Sagrada Orden v.
NACOCO The Alien Property Administration had the control and administration of the property not as
Doctrine:
Obligations must arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namely, law, contract
or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence
FACTS:
Orden owned the property before the war. On January 4, 1943, during the Japanese military
occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho
After liberation the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession,
control, and custody thereof under section 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat., 411, for
the reason that it belonged to an enemy national
In 1946, it was occupied by Copra when it vacated the property it was occupied by the defendant
herein
On March 31, 1947, the defendant was authorized to repair the warehouse on the land, and
actually spent thereon for repairs the sum of P26,898.27. In 1948 defendant leased one-third of
the warehouse to one Dioscoro Sarile at a monthly rental of P500, which was later raised to P1,000
a month – Sarile did not pay – he was brought to Court – no judgement
Plaintiff made claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian of the United States, but
as this was denied, it brought an action in court to annul the sale of the property to the Taiwan
Tekkosho, and recover its possession – said it was made under duress
The court rendered judgment releasing the defendant and the intervenor from liability, but
reserving to the plaintiff the right to recover from the National Coconut Corporation reasonable
rentals for the use and occupation of the premises
NACOCO did not want to pay rentals prior to Feb 28, 1949 arguing that it acquired the property in
good faith, and that it is under no obligation whatsoever to pay rentals for the use and occupation
of the warehouse
The RTC ordered NACOCO to pay 3k monthly rentals from August 1946 stating that plaintiff has
always been the owner, as the sale to the Japanese purchaser was void ab initio; that the Alien
Property Administration never acquired any right to the property, but that it held the same in trust
until the determination as to whether or not the owner is an enemy citizen
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER NACOCO MUST PAY RENT – NO
Obligations must arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namely, law, contract or quasi-
contract, crime, or negligence
Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises and
occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof,
the Alien Property Administration
There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and the
Taiwan Tekkosho, which had secured the possession of the property from the plaintiff-appellee by
the use of duress, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant)
may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property by the said
Taiwan Tekkosho
successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express
provision of law (Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States)
From August, 1946, when defendant appellant took possession, to the date of the judgment of
February 28, 1948, the Alien Property Administration had the absolute control of the property as
trustee of the Government of the United States, with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise,
as though it were the absolute owner
Even if defendant-appellant were liable to the Alien Property Administration for rentals, these
would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the old owner, but to the United States
Government
There was no express agreement between the Alien Property Custodian and the defendant-
appellant for the latter to pay rentals on the property. The existence of an implied agreement to
that effect is contrary to the circumstances. The Copra Export Management Company, which
preceded the defendant-appellant in the possession and use of the property, does not appear to
have paid rentals therefor, as it occupied it by what the parties denominated a "custodianship
agreement," and there is no provision therein for the payment of rentals or of any compensation
for its custody and or occupation and use
The Trading with the Enemy Act, as originally enacted, was purely a measure of conservation,
hence it is very unlikely that rentals were demanded for the use of the property. When the National
Coconut Corporation succeeded the Copra Export Management Company in the possession and
use of the property, it must have been also free from payment of rentals, especially as it was a
Government corporation, and steps were then being taken by the Philippine Government to secure
the property for the National Coconut Corporation – circumstances do not warrant an implied
agreement
The above considerations show that plaintiff-appellee's claim for rentals before it obtained the
judgment annulling the sale to the Taiwan Tekkosho may not be predicated on any negligence or
offense of the defendant-appellant, or on any contract, express or implied, because the Alien
Property Administration was neither a trustee of plaintiff-appellee, nor a privy to the obligations of
the Taiwan Tekkosho, its title being based by legal provision on the seizure of enemy property
No law or provision on quasi-contract as well
Defendant-appellant entered into possession without any expectation of liability for such use and
occupation, it is only fair and just that it may not be held liable therefor
Decision reversed
PEOPLE’S CAR v. COMMANDO SECURITY
DOCTRINE:
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith
FACTS:
On April 5, 1970 at around 1:00 A.M., however, defendant's security guard on duty plaintiff's
premises, "without any authority, consent, approval, knowledge or orders of the plaintiff and/or
defendant brought out of the compound of the plaintiff a car belonging to its customer, and drove
said car for a place or places unknown, abandoning his post as such security guard on duty inside
the plaintiff's compound, and while so driving said car in one of the City streets lost control of said
car, causing the same to fall into a ditch along J.P. Laurel St., Davao City by reason of which the
plaintiff's complaint for qualified theft against said driver
1

As a result of these wrongful acts of defendant's security guard, the car of plaintiff's customer,
Joseph Luy, which had been left with plaintiff for servicing and maintenance, "suffered extensive
damage – totaling to 8k – plaintiff paid
Plaintiff claimed that defendant was liable for the entire amount under paragraph 5 of their contract
whereunder defendant assumed "sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch hours" by
its guards, whereas defendant contended, without questioning the amount of the actual damages
incurred by plaintiff, that its liability "shall not exceed one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos per guard
post" under paragraph 4
Trial Court limited the amount of damages to 1k based on par. 4 of the contract
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER COMMANDO SECURITY IS LIABLE FOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
CAUSED BY THE GUARD – YES
Par. 5 instead of 4 should be made the basis of the issue. Paragraph 4 of the contract, which
limits-defendant's liability for the amount of loss or damage to any property of plaintiff to "P1,000.00
per guard post," is by its own terms applicable only for loss or damage "through the negligence of
its guards - paragraph is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulated facts of record, which involve
neither property of plaintiff that has been lost or damaged at its premises nor mere negligence of
defendant's security guard on duty
Here, instead of defendant, through its assigned security guards, complying with its contractual
undertaking "to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft, robbery,
vandalism and all other unlawful acts of any person or persons," defendant's own guard on duty
unlawfully and wrongfully drove out of plaintiff's premises a customer's car, lost control of it on the
highway causing it to fall into a ditch
Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus
incurred, since under paragraph 5 of their contract it "assumed the responsibility for the proper
performance by the guards employed of their duties and (contracted to) be solely responsible for
the acts done during their watch hours" and "specifically released (plaintiff) from any and all
liabilities . . . to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions done by the guards during their
tour of duty." As plaintiff had duly discharged its liability to the third party, its customer, Joseph
Luy, for the undisputed damages of P8,489.10 caused said customer, due to the wanton and
unlawful act of defendant's guard
Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer's car, which had
been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making good such
damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed
damages, which had been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's
security guard in breach of their contract
In Article 1159, Civil Code, "obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith
Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court's view, that "under the Guard Service
Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant" — since the customer could not hold
defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant
FGU v. SARMIENTO
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver thirty (30) units of Condura S.D.
white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of
Concepcion Industries, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City.
While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay
Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentied truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal,
resulting in damage to the cargoes
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries,
Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee
of the rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it
had paid to the latter from GPS.
The trucking company failed to heed the claim, FGU led a complaint for damages and breach of
contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the a Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler
only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a
common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental
Trial Court dismissed the case because it was not proved that the defendant is a common carrier.
Ruling:
the application of the law on common carriers is not warranted and the presumption of
fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in case of loss, damage or
deterioration of goods during transport under 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing
"Evidence for the plaintiff shows no proof that defendant was violating any traffic
regulation. Hence, the presumption of negligence is not obtaining.
