A0E6G5 - Volume 2 Development Plan Part 2

6 CONSTRUCTION AND INSTALLATION
6.1 Contracting Philosophy
Currently the Project involves the construction of three offshore platforms, an export gas pipeline, and
onshore metering station. An experienced, competent engineering contractor was selected to perform
the FEED study currently underway. Pre-approved contract option provisions may be exercised to
continue with the FEED contract and assign the responsibility for Engineering, Procurement,
Construction Management (EPCM) to the FEED contractor. Through the selection of the optimum
design for the Project, various packages will be created for the supply, fabrication, construction and
installation of the components, which make up the Project. Expressions of interest will be requested on
all major scopes of work.
All contracts for supply, fabrication, construction and installation will be offered for tender to pre-
qualified contractors locally as well as across Canada and internationally. The combined criteria of
technical suitability, quality, HS&E performance and management, reliability, cost, scheduled delivery,
and Canada/Nova Scotia content will result in an assessment of ‘best value’, which will be the criteria
for awarding contracts. All successful contractors will be required to adhere to the Project’s guidelines,
the Project’s management policies, and the Projects goals and objectives, to create a successful project.
Upon successful project completion, custody of the facilities will be turned over to PanCanadian’s
operations group.
6.2 Management Philosophy
The Deep Panuke Project management philosophy values quality and safety as the most important
criteria. Through an integrated staffing approach, a successful outcome can best be achieved by
combining the experience and skills of PanCanadian employees with the knowledge and experience of
Project team members, inclusive of contractors and consultants. The Project’s objective is to create a
management structure and Project execution plan that ensures quality, while maintaining cost and
schedule requirements.
The Project has integrated the regulatory requirements for safety and environment standards into its
approach for the development and operation of the Project. The Project will fully comply with the
appropriate regulatory and industry codes. The use of new technology will be embraced where analysis
indicates such use to be prudent, but will be limited in application in order to minimize Project risk.
Deep Panuke Volume 2 (Development Plan) • March 2002 6-1

6.3 Schedule
Figure 6.1 highlights the major milestones for the Deep Panuke Project.
The FEED study is to be completed in 2002, with detailed engineering to follow after PanCanadian
Project sanction. The preliminary master schedule has construction activities planned for 2003 and 2004
with the peak construction season during 2004 to meet the 2005 installation weather window.
Commissioning and start up is scheduled to occur during the second half of 2005 with first gas by the
end of 2005.
This schedule is being updated continually, based on improved information on equipment availability,
material lead times and resource availability.
6.4 Project Execution Plan
6.4.1 Wellhead Platform
The current concept for a wellhead platform is a four pile steel jacket with a deck weight estimated at
approximately 700 tonnes. The construction and installation options for this platform are currently being
investigated under the FEED study.
6.4.2 Production Platform
The current concept for the production platform design consists of a six to eight pile steel jacket with a
deck weight of between 8000-9000 tonnes. The deck will be constructed as an integrated deck. The
installation is anticipated to be performed by a semi-submersible crane vessel (SSCV); only two (2)
SSCVs (Thialf and Saipem 7000) are capable of performing the lift. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 provide
examples of SSCVs. Again, the construction and installation options are currently being investigated
during the FEED study.

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Conceptual Definition
Phase Phase
Preliminary FEED Study
Technical Options & Value Engineering
Feasibility Studies Prep & File DPA
Complete Prepare Bid Pkgs
Project Sanction
Regulatory
Approval and
PCE Board
Regulatory Review Sanction
Pre-Eng Engineering
First Gas
Mat'l Planning Equip & Matl Procurement on
Platform
Execution Phase Pre-Eng Pipeline Eng, Procure, Coating, & Install

First Gas
Jackets & Platforms Fabrication Onshore
Determine
Potential
Offshore Dev Drilling (Eng & Drill)
Fabricators
Offshore
Install
Hook-up
& Comm
Operations Phase Production
P:\EnvSci\15xxx\15999 PanCan\500 RAS Coordination\Development Plan Application\DPA Report January\Figures\Fig6_1.cdr
Figure 6.1 Preliminary Master Schedule

Figure 6.2 Saipem 7000 SSCV
Figure 6.3 Thialf SSCV

6.4.3 Utilities / Quarters (U/Q) Platform
The current concept for the utilities/quarters platform consists of a four pile steel jacket, with a total
deck weight estimated at approximately 2000 tonnes. The U/Q deck is anticipated to be constructed as
an integrated module with the quarters weighing approximately 800 tonnes and a cellar deck unit
weighing approximately 1200 tonnes and installed by the same SSCV used to install the production
platform.
6.4.4 Offshore Pipeline
The offshore gas pipeline is currently scheduled for fabrication and installation during the weather
window in years 2004 and 2005. The current pipeline design is for approximatly 47,000 tonnes of 610
mm (24 inch) outside nominal diameter pipe. Figure 6.4 illustrates a gas pipeline being installed, with
the stinger in the water and the pipe being fed from the underside of the vessel.
Figure 6.4 Castoro Sei Pipelaying Vessel

6.4.5 Well Development & Subsea Tie Backs
PanCanadian’s current plan is to evaluate the option of completing the suspended subsea wells,
including the required remedial work to provide a fit-for-purpose wellbore, and to drill additional new
wells, from the wellhead jacket.
Subject to further engineering in regard to existing wellbores and alterations to the Reservoir
Management Plan, drilling activities for Project will be limited. Approximately three to four additional
new production wells and one or two injection wells will be directionally drilled from the wellhead
platform. The current configuration will investigate the possibility of two subsea production wells tied
back to the wellhead platform using mudline conversion, horizontal production trees with flowlines and
umbilicals. If this is not feasible or economic, additional wellbores will be drilled from the wellhead
platform.
The current plan is to start well construction activities in early 2004 to enable full production to be
available by the time the facilities and pipeline are commissioned in 2005. During this time, the subsea
tieback wells will be constructed using either a cantilever jack-up or a small semi-submersible drilling
rig, if they are deemed feasible.
The contracting strategy for such items as tubulars, wellheads, trees, flowlines and services will likely be
based on enhanced supplier relationships. The criteria for well construction contractors will be based on
their experience with AVC drilling techniques in offshore wells, technical ability, cost, benefits and
HSE considerations.
6.4.6 Onshore Facilities and Pipeline
Onshore facilities and pipeline are scheduled to be constructed during 2004 and 2005. The amount of
onshore construction will be minimal as compared to offshore construction, and is anticipated to be
completed well in advance of first gas target date.
6.4.7 Offshore Hook-up and Commissioning
Offshore hook-up and commissioning is scheduled for three months; however, this time frame will vary
depending upon the concept selected for the production topsides. However, if more bed space is
required than can be economically provided in the accommodation platform, an accommodation vessel
will be used.

7 DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Project economics for the Deep Panuke Offshore Gas Development have been analyzed using
discounted cash flow models under various scenarios. The economic and financial models were
developed using forecast production data, cost inputs, and other economic assumptions regarding
pricing, royalties, and taxation. Details regarding the development of the cost inputs and economic
assumptions are contained in Part Two (DPA – Part 2, Ref. # 7.1).
Production profiles and cost estimates contained in this section are based on estimates compiled from
front end engineering studies and reservoir interpretation work carried out by PanCanadian staff,
engineering contractors and other external consultants. The estimates shown will be refined and revised
through the FEED study and additional reservoir analysis.
The following estimates are for the preferred design alternative with offshore platforms, full offshore
processing, a single subsea pipeline transporting gas to shore, and an interconnection to the M&NP main
transmission line at Goldboro.
7.1 Production Profile
Figure 7.1 contains the base case production forecast used in economic evaluations of the Project. The
graph shows the average daily sales gas production rate per year for recovered reserves of approximately
26.3 E9m3 (935 bcf) of natural gas. This profile shows a production life of approximately 11.5 years.

935 BCF Case
450
400
350
Million Cubic Feet per Day
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Production Year
935 BCF Case
Figure 7.1 Average Daily Gas Production Rate
7.2 Preliminary Development Capital Costs
The preliminary estimate for development capital expenditure on the Project is $1.1 billion. The
estimated breakdown of the total capital expenditure is as follows:
Engineering/Project Management $127 Million

Pipeline (including installation) $242 Million
Drilling/Completions $178 Million
Offshore Structures (including installation) $474 Million
Offshore Hookup and Commissioning $ 41 Million
Miscellaneous Costs $ 38 Million
Total $ 1.1 Billion

The breakdown of development capital expenditures prior to first gas is estimated as follows:
Year 2001 $ 20 Million

Year 2002 $115 Million
These amounts do not include costs incurred between 1998 and 2000 for exploration and delineation
drilling on the Deep Panuke prospect, as well as predevelopment engineering and concept screening.
The total expenditure during this period was approximately $190 million.
7.3 Preliminary Operating Costs
During peak production, annual operating costs (excluding transportation charges) are estimated at
approximately $60 million per year. Operating costs include estimates for:
• Logistics: supply and standby boats, helicopters, supply base;

• Offshore Production Operations: offshore staff, maintenance, subsea operations, health, safety and
environment, communications, engineering, accommodations and utilities, miscellaneous production
operations costs;
• Well Operations: workovers and well interventions; and
• Onshore Support: onshore staff, consultants, training and travel.

8 LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
8.1 Introduction
Throughout the course of the Project, incidents may occur which cause damage to the environment or loss
or damage to others.
PanCanadian’s strategy is focused upon preventing such occurrences by following a well devised
Environmental Protection Plan which prevents or mitigates such occurrences. In the event, however, that
PanCanadian’s activities damage the environment or cause others to suffer loss or damage, PanCanadian
will address its liability through compliance with legislated compensation schemes, complemented by
participation in voluntary compensation programs.
8.2 Environmental Protection
PanCanadian is preparing an Environmental Protection Plan (“EPP”), in full consultation with local
communities and stakeholders including those involved in the fishing industry. The concerns of these
stakeholders were canvassed during the preparation of the EIS and SEIS. The EPP, which will be filed
with the appropriate authorities, will address those issues raised during the EIS/SEIS preparation as
having potential environmental impacts. The EPP will address all phases of the Project, including
construction, installation, operation, decommissioning and abandonment. The EPP will also provide
contingency measures to control and mitigate potential adverse environmental effects resulting from an
accidental event.
8.3 Legislative and Regulatory Requirements
In order to obtain authorization from the CNSOPB for a work or activity in connection with the Project,
PanCanadian will be required to provide proof of financial responsibility satisfactory to the CNSOPB in
accordance with the Accord Act and Regulations. PanCanadian is liable under the Accord Act for loss and
damages arising from spills and debris, without proof of fault or negligence on the part of PanCanadian,
up to a prescribed limit of $30 million. PanCanadian will provide the CNSOPB with evidence of its
financial responsibility for the $30 million in a form that affords the Board direct access for the purposes
of settling claims.
The statutory strict liability regime with a $30 million limit of liability does not affect other remedies that
may be available at law, for example claims attributable to an operator’s fault in carrying out its work or
activity. In respect of such claims for losses or damages arising from its work or activities, PanCanadian
will provide evidence of its financial responsibility as required by the Board in accordance with its

statutory authority. This will ensure that it is financially capable of meeting liability that may occur in
developing and producing fields, including physical damage to property, removal of debris, liabilities to
third parties, well safety and control, pollution cleanup, redrilling costs and evacuations, and search and
rescue.
The Fisheries Act imposes strict liability upon those responsible for deleterious substances. In addition,
the Canada Shipping Act makes ship owners civilly liable for damage and cleanup caused by oil pollution
and debris from ships not engaged in exploration, drilling or production of oil or gas.
8.4 Voluntary Compensation
Through consultation with the fishery and aquaculture industry, PanCanadian will develop a fisheries
compensation program to provide timely, proper and adequate compensation in the event that its
operations cause loss or damage.
Where loss or damage to vessels and fishing equipment is caused by debris of unknown origin, the non-
attributable fisheries compensation plan of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (“CAPP”),
of which PanCanadian is a member, may provide compensation.
For additional details on fisheries compensation, please refer to Section 10.1.4.

9 SAFETY PLAN
9.1 Introduction
This section discusses the Deep Panuke Safety Plan in the context of PanCanadian’s Health, Safety and
Environmental (HSE) Management System. The Project Safety Plan is one component of the HSE
management system; other key components are the Environmental Protection Plan (Section 10) and
Contingency Planning (Section 11).
Implementation of the HSE management system involves the development and execution of a
comprehensive Project Safety Plan that will ensure efficient and safe activities in all Project phases from
conceptual development to abandonment.
9.1.1 Health, Safety and Environment Corporate Statement
PanCanadian is fully committed to protecting the health and safety of all individuals affected by their
work, as well as the environment in which they live and operate. PanCanadian’s Health, Safety and
Environment Corporate Statement includes the following commitments:
• We are committed to protecting the health and safety of all individuals affected by our work as well
as the environment in which we operate.
• We comply with government regulations, follow accepted industry practices and maintain our own
corporate policies at levels which are commensurate with the high standards by which we conduct
our business.
• We believe that continuously improving these standards is compatible with improving our business
performance.
• We, individually and collectively, are committed to pursuing this objective and accept responsibility
for doing so.
• We will establish appropriate health, safety and environmental performance goals and regularly
review our progress toward them.
• We will communicate on health, safety and environmental matters in an open and timely manner
with all affected parties and will present regular status reports to our Board of Directors.
• Management will develop the culture and provide the training and resources necessary to support our
commitments and will take health, safety and environmental matters into account when making
business decisions.
• We will maintain PanCanadian as a healthy and safe place to work and a desirable member of the
communities in which we operate.

9.1.2 Operations Risk Management System
PanCanadian’s Operations Risk Management System (ORMS) was formally launched in 2000. It
supports PanCanadian’s commitment to the health and safety of individuals and the environment by
providing a structured approach to ensuring safe and reliable operations. The ORMS serves as a
framework or “umbrella” for the health, safety and environment policies, practices and guidelines
implemented by PanCanadian. Specifically, the ORMS provides a structured approach to the
anticipation, prevention, management and mitigation of hazardous conditions and practices that could
harm people and the environment. The ORMS focuses on eleven key elements required for successful
management of the potential risk associated with PanCanadian’s activities and outlines the expectation
of each level in the organization for meeting the principles and objectives of each element. The
elements of ORMS are as follows:
1. leadership, commitment and accountability;

2. risk management;
3. facilities design, construction and start-up;
4. operations and maintenance;
5. competency and training of employees;
6. third-party business relationships;
7. change management;
8. reporting and resolving incidents;
9. documentation;
10. emergency preparedness; and
11. evaluation and continuous improvement.
The ORMS also outlines the expectation of each level within the organization for meeting the principles
and objectives of each element, namely Senior Management, Middle Management, and Frontline
Personnel.
9.1.3 Health, Safety and Environment Management System
PanCanadian’s East Coast HSE Management System provides guidance to PanCanadian East Coast
employees and third parties acting on behalf of the company to ensure safe and environmentally
responsible operations. The HSE Management System has been reviewed for alignment with ORMS
(refer to Section 9.1.2), CNSOPB regulations and HSE-related guidelines issued by CAPP.

The primary components of the HSE Management System are:
• an organization structure and defined HSE responsibilities and accountabilities for personnel;
• a safety performance objective system that provides a mechanism to measure and improve safety and
recognize achievements in safety performance;
• a management plan to ensure compliance with regulations, goals and objectives;
• requirements for contractors to establish standards for a contractor safety and environmental
program, and the interface between PanCanadian and the contractor’s safety and environmental
programs;
• safe work practices and procedures documentation that establish basic precautions for preventing
accidents, injuries or illnesses in the performance of work;
• environmental practices and procedures that establish standards for all operations that have a
potential to cause environmental problems;
• safety training standards established to ensure that all personnel are aware of potential hazards and
know safe work practices/emergency procedures;
• a medical and occupational health management program that is intended to foster the maintenance
and preservation of employees’ good health and welfare;
• a safety meeting and Joint Health, Safety and Environment Committee structure that provides a
forum for both, management and non-management personnel to work together to identify and solve
potential health, safety and environment problems at the worksite;
• an accident/incident reporting system that standardizes prompt reporting of all injuries, property
damage, environmental incidents and near misses;
• an accident/incident investigation system that establishes investigation procedures for various
categories of accidents/incidents;
• an Operations HS&E Review Committee that ensures PanCanadian and contractor management are
aware of actual and potential hazards and therefore, can endorse or amend corrective action;
• a safety impact assessment intended to ensure installations not only provide an acceptable level of
protection for personnel and property, but also meet all regulatory requirements;
• procedures for conducting major hazard reviews intended to ensure that the impacts of the full range
of major accident scenarios, that could conceivably affect installations, are within acceptable limits;
• procedures for conducting hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies. This is a systematic
engineering technique for analyzing those routes whereby the operation or maintenance of an
installation can lead to material damage, environmental damage, injury or death;
• a procedure to carry out formal safety and environmental audits for operations controlled by both
PanCanadian personnel and contractors;
• conduct audits (internal and third-party) to verify compliance with approved plans, procedures,
system specifications and/or other applicable contract requirements;

• a procedure for periodic operational safety and environmental inspections conducted to verify all
activities conform to PanCanadian and regulatory agency requirements and are being conducted in a
safe, efficient, and environmentally responsible manner;
• identification of potentially hazardous materials and exposures, controlled by WHMIS (Workplace
Hazardous Materials Information System);
• procedures and an organization to initiate an organized response to an emergency or potential
emergency situations, including periodic exercises; and
• a safety information management system that provides the ability to record safety information,
analyze data and produce timely and relevant reports.
The East Coast HSE Management System will provide a framework to document, evaluate and
communicate PanCanadian’s HSE performance. PanCanadian’s Managers will use the system as a
means of documenting the company’s overall strategic approach. The HSE management system is also
a means of demonstrating PanCanadian’s compliance with all required hazard prevention, control and
mitigation measures, and regulatory requirements.
9.1.4 Organization and Responsibilities
The responsibility and accountability for the implementation of the Project Safety Plan will rest with the
Project General Manager (PGM). The PGM will ensure that the Safety Plan is followed during the
design and construction of facilities, and the development of operational procedures. The PGM will
follow the PanCanadian East Coast Business Unit (ECBU) Health Safety and Environment Management
System to manage HSE issues related to the project.
Figure 9.1 indicates the HSE activities that will be carried out throughout the Project lifecycle. A Total
Loss Management (TLM) group, comprised of dedicated safety, environmental and risk management
personnel, will be assigned to the Project to co-ordinate these and any other health and safety-related
activities, and to implement the Project Safety Plan. The TLM group will ensure that the Project follows
existing philosophies and policies of the ECBU, and will oversee implementation of the Project Safety
Plan.

Figure 9.1
Acquire Asset
Abandon Facility
Commission facility
Carryout HSE Analysis
Make Design Concepts
Project Lifecycle Phase
Prepare Detailed Design

HSE Activity Matrix
Operate and Manage facility

Define Operating Conditions
Appraise and Modify Facility

Construct and Pre-Commission
Evaluate Development & Design Options
Evaluate and Propose Development Concepts
Required
Define HSE Objectives
Develop HSE Plan
Collate and Develop HSE Data
HAZID
Environmental Assessment
Social & Economic Impact Assessment
Update
Health Risk Assessment
Physical Effects Modeling
Layout Study
Pre Start up Safety Audit
Coarse HAZOP
& complexity
Detailed HAZOP
Fire & Explosion Review

Determined by findings
Human Factors Review
Coarse QRA
Detailed QRA
Escape, Evacuation & Rescue Analysis
Emergency System Survivability Analysis
Permit to Work System
Job Hazard Analysis
Process Hazard Review
Safety Integrity Analysis
Compile Hazards Register
Document HSE Case

9.2 Hazards and Effects Management Process
Inherent to the effective implementation of the HSE Management System is the development and
implementation of a Project Safety Plan that will ensure efficient and safe activities in all Project phases.
The Safety Plan incorporates risk assessments that will affect the design of the Project and develop the
best design option.
The Project Safety Plan will be built upon a “Hazards and Effects Management Process” (HEMP).
Based on the Project lifecycle phase, this hazard and effects management process will apply the
appropriate emphasis on hazard identification, hazard assessment, hazard control and mitigation. The
Project Safety Plan will fulfil the requirements of the CNSOPB’s Operator’s Safety Plan Guidelines
3150.002.
The major focus of the HEMP is identification of and the adoption, where practicable, of an inherently
safe approach. This focus was, or will be, captured during:
1) the concept development phase where considerable levels of risk can be eliminated;
2) the FEED study where more detailed information will be used for the identification and evaluation
of hazards;
3) the detailed engineering phase, where the focus will be on detailed engineering of inherently safe
operations, agreed risk reduction measures, and the evolution of philosophy into operational and
emergency procedures.
At the construction and commissioning phase, a Construction Safety Plan will be prepared to address
risks associated with construction. Any design changes that may be imposed by construction methods
will be identified through quality assurance and carefully evaluated to ensure the integrity of the HEMP.
Risk management and quality assurance procedures will be in place during the construction and
commissioning phase.
Engineering assumptions and options that are agreed upon and translated into final design and
construction will also be translated into ‘issued for use’ operations and maintenance manuals at the
operations phase. At this phase, an “Operations Safety Plan” will be in place. It will formally document
all hazards and effects associated with the asset and the corresponding control and recovery measures.
Prior to the start of the de-commissioning and abandonment phase, a risk assessment and other required
studies will be conducted to verify and validate the assumptions made during the design phase.

9.2.1 Design
PanCanadian will employ a systematic approach in identifying and addressing potential hazards, and
defining appropriate control and recovery measures. The ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)
principle will be used to establish target levels for safety, environment and relevant acceptance criteria.
These target levels will incorporate regulatory, industry best practices and internationally accepted
norms.
In setting these target levels for safety, major accident and occupational hazards will be identified and
evaluated. Examples of these are as follows:
• fire and explosion;

• loss of containment;
• dropped objects;
• marine impact (collisions at sea);
• helicopter crash;
• loss of structural integrity;
• extreme environmental conditions;
• major occupational hazards, (i.e. H2S, BTEX);
• loss of well control;
• natural seismic activity; and
• simultaneous drilling/production/construction operations.
All hazards and associated risks and controls will be recorded and maintained in a hazard register, which
will be updated as required when new scenarios, control measures or design changes occur. The hazard
register will form a major component of the Safety Plan documentation.
A Concept Safety Analysis (CSA) will be undertaken after the Project concept has been finalised. The
CSA will address all components and activities associated with each lifecycle phase from design to
construction, operation and abandonment. The CSA, aside from satisfying regulatory requirements, will
provide the action plan for HSE studies, which will be required for all phases of the Project. The CSA
will also determine the required focus, level of detail and complexity of future studies.
The CSA components include hazard analysis, risk evaluation and safety studies that will be conducted
during the conceptual design and detailed engineering phases. This approach uses engineering
judgement and qualitative and quantitative risk analyses.

9.2.2 Construction
Prior to the construction phase, PanCanadian will implement its Third Party Business Relationships
program. This program will focus on contractor safety management, including planning, pre-
qualification and selection, pre-mobilization and ongoing audits.
PanCanadian will require its contractors to have a complete and fully functional HSE management
system. Bridging documents will be prepared to manage areas where the Contractor’s system and
PanCanadian’s do not align. As a minimum, the contractor’s HSE program will address the
requirements outlined in CNSOPB’s “Operators Safety Plan”.
These requirements will include, but not be limited to, the following:
• an HSE organization;
• HSE training and competency assurance;
• HSE standards and procedures (e.g. permit to work, job hazard analyses, etc.);
• methods and procedures for hazards and effects management;
• emergency response management;
• facility and equipment management;
• HSE inspections and audits; and
• incident/accident reporting investigation and analysis.
9.2.3 Operations
The Project Safety Plan will evolve into an Operations Safety Plan that documents all the hazards and
effects associated with the facility and the corresponding control measures. These control measures will
be translated into operations procedures, maintenance procedures, and emergency response systems.
Management of hazards during the operational phase will focus on procedural and administrative
aspects. Hazard management techniques such as an effective permit to work system, job hazard
analysis, HSE performance monitoring system and contingency planning presently in use will be
reviewed and updated to address operations specific hazards. Production operations manuals, existing
drilling operations manuals, and other manuals required for safe operations will be developed for daily
routine activities.

9.2.4 Documentation and Quality Assurance
9.2.4.1 Management of Change
PanCanadian will build on its existing Management of Change (MOC) procedures to ensure that
changes to the Project design or construction will not compromise the integrity of the facility and/or
process. These procedures will initiate risk assessments and safety studies to validate proposed changes
to the facility and its processes.
9.2.4.2 Document Control
PanCanadian, as required by the ORMS, will establish a formal document administration system. This
system will formally record and control the key HSE management system requirements, which include:
• corporate HSE Policy;

• HSE Strategic Objectives;
• responsibilities and accountabilities;
• corporate and facility specific procedures;
• relevant regulatory and legislative requirements;
• hazards and effects management process (e.g. hazard registry, MSDS, etc.);
• relevant PanCanadian and external standards;
• emergency response plans; and
• audit and inspection records.
9.2.4.3 Training and Competence Assurance
PanCanadian will implement a comprehensive training program based on its “Training and
Qualifications Manual”. Prior to assignments, all staff will go through an induction program to
familiarize themselves with PanCanadian’s health and safety policies, procedures and on-the-job hazards
and controls. Competency assessments will be conducted to ensure that individuals assigned to the
Project have the required knowledge and skill sets. Developing staff competence will be one of the
priorities in managing workplace hazards.

9.2.4.4 Audit and Management Reviews
As required by PanCanadian’s ORMS, regular audits will be conducted throughout the lifecycle of the
Project. Audit procedures are stipulated in PanCanadian’s East Coast Health, Safety and Environment
Management System Manual. Examples of these audits are:
• project safety reviews;

• contractor audits; and
• HSE management system audits.
HSE committees are currently in existence at PanCanadian, and additional committees will be
established as required to assist the implementation of the HSE management system at their locations.
At the business unit level, a Senior Management Committee meets on a regular basis to review the
effectiveness and performance of the system. Contractors will be actively engaged in HSE management
through periodic meetings.
These committees will review the following HSE aspects and elements:
• HSE performance;
• compliance with HSE policies and objectives;
• accidents and incidents;
• training;
• emergency response;
• audits;
• changes to procedures, process or facilities;
• introduction of new technologies; and
• HSE awareness and communication.
All HSE information and initiatives resulting from management reviews, audits and meetings will
cascade down to all levels of the organization through a formal communication procedure.
9.2.4.5 Provisions For Decommissioning and Abandonment
The decommissioning and abandonment of the Project facilities will be performed in accordance with
the regulatory requirements applicable at the time of decommissioning. Potential changes in technology,
regulations, and accepted industry practices during the lifecycle of the Project make it difficult to
commit to any specific HSE action plans at this time. For this reason, an action plan will be submitted at
a later date to the appropriate authorities for approval prior to commencement of decommissioning and
abandonment activities.

10 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN
PanCanadian will implement environmental protection procedures for all phases of the Project. This
approach will recognize and provide for the varying activities associated with the different phases of
development and will be an evolving, life-of-the-Project, planning exercise. This approach is consistent
with the requirements of the CNSOPB’s regulations and guidelines.
Environmental protection planning will address the following activities or phases: construction (offshore
and onshore), drilling, production, and decommissioning and abandonment. An Environmental
Protection Plan (EPP) will be developed to provide detailed guidance, in particular for Project personnel,
on methods of eliminating or minimizing and mitigating adverse environmental effects from the Project.
The EPP will be a practical document containing environmental protection requirements and thus will be
an important tool in staff orientation and training, and an integral component of environmental
inspection under PanCanadian’s HSE Management System.
To ensure the successful implementation of environmental protection procedures, it is imperative to

have a clear description of the roles and responsibilities of all employees. This description must provide
clear direction related to accountability, lines of communication and reporting relationships.
Environmental performance will be assessed continually and targets will be reviewed annually during
the design, construction, operation, decommissioning and abandonment phases of the Project. The EPP
will reflect the commitments that PanCanadian have made in the Development Plan (Volume 2), EIS
(Volume 4), SEIS (Volume 5), regulatory conditions of approval, and other regulatory requirements of
the Project.
Specifically, the objectives for the EPP are to:
• outline PanCanadian’s commitments to minimize potential environmental effects, including

environmental commitments made during the regulatory approval process (e.g., regulatory
conditions of approval) and in the Development Plan (Volume 2), EIS (Volume 4), and other
regulatory requirements of the Project;
• provide a summary of environmental issues and legislative requirements and guidelines applicable to
Project activities;
• provide clear and concise instructions to PanCanadian’s personnel regarding procedures for
protecting the environment and minimizing potential adverse environmental effects;
• provide procedures for monitoring compliance with applicable regulations;
• provide a reference document for Contractor personnel regarding PanCanadian’s expectations for
environmental performance; and

• provide direction for environmental orientation and refresher programs for PanCanadian and
Contractor personnel.
The EPP is expected to consist of the following elements:
• purpose of the EPP;

• scope of the EPP;
• organization of the EPP;
• maintenance of the EPP;
• responsibilities and training;
• general procedures:
- waste manageme nt;
- chemical management;
- bulk transfers;
- spills;
- sewage treatment;
- traffic routing for supply ships and helicopters;
- helicopter fueling and maintenance;
- management of change; and
- environmental codes of practice;
• construction activities;
• drilling activities;
• production activities:
- produced water;
- deck drainage; and
- atmospheric emissions:
• pipeline operations and maintenance:
- testing and commissioning; and
- routine inspections;
• environmental compliance monitoring; and
• key contact lists.
The EPP will be a living document, capable of changing to meet the needs of the Project over time.
10.1.1 Environmental Compliance Monitoring
An important aspect of the EPP is Environmental Compliance Monitoring (ECM), which ensures
compliance with all regulatory requirements and self-imposed environmental commitments.
PanCanadian will use ECM to monitor performance standards developed for the Project. ECM will

primarily involve monitoring for conformance with the discharge limits identified in the Offshore Waste
Treatment Guidelines and targets set by PanCanadian. Monitoring programs will be developed which
provide the measurement and reporting of waste discharges that undergo treatment pursuant to the
Guidelines.
10.1.2 Environmental Effects Monitoring
Environmental Effects Monitoring (EEM) is an integral component of the follow-up program required
by CEAA and of an EPP. The EEM program will be developed in consultation with the CNSOPB and
other regulators. EEM will be conducted to verify effects predictions made during the environmental
assessment, assess the effectiveness of the implemented mitigative measures, provide an early warning
of changes in the environment, prompt corrective action, and, ultimately, to improve understanding of
environmental cause and effect relationships. The EEM program will enable the evaluation of effects
and function as a feedback loop to PanCanadian’s operational managers who can effect any necessary
modifications to operational activities or emissions. An EEM program will be designed to be specific to
the Deep Panuke Project. EEM commitments are included throughout the EIS with respect to follow-up
and monitoring requirements for VECs.
10.1.3 Waste Management Plan
The EPP will also refer to a Waste Management Plan, which will be developed by PanCanadian for the
Project. This plan will outline the various sources of waste that is generated during the Project phases
and establish policies and procedures for the handling and reduction of waste. This plan will be
consistent with the East Coast HSE Management System and with all applicable regulatory
requirements, including Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System regulations and the
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act.
10.1.4 Fisheries Compensation Plan
Throughout the course of the Project, incidents may occur which cause damage to the environment or
loss or damage to others. PanCanadian’s strategy is focused upon preventing such occurrences by
following a well-devised Environmental Protection Plan, which prevents or mitigates such occurrences.
In the event, however, that PanCanadian’s activities damage the environment or cause others to suffer
loss or damage, PanCanadian will address its liability through compliance with legislated compensation
schemes, complemented by participation in voluntary compensation programs.
The Fisheries Compensation Plan will be designed to assess the extent of impact to potential claimants
and the extent of the claim. The document will also contain an outline of the procedures for making and
assessing claims and an appeals process for disputed claims.

11 CONTINGENCY PLANNING
11.1 Introduction
The primary objective of an emergency response contingency plan is to ensure the safety of project
personnel and the public, and to protect the environment. Other important objectives are the protection
from loss of the financial investment, investigation of the incident and assisting with the development of
an effective business resumption plan in the aftermath of an emergency.
Specifically, PanCanadian principles to effectively manage any incident are to:
• protect lives, (workers, responders, public);

• effectively rescue and treat casualties;
• minimize environmental impacts;
• minimize damage to company, public and private property;
• effectively use the combined resources of PanCanadian, mutual aid partners, the government and
other external services;
• provide factual information to news media and other stakeholders on a timely basis;
• preserve records and evidence for use in post incident investigations; and
• protect shareholder value.
The PanCanadian “Alert/Emergency Response Contingency Plan” (AERCP) provides emergency

response command and control functions for both onshore and offshore emergency situations, and is
currently being used across PanCanadian’s East Coast Operations. The AERCP is modelled after the
Incident Command System (ICS), tying in the three levels of operations - field, business unit and
corporate office, to ensure effective forward planning, communications and overall response strategy. A
copy of the PanCanadian AERCP is on file with the CNSOPB and will be filed with other regulatory
authorities as required.
Onshore, the AERCP makes provision for the call-out of emergency support resources, liaison with
federal, provincial and municipal agencies, communication with the corporate organization, media
response, and communication with next of kin and relatives.

Offshore, the installation or support unit will have an onboard Emergency Response Plan. The
installation specific plan is to ensure the effective mobilization of personnel, facilities, and resources in
the event of an on-board accident or incident. It provides information on the levels of Alert, notification
structure, response team key duties, emergency telephone lists, and various forms and checklists.
PanCanadian will use bridging documents from the AERCP to these installation specific plans to ensure
that a co-ordinated response occurs.
The Emergency Response Plans for offshore and shore-based installations, pipelines and buildings that
are part of the Project will be developed to comply with the Canadian Association of Petroleum
Producers (CAPP) “Guidelines for the Preparation of Emergency Response Plans” and CAN/CSA-
Z731-95 “Emergency Planning for Industry”. The plans will take into account hazard identification and
assessment, environmental considerations, consultation with government agencies to ensure regulatory
compliance, incorporation of Industry Codes of Practice, and consultation with local and other
emergency resources.
Having a quality Emergency Response Plan in place is vital, but is only one aspect of emergency
preparedness. PanCanadian’s emergency preparedness involves all aspects of planning, training,
exercising, response and quality assurance. The AERCP may be amended, as appropriate, as the project
progresses to the construction, operation, drilling, decommissioning and abandonment phases of its
lifecycle.
The following diagram (Figure 11.1) identifies the key components of PanCanadian’s Emergency
Preparedness.

Figure 11.1 PanCanadian’s Emergency Preparedness
11.2 Alert/Emergency Response Contingency Plan
The AERCP is currently being used by PanCanadian’s offshore operations and was originally developed
during the Cohasset Project. The Plan will be updated to reflect all stages of the Deep Panuke Project
and will be forwarded to the appropriate regulatory authorities prior to commencement of activities.
The AERCP outlines the measures to effectively prepare for and the framework to respond to any type
of emergency involving operations, equipment and products. This includes seismic acquisition, drilling,
completions, construction and production operations. The AERCP addresses response from a Business
Unit level that cover three broad areas of Emergency Management responsibility:
1. To provide logistical, consultative support and advice to the Incident Commander and Field
Response Team. Note: Incident Commander is an incident command system term for the “person in
charge” of on-scene emergency response efforts, such as a marine vessel Master.

2. To assess short and long term risk / potential impact and take mitigating actions to co-ordinate
regulatory liaison, media communications and relative response.
3. To notify and communicate with the corporate Crisis Manager and Crisis Management Team,
clarifying support requirements, and using the incident action plan, to manage the risks of the
incident.
The following topics are expected to be included in the updated version of the AERCP:
• administration;
• organization;
• roles and responsibilities;
• communications;
• emergency response levels and actions;
• offshore/onshore installation emergency;
• transportation emergency;
• personnel emergency;
• security alert/emergency;
• environmental alert/emergency;
• business restoration/resumption planning;
• resources;
• training; and
• appendices (as required).
Additional information will be provided in the AERCP on specific emergencies that could occur during
offshore activities. These emergencies are outlined below.
11.2.1 Loss of Well Control (Drilling & Well Servicing)
All plans and equipment necessary for the establishment and maintenance of well control will be
completed and provided for offshore drilling operations, in compliance with CNSOPB requirements.
Procedures and equipment for well control, and early kick detection are covered by the “PanCanadian
Well Control Procedures Manual” and the “PanCanadian Drilling Policies and Guidelines Manual”,
which will be reviewed and upgraded for the Deep Panuke Project. This will include, but is not limited
to, shallow gas, lost circulation, kicks and underground flows.

During workover and completion operations, a minimum two-barrier well control philosophy will be
strictly adhered to. This ensures redundancy for well control against all predictable occurrences. This
will include combinations of kill fluid, downhole plugs, BOPs and wellhead safety valves.
Existing safety procedures developed for critical operations will be reviewed for applicability to this
Project’s activities and will be implemented to ensure compliance with CNSOPB regulations and
identification of critical operations. The safety procedures will adhere to PanCanadian’s safe operating
practices guidelines.
11.2.2 Subsea Pipