNN had prac-
tically sealed off the coast of RVN to infiltration. These factors meant
that more men, time, and effort had to be expended to extend and improve
the Ho Chi Minh Trail(s).
The attrition of men in the South and the visible destruc-
tion in the DRV, though they aided in mobilizing the people of the North,
did create serious morale and efficiency problems. The absolutely
essential "secure base" in the North was endangered, seriously.
The total demands for manpower--at home, on the trail , and
in the South--were steadily climbing. Many of the replacements sent to
the South were too young or too old and ill-trained. Although they never
reached the bottom of their manpower pool, they had to strain extremely
hard to meet the minimum needs of all fronts.
A combination of commitment to communist ideology and/or
outright false reporting from their leaders in the South led Giap and the
Central Cuinmittee to make serious errors in their political and military
planning for the 1968 offensives. The general uprising never materialized.
4. 1972
a. Situation and Opportunity
Despite their heavy losses, the enemy had won major psycho-
logical victory in Washington as a result of the Tet Offensive. The
crucial attrition suffered in the ranks of the NLF/PLAF, however, con-
strained the communists from any future attempts to achieve a general
uprisi-g. Without an effective Southern apparatus, an uprising was no
longer possible. New strategies seemed necessary.
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The unilateral halt of bombings, the plea for negotiations,

and the withdrawal of President Johnson from the 1968 election gave the
enemy new life and confidence. The withdrawal of US forces and the
emphasis on Vietnamization and Pacification resulted in a major dilemma for
the enemy. On the one hand, it was obvious that the US was backing out of
the war, irrevocably, and that before too long it would be the DRV against
only the RVN. But conversely, both the NLF and the PLAF were sorely
wounded and PAVN was in no condition to render them sufficient aid to
reverse the downward trend.
The period from 1969 through the first quarter of 1972 was
the "golden days" of the RVN. Its power and confidence grew as more ter-
ritory and more people than ever were brought under governmental control;
the large number of refugees who fled the countryside for the cities
further reduced the recruiting base of the NLF/PLAF.
The Central Committee debated painful alternatives: return
to guerrilla war or continue to expand the big unit war. The decision was
for a practical compromise: interim "super guerrilla" war (widespread
attack by elite sappers and standoff mortar and rocket attacks to create
uncertainty, casualties, and headlines), and the organizatinn, equipping,
and training of larger and more modern conventional units. The former
mode provided time for the latter to develop without surrendering the
overall initative to tneir opponents, and at least cost. The on-again-off-
again negotiations with the US also bought time and propaganda gains.
In 1971 the enemy decided that they would have to act deci-
sively soon or their strength in RVN would be totally neutralized. Yet
they also had hope, since the US strength in RVN was declining rapidly,
especially in ground forces who were committed primarily to a self-defense
role. The rough handling they gave the RVNAF during their attack into Laos
(Lam Son 719) gave them additional confidence.
Internationally, the odds appeared to be on their side.
Although Vietnamization and the drastic reduction in US casualties had
temporarily defused the antiwar movement in the US, the violent reaction to
the 1970 incursion into Cambodia lent them hope that President Nixon's
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THE BDM CORPORATION
options were few. Above all, their allies, especially the USSR, had
suppl•!ed them with huge quanties of modern arms - tanks, long-range artil-
leoy, and low-level antiaircraft missiles.
On balance, the "Easter offensive" of 1972 appeared to be
the instrument by which they could reverse the trends if both Vietnamiza-
tion and Pacification.
The probably unexpected violent reaction of the USG to this
overt attack eventually defeated it. The South Vietnamese, supported by US
air strikes, quickly resupplied in equipment and munitions by the US to
replace combat losses, and glued together by the US advisory network, first
stopped and then forced the enemy back. Again the communist leaders had
miscalculated.
Their major supporters, the USSR and the PRC, for their
separate reasons, wanted better relations with the US--a situation which
was exploited by Nixon and Kissinger.20/ The Soviets and Chinese failed to
support the ORV strongly when it was faced with the mining of its harbors
and the "Christmas blitz" on Hanoi and Haiphong. The two major communist
powers may have helped to convince the DRV to accept the ceasefire in
January 1973.
The attack on their bases in Cambodia, in 1970, and the
closing of the port of Sihanoukville by Lon Nol seriously restricted DRV
capabilities in Cochin China. The 1971 attacks in the Laotian panhandle
also set them back temporarily, even though they eventually defeated the
RVNAF forces.
The strain of almost three decades of war waz teiling on the
people and apparently even on their leadership. The false hopes of the
extended peace talks compounded by the mining of Haiphong and B-52 strikes
placed them in a very isolated and vulnerable position. By the end of 1972
their freedom of action was severely reduced.
5. 1973-1975 (final reversal)
During this period the external constraints on the DRV were
removed one by one. Increasingly constrained by Congress and then consumed
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THE BDM CORPORATION
by the Watergate crisis, the Nixon Administration was in no position to

live up to the agreements to 2iVN. As both economic and military aid was
slashed year by year, the RVNAF lost both capability and morale. The
inflation, inflamed by the 1973 oil embargo, further depleted the resources
available to the RVN. And "in place" coasefire arrangmer.'- insured that
South VietnAm would be exposed, both internally and externally, on all
flanks.
On the other hand, supplies and arms continued to pour into the
now reopened ports of the DRV. The balance of forces had finally shifted
decisively in favor of the communists. The capture of Phuoc Long Province,
ir late 1974, proved to the Central Committee that the US wculd not and
could not intervene in time or with sufficient strength to redress the
balance. During this period the Ho Chi Minh Trails and pipelines were
expanded vastly in length and capability; they were even built through the
western reachs of RVN.
The final campaign consumed only 55 days. Errors in judgment by
President Thieu and some of his senior military commanders merely accele-
rated the timing of, but did not preordain, the end result. Vietnamization
came too late and too fast.21/ Without massive US support, the South Viet-
namese were incapable of standing up to the stronger, more experienced, and
cohesive enemy.
After overcoming formidable constraints over the years, the Lao
Dong Party eventually achieved their ultimate objective relatively cheaply.
E. SUMMARY
In view of the serious constraints discussed in this chapter, the

question arises, why did Hanoi and the NLF not succumb to US pressures?
The answer to this question is cumplex. But in part it can be found in
Hanoi's perspective of the Vietnam War, which was firmly shaped by a pro-
found sense of hitory and destiny. The leadership of North Vietnam
believed that it was waging a war of global revolutionary significance, and
its policies and actions were firmly grounded on its own past experiences
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THE BDM CORPORATION
in successfully resisting attempted domination by the Chinese, the

Japanese, and the French. The strong nationalist character and the strong
will of the leadership to triumph over all opponents, served to alleviate
the material constraints which operated against them. These were major
reasons why Hanoi was not as vulnerable to military pressure as some in the
United States apparently expected. Moreover, Hanoi believed that the
inherent social, moral and political contradictions of the United States
were unchangeable and would be fatal, and that the superior military hard-
wvare and technology of the US could be countered over a period of time.
They knew their enemy.
The North Vietnamese and their cadres in the National Libo~ration Front
faced serious constraints - militarily, economically, industrially, and
agriculturally. But --- they were fighting a total war; their enemies were
conducting a limited war which was further constrained by self-imposed
injunctions. Those injunctions prohibited a ground invasion of the North
or any action that might bring in the Chinese. US decision makers failed
to perceive and exploit the intensity of the PRC-USSR split until late in
the war. Conversely, the DRV successfully exploited both of its major
supporters throughout hostilities despite that split.
Thc United States presence in Vietnam gave credence to the North
Vietnamese and NLF claims that the Vietnam War was being fought justly for
freedom from foreign influence and domination. This increased credibility
of the justice of their cause clearly had a positive effect on the discip-
line and morale of the "people's armies." Over time it also had a
corrosive effect on US public suppor-t for the war, which eventually led to
the withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam, thereby eliminating a
major constraint on North Vietnamese and NLF policy and actions. It seems
quite clear that the massive US presence in Vietnam was self-defeating,
over the long term. And this is precisely what the North Vietnamese
leaders argued when they commented on their enemy's "inherent
contradictions."
Major constraints on Hanoi's policies and actions appear to ha~ve
attracted far less attention in the United States, especially in the
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THE BDM CORPORATION
earlier periods of the Vietnam conflict, than the communist character of

the leaderships of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. The US
generally considered the political and military struggle in South Vietnam
to be an extension of Soviet and Chinese Communist expansionism, driven by
policies formulated in Moscow and Peking. Major Constraints wh-;h were
comparatively neglected included: insuf~icient food in North Vietnam to
feed its growing population, a relatively undeveloped industrial base fýr
economic g,'owth in North Vietnam, Party disunity and general disorganiza-
tion within the Southern resistance movement, Vietnamese geographical
regionalism and ethnic separatism, and elements of the political and
military environment of South Vietnam which constrained the North
Vietnamese and NLF leaderships in their attempts to gain legitimate politi-
cal control in the South. In retrospect, these constraints appear to have
been of major practical importance to the leaders of North Vietnam and the
NLF in their formulation and implementation of policy. If the United
States had clearly understood these constraints, it might have adopted
alternatives to its political, economic and military strategies in Vietnam.
For example, it might have developed realistic Pacification/Vietnamization
programs in South Vietnam at an early stage of the conflict. Or, it might
have cn,)sen to be an interested, but nonparticipating observer in Vietnam.
While the cowtiitment of the Hanoi leadership to its goal of
reunifiying Vietnam under Lao Dong leadership was the major factor that
kept the communists in the war, the constraints reviewed in this chapter
severely restricted the selection of strategies and the timing for
achieving that purpose. By the end, of 1972 the United States and the South
Vietnamese government had exploited the communist constraints through
combinations of military, political, and diplomatic efforts so that the
Hanoi leadership was forced to return to the peace table in Paris. For
reasons that will be examined in Volumes III and IV of this study, the
pressures that had been brought to bear on the communists were subsequently
relaxed, and the Hanoi leadership was able to begin again formulating a
strategy for conquering the South.
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F. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS
The Vietnamese Communists were able to overcome most of the signifi-

cant domestic and internAtional constraints on their activities through
their strong leadership, their dedicated commitment to ultimate victory,
and the flexibility they demonstrated in their efforts to achieve that
victory. The DRV leadership was a relatively homogcneous entity. Dif-
ferences of opinion between members of the Central Committee (such as
between Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap) were resolved within the Central
Committee. A united front was presented to the people of North Vietnam and
to the outside world. In this context, the Politburo was not constrained
by a divisive public image. The flexibility and durability shown by the
members of the Central Committee were remarkable.
The Vietnamese Communists were strongly aware of the constraints on
their actions, and they showed themselves capable of reviewing and altering
both strategies and tactics in order to reach their ultimate objective.
Nor were DRV leaders constrained by ingrained Vietnamese traditionalism;
rather, they used the spirit of nationalism, anticolonialism, and defense
of the homeland against foreign enemies to neutralize those traditions and
impose their population control program (in the guise of land reform) and
to mobilze their political, military, agricultural, anid industrial
entities.
The Vietnamese Communists showed themselves to be keenly aware of the

constaints on US and South Vietnamese actions and they attempted to manip-
ulave those factors to obtain relative advantages on the battlefield, inin
the war for the international public opinion, and at the peace table. in
this context they were more successful in the political arena than on the
battlefield while US forces were in-country. Political constraints were
less restricting than were the US-imposed military constraints.
The massive and essentially unconstrained bombing of North Vietnam in
May-October and again in December, 1972, brought the DRV leaders to the
peace table and was instrumental in enabling the US to achieve its
principal contemporary goals of recovering US POWs and completing its
7-20
uncontested military withdrawal from South Vietnam;, that withdrawal ulti-

mately removed the single most important constraint which had prevented a
communist military victory from 1965 to 1973.
After the 1973 "ceasef ire" the constraints on the ORV's freedom of
action were minimal. Time was the principal constraint; the DRV leaders
needed a respite during which they could retrain, rebuild, and re-equip
their forces with more modern weapons, while simultaneously preparing road
and POL pipeline networks to support the final offensive which, to them,
was foreordained. Constraints on the GVN and RVNAF multiplied in every
important respect during this period.
G. LESSONS
All participants in a sustained political-military strL'-'gle are faced

with a varying mix of internal and external constraints. Successful
politicians/strategists develop ways and means to minimize or circumvent
the restrictions on their freedom of action while exacerbating and
exploiting those facing their opponent(s).
Clever and dedicated leaders do not impose constraints on themselves
that are likely to prevent them from achieving the goals they have
established. If the goal is worth achieving, all significant constraints
must be overcome, neutralized, or circumvented.
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CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES
1. The enduring aspiration of the North Vietnamese leadership unifica-

tion of Vietnam and hegemony over Laos and Cambodia. Accor,,ig to
Douglas Pike, DRV Attitude Toward Cambodia: Special Study, from the
History of The Vietnam War on Microfilm (Personal iibrary of Douglas
Pike, file DRV, Subj: FR, Date 3/74, subcategory CAMB) March 1974, in
1974 speculation among East Eiropean diplomats in Hanoi suggested that
Hanoi would have preferred a "Gaullist" solution for Laos and Cambodia
which would have left the two, together with South Vietnam, under the
domination of Hanoi's Lao Dong Party. But in the 1950's, consolidation
of The North or "Rear" held the first priority.
2. There is ample evidence that The NLF included some noncommunist groups.
Clearly, as parts of the Front, those groups supported the overthrow
of Diem and successor GVN regimes and sought a share in the political
power in South Vietnam. The communist elements in the NLF exploited
the united-front aspect of the organization, but they took their
orders from the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi via the PRP, the Central
Committee of whi-h was also the Central Committee of COSVN. See
Albert E. Palmerlee "The Central Office of South Viet-Nam"
Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, Vietnam Document No. 40,
August 1968.
3. These options were deduced by BDM analysts from the documentation used
in the research for this chapter.
4. Harvey Smith et.al., Area Handbook for South Vietnam (Washington,
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 59-62. During President
Diem's crack down on the militant sects, many Hoa Hao and Cao Dai
joined the communist side in RVN, but many rallied to the GVN after
Diem's death. Contrary to the Area Handbook's claim that the Montagnards
were "off limits" to communist recruiters, a substantial number of
mountain people in tie Central Highlands served in Montagnard VC
units, according to Ha Jimmy, a Montagnard Chief, who was interviewed
in March 1976. Data on that intervi{A provided by a former member of
The staff of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast
Asia who conducted that interview. Ha Jimmy stated that two of his
Montagnard friends were generals in the VC and commanded large-sized
Montagnard units.
For a discussion of the minorities in North Vietnam see Bernard B.
Fall, The Two Viet-Nam's (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher,
Second Revised Edition, 1967), p. 112. Fall states, "It must be
considered one of the Viet-Minh's signal achievements that it succeeded
in at least partly winning over the mountain tribes of Viet-Nam:
without the suc;essful wooing of those tribes, Ho and his staff would
sooner or later have been betrayed to the French.'"
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Ho Chi Minh recognized very early that special measures were required
in dealing with the mountain tribes. Within a year after the Viet
Minh victory over the French, Ho announced the establishment of the
Thai-Meo Autonomous Region. See Ho's "Letter to the Compatriots in
the Thai-Meo Autonomous Region" May 7, 1955. Ho Chi Minh On Revolution.
Selected writings, 1920-66. Ed. and introduction by Bernard B. Fall
(New York. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), pp. 287-289.
5. Douglas Pike, War, Peace and The Viet Cong, (Cambridge, Mass.: The
M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 65.
6. Douglas Pik.e, "North Vietnam in the Year 1972." Asian Survey 13
(January 1S73), p. 52.
7. The Tet '68 offensive was a failure militarily, but clearly the
psychological victory achieved in the US by the communists, however
inadvertent that victory might have been, more than compensated for
their over-optimism in anticipating a general uprising. In a COSVN
document dated January 5, 1968, the description of the friendly (NLF)
situation was described in these terms: "The Central Headquarters
concludes that the time has come for a direct revolution, and that the
opportunity for a general offensive and general uprising is within
reach." From "Final Phase of the Revolution at Hand" p. 11.
8. The Ninth Conference of COSVN in July 1969 pointed out that its military
and political forces had not fulfilled all the expectations that it
had placed upon them. COSVN issued instructions for holding Party
elections at district and province level and for improving discipline
and control. DOS Historian Viet Nam Documents and Research Notes,
"The PRPSVN-Part II - CISVN'S 1969-1970 Attempt to Revitalize the
PRP." Document No. 102, Part II.
9. In the French-Viet Minh w&r General Vo Nguyen Giap miscalculated badly
in 1951 when he moved into Phase Three, conventional warfare. In the
five-month struggle that began in January, Giap lost a major part of
three divisions to newly arrived French Commander in Chief Jean de
Lattre de Tassigny. The communist forces retreated to Phase Two of
Mao's precepts, guerrilla warfare. For a more complete description of
these events see Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, pp. 113-118. In the second
Indochina War, infiltratioh by PAVN units into RVN gave the US an
additional re5on to introduce ground combat forces, an eventuality
that the DRV would have preferred to avoid. In 1968 the hoped-for
general uprising did not occur, and the results were disastrous for
the PLAF. In 1972 their Easter Offensive cost the DRV heavily when
they unexpectedly encountered a violent reaction by US air power.
d7
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THE BDM CORPORATION
10. Douglas Pike, interview on 20 November 1978 at the BDM Corporation.
11. USAID official John Paul Vann, generally recognized as an authority on

operations in South Vietnam (particularly in Military Regions III and
IV) stated in 1967 that the communists sometimes fought large-unit
battles for the express purpose of uffering sufficient bait to induce
the US command to continue to operate in battalion and larger size
formations. That tactic prevented the US forces from breaking down
into small units and neutralizing or destroying the insurgents by
expanding such programs as the Marine Combined Action Platoons and
Army Mobile Advisory Teams. Presentation by John Paul Vann on 27
November 1967 at a seminar at the University of Denver, Graduate
School of International Studies. The presentation was hosted by
Professor Vincent Davis who made the tape recording available to BDM
for purposes of this study.
12. Two authors provide some insights in this area although neither claims
that Soviet or Chinese concurrence with a strategic decision was
essential. See Janos Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality (South Bend,
Ind.: Gateway Editions, Ltd., 1978), pp. 40, 158-159; and Douglas S.
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era (New York: The Free Press, 1977),
pp. 10-1l.-
13. The "Unilateral Declaration by the United States at the Closing Session
of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954" included the fcllowing statement:
In the case oi nations now divided against their will, we shall continue
to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the
United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.
That Unilateral Declaration was published in Deparment of State Press

Release No. 394 of July 21, 1954.
The population of North Vietnam was about two million persons larger
than that of the South at that time, and the Northerners constituted a
more homogeneous society. Ho Chi Minh was a heroic figure to a majority
of Vietnamese, North and South. These factors made it abundantly
clear that in any nation-wide election, Ho Chi Minh was a "shoo-in".
President Eisenhower acknowledged that, "...possibly 80 percent of
the population w.7uld have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their
leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dei." Dwight D. Eisenhower
Mandate For Change (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 372.
14. On July 16, 1955 Diem made a radio broadcast and pointed out that, "We
did not sign the Geneva Agreements." He stated that he would not
consider any Viet Minh proposals unless proof were given that the Viet
Minh put national interests above those of communism. For a discus-
sion of these events soe The Pen*agon Papers, Senator Gravel Edition,
Volume T (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 286-289.
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ITHE BDM CORPORATION
15. The 1979 example of the "boat people", the unfortunate Chinese and
other minorities including some anticommunist Vietnamese who are
fleeing Vietnam at considerable risk of life and substantial financial
sacrifice (including bribes) provides additional evidence that the
Vietnamese Communist leaders prefer to rid themselves of dissidents by
expulsion. It saves a major "blood bath" and scarce resources.
16. There is some question concerning precisely when the staybehind cadres
were at their lowest point. P. J. Honey (cited in Gravel, The Pentagon
Papers p. 325) found in 1958 that one could travel anywhere in South
Vietnam without any risk, but a year later h3 detected dangerous
unease in the countryside. In any event, the precarious situation in
which the Southern cadres found themselves by 1958 prompted the DRV to
begin sending regroupees to the South beginning in 1959.
17. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 June
1968) Sec. II, by General W. C. Westmoreland, p. 95 reports that at
least the 95th, 32d, and 101st North Vietnamese regiments were believed
in December 1964 to have deployed South.
18. Mass uprisings did not occur, nor did mass desertions. One of the
authorities on the 1968 Tet Offensive commented that the communist
forces in South Vietnam were unable to recruit new members in the
South after Tet because the people in RVN were deeply affronted by
many aspects of that offensive and particularly by the vicious massacre
at Hue. The Hue incident had a profound effect on noncommunists.
Peter Braestrup (author of The Big Story) comment at the BDM Senior
Review Panel discussion on Volume I of this study, 13 February 1979,
tape 3. At the same discussion, Ambassador William Colby pointed out
that the Party apparatus in the South atrophied in the early 1970's
after Tet.
19. This constraint dissolved with the departure of American troops and
air forces, and in the 1975 offensive the DRV was able to commit
virtualiy its ent.ire army to the offensive without fear of the North
being invaded.
20. Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts The Irony of Vietnam: The Sstern
Worked (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 355-357,
provides a convincing analysis of how President Nixon exploited the
situation.
21. During the early phases of the Vietnam War the US took most of the
initiative. When the Nixon administration came to power in 1969, the
US was seeking ways to assuage the American public while building up
RVNAF and drawing down US military forces in RVN. Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird designated the new strategy "Vietnamizatiun".
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Expounding the new dcctrine in a speech "The Nixon Doctrine: From

Potential Despair to New Opportunities," Laird stated: Prom a stand-
point of American defense plicy, a real tragedy of Vietnam is that
Vietnamization was not started much earlier than 1969..."
Several Vietnamese generals contend, with considerable justification,
that Vietnamization was "implemented in haste," "belatedly," and "the
US began to rush the Vietnamization process." "By far the widest
loophole of the Vietnamization program was its failure to provide the
RVN with enough time for an overall improvement." Major General
Hguyen Duy Hinh, Vietnamization and the Cease-fire. Indochina Refugee
Authored Monograph Program. Prepared for Department of the Army,
Office of The Chief of Military History, by General Research Corp. of
McLean, VA. 15 September 1976, pp. 183 and 189. Another monograph in
this generally excellent series, Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong,
RVNAF and US Operational and Cooperation and Coordination (McLean, Va:
Ge-n-er~a oserach Corp., 1976) pp. 172 and 181 states that valuable
time was lost before US attention focused on preparing the Vietnamese
to save their own houses. The author wonders what could have been
done had Vietnamization been initiated at the beginning.
In Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen, Brian M. Jenkins, The Fall of
South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders,
a report prepared for Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1978), pp. 9, 47, and 72 the subject
of Vietnamization is addressed; General William C. Westmoreland A
Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1976)-pp.
235 and 390 states that Defense Secretaries McNamara and Clifford
never full. approved his goal of self-contained ARVN forces, and he
describes the shortcomings of ARVN, despite Vietnamization, at the
outset of the 1971 Lam Son 719 operation.
At least one senior American commander gives good marks to Vietnamiza-
tion. Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp Strategy for Defeat (San Rafael, Ca.:
President Press, 1978), pp. 246, 261. It should be remembered that
Admiral Sharp was based in Hawaii and while he recognized some of the
benefits of Vietnamization he lacked the vantage point of the soldier
on the ground. A number of BDM analysts who served in RVN during the
later days describe Operation Enhance and Operation Enhance Plus as
forced-feeding operations that pumped into RVN vastly greater quantities
of weapons and equipment than RVNAF was capable of using or absorbing.
In many instances they lacked the skilled, technically trained per-
sonnel that were urgently needed.
Finally, Tran Van Don Our Endless War (San Rafael, Ca.: Presidio
Press, 1978), pp. 157-158 describes the innundation with American
material and adds, "It was a question of too much, too late."
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THE BDM CORPORATION
The following additional sources were also consulted:
Burton, LTC Lance J. (USA). North Vietnam's Military Logistics System:

Its Lontribution to the War, 1961-Il69. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College, 1977).
Chau, Phan Thien. "Leadership in the Viet Nam Workors' Party: The Process
of Transition." Asian Survey 12 (September- 1972): 772-732.
Chen, King C., "Hanoi vs. Peking: Policies and Relations--A Survey."
Asian Survey. Vol. XII, No. 9. (September 1972).
Conley, Michael, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam:
A Study of Organization and Strategy. (Washington, D. C.: The AmeriTcan
University, 1967).
f General Van Tiern Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, Trans. by John Spragens,
Jr. Afterword by Cora Weiss and Don Luce. (New York arid London: Monthly
Review Press, 1977).
General Van Tien Dung, On Some Great Experiences of the People's War as
represented in McGarvey, Visions of Victory. (Stanford, CalifornTaT
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1970).
Durr, John C.: Peters, Stephen; and Spinks, Charles N., The North Vietnamese
i Institutions and Problems,
Regime: 1969).
April, (Washington, D.C.: The American University,
Giap, General Vo Nguyen and Dung, Van Tien, How we Won the War, (Philadelphia,
Pa.: Recon Publications, 1976).
Giap, General Vo Nguyen, On the Strategic Pole of the Self Defense Militia,
as represented in Patrick McGarvey, Visiont of Victor , (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution andeace, 1970.
Giap, General Vo Nguyen, Unforgettagle Months and Years. (Ithaca, New

York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program DatL Paper, No. 99, May
1975).
Gurtov, Melvin. "Hanoi on War and Peace," In Vietnam and American Foreign
Policy, Edited by John R. Boettiger. (Lexington, MA.: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1968).
Hoeffding, Oleg, Bombing North Vietnam: An Appraisal cf Economic and

Political Effects, Memorandum RM-5213-l-ISA. (Santa Monica, Calif.: The h
RAND Corporation, 1966).
Kellen, Konrad, A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy Camp
"U). (Santa Monica, CA.: The RAND Corporation, October, 1976).
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Leighton, R.M. and Sanders, Ralph M. eds. "Logistical Support of Guerrilla

Warfare." in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology, (Washington,
D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, October 1967).
Lent, Michael, Decision Making in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

(Maryland: American Institt' i for Research, 1973).
Lewy, Guenter, America in Vietnam, (New York: Oxford University Press,

1978).
McGovern, Raymond L. "Moscow and Hanoi." Vietnam and American Foreign.Policy,

(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1968).
Pike, Douglas, "The 'Quality of Life' Problem in North Vietnam", (Saigon:

Personal Papers, 1974).
Pike, Douglas, "Vietnam War," Marxism, Communism and Western Society: A
Comparative Encyclopedia, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972).
Snepp, Frank, Decent Interval, (New York: Random House, 1977).
Translations from HOC TAP (Studies), No. 12, 1965.
U.S. Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, 12

vols. Printed for use of House Committee on Armed Services, (Washington,
D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).
U.S. Mission in Vietnam, Hanoi's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)
A Background Paper, (Saigon, Juiy, 1969).
United States Mission in Vietnam, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes,

Saigon, Vietnam: Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs, September, 1968.
Van Dyke, Jon M., North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival, (Palo Alto, Calif.:
Pacific Books, PublTis--ers, 1972).
Zagoria, Donald, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, (New York, N.Y.:
Pegasus, 1967).
7-28
BIBL IOGRAPHY
40
AND
GLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND
GLOSSARY
THE BDM CORPORATION
VOLUME I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PANEL DISCUSSION
The following persons participated in the BDM Senior Review Panel

meeting on February 13 and 14, 1979 at The BDM Jones Branch Conference
Center. Members of the panel provided a critique of the original drafts for
this volume and offared detailed comments during the panel discussions.
Braestrup, Peter. Editor, Wilson Quartery. Former Saigon Bureau Chief

for the Washington Post and author of Bjg Story.
Colby, William E., LLB. Former Ambassador and Deputy to COMUSMACV for
CORDS, and former Director of Central Intelligence.
Davis, Vincent, Dr. Professor and Director of the Patterson School of
Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky.
Greene, Fred, Dr. Professor, Williams College. Formcr Director, Office
of Research for East Asian Affairs, Department of State.
Hallowell, John H., Dr. James B. Duke Professor of Political Science, Duke
University.
Hughes, Thomas L., LLD. President of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. Former Director for Intelligence and Research, US Department of
State with rank of Assistant Secretary of State.
Johnson, U. Alexis. Chairman of the Senior Review Panel. Career Ambassador.

Former Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia,
Thailand, and Japan, and (in 1964-65) Deputy Ambassador to Maxwell Taylor
in the Republic of Vietnam.
Sapin, Burton M., Dr. Dean, School of Public and International Affairs,
George Washington University. Former Foreign Service Officer.
Sigur, Gaston, Dr. Director, institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, George

Washington University.
Thompson, Kenneth W., Dr. Director, White Burkett Miller Center of Public
Affairs, University of Virginia.
Vogt, John W., General. USAF (Ret.). Formerly J-3 and Director, Joint
Staff and DEPCOMUSMACV and Commander, 7th Air Force.
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VOLUME I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTERVIEWS
The following interviews conducted by members of the BDM study team
provided both general and specific information useful in Volume 1:
Blaufarb, Douglas S. Retired from CIA and author of The Counterinsurgency

Era. Series of interviews, February 1-28, 1979.
Bui Diem, Ambassador. Former GVN Ambassador to the US. Interviewed in
Washington, D. C., June 8, 1979.
DePuy, William, General USA (Ret.). Formerly J-3 USMACV and Commanding
General, 1st Infantry Division, US Army in Vietnam. Interviewed at the 8DM
Corporation, September 9, 1978.
Gadding, George A., Sr., MG USA (Ret.). Formerly J-2 USMACV. Interviewed
at the BOM Corporation, November 16, 1978.
Ha Jimmy. Montagnard Chief. Interviewed by the staff director of the

House of Representatives Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast
Asia in March 1976. Tape recording made available to BDM for purposes of
this study.
Johnson, U. Alexis, Career Ambassador. Former Deputy Ambassador to the

Republic of Vietnam. Interviewed at the BDM Corporation, September 13,
1978 and January 9, 1979.
Lewis, William H. Adjunct Professor, George Washington University, Institute

of Sino-Soviet Studies. Series of interviews in February and March 1979.
Pike, Douglas. Former member US Department of State Policy Planning Staff,
Vietnam and noted author. Interviewed at the BDM Corporation, November 16,
20 and 23, 1978.
Taylor, Maxwell D., General USA (Ret.). Former Ambassador to Vietnam.
Ir,ý'.rviewed at General Taylor's home in Washington, D.C, July 11, 1979.
Thornton, Richard, Sr. Professor, George Washington University. Interviewed
at the BDM Corporation, October 30, 1978.
Vogt, John W., General USAF (Ret.). Formerly J-3 and Director, Joint Staff
and DEPCOMUSMACV and Commander, 7th Air Force. Interviewed at the BDM
Corporation, November 30, 1978.
8-2
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VOLUME I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES
Anonymous. Former government official. Comwents on Study of Strategic

Lessons Learned in Vietnam Volume I, "The Enemy" provd totheStrategic
Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Copy provided to BdM by SSI.
McChristian, Joseph A., MG, US Army (Ret.). Papers at Military History
Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
The New York Times. Selected issucs.
The Pentagon Papers. Senator Gravel Edition. Volumes I-IV. Boston:

cn Press, 1971.
Pike, Mye'na. Informal memorandum to BDM Corporation, September 12, 1979.
U.S. Department of Defense. United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967. 12

vols. Printed for use by :iousa Committee on Armed Services. Washington,
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971.
Van Tien Dung, General. "Great Spring Victory." Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service. APA-76-110, June 7, 1976. Vol. IV, No. ll, Supp. 38.
Vann, John Paul. Former AID official and retired US Army lieutenant colonel,
now deceased. Tapes of Vann's address to a small audience of academicians
at the University of Denver, October 1965, were made available to BDM for
purposes of this study by DP Vincent Davis.
B-3
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Oepartment of the Army, Office of Chief of Military Iiistory, Indochin

Refugee Authored Monograph Program. Monographs prepared by the General
Research Corporation, McLean, Virginia. Excellent source material on the
Vietnam War is contained in this 20-monograph series of which the following
were used extensively in preparation of this volume:
Cao Van Vien, Gen. ARVN Leadership, July 7, 1978.
Hoang Ngoc Lung, Colonel, ARVN. The General Offensive of 1968-69, June
27, 1978.
Hoang Ngoc Lung, Colonel, ARVN. Intelligence, 1976.

Hoang Ngoc Lung, Colonel, ARVN. Strategy and Tactics, July 10, 1978.
Ngo Quang Truong, Lt. Gen. RVNAF and US Operational and Cooperation and
Coordination, 1976.
Nguyen Duy Hinh, MG, ARVN. Lamson 719, July 31, 1977.
Nguyen Duy Hinh, MG, ARVN. Vietnamization and the Cease-Fire, September
1976.
Sak Sutsakham, LG, FANK Chief of the General Staff and last Chief of State
of the Khmer Republic. The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse,
November 1978.
Southchay Vongsavanh, BG. Military Operations and Activities in the Laotian

Panhandle. February 1978.
Tran Dinh Tho, BG, ARVN. The Cambodian Incursion, 1978.
B-4 f
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VOLUME I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DOCUMENTS
Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961-1973.
Washington, 0. C.: Office of Air Force History, 1977.
Burton, Lance J., LTC (USA). "North Vietnam's Miiitary Logistics System:
Its Contribution to the War, 1961-1969. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US
Army Command and Generil Staff College, 1977.
Central Intelligence Agency. Intelligence Memorandum. SC No. 08753/67. "A
Review of the Situation in Vietnam," December, 8, 1967.
Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Current Intelligence. The
Intelligence Background of the Current Communist Offensive, Febru-ary 15,
1968.
CINCPAC/COMUSMACV (Commander in Chief Pacific and Commander US Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam). Report on the War in Vietnam. Washington,
0. C.: GPO, 1969.
Collins, James Lawton, Jr., BG. The Development and Training of the South
Vietnamese Army 1950-1972. US Army Vietnam Studies Series.
WashiMgton, 0. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1975.
"Dimensions of Soviet Aid to North Vietnam." IRS/AF Vietnam Unit Report,
August 1965. (From personal library of Oouglas Pike).
Ello, Paul S. "The Commissar and the Peasant: A Comparative Analysis of
Land Reform and Collectivization in North Korea and North Vietnam." Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Iowa, 1967.
Fulton, William B., MG. Riverine 0perations 1966-1969. Department of
Army.- Vietnam Studies Series. ington, 1973.
Joint US Public Af airs Office. Message No. 114, January 28, 1967.
NIC Field Exploitation Team. National Alliance Democratic and Peace Forces.
Saigon: National Chieu Hoi Center, 1968.
Nutt, Anita Lauve. Troika on Trial. Vol. I. September 1967. Prepared
under contract to Office of International Security Affairs, Department of
Defense.
Palmerlee, Albert E. The Central Office of South Viet-Nam, Saigon: US
Mission, August 1968.
B-5
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Pike, Douglas. DRV Attitude Toward Cambodia: Special Study. (Personal

library of Douglas Pike, file DRV, Subj. FR, Date 3/74, sub-catagory CAMB),
March 1974.
Pike, Douglas. The "Quality of Life" Problem in North Vietnam. Saigon:
U.S. Mission, February 1974.
Pike, Douglas. The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror. Monograph prepared in
Saigoii for the United States Mission, Vietnam, February 1970.
Rogers, Bernard W. LTG (USA), Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point.

Washington, D. C.: Department of the Army, 1974,
SEATO Short Paper. The Viet Cong Political Infrastructure in South Vietnam.
Bangkok: The ResearchOffice, South-East Asia"Treaty Organization, 1972.
Thies, W. J. "Coercion and Diplomacy: Force and Foreign Policy in the
Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968." Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1977.
Tolson, John J.. LTG. Airmobility 1961-1971. US Army. Vietnam Studies
Series. Washirngton, D. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1973.
US Department 0f Defense. Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in

Cambodia and Laos, September 10, 1973.
US Department of State. Agression From the North. Washington, D. C.: US
Government Printing Office, February 1965.
US Department of State. "Hanoi's Effnrts to Build Up the PRG." Working

Paper, May 1974.
US Department of State. Press Release No. 394. Unilateral Declaration by
the United States at the Closing Session of the Geneva Conference. July
21, 1954.
US Department of State. Office of the Historian. Working Paper on the
North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam, 1966.
US Department of State. Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs.

Vietnam Information Notr•s. No. 3, Revised May 1967.
US I,,;rmation Service. Special Report. The Evid%,nce at Vtqng Ro Bay,

February 23, 1965.
US Military
Vietnam Assistance
(CICV). Study Command
ST 70-05.Vietnam. Combined Intelligence Center.
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Military Objectives Study, October

16, 1968.
B-6
4
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THE 8DM CORPORATION
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. "Viet Cong Base Camps and Supply
Caches." Counterinsurgency Less2ns Learned No. 68 (U).
* US Mission, Vietnum. Hanoi's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) A
Background Paper. Saigon, July 1969.
US Mission, Vietnam. Press Release. "Captured Documents Point to Viet
Cong Recruitment Problems." December 21, 1967.
US Mission, Vietnam. Viet-Nam flocuments and Research Notes. Saigon, Vietnam:
Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs, September 1968.
The United States Strategic Pombing Survey. 316 Vols. Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1945-47.
B-
I.
FL
B-7
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.... .4•,. • •, - • , ,:,,• • :;. : ..
THE BDM CORPORATION
US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Collection of

Translations of Documents and Interrogation Reports. The following items
were used in this volume:
Item 11. US Department of State Biographic Intelligence Summary, 1961.
Item 12. Interrogation in 1958 of a prisoner who had been active in the
resistance since 1945.
Item 25. US Army Attache Situation Report, Saigon, July 1956.
Item 36. The Revolutionary Mission in 3outh Vietnam, April 1964.
Item 37. Interrogation of a Viet Cong recruiter who was captured by ARVN
forces in 1964 in Hau Nghia Province.
Item 38. COSVN Training Bulletin, 1962.
item 56 and 110. Interrogation of a former officer of the Viet Cong 5th
Division, who rallied to the GVN in 1966.
Item 65. Translation of a notebook belonging to a COSVN cadre captured by
elements of the US 101st Airborne Division in January 1967. Notes based on
speech given by late North Vietnamese Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, head
of COSVN, 1965-1967.
Item 66. Translation of a document captured by elements of III Marine
Amphibious Force on July 20, 1966.
Item No. 84. Interrogation of Le Van Thanh, V;et Cong signal platoon
leader who stated that the DRV began enforcing the Military Service Law in
1959.
Item 96. "The VOet-Nam Worker's Party 1963 Decision to Escalate the War
in the South."
Item 200. "Viet Minh Policy Paper on Post-Geneva Strategy." Probably
issued by Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party to the Eastern Inter zone
of Nambo (South Vietnam).
Item 207. Intelligence report on command relationships between the Lao
Dong Party and COSVM. Based on Interrogation of cadre, Spring 1967.
Item 301. The CRIMP Document. "Experience of the South Viet-Nam "
Revolutionary Movement During the Past Several Years," 1963.
Item 302. Translation of a letter dated March 1966, presumably written by
Le Duan, First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee.
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Item 303. "Talk by General Nguyen Van Vinh, Chief of Staff of the North
Vietnamese High Command and Chairman of the Lao Dong Reunification Department,
made before the Viet Cong Fourth Central Office (COSVN) in April 1966.
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US Mission, Saigon, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes on file with

US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Collection of Captured
Documents and Research Notes. The following documents were used in this
volume:
COSVN Resolution No. 9. July 1969.

"Final Phase of the Revolution at Hand." January 1968.
VietCong Economic Problems, February 1968.
"Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South

Vietnam." Prepared by DOS, 1966.
Document No. 8. "The Position of North Viet-Nam on Negotiations," October

1967.
Document No. 28-29. "The Decisive Hour: Two Directives for Tet," April
1968.
Document No. 35. "The People's Revolutionary Councils in Rural' Areas."
.Document No. 36-37. "North Vietnam's Role in the South," June 1968.
Document No. 40. "The Central Office of South Vietnam," August 1968.
Document No. 45. "The Process of Revolution and the General Uprising,"
October 1968.
D3cument No. 46. "On Political and Ideological Indoctrination Against

Desertion and Surrender," October 1968.
T -
Document No. 55. A COSVN Directive for Eliminating Contacts with Puppet
Personnel and Other "Complex Problems."
Document No. 56-57. COSVN Unit H 207, "Report the Status of Deserters,"
dated April 1969.
Document No. 64. "Summer 1969: A Viet Cong Study of the Situation and
Prospects."
Document No. 101. The PRG RSV-Part I. "Preparing to Form the PRG."
Document No. 101. The PRGRSV Part II. "The Founding Conference of the
PRG," 1972.
Document No. 102. Part II. "COSVN's 1969-1970 Attempt to Revitalize
the PRP."
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The foillwing congressional hearings, reports and studies were used in

the compilation of this volume.
U.S. Congress. House. Final Report of the Select Committee on Missing

Persons in Southeast Asia. 94th Congress. 2nd session. Washington, 0. C.:
US Government Printing Ofice, December 13, 1976.
U.S. Congress. Senate. "Air War Against North Vietnam. Hearings before
the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services. 90th Congress. 1st session. August 9, 1967.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Infor-

mation Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam. 6th revised ed., June 1970,
91st Congress. 2nd session. Washington, D. C.: US Government Printing
Office, 1970.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations.
On Causes, Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War. 92nd Congress. 2nd
session. May 9, lO, 11, 1972. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, 1973.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. 90th Congress. t session.
August 9 and 10, !967. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office,
1967.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Study No.
5. Bombing as a Policy Tool in Vietnam: Effectiveness October 12, 1973.
Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1972.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Vietnam: May 1974. A Staff Report of the Committee
on Foreign Relations. 93rd Congress. 2nd session. August 5, 1974.
Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1974.
! B-ll
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The following reports prepared by the Rand Corporation were used in

the development ot this volume.
Hoeffding, Oleg. Bombing North Vietnair: An Appraisal of Economic and
Political Effects. Memorandum RM-5213-l-ISA, 1966.
Holliday, L. P. and Gurfield, R. M. Viet Con4 Logistics, June 1968.
Hosmer, Stephen T., Kellen, Konrad, and Jenkins, Brian. The Fall of South
Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, December
1978.
Kellen, Konrad. A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy Camp
October 1976.
Leites, Nathan. The Viet Cong Style of Politics (U), July 1968.
Zasloff, J. J. Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam 1954-1960: The
Role of the Southern Vietminh Cadres, 1968.
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VOLUME I
BIBLIOGRAPHV
BOOKS
Allen, William L. "Spring 1972: Northern Invasion Repulsed." 'he Vietnam
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Boorman, Scot. A. The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch'i Interpretation of
Maoist Revolutionary Stratagy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Bundy, William P.. "The United States and Communist China." Vietnam and
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Burchett, Wilfred G. Vietnam Inside Story of the Guerilla War. 'New York:
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Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York:

Frederick A. Praeger7,'167.
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Colbert, Evelyn. Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941-1956.

Ithaca and Londun: Cornell University Press, '977.
Colby, William. Honorable Men. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.
Cole, Allan B., ed. Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions:

A Documentary History?46-1955. New York: Cornell University Press.
Collins, Colonel John M. The Vietnam War in Perspective. Washington,

D.C.: The National War CoTlege, 1972.
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Critchfield, Richard. The Long Charade: Political Subversion in the Vietnam

War. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968.
Deutscher, Isaac. Russia. China, and the West. A Contemporary Chronicle,
1953-1966. Edited by Fred Halliday. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, Inc.,
*IB-13
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Dickson, Paul. The Electronic Battlefield. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana

University Press, 1976.
Die Volksarmee Vietnams. East Berlin: Ministerium fUr Nationale
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Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York and
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Durr, John C., Peters, Stephen, and Spinks, Charles N. The North Vietnamese
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Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace. 'Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Co., Inc., 1965.
Fall, Bernard B. The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis.
New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
Fall, Bernard B. The Viet-Minh Regime. New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1956.
Fall, Bernard B. Viet-Nam Witness. New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers,
1966.
Fishel, Wesley R., ed. Vietnam: Anatomy of A Conflict. Itasca, Illinois:
F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968.
Fitzgerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake. New York: Random House, 1972.
Galbraith, John Kenneth. Ambassador's Journal. Boston, Massachusetts:
Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
Gallucci, Robert L. Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of American
Military Policy in Vie-t-Na. '"Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins, 1975.
Gelb, Leslie H., and Betts, Richard H. The Irony of Vietnam: The System
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Gerassi, John. "US Bombs Cannot Demoralize the Vietnamese People." The
Have Been in North Vietnam. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1968.
Graubard, Stephen R. Kissinger. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973.
~-l 4
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Gupta, 2,,abani Sen. The Fulcrum of Asia. Relations Among China, India,
Pakistan, and the USSR. New York: "e-gasus, 1970.
Gurtov, Melvin. "Ha'oi on War and Peace." In Vietnam and American Foreign
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Ho Chi Minh. On Revolution. Edited by Bernard B. Fall. New York: Praeger,

1967.
Ho~ng Van Chi. From Colonialism to Communism. Introduction by P. J.

Honey. London: Pall Mall Press, 1964.
Honey, P. J. Communism in North Vietnam. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
M.I.T. Press, 1963.
Hosmer, qtephen T. Viet Cong Repercussion and Its Implications for the
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Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point. New York, Chicago and San Francisco:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.
Jukes, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union in Asia. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1973.
Kaye, William. "A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam."
In North V1 tnam Today. Edited by P. J. Honey. New York- Praeger, 1962.
Kellen, Ko, d. "1971 and Beyond: The View from Hanoi." In Indochina in
Conflict: lolitical Assessment. Edited by Joseph J. Zasloff and Allan
E. Goodman. Lexngton, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972.
Kinnard, Dougl- .. The War Managers. Hanover: University of New England
Press, 1977.
Kissinger, HL. y. White House Years. Boston: Little Brown and Company,
1979.
Lacouture, Jean. Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography. Translated by Peter
Wiles. New Yor!:: Random House, 1968.
Lacouture, Jean. Vietnam Between Two Truces. Introduction by Joseph

Kraft. Translated by Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael. New York: Random
House, 1966.
La Feber, Walter. America Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1975. 3rd ed.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1976.
Laquer, Walter. Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1976.
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Leighton, R. M. and Sanders, Ralph., eds. "Logistical Support of Guerrilla

Warfare." In Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology. Washington,
D. C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, October 1962.
Lent, Michael. Decisionmaking in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Maryland: American Institute for Research, 1973.
Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press,

1978.
MacDougall, John J. Analysis of Vietnamization: North Vietnamese Leadership.

Ann Arbor, Michigan: Applied Science and Technology, Bendix Aerospace
Systems Division, "March 1973.
McAlister, John T., Jr. and Mus, Paul. The Vietnamese and Their Revolution.
New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970.
McGarvey, Patrick J. Visions of Victory. Selcctad Vietnamese Communist

Writings, 1964-1968. Stanford, ali orniTT-7fover Institution on War,
Revolution and Peace, 1970.
McGovern, Raymond L. "Moscow and Hanoi." In Vietnam and American Foreign

Policy. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1968.
Mecklin, John. Mission in Conflict. Cited in A War College Vietnam

Elective, Selected Readings. Carlisle; W,: Army WarCollege, n. d.
Momyer, William W., General, USAF (Ret.). Airpower in Three Wars.

Washington: Department of tt'e Air Force, 1978.
Montross, Lynn. War Through the Ages. New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1946.
Moore, John Norton. Law and the Indo-China War. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1972.
Mozingo, David P. "Containment in Asia Reconsidered." Vietnam and

American Foreign Policy. Lexington, Massachusetts: D C. Heath and Company,
1968.
N. Kahc. Huyen. Vision Accomplished? The Enigma of Ho Chi Minh. New York
and London: The Mac-iiTan Company, 1971.
Nalty, Bernara C. "The Air War Against North Vietnam." The Vietnam War.
New York: Crnwn Publishers. Inc., 1979.
Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York: Stein and Day,
1976.
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Nguyen Ngoc Bich. "Vietnam--An Independent Vietnam." In North Vietnam Today.

Edited by P. J. Honey. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, IM2.
The North Viettiamese Regime: Institutions and Problems. Washington, D.C.:
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April 1969.
Oberdorfer, Don. Tet! Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company,
Inc., 1971.
O'Meara, Andrew P., Jr., Major, US Army. Infrastructure and the Marxist
Power Seizure: An Analysis of the Communist Models of Revolution. New
York: Vantage Press, 1973.
Palmer, Dave R. Summons of the Trumpet. San Rafael, California: Presidio
Press, 1978.
Palmer, Gregory. The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War. Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978.
Piao, Lin. Long Live the Victory of People's War! Peking: Foreign
Languages Pri.196•5.
Pike, Douglas. History of Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1976. Stanford,
California: Hoover Institution Press,7978.
Pike, Douglas. The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The
M.I.T. Press, 1966.
Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong. Cambridge, Massachusitts: The M.I.T. Press,

1968.
Pike, Doug'as. "Vietnam War." In Marxism Communism and Western Society:

A Comparative Encyclopedia. New-r,:T erder and Herder, 1972.
Pike, Douglas. War, Peace and the Viet Cong. Cambridge, Massachusetts and
London, England: M.I.T. Press, 1969.
Pye, Lucian W. "China in Context." In Vietnam and American Foreign Policy.

Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1968.
Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
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Radvanyi, Janos. Delusion and Reality. South Bend, Indiana: Gateway
Editors Ltd., 1978.
Raskin, Marcus, and Fall, Bernard, eds. The Vietnam Reader. New York:
Vintage Bocks, 1965.
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Sainteny, Jean. Ho Chi Minh and His Vietnam. Translated by Herma Briffault.
Chicago, Illinois: Cowles Book Company, 1972.
Schurmann, Franz, The Logic of World Power. New York: Pantheon Books,
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Presidio Press, 1978.
The Sino-Soviet Dispute. Keesing's Research Report. New York: Charles
Scribners Sons, 1969.
Smith, Harvey, et al. Area Handbook for North Vietnam. Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, June 1956.
Snepp, Frank. Decent Interval. New York: Random House, 1978.
Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1973.
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Illinois: American Bar Association, 1967.
Tanham, George K. Ccmmunist Revolutionary Warfare. revised ed. New York:
Praeger, 1967.
Tatu, Michael. "Moscow, Peking and the Conflict in Vietnam." Vietnam
L . The War, American Society, and the Future of American rein Polic.
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Taylor, Maxwell 0. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W. W. Norton and
Co., Inc., 1972.
Thompson, Scott, and Frizzell, Donaldson D. eds. The Lessons of Vietnam.
New York: Crane, Russak, 1977.
Tran Van Don. Our Endless War. San Rafael, California: Presidio Press,
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Truong Chinh. Primer for Revolt. The Communist Takeover in Viet-Nami.
Introduction by Bernard B. Fall. New York and London: Frederick A.
Praeger, Pub., 1963.
Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism. Its Origins and Development.

Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1975.
Van Dyke, Join M. North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival. Palo Alto,
California: Pacific Books, Publishers, 1972.
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Van Tien Dung, General. Our Great Spring Victory. Translated by John
Spragens, Jr. Afterword by Cora Veiss and Don Luce. New York and London:
Monthly Review Press, 1977.
Vietnam: Matters for the Agenda. Los Angeles: Center for Study of
Democratic Institutions, 1968.
Vo Nguyen Giap, General. Banner of People's War, the Party's Military Line.
London: Pall Mall Press, 1970.
Vo Nguyen Giap, General. People's War, People's Army. Hanoi: Foreign
Languages Publishing. House, 1961.
Vo Nguyen Giap, General. Unforgettable Months and Years. Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper, No. 99, May 1975.
Vo Nguyen Giap, General and Van Tien Dung. How We Won the War. Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania: Recon Publications, 1976.
Warner, Denis. Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War. Kansas City:
Sheed Andrews and McMeel, Inc., 1978.
Westmoreland, General William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1976.
Whitacker, Donald P., et al. Area Handbook for the People's Republic of
China. Washington, D.C.: US Nvernment Printing Office, 1972.
Woodside, Alexander B. Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam. Boston,
Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976.
Zagoria, Donald. Vietnam Triangle. Moscow, Peking. Hanoi. New York:
Pegasus, 1967.
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VOLUME I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARTICLES
Burchett, Wilfreo. "The Vietnam War: Past, Present, Future." New World
Review. Spring 1968.
Chau, Phan Thien. "Leadership in the Viet Nam Workers Party: The Process
of Transition." Asian Survey, 12 (September 1972): 772-782.
Chen, King C. "Hanoi vs. Peking: Policies and Relations - A Survey."
Asian Survey. Vol. XII, No. 9, September 1972.
Chen, King C. "Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam
War." Political Science Quarterly. Volume 90, Number 2, Summer 1975.
Machol, Robert E. "The Titanic Coincidence." Interfaces. V-3 (May 1975)
53-54.
Middleton, Drew. "Perntagon Cites Build-up by Hanoi." The New York Times,
March 4, 1974.
Mikryukov, Major General AVN. L. and Babich, Colonel V. "Development of
Fighter Aviation Factors Since World War II." VoyennorIstoricheskiy Zhurnal,
No. 5, May 1977.
Military Balance. The Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Adlard
and Sons Ltd., 1970.
Nhan Dan (The People). No. 3955, Hanoi, 28 January, 1965.

Pike, Douglas. "North Vietnam in the Year 1972." Asian Survey, 13 January,
1973.
Prosser, Lamar M., Major. "The Bloody Lessons of Indochina." Army Combat
Forces Journal. June 1955.
Rigg, Robert B., LTC. "Red Parallel: The Tactics of Ho and Mao." Army
Combat Forces Journal. January 1955.
Rolph, Hammond. "Vietnamese Communism and The Protracted War." Asian Survey.
Vol. XII, No. 9, September 1972.
Scott, Winfield S. BG, (USA, Ret.). "A Strategic Logistics Force."
Strategic Review. Vol. IV. Fall 1976.
Smith, Ralph B. "The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of March 9,
1945." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. IX, Ho. 2, September 1978.
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Ta Yuan Linh. "How Armed Struggle Began in South Vietnam." Viet Nam Courier.
No. 22. March 1974, p. 22.
"Thayer, Thomas C. "How to Analyze a War Without Fronts, Vietnam 1965-72."

Journal of Defense Research, Vol. 7B. Fall 1975.
United Press International. Peking. "News Service Release UP-013," July

30, 1979.
I
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GLOSSARY
Alliance Full Title- The Alliance of National and Democratic Peace

forces of Viet-Nam. A front organization designed to unite
communist and non-communist forces in the political struggle
in South Vietnam. Specifically appealed to intellectuals in
urban areas.
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam, under command of the Saigcn
4 government.
Binh Tram Equivalent to a logistics regiment headquarters
Binh van "Action against the enemy troops." This was a program of
the National Liberation Front to degrade and demoralize the
enemy's armed forces - the troop proselyting program.
Cao Dai Organized religious sects involved in the political movement

& Hoa Hao (struggle) in South Vietnam, armed by French to resist
Viet Minih.
SCOSVN
Central Office for South Vietnam. The top command post for
all communist political and military activities in the
southern half of South Vietnam. Southern branch of the Lao
Dong Party. Thrcuqh interlocking organization and concur-
rent assignments, COSVN members directed or guided the PRP,
NLF, and PLAF.
DLD Dang Lao Dong. The Workers' Party or Communist Party in

North Vietnam. Often referred to as the Lao-Dong Party, it
was formed on March 31, 1951 and eventually became the
;primary political party in North Vietnam.
DRVN Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Often abhreviated DRV. Pro-

(DRV) claimed as the official government of North Vietnam by Ho
Chi Minh on September 2, 1945.
GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany).
GVN Government of (South) Vietnam in Saigon.
Dan Van Literally translates to "action among the people." This

program originated with the Viet Minh and was directed
toward gaining popular support from the general population.
During NLF days, the program was redefined and limited to
the "1i berated areas."
Dich Van Literally translates to "action among the enemy." This
program originated during the Viet Minh days and was origi-
nally directed against the enemy's military and civilian
G-1
THE BDM CORPORATION
administration. As an NLF program, it was designed to gain

popular support among the rural population in GVN-controlled
areas.
FWMAF Free World Military Assistance Forces.
ICC International Control Commission. The international organi-

zation established for the supervision of the 1954 Geneva
Agreements in Indochina. Also known as ICSC - The Interna-
tional Control and Surveillance Commission.
ICP Indochinese Communist Party. Formed in January, 1930 by Ho

Chi Minh, it was dissolved on November 11, 1945 and replaced
by the Lien Viet (see below).
Lien Viet Full title - Mat-tran Lien Viet Quoc Dan Viet-Nam. United
Vietnamese Nationalist F-ont organization formed on May 27,
1946 which became the political organizational structure for
the Viet-Minh. It was considered a popular (nationalist)
front party in North Vietnam and eventually outlived its
usefulness as an organizational vehicle for the North Viet-
namese communists.
NLFSV National Liberation Frcnt of South Vietnam. Often abbrevi-
(NLF) ated as NLF. This was the communist front organization in
South Vietnam. Similar in structure to the North Vietnamese
government (DRV), it had a central committee, a presidium or V
politburo and a secretariat with organizational elements
running down to the village level.
NVA A common but imprecise term used in many official US docu-

ments to identify the North Vietnamese Army. Generally
referred to in this volume by its official title, the PAVN.
PAVN People's Army of Vietnam. This term refers to North Vietna-
mese army units, including those regular North Vietnamese
units deployed to RVN.
PLAF People's Liberation Armed Forces, also called the Liberation

Army. The PLAF consists of two elements: the Full Military
Force or the Main Force and the Para-Military Force or the
guerrilla force. Initially indigenous Southsrners, but
increasingly comprised of PAVN fillers as the war continued.
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants.
PRC People's Republic of China.
G-2
,• " • ,,•,,••-.,,.,L•,•.•,.•,.,,-um • ' • #..•.. .. • .:,• ,• +•,• •PA

THE BDM CORPORATION
PRGRSV Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of

(PRG) South Vietnam, often abreviated PRG. Established on June 10,
1969 as a means to challenge the legitimacy of the Saigon
Government and provide a political entity to claim a
share of any coalition government that might eventuate
(temporarily).
PRP People's Revolutionary Party. Formed on January 1, 1962,
the PRP was the Communist Party of South Vietnam.
PSY-WAR Psychological Warfare.
RVN Republic of (South) Vietnam.

Tet Vietnamese holiday, the lunar new year.
USG US Government
Viet-Cong(VC) Term used by the US to describ; Communist forces in Vietnam.
Although imprecise, it is in almost universal use.
Viet-Minh Formal title - Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi or Revolu-
tionary League for the Independence of Vietnam. Formed on
May 19, 1941 at the initiative of the ICP to develop a
"national front" policy.
VNQDD Vietnam Quoc Dan Dong or Vietnamese Nationalist Party.

Early nationalist noncommunist political party eventually
supplanted by the ICP.
VPA Vietnamese People's Army. In some translations of same
official DRV documents the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)
is referred to as the VPA.
f G-3
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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTr
CARLISLE BARRACKS. PENNSYLVANIA 17013
AWCI 9 March 1981
SUBJECT: Declassification of the BDM Study, "The Strategic Lessons Learned in

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Defense T.-chnical Information Center

F ATTN. Ms.. betty Weatherholtz
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1. Your organization was on the distribution list for the BDM study, "The
Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam." The study was assigned AD nuimbers
B048632L through 641L.
2. In December 1980, the Army War College Security Office notified all
recipients of the study by telephone that it contained classified information
and should be secured.
3. BDM now has revised the appropriate pages of the study to delete all
I classified information and has conformed to All other requirements required by

the clearance review.
4. A revised copy of the study which is unclassified and approved for public
releas-ý is inclosed. DTIC Form 50's are inclosed for assignment of new AD
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Incls ANDREW C. REMSON,

as Colonel, CE
Director, Strategic Studies Instite
CORPORATION
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Phone (703) 821-5000
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SI I Jail '--: --
A SAiUOY OF JTRATEGIC .ESSONSi

WARNED IN,IETNAMa
,LUME
~4 t,,t---
U17FOREIGN POLICY AND VIETNAM 1945-19752
This 'aft report is submitted to DAMO-SSP.

4541178W
v914a ,/
1110'ol"
, - IMI!
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FOREWORD I
This Study is a final draft submitted to DAMO-SSP in accordance with .
the provisions of Contract No. DAAG 39-78-C-0120.

The task is to identify and analyze lessons that should be learned
from three decades of US involvement in Vietnam. This is Volume III of the
Study.
Volume I The Enemy
Volume II South Vietnam
EVolume III US Foreign Policy and

Vietnam 1945-1975
Volume IV US Domestic Factors Influencing
Vietnam War Policy Making
Volume V Planning the War

Volume VI Conduct of the War
Volume VII The Soldier .. -.-
Volume VIII The Results of the War , <;j.Aj.
-- ~ I
The views of the authors do not purport to reflect the positions of the
Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.
iii
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....... Sr
. . .. . . . . .. . ..
THE BDM CORPORATION
PREFACE
A. PRESPECTIVES OF THE STUDY
This volume, "US Foreign Policy and Vietnam, 1945-1975," is the third
of an eight-volume ztudy entitled A Study of Strateqic L-ssons Learned in
Vietnam undertaken by the BDM Corporation under contract to the US Army.
This comprehensive research effort is aimed at identifying lessons which US
military leaders and US civilian policy makers should have learned or
should now be learning from the US experience in Vietnam.
Volume I of this study, an examination of the enemy, includes discus-
sions of the DRV leadership and party organization, Communist Vietnamese
goals and strategies, and internal and external channels of support estab-
lished to aid the North's war effort. Volume II focuses on the Republic of
Vietnam, the country's societal characteristics and problems, its govern-
ment, and its armed forces. Volume IV explores the US domestic scene,
including its political and economic components, the role of the media
during the Vietnam conflict, and the extent of domestic support for the
war. Volume V concent.ates on the actual planning of the US war effort,
examining various aspects of this effort, including contingency planning,
the Pacification and Vietnamization programs, and the negotiation process.
Volume VI, "Fighting the War," includes discussions of US intelligence,
logistics, and advisory efforts; US counterinsurgency programs; and ground,
air, naval, and unconventional operations. Volume VII examines the US
soldier, including the war's psychological effects on the soldier; alcohol,
drug abuse, and race relations in the US military; and leadership and
personnel relations in the US armed forces. Finally, Volume VIII dis-
cusses, in broad terms, the results of the war fcr the Untited States in
terms of domestic, foreign, and military policies.
This eightvolume study effort is analytical, not historical in
nature. Its focus is primarily military in orientation. The purpose of the
entire eight volumes is not a retelling of the Vietnam conflict, but a
v
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__M JU :IiW
THE 8DM CORPORATION
drawing of lessons and insights of value to present and future LUS policy
mikers, both civilian and militar,
ti. METHODOLOGY AND PURPOSE OF V3LUME III, "FOREIGN POLICY AND VIETNAM,
1945-1975"
1. Methodology
This volume, entitled "US Foreign Policy and Vietnam, 1945-1975,"
assesses the United States' involvement in Vietnam by examining the global
context in which this involvement occurred, the major historical precedents
influencing US involvement, and the US national-level policy process which
shapad this involvement. This volume and Volume IV, "US Domestic Factors
Influencing Vietnam War Policy Making," serve together as a joint research
effort; both US domestic and foreign policies influenced the nature and
scope of US military involvement in Vietnam and it would be detrimental to
segregate these concerns into mutually exclusive efforts. The information
in these volumes should, therefore, be considered together in order to gain
an appreciation of the full constraints and concerns which influenced US
policy makers determining US policy for Vietnam.
Volume III is divided into four chapters. Figure 11I-I provides
an overview summarizing the interrelationship of the four chapters and
"volume appendices and the methodology employed to derive lessons and
insights regarding US foreign policy for Vietnam. The four chapters and
the volume appendices serve together as an integrated and unified study
effort. Each chapter, in succession, provides background information for
the next, culminating in the final chapter, "US Foreign Policy and Vietnam,
1945-1975: Lessons to Be Learned." The appendices serve as supplementary
support data for the reader. (See Figure III-l for the relationship of the
appendices to the rest of Volume III..)
2. Purpose
Chapter 1 illustrates US global policy during the 1945-1975
period and relates this policy to US policies for Southeast Asia in
general, and for Vietnam specifically. Chapter 2 discusses a number of
I vi
THE BDM CORPORATION
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historical precedents and perceptions expressed as catchwords such as thie

"loss of China" or "appeasement at Munich," which served to justify or
constrain US policy making for Vietnam. Chapter 3 assesses the US Vietnam
policy-making process, providing an overview of the six post-WW II adminis-
trations, their respective policy-making styles, and the relative level of
influence enjoyed by the major US policy-making bodies in the Vietnam
policy-making process. Chapter 3 also provides case studies for each of
the six adm'inistrations examined; these case studies provide detailed
descriptions of the policy-making process employed by each particular
administration inmaking key Vietnam policy decisions.
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 all conclude with a section entitled "Anal-
ytic Summary and Insights," serving both as a conclusion and as a basis for
deriving lessons on US foreign policy and Vietnam for the period 1945-1975.
Chapter 4 is based on the data anzd analyses appearing in Chapters 1, 2,
I and 3, integrating this information in a brief concluding chapter devoted

to lessons.
C. THEMES THAT EMERGE FROM VOLUME III: "US FOREIGN POLICY AND VIETNAM,
1945-1975"1
Cha~ter 1, entitled "US Global Policy and Its Relationship to US

Policy for Southeast Asia, 1945-1975," demonstrates that US interests in
Southeast Asia were almost entirely dictated by US perceptions of global
threats outside of the region, particularly the threat of Soviet and
Chinese Communist expansionism. The major themes (and their relationship
to US involvement inVietnam) assessed in this chapter include:
* the conflict of colonialist concerns with post-war economic
reconstruction and the creation of security alliances;
* the conflict between anticolonialist and anticommunist concerns;
* the US understanding of monolithic communism and the Sino-Soviet
rift;
* the US investment with its allies, particularly with South
Vietnam, (in men, materiel, money, and prestige) and its effect
on US foreign policy formation, and
viii
THE BOM CORPORATION
* the United States' eventual exploitation of hostilities between

the Soviet Union and Communist China as a politico-diplomatic
tool.
Chapter 2, entitled "Historical Precedents Which Influenced US Involve-
mont in Vietnam," identifies those historical experiences most influential
in shaping US policy for Vietnam. The major themes emerging from this
chapter include:
* the fear of appeasement, such as occurred at Munich in 1938,
served to justify the US policy of containment in Southeast Asia;
* the "loss of China" prompted successive US administrations to
fear a "loss" in Southeast Asia, and to commit US resources in
order to prevent such a "loss";
* the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion servc- to strengthen the
Kennedy administration's resolve in proving US capabilities
(especially counterinsurgency) elsewhere, particularly in
Vietnam;
6 the fear of Chinese Communist intervention, such as experienced
during the Korean War, limited the level of the US military
respense to North Vietnam; and
* the adage "never again," referring to US involvement in another
Asian land war, served to constrain two post-WW II administra-
tions in policy making for Vietnam.
Chapter 3, entitled "Washington and Vietnam: US National-Level Policy
Makers and the Policy-Making Process," explains the pervasiveness of the
containment loctrine and dormino theory in US policy toward Vietnam by show-
irng that the key decision makers shared a belief in their validity in
[idochina. Chapter 3 also shows that the decision-making processes, while
'enabling some dissent on this view to emerge, tended to minimize dissent by
stressing presidential decisionmaking with a narrow band of l.yal appointed
advisers who shared the basic beliefs of the president. Chapter 3 also
explores the themes of centralization and decentralization in the decision
m&king process.
ix
THE 6DM CORPORATION
Chapter 4, entitled "US Foreign Policy and Vietnam, 1945-1975: Les-

sons to Be Learned," examines a number of general lessons to be learned
from the preceding discussion of US foreign policy and Vietnam. The les-
sons and insights are summarized in the "Executive Summary" following this
preface.
D. HISTORICAL-CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF VOLUME III
Figure 111-2 *provides an encapsulation of the data and analyses appear-

ing in Volume III. The figure offers a time-sensitive depiction of major
US global objectives and interests, perceived threats, and strategies for
the thirty--year period, 1945-1975. The figure also summarizes the impact
of certain historical precedents which served to justify or constrain US
policy making for Vietnam during this time period. In ad'dition, the
graphic highlights general characteristics of the policy-making styles and
processes for each of the six post-WW II administrations. The final sec-
tion of Figure 111-2 plots seventeen major turning points during US mili-
tary involvement in Vietnam, allowing the reader to gauge their development
with other data appearing in this framework of US foreign policy, 1945-
1975.
- ~7:
THE 6DM CORPORATION
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-2. Historical-Chronological Overview of Volume I xi/xii

THE BDM CORPORATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
FOREWORD iii
PREFACE v
TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii
LIST OF FIGURES xv
LIST OF MAPS xix
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EX-1 to EX-6
US GLOBAL POLICY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO US
POLICY FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1945-1975 1-1 to 1-48
A. Introduction 1-1
B. 1945-1950 (Pre-Korea) 1-3
C. 1950-1955 1-12
0. 1955-1960 1-17
E. 1960-1965 1-22
F. 1965-1970 1-27
G. 1970-1975 1-33
H. Analytic Summary and Insights 1-40
2 HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS WHICH INFLUENCED US
INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM 2-1 to 2-34
A. Introduction 2-1
B. Appeasement in Munich 2-i
C. The Fall of China 2-6
0. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Berlin: Firmness
With the Adversary 2-10
E. The Bay of Pigs: Limited Intervention As a
Means of Containment 2-13
F. The Chinese Intervention in Korea 2-17
SG. "Never Again" Employ Combat Troops in an
Asian Land War 2-22
H. Analytic Summary and Insight3 2-25
3 WASHINGTON AND VIETNAM: US NATIONAL LEVEL

POLICY MAKERS AND THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 3-1 to 3-71
A, Introduction 3-1
B. The Truman Administration 3-3
xiii
THE BDM CORPORATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Chapter Page
C. The Eisenhower Administration 3-12

0. The Kennedy Administration 3-22
E. The Johnson Administration 3-33
F. The Nixon Administration 3-39
G. The Ford Administration 3-48
H. Analytic Summary and Insights 3-55
4 US FOREIGN POLICY AND VIETNAM, 1945-1975:
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 4-1 to 4-8
A. Introduction 4-I
B. Lessons 4-1
Appendix Page
A SUPPLEMENTAL DATA TO VOLUME III: SIGNIFICANT
US NATIONAL POLICY DECISIONS WHICH INFLUENCED
US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM A-i to A-99
B SUPPLEMENTAL DATA TO CHAPTER 3: BIOGRAPHICAL,
INFORMATION ON KEY US VIETNAM DECISION MAKERS,
1945-1975, THEIR BACKGROUNDS AND BIASES B-i to B-29
C SUPPLEMENTAL DATA TO CHAPTER 1: A SERIES OF

SIX CHARTS SUMMARIZING US GLOBAL INTERESTS AND
OBJECTIVES, PERCEIVED THREATS, AND STRATEGIES AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO US INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA, 1945-1975 C-1 to C-14
BIBLIOGRAPHY BB-i to BB-19
xiv
q:,, ... ....... •o•....•........ .... . . •• - . • ,• . • •• . , , -*,.• . .. *

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
II-i Summary of Volume III Methodology: Inter-
relationship of Chapters and Related Appendices vii
111-2 Historical - Chronological Overview of Volume III xi/xii
1-1 A Sumtmary of US Interests, Objectives, Perceived
Threats, and Strategies on a Global Basis,
1945-1975 1-5/6
2-1 A Summary of Historical Precedents as They
Influenced US Involvement in Vietnam 2-2
3-1 Vietnam Policy Making: Key Decision Makers and
Other Important Advisers Within the Truman
Administration, 1945-1952 3-5
3-2 Vietnam Policy Making: Key Decision Makers anid
Other Important Advisers Within the Eisenhower
3-3 Vietnam Policy Making: Key Decision Maker3 and
Other Important Advisers Within the Kennedy
Other Important Advisers Within the Johnson
Administration, 1963-1968 33
Other Important Advisers Within the Nixon4j
Other Important Advisers Within the Ford
Administration, 1974-April 1975 3-501
A-1 Decision I, US Decision To Acquiesce to Frenchk

Reentry Into Indochina A-5
A-2 Decision II, US Decision To Recognize the Asso-
ciated States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos,
February 1950; and To Increase Military Aid to
France and Indochina, June 1950 A-1l
xv
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THE BDM CORPORATION
LIST OF FIGURES (CONTINUED)

Figure Page
A-3 Decision III, US Decision Not To Intervene
Militarily at Dien Bien Phu A-17
A-4 Decision IV, US Decision To Become Directly

Involved in Vietnam A-25
"A-5 Decision V, US Decision To Sharply Increase US-
RVN Joint Efforts A-31
A-6 Decision VI, US Decision To Support the Overthrow
of Ngo DInh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu A-37
A-7 Decision VII, Southeast Asia Resolution (Tonkin
Gulf Resolution) A-41
A-8 Decision VIII, US Decision To Conduct Air Strikes
Against Targets in North Vietnam A-45
A-9 Decision IX, US Decision To Introduce Ground
Troops Into Vietnam A-49
A-10 Decision X, US Decision(s) Not To Mobilize the
Reserves A-55
A-ll Decision XI, US Policy Decision To Change From
Commitment to Disengagement A-59
A-12 Decision XII, US Policy Decision on Negotiations,
Withdrawal, and Vietnamization A-65
A-13 Decision XIII, US Decision To Launch Incursions
Against Enemy Sanctuary Bases in Cambodia A-71
A-14 Decision XIV, US Decision To Bomb DRV Military
Targets and Mine Haiphong Harbor A-75
A-15 Decision XV, Paris Cease-Fire Accords A-81
A-16 Decision XVI, US Congressional Decision To Cut
US Military Assistance to RVN to $700 Million A-85
A-17 Decision XVII, US Decision Not To Aid RVN at
the Fall of Phuoc Long A-89
xvi
THE BDM CORPORATION
LIST OF FIGURES (Continue(1)
Figure Page
C-I Summary of US Global Policy, 1945-1950 (Pre-
Korea), and Its Relationship to US Policy
for Southeast ;ia C-3/4
C-2 Summary of US Global Policy, 1950-1955, and Its
Relationship to US Policy for Southeast Asia C-5/6

C-4 Summary of US Global Policy, '960-1965, and Its

Relationship to US Policy for Southeast Asia C-9/lO

Relationship to US Policy for Southeast Asia C-ll/12
xvii
THE 8DMV CORPORATION
LIST OF MAPS
Map Page
1-1 Major Crises and Significant Evenits Affecting
US Policy for the Period 1945-1950 (Pre-Korea) 1-8
1-2 Major Crises and Significant Events Affecting
US Policy for the Period 1950-1955 1-13
Major Crises and Significant Events Affecting
xix
THE BDM CORPORATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
he chapters of Volume III develop a number of -key insights and les-1

sons relating to the formulation of US policy toward Vietnam during the
years 1945-1975. These insights underscore both the general context and
the specific nature of US policy making--the global environment in which 4
Vietnam policy was formulated, the historical precedents which influencedOW
subsequent US foreign policy and particularly Southeast Asian policies, and
the UJS policy-making process. The insights are specific, focusing on such
issues as US perceptions of its global role, US perceptions of external
powers, both friendly and unfriendly, consistencies and contradictions in
US foreign policies, the influence of historical precedents on US policy
makers, and the advantages and liabilities inherent in specific approaches
to policy making. In contrast, the lessons derived in this volume are1
general, concentrating on the broader issues and themes discussed in the
volume which are relevant to a discussion of US foreign policy during the
1945-1975 period and to present day policy considerations.
4 ~EX- 1j
THE 8DM CORPORATION
INSIGHTS
US Foreign Policy a The early years of US involvement in Southeast Asia

and Vietnam, witnessed an attempt by national policy makers to
1945-l975 reconcile US anticolonialist and anticommunist
pclicies, generally at the expense of the former.
e During the time period under consideration, the US

found itself constrained by perceptions of its own
leadership role in the world and by its percep-
tions of threats to (ISobjectives.
e The United States' post-WW II assumption of the
role of "global policeman," aimed at combatting
international communism in the post-World War II
era, limited its appreciation of other forces at
work in the global environment, particularly that
of nationalism.
s Inconsistencies or abrupt changes in US policies I

undermined the effectiveness and credibility of
the United States. In addition, the United
States' long-held Eurocentric policy perspective
diminished overall US effectiveness in fashioning
viable policies outside of Europe.
e The broad US objective of containing communism
globally conflicted with the US objective to
promote self-determination for ind civil liberties
in the world's former colonies in general and in
South Vietnam in particular. Perceptions of the
monolithic communist threat frequently clouded the
differences between civil wars, colonial wars, and
what the communists termed as "wars of national
liberation."
* Foreign policy terms such as "vital interest,"
"objective," and "threat" were often applied
without careful discrimination by US national
policy makers, thus leading to oversimplification,
contradictions, and confusion in US foreign•
policy.
EX-2
THE BDM CORPORATION
LESSON
The importance of particular US interests may

undergo significant changes, depending upon a
broad array of international and national con-
siderations, often beyond the control of the
United States Government. To minimize confusion
at subordinate levels of leaorship, (IS national
leaders must be as clear, precise, and discrimi-
nating as possible in determining "vital" inter-
ests, especially prior to making a long-term
comitment to another nation or governnment.
EX-3
¶ THE BOM CORPORATION
INSIGHTS
Historical e The Chinese threat perceived by the US was more
Precedents assumed than real. For example, throughout the
Which Influenced period of US involvement in the Vietnam conflict
US Involvement the significance of the political rift between
In Vietnam the USSR and the PRC and the cultural enmity be-
tween the Vietnamese and Chinese was consistently
understated.
0 The admonition that the US must not "lose" South
Vietnam (like it "lost" China) was often used by
US policy makers to justify the US commitment to
Southeast Asia. The fact that the term "loss"
implied previous control or hegemony by tne US
over China reinforced the United States' parcep-
tion of its post-World War I! role as th: free
world's global policeman, and of the natire of
global politics as "bipolar," where a "loss" by
the US was considered a gain for world communism.
0 Tendencies toward moderation and compromise in
Vietnam policy making were sometimes discredited
by being cc'ipared with "appeasement" of Hitler at
Muni.h in 1938.
* Policie-, and strategies proven effective in super-
power confrontations may be wholly inapplicable to
probl ems i n the Thi rd World.
* Several important lessons provided by the Bay of
Fics '(perience were neglefted: first, prior to
commi .ing military and/or politir.al resources to
a given cot ntry, a thorough assessment of politi-
cal and social realities in that country shnuld be 14
undertaken. Scodd, there are signific.-ant risks
inherent in restricting the scope and employment
of military resourLes in a given operation. US
lck of knowledge about Asia and Asians helped
load to faulty perceptior~s, as did a lack of
undoe-starlding abcout the goals, etc. of Cuba and
LESSON
It is essential to know precisely the nature of

relationships between Third World countries and
external communist powers - a corollary to the
"Know Your Enemy" and "Know Your Ally" les'ons
underscored in Volumes I and II. US policy makers
must carefully examine the premises upon which
they formulate any US policies.
EX-4
I)
THE BDM CORP~ORATION
INSIGHTS
US National-level # Pressures to arrive at timely decisions militate
Policy Makers and against the possibility of obtaining expert advice
the Policy Making on all sides of every issue. However, when expert
Process advice is available but is continually ignored
because of an assertion that timeliness is cru-
cial, then the validity and implications oft this
assertion deserve careful scrutiny.
0 The U.. Congress indicated its dissatisfaction with
the executive branch's performance in foreign
policy, especially with regard to Southeast. Asia,
by reducing aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia,
thereby using its "power of the purse" to shape
future US commitments to the region.I1
0 Presidents, like other leaders, sometimes confused
disaent over Vietnam policy with per'sonal dis-
loyalty or lack of patriotism.
0 General beliefs about the dangers of "appeasement"
and of global communist unity and expansionism,
conditioned by experiences such as Munich, Yalta,
Korea, and the McCarthy era, frequently served as
the basis for US Southeast Asian policy formula-
tion, often regardless of the political, cultural,
traditional, or ideological realities in the
i
region.
0 All decision makers are human and fallible and
adopt a decision-making procebs with which they
:
feel comfortable. While good organizations and
procedures cannot ensure sound decisions, weak
ones are more likely to produce bad policies and
deci sions.
LESSON
The American experience in Vietnam points to the
danger of elevating one fundamental principle --
anticommunism -- to the status of doctrine and of
applying it to all regions of the globe. This
reduces the possibility of meaningful debate and
limits the airing of legitimate dissenting view-
points. Careful and contioual reexamination of US
foreign policy premises may forestall this poten-
tially dangerous development from occurring in
future policy deliberations.
EX-5
THE BDM CORPORATION
OVERALL LESSON
US natioaial leaders, both civilian and military, must continually
assess the validity and importance ot the policies thty are pursuing. In
particular, they must assess the changing implications of these policies
for particular foreign countries and regions ard determine the political,
military, and economic prices that they are likely and willing to pay for
successful policy implementation, Assessments of this nature will foster
the creation and/or revitalization of strong, mutually beneficial alli-
ances, thereby providing an element of continuity and constancy to US
foreign policy. Moreover, the national leadership should continually
assess its willingness to accept the responsibility for policy failures,
especially if it is unwilling to pay the price called for by a given
policy. US .iational leadership must, therefore, conduct continual and
honest reassessments of the premises of its national policy in light of
changing circumstances in both bipolar and multipolar relationships.
EX-6
T'HE BDM CORPORAT'ION
CHAPTER 1
US GLOBAL POLICY AND ITS RELATION-SHIP TU
US POLICY FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1945-1975
A. INTRODUCTION
The nature and extent of US involvement in Vietnam was shaped by the

post-W II gloWa environment and the tensions inherent in that environ-
ment. This chapter provides a discussion of US global interests and objec-
tives, the tensions and problems which threatened these goals, and major US
strategies to achieve t~iese goals. This chapter also assesses US interests
and objectives in Southeast Asia and strategies for achieving them which
usually flowed directly from US global interests and objectives.
Use of terms "national inte~rest," "national objective," "nationial
strategy," "national threat," and "national policy" is common in any dis-
cussion of US foreign policy; yet they have been frequently overused, mis-
applied or misunderstood. US policy makers, both civilian and military,
have often been obscure rather than clear and precise in their use of these
terms. For the purposes of this discussion, the above terms are defined as
follows: '1/
0 National Interest: A fundamental goal (,r purpose of a nation
(e.g. , peace, freedom, security, prosperity) which a nation is
prepared to defend.
* National Objective: A tangible, material object (as distin-
guished from a theoretical, abstract concept or idea) which a
nation desires in pursuit of its interests (e.g., use of
resources, use of sea, air and land for security reasons - bases,
etc.).
* National Threat: Anything which appears to jeopardize or
obstruct the attainment of a national interest or objective
(e.g., aggression, non-cooperation).
[ National Strategy: A plan for developing and applying a nation's
political, economic, psychological, and military capabilities and
1-1A
THE BDM CORPORATION
resources to provide maximum support to policies, thereby

securing national objectives and interests, (e.g. , provision of
economic, military, technical aia; promote the establishment of
defense organizations.)
* National Policy- A broad course of action or statements of
guidance adopted by the government at the national level in
pursuit of its national objectives and interests, including
strategies for their attainment and for dealing with national
threats (e.g., statements of definition or clarification of US
interests, objectives, atid strategies).
From the abcve, then, US national policy is seer as the government's artic-
ulation of national interests, objectives, and threats in the form of a
stated course of action.
The thirty years covered in this chapter are divided into six five-
year time periods, an 3pproach which lends itself to a neutral, perhaps
clinical, overview of the era to be discussed. This analytical tool of
five-year "slices" - to use Paul Kattenburg's terminology - allows for the
inclusion of a broad array of diverse themes within the discussion.2/
There are other possible time-sensitive breakdowns open to the analyst
assessing US foreign policy. The following list, by no means exhaustive,
illustrates a number of thase breakdowns; the era could be delineated and
discussed accordinq to:
* US administrations;
* Periods of the Cold War;
0 Changes in the global strategic balance;
* Changes in the global economic balance;
* Emergence of the Third World and its impact on the global
envyironment;
* Changes in the European balance of power;
* Changes in the Asian balance of power;
* Key events on a global basis shaping US foreign policy;
* Key events during the years of US involvement in Vietnam;
1-2
_..,
7
'I
pp ", mi
THE 8IDM CORPORATION
0 Changes in a bipolar world;

0 Changes in a tripolar world; and
0 Changes in a multipolar world.
Most of the above devices, however, are geared primarily to one par-
ticular theme, thus limiting the inclusion of other relevant yet dissimilar
I
themes manifeste.1 in a given time period. The five-year "slice" approach,
on the other hand, allows for an interweaving of themes without necessarily
limiting the discussion to any one particular focus. The approach chosen,
therefore, is a superior analytical tool for developing a neutral, objec-
tive discussion of US global interests and objectives., perceived threats,
and strategies for the period 1945-1975. Figure 1-1 provides an overview
of the themes addressed in the chapter and is divided according to the
five-year breakdown. Appendix C of this volume provides additional graphic
depictions of these themies, relating their global applicability to US
interests and objectives, perceived threats, and strategies for Southeast
* Asia, 1945-1975.
B. 1945-1950 (PRE-KOREA)
Emerging as the world's major power at the close of the second World
War, the United States hoped to create a strong and stable international
order and in pursuit of this goal strove for two major objectives: the
reconstruction and stabilization of the European continent and the evolu-
tion of the world's colonies towards self-government. Yet, in the imme-
diate post-war environment, obstacles to the attainment of these objectives
arose: the incompatibility of these two major objectives was, in itself, a
sizable obstacle to overcome.
To attain the first objective, the US committed itself to programs for
European economic recovery, centered on the Marshall Plan, and security
assistance, centered on NATO. To attain the second objective, the US
encouraged the colonial powers to prepare their Asian colonies for self-
government. France and Britain, whose participation in European security
1-3
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454 1/7Sv
Figure 1-1. A Suniiiary of US Interests, Objecti
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f US Interests, Objectives, Perceived Threats, and Strategies 1-5/6
1 Basis, 1945-1975
arrangements was believed essential by the United States, were unwilling to

move as fast as the US had hoped toward preparing their Asian colonies for
In addition, tension with the Soviet Union resulted from
I
A.self-government.
disagreements with the West over the nature and scope of European recon-
struction and defense requirements, culminating in Soviet refusal to
participate in -the US-sponsored European recovery and security programs.
US perceptions of Soviet post-war objectives in Europe clashed with US
objectives, as did British and French objectives regarding the fate of
their colonial territories. On this overarching global framework depended
US interests and objectives for the Asian continent and, in particular, fo~r
Southeast Asia.
Map 1-1 pinpoints major crises and events in the period 1945 - 1950
which had a significant impact on the development of US objectives, inter-
ests, and strategies. This graphic representation~ serves as a conceptual
backdrop for the following analysis of US global and Southeast-Asian
policy.
1. Interests and Ojectives
Desiring a strong international system composed of several viable
powers with which to trade, and based on a rational balance of power in
both Europe and Asia, the US committed its economic, political, and
military resources to the European Recovery Program, the United Nations,
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. From 1945 to 1950, the US
mraintained its traditional European focus. Concerning Asia, US attention
was concentrated on the reconstruction of Japan and on the promotion of
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China as a viable, independent, "replacement"
power for debilitated Japan.
US interests ard o[Jectives for Japan and China underwent radical
redefinition during the 1945-19503 period, having a v~ary real influence on
overall US relations with the Asian countries and the power balance in
Asia. At the beginning of the Truman administration, the primary US objec-
tive in the Pacific remained the defeat of the Japanese; as one mearis to
secure this objective, US OSS personnel cultivated relations with
I-
THE BDM CORPORATION
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* Vietnamese nationalists, including Ho Chi Minh, as an important and dynamic

* anti-Japanese force.4/ With Japan's defeat, US objectives and interests in
the Pacific came to center on revitalizing Asia, which included the crea-
tion of peace-time markets and the establishment of strategic bases. US
relationships with the Southeast Asian nationalists, previously based on
the objective of defeating the Japanese, dimmed considerably in the absence
*of their common enemy. European reconstruction and the need to ensure
French and British participation won out over earlier ties established with
nationalist forces in Indochina.
With the defeat of the Japanese, China became of vital interest
to US policy makers, both as a "replacement" power in the Pacific and as a
potential investment site for US entrepreneurs. The success of Mao
Tse-tung's forces in 1949 abruptly altered US interests in Asia. The
attention of the US came to rest on containing the communist advance, and,
as NSC 48/2 of December 1949, stated, on the:
prevention of power relationships in Asia which would

enable any other nation or alliance to threaten the
security of the United States from that area, or the
peace, national independence and stability of the
Asiatic nations."5/
2. Thrtats
In the immediate post-war years, the US found itself in a vitally
different global environment: the effects of the war and the ramifications
of the post-war settlements had shaped a new and unfamiliar world, marked
by different boundaries, a weakened Europe, and a single world power
possessing a nuclear capability. The post-war expectations of US policy
makers assumed that a certain compatibility of interests existed; yet US
war-time allies - the Soviet Union, Britain, and France - expressed
objecti%,s which did not coincide neatly with those of the US. Soviet
expansionism, based on a professed need to secure its fronts against
encroachments such as those witnessed during the war, and the British and
French desire to preserve intact their empires for both economic and
prestige-related reasons, threatened US post-war objectives.
1-9
THE BOM CORPORATION
A series of events lltd gradually to a redefinition of US policy

in the immediate post-war perio3d: first, French and British reque~sts for a
clear statement of US intentions regarding their colonial possessions, and
an increased concern, especially on the part of Churchill, regarding Soviet
intentions, set the heretofo~re ambiguous US policy on a course strongly
predicated upon anticomimunist prlnciples.6/ Hence, while the US stood
firmly against colonialism when dealing with the Dutch, a less important
ally, when pressed for a clear statement of policy by the French and
British regarding the US position on colonial issues, the US chose to
pursue objectives which would serve to rally Western Europe and the US
again~st the Soviet-inspired advance of communism.7/ The series of crises
pinpointed in Map 1, in particular the events in Eastern Europe and the
USSR's successful detonation of its first atomic device, lent credence to
the belief that communism was the major threat to US-allied interests and
objectives. The "loss" of China to the communist orbit did more to enhance
the "validity" of this threat than perhaps any other crisis or event during
the 1945-1950 period. Yugoslavia's breakaway from the Kremlin's orbit was
overshadowed by the China "loss" and did littlc to shake the US perception
cof the monolithic character of communism.
The US, therefore, found itself on a policy course directed
towards the containment of communism. The United States' ambiguous policy
regarding colonialism gave way to strategies focused oqi controlling the
communist advance, often to the detriment of ties earlier forged with
nationalist forces in the Asian Third World.
3. Strategies
The most significant and far-reaching strategy devised by the
national policy makers during this period, a broad program for dealing with
communism and, to a lesser degree, with the developing nations, was stated
in the Truman Doctrine and NSC 68. The Truman Doctrine was a response to
the British inability to deliver aid to Greece and Turkey beyond March 1947
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and sn'. out the following policy which would serve as a basis for US rela-
tions with the world's developing nations, including Vietnam:
It must be the policy of the US to support free peoples

who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures...we must assist
free peoples to work out their own destinies in their
own way... 8/
Herein lay the foundation for assistance programs designed to inculcate

democratic principles, inspire democratic development, and serve as an
attractive alternative to communism.
NSC 68 set forth a broad range of objectives and strategies fcr a
- LUS victory in the Cold War 9/ and identified the Soviet Union as the major
threa, to the free world. It set forth a highly ambitious, all-
encompassing program for containment of the Soviet Union. Briefly, the
document recommended:
e Against negotiations with the Soviet Union since conditions were
not yet sufficient to force the Kremlin to "change its policies
drastically;"
4 Development of hydrogen bombs to offset possible Soviet posses-
,on of an effective atomic arsenal by 1954;
1 jpid building of conventional military forces to preserve
,erican interests without having to wage atomic war;
0 A large increase in taxes to pay for this new,, highly expensive
mil tary establishment;
• A trong alliance system directed by the US;
• Unuermining of the "Soviet totalitariat" from within by making
"the Russian people our allies in this enterprise."1O/
By June 1950, then, US national policy makers had decided on a
strategy to cuunter communist-inspired aggression. As will be seen in the
following discussion of the 1950-1955 period beginning with the Korean War,
NSC 68 and the Truman Doctrine served as the basis for US assistance to
South Korea and to the French in the latter's conflict in Indochina with
the Viet-Minh.
I
C. 1950-1955
Wi th the outbreak of the Korean War, the US undertook a mission aimed

at curbing the advance of presumably monolithic communism and at vindticat-
ing the administrition for "allowing" the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's
forces by those of Mao Tse-tung in China. The Korean conflict, following
so closely after the victory of the Chinese Communists and the recognition
of Ho Chi Minh's government by both the Soviet Union and the Peoples'
Republic of China, appeared to be a threat of substantial proportion. One
important result of the Korean conflict was that it concentrated the atten-
tions of high-ranking US national advisers on the Asian arena, perhaps
serving to balance the heretofore disproportionate attention concentrated
on European concerns.
As in the 1945-1950 period, the US continued to seek French coopera-
tion in granting a modicum of independence to Indochina; yet, in retro-
spect, the US desire for establishing a strong European defense community
and .for defeating the advance of monolithic communism took precedence over
anti colonialist concerns.
This period also witnessed a restatement of US interests and objec-
tives, particularly with regard to the preservation of Southeast Asia as a
region of economic and strategic significance, the stability of which was
perceived as paramount to the security of the US, Japan, and the rest of
the non-communist world. Perceptions of the communist threat during this
period took on a new dimension: the threat of subversion and guerrilla
warfare were considered offshoots of the broader threat of monolithic com-
munism. And new strategies to counter these threats evolved: "massive
retaliation" and initial preparations for what was later termed counter-
insurgency had their inception during this period of US policy formulation.
Map 1-2 depicts the significant events which had a bearing on US policy
during the years 1950-1955.
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1. Interests and Objectives

The Korean conflict served as a catalyst for increased US involve-
ment in Southeast Asia. North Korea's invasion not only precipitated US
involvement on the Korean peninsula, but also provided the rationale for
the immediate provision of military assistance to the Associated States if
Indochina ind, in particular, to the French and Vietnamese forces battling
the Viet-Minh.ll/ The prevention of a communist takeover in Southeast Asia
was seen to be of importance, for both economic and strategic interests
-were open to partial compromise or total jeopardy if communism gained a
foothold in the region: numerous national policy 'itatements stressed the
importance of Southeast Asia as the "Asian rice bowl", providing Japan with
essential resources for its industrialization. 12/' The preservation of a
southeast Asia sympathetic to Western defense needs explained the
strategic-military interest in the region: bases, air and sea routes, and
an Asian "perimeter of defense" were cited as the major strategic interests
meri ti ng US protec ti on. 13/
As before, the US continued to call for the establishment of a
viable, non-communist, yet independent Indochina. The French, however,
regardless of US beliefs to the contrary, were involved in a battle to
preserve the French Indochinese empire.14/ Yet, the US, committed to its
policy of "containment," tended to gloss over the colonial realities oper-
ating in Indochina. As the US saw it, France was to serve as the Western
force dedicated to defeating communism in Southeast Asia; upon winning, the
French would bow out of the region, allowing for the As,ýociated States'
independenice and self-government. 15/ The US government 40d not overly
stress such expectations, for it was also extremely conscious of French
hesitancy over joining the US-sponsored European Defense Community. US
interests in Europe coupled with the realities of a growing communist
movement in Indochina, therefore, worked against a firm US anticolon'talist
posture vis-a-vis the French in Indochina.
The Dien Bien Phu crisis ir,1954 found the US encumbered as it
sought to balance its European and Asian objectives. Committed to contain-
ment, yet fearful of initiating unilateral action, especially in an
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Asian land war, the US developed its strategy for collective, "united
action. " 16/
2. Threats
While Kremlin- inspired aggression in Europe continued to be seen
as a dangerous threat to US global objectives and interests, the threat of
Chinese Communist aggression was perceived as equalling, if not surpassing,
the Soviet threat in Asia. Mindful of falling dominos and of the Chinese
Communist support to North Korea, the US sought to deter future PRC inter-
vention, especially in Indochina. In fact, the 1950-1955 period found the
US national-level security advisers preoccupied with the possibility of
Chinese Communist intervention in the Indoch inese- French conflIict..l7/
Several other threats were identified during this period,
presenting serious problems for the US: the increase in communist guer-
rilla warfare in the Philippines and Indochina was seen as potentially
detrimental to the preservation of the status quo. Problems in Europe also
troubled the US. Still weakened f-om the second World War, US all1i es were
incapable of committing economic and military resources comparable to those
provided by the US for the establishment of a strong, European defense
community. In particular, the large commitment of French troops to
Indochina was incompatible with European defense requirements, imposing
severe constraints on French participation in NATO. Moreover, a divided
Germany did little to foster either a strong Europe or an economically
viable Geinnan nation.
3. Strategies
One of the most significant strategies developed by the US as a
means to curb the communist advance both in Europe and in Asia was to
establish regional defense organizations, including collective and bilat-
eral security arrangements. During this period, numerous US-Asian security
treaties were negotiated, including: 18/
0 ANZUS: September 1, 1,951 - US, Australia, New Zealand
* US - Republic of the Philipp~ines: August 30, 1951
. US - Republic of Korea: October 1, 1953
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0 SEATO: September 8, 1954 - US, UK, France, Australia, New

Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of the Philippines, Thailand
* US - Republic of China: December 2, 1954
Strategies set out in the Truman Doctrine and in NSC 68 also
obtained for this period: military and economic assistance provided to the
French and Vietnamese by the Truman administration increased steadily under
Eisenhower. Yet, mindful of the Korean experience, President Eisenhower

required an allied commitment to united action in Indochina as a pre-
requisite to US military intervention during the Dien Bien Phu crisis. 19/
Perhaps the most well-known strategy developed during this period
was Secretary Dulles' deterrence strategy of "massive retaliation." Fre-
quently misunderstood, this strategy was designed to alleviate the sizeable
economic burden of security expenditu.'es which were weighing heavily on the
US and its allies during this period.20/ In short, this strategy called
for:
a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost. Local

defense will always be importa;it. But there is no
local defense which alone will contain the mighty land
power of the Communist world. Local defenses must be
reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retal-
iatory power... The way to deter aggression is for the
free community to be willing and able to respond vigor-
ously at places and with means of its own choosing.2.'
Contrary 'to soie interpretations of Dulles' speech, the siategy allowed
for a degree of flexibility by providing for a conscious'and selective
approach to retaliation. Coupled with the Dulles-inspired "roll-back" and
"liberation" slogans, however, massive retaliation carried with it an
undertone indicative of this period's staunch anticommunist posture. While
the following period of 1955-1960 saw a continuation of the declared
strategy of massive retaliation, its credibility as a deterrent threat was
diluted by President Eisenhoweý,..", 'Aesire to reduce the superpower tensions
which prevailed during the 1950-)95. period.
In Indochina, the US continred to support the develocpment of a
non-communist, nationalist government By 1955, US concerns over Vietnam
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had subsided; the US continued to provide assistance to Vietnam and cul-

tivated ties with its non-communist leader, Diem, while the activities of
Ho's forces appeared minimal after their defeat of the French at Dien Bien
Phu and Ho's setback at the conference table in Geneva.
D. 1955-1960
US interests and objectives during this time period were markedly

similar to those discussed for the preceding period. However, US percep-
tions of the communist threat and strategies to deal with it underwent a
subtie reinterpretation. While the threat of monolithic communism con-
tinued to weigh heavily on US national security advisers, the nature and
scope of communist aggression now appeared capable of manifesting itself in
forms other than overt activity. Cloaked in the guise of indigenous rebel-
lion, the communist advance was now seen as a major cause of global unrest,
subversive activities, and guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the Kremlin's call
for "peaceful coexistence" did not preclude communist-inspired exploitation
of political and economic vulnerabilities in the Third World.
US strategies devised during the 1955-1960 period for dealing with
this "multi-f,'ont" threat were also carried over from the preceding period,
although subtly modified. While Dulles' deterrent strategy of "massive
retaliation" remained a basic elsner,t of US Cold War policy, it was
combined with Eisenhower's cautioiis desire for relaxation of tensions
between the two superpowers. Hence, while containment remained a primary
national objective, increased emphasis came to rest on deterring total war
through the control of arms and the maintenance of a low threshhold of
global conflict.22/ Thus, while Cold War attitudes persisted, the US began
to focus on "learning to live with the Communists."23/
As Map 1-3 indicates, the period 1955-1960 witnessed a broad array of
cr,,es, any one of which could have developed into a major superpower con-
frontation. The developing nations of Asia, Latin America, and Africa all
posed unique problems for the US and the Soviet Union. South Vietnam was
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viewed as an example of the US success in engendering a "model" democracy

in a developing nation. Concerns in Southeast Asia, especially during the
last several years of this period, centered primarily on Laos and the
activities thire of communist insurgents.
Consistent with the objectives and interests set forth during the
years 1950-1955, the US continued to view Southeast Asia as vitally impor-
tant, owing to the region's wealth of natural resources. President
Eisenhower, in a 1959 speech, noted:
... by strengthening Viet-Nam and helping insure the

safety of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, we
gradually develop the great trade potential between
this region, rich in natural resources, and highly
industrialized Japan to the benefit of both. In this
way freedom in the Western Pacific will be greatly
strengthened and the interests of the free world
advanced. 24/
After the resolution of the first Indochinese war which left a
divided Vietnam, the importance of South Vietnam as an economic trade link
to Japan appeared paramount. The strategic significance of Southeast Asia
to the US and its dllies was also a persistent theme throughout this
period; the possibility of losing another Asian state to the communist
orbit would run counter to the primary US objective of this period: the
global containment of communist expansion. It was felt that the "loss" of
Southeast Asia would:
6 Indicate US inability to act resolutEly in the face of communist
aggression and to maintain a strong, credible, leadership posi-
I
tion in the free world;
* Illustrate the weakness of capitalism and democracy;

Encourage other non-communist Asian states, including Japar and
India, to seek accommodation with the Communists.25/
Therefore, while Southeast Asia and, in particular, Vietnam did not consume
the attentions of US policy makers during this period, its potentia loss
would have a major impact on both US Asian and global policy.
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2. Threats
US perceptions of a monolithic communist threat continued
throughout this period, regardless of the growing antagonism between the
Soviet Union and the PRC. Soviet technological advances, in particular the
launching of Sputnik I, greatly alarmed Washington. It was perceived as an
ominous indication of overall Soviet military strength - greatly over-
estimated by the US at this time - and created suspicions in the US as to
the Soviet Union"s sincerity in calling for "peaceful coexistence" between
capitalism and communism.
In Asia, the communist strategy seemed oriented towards non-
military forms of aggression; while communist overt military aggression was
not ruled out by the US, "subversive activities ranging up to armed insur-
rection" and "an intensified campaign of communist political, economic and
cultural penetration" appeared the more prominent and less easily con-
trollad thr'eat to US interests in the region.26/
Local conflicts - involving low-level subversion, armed insur-
rectiori, and protracted guerrilla warfare - concerned US policy makers;
they would debilitate weaker states, thereby making them more susceptible
to commur:ist penetration. Nationalist uprisings threatening the status quo
were f-:.•'.quzntly considered as communist-inspired. US global objectives
were also seen as threatened by the preference for "non-alignment" or
neutrality, professed by a number of Third World nations, particularly as
regards economic and strategic arrangements.
In Europe, the 1956 invasion of Hungary indicated the lir:its ,in
the Kremlin's willingness to liberalize, or "de-Stalinize," Ats policies.
The invasioti also dealt a decisive blow to Dulles' "liberation" doctrine,
for Hungary now appeared even more entwined within the communist bloc.
Tensions regarding the status of Berlin, as well as antagonisms between the
US French and British over the handling of the Suez crisis threatened both
the spirit of this period's mini-detente and the cohesion of the Atlantic
Alliance.
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S... -•., .•b ,Y ,. •-.: , , L -

3. Staegies
While the US continued to rely on the strategy of "massive retal-
iation" to deter aggression, other strategies wer.e also developed during
the period 1955-1960. The most notable of these was the strategy of
p "flexible response" articulated by General Maxwell Taylor and the strategy
of negotiating with the Soviet Union in the fields of arms control and dis-
armament.
President Eisenhower did draw somewhat on the principles under-
lying these strategies, for he gradually came to stress the need for
flexibility in dealing with conflicts and for controlling the arms race
I ~
with the Sov~iet Union. His growing advocacy of conventional forces backed
by comparatively low-yield tactical nuclear weapons war ads the European
allies of the US sometimes feared) indicative of this readjustment away
from the deterrent strategy of massive retaliation to~wards more flexibility
in dealing with aggression in Europe. Eisenhower's ,nterest in arms con-
Vt 'trol led to the Open Skies Agreement of 1955, th. Geneva conference on
nuclear test bans, and the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference. The US con-
tinued to promote regional collective security arrangements to deter Soviet
aggression and to justify the use of US force to meet communist aggression
if deterrence failed. An excerpt from President Eisenhower's 1957 message
to Congress regarding mutual security programs illustrates this:
We in our own interest, and other free nations 'in their

own interest, have therefore joined in the building and
maintenance of a system of collective security in which
the effort of each nation strengthens all. Today that
system has become the keystone of our own and their
I
I security in a tense and uncertain world. 27/
To preserve both our economic and strategic interests in South-
east Asia, then, the US drew up detailed strategies for meeting the o ten
ment outlining many of these strategies was NSC 5809. (See Appendix C.)
Several of these strategies - for example, those relating to the training

of indigenous police forces and the implementation of covert operations -
were, in retrospect, the building blocks for future US strategies in
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Southeast Asia, thus paving the way for future US military involvement in
the region. Yet, even though national policy makers of this period
fashioned strategies for dealing with communist aggression in Indochina, it
was not until the following period, beginning with the Kennedy presidency,
that attention focused on this particular region.
E. 1960-1965
This time period, beginning with the inauguration of President Kennedy

in 1960 and ending just prior to the 196i arrival of US troops at Danang,
can be characterized as an era in which new strategies were used for the
attainment of old interests and objectives. The Kennedy administration
began to stress the necessity of "nation-building" in Vietnam, concen-
trating on the region as a "test-case" for halting "wars of national
liberation." In fact, while policy makers in the preceding time frame
viewed subversion and guerrilla warfare as threats to US national objec-
tives, it was not until the Kennedy presidency that a strategy was
developed specifically for dealing with these threats.
A rejection of the "massive retaliation" strategy resulted; while the
US would maintain an adequate defense in the event of total war, which
implied the use of nuclear weapons, US strategists focused intently on
developing responses for fighting limited wars, particularly those of an
insurgent, subversive nature.28/
Indeed, the majority of conflicts in the world during this period were
primarily of a limited, subversive nature (see Map 1-4). Except for the
1962 Cuban missle crisis and continuing tensions over Berlin, both of which
involved direct superpower confrontations, this era' s focus on flexible
response appeared to meet the requirements of the time.
Similar to the interests and objectives outlined for the preced-
ing periods, the US continued to stress the need to maintain a free, non-
Communist Southeast Asia. In particular, the preservation of Vietnam
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from the aggressive machinations of communist China was emphasized.29/

Moreover, the emphasis on the region's economic importance to the US was
reduced during this period; statements regarding US interests in Southeast
Asia focused more on its strategic relevance and on the importance of
fulfilling prior US commitments based on obligations set forthi by SEATO,30/
The promotion and development of a viable, democratic South
Vietnamese government was frequently cited as a major US objective in
Southeast Asia. However, US visions of a "model" democracy in Vietnam were
shattered by the corrupt and uncompromising Diem regime.
Globally, the US focused on two objectives: deterring total war
and countering guerrilla insurgency. After the first tension-filled years
of this period, characterized by saber-rattling on the part of both the US
and the USSR, emphasis came to rest on reducing the frequency and intensity
of superpower brinkmanship. The objective of deterring a nuclear holocaust
came to be regarded as a vital interest of both powers.31/
The second objective, aimed directly at the Third World and
indirectly at the world's two leading communist oations, entailed proving
that the US was capable of dealing effectively with insurgency and guer-
rilla warfare. So vital was this objective considered that President
Kennedy officially endorsed the US Army Special Forces, christeninig them
the "Green Berets." Their responsibilities were greatly expanded in line
with the administration's focus on counterinsurgency and covert operations.
While the Bay of Pigs episode failed to prove US capabilities in this type
of warfare, Vietnam seemed an excellent testing ground for countering
"protracted guerrilla warfare" and "wars of national liberation. "32/
2. Threats
The threat of communist aggression and imperialism assumed sub-
stantial proportions during this time period; in particular, the US per-
ceived Peking as the primary instigator of subversion in Asia, Africa, and
even in Latin America. Rhetoric emanating from the Soviet Union, stressing
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Soviet support for "wars of national liberation," and from the PRC, prais-
ing the virtues of "protracted guerrilla warfare," reinforced perceptions
of a monolithic communist threat. A 1962 JCS assessment stated:
It is recognized that the military and political effort

of Communist China...and the political and psycholog-
ical threat by the USSR... is part of a major campaign
to extend communist control beyond the periphery of the
Sino-'Soviet Bloc. . .It is, in fact, a planned phase in
the communist timetable of world domination.33/
Hence, while President Kennedy indicated an appreciation For the "profound
divisions" which, by 1962, had beset would-be communist unity, it was
apparent that this appreciation was not shared by all other national policy
advisers.34/ Even when the tensions between the USSR and PRC could no
longer escape US notice, the dynamics of the rift and its overall effect on
the Vietnam conflict were not seriously considered.35/
But, regardless of their external or internal direction, the US
considered "wars of national li~bration" - entailing cross-border insur-
gency, brush-fire aggression, and "spread and conquer" tzctics - a major
threat to its interests in Southeast Asia and, indeed, throughout the Third
World. According to President Kennedy,
T -, anet6 type of war, new in its intensity,

- in `. origin -- war by guerrillas, subver-
s .' , insurgents, assassins, wars by ambush instead of
by ,:ombat, by infiltration, instead of aggression,
seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy
instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare
uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called
"wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new
and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they
have finally achieved. 36/
Globally, US I .. ior.: 'th European countries, particularly with

France, threatened tile fray1 Iie harmony of the Atlantic Alliance. Dis-
gruntled by the US approach to a multi-lateral force (MLF) concept. France
indicated intense displeasure with the US, initiating a reassessment of its
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own commitment to NATO and, in general, causing considerable anxiety within

the US government.37/ The sincerity of the US commitment to its treaty
obligations had, thus, come unrwx question. Although this was not the
first time that US allies questioned the sincerity of US intentions, the
French reassessment did mark the beginning of a decade in which US cred-
ibility became an issue domestically and internationally. The frequency
with which national level policy makers stressed our SEATO obligations
suggests that the possibility of losing credibility was a major national-
level concern. This theme gains increasing relevwnce in the rema"ning two
time-frames.
3. Strategies
Pursuing its objectives of an independent government and strong
economy in South Vietnam, the US increased its political, economic and
technical assistance to the country as part of its "nation building"
program.
The most important national strategy developed during the 1960-
1965 period, influencing not only US involvement in Vietnam but the entire
US military posture, was the strategy of "flexible response." The impor-
tance of developing a method for dealing with subversion, especially of a
limited nature, was a major reason for its evolution - thus, the develop-
ment of the Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) and other programs designed to
meet the threat of insurgency. In 1961, President Kennedy noted,
We need a greater ability to deal with guerrilla 2

forces, insurrections, and subversion. Much of our
effort to create guerrilla and anti-guerrilla capa-
bilities has in the past been aimed at general war. We
must be ready now to deal with any use of force,
including small externally supported bands of men; and
we must help train local forces to be equally
effective. 38/
The strategy of "flexible response," by which the US was "to respond any-
where, at anytime, with weapons and forces appropriate to the
situation," 39/ also left open the option of US troop commitment as a means
1-26
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by which to realize US national objectives, both global and in Southuast

aAs ia. The Kennedy administration's build-up of US conventional forces was
tin keeping with this strategy of US flexible response. Citing its SEAlS0
commitments and the Southeast Asian Resolution, the US committed troops to
South Vietnam in 1965 and initiated its first bombing campaign against
North Vietnamese targets as part of its strategy of flexible response in
the Southeast Asian theater.
F. 1965-1970
The 1965-1970 time period can be divided into two sub-periods: the
first, 1965-1968, saw a high degree of thematic continuity from the pre-
ceding time period; the second, 1969-1970, marked the United States'
entry into a fundamentally different era of foreign policy making. While
characterized by many of the same objectives and interests which obtained
for the four periods discussed above, this period saw the development of
new strategies for their realization.
The years 1965-1970 found the Vietnam conflict at the center of US
foreign policy concerns. The magnitude of the US investment in men, money,
and materiel was unprecedented for any of the preceding time periods.
Indeed, as the US investment in the region increased, so too did the
frequency with which policy advisers stressed the need to uphold US commit-
ments to its allies and to preserve the credibility and prestige of the USA
both at home and abroad.
Globally, the US found itself in a less turmoil-ridden environment as
compared to the 1960-1965 period. With the exception of Vietnam, the focus
of US policy came to rest briefly on the Dominican Republic and'on the
Middle East. Map 1-5 depicts these and other events which affected US
policy for the period under consideration.
a. 1965-1968
Asinte16-95proteU otne ove h
containment of communist-inspired aggression in Southeast Asia as a major
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US policy objective. Communist China was perceived to be the primary

instigator of aggression in Southeast Asia and, hence, US national inter-
ests included the conta'nment of this aggression prior to its eruption into
-i major global confroitation. Guided by the lesson that "aggression is
biever satisfied," 31/ the preservation of US and allied security in the
face of a potent 4 al third world war was considered to be of vital impor-
tance.
While the frequency of statements regarding the strategic
significance of Vietnam decreased during this period, US policy advisers
did continue to view the region as vital to US national security.41/ More
prevalent, however, were statements regarding the preservation of US credi-
bility with its allies. As Secretarý Rusk stated in August 1965,
.. we know we have a commitment. The South Vietnamese

know we have a commitment. The Communist world knows
we have a commitment...This means that the integrity of
the American commitment is the heart of this problem.
... if our allies, or, more particularly, if our adver-
sarie,; should consider that the American commitment is
not worth anything, then the world would face dangers
of which we have iiut yet dreamed. And so it is impor-
tar.t for us to make good on that American commitment to
South Vietnam. 42/
The US commitment to SEATO and sliccessive presidential pledges served to
reinforce the significance of the US investment in Vietnam. The preserva-
tion of US integrity and honor, therefore, became a high priority interest,
both in waging the war, and, as will be seen, in terminating it.
b. 1969-1970
In this sub-period, the US continued to view the preserva-
tion of a free South Vietnam as a vital objective, but in contrast with
earlier periods, more emphasis was placed on South Vietnamese participation
as a method for securing this objective. This policy, one facet of the
Nixon administration's strategy for teiminatiog the conflict, was an elec-
tion campaign promise and a major objective of this sub-period and the
following one.
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While still committed to containing communism in Asia and

throughout the world, the US began to focus subsý.antial attention on
securing the objective of peace in Southeast Asia. The war's unpopularity,
its seemingly endless duration, and its adverse effects on the US economy
irade the realization of this objective particularly vital.
Consistent with this aim, then, was the objective of
reducing tensions with both the USSR and the PRC. The reduction of
tensions on a global basis was regarded as a way to eventually terminate
the conflict in Southeast Asia. Therefore, this sub-period saw an increase
in statements highlighting the US desire to pursue detente; it also wit-
nessed a greater appreciation of Sino-Soviet hostilities, as well as of the
potential for exploiting these hostilities as one method for realizing US
global objectives.
2. Threats
a. 1965-1968
Similar to perceptions maintained in the 1960-196i period,
in the 1965-1968 sub-period, Communist China was regarded as the most
significant danger to the security of Southeast Asia and, therefore, to the
security of the US as a Pacific power. In its effort to secure South
Vietnam, the US was faced with the threat of cross-border insurgency. This
phenomenon made it exceedingly difficult to create and preserve regions in
the South "free" of communist infiltrction and subversion. Hence, brush-
fire aggression, with its tactics of "spread and conquer," was seen not
only as threatening the security Qf Southeast Asia, but also the US ability
to counter limited, guerrilla warfare.
A possible withdrawal of US forces from the conflict area
was seen by US national security advisers as a psychological threat, with
both domestic and international repercussions. If the US failed to curb
the advance of communism in Asia, then as President Johnson stated in July,
1965, "no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American
promise or in American protection."43/
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The Third World continued to experience a high degree of
turbulence as it moved towards independence, and the US feared this chaos

would lend itself too easily to communist subversion. The United States'
1965 intervention in the Dominican 4eptiblic reflected the Johnson adminis-
tration's uneasiness over political shifts in the world's developing
nations. It was felt that the Seviet Union, while perceived as almost
docile when compared with the extremely militant and vocal PRC, would not
pass up an opportunity to influence events in a turbulent, Third World
nation.
b. 1969-1970
The Third World continued to be a major concern for the US
during this sub-period; in addition to lending itself to romrr'unisv. sub-
version, it was also regarded as a potentially disruptive annoyance,
encumbering the US-Soviet-Chinese approach towards detente. The Vietnam
conflict was, therefore, in itself, perceived as a threat to detente, as
well as to the economic prosperity of the US both domestically and inter-
nationally. Widespread inflation coupled with a devalued dollar, out-
growths of managing a war on a peacetime economy, were very real threats
to US strength during this sub-period.44/ Concurrently, the rise of Japan
and the Common Market as strongly endowed competitors threatened to
exacerbate the critical US economic situation.
In Southeast Asia, guerrilla warfare and cross-border insur-
gency, now seen as a predominantly North Vietnamese export, continued to be
seen as a major threat to the preservation of a free South Vietnam. In
addition, over-reliance by US allies on American assistance and expertise
was viewed as a liability to allied self-defense, diminishing allied initi-
ative in meeting their own defense needs. As Richard Nixon said, "for if
domination by the aggressor can destroy the freedom of a nation, too mu:h
dependence on a protector can eventually erode its dignity."45/ The situa-
tion in South Vietnam reflected this concern.
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3. Strategies
a. 1965-1969
Just as the interests and objectives for the 1960-1965
period were markedly similar to those for this sub-period, so also were the
strategies employed for realizing these objectives during this and the
previous period: The significant difference lay in the level of the US
commitment - the number of troops, the amount of aid appropriated, and the
intensity of bombing - to realizing its policy objectives in Southeast
Asia. Consistent with its objective of maintaining a non-communist South
Vietnam, the US initiated its "talk-fight" strategy, designed to induce
Hanoi and its allies to cease aggression and eventually move towards a
position considered by 0he US as favorable to North-South-US negotiations.
The US continued 'o commit its resources to South Vietnam;
troops, materiel, and economic aid served to reinforce the US investment in
the region. They also served to weaken the strategy aimed at inspiring
South Vietnamese self-reliance and initiative in developing their own
defense capabilities.
b. 1969-1970
The most significant strategy developed during this sub-
period for realizing US policy objectives in Southeast Asia was the Nixon
Doctrine; laying the groundwork for the gradual termination of hostilities
in the region. Its central thesis, said President Nixon:
is that the United States will participate in the

defense and development of allies and friends, but that
America cannot -- and will not -- conceive ALL the
plans, design ALL the programs, execute ALL the
decisions, and undertake ALI. the defense of the free
nations of the world. We will help where it makes a
real difference and is considered in our interest.46/
The Nixon Doctrine reflected a vast array of concerns: the
economic well-being of the US was jeopardi.ed by over-spending on the war,
US NATO allies expressed displeasure over what they perceived as the US
1-32
over-extension in Vietnam, and a commitment to reducing tensions with the

USSR and the PRC required a timely resolution of the Vietnam conflict.
Hence, this sub-period saw the initiation of the "Vietnamization" strategy,
of gradual withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam, and of attempts at
negotiating a durable and honorable plaace.47/
While committed to an "era of negotiation," the US continued
to provide a high level of military assistance to South Vietnam as a means
of preserving the country from a communist takeover and, in addition, as a
way to bolster Saigon's morale as the US force withdrawal commenced.
Military operations in and ove-' Cambodia were also directed towards these
ends.
The Kissinger-Nixon style of diplomacy, characterized by
personal and often secret dialogue, served as a tool by which to realize
negotiation objectives -- with the PRC and USSR for the purpose of detente,
and with Hanoi for the purpose of terminating the war. As will be seen in
the next period, 1970-1975, this style of diplomacy did allow for progress
in both of the above-mentioned areas. It also allowed for a commitment to
be made to South Vietnam which, given the attitude of the US Congress at
the time, had little chance, ifany, of being upheld.
G. 1970-1975
The 1970-1975 time period evidenced a thematic continuation of the

major interests and objectives, perceived threats, and strategies enume-
rated for the 1969-1970 sub-period. During this final time period, the US
found itself in the midst of a major foreign policy reevaluation which had
a significant influence on the nature and shape of US5 international rela-
tions. In essence, a set of new objectives dictated that th. ideologies of
the pos-t-WW II period be substantially discarded; the US objective of
terminating hostilities in Southeast Asia and of realizing a durable and
honoo-able peace stimulated the development of a significantly different US
foreign policy.
A desire to limit aggression (and the tools of aggression) and estab-
lish an international order based on stability, restraint, and peace were
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the major US global objectives durirg this period. Their realization

required a commitment to international partnership, national strength, and
a willingess to negotiate.48/ In addition, the executive branch's boldness
of purpose, built upon linkage and personal diplomacy, served as the
this time period.
oriving force for realizing ma-or US objectives during
The problem of turbulence in Southeast Asia remained a major concern
of US national policy makers. Yet, the desira to progress towards detente
with the PRC and the USSR was of equal, if not greater, significance. The
Sino-US and Soviet-US rapprochement came to be seen as a powerful diploma-
tic tool for resolving Southeast Asian hostilities.
As Map 1-6 indicates, other global concerns captured the attention of
US policy makers during this period. The Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil
embargo of 1973 drew US attention away from Vietnam for which a peace
settlement had been negotiated the same year. From the US experience with
the Middle East came a greater appreciation ol the potency of economic and
political regionalism; the Arab-Israeli conflict brought the, compatibility
of US-allied interests (particularly those of Japan and Western Europe)
into question.
US interests and objectives for Southeast Asia for the 1970-1975
period emphasized the elimination of hostilities in the region, the realiza-
tion of a peace which was durable and honorable for both the US ano South
Vietnam, and the promotion of South Vietnam's (ard of other countries' of
the region) self-reliance in defending its own national interests and
objectives.
The elimination of hostilities in the region paralleled the US
global objective of resolving local conflicts prior to their resulting in a
major superpower confrontation and prior to the antagonists' use of force
to resolve the conflict. The US objective of decreasing tensions with both
the PRC and the USSR served the purpose of avoiding a major superpower
confrontation as well as of 3ecuring Hanoi's acceptance to negotiate more A
willingly and with less intransigence. While the US gradually withdrew its
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troops from the South, it increased its bombing activities to compensate
for the RVNAF's weakness, to decrease further the number of US war casual-
ties, and to serve notice to Hanoi that it was inherently in its interests
to halt insurgency and negotiate a settlement. This objective did, in
fact, conflict with the objectives of securing detente and detering a major
confrontation with the world's leading communist powers: the decision to
mine Haiphong harbor and, in general, to escalate just prior to the 1972
Moscow summit, was not only a bold move, but a risky one. Yet, in retro-
spect, the decision appears to have been made based upon a balancing of
seemingly opposite objectives. The US had gained a greater appreciation of
the Sino-Soviet rift, of the objectives and interests pursued by each of
these countries, and of Hanoi's independence in policy formation.49/ With
these factors in mind, it was possible (albeit risky) to pursue concur-
rently these two major objectives.
The preservation of US credibility, both domestically and inter-
nationally, continued, as before, to be a major US objective. henre, in
Southeast Asia, the search for a lasting and honorable settlecnt, pro- .
viding for the maintenance of a free South Vietnam, reflected the US inter-
est in standing by its commitments ana in protecting its past investment
(of men, materiel, monetary assistance, and pride) in the region.
The US objective of maintaining viable and mutually beneficial
security programs, particularly with Western Europe, Japan and Taiwan,
found itself jeopardized hy US foreign policy initiatives with the Soviet
Union and Communist China. The US pro-I;rael stancc in the face of the
Arab oil embargo, the US resistance to British and French efforts to create
an independent nuclear force (an objective theoretically in line with the
US aim of encoujraging greater allied self-reliance), the US non-consulta-
tion with its allies concerning Its major policy changes regarding the USSR
and the PRC, and the US changes in its trade and monetary policies all
served to bring the sincerity of this US objective intc question. The
allied response to US behavior indicated theft the post-war era was, indeed,
drawing to a close.5•O/ The 1970-1975 period was dynamic, placing in
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opposition, often purposefully, many long-held interests and objectives

with new.
2. Threats
A closed, compartmentalized world, divided into a number of
dominant and competing blocs consisting of the US, PRC, USSR, Japan, the
Common Market, and OPEC - all pursuing self-serving objectives and inter-
ests with little regard for international cooperation - was perceived by US
policy makers • a threat to both global stability and to US-allied
economic and mr i pzrtnerships.5l/ Thus, as Winston Lord, Director of
the Polity Plannrlg Staff, noted in 1974,
Partners in international politics, as in marriage,

take each other for granted only at the risk of
divorce. Our alliances must grow or they will wither -
adjust to new conditions or become anachronistic.. .we
will advance together, or we can all slide back
together. Nations no longer can afford to pursue
national or regional or bloc self interest without a
broader perspective. Countries must find their self-
interest in the common interest and, indeed, recognize
that the two are often identicai.52/
Threats to global stability evolved in response to US-allied
reevaluations of their coimon objective. Perceptions of the monolithic
communist threat and the concomitant policy to contain this threat were
considered misguided.53/ iherefore, while communist insurgency and
terrorism continued to be regarded as a major threat to US (and allied)
security interests, the fact that these activities were independently
initiated or exported, rather than monolithically conceived, made it more
difficult to gar;ier broad-based suppo;-t for alliances based upon the prin-
ciplos of containment.
The economic difficulties of the US during this time period also
served to threaten US-allied economic and political relations. Deficit
spending, a weakened dollar, massive inflation, and Arab oil politics
prompted the Nixon administration to develop a n,4mber of economic policies
designed to stabilize the US economy; many of these actions were met with
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considerable allied consternation. Global interdependence, based on mutual

understanding and restraint and applied not only to US-Soviet and Sino-US
relations, but also to US-allied relations, was regarded as a major US
objective; the inability to realize this goal was, in itself, a threat.
According to Mr. Lord,
Global interdependence is no longer a slogan, but an

insistent reality. The crises of oil, food, and infla-
tion cast shadows over the future of developed and
developing, rich and poor, consumer and producer
nations alike. Not only the prospects for world growth
are at stake. A serious economic decline could trigger
widespread domestic instability and tear the fabric of
international political cooperation upon which peace
itself depends.54/
Domestic difficulties generated by the Watergate scandal also posed a
serious threat to US credibility, both at home and abroad.
In Southeast Asia, US national policy makers identified several
threats. Prior to the 1973 peace settlement, the most significant threats
appeared to be Hanoi's (and the Viet Cong's) continued aggression coupled
with intransigence regarding negotiations, and South Vietnam's internal
weaknesses - economical, political, arid military. Communist infiltration
from the North, Hanoi's use of supply routes and sanctuaries in neighboring
countries, and the replenishing of the North's military stockpile,
primarily by the USSR, represented major obstacles to the US objectives of
preserving a free South Vietnam (and Cambodia) and of reaching a negotiated
settlement.
The US goal of peace with honor (and of diminishing its own
presence in the region) was also obstructed by South Vietnam's initial
refusal to accept an in-place cease-fire and by its rejection of the
Vietnamese-language version of what had been considered the final text of
the treaty.55/ South Vietnam felt threatened not orny by commurilst
aggression but also by its own realization that its forces were not yet
adequately prepared to fulfill the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine.
After the peace settlement was signed, US national policy makers
identified two serious threats to US interests in Southeast Asia: South
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Vietnam continued to have difficulties in self-defense and the North con-

tinued its aggression after a brief respite. By mid-1974, the situation in
South Vietnam and Cambodia had begun to deterioriate significantly. From
this point until the communist successes in these countries in the spring
of 1975, the US executive sought a way to counter this threat. As will be
seen in Chapter 3 of this volume (in the sections dealing with the Nixon
and Ford administrations), Congressional restraints on the provision of US
aid to the region came to be considered, at least from the executive per-
spective, a threat as great, if perhaps not greater, than Hanoi's
aggression. 56/
3. Strategies
The basic strategies use, by US national policy makers for rea-
lizing US objectives during this time period were, essentially, those
determined in the 1969-1970 sub-period. In the international arena, the US
sought to accomplish its goal of relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union
and Communist China; the basic strategy employed was that of personal
diplomacy which included a tough negotiating posture and the strategy of
linkage. The Nixon-Kissinger initiatives in summit negotiations served as
major vehicles for realizing a number of important arms limitations nego-
tiations, specifically the SALT I agreement and the MBFR and SALT II talks.
The strategy of exploiting the hostilities existing between Moscow &nd
Peking was also utilized as a means both for realizing detente with each of
the powers and for bringing pressure on Hanoi to negotiate.
The strategies set forth in the Nixon Doctrine also obtained for
the 1970-1975 period: In Southeast Asia, "Vietnamization" continued as aid
the provision of US military assistance to those countries in the region
dependent upon the US for the development of their indigenous defense
capabilities. Prior to the 1973 peace settlement, the US also employed
coercive diplomacy in the region (a strategy which was, in essence, a
continuation of Johnson's "talk-fight" strategy) as a way to compel Hanoi
towards negotiations.
The maintenance of US bilateral and multilateral defense arrange-
ments, such as S1 \TO, was emphasized during this period, both as a way to
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assuage suspicions regarding the US sincerity in upholding its commitments

as it withdrew gradually from South Vietnam, and as a way to deter aggres-
sion in countries aligned with the US.
The applicability of these strategies to US-Southeast Asian
relations during this time period was, however, limited: their effective-
ness was diminished both by US Congressional (and public) constraints on
renewing US involvement in the region and by national-level confusion
generated by the Watergate crisis. In theory, the Nixon Doctrine could
have been both a realistic and effective strategy if applied to a country
which had not been exposed to a high level of US presence or, for that
matter, to the US willingness to fight the "host" country's battles. For
South Vietnam, the strategy of self-reliance was so poorly understood and
applied that it stood little chance of succeeding.
H. ANALYTIC SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS
The 1945-1950 period was marked by an ardent and perhaps idealistic

desire for a tension-free international system; it also witnessed an
attempt by national policy makers to reconcile US anticolonialist and
anticommunist policies. With the outbreak of the Korean war, the second
period, 1950-1955, saw the advance of monolithic communism as the major
threat to US interests and objectives. The US strategy of "massive reta-
liation" and the "liberation" doctrine ("roll back") earmarked the US for
the role of "world policeman." The third period, 1955-1960, saw a degree
of continuity with the preceding period regarding perceptions of the mono-
lithic communist threat; however, while the bi-polar world continued to be
marked by considerable tension between the two superpowers, the US and the
USSR, a perceptible softening in the rhetoric of "massive retaliation" and
"liberation" occurred. illustrating the US policy makers' gradual approach
to arms limitations and the reduction of international tensions. A new
strategy, "flexible response," which included counterinsurgency to fight
what Khrushchev termed "wars of national liberation," marked the 1960-1965
period; in addition, the preservation of US credibility was found to be of
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increasing relevance as a major nationalI interest and its potential loss, a

threat to US international and domestic prestige.
The fifth period, 1965-1970, was divided into two sub-periods: The
first, terminating with the close of the Johnson presidency, saw -1 con-
tinuation of themes from the preceding period, although greater emphasis
was placed on the PRC as the major threat to US interests and objectives.
The second sub-period ushered in a substantially new era of national policy
which, while characterized by similar objectives and interests, saw the
development of several new strategies for their realization. In the 1970-
1975 period, the major goal and preoccupation of US policy makers was the
establishment of a stable, international system based orn mutual under-
standing and restraint, an objective which was remarkably similar to that
of the 1945-1950 period (see Figure I-1). The credibility and prestige
themes continued to permeate US national policy during this period, and the
employment of coercive and secret diplomacy came to the center of US for-
eign policy conduct.
In the majority of time periods discussed, the US found itself con-
strained by its perceptions of its own leadership role in the world and of
the threats which appeared to obstruct the realization of US objectives.
As the strongest post-World War II power - both economically and militarily
-the US fashioned its global policy on the premise that it was America's
*duty to assume the role of global arbiter and policeman. Although this
perspective was a "natural" response precipitated by the realities opera-
ting in the immediate post-war environment, it was also one founded upon
what many prominent individuals have termed arrogance. This viewpoint came
to be so firmly ingrained in the minds of US policy makers, that, in
essence, it served to limit the US appreciation of the other f~orces it work
in the global environment, particularly of nationalism.
Inconsistencies in policy served to undermine the effectiveness and
credibility of the United States. For instance, the US World War II objec-
t tive of defeating the Japanese served as the basis for cooperation and
friendship between US forces in Southeast Asia with Southeast Asian, parti-
* -cularly Vietnamese, nationalists. Yet, after their common enemy had been
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defeated, the predominantly Eurocentric US policy perspec-tive reasserted

itself; to many Vietnamese nationalists, this appeared to be a betrayal o,•1
confidence, laying the foundation for future anti-American (and anti-
imperialist and anticolonialist) attitudes on the part of numerous Viet-
namese people.
The objective of containing the communist threat, globally and in
Southeast Asia, was the major US objective throughout most of the time
periods discu3sed. This aim conflicted steadily with the US obiective of
promoting self-determination and civil liberties on a global basis, par-
ticularly in Vietnam. The battle against communism took precedence over
these other US objectives. Hence, the US came to support predominantly
authoritarian, repressive regimes, as in South Vietnam and South Korea,
rationalizing this support by citing the domino theory and the lessons of
Munich. Tne differences between civil wars, colonial wars, and "wars of
national liberation" were too frequently clouded by perceptions of the
monolithic communist threat.
Finally, terms such -s "interest," "objective," and "threat" have been
frequently misunderstood, overused, or misapplied by US national policy
makers. In scrutinizing the major US policy statements for the period
1945-1975, especially regarding Southeast Asia, one is immediately struck
by the frequency with which these terms are employed, often emphasized by
the adjective "vital." Such ver'bal extravagance leads to generalization
and ambiguity, making it difficult for the US public, US policy makers, and
US allies and non-allies to grasp the true level of priority attached to US
interests, objectives, and threats. For the purpose of a coherent and
consistent US foreign policy, it is of paramount importance that such terms
be applied carefully, with the utmost attention given to identifying real
US objectives and interests in a realistic manner. Frequent US national
level reviews of long-held objectives and interests, of perceived threats,
and of strategies to meet the threats or accomplish US national objectives
and interests would facilitate this process of evaluation and reevaluation.
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CHAPTER 1
ENDNOTES
1, These definitions were drawn primarily from the JCS manual, Dictionar
of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, Publication 17Wash--
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing office, 1968). Modifications
were made, however, to reflect a blend of military and civilian usage
of these terms.
2. The five year "slice" .pproach was utilized by Paul Kattenburg in
"Vietnam and US Diplomacy 1940-1970," Orbis, 15, #13 (Fall 1971),
pp. 818-841. Although Kattenburg uses-the device as an analytic tool
as the Vietnam Study team does, his methodology and conclusions are
.somewhat different. Nevertheless, his article served as the basic
inspiration for this chapter's five-year breakdown.
3. Figure 1-1 was compiled from sources which appear in the Volume III
Bibliography. The major source used in drawing up this graphic was
United States - Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Study Prepared by the
Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971) hereafter DOD US/VN Relations. All entries are para-
phrases of US national policy statements made by US national level
policy makers.
4. See DOD US/VN Relations, Book 1 for a discussion of US wartime inter-
action with Ho Chi ,-Mi. The US OSS had cultivated ties with Ho,
prompting the latter to view the US as the only major post-war power
truly interested in and capable of intervening for the Viet-Minh on
the side of independence, countering the French colonialist drive in
Indochina.
5. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, p. 266, "Report by NSC on US Position in
Indochina."
6. Churchill's "iron-curtain" speech, in Paul Hammond, Cold War and

Detente (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanich, 1975)7, p. 2.
7. See Kattenburg, p. 821. For a discussion of the US handling of the
Dutch colonialist problem, see Henry Kenny, "The Changing Importance
of Vietnam in United States Policy: 1949-1962," Ph.D. dissertation,
American University, 1974.
8. President Truman in his March 1947 message known as the "Truman

Doctrine," cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 1, IV A 5.
9. For an illuminating and controversial treatment of the Truman
Doctrine, NSC 68, and Cold War Strategies, see Richard M. Freeland's
work, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York:
Schocken Books, 1974).
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10. Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1975, 3rd ed.
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976); see also Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise
to Globalism (London: Penguin Book; 1971), pp. 188-191; NSC 68 wa-
indeed a hi'ghly controversial document which decreed that the Soviet
Union sought complete dt.minion over the entire globe. Regardless of a
number of top-ranking State Department officials' opposing viewpoints
(including those of Kennan and Bowlen), who argued that this was not
the USSR's intention, the document and strategy it proposed served the
aim of providing an "enemy" for the US, giving purpose and definition
to the US in the new post-war environment. See also Hammond, pp.
61-62.
11. See Chapter 3 of this volume - "The Truman Administration" for more
details on th! provision of aid.
12. See, for example. Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith's statement of
April 19, 1954, in 000 US/VN Relations, Book 7, B-12; Dulles' state-
ments in Book 1, I B-21, and in Book 7, B-15; Eisenhower's statement
in Book 7, B-10. Interestingly, the 1950-1955 and 1955-1960 periods
were, in fact, the only periods during which the economic significance
of the Southeast Asian region was given primary stress. Some analysts
(Schlrnsin,1er, for example) indicate that with the development of syn-
thetic ruober, the natural rubber of Southeast Asia was no longer of
prime interest to the US or Japan. Other analysts contend that the US
emphasis on the significance of Southeast Asia as a resource base was
extremely exaggerated; their view sees Southeast Asia's economic
merits as having little or no importance. It should be noted that
Japan's resurgence as an industrial power derived mainly from US
requirements for support of US/UN forces in Korea.
13. See, for example, the JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,
10 April 1950, on the strategic importance of Southeast Asia, DOD
US/VN Relitions, Bk. 8, pp. 308-313.
14. Ambrose, p. 229; and Kenny, p. 326.
15. See Kenny, p. 326, and DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 2, p. A-2.
16. See Chapter 3 of this volume - "The Eisenhower Administration" for
additional information on the strategy of "united action."
17. For example, see NSC 124 (February 1952) which recommended in the case
of overt Chine5e intervention:
o naval, air, and logistical support of French Union forces;
o naval blockade of Communist China; and
o attacks by land and carrier-based aircraft on military targets in
Mainland China. DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. i, II.B. l.a., p. B-5.
18. Fred Greene, US Policý and the Security of Asia (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1968), 2pp.7T-73.
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19. See Chapter III of this volume - "The Eisenhower Administration" for a
detailed discussion of the US call for united action during the Dien
Bien Phu crisis.
20. John Foster Dulles, "The Doctrine of Massive Retaliation", in Richard
Head and Ervin Rokke, eds., American Defense Policy (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, i973T.
21- Ibid.
22. Ambrose, p. 258.
23. Ibid., p. 262. This "softer" approach, apparent in late 1957-1958,
particularly after Dulles' departure from the administration, waned at
the close of the Eisenhower administration. Tensions over Berlin, the
Cuban Revolution, and the U-2 incident (leading to the abo,-ted summit)
were major factors in this US turn away from the mini-detente evident
during these years.
24. President Eisenhower, Address at Gettysburg College, "The Importance
of Understanding," April 4, 1959, DOD US/VN Refetions, Bk. 7, B-51.
25. Taken from NSC 5809, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 10, 1115, and NSC
5602/1, pp. 1054-1056.
26. See NSC 5809, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 10, p. 1115.
27. President Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual
Security Programs," May 21, 1957, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 7, B-32ý
28. For a brief discussion of the basic tenets of "Flexible Response," see
Maxwell Taylor's "Flexible Response: A New National Military
Program," in Head and Rokke, pp. 65-67.
29. During this period, Secretary of State Dean Rusk went to great lengths
to highlight the Peking-Hanoi alliance. He consistently pinpointed
the PRC as responsible for the aggression in Vietnam. See for
example, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 12, VI B, p. 8 - Interview with Rusk
"on February 25, 1965; also, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 7, 0-25 - NBC
conversation with Rusk on January 18, 1965; also Ambrose, pp. 301-302.
30. See ':Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense" from the JCS on the
strategic importance of the Southeast Asian mainland, January 13,
1962, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 12, V B 4, pp. 448-453.
31. While this period did not witness a great deal of progress in detente
in general, and in arm limitations in particular, it should be noted
that an underground nuclear test ban and the establishm.ent of the
Moscow-Washington hot-line occurred during this time frame.
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32. See, for example, NSAM 288, an extract of which appears in DOD US/VN
Relations, Bk. 3, IV C 1, p. 47, as an indication of the national
ivel acceptance of Vietnam as a "test-case."
33. Memo for the Secretary of Defense, 13 January 1962 from the JCS on the
strategic importance of the Southeast Asian mainland, DOD US/VN
Relations, Bk. 12, V B 4, p. 450.
34. See President Kennedy's speech at the University of California,

March 23, 1962, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 7, C-I1. Kennedy's apprecia-
tion was also rather limited "n that, while he admitted international
communism was suffering from disunity, he also maintained that the
USSR and PRC were still pursuing the goal of a monolithic communist
world.
35. See Secretary Rusk's news conference in which he quoted President

Johnson, February 25, 1965, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 12, VI B, p. 4.
From 1962-1964, the split was particularly obvious. During the
Brezhnev power consolidation period (1964-1965), however, the USSR and
PRC did attempt to initiate a healing of the rift, which, ultimately,
failed. In all fairness, President Johnson may have taken notice of
this brief "thaw" between the USSR and the PRC and assumed the two
powers were united and unified in their objectives and strategies
regarding Vietnam.
36. President Kennedy's address at graduation exercises of the US Military

Academy, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 7, p. C-23.
37. De Gualle, already distrustful of US independence in deciding to

threaten a nuclear attack without consulting its NATO allies in Europe
(re. missiles ini Cuba), was further dismayed by the US veto in multi-,
lateral force decision making. 'ie Ambrose, p. 295.
38. J. F. Kennedy, "Special Message to Congress or the Defense Budget,"

March 28, 1961, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 7, C-7.
39. From General Maxwell Taylor's "Flexible Response: A New National

Military Program," Rokke and Head, p. 65.
40. LBJ speech at John Hopkins, April 17, 1965, DOD US/VN Relations,
Bk. 12, Vi B-13.
41. See, for example, Address by Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs, "Present Objectives and 1:uture Possibilities
in Southeast Asia," April 19, 1965, 000 US/VN Relations, Bk. 7, 0-33;
also, Statement by Secretary Robert McNamara before the Subcommittee
on Department of Defense Appropriations, August 4, 1965, "Build up of
US Forces in Vietnam," Bk. 7, D051.
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42. Secretary Rusk, Interview with Mr. Reasoner and Mr. Kendrick,
August 8, 1965, D0P US/VN Relations, Bk. 7, D-55.
43. LBJ press conference, July 28, 1965, DOD US/VN Relations, Bk. 12,
VI B-17.
44. See Volume IV -. U.S. Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam War Policy
Making, Chapter 4 "US Economy and the Vietnam War," for a detailed
discussion of the war's impact on the US economic situation.
45. Elliot Richardson, quoting President Richard M. Nixon, "The Foreign
Policy of the Nixon Administration: Its Aims and Strategies," Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, LXI, 1978, p. 258.
46. Richard M. Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's," in
Head and Rokke, pp. 75-76.
47. See Chapter 3 of this volume, the Nixon administration, for a more
detailed discussion of the Vietnamization, withdrawal, and negotiation
strategies.
48. President Richard M. Nixon, "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New
Strategy for Peace," Report to the Congress, February 18, 1970,
Department of State Bulletin, LXII, 1602 (March 9, 1970), p. 275; and
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, "Department Discussed Security
Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1974," Department of State
Bulletin, LXVII, 1770, p. 697.
49. See, fur example, Nixon's "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New
Strategy for Peace," op. cit. For a well developed discussion of the
US balancing of these objectives, see Hammond, pp. 269-278.
50. The allied response, while varied, indicated a position marked by miore
independence and initiative: West Germany mnoved to settle the Berlin
issue; Western Europe and Japan, in line with their own national inte-
rests and needs, moved to support the Arabs in the Middle East as the
oil embargo took its toll on their economies. For a detailed discus-
sion of US policy during this period and its impact on US-allied rela-
tions, see Hammond, Chapter 11, "Nixon and the New 'Era of Negotia-
tions.'" Also, see LaFeber, pp. 275, 283.
51. LaFeber, p. 265.
52. Address by Winston Lord, Director,. Policy Planning Staff, "America's
Purposes in an Ambiguous Age," Department of State Bulletin, LXXI,
1845, (November 4, 1974), pp. 618, 621.
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53. Lord, pp. bi8-619; President Nixon, "US Foreign Policy for the
1970's," pp. 274-275; and D'aputy Secretary of State Kennetn Rush, "The
US Commitment to a Generation of Peace," Department of State Bulletin,
LXX, 1825, p. 649.
54. Lord, p. 621.
55. Hammond, pp. 280-281.
56. See, for example, Seretary of State Kissinger's "America's Strength
and America's Purposes," Department of State Bulletin, LXXI, 1838,
p. 377.
14
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CHAPTER 2.
HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS WHICH INFLUENCED US INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
A. INTRODUCTION
!
- Past history shapes perceptions of present c•y events as well as
the evolution of future events. This statement, albeit unoriginal, is
extremely relevant to a discussion of US fureign policy for Vietnam.
During the course of the war, US policy makers 'frequently drew from the
"lessons" cf history in explaining a particular course of action - polit-i-
* cal or military. Simplistic adages, such as "never again" or "remember
Munich," were often used in lieu of developing more precise and perhaps
more convincing explanations for making a paiticular policy decision. In
addition, they often came to he voiced indiscriminately, leading to gener-
alization, overuse, and misapplication.
This chapter focuses on "historical precedents" and US policy makers'
perceptions of these precedents. The discussion centers on the use of
these precedents their' role in determining and constraining US policy
formation for Vietnam. The term "historical precedent" is defined in this
chapter as a decision or event that occur-,ed in the past which served as an
example or lesson justifying a subsequent action. The precedents analyzed
in this chapter are chosen only insofar as they relate to US involvement in
Vietnam. Those chosen are considered to have been the most important and
most frequently cited precedents influencing US national-level policy
wakers. I/ Figure 2-1 provides an overview of the historical precedents
discussed in this chapter and summarizes their role in shaping or con-
straining US involvement in Vietnam. 2/
, ij
B. APPEASEMENT IN MUNICH
* The 1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct

if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately
leads to war. 3/
(President John F. Kennedy, 1962.)
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HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS AS INFLUENCES IN THE VIETNAM WAR
PRECEDENTS HOW THE PRECEDENTS I-LUENCED US POLICIES

JUSTiFICATIONS FOR INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
APPEASENENT AT MUNICH APPEASEMENr ENCOURAGED NAZI AGGRESSION;

SIMILAR APPEASEMENT WhIULD ENCOURAGE THE
COMMUNISTS.
"LOWS" OF CHINA THE DEMOCRATS WERE ACCU5ED OF LOSING CHINA.

WHICH, INTER ALIA, RESULTED IN THE NCCAPTHY
ERA; ALSO LOSS OF VIETNAM TO THE COMMUNISTS
MIGHT CRIPPLE ANY INCUMBENT ALMINISTRATION.
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND 3ERLIN CRISES FIRMNESS WITH THE ENEMY, GOOD CRISIS MANAGE-
MENT, AND GRADUAL PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY
LED TO SUCCESS IN THESE CRISES AND PROVIDED
A BASIS FCR THE SUBSEQUENT US POLICY OF
GRADUALISM IN VIETNAM.
LIMITED INTERVENTION TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM US INTERVENTION IN LEBAIMON AND THE DOMINICAN

INCLUDING LEBANON, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND REPUBLIC WERE RELATIVELY BLOODLESS, SHORT-TERM
tHE BAY OF PIGS. AND DECISIVE OPERATIONS. CONVERSELY, FAILURE
AT THE BAY OF PIGS PROVIDED AN INCENTiVE FOR
PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO OEMONSTRATE SUCCESS IN
VIETNAM.
CONSTRAIMTS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
FAILURE OF THE BAY OF PIGS US FAILURE IN THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

MILITATED AGAINST DIRECT US INTERVENTION IN
LAOS IN I196ANM 1962. HAVING FAILED TO
DESP)SE CASTRO IN CUBA, KENNEDY APPROVED
THE DIEM COUP ONLY' AFTER BEING ASSURED IT
WOULD SUCCEED.
CI;INESE INTERVENTION DURING THE KOREAN SUPRISE CHINESE INTERVENTION IN KOREA

WAR iURASTICALLY CHANGED THE COURSE AND COST OF
OF THE KOREAN WAR. THEREAFTER US ADMINIS-
TRATIONS AVOIDED ACTIONS THAT MIGHT BE
PROVOCATIVE TO THE CHINESE.
THE RESPECTED ADAGE: "NEVER AGAIN" SEND EISENHOWER DECIDED NOT TO SUPPORT THE FRENCH
TROOPS TO FIGHT IN THE ASIAN NAINLAND (AS AT DIEM BIEN PHIU. KENNEDY RESISTED COMMITTING
IN KOREA) GROUND COMBAT FORCES IN LAOS AND VIETNAM.
JOHNSON COMMITTED GROUND COMBAT FORCES ONLY
AFTER AIR POWER FAILED TO DETER 'HE DRV.
4541178W
Figure 2.1. A Summary of Historical Precedents as they

Influenced US Involvement in Vietnam. 2/
2-2
D. '
When Senator Henry Jackson accused President Carter of "appeasing" the

Soviets with the SALT II treaty, he was invoking one of the most agonizing
memories of his generation. 4/ The lesson, derived from the 1938 appease-
ment of Hitler in Munich, has been frequently cited by US post-WWII admini-
strations to gain support for a policy of containing communism and aggres-
sion. US presidents and congressmen repeatedly warned that "appeasement"
in Greece, Berlin, Quemoy, Cuba, or Indochina would only encourage more
aggression. In 1947, Congressmian Lyndon Johnson cited Munich to support
Truman's aid proposal for Greece and Turkey. 5/ During the Vietnam con-
flict, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson both stressed that US vital interests
would be jeopardized if the US failed to meet force with force, thereby
showing strong determination to halt communist expansion in the Third
Wo rlId.
As a r'esult of the Munich experience, the concept "appeasement" has
come to connote weakness and conciliation -- "peace at any price" -- rather
than a means for buying time. 6/ The traumatic Munich experience seemed
to teach that US national leaders meet aggression quickly, decisively, and
ideally multi-laterally; moreover, it cautioned that unchecked aggression
is less restrained with each success, prompting states to fall like
dominoes, as happeied after Munich. Finally, the Munich experience warned
that a statesman must be willing to go to war if his policy and determina-
tion are to appear credible.
Each of the major decisions that increased US involvement in Vietnam,
beginning with the 1950 decisions to recognize Bao Oai and provide aid and
advisers (MAAG) to the Associated States, was based on a belief that the
Munich analogy applied to Vietnam. In June 1950, with the outbreak of the
Korean War, President Truman justified his request for the rapid dispatch
of aid to Indochina by stating,
The Communists.. are engaged in a monstrous con-

spiracy... the best time to meet the threat is in the
beginning... if [peace loving nations) don't act
together, they are likely to be picked off, one by
one. 7/
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Eisenhower called f~r united action in 1954 when he asked Churchill to

join forces with the US in preventing the collapse of the French garrison
at Dien Bien Phu:
We failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by

not acting in unity and in time. That m~arked the
beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate
peril... .May it not be that our nations have learned
something from the lesson? 8/
Winston Churchill, however, rejected the applicability of the Munich
analogy to the situation in Indochina. 9/
To justify the deepening of America's involvement in Vietnam, Presi-
dent Johnson and his advisers cited the danger of appeasement and the
domino effect: "aggression feeds upon aggression." 10/ Only a week before
the Gulf of Tonkin incident, President Johnson stated,
we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only

...
feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be
renewed in one country and then another country, bring-
ing with it perhaps even larger war and crueller con-
flict as we have learned from the lessons of
history. 11/
President Johnson's Secretary of State, Mr Rusk, extended the Munich
analogy further, equating Hitler's Mein Kanp with Chinese Defense Minister
Lin Piao's 1965 message to the Third World. .12/ President Johnson also
alluded to the Munich analogy when he suggested that US involvement in
Vietnam was probably deterring World War III:
Your American President cannot tell you with certainty

that a Southeast Asia dominated by Communist power
would bring a third world war much closer to terrible
reality. One could hope that this would not be so.
But all that we have learned in this tragic century
strongly suggests to me it would be so. 13/
With the Tet offen~sive of 1968 and the subsequent winding down of the
US involvement in Vietnam, the Munich analogy as applied to Vietnam was
dropped from the speeches of key US policy makers. However, the n.ýcessity
2-4
of showing domestic and international audiences that the US was not selling
out an ally or appeasing an aggressor was reflected in phrases such as
"peace with honor" used by the Nixon administration.
Was the Munich analogy misused and overused? Indeed, this analogy was
frequently drawn by US national leaders to just-ify or explain the US need
to meet aggression anywhere (in this case, in Vietnam) in an assertive,
aggressive, non-appeasing manner because it served as a convenient and
familiar rallying device for eliciting a strong, often emotional response
from the US publ ic in support of US policies directed at forcefully con-
taining or curtailing (communist) aggression. Frequent application of
historical analogies, however, often leads to misap~lication and general-
ization. They often come to serve as a basis for action, causing the
necessary reflective analysis of each singular case to be neglected or even
avoided. The Munich experience and the circumstances surrounding it were
unique, not wholly or even partially applicable to the US experience in
Vietnam. It appears that of the post-WWII presidents, only President
Kennedy seemed to appreciate that historical analogies must be drawn
sparingly and with great care; 14/ for few if any contemporary events or
If crises mirror those found in past history.
In the case of Vietnam, memories of Munich encouraged a forceful US
response; they may also have contributed to the United States' reticence in
negotiating with the North Vietnamese, particularly in the 1960-1965
time-frame. Broadly speaking, reticence to negotiate based on the fear
that negotiating .oi4gtt be construed as or result in "appeasement." illu-
strates an incorrect usage of the Munich analogy. 15/ The diplomatic
tragedy of Munich, however, had such international consequence that its use
(and, hence, misuse) as an historical analogy, especially regarding
Vietnam, was, problematically, a "natural" response to aggression in the
post-WWII environment.
2-5
C.THE FALL OF C.HINA
The United States is determined that the Republic of

Vietnam shall not be lost. 16/
(President. John F. Kennedy, 1961.)
I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be
the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China
went. 17/
(President Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963.)
China's "loss" to the communists in 1949 served as an historical
precedent compelling each successive post-WWII president to support South
Vietnam in order to contain communism and prevent the loss of anot~ier Asian
nation. Mao Tse-tung's victory over Chiang Kai-shek was indeed a traumatic
event for the United States. At the time, the Chinese Communist victory
was considered a severe threat to US global, strategic interests. On the
domestic front, it had severe consequences for the Demiocratic administra-
tiorr and provided ample ammunition for Senator Joseph McCarthy in his
proceedings against alleged communists in the US government.
Although the Chinese mainland was not actually the United States' to
"lose," its fall has been considered by some analysts to have been "the
greatest single tragedy of modern times." 18/ Peking's alignment with
Moscow significantly altered the balance of power in Asia. 19/ And Mao's
vociferous anti-US stance was also a grave disappointment for the US:
before his death, President Roosevelt had hoped that China would serve as a
stabilizing influence in Asia during the continent's transition from
colonialism to nationalism. 20/
After the fall, communist activities in Asia were seen as direct~y
inspired by Peking. Soviet support for the Mao regime during the early and
mid-1950's intensified the US fear of international communism, serving as
the basis for US perceptions of communism as a monolithic entity, even
after the Peking-Moscow union had become severely strained.
On the domestic front, the "loss" of China, followed shortly by the
Korean War, contributed to the 1952 defeat of the Democratic party. 21/
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The view that China's fall occurred because of communist plotting from
within the Department of State led to the McCprthy hearings. As a result,
the US government lost officials who best understood Asian communism. The
purge of China experts also discouraged Foreign Service Officers from
independent thinking and encouraged many to assume a rigid anticommunist
stance. 22/
China's "loss," or the "fall of China syndrome" 23/ prompted sub-
sequent post-W(WII presidents to intervene actively and often forcefully in
Asia in support of non-communists faced with communist aggression. Both
Korea and Vietnam can be seen in this light. The "loss" of South Vietnam
to communism was feared by US national level policy makers because it could
potentially,
* Alter the strategic balance of power in Asia, benefiting the
communist world;
0 Encourage the communists to foment additional "wars of libera-
tion;"
0 Weaken the SEATO alliance;
* Weaken US allies' faith in America' s commitments abroad;
* "Stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the US and be seized
upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the
administration"; 24/ and
* Mar the place in history of the president who "lost" South
Vietnam.
During the United States' involvement in Vietnam, the "fall of China
syndrome" weighed heavily on US national level policy makers. According to
Charles Yost,
The US leaders recollection of the domestic-political

consequences of the "loss" of China and their fear of
similar consequences to them if Vietnam were "lost" was
perhaps the decisive factor in determining their poli-
cies and behavior. 25/
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Even Republican President Nixon, while withdrawing US forces from Vietnam,

was fearful of a political backlash reminicent of the 1952 and 1968 Demo-
cratic Party's defeat if he were to "lose" South Vietnam. Mr. Yost states,
President Nixon continued to be so convinced that the

"silent ma~jority" would still react with political fury
to a defeat in Vietnam that for four more years he
pursued the will o' wisp of winning the war while
withdrawing from it. 26/
Was the "loss" of China and the eveo'ts surrounding it analogous to the
situation in Vietnam? The evidence indicates that the Nationalists "lost"
China because of their corrupt, inefficient leadership, a lack of broad
based popular support, and a lack of ideological purpose. The eminent
Sinologist John King Fairbanks pointed out that, although from 1945-1959
Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists was less than US aid to the Chinese
Nationalists, Mao's forces were, nevertheless, capable of mobilizing and
utilizing the potentialities of revolution while the Nationalists were 1
not. 27/ Some analysts contend that the Chinese Nationalists would have
been defeated even if the US had committed one million men to the
region. 28/ In Vietnam, during the 1968 Tet offensive, US gradualism left * A
open the possibility of sending an additional 200-250 thousand US troops to
Vietnam in order to deal with the growing number of communist troops in
South Vietnam. 29/ Although President Johnson did not fulfill this
request, the already large number of US troops in Vietnam indicated the
administration's fear of being the second Democratic administration since
World War II to "lose" an Asian country to communism.
It is possible to draw some parallels between the leadership capabili-
ties of Nationalist Chinese Chiang Kai-shek and South Vietnamese Ngo Dir~h
Diem. The regimes of both men were corrupt, repressive, and without broad
based popular support. Broadly speaking, a government that is incapable of
demonstrating real leadership has little chance for survival. A State
Department cable dated May 1949, transmitted over Secretary Acheson's name
to the US consulate in Haaioi, made this point regarding Baa Dai's political
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fviability at the time. Drawing from the US China experience, a comparison

was made between the leadership problems in China pre-Mao and Vietnam:
The Experience [of) China has shown [that] no amount

[of) US military and economic aid can save [the]
government, even if recognized by all other powers and
[if it] possessed full opportunity [to) achieve
national aims, unless it can rally support [of the]
people against commies by affording representation (of]
all important national groups, manifesting devotion to
national as opposed [to] personal or party interests,
and demonstrating real leadership. 30/
Had this cable been written a decade or so later regarding the Diem govern-
ment, itwould have been an equally realistic assessment.
Finally, at the time of China's fall, there were a number of talented,
experienced China "watchers" within the US government who were capable of
assessing the situation in civil war-torn China. The purge of these old
China hands, a by-product of the McCarthy era, left a void in the State
Department's pool of Asian experts. 31/ This purge also had an effect on
US Vi.~tnam policy making; whereas the old Asian experts had generally
promoted compromise between the Communists and Nationalists in China, the
new Asian hands urged intervention at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. 32/ By way of
contrast, the Cuban missle crisis found a number of well-informed Sovieto-
logists on hand to gauge the situation and advise the President accord-
ingly.
The "loss" of China, therefore, served as a justification for US
involvement in Vietnam as it had for US participation in the Korean War. As
an historical precedent, it served as the basis for a gradualist approach
to the insurgency in~ Vietnam, particularly since many US policy makers
believed that the US had done too little in trying to "save"~ China in 1949.
Strong criticism regarding Congressional aid limitations at the time of
Mao's victory may also have encouraged the Congress, especially during the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, to be less "budget-conscious" and more
willing to appropriate funds for the Vietnam war effort.
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0. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND BERLIN: FIRMNESS WITH THE ADVERSARY
The challenge that we face in Southeast Asia today is

the same challenge that we have faced with courage and
that we have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in
Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba, ... there can
be no peace by aggression and no immunity from
reply. 33/
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and successive crises over Berlin
served as precedents illustratinq the benefits inherent in good crisis
management, in dealing firmly with an adversary, and in employing gradual
coercion as ,an indication of US resolve, while simultaneously allowing vre
antagonist time to comply with US demands. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
both hoped to resolve the Vietnam challenge by employing similar tactics in
order to compel Hanoi to halt its subversive activities. The Cuban missile
crisis brought the US and USSR very near to a major nuclear confrontation;
this fact counseled the need for more moderate policies of co-existence on
the part of both the US and the Soviet Union. The 1963 nuclear test ban
treaty and the establishment of the Moscow-Washington hot-line illustrated
the moderating influence of that crisis, marking a watershed in Soviet-
American relations 34/ and prompting both countries to refrain from a
nuclear confrontation over Vietnam.
After three years of post-WWII bureaucratic wrangling between the four
occupying powers in Berlin over the city's status, the Soviets and East
Germans attempted to blockade Berlin in order to prevent Western access.
The US responded with the famous Berlin Airlift of 1948. 35/ Minor crises
erupted in Berlin during the 1950s, culminating in the 1961 erection of the
Berlin Wall which the Soviets and East Germans hoped would halt the flow of
East Berliners to the West. Construction of the wall resulted in a tense
confrontation between US and Soviet forces during which President Kennedy
mobilized US reserve forces to reinforce the West Berlin garrison. 36/
The instcallation of missiles in Cuba, 90 miles from the United States,
was considered a significant threat to US security. US nationel policy
makers felt their installation would enhance the Soviet Union's strategic
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THE BDM CORPORATION
posture and, perhaps more importantly, would damage US prestige and

threaten US strategic interests. If the Soviets were succ-ssful in estab-
lishing and maintaining a missile base in the Western Hemisphere, then, in
the view of the Kennedy administration, the politico-diplomatic damage to
the US would be sizeable. After the crisis, President Kenner 4y indicated
that a Soviet success "would have politically changed the balance of power.
It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality." 37/
The US experiences in Berlin and Cuba illustrated the US ability to
deal firmly with the Soviet Union in order to achieve US objective3 while
also avoiding a nuclear conflict. In both crises Kennedy respected the
rules of good crisis management:
a Never corner an opponent and always assist him to save face;
* Convince the opponent that the situation threatens US vital
' nterests;
* Clearly communicate to the opponent one's own goals and inten-
tions, and pressure the opponent by gradual steps;
* Provide a time limit within which the opponent may respond;
0 Convincingly threaten the opponent if he fails to respond in a
favorable or timely fashion; and
* Offer an incentive or "carrot" as well as a "stick." 38/
In the 1961 Berlin crisis, President Kennedy moved ýr:dually to
increase US pressure on the Soviets. In order to convince Khrushchev how
strongly the US regarded Berlin as a vital interst, President Kennedy
called up the Reserves and mobilized for a possible cronflict. Khrushchev
finally removed his deadline for Kennedy and the US president removed his
threat of attack. The Berlin Wall marked the termination of the crisis,
halting the flow of refugees yet allowing Western access to Berlin. 39/
In the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy again moved in gradual steps,
increasing US pressure on the Soviet Union to remove its missiles; he
provided a time limit and, if the Soviets persisted, a threat of nuclear
attack. Kennedy employed the "carrot and stick" strategy: the "carrot"
was a promise not to invade Cuba, and the "stick" - a tacit ultimatum of
nuclear war. In addition, Kennedy privately assured Khrushchev that the US
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would remove its own missi' from Turkey after the crisis. 40/ Khrushchev
valued the political .igi icance of this act, aware that US missiles ir
Turkey were obsolete. 41/ After the missile crisis was defused, President
Kennedy observed that the lesson "toughness with the communists guarantees
their collapse or compliance" should not necessarily be cohcluded from his
administration's victory.42/
The Cuban missile crisis tested the strength of American leadership
and its ability to manage power effectively. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy's
Special Assistant at the time, provided this assessment,
To the whole world it displayed the ripening of an

American leadarship unsurpassed in the responbible
managermient of power. From the moment of challenge the
American Presidert never had a doubt about the need f~r
a hard response. But throughout the crisis he coolly
and exactly measured the level of force necessary to
dpal with the level of threat ... At every stage he gave
his adversary time for reflection and reappraisal,
taking care not to force himi into "spasm" reactions cr
to cut off his retreat. 43/
Southeast Asia posed no sudden crises of the magnitude that the
Berlirn or ,a crises caused for the Kennedy Administration (the Laotian
crisis was temporized by the neutrality agreement of 1962). Nonetheless,
Kennedy responded to communist subversion and terrorism in Vietnam with a
similar gradual approach, increasing the amount of US aid and the number
of US udvisors Edlocated for South Vietnam. President Kennedy was deter-
mined to prove that "wars of national liberation" would not succeed andJ
that the US was capable of meeting this type of challenge through counter-
insurgency tactics.
The situation in Vietnam reached crisis proportions during the Johnson
administration. As vice president under Kennedy, Johnson had observed the

administration's management of the Berlin and Cuban crises, concluding that
the d•nger of nuclear blackmail could be removed by facing down the Soviet
threat. 44/ Johnson had hoped for similar success in forcing Hanoi to
desist in its support of Southern insurgency by gradually e,ýcalating US
bombing against the North. When this strategy failed, he derided upon the
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next gradual step of committing US combat forces to curtail Hanoi's aggres-

sion. In the case of Vietnam, however, each increase in US pressure was
met by an increase in pressure from the DRV and the NLF.
During the Nixon administration, Henry Kissinger employed a similar
"carrot and stick" strategy as a -way to move Hanoi towards negotiations.
In this instance, the "carrot" was an offer of substantial aid to rebuild
the North; the "stick" - more bombing. 45/ This strategy was not, however,
effective for dealing with the Vietnam conflict. Two essential ejements
present in the Cuba and Berlin crises were absent from the Vietnam situa-
tion. While the Soviet Union had apparently set its own limits as to the
level of US punishment it was willing to endure for involvement in Berlin
and Cuba, the DRV was uncompromising in its determination to reunify
Vietnam and seemed to have no such limitations. In the Berlin and Cuba
crises, the US employed a potent threat that, if absolutely necessary,
would have been fulfilled; in dietnam, the US was unwilling to exert the
kind of military pressure (i.e., nuclear attack) sufficient to threaten the
forth's survival, thereby compelling Hanoi to meet US demands and desist
from aggressive activities. Time limits proved to be inapplicable to
Vietnam.
Therefore, while the Berlin and Cuba precedents influenced both Presi-
dent Johnson and Nixon to meet the adversary firmly, both in war and nego-
tiations, the Vietnam conflict was actually too long and complex to be
handled as Berlin and Cuba were; the lessons learned from Cuba and Berlin
by both Moscnw and Washington cautioned against .mploying the "carrot and
(nuclear) stick" in Vietnam.
E. THE BAY OF PIGS: ZIMITED INTERVENTION AS A MEAHS OF CONTAINMENT
I believe that it must be the policy of the United

States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or oy outside
pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples
to work out their destinies in their own way. 46/
(President Harry S. Truman, 1947.)
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The principle espoused by PresidenL Truman in his 194' spee2!, ;gar-

ding aid to Greece and Turkey became the basis for the majority of US
economic and military assistance programs during the next thirty years.
The purpose of the Truman Doctrine, as it came to be called, was to contain
communist aggression and protect US strategic economic, and political
interests on a global basis. It served as the basis for covert interven-
tion in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, the Philippines, and Chile; and overt action
in Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. 47/
A number of these earlier operations- such as the 1953 reinstatement of the
Shah of Iran, came to be regarded by US national policy makers as having
been so successful that future p;'esidents were also prompted to endorse
atrategies of limited covert politico-military intervention.
In 1958, when President Eisenhower sent US Marines to Lebanon to quell
pro-Nasser Arabs and protect US oil interests, he cited the Truman Doctrine
as the justification for the action. Eisenhower limited the action to a
take over of the airfields, capital, and other key installations while the
Lebanese government regained stability. 48/ In 1965, President Lyndon
Johnson sent US Marines and an airborne division to the Dominican Republic
to restore order, protect American citizens and their interests, and deter
a possible communist coup. The intervention was limited in timc, economic
cost, and numoer of troops and casualties. This experience probably
encouraged President Johnson in his hope that Viatnam would also be a
short-term limited war which would be resolved quickly and satis-
factorily. 49/
One of the most significant examples if limited intervention, from the
standpoint of lessons later applied to US involvement in Indochina, was the
Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. The invasion was ap American-planned
attempt to depose Fidel Castro and establish a government more amicable to
the US. Only ninety miles from the Florida coast, a communist Cuba was
seen as a direct threat to the US, capable of exp.rting communist subver-
sion to neighboring Latin American countries.
Encouraged by a 1954 success in Guatemala, the CIA drew up invasion
plans during the Eisenhower administration. 50/ After his inauguration,
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President Kennedy soon came under heavy pressure to accept and act upon
these plans. 51/ The new President, while agrefing to the plan, imposed
one condition on the invasion: he ruled out any direct, overt participa-
tion of US armed forces in order to avoid the appearance of direct inter-
ference in Cuba's internal affairs and any associated international criti-
cism of US activities, particularly by the OAS. This limitation, however,
greatly weakened the CIA-sponsored operation; the spring 1961 invasion by
Cuban exiles failed miserably.
The operation's failure had a substantial impact on the US, particu-
larly on its international relations. US support of the invasion strength-
ened Castro's popular support in Cuba and revived Latin American fears of
American imperialism, negating Kennedy's attempt to identify the US with
anticolonialism. It undermined American allies' confidence in US leader-
I,• ship, while the Soviet Union gained prestige as a protector of small
nations, threatening the US with retaliation for its ictions. More impor-
U• tant, the humiliation compelled Kennedy to follow a harder line in the Cold
War to prove his toughness both to domestic critics and to the Soviet
leaders. 52/
£ President Kennedy learned some valuabie lessons from this experience
at a relatively low cost. The most important lesson counseled the reed for
caution before embarking on military ventures ir the Third World. Presiaent
Kennedy's appreciation of this lesson was reflected in his statement after
the invasion's failure: "If it hadn't been for Cuba, we might be about to
intervene in Laos.... I might have taken [Lemnitzer's] advice seriously,"
referring to the JCS's urging to bomb and/or invade Laos. 53/ Thus,
Kennedy was more wary of advice from the JCS and CIA, instituting stricter
40 controls over CIA activities. For alternative military advice, he turned
to his newly appointed Special Military Representative, General Maxwell
Taylor. Further'more, the White House staff was given more responsibility
in foreign and defense affairs; the staff offices were moved closer to the
president, providing better coordination within the executive branch.
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t
The US attitude towards the overthrow of South Vietnam's President "
Diem was also influenced by the Bay of Pigs experience. Several of Presi-
dent Kennedy's advisers, in particular Ambassador Frederick Nolting and
Vice President Johnson, urged that Diem be allowed to continue as presi- a
dent, hoping Diem would insitute much-needed reforms to gain the confidence U
and support of the South Vietnamese populace. As US patience with Diem

dwindled, the South Vietnamese generals advised US officials they were j
prepared to remove Diem. from power. President Kennedy, however, remained -
noncommital, wishing to avoid world criticism for interferring in the
internal affairs of another Third World nation.54/ (For a detailed discus- /
sion of US involvement in the Diem overthrow see Chapter 3 - The Kennedy
Administration.)
Although the Bay of Pigs experience imposed certain constraints on US
activities in Southeast Asia, the experience also served as an incentive to
succeed in Vietnam. Kennedy's embarrassment over the invasion's failure,
his settling for the neutralization of Laos and for the USSR's erection of f
the Berlin Wall, and, finally, his 1961 Vienna encounter with the gruff and
vociferous Nikita Khrushchev prompted the President to remark to James
Reston,
... the only place in the world where there was a real
challenge was in Vietnam, and now we have a problem in
trying to make our power credible, ... Vietnam looks
like the place. 55/
President Kennedy felt compelled to balance what he perceived as blows to
his and American's prestige by taking an aggressive stand in Vietnam.
South Vietnam, therefore, was to serve as a "test-case" of America's capa-
bilities in containing Third World based communist aggression in a limited
war, the successful outcome of which was of paramount importance to the
United States.
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F. THE CHINESE INTERVENTION IN KOREA
...it is clear that, to bomb the Noyth sufficiently to

make a radical impact on Hanoi's political, economic
and soc~al structure, would require an effort which we
* could make but which would not be stomached either by
our own peopite or by world opinion; and itwould involve
a serious risk of drawing us into open war with
China. 56/
(Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1966.)
The fear that the Chinese might intervene as they did in the Korean
*War acted as one of the most signi'icant constraints on US policy makers in
their determination of a military strategy for Vietnam. The Chinese inter-
vention in Korea changed the direct-ion of both the Korean War and of the
Cold War:, it prevented a UN victory and led to a stalemate involving two
painful years of negotiations. Mcreover, it resulted in greater hostili-
ties between the US and Communist China, tensions which continued for the
next 20 years. 57/
In 1952, American policy makers expected the Chinese Communists to
I
intervene in Vietnam against the Fv'ench, regarding as evidence of this
intention the massing of Chinese troops on the Tonkin border, 58/ The US
contingency plans for responding to massive Chinese intervention at that

time included a naval blockade, interdiction of Chinese communication
lines, and possible air strikes against military targets in China. 59/ It
was generally assumed by US strategists that if a "wider war" resulted
owing to Chinese intervention, then nuclear weapons would be used to termi-
nate the conflict. In April 1954, at the time of the Dien Bien Phu siege,
Secretary of State Dulles met with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and
Chinese For-iign Minister Chou En-lai in Geneva. Based on his discussions
with the two ministers regarding the situation in Vietnam, Dulles remarked
ina memo to Washington:
The attitude 'here of Molotov and Chou En-lai's state-

* ment yesterday lead me to rate more highly than hereto-
fore the probability that any open US intervention
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would be -inswered by 2en Chinese intervention with

consequenc..s of general war in Asia.O (mphasis
added.)
Hence, US fears of Chinese intervention in Vietnam arose early in the
history of US involvement in that area, continuing throughout most of the
war.
The "flash point" (or point beyond which Communist China could no
longer tolerate US actions in Vietnam, prompting them to intervene) was
difficult for US policy makers to quantify. Although fear of Chinese
intervention persisted throughout most of the war years, speculations as to
which US action would trigger Chinese intervention changed over time. The
level of escalation considered by the US as being tolerable to the Chinese
was reassessed frequently during the war. In 1954, Secret.ary Dulles
defined the "flash point" as that time when the US initiated "any open
intervention;" in 1965, the Chinese themselves defined the "flash point" as
the moment when US troops entered North Vietnam. 61/
During the United States' intermittent bombing off North Vietnam,
specific targets most likely to be provocative were -!.voided. President
Johnson believed that a "wider war" with China or the coviet Union could be
prevented if certain actions were avoided, including:
* Use of nuclear weapons;
* Invasion of North Vietnam;
* Destruction of the dike system in Northi Vietnam;
0 Bombardment of civilian population centers;
* Attacks on lines of communication close to the Chinese border;
I * Mining of North Vietnamese ports; and

Increases in
clandestine operations
Cambodia and Laos.
in, or an invasion of,
The prohibitions against the first four were so strong that these particu-
lar actions were never seriously proposed; the others were suggested by the
JCS at various times and rejected. 62/ Yet US policy makers were never
absolutely sure that by avoiding certain provocative actions, the Chinese
would not intervene. As George Ball said in 1966, "Unhappily we will not
find out [where the flash point is] until after the catastrophe." 63/
2-18
ofLater, President Nixon and his policy advisers appeared less fearful
oftriggering Communist Chinese intervention. The Nixon administration's

initiation of detente with the PRC and the USSR decreased the likelihood
that a "flash point" would be reached. This leverage allowed the US to
conduct bombing of and operations in Cambodia and Laos, as well as to bomb
targets and mine waters in North Vietnam heretofore considered too pro-
vocative.
The collection, US-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, (the DoD Pentagon
Papers) includes many memos and conversations in which a decision to esca-
late operations against North Vietnam or its sanctuaries was postponed or
never approved out of fear that the Chinese would intervene. When con-
sidering the US intervention at Dien Bien Phu, the State Department urged
caution, suggesting that the US make clear to both the PRC and US allies
that US intervention would not have as its aim the overthrow or destruction
of the Peking regime. 64/ Ten years later, because of uncertainty as to
the Chinese response, the US refrained from a retaliatory strike after the
Viet Cong attack on the Bien Hoa base in November 1964. 65/ For the same
reason, air strikes against POL facilities, power stations, airfields, and
surface-to-air missile sites were postponed in 1964-65. US decision makers
also postponed destruction of the MIGS and airfield in Phuc Yet for three
months in 1965. 66/ Likewise, in August 1967, President Johnson rejected
usi~ig air power to close the port of Haiphong and to destroy a section of
the dike system. 67/ Decisions to mine the North's major ports were also
j constrained by fears of possible Suviet retaliation, either directly in
Vietnam or elsewhere, such as in Berlin. 68/
Chinese and Soviet warnings increased in number when President Johnson
initiated the first US bombing campaigns against the North and committed
troops to the South. In March 1965, both Brezhnev and Chou En-'Iai offered
to send in troops in support of Hanoi. 69/ The Chinese did, in fact,
intbrvene in the war between 1964 and 1971 by sending military personnel to
North Vietnam, including engineers, railroad construction workers, and
antiaircraft personnel, some of whom were casualties of American bomb-
ing. 70/ But the Chinese never responded by sending a "yellow norde" into
Vietnam as happened in Korea.
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V4.
The major effect that the fear of Chinese intervention had on the US
conduct of the war from 1961-1968 was that it limited the scope and nature
of US military operations. By proceeding gradually (in reaction to
increasing DRV-NLF pressure), the US felt it could gauge the Chinese-Soviet
reaction and, thereby, avoid a major confrontation with either Power. The
United States' gradual escalation, however, afforded North Vietnam the time
to repl eni sh both men and materi el1, as well as to augment its resources
with those provided by the USSR and the PRC. In 1968, Clark Clifford
F offeredi this pessimistic appraisal:
If we send in 100,000 men, the North Vietnamese will

meet us. If North Vietnam runs out of men, the Chinese
will send in volunteers. Russia and China don't intend
for us to win the war. 71/
The JCS argued that once the US had committed itself to the defense of
South Vietnam, no restrictions should be placed on the US conduct of the
war; 72/ nevertheless, each administration felt compelled to limit US
military action out of concern for a wider war. Admiral Sharp, among
others, criticized the restrictions placed on the US military; he argued
that the "political and diplomatic circles in Washington were dispropor-
tionately concerned with the possibility of Communist Chinese and Soviet
intervention, throttling the military's ability to conclude successfully
the commitment into which that leadership had drawn us." 73/ Others main-
tained a similar point of view. According to Bernard Brodie,
We have seen the US engage itself in a foolish and

costly war in Vietnam, but with critical restraint with
respect to anything that might involve China or the
Soviet Union, and doing so despite the fact that the
cost of that restraint was humiliation and military
failure inVietnam. 74/
Whereas the US military enjoyed considerable flexibility in the conven-
tional fighting employed in Korea short of using nuclear weapons or viola-
ting the Manchurian sanctuary, in.Vietnam US military planners were
frustrated by the constraints on operations against Hanoi which had been
imposed from fear that the Chinese or Soviets might intervene in response.
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It is possible, however, that fea' of a wider war constrained the

Chinese more than the US. In the 1960s, the Chinese had many internal
difficulties with which to contend, including the upheaval caused by the
Cultural Revolution from wnich they are still trying to recover. These
problems may have restrained the PRC from intervening in Vietnam, making
their provision of aid to Hanoi a more realistic and feasible course of
action for them at the time. General Maxwell Taylor suggested that the
Chinese and Soviets may have feared confrontation with the US more than the
US feared one with them. 75/ Certainly the idea of a major superpower
confrontation prompted both the.US and the two major communist powers to be
cautious during the Vietnam conflict. Even if the Chinese had been ready
to directly intervene, the North Vietnamese would not have been enthusi-
astic about having great numbers of Chinese on their soil again. Histori-
cally, considerable enmity has existed between the Vietnamese and Chinese
for centuries; China controlled Vietnam for over a thousand years. As an
example of the Vietnamese disdain for the Chinese, Ho Chi Minh stated in
1945:
The French are foreigners. They are weak... Colonialism

is dying out. Nothing will be able to withstand world
pressure for independence. They may stay for a while,
but they will have to go because the white man is
finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they
will never leave. For me, I prefer to sr~ell French
sh-- for five years, rather than Chinese sh-- for the
rest of my life. 76/
Fear of Chinese intervention coupled with a desire to avoid a nuclear
confrontatiori between the major superpowers, therefore, counseled US
restraint in determining military strategies for Vietnam. The Korean
precedent of Chinese intervention shaped this attitude. The gradual
Sint.-US rapproachment of the early 1970s eased the intensity of this here-
tofore prevalent US fear, allowing for actions to be taken previously
considered too provocative.
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G. "NEVER AGAIN" EMPLOY COMBAT TROOPS IN AN ASIAN LAND WAR
We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for

Asian boys. We don't want to get involved in a nation
with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war
in As ia..77/
The fear of another protracted Asian land war like Korea served to
restrain Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy from committing US ground forces
to Vietnam. After the Korean War, which resulted in a stalemate after long
negotiations, a number of high-ranking US military leaders 78/ and
civilians stressed the importance of "never again" committing American
ground forces to a ground war inAsia.
Several factors militated against such a commitment:
* The vast expanse of Asia with its huge population historically
placed the foreign invader at a disadvantage;
* Geopolitical boundaries provided numerous potentia. sanctuaries;
* The terrain and climate of many parts of Asia) particularly in
Indochina, were not conducive to operations by modern, sophisti-
cated armed forces;
* The communications infrastructure was primitive, lacking modern
roads, railroads, ports, harbors, and airfields needed to support
US combat forces;
* The enormous engineering and log-istical problems involved in
supporting combat operations in Indochina required exceptionally
heavy commitments of combat service support units;
* Heavy casualties could be expected to result from a combination
of enemy action, disease, and sickness during a protracted war;
and
* The communists in Asia had ready access to almost unlimited
personnel and materiel and enjoyed relatively safe lines of
communication.
Advocates of air and naval power during the Dien Bien Phu crisis con-
tended that ground combat troops were not needed in Indochina; air support
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alone would do the job, although tactical nuclear weapons would possibly be
required. The Chairman of the JCS at the time, Admiral Radford, was such
an advocate. He proposed "Operation Vautour" (Vulture) which would have
provided approximately 200 Naval aircraft from two US carriers in the Gulf
of Tonkin and land-based US Airforce planes from the Philippines to attack
General Giap's three divisions of Viet Minh surrounding Dien Bien Phu.
Vice President Nixon and Secretary of~ St~ate Dulles supported Admiral
Radford, but Congress and others in the military who opposed his plan
prevailed. It was felt that air and naval power alone could not do the job
intended and that ground forces would inevitably be needed. 79/ General
Matthew B. Ridgeway, U'S Army Chief of Staff, cautioned President Eisenhower
in the strongest terms not to intervene at Dien Bien Phu:
If we did go into Indo-China, we would have to win. We

would have to go in with a military force adequate in
all its branches, and that meant a very strong ground
force--an Army that could not only stand the normal
attrition of battle, but could absorb heavy casualties
from the jungle heat, and the rots and fevers which
afflict the white man in the tropics. We could not
again afford to accept anything short of decisive
military victory. 80/ f
Not only would intervention at Dien Bien Phu be infeasible, but also costly
and neocolonialist. 81/ Senator John Stennis also drew from the Korean
experience, stating in a letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson in January
1954:
We should certainly stop short of sending our troops or

airmen to this area.. .when we send one group, we shall
have to send another to protect the first..,..I do not
think we can at all afford to take chances on becoming
participants in Indo-China. 82/
President Kennedy was consistently opposed to sending ground troops to
Vietnam, although he did not openly admit his opposition for fear of
criticism. 83/ He had been warned against `ture involvement in Asian land
wars by both President Eisenhower and General MacArthur. Kennedy's aver-
sion to waging a "white ran's" war contributed further to his reluctance to t
2-23
commit combat forces to Vietnam; in lieu of this course of action, he

continued to send aid and advisors to South Vietnam and promoted the devel-
opment of a counterinsurgency program. 84/
By March 1965, the imperatives of the deteriorating situation in South
Vietnam, however, convinced President Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson
adhis principal advisers that a cautious, carefully orchestrated commit-
ment of US forces to the South could prevent its loss to the communists
without enlarging the war beyond the two Vietnam~s. The decision to commit
US ground forces to Vietnam was-based on a number of reasons, including:
0 The need to counter the South's deteriorating situation in the
war;
* The need to bolster South Vietnam's morale and determination;
* Prior US bombing campaigns had failed to slow DRV and NLF
aggressi on;
* By 1965, the US conventional force posture had improved; 85/
* The Chinese, it was felt, would not intervene as long as US
troops conducted operations in the South without crossing into
~ North Vietnam; 86/ and
* The need to prove US capabilities in Vietnam.
It is quite possible that the above reasons negated the potency of the
President Eisenhower gave credence to "never again" owing to the freshness
of the United States' Korean experience. President Kennedy, warned by both
President Eisenhower and General MacArthur to avoid US involvement in an
Asian land war, was also, thereby, constrained from, sending US combat
troops to Asia, particularly to Indochina. Had the Bay of Pigs mission
succeeded, however, Kennedy might have been more receptive to the idea of
committing US forces to Laos and/or Vietnam. While not an overt commitment
of US combat forces to an Asian land war, counteri ns urgency operations and
bombing campaigns prior to the 1965 force commitment did lay the groundwork
for successive increments of involvement; the 1965 decision can, therefore,
be seen as one step in a series of gradual steps which moved three succes-
sive administrations away from the potency of the "never again" adlage.
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* * In addition, the strength of "never again" was further diluted when

counterbalanced with a number of the justifications for US involvement in
Vietnam. (See Figure 2-1). Frequently used analogies such as the "loss of
China" and "appeasement at Munich" very likely outweighted "never again,"
*especially for the Democratic Johnson administration. Yet, if the con-
straining influence of the "never again" adage abated to allow for the 1965
decision to commit US combat forces to Vietnam, it soon regained a promi-
nent position in the hierarchy of historical analogies. The majority of
reasons given for avoiding a land war in Asia were soon found to be applic-
able to the US combat experience inVietnam,.
The fear of another "Munich"' - of appeasing an aggressive antagonist
Ithe and, thereby, unleashing an extreme political backlash - served to justify

US long-held policy of containment for Southeast Asia. The phrase
"1appeasehient," generally invoking an emotional response, serves to convince
domestic and international audiences that firmness is the best response for
handling a threatening aggressor. Yet moderation and compromise should not
be confused or equated with "appeasement." The Munich experience and the
circumstances surrounding it were unique in world history and should not be
haphazarUiy applied to any situation in which the US chooses a policy
course of moderation or compromise as a means for achieving its objectives
or protecting its interests.
Appeasement deserves consideration from two angles: on the one hand,
a nation may appease an enemy; on the other, a nation may also appease an
ally. Both acts of appeasement may be detrimental to a nation's interests
and objectives. The US-French relationship, from 1945 through the French
exit from Indochina in the mid-1950's, illustrates this latter notion of
European defense programs, American policy makers "appeased" France with

regard to French territorial claims in Indochina.
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South Vietnam also exploited its relationship with the United States,
using intransigence, animosity, and non-compliance to obtain desired
responses from the US. As a result, US policy makers occasionally found
themselves actively soothing, if not "appeasing," the aroused leadership of
South Vietnam. This second brand of appeasement, while perhaps not equiva-
lent to Munich in international significance, signifiLCntly constrained US
policy making for Vietnam during a major portion of the US imvlnovement in
IS'utheast Asia.
The "loss of China" adage was frequently, if not excessively, utilized
by US policy makers in warning against such a "loss" in Southeast Asia,
particularly with regard to Vietnam. The fear of possible political reper-
cussions if another nation were to be "lost" to communism served to justify
the US commitment to Vietnam. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were
particularly fearful of the implications that another "loss" would have for
their presidencies and for their political party as a whole. This broad-
based fear, moreover, tended to mitigate the fact that "loss" generally
connotes possession. It is arguable therefore, that statements regarding
the US ability to "lose" another sovereign nation are, in themselves,
indications of America's post-WW II vision of its own global responsibil-
ities and power.
The US experience in handling the Cuba and Berlin crises stressed the
virtue of dealing firmly with an adversary, employing gradual coercion to
elicit a desired response. The politico-diplomatic lessons derived from
these crises were then applied to the insurgency problems in Vietnam. It
is arguable, however, that these lessons were not wholly applicable to the
situation in Indochina. A crisis situation differs significantly from ag-
gression evolving in a gradual, spurt-like fashion as manifested in Vietnam
during the 1960's. Additionally, while time-limics and cautious US threats
of nuclear retaliation apparently prompted the USSR to meet the US demands
regarding Cuba and Berlin, such strategies, in effect, were inappropriate
for dealing with Hanoi. A Third World country which perceives it has little
to gain, but much to lose by acquiescing to a superpower's demands (in this
case those of the US) cannot be expected to respond "appropriately" to a
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strategy designed for use in sup(.,rpower confrontations. Broadly speaking,

0 strategies useful in the superpower ,rena may be wholly unsuitable for
engendering change in or achieving compliance from a Third World country.
The Bay of Pigs precedent oftered a number of potential lessons to the
Kennedy administration: it cautioned against initiating overly ambitious
plans for overthrowing Third World leaders perceived as inimicable to US
global interests; it strengthened the Kennedy administration's resolve to
counter communist, (Soviet) successes in the Third World by developing a
brand of warfare effective for fighting "wars of national liberation;" andp
it advised against sponsoring a coup unles a reasonably sound assurince
for its success could be guaranteed.
Of the lessons derived from the Bay of Pigs experience, it appears US
national policy makers learned the lesson of "resolve' the most readily.
The Bay of Pigs experience should have cautioned againist military and/or
political involvement in a country prior to cultivating a thorough appreci-
ation of the political realities in that country. The invasion's failure
also should have illustrated the potential liabilities and risks in
restricting US military resources for a given operation, conventionally
and/or unconventionally. These same insights have even more relevance in
assessing the US experience in Vietnam.
Fear uf provoking Communist China to intervene on behalf of Hanoi per-
meated US policy deliberations regarding military operations in and over
Vietnam for both the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations. The PRC's
reported massing of troops in 1954 and Peking's protracted voza1 militancy
during the 1960's forewarned US policy makers that the Chinese leadership
could indeed be provoked. India's intermittent difficulties with China
illustrated Peking's resolve to pursue bold'iy its national policy object-
ives. It is plausible, however, that Peking's militancy, both verbal andJ
physical, was displayed by the Chinese leadership for the purpose of
gaining international credibility at what were perceived as politically
opportune moments. President Kennedy's observation that "appearancels
contribute to reality'' may have had its Communist Chinese proponents as
well. Generally speaking, high-level US observations as to the nature of
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the Chinese threat during the years of US military involvement in Vietnam

were generally based more on presumption than reality. The fact that both
the political rift between Pek,,.g and Moscow and the cultural enmity
between the Vietnamese and Chinese were largely understated throughout the
conflict serves to substantiate this insight.
"Never again" served as only a minor constraint on the formation of US
policy for Vietnam. President Eisenhower seemed to respe:t the lesson;
President Kennedy diluted the adage by providing South Vietnam with addi-
tional aid and advisers. President Johnson, a one-time adherent of "united
action" during the Dien Bien Phu crisis, found the "never again" precedent
a hindrance only when reminded by dissenting policy advisers or antagonis-
tic members of the media. The potency of "never again" was, in actuality,
diminished by a number of more weighty adages: "beware of appeasement,"
"avoid losing Vietnam," and "stand firm with the adversary" took precedence
over "never again."
Lessons and insights derived from past historical experiences are
crucial to present and future US policy formulation. Yet, while hi3tory
may be regarded as cyclical or repetitive in nature, broad generflizations
of history or sweeping applications of historical analogies lead to
ambiguity of policy rather than clarity. Historical precedents are useful
tools for analysis, but their use must be moderated so as not to lead to
policy paralysis. As historian-writer Mark Twain stated,
We should be careful to get out of an experience only

the wisdom that is in it--and stop there; lest we be
like the cat that sits down on a hot stove lid. She
will never sit down on a hot stove lid again--and that
is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold
one.
Lessons derived from the US Vietnam experience should not be reduced to the
simplistic level of "No More Vietnams."
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CHAPTER 2
ENONOTES
1. Other possible precedents influencing US-Vietnam policy making include

the training of clients (South Vietnamese army) for the wrong type of
war, a mistake made in Korea before the outbreak of war there, and the
precedent of negotiating with communist governments (Korea, North
Vietnam), and lessons to be drawn from these precedents. However,
thesi precedents are considered less influential in shaping or con-
straining US involvement in Vietnam than those selected for discussion
in this chapter.
2. Figure 2-1 is based on information drawn from sources appearing in the
Volume III bibliography.
3. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row), p. 703.
4. William Greider, "Appeasing the Arms Crowd," The Washington Post,
July 8, 1979, p. C-1.
5. Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Popular Library, 1971),
p. 47.
6. Earl Ravenal, Never Again, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1978), p. 34.
7. President Truman's "Repor-t to the American PeopkQ on Korea and on U.S.
Policy in the Far East," April 11, 1951, cited in U.S. Department of
Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, Book 7 of 12
Books, V. A. I. p. A42. The DOD collection is hereafter cited as DOD
US/VN Relations.
8. President Eisenhower in a personal message to Prime Minister Churchill
9. Arthur Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1967), pp. 90-91.
10. Johnson Administration - 1966 Summary, in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 7,
V. A. II D., p. D-60.
11. Statement by President Johnson at White House News Conference on
28 July 1965, "We Will Stand in Viet-Nam," Department of State
Bulletin, 16 August 1965, p. 262 cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 7,
V. A. lIID., p. D-50.
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12. Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage, pp. 70-71.

13. Ibid., p. 91.
14. See Chapter 3, p. 29; Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage, pp. 91-92; and
US Army Military History Research Collection, Senior Officers' Debrief-
ing Paper, Interview on January 9, 1976, at the Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars, with General Andrew J. Goodpaster by
Colonel William D. Johnson and LTC James C. Ferguson, USAWC Class of
1976. Goodpaster transcript section 4, p. 28.
15. Ibid., p. 90.
16. Clyde Pettit, The Experts (Secaucus, New Jersey: Lyle Stuart Inc.,
1975), p. 114.
17. Tom Wicker, JFK & LBJ (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1970), p. 205.
18. The Amerasia Papers, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, (Washing-
ton, D.C.7: US overnment Printing Office, January 26, 1970), p. 1.
19. Address by Alfred Jenkins, Officer in Charge, Chinese Political
Affairs, Department of State April 1954, DOD US/VN Re'.Ltions, Book 7,
p. B-9.
20. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1950 (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1963),F 496.
21. James Thomson, in Causes Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War,
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 92nd
Congress, May 9, 10• Ii, 1972, p. 16. Hereafter Causes.
22. E. J. Kahn, The China Hands (New York: Viking Press, 1972), p. 28; and
Vincent Davis, Director7,F tterson School of Diplomacy and Inter-
national Commerce, University of Kentucky, Conversations at BDM,
September 7, 1979.
23. The phrase is Paul Hammond's. See his Cold War and Detente (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Jovwnovich, 1975), p.
24. Memorandum for President Kennedy, 11 November 1l61 in the Kennedy
Commitments and Programs, cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 2,
IV. 8.1, p. 126.
25. Charles Yost, The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs (New York:
Random House, 1972), p. 39.
26. Yost, p. 40.
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27. John King Fairbank The United States and China (New York: Viking
Press, 1958), p.
28. Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971),
p. 91.
29. Gunter Lewey, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press,
1978), pp. 129-130.
30. Acheson to Hanoi, 20 May 1949, in Department of State cable, cited in
DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, p. 198.
31. See E. J. Kahn for an in-depth discussion of this particular situation.
32. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institute, 1979), p. 234.
33. "Address by the Pres Jent, Syracuse University, 5 August 1964, p. 260,
DOD US/VN Relations, Book 7, V. D., p. 0-14.
34. John Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co. 1976), p. 80.
35. See Sorenson, pp. 584-586.
36. For the Soviet version, see Khrushchev Remembers, translated by Strobe
Talbot (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), pp. 452-460.
37. Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons, The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 92.
38. Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage, p. 36; and George, pp. 89-143.
39. See Eleanor Dulles, Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina, 1967) for a more detailed discussion.
40. George, et al., p. 101.
41. Ibid.
42. Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage, p. 91.
43. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1965),
p. 840.
44. Johnson, p. 470.
45. See Tad Szulc, "Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement," Foreign Policy,
Summer 1974, pp. 21-69, for a full account of Kissinger's negotiations
procedure.
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46. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (New Ycrk: Doubleday, 1956), p. 106.

47. Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (New York: Doubleday, 1976),
p. 32.
48. Ambrose, p. 2F5.
49. Ibid., p. 325.
50. Karl Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle for
Disaster (New Yo .: Frederick Praeger, 1962), p. 13.
51. Sorenson, pp. 295-297.
52. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House,
1972), p. 66.
53. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 339.

54. Interview with Col. Lucien Conein, US Army (Ret.) at The BDM Corpora-
tion on 25 August 1979.
55. Halberstam, p. 76.
56. McNamara memo to President Johnson on 6 October 1966 cited in DOD
US/VN Relations, Book 6, IV. C. 7., II. B. 3., p. 163.
57. Samuel Wells, Jr., "The Lessons of the War," The Wilson Quarterly,
Sumroer 1978, p. 124.
58. Perceptions of the Communist Threat to South Asia and to Basic U.S.
Interests: Impact of Start of Korea War, cited in DOD US/VN Relations,
Book 1, I1. A. 3. 3., p. A-48.
59. Ibid., DOD US/VN Re'ations, Book 1, II. A. 3.3., p. A-48.
60. Dulles, 29 April 1954, cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 9, p. 398.
61. Henry Kenny, "The Changing Importance of Vietnam in United States
Policy, 1949-1969," Ph.D dissertation, American University, 1974,
p. 250.
62. Gelb, p. 264.

63. Lewy, p. 392.
64. "The Interagency Debate Over U.S. Intervention in Indochina: The New
Approach: United Action," cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 1,
II. B.1. 3, p. B-12.
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65. Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Strategy for Peace (San Rafael: Presidio Press,
1978), 9. 48.
66. William C. Westmoreland, Personal Papers filed in Office US Army,
Chief of Military History, file #15, History Back-up (27 March 1965 -
7 May 1965).
68. Sharp, p. 148, and Kenny, p. 312. Kenny notes: In January 1966,
McNaughton expressed his opposition to closing Haiphong harbor as it
would create "a particularly unwelcome dilemma" for the USSR. On
May 19, 1967, a McNamara-approved DPM stated: "Mining the harbors
would place Moscow in a particularly galling dilemma...Moscow, in this
case should be expected to send volunteers, even pilots, to North
Vietnam." Vance, on February 21, 1967, wrote the President: "To the
USSR the mining of the ports would be particularly challenging. Last
year they moved some 530,000 tons of goods to North Vietnam...the
Soviets would be likely to strike back at th US in their bilateral
relations." On March 1, i968, Ambassador to the Soviet Union Lewellyn
Thompson, cabled that in case of either all-out bombing of North
Vietnam including the bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong " mining or blockade
Haiphong, that any serious escalation except in .outh Vietnam would
trigger strong Soviet response. He cited Korea, the Mid-East, Germany
and particularly Berlin as areas of possible Soviet response.
69. Public Attempts Toward a Negotiated End to Conflict in Vietnam, April
1965, cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 12, VI. A. 1., p. 5.
70. Associated Press releasc, New York Times, July 30, 1979.
72. Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces (Newport,
Rhode Island: Naval War College, 1977),-p~p.16-26.
73. Sharp, Strategy for Peace, p. 4.
74.; Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New Yoik: MacMillan Co., 1973),
p. 432.
75. Gelb, p. 264.
76. Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War (New York: Schocken Books,
1964), p. 85.
77. Wicker, p. 231.
78. Among those concerned were President Eisenhower, Generals Douglas
MacArthur, Maxwell Taylor and Matthew Ridgway.
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79. Both Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1975), Vol. II., pp. •39-898, and Buttinger, Vol. II,
pp. 819-820, 1082, provide succinct descriptions of the debate con-
cerning possible US intervention at ODen Bien Phu. (General Ridgway
4
pointed out that inadequate land forces could not do the jcb either).
!S
80. Genersl Matthew Ridgway, Soldier (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood

Press, 1957), p. 277.
81. Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1968), p. 30; and Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold
War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,'1977), p. 22.
82. Senator John C. Stennis in a letter to Secretary of Defense Charles E.
Wilson, 29 January 1954, cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 9, p. 239.
83. Kenny, p. 165.
84. See Chapter 3 - The Kennedy Administration.
85. Brodie, p. 126.
86. Kenny, p. 250.
f4
2-34
CHAPTER 3
* ~WASHiINGTON AND VIETNAM: US NATIONAL LEVEL
POLICY MAKERS AND THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines US national-level policy making concerning

Vietnam during the period 1945 to 1975. It focuses on the executive branch
because most of the major policy decisions which shaped US military involve-
ment were made by the president after consultation with his close advisers.
Congress did not play a major role until the second term of the Nixon ad-
ministration when it increasingly acted as a major' constraint on the presi-
dent's ability to implement his policies (and thereby shaped future poli-
cies) by placing limits on. appropriations, and reaquiring presidential
notification of and consent from Congress for further military lctivities
in Vietriam.
I The purpose of this chapter is to gain insights and lessons about the
process of decision making and the role of individual US decision makers in
the shaping of US policies toward Vietnam. The four tasks of this chapter
a.%e to identify the key policy makers, to show how their backgro~unds
influenced their decisions concerning Vietnam, to describe changes in the
process of national 'level policy making concernirg Vietnam, and to analyze
how these changes influenced US policies toward Vietnam.
The chapter is divided into six subsections covering each admin*stra-
tion from Presidents Truman through Ford. Within each subsection is aF
brief introduction, followed by a graphic representation identifying the
key decision makers in that administration as well as other important
policy advisers influencing Vietnam decision making. (Appendix B, which
appears at the close of Volume III, provides additional bibliographical
information on the key Vietnam decision makers for each of the administra-
tions c~onsidered.) Next is an overview of the national-level decision
making process concerning Vietnam, which includes both an assessment of the
relative influences of the president, White House staff, National Security
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Council, Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint

Chief. of Staff, and Congress as well as an evaluation of the decision-
making style peculiar to each administration. This dis ssion is followed
by a detailed analysis of the making of one ur more si "icant decisions
concerning Vietnam, illustrating the interaction of the key personalities
and the unfolding of the Vietnam decision-r;iaking process used by that par-
ticular administration a. the time the decision was made. As will be
shown, the details of the decision-making process differed for each deci-
sion, depending on the time and circumstances. The purpose here is not to
demonstrate these details, but rather to illustrate, by case study, how
decisions were made by all six administrations, and to highlight the inter-
relationships between and changing roles cf the key decision-makers ard
institutions as a particular decision was "made."
The significant themes and topics presented in this chapter include:
* Differences in decision-making styles of each administration;
* Tendencies toward centralized vs. docentralized control of deci-
sion making;
* The building of a "consensus" in support of a decision;
* The conflict between the building of presidential confidence on
the one hand with the necessity for considering dissenting
opinions;
* Relations between the executive and legislative branches;
* Constraints and other influences on decisions;
* The role of an indivioual's background in shaping his views on
Vietnam, especially the role of the president and his perceptions
in the shaping of decis'ons;
* The pervasiveness within all administrations of a belief in the
"domino theory" regarding Asian communism and the need not to
"lose" Vietnam to communism;
* The paramount importance of loyalty to the president as a pre-
condition for influence as an advisor;
* The emergence of the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs to a position of great significance in the formulation of
Vietrnam policy;
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0 The changing relative influence of the Secretary of State, Secre-

tary of Defense, and Sptcial Assistant for Nf.tional Sacuý ;Ly
Affairs in Vietnam decision making; and
a The role of the National Security Council and the White House
stf in such decision making.
The chapter concludes with an analytical summary highlighting the
relevance of the above and offering insights to be gained from the US
Vietnam decision-making process.
B. THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
I believe that it must be the policy of the United

States to support free peoples who are resisting
Iipressures. attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
I believe we must assist free peoples to
work out their own destinies in their own way ... l
(President Harry S. Truman, 1947)

1. Introduction
The Truman administration began its tenure in the White House
just prior to the resolution of World War II. After defeating the Japanese
in the Pacific, the new president faced the tasks of restoring the US to
peace-time footing, rebuilding a weakened and decimated Europe, and secur-
ing a semblance of international stability, prosperity, and order. To help
accomplish these tasks, President Truman promoted the Marshall Plan, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations.
The internationa'l environment was highly complex and dynamic.
One of the United States major allies in the war - the Soviet Union-
sought to establish its own security by means of power consolidation and
expansion in both Eastern Europe and in Asia. The Truman administration
gradually came to focus on the USSR as its major enemy and initiated a
drive to contain communism both at home and abroad. The Cold War had
begun.
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In the post-war environment the native peoples of the worci's

colonial empires expressed their desire for self-determination and inde-
pendence. The US sought to support such movements, granting the
Philippin.•s independence as an example for other nations with colonies.
Yet the US anticolcnialist policies operated within certain limits: in a
broad serise the US was committed to the concept of self-determination, but
if such a policy jeopardized Western European participation in a security
arrangement, the concept was relegated to a secondary position.
Thus, the Truman administration walked a thin line, attempting to
balance its anticolonialist policies with those aimed at securing Westarn
European cooperation. The balance, from the start, leaned heavily towards
the latter consideration. US promotion of Vietnamese independence from
France must, therefore, be considered within this framework. While urging
France to consider such policies, overall security considerations led the
US to allow for French re-entry in Indochina, much to the dismay of the
Vietnamese nationalists.2/
2. Vietnam Decision-Making Process During the Truman Administration
a. Vietnam Decision-Making Style and the Level of Institutional
Tnfl-uence During the Truman Administration
In contrast to the highly personal, somewhat disorganized
approach to wartime decision making taken by President Roosevelt, President
Truman relied more fully on foi'mal decision-making organizations. In fact,
his administration was responsible for seveial important innovations in the
US national security machinery. The 1947 National Security Act, providing
for the creation of the National Security Council, the National Security
Resources Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and a separate Air Force, 4/ was the most
important of these innovations. The National Security Act served as a
centralizing mechanism, delegating heretofore ambiguous decision-making
responsibilities to specific institutions at the national level of US
government. (See Figure 3-1 for a graphic representation of the key
decision-making institutions and key Vietnam decision makers within the
Truman administration.)
3-4
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President Truman's first term in office found him jealously

guarding his presidential prerogatives, seeking to limit possible encroach-
ments by both Congress and his advisers in decision making.5/ Truman
prided himself on his abilities as a decision maker.6/ His belief in the
importance of the role of the president as the Commander in Chief and as
the nation's top-ranking decision maker, dominated his outlook.7/
The Truman administation saw a remarkable increase in the
size of the White House policy staff, serving to institutionalize the White
House advisers as an in-house resource base for the making of national
policy.8/ This increase,, however, was relatively small when compared to
those made by later administrations. Due to his desire to make key deci-
sions himself, President Truman infrequently convened the National Security
Council (NSC) until the outbreak of the Korean War. But at the outset of
that crisis and the attendant increase in international tension, Truman met
with the NSC on a weekly basis.9/ His decision for more frequent meetings
reflected the administration's increased need for top-level coordination in
the decision-making process. It did not, however, indicate a reversal in
Truman's thinking regarding presidential responsibility. He stressed that
the NSC was a place for recommendations to be worked out, but policy and
final decisions continued to come down from the President.
Al-though the State Department's overall role in the Truman
administration war not highly influential, it did play the leading role in
formulating US policy towards Indochina until 1950. 10/ One major reason
can be offered by way of explanation: the administration's top priority
was the reconstruction of Europe; Asia, although important, was relegated
to a second-place position. Reports from in-country personnel served as
the primary basis for the administration's perception of Vietnamese-French
relations. In essence, prior to 1950, Indochina concerned the administra-
tion only insofar as tensions there detracted from France's cooperation in
European security arrangements. Therefore, while the State Department's
Division of Far Eastern Affairs stressed the need for French "liberalism"
in the area, the overall posture of the Department leaned heavily towards
European concerns. With Mao's victory in China, the State Depdrtment's
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Asian specialists came under attack for the "loss" of China to communism.
And with the onset of the McCarthy era, many of these specialists found
their reputations tarnished and careers destroyed.ll/ A line of continuity
and familiarity with Asian affairs was broken.
The Truman administration was faced with restoring national
security-policy formulation to a civilian peace-time footing. The transi-
tion, however, disturbed the administration's professional military advi-
..ers who had been highly influential in policy formulation during the
second World War.12/ In addition, the decision to place the military
establishment under the authority of a civilian Secretary of Defense caused
the military significant dissatisfaction. With the creation of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and appointment of General Marshall as Secretary of
Defense, the military professionals appeared more at ease with their stand-
ing within the administration. The JCS were not as influential in policy
formulation as senior military officers during Roosevelt's presidency.
However, they were gererally supportive of the Truman administration's
polfcies, ircluding, as will be seen below, the need to save what they
regarded as strategically important Indochina from the advance of
i ~ ~communismn. 1_3./
The Truman administration, aware of
Congress's desire for a
greater voice in decision making on oreign affairs after the war, sought
to establish a solid, bi-partisan working relationship with the legislative
branch.14/ The executive branch's frequent consultations with Congress
regarding the Marshall plan fortified this relationship. However, with the
outbreak of the Korean war, the Congress saw its influence slip in relation
to that of the military. President Truman's decision not to consult with
Congress prior to initiating military operations in Korea, in Senator
Vandenberg's words, set the Congress on, an inevitable collision course with
the administration. 15/
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b. Decision to Accelerate the Provision of Military Aid to

France and the Associated States of Indochina and to
Dispatch a Military Mission to Indochina
1) Awareness of the Problem
Du,,ing the years 1945-1949, the Truman administration
came tc view Indochir as an important battleground upon which to wage the
struggle against communism; at the same time, however. the administration
was cognizant of French colonial designs on the region. Hence, these two
major concerns shaped the admini'tration's attitude towards Indochina. By
1S49, a,- -che Chinese Nationalists' probability of defeat increased, so too
did the administration's concern r'egarding Indochina. Communications
between the US diplomatic representative in V:etnam, Mr. George Abbott (see
Figure 3-i and Appendix B) and Li•e State Department indicated a growing
uneasiness on the part of the US over both Moscow's intentions in the area
and Ho Chi Minh's affiliation with the communist party of the Soviet Union.
With Mao's victory in China in October 1949, the Truman administration
began a reassessment of its policy regArding Asia in general, and Indochina
in particular. The Bao Dai "solution," therefore, came to be regarded as
the only alternative to a costly colonial war or to French withdrawal and
the subsequent establishment of a communist-controlled government in
Vietnam. 16/
2) Debate and Reassessment in Washington
In response to a request by Secretary of Defense Louis

Johnson for a reassessment of US policy toward Asia, the NSC submittid its
report of December 23, 1949, entitled "The Position of the US with Respect
to Asia.=. The report, as amended and approved by President Truman as NSC
48/2 a week later, set forth the following US objectives in Asia: 17/
(1) Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a stable and
self-sustaining basis in conformity with the purposes and princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter,
(2) Development of sufficient military power in selected non-commu-
nist nation! of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent
further encroachment by communism,
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(3) Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant

power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the
Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area
the security of the United States or its friends and that the
Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt
to tntreaten the peace, national independence and stability of the
Asiatic nations, and
(4) Prevention of power relationships in Asia which 4ould enable any
other nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United
States from that area, or the peace, national independence dnd
stability of the Asiatic nations.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense dated January 1950, proposed as a major military
objective that "US support in the Pacific be available to delay any Com-
munist invasion in the ... Far East and Southeast Asian areas...."W8/
Hence, key decision-making bodies within the Truman administration agreedl
that the major US political and military objective in Southeast Asia was
the containment of communism.
One facet of the administration's NSC 48/2 strategy for
containilg communism in Asia caillrd for the establishment of "stable and
self-sustaining" nations. With regard to Vietnam, th[ path to rpalzing
this objective was obstructed by the colonialist desires of the French.
The Truman administration agonized over recognizing the French-supported
Bao Dai government because the government was considered a puppet regime by
neighboring Asiatic states. However, with Secretary of State Acheson's
conviction that Ho Chi Minh was a communist and with Moscow's recognition
of Ho Chi Minh's government in January 1950, the Truman administration felt
compelled to take a stand. (See Appendix B - Acheson) French intransi-
gence on the issue of granting independence to the Associated States
further per-suaded President Truman to approve a recommendation from Secre-
tary Acheson that the NS recognize the Associated States of Indochina
(Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia).19/ Formal recognition was extended on
February 7, 1950.
3-9
Additional assessments of US interests in Southeast

Asia were undertaken by the Truman administration during the period
February - May 1950. Based on the recommendations of NSC 64, which reiter-
ated the administration's containment theory, tho Departments of State and
Defense were asked to orepare a "program of all practicable meabures ... to
protect US security interests In Indochina."20/ Prompted by French
requests for assistance, 21/ the US Government sent one of its first fact-
finding missions to Southeast Asia in mid-March 1950, for the purpose of
assessing the economic needs o01the countries in the region.22/ Upon its
return, the Griffin Mission recommended economic and technical assistance
to Vietnam as a "way to promote the Bao Dai government's appearance of
independence and its local and international prestige," and to "win" over
the "non-communist elements that continue to support Ho."23/
The Joint Chiefs of Staff completed their military
assessment of Southeast Asia in early-May 1950. In line with their memo-
randum of 10 April 1950 to the Secretary of Defense, which stdted that the
"m1ainland states of Southeast Asia are at present of critical strategic
importance to the US because of the requirement to stockpile strategic
rvzterials acquired there," the JCS "stressed" In a memoranium to the Secre-
tary of Defense, dated May 2, 1950, that a small United States military aid
group should be established in Indochina "immediately," that the nad for
early arrival of US military aid ($15 million) to Indochina was "urgent,"
and that th6&ý.e was a requirement to integrate such aid with political and
economic progrems.24/ Evidently, earlier in a draft position paper of
April 25, 1950, the State Department had opposed the establishment of a US
MAAG in Indochina because it believed that such action would place the
responsinility for the security of Indochina on US shoulders.25/ In chal-
lenging thie argumtnt of the State Department, the JCS referred to the
conclusion in NSC-68, a document largely written by State Department
officials, that the US "position as the center of power in the free world
places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership."26/
In this vein, the JCS argued that "in order to retrieve the losses result-
ing from previous mistakes on the part of the British and the French, as
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wfll as to preclude suck mistakes in the future,... it [is] necessary that

positive and proper leadership among the Western Powers be assumed by the
United States in Southeast Asian matters."27/
In May 1950, as an outgrowth of the recommendations of
the Griffin Mission and of the JCS, President Truman approved the estab-
lishment of an economic mission to the Associated States and $10 million in
military aid to France and Indochina.28/ However, the Truman administra-
tion adopted the State Department view that, while Southeast Asia was of
strategic importance to the US, the direct responsibilities of the UK and
France made it of greater concern to them. Therefore, President Truman did
not decide to establish a MAAG in Indochina until the outbreak of the
Korean War one morth later. 29/
3) Catalyst for a Decision
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces attacked South
Korea. According to President Truman, this incident forced the accelera-
tion of US military assistance to France and Indochina.30/ President
Truman and his advisers were acting on the assumption that the North Korean
attack was possibly only the beginning of a campaign by communism to
conquer independent nations in the Pacific, and suspected that it might
even be a prelude to or feint for an assault on Western Europe. 31/
4) Decision to Accelerate the Provision of Military Aid
to France and to the Associated States of Indochina,
and to Dispatch a Military Mission to Indochina
On June 27, 1950, President Truman announced the US
'-overnment's intention to provide military support to the South Korean
government. In addition, the president stated:
I have ... directed acceleration in the furnishing of

military assistance to the Forces of France and the
Associated States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a
military mission to provide close working relations
with those forces.32/
Accordiny to President Truman, the fall of China and North Korea's attack
made it "plain beyond all doubt that communism had passed beyond the use of
subversion to conquer independent nations and would now use armed invasions
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and war."33/ Within this context, Vietnam's strategic importance grew as a

country where communism had to be contained. Another possible loss of an
Asian country to ccmmunism - be il, South Korea or one of the Associated
States of Indochina - would indicate the DemocratIc administration's
incipacity for dealing with what the JCS (and Truman administration) per-
ceived as the "Kr'emlin's design for world don,,nation."34/ Th3 Korean
experience, while ensuring President Truman's political demise and
encouriging a "never again" attituae towards US involvement in Asian land
wars, did :iot dampen the US 'resolve to contain communism in both Asia and
Europe.
C. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
TherE is going to be no involvement of America in war

unless it is a result of the Constitutional process
that is Alaceo upon Congress to declare it. Now let us
have that clear. 35/
(President Dwight 0. Eisenhower, 1954)

1. Introduction
General Eisenhower was elected president in 1952 on a platform
that asserted t•':. necessity for the "enslaved nations of the world," then
under communist domination, to have the freedom to choose their own govern-
ments.36/ For President Eisenhower, as for President Truman, the conse-
quences of Munich were a constant reminder of the disaster that could
attend the appeasement of aggressors. Eisenhower often spoke of Munich and

compared the communist leaders in the Soviet Union and China to Hitler.37/
President Eisenhower also knew that the American public was weary of the
fighting in Korea. Already the cry was raised that the United States
should never again allow itself to become involved in an Asian land war.
Moreover, the Republican Party was committed to balancing the federal
budget, and President Eisenhower chose to do this by reducing military
spending.
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In 1954 the US government agonized over possible US military

intervention on behalf of the French at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina. Presi-
dent Eisenhower and his senior advisers called for numerous high-level
assessments of the immediate battlefield situation and of its global rami-
fications. Ultimately, the president decided against taking unilateral
executive action and he brought Congress into the decision making process
2. Vietnam Decision-Making Process During the Eisenhower
Admi ni stration
a. Vietnam Decision-Makin..Style and the Level of Institutional
InfluencZe During the Eienhower Administration
President Eisenhower's military background and desire to
arrive at decisiuns through careful, painstaking staff studies, led him to
control the process of national security policy making in a more highly
structured manner than any other president in the post-World-War It era.
That structure was pi,'ticularly evident in the National Security Council
system. Whereas President Truman had used the council as a supplementary
advisory organization, President Eisenhower decided that, except in special
caes of urgency, national-security policy formulation was to run from a
department, agency, or individual through the NSC.38/ (See Figure 3-2 for
an overview of the Eisenhower adniinistration'.5 decision making institutions
and key Vietnam d.cis~on makers. For additional biographical information

on the administration's ivVietnam decision makers, see •.ppendix B.)
President Eisenhcvy. was more 'flexihle in his attitude
toward the ?NSC than many com,..•n'Zators suggest. He rid not formally
consult the council on every issu,-), and he did not use the council to
decide immediate problems. Moreover, President "isenhower frequently met
with a select group of advisors in wh:,t were termed "Special NSr meetings"
on iiportant issues rather than call a regular NSC meeting.
With the imp'.,tant exception of Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles's shuttle diplomacy between Washington, Londun, and Paris.
the Vietnam decision making process under President Eisenhower conformed to
the highly structured approach that the President pr:ferred in his NSC
system. The White House staff worked through the executive depa, tments and
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agencies to identify and clarify the significant issues that necded atten-
tion in the NSC and resolution by the president. This work was largely
carried out at meetings of the NSC Planning Board, attended by senior
officials who were usually at the assistant-secretary level, and chaired by
the President's Special Assistant f , National Security Affairs.40/ lhe
Special Assistant (Robert Cutlei at the time of Dien Bien Phu) served
largely as an administrator, though he did help shape the substantive
content which ultimately reached the president.. In fact, President Eisen-
hower wanted his Special Assistant to integrate and compromise any
opposing departmental views whenever possible at meetings of the Planning
Beard and bring oniy the irreconcilable differences to the NSC.41/
Foreign policy options were generally developed in the State
Department with advice from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It was not rare during the Dien Bien Phu crisis, however,
to find Secretary Dulles taking swift diplomatic action, especial ' with
France and Great Britain, wlthout subnmitting issues through the State
L.*partment or NSC.42/ He did seek and gain full prior approval T.Ir his
actions from the President. 43/
Military options in support of foreign policy objectives
were largely developed by the Joints Chiefs of Staft, though the CIA and
the President's Intelligence Advisory Committee (which included representa-
tives from the State Department and the Armed Services) had inmportant
advisory roles. In addition, the president created an ad hoc "Special
Committee on Indochina" during the Dien Bien Phu crisis, which included
General Bedell Smith, Director of the CIA Allen Dulles, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Roger Kyes, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to study feasible
options for supporting the French "Navarre Plan."44/ (See Figure 3-2 and
Appendix B - Eisenhower) RecommendAtions by this committee were forwarded
with the recommendations of the individual departments and agencies to the
NSC for review. 45/
President Eisenhower wanted the Congress to be a partner in
the decisionr-making process concerning US intervention at Dien Bien Phu.
One of his preconditions for US military intervention was the passage of a
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join+ resolution by Congress permitting the president to use military power

in Indochina.46/ Congressional leaders from both parties were consulted at
the critlcal juncture in the process, "probably the decisive moment,"
according to a recent publication by the Congressional Research Service.47/

However, as the publication asserts, "Cuigrzt for Lhe most part remained
on the periphery of the action, at a distance from the main diplomat':.
events and military maneuvering."48/ Congress was at the periphery largely

because it took little interest in Indochina affairs at this time, illus-
trating a general tendency in Congress to neglect particular foreign-policy
problems until they have gained national prominence.49/ In turn, the
failure of the Dien Bien Phu crisis to gain such prominence resulted in
part from a general tendency of the executive branch to dowrnplay the signi-
ficanLe of crises in its public statements until a policy has beenl estab-
lished by the administration for dealing with them. 50/
Public opinion had an indirect influence on Vietnam de-ision
iwaking during the Eisenhower administration in the sense that the Admin-
istration was well aware .that less than a year after the pain and frustr.a-
tion of tne Korean War, the American people were hardly ready to embrace a
r,ew war.51/ The Eisenhower administration believed that -t had a respon-
sibility to "educate" the American and foreign publics and induce them to
understand and support American policies. As Dulles bluntly stated, "We
can't get too far ahead of public opinion, and we must do everythinc' we cAn
to bring it along with us."52/
b. Case Study: Decision Not to Intervene at Dien Bien Phu
Without the Assistance of US Allies
1) Awareness ot the Problem
As a former military commander, President Eisenhower
was seriously disturbed by the French decision in November 1953, to send
ten thousand troops into Dien Bien Phu, whoce only means of resupply was by
air. On December 30, 1953, CIA Director Allen Dulles reported to the
President that "the real danger spot" in Indochina was at Dien Bien Phu,
where the Viet Minh forces were attempting to surround the French garrison.
By January 1, 1954, reports were received in Washington that the French
garrison was surrounded by approximately three Viet Minh divisions- a
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ratio favoring the Viet Minh by three to one.53/ Eisenhower later

recollected that, in Washingtnn, there was an awareness of the potential
"far-reaching" psychological effects on the French should the garrison at
Dien Bien Phu be lost. Such a loss might lead to the withdrawal of the
French from Indochina, despite the fact that the location of Dien Bien Phu
was of "minor military significance."54/ Thus, the essential problem, as
President Eisenhower perceivad it, was not the fate of Dien Bieh, Phu, per.
se. The essential problem was to keep the French fighting in Indochina
against the Communist Vietnamese forces, even if Dien Bien Phu Wcre to
fall. A withdrawal was considered against the interest of the United
States because, if it happened, the United States would have to participate
more actively in the Indochina co'flict in order Lo prevent the "loss" of
Indochina to the Vietnamese Communist forces. In addition, there was
concern, as expressed by the National Security Council on 14 January 1954,
that if the Un ,ed States were to join tha fighting, there would be a
"substantial risk that the Chinese Communists would intervene."55/
2) Debate in Washington
April 1954 was the critical month of debate and deci-
sion in Washing.t.n concerning the crisis at Dien Bien Phu. On 30 March
1954, the Viet Minh launched a large-scale attack on the garrison, and the
issue of Chinese Communist intervention on behalf of the Viet Minh was
raised at that time by General Paul Ely, French Chief of Staff, with
Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford. Dulles, a staunch anticommunist,
sent a memorandum to Eispnhower, arguing that if the United States were to

use its military forces in Indochina, then "the prestige of the United
States would be engaged to a point where we would want to have a suc-
cess."56/ One clear implication was that, before initiating any interven-
tion in Indochina, the US ought to be prepared to fight successfully
igainst Chinese Communist forces, on the assumption that they might become
involved. With the Korean War fresh in the minds of the American public,
and because the crisis at Dien Bien Phu was not a sudden, unforeseen
emergency, President Eisenhower wanted congressional endorsement for any
plan of US intervintio,1.57/
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On 3 April 1954, eight congressional leaders, including

Senator Lyndon Johnson, were called in by the administration to meet with
Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford about the Indochina situation.58/
Specifically, the administration wanted to know the prospects of obtaining
a congressional resolution supporting US military intervention at Dien Bien
Phu. The intervention, as proposed by Admiral Radford, Chairman of the JCS
and a zealous anticommunist, would consist of an air attack from carriers
in the Pacific, possibly involving the use of tactical riuclear weapons, on
communist installations around Dien Bien Phu.59/ The congressmen, particu-
larly Senator Johnson, made clear that the US had to have allies before
they could support a congressional resolution. The congressional leaders
said that support from Congress would be contingent on meeting three
conditions:60/
. US intervention must be part of a coalition, including the free
nations of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the British
Commonwealth;
* France must agree to accelerate the independence of the Asso-
ciated States in Indochina, so that 'S assistance would not be
interpreted as support for French colonialism; and
& France must agree to keep its forces in the war if the US commits
its President Eisenhower accepted these conditions, in
part, because he had similar reservations, bot also, it appears, out of

genuine respect for congressional opinion i its constitutional signifi-
cance. 61/
As a result of the meeting with the
congressmen, Secre-
tary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith tried to rally international support
for the idea of "unitE iction" in Indochina, that is, a joint effort by
the United States and i allies in support of the French. However, con-
cern over Dien Bien P was overshadowed in Britain and France by the
prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Indochina conflict through the
Geneva Conference, scheduled to open on 26 April 1954.62/ Dulles met
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uncompromising r-eqistance from the British to any scheme for united mili-
tary action in Indochina before the Geneva Conference. Owing to the need
to enlist international support, the State Department reconmmended to the
NSC, in early Ax I1 1954, the following courses of action:63/
0 Tha-. there be no US military intervention for the moment, nor the
promise of such action to the French;
* That planning for military intervention continue; and
* That discussions continue with potential allies on the possi-
bility of forming a regional defense grouping for Southeast Asia.
These three recommendations were approved by tht NSC and the president and
formed the basis of US policy up through the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May
1954.64/
While the State Oeparl.n,ent sought allies for united
action, the Defense Department debated the likely success of possible
military actions to save Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford advocated an air
strike from carriers, and the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons, on
communist instaliations around Dien Bien Phu, as a means for saving the
French garrison. The Army argued strongly against Radford's proposal, as
offered at the meeting with the congressional leaders, claiming that air
and naval action alone would not assure a military victory.65/ In the
first week of April 1954, Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew Ridgway
issued a report based on extensive field research, which concluded that US
ground forces would eventually be required to assure a military victory in
Indochina. The report is believed to have been highly influential with
Presia'.nt Eisenhower.66/ The contents of the report can be summarized as
foliows:67/
e •. military victory in Indochin.a cannot be assured by US interven-
tion with air and naval forces alone;
* The use of atomic weapons will not reduce the number of ground
forces required to achieve military victory;
s If the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists do not inter-
vene, an estimated seven US divisions or their equivalent will be
required to achieve victory;
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0 If the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists intervene,
twelve US divisions will be required;

* If the French remain and the Chinese Communists intervene, seven
divisions will be required; and
0 There are important military disadvantages to intervention in
Indochina, namely, the US ability to meet its NATO commitment
will be seriously affected for a considerable period.
On the night of 4 April 1954, French Prime Minister
Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault met with the American Ambassador to
France, C. Douglas Dillon, to request immediate armed intervention of US
carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu to "save the situation."68/ The French
leaders also reported, according to Dillon, that "Chinese intervention in
Indochina [is] already fully established," including technical advisers,
communications operators, and personnel to operate antiaircraft guns and
one thousand supply trucks. Secretary Dulles, Under Secretary Smith, and
Admiral Radford were immediately notified of this request.69/
4) Decision: President Eisenhower Decides that there will
be "No Intervention without Allies"
In response to the French request, a meeting cf the
National Security Council was called on 6 April 1954 to discuss recommenda-

tions on "appropriate action regarding Indochina and on the need for US
military intervention."70/ The NSC Planning Board had met the previous day
and agreed that "on balance, it appears that the US should now reach
decision whether o" not to intervene with combat forces, if that is nec-
essary to save Indochina from communist control and, tentatively, the form
and condition of such intervention." The Planning Board also neatly clari-
fied for the NSC the key issue involved in this decision: "The real
issue," according to the Planning Board,71/
... is that the [National Security] Council must decide

whether it is essential to intervene now with little or
no time to (1) work out arrangements with tne French
(including acceptance of conditions, command arrangs-
ments, etc.), (2) condition public and Congressional
opinion -- intervention may involve our drafting men
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for Indochina where the French tave never yet sent a

conscript -- and (3) try to prepare a regional type
arrangement. Decision to act later may take care of
these difficulties but might come too late to save Dien
Bien Phu.
At its meeting on 6 April 1954, the NSC "postponed
decision" on the Planning Board's recommendation that the US decJd. whether
or not to intervene. The President approved this postponement, and
affirmed the main precondition for intervention established by the congres-
sional leaders on 3 April: that the US intervene only as part of a coali-
tion. This coalition, or "regional grouping," as termed by the NSC, was to
include the US, France, Great Britain, the Associated States, Australia,
New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. Thus a major decision was
taken by the President, with the participation of members of Congress and
the NSC. As Eisenhower later recorded, "There would be no intervention
without allies."72/
On April 23, French Foreign Minister Bidault again
requested US armed intervention -- to involve massive B-29 bombing. Dulles
responded that the proposed intervention "seemed to me out of the question
under existing ci'rcumstances," that is, the continued refusal by the
British Government to participate in a regional grouping before the Geneva
Conference.73/ Dulles forwarded the request to President Eisenhowar for
final decision. President Eisenhower reaffirmed his earlier decision that
the United States would not initiate armed intervention in Indochina with-
out allies.74/ This remained the US policy through 7 May 1954, when the
French garrison at Dien Bien Phu fell to General Giap.
One of the most striking features of the decision-
making process for the Oien Bien Phu decision ik that despite the rapid
deterioration of the situetion, the Eisenhower Administration continued to
proceed in a highly-structured manner with carefully planned meetings of
the NSC and its Planning Board used to clarify the main issues for the
President. This formal, structured approach was an ever-present character-
istic of the Eisenhower admini3tration's decision-making style, contrasting
significantly with the style of his successor's administration.
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D. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or

ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet
any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in
order to assure the survival and success of liberty.
This much we pledge and more. 75/
(President John F. Kennedy, 1961)

1. Introduction
John F. Kennedy, elected President in 1960 by a slim margin,
promised a new, dynamic approach to American foreign policy. 01haracterized
by boldness and a penc,,.nt for action, the Kennedy administration stressed
the importance of US assistance to Third World nations.76/ The world's
newly developing nations were a "great battlefield for the defense and
expansion of freedom;" Vietnam would sert is an example of the US commit-
ment to this cause.
While the Kennedy administration sought to vitalize what it
perceived as the tired, bland approach of the preceding administration,77/
it nonetheless continued to formulate US policy on the basis of the con-
tainment and domino theuries. Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam, served
as more than a test case for nation building; it was also the Kennedy
administration's proving ground for checking wars of national liberation.
In addition, success in Vietnam would help to blot out the administrat.on's
foreign policy debacles in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.78/
2. Vietnam Decision-Making Process During the Kennedy
AdiniTnstrati on
Influence During the Kennedy Administration
Believing that the Eisenhower administration's decision-
making process had been too rigidly structured and thereby had unduly
restricted the President's freedom of choice, the KEnnedy administration
utilized a seminar approach to decision making which allowed for a fluid,
open, and flexible process and culled the ideas and suggestions of advisers
at all levels in the executive branch.79/ President Kennedy sought to
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maintain open channels of communication in the government as well as

auxiliary lines to respected individuals outsida the administration and the
Washington bureaucracy. Figure 3-3 provides a summary of the major deci-
sion-making institutions in the Kennedy administration and an overview of
its high-level decision makers. Additional biographical information on the
administration's key Vietnam decision makers appears in Appendix B.
As a function of this informal approach, official decision-
making bodieý and committees were often disbanded or ignored.81/ The
National Security Council met less frequently and, in its place, White
House staff meetings and special interagency task forces generated foreign
policy options and advice.82/ In fact, while President Kennedy was not the
first of the post-war presidents to use an ad hoc approach in policy formu-
lation, the extent to which the new President created ad hoc groups to
I
assist him was unprecedented. The most notable of these groups, with
respect to Vietnam decision making, was the inter-agency task force on
Viotram, created in the early days of the administration, which included
representatives from the CIA, the White House, USIA, and the Departments of
State and Defense.83/ The most important set of recommendations issued by
this group called for a commitment of US combat forces to Vietnam. In
addition to the use of ad hoc groups, President Kennedy created the White
House situation room as a convw-nient in-house operations-and-planning
S~center for the administration's use, especially during times of crisis.8_4/
While Kennedy's creation of a strong White House staff
afforded the President a constant influx of policy considerations and

frequent interaction with his adviser-intellectuals, it diminished the
role and influence of the State. Departmc, in the decision-making process.
President Kennedy's attitude towards the State Department was marked by a
certain ambivalence; upon coming to office he stressed the need to improve
the quality of advice coming from the Department; yet, with the passage of
time, the President appeared increasingly reluctant to use the Department
in the formulation of national security policy on a day-to-day basis.85/
Two major factors contributed to the Kennedy administration's attitude.
First, the president's own personal, informal approach to decision making
3-23
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Advisers 1ithin the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963 80/
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it..duced the administration's reliance on a formal, bureaucratic entity for

policy formulation. Second, Kennedy saw the Depar',1;cnt as ',cking in
initiative, which prompted him to rely more fully on his Write House
staff.86/ The staff, under the direction of McGeorge Bundy, a believer in
presenting 'he president with dissenting points of view, assembled policy
options and organized all incoming information according to the president's
preferred format. The Kennedy administration's final decisions and orders
were recorded in its National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs).
The State Department's overall influence on Vietnam-related
policies also declined with the ascendancy of Secretary McNamara and the
Department of Defense. Several authors have described the State Depart-
m~nt's apparent inability to compete with the Pentagon; they contend it
resulted both from McNamara's extraordinary strength and dominance in
expressing his Department's views, and from Secretary of State Rusk's own
ambivalence.87/ However, Rusk contends that he and his staff generally
agreed with McNamara's military solutions for Vietnam, and, therefore, that
there was no serious bureaucratic struggle between McNamara and himself on
Vietnam policies.888/
Secretary McNamara's innovations in the Defense Department's
bu,.. ing system, his demands for short-order defense c.ssessments, and his
reli. ýe on civilian defense analysts contributed to the gulf that grew
increasingly wide between the Secretary of Defense and his immedicte staff
on one 1-nd and the military services and Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
other.85.
The president's call for a combined political-military
solution for Vietnam was based on the counterinsurgency (CI) strateg es
proposed by the Special Group for Counterinsurgency, chaired by General
Taylor. The president had established the Special Group for Counterinsur-
gency shortly after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion.90/ His
emphasis on a combined solution probably reflected his suspicion of mili-
tary solutions and desire to restrain the JCS (and CIA) in Vietnam opera-
tions. As Kennedy saw it, Vietnam was the test case for the CI response to
communist insurgency.91/
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The president, in line with this political-military orienta-

tion, urged the JCS to expand its horizons beyond purely military consider-
ations.92/ However, the JCS had difficulty in fulfilling his wishes. In
fact, as a statement by General Wheeler in 1962 suggests, the JCS bridled
at the Taylor-Kennedy political-military program of counterinsurgency
operations. According to Wheeler,
It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the

problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and
economic rather than military. I do not agree. The
essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.93/
Therefore, it is not surprising that while the administration sought to
implement its CI program, the military's interpretation and subsequent
application of it emphasized "conventional, military" methods, particularly
since the military was professionally trained to respond to conflicts
using these methods.94/ Even General Taylor, who headed the Special Group
for Counterinsurgency, initially had difficulty in understanding President
Kennedy's conception of cnunterinsurgency operations.95/
The Kennedy administration, especially with regard to its
covert operations abroad, sought to avoid congressional disapproval of its
foreign policy initiatives by maintaining a certain degree of secrecy.96/
To protect its initiatives and prevent leaks, the administration estab-
lished a strong White House legislative liaison with sele':ted members of
Congress.97/ President Kennedy's attempt to reserve foreign-policy deci-
sion making for the executive branch 98/ may have beefn an outgrowth of his
own insecurity and lack of success in dealing with Congress despite his
previous congressional experience.99/ He had little success in obtaining
passage of a great number of his bills. Indeed, Kennedy remarked that the
Congress looked more powerful from the President's position than from
inside the legislative chambers.lO0/ In adtition, President Kennedy's
understanding of his presidential prerogative, similar to the views later
maintained by Presidents Nixon and Ford, lent credence to his rationale for
swift unilateral action. As a presidential candidate, Mr. Kennedy was
highly critical of President Eisenhower's conception of the presidency. In
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the foreign-policy area, Senator Kennedy said that "it is the President
alone who must make the major decisions."IOl/ He ddded, should a "brush-
fire" war threaten "in some part of the globe," the President "alone can
-act, without waiting for Congress."I102/
The folluwing discussion of the decision-making process and
final decision taken by the Kennedy administration to support the overthrow
of South Vietnam's President Diem illustrates the actual roles of and
interplay between the decision-making institutions discussed above.
b. Decision to Supoort a Coup Which Would Have a "Good Chance
of Succeeding" in Overthrowing the Diem Government, without
Directly Involving US Armed Forces
Durirg its tenure, the Diem regime had never succeeded
in cultivating broad popular support; in essence, it had isolated itself
from the people and had given the predominately Buddhist population cause
for resentment due to the regime's blatant favoritism of the country's
Catholic minority. By the spring of 1963, two factors contributed to the
Diem regime's unpopularity and, hence, its instability. First, the power
and dominance of the Nhus and their acerbic attitude towards the Buddhist
community had become increasingly apparent.103/ Second, and as an out-
growth of the first, the regime's favoritism of the Catholic community had
evolved into outright discrimination against the Buddhists.104/ On May 8,
1963, the Diem regime responded to a demonstration celebrating Buddha's
birthday with gunfire, killing several people and injuring many others.
This was the beginning of a series of repressive actions taken by the Diem
government against the Buddhist community. To the embarrassment of the
United States, President Diem remained unmoved by the dissent of the
Buddhists or their supporters, refusing to implicate his government's
forces in the May 8 killings. With the world watching, the first of
several Buddhist monks offered his self-immolation in protest against the
regime's repression and discriminaticn.105/ The US government, increas-
ingly concerned, began to exert considerable pressure on President Diem to
comply with the Buddhists' demands and to curtail his government's repres-
sive actions.
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On July 10, 1963, in a Special National Intelligence

Estimate, entitled "The Situation in South Vietnam," the CIA, with concur-
rence from the US Intelligence Board, reported to the NSC that in several
countries, including the US, the Buddhist crisis revived international
criticism of US policy on the grounds that it supported an "oppressive and
unrepresentative regime."106/ In speculating about the likely situation in
South Vietnam after a possible departure of the Diem government, the
authors of thle SNIE said that the counterinsurgency effort "would probably
be temporarily disrupted."107/ tiowever, they added,
... there is a reasonably large pool of under-utilized

but experienced and trained manpower not only within
the military and civilian sectors of the present gov-
ernment but also, to, some extent, outside. These
elements, given continued support from the US, could
provide reasonably effective leadership for the govern-
ment and the war effort. 138/
Thus, the attention of the US government was drawn to

possible alternatives to the Diem regime, in the light of growing criticism
of US policy toward Vietnam.
2) Debate in Washington
The Kennedy administration began what was to be an
intensive and lengthy debate concerning the future of the Diem regime and
the likely consequences of a possible coup. The administration was faced
with a vast array of conflicting assessments. The US media's reporting
indicated that the regime's repressive actions were having a detrimental
effect on the country's stability in general, and on the progress of the
war in particular; US military personnel in Saigon and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff disagreed, arguing that a coup in itself would disrupt the war
effort.109/ The US Ambassador in Saigon, Frederick Nolting, soon to be
su~ceeded by Henry Cabot Lodge, urged continued efforts in the on-going
pressure campaign to obtain Diem's compliance with US demands.ll0/ In
Nolting's view, a coup would probably lead to a civil war. In short, the
administration realized that a coup could indeed result from the turbulence
in Saigon, especially if the Nhus remained in power. Yet it was considered
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highly improbable that the Nhus would relinquish power or that Diem could
be convinced to remove them.ll0! Against the backdrop of Congressional
pressure for cutbacks in US aid to South Vietnam (in protest against Diem's
repressive actions), the administration granted Ambassador Nolting's
request that he be allowed one more attempt to elicit a satisfactory
response from President Diem. ll/ h

On August 21, 1963, Nhu ordered an assault on the
country's Buddhist pagodas, culminating in the arrest of hundreds of
Buddhist monks.113/ Arriving the next day, US Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge, who had abruptly replaced Ambassador Nolting, faced a highly con-
fusing situation; the US Embassy's information about the incident was
extremely sketchy, partly owing to Nhu's order that its line of communica-
tions be cut during the attack.114/ In addition, Diem maintained that it
was the Army, and not Nhu, who had ordered the attack. Amid this confu-
sion, several South Vietnamese generals approached US Embassy personnel to
discern what 'he US reaction to a pobsible military coup against President
Diem would be e-d to clear up the misunderstanding over who had ordered the
attack. 115/
b. Decision to Support a Coup
The pagoda incident found four of the Kennedy administra-
tion's highest level decision makers away from Washington at a time when a
decision or change in policy appeared to be an urgent requirement. In the
absence of President Kennedy, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and CIA Direc-
tor McCone, a fateful cable to Ambassador Lodge, was drafted in the State
Department ,on August 24, 1963. Approval of the absent policy makers or
-those acting in their place was obtained hurriedly and the cable was
sent.116/ The message, which met with the Ambassador Lodge's immediate
approval, and which the Ambassador interpreted as a "direct order to pre-
pare for a codp against Diem," 117/ signaled US acquiescence in the
plotting of a coup and set out the administration's stipulations for
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supporting the military commanders in their efforts to overthrow the Diem

government. Significant excerpts from the cable follow:
U.S. Government cannot tolerate situation in which

power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given chance
to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them
with best military and political personalities avail-
able....
We wish [to] give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove
Nhus, but if he remains obdurate, then we are pripared
to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer
support Diem. You may tell appropriate military com-
manders we will give them direct support in any interim
period of breakdown [of the] central government
mechanism...
Concurrently, with above, Ambassador and country team
should urgently examine all possible alternative lead-
ership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring
about Diem's replacement if this should become
necessary. 118/
In addition, the State Department instructed Lodge to inforin
both President Diem and the generals involved in the plotting of the coup,
of the US position. Ambassador Lodge, however, proposed that only the
generals be informed since he felt the chances of Diem's compliance were
quite slim.119/ However, following the telegram's dispatch, a mood of
uncertainty and ambivalance permeated the Kennedy White House. The broad
array of existing assessments and conflicting points of view lent little
clarity or decisiveness to the administration's posture regarding a coup or
the question of how to handle the Diem-Nhu regime in general. On the one
hand, there were those involved in the drafting of the cable and its
recipient, Ambassador Lodge, who advocated US support for a coup; on the
other, there were the Defense Department, former US Ambassador to South
Vietnam Nolting, and General Harkins, who argued that a coup would debili-
tate the country and, therefore, have a detrimental effect on the progress
3t the war. 120/
President Kennedy, reflecting his earlier unhappy experience
with the Bay of Pigs invasion, told his advisers at an NSC meeting on
August 29, 1963, that he wanted assurance that a coup would succeed before
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he would support it. 121/ In a cable notifying Ambassador Lodge and 3enerai
Harkins of the President's decision, Secretary of State Rusk said, "The USG
will support a coup which has good chance of succeeding but plans no direct
involvement of US armed forces." It instructed Harkins to tell the South
Vietnamese generals that he was prepered to "establish liaison with the
coup planners and to review plans," but not to engage directly in joint
coup planning. According to former CIA director, William Colby, from this
point on US i,,-country CIA personnel were in continual contact with the
plotting generals.122/ Lodge was further authorized to suspend Aid to the
South Vietnamese government if he thought that it would "enhance the
chances of a successful coup."123/ This presidential decision of
August 29, 1963 and the famous cable of August 24, 1963 were tiie essential
statements of US policy concerning the coup. But for the next two nonths,
the Kennedy administration constantly reassessed the political-military
situation in South Vietnam, using fact-finding missions and continuous
cable traffic,hoping to improve its perception of the prospects for a
successful coup, but refusing to make a decisioa on further US involvement
beyond supporting the continued coup plotting by the generals, while con-
tinuing to pressure Diem to make reforms.
In an effort to clarify how deitrimental a coup might be and to
assess the political-military situation in South Vietnam, the administra-
tion sent two high-level fact-finding missions to the country. The first,
the Krulak-Mendenhall mission, was a military-civilian team. Upon its
return, it offered highly contradictory assessments to the NSC, offering
little clarity to the prevailir.0 ambiguities.124/ In the mission's report,
dated September 10, 1963, General Krulak, taking an
optimistic view,
stressed that the civii-political turmoil had little effect on the progress
of the war. Mr. Merndenhall, a senior Foreign Service Officer, argued that
disaffection with the regime threatened the viability of the civil govern-
ment; he concluded that the war effort could not proceed effectively with
the present regime..125/ The secoo'•d, the McNamara-Taylor mission, resulted
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in a compromise assessment of the prevailing civilian and military view-

e
points.126/ In its report, dated October 2, 1963, 1he team suggested the
following alternative policy options to the president:
(1) Return to avowed support of the Diem regime and attempt to obtain
the necessary improvements
I'I
through persuasion from a posture of
"reconciliation." This would not mean any expression of approval
of the repressive actions of the regime, but simply that we would
go back in practice to business as usual.
(2) Follow a policy of selective pressures: "purely correct" rela-
tionships at the top official level, continuing to withhold
further actions in the commodity import program, and making clear
our disapproval of the regime. A further element in this policy
is letting the present impression stand that the US wGuld not be
averse to a change of Government -- although we would not take
any immediate actions to initiate a coup.
(3) Start immediately tri promote a coup by high ranking military
.'fficers. This pol'icy miight involve more extended suspensions of
aid and -!Iarp denunciat'ions of the regime's actions so timed as
to fit with coup prospects and planning. 127/
The president, after further deliberations with his NSC
advisers on October 2, 1963, opted for the second option. The decision
was, therefore, an dffirmation of US policy to date: The Kennedy admin-
istri.tioi, would continue its pressure on the Diem Government, in the form
of economic sanctions, while, simultaneously, supporting the coup plotting.
The coup began on Novenber 1, 1963; an official in Saigon was allowed to
sit with the plotting generals and report the coup's development to the
CIA Saigon station.128/ The administration's earlier cable of August 24,
1963, set the coup plotting in motion and, although the US national-level
policy .ai'-s entertained second thoughts regarding the advisability of
a coup, the matter was, in actuality, already beyond the control of
Washington. The oýtcome of th1e coup has been reported in detail by many
histurians of the Vietnam era. Twenty-one days later President John
Kennedy was dead and a new administration faced the continuing turbulence
in South Vietnam.
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E. THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
Our purpose in Vietnam is to join in the dcrense of

freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is
controlled and that is directed from outside their
country. 129/
-TPresident Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965)
1. Introduction
In many rl-spects the Johnson administration continued the Vietnam
policies of its postwar predecessors. As a product of World War II and the
cold war era, the Johnson administration continued to see the world in
bipolar terms, a battle between the forces of the communism and the free
world. Also like its predecessors, the Johnson administration considered
the failure of appeasement at Municn to be a lesson of great importance and
relevance to the contemporary fight against communism in Asia. Communist
Chirna was perceived as a highly aggressive power which had to be contained,
much as the Soviet Union had to be contained in Europe. President Johnson
believed that the conflict in Vietnam was principally inspired and fueled
by the Chinese and Soviet leaders, to gain a unified monolithic "communist
bloc," rather than a nationalist form of Vietnamese Communism under the
rule of the North Vietnamese Communist Party. 130/
In a deeper sense, President Johnson, like his predecessors, did
not appreciate the cultural dissimilarities between the American and Viet-
namese societies; he assumed that his pruyrams for a ' Creat Society" in the
United States could be applied in Vietnam, once "democracy" had been estab-
lished there.131/
2. Viet'n.vm De.-ision-Making Process During the Johnson
Administrato3n
a. Vietna,. Decision-Making Style and the Leve! of Institutional
Influence Durinm the JohnsonAdministration
President Johnson's Vietnam decision-making style was
informal, centering on the Tueday Lunch Group and meetings between the
president and small groups of advisers both in and out of the government.
Senior civilian advisers with cabinet rank and senior military officers
provided advice directly to the president during such meetings, as well as
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at the formal meetings of the National Security Council. However, subordi-

nate officials in the various government departments and agencies had very
little direct access to the president. They were dependent upon their
superiors to forward advice to the president.132/ President Johr.son's
style also reflected his desire to achieve consensus on a particular policy
decision, this drive for "consensus building" was particularly evident in
the face of an ambiguous situation requiring a policy decision or when
confronted by dissent from a participating policy maker challenging the
majority view. In the latter cases, the dissenter was usually encourageod
to rethink his approach; his exclusion from the from the decision-making
process followed if he pk.rsisted in blocking the "consensus building"
drive. Administrative efforts to reach consensus very likely contributed
further to the executive's ever-growing tendency to a centralized approach
to decision making.
The role of the NSC as a decision-making organization on
Vietnam policy was marqinal.133,/ Johnson relied far more on the personal
views of Secretary of Defense McNamara, of McGeorge Bundy, and of other
members of his White House staff. (See Figure 3-4 for a graphic overview
of the positions held by th-ase and other of the key Vietnam decision makers
in t:ie Johnson administration. Appendix B provides biographical informa-
tion on the key Johnson administration Vietnam decision makers.) This
-eliance on close senior advisers grew as Johnson became increasingly
suspicious of the NSC as a wellspring for security leaks to the press.135/
The Johnson administration's attitude towards the press was never particu-
larly positive and, with the passage of time, the press came to be con-
sidered as one of the adminstration's more powerful and most critical
enemies.
The influence of the State Department continued to decline
under' President Johnson, whereas conversely, the Defense Department, and
Oarticularly the Office of the Secretary of Defense, maintained a very
prominent position in Vietnam decision making. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
apparently felt that McNamara's influence with Johnson frequently exceeded
his professional expertise, and were concerned that their advice on mili-
tary issues such as selection of bombing targets, received less attention
than did advice by civilian "whiz. kidr" in the Defense Department.136/
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Early in President Johnson's administration, the Congress

played a supportive but largely peripheral role in Vietnam decision making.
Congress passed the Southeast Asia Resolution in August 1964, with only two
dissenting votes, thereby, perhaps unintentionally, yielding unprecedented
power to the president to act unilaterally in Vietnam. It is rather ironic
that Johnson sought and received congressional support in this instance
without a precondition that US allies also participate in heightened mili-
tary action in Vietnam. During the Eisenhower administration, Senator
Johnson emphasized that he would not support US military action during the
Dien Bien Phu crisis unless US allies also participated. By 1966, key
congressmen, particularly Senator William Fuibright who had been a close
friend of the president, vocalized their dissent to Johnson's Vietnam
policies in an effort to bring about an end to the war. But congressional
opinion continued to play a minor role, even in Johnson's reversal of
policy in March 1968. This reversal was not in response to dissent from
Congress. Rather, it was in response to the changed opinion of his close
personal advisers and of a select advisory group cummonly referred to as
the "Wise Men."
President Johnson is famous for his "consensus-building"
approach to national security policy. It was not that the president sought
to reach a consensus in the Congress or even in most of the executive
branch when policy was actually being formulated. Rather, such a consensus
was usually sought after he had taken a decision. Essentially, the con-
sensus-building approach was a t)ol to get the Congress and NSC advisers on
record as being in agreement with major, sensitive decisions.137/ The
decisions themselves usually had been taken earlier, based on the advice of
a very small group of trusted advisers, usually including the Secretaries
of State and Defense and the Special Assistant for Uational Security
Affairs. This approach was represented in the decision-making process
surrounding the Tonkin Gulf crisis of August 1964.
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b. Case Study: Decision to Retaliate Against North Vietnam