"Considering that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that defendant is a common carrier
and defendant's driver was the one negligent, defendant cannot be made liable for the
damages of the subject cargoes
CA agreed with the RTC
ISSUE/S &. RULING:
WHETHER GPS IS A COMMON CARRIER – NO
GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering
its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering
their services to the public, 8 whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular,
but never on an exclusive basis
WHETHER GPS IS FREE FROM LIABILITY – NO
In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance
justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from
liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the
tenor thereof
2
A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which
may have been lost or suffered
To preserve the interests the promisee:
Expectation interest - his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as
good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed
Reliance interest – his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract
not been made;
Restitution interest - his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party
Agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the
basis for action
The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who
has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence
of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common
carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him
from his ensuing liability
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and
petitioner's assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or
damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the
obligation — in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination —
gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual
obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise
Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner, holds a defendant liable where the thing
which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latter's management and the
accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who
have its management or control use proper care
Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when:
(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are
sufficiently eliminated by the evidence;
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff
it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes,
for some of which the defendant could not be responsible
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists
between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the
circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties
Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not
himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage
between petitioner's principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A
contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed
their personality or their juridical position
Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither
favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioner's civil action against the driver can only be based on
culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for damages to prove
negligence or fault on the part of the defendant
LRTA v. NAVIDAD
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o'clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the
fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight
At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously
the widow of Nicanor and heirs filed a case against the guard, Roman, LRTA, and Metro Transit,
and Prudent security agency
LRTA and Roman led a counterclaim against Navidad and a crossclaim against Escartin and
Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its security guards
RTC rendered in favor of plaintiff – asked guard and Prudent to pay damages
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated
its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad
and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the
train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place
where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token
therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the
security agency to the death of Navidad.
It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inicted st blows upon the victim and the evidence
merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned
and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman – did not present evidence that
emergency brakes could have stopped the train
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage
was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation,
and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad
in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER OR NOT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD – YES
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers
3
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during
the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they
fought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage
The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees
(b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of due diligence could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission
In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it
has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved
The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier
WHETHER OR NOT PRUDENT SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE – NO
If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the
employer's liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is
established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision
of its employees
There is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven
WHETHER ROMAN CAN BE HELD LIABLE – NO
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable
act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie
between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus,
Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence
LG FOODS v. AGRAVIADOR
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was
hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was led against the driver
before the MTCC – driver committed suicide
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera led a complaint for damages
against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees
– petitioners denied this duh
the defendant petitioners led a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically
a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of
conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable – since driver died
there is no cause of action – they did not reserve the right to file a civil case – case was not
dismissed
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER THE ISSUE IS BASED ON ART. 103 OF THE RPC OR ART. 2180 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE – CIVIL CODE
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant
petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the
complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners
To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of
the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees.
The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of
their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have
prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure denes cause of action as the "act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to an
obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delict
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto and 2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to le an action independent and distinct from the criminal action
Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-
delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code
the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act
of its employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of
the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the
employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee
Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating
damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from
in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from
quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his
initiatory pleading or complaint, and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency
of such employee
Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 —
4
Civil Code to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their
negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not
engaged in any business or industry
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made
when the criminal case was led is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was
dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place
RCPI v. CA
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him
not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely
his business as well because other people have come to know of said defamatory words
Defendant-corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog was a private
joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or intended
for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not
defamatory
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER THE CORPORATION IS LIABLE DIRECTLY – YES
The action for damages was filed in the lower court directly against respondent corporation not as
an employer subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation
to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on
Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code (supra). As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru
the negligence of its own employees
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting
messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a
contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit
the message accurately. There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were
included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a
clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the
message sent to the private respondent
To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of
petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an
effective and adequate remedy
The doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence
of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury
CAMINOS v. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Arnold, who had earlier passed by Wack Wack Subdivision, was traversing Ortigas Avenue toward
the direction of Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue. He prepared to make a left turn as he reached the
intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street, and as soon as he had maneuvered the turn
through the break in the trac island the Mitsubishi car driven by petitioner suddenly came ramming
into his car from his right-hand side
Petitioner, the lone defense witness, was a company driver in the employ of Fortune Tobacco, Inc.
assigned to drive for the company secretary, Mariano Tanigan, who was with him at the time of
the incident. In an effort to exonerate himself from liability, he imputed negligence to Arnold as the
cause of the mishap, claiming that that he, moments before the collision, was actually carefully
traversing Ortigas Avenue on second gear. He lamented that it was Arnold's car which bumped
his car and not the other way around and that he had not seen Arnold's car coming from the left
side of the intersection
the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. The trial court relied principally on the sketch
made by Patrolman Santos depicting the post-collision positions of the two vehicles — that piece
of evidence which neither of the parties assailed at the trial — and found that of the two coniflcting
accounts of how the collision happened it was Arnold's version that is consistent with the evidence
CA agreed but said that Arnold was also guilty of negligence
petitioner was still unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court. Seeking an acquittal, he led
the present petition for review in which he maintains Arnold's own negligence was the principal
determining factor that caused the mishap and which should thus defeat any claim for damages
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER CAMINOS IS GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE – YES
Reckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place
something more than mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle is necessary to
constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences
is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of
reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which
injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of
facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person
Elements of reckless imprudence:
(a) that the offender has done or failed to do an act; (b) that the act is voluntary; (c)
that the same is without malice; (d) that material damage results; and (e) that there
has been inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender
Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in
determining whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile, and evidence of the
extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact from which the rate of speed of
the vehicle may be modestly inferred. While an adverse inference may be gathered with respect
to reckless driving from proof of excessive speed under the circumstances — as in this case where
the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the intersection in excess of lawful speed — such
proof raises the presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence
5
Speeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to exercise
such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions
encountered on the road (R.A 4136)
It is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the motorist
is approaching an intersection. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at
an intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere
in a street or highway
Petitioner contends that Arnold do not have right of way
the term "right of way" is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner in
preference to another approaching vehicle under such circumstances of direction, speed and
proximity as to give rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles grants precedence to
the other
Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in
terms. It is actually subject to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the
point of intersection. Thus, whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as sometimes stated,
has the status of a favored driver on the highway, is a question that permeates a situation where
the vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and speed
that if either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely to occur
CANGCO v. MRR
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of the Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk
As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the
railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to
rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose
Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons
with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform
His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right
arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the
car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop
he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages
of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees
of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed
as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains
the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to
the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the
sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and
was therefore precluded from recovering
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if
at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care
in its performance
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER CANGCO IS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - NO
but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons
who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage
caused
under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in
the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yields to proof of
due care and diligence in this respect
in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have
been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article
1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption
the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the
special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the
damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him
in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article 1258).
That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be
excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas
if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed
to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if
defendant was in factguilty of negligence
It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the
prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances, to avoid injury
Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom
to get on and off the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform
where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight
while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore
he was not guilty of contributory negligence
6
VIRON v. DELOS SANTOS
DOCTRINE:
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages
FACTS:
The said civil case is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict led as a result of a
vehicular accident in the afternoon of August 16, 1993 between a passenger bus owned by
petitioner Viron Transportation Co., Inc. and a Forward Cargo Truck owned by private respondent
Rudy Samidan
Version of petitioner:
The cargo truck swerved to the right shoulder of the road and, while about to be
overtaken by the bus, again swerved to the left to occupy its lane. It was at that instance
that the collision occurred, the left front side of the truck collided with the right front side
of the bus causing the two vehicles substantial damages
Version of respondent:
The Viron bus with Body No. 1080 and Plate No., TB-AVC-332, driven by Wilfredo
Villanueva y Gaudia, tried to overtake his truck, and he swerved to the right shoulder of
the highway, but as soon as he occupied the right lane of the road, the cargo truck which
he was driving was hit by the Viron bus on its left front side, as the bus swerved to his
lane to avoid an incoming bus on its opposite direction. With the driver of another truck
dealing likewise in vegetables, Dulnuan, the two of them and the driver of the Viron bus
proceeded to report the incident to the Gerona Police Station. A Vehicular Trac Report
was prepared by the police (See Exhibit "D"), with a Sketch of the relative positions of
the circumstances leading to the vehicular collision
The trial court dismissed the petitioner’s claims and ordered the respondent to pay actual,
compensatory damages and attorney’s fee
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS DUE TO THE FAULT OF
THE PETITIONER'S DRIVER – NO
The rule is settled that the findings of the trial court especially when armed by the Court of Appeals,
are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. The Supreme Court will
not assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary adduced by
the parties to an appeal particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and
the appellate court on the maker coincide. 8 Indeed, petitioner has failed to show compelling
grounds for a reversal of the following findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals
On the basis of the documentary evidence and the testimonies of the witnesses, that the vehicular
collision was due to the negligence of plaintiff's regular driver, Wilfredo Villanueva y Gaudia, at
that time. The cargo truck was on its proper lane at the time of the collision. In fact, the cargo truck
even swerved to the right shoulder of the road to give much room for the Viron bus to pass.
Notwithstanding the condition of the road and the in-coming Dagupan Bus from the opposite
direction, the Viron bus nonetheless proceeded to overtake the cargo truck, bringing about the
collision. The evidence is uniform as to that fact. Indeed, no witnesses for the plaintiff ever
contradicted the obtrusive fact that it was while in the process of overtaking the cargo truck that
the Viron bus collided with the former vehicle courts are inclined to put the blame for an accident
occurring while a passage is being attempted on the driver of the overtaking vehicle
In any event, it is doctrinally entrenched that the assessment of the trial judge as to the issue of
credibility binds the appellate court because he is in a better position to decide the issue, having
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial,
except when the trial court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value, that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, or where the assessment is clearly shown to be
arbitrary
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER LIABLE FOR DAMAGES WHEN
THE COUNTERCLAIM FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION – NO
It is not necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its
employees, as its negligence is presumed by operation of law
As employers of the bus driver, the petitioner is, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and
primary liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure
When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof
of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family.
Petitioner, through its witnesses, namely, Danilo Azardon, a shop supervisor and Fernando
Mallare, an administrative officer, failed to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of employees, thus, petitioner as the employer is responsible for
damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familia or on the employer's own
negligence
it is too late in the day for petitioner to raise failure to state a cause of action as an issue. Rule 9,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides as a general rule that "defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." An exception is made
where there is a "failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading, if one
is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN AWARDING COMPENSATORY OR ACTUAL DAMAGES AS
WELL AS, TRAVELLING EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES WHEN THE SAME WERE
NOT SUBSTANTIATED OR BUTTRESSED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD – YES
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages
Considering that the actual damages suffered by private respondents were based only on a job
estimate and a photo showing the damage to the truck, there is absence of competent proof on
the specific amounts of actual damages suffered. Neither were the transportation and
accommodation expenses during the trial supported by competent proof, the lower court having
relied merely on the unsubstantiated allegations of private respondents
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party is entitled to temperate
damages. Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 2224.
7
 Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved
with certainty
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, there is likewise neither factual nor legal basis
therefor. This case does not fall under any of the instances found in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
CEREZO v. TUAZON
DOCTRINE:
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action
based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action
FACTS:
A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon led a complaint
for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo
("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda")
Negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle
and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming
disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut
On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazon's testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court
ruled in Tuazon's favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because
there was no service of summons on him. The trial court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon
failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s business benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the
Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon
arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Mrs. Cerezo led before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of "fraud,
mistake or excusable negligence." Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty.
Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court. Atty. Valera added that he
received no notice before or during the 8 May 1995 elections, "when he was a senatorial candidate
for the KBL Party, and very busy, using his office and residence as Party National Headquarters
The trial court issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court stated
that having received the decision on 25 June 1995, the Cerezo spouses should have led a notice
of appeal instead of resorting to a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court refused to grant
relief from judgment because the Cerezo spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal
The petition questioned whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there
was no service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was an indispensable
party
CA denied petition of annulment of judgement:
In this case, records show that the petitioner previously led with the lower court a Petition
for Relief from Judgment on the ground that they were wrongfully declared in default
while waiting for an amicable settlement of the complaint for damages. The court a quo
correctly ruled that such petition is without merit. The defendant spouses admit that
during the initial hearing they appeared before the court and even mentioned the need
for an amicable settlement. Thus, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant spouses
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE CASE BEC IT FAILED TO HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER FORONDA – NO
Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is lack of jurisdiction.
Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire
jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs. Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on
Foronda
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-
delict may proceed independently from the criminal action
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. In his complaint, Tuazon
alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, "without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and
management of her employees and buses," hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled
because of Foronda’s "recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence," aggravated by Mrs.
Cerezo’s "lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly Foronda
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An
indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final resolution of the case is possible
Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's
liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary
Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly
If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is
necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for
the delict of Foronda
Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to
reserve the ling of a separate civil action because he opted to le a civil action for damages against
Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence
MINDANAO TERMINAL v. PHOENIX
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-
delict may proceed independently from the criminal action
Del Monte Produce insured the shipment under an "open cargo policy" with private respondent
Phoenix Assurance Company of New York (Phoenix), a non-life insurance company, and private
respondent McGee & Co. Inc. (McGee), the underwriting manager/agent of Phoenix
Del Monte Produce insured the shipment under an "open cargo policy" with private respondent
Phoenix Assurance Company of New York (Phoenix), a non-life insurance company, and private
respondent McGee & Co. Inc. (McGee), the underwriting manager/agent of Phoenix
8
Del Monte Produce led a claim under the open cargo policy for the damages to its shipment.
McGee's Marine Claims Insurance Adjuster evaluated the claim and recommended that payment
in the amount of $210,266.43 be made. A check for the recommended amount was sent to Del
Monte Produce; the latter then issued a subrogation receipt 6 to Phoenix and McGee
Phoenix and McGee instituted an action for damages against Mindanao Terminal
RTC ruled the only participation of Mindanao Terminal was to load the cargoes on board
the M/V Mistrau under the direction and supervision of the ship's ocers, who would not
have accepted the cargoes on board the vessel and signed the foreman's report unless
they were properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand voyage across the open
seas.
