Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
b.) No, the additional obligation to preserve and deliver the fruits and accession and accretions applies
only to specific objects. These additional obligation cannot apply to generic object because the debtor
would not know which object to preserve; and whose fruits, accession and accretion would be
delivered.
a.) Yes. The pledge is valid because it is lawful. The condition is not contrary to law, morals,
public order or public policy. Since legally and morally pedro cannot marry his first cousin.
b.) No. Jane is not bound to deliver the race horse. The condition imposed by jane was not met
by Cheryl since she was not able to take the board exams due to her failure in one of her fourth
year subject. Since what has been contracted was a subject to a suspensive condition, it will
only give rise to the obligation of the conditions has been fulfilled since there is no fulfillment
of the condition, jane is not bound to deliver the race horse.
B.) No. A is not correct. In the case at bar A and B are solidary debtor, meaning they have for each
other mutual guarantee. Thus, they are both liable for the whole amount of P100,000.00 to either C
& D. If A payed the whole amount of 100,000.00, A is entitled for the reimbursement of B.
Q5:
A: No, there was no express grant by the debtor to the creditor of the right to choose. In alternative
obligations, the right of choice is generally given to the debtor. The debtor must choose before the
debt is due or at the time of the performance of the obligation. The same must be communicated to
the debtor because a CHOICE produces NO EFFECT until it is COMMUNICATED.
d) once the choice is communicated to the creditor & accepted by the creditor, obligation is converted
to a simple/pure obligation because there is already a prestation chosen. Once the choice is made,
communicated & accepted it cannot be revoked.
No, A’s refusal was untenable as there have already been substantial compliance in good faith since it
is the duty of A to provide all the materials including the required permits for the construction. Hence,
it was without B’s fault that construction was ordered to be stopped, since it is attributable to A’s fault
or negligence.
Explanation 2:
No. A’s refusal is not tenable. B is entitled to the agreed amount since there was substantial compliance
on the part of B. The work was not finished by B because of the stoppage of work due to each of
mayor’s permit cannot be imputed to B since it is A’s obligation to get the permit.
( b) general rule is that A cannot do such exception if the choice is expressly granted to him by
the creditor. In the case the obligation would cease to be an obligation with a penal clause but will
be an alternative obligation whereby the compliance of either of the prestation extinguishes the
obligation.
( c ) Yes, only if the right of A to pay penalty in lieu of the performance was expressly reserved
for him.
( d ) the effect upon the nature of A’s obligation will be its conversion to an alternative obligation
where A has the right to choose either to perform or to pay penalty or FACULTATIVE
OBLIGATION where he has the right to perform the obligation but reserves it for the
substitution of penalty.
B. No, B’s contention is not tenable. On the case at bar, B is indebted to C to be paid by money.
Money is considered a generic object thus even though there is a pace majeure such unforeseen event
would not extinguish B’s obligation because it concerns a generic thing.