After the Attacks
After the Diem coup in November 1963, and particularly
beginning in February and March 1964, US intelligence assessments indicated
substantial deterioration in the military situation in Vietnam.138/ These
assessments induced President Johnson to send Secretary McNamara and Chair-
man of the JCS Maxwell Taylor on a major fact-finding mission to Vietnam
from March 8 to 13.139/ In his formal report to the president, McNamara
argued that the US should send additional economic aid and military equip-
ment to South Vietnam and be in a position on thirty-days notice to initi-
ate a program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North
Vietnam. 140/
2) Debate In Washington
McNamara's recommendations were softer than those

proffered on February 18 and on March 2 by the JCS, which included a pro-
posal for punitive action against North Vietnam to halt support for the
insurgency in the South.141/ The JCS had specifically recommended that
bombing of the North be initiated. 142/
President Johnson accepted McNamara's reccmmendations
and instructed the JCS not to initiate bombing but instead to plan how the
United States should strike at sources of the insurgency in North Viet-
nam.143/ On June 15, 1964, McGeorge Bundy, the president's Special Assis-
tant for National Security Affairs, sent a memorandum to McNamara and Rusk,
which dealt with the question of obtaining a congressional resolution
supporting Johnson's Vietnam policy.144/ Thus, almost two months bzfore
the Tonkin Gulf crisis, the Johnson Administration considered the possi-
bility of bombing North Vietnam and obtaining a congressional resolution
that would justify such action.
General Maxwell Taylor, who, as ,Chairman of the JCS and
as a memher of the fact-finding mission with McNamara in March 1964, had
recommended immediate bombing of the North, was sent by President Johnson
to serve as US Ambassador to South Vietnam in early July. 145/
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On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox and C. Turner Joy
were reportedly attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin.146/ General Maxwell
Taylor, the new US Ambassador to South Vietnam, recommended that the US
Initiate immediate and severe retaliatory bombing against North Viet-
nam.147/ The United States officially protested to the International
Control Commission, but President Johnson did not order the reprisals
Taylor recommendea. Howpver, a second set of attacks allegedly occurred on
August 3 and 4, 1964.148/ These attacks were the catalyst for a major US
decision.
4) Decision: President Johnson Decides to Retaliate
Against North Vietnam
On August 4, President .ohnson met first with the JCS
and then with the National Security Council. Significantly, from the
standpoint of Vietnam decision making, President Johnson dismissed the NSC
in order to be with his closest advisers, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Cyrus
Vance, and John McCone.149/ This small group of advisers concluded that
reprisals were necessary. Johnson agreed and at that time made the deci-
sion to retaliate. According tc Johnson:
The unanimous view of these advisers was that we could
not ignore this second provocation and that the attack
required retaliation. I agreed. We decided or air
strikes against North Vietnamese PT boats and their
bases plus a strike on one oil depot. 150/
Later that day, Johnson reconvened the NSC to confirm

formally the details of the attack. He then met with congressional leaders
and informed them of his decision to initiate reprisals on his own
authority, but true to his consensus building approach he requested Con-
gressional support for this action and any subsequent action he considered
necessary. These key Congressmen informed him that he would have no
difficulty in getting such a resolution through Congress.151/ With the
presidential election only three months away, Johnson was concerned with
presenting an image of moderation in military affairs compared to the image
Senator Goldwater projected. The Southeast Asia Resolution, therefore,
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served as public evidence that consensus existed throughout the federal

government concerning Johnson's Vietnam policy. From the president's point
of view, such a suggestion had the desired effect of sharing the responsi-
bility for the initiation of military reprisals with the Congress. No
evidence suggests that Congress or the NSC played a significant role in
* making the decision to initiate reprisals.
This case study illustrates the administration's deci-
sion-making process during President Johnson's first years in office. From
the discussion it is evident that the president did rely on the NSC, a
formal decision-making organization, as an advisory body during the crisis;
the final decision, however, was taken in the company of a small group of
presidential advisers outside the confines of a formal, structured meeting.
Eventually President Johnson's regular Tuesday lunches assumed the function
of an integral, if not the integral, decision-making body within his admini-
stration. Johnson's remaining four years in the White House saw his prefer-
ence for this type of decision making process and style grow, diminishing
low-level access to the administration's key dec:si n makers and increasing
the executive branch's tendency towards centralized decision making.
F. Ti!l 1'TXON AOMINISTRATION
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep divison

about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost con-
fidence in what the government has told them about our
policy. The American people cannot and should not be
asked to support a policy which involves the overriding
issues of war and peace unless they know the truth
about that policy.152/
(Pr-dent Richard M. Nixon, 1969)
The installation of the Nixon administration in 1969 marked the

beginning of a new and significantly different approach to the making of US
foreign policy: the Nixt .ministration was determined to end the Vietnam
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war - perceived as President Johnson's fiasco - and to restore balance to

US foreign policy. Based on a growing appreciation of the diversities in
the world communist movement, Nixon and Kissinger sought an approach to
foreign diplomacy which would restore the world's confidence in the US,
strengthen US alliances with Western powers, and command the respect of the
major communist powers.153/ In campaign pledges in 1968, Mr. Nixon prom-
ised the rapid terminat'on of thie Vietnam conflict. When Henry Kissinger
joined the Nixon White House staff, a plan for realizing this goal emerged,
as will be seen in the decision-making case study for the Nixun adminis-
tration.
2. Vietnam Decision-Making Process During the Nixon Administration
Influence During the Nixon Administration
In the Nixon administration's early period, the decision-
making style tended to be formal and structured, similar in both style and
approach to President Eisenhower's mode of operation.154/ This formal
approach was characterized by frequent NSC meetings, a low-profile positicn
for the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and a
commitment to a wel!-coordinated, open-channeled approach to national
sicurity. However, this formal process quickly diminished and eventually
faded almost entirely.155/
Kissinger initiated several organizational innovation!; in
the NSC system which were designed to enhance the NSC's coordination with
the White House and other government agencies on national security mat'.ers,
including interagency task forces, such as the Washington Special Action
Group (WSAG). Kissinger's innovations were designed to improve crisis
management at the national level. As Kissinger's responsibilities and
access to the pres~dent increased, the frequency of NSC meetings diminished
significantly. Decision making, especially during crises, came to be a
White House operation with Special Assistant Kissinger at the foref.,ont of
these advisory groups. As an outgrowth of this development, the irfluence
of the State Department on major Vietnam decisions declined still 'urther.
(For a graphic overview of the Nixon administration's decisio;i-making
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bodies and its key Vietnam decision makers, see Figure 3-5. Appendix B
provides biographical information on each of the key Vietnam decision
makers.)
The Department of Defense, under the stewardship of Secre-
tary Laird, attempted to increase the participation of the military in the
overall decision-making process. Evidence suggests that this goal was only
partially realized. While the military did in fact concur with Nixon and
Kissinger on a number of broad issues - maximization of aid to Scu.jth Viet-
nam, the bombing of Cambodia, and the mining of Haiphong harbor - it
appears the JCS frequently had difficulty in making their voices heard over
the more dominant one of Henry Kissinger. Nevertheless, compared to the
McNamara era, the military relished its comparative increase in overall
decision-making participation within the administration. 157/
The role of Congress in Vietnam decision making changed
markedly during the Nixon administration. In the administration's early
years, the Congress did not substantially influence or restrict major
executive decisions affecting US involvement in Southeast Asia, including
the decisions on negotiations, Vietnamization, and US troop withdrawals set
out in National Security Decision Memorandum 9 (NSDM 9), or the decision to
bomb the sanctuaries
Congress increasingly
policy by restricting
in Cambodia. However, witn the passage of time,
asserted itself in the formulation of US foreign
presidential powers in military matters, including
U
allocation of defense appropriationz and the application of US military
force. Most significant among these restrictions were bills cutting off
all funds for Cambodia and prohibiting further military action in Indochina
without explicit congressional authorization, and provisions in the War
Powers Act of 1973 requiring the president to report to Congress any com-
mitment of US combat forces abroad and allowing Congress to terminate US
commitment of forces at any time. 158/
b. Case Stidy: Decision for a New Approach to the Vietnam
Conflict: National Security•Decision Memorandum ;-(NSDM 9)
President Nixon came to office in 1969 at the height of
public concern over US Involvement in Vietnam. His predecessor, Lyndon
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Johnson, had acknowledge% the need for deescalating US activity in South-

east Asia and, just prior to leaving the presidency, had received Hanoi's
willingness to commence negotiations. Therefore, President Nixon and his
staff, in particular Henry Kissinger, were confronted with the problem of
gracefully extricating the United States from an extremely unpopular war.
Although it is doubtful that Nixon himself had a
detailed preelection "plan" for dealing with this problem, such a plan did
emerge in the first days of the administration. Henry Kissinger, in an
article entitled "The Vietnam Negotiations" published in the January 1969
issue of Foreign Affairs, explained his approach for ending the war.159/
He proposed a two-track solution which called for the following negotiating
sequence;
* The US would seek a military settlement with Hanoi while, simul-
taneously,
* Saigon would seek a political solution through negotiations with
the National Liberation Front (NLF).
After the completion of the above two steps, an international conference
would be convened during which the necessary safeguards and guarantees
would be drawn up. Kissinger also provided a contingency plan in the event
that this approach shortcircuited and the war continued. This second
strategy called for the urgrading and strengthening of South Vietnam's
military (later coined "Vietnamization") in order that US forces could be
withdrawn gradually. 160/
2) Pebate in Washington
rhe Wixon administration, armed with this plan, set the
bureaucratic process in motion by calling for an all-governmental review
and reassessment of US involvý:ment in Vietnam. In January, a special task
force, including Henry Kissinger, Daniel Ellsberg, and Mortcn Halperin,
drew up an options paper for the administration. 161/ In addition, various
government agencies were tasked '%4th aiiswering a series of 28 questions
covering a broad spectrum of war-related concerns: negotiations, enemy
capabilities, South Vietnam's military and political capabilities, pacif-
ication, and US military operations.162/ Significantly, Kissinger directed
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that US departments
ta
and agencies, including the State Department, CIA,
MACV, and the US cmhassy in Saigon, develop their responses separately
rather than formulating a joint reply. In this way, the prevailing views
of each particular agency would surface, thereby revealing diversities of
viewpoint. The responses submitted to the administration in late February
1969 did indeed reveal that a broad array of views existed in the
bureacracy.163/
The major catalyst for the decision taken by the Nixon
administration was the public pledge of the new president to end the war:
"New leadership will end the war and win the peace in the Pacific."164/
Based both on the responses of the various agencies which were compiled in
National Security Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM 1), and on Henry Kissinger's
two-track solution for terminating the war, President Nixon arrived at his
own decision.
4) Decision: President Ni )n Adopts a Four-Fold Appoach
for Terminating the War
Pi'esident Nixon, with the advise of his special assis-
tant Henry Kissinger, and in reaction to NSSM I which indicated that the t
military pressure applied on Hanoi by the Johnson administration had
generally been ineffective, decided that the war could be terminated by
increasing bombing to a maximal level in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.165/
In his view, the previous ineffectiveness of the bombing did not indicate
that a new approach without the use of bombing was needed, but, rather that
an intensified bombing campaign to elicit a "better" DRV negotiating
posture would be more effective.166/ In addition, President Nixon, with
advice from Dr. Kissinger and the NSC staff, decided three important
issues. As outlined in National Security Decision Memorandum 9 (NSDM 9),
these decisions were as follows:
* The negotiation policy would include insistence on mutual with-
drawal by DRV and U.S. forces with adequate inspection
procedures;
* The Vietnamization process would be carried out rapidly and
effectively; and
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. A specific timetable for US troop withdrawals, regardless of

the progress made at the Paris talks, would be worked out. 167/
The decision-making process which generated the NSDM 9
document reflected a generally formal and structured approach; input from a
variety of agencies was solicited, a special task force was created, and
the National Security Council was convened. However, ;SOM 9 was essen-
tially a reiteration of the Kissinger Plan and, therefore, cannot be cited
as evidence of strong influence on Vietnam decision making by variouis
bureaucratic elements in the Nixon administration. The bombing decision,
on the other hand, was developed more clearly on the basis of analysis
provided in NSSM 1, thereby suggesting the influence of other bureaucratic
elements on Vietnam decision making in the very early period of the Nixon
administration.
By mid-1969, the administration's broadly based (though
formal) decision-making process became tightly closed. Centralization of
Vietnam decision making and the secrecy which sustained this centralized
structure was soon carried to an extreme in the decision to bonb the
sanctuaries in Cambodia. Secretary of Defense Laird was excluded from this
decision-making process.168/ The reasons for this high degree of centrali-
zation and secrecy stemmed largely from the Nixon-Kissinger desire to
retain maximum flexibility for bold, personally developed initiatives.
Hence, what were perceived as fleeting opportunities were seized upon
privately, thus avoiding possible sabotage by leaks from NSC staff members,
time-consuming scrutiny (and possible opposition) by Congress, and the
ponderous workings of the bureaucracy.
c. The Final Years of the Nixon Administration and the Rise
of-,ongress to the Center of Vietnam Decision Making
After the Paris Peace Accords had been signed in January
1973, the locus of Vietnam decision making shifted dramatically toward
Congress. Domestic reasons for the shift are highly complex, and will be
analyzed in Volume IV of this study.169/ But it is important to acknowl-
edge here that the centralized Vietnam decision-making process of the Nixon
Administration devolved into one characterized by active congressional
participation.
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Congress's heightened activity in the Vietnam decision-

making process became visible in the late spring of 1973. In May 1973, the
House recommenaed that all supporting funds for the bombing of Cambodia be
terminated. In July, the House and Senate passed this recommendation, and
prohibited US military activity after 15 August 1973, in, over, or off the
chorus of Camboaia, Laos, and Vietnam without explicit congressional
approval. 170/
During the last quarter of 1973, the Nixon administration.
constrained by congressiunal aid cuts for military activities in Cambodia
and limitations on overall military activity in Southeast Asia, girded
itself for a battle over aid to Vietnam for the next fiscal yea-. Based on
recommendations by Ambassador Graham Martin, the administration req(:ested
$1.45 billion in aid for South Vietnam. Ambassador Martin and the US
Defense Attache in Saigon, Major General John E. Murray, made nunmerous
trips to Washington in an effort to persuade Congress to maintain the size
of the appropriations. Several congressional committees recommended size-
able cuts in the administration's proposal. Finally, the Senate Armed
Services Committee, uncertain of South Vietnam's actual aid requirements,
requested that a Pentagon team assess the situation and report its findings
to Congress. Erich von Marbod, one of Secretary Schlesinger's top civilian
logistics experts, toured South Vietnam and reported that the administra-
tion's aid recommendations had overestimated the GVN's requirements. In
late July 1974 the Senate and House voted to impose a $1 billion ceiling on
all Vietnam-related military spending for the next eleven months. This was
the last congressional aid decision taken during Nixon's tenure as Presi-
dent; however, the next administration would face a continuation of the aid
battle with Congress.
A second legislative act deserves consideration when dis-
cussing Congress's rise to the center of Vietnam decision making: the War
Powers Act. This bill, passed by Congress in November 1973, required the
president to notify Congress within 72 hours of any new commitment or
increase in existing commitment of US combat troops abroad. In addition,
it required the president to terminate any such action within 120 days of
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T
his notification unless Congress authorized continuation of the commitment;

the law also allowed Congress to direct the termination of US commitments
at any time. 171_/
The passage of this act, a logical progression from the

July-August 1973 congressional limitations on US aid and commitments to
Southeast Asia, illustrates the greatly increased participation of Congress
in Vietnam decision making. The last years of Nixon's presidency, in
particular from mid-1973 through August 1974, were marked by a breakdown of
the administration's characteristically centralized approach to decision
making. The exposure of Watergate and the administration's secrecy in the
making of foreign policy eroded any congressional acceptance of this cen-
tralized approach; Congress visibly increased its participation in the
decision-making process through its control of Vietnam appropriations.
Hence, there were three distinct stages of Vietnam decision
making during the Nixon Administration. In the first stage -- immediately
following President Nixon's inauguration in January 1969 -- the principal
decision makers were those in the executive branch, and participation was
actively sought from a broad spectrum of government agencies. The
decisioi-making process leading to NSDM 9 fell in this stage. The second
stage w, characterized by a highly centralized process, in which bureau-
cratic participation declined sharply as a function of Dr. Kissinger's rise
to prominence as the administration's chief spokesman and adviser on
foreign affairs. The peak of this stage was reached in September 1973,
when Dr. Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State, while cortinuing to
hold the positioe of Special As!istant for National Security Affairs. The
third stage followed almost immediately in mid-1913 when Congress, alarmed
by abuses of executive power, began itb rise to the 'orefront of Vietnam
decision making. This shift in power continued after President Nixon
resigned in August 1974.
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G. THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
The President and his emissaries must not be handi-

capped in advance in their relations with foreign
governments as has happened in the past. .... There can
be only one Commander in Chief. 172/
(President Gerald Ford, 1977)
1. Introduction
Gerald Ford assumed the presidency under trying circumstances.
In his two and one-half-year tenure in the White House, he was faced with a
broad spectrum of domestic and international problems. The Watergate
scandal and President Nixon's subsequent resignation had shattered the US
public's faith in high-level government. International attention focused
on the Middle East, and Secretary of State Kissinger turned his attentions
towards shuttle diplomacy in that area of the world. Vietnam, once a
household word, was rapidly fading from the minds of most Americans, and
Congress sought to keep US involvement in Southeast Asia to a bare minimum.
Several pieces of legislation, in particular the War Powers Act of 1973,
indicated that the Congress was intent on restraining presidential manue-
verability in foreign affairs. President Ford found that Congress, in
direct contrast to the early years of the Johnson administration, demanded
and reguired executive accountability for all military-related activities
abroad. This phenomenon - the enlarged role of Congress - stands out as
the most significant feature of Vietnam decision making during the Ford
administration.
2. Vietnam Decision-Making Process During the Ford Administration
a. Viptna.m Decision-Making Style and the Level of Institutional
Influence During the Ford Admirnistration
In a normal transition period, a president-elect has time to
prepare for his assumption of presidential responsibilities. He studies
the previous administration's foreign policy and takes time in the s'!lec-
tion of his cabinet members and staff. Like Presidents Truman and Johinson,
President Ford did not have this opportunity to gear up and ease into his
new position.173/ Consequently, he chose to retain most of the key Vietnam
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THE BDM CORPORATION
decision makers of the Nixon administration, ensuring a good deal of conti-

nuity in administration policy toward Vietnam. (Figure 3-6 provides a
summary of tne Ford administration's key Vietnam decision makers. Bio-
graphical information for a number of these individuals appears in Appendix
B.)
President Ford's decision-making style contrasted signi-
ficantly with President Nixon's. Ford preferred an informal decentralized
mode of operation, seeking the opinions of a broad range of advisers.175/|
One vehicle us.d for this exchange of views was the NSC which Ford convened
with regularity. He championed interagency debate on Vietnam issues,
considering this activity to be beneficial in making sound presidentiai
decisions. 176/
Bas-,2d on lessons he drew from President Nixon's Watergate
experiences, President Ford ensured that his White House staff operated
within carefully defined boundaries: while the president appreciated the
need for a staff with authority, his White House assistants did not have
the right to make policy decisions or prevent access of other advisers to
the president. 177/ Ford's eventual decinion to remove Dr. Kissinger from
the position of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, which Ford
considered an administrative position, while retaining him as Secretary of
State, a policy-making position, was in keeping with this principle. 178/
inder Dr. Kissinger's leadership, the bureaucracy at the
Department of State remained relatively uninfluential in Vietnam decision
making during Ford's tenure as president. Some officials in the department
found their assessments of South Vietnam'ý aid requirements ignored because
they did not coincide with Ford's or Kissinger's conceptions. 179/
The administration's military specialists, includirg those
in the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported the
position held by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger that supplemental
military aid to South Vietnam would reverse that country's deteriorating
situation. 180/ The Defense Department produced a number of pessimistic
assessments regarding Saigon's viability. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the US Defense Attache to Saigon, Major General Murray, were
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the principal contributors of toese pessimistic assessments. The Depart-

ments of State and Defense, however, were to sonme degree caught up in the
Kissinger-Schlesinger tensions which eventually caused the latter to be
placed on the periphery of the administration's Vietnam decision
making.181/ Moreover, according to Admiral Sharp, Secretary Kissinger's
personalized diplomacy often removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from an
influenti" ition in the decision-making process, leaving them
uninformeo inpolicy initiatives.182/
Congress, as has been indicateC, participated extensively in
the formulation of US policy toward Vietnam. By early 1975, when approval
of aid appropriations to South Vietnam was particularly critical, the new
I congressional majority used its legislative power to end US involvement in
the area completely.183/ There were two major congressional constr•.ints on
I the Ford administration's efforts to bolster South Vietnam:
* Congressional refusal to approve substantial amounts of military
and economic aid to the Saigon regime, and
j. Congressional refusal to approve renewed American military
involvement after Hanoi's violation of the 1973 Paris Peace
Accords.184/
Sb. April 1975 Congressional Decision not to Grant Supplemental
Military Aid to South Vietnam
This decision emerged from a complex decision-making process
which involved officials in the Ford administration, the US Congress, and
high-level US military and diplomatic personnel st3tioned in Saigon. The
decision followed a lengthy debate between Congress and the administration
over whether a large amount of additional aid to Saigon was necessary to
"save" the rapiaiy deteriorating military and political situation in South
Vietnam, and over whether the interests of the United States ,,ould be
served by this increase in aid.
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As Vice President, Mr. Ford had witnessed the Nixon
administration's difficulties in securing congression-al support for supple-
mental aid to South Vietnam. Two weeks before President Nixon's resigna-
tion, Congress imposed a $1 billion ceiling on military spending for
Vietnam to cover the next eleven months.185/ In President Ford's first
K month in office, Congress refused to allow the $1 billion ceiling to be
reached, appropriating only $700 million for military spendinig in Viet-
nam.186/ The new president, aware of his predecessor's commitments to
defend the South if Hanoi broke the 1973 Accords, was faced~ wi'th '.ontinual
reports that Saigon's stability was deteriorating. This instability
H stemmed both from the increased activities on the part of the North, and
from the South's sagging morale, resulting from the above and from fear
that the US would no longer provide support. Hence, the Ford administra-
tion, on 8 January 1975, requested Congress to grant the South $300 million
H2) in supplemental military aid. President Ford, in requesting this aid, was
aware that congressional support would be difficult to obtain.187,/
Debate inWashington
President Ford's request for supplemental aid received
criticisidi in Congress. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and House
Majority Leader Thomas O'Neill said they would not back the request.
Speaker of the House Carl Albert promised his support but conceded that the
request would stand little chance of passage in the House.188/ Throughout
the first quarter of 1975, Congress considered the request, but could not
support it in the face of widely varying intelligence assessments regarding
South Vietnam's viability. Congressional confusion over the real situation
in Vietnam was fueled by conflicting briefings, some of which obscured the
South's problems, while others highlighted them. 189/
In an attempt to obtain a clearer view of tlie situa-
tion, Congress sent its own fact-finding team to South Vietnam.190/
Unwilling to participate only in the ambassador's prepared briefings, the
team sought to uncover facts for themselves by speaking with other US

personnel in Saigon and with South Vietnamese. The mission did little to
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alleviate the confusion in Congress. While some legislators on the mission

concluded that continued US support was essential, most returned home
unconvinced of its necessity. Those who supported aid, apparently came to
this conclusion as a result of fruitless talks with DRV and PRG officials
concerning the return of the prisoners of war and information about those
who were missing in action. These congressmen argued that until the ques-
tion was resolved, continued aid to the South was necessary. Those who
remained unconvinced, found f, . ieir positions in meetings with US
arn South Vietnamese officials h dissented with Ambassador Martin's
p.ositi on. 191/t
From January to mid-April 1975, the
Ford administration
lobbied hard on Capitol Hill. Senior officials from the Departments of
State and Defense testified before Congress, urging the passage of the
administration's $300 million aid request. President Ford, Vice President
Rockefeller, Secretary Kissinger, and Ambassador Martin made appeais pro-
moting the aid proposal.
President Ford convened a session of his top-level
advisers on March 25, 1975. The meeting took place just after Secretary
Kissinger's return from a trip to the Middle East, during which an option
for obtaining aid for South Vietnam from Saudi Arabia had been dis-
cussed.192/ The advisers included Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Martin,
General Frederick Weyand, and Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs Lieutenant General Brint Scowcrnft. Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger was noticeably absent, apparently excluded at the request of
Henry Kissinger. 193/ At this meeting the following decisions were made:
9 To send a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam and Southeast
Asia headed by General Weyand. (The teal, included two staff
members from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)
0 To use American naval vessels to aid the evacuation of US per-
sonnel and to inform Congress of this action, in accordance with
provisions in the War Powers Act.
* To send all arms and supplies already on order to Saigon without
delay.
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4 To delay any increase in its aid request for South Victnam until
after the return of the Veyand mission (that is, the *,dministra-
tion would continue to lobby for $300 million in supplemental
military aid).194/
In mid-March, standing plans for such an evacuation were ccnsidered by
in-country personnel in the face of an increase in DRV milit.ary activi-
ties.195/ Concurrent with DRV military successes in many of the country's
provinces, there was an increase in the evacuation of US personnel and
their belongings, and in the dismantling of posts in these areas. Full-
scale evacuation began in the last weeks of April 1975.196/
3) Catalyst For a Decision
On 10 April 1975, based on the Weyand m'.ssion's report
which indicated that the situation in Southeast Asia was extremely criti-
cal, President Ford went before a joint session of Congress to request a
grant of $722 million in emergency military aid to South Vietnam and a
reaffirmation of his authority to use the US military for a full-scale
evacuation.197/ The legislators' reaction was almost uni'.:ormly negative:
in essence, they were greatly concerned by the president's request for the
use of military forces and bridled at his emergency aid request as "throw-
ing more good money after bad."198/ A few days later, *ýwo staff members
from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had also participated on
the Weyand mission, briefed the committee on their 1lindings.199/ The
committee was alarmed by their report which recommended in acceleration of
the US evacuotion from South Vietnam and argued that the administration's
aid request was uJnlikely to prevent the South's collapse.•:O0/
4) Decision Not to Grant Supplemental Mid to South Vietnam

On April 14, 1975, the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, in a meeting with President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and Secretary
Schlesinger, insisted on an accelerated evacuation of US personnel from
South Vietnam. Aid for evacuation was promised, but nilitary aid for other
purposes was bluntly rejected.201/ The president, ob3viously frustrated by
the committee's stance, refused to meet its demand&, for accelerated evac-
uation. According to his lter account of the meeting, the presidernt said
to the congressmen,
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Gentlemen, I respect your views, but I have to carry

out the plan that in my opinion is in our nation's best
interest. If we try to pull out right now, it'll lead
to panic and the chaos will jeopardize the lives of
untold Americans. Believe me, we need to buy time,
even a few days. Thank you for coming down. We've had
a good discussion but the decision is my responsibility
and I'll accept the consequences.202/
The speed of events in Indochina overtook the administration, prompting the
decision to accelerate evacuation. 0Di April 17, 1975, the day of
Cambodia's fall, the Senate Armed Servi res Committee voted not to support
any appropriation of supplemental military aid for South Vietnam.203/
Without waiting for a Joint congressional vote on the issue, Secretary
Kissinger ceased asking for the supplemental aid and conceded the adminis-
tration's defeat. In Kissinger's words, "The Vietnam debate is over. The
Administration will accept the Congress' verdict without recrimination or
vindictiveness."204/
It is clear that Congress served as a major participant
in the development of US policy toward Vietnam during the Ford administra-
tion's term of office.205/ Regardless of the tactics used by President
Ford and other members of the administration to alleviate congressional
concern, key congressional committees considered any compromise over US
military aid to Indochina unacceptable. In short, Congress acted as a
decision maker through its control of military appropriations for Vietnam.
The Ford administration was forced to accelerate its evacuation of US
personnel because Congress refused to allocate the additional money
believed necessary by President Ford to support South Vietnam. On
April 29, 1975, the Siigon government collapsed.
Decision making is, in many respects, so speciric to the particular

issues and circumstances that generalized insights are somewhat hazardous
* to make. In assessing national-level decision making, the information upon
which analysts must rely is the written documented word. Yet, as a point
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of fact, it should be observed that marv presidential decisions are com-

municated "by voice instead of in writing, by telephone, instead of letter
and to one instead of many."206/ Theodore Sorenson's statement regarding

John Kennedy can be applied to the other five post-WWII presidents con-
cerned with Vietnam:
While those on the inside knew far more than those on

the outside, no one -- no single aide, friend or member
of his family -- knew all his thoughts or actions on
any single subject...His motives were often unknown or
unclear to others, for he resisted the obvious and the
easy; and he was usually too busy with the next deci-
sion to take time to explain -ýhe last. 207/
Statements such as these serve to illustrate that there are certain
elements and constraints in assessing national-level decision makers and
the decision-making process. Pressures to arrive at timely decisions also
militate against the possibility of obtaining expert advice on all sides of
every issue, pa-ticularly sir,..e the 0ituation in Vietnam, even under crisis
conditions, was only one of the pr.oblem areas that daily required presi-
dential attention.
Presidents were the key decision makers on Vietnam policy. Each of
the six postwar presidents considered himself to be the one ultimately
responsible for the determination Df Vietnam policy, though each chose to
involve the Congress more or less, depending on the circumstances and
presidential preferences. Eisenhower would involve the Congress in the
formulation of policy provided that there was not a "sudden, unforeseen
emergency," presumably so deemed by himself, in which case the Congress
would not necessarily be involved. This approach contrasts significantly
with that employed by the Nixon ddministration when Congress began to
assert its right to extensive involvement in Vietnam policy making.
All of the presidents had lived through Manchuria, Munich, Poland,
Yalta, the "loss" of China, the Korean War, and the McCarthy era. Each
drew the lesson that the United States could not afford to be soft on
communism, specifically that he could not be the president who permitted
the "loss" of Vietnam to communism. Their close advisers reinforced their
I.I
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own anticommunist orientation. There is no question that the presidents

and their advisers were coriditioned by such past experiences when con-
sidering how to deal with the conilict in Vietnam.
Like leaders in any organization, presidents are ,iot immune to con-
fusing dissent with lisloyalty. The Vietnam experience should point to
some of the dariG.rs in such cooifusion. Premises fail to receive the
critical examination they require in formulating a sound policy that keeps
pace with changes in a dynamic world. There was a time when monolithic
communism may have justified the anticommunist approach of the US in the
1950s. Equally, it so-ems possible toiat the US might have tailored its
policy toward Vietnam more closely to observable changes in the Sino-Soviet
relationship earlier than it did (during the Nixon presidency). Urfor-
tunately, the problem arose that the investment of US political, economic
and military prestige, not to mention US casualties, came to override the
intrinsic importance of Vietnam to the US.
The American experience in Vietnam points to the danger of having one
fundamental principle -- anticommunism -- elevated to .the status o,' doc-
trine for all regions in the world. By elevating a principle to the level
of doctrine, further debate of the subject is minimized, thereby reducing
the possibility that legitimate dissenting views will receive sufficient
attention at the national policy-making level. What tended to happen in
Vietnam was that consensus building on the premise of anticommunism was
achieved to give coherence to Vietnam policy at the national level, at the
sacrifice of a needed closer examination of the accuracy of that premise.
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CHAPTER 3
E4IDNOTES
1. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956),
p. 106.
2. For additional information on Ho Chi Minh and the OSS, see Decision #1
in Appendix A of this volume. Books 1, 7, and 8 of US Vietnam Relations
1945 - 1967, Prepared by the Department of Defense, P-rn--t-e_ F the
Use of the House Committee on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1971), offer a number of pertinent commun-
ications between tne US and Ho Chi Minh as well as information relating
to early US-Vietnam relations. Hereafter, DOD US/VN Relations.
3. Compiled from sources which appear in the Volume III bibliography.

The DOD US/VN Ri'ations series was the major source used in drawing up
this particularFraphic.
4. Gordon Hoxie, Command Decision and the Presidency (New York: Reader's
Digest Press, T977) See Chapter 5, "J. V. Forrestal and the National
Security Act of 1947."
5. Hoxie, pp. 76, 94; and Keith C. Clark, and Laurence Legere, eds., The
President and the Management of National Security (New York: Frede-FTck A.
Praeger, 1969), pp. 58-59.
6,. Hoxie, p. 55.
7. ibid., p. qO.
8. Ibid., p. 119.
9. Clark and L:gere, p. b9.
10. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System
Worked (Washington, D.C.: Brookinqs institute, 1979), pp.-56.
11. E. J. Kahn, The China Hands (New York: Viking Press, 1972); Origins
Causes, and Lessons of-t-he-Vietnam War. Hearings from the Committee
on Foreign Relations US. Senate, 197?, p. 64 and Richard Freeland,
The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York:
Schocken Books, 1974)7.
12. James Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara (Coral Gables: Uni.ver-
sity of Miami Press, 1970), p. 21.
13. See Hoxie, Chapter 5, pp. 133-143, for a detailed discussion of this
issue.
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14. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises (Cambridge:
Harvard University ress, 1977), pp. 6, 53.
15. Congress, Information and Forei n Affairs, Congressional Research
Services (Washington, D.C.: . overnment Printing Office, 1978)
p. 17. Hereafter Cong. Info.
16. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, pp, 150, 190, Cable from Abbott to Depart-
ment of State and Cable from Acheson to American Consul, Saigon.
17. Ibid., Book 8, p. 266, Report by NSC.
18. Ibid., Book 8; p. 274, JCS report.
19. Ibid., Book 8, p. 276-277, Memo for the President from Acheson; and
Russell Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia (New York: Crowell,
1973), pp. 126-127.
20. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, pp. 283-285. NSC Report on US position
on Indochina.
21. Russell Fifield, p. 174.
22. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, pp. 286-287, Cable from Under Secretary
Webb to Griffin.
23. Ibid., Book 8, p. 292, Report from Griffin.
24. Ibid., pp. 312-315, JCS Memos.
25. Ibid., p. 319, JCS Memo to Secretary of Defense.
26. Ibid., p. 318.
27. Ibid., pp. 321-332, Acheson to London embassy.

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., Book 8, ix, "Extract of Tripartite Ministerial Talks," May 13,
1950.
30. Ibid., Book 8, p. 336, Statement by the President.

31. Ibid., Book 8, p. 336-340.
32. Ibid., Book 8, p. 336.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p. 318, JCS to Secretary of Defense.
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35. William Effros, Quotations Vietnam: 1945-1970 (New York: Random House,
1970), p. 15.
36. Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971),
p. 217.
37. Ibid., p. 220.
38. Clarke and Legere, p. 62.
The DOD US/VN Relations series was the major source used in drawing up
this particular graphic.
40. Clarke and Legere, p. 63.
41. See David Hall, "The 'Custodian-Manager' of the Policymaking Process,"
in Volume 2 of Commission on tha Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy.
42. See the exchange of telegrams between The Department of State and
American Embassies in London and Paris during the period 1-5 April
1954 cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Bouk 9, pp. 291-297.
43. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Chanqge (New York: Doucleday, 1965)
pp. 349-350.
44. Ibid., pp. 338-341.

45. DOD US/VN Relations, Bot,, 9, pp. 333-358. President's Special Commit-
tee Report - "Indochina."
46. Eisenhower, p. 340.
47. Cong. Info., p. 35.
48. Ibid., p. 36.
49. Ibid., p. 36, and Melvin Gurtov, Southeast Asia Tomorrow (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 145-146.
50. Ibid. See also Volome IV of this study for a discussion of domestic
politics.
51. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1973) p. 205.
52. Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: 0. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1965), p. 142.
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54. Ibid., p. 340.
55. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 9, p. 266, JCS to Secretary of Defense, on
anegotiat7nS.
57. Ibid.
58. Sec Chalmers Roberts, "rhe Day We Didn't Go to War," The Reporter,
Vol. Ii (September 14, 1954), pp. 31-35.
59. Roberts, p. 31, and Betts, p. 106.
60. Eicenhower, p. 347
61. Ibid., Congr. Info., p. 35, and Gurtov, pp. 145-146.
62. Eisenhower, p. 345, DOD US/VN Relations, Book 9, pp. 277-296, 388-390.
63. Sen. Mike Gravel, ed., The Pentagon Papers, Vol. I, p. 94.
64. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 9, pp. 461-465, 382-383.
65. Ibid., p. 332, and Betts, pp. 21-22.
66. Ibid., p. 332. See also General Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier (Westport,
Conn.: 1956), pp. 274-280.
67. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 9, p. 332, "Army Position on NSC Action
No. 1074-A".
68. Ibid., p. 296., Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Paris to Secretary of
State.
69. Ibid., p. 297.
70. Ibid., p. 361, Recommendations of Planning Board on NSC Action 1074-A.

71. Ibid., p. 362, Emphasis in the original.
72. Ibid., p. 382, and Eisenhower, p. 351. Later in September 1954, this
regional grouping formed the basis of SEATO. But at this point, before
the Geneva Conference, the concept of a regiona1 qrouping was discussed
in reference to requirements for immediate US intervention rather than
to possible future defense requirements in Southeast Asia-
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74. Ibid., p. 351.
75. President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, January 1961.
76. Ambrose, p. 271, and Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War,
1945-1975 (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 214-215.
77. Ambrose, p. 271.
78. LaFeber, pp. 222-229.
79. I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 99; Ambassador U.A. Johnson
and Dr. Vince Davis, BOM Senior Review Panel, September 7, 1979, in a
discussion of the Kennedy administration's decision-making style,
referred to the administration's style as a "seminar approach."
80. Compiled from sources which appear in the Volume III bibliography. The
DOD US/VN Relations series was the major source used in drawing up
81. Destler, p. 26.
82. Clark and Legere, p. 77.
83. Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965)
p. 652.
84. Clark and Legere, pp. 73-74.
85. '>.stler, pp. 97-98; Clark and Legere, pp. 74-75.
86. John P. Leacacos, Fires in the In-Basket (New York: World Publishing
Co., 1968).
87. Sorenson, p. 655; Robert Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor (Baltimorea:
Johns Hopkin. University Press, 1975), p. 33.
88. Frank Merli and Theodore Wilson, Makers of American Diplomacy (New
York: Scribner & Sons, 1974) p. 322; Leacacos, p. 132; BDM interview
June 13, 1979 with Dr. Vincent Davis. In a private meeting with Mr.
Rusk, Dr. Davis querried him concerning Rusk's apparent deference.
Mr. Rusk himself explained that in matters of Vietnam, he and his
staff gener3lly concurred with McNamara's approach. [
39. Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bloomington: Indiana
University Iress, 1976), pp. 112-113, 119-120; Betts, p. 35; Destler,
p. 229.
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90. Gallucci, p. 15.

91. Ibid., p. 16.
92. Betts, p. 35.
93. Ibid., p. 35.

94. Robert Gallucci, Neither Pea%:e Nor Honor (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press,7-75), pp. 14717.
95. In an interview with BDM analys'cs, General Taylor indicated that Pres-
ident Kennedy had an excellent appreciation of the potential role of
counterinsurgency operations in "wars of national liberation." In
C-ct, Kennedy was obliged to explain the concept of counterinsurgency
to General Taylor so that the latter could understand it and explain
the concept to other military professionals.
96. Congr. Info., p. 133.
97. Ibid., p. 42.

98. Ibid., p. 41.
99. Leacacos, p. 133.

100. Congr. Info., p. 42.
S101. Ibid., p. 41.

102. Ibid., p. 41, cite taken from John F. Kennedy, A Comrilation of State-
ments and Speeches Made Durinq his Services in the US Senate and House
i
of Rep'esentatives (Washington, OC..: U.S. Government Printing Office
i1964).
103. With the passage of time, the ferocity of the Nhus' abuse towards the
Buddhists increased. Madam Nhu was particularly insensitive in her
remarks: upon the death of the first Buddhist monk by fire, she
Sreferred to the incident as a "barbeque." She was also outspokenly
anti-American in her comments.
104. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 3, IV B 5, pp. 1-5. "Overthrow of Ngo Dinh
105. Ibid., p. 6.
106. Ibid., Book 12, V B 4, p. 533.
107. Ibid., p. 535.
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108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., Book 3, IV B 5, p. 10.
110. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
111. Ibid. Presidev't Diem's reluctance in removing the Nhus stemmed par-
tially from the traditional Vietnamese regard for family unity and
loyalty.
112. Senator Frank Church urged the passage of a bill reducing or
eliminating US aid to South Vietnam. The administration requested
that he postpone introduction of the bill until the administration had
settled on a course of action.
113. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 3, IV B 5, p. 10, "No Alternatives to Diem"
Policy.
114. Ambassador Nolting reported later that the announcement of his
replacement by Ambassador Lodge had come as a surprise to him. "I
heard that I had been replaced by Ambassador Lodge in a radio broad-
cast while I was on vacation. It seems obvious to me that those who
wanted to let Diem hang himself didn't want me back in Saigon," in US
New & World Report, July 26, 1971, p. 68. Ambassador Nolting provided
BDM with a copy of this article. He still considers the US role in
that coup to have been our "cardinal mistake."
115. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War (San Fafael: Presideo Press, 1978), pp.
89-90.
116. Lodge vs. Diem: August 20-October 2: The Pagoda Raids and Reper-
cussions, cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 3, IV B 5, p. 15.
117. William Colby, Honorable Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p.
120.
118. DOD US/VN Relations Book 12, V B 4, p. 536. State Department to
Lodge.
119. Ibid., Book 3, IV B 5, p. 16., "Lodge vs Diem: August 20 - October
2."1
120. Later, General Harkins described Ambassador Lodge as pulling the rug
"11... right out from under Diem." Although Harkins had been
instructed from Washington to confer with General "Big" Minh, he was
unable to comply with the instruction because the Vietnamese General
refused to see him. US Army Military History Research Collection,
Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Report of an interview of General
Paul D. Harkins, April 28, 1974, by Major Jacob B. Couch, Jr., p. 54.
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121. State Department to Lodge and Harkins, DOD US/VN Relations, Book 12, V
3 4, p. 538.
122. Colby, p. 211.
123. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 12, V B 4, p. 538.

124. Ibid., IV B 5, p. 24.
125. Ibid., p. 26., President Kennedy, upon hearing their respective
F ,reports, could not help but ask, "You two did visit the same country,
"didn't you?"
126. Ibid., p. 30.
127. Ibid., Book 12, V B 4. p. 571.
* 128. Colby, p. 215.
129. Effros, p. 33.
130. Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Signet
Books, 1976), p. 325, 331; Tom Wicker, JFK & LBJ (Baltimore, Pelican
Books, 1970), pp. 200-201.
131. Kearns, pp. 278-279; 000 US/VN Relations, Book 4, IV C, p. 95.
132. Gallucci, p. 97; Hoopes, pp. 59-61; Janis, p. 126.
133. Kearns, pp. 274-5, 339.
this part'icular graphic.
135. Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade (Greenwich: Fawcett Publishers,
1970), p. 273.
136. Kearns, pp. 334-335.

137. Gallucci, pp. 89-91; Hoopes, pp. 83-89.
138. Cooper, p. 273.
139. US Progress in South Vietnam, November 1963-April 1965 NSAM 273-NSAM
288, DOD US/VN Relations, Book 3, IV C 1, pp. A-4, A-8.
140. Ibid., Book 3, IV C 2 A, p. 9., "Military Pressures Against NVN."
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141. Ibid., Book 3, IV C 1, A-5. (Chronological history).

142. Ibid., pp. A-4, A-5.
143. Ibid., p. A-6.
144. Ibid., p. A-8.
145. Ibid., pp. A-4, A-8. Secretaries McNamara and Rusk both volunteered
to serve as US Ambassador to South Vietnam. General Taylor did not
volunteer for the assignment but accepted it when assigned. Taylor
interview by BDM on 11 July 1979.
146. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 3, IV C 1, p. A-9.
147. General Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton,
1972), pp. 324-325.
148. US Progress in South Vietnam, November 1963-April 1965. Chronology
cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 3, IV C 1, p. A-lO.
149. Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1971), p. l14.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid., pp. 115-118.
152. Effros, p. 12.
153. Raymond Price, With Nixon (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), p. 108.
154. Hall, p. 112.
155. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
156. Compiled from sources which appear in the Volume III bibliography. The
DOD US/VN Relations series was the major source used in drawir3 up this
particular graphtic
157. Betts, p. 9.
158. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 63.
159. Henry Kissinger, "Vietnam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, January
1969; John Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power (New
York: %.W. Norton, 1976), p. 51. Dr. Vincent Davis, in an interview at
BDM, 1979, indicated that Dr. Kissinger's plan drew heavily on
information from the papers of John Vann. After the Republican
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Convention in 1968, at which Rockefeller lost the nomination for the

Republican ticket, Kissinger returned to Harvard a disillusioned man.
He had strongly supported Rockefeller's nomination and had desired to
work as Rockefeller's Special Assistant on National Security Affairs.
While preparing for fall classes, he requested to see Vann's papers in
which were contained the seeds for Kissinger's later article in the
January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs
160. Early in 1969, the new Secretary of the Navy, John Chaffee, toured
Vietnam. One of the most persistent questions he posed to serior
officers concerned the efficacy of withdrawing American forces and the
c"rcumstances that would make such a withdrawal possible. Based on a
discussion with Secretary Chaffee as reported by Col. J. A. MacDonald,
USMC (Ret.), the MACV J-52. Memo for the Record.
161. Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace (New York: Viking Press, 1978), pp.
23-24.
162. William Corson, Consequences of Failure (New York: W. W. Norton,
1974), p. 185; Daniel Ellsberg, "Alternatives and Issues for US Policy
in Vietnam," John P. Vann Papers, 1969.
163. Ibid. Corson notes that the responses to the questions posed regard-
ing Vietnam indicated agreement on some matters as well as very sub-
stantial differences of opinion within the U.S. government on many
aspects of the Vietnam situation. While there were some divergencies
on the facts, the sharpest differences arose in the interpretation of
those facts, the relative weight given them, and the implications
drawn. There was general agreement on the following points:
1. The GVN and allied position in Vietnam had been strengthened in
many respects.
2. The GVN had improved its political position, but it was not
certain that the GVN and other non-Communist groups would be able
to survive a peaceful competition with the NLF for political
power in South Vietnam.
3. The RVNAF alone could not, at the moment, or in the foreseeable
future, stand up to the current North Vietnamese-Vietcong forces.
4. The enemy had -suffered some reverses but they had not changed
their essential objectives and they had sufficient strength to
pursue these objectives. We were not attriting his forces faster
than he could recruit or infiltrate.
5. The enemy was not in Paris primarily out of weakness.
As for the disagreements, their portrayal was simplified when

broken down into the two schools of thought which existed within the
administration. (Corson's breakdown.)
The first school, Group A, usually included MACV, CINCPAC, JCS,
and Embassy Saigon. The second school, Group B, usually included OSO,
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CIA, and (to a lesser extent) State. These schools lined up as

follows on some of the broader questions:
1. In explaining reduced enemy military presence and activities,
Group A gave greater relative weight to allied military pressure
than did Group B.
2. The improvements in RVNAF were considered much more significant
by Group A than Group B.
3. Group A underlined advancements in the pacification program,
while Group B was skeptical both of the evaluation system used to
measure progress and of the solidity of recent advances.
4. In looking at the political scene. Group A accented recent
imprevements while Group B highlighted remaining obstacles and
the relative strength of the NLF.
5. Group A assigned much greater effectiveness to bc*mbing in Vietnam
and Laos than Group B.
164. Nixon, Memoirs (New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 1978), p. 298.
165. Szulc, p. 31,
166. Ibid.
167. Charles MacDonald, An Outline History of US Policy Toward Vietnam
(Washington, D.C.: Jj Govsrnment Printing Office, 1978),p. 74.
168. William Shawcross, Sideshow (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), p.
140; Lair6 was not at the discussion on the decision to bomb
Cambodia; according to William Watts of Kissinger's staff, who was
present, Admiral Moorer asked what he should relay back to the
Secretary. He was informed that he was atteoding the meeting as the
President's military adviser not as tho representative of the Secre-
tary of the Defense; he was to tell Laird nothing.
169. Several important factors influenced the congressional rise to the
center of Vietnam decision making. The mood of the US public,
especially after the signing of the 1973 Peace Accords, indicated an
overall desire to minimize further US military activities in Southeast
Asia. Domestic unrest over the administration's Cambodia bombing
found reflection in the Congress; aware of the public's displeasure
with this policy and with rising inflation, the Congress sought to
curtail further Vietnam-related military spending. In addition,
Congress may have itself been displeased with the Administration, in
particular, with Henry Kissinger. Prior to his rise to the
stewardship of the State Department, Kissinger, as Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, was not, by law,
required to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Testimony before Congressional committees serves as an important
vehicle by which Congress obtains information regarding an
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administration's foreign policy. Since Special Assistant Kissinger

was, in fact, the Administration's chief foreign affairs advisor and
spokesman, his non-accountability to Congress was viewed with
suspicion and displeasure.
It is interesting to note that, two months after Nixon signed
this bill into law, he promised President Thieu that US support would
be forthcoming if the North broke the 1973 Peace Accords. In his
November letter, Nixon stated: "You have my absolute assurance that
if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement, it is my
intention to take swift and retaliatory action." And in a subsequent
letter of January 1973, Nixon stated: "...you have my assurance of
continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will
respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North
Vietnam." See John Osborne, White House Watch: The Ford Years
(Washington, D.C.: New Republic Book, 1977), p. 122. The question
arises, how could President Nixon, in good faith, promise this type of
action, based on Congress's restrictions several months earlier?
171. President Ford: The Man and His Record, Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, August 1974.
172. Hoxie, preface, pp. xvii-xviii.
173. Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pp.
125-126.
175. Ibid., p. 126.
176. Ibid., pp. 131-132.
177. Ibid.
178. Hoxie, p. 332.
179. See for example, Snepp, p. 148.

180. For examples of their concurrence, see Ford, p. 253, and Snepp, pp.
146-147.
181. Snepp, p. 235.
182. Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Strategy for Defeat (San Rafael: Presidio
Press, 1978), p. 41.
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183. Gelb, p. 351.

184. Ibid., p. 350.
185. Ford, p. 250; Snepp, p. 112.

186, Ford, p. 250.
187. $200 million was also requested fcr Cambodia at this time. Snepp, p.
142.
188. Ford, p. .250.
189. For example, in late winter 1974, Ambassador Martin apparently
attempted to minimize South Vietnam's problems, to convince Congress
that the situation in the South was not so desperate as to be past
saving. However, Senator Sam Nunn, on a visit to Saigon in mid-
January 1975. questioned Ambassador Martin and CIA Station chief
Thomas Polgar about the South's viability. Whiie Martin stressed that
the South, with sufficient aid, could be economically independent
within three years, Polgar's estimates were directly contradictory.
He argued that unless the USSR and PRC cut back their aid supplies,
the South could in no way become viable with or without US aid. Other
US officials supplied alternately pessimistic and optimistic
assessments. See Ford, p. 254, and Snepp, pp. 117-149.
190. Snepp, p. 159.

191. Ibid., pp. 166-169
192. Ibid., p. 216.
193. Ibid., p. 235.

194. Ibid., p. 308.
195. Snepp, p. 190.

196. Ibid. pp. 347, 365, 375, 389.
197. Ford, p. 254; Snepp, p. 337.
198. Snepp, p. 337.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid., pp. 359-360
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201. Senator Jacob Javits, for example, asserted, "I will give you large
sums for evacuation, but not one nickel for military aid." Ford, p.
255.
202. Ibid.
203. Snepp, p. 364.
204. Ibid.
205. By extension, Congressional suspicion of the administration's urgent
request for military aid also reflected the US public's resolve to
avoid further involvement in Vietnam. The influence of public opinion
cn US policy toward Vietnam is discussed in Volume IV of this study.
206. Sorenson, p. 17.

207. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 4
US FOREIGN POLICY AND VIETNAM, 1945-1975: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to derive lessons from the development of US policy toward

Vietnam during the period 1945-1975, the analysis ir,this volume has been
divided into three chapters each of which provides a distinctive analytical
perspective: the global environment of US policy making, historical land-
marks or precedents which influenced subsequent US foreign policy, and
the process of national policy making in the US. Each of these perspec-
tives provide insights into the reasons why the United States adopted
particular policies. This chapter will derive lessons of broad signifi-
cance based on these insights. Subsequent volumes of this study will
consider other perspectives, such as the US domestic environment,
illuminating other reasons for these policies.
B. LESSONS
First among the lessons of this volume is a reinforcement of the

adage, "know your enemy." Fundamentally, before 1962, the US response tot
the conflict in Vietnam was driven by the logical connections which linked
four widely held beliefs:
(1) Ho Chi Minh and his forces were communists;
(2) All communist forces were part of a monolithic hierarchy ruled by
Moscow (i.e., that communist nationalism was a contradiction in
terms, with the exception of Russian communism);
(3) Moscow was determined to dominate the world; and
(4) US security was globally indivisible in the sense that a victory
by communist forces in any part of the "free world" would result
* automatically in a step toward Moscow's global domination, would
diminish US security, and therefore required US resistance.
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It was not until 1962 that the US government began to act on signs of
international communist disunity which had appeared ,ince 1;56 (highlighted
by the Sino-.Soviet split), and Hanoi's struggle in South Vietnam cime to be
seen as part of a Chinese drive for hegemony in Southeast Asia, a situation
considered no less dangerous for US security interests (e.g., in Japan)
than one in which Hanoi was Moscow's satellite. It wa3 not until the
1966-1968 period that the US government began to act on perceptions that
Hanoi's aims were nationalist and distinguishable from Soviet and Chinese
aims in Southeast Asia. Whether and how United States involvement in
Vietnam would have been different if key decision makers had earlier under-
stood the true nature of the Hanoi-Moscow-Peking relationship are not
issues addressed in this study. (The purpose of this study is not to
speculate on "might have been history," but rather to explain what actually
happened.) But clearly the attractiveness of alternativ.a courses of action
might havw increased, which reinforces the importance cf learning the basic
lesson -- "Know your enemy." A corollary of this lesson is "Know very
.precisely the nature of the relationships between Third World countries and
external communist supporters." These are particularly important lessons
today, as the protlems of proxy wars and surregate forces attract the con-
cern of US policy makers.
A second lesson that emerges from Volume III is that what, in the
past, have been termed vital interests, can cease being seen as such in a
very short span of time, depending on such factors as US perceptions of
global threats. US involvement in a particular country, however, cannot be

altered as rapidly since it is based on various long-term commitments and
on US politic&l, economic, and military "investment" in that country. This
is a very important and romplex lesson, as US policy makers learned when
considering plans for withdrawing US forces from South Vietnam. The rhet-
oric in this instance was much easier to formulate ("peace with honor")
than to implement ("Vietnamization"). Changes in policy*statements are
easily made; reversals in actual policy implementation are much more diffi-
cult to effect in a short period of time. The general lesson about vital
4-2
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III
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interests defined b( is similarly problematic because it is hard to know

precisely how to act upon it. An approach to ths problem, helpfui in
avoiding extreme consequences, but not in entirely elii•inatirg the problem,
is suggested in Chapter 1 of this volume: Be very clear dt all times about
what is actuaily meant by "vital" interest and about whether a particular
interest in another country meets that definition, prior to committing US
resources - political, economical, or military--especially to such in
extent that US "investment" in the -ountry is likely to preclude an honor-
able extrication from that country when and if US interests are no longer
perceived as v;tal. The basic thrust of this lesson is to force US policy
makers to think through the reasons for and conse-uences of their actions.
A corollary to this approach is to insure that dt the national level of the
US government careful examinations are continually made of the premises as
well as the instrumentalities of US policy.
A third lesson based on the research in Volume III can be derived from
the relationship between the US and its allies, the French and the South
Vietnamese: US leverage over an ally is a function not only of how much
the al oerceives it needs US help, but also of how much the US perceives
it nee.. the ally's help, and of how much the ally recognizes that the US
needs its help This statement speaks to the US problems in persuading the
French to continue fighting in Indochina during the period immediately
bet a and after the Geneva Conference of 1954, while at the same time
trying to persuade the French to promise the independence of the Associated
States of Indochina. Clearly, as a first priority, the US wanted the
French to cor.tinue fighting the communist forces. Second, the US wanted a
French declaration that independence would be granted. The French per-
ceived this ordering of priorities and therefore rofused to be pressured
into making a declaration by openly reminding the US that France might
choose to negotiate with the communists. The lesson 11so relates to the
problems the LIS had in trying to persuade successive South Vietnamese
governments to institute democratic reforms which these governments did not
wisl, to implement.
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When reflecting on US-GVN relations, it is also important to under-

score the following lesson: The US should not expect the political
processes of other countries to be structured or to function in exactly the
way those of the United States do. If the US encourages "reform" of the
political processes of another country, it should be prepar.•d to face
considerau!e resistance by the political leadership in that country and to
deal with the potentially destabilizing tendencies in that country's
political system which might jeopardize or preclude self-determination for
that country. Self-determination in the sense of choosing one's own form
of government must not be confused with the US conception of "democracy" or
"civil libert.y." The fact that democracy and civil liberty occur together
in the United States is no argument or guarantee that they shoold occur in
all countries, or even that they can occur in otne- countries with dif-
ferent cultural, moral, aiid ethical values.
A fourth lesson concerns the relationship between US perceptions of
the global environment and restraints imposed by US policy mak'rs on the US
conduct of the Vietnam War. In Third World conflicts presenting possibil-
ities of military confrontation betwenr
1 the Unitel States and another great
power, especially the Soviet Union or China, U.- policy makers will impose
restraints on US methods of conflict resolution. This lesson may be most
applicable and immediately essential in conflicts where clearly identifi-
able US interests (e.g., tangible interests such as natural, technological,
or manpower resources needed by the US) are not at stake. This lesson
combines insights relating Co the US conduct of "limited war" (sometimes
referred to as "gradualism") in Vietnam. For example, it is often wondered
why the US chose to fight within narrow territorial boundaries in Indo-
china, while the North Vietnamese communist forces were unrestrained by
such boundaries. A central answer to that question is that the North
Vietnamese, from their perspective, were fighting a total war Vaich they
believed would result either in the eventual union of North Vietnam with
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, under Lao Dong Party rule, or else in
the total destruction of North Vietnam - in short, a "do or die" proposi-
tion from their perspective. Such wes never the case for the United
4-4
LI
States. US policy makers had no intention of provoking a war with China or

the Soviet Union. Conflict avoidance with the PRC and USSR remained their
basic approach and explains why several major restraints on the US were
imposed. This helps explain why the war from the US side was limited
geographically and in ternms of the types of weapons used and targets
struck. Arguments continue today over whether the US was too restrained in
its conduct of the war. But to enter into this issue would, once again, be
to engage in "might-have-been history," which is not the task of this
study. The point remains that US policy makers did impose restraints a&id,
under similar conditions, are likely to do so again. Problems relating to
"limited war" and "gradual isw," will be examined further in this study.
(See Volume IV domestic factors influencing US involvement in Vietnam, and
Volume VI - Conduct of the War.)
A fifth lesson in Volume III derives from the decision-making styles
of the six US administrations involved in Vietnam policy making. Although
centralization of executive policy making (the reduction in the number of
individuals involved in policy making) may lead to an increase in the
executive branch's flexibility of approach and speed of response in resolv-
ing foreign problems, centralization also tends to isolate these individ-
uals frormi governmental as well as private expertise. There are several
conseqeunces of this isolation: First, the President and his key advisers
may be forced to rely on their own preconceptions, predispositons, anu
prejudicies in shaping policy. Second, premises of foreign policy (such as
what constitute US "vital" interestF at a given moment) are le3s likely to
be vigorously debated than the instrumentalities, that is, the strategies
and tactics of implementation. The second problem arises because premises,
couched in general terms, are more likely to appear unobjectionable and
because of the executive branch's urge to do something to solve the prob-
lem. Since the principal function of the executive is to execute policy,
no actions can be taken until the premises are firmly established. This
urge to "do something" is reflected in an impatience with continual reexam-
inations of premises. Th;s urge and impatience seem to have been partic-
ularly strong in President Johnson. Critics who seek a simple remedy in
4-5
"1pluralism" (allowing mo~re individuals or groups to participate in national

policy making), expose US foreign policy to potential dangers of a differ-
ent but no less significant kind. This approach results in fragmentation
of responsibility, loss of accountability, and incoherence or inconsistency
in policy prescriptions with respect to key -issues and their applicability
to different countries or regions.
One of the most difficult aspects of the problem concerns the amount
of time that national-level policy makers can afford to devoti to partic-
ular issues. Limits on time force a simplification of arguments, initially
developed in detail by the bureaucracy, into presentations more manageable
for consumption at higher levels of government. Thus, it should be clear
that simplication (and the potential for oversimplification) is in itself
an inescapable result of centralized decision making. Althoughi the need
for simplification certainly does not eliminate the need for expertise, the
r subtler ways of treating complex issues are often screened out before they
reach the national level,, As Chester L. Cooper, a former CIA official and
member of the National Security Council Staff, explained:
sromletmeisproide
lower-evelbudgenurtsc by the tintel
thtby the itiel
problmise
loweraevmajoburgeaurticsmeie
ligence cmuiyadsometimes by political mas
reach top decision-makers, many of the qualifications
and many of the differences of approach get washed out,
partly because the desire and sometimes the ne,,essity,
to reduce the problems to a page or two becomes a
governing factor -- mainly because busy men feel unable
to read the facts.1/
i There are methods for mitigating some of the consequences of central-

ization. For example, Chapter 2 in this Volume indicated major' conse-
quences arising. from the indiscriminate use of historical precedents,
including most dangerously, the proliferation of emotionally charged adage!;
such as "appeai-iment at Munich." One of the problems of centralized deci-
sion making is that sensitivity to nuances in history may be reduced at the
national level; fewer perspectives are brought to bear on the particular..
complex issues involved while simplification up the hierarchy eliminates
the qualifications, as Chester Cooper explains in the passage above. Ore
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THE BDM CORPORATION
significant lesson is that personalities, predispositions, and prejudices

are more likely to determine US decisions on foreign policy in the absence
of informed discussion and debate at the naticnal level of policy making.
This is no minor lesson, as we have seen from the Vietnam experience in
which such charged words as "Munich," "the Free World," the "loss of
China," and the "the Domino theory" came to be accepted as self-evident
lessons. This is a very importatnt point. US policy makers were forced to
rely on inapplicable historical precedents and misleadinq analogies because
there was so little expertise on Vietnam at the national policy-making
level. As Dr. Vincent Davis has explained, "...we had virtually no know-
ledge of Vietnam, no intellectual capital to draw on, no sense of Vietnam
itself, its history, its culture, its economics, its political dynamics."2/
Moreover, the use of "buzz words" had the circular effect of freezing
debate, leading to US involvement and escalation in Vietnam. In this
connection, it is similarly disturbing to reflect on the possibility that
the American experience in Vietnam may lead to the future derivation of
seemingly self-evident "lessons." At the moment, the expression "No More
Vietnamsu signifies different things to different Americans. But a probl'em
of centralized decision making, whether in the executive branch or in
Congress, is that particularist, oversimplified interpretations of "No More
Vietnams" by a small group of individuals in key policymaking positions may
come to dominatiithfe shaping of US foreign policy in the near future.
4-7
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CHAPTER 4
ENDNOTES
1. Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of
American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968),
pp. 108-109.
2. Dr. Vincent Davis, Director, Patterson• School of Diplomacy and Inter-
national Commerce, University of Kentucky, inter~iews and Notes, BDM,
September 6-7, 1979.
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VOLUME III
APPENDI CES
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA TO VOLUME III: SIGNIFICANT US
NATIONAL POLICY DECISIONS WHICH INFLUENCED US
MILITARY INVOL.VEMENT IN VIETNAM
The material presented in Appendix A examines seventeen key turning

points that mark, in the estimation of the Vietnam study team, the begin-
nings or ends of important stages in the US military commitment to the
Vietnam conflict. These seventeen decisions have the following character-
istics in common.
* They are decisions made by the United States. Key events, such
as the Tet '68 offen•Aie, are not included because they were not
designed by US policy makers. The American response to Tet in
March 1968, however, is of interest within the given methodology.
* They are decisions that affected the level of US military involve-
ment. Thus, decisions that affected increases or decreases in
the US war effort are considered as turning points.
The seventeen US national policy decisions are as follows:
(1) The decision to allow the French return to Indochina in 1945,
marking the first major US post-WWII action regarding Vietnam's
future.
(2) The 1950 decision to rzcognize the government of Bao Dai and to
accelerate military and economic aid to France and the Associated
States, including the installment of MAAG in Saigon.
(3) The 1954 decision not to assist the French directly through
bombing support during the Dien Bien Phu crisis.
(4) The 1954 decisions to prevent the communists from taking over all
of Vietnam by supporting Diem in the South.
(5) The 1961 decision to increase sharply the scale of US support to
South Vietnam.
(6) The 1963 decision to suppoit the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem and
Ngo Dinh Nhu.
A-l
" -4
(7) The 1964 Congressional decision to pass the 1964 Southeast Asia
Resolution mark-ng the "high water mark" of Congressional and
domestic US support for the war effort and paving the way for
further US escalation.
(8) The 1964-65 decisions to conduct air strikes against targets in
North Vietnam to reverse the downward trend of the war.
(9) The 1965 decision to introduce US ground combat troops into
Vietnam, representing a major increase in US commitment to Viet-
nam.
(10) The 1965, 1966, and 1967 decisions not to mobilize US Reserves to
augment the US military commitment made to Vietnam.
(11) The 1968 decision to seek a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam
conflict, shifting the US goal from military victory to finding
an acceptable political solution to the conflict.
(12) The 1969 Nixon Administration decisions to withdraw US troops, to
support the South Vietnamese efforts to pacify 'the countryside
and take over the war effort (Vietnamization), and to negotiate
(1)on "honorable and durable" peace.
(1)1970 decision to launch combined US/RVNAF incursions against the
PAVN/PLAF sanctuary bases in Cambodia.
(14) The 1972 decision to bomb North Vietnamese military targets
(Linebackers I and II) and mine Haiphong harbor and inland water-
ways.
(15) The 1973 Paris Peace Accords, representing the formal conclusion
of direct US military participation in the Vi.etnam War.
(16) The 1974-1975 Congressional decision to cut military appropria-
tions for Vietnam, culminating in a decision not to grant supple-
mental aid to the South.
(117) The 1975 US decision not to intervene militarily in spite of the
GVN's inability to hold Phuoc Long Province.
The data presented in Appendix A was used extensively in the writing of
Volume III. It was utilized as a supporting research tool by the Volume
III research team and is intended as a useful compendium of supplementary
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data for the reader. The material herein is also deliberately oresented in
abbreviated style; endnotes are restricted to general sources, all of which
appear in the Volume III Bibliography,
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DOMESTIC FACTORS FOREIGN FACTORS
* U S A&SERTION OF SUPPORT FOR SELF

o NEGATIVE U S PERCEPTIONS OF DETERMINATION CONCEPT IN U S -
COLONIAUSM AND OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS
AND DOCUMENTS
o FEAR OF COMMUNIST THREAT BEGINS
TO GROW * REACTION TO JAPANESE DOMINATION
OF INDOCHINA
* U S OBUGATION TO SUPPORT OUR
ALUES, ESPECIALLY BRITAIN BRITISH/FRENCH
b POSITIONS ON
COLONIES
NO'S
N TIES WITH COMMUNISM
DECISION
* FALL 1946
0 U S ACQUIESCENCE TO F9ENCH REENTRY

TO INDOCHINA
EFFECT OF DECISION ON U.S. INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETAM
9 SET P:%ECEDqNT FOR SUPPORT BASED
ON REFORM
o PROMPTED HO TO TURN TO USSR (AND

LATER TO THE PRC) FOR AID
INDICATED TO LESS DEVELOPED

COUNTRIES U S INSINCERITY IN
SUPPORT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
INSIGHTS
POUCY AMBIGUITIES CAN BACKFIRE OR FORCE A DECISION BEFORE

ALL EFFECTS CAN BE ASSESSED
* CONFiDENCE IN FRENCH COMMITMENT TO REFORMS WAS SHORT-

SIGHTED ANDIOR NAIVE
* PRIORMES SUCH AS ESTASUSHING THE EDC OFTEN DICTATE ACTION

WHICH OTHERWISE MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN
4541/78W
Figure A-I. Decision I: US Decision To Acquiesce to French Reentry

Into Indochina
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I. US DECISION TO ACQUIESCE TO FRENCH RETURN IN INDOCHINA (I.C.)j/

A. Decision. US Government states that it "has no thought of oppos-
Sng the reest.ýblishment of French control in Indochina )nd no
official statement by US Government has questioned even by impli-
cation French sovereignty over Indochina. However, it is not the
policy of this government to assist the French to reestablish
r.heir control over Indochina by force and the willingness of the
US to see French control reestablished assumes the French claim
to have the support of the population of Indochina is borne out
by future events."2/
1. When: October 1945
2. Principal Decision Makers: President Truman and Secretary
of State Stettinius.
3. Purpose: To clarify the US government's somewhat ambiguous
Policy stance vis a vis Indochina in light of British and
French interest in the area coupled with our allies' confu-
sion concerning our exact policy position on Indochina.
4. Themes: Ardent anticolonialism stance toned down to accept-
ance of our allies' colonial interests but. with qualifica-
tions/stipulations.
a. No direct US involvement in aiding French reassertion
of influence in I.C.
b. Reassertion of French dominance in I.C. to be based on

amount of leeway given to peoples of I.C. for self-
determination and self-government coupled with French
posture on reform in Indochina.
B. Precedents for the Decision. Two sets of precedents are evident
which influenced the formation of this policy decision. As US
government policy regarding I.C. was somewhat ambivalent until
the October 1945 statement, it seems relevant and necessary to
highlight the two existing sets of precedents which at times were
contradictory.
1. Set of Precedents 1: Several statements, communiques and
offical diplomatic exchanges indicating US support of French
reassertion of influence in its overseas empire post WW-II.
US commitments regai,-i'g this policy slirfaced in various
documents and statements, for example:
3. November 2, 1942 - letter from President's personal
representative to General Henri Giraud (letter from Mr.
Murpry to Gen. Giraud).
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b. FOR instruction of November 3, 1944 on US view of

France in regaining Indochina.
c. May 1945 - Communication between French government
(Bidault) and US Sec'y of State Stettinius which indi-
cated US did not question French sovereignty in Indo-
china.
2. Set of Precedents 2: Presidantial position on coloniali.n

stresses the importance of self-determination for peoples of
the world's colonies; if colony status to be maintained, the
"natives" should be assisted in their development and growth
towards self-government and the "colonizers" stance should
indicate willingness to better the colonies' positions via
reforms etc.
a. January 24, 1944 - FOR response to memorandum from
Sec'y of.State Hull on Indochina. Indochina should not
go back to France.
b. FDR's conversations with Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek on
colonies.
C. November 1942 - Draft proposal submitted to FOR by
Sec'y of State Hull on colonies and self-determination
entitled "The Atlantic Charter and National Indepen-
dence." Draft approved by FOR.
d. June 1945 - Dept. of State instructs US ambassador to
China on US position concerning colonies and necessity
of increased civil liberties and self-government for
Indochina.
C. Options P'-esented.
1. Policy of International Trusteeship for Indochina and other
of the world's colonies. Consistenttly supported by FOR,
especially from 1942-1944. Met with little if any support
on the part of Britain, France and, it appears, some sec-
tions of the US military.
2. Policy on support for resistance forces in Indochina at the

close of WWII which could have, if pursued after the war,
indicated U.S. support for the "natives" vs. the "coloni-
zers" (Ho Chi Minh). Pressure from France/Britain coupled
with the recognition of Ho's communist orientations reduced
the viability of this particular option.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
3. Concept of Neutralization. This particular policy option

was considered as an alternative to Japanese wartime domina-
tion of Indochina. It could conceivably have been con-
sidered as a post-war option, although the French/British
response would likely have been negative.
4. Policy of non-involvement/ron-commitment and non-decision.
At the close of WWII, FOR, until his death, stressed US
low-key posture on committing itself to a forthright policy
stance concerning Indochina as a colony. FOR stressed the
importance of dealing with the issue as a post-war matte",
perhaps in hopes of buying time for the promotion of his
"self-determination" concepts. This option of low-key,
non-committal policy regarding Indochina could not have con-
tinued; the US, as one of the strongest pcst-WWII powers,
was compelled to take a forthright stand in the face of
continual French/British inquiries.
0. Influential Factors
1. Foreign:
a. US assertion of its support for self-determination
concept which appeared in:
1) Atlantic charter
2) League of Nations charter
3) At Yalta, in conversations between FDR and Stalin
b. US strong reaction to Japanese domination/occupation of

Indochina during World War II.
c. The British and French positions on their colonies.
d. Ho's ties with communism.
2. Domestic:
a. US negative domestic perceptions of colonialism and of
the French.
b. Initial, growing concerns of a Communist threat.
c. Desire to support our allies, especially Britain, (the
pressure of which influenced this policy decision) as
one of the Big Three post-WWII
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E. Effect of Decision on US Involvement in Vietnam.