Mindanao Terminal cannot be held liable for whatever happened to the cargoes after it
had loaded and stowed them. Moreover, citing the survey report, it was found by the
RTC that the cargoes were damaged on account of a typhoon which M/V Mistrau had
encountered during the voyage
Phoenix and McGee had no cause of action against Mindanao Terminal because the
latter, whose services were contracted by Del Monte, a distinct corporation from Del
Monte Produce, had no contract with the assured Del Monte Produce
Phoenix and McGee appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC in its 29 October 2003 decision. The same court ordered Mindanao
Terminal to pay Phoenix and McGee "the total amount of $210,265.45 plus legal interest from the
ling of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees of 20% of the claim".
It sustained Phoenix's and McGee's argument that the damage in the cargoes was the result of
improper stowage by Mindanao Terminal
It imposed on Mindanao Terminal, as the stevedore of the cargo, the duty to exercise extraordinary
diligence in loading and stowing the cargoes. It further held that even with the absence of a
contractual relationship between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte Produce, the cause of action
of Phoenix and McGee could be based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER MINDANAO IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES – NO
Article 1173 of the Civil Code is very clear that if the law or contract does not state the degree of
diligence which is to be observed in the performance of an obligation then that which is expected
of a good father of a family or ordinary diligence shall be required
There is no specific provision of law that imposes a higher degree of diligence than ordinary
diligence for a stevedoring company or one who is charged only with the loading and stowing of
cargoes
stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ship's
tackle and the holds of the vessel. The responsibility of the stevedore ends upon the loading and
stowing of the cargo in the vessel
as a stevedore, was only charged with the loading and stowing of the cargoes from the pier to the
ship's cargo hold; it was never the custodian of the shipment
The public policy considerations in legally imposing upon a common carrier or a warehouseman
a higher degree of diligence is not present in a stevedoring outfit which mainly provides labor in
loading and stowing of cargoes for its clients
WHETHER MINDANAO WAS NEGLIGENT – NO
Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the cargoes of Del Monte Produce aboard the M/V Mistrau
in accordance with the stowage plan, a guide for the area assignments of the goods in the vessel's
hold
The loading and stowing was done under the direction and supervision of the ship officers. The
vessel's officer would order the closing of the hatches only if the loading was done correctly after
a final inspection
The said ship ocers would not have accepted the cargoes on board the vessel if they were not
properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand the voyage in open seas
How and where it should load and stow a shipment in a vessel is wholly dependent on the shipper
and the officers of the vessel. In other words, the work of the stevedore was under the supervision
of the shipper and officers of the vessel. Even the materials used for stowage, such as ropes,
pallets, and cardboards, are provided for by the vessel
RAMOS v. CA
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos was brought into the operating room of the Delos Santos Medical Center for a
cholecystectomy
She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder
she and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka
Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a "cholecystectomy" operation after examining the
documents.
Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who
was to administer anesthesia
Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap
ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. Dr. Hosaka issue an order
for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist – was able to intubate
Something went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to what was told to him, Rogelio reminded
the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he (Dr. Hosaka) looked for
a good anesthesiologist
Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the
patient. The doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm
petitioners led a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein
private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos
Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that
the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty
management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase
private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora, a
pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda's allergic reaction to the
anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium – RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs
9
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER THE CA SHOULD HAVE USED THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR – YES
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur" is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption
of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was
caused by the defendant's want of care
It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such
experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the
accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge
It is regarded as a mode of proof, of a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute
for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specic proof of negligence
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of the instrumentality" which
caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the
defendant
The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary
incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular
scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the
untoward consequence
In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general
surgery to be performed on her gall bladder
At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor
discomforts, was likewise physically t in mind and body
brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process
of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not happen in the absence of
negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube
Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of
administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed. The instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control
of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge
Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence
of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious
Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters on which
she is capable of observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician and surgeon This
is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses
is not required. It is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of
negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary person may be expected to have
knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony
unnecessary
anesthesia procedures have become so common, that even an ordinary person can tell if it was
administered properly. As such, it would not be too dicult to tell if the tube was properly inserted
her testimony was armed by no less than respondent Dra. Gutierrez who admitted that she
experienced difficulty in inserting the tube into Erlinda's trachea
Dra. Gutierrez made the haphazard defense that she encountered hardship in the insertion of the
tube in the trachea of Erlinda because it was positioned more anteriorly (slightly deviated from the
normal anatomy of a person) making it harder to locate and, since Erlinda is obese and has a
short neck and protruding teeth, it made intubation even more difficult
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is universally
observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Pre-operative evaluation and
preparation for anesthesia begins when the anesthesiologist reviews the patient's medical records
and visits with the patient, traditionally, the day before elective surgery
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on
the day of the operation itself
WHETHER THE FAULTY INTUBATION IS TRULY THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ERLINDA'S
COMATOSE CONDITION – YES
Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is
not an anesthesiologist. Since Dr. Jamora is a pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of
properly enlightening the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications
Moreover, private respondents' theory, that Thiopental Sodium may have produced Erlinda's coma
by triggering an allergic mediated response, has no support in evidence. No evidence of stridor,
skin reactions, or wheezing — some of the more common accompanying signs of an allergic
reaction — appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented to the court
WHETHER DR HOSAKA WAS NEGILIGENT – YES
no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka veried if respondent Dra.
Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr.
Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation
WHETHER THE HOSPITAL IS LIABLE – YES
In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly,
on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to whether or
not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner's condition
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found
in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts
but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas
NOGALES v. CMC
DOCTRINE:
10
FACTS:
Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was then 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care
of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr. Estrada") beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy
While Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood
pressure and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous
complication of pregnancy
Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales
("Spouses Nogales") to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada
advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center
Dr. Rosa Uy ("Dr. Uy"), who was then a resident physician of CMC, conducted an internal
examination of Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Dr. Estrada to notify him of her findings
Dr. Estrada ordered for 10 mg. of valium to be administered immediately by intramuscular
injection. Dr. Estrada later ordered the start of intravenous administration of syntocinon admixed
with dextrose, 5%, in lactated Ringers' solution
Dr. Joel Enriquez ("Dr. Enriquez"), an anesthesiologist at CMC, was notified at 4:15 a.m. of
Corazon's admission. Subsequently, when asked if he needed the services of an anesthesiologist,
Dr. Estrada refused. Despite Dr. Estrada's refusal, Dr. Enriquez stayed to observe Corazon's
condition
Corazon was transferred to Delivery Room No. 1 of the CMC. At 6:10 a.m., Corazon's bag of water
ruptured spontaneously. At 6:12 a.m., Corazon's cervix was fully dilated. At 6:13 a.m., Corazon
started to experience convulsions
Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of ten grams of magnesium sulfate. However, Dr. Ely Villaor ("Dr.
