Paper for the Seminar on Fundamental Theology 2006 Tom Uytterhoeven

Exploring Christian Identity with Paul Ricoeur

1. Introduction

When I was young, I dreamed about becoming a knight. In retrospective, this seems
nothing but a fantasy. But when I look at my six-year old son, I wonder if this almost
forgotten dream really was just imagination. When he has his cardboard helmet on, looking
for the monster under the stairs, he doesn’t imagine himself to be ‘Tuur, Knight of The Round
Table’; he just is this fearsome warrior and protector of the poor and weak. The monster under
the stairs is not just a shadow. As long as Tuur is a knight, the shadow is a monster (and the
stairs are a deep, dark cave). As Ricoeur would say: “seeing as is being as.” 1 It’s just one
example of the power of human imagination. Human beings seem to be capable of building
up their own world, with themselves as the centre of gravity that holds it all together. And we
thank this capacity to our culture, with language as its vector. 2 We live in the world we tell to
ourselves about. We are what we tell ourselves, and each other, to be. Like the definition of a
spider is its web, we are defined by the stories about ourselves. 3 With Ricoeur’s elaboration
on the relation between people and language as a guide, it will become apparent that talk
about God has to find new ways to maintain its metaphorical strength, if it wants to be loyal
to its referent.

2. Living in language

Humans don’t have any impressive bodily features that would explain our survival.
But, the one thing that is special about us means a quantum leap through the space of
biological possibilities: we can speak. In the way we can use sound waves to pass on
information, we surpass every other species. 4 The relation between biology and culture is a
point for debate that goes beyond the limits of this paper, 5 but there seems to be no doubt that
it is culture that separates us from the rest of the biological world, and that language is one of
culture’s constituents. Some go even as far as stating that the human species lives in a
“cultural niche”6 or a “cognitive niche”.7

1
PAUL RICOEUR, Temps et récit. Tome 1, Paris, Editions du Seuil, p. 13.
2
NATHALIE GONTIER, Het laatste woord is niet gezegd: de moderne synthese voorbij, in: CHRIS VAN WOENSEL
(RED.), Evolutie vandaag. Hoe de dingen ontstaan en waarom ze veranderen, Brussel, VUBPress, 2005, p. 57-84,
KEVIN N. NALAND & JOHN ODLING-SMEE, The Evolution of The Meme, in: ROBERT AUNGER (ED.), Darwinizing
Culture. The Status of Memetics as a Science, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 121-141, JOHN
ODLING-SMEE, KEVIN LALAND & MARC FELDMAN, http://www.nicheconstruction.com/ (access: 27/12/2006).
3
This analogy is inspired by DANIËL C. DENNETT, Het bewustzijn verklaard, Amsterdam, Olympus, 1999, p. 457.
4
NATHALIE GONTIER, Evolutie van taal, in: CHRIS VAN WOENSEL (RED.), Evolutie vandaag. Hoe de dingen
ontstaan en waarom ze veranderen, Brussel, VUBPress, 2005, p.243-244.
5
A good introduction is: JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, Human Nature After Darwin. A Philosophical Introduction,
London/New York, Routledge, 2000.
6
http://www.nicheconstruction.com/, go to: “Niche construction & Human Sciences”, the term is used in the
diagram on that page. (access: 03/01/2007).
7
See: STEVEN PINKER, Hoe de menselijke geest werkt, Amsterdam, Contact, 1997, p. 191-196. Pinker refers to
JOHN TOOBY, IRVEN DEVORE, The Reconstruction of Hominid Behavioural Evolution Through Strategic
Modelling, in: WARREN G. KINZEY (ED.), The Evolution of Human behaviour: Primate Models, Albany/New York,
SUNY Press, 1987, p. 182-237. This article is accessible on:
http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/papers/Reconst.pdf, (access: 03/01/2007).
Paper for the Seminar on Fundamental Theology 2006 Tom Uytterhoeven

Ricoeur, in his analysis of language, is aware of the importance of the link between the
non- or pre-linguistic world and linguistic expressions. In Husserl’s footsteps, he describes
human conscience as primarily oriented towards the world. 8 It is language that brings
conscience and world together.9 This resonates with the insights evolutionary biology has to
offer about human language.10 Based on Ricoeur I propose to see human actions as belonging
to a cultural – and thus symbolic – world in the sense that these actions only have meaning
within this cultural world. Ricoeur goes through great length to show how language has its
own autonomy. He uses mostly texts as study-objects, but ‘symbol’ is not confined within text
alone.11 Exploring the capacity of language to represent the world, Ricoeur formulates a
daring thesis: language doesn’t just describe the world we live in. Language re-describes it,
brings novelty into it, and changes it. Ricoeur develops this thesis throughout his work on
discourse,12 on metaphor,13 and on narrative.14 If language rearranges the world we live in –
our “cultural niche” – than this must have a bearing on the way we perceive ourselves.

3. The Story of “I”

Ricoeur makes it clear beyond doubt: we have no direct access to ourselves. He refutes
the Cartesian Ego.15 This implies not only that we don’t have a ready-made image of
ourselves, it also means that a complete reconstruction of a self is impossible. 16 So, if we want
to know who we are, we have to look at the world we make. 17 That means that we have to
look at the stories we tell about our lives. 18 Human selves can be regarded as “narrative
centres of gravity”.19 But, while this term, coined by Dennett, seems to make our identity less
real – we’re nothing but a story – Ricoeur describes our narrative identity as a concept that
gives ground to a dynamic, but stable vision on identity. 20 He balances between an objective
part of human self – what we could call ‘behaviour’ – and a subjective part of human self –

8
PAUL RICOEUR, Reflexion faite, p. 17.
9
Cfr.: ID. , Temps et récit, p. 117-124.
10
Although this resonation isn’t a ‘proof’ for the value of Ricoeur’s statements, it shows, in my view, the force of
his philosophical approach and, above all, the contemporary character of his work.
11
Cfr.: PAUL RICOEUR, Temps et récit, p. 91-94.
12
Cfr.: ID., L’imagination dans le discours et dans l’action, in H. VAN CAMP, Savoir, faire, espérer: les limites de
la raison, Brussel, Pulications de facultés universitaire Saint-Louis, 1978, p. 214-215.
13
See: ID., P. Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutics, in Semeia, 4 (1975), p. 29-148, on p. 78-88, regarding “the role of
resemblance” and on “Metaphor and reality”.
14
Cfr.: ID., Temps et récit. Tome 1, for instance: p.13, and p. 116-117.
15
ID., Existence et herméneutique, in P. RICOEUR, Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d’herméneutique, Paris,
Seuil, 1969, p. 7-28, see: p. 21-22.
16
See: ID., Reflexion faite, p. 40: on the “Cogito blessé”.
17
Cfr.: PAUL RICOEUR, Reflexion faite, p. 34: “… la nécessité du detour par les signes et des oeuvres déployés
dans le monde de la culture.”
18
ID., L’identité narrative, in Esprit N.S., 12 (1988), p. 295-304, 305-314, see p. 295: “Il est donc plausible de
tenir pour valable la chaîne suivante d’assertions: la connaissance de soi est une interpretation, - l’interpretation de
soi, à son tour, trouve dans le récit, parmi d’autres signes et symbols, une mediation privilégiée, - ….”
19
DANIËL C. DENNETT, Het bewustzijn verklaard, Amsterdam, Olympus, 1999, p. 457.
20
Cfr.: PAUL RICOEUR, L’identité narrative, p. 301: “Selon ma these, le récit construit le caractère durable d’un
personnage, qu’on peut appeler son identité narrative, en construisant la sorte d’identité dynamique proper à
l’intrigue qui fait l’identité du personnage.”
Paper for the Seminar on Fundamental Theology 2006 Tom Uytterhoeven

what we could call ‘consciousness’ or ‘self-awareness’, and which implies the capacity of
taking responsibility.21
Considering ourselves as “narrative identities” has its consequences. First of all, we
have to abandon the idea of a fixed identity. There’s no essential “I”. The “I” is always “de
bout en bout être-interprété”.22 Since interpretation is a re-figuration of reality, and the texts
we read23 change the world we live in, 24 by the re-arranging force of metaphor, 25 this
eventually leads to a re-figuration of the “I”. 26 That opens up the possibility of a self being
influenced by its cultural environment, without subsuming the self under the almightiness of
culture.27 In placing the self in the realm of language – and eventually in that of discourse,
implying the self having both an event- and a social character 28 – Ricoeur can state that the
self is not reducible to anything in the material world, 29 without running into the pitfall of
dualism. But when the self belongs to the realm of language, when narrative can influence the
“I”, we should expect a close link between Christian narrative(s) and Christian identity.

4. Change is our Middle Name

Following his own line of thinking, Ricoeur places biblical faith in close relation with
texts. His conception of this relation retains a dynamic aspect. 30 By seeing text as a form of
discourse, with autonomy for the text, Ricoeur counters the idea that his priority for the text
includes nothing more than the passing on of instructions. 31 Meaning, and thus the definition
of the self through narrative, becomes dynamic, constituted through the mutual relation
between man and cultural artefact (text or other), 32 what Ricoeur calls “se comprendre devant

21
See: ID., Reflexion faite, p. 76-77: on “l’identité-mêmeté” and “l’identité-ipséité”.
22
ID., Existence et herméneutique, p. 15 (italics by the author).
23
This could be said of all cultural artefacts. Of course, it could be questioned if these forms of cultural expression
are independent of language. See: J.F.H.H. VANBERGEN, Voorstelling en betekenis. Theorie van de
kunsthistorische interpretatie, Leuven/Assen-Maastricht, Universitaire Pers Leuven/Van Gorcum, 1986.
24
Cfr.: PAUL RICOEUR, Reflexion faite, p. 48: “Ce qui finalement est redécrit, ce n’est pas n’importe quel réel,
mais celui qui appartient au monde du lecteur.”
25
Cfr.: ID., Temps et récit. Tome 1, p. 13: “J’ai meme suggeré de faire du ‘voir-comme’ en quoi se résume la
puissance de la métaphore, le révélateur d’un ‘être-comme’ au niveau ontologique le plus radical.”
26
Cfr.: ID., Existence and hermeneutics, p. 4: “…, the very work of interpretation reveals a profound intention,
that of overcoming distance and cultural differences and of matching the reader to a text which has become
foreign, thereby incorporating its meaning into the present comprehension a man is able to have of himself.” (my
italics).
27
Cfr.: ID., Reflexion faite, p. 57: on “l’origine radicale”. See for a contrasting view, with less consideration of a
mutuality between man and culture: DANIËL C. DENNETT, Darwins gevaarlijke idee, Amsterdam, Contact, 1995,
IBIDEM, De evolutie van de vrije wil, Amsterdam, Contact, 2004, IBIDEM, Breaking The Spell. Religion As A
Natural Phenomenon, New York, Viking (Penguin Group), 2006.
28
Cfr.: ID., Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu, in P. Ricoeur, Lectures 3. Aux frontières de la
philosophie, Paris, Seuil, p. 281-305, p. 285: “Le discours consiste en ceci que quelqu’un dit quelque chose à
quelqu’un sur quelque chose.” (italics by the author).
29
ID., L’identité narrative, p. 299: “Le soi, dirai-je, n’appartient tout simplement pas à la catégorie des événements
et des faits.”
30
Cfr.: PAUL RICOEUR, Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu, p. 218: …, what is presupposed is that
faith, …, is instructed – … – within the network of texts that in each instance preaching brings back to living
speech.” (my italics).
31
Cfr.: ID., Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu, p. 219: “Cette triple indépendance du texte à l’égard
de l’auteur, de son contexte et de son deinataire premier, explique que les textes soient ouverts à d’innombrables
recontextualisations par l’écoute et la lecture, en réplique dans l’ acte même d’écrire ou, plus exactement, de
publier” (my italics)
32
see: note 11.
Paper for the Seminar on Fundamental Theology 2006 Tom Uytterhoeven

le texte”.33 Ricoeur sees religious language as poetic language: a language that calls forth
profound change in the self.34
In his analysis of religious language – aimed specifically at biblical language –Ricoeur
tries to show that religious language has the same force as metaphor in rearranging the world.
This even brings him to see different biblical genres as interchangeable. 35 Even though this
move doesn’t seem to be without drawbacks,36 it leads Ricoeur to intensification as typical for
religious language.37 This intensification lies in the referent of biblical language. Named “the
Wholly Other” or “the Kingdom of God”, this referent escapes full comprehension. 38 It
summons the reader of the Bible to a specific attitude towards the world, to a total
commitment that never can be regarded as ‘enough’. 39 Whoever accepts biblical texts as part
of ones identity, cannot escape the re-description these texts give of “human experience” and
“human reality in its wholeness.” 40 Just like the creation myth (Gen. 1:1-2:4) shows us who
we can be, by telling us that: “We are made in the image of the one God himself …,41 the
parables put us under continuing critique. 42 The contribution the Bible gives to a self is the
loss of self-evidence, not only because of the nature of narrative identity (see chapter 2), but
also because of the ‘scandalous modality’ of biblical texts, texts which eventually keep us
focussed on reality, as it could be.43
The truth of this ‘scandalous identity’ can only be attested. When we speak of Christian
identity today, following Ricoeur, we can only speak of an identity that is based on the
contingent testimony about contingent events and persons. 44 A narrative identity is always a
contextual identity,45 but this should not worry us. God, in biblical faith, has always been “the
God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob”. 46 The presence of other texts, other narratives, already in
biblical ages,47 must make us aware of the contingency of our identity as a Christian. The
novelty of our situation is that, when people once were entangled within the narrative
structure of the community they were born in, we now are entangled in a maze of narratives.

33
IBIDEM, p. 234.
34
See: IBIDEM, p. 300: “Le monde du texte est ce qui incite le lecteur, l’auditeur, ... à développer, en imagination
et en sympatie, le soi susceptible d’habiter ce monde en y déployant ses possibles les plus propres.” (italics by
author)
35
ID., P. Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 101-102, paragraph 2.44.
36
See: MARGARET NUTTING RALPH, And God Said What? An Introduction to Biblical Literary Forms for Bible
Lovers, New York/Mahwah, Paulist Press, p. 3: “… a lack of understanding about form leads to a
misunderstanding about what a particular book in the Bible is actually saying, …”
37
PAUL RICOEUR, P. Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 108, paragraph 3.1.
38
Both terms from: IBIDEM, p. 108, paragraph 3.1. See also: ID., Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu,
p. 228: “Le référent ‘Dieu’ n’est pas seulement l’index de l’appartenance mutuelle des formes originaires du
discours de la foi, il est aussi celui de leur inachèvement. Il est leur visée commune et ce qui échappe à chacune.”
39
See: ID., P. Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 126-128: paragraph 3.23.
40
IBIDEM, p. 127.
41
MARGARET NUTTING RALPH, o.c., p. 38-39.
42
IBIDEM: “A parable is told to personally criticize the person to whom the parable is told, to raise that person’s
consciousness to a new level of understanding, to call that person to conversion and reform.”
43
PAUL RICOEUR, P. Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 121-128.
44
Cfr.: ID., Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu, p. 217-218: “Oui, j’assumerai cette contingence
scandaleuse pour la pensée, comme un trait de la présupposition qui s’attache à l’écoute.”
45
See: ID., Temps et récit. Tome 1, p. 92.
46
See: Ex. 3: 6.
47
MARGARET NUTTING RALPH, o.c., p. 38-39 gives a short comparison between the Enuma Elish myth and
Genesis.
Paper for the Seminar on Fundamental Theology 2006 Tom Uytterhoeven

We relate with threads of stories during our lifetime and are challenged to integrate them in a
congruent narrative identity.48 The only legitimate reason we can give for our preference for
Christian elements in our narrative identity is our trust in the testimony 49 of the texts our
predecessors have given us. Difference, inherent to change and novelty in and between
traditions, should not make us feel like strangers, since it is typical for biblical language. 50

4. Conclusions

Following Ricoeur, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the term “God” belongs to the
cultural, linguistic world. This could give fuel to critics, like Dennett, who claim that religion
is at most an irrational relict of our evolutionary history. 51 God would then seem nothing more
than a construction of our imagination.52 Ricoeur, however, reminds us at an important feature
of language: its link with pre-linguistic reality. Christians can still speak about “God”,
knowing that the referent of this term escapes every final comprehension, but also knowing
that this term refers to a quality of reality. I see it as a task for systematic theology today to
further develop and make intelligible the notion of an unknowable God, 53 which in my view is
under the threat of misunderstanding as a non-existing God. 54 A promising start could be
Ricoeur’s remark about the “void centre” 55 where all biblical testimony circles around. Could
we see this “void” as a “narrative centre of gravity”? I think “transtextuality”, 56 in
combination with being immanent to the text, could be a guide to develop new models for
God-talk. If narrative identity makes a link between objective an subjective, between
coherence and rupture, the application of this notion on the term “God” should help us reveal
new meaning in ancient expressions.
A second conclusion that can be inferred from our brief look at Ricoeur’s work is that
talking about God alters our world. That is, in taking up the network of texts that instruct our
faith as constituents for our self-understanding, we are summoned to give a radical direction
to the way we relate with the world. A narrative identity implies the capacity to be

48
See: LIEVEN BOEVE, Onderbroken traditie. Heeft het christelijk verhaal nog een toekomst?, Kapellen,
Pelckmans, 2004, p. 47.
49
Cfr.: PAUL RICOEUR, L’Attestation: Entre phénoménologie et ontologie, in J. Greisch, R. Kearney, Paul Ricoeur.
Les métamorphoses de la raison herméneutique, Paris, Les editions du Cerf, p. 381-403, on p. 382: “… le témoin
croit à ce qu’il dit, et en croit en la sincérité du témoin; on croit en sa parole. Pour marquer ce décrochage de la
créance par rapport à la croyance doxique, assurance est mis en couple avec confiance, au sens où la parole de
quelqu’un est fiable ou non.”
50
See: ID., Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu, p. 290: “La nomination de Dieu, dans les expressions
originaires de la foi, n’est pas simple mais multiple. Ou plutôt elle n’est pas monocorde, mais polyphonique.”
See also: ID., Temps et récit. Tome 1, p. 68-69 for indications of the tension between keeping and making tradition.
51
DANIËL C. DENNETT, Breaking The Spell. Religion As A Natural Phenomenon, New York, Viking (Penguin
Group), 2006.
52
PASCAL BOYER, Godsdienst verklaard. De oorsprong van ons godsdienstig denken, Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij,
2002.
53
See: PAUL RICOEUR, Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu, p. 289-295.
54
I refer to the contribution of Patrick Loobuyck on the 2006 Vliebergh-Sencie course, in which he claimed an “as
if-attitude” towards the concept of God., which was refuted by his respondent, Stefaan Cuypers as a logical and
psychological untenable attitude. See: PATRICK LOOBUYCK, Moraal zonder God? Pleidooi voor moreel
fictionalisme, Budel, Damon.
55
PAUL RICOEUR, P. Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutic, p. 60. Ricoeur talks about Jezus here, but makes the
connection with God as “the Other” on p. 63.
56
IBIDEM, p. 63.
Paper for the Seminar on Fundamental Theology 2006 Tom Uytterhoeven

responsible.57 Thus, in taking up the texts hat refer to the Kingdom of God, we have to take up
the responsibility to create the world these texts stand for, to “mettre la Parole en pratique”, 58
if we are to be true to ourselves as Christians. This means bringing the extra-ordinary into
ordinary life,59 in a way making ordinary life metaphorical. Theological speculation should
therefore regard ordinary life as a ‘locus theologicus’.
Third, when looking at Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity, it becomes obvious that
identity, be it individual or communal,60 is a dynamic identity. There is a tension between
what is to be interpreted, and the novelty that enters through the interpretation, which cannot
be avoided. Change and novelty shouldn’t scare us off; they are old allies. Difference,
inherent to change and novelty in and between traditions, should not make us feel like
strangers, since it is typical for biblical language. 61 If a Christian narrative identity is to be
possible in the future, we will have to find ways of keeping the metaphorical strength of
biblical texts alive.62 This challenge is of course connected with the first two. In a way, we
should have the faith of a child. Just as we can imagine to be a knight, we can imagine to be a
Christian...

57
see note 21.
58
See: PAUL RICOEUR, Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu, p. 303.
59
See: ID., P. Ricoeur on Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 99.
60
See: ID., L’identité narrative, Débat, p. 308, where Ricoeur refers to “l’ancien Israël” as having a “identité
narrative”, p. 310, where he discusses tradition, and p. 311, where he talks about the relation between “identité
individuelle/identité collective”.
61
See: ID., Entre philosophie et théologie II: nommer Dieu, p. 290: “La nomination de Dieu, dans les expressions
originaires de la foi, n’est pas simple mais multiple. Ou plutôt elle n’est pas monocorde, mais polyphonique.”
62
It is impossible to give a complete list of recent publications concerning religious education. Exemplary is: JOKE
MAEX, Geloofsverhalen en godsdienstdidactiek: mijn verhaal, een geloofsverhaal?, in: LIEVEN BOEVE (RED.),
God, hoe voelt dat?, Leuven, Davidsfonds, 2003, p. 253-262, in that she points to both to (1) the strength and (2)
the problematic character of religious stories: (1) on p. 260: “Ze hebben de kracht in zich om bepaalde wendingen
in ons levensverhaal te bewerkstelligen.” (2) on p. 257: “Een zekere vertrouwdheid met het symbolische karakter
van geloofstaal is noodzakelijk voor een kritisch-creatieve benadering van geloofsverhalen.”