1. Aithough this policy reflected the US attitude of non-
involvement in easisting the French to reassert domination
in Indochina, it set a precedent for US "go-ahead" policies
of approval/aid contingent on reforms to be made by the
appropriate party. (In this case by the French, later by
the GVN- Diem).
2. Decision to allow the French to return, and to cease support
for Ho's resistance forces affected later events by prompt-
ing him ta turn to the USSR and the Chinese Communists for
aid and assistance. Future implications are obvious.
3. May have indicated to world's colonies and less developed

countries, especially in Indochina, that US could not be
counted on to support concept of self-determination.
F. Effectiveness of the Decision. Decision taken allowed Frenchi to
reenter Indochina without our initial assistance. (Although we
did provide modest aid to the French in re-entering by not
resisting tne British turnover of 800 US lend-lease transport
vehicles to the French). As a post-war consideration, we chose
to back our allies' interests, presumably a natural response.
However, in light of FDR's continual advocacy of self-
determination and the growing sentiments of nationalism in the
post-war world, the decision left the possibility of a French-
Vietnamese conflict wide open.
G. Insiqh-s.
1. Policy ambiguities, while perhaps a conve.-ient way to stall
for or buy time, may serve to force a policy stance before
all possible effects of the policy decision can be assessed.
FOR's verbal attacks on colonialism caused a great degree of
confusion in OSS operations/relations with Ho, for the
French and the British, and served to confuse the French as
regards OS goals in Indochina. The record needed to be set
straight in order to avoid ambiguities and misinterpreta-
tions by our allies as well as US (055) oersonnel In Indo-
china.
2. Confidence io the French ability to tackle reforms in Indo-

China, in view of the rising rationalist sentiments in
Indochina and Ho's strong posture, may have been short-
sighted and/or naive.
3. The US desire that the French support tho European Defense
ii
Community overruled the US anticolonialist stance.
A-9
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DOMESTIC FACTORS C*CRf

FOREIGN F&,
* COMMUNIST THREATS: FALL.O Cw'.",

SOVIET ATOM SOMO. KOREAM' WAR
*TRUMAN ADMINISTATION MUST
NOT "'LOSE"
NOETN SOUTH"
LOSE"
SOTH N SOVIET & CHINESE RECOGNITION OF
VIETNAM AS THEY "LOST" CHINA *M O DAY
6 AI0 FOR N
* Net* FOR FRENCH SUWORT ZF DDC,.
NATO
I FR¶NCH AGREEMENT TC ELEVATE IN-

OOCHINA STATES FROM PROTEC.
TORATEIS TO INDEPENDENT STATES
WITHIN THE FRENCH UNION
DECISION
DECISION TO RECOGNIZE THE ASSOCIATED STATEM

O
OF VIETNAM, CAMO3ODIA bI LAOS FEBRUARY 1950,
AND TO INCREASE MIUTARY AID TO FRANCE AND
INDOCHINA. JUNE 1960
EFFECT OF DECISION ON US INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETNAM
* DIRECTLY INVOLVED THE US IN THE INDOCHINA

CONFUCT
* BEGAN A HEAVY DEPENDENCY OF FRENCH AND

BAO CAI GOVERNMENTS ON US AID
INSIGHTS
"* US LOST AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE HO CHI MI.JH BY

DISREGARDING HIS EFFORTS AT COMMUNICATION Wo-iH THE US
GOVERNMENT
"* US BEUEVED COMMUNISM WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH NATIONALISM

AND THAT THE VIET MINH WERE EXTERNALLY INSPIRED
* PERCEPTION OF MONOLITHIC COMMUNISM PREVAILED
* THESE PREMISES BECAME THE BASIS FOR US INVOLVEMENT IN VIET-

NAM FOR THE NEXT 20 YEARS
4541/78W
Figure A-2. Decision II: US Decision To Recognize the Associated States of'
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, February 1950, and To Increase
Mi'litary Aid to France and Indochina, June 1950
A-11
FRI1OIMEW Jan: INACMO Plum

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THE BDM CORPORAT;ON
II. 0ECISION *oRECOGNIZE THE ASSOCIATED STATES OF VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND

LAOS (FEBRUARY 1950), AND THE RELATED DECISION TO ACCELERATE MILITARY
AID TO FRANCE AND THE ASSOCIATED STATES AND DISPATCH A US HILITARY
MISSION (MAAG) TO INDOCHINA (JUNE 1950)3/
A. Decision. US decision to recognize the Bao Dai government, and
to give military aid to both France and the Bao Dai Government of
South Vietnam.
1. When: Formally recognized Bao Dai Government February 7,
TW-5; "Statement by the President" to give military aid,
June 27, ),J50.
2. Principal Decision Makers: President Truman and Secretary
of State Dean Acheson, in concert with the NSC and JCS.
3. PurLoe: The US recognition of Baa Dai's government was a
"means to assist the French in their anticommunist fight
while tr%!ing to avoid support for French colonialist activi-
Sties in the region. The US viewed the Viet Minh threat as
part of a monolithic communist advance against the Free
World. The US, suffering from the fall of Nationalist
China, wanted to prevent the fall of Vietnam. Provision of
military and economic aid was designed to keep the French in
Indochina fighting the Viet Minh and to encourage the French
to support NATO and EDC.
4. Themes:
a. Anticommunism - The US chose to aid the French in their
war with the Viet Minh to resist wtonolithic communist
aggress 4 on.
b. Ancicolonialism - Paradoxically, the US remained
K opposed to Firench efforts to restore their colonial
power in Indochina while, at the same time, supporting
the French forces. The US minimized this paradox by
stressing French promise of independence for Vietnan,
and the other Associated States and by viewing the
French effort as part of a united free wor'Id response
to communist aggression.
c. Support for emerging nationalisnm in less developed
countries - While supporting the French colonial pro-
grams, the US insisted on the rights of self-
determination for the Vietnamese.
A-12
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B. Precedents for the Decision.

1. US acquiesced to French reentry to Indochina in 1945.
2. In 1949 the US a':teu to protect the Nationalist regime in
Taiwan from communist attack.
3. The US was supporting the Republic of Korea.
4. The US gave military aid to Greece in their fight against
communist aggression in 1947.
C. Options Presented.
I. No support - remain outside the Indochina conflict and dis-
approve of French colonialist objectives.
a. Not recognize Bao Dai because of Asian perception of
him as a puppet of the Franch.
b. Not establish MAAG in Indochina because it would
directly involve the US in the security of Indochina,
although with the French playing the dominant role.
2. Support the French and the Bao government but disapprive of
colonialist objectives.
3. Direct US military intervention.
D. Influential Factors
1. Foreign:
a. The fall of Nationalist China in 1949 made more urgent
the US and allied support of non-communist governments.
b. North Korean attack on South Korea prompted US military
support of Indochina.
c. USSR exploded atom bomb in September 1949.

d. February 1950 French agreement to elevate Indochinese
states from protectorates to independent states within
the French Union.
e. US perception of its vital interests required a viable
Western Europe, which in turn required French viability
and membership in a European Defense Community (EDC).
A-13
~ ~~~~~~L
... 6 . ' ; J••,. . ,•., . .
If.
THE BDM CORPORATION
g.
December 1949 Chinese communist forces at the borders
of Vietnatm.
January 1950 the PRC and USSR recognized Ho Chi Minh's

government (DRV)-
h. The Chinese and Soviet governments promised financial
and military support to the ORV.
2. Domestic:
0 Truman administration could not afford to "lose"
another country to communism as China was "lost."
1) The decision directly involved the US in the Indochina
conflict.
2) It began a heavy dependency of French and Bao Dai govern-
ments on US aid.
F. Effectiveness of the Decision.
1. The decisions did accomplish the purpose of getting the
French to support NATO and EDC, and of temporarily staving
off a communist takeover of all of Vietnam.
G. Insights
1. The US policymakers perceived Ho Chi Minh as part of an
international communist pattern of aggression. Tile US
believed that communism was incompatible with Vietnamese
nationalism or, that nationalism was a disquise for com-
muuni sin.
2. The US policy maakers perceived the Viet Minih effort as
externally inspired by the forces of monolithic communism.
It was assumed that if outside support of the Viet Minh
ceased, the insurgency would wither away.
3. Since the conflict was seen as part of an international
communist plan, the 6omino theory prevailed: the fall of
Indochina would lead to the fall of Southeast Asia.
4. The above reasoning became the basis for US involvement in
Vietnam for the next 20 years.
A-14
THE BDM CORPORATION
5. By publicly linking Ho Chi Minh to Moscow and disregarding

his many e forts to communicate with the US, the US lost an
opportunity to influence Vietnam away from Moscow and to-
wards a Tito-likak inaependence.
A-15
THE BDM CORPORATION
* CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSMON TO U 8 UERUIN

B CONFERENCE OF FOREIN
INTERVENTION MINISTERS
a PUBUC WEARINESS OF WAR FOLLOWING D ,PAMl1nC WEAKNESS OF FRENCH

KOREA GOVERNMENT
* DEMORALIZATION OF U S FORCES AFTER U.K.IFRENCH PRESSURES

KOREA
* U.K. INAWULTY TO JOIN COALITiON
(TROUBLU AT HOME & IN COLONIES. E.G.
MALAYA)
* KOREAN EXPERIENCE
• FEAR OF PRC INTERVENTION
T)ECISION
* JANUARY 1964 - 7 MAY 164
* U S DECISION NOT TO INTERVENE

MILITARILY AT DIEN BIEN PHU

IN VIETNAM
"LUMITED U S MILITARY SUPPORT TO
FRENCH IN INDOCHINA
" "LELVEUNG OFF* OF U.S INVOLVEMENT IN

INDOCHINA
" CHANGE IN U S EMPHASIS AT GENEVA

CONFERENCE: U S SALVAGES WHAT IT
CAN DIPLOMATICALLY
INSIGHTS
3"U
ATTEMPT TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM VIA SUPPORT FOR A
COLONIALIST FRANCE WAS BOTH UNREALISTIC AND UNJUSTIFIED
"* THE DECISION NOT TO INTERVENE HAD UTTLE EFFECT ON

CONTAINING COMMUNISM IN INDWCHINA
*641/78W
Figure A-3. Decision III: US Decision flot To Intervene Militarily at

Dien Bien Phu
A-17
,,,.. ,,_- .. .. . . . . .
& . .1 • • . .. ,'" I
THE BDM CORPORATION
III. US DECISION NOT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY AT DIEN BIEN PHU (DBP,)4/

A. Decision, US Government continually reaffirmed its Indochina
pol-cy7,held for more thQn three years, that the US would not
intervene militarily in Indochina on behalf of the French, unless
the French government would "unequivocably pledge independence to
the Associated States upnn the achievement of military victory,"
and, even then, only if toe US were "one of a concert of powers,
which concert must include local Asiatic peoples."5/
1. When: January 1954 - May 7, 1954.
2. Principal Decision-Makers: President Eisenhower and John

Foster Oulles, Admiral Radford, General Ridgway.
3. Purpose:
a. To uphold US moral position as leader of the Free World
by avoiding association with colonialism and imperial-
ism.
b. To prevent the sacrifice of US f,. -es for an unjusti-
fied cause.
c. To encourage the formation of a joint allied coalition
for resisting communism.
d. To accelerate independence of the Associated States.
4. Themes:
1. Arnticolonialism.
2. Anticommunism.
3. Internationalization of the conflict.
B. Precedents for The Decisicn. Key decisions, which taken

together, comprised the'US decision not to intervene at DBP.
1. Early 1954: inEisenhower's
intervention Vietnam: precondition for US military
a. Urgent French request for US intervention.

b. Desire of Vietnamese government for US intervention.
A-18
THE BDM CORPORATION
C. Favorable climate of Free World opinion.

d. Favorable action by Congress.
2. Jnay1954: Eisenhower told associates that he could not
at thernmoment see the value of putting US ground forces in
SEA. The final decision here entailed:6/
a. Trying to convince British and French to form coalition
in order to give moral meaning to intervention.
b. Trying to convince Vietnamese and world of French
r sincerity to grant Associated States independence.
C. Stepping up US material aid in every practical way.
3. March 1954: Eisenhower "let it be known (to the French)
that I would never agree to send our ground troops as mere
reinforcements for FrencO units, to be used only as they
(the French) saw fit."7/
I. 4. Aprji4, 1954: Eisenhower writes to Churchill &boat the im-

portance of stablishing a new, ad hoc g~'oupinq or coalition
composed of nations which have a vitiT co~ncern inthe check-
ing of communist expansion in Indochina: UK, US,
Associated States of Indochina, Australia, New
Thailand and the Philippines. Eisenhower did not
France,
Zealand,
envisage I
the need for US or UK ground forces 'inIndochina. British
response was essentially negative.
5. April 4, 1954: According to Dulles who had met with con-
grssoriaT laders, it would be impossible to get Congres-
sional authorization for the US to act alone. Congressional
support was dependent on 3 conditions with which Eisenhower
was in full agreement:
a. US intervention being part of a coalition to include
the other free nations of SEA, Philippines, and British
Commonweal th.
b. Fren~ch must accelerate their independence program fcr

the Associated States.
I
C. French must agree not to pull their forces out of the
war if we put our forces in.
6. April 12, 1954: Dulles conferred with UK leaders in London,.
UV appeared to place much faith in negotiations at Geneva.
Eisenhower's view of negotiating with communists: communist
participation in conferences never implied that they would
either make concessions or keep prom~ises,
A-19
THE BDM CORPORATION
7. April 23, 1954: Eisenhower reaffirms Dulles' oosition of

April 4, that there would be no US intervention at Dien Bien
Phu without all les.
8. Ai 22 1954: Eisenhower was told that Australia and New
anwould consider intervention but Eisenhower decides
that US should not urge collective action with other members
of the British Commonwealth without "st:'Vdy Britain as a
participant."
9. April 29, 1954: US government considers again the possible
use of air strikes in Indochina. According to Eisenhower:
"During the course of this mreeting I remarked that if the
United States were, unilaterally, to permit its forces to be
drawn into conflict in Indochina and in a succession of
Asian wars, the end result would be to drain off our
resources and to weaken our over-all defensive position. If
we, without allies, should ever find ourbelves fighting at
various placrs all over the region, and if Red Chinese
aggressive participation were clearly identified, then we
could scarcely avoid, I said, consideri-g the necessity of
striking directly at the head instead of the tail of the
snake, Red China itself. But in the meantime, the problem
was to solve the current dilemma. Even without a mechanism
for united action, we could still go on giving the French
considerable material aid."8/
10. May 7, 1954: Dien Bien Phu fell.

C. Options.
1. Massive B-29 bombing (US operation from, US bases outside
Indochina).
2. Support for cease fire at Dien Bien Phu.

3. Support for cease fire throughout all Indochina.
4. Send US ground forces to Dien Bien Phu - according to Eisen-

hower, "this was always a possibility; the question was
under constant study."9/ The logistical problems were too
great; this also might require mobilization.
5. Use nuclear weapons against Viet Minh.l0/
A-20
. i* .. - ~ - - - .- -
THE BDM CORPORATION
0. Influential Factors.
1. Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers - inuary 25, 1954
through February 18, 1954, between US, UK, ince, USSR. UK
and France were both seeking agreement •, hold a future
conference at Geneva on the Far East: Korea and Indochina.
Eisenhower (and Oul es) believed "there was danger in the
attitude developing among the Western Allies which, to us,
seemed to put too much faith in the validity of negotiations
with the Soviets and Chinese Communists." But the life of
the Laniel government in France was important to US poli-
cies; it took a very strong position on the defense of
Indochina and in support of the European Defense Community.
According to Eisenhower, "We had to be sympathetic to the
French desire." US was also concerned to manifest unity of
the Western Allies, and recognized that if the US was held
responsible for blocking such a conference, the moral obli-
gation to carry on the war in Indochina might be shifteo
from the French to the US. For these reasons, Dulles pro-
posed that the four powers meet for a conference on the Far
East.
2. Domestic weakness of French Government - US fear that the
Laniel government would fall unless US came to the aid of
the French in Indochina.
3. Unwillingness of UK to join in a coalition with the US for
collective action in Indochina, until all possibility of a
settlement by negotiations had been tried and fai!ed.
4. Pressure from France and UK to negotiate with the
Communists. US wanted to avoid negotiations with Communists
from a position of weakness.
5. Geneva Conference was looming in the background. The deci-
sion to hold the conference was taken in February 1954.
Dien Bien Phu did not fall until May 7, 1954.
6. Korean experience led to reluctance on the part of the US to

carry the primary responsibility for defense of Indochina.
7. 30 March 1954 a new issue arose: What would US reaction be
to Chinese Communist attack en French in Vietnam with their
MIG aircraft. Dulles could not give a definitive answer -
would depend upon circumstances. US prestige would be
engaged to a point where we would want to have success if we
intervened.
A-21
- - i '
THE BDM CORPORATION
8. Domestic:
S Congressional oppnsition to adopting a rongrfssional
resolution authorizing American entry into the Indo-
china war. Congressional leaders knew well the diffi-
culties of the Korean war and were disturbed because US
had found no allies to support intervention.
E. Zffect of the Decision on US Involvement in Vi,ýtnam. The deci-

sT-o from January througn May 1954 placed significant limits on
US rmilitary support for the French in Indochina. The US would
continue to supply money and materiel but steadfastly refused to
intervene militarily until certain clearly specified conditions
were met: French pledge to grant independence to Associated
States and formation of a coalition (to include Asiatic states)
which would assume responsibility for intervention on behalf of
the French. They were never met, and Dien Bien Phu was allowed
to fall.
In effect this series of US decisions from January to May

1954 resulted in a "leveling off" of US involvement in Indochina.
Previously, there had been an escalation in US involvement from
no clear policy at all, to a policy of allowing tne French to re-
assert control in Indochina, to a policy of recognizing Bao Dai
and supporting the French with money and materiel without inter-
vening militarily in behalf of the French unless the conditions
specified above were met. The series of decisions taken from
January to May 1954 by the US clearly reaffirmed the last policy
and ultimately led to the negotiated settlement reached at Geneva
in July 1954.
1. Continued US financial and materiel support of the French
eroded any good will or moral tone that otherwise might have
accrued to the US because of its decision not to intervene
at Dien Bien Phu.
2. The decisions were effective in encouraging:
a. the formation of a joint allied coalition for resisting
communist aggression (SEATO).
b. accel2ration of independence for the Associated States
of Indochina.
3. Continued US support of the French ensured that CS prestige
was damaged as a result of the French defeat at Dien Bien
Phu.
A-22
THE BDM CORPORATION
G. Insights.
I. US non-intervention did little to persuade French to accept
willingly the conditions set by Washington for intervention.
2. US attempt to use the French colonialist struggle for its

own purposes of containment of communism (by means of in-
direct skippyt for the Frertch in Indochina) was not success-
ful. US attempts to straddle the fence on the issues of
support of French colonialism and support of anticommunist
efforts in Vietnam were contradictory and self-defeating.
3. The Dien Bien Phu decision, coupled with continued US aid to
the French, did little to stop the spread of conununism as
soon as it became clear that the French had no int-rition of
granting independence to the Associated States. Where
anticoic,•a! ist and articommunist objectives of the United
States clash, the US government must consider the possibil-
ity that the achievew1 ent of anticolonialist objectives is a
precondition for the achievement of anticommunist obj.c-
tives.
A-23
THE 8DM CORPORATION
DOMESTiC FACT3RS FOREIGN FACTOP.S
* vMIcCAJTHYISM * GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954
* C')NCERN OVER DEFENSE SPENDING * COMMUNIST SUCCESSES IN INDOCHINA

(NEW LOOK) (01N lIEN PHU) AND DOMINO flF'CT
* DESIRIE TU AVOID INVOLVEME9T IN * KOREAN WAR

ANOTHER ASIAN LAND WAR BASED ON
X(OPFAN EXPERIENCF • FEAR OF PRC AGGRESSION
DECISION
AUGUST 11154
' NSC 54M- TO 0ECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED
IN VIETNAM: A SET OF IMPORTANT OECI.
SiONS EMBODIED IN NBC 54M

IN VIETNAM
* DIRECT U S INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
o U S REFUSAL ON ALL.VIETNAM
ELECTIONS
U COVERT OPERATIONS
U S SUPPORT FOR DIEM
o U S SIGNING OF SEATO
INSIGHTS
e LACK OF U S POLICY RE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

0 NATO MODEL OF ALLIANCES MAý* NO T BE APPLICABILE FOR
DEAUNG WITH CONTAINMENT OF ASIAN COMMUNISM
LACK OF U S UNDERSTANDING OF NATIONALISM
o U S ATTITUDES TOWANDS ASIAN PEOPLES OFTEN CONDESCENDING

/WREGARDING THEIR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH OWN PROBLEMS
4541/D8W
Figure A-4. Decision IV: US Decision To Become Directly Involved

in• Vietnam
A-25
THE eDM CORPORATION
IV. US DECISION TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN VIETNAM II/

A. Decision. Several key decisions were made by the US between the
fall of Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954 and the approval by Presi-
dent Eisenhower of NSC 5429/2 on August 20, 1954. This outline
will focus on NSC 5429/2 as the formal expression of these deci-
sions. NSC 5429/2 clarified the new US policy of direct in-
voivement in the Vietnam conflict. Several specific decisions
are included in NSC 5429/2. The most important of these for our
purposes are:
a The US will "deal directly," wherever advantageous to the
US, with the governments of Cambodia, Laos, and free Viet-
nam.
* The US will work through the French "o'nly insofar as neces-

sary," in order to assist Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam
to maintain military forces necessary for internal security
and economic conditions conducive to the maintenance and
strengthening of non-Communist regimes.
0 The US will work tc maintain a friendly non-Communist South
Vietnam.
* The US will work to prevent a Communist victory through
all-V;etnam elections. (Later, US and GVN refused all-
Vietnam elections).
0 The US will work to prevent North Vietnam from becoming
incorporated in the Soviet bloc, using consular relations
and non-strategic trade.
0 The US will conduct covert operations on a large and effec-

tive scale in support of foregoing policies.
The US will negotiate a Southeast Asia security treaty with
the UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Thailand and, as appropriate, other free Scuth and Southeast
Asian countries (SEATO).
The US will encourage the prompt organization of an economic
grouping by the maximum number of free Asian states, includ-
ing Japan and the Colombo powers (Ceylon, India, Pakistan,
Indonesia and Burma), and the US.
0 The US President should consider requesting congressional
authority to take appropriate action, which might include
the use of US military forces either locally or against the
external source (including Communist China), if requested by
a legitimate local government which requires assistance to
A-26
,.
I
THE BDM CORPORATION
defeat iocal Communist subqersior or rebellion, not ronsti-

tuting armed attack.
1. When: NSC 5429/2 adopted by NSC on 18 August 1954 and
approved by Eisenhower on 20 August 1954.
2. Pri al Decision Makers: President Eisenhower and t~e
3. Pur.pose:
a. To clarify and make formal, in a single document, US
policy on the Far East following the Geneva Conference
of 1954.
b. To contain communism in SEA
1) by halting or preventing subversion
2) by halting or preventing aggression
3) by developing good relations with Free Asia
B. Precedents.
1. Geneva Conference: US is nonsignatory, but declares tt'at it
the use of the
to disturb with
will
agreements; from threat
-efrain would or, renewal
view any of force
*the aggression
grave concern and as a threat to international peace and
security.
2. CIA assessment of the p obable outlook in Indochina in the
light ol' the agreement5 at the Geneva Conference. (NIE
63-5-54). NIE concludes:
a. that the communists will continue to pursue their
objectives in South Vietnam by political, psychological
and paramilitary means.
b. that if elections are held in 1956, the Viet Minh will
win.
c. that the events in Laos and Cambodia depend on the
developments in Vietnam. (3 August 1954).
3. President Eisenhower directed that US aid to Indochina be
given directly to the South Vietnamese government rather
than through the French. Full military implementation of
this directive had to await final French military departure.
(17 August 1954). (See also the related US decision not to
intervene at Dien Bien-"hu3.
A-27
____
THE 8DM CORPORA VION
4. NSC 5429, "Review of US Policy in the Far East," considered

y7the NSC at its meeting on 12 August 1954.
C. Options. JCS recomnended that the US formulate a comprehensive
policy in which the Far East is viewed as a strategic entity
and which would provide definitive direction for the develop-
ment of a position of military strength in the Far East.
Defense and JCS argued that US policy with regard to the
peripheral Areat should be established in the light of this
determinat on. JCS recommended that the US "continue to
exploit opportunities to further US long-range objectives
toward uniting Vietnam under a democratic form of govern-
ment." According to JCS, "the first and basic neec ... is
for a'statement in a single document of a US foreigr, policy
or a global basis, with the principal objectives listed."
One principal objective should be "to split Communist China
from the Soviet bloc."13/
D. Influential Factors.
1. Foreian:
a. Geneva Conference of N1954.

b. Accordirng to NSC 5429/2, communist successes in Indo-
china (Diet, Bien Phu) culminating in Genevd Agreement
1i954 led to:
1) Fear of Communist military and non-military pres-
sures mounted against areas adjacent to RVN and
more remote non-communist areas. (Domino effect).
2) Loss of US prestige in Asia resulting from US
backing of France and Bao Oai governments. Doubts
in Asia resulted concerning US 'eadership and
ability to check fur'her com.munist expansion in
Asi&. US prestige waa inescapably associated with
subsequent developments in 3EA.
3) Communists are in a good position to exploit the

political strategy of imputing to US motives of
extremism, belligerency and opposition to coexist-
ence, seeking thereby to alienate the US from its
allies; communists can accentuate "peace propa-
ganda" in Asia to allay fears of expansionism and
establish closer relations with nations of free
Asia.
A-28
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i4
THE BDM CORPORATION
4) In order to achieve their ends, the communists

have an increased capacity for exploiting politi-
cal and economic weakness in frec Asia without
having to resort to armed attack.
5) Loss of Southeast Asia would imperil US retention
of Japan as a key element in the offshore island
cha i.
6) Concern over possible Chinese aggression in SEA.
7) Dien Rien Phu/Geneva Conference 1954.

8) Korean War (Chinese intervention,
9) Indonesia (see NSC 171/1).
10) Concern about falling dominoes in Asia (Philip-
pines, Malaya, Burma).12/
2. Domestic Factors:
a. McCarthyism (contain communism).
b. Concern over defense spending (New Look).
c. "Never again" land war in Asia (US tired of fighting in
Korea a protracted, indecisive,and costly war.
1. Direct US involvement in Vietnam (Severing of the French
connection)
2. US refusal to agree to holding all-Vietnam elections, once
it was clear that Ho would win.
3. Increase in covert operations.

4. US support for Diem (mairntain a "friendly" non-communist
RVN).
5. US signing of SEATO.
F. Effectiveness of Decision. NSC 5429.2 was effective in clarify-
ing the change in US policy on Vietnam: to offer aid directly to
South Vietnam rather than through the French.
A-29
THE BDM CORPORATION
G. Insights.
1. No poli had yet been formulated by the US for dealing
effectively kith countries of the Third World.
2. Assumotion made that formal alliances such as SEATO, using
NATO as the model, would be useful in dealing with Asian
communism.
3. US still did not understand the importance of nationalism in

Indochina and the need to address problems that had arisen
from years of colonialism in SEA before trying to marshal
support against communism.
4. US hau a condescending attitude toward the Asian peoples and
their ability to deal with their own prcblems.
A3
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THE BDM CORPORATION
DOMESTIC FACTOR,* FOREIGN FACTORS

* KHRUSHCHEV'S VIEW ON "WARS OF
* KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION RECEIVES NATIONAL UBERATION"
INTENSE DOMESTIC CRITICISM FOR
FOREIGN POLICY FAH'URES o BAY OF PIGS FAILURE
* DEFENSE OF FREEDOM Ari'roE * VIENNA SUMMIT: KHRUSHCHEV &

STRONG IN FACE OF DOMESTIC VIEW KENNEDY
REGARDiING COMMUNISM
* BERLIN WALL
* DEVELOPMENT OF "FLEXIBLE
RESPONS'I" STRATEGY * US DEFEATS IN COMPETITION WITH
USSR: FALL OF CUBA, U-2 INCIDENT,
SPUTNIK. AND HUNGARY
DEC.ISION
* 16 nECISION TO INCREASE FORCES

"" ACTUAL BEGINNINGS OF NEW US FORCE
COMMITMENT
* INCREASE PRESSURE ON GVN
EFFECT OF DECISION OF US INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETNAM
• LAID BASIS FOR FURTHER ESCALATION AND US

TROOP COMMITMENT
INSIGHTS
"• INACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF US ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE

DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AN ALLY
"* VIEW OF INTERNATiONAL COMMUNISM DID NOT ALLOW CLEAR

PERSPECTIVE OF THE NATURE OF THE THREAT TO THE GVN
4541/78W
Figure A-5. Decision 4: US Decision To Increase Sharply US-RVT Joint

Efforts
A-31
V. 1951 DECISION TO INCREASE SHARPLY US - GVN JOINT EFFORTS TO AVOIO A

FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN RVN 14/
A. Decision. Decision to increase the scope of US participation in
Vietnam was articulated in National Security Action Memorandum
111, 22 November 1961.
0 The decision included both increased military assistance and
"aid in developing domestic programs" for the GVN.
* The decision articulated in NSAM 111 had been made earlier

when US personnel were committed to Vietnam. -13/
1. When: NSAM 111, November 22, 1961 had been preceded by
force commitments in May and November.
2. Principal Decision-Makers: President Kennedy, especially
advice and supporf of General Taylor, Secretaries Rusk
and McNamara, and cleared with the NSC.
3. Purpose: In 1959, the North Vietnamese had decided to
Tntensify their struggle in the South by moving from politi-
cal effortsin to
Beginning 1960combined
with thepolitical and of
military activities.
overrunning a regiminiil'head-
quarters near Tay Ninh City (January), the DRV escalation
began seriously to weaken the RVN. The United States sought.
to arrest this trend by intensified military commitments
that were to be accompanied by GVN reforms and programs for
improving the credibility of the GVN among the people of the
South..•
4. Themes:
a. The United States was determined to resist a perceived
march of international communism and to reverse the
trend of important communist successes.
b. From 1961 onwayd, The United States policymakers consis-
tently underestimated the ability of the Vietnamese
Communists to match our escalation.
c. The pattern of action - reaction was being established
whereby relatively small increments of US men and
materiel were expected to reverse negative trends
evident in the struggle in Vietnam.
d. The United States coupled its military assistance to
the GVN with political requirements for reorganization
and reformation of the South Vietnamese government.
A-32
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THE BDM CORPORATION
B. Precedents for the Deci•sion.

1. The establishment of MAAG in Indichina in 1950, provided the
original precedent for US military commitment in Indochina.
2. In 1954, the MAAGV continued the original commitment to
trein and equip the South Vietnamese.
3. After 1955, the MAAGV aid was no looger channelled through
the French. Instead, it was received directly by the GVN.
4. In 1956, "Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission" (TERM) per-
sonnel began performing training functions that were "insep-
arable from the tasks of racovering and maintaining."
5. In 1960 (5/20) TERM personnel were assigned to MAAGV, moving
beyond the 7,anpower restrictions of the Geneva Agreement.
6. In October 1960 an integrated Counterinsurgency Progr3m
(CIP) was called for.
C. Options Presented. The Taylor report frames the basic issue 16/
concerning whether thi US should:
1. Cemmit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall
of South Vetnam to communism, and support this commitment
by immediate military actions and preparations for possible
later actions.
2. Maintain US commitment at existiný, level.
3. Reduce US •..mmitment to RVN.
0. Influentia' 'actors.
I. Fort_.. n:
a. eay o? pigs fiasco had tarnished the image of the US as
ieader of the Free World.
b. The United States had experienced a series of defeats

in i-s rmpetition with the USSR. These defeats
included: Soviet 1956 invasion of Hungary, the fall of
"Cuba to Castro, the Sputnik launching, and the U-2
incident.
c. Construction of the Berlin Wal, was perceived as a tri-

umph for the USSR in war of wills with the US.
A-33
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THE 6DM CORPORATION
d. Khrushchev promised to make South Vietnam a testing

ground for his program of wars of national liberation.
2. Domestic:
a. Faced with a series of foreign policy failures, espec-
ally the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy Administration could
not afford another defeat and maintain its domestic
pol itical! credibility.
b. The Vietnam conflict seemed cn appropriate place to

tpst the Administration's inaugural commitement "to pay
any price, to bear any burden, in the defense of free-
d&m."
3. War Related:
a. Phuoc Vinh (Provincial capital 40 miles from Saigon)

was overrun (autumn 1961).
b. Communist. forces in Scuth were growing stronger after

Hanoi's 1959 decision to escalate.
E, Effect of Decision on US Involvement in Vietnam. The United
States moved from a limited commitment of maintaining a non-
Communist South Vietnam to a large-scale effort. This decision
point marked a significant step up in the US escalation as the
nation moved to meat and exceed the North Vietnamese commitment
made in 1959.
F. Effectiveness of the Decision. Those who made the decision in
1961 to increase signifMcantly US commitment to the war believed
that the military forces and the political reform of the GVN
would be sufficient to produce the intended positive results.
The US was ill-prepared for a failure of those results to materi-
alize. When they did not, the only recourse was to increase the
military commitment to i higher level
1. The 1961 US response to the po,;t 1959 North Vietnamese at-

tacks represented a significant increase in US commitment to
the RVN, but it was not sufficiently strong tc affect per-
marnently the progress of the war.
2. The US assumed that the root of the GVN's problem was cor-
ruption and inefficiency. It was believed that reforms di-
rected by the Americans would cGrrect these problems.
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I
THE BDM CORPORATION
3. While US authorit-;e3 be I eved that political and govern-

mental reforms were necessary to win the struggle with the
North Vietnames,', there seerid to of no way the US could
force those raforis without oulling out and thereby forfeit-
ing the country to the communisks. Hence the US lost most
of its ieverdge in the GVN.
4. The United Stdt`,rs view I tha. Vietnam situation as an exten-

sion of internaticri communist aggression. As a conse-
quence, it associatau the increased pressure from the Viet-
namese Communists with Khrushchev's pronouncements rather
than internal Vietnamese factors. Thus, the US was ill-
prepared to weigh the positive successes of Diem's govern-
ment and the threat those successes posed to the communists
qvho had expected him to fail.
5. The United States was confident that our experience of
strengthening friendly governmeots (such ad Greece and
Korea) could be repeated in Asia,
A-35
,- A..•
.. ... • : . . ... A . • . ., ..- 1 ,•• .. U.•
THE 8DM CORPORATION
OMES'rIC FACTORS -OREIGN FACTORS S
CONGRE5M8(,NAL AND PUBIC CON. WAR RULATI0:

CERN OVER DIIM'S RIPRESSIVE
HANDING OP THE BUDDHISTS. QL.S- BUDDHIST RIOTS BECAME A
TIONING US SOPPORT OF DIEM POUTICAL MOVEMENT
- ANTI.OIEM H.C. LODGE APOINTED
AMBASADOR TO OVN
9 DIM'S IENERALS APPROACHLD U S

FOR SUPPORT OF COUP
DECISION
0 FALL, 193
"- DECISION TO SUPPORT THE
OVERTHROW OF DIEM AND NA4U
EFFECT OF DECISIONN ON US INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETNAM
* STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, A KEY
WAR STRATEGY, FAILED
• COUP FOLLOWED BY CHAOS, THUS
WdAKENING RVN SECURITY AND SUP. ,
*5USUILT BY AVZOCIATION OEEPENED

US INVOLVEMENT
*SUBSEQUENT REGIMES SZEN AS PUPPETS
OF US
VC CNCOURAGED BY CHAOS AND IN-
CREASED ATTACKS
INSIGe1TS
* U S LEADERS 0DI NOT ANTICIPATE T•4E PROBLEMS CAUSED BY

THE COUP
e BUREAUCRATIC MOMENTUM AND INDLECISION MADE THE AUGUST

DECISION SEEM IRREVERSIt.
4541/78W
Figure A-6, Decision VI: US Decision To Sipport the Overthrovw of Ngo

Dinh riem and Ngo Dinh rlhu
A-37
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Flaw
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THF BDM CORPORATION
VI. DECISION TO SUPPCRT THE OVERTHROW OF NGO DINH DIEM AND NGO DINH
NHU 17/
A. Decision. To suppor" Sou'.n Vietnamese generals' overthrow of

SoLth Vetnam's President Diem and his brother Nhu.
I. When: August 24, 1963, State 0*parti,:jt sent a cable to
W--bassador Lodge in Seigon urging Diem's removal of his
hrother Nhu and stating that. if Diem refused to comply with
US demands, the US could no longer support Diem and would
promote his nverthrow. On August 29, President Kennedy
agreed to support a coup without direct US support if it was
likely to succeed. During October 2 NSC meeting, President
Kennedy favored option 2, below.
2. Principal Decision Makers: It was a struggle between mainly
th~emilitary and CIA on tne one hand, who wpre most con-
cerned about military progress and t' .refore against the
coup' (McNamara, Harkins, Taylor, Lansdale, McCone, Colby,
Richardson), and State Department personnel on the other
hand, who were concerned with political support for GVN
(Harriman, Hilsman, Ball, Ambassador Lodge, Truehart, Bundy,
Rol rt Kennady and Vice President Johnson).
3. Purpose:
a. To pressure Diem to reform and unseat his unpopular

brother Nhu;
b. To disassociate US fromn the repressive South Vietnam
regime;
c. If necessary, to prcnote a cnange of government "if it
appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of mili-
tary effort, ensuring populai support to win the war,
and improving working relations with US".18/
4. Theme. The coup marked a watershed between the commitments

of 7961 and massive military ir'ervention in 1965. By
supporting the Vietnamese generals' coup, the US felt even
more responsible for the fate of South Vietnam.
B. Precedents.
1. In 1965 General Lawton Collins recommended a change in
government. (Gelb, p. 86)
2. In '96i Galbraith visited Saigon, told Washington that we
must get rid of Diem, that a military government would be
better than this "mandarin."
A-38
THE 8 CHE BDM CORPORATION
3. In June 1963, Deputy Chief of Mission William Truehart

Sl
warned Diem that the US might have to disassociate itself
from him if he were not more forthcoming with reform. 19/
C. Influential Factors.
I. Buddhist riots in Hue became a political movement, drawing

world attention to the Diem regime's repression with the
burning bonzes.
2. Diem's repressive policies towards the Buddhists and Madame

Nhu's inflammatory remarks brought severe US domestic criiti-
cism of Diem, raising the question of US support for such a
regime.
3. Kennedy replaced pro-Diem Ambassador Nolting with anti-Diem

Henry Cabot Lodge, partly to demonstrate US disapproval cf
Diem's policies.
4. Diem's generals approached CIA in bid for support of a coup.
D. Options.
1. Mantain the status quo and continue to pressure Diem for

reforms.
2. Follow a "purely correct" relationship, withholding selec-

"I tive aid programs such as for the Special Forces, and show
US disapproval for Diem's policies. Acquiesce xo but Jo not
initiate, any coup.
3. Suspend aid, denounce the regime, and promote a coup.
E. Effecc of the Decision on US Involvement in Vietoam.

1. The Strategic Hamlet program, identified with the Diem
regime, failed.
2. The coup was followed by two years of count.rcoups and

instability, jeopardizing tVe country's security and GVN's
popular support.
3. US guilt by association led to deeper involvement, based on

a need to help them out of their difficulties.
4. Subsequent regimes were perceived to be puppets of the US.

5. The VC, encouraged by the chaos in RVN, increased their
attacks.
A-39
THE BDM CORPORATION
F. Effectiveness of the Decisions.

1. The overthrow of Diem was followed by eight more changes in
the government over the next two years. It was therefore
decided. by ,many, including Lyndon Johnson, that supporting
the coup had been the United States' worst mistake during
the Vietnam war.
2. The US association with the coup further confirmed world
suspicions of the machinations of the American CIA.20/
G. Insights/Lessons
1. The US leaders who participated in this decision did not
anticipate the adverse political and military consequences
of this action. They did not find and prepare someone who
could successfully replace Ulem.
2. American complicity in Diem's overthrow tended to tie the US

morally to the support of succeeding South Vietnamese govern-
ments.
3. Bureaucratic momentum behind the US decision in August was
used later to make that decision Appear irreversible,
especially onpe the US gave the RVNAF generals the go ahead.
4. One cannot foresee the type or extent of violence that may
attend a coup. US leaders did not want Diem killed. The
overthrow risked civil war and dangerously weaken2d RVI''s
defense against the communists.
5. US encouragement of the coup showed a fundamental ignorance
of Vietnamese politics and society. Ambassador U. Alexis
Johnson described the Washington attitude at that time as
one of getting rid of the Sout¶, Vietiamese leadership if it
did not meet US standards.21/
A-40
THE BDM CORPORATION
DOMAESTIC FACTORS FOREIGN FACTORS
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SECURING

U S INTERESTS AND RESPONDING TO 0 AUGUST 2 AND 4, 194: DRV
DIRECT THREAT/ATTACK ATTACKS ON USS MADDOX AND
C. TURNER JOY
U S TREATY COMMITMENTS
DECISION
* AUGUST 10, 1964
0 CONGRESS PASSES SOUTHEAST ASIA QESOLU.

TION - PUBLIC LAW 89.408
EFFECT OF DECISION ON U.S. INVOLVE.

MENT IN VIETNAM
* PERMITTED PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY IN COM-
MITING US TROOPS IN VIETNAM CONFLICT
o PROVIDED VEHICLE FOR ESCALATION OF U S IN-
VOLVEMENT
INSIG-HTS
"* ACTIONIREACTION SYNDROME: U S PERCEPTION OF TONKIN GULF

INCIDENT PROMPTS HASTY PASSAGE OF RESOLUTION
"* LBJ'S INTERPRETATION OF THE RESOLUTION MARKED TME OFFICIAL

ACKPIOWLEDGEMENT OF A PRESIDENT'S INDEPENOEN' POWERS FOR
ACTION/DECISIONS VIS A VIS VIETNAM
4•tl/78W
Figure A-7. Decision VII: Southeast Asia Resolution (Tonkin Gulf

Resol ution)
A-41
THE BDM CORPORATION
VII. SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION - PUBLIC LAW 88-408 (TONKIN GULF RESOLU-
TION)22/
A. Decision. "The Congress approves and supports the determination
of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national
interest and to world peace the maintenance of international
peace and security in Southeast Asia. .... to take all necessary
steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol states of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense TreaTy
requesting 3ssistance in defense of its freedom."23/
1. When: Approved August 10, 1964
2. Princip l Decision Makers: Lyndon B. Johnson and special
viors Rusk, McNamara, Vance, McCone, and Bundy.
3. Purpose: To show a unified front to Southeast Asia and to
provide legal authority for Johnson's future military,
political, economic decisions.
B. Precedents. The historical precedents for this decision show a

gradual shift in 0he balance of power from the Congress to the
President. The key issue here is authority for war.
1. 1945 United Nations Participation Act: Congressional dele-

gation of authority to the President to engage in hostili-
ties if acting pursuant to article 43 of the U.N. collec-
tive peace force agreement approved by Congress.
2. Formosa Resolution - 1955: A-thorizing the President to
employ Armed Forces of US to protect Formosa, the Pesca-
dores, and related territories.
3. Middle East Resolution - 1957: amended 19G1. President is
authorized to assist nation(s) in Middle East in development
of economic and military strength. US can use armed forces
to assist any nation requesting such assistance. 24/
4. War Related: August 5, US attacked DRV torpedo boat bases

and oil storage area.
C. Qptions. The Southeast Asia Resolution was passed in Congress
w-t ittle opposition and discussion of alternative actions.
One senator who was wary of the new resolution, Senator Wayne
Morse, called it a "pre-dated resolution of war." He believed
A-42
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THE BDM CORPORATION
the passage of this resolution, which provided the President

"war-making powers in the absence of a declaration of war," to be
"a historic mistake."25/
1. Foreign:
a. The US had established treaty ties and assistance
agreements with South Vietnam and it was widely
believed in 1964 that the US did indeed have vital
interests in the security of the region.
1. December 23, 1950: Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement
2. February 19, 1955: SEATO

b. The PRC and USSR were active in the SEA region and the
US wanted to counter this.
1. PRC and USSR agreements with Cambodia: May 9-17,
1956.
2. Sihanouk demands that the US change its policy or
he will request aid from the USSR. (July, 1960)
2. Domestic: There was popular support for securing US inter-

ests abroad, especially in face of an attack.
3. War-Related: The August 2, 3 and 4, 1964 attacks on the USS
Maddox and C. Turner Joy directly influenced this decision.
E. Effect of the Decision on US Involvement in Vietnam.
1. Southeast Asia Resolution represents the vehicle oF author-
V
ity by which escalation of the conflict was accomplished.
2. The May 1970 Cooper-Church Amendment represents both the
turning point of public tolerance for the war and Congress's
recognition of need to curb the powers of the presidency.
1. Use of this type of resolution for similar conflicts is both

legal and reasonable (vs. declaration of war).26/ Neverthe-
less, it is this law which creates the issue of authority
for war, as well as generating possible court decisions.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
2. The resolution served as the basis for all involvement in

Vietnam, from August 10, 1964, until its repeal during th3
Cambodian incident.
G. Insights.
1. A common perception of the Southeast Asia Resolution is that
it was hastily passed as a result of the Gulf of Tonkin
incident, without Congress having a chance to understand the
real implications of this grant of power to the President.
However, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee William
Fulbright did clearly explain the implications to the
Senate, so these charges of deception (which arose 3 years
later) are probably unjustified.
[ 2. Awatershed in history as the Resolution was interpreted by
Johnson as providing independent powers to the President in
terms of involvement in Vietnarm.
i4
A-44
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THE BDM CORPORATION
* LOSS OF AMERICAN LIVES TO VC

ATTACKS HEIGHTENED AMERICAN * NEED TO COUNTER PRC AND USSR
SUPPORT FOR REPRISAL ATTACKS AID TO AND SUPPORT FOR DRV
e NEED TO PUNISH 0RV AND VC FOR

ATTACKS
9 ORV TROOPS INFILTRATIN43 SVN IN

INCREASING NUMBERS
DECISION
* DECISION TO CONDUCT AIR STRIKES

AGAINST TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IN ViETNAM
* SERIOUS ESCALATION OF US INVOLVEMENT
* INCREASED INVOLVEMENT MADE ANY US

WITHDRAWAL MORE DIFFICULT
INSIGHTS
* BOMBING FAILED TO DETER DRV INSURGENCY
9 G;IADUATED ESCALATION WAS MET BY DRV STEP BY STEP
9 BOMBING'S FAILURE LED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF TROOPS
4541/78W
Figure A-8. Decision VIII: US Declsion To Conduct Air Strikes Against

Targets in Niorth Vietnam
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Vl.I. DECISION TO CONDUCT AIR STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM 27/
A. Decision. To bomb North Vietnam.,
1. When: March 1964 contingency plans were made. June 1964
='F selected targets. December 1964 forces were put on
stand-by for action. February 7, 1965 air strikes were
carried out in retaliation for VC attacks on Pleiku.
2. Principal Decision Makers: President Johnson, JCS, NSC, and
special advisors McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Vance, and McCone.
3. Purpose: The war was going very badly. "Early in January
196t, aylor sent in a report concluding that "we are pre-
sently on a losing track and must risk a change... to take
no positive action now is to accept defeat in the fairly
near future. That was the view of every responsible mili-
tary adviser in Vietnam and in Washington."28/ The US
response was provoked by the February 6 VC attack. The ai¾"
campaign called Rolling Thunder was based on:
a. The theory that an air campaign was low cost and low
risk.
b. The hope that the bombing campaign would lessen VC
violence.
c. The desire to punish DRV.
d. The need to raise the morale of GVN & RVNAF.
e. The limited expectation that communist logistic support
would be impeded.
B. recedents
Southeast Asia Resolution of August 19, 1964.
2. US air strike reprisals for Gulf of Tonkin attacks of August

1964.
h5. JCSM 746-64 of August suggesting provoking DRV into action
to justify US bombing in the North.
4. September 7, 1964, JCS furnished a list of 94 targets for
air strikes.
5. Air interdiction operations in 1964 against Ho Chi Minh

Trail in Laotian Panhandle.
A-46
THE BDM CORPORATION
C. Opti2ons.
1. Withhold air support.
2. Air support in South Vietnam only.
3. Air interdiction in Laos only.
4. Bomb/interdict targets in DRV.
1. Foreign:
a. In late 1964, DRV began sending regular troops to the
South in increasing numbers.
b. Nead to counter PRC and USSR aid to and support for
DRV.
c. Communist' attacks beginning with Tonkin Gulf incidents,
including VC attacks against Americans in Pleiku,
Saigon, and Qui Nhon.
d. South Vietnamese military and political leaders agreed
to bombing policy and sent air sorties into Laos.
2. Domestic: Loss of American lives to VC attacks, especially
in Qui Nhon February 1965, heightened American suoport for
reprisal attacks.
3. War-Related:
a. The State Department ' s 1965 White Paper documented DRV

infiltration: 71% of the com•munists in RVN were North-
erners.
b. The RVNAF was determined as not capable ýf defeating
the PAVN or the PLAF.
E. Effect of the Decision on US Involvement in Vietnam
1. Bombing the North was a serious escalation of US involve-
ment. It deepened US commitment to RVN and investment in
the war, called public and world attention to the way, and
could have provoked Chinese or Soviet intervention. It also
brought some world sympathy to the North Vietnamese as
victims of American fire power.
A-47
THE BOM CORPORATION
2. Rombing the North signaled a changc in the ground rules of

the war. no longer was North Vietnam inmmune to reprisals
for its aggression in the South.
3. This increased involvement made US withdrawal more difficult
and changed the war into a "white ,nan's war" with less RVNAF
responsibility for the burden of fighting it.
4. The bombings' ineffectiveness pavec the way for a commitment

cf US combat troops.
F. Effectiveness of the Decision. The bombing of North Vietnam
failed to hc.lt suppol't of the insurgency from the North, and did
little to deter the VC attacks in South Vietnam. Although the
bombing raised the morale of RVN temoorarily, it did not signifi-
cantly punish the DRV nor did it appreciably interdict the flow
of men and supplies being sent from the North to the South. The
bombing was more effective in 1972 because oF the use of "smart
bombs." See Decision XIV.
G. Insights. The authority for this action was based on the South-
east Asia Resolution, which gave the president authority to repel
attacks and to assist any protocol state of SEATO in its defense.
The bombing was done in a graduated approach, leaving open the
option of further escalation or de-escalation depending on
Hanoi's reactions. Unfortunately the bombing campaigns (FLAMING
DART I & II) failed to restrain the support from the North.
Hanoi ad t,sted to the graduated pressure in bombing and was not
deterred; the US failed to convince Hanoi of its resolve in this
contest. More important, the US failed to realize how much will
and determination the DRV had to win this war.
A-48
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THE BDM CORPORATION
DOMESTIC FACTORS FOREGN FACTORS
• PEKING rt MOSCOW RELLICOSE OVER

a ADVISORS URGE ,1SCALATION TO BOMBING
REVERSE FHe TREND, OF THE WAR
* SUKARNO LEAVES UN.. CAMPAIGNS
* GROWING DOMESTIC, OPPOSITION AGAINST MALAYSIA
* V!ETr.'AM, CHAOS IN RVN. ENEMY

CLOSE TC TAKING OVER
DECISION
* MARCH 8, 1965
* INTRODUCE GROUND TROOPS INTO VIETNAM:

FROM
ROLE ADVISORY ROLE TO ACTIVE COMBAT
* 3500 MARIhES LAND IN DANANG AS RE.

QUESTED BY COMUSMACVINESTMORELAND
EFFECT OF DECISION ON US
INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
* ESCALATION. NSAM 328: ACCEPTANCE 13'?THE

PRESIDENT THAT US TROOPS WOULD ENGAGE
IN COMBAT
* PROPOSAL TO DEPLOY THIRD COUNTRY FORCES

ALSC, E.G. KOREA, AUSTRALIA
INSIGHTS
* THIS DECISION MARKED A MAJOR CHANGE IN OUR ROLE FROM
ADVISOR/S'JPPORTER TO ACTIVE COMBATANT. IT BEGAN THE

AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR AND GRADUALLY PUT RVNAF IN A
SECONDARY ROLE
* OUR MORE ACTIVE ROLE REINFORCED THE PERCEPTION OF 3OME

COUNTRIES THAT RVN WAS A "PUPPET REIMIM'
e THE M10IA SAW THIS ANNOUNCSMENT AS A P(,ISSIBLE DECEPTION:

TROOPS ANOUNCED AS PROTECTION, YET WITHIN WEEKS THEY TAKE
ON A COMBAT ROLE
4541/'/8W
Figure A-9. Decision IX: US Decision To Introduce Ground Troops Into

Vietnam
A-49
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THE BDM CORPORATION
IX. THE INTRODUCTION OF GROUND TROOPS INTO VIETNAM 29/

A. toof--Wba-•n g. To send 3,500 Marines (Marine Expeditionary Brigade)
Decision.
In February, after a dramatic increase in activity

initiated by the Viet Cong, the United States responded
by increasing its own level of commitment to the Repub-
lic of Vietnam, For the first time, US jet aircraft
were authorized to support the RVNAF in ground opera-
tions in the South without restriction. In immediate
retaliation for guerrilla raids on US installations in
the South, US aircraft also began bombing targets in
the southern reaches of North Vietnam. In early March,
the latter program evolved into Rolling Thunder, the
sustained bombing of the North. Also, during March,
two US Marine battalions were landed at Da Nang on the
coast of Central Vietnam. The air base at Da Nang was
a major base of the Rolling Thunder bombing, and the
mission of the Marines was to strengthen its defenses.
Those troops represented the first US ground combat
commitment to the Asian mainland since Korea. 30/
Up to this point we had agreed with Generals MacArthur and Ridg-
way that we should never agaii get involved in Asian land war-
fare.
1. When: March 8, 1965.
2. Principal Decision Mkers: COMUSMACV General Westmoreland
requested this c'cop commitment on February 21, 1965. The
decision was approved February 26, 1965, by President
Johnson.
3. Purpose:
a. "To occupy and defend critical terrain features in
order to secure the airfield and, as directed, com-
munications facilities, US supporting installations
against attack. The US Marine Forces will not, repeat
will not, engage in day-to-day actions against the Viet
Cong."31/
b. To reverse tht downward trend of the war.