Villaor"), who was assisting Dr. Estrada, administered only 2.5 grams of magnesium sulfate
Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process,
a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apnic, cyanotic,
weak and injured condition
Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon's
blood pressure dropped from 130/80 to 60/40 within 5 minutes. There was continuous profuse
vaginal bleeding
Dr. Estrada ordered blood typing and cross matching with bottled blood. It took approximately 30
minutes for the CMC laboratory, headed by Dr. Perpetua Lacson ("Dr. Lacson"), to comply with
Dr. Estrada's order
Dr. Noe Espinola ("Dr. Espinola"), head of the Obstetrics-Gynecology Department of the CMC,
was apprised of Corazon's condition by telephone. Upon being informed that Corazon was
bleeding profusely, Dr. Espinola ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made to sign a
"Consent to Operation
Despite Dr. Espinola's efforts, Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage,
post partum
petitioners led a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against CMC, Dr.
Estrada, Dr. Villaor, Dr. Uy, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr. Espinola, and a certain Nurse J. Dumlao
for the death of Corazon
Petitioners mainly contended that defendant physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the
treatment and management of Corazon's condition. Petitioners charged CMC with negligence in
the selection and supervision of defendant physicians and hospital staff
the trial court rendered judgment on 22 November 1993 finding Dr. Estrada solely liable for
damages
The victim was under his pre-natal care, apparently, his fault began from his incorrect
and inadequate management and lack of treatment of the pre eclamptic condition of his
patient
he misapplied the forceps in causing the delivery because it resulted in a large cervical
tear which had caused the profuse bleeding which he also failed to control with the
application of inadequate injection of magnesium sulfate by his assistant Dra. Ely
Villaflor
Petitioners stressed that the subject matter of this petition is the liability of CMC for the negligence
of Dr. Estrada
CA RULING:
the Court of Appeals applied the "borrowed servant" doctrine considering that Dr.
Estrada was an independent contractor who was merely exercising hospital privileges.
This doctrine provides that once the surgeon enters the operating room and takes
charge of the proceedings, the acts or omissions of operating room personnel, and any
negligence associated with such acts or omissions, are imputable to the surgeon
While the assisting physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital, or engaged
by the patient, they normally become the temporary servants or agents of the surgeon
in charge while the operation is in progress
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER CMC IS LIABLE – YES
petitioners maintain that CMC, in allowing Dr. Estrada to practice and admit patients at CMC,
should be liable for Dr. Estrada's malpractice. Rogelio claims that he knew Dr. Estrada as an
accredited physician of CMC, though he discovered later that Dr. Estrada was not a salaried
employee of the CMC
the fact that CMC made Rogelio sign a Consent on Admission and Admission Agreement and a
Consent to Operation printed on the letterhead of CMC indicates that CMC considered Dr. Estrada
as a member of its medical staff
CMC alleges that Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor "for whose actuations CMC would be
a total stranger." CMC maintains that it had no control or supervision over Dr. Estrada in the
exercise of his medical profession
EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in
the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots,
visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational
qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence
of fellowship in most cases, and references
11
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he is normally required
to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and
residents, moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities,
for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting
patients into the hospital
In other words, private hospitals, hire, re and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the
hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-
employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians
Specifically, the employer (or the hospital) must have the right to control both the means and the
details of the process by which the employee (or the physician) is to accomplish his task - After a
thorough examination of the voluminous records of this case, the Court finds no single evidence
pointing to CMC's exercise of control over Dr. Estrada' treatment and management of Corazon's
condition
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There
is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the
"ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent
authority."
DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent
of the hospital;
(2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also
prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them;
(3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent
with ordinary care and prudence.
The element of "holding out" on the part of the hospital does not require an express representation
by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is
satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care without informing the
patient that the care is provided by independent contractors
The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is satisfied if the plaintiff relies upon
the hospital to provide complete emergency room care, rather than upon a specific physician
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil
Code provides that "[t]hrough estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon."
Estoppel rests on this rule:
"Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it."
CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC
clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that
Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority
CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its medical staff and facilities to Dr.
Estrada. Upon Dr. Estrada's request for Corazon's admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily
accommodated Corazon and updated Dr. Estrada of her condition
CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead. Prior to Corazon's admission
and supposed hysterectomy, CMC asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of which
reinforced Rogelio's belief that Dr. Estrada was a member of CMC's medical staff
Without any indication in these consent forms that Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor-
physician, the Spouses Nogales could not have known that Dr. Estrada was an independent
contractor
Dr. Estrada's referral of Corazon's profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr. Espinola, who was then the
Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of CMC, gave the impression that Dr. Estrada
as a member of CMC's medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed specialists in
treating Corazon
The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry
on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent
with ordinary care and prudence
The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived employment relationship
with CMC in accepting Dr. Estrada's services. Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically
chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon's delivery not only because of their friend's recommendation,
but more importantly because of Dr. Estrada's "connection with a reputable hospital, the [CMC
CMC's argument that petitioners are estopped from claiming damages based on the Consent on
Admission and Consent to Operation. Both release forms consist of two parts. The rst part gave
CMC permission to administer to Corazon any form of recognized medical treatment which the
CMC medical staff deemed advisable. The second part of the documents, which may properly be
described as the releasing part, releases CMC and its employees "from any and all claims" arising
from or by reason of the treatment and operation
The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to Corazon due to negligence
during her treatment or operation. Neither do the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from
liability for Corazon's death due to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release
forms, being in the nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed strictly against hospitals.
Besides, a blanket release in favor of hospitals "from any and all claims," which includes claims
due to bad faith or gross negligence, would be contrary to public policy and thus void
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES v. AGANA
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City Hospital) because
of diculty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations,
Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the
sigmoid
Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior
resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on
her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it
12
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region
They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then
recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not
removed during the operation
Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further treatment. After
four months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was free of
cancer
Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her
daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr.
Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring
1.5 inches in width
the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital.
While conned there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her
vagina — a foul smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal
vault. A recto-vaginal stula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete
through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage
Natividad and her husband led with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages
against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and
Dr. Fuentes
the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, nding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable
for negligence and malpractice
The Board held that the prosecution failed to show that Dr. Fuentes was the one who left the two
pieces of gauze inside Natividad's body; and that he concealed such fact from Natividad
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE – YES
Records show that he did not present any evidence to prove that the American doctors were the
ones who put or left the gauzes in Natividad's body. Neither did he submit evidence to rebut the
correctness of the record of operation, particularly the number of gauzes used. As to the alleged
negligence of Dr. Fuentes, we are mindful that Dr. Ampil examined his (Dr. Fuentes') work and
found it in order
Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled
her that the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he
been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to
remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr.
Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient
the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation – medical malpractice
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ABSOLVING DR. FUENTES OF ANY
LIABILITY - NO
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Dr. Fuentes on the ground
that it is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an
injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the "control
and management of the thing which caused the injury – lacking
Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of
Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter
reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and nding everything to be in
order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of
the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders
To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces
of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad's body
WHETHER PSI IS LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF DR. AMPIL- YES
Many courts now allow claims for hospital vicarious liability under the theories of respondeat
superior, apparent authority, ostensible authority, or agency by estoppel
Art. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter
ART. 2180.
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of
ostensible agency or agency by estoppel
"The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly
permits the agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing
ART. 1869 .
Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or
lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is
acting on his behalf without authority
PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the
physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur
with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that it "is now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public to believe
that it vouched for their skill and competence.
