G.R. No.
177597 July 16, 2008 in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.
FACTS: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two
legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district
consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act,
Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
9054).4 Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s
first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted
against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054,5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which
includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on
6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407,
which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department under a
Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,7 provides in pertinent parts:
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated
on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative
district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act
201.8
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a
valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under
Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions,
through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.17 However, Sema concedes
that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated"
Constitution.18 Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as
prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not
comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160.19
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not
among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated
in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
ISSUE: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
HELD: p.28-30
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction,25 subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of
Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities.26
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within
the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers
because the power to create local government units is not one of the express
legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. 27 In the
present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional
Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will
violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.
Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with
a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district
because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes
entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create
a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past28 Constitutions, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution provides:
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to
create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic
Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because
the Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one
representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a
legislative district is unconstitutional.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can
create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise
under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
G.R. No. 135927 June 26, 2000
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR
HASSAN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and
ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN, respondents.
FACTS: On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and
annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC
by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein
private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was (Barangay)
Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition for certiorari.1
On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T.
Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors who were allegedly
barangay chairmen of the twenty three (23) barangays the "Books of Voters" and
precincts of which were sought to be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an
"Answer in Opposition"3 which included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of
the affected precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the book of voters
and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing
the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur. 4
After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the
parties, the COMELEC issued an Order 5 dated February 11, 1998, referring the case
to its Law Department for appropriate investigation. The COMELEC Law Department
conformably issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin
Tahir, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a
rigorous incisive investigation on the alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a
report on the investigation conducted."6 Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK
FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998
directing Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to
conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in the
Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur." 7
On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the
Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated
June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and
Rakutan were uninhabited.9
On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan
as ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order reads:
On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor
Hassan, in their respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor
and Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC,
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Likewise, petitioners moved to
consolidate this case with G.R. No. 134456 entitled "Sultan Sarangani, et. al vs.
COMELEC, et. al" alleging that G.R. No. 134456 also involves a COMELEC decision
declaring the precinct corresponding to eight (8) barangays in Madalum, Lanao del
Sur as ghosts precincts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct. 12
HELD: NO. The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal
or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to
have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have
substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. 17 The assailed order
having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence
of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said
order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. 18 No voter is
disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed
by the Constitution 19 is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from
an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who
are qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such
exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the validity and credibility of
the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage because the "electoral will"
would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws
should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people. 20
G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of
Camarines Norte, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS: Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated
on November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows:
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units
affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labor,
Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo,
only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of
the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise,
the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the
independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3
Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines
Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout
the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided
by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete
failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite,
as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in
the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,
Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner
stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the
mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of
Labo is valid.
HELD: YES. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion
thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the
phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would
participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be included in such political areas
are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus,
we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2312.
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL,
and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO,
and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, respondents.
FACTS: Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on
April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of
the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By
virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically
Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific
provisions of the Constitution.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase
in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article
VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division
was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that
Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
ISSUE: Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?
HELD: NO. Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to
the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000
inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not
suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including
due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all
laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by
Congress in the enactment of said laws.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to
participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their
legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus,
the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they
had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992
CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of
Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac,
Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes;
ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T.
ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in
his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity
as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as
Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents.
FACTS: It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the
residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by
the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which
affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious
odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal
council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature
of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so
much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by
the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable
materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the
neighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April
22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public
nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. 2
Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed
in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without
maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid
loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional,
contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null
and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is
unconstitutional and void.
HELD: NO. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local
self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its
authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code,
which reads:
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed
by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles
of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable. 5 Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.
G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006
LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP, Petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY OF PASIG, HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI, in her capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 165 and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of
land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig,
respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter
portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational
activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No.
42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this
time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community."
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended
expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area
of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving
poor sectors of our community."
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the
expropriation of petitioner’s property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities
to its poor residents."
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a
genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does
not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be
a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner,
there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center
at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents,
including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this.
Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify the expropriation.
ISSUE: WON there is genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property.
HELD: NO. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the
government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public
entities and public utility corporations,9 subject only to Constitutional limitations.
Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it
only when expressly authorized by statute.10 Section 19 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the
power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters
for its exercise, thus:
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of
the records shows that the Certification14 issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council
dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization,
not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said
Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational
facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is,
therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown,
especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development
and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all
residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.