4. Theme: The introduction of regular combat troops was a
dlamatic change in the nature of the American involvement
and redefined American commitments.
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THE BDM CORPORATION I
B. Precedents. In February, the US began an incremental bombing
campaign, Rolling Thunder, in order to bolster RVNAF and slow the
infiltration from the North. Both the bombing and ground troops
were preceded by VC violatons of the Geneva accords.
C. Options. The bomting campaign did not halt the VC violence or
bring a response from Hanoi. This left the following options
open for consideration:
1. Withdrawal without achieving US objectives.
2. Continuation of the war in the same manner as before and

thus, watch South Vietnam crumble.
3. Escalation of the bombing. This option was rejected in fear
of PRC intervention.
4. Commitment of ground forces. The main objection to this
option was that once ground troops were in, it would be
almost impossiblhý to reverse the policy to the former non-
combatant one. The main question regarded the number of
troops to commit. The suggestions outlined ranged from two
battalions to several divisions. However, if tio many were
committed, this would indicate to RVNAF that we h~d no faith
in them.
D. Influential Factors [
Foreign:
.
a. Peking ana Moscow raised severe objections to the
bombing campaign.
b. President Sukarno pulled out of the United Nations in
January 1,965, campaigned against Malaysia.
2. Domestic:
The US felt it needed to show its strength and deter-
mination.
3. War-Relateid:
a. US aircraft deployments to RVN early in 1965 to initi-
ate Rolling Thunder increased the need to protect Da
Nang air base and supporting installations against PLAF
(VC) attack. MACV had estimated that there were about
twelve enemy battalion totalling 6,000 men within
striking distance of the airbase.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
b. in early February 195, a US Marine corps light anti-

aircraft missile (LAA") battalion was assigned to the
base. General John T:rockmorton. DEPCOMUSMACV, recom-
mended that a full Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)
be deployed to protect the base. General Westmoreland
requested two Marine battalions from the JCS. Ambassa-
dor Taylor and Admiral Sharp concurred, although Taylor
had misgivings that such a deployment would lead to
escalating troop commitments.
C. US advisors,inciuding Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, were

urging escalation, especially bombing.
d. The State Department's 1965 White Paper documented DRV
infiltration: 71% of the Communists in RVN were North-
erners.33/
e. The RVNAF was seen as not capable of defeating the DRV
and NLF.
f. The use of ground troops was considered as possiblý
temporary; President Johnson felt he could pull them
out if the combat troops failed to make i difference.
g. There was a hope that the bombing would bring results
and that the US would not have to send any more
troops. 34/
h. The need to bolster (VN morale was felt.
E. Effect of decision on our involvement in Vietnam.
1. Lea to further escalation of the w&r:
a. Lqd to authorization for combat, June 26.
b. By the end of 1965, the US had committed 18(1,OOO troops

to RVN.
c. The JCS proposed deploym'rnt of one Korean and two

Americarn divisions against the VC.35/
d. NSAM 328 was a p~votal document, marking "the accep-

tance by the President of the United States of the
concept that US troops would engage in offensive ground
operations against Asiar insurgerts."36/
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THE BDM CORPORATION
2. Led to much criticism from communist countries, some of

which was picked up by groups in the US.
F. Effectiveness of the decision.
1. Tt achieved the purpose of base protection and later active
combat, bolstering South Vietnam.
2. The decision was jLstified in May due to VC offensives, the
fact that ARVN was near collapse, and 4he high rate of ARVN
desertions; hence, US troops were very much needed.
G. Insights.
1. The deployment of Marines to Da Nang marked a crucial change
in our role in Vietnam from advisor/supporter to active com-
batant. In fact, we Americanized the war from then until
1969, and RVNAF gradually took on a secondary role. It was
a big step in the escalation of the war because once the men
and the support were installed, it would be very difficult
to reverse the decision and send them back home. As it
turned out, they were very much needed.
2. On June 30, 1965, William Bundy warned that unless the
performance of the South Vietnamese improved substantially,
our intervention in force "would appear to be turning the
conflict into a white man's war with the US in the shoes of
the French."37/ By our tzking over the combat role in the
war, the GVN was more justifiably called a "puppet regime"
by the DRV.
3. The land~nv of the Marines was another case of the media:s
perception of a possible deception of the American public,
which reinforced the credibility gap and later the lack of
suppcrt of the war. There was a good deal of debate concer-
ning whether to send troops, how many, and how they would be
used. The Chairman of the JCS and the Thief of Staff of the
Army were determined to see the deployment of troops for
"uniimited combat operations." Because of the concern that
the PRC might enter the war, CINCPAC contingency plans were
drawn up. Yet the announcement concerning the landing of
US Marines stressed that they were to be used only for
protection of US installations. And Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, appearing on "Face the Nation" •he day before the
marines landed, said that the Marines would not engage in
offensive operations against the VC. Twelve days later,
JCMS 204-65 pruposed that US troops be deployed to GVN for
active operations against the VC. The President decided on
April 1, 1065 to allow the involvement of US ground combat
units in the war against the insurgents.38/
A-53
THE BDM CORPORATION
* NEEDS OF THE "GREAT SOCIET'" VS. ADMINISTRATION'S BCLIEF THAT

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AMERICAN DEBPtE ON MOBIUZATION
WOULD ENCOURAGE HANOI
-z FLECTIONS APPROACHING
MOOILIZATION FOR VN WOULD
EFFECT OF MEDIA COVERAGE ON WEAKEN USINATO DF.FENSE OF
AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF Tht% •,Pt EUROPE
LBJ FwLT HE HAD MORE CONWRC.L -:)F

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR BV OCI I'
MOBILIZING
DECISION
e'ULY 1965. NOV 1966, FEB 1968
* DECIS0)N NOT TO MOMILIZE THE RESERVES
EFFECT OF DEl.ISION ON U S INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETNAM
""CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF
"TRAINED PERSONNEL
"* CONCEALED DEPTH OF U S INVOLVEMENT IN VIET.
NAM H
"• NOT MOBILIZING LESSENED CREDIBILITY OF U S
POLICY - FROM HANOI'S VIEWPOINT
"* CROWING GAP BETWEEN MILITARY AND

POLITICAL VIEWS OF THE WAn
INSIGHTS
* THE LACK OF A CONSISTENT, CLEARLY DEFINED POLICY ON

MOBILIZATION HINDERED ThE WAR EFFORT
* MOBILIZATION BECAME A POLITICAL DECISION. OUTWEIGHING

MILITARY STRATEGIC NEEDS
4541/78W
Figure A.-1, Decisi.n X: US Decision(s) [lot To Mobilize the Reserves
A- 55
THE BDM CORPORATION
X. DECISIONS NOT TO MOBILIZE THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 39/

A. Decision. Not to mobilize Reserve Components but rather to
continue to depend on the draft for military manpower.
I. When: President Johnson decided not to mobilize during his
a-dmiiTnistration (beginning in July, 1965).
2. Principal Decision Makers: The decision not to mobilize the
Reserves was made by President Johnson, supported by
McGeorge Bundy and other civilian advisers. The JCS and
Generals Westmoreland, Johnson, Taylor and Admiral Sharp
advocated mobilizition.
3. Purposes:
a. Minimize the public perception of the depth of American
involvement in Vietnam, and therefore continue the guns
and butter policy.
b. Avoid using the Reserve components to avoid Corqres-
sional dissatisfaction like that which followe, the
1961 (Berlin) mobilization.
4.
H-VieTedm
Theme: Although the JCS argued that the US could lot meet
force requirements and simultaneously fulfill other
US global commitments like NATO, and that the US could not
achieve its war objectives at low cost and quickly unless
the reserves were mobilized, President Johnson nevertheless
refused to mobilize because it would expose the depth of US
involvement and jeopardize his Great Society programs.
B. Precedents.
0 Berlin 1961. Reserve component personnel wer? mobilized but
were not deployed; the domestic distress which it caused
seemed unjustified and brought Coýngressional criticism.
C, Options
-. The President could declare a national emergency and call up
a maximum of one million men. Rejected because the Vietnam
War was riot considered an emergency and US physical security
was not threatened. President Johnson wanted to keep the
war a "low-key" involvement in the public eye.
A-5f
THE BDM CORPORATiON
2. The president could ask Congres' for a joint resoluti.

authorizing the call up of Reserves. Rejected because ic
would mean a major congressional debate which would jeopard-
ize Johnson's domestic programs, the guns and butter policy,
and such a debate would encourage Hanoi.40/
3. JCS urged mobilization despite above objections in order to:
a, Unify the country in support of the war effort,
b. Conduct the war more vigorously and thus end the war.
c. Signa; to the enemy US resolve.
d. Provide necessary combat and service support which the
Reserves could provide.
e. Avoid weakening the worldwide US military posture,
including NATO.
f, Obtain the good quality, wel'-trai,:ed junior officer
leadership that was in tt.e Re';,rve component.
D. Influential Factors
1. Foreign:
a. Recognition thit an American debate on mobilization
showing internal dissent would encourage Hanoi.
b. Mobilization for Vietnam would have serious impact on
NATO allies vhose primary concern w;.s Western Europe.
2. Domestic:
1. Fear that mobilization would erode public support for
the administration.
2. Increased public desire to disengage from the war after
Tet 1968.
3. LBJ fet that he had more ccntrol of the conduct of the
war by not asking Corgress to authorize a cal-up of
the Reserves. 41/
Effect of the Gecision -in US involvment in Vietrnam.

1. The forzes committed io Vietnam suffered a serious imbalance
when the requir,'d Reserve component comoat support and
combat service suoplurt uanits were not activated
1' A-5?
THE BDM CORPORATION
2. Reserve Component equipment was transferred to newly organ-

ized active units, thus debilitating many Reserve units.
3. The depth of US involvement in Vietnam was concealed from
tha American public until about 1967, later resulting in
widespread disillusionment.
4. Manpower requirements could not be met effectively by selec-
tive service resulting in wasteful personnel policies and
practicies such as early-outs, etc.
5. Training and equipping draftees was more time consuming and
expensive than using reserves.
6. The Reserve Components became a haven for legal draft avoid-
ance.
7. Not mobilizing lessened the credibility of US Vietnam policy
in the ayes of Hanoi.
1. The guns and butter policy continued, to the long-term
detriment of US economic health.
2. Not mobilizing dictated the policy of gradualism.
G. Insights.
1. Without reserve mobilization, active forces could only be
introducted into RVN incrementally, contributing to a policy
of gradualism.
2. Political imperatives outweighed military rationale in the
1965 non-mobilization decision to the surprise and dismay of
the JCS, but that issue did not cause any senior military
officials to resign.
3. The administration's manpower policies extant in 1965 con-
tributed to making the Reserve Components a haven for legal
draft avoidance during hostilities.
4. The token call-up of Reserves in 1968 was "too little too
late" to be of any significance vis ' vis the war's outcome
or Hanoi's perception of US will and determination.
A-58
THE 8DM CORPORATION
0 PUBLIC • WASHINGTON PRESSURE TO

0142CALATE & WITHDRAW FROM * WORLD CRITICISM OF WAR •
VIETNAM BOhwINC
0 BALNCIE OF PAYMENTS, GOLD CRISIS * USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

* CIA : OTHER STUDIES IMISliC . DEVELOPING CRISIS IN WEST
* '5J UNPOPULAR. LOST NEW HAMP. RERUN

UHIRE PRIMARY
DECISION
"* MARCH 31, 1064

"* POIUCY CHANGE FROM COMMITMENT TO
DISENGAGEMaNT
- BOMB HALT NORTH OF fth PARALLEL
- SEEK NEGOTIATIONS
- BUILD UP ARVN. VIETNAMIZATION
- 13.500 INCREASE OiNSTIAD OF 205.601 IN U S

FORCES
L-
IJ ANNOUINCIS HE WILL NOT INTER "Ul1
ELECTION
4
EFFECT OF DECISION OF U S INVOLVEMENT
IN VIET?4AM
* APRIL 3. IMS HANOI WILLNG TO SEND REPRESIN.

TATIVES
* HALT HAILED MY FOREIGN O DOMESTIC CRITICS
* L8J ABLE TO CONCENTRATE ON WAR
eOf-ESCALATION AND EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL
INSIGHTS
* PUBLUC OPINION AFFECTS U S FOREIGN b DOMESTIC POUCY
a MASSIVE BOMBING BEFORE '72 INNOVATIONS WAS INiFFECrTIVE
* MEDIA HAS IMPORTANT EFFECT ON PUBLUC OPINION, Ah,3 ON U S

LEAVIRS
* IN OUERF4ILLA WARFARE. MILITARY VICTORY ILLUSIVE
4541/78W
Figure A-l. Decision XI: US Policy Decision To Change From Commitment

to Disengagement
A-59
p. '-
THE BDM CORPORATION
XI. POLICY CHANGE FROM COMMITMENT TO DISENGAGEMENT 42/
A. Decision. LBJ's March 31, 1968 speech in which he announces:

0 Bomb halt north of 20th parallel.
* Seeking negotiations with Hanoi. Will send Ambassadors
Harriman and Thompson as our representatives.
* Will build up South Vietnam economically and militarily

(Vietnamization). ARVN is beginning to mobilize.
0 Will increase troop strength by only 13,500 (instead if
206,000 that was requested).
* Will not run for reelection in order to unify the country
and concentrate on the war and domestic problems.
This point in the history of the Vietnam war was the crest of the
wave in escalation and led irreversibly to disengagement. Like
Dien Bien Phu, Tet broke US illusions and hopes of progress in
the war, and it helped break President Johnson, who so fervently
had wanted to succeed in Vietnam. Althcugh Tet was a US/RVN
military victory (realized only later), t~e immediate result was
political and psychological d~feat there and in the US. The
combination of domestic dissent, econor.dic problems, and deep
pessimism concerning the war led to the decisiou to seek negotia-
tions more seriously and buy time, and eventually to disengage.
Hence, our policy changed from escalation and commitment to de-
escalation, seeking negotiations, and Vietnamihation.
1. When: LBJ decided in February-March 1968
2. Principal Decision Makers: LBJ and Rusk reached these

ecisions after exhaustive studies were submitted by the
CIA, Defense, State, NSC, JCS, and Treasury Department. On
March 18, 1968 he also consulted the 30 "wise men" who were
friends and confidants outside the government. They
included: George Ball, Dean Acheson, General Matthew Ridg-
way, General Maxwell Taylor, Cyrus Vance, McGeo'ge Bundy,
Douglas Dillon, and General Omar Bradley. The briefings
they heard were pessimistic.
3. Purpose: To bring a change in the stalemate of the war by
political solutions:
1. To reduce casudlties
2. To recover POWs
A-60
THE BDM CORPORATION
4. Theme: This was a turnirg point in the war from an escala-

T-T1ii, action-reaction strategy. It was realized that no
matter how many troops we sent and no matter how much we
bombed, the enemy would always win in the end through per-
sistence, determination, will and patience. "They will win
politically, psychologically and eventually militarily.
Time is on their side. The guerrilla wins if he doesn't
lose; the conventional army loses if it doesn't win...
Henceforth, no matter how effective our actions, the preva-
lent strategy could no longer achieve its objective within a
period or, with force levels politically acceptable to the
American people. "43/
B. Precedents for the Decisions.
1. Tet Offensive. Military victo-y, political defeat there and
in the US.
a. Vietnam: VC gained control of much of the population
through fear and coercion. "We had military successes
that could not be translated into permanent political
advanta ;e. "44/
b. US: Media's reporting on Tet caused increased antiwar
sentiments and activities, increaing determination to
get out of t wwar.
2. Precedents for the bombing halt and serious attempts to
negotiite with Hanoi:
a. M:nila Pledge: We will withdraw as they withdraw.
b. zan Antonio formula (Sept. 29, 1967): "The US is
willing to stop the aerial and naval bombardment of
North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to produc-
tive discussions." (LBJ).
c. Bombing pause. to promote diplomatic pressure on Hanoi
towards peace talks.
d. Efforts to have 3rd countries such as Britain and USSR
promote - ice talks.
C. Options present•u.
1. The desired goals included:
a. Making it costly as possible for DRV to continue the
war.
A-61
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THE BDM CORPORATION
b. Defeat of the VC and DRV forces in GVN.

c. Extension of GVN control over all of South Vietnam.
2. The options which were considered included:
a. Escala';ion of bombing. This option was rejected
because it would risk a wider war, thereby rousing the
PRC and USSR.
b. Increases in troop strength by 200,000 - 500,000 more
US forces. This option was rejected because of:
!) It would mean politically costly mobilization of
our Reserve forces.
2) Hanoi's ability to keep up the current ratio,

matching our increases; heoce, increases promise
no victory.
3) The presence of 700,000 or more US military in

Vietnam would mean total Americanization of the
war.
4) GVN determination and will to win the war would

lessen, and the GVN would be less likely to
reform.
5) It would worsen the domestic crisis at home,
6) It would cost us too much, considering our finan-

cial problems.
c. Remain as we are. Rejected because no progress was
within sight.
d. Demographic strategy of population security. Meant a
small increase in US tr,'ops, and protection for the
heavily populated areas. Province capitals would be
garrisoned by ARVN. This option was rejected because
it would mean increased fighting in the cities, and
would give the enemy the ability to mass near the
population centers.
e. Withdraw. This option was not seriously considered at
this time.
A-.62
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THE BDM CORPORATION
1. Foreign:
a. USS Pueblo incident (Jan 23)
b. West Berlin crisis developing
c. World criticism of war and bombing
2. Domestic:
a. Gold crisis; US in largest deficit since 1950; domestic
programs require funding.
b. Growing pessimism and dissent at home and in Washing-
ton. 30 "wisemen" meeting and Asian scholar' s caucus
in Philadelphia of 375 scholars: 81% agreed tnat US
had already lost the war in terms of stated American
objectives.45/
c. CIA study, 10-month outlook: even if we sent 200,000
more, the study predicted that no positive results
could be achieved.46/
d. LBJ becomes increasingly unpopular. The Gallup poll in
March indicated that only 36% of the population
approved his conduct in office and only 26% approved
his conduct of the war. New Hampshire primary results J,
indicate: 57% McCarthy, 35% Johnson; Kennedy entered
the race..47/
e. Th• re,.i•r•t f4),, 206,000 troops was leaked to the New

York TiLjip W, -larch 10 and set off a new debateT--
-ordgress -and tne press, most of it highly critical.
This w.is a 1cion to peace candidates McCarthy and
Kennedy and resulted irnone-third of the House of
Representatives sponsoring a resolution which called
for &n imhvediate cong1-essional review of US policy in
Southealt Asia. 48/
3. War-Rolated Facto, s: Decision for a bombing halt.
a. To crut down pilot casualties.

b. The partial bombing halt may br".ng Hanoi to negotiating
table, or lessen VC violence. The halt shifts the
responsibility for peaci from the US to Hanoi. "I
think there will be tremendous world pr:skji-e on Hanoi
now to respond favorably in kind."4_9/
A-63
THE BDM CORPORATION
c. The bombing in the north was estimated by some to be

only 5-10% effective.
d. To lessen the criticism of US bombing.
E. Effect of Decisions on US involvement in Vietnam.

1. Hanoi responded to negotiations proposal on April 3; they
will send representatives to discuss US withdrawal ana
termination of the war.
2. Led to de-escalation and Vietnamization: strengther ARV so

that they might take on a more active role in conduct of the
war, thereby allowing for the start of US withdrawa.
F. Effectiveness of the Decisions.

I. World and American approval of the decisions.
2. LBJ, now out of the campaign race, was able to spend his
energies on the war and domestic programs as he had wished.
3. However, American dissent continued throughout. 1968; hence,
these decisions did not serve to unify America (although
other factors were also involved here.)
4. Purpose was achieved as regards de-escalation and eventual
withdrawal.
G. Insights.
1. "Military power wichout political cohesiveness and support
is an empty shell."50/
2. Public dissent does affect US foreign and domestic policy.
3. Massive bombing without the "smart bombs" of 1972 was inef-
fective and harmed our image.
4. The media has ý very important influence on the public and
Washington, e.g., Tet resulting in political victory for
Hanci; the NY Times and Washington Post, tending to be
critical of the war, were read by our e-iders and influien-
tiaI people.
A-64
THE BDM CORPORAIrON
DOMESTIC FAiCTORS FOREIGN FACTORS
0 DOMESTIC REACTION TO WAR

SW.W'Rt CRITICISM OF WAR
SINFLATION * FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVISIEFPORVS
EMPHASIS ON VIETPMAMIZ&TIUN i ULSSIERE (MIMIAST PRC
NEED
PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK ON WAR

•PRESSURE OF POWIMIA ISSUE
DECISION
6 MARCH iMS
P OLICY DECISION ON NEGOTtATIOKS,

WITHDRAWAL AND VIETNAMIZATION
EFFECT OF DECISION ON U S INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETNAM
o COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL MADE
* rEDUCED U S TROOP INVOLVEMENT, ATTEMPTS

Ii STRENCTHEN RVN
* DID NOT CONSIRAIN BOMBSING .
INSIGHTS
* VIETNAMIZATION APPLIED 100 %.ATE
D
cOMESTIC OUTCRY IN LATE 1110's SHOULD HAVE SERVED AS SIGN
THAT ANY ýUTI4RE ESCALAT!'N 1I.E..BOMBINGS AND INVASION OF
CAMBODIA ETC.) W,,;,JLD ALSO SEMET WITH SEVERE OPPOSITION
o DRAMATIC DISENGAGEMENT HAD TO OFIACCOMKtISHED BY

NOVEMBER 1872. PRIOR TO NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
a VIETNAMIZATION WAS NOT COMPLE1 ED DUE TO LACK OF

TECHNICALLY GUALIFIED RVNAF Pt-1'00NNEL
L
4541/78W
Figure A-12. Decision XII: US Policy Decision on Negotiations, Withdrawal,

and Vietnamization
A-65
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THE BDM CORPORATION
XII. POLICY DECISION ON NEGOTIATIONS, WITHDRAWAL AND VIETNAMIZATION 51/

A. Decision. Three point policy decision taken by the Nixon Admini-
straion in thee first months of Nixon's tee'm in office on with-
drawal, Vietnamization and negotiations.
* Negotiation policy would involve insistence on mutual with-
drawal of ORV and US troops with adequate inspection proce-
dures.
0 A major step-up to be taken in pruparing RVNAF to stand
alone, i.e., Vietnamization.
* Development of a specific timetable for a progressive with-
drawal of US t,'oops no matter whiat )rogre;i is made at Paris
Peace talks.
I. When: March 27-28, 1969 (made official' with NSDM 9-
rpr-i! 1, 1969).
2. Principal Decision-Makers: Nixon, Kissinger, and the NSC.
3. Purpose: Based on Nixon's campaign promise, to initiate a

de-escalation of US troop in~olvement in Vietnam by creating
a more capable, self-sufficient RVNAF and to allow for
"peace with honor" by calling or a mutual withdrawal of US
and DRV forces.
4. Themes: US to maintain its credibility by building up its
aly's competence while simultaneously placating the anti-
war people's sentiments expressed during the latter part of
the sixties. The Vietnamization theme cin be viewed as
partial implementation of the Nixon Doctrine (albeit unpro-
claimed at this point) in that both emphasized aid rather
than direct involvement as integral components, -7T.e., of
both the Vietnamizai`on policy and Nixon Doctrine).
B. Precedents. Several important precedents for each of the three
points outlined in the March 1969 decision can be identified:
1. Point on negotiations: Nixon qualified the US position on
negotiations with the DRV, but the option of utilizing
negotiations as a viable method for ending the conflict had
beer considered by LBJ virtually throughout his entire
full-term in office. In 1968, after LBJ partially halted
the bombing campaigns against the DRy, Hanoi surprisingly
indicated its willingness to discuss negotiations. The
negotiation process began in the same year.
A-66
..0I
THE t3DM CORPORATION
2. Point on Vietnimization: This point was actually a continu-

ation of a policy option adopted by LBJ ,n 1967 as well as a
reflection of earlier statements made by JFK that the RVN
should be/is fightinq its own war. However, overall enipha-
sis/dedication to the Vietnamization process was far from
adequate up to the time Nixon entered office; hence a
rescatement and reaffirmation of Vietnamization as an essen-
tial policy for US government to pursue vis h vis Vietnam.
Several st.atements made during the Johnson administration
serve as illustrations of preýcedents for the reaffirmation
of the Vietnamization policy point:
a. March 1968 - Clifford Task Force proposes urgent effort

to upgrade RVNAF,
b. ISA (Office of International Security Affairs) and DOD
memoranda in March 1968 which included statements
emphasizing the need to strengthen/modernize RVNAF.
c. LBJ statemerts specifying the need for RVNAF to be

strengthened in order that they assume more of the
burden of fighting. It 5hould also be stressed that
the urgency of Vietnamization was strongly felt in 1968
due to the initiation of the negotiating process and
the bombing halt. The JCS felt especially pressed to
urgrade RVNAF before a possibie cease-fire/force freeze
c uld be implemented as part u1othe negotiation process
(obviously, at this time, JCS considered it plausible
that the negotiation process could move a:ong at an
accel prated pace).
3. Point on Withdrawal: While the Nixon/NSC point called for a
spe(:ific timetable for a progressive US troop wichdrawal,
LBJ did set the precedent for this pcflicy poirt by calling
for force limitations.
C. Options Presented.
1. The major hnd obvious option presented prior -to the Nixon/
NSC polic(y decision was to increase US involvement, posZ-
Tet, by ..e'iding an increased number of US troops to Vietnam.
In 1968 there were tw,' possible plans of action, both of
which were coosidered ways of prov;ding the "extra push"
needed -to maintain the tactical gains of 1968 and to achieve
greater futurx. successes, eventually speeding up the end ot
US involvement.
11. f.linimut,, es~en'.ial force of ,0.)500 troop increase
A-67
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THE RDM CORPORATION
b. Optimal force of 201,250 idditional men.
2. Another option, presented by General, Westmoreland, was to

speed up the negotiation process etc. by employing small
tactical nuclear weapons. This option, formulated and
rejected during the Johnson administration, may have been
considered during the Nixon years.
3. Based solely on the wording of the Nixon/NSC policy point on

withdrawal (i.e. - "withdrawal no matter what progress is
made at the Paris Peace Talks"), it seems probable that an
option considered (but rejected) regarding withdrawal could
have made US troop withdrawal contingent on progress made at
the talks. Verification of this as a policy option is
necessary. Plausible reasons for its rejection:
a. The slow pace at the Paris talks
b. Nixon's camnaign promises
c. Public reaction.
0. Itifluential Factors
1. Foreign:
a. World criticism of US involvement in Vietnam, espe-

cially post-Tet, wds extremely vocal and harsh.
b. Foreign policy time and effort was required in other

areas, i.e., the Mid-East, and in attempts at rap-
prochement with the USSR.
2. Domestic: Domestic reaction to the war greatly influenced

tne formulation of this policy. The following domestic
factors served as influences:
a. Media coverage of Tet (and public reaction to Tet), the

My Lai incident and the war in general.
b. Spiraling inflation.
c. Laird's emphasis on "Vietnamization" as a #1 priority.
Pessimistic apprctisals of US position in Vietnam.

e. Rise in casualties, especially in 1967.
f. Gverall course of events vis a vis the war during 'he

Johnson administration, the two "wisemen" meetings.
Lq
A-68
'.. a ;
THE BDM CORPPORATION
g. "Dove" mood permeates Conqrsss; limits and constraiiits.

h. Pressure on POW/NIA issue.
E. Effect of Decision on US Involvement in Vietnam
'. Served as a ccmmitment to c-,'ry out progressive withdrawal
of US troons according to a specific timetable.
DATES OF NIXON ANNOUNCEMENTS ON # OF US TROOPS TO BE
WITHDRAWN 1969-1971
a) June 8, 1969 25,000 (Midway Island)
b) Sept 16, '.969 35,000
c) Dec 15, 1969 50,000 (by Apr 1970)
d) Apr 10, 1970 150,OO0 (by Spring 19)1)
2. Reduced US troop commitment: attempted to strengtheo RVNAF
F. Effectiveness of Decision.
1. The initiation of the withdrawal process was the most signi-
I
ficant and successful (i.e., it was accomplished) point of
this policy decision, eventually reducing US troop involve-
ment to a minimum.
2. Vietnamization, although conceptually sound, was not parti-
:ularly effective for various reasons:
a. Its initiation as a serious program came too late.
b. With congressional cuts (at a later date) in military
spending for RVNAF, re-equipmern÷ and strengthening of
RNVAF forces became increasingly difficult.
c. South Vietnamese perceptions of Vietnamization were
often negative. Although RVNAF officers attempted to
"Vietnamize" (i.e. , in order to please US personnel by
"making a go of it"), the South Vietnamese often felt
they had all along been "fighting their o,.n war,"
d. Vietnamization could not offset the DRV's strategic
advantages cf sanctuaries, bases and Ho Chi Minh trail,
and of cohesion and discipline.
3. 'he negotiation procedure point served only to highlight US
expectations/intentions vis ' vis the talks and withdrawal.
In roality, the progress of negotiations depended upon the
overall interplay of the parties involved, day-to-day stra-
tegy and respective concessions/compromises made by the
parties involved.
A-69
THE BDM CORPORATION
G. Insights.
1. Alth'nugh both Kennedy and LBJ gave criddence, to the impor-
tance of strengthening RVNAF in order that they be capable
of "fighting their own war'JPtake on more of the burden of
fightirg," in actuality, this overall process of Vietnami-
zation came too late and, as regards JFK and 118IJ, lacked
cominitment/sincerity in actual imiplementation. (i.e., A con-
venient sloga~n hut little concerted effort).
2. While a scheduled timetable for progressive withdrawal
served to help soothe the pervisive anti-way, sentiments, the
strength~ of these anti-war attitudes/sentiments from 1968 on
should have beer an indication to the Nixon administration
that future escalations (with or without troops - i.e. , the
war against DRV & sanctuaries) would be just as unpopulir as
they were under LBJ.
A.70
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THE BDMA C;ORPORATION
DOMESTIC FACTORS FCOREIGN FACTORS
FEAR OF DOMESTIC REACTIONS ro A @ CHINA WEAKENC!D BY CUlTURAL

WIDER WAR )VERRULED BY NEED REVOLU1ION AND SINO-SOVIET SPLIT
TO PROVE OUT MIUTAnY STRATEGIES US
. US D~TEiNT• WITH USSR LESSENED
LIKEUHOOD OF SOVICT Ilrt4RFERENCE
DECISION
MARCH 1970
0 DECISION TO LAUNCH INCURSIONS AGAINST

ENEMY SANCIUARY BASES IN CAMBOD'IA

!N VIETNAM
* wIrlENED THE WAR. REQUIRING CONTINUOUS

SUPPORT FOR LON NOL OOVERNM;.NT
* GAINED TIME AND AIDED IN U.S WIThIORAWAL
• CAUSED A SERIOUS DOMESTIC REACTION WHICH

CONTRIBUTED TO FUTURE PROBLEMS IN GETTING
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR AID FOR VIETNAM
* CAUSED REVERSALS IN US EFFORTS TO

NEGOTIATE AND END THE WAR
INSIGHTS
DECISION TO ATTACK CAMBODIA WAS MADE TOO LATE 1,3 SE

4THE
POUTICALLY VIABLE.
THE INCURSION ONLY REINFORCED COA4ORESS'ONAL

UESIflE TO LIMIT US COMMITMENT TO RVN
THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION WAS CONSTRAINED FROM

THE OUTSET AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DECISIVE
STRAT"GICAi.LY OR TACTICALLY, GIVEN THE IRP.-VGCABILITY
OF TEE U.S WITHDRAWAL THE INHERENT WEAKNESSES OF TiIE
FANK ARMED FORCEG AND THE STRENGTH AND DETERMINfJAYION
OF THE DRV
4•4 I/178W
Figure A-13. Decision XLI1: US Decision To Launch Incursions Against Enemy

Sanctuary Bases in Cambodip
A-71
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THE CDM CORPORATION
XIIi. DECISION TO LAUNCH A CGWI1ED U/RVWAF INCURSION INTO THE PAVN/PLAF

SANCTUARY BASES IN CAMBODIA 52/
A. Decision. Following the "secret" bombing war in Cambodia in
M17,-te US admiaistration decided it neccssary to send US/RVNAF
Sground
forces temporarily into the Parrot's Beak and Fish Hook
areas.
1. When: March 1970.
2. Principai Decision-Makers: President Nixon and Dr.
Kissinger, with support by JCS and COMUSMACV.
3. Pur2,o)se:
a. To destroy major enemy stockpiles and base areas that
supported enemy operations in more than half of RVN.
b. To stave oif communist domination of Cambodia.
c. To save the new Lon Nol government.
d. To help defend South Vietnam.
e. To protect American withdrawal by gaining time.
f. To spare Saigon the shock of seeing its neighbor fall.
g. To deny Hanoi an easy gain -nd in excuse to spurn
negotiations.
B, Precedents.
1. Sihanouk had tolerated some 50,000 DR- troopi in Cambodia.
2. Johnson had refused to permit ground attacks on supply
routes in Laos and Carbodia to avoid a "wider war" and
possible Soviet/Chinese intervention.
3. Sihanouk in 1969 secretly and tacitly acquiesced in American
B-52 bombing of communist base areas in Cambodia.
4. S4ihanouk was deposed in March 1970 by Lon Nol.
5. Lon Nol tried te push out the communist troops without
success and therefore requested US support.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
C. Options. General Creighton Abrams suggested three options:

I. Have South Vietnamese troops harrass the enemy across the
border.
2. Help the South Vietnamese army conduct larger attacks over a
period of months to disrupt enemy bases.
3. Use US forces with South Vietnamese forces in swiit full-
scale assaults en bases.
0. In.! .' Factors.
d l. Foreign:
a. China was lezs able to interfere because she was crip-
pled by the Cultural Revolution and suffered inter-
rupted diplomatic ties with developing nations, and
because of the Sino-Soviet split.
b. US detente with the Soviets lessened likelihood of
Soviet interference.
c. Earlier Indonesia oerthrew the communists and became
more a stable anticommunist neighbor (more stability in
Southeast Asia than before).
2. Domestic:
* Some fear of domestic reaction to the incursion, but
this WdS outweighed by the need to save Lon Nol and to
get a stronger hand in negot'ations by weakening the
sanctuary ba3e5.
E. Effect of the Decision on US Involvement in Vietnam 53/
1. It widened the war, thereafter requiring continuous air and
logistic support for Lon NoI's forces and government.
2. It facilitated US withdrawal by interrupting communist

logistics efforts and thereby gaining time for Vietnamiza-
tion.
3. The 1969 secret bombing and the major incursion ir, 1970
which seemingly reversed de-escalation, and withdrawal caused
a powerful domestic reaction.
4. It caused reversals in efforts to negotiate and end the war:
The Soviets backed off from the Indochina conference idea;
Sihanouk joined a new united military front for liberation
A-73
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THE BDM CORPORATION
of Indochina; Lon Nol, his government still falling,

requested $500 million more in military aid.
ItF. Effectiveness of the Decision.

1. Because of the domestic reaction to the Cambodian actions,
the US was later constrained from helping RVNAF in its
F operations (Lamson 719) in Laos, which suffered heavy casual-
ties.
2. US negotiating hand was weakened as Hanoi took advantage of
the American antiwar movement.
G. Insights:
1. The decision to make an attack into Cambodia was made too
late to be viable politically, and it impelled restrictive
legislation which impacted on the conduct of that war and
any future conflicts.
2. The military implementation of the Cambodian incursion
decision was self-constrained from the outset and could not
have been decisive strategical'ly or tactically, given the
irrevocability of the US withdrawal, the inherent weaknesses
of the FANK (Cambodian armed forces) and the strength and
determination of the DRV.
A-74
* PARIM PEACE TALKS STALEMATED

* FEAR OF MORE DOMESTIC CRITICISM
OVERRULED BY PERCEIVED MILITARY . US DETENTE WITH USSR AND PRC
NEEDS WOULD SOFTEN REACTIONS TO US
BOMBINGS
* NEED TO PUNISH D'IV EASTER OFFEN-

SIVE
* WAY ANC jECEMBERW972

* DECISIONS TO BOMP DRV MILITARY
TARGETS AND MINE HAIPHONG HARBOR
AND IrLAND WATERWAYS

IN VIETNAM
BOMBING LED DIRECTLY TO SUCCFSSFUL

JANUARY 1973 CEASE FIRE TALKS
EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING AND MINING

ACHIE'VED US MILITARY PURPOSES
INSIGHTS
THE BOMBING PAUSE BETWEEN LINEBACKEn I

AND !I WAS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ENEMY
* BMB.NG SUCCErDED BECAUJSE OF "SMAPT

BOMB" AND BECAUSE MtNING THE IAARBOR
PIEVENTED DIR FROM RESUPPLYING b RECOVER-
ING
9 US FAILED TO EXPLOIT PROPAGANDA W2APON$
* US FAILED TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF BOMBING

EFFi.CTnVENES .r-OR BEST POSSIBLE PEACE TEFrAA
Figure A.-14. Decision XIV: (ISDecisions To F,omb DRV t.1ilitary Targets and
Mine Haiphong Harbor
A-75
L ..... ~ ii - At." '1 .E ! 4 , £.,•

t,:,.
THE BDM CORPORZATION
XIV. DECISION TO BOMB NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY TARGETS AND TO MINE

HAIPHONG HARBOR AND INLAND WATERWAYS (LINEBACKER I AND II) 54/
A. Decision, The decision included the following components:
* Mine all entrances to North Vietnamese ports.
I * Interaict delivery of supplies nn internal waters of North

Vi etnam.
* Cut off LOCs as much as possible.
0 Initiate air and naval strikes against military targets in

DRV.
. Interdict shipping in the open ocean to stop coastal ships
from supplying DRV.
* Bomb communis• depots and supply lines in DRV.

* Cut key bridges in DRV.
1. When: President Nixon announced this decision (Linebacker I
and mining the Haiphong harbor) on television May 8, 1972.
Linebacker II was announced Decembeu 18.
2. Princial Decision-Makers: President Nixon made the deci-
sion based on the recommendatiuns of JCS and Kissinger, but
with dissent from Secretay of Defense Laird.
3. Purposes:
a. Coerce DRV/VC to agree to immediate cease fire under

international supervision throughout all of Indochina.
b. Coerce the Communists 'nto returning all American POWs.
c. Counteract the 1972 Easter' offensive and reverse ORV
gains.
d. Drive ORV forces beck to their sanctuaries.
el Close off DRV's importing of war mater 4 al & supplieL
from PRC and USSR.
f. Cffer a "carrot" that if (a) and (b) conditions ae
met, US would withdrew 60,000 men within the next four
months.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
g. Buy time before pulling out entirely.

4. Theme: Mhe need to break the Paris peace talks stalemate,
bi'n home the POWs, and withdraw necessitated the use of
force. President Nixon halted the bombing October 23 on the
promise of progress; the pause only meant DRV recovery and
further hostilities, so President Nixon resumed the bombing
Decer,,ber 18, 1972. This led to the January 1973 ceasefire
talks.
B. Precedents.
1. 1965-1968 bombing of DRV as discussed in Decision #8.
2. During the 1965-68 Rolling Thunder operations, President

Johnson rejected the JCS proposal to close Haiphong and
knock out part of the Red River dike system. Although 80%
of the imports for DRV came through Haiphong, he would not
authorize mininq and blockading out of fear of Chinese/
Soviet intervention and fear of heavy civilian
casual ties. 55/
C. Options.
1. Withdraw a-, soon as possible while proceeding with Vietnami-
zation, as proposed by Secretary of Defense Laird.
2. Do nothing new out of feaý' of more criticism at home and nut
of fear of widuning 0he war.
3. Bomb civilian centers as well as military targets to further
demoralize the cnemy This was rejected because of antici-
pated public reaction and damage to US prestige.
1. Fo,'eiqn:
a. Paris peace talks at a stalemate, DRV was demanding

that Thieu resign and the US withdraw.
b. US detente with USSR and r&pproachment with PRC would
likely soften these two cuuntries' reactions to US
bcmbinO in DRV.
c. DRV/VC spring 1972 Easter offensive and invasion
required punishment and reversal of their gains.
A-77
THE BDM CORPORArION
2. Domestic:
I War critic., already concerned about bombing in Cambodia
and Laos; bombing in NVN would increase the furor.
E. Effect of the Decision on US Involvement in Vietnam.
I. The bombing led directly to the successful January 1973,

ceasefire tal.%s.
2. It stopped thie DRV invasion, inflicted heavy casualties, and
forced the withdrawal of substantial PAVN forces.
3. It virtually eliminated shipment of goods through Haiphong
and other ports.
4. I. seriously crippled railroad traffic from China to DRV.
5. It cut all imports to DRV from Communist allies to 1/3 or
1/2 of what it r;ad been in May 1972.56/
6. Hanoi re.penoded in Paris to Linebacker I by dropping its
insistence in a coalition government and the resignation of
Thieu; these cc.ncessions were withdrawn after the bombing
halt. President Nixon therefore resumed with Linebacker II
in December 1972.
7. After LinebacN;'r !I, iRV's electricity supply was crippled
and its air defe;nses wre 5hattered.
F. Effectiv'.ness of the Decision.
1. Positive:
0 Progress with the ?aris peaci "alks; US POWs returned
home; and RVN's military situation appeared stable.
General William Momver said, ':I.t was apparent that air
power was the decisive factor leading to the peace
agreement of 15 Jau.ary 1973."57/
2. Negative,;
a. Severe criticism in the US which raised the con-

straints against further bombirg.
b. Senate Democrats adopted a resolution disapproving of
the escalation of the war. It was offered by
Seni-)r W. Fulbright, Chairman oF the Senate Foreign
Relacions Committee, approved 29 to 14. Furthermore,
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THE BDM CORPC RATION
the Senate Democrats endorsed a proposal that all 'unds

fcr Vietnam War be cut off four months after DRV
returned American prisoners.58/
G. Insiqhts.
1. The bombing pause between Linebacker I and II provided the
enemy i'lie to recover some of its losses and damage, and
reverse, some of the progress already made in Paris (DRV
withdrew some important concessions).
2. The 1972 bombing succeeded in achieving US purposes because
(1) Haipheng was mined and therefore war material and sup-
plies could not easily be replaced and (2) the new "smart"
bombs which were accurate and efficient, were used.
3. The US did not effectivelv counter DRV propaganda which
sharply criticized US bombing and brought sympathy to the
DRV. The DRV reported, for example, that 1,600 civilians
were :.illed as a result of US bombing, but the US failed to
counter this with the fact that ORV forces had killed 25,000
South Vietnamese civilians in the 1972 Easter offensive.
4. The US fail•,d to take full advantage of the effectiveness of
the bombing. The terms of the peace settlement could have
been more advantageous to the US and GVN had the US thrtat-
ened further bombing on the scale of Linebacker If. But the
American public and congressional clamor constrained the US
from employing such threats or taking such actions.
A-79
THE BDM CORPORATION

* ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT STRONG P CA
ANDDUSSR
U S INNN G TAI N
.. J
* P•C NEGOTIATION8S
o ECONOMY WEAKENED WITH THE U S DETENTE/RAPPROACHE-
MENT MAKING SOME PROGRESS
* NIXON'S LANDSLIDE PROVIDES CLEAR
HONOR....
MANDATE TO END WAR "WITH
DECISION
0 1972 -JANUARY 1973
* DECISION TO REACH PEACE fAGREEMENT BETWEEN

NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND THE U S
EFFECT OF DECISION ON U S INVOLVIEMENT

IN VIETNAM
SU.S PHASE OF VIc-TNAM WAR E14DED
INSIGHTS
* EKFEC tIVENESS OF AIR POWER IN SRINGINC THE WAR TO AH END
* DANGER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXTENDING COMMITMENTS

WTmCUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
4641,78W
Figure A-15. Decision XV: Paris Cea,-Fire Accords
A-81
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L? kmcZK*
Pm aP &3 i-nO
THE BOM CORPORATION
XV. PARIS CEASE-FIRE ACCORDS 59/

A. Decision. Decision to reach peace agreement between the North
and South Vietnamese anI the US (The Paris F~ace talks were
stalled when Nixon came to office. Henry Kissinger sought to
develop a strategy for mov•ng the talks off dead center.)
1. When: The cease-fire was signed in January 1973, but the
n-gotiations had been intense from the sunmer of 1972.
2. Principal Decision Makers: Nixon and Kissinger were the
principal decision makers who formvulated the plan for peace
and obtained both Soutn and North Vie tnamese participation.
3. Purpose: The stated purpose of the cease-fire agreements
was to briap an end to the vietnain War ani to provide a
cortext for US withdrawal from the conflict.
4. Themes:
a. South Vietnam had to be prepared to defend itself
through both the Vietnamization and pacification pro-
grams.
b. The United States role 'n the war had to be reduced.
d. The MIorth Vietnamese had to be persuaded to join in

peace negotiations short of their stated objectives of
toppling the GVN.
e. The South Vietnamese had to be persuaded to accept a
cease-fire that fell short of their earlier objective
of forcing the communist forces out of the South.
B. Precedents for the Decision. President Johnson had initiated
peace talks with the o6rth Vietnamese in 1968. By 1972 it ýqas
evident that those talks would not produce a cease-fire.
C. Options.
1. Kissinger's program f-r a-hieving peace included both
threats of intensified warfare against the Nonrh Vietnamese
and offerings of financiel assistance if they could be
persuaded to establisii .nd maintain peace. LBJ suyj.ested
aid to LRV in 1965 speecn it Joh,' HopKlns.
2. The South Vietnamese sought to stri-Qthen their position by
refusing to accept the estiblish,,,ent oi an in-placp
ceasefire.
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THE IDM CORPORATION
3. Kissinger was able to create a carefully balanr.ed peace

agreement for the following reasons:
a. The North Vietnamese were persuaded to negotiate
through the effectiveness of two 1972 bombing cam-
paigns, Linebacker I and Linebacker II. The cost of
continuing its war became prohibitive.
b. The North Vietnamese had failed in their 1972 "Easter
Offersive."
C. Although the GVN continued to have misgivings over US
intentions and re ibiIi y, the South Vietnamese were
somewhat reassured by Nixon that if the North broke the
dgreements, the US would retaliate in strength.
0. Influential Factcrs
1. Foreign:
a By 1972 US diplomatic initiatives with both the FRC and
USSR had undercut the basis for a long-term Northern
strugg'3 against RVN.
2. Domestic:
a. The antiwar movement was exerting pressure on the Nixon

Administration.
The US economy was weakened by inflation.
c. Nixon's ij72 landslide victory gave him a strong man-
date for achieving peace.
E. Effect of Decision. The decision to s;gn the Paris cease-fire
accords effectively ended US participation in the Vietnam WAr.
F. Effectiveness of the Decision. The success of the peace accords
depended upon either the good will of all the parties who were
signatories or upon the United States to enforce the provisions
of the accords. The North Vietnamese used the peace provided by
the accords to prepare for their firal attack on RVN. The United
States government, weakened by domestic dissent and Watergate,
was unable or unwilling to enforce the provisions of the accords
in spite of promises to the GVN. During the 1973 Middle East
war, the US resupplied Israel from POMCUS and PWRMS stocks in
Europe thereby eroding the supply base that mignt otherwise have
been used to support RVNAF.
A
A-83
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THE BDM CORPORATION
G. Insights.
1. The Nixon Administration made commitments to the RVN that

required support from the Ccgress. When that support was
called for, Ccngress refused.
2. US objectives in RVN changed over time--from wanting to

ensure a free, viable, independent South Vietnam to wanting
US POWs returned and US forces extricated from RVN while at
the same time ensuring a period during which the RVN might
achieve the capdbility to stand alone.
3. The DRV accurately assessed the situation in late 1972 and
early 1973:
a. The US was anxious to end the war and sign the cease-
fire before the inauguration.
b. The educed US demands enabled the ORV to retain its
troops 'i RVN and in the border sanctuaries, thereby
retaining a geostrategic advantage over RVN/RVNAF.
c. The punishment suffered by the DRV in Linebacker I and
II was severe, but they were able to stop their losses
by agreeing to the ceasefire at a time when their other
objectives became achievable.
d. The ceasefire made it possible to reopen the strategic
lines of communic.•tion overland from China and through
Haiphong port, thereby facilitating replenishme,,t of
supply and iiiateriel losses during the Linebacker
campaigns.
4. Agreeing to the ceasefire records assured the ORV that US
forces would leave RVN and leave the field to them.
A8
A-84
THE BDM CORPORATION
* STRONG ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT 9 OCT 73 WAR AND OIL EMBARGO

WITHIN POPULATION AND 1,4 CON-
GRESS 9 MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVES
UNDERWAY
* WATERGATE CRISIS
9 C'YPRUS CFPISIS ERUPTED
* RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT
* Uri PURSUES DETENTE WITH PRC
* DETERIORAjING DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND USSR
DECISION
0 SEPTEMBER 1974 AND APRIL 1975
STO REDUCE USMILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SVN

AND NOT TO GRANT SUPPLEMENTAL AID
EFFECT OF DECISION OF US INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETNAM
* SEVERE REDUCTION OF US SUPPORT OF SVN
e A MAJOR POINT IN Ut'. ECONOMIC WITHDRAWAL
INSIGHTS
THE VIETNAM CONFLICT HAD NO POPULAR SUPPORT IN US AND

CONGRESS RESPONDED BY ASSERTING ITSELF AS DECISION MAKER
STh,' POWER AND INFLUENC2 OF THE PRESIDENCY DECREASED DUE

TO WATERGATE
* US DECREASE IN SUPPORT FOR SVN SERIOUSLY WEAKENED RVNAF'S

MILITARY POSTURE
4541/178W
Figure A-16. Decision XVI: US Congressional Decision To Cut US Mlilitary

Assistance to RVfl to $700 Million
A-85
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THE BUM CORPORATION
AVI. CONGRESSIONAL VOTE TO CUT MILITARY SPENDING IN SOUTH VIETNAM 60/
A. Decision. The HWuse and the Senate vote to reduce military aid
to RVN to $700 million (Sept. 1974) and nat to grart supplemental
aid (April 1975).
1. When: September 1974 and April 1975.

2. Principal Decision Makers: Congress as decision maker. Key
proponents: Fulbright, Mansfield, Muskie, over opposition
of Ford, Kissinger.
3. Purpose: The decisicns were intended to reduce dramatically
US involvement in a conflict for which military solutions no
longer appeared viable. The US involvement in Vietnam was
becoming less and less popular for political and economic
reasons and Congress wanted to tz.ke a greater E'3rt in deci-
sion making.
4. Theme: The executive's "Peace with Honor" had b-come "Gct

-ut-Now" in Congress (due to the growing antiwar sentiment
in Cor•gr•.ss). These actions murk the beginning of an
isolati.)nist/non-involvement trend, reducing US military
i nvolve•ment overseas in favor of taking care of the home
front.
a. The actions also signal congressional re-emerge,,ce 3s a
powerful decision maker in foreign affairs, ýn area V
formerly dominated by the executive branch.
b. Economic and military withdrawal constitute a new

theme, contrary to our pledges to Tfbieu at the time of
the Paris Peace Agreements.
B. Precedents.If
!. 30 June 1973 - Congress voted to cut off all funds for US

military activity in Indochina region after August 15, 1973.
2. 7 November 1973 - Enactment of the War Powers Resolution

provided' Congress greater oversight authority vis a vis US
military involvement abroad. While not a direct precedent
to the September 1914 congressional move to drastically sut
funds, the action is consonant with the trends and themes
discussed above.
3. 3 April 1974 - Sena.te Armed Services Committee voted not to
increase aid to Vietnam beyond current levels; the trend had
A-86
THE BDM CORPOPATION
been $2.27 billiun for fiscal 1973, 1`,010 billion for

fiscal 'q74 and $700 million for fiscal 1975.
4. 5 August 1974 - Senate/House Conference agreed to impose $1
b,! II ion ceiling on all military aid for the next II months.
Nixon signs into law.
C. t~ions. This Congressional decision came at a time when the
ccuntry was in turmoil due to Nixon's resignation a month
earlier, Thus, while members of the executive hraqich fdvored
providing increased aid to RVN, they could gain little support
for their views.
0. Influential Factors
1. Foreign:
ý. Oct 1973 Middle East war and o~i embargo.
D. The Middle East situation was taking up much of
Kissinger's time and ,attention. Earlier in 1974, he
had. through "shuttle diplomacy," achieved military
disengagemeiit o.ccords between Israel and Syria, and
Israel and E,3ypt.
c. The Cyprus crisis had erupted.
d. The US waa pursuing detente with the USSR and PRC.
2. nomestic:
a. Direct Factor - strong antiwar sentiment among the
US people and witnir: Congress (antiwar protests) and
feelings reflecting a "why can't they fight their own
war?" stance.
b. Indirect Factor - Because the Watergate hearings were
beg nning and John Dean's testimony was incriminating
President Nixon, the power of the presidency was
reduced.
c. Direct - Worsening US economic ýituation and public
weariness with IJ involvement in Vietnam encouraged
Congress to move toward withdrawal of US economic aid
to RVN.
d. Indirect Factor - Nixon resigns.
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THE BDM CORPORATION
E. Effect nf Decision on US Involvement in Vietnam.

1. Severe reduction of US economic and military support. This
decision was a key point in US economic withdrawal from
RVN (military withdrawal had already taken place).
2. The oil embargo and high inflation caused the $700 million
US aid to become worth even less.
F. Effectiveness of Decision. The decisionsý wse a continuation of
a trend of withdrawal of economic support to RVN to which Con-
gress adhered. Thus, the purpose of the decisions--withdrawal of
US involvement--was achieved. Additional effects, unintended
though they were, include the creation of ammunition, POL, and
equipment shortages, and a further weakening of morale among
RVNAF troops and the population of RVN.61/
G. insights.
. T'he Vietnam conflict h3d no popular support in the US and
Congress responded to popular sentiments by imposing itself
as decision maker.
2. At the same time, the power and influence of the presidency
were lessened due to the effects of Watergate.
3. The rapidly decreasing support for RVN seriously weakened
RVNAF's military posture while PAVN grew stronger.
I
A
t-t.
A-88
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THE BDM CORPORATION
WATERGATE EOOED PRESIDENTIAL

AUT14ORITY 9 MIDDLE EA1T PEACE INITIATIVES
WIRE UNDERWAY
* INFLATION PROSLEM9
* ARMS CONTROL 'tALKS WITH USSR
f NIXON PISIGNlEO WERE UNDERWAY
* PUBUC AND CONGRESSIONAL * RAPPIROCHEENT WITH THE PRC

PRESSURE TO GET OUT OF RVN WAS INITIATED
STRONG
DECISION
* OSCEMBEA 19741JANAUARY 1975
* U S DECISION NOT TO AID RVN AT THE FALL OF

PHUOC LONG
EFFECT OF DECISION OF U S INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETNAM
0 THE U S SOUOIFIED ITS NEW POUCY OF NON.

INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT.
INSIGHTS
"* KEY DECISIONMAKERS MISCALCULATED INTENTIONS OF THE CRV

AND MISPERCEIVEb WEAKNESSES IN THE SOUTH
"* CON(IRES8 HAD ALRILADY CONCLUDED THAT RVN WAS A "LOST

CRUSADE"
a DESPITE EARLIER PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENTS. THE FORD AD-
MINIS (RATION WAS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACT IN 0EFENSE OF
RVN
TO eE BINDING. A U S COMMITMENT MUST diEENDORSED Y THE

PEOPLE THROUGH THEIR CONGRESS
Figure A-17. 03cision XVII: US Decision rlot to Aid RVt1 at the Fall of
Phuoc Long
A,.89
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THE BOM CORPORATION
XVII. US DECISION NOT TO AID SOUTH VIETNAM'. DEFENSE OF PHUOC LON!G

PROVINCE 62/
A. Decision. The US decided against intervening on behalf of the
South-V1etnamese at the tir of the DRV attack on Phuoc Long.
Although the US entered its diplomatic protests, it refrained
from sending ground/air materiel and support to South Vietnam as
the attack was underway and following the fall of the province.
This decision was taken in spite of Nixon's secret assurance to
Thieu in November 1972 and January 1973 that, should the North
violate the cease-fire in a major way, the US could L.e counted on
to react with force. These assurances were provided to Thieu
through two personal letters from President Nixorn.63/
1. When: December 1974/January 19/!
2. Principal Decision Makers: Congress as decision maker,
opposed by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger.
3. Purpose: Adherence to US commitment to withdrawal
4. Themes: RVN must fight its own war and US must withdraw.
TRe broad themes of US withdrawal and deescalation were
present in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, there
were differences of opinion in Congress and the Ford admini-
stration as to how fast the US should withdraw. President
Ford and Dr. Kissinger felt that the US should continue to
pe'ovide financial support for the purchase of military
equipment and supplies for the country to buy time for a
"decent interval." Kissinger and Ford were still concerned
with the issue of American prestige and image. Kissinger's
statement raises this point. "I believe, and the' Admini-
stration believes, that if Vietnam falls as a result of an
American decision to cut off its aid, that this will have,
over a period of time, the most serious consequences for the
conduct of our foreign policy.., it must raise the gravest
doubts in the minds of many countries that have been asso-
ciated with us .. " (February 25, 1975).64/ Congress,
however, took the view that Vietnam would have-to make it on
its own as there was no public support for further aid.
B. Precedents
1. Paris Peace Agreement - 27 January 1973 signed by the US
called for a reduction of US prezence in the region.
2. Both sides violated the truce by "planting flags" in claimed
territory. In fact DRV stepped up its infiltration of men
and equipment to the South - despite this, US responses were
light in view of the offense. While at first the US
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embarked on athebombing
violations, campaign
Congress to strongly
reacted punish the
andNorth
the for its
bombing
was halted. Harsh words characterized the level of US
responses to violations by the North.
3. June 1973 - Congress passed a bill curtailing all mifitary

action by US forces in or over Indochina; Nixon,
disapproving of the measure, negotiated to delay the effec-
tive date until 15 August 1973.
4. October/Novemberl973 - Congress passed the War Powers Reso-
lution limiting the president's traditional freedom of
action with regard to employment of armed force,. Congress
overrode the presidential veto and the Resolution becVme law
PL93-148.
5. Congressional aid cuts as described in Decision XVI.
C. Options.
1. Intervention by the US was the option not taken. While the
US sent tne aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Vietnamese
coast and ordered the Third US Marine Division (located in
Okinawa) to emergency alert, no military action was taken.
Defense Se:retary Schlesinger is reported to have said that
this (Phuoc Long attack) was not a massive offensive by the
North and could be ignored. 65/
2. A second range of options concerned the provision of addi-
tional financial assistance in order to buoy RVN up while it
was fighting the North. The Ford administration in January
1975 announced that it would ask Congress for additional
military aid for the region, to include supplemental aid of
$300 million for RVN, This was followed on February 8,
1975, by Ford's endorsement of the idea that the US embark
on a massive aid program to RVN such that the country might
be "economically independent" within three years.
1. Foreign:
a. By 1975, the US was preoccupied with achieving a peace
settlement in the Middle East and Kissinger, in parti-
cular, as the link from Nixon's administration to
Ford's, was consumed by ;tep-by-step diplomatic manue-
vers.
b. US progress in ichieving rapproachment with the USSR
(SALT talks etc. ) and Zhe PRC could not be jeopardized.
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2. Domestic:
a. Watergate had s-riously eroded Presidential author-
ity. Nixon had resigned, and Congress took actions to
insore that all activities to be conducted by the US in
RVN required Congressional authorization.
b. Theie was tremetidous public (ressure (reflected in
public opinion polls, protests) to extricate ourselves
from the Vietnamese conflict v'egion. Kent State Uni-
versity, May 1974, and other protests demonstrated the
fervor of public cotilmitmcnt. to stay out of Vietnam.
c. The US economy suffered from severe inflation.
E. Effect of De'ision on US invulvement in Vietnam. Having stepped
aside while the North took and held an entire province of the
South, the US sigiialled its total disengagement from the war. The
decision lent credibility to the US withdrawai effort. The
decision had a very clear impact on the North as it indicated
that the US would not/could not intervene in the South. The
attack on Phuoc Long is described as a "trial balloon" attack by
the North, and the affect on the North was immediate. Le Duan
stated, "The world supports us. Never before have the military
and political conditions been more propitious."
F. Effectiveness of Decision. With LIS intervention no longer
Tikely, the North felt unhindered in ;ts attack on the South.
G. Insights.
1. The key US decision makers, particularly Congress, may havy
seriously miscalculated the intentions of the North and the
weaknesses of the Southern defense.
2. Governments cannot be counted on to adhere to a peace treaty
if they feel that their aims have not been met. Kissinger
may have misjudged the sincerity of the DRV or he may have
believed that the treaty was the best that could be accom-
plished given the situation.
3. US commitments to its allie-s must be made according to the
probability for their realization. President Nixon's
promises to Thieu were not realistic given Congressional
attitudes at the time and Congressional limitations on
presidential power.
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APPENDIX A
ENDNOTEs
1. Sources for this decision included the foilowing:

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday & Co. , 1956).
United States - Vietnam Relations, Bock 1 of 12 books 1945-1967,
(Wshington, D.C.: DS Government Piriting Office, 1971). Hereafter
DOD US/VN Relations.
The Public Papeers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 1944-1945
(Mew York: Harper and Bros., 190).
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, Vols. I and II (New
York: Praeger, 1967).
George M. Kahin and John W. Lewis, United States in Vietnam: An
Analysis In Depth Of The History Of America's Involvement in Vietnam,
Strategic stidies In ee-u•asrTsle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 'US Amy
War College, 1978).
Charles MacDonald, An Outline History Of US Policy Toward Vietnam.
Strategic Studies Instilute (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvan-Ta -'y
War' College, 1978).
2 White House Memorandum for Secretary of State, 17 Marcii 1965, cited in
DOD US/VN Relations, Book I.A.1.b, pp. A-P? - A-23.
3. Sources for this decision inc'uded the following:
Josephi Buttinger, op. cit. , p. 81.
DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, pp. 265-282.
George Herring, America's Lonqest War: United States I, Vietnam
1950-1975 (N~w York: John Wiley, 1979). Dr. Herring provided a copy
of his manuscript to the BDM study team for purposes of this study.
Leslie Gelb, The IronX Of Vietnam (Wishington, D.C.: Brookings
Institute, 1979), pp. 36-48.
4. Sources for this decision included the following:
Dwight 0. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956 (New York: Dojuble-
d.uy, 1963), pp. 332-375.
DOD US/VN Relations, Book 9, pp. 212-439, 705-709.
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Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen And Cold War Crises (Cambridge

Press, 1977), pp. 17-23, 98-99, 106-107.
Buttinger, op. cit.
Alexander Georep and Richard Smoka, Deterrence In American Foreign

Policy (New York: Columbia University Pre-ss, '7"4), pp. 234-265.
5. Eisenhower, op. ci., p. 152.
6. Ibid., p. 341.
7. Ibid., p. 345.
8. Ibid., p. 354.
•. Ibid., p. 353.
10. General Mattiiew Ridgway, Soldier (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1956).
ii. Sources fur this decision included the following:
DOD US/VN Relations, 3ooks 8, 9, and 10.
12. Ibid. , Book 10, pp. 709-713, 676-741.
13. Ibid., Book 8, p 731.
14. Sources for this decision included the followirg:
DOD US/VN Relations, Book 2, pp. 337-ff, 434, 359-ff, 419-421.
15. See 0OD 'IS/VN Relations, pp. 419-421, NSAM 52: Decision to send CIA
for covert harrassment of DRV and the November 10, 1961 decision to
.ommit a US Air Force Counteri osurgency unit.
16. DOD US/VN Relations, Book II, p. 343.
17. Sources of this decision included the following:
Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam (New York: Oxford Press, 1978).
Gelb, op. cit.
DOD US/VN Relations, Book 12, V.B.4.
William Colby, Honorable Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978),
Chapter 7.
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18. The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963: Renewed Coup
Plotting, The Pentagon Papers, Sen. Mike Gravel, ed. (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971) Vol. 2, 4 IV C, p. 251
19. Gelb, p. 86.

20. Colby, p. 213.
21. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, interview at BDM, September 8, 1979.
Collect~ive Defense Tre-*1es, Committee Print, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967).
Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade (Greenwich: Fawcett Publishers,
1970), p. 297.
23. Collective Defense Treaties, p. 204.
24. Ibid. , p. 198.
25. Cooper, p. 297.

26. John N. Moore, Law And The Indochina War (Princeton: Princetcn Urniver-
sity Press, 1972).
Lewy, op. cit.
DOD US/VN Relations, Books 4 and 8.
Paul Hammond, Cold War And Oetente (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, Inc., T769).
28. Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point (New Yor!k: Holt, Rinehard & Winston,
1971), p. 122.
29. Sources for this decision included the following: BDM interviews with
General William C. Westmoreland, Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, and
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson.
DOD US/VN Relations, Books 4 and 5.
Senator Mike Gravel, Ed., The Pentagon Papers Vol. 3 (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971).
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Robert Galluccl, Neither Peace V'nr Hooor (Baltimore: John Hopkins

Univowsity Press, 1975).
Lyndon Johnson, op. cit. The Vietnam War (New York: Crown Publi.,hers,
1979).
30. Gravel, Vol 3, p. 391.

31. Ibid., p, 417.
33. Lewy, p. 41.
34. Ibid., p. 47.
35. DOD Chronology of Suild-Up Activity, Phase I in The Build-Up of U.S.
Forces, DOD US/VN Relations, Book 4, IV.C.5, pp. 5-14.
36. Lewy, p. 46.
37. Ibid., p. 49.
38. Gravel, Vol. 3, p. 394; Lewy, p, 42.

Kinnard, The War Managers (He.nover: University of New England Press,
1977).
Doris Kearns, Lyndon B. Johnson and the American Dream (New York .
Signet, 1976).
40. Kinnard, p. 119.

41. Kearns, p. 296.
42. Sources for this decision included in the following:
Causes Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War, Hearing Before the
Commtt'iee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 21st Congress, May 9-II,
1972.
Grav&,, op. cit.
DO0 US/VN Relation5, Books 4 and .
43. Henry Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, 47:2,
(January 1969).
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44. Ibid.
45. The Nation, .pri 15, 1978.
465 Director of Central Intelligence Working Paper I March 196S, cited in
DOD US/VN Relations Book 5, pp. 18-21.
47. New York Times, April 2, 1968.
48. Lewy, p. 132.
49. Hedrick Smith, New York Times, April 1, 1968.
50. Leslie Gelb, Causes, Origins, •. 347-339.

51. Sources fur this decision included the following:
Lewy, op. cit.
MacDonald, op. cit.
Frank Snepp, Descent Interval (New York: Random House, 1977).
52. BG Tran Dinh The, Cambodia Incursion, Indochina Refugee Authored Mono-
graph Program. Prepared for the Department of the Army, Office of
Chief of Military History (McLean, Virgina: General Research Cor-
poration, 1978).
y Kissinger "The Agony of Vietnam," White House Years, Park 2,
Time, October 8, 1979, pp. 32-49.
W.lliam C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reoorts (New York: Doubleday,
1976).
Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Polic. in The Nixon Years
(New York: The Viking Press, 1978).
William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction
of Cambodia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974)..
53. Ibid. See also "Letters" In The Economist, September 8, 1979, pp. 6-7,
in which William Shawcross responds to a review of his book Sideshow.
Henry A. Kissinger, while agreeing with the reviewer that the book is
",misleading and unfair," provides his own succinct defense of US
policy and his description of some of the results of the war.
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Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Strategy for Defeat (San Rafael: Pres'dio
Press, 1978)
General William Momyer, Air Power In Three Wars, Depavtment of Air
Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 197.3), pp.
236-244.
Richard Nixon, Memoirs (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978).
55. Lewy, op. cit., p. 392.
56. Ibid., p. 411.
57. Momyer, p. 243.
58. Sharp, p. 247.
Lewy, op. cit.

Nixon, op. cit.
0. R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet (San Francisco: Presidio Press,
1978).
John Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power (Toronto:
G. McLeod, 1976).
Ni" 'it.
Allen : , :, The Lost Peace (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1978).
Nguyen Cao Ky, Twenty Years And Twenty Days (N.Y.: Stein and Day,
1976).
Snepp, op. cit.
Sen. Gen. Van Tien Dung, "Great Spring Victory", FBIS, 6/7/76, IV,
110, Supp. 38.
61. Lewy, pp. 208-209.
Ky, op. cit.
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Snepp, op. cit.

Nixon, op. cit.
63. Lewy, pp. 202-203.
64. Goodman, Epigraph II (Preface).
65. Dung, pp. 6-7.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA TO CHAPTER 3: BIOGRAPHICAL
INFORMATION ON KEY US VIETNAM DECISION MAKERS,
1945-1975, THEIR BACKGROUNDS AND BIASES
The information included herein is intended as a supplement to Chapter

3, "Washington. and Vietnam: US National Level licy Makers and the
Policy-Making Process." The appendix is divided by the six post-WWII
presidential administrations; for each administration five or six key US
Vietnam decision makers are discussed. These biographical sketche; are not
intended to be exhaustive studies of each particular decision maker's
background, personality, and indiviaual biases. Moreover, the selection of
the key Vietnam decision makers is not definitive or exhaustive. In each
of thie administrations discussed in Chapter 3, a graphic cverview of other
important Vietnam decision makers is included. Those (:hce, appeared to
have bpen the key US decision makers involved in major JU policy making
regarding Vietnam. The sources used in compiling Appendix B appear in the
Volume III Bibliography. In addition, direct citations appear in the
endnote section for Appandix B.
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APPENDIX B
KEY DECISION MAKERS
A. KEY DECISION MAKERS WITHIN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
The Truman admi.nistration's most influential decision makers involved

in Vietnam-related matters included President Harry S. Truman, Under
Secretary of State (later, Secretary of State) Dean Acheson, Secretary of
State (later, Secretary of Defense) George Marshall, Mr. George M. Abbott -
the US Consul General in Saigon, and Deputy Undersecretary of State (later,

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) Dean Rusk. in addi-
tion to the above individuals, whose roles and influence will be discussed
below, other important advisers involved in early Vietnam decision making
appeared in Chapter 3, Figure 3-1, a graphic representation of the decision
makers' positions within the administration.
1. President Harry Truman
Harry Truman assumed the presidency on April 12, 1945, upon the
de3th of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although he had been aware of
Roosevelt's deteriorating health, Truman was initially overwhelmed and ill
at ease in the presidency.l/ As vice president, he had participated only
marginally in high-level decision wiaking.2/ With the passage of time, his
familiarity with foreign affairs grew and he came to share the views held
by many of his top-level advisers that r-,mmunist aggression was a Moscow-
inspired and directed operation, bent on consuming all of Europe and
Asia._3/ His famous speech of 1947, concerning aid to Greece and Turkey,
set the stage for containing communism by offers of US military and econo-
mic assistance to the newer and hence weaker countries of the world.4/
Known as the Truman Doctrine, this policy was broadly applied by President
Truman and his administration; Vietnam, for example, was given US aid based
on this doctrine.
2. George Marshall
General George Marshall, Truman's third Secretary of State, was
praised by the president for his outstanding 1eadership abilities.5/ Prior
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to succeeding Secretary Byrnes, General Marshall headed a mission to China

in an effort to reconcile nationalist and communist forces. His experi-
ences in China helped shape his understanding of communism and nationalism
in the post-war environment; his personal statement to the president upon
returning from his year-long mission in January 1947, revealed both his
concern about the Chinese Communist Party's activities and his
understanding of communism as a possible vehicle for the expression of
nationalist sentiments. 6/
As Secretary of State, Marshall's first mission was to discuss
with the Soviet leaders the problem of Germany's reunification. His
failure to reach an acceptable agreement with the Soviet leaders stimulated
his disdain for the USSR and its policies regarding Eastern Europe. The
general's most significant contribution was his plan for European economic
recovery; the Marshall Plan became a basis for policy toward areas outside
of the European community, including Indochina.
As Secretary of State, his views on Indochina and on Vietnam, in
particular, opposed France's colonialist posture. But he also considered
French presence in the area more desirable than Moscow's.7/ During his
tenure, Secretary Marshall promoted political - economic solutions for
Vietnam as a way to reduce communist influence, prevent Chinese communist
penetration, and promote the establishment of an independent and free
Vietnam. 8/
3. Dean Acheson
Prior to his appointment as Secretary of State, Dean Acheson
served as Undersecretary of State, a position which afforded hinm ample
exposure to the complexities of the post-war environment. Although the
adaminibtration focused its primary attention on the reconstruction of
Europe,9/ Mr. Acheson also dealt extensively with Asian affairs. He was
instrumental in arranging independence for the Philippines, assisted in the
resolution of the Thai-French border disputes of 1946, and urgad the
English to allow for Burma's "peaceful transition to self-government."lO/
Secretary Acheson placed great hopes on the building of a strong
and free international order.ll/ US military strength, security arrange-
ments such as NATO, and an economically viable Europe would contribute to
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the realization of this goal. With the defeat of the nationalist forces in
China, however, t e Truman administration came under heavy domestic criti-
cism for losing an ally to communism. Secretary Acheson sought to explain
the loss, vowing that, barring direct. military intervention which the US
public would never have tolerated, the Truman administration had done all
that was feasible to "save" China.12/ Acheson concluded from the Chinese
experience that no amount of US military and economic aid could save a
government, ever if it was recognized by all other major powers and had the
full opportunity to achieve its national aims, unless, as he wrote to the
Ameri'an Consulate in Hanoi in May 1949, it could rally the support of the
people against the commurnists by "affording representation" to all impor-
tant national grouns, "manifesting devotion to national as opposed to
rerso.ial or party interests," and "demonstrating real leadership."13/ When
pressed by Vietnamese opinion that "US abandonment" of Nationalist China
presented an "unfavorable augury" for any noncommunist regime in Vietnam,
Acheson stressed that Nationalist China met its fate because of deficien-
cies in the above qualities and the lack of a will to fight, not because
the US "wrute it off. "34/
By 1949, Acheson had bpcome fully convinced that Ho Chi Minh was
a full fledged Cammunist. I5/ Although he was confronted with the pos-
sibility that Ho might be a nationalist, he questioned the relevance cf
that possioility, giver, Ho's b'ckground. According to Acheson, in his
abbreviated-style cable to the American Consulate in Hanoi:
All Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists.

With achievement national aims (i.e., independence)
their objective necessarily becomes subordination state
.o Commie purposes and ruthless extermination not only
opposition gi'oups but all elements suspected even
slightest deviation. On basis examples eastern Europe
it must be assumed such wld be goal Ho and men... 16/
4. George M. Abbott
George Abbott, whu served with the US Embassy in France and then
as US Consul General in Saigon, provided the Trumcn administration with an
itn-country perspective of French-Vietnamese relations and assessments of
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Ho Chi Minh. In 1946, at the request of the US Ambassador to Fraoce,

Jefferson Caffery, he met with Ho and found the Vietnamese leader desirous
of US aid, urging such assistance as beneficial to both the US and his own
fledgling government.17/ Despite Abbott's early interaction with Ho his
communications with the Truman administration in 1948-1949 indicated his
belief that Ho was a communist agent of Moscow who would eventually estab-
lish a "New Democratic Republic" in Southeast Asia. The only recourse for
deterring such a development, he believed, was US recognition of the
Sao Dai governmer~t.18/ His assessments proved to be influential in the
administration's policy regarding Vietnam.
5. Dean Rusk
The role of Deputy Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk in the
Truman administration's Vietnam decision making deserves mention because
his line of thinking as developed in the late 1940's and early 1950's was
later drawn upon during his service with Presidents (ennedy and Johnson.19/
As Deputy Undersecretary and as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern
Affairs, Mr. Rusk maintained that the US should halt communist aggression
in Southeast Asia. In addition to promoting US economic assistance, Rusk

urged the JCS to reassess the need for deploying US "resources" in Indo-
china 'to prevent the loss of the region which, in his view, was "the most
strategically important area of Southeast Asia. "20/
B. KEY DECISION MAKERS WITHIN THE EiSENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
In decisions concerning Vietnam, two individuals had central roles:

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Among the
host of individuals involved in the decision-making process, two others had
important roles- Under Secretary of State and Chairman of the Presidmnt's
Special Committee on Indochina, General Walter Bedell Smith, and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiril Arthur Radford. In addition to these
key officials, whose background and policy recommiendations will be dis-
cussed below, a large number of senior advisers assisted these key decision
makers. Their positions were highlighted in Chapter 3, Figure ?-2, a
schematic, overview uf the Eisenhower administration's high-level personnel.
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1. President Dwight D, Eisenhower

President Eisenhower was at the renter of the decision-making
process on national-security issves. Eisenhower's experience as Commander
of Allied Forces during World War II and his subsequent service as Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe made him uniquely familiar with political,
economic, and military factors involved in national and multinational
security. His military background also gave him a prodispositior for
arriving at decisions through careful, painstaking staff studi-as.21/
President Eisenhower was convinced of the validity of the "domino
theory" in Southeast Asia. He believed that if Indochina fell, "not only
Thailand biit Burma and Malaya would be threatened, with added risks to East
Pakistan and South Asia as well as to all Indonesia."22/ President Eisen-
hower also shared three important percaptions with other members of the
policy-making establishment: belief in the monolithic nature of communism,
belief that "Ho Chi Minh was, of course, a hard-core Communist," and belief
that the First Indochina War was a "clear case of freedom defend 'ng itself
from communist aggression."23/
2. John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State Jehin Foster Dulles, the chief Foreign policy
adviser, enjoyed an influence with Eisenhower that was unequalled in the
Washington bureaucracy. Dules had been the principal architect of the
Republican Party's "roll back" platform of 1952, and his vehement anti-
comit,,nist orientation during his years as Secretary of State has been
thoroughly recorded by historians.2_/ Less wel'i recorded is Dulles's anti-
pathy for colonialism. In his words,
Colonialism is the American dil, va. Our foreign

policy is squeezed between our opposition to colo-
nialism which in any event is inevitably passing, and
our ties to the colonial powers with whom we are linked
in the Atlantic alliance. We must be the mediator
between the European colonial powers and the people
struqgling for independence. 25/
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Dulles was particularly disturbed by French colonial policies in

Indochina. He deplored what he considered to be the venal readiness of the
French government to establish commercial relations with the Viet Minh, and
believed that if Vi-tnam was to survive as a bulwark against the expansion
of international communism in Asia, the French would have to declare their
intention to grant the Assoziated States full independence after (what
later came to be called) the First Indochina War.26/
Dul'ies was & man of exceptional intellectual power and purpose,
and he insisted on maintaining a strictly personal and private line to
President Eisenhower.27/ Dulles concentrated on the making of policy. He
had no interest in administering the Department of State, which he left to
his subordinates.28/ His ideas or policy were largely self-developed; he
used his subordinates to produce only minor refinements.29/ In addition,
probably as a result of h's own observation of the disastrous veto of the
League of Nations by the US Senate, Dulles was extremely sensitive to
public and particularly congressional opinion, which was reflected in a
steady collaboration betwezrn the executive and legislative branches during
his tenure as Secretary of State.30/ This collaboration was clearly
evinced during the Vietnam crisis over Dien Bien Phu.
3. Arthur Radford
President Eisenhower, a military expert in his own right, turned
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly the Chairman, Admiral Radford,
for advice on military policy, and not to Secretary of Defense Charles
Wilson. Radford had served previously as Commander of the Pacific Fleet
and claimed expertise in Asian affairs.31/ Like Eisenhower and Dulles,
Radford was zealous in his anticommunism. 32/ This anticommunist postur-e
led ltim to argue for military intervention in Indochina. However, his
repeated argum,.nts for military intervention at Dien Bien Phu were coun-
tered by other members of the Joint Chiefs, particularly Army Chief of
Staff, General Matthew Ridgway.
4. Walter Bedell Smith
More influential than Admiral Radford in Vietnam decision making
was Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith. Smith was a
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longtime personal friend of Eisenhower's. He had served as General Eisen-

hower's wartime Chief of Staff, and later served with distinction as US
Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. According to Eisenhower, Smith's statesmanlike "tact and under-
otanding were remarkable to those who had known him only through his repu-
tation in the Army as a tough and rigid taskmaster."33/ Smith's background
and Personality were well suited for his role in the Dien Bien Phu crisis,
which was to help initiate discussions with Britain, France, Australia and
New Zealand, in the lope of arranging "united action" against the communist
forces at Dien Bien Phu.
C. KEY DECISION MAKERS WITHIN THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
President John Kennedy's commitment to a creative, action-oriented

foreign policy was reflected in his choice of advisers. The men most
influential in Vietnam decision making -- Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy,
Dean Rusk, Maxwell Taylor, and Walt Rostow had in common intellectual,
scholarly backgrounds and an eagerness to employ their expertise within the
dynamic environment provided by the new President.34/ Figure 3-3, appear-
ing in Chapter 3, provides a graphic representation of the positions held
by the above advisers as well as those of other important individuals in
the Kennedy administration.
1. President John F. Kennedy
Four experiences in President Kennedy's past significantly
influencEd his decisions relating to Vietnam. First, as the son of the US
Ambassador to Great Britain, Kennedy witnessed the diplomatic developments
in Europe leading to World War II. He returned to Harvard to write his
thesis on the appeasement at Munich, later published as Why England Slept.
Kennedy's understanding of the conseqvences of that appeasement helped
determine his perception that security for any country rested on a superior
military force and the will to use it. Moreover, he learned the uniqueness
of the situation that led to the Munich tragedy. Unlike other post-war
presidents, he did not equate the situation in Vietnam with Hitler's attcck
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on Czechoslovakia. Rather he considered the Vietnam conflict to be a civil

war, involving insurgent forces led by Ho Chi Minh, which would be won by
the side that offered the Vietnamese people the most in terms of freedom to
choose their political leaders, security, and nation-building programs, He
stressed the importance of politico--military, counterinsurgency operations
to help resolve the conflict.35/ Second, as a US Senator, Kennedy made two
trips to South Vietnam and undertook a concerted study of Vietnam's prob-
lems; as a result, he believed that a prerequisite to defeating communism
in Vietnam was the development of a viable, nationalist government.36/ For
Kennedy, support of Diem was a methnd for achieving this goal. He did not
believe that the indigenous communist movement led by Ho Chi Minh repre-
sented the people's aspirations for independence and national self-determi-
nation. Third, Kennedy reacted strongly to Khrushchev's speech on "wars of
national liberation," delivered a month before Kennedy assumed the presi-
dency. Viewing this speech as a direct challenge to the free world and his
administration, the president-elect steeled his resolve to make a clear
showing of US strength in Vietnam. Fourth, in light o7 his perception of
the Korean experience, Kennedy was determined to prevent US involvement in
another protracted land war in Asia. Shortly before his presiaential
inauguration, he was again warned of the dangers of such involvement in a

special briefing by General Douglas MacArth'jr. This briefing made a last-
ing impression on the young President. 37/
2. Robert McNamara
President Kennedy's closest adviser on Vietnam was his Secretary
of Defense, Robert McNamara. McNamara was highly skilled in the art of
bureaucratic management, gaining much of his expertise from services with
the Ford Motor Company. He managed the Defense DeDartment like a bus.iness,
utilizing quantitative techniques of systems analysis to gain maximum
cost-effectiveness. His management ability and his extraordinarily reten-
tive mind impressed President Kennedy; as a result, McNamara gained unpre-
cedented influence in the formulation ,f US military policy. Since this
influence was sometimes seen as infringinp on the province of the military
professionals whu often perceived McNarara and his staff as arrogant,
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inexperienced civilians capable of overruling their expert advice, there

was resentment towards McNamara and his role.38/
In the area of military policy, Secretary McNamara was instrumen-
tal in developing a greatly increased nuclear capability. in addition, he
emphasized programs for the improvement of US conventional warfare capa-
bilties.39/ McNamara advocated politico-military solutions for the insur-
gency problem in Vietnam and, in October 1961, urged the sending of combat
forces to South Vietnam to prevent its loss to commnunism.40/
3. McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, also exerted considerable influence in the White House; like
McNamara, he was extremely intelligent and an able administrator. Bundy
sought to clarify options for the President; his efficiency in delegating
respoý sibility to his own staff and in eliciting response and cooperation
from others aided the development of these options.41/ In contrast to his
predecessors under Truman and Eisenhower, whose functions were predomi-
nately administrative, Bundy and his staff enjoyed considerable influence
in the formulation of national security policy. 42/
4. Dean Rusk
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a low-key Southern gentleman,
deferred to Secretary McNamara on matters relating to Vietnam, despite his
expertise in Asian affairs,43/ Secretary Rusk did, however, provide 3
historical dimension to Vietnam decision making, having served as Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the Truman administration.
President Kennedy was disappointed that Rusk failed to develop
imaginative, dynamic solutions to problems in Vietnam,44/ yet, Rusk, perhaps
in deference to Mr. Kennedy's ambition to be his own Secretary of State,
never sought to be the president's alter ego in foreign policy.45/ While
he maintained a close, personal line to the president, he realized he had
•i f other duties to fulfill, including constant interaction with other govern-
mental departments involved in the formulation of US foreign policy.46/
Secretary Rusk was strongly anticommunist, and was especially convinced
that Communist China was responsible for the turmoil in Vietnam.
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5. Maxwell Taylor
General Maxwell Taylor had impressed Mr. Kennedy with his criti-
cism in The Uncertain Trumpet of the Eisenhower administration's strategy
of massive retaliation. Taylor advocated a strategy of "flexible
response," which emphasized capabilities for responding to limited wars
with conventional forces and weaponry. When President Kenredy's colnfidence
in the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was diminished by the expericnce
of the Bay of Pigs, he created a new position in his administration,
Special Military Representative ti; the President, and appointed General
Taylor to fill this post.47/ Taylor argued for political and administra-
tive reforms and counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam. In his
view, US military support should include the conventional bombing of North
Vietnam; but as a determined advocate of the "never again" school, 48/ he
did not favor the use of American ground combat forces unless such a step
became absolutely necessary. He helped establish and chaired the Special
Group for Counterinsurgency to cGiscuss ways of meeting the threat of insur-
gency warfare, especially as eŽxported across national borders.49/ Accor-
ding to Taylor, this group assured recognition throughout the government
"that subversive insurgency was a political-military conflict equal in
importance to conventional karfare,"50/ In October 1962, General Taylor
was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and served in that
capacity until July 1964.
6. Walt Ro.stow
Walt Rostow, formerly a professor of economics, served as
McGeorga Bundy's Deputy Special Assistant for Natin&l Security Affairs
early in ;he Kennedy adm, nistraý.ion. Rostow was influential in developing
the. Counteri n L.urgency Plan (CIP).5..1/ In addition, he was the first of
Kennedy's advisers to deal closely with Viecnam-related matters, heading a
White House task force in February 1961, which kept a close watch on
developments in Laos and Vietnam.52/ Yzt President Kannedy, while
impressed with Mr. Rostow's creativity, became suspicious of his judgment
on questions con, rning the use of milita.-y force. Rostow had been one of
the most iociferous adverýates of the bombing of North Vietnam and of using
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US combat forces in the South. President Kennedy consistently rejected

that advice, believing that Vietnam was primarily a political conflict
which required counterinsurgency efforts, advisers, and aid. After a few
months in office, President Kennedy appointed Mr. Rostow Chairman of the
State Department's Policy Planning Council, thereby moving him from the
White House to a somewhat less powerful, "safer" position more suited to
his creative approach to policy making.53/ In this position, Mr. Rostow
put his professional economic talents to use in planning programs for the
economic development of Third World countries.54/
0. KEY DECISION MAKERS WITHIN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
Johnson's continuity in Vietnam policy sprang not only from his own
background and preconceptions but also from the fact that he kept many of
President Kennedy's Cabinet and White House Staff members as advisers.
Although Dean Rusk was the only major Vietnam adviser to remain in the
Johnson Administration until JohnsQn left office in January 1969, several
of Kennedy's top-level advisers, such as Robert McNamara and Walt Rostow,
McGeorge Bundy's replacement,55/ continued to serve Johnson for the
majority of his presidential tenure. The positions of these and other
important advisers appeared in Chapter 3, Figure 3-4, an overview of the
Johnson administration.
1. President Lyndon B. Johnson
Three major factors influenced President Johnson's Vietnam deci-
' j sions. First, as a Democrat who hao lived through the "loss" of China and
the McCarthy era, he believed strongly that he must not be "soft" on com-
i munism or ;'lose" South Vietnam to communists.56/ Second, his previous
experience in the Congress, particularly as Senate Majority Leader, had
"taught him the value of achieving consensus, often to , detriment of

minority views, by squelching all debate.57/ His desire to reason together
and achieve consensus on Vietnam policy was reflected in his special
"Tuesday lunch group" meetings where reoresentatives from various depart-
ments and agencies met regularly to discuss most actions relating to
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Vietnam. Based on this rationale, Johnson believed that every mail could be
bargained with, including Ho Chi Minh, and that a strategy of gradual
escalation in Vietnam provided the US with bargaining leverage at a reason-
able cost to the United States.58/ Third, President Johnson, whose great
strength lay in the area of domestic politics, was fundamentally insecure
when dealing in foreign affairs. This insecurity was reflected in his
attitude toward key advisers on Vietnam policy. Those who disagreed with
his basic objective of preventing the loss of South Vietnam to the Com-
munist forces, or with his strategies for achieving that objective, were
often excluded from high-level decision making.59/

2. Robert McNamara
President Johnson described Robert McNamara as "the ablest man
I've ever met." Johnson was awed by McNamara's facility with statistics,
and strongly supported McNamara's systems-analysis approach to military
questions concerning Vietnam.60/ As Johnson's Secretary of Defense,
McNamara continued to advocate a broad range of political and economic, as
well as military actions to prevent the "loss" of South Vietnam. He also
advocated bombing restrictions which caused considerable consternation
within the JCS.61I By late 1967, McNamara was disillusioned about US
involvement in Vietnam, and he began to press for deescalation.62/ This
position ran counter to Johnson's instincts and stated policy, causing the
President to lose confidence in his Secretary nf Defense.63/ Clark
Clifford replaced McNamara as Secretary of Defense one month after the
Tet '68 Offensive abated and one day after President Johnson announced his
decision not to run for reelection.
3. McGeorge Bundy
Like McNamara, McGeorge Bundy was retained by President Johnson
as a close adviser after Kennedy's death. Bundy continued to serve as
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs until 1966, when he
resigned to become President of The Ford Foundation. This decision to
leave the administration allegedly stemmed from his dissatisfaction with
Johnson's overall approach to policy formulation and not from a softening
of his own position regarding the war.64/ Until that time, Bundy had
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supported militiry sojutions, including the bombing of North Vietnam and

the use of ground forces, partly because he believed that the United
States, as a superpower, had the responsibility for resisting communist
aggression.65/ and partly because he believed that a strong US presence in
Southeast Asia was needed in order to maintain the credibility of Anerican
defense commitments with other allies. He had been deeply moved by his
official trips to Vietnam, during which he saw the consequences of ter-
rorist actions by Vietnamese communist forces.66/ President Johnson was
impressed with Bundy's knowledge of foreign affairs and relied on his
advice as a member of the Tuesday Lunch Group.
4. Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk continued as Secretary of State throughout President
Johnson's term of office. His continued service was a testament to his
unswerving loyalty to the president as much as it was to the quality of his
stewardship.67/ Johnson greatly prized and rewarded loyalty; at times this
tendency caused him to confuse dissent with dis loyalty.68/ Rusk believed
that Communist China was bent on consuming the "free world" and that the
Soviet Union and China constituted a monolithic communist power structure
despite contrary evidence from his subordinates. By 1968, however, it
appears Rusk did acknowledge that the monolithic view of communism was an
outmoded concept. 69/
5. Clark Clifford
Clark Clifford succeeded McNamara as Secretary of Defense in
March 1968. His long-time personal friendship with President Johnson and
his reputation for anticommunism, established while serving as an adviser
to President Truman, endowed him with important credentials. These factors
enhanced his influence when advocating a reversal of Johnson's Vietnam
policy in the spring of 1968. Johnson could, therefore, not suspect him of
being "soft" on communism. However, As Clifford geared up for his new
responsibilities as Secretary of Defense, fie realized that support for
Johnson's war policies had waned substantially. Armed with his Task
Force's findings, he conveyed to Johnson that the administration must seek
a new course. Johnson's reaction to Clifford's appraisal was apparently
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one of dismay; Clifford's coming aboard was to have been a mean!; of rees-
tablishing solid group harmony, and then, as Clifford himself stated, "this
Judas appeared."70/ Clifford stayed on in the administration !serving as
one of the President's more influential advi,ers bent on reassessing US
policy regarding Vietnam.
6. Walt Rostow
Walt Rostow is noteworthy because, as Bundy's successor in 1966,
he became a highly influential advocate of the bombing and use of ground
forces in Vietnam. He was a continuous supporter of a hard-line position
in Vietnam, founded -on decisive military action. Even more than Rusk, Mr.
Rostow was a vehement anticommunist. 71/ His close proximity to Johnson 'in
1966, after his exile in the State Department, is believed to have been
largely responsible for Johnson's excessive optimism concerning the pro-
gress of the war.72/ Rostow has been described as having a penchant for
"mind-guarding" and for the "cleansing" of incoming intelligence, when he
served as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
E. KEY DECISION MAKERS WITHIN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
Of the individuals who served in the Nixon administration, those that

played the most significant roles in overall Vietnam decision making
included President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Melvin Laird and William Rogers.
In addition to these key officials, whose backgrounds and polii:y recommen-
dations will be discussed below, a large number of senior advis~rs aqsisted
these key decisionmakers. Their positions are highlighted in Chapter 3,
Figure 3-5, a schematic overview of the Nixon administration'5 high-level
personnel.
1. President Richard M. Nixon
Two significant factors which influenced President Nixon's
approach to international affairs were belief in the importance of a strong
posture towards communism and belief in the necessity of a centralized,
personal foreign policy. Nixon's views on communism coalesced during his
tenure as vice president under President Dwight Eisenhower. From his
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experiences during the Korean war era, he came to appreciate the use of
force as potential tool for eliciting desired diplomatic responses. By the
time he became president, Nixon had develooed a reputation as a hard-liner
capable of potent anticommunist rhetoric. But he also was pragmatic in his
approach to foreign policy, and appreciated the opportunity to initiate
detente with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
This major shift in US foreign relaticns stemmed from President
NiAor's belief that the Vietnam war could be terminated favorably if the US
made use of the tensions which existed between Peking and Moscow. The
promotion of peace in Vietnam and detente with the Soviet Union and the PRC
were the Nixon administration's top priorities. They were to be accom-
plished via linkage politics, a strategy which Nixon and Kissinger strongly
endorsed. In short, the administration's linkage policy combined
Kissinger's theories on power balancing with Nixon~s belief that the Soviet
Union held the key to peace in Vietnam.73/ In essence, linkage was a form
of diolomatic barter: tne Soviet Union, for example, would reap US credit
in return for cooperation in reducing the tensions in Southeast Asia. The
realization of this goal was to be accomplished by means of personal diplo-
macy, which both N~xon and Kissinger practiced extensively.
President Nixon had a penchant for privacy which was clearly
evident in his decision-making style. When making decisions, he generally
pigeonholed himself in his office with notepad and pencil, ultimately
making all final decisions in private. His penchant for privacy at times
bordered on secrecy; his fear of leaks and antipathy towards the press
tended only to increase this tendency.
2. Henry Kissinger
In Henry Kissinger, Nixon found a man who promoted an approach to
foreign affairs which he advocated and admired. Their working relation-
ships as rresident and Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (and later, as Secretary of State) was extremely close --
based on a rare compatability of mind and temperament.74/
Henr. Kissinger's centralized approach to decision making and his
preference for linkage diplomacy stand out as the two major features of his
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overall approach to foreign policy. His preference for centralized deci-

sion making stems fron his views regarding the dangers inherent in any
bureaucracy:
The bureaucracy absorbs the energies of top execu-

tives... Attention tends to be diverted from the act of
choice--which is the ultimate test of statesmanship--to
the accumulation of facts. Decisions can be avoided
until a crisis brook.s no further delay... But at that
point the scope for constructive action is at a min-
imutn.. .Moreover, the reputation, indeed the political
survival, of most leaders depends on their ability- to
realize their goals, however these may have been
arrived at.75/
His was a converional approach to foreign affairs based on the
notion of power balance in the international arena; peace could be achieved
and maintained only in a stable international scene. Kissinger's approach
to resolving the Vietnam zonflict by way of enlisting Moscow's and Peking's
participation stemmed from his general approach to international affairs.
A former Harvard historian, Kissinger found contemporary application for
the diplomatic power-balancing maneuvering of Metternich, whom he had
closely studied. 76/
A difficult man to work for, Kissinger's overall strength was
greatly enhanced precisely because his approach fit smoothly into Nixon's
preferred mode of decision making. The president's trust in Kissinger
reinforced his special assistant's overall effectiveness and strength.77/
However, one major drawback to Kissinger's dominance of the administra-
tion's national security decison making was that the administration was
frequently out of touch with events in Vietnam.78/ This dilemma was par-
ticularly apparent during Kissinger's frequent trips to the Middle East in
hopes of realizing a peace settlement.
Kissinger's powers in the administration reached a peak in 1973,
when he replaced William Rogers as Secretary of State, thereby assuming
dual authority in the formulation of national security policy - as Secre-
tary of State and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
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3. William Rogers
William Rogers served as Secretary of State from 1969 to 1973,
leaving private law practice to join the Nixon administration. Lacking
significant background in foreign affairs, Secretary Rogers' influence in
the administration ste&dily declined concurrent with Kissinger's increasing
dominance in the decision-making process.
Uneasy with the Nixon-Kissinger preference for personal diplo-
macy, Secretary of State ogers strongly opposed Kissinger's extension of
authority into pnlicy formulation which Rogers considered within the realin
of the State Department. 79/ Rogers opposed any continuation of military
operations in Southeast Asia, and along with Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, advocated a prompt liquidation of the US war effort.80/ While
President Nixon maint.-ined that Rogers was his chief foreign policy adviser
and spokesman for the administration, Rogers' influence within the admini!s-
tration was negligible on Vietnam policy compared to Kissinger's.81/
4. Melvin Laird
Secretary of Defense Laird was, like Rogers, a strong advocate of
rapid Vietnamization combinea with the rapid withdrawal of US forces. This
approach contrasted with that advocated by Nixon, Kissinger, and the JCS,
all of whom desired a more gradual withdrawal and a less hasty Vietnami-
zation. Laird's chief objective was to get out of Vietnam as quickly as
possible--all other issues were secondary.82/ Laird and Rogers were the
Nixon administratior's highest level opponents of military escalation in
the Indochina area 83/ In fact, it was Laird who actually coined the term
"Vietnamization" and, at every possible opportunity, he promoted this
program with the public in his search for a political solution to the
war.84/ He made use of his familiarity with Congress by meeting frequently
with various legislators to promote his overall approach for the war's
termination; apparently he was quite successful in this undertaking.8L5/ It
is therefore possible that the Secretary's interaction with Congress rein-
forced the legislaturq's growing anti-interventionist sentiments.
In his stewardship of the Defense Department, he advocated an
increase in the military's overall input in the decision-making process.
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However, in practice, it appears he distrusted the JCS, owing to their

close relationship with Kissinger, and actually sought to restrict their
interaction with high-level decisicn makers. According to Admiral Sharp,
t Laird operated according to a closely held "game plan," a

blueprint of precise and skillfully devised political moves
carried out t~y & small group of confidants. When Kissinger
sought my views or, the basis iuf my experience in Vietnam,
the Secretary made clear his disapproval of my talking
directly with Kis~singer. Although the two were seldom
together in my presence, Laird seemed to be concerned that
Kissinger was exerting undue influence on policies of the
Department of Oefense.86/
F. KEY DECISION MAKERS WITHIN THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
Similar to Lyndon Johnson's approach to the transition period, after

President Kennedy's assassination, President Ford also sought to maintein a
to. administrative th
Hof Initdta stability
rntinpro be after
and continuity Nixon' s resigna-
ohyhnldbmodicum
special staff selected for this purpose, and made few personnel changes in
the ranks of the high-level bureaucracy. Other key decision makers
involved in Vietnam-r~elated issues included Henry Kissinger, James
Schlesinger and Graham Martin, each of whom had served under President
Ilixon. The respective positions of these individuals within the bureau-
cracy, as well as those of other important advisers, appeared in Chapter 3,
Figure 3-6, an overview of the Ford administration.
1. President Gerald Ford
Gerald Ford had over twenty years of experience in the US Con-
gress before entering the Nixon administration as vice president in 1973.
As a congressman, he had consistently advocqted a US military posture of
strength and supported legislation which provided ample military assistancek
to US allies. His resolve to contain communism was similar to that of his
five postwar presidential predecessors. A statement by Congressman Ford[
just prior to the Gulf of Tonkin crisis illustrates this resolve.
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Our lesson in Cuba ought to guide us during the third

great crisis of this decade - in Viet Nam. In Cuba,
our early vacillation encouraged the Communists to
bolder and bolder aggression. We cannot - we dare
not - lead them to repeat that mistake in Viet Nam.
The Communist leaders in Moscow, Peking and Hanoi must
fully understand that the United States considers the
freedom of South Viet Nam vital to our interests. And
they must know that we are not bluffing in our deter-
mination to defend those interests. ... Toward this end
I recommended a short time ago that we intensify our
air strikes against significant military targets in
North Viet Nam... 87/
As Congressional Minority Leader in the early seventies, Mr. Fcrd's record
clearly indicates that he in no way softened his view regarding US commit-
ments in Southeast Asia.88/
President Ford was familiar with foreign affairs. His membership
in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee provided him the
opportunity to question Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Directors
of the Central Intelligence Agency. He had also traveled extensively in
Europe and Southeast Asia. As vice president he was afforded the oppor-
tunity to participate in briefings given by Dr. Kissinger on a variety of
foreign policy issues.89/ He endorsed Nixon's gradual Vietnamization
program and the 1973 signing of the Paris Peace Accords.90/
Gerald Ford'% views on the role and responsibilities of the
presidency deserve mention because, as president, he was confronted by an
increasingly as';ertive Congress which he felt had undermined the power of
the pre.ident at Commanier-in-Chief with the passage of the 1973 War Powers
Act.91/ Indeed, before leaving Congress for the vice presidency, he had
opposed the passage of this act. As president, he came to view Congress as
being overly involved in the day-to-day operation of US foreign policy, a
complaint which increased as he wrestled with Congress over appropriations
to shore up the rapidly deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. There-
fore, while he believed that his responsibilities as president included the
effective and expeditious resolution of crises, in practice, he found his
freedom of action severely constrained by Congress.
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2. Henry Kissinger
Gerald Ford chose to retain Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State
because of his high regard for Kissinger's ability. According to Ford,
He [Kissinger] had gone through hell during the final

days of the Nixon administration, and he had agreed to
stay on only because I said I needed him. Sure he had
an ego ... and it's also true he had a penchant for
secrecy. But that, I felt, was a necessary ingredient
of successful diplomacy... Our personalities meshed.
I respected his expertise in foreign policy and he
respected my judgment in domestic policies. He was a
total pragmatist who thought in terms of power and
national interest instead of ideology... L2/
Since the signing of the Peace Accords, Or. Kissinger had turned his atten-
tion to other international concerns and tried to restore acceptance of the
validity of the domino theory. When faced with the rapidly deteriorating
situation in South Vietnam inlate 1974 and early 1975, he stated:
We must understand that peace is indivisible. The US

cannot pursue a policy of selective reliability. We
cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without
jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere... [if
Saigon falls]... then we are likely to find a massive
shift in the foreign policies of many countries and a
fundamental threat over a period of time to the
security of the U.S.93/
Kissinger's distress was aggravated by congressional reluctance to support
the administration's requests for' aid to rescue South Vietndim.
Executive- legislative haggling over military aid appropriations was the
most significant feature of the Vietnam decision-making process during the
Ford administration, and Kissinger was one of the main participants in
these debates.
3. James Schlesinoer
President Ford also retained Secretary of Defense Schlesinger,
when the former took office in August 1974. However, in contrast to the
Ford-Kissinger relationship, Ford had difficulties in dealing with
Schlesinger.94/ Aware of the nation's need to heal its war-inflicted
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wounds, Schlesinger suggested that the president take positive action

regarding the status of Vietnam draft evaders and deserters Apparently he
was influential with the president on this issue, for the pr ident shortly
thereafter developed a program to rehabilitate these men.95/
Schlesinger's relationship with Dr. Kissinger was also marred by
tension. Both men, dominant and aggressive, did not always agree on
strategies to save South Vietnam.96/ By March 1975, tension between the
two men ran so high that it complicated the administration's development of
a concerted strategy for dealing with the crisis in Vietnam.97/ Schles-
inger's resignation was finally requested by the president prior to the
1976 presidential election.
4. Graham Martin
As a career diplomat who was assigned the ambassadorial post to
Saigon in 1973, Graham Martin had previous experience in US-Vietnamese
diplomacy. He )articipated in the 1954 Geneva negotiations and joined the
1973 Paris talks as an observer.98/ His participation in national-level
Vietnam decision making became more visible as congressional resistance to
the administration's aid requests increased. Ambassador Martin made
frequent trips to Washington to lobby for the administration's aid pack-
ages, illustrating his commitment to saving the rapidly weakening Saigon
government.
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APPENDIX 3
ENDNOTES
1. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1956) Vol. 1, pp. 1-4,
and Gordon Hoxie, Command Decision and the Presidency (New York:
Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 55.
2. Hoxie, pp. 55-56.
3. Janis Irving, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972),
p. 61; and 0rigin of the U.iJ-Ynvulvement in Vietnam," US-Vietnam
Relations 1945-1967. Pr~apared by the Department of Defense. hrinted
fLr lhe Ue ur thefHouse Committee on Armed Services. (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971) in 12 Books; Book 1,
I.A.3. pp. A51-A58, Hereafter DOD US/VN Relations.
4. Barton J. Bernstein and Allen Matusow, The Truman Administration (New
York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 251-256, and Russell Fifield,
Americans in Southeast Asia (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell), p. 65.
5. Hoxie, p. 80.
6. Bernstein, pp. 331-332.
7. Cable from Secretary of State G. Marshall to American Embassy, Paris,

cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, p. 99.
8. !bid., Book 8, pp. 130, •35, 144.
9. Fifield, p. 67.
10. Ibid., pp. 71-73, 75, 100.

11. See for example, "Strengthening the Forces of Freedom,'" in Bernstein
and Matusow, pp. 289-293.
12. See Acheson's "Summary of China Policy" in Bernstein and Matusow,
pp. 300-309.
13. DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, p. 198, Cable from Acheson to American
Consul in Hanoi, May 20, 1949.
14. Ibid., Book 8, pp. 198, 199.
15. Ibid., Book 8, p. 196.
16. Ibid., Book 8, p. 196, and Fifield, p. 126.
17. Fifield, p. 118, Ho's discussion with Abbott was one in a series of
oral and written communications with the US in which Ho requested US
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support for Vietnam's search for self-determination. "U.S. Neutrality

in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1946-1949: Failures of Negotiated
Settlement" cited in DOD US/VN Relations, Book 1, l.A.2. pp. A-28-A-29.
Also see, in Book 8, the following: Memo From The Assistant Chief of
the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs London to the Secretary of
State, February 1946, p. 61; Telegram from The Vice Counlcil at Hanoi
O'Sullivan to the Secretary of State, June 5, 1946, p. 71; and
Department of State Cable to AMCONSUL Saigon, February 3, 1948, p. 117.
18. Cable from Abb,)tt to Department of State, November 5, '948, cited in
DOD US/VN Relations, Book 8, p. 159; and American Consulate General
Saigon Memorandum on Indochina for the New Delhi Foreign Service
Conference, p. 157.
19. See section on President Lyndon Johnson in Appendix B - The Johjnson
Administration.
20. 000 US/VN Relations, Book 8, p. 288, Letter from Dean Rusk, Deputy Under
Secretary of State, to MG James Burns, Office of Secretary of Defense
and Fifield, p. 142.
21. Ibid., p. 249.

22. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday, 1965),
p. 333.
23. Ibid., pp. 333-336.
24. Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971),
pp. 217-221. "Roll Back" went a step further than "containment." The
former entailed the "liberation" of peoples who were already under
comimunist leadership, whereas the latter stressed maintenance of the
status quo by halting current or future communist expansionism.
25. Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965),
o. 84.
26. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1973), p. 252.
27. Townsend Hoopes, p. 140. According to Sherman Adams, the President's
principal staff man in the White House, Dulles would bypass and enter
the President's anteroom, ask the lady secretary if the President was
engaged, and "if the answer was no, he just opened the door and walked
in." Dulles enjoyed the confidence and respect of the President partly
because of his meticulous preparation, down to and including a recom-
mended course of action for the problem at hand.
B2
B-24
THE BDM CORPORATION
28. Ibid., p. 142-145.

Li
29. Ibid., p. 1,1-14ý.
30. Charles Yost, The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs (New York:
random House, 1972), p. 68.-.
31. Richard K. Betts Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 197i), pp. 66-67.
32. Ibid., p. 177.

34. Paul M. Kattenburg, "Viet Nam and LIS Diplomacy 1940-1970," Orbis 15,
#3, Fall 1971.
35. Robert Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975), pp. 15-16.
36. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday), p. 423.
37. Frantl Merli and Theodore Wilson, ed., Makers of American Diplomacy
(New York: Charles Scribners), p. 327, arTd U. A. Johnson, SOM inter-
"view, January 9, 1979.
38. Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bloomington: Indiana
University Pre3s, 1976), p. 119.
39. Merli, p. 325.

40. Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: MacMillan Co.,
1973), p. 459.
41. John Leacacos, Fires in the In-Basket (New York: The World Publishing
Co., 1968), pp. 138-139.
42. David K. Hall, "The Custodian-Manager of the Policymaking Process", in
U.S., Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government
Printing Of'ice, June 1975) Vol. 2, p. 108.
43. Merli, p. 32.; Leacacos, p. 132; BDM Interview June 13, 1979 with Dr.
Vincent Davis. In a private meetilg with Mr. Rusk, Dr. Davis querried
Rusk concerning the apparent deference. Mr. Rusk himself explained
"that in matters concerning Vietnam he and his staff generally
concurred with McNamara's approach to the problem.
B-25
, - ! -.
THE BDM CORPORATION
44. Leacacos, p. 6.
45. Ibid., p. 124, 128.
46, Ibid., p. 124.
47. Theodore Sorenson, Kennegy (New York: Harper & Row), p. 606, and
Betts, p. 67.
48. Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the SecuritX of Asia (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1968), p..-).
49. In an interview with BOM analysts, General Taylor indicated that
President Kennedy had an excellent appreciation of the potential role
of counterinsurgency operations in "wars of national liberation." In
fact, Kennedy was obliged to explain the concept of counterinsurgency
to General Taylor so that the latter could understand it and explain
the concept to other military professionals.
50. Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
1972), p. 201.
51. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965),
p. 341.
53. Hoopes, p. 21.
55. Two significant changes occurred: Walt Rostow supplanted McGeorge
Bundy in 1966 after the latter became disillusioned with the war, and
Clark Clifford replaced Defense Secretary McNamara shortly after the
Tet Offensive of 1968.
56. Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ (Baltimore: Pelican, 1970) pp. 205, 248; and
Gallucci, p. 43.
57. Doris Kearns, L Johnson and the American Dream (New York:
Signet, 1976), pp.142-145.
58. Ibid., pp. 268-270, 279; and Wicker, p. 153.

59. Gallucci, p. 99; Schlesinger, pp. 184-185; and Kearns, p. 335.
60. Hoopes, pp. 17-18; Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston, 1971), p. 20; Dr• Vince Davis, interview at BDM,
June 13, 1979.
B-26
THE BDM CORPORATION
61. Henry L. Trewhitt, McNamara (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp.
225-227.
62. Wicker, p. 198; Jim F. Heath, Decade of Disillusionment (Bloomington:
Indiana University, 1975), p. 102, DOD US/VN Relations, Book 6, p.
138.
63. Heath, p. 102; Hoopes, pp. 83, 90.
64. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House,
1969), pp. 624-625.
65. Hoopes, pp. 18-20.
66. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor had previously recommended bombing the DRV
on two occasions, but his recommendations were iiot accepted. Bundy
was in South Vietnam when the Viet Cong attacked the US barracks at
Pleiku, and he joined in Taylor's third recommendation for bombing.
Ambassador Taylor credits Bundy with having tipped tht' scales in his
favor. The bombing request was approved. Maxwell Taylor, BOM
interview, July 11, 1979.
67. Ibid.
68. Johnson, p. 208; Henry Graff, The Tuesday Cabinet (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 197), p. 40.
69. Kearns, pp. 334-336.
70. Interview with Dr. Davis, BOM, June 13, 1979; examples may be found in
DOD US/VN Relations, Book 7, 0-81.
71. Hoopes, p. 181; Kearns pp. 361-3,.2.
72. Hoopes, pp. 20-21.
73. Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel, Roots of Involvement (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1971), pp. 102-3.
74. A. Hartley, "American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era," Ade1hi
P , #110 (London: International institute for Strategic tudies),
p.1
75. Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in
Conditions of World Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968),
pp. 168-170.
76. Michael Roskin, "An American Metternich: Henry A. Kissinger and the
Global Balance of Powers," in Merli, p. 377.
77. I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy (Princeton
University Press, 1972), p. 125.
B-27
II
THE BDM CORPORATION
78. Stephen Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: W. W.

Norton, 1974), p. 276.
79. Theodore White, Breach of Faith (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), p.
105.
80. Halberstam, p. 6 ; White, p. 380.
81. Destler, p. 131.
82. Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces
(Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 1977), pp. 36-37.
83. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Interview at Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, April 19, 1976 Transcript at US
Army Military History Research Collection, Senior Officers Debriefing
Program, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; Destler, p. 29;
and fad Szulc The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon
Years (New York: Viking Press, 1978), pp. 60, 290.
84. Sharp, Strategic Direction, pp. 36-37.
85. Ibid.
86. General William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday,
1976), p. 387. Admiral Sharp obviou• s concurs with this evaluation
since he quoted this passage as an example of the delicate relation-
ship between the two secretaries. See Sharp, p. 37.
87. Speech by Gerald Ford at the National Press Club, July 1965, cited in
President Ford. The Man and His Record (Washington, D.C.,
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., !974).
88. Ibid.
89. Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 129.
90. See "President Ford: The Man and His Record."
91. See Hoxie, pp. xvii-xviii.
92. Ford, p. 129.
93. Gelb, p. 351.
94. Ford, p. 136. In the first days of the Ford administration, the
President was irritated by rumors that Schlesinger, concerned about
Nixon's mental stability during his last days in office, had taken
measures to ensure that Nixon could not issue unilateral orders to the
Armed Services. Ford told Schlesinger that he was aware of these
B-28
THE BDM CORPORATION
rumors, and while not pointing a finger directly at the Secretary of

Defense, stated that he wanted the situation straightened out imme-
diately. Ford's comment after his meeting with Schlesinger indicated
a disharmony between the two. ..... that was the first run-in I had
with Schlesinger. I hoped it would be the last, but I suspected
otherwise."
95. Ford, p. 141.
96. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 153.
97. Ibid., p. 235.
98. While he felt Le Duc Tho had not changed much since 1954, he was
impressed by some of the younger technocrats who took part in the 1973
talks. He considered them more malleable and more inclined toward
moderation. See Snepp, p. 63.
B-29
THE BDM CORPORATION
APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA TO CHAPTER 1: A SERIES OF SIX CHARTS
SUMMARIZING US GLOBAL INTERESTS ANt OBJECTIVES, PERCEIVED
THREATS, AND STRATEGIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO
US INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1945-1975
Six charts appear in Appendix C, each representing a five year time-

period during the 30 %ear era of US involvement in Vietnam. Each chart
depicts the interrelationship between US global interests and objectives,
perceived threats, and strategies with those related to Southeast Asia.
All information summarized in each graphic 'is taken directly from US
national policy statements which appeared during each particular time
period. The US Department of Defense publication, United States - Vietnam
Relations 1945-1967 and US Department of State Bulletins served as the
primary sources for the extraction of such statements. All other sources
used in the preparation of these charts appear in the Volume III Biblio-
graphy.
C-1
THE BDM CORPORATION
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THE BDM CORPORATION
VOLUME III
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(y
9
"THE BDM COFPORATION
VOLUME III
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PANEL DISCUSSIONS
The following persons participated iro the 8DM Senior Review Panel meating
on September 7 and 8, 1979 at The BDM Westbranch Conference Center. Mem-
bers of the panel provided a critique of the original drafts for this
volume and offered detailed comments during the panel discussions.
Braestrup, Peter., Editor, Wilson Quarterly. Former Saigon Bureau Chief

for The Washington Post and author of Big Story.
Colby, William E., LLB., Former Ambassador and Deputy to COMUSMACV for
CORDS, and former Director of Central Intelligence.
Davis, Vincent, Dr., Professor and Director of the Patterson School of

Diplomacy and International Commerce, The University of Kentucky.
Greene, Fred, Dr., Professor, Williams College. Former Director, Office

of Research for East r:i•n Affairs, Department of State.
Hallowell, John H., Dr., James B. Duke Professor of Political Science,

Duke University.
I~AI
Hugh,,, Thomas L., LLD., President of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace. Former Director for Intelligence and Research, US
Department of State with rank of Assistant Secretary of State.
Johnson, U. Alexis, Chairman of the Se1,ior Review Panel. Career Ambas-

sador. Former Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to
Czechoslovakia, Thailand, and Japan, and (1964-65) Deputy Ambassador
to Maxwell Taylor in the Republic of Vietnam.
Sapin, Burton M., Dr., Dean, School of Public and International Affairs,
The George Washington University. Former Foreign Service Officer.
Thompson, Kenneth W., Dr., Director, White Burkett Miller Center of Public
Affairs, University of Virginia.
BB-1
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VOLUME III
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTERVIEWS
The following interviews, conducted by members of the BDM study team,

provided either general or specific information useful in Volume III:
Berger, Samuel D., Retired Ambassador. Former Ambassador and Deputy to
Ambassador Bunker in Saigon 1968-69. Interviewed at his home in
Washington, D.C. on 22 June 1979.
Brady, Leslie S., Retired Foreign Service Officer. Former Public Affairs
Officer in Saigon 1951-1952. Interviewed at The BDM Corporation
5 June 1979.
Crý in, l.ucien, Colonel, US Army (Ret). Former OSS and CIA officer,
serving i~n North Vietnam in 1945-46 and 1955, and in South Vietnam in
the mid-1950s and 1961-1964. Interviewed at The BDM Corporation on
25 August 1979.
Davis, Vincent, Dr., Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International
Commerce. Frequent consultant to high-level offices in the Departments
of State and Defense and the Central IntelliCence Agency. Interviewed
at The BDM Corporation 13 June 1979.
Bui D0"-•, Former GVN Ambassador to the US (1967-71). Cabinet Secretary in

Defense Ministry in the Bao Dai Government. Interviewed in
iiington, D.C. 8 June 1979.
Lemnit.--, Lyman L., General, US Army (Ret) Former Army Chief of Staff and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander,
Euuapa. Interviewed in the Pentagon on 15 June 1974.
Taylor, MAxwell D., General, US Army (Ret). Former Army Chief of Staff,
Ch• iarn of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Ambassador to the Republic
of Vietnam. Interviewed at his home in Washington, D.C. on 11 July
1979.
Westmoreland, William C., General, US Army (Ret) Former COMUSMACV and Army
Chief if Staff. Interviewied at The BDM Corporation on 17 August 1979.
BB-2
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VOLUME III
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CORRESPONDENCE - ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPTS
The following persons responded in writing to BDM queries and provided
information of use in Vulume III:
Croizat, Victor Colonel, USMC (Ret). While employed by the Rand Corpora-
tion in 1967, Colonel Croizat translated a document, The
Lessons of the War in Indochina, Volume II, written in 1955 by the
Commander in Chief, French Forces, Indochina. Colonel Croizat provided
The BDM Corporation with his views on US involvement in Indochina in a
letter dated 11 September 1979. A detailed transcript covering his
experiences in Indochina in the mid-1950s is held by the Oral History
Section, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps,
Washington, D.C.
Harkins, Paul 0., General, US Army (Ret). Former COMUSMACV (1962-64) in a
letter to BOM dated 29 August 1979 provided certain of his views of
the 1963-64 period in Vietnam.
Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., Retired Ambassador. Former Ambassador to the
Republic of Vietnam (1961-1963) in a letter to BDM dated 18 June 1979
replied briefly on the Diem coup, about which he still feels strongly,
and furnished a copy of an interview he gave to the U.S. News and
World Report and which appeared in the 26 July 1971 .issue of that
magazine, pp. 66-70.
The following transcripts in the US Army Military History Research Collec-
tion, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, (ISArmy War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania provided some background data or insights useful in
Volume III.
Goodpaster', Andrew J., General, US Army (Ret). Former DEPCOMUSMACV
(1968-69) and later SACEUR, USCINCEUR (1970-1974). Interviewed by
Col. William D. Johnson and LTC James C. Ferguson, (Class j, '76 at
AWC) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center fur Scholars, 9
January 1976.
Harkins, Paul D., General, US Army (Ret). Former COMUSMACV. Interviewed
by Major Jacob B. Couch Jr. in Dallas, Texas on 28 April 1972.
Professor Vincent Davis, Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and
International Commerce, made available to the BDM Corporation, for purposes
of this study, selected correspondence and tape recordings from John Paul
Vann for the period 1965-1972. As a lieutenant colonel, Vann was the
senior advisor in Tay Ninh Province in 1963, notably at the Battle of Ap
Bac. He retired in 1964 and from 1965 until his death in 1972 he served in
Vietnam with USAID and CORDS. He was the Corps Advisor in II Corps as a
civilian at -the end. Vann w35 a controversial indi',idual, but his service
in Vietnam was longer and more varied than that of any other American,
hence his unique value as an observer. The data provided was of some use
in Volume III but has its greatest value in Volumes V and VI.
SB -3
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VOLUME III
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DOCUMENTS
The Amerasia Papers. Prepared by ti~e Subcommittee to Investigate the
istration of the internal Security Act and Other Internal Security
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary. Washington, 0. C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, January 26, 1970.
A Bibliographic Survey: Insular Southeast Asia. Department of the Army.
Washington, 0. C.: U.S. Government Printing O?fice, 1971.
A Bibliograpnic Survey: Peninsular Southeast Asia. Department of the

Army. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
Brown, Leslie. "American Security Policy In Asia." Adelehi Papers. No.
132. London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1977.
Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War. U.S. Congress. Senate.
HriTIngs Before The Committee On Foreign Relations. 92nd Congress, 2nd
Session, May 9, 10, 11, 1972. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1973.
Collective Defense Treaties. Committee Print. 9Otn Congress. Ist
Session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.
Congress, Information, and Foreign Affairs. U.S. Congress. Senate.
Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations. By the Foreign Affairs and
National Defense Division. Congressional Research Service. Library of
Congress. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September,
1978.
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Department of Defense. Joint
Chifs Of Staff. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1974.
Dukesbury, John. The Gulf Of Tonkin: The Incarnation Of Al, .dea.
Unpublished Paper. Canisius Colle~e, Buffalo, N.Y.: Spr7ng,T
i7 -9.
Dung, Van Tien, Senior General. Our Great Spring Victory. Asia and
Pacific.. Foreign Broadcast Infor ation Service. June 7, 1976.
Ellsberp, Daniel. "Alternatives and Issues for US Policy in Vietna.m."John

P. Vann Papers. 1969.
Ellsberg, Daniel. "Vietnam: Lessons And Mislessons." Paper Given at the

University of Chicago, June, 1968,
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Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam. Agreement and Protocols
Beween the U7SA the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of
Viet-nam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Vietnam. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 7542. State
Oepartment. Washington, 0. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
Kennan, George F., Ambassador, Nitze, Paul II., Secretary Of The Navy; and
Scherer, Ray of NBC and RCA. Thompson, Kenneth W. ed. Four Virginia
Papers Presented at the Miller Center Forums, 1979. Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1979.
Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Rise and Fall of the 'Defensive Perimeter'
Concept: United States Strategy in the Far East, 1947-1951." Mimeographed
53-page paper by Professor Gaddis at Ohio University. With permission of
Professor Gaddis a copy was provided to BDM by Professor Vincent Davis,
University Of Kentucky, May 1979.
Hall, Davia K. "The 'Custodial-Manager' Of The Policymaking Process."

Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy, June 1975. In 7 Volumes. Appendices. Volume 2.
Hartley, A. "American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era." Adelphi Papers.

No. 110. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,"
Winter 1974.
Hughes, Thomas. "The Fate of Facts in a World of Men, Foreign Policy and
Intelligence Making." Headline Series. No 233. Washington, 0. C.: The
Foreign Policy Association, December 1976.
Kenny, Henry. "The Changing Importance of Vietnam in United States Policy:
1949-1962." Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1974.
Komer, R. W. Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: The Impact Of Institutional
Constraints On US/GVN Performance in the Vietnam. Santa Monica: The RAND
corporation, February 1971.
MacDonald, Charles. An Outline HistorX of US Policy Toward Vietnam.
Prepared for the U.S.--riy Center of Military History. WashingtnT, D. C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.
Momyer, William W., General. Air Power in Three Wars. Department of the
Air Force. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
Pre,;ident Ford: The Man And His Record. Washington, D. C.: Congressional
Quarterly, August 1974-.
Selected Statements On Vietnam by DOD and Other Administrative Officials.
July-December 31, 1967. Prepared By SAFAAR, January 1967.
BB1-5
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Shulman, Marshall, et al. "Soviet-American Relations and World Order:

The Two and the Many." Adelphi Papers. No. 66. London: The Institute
For Strategic Studies, 1970. -
Staff Rep£rts And Hearings. U.S. Congress. Subcommittee On National Secu-
rity Starring And Operations. Eighty-Eighth Congress. Washington, 0. C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
Tran, Oinh Tho, Brigadier General, ARVN., The Cambodian Incursion. Indo-
china Refugee Authored Monograph Program. "Department of the Army. McLean,
Virginia: General Research Corporation, 1978.
United States General Services Administration. National Archives and
Records Service. Benjamin H. Read, Gift of Personal Statement to the
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. Narrator: Benjamin Huger Read, Inter-
viewer: Paige E. Mulhollan., U.T. Oral History Project, 1969-1971.
United States - Vietnam Relations !945-ý967. Prepared by the Department of
Defense. Printed for the Use of t1he-o Committee on Armed Services. 12
Volumes. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
.4
)I
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VOLUME III
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department.
New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969.
Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower
Administration. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961.
Allen, Robert S. and Shannon, William V. The Truman Merry-Go-Round. New
York: The Vanguard Press) Inc., 1950.
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Politics
Since 1938. Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1971.
Anderson, Patrick P. The Presidents' Men. New York: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1968.
Art, Robert J. and Waltz, Kenneth N., eds. The Use Of Force:
International Politics and Foreign Policy. Boston: Little Brown and
Company, 1971.
Austin, Anthony. The President's War. N.Y. Lippincot, 1971.

Ball, George W. Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign
Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976.
Bell, Coral. The Conventions of Crisis. London: Oxford University Press,

1971.
Berding, Andrew H. Dulles on Diplomacy. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand
Bernstein, Barton J. and Matusow, Allen J. The Truman Administration: A
Documentary History. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966.
Betts, Richard K. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press) 1977.
Boettiger, John R., ed. Vietnam and American Foreign Policy. Lexington,
Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1968.
Bohlen, Charles E. The Transformation of American Foreign Policy. New
York: W. W. Norton a-nd Company, 1969.
Mc,
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THE BDM CORPORATION
Brandon, Henry. Anatomy of Error: The Inside Story of the Asian War on
the Potomac, 1954-1969. Bon: Gambit, Inc., 1969.
Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: The MacMillan Company,
1973.
Buchan, Alastair. The End of the Post War Era: A New Balance of World
Power. New York: S-turday Review Press, E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc.,
Tr7TT
Buhite, Russell. The Dynamics nf World Power: Volume IV: The Far East.
New York: Chelsea House, Pub is'he",'197Tf7.
1
Bull, Hedley, ed. Asia and the Western Pacific: Toward4 a New
International Order. Australia: Thomas Nelson Limited. The Australian
Insitute o•-Int-Tal Affairs, 1975.
Cameron, Allan W., ed. Vietnam Crisis: A Document History. Volume I1
1940-1956. Ithaca: Cornell
--- University Press, 1971.
Campbell, John Franklin. The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory. New York:
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1971.
Casserly, John J. The Ford White House: A Oiary of a Speechw..ter.
Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1977.
Clark, Keith C. and Legere, Laurence J., eds. The President and the
Management of National Security: A Report by the Institute for Defense
Analyses. New YorK: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969.
Cochran, Bert. Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency. New York: Funk
and Wagrnalls, 1973.
Colbert, Evelyn. Southeast Asia in International Politics 1941-1956.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
Colby, William and Forbath, Peter. Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.
Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America In Vietnam. Creenwich:
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1970.
Corson, William. Consequences of Failure. New York: W. W. Norton and

Company, 1974.
Crabb, Cecil V. Jr., Policy-Makers and Critics: Conflictin Theries of
American Foreign Policy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pub1iishers,
Inc., 1972.
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Cronin, Thomas E. and Greenberg, Sanford D., eds. The Presidential

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i 'I
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THE

DIEN BIEN PHU S H ANOI

SA Study of Ste.•, Lessons Learned

' •L) ~ ~BAN

for p bli. reloase xid sale:

AWCI 9 March 1981

SUBJECT: Declassification of the BDM Study, "The Strategic Lessons Learned in

Defense Technical, Information Center

Incls ANDREW C. REI4SON,

7915 Jones Branch Drive

November 30. 1979

.A TUDY OF,,TRATEGIC4 ESSONS

This draft report is submitted to DAMO-SSP. r.t Ep~c)_L4 .

This Study is a final draft yubmitted to DAMO-SSP in accordance with

* h Volume I The Enemy

Volume II South Vietnam

Volume III US Foreign Policy and Vietnam 1945-1975

Volume IV US Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam

Volume V Planning the War

Volume VI Conduct of the War

Volume VII The Soldier

Volume VIII Results of the War

A. PERSPECTIVE OF THE STUDY

Basically, as far as Vietnam is concerned, we

I would emph~asize my belief that it is most

fluenced US decision and US decision makers. Together these four volumes

B. PURPOSE OF VOLUME I. THE ENEMY

Volume I examines the goals, characteristics, and organization of the

. The long'--ange goals cf the Communist Vietnamese, 1954-1975.

0. SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS THAT AFFECTED THE COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE

Volume I analyzes aspects of communist activity in Vietnami without

YEAR 194 I941941949_ 195011951

jAPANESE DIEN BIEN PHU DRY CALLS DR 3YR DRY

US CONTINUES MAO TSE TUNG PRC ENTERS FIRST 5-YEAR ASUSIRVE

Figure 1-1. Siqnificant Event

•DRy CANCELS PEACE TALKS

MASSIVE CROP L GnEAT

i-1. Significant Events Relating to US Foreign xi/x1i

TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii

LIST OF TABLES xxi

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

C. Debates Within the Leadership 2-10

1. The Correct ýalution 2-12

L.. Analytical Summary: Insights 2-19

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF V.TNAM

A. Introduction and General Overview 3-2

1. Principles Governing the Party Control

C. Historical Perspective 3-12

1. Party Development and the Front

D. The Organization of the Democratic Republic of

1. Organization for the Dang Lao Dong Party 3-17

E. The Organization of the National Liberation

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

F. Provisional Revolutionary Government 3-34

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

1. The Fateful DRV Decision 5-12

1. The Buildup 5-25

1. The Three Strategic LOC's 5-43

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

BIBLIOGRAPHY B-i to B-21

GLOSSARY G-1 to'G-3

LIST OF FIGURES (CONTINUED)