13
The wisdom of the foregoing ratiocination is easy to discern. Corporate entities, like PSI, are
capable of acting only through other individuals, such as physicians. If these accredited physicians
do their job well, the hospital succeeds in its mission of offering quality medical services and thus
prots financially
Recent years have seen the doctrine of corporate negligence as the judicial answer to the problem
of allocating hospital's liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support
the application of respondeat superior or apparent authority. Its formulation proceeds from the
judiciary's acknowledgment that in these modern times, the duty of providing quality medical
service is no longer the sole prerogative and responsibility of the physician. The modern hospitals
have changed structure. Hospitals now tend to organize a highly professional medical staff whose
competence and performance need to be monitored by the hospitals commensurate with their
inherent responsibility to provide quality medical care
In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the
purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public.
Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted
into its facility for medical treatment
PSI's liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the nota
bene of the count nurse. Such failure established PSI's part in the dark conspiracy of silence and
concealment about the gauzes
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of
the Medical City Hospital's staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is
reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive
knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the attending nurses that the
two pieces of gauze were missing
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the hospital had created a professional staff whose
competence and performance was to be monitored and reviewed by the governing body of the
hospital, and the court held that a hospital would be negligent where it had knowledge or reason
to believe that a doctor using the facilities was employing a method of treatment or care which fell
below the recognized standard of care
Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for damages, let it be
emphasized that PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce evidence
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and
supervision of the latter
CANTRE v. SPS
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus
Delgado Memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who was
admitted at the said hospital on April 19, 1992
Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However, at around 3:30 a.m., Nora suffered
profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not completely
expelled from her womb after delivery. Consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting
in a drop in her blood pressure
Petitioner and the assisting resident physician performed various medical procedures to stop the
bleeding and to restore Nora's blood pressure. Her blood pressure was frequently monitored with
the use of a sphygmomanometer. While petitioner was massaging Nora's uterus for it to contract
and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby
While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David Z. Go noticed a fresh gaping
wound two and a half (2 1/2) by three and a half (3 1/2) inches in the inner portion of her left arm,
close to the armpit. 5 He asked the nurses what caused the injury. He was informed it was a burn.
Forthwith, on April 22, 1992, John David led a request for investigation – acc to petitioner the BP
cuff caused the injury
The medico-legal ocer later testied that Nora's injury appeared to be a burn and that a droplight
when placed near the skin for about 10 minutes could cause such burn. He dismissed the
likelihood that the wound was caused by a blood pressure cuff as the scar was not around the
arm, but just on one side of the arm
Plastic surgery was done on the arm. Unfortunately, Nora's arm would never be the same. Aside
from the unsightly mark, the pain in her left arm remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle her
wounded arm. Her movements now are also restricted. Her children cannot play with the left side
of her body as they might accidentally bump the injured arm, which aches at the slightest touch
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER CANTRE IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND DAMAGES – YES
In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence
of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrument causing the injury
As to the rst requirement, the gaping wound on Nora's arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence
in the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process
of giving birth. Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere
whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both
instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain
of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the
negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeon's control.
In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge
during the delivery of Nora's baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use
of the droplight and the taking of Nora's blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the
blood pressure cuff is also within petitioner's exclusive control
the gaping wound on Nora's left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could only
be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in
hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to
her own injury
As testied to by the medico-legal ocer, Dr. Arizala, Jr., the medical practice is to deate the blood
pressure cuff immediately after each use. Otherwise, the inated band can cause injury to the
patient similar to what could have happened in this case. Thus, if Nora's wound was caused by
the blood pressure cuff, then the taking of Nora's blood pressure must have been done so
negligently as to have inicted a gaping wound on her arm
ART. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. . . .
ART. 2217.
14
 Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission
PHIL HAWK v. TAN LEE
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
respondent Vivian Tan Lee led before the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint against petitioner
Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict,
arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991 in Barangay Buensoceso,
Gumaca, Quezon. The accident resulted in the death of respondent's husband, Silvino Tan, and
caused respondent physical injuries
Respondent testied that on March 17, 1991, she was riding on their motorcycle in tandem with her
husband, who was on the wheel
They were on a stop position at the side of the highway; and when they were about to make a
turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked
on the roadside, and their motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness and was brought to the
hospital in Gumaca, Quezon, where she was conned for a week. She was later transferred to St.
Luke's Hospital in Quezon City, Manila. She suffered a fracture on her left chest, her left arm
became swollen, she felt pain in her bones, and had high blood pressure
Respondent's husband died due to the vehicular accident. The immediate cause of his death was
massive cerebral hemorrhage
the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and defendant Margarito Avila
The trial court held that if the bus were on the right side of the highway, and Margarito
Avila turned his bus to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the motorcyle, then the bus
would not have hit the passenger jeep, which was then parked on the left side of the
road. The fact that the bus also hit the passenger jeep showed that the bus must have
been running from the right lane to the left lane of the highway, which caused the
collision with the motorcycle and the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road.
The trial court stated that since Avila saw the motorcycle before the collision, he should
have stepped on the brakes and slowed down, but he just maintained his speed and
veered to the left
The trial court held petitioner bus company liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of Avila, having failed to sufficiently inculcate
in him discipline and correct behavior on the road
On appeal, the Court of Appeals armed the decision of the trial court with modification in the award
of damages
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER THE BUS DRIVER WAS NEGLIGENT – YES
A review of the records showed that it was petitioner's witness, Efren Delantar Ong, who was
about 15 meters away from the bus when he saw the vehicular accident. Nevertheless, this fact
does not affect the nding of the trial court that petitioner's bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of
simple negligence as armed by the appellate court. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of
negligence.
To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably
subjected to a general but definite class of risks
WHETHER PHIL HAWK WAS NEGLIGENT – YES
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection or supervision of its employees.
To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee
LI v. SPS SOLIMAN
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
respondents' 11 year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in
her lower extremity at the St. Luke's Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was
suffering from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, 4 a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the
bone which usually afflicts teenage children
Angelica's right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As adjuvant
treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence
and prevent the disease from spreading to other parts of the patient's body (metastasis),
chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at
SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist
Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died on September 1, 1993, just eleven (11) days
after the (intravenous) administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because
SLMC refused to release a death certificate without full payment of their hospital bill, respondents
brought the cadaver of Angelica to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp
Crame for post-mortem examination. The Medico-Legal Report issued by said institution indicated
the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and
Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation
respondents led a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain
Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelica's
safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure
to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet
decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that
caused Angelica's untimely demise
it was specifically averred that petitioner assured the respondents that Angelica would recover in
view of 95% chance of healing with chemotherapy when asked regarding the side effects,
petitioner mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness
Respondents thus claimed that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had
petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects
petitioner denied having been negligent in administering the chemotherapy drugs to Angelica and
asserted that she had fully explained to respondents how the chemotherapy will affect not only the
cancer cells but also the patient's normal body parts, including the lowering of white and red blood
cells and platelets
15
Few as they may be, these have the capacity to compete for nutrients such that the body becomes
so weak structurally (cachexia) and functionally in the form of lower resistance of the body to
combat infection. Such infection becomes uncontrollable and triggers a chain of events (sepsis or
septicemia) that may lead to bleeding in the form of Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC),
as what the autopsy report showed in the case of Angelica
petitioner saw the respondents at the hospital after Angelica's surgery and discussed with them
Angelica's condition. Petitioner told respondents that Angelica should be given two to three weeks
to recover from the operation before starting chemotherapy. Respondents were apprehensive due
to nancial constraints as Reynaldo earns only from P70,000.00 to P150,000.00 a year from his
jewelry and watch repairing business
On the second day of chemotherapy, August 20, respondents noticed reddish discoloration on
Angelica's face. They asked petitioner about it, but she merely quipped, "Wala yan. Epekto ng
gamot. Petitioner recalled noticing the skin rashes on the nose and cheek area of Angelica. At that
moment, she entertained the possibility that Angelica also had systemic lupus and consulted Dr.
Victoria Abesamis on the matter
On the third day of chemotherapy, August 21, Angelica had diculty breathing and was thus
provided with oxygen inhalation apparatus. This time, the reddish discoloration on Angelica's face
had extended to her neck, but petitioner dismissed it again as merely the effect of medicines.
Petitioner testied that she did not see any discoloration on Angelica's face, nor did she notice any
diculty in the child's breathing. She claimed that Angelica merely complained of nausea and was
given ice chips
The next day, August 24, respondents claimed that Angelica still suffered from convulsions. They
also noticed that she had a fever and had difficulty breathing. Petitioner insisted it was carpo-pedal
spasm, not convulsions. She veried that at around 4:50 that afternoon, Angelica developed diculty
in breathing and had fever. She then requested for an electrocardiogram analysis, and infused
calcium gluconate on the patient at a "stat dose." She further ordered that Angelica be given
Bactrim, a synthetic antibacterial combination drug, to combat any infection on the child's body
By August 26, Angelica was bleeding through the mouth. Respondents also saw blood on her
anus and urine. When Lina asked petitioner what was happening to her daughter, petitioner
replied, "Bagsak ang platelets ng anak mo." Four units of platelet concentrates were then
transfused to Angelica. Petitioner prescribed Solucortef. Considering that Angelica's fever was
high and her white blood cell count was low, petitioner prescribed Leucomax. About four to eight
bags of blood, consisting of packed red blood cells, fresh whole blood, or platelet concentrate,
were transfused to Angelica. For two days (August 27 to 28), Angelica continued bleeding, but
petitioner claimed it was lesser in amount and in frequency
The next day, respondents claimed that Angelica became hysterical, vomited blood and her body
turned black. Part of Angelica's skin was also noted to be shredding by just rubbing cotton on it.
Angelica was so restless she removed those gadgets attached to her, saying "Ayaw ko na" ; there
were tears in her eyes and she kept turning her head. Observing her daughter to be at the point
of death, Lina asked for a doctor but the latter could not answer her anymore
At three o'clock in the morning of September 1, a priest came and they prayed before Angelica
expired. Petitioner nally came back and supposedly told respondents that there was "malfunction"
or bogged-down machine
Dr. Vergara opined that this can be attributed to the chemical agents in the drugs given to the
victim, which caused platelet reduction resulting to bleeding sufficient to cause the victim's death
In the case of Angelica, he had previously explained to her parents that after the surgical
procedure, chemotherapy is imperative so that metastasis of these cancer cells will hopefully be
addressed. He referred the patient to petitioner because he felt that petitioner is a competent
oncologist. Considering that this type of cancer is very aggressive and will metastasize early, it
will cause the demise of the patient should there be no early intervention (in this case, the patient
developed sepsis which caused her death). – Tamayo testimony
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she
observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient died. It cited
the testimony of Dr. Tamayo who testied that he considered petitioner one of the most procient in
the treatment of cancer and that the patient in this case was aicted with a very aggressive type of
cancer necessitating chemotherapy as adjuvant treatment
the CA which, while concurring with the trial court's finding that there was no negligence committed
by the petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that petitioner
as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known side effects of
chemotherapy. The appellate court stressed that since the respondents have been told of only
three side effects of chemotherapy, they readily consented thereto
On her supposed non-disclosure of all possible side effects of chemotherapy, including death,
petitioner argues that it was foolhardy to imagine her to be all knowing/ omnipotent. While the
theoretical side effects of chemotherapy were explained by her to the respondents, as these
should be known to a competent doctor, petitioner cannot possibly predict how a particular
patient's genetic make-up, state of mind, general health and body constitution would respond to
the treatment. These are obviously dependent on too many known, unknown and immeasurable
variables, thus requiring that Angelica be, as she was, constantly and closely monitored during
the treatment
As to the cause of death, petitioner insists that Angelica did not die of platelet depletion but of
sepsis which is a complication of the cancer itself. Sepsis itself leads to bleeding and death. She
explains that the response rate to chemotherapy of patients with osteosarcoma is high, so much
so that survival rate is favorable to the patient
Thus, without chemotherapy, other medicines and supportive treatment, the patient might have
died the next day because of massive infection, or the cancer cells might have spread to the brain
and brought the patient into a coma, or into the lungs that the patient could have been hooked to
a respirator, or into her kidneys that she would have to undergo dialysis.
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER DR. LI FAILED TO INFORM THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHEMO TO SPS.
SOLIMAN –
The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical
negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully
pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician,
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done,
or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that
that failure or action caused injury to the patient
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts concurred in nding that the alleged negligence of
petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy drugs to respondents' child was not proven
considering that Drs. Vergara and Balmaceda, not being oncologists or cancer specialists, were
not qualied to give expert opinion as to whether petitioner's lack of skill, knowledge and
professional competence in failing to observe the standard of care in her line of practice was the
proximate cause of the patient's death
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The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes far
back into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of "battery"
(i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not gained the consent of their
patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure
From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community
in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury
might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care
for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative
treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the
probable risks against the probable benefits
The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule
only requires of him a reasonable explanation, which means generally informing the patient in
nontechnical terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals
expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may ensue from particular treatment or no treatment
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed
to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure
to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and
(4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment."
When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which
includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney
or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that
the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same
for all patients undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each
patient's reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be
precisely determined by the physician
That death can possibly result from complications of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself,
immediately or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be
ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably
drawn from the general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed
As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the variables
in the recommended treatment for their daughter aicted with a life-threatening illness. On the other
hand, it is dicult to give credence to respondents' claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of
recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with
grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapy's success rate.
Besides, informed consent laws in other countries generally require only a reasonable explanation
of potential harms, so specific disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary
The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot
thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a medical
malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the duty and
the breach of that duty through expert testimony. Such expert testimony must show the customary
standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor
As we progress toward the twenty-rst century, we now realize that the legal standard of disclosure
is not subject to construction as a categorical imperative. Whatever formulae or processes we
adopt are only useful as a foundational starting point; the particular quality or quantity of disclosure
will remain inextricably bound by the facts of each case
CERENO v. CA
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
At about 9:15 in the evening of 16 September 1995, Raymond * S. Olavere (Raymond), a victim
of a stabbing incident, was rushed to the emergency room of the Bicol Regional Medical Center
(BRMC). There, Raymond was attended to by Nurse Arlene Balares (Nurse Balares) and Dr. Ruel
Levy Realuyo (Dr. Realuyo) — the emergency room resident physician
After extending initial medical treatment to Raymond, Dr. Realuyo recommended that the patient
undergo "emergency exploratory laparotomy." Dr. Realuyo then requested the parents of
Raymond to procure 500 cc of type "O" blood needed for the operation
At 10:30 P.M., Raymond was wheeled inside the operating room. During that time, the hospital
surgeons, Drs. Zafe and Cereno, were busy operating on gunshot victim Charles Maluluy-on.
Assisting them in the said operation was Dr. Rosalina Tatad (Dr. Tatad), who was the only senior
anesthesiologist on duty at BRMC that night. Dr. Tatad also happened to be the head of
Anesthesiology Department of the BRMC
Just before the operation on Maluluy-on was finished, another emergency case involving Lilia
Aguila, a woman who was giving birth to triplets, was brought to the operating room
At 10:59 P.M., the operation on Charles Maluluy-on was nished. By that time, however, Dr. Tatad
was already working with the obstetricians who will perform surgery on Lilia Aguila. There being
no other available anesthesiologist to assist them, Drs. Zafe and Cereno decided to defer the
operation on Raymond
Drs. Zafe and Cereno, in the meantime, proceeded to examine Raymond and they found that the
latter's blood pressure was normal and "nothing in him was significant." 3 Dr. Cereno reported that
based on the x-ray result he interpreted, the uid inside the thoracic cavity of Raymond was minimal
at around 200-300 cc
Blood was nally transfused on Raymond at 1:40 A.M. At 1:45 A.M., while the operation was on-
going, Raymond suffered a cardiac arrest. The operation ended at 1:50 A.M. and Raymond was
pronounced dead at 2:30 A.M.
Claiming that there was negligence on the part of those who attended to their son, the parents of
Raymond, on 25 October 1995, led before the RTC, Branch 22, Naga City a complaint for
damages against Nurse Balares, Dr. Realuyo and attending surgeons Dr. Cereno and Dr. Zafe
The trial court found petitioners negligent in not immediately conducting surgery on Raymond. It
noted that petitioners have already nished operating on Charles Maluluy-on as early as 10:30 in
the evening, and yet they only started the operation on Raymond at around 12:15 early morning
of the following day. The trial court held that had the surgery been performed promptly, Raymond
would not have lost so much blood and, therefore, could have been saved
The trial court also held that the non-availability of Dr. Tatad after the operation on Maluluy-on was
not a sucient excuse for the petitioners to not immediately operate on Raymond. It called attention
to the testimony of Dr. Tatad herself, which disclosed the possibility of calling a standby
anesthesiologist in that situation. The trial court opined that the petitioners could have just
requested for the standby anesthesiologist from Dr. Tatad, but they did not
Lastly, the trial court faulted petitioners for the delay in the transfusion of blood on Raymond
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the CA in a decision dated 21 February 2005 armed in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC
nding herein petitioners guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their duties and awarding
damages to private respondents
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER PETIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT – NO
There is nothing in the testimony of Dr. Tatad, or in any evidence on the record for that matter,
which shows that the petitioners were aware of the "BRMC protocol" that the hospital keeps a
standby anesthesiologist available on call. Indeed, other than the testimony of Dr. Tatad, there is
no evidence that proves that any such "BRMC protocol" is being practiced by the hospital's
surgeons at all
We nd that it is quite reasonable for the petitioners to assume that matters regarding the
administration of anesthesia and the assignment of anesthesiologists are concerns of the
Anesthesiology Department, while matters pertaining to the surgery itself fall under the concern of
the surgeons. Certainly, We cannot hold petitioners accountable for not complying with something
that they, in the first place, do not know
From the testimony of Dr. Tatad herself, it is clear that the matter of requesting for a standby
anaesthesiologist is not within the full discretion of petitioners. The "BRMC protocol" described in
the testimony requires the petitioners to course such request to Dr. Tatad who, as head of the
Department of Anesthesiology, has the nal say of calling the standby anesthesiologist
Dr. Cereno even concluded that based on the x-ray result he interpreted, the uid inside the thoracic
cavity of Raymond was minimal at around 200-300 cc. Such findings of Drs. Cereno and Zafe
were never challenged and were unrebutted
We find it reasonable that petitioners decided to wait for Dr. Tatad to nish her surgery and not to
call the standby anesthesiologist anymore. There is, after all, no evidence that shows that a
prudent surgeon faced with similar circumstances would decide otherwise
there were no expert witnesses presented to testify that the course of action taken by petitioners
were not in accord with those adopted by other reasonable surgeons in similar situations. Neither
was there any testimony given, except that of Dr. Tatad's, on which it may be inferred that
petitioners failed to exercise the standard of care, diligence, learning and skill expected from
practitioners of their profession. Dr. Tatad, however, is an expert neither in the eld of surgery nor
of surgical practices and diagnoses. Her expertise is in the administration of anesthesia and not
in the determination of whether surgery ought or not ought to be performed
The alleged delay in the cross-matching of the blood, if there was any, cannot be attributed as the
fault of the petitioners. The petitioners were never shown to be responsible for such delay. It is
highly unreasonable and the height of injustice if petitioners were to be sanctioned for lapses in
procedure that does not fall within their duties and beyond their control
Before the operation, Dr. Cereno explained that the reason why no blood transfusion was made
on Raymond was because they did not then see the need to administer such transfusion – had to
stop bleeders – not rebutted
BREACH OF DUTY
In medical negligence cases, it is settled that the complainant has the burden of establishing
breach of duty on the part of the doctors or surgeons. It must be proven that such breach of duty
has a causal connection to the resulting death of the patient. Causation In medical negligence
cases, it is settled that the complainant has the burden of establishing breach of duty on the part
of the doctors or surgeons. It must be proven that such breach of duty has a causal connection to
the resulting death of the patient
The cause of action against petitioners may be prosecuted fully and the determination of their
liability may be arrived at without impleading the hospital where they are employed. As such, the
BRMC cannot be considered an indispensible party without whom no nal determination can be
had of an action
NUGUID v. NICDAO
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in
fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August
thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and
asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by them
and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former her
money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the
total amount reached P1,150,000.00
As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated
Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within
one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check:
In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [above-
mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6,
1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling
P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The
checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds
In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Dinalupihan, Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her
the CA reversed the decision of the lower courts and acquitted respondent. According to the CA,
certain substantial facts were overlooked by the trial court. These circumstances, if properly
considered, justified a different conclusion on the case
ISSUE/S & RULING:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CIVILY LIABLE – NO
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character:
(1) as an offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and
(2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the
crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability
arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be
compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime 7 ).
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law
On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable
is also civilly liable, crime being one of the 5 sources of obligations under the Civil Code
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In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that
he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused
may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of.

It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged

Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court
declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted

In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA,
her supposed civil liability had already been fully satised and extinguished by payment

However, no evidence of whatever nature was presented by the prosecution to

substantiate their claim that there was indeed a previous obligation involving the same
amount for which the demand draft was given. Except for this bare allegation, which is
self-serving, no documentary evidence was ever adduced that there were previous
transactions involving the subject amount

From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of
P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is denitely much
more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These
facts were never rebutted by [petitioner].

Moreover, we nd no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was
a stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations
[as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code]

By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before
the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when
there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation
was extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore nd the
clear and convincing documentary evidence of payment presented by [respondent]
worthy of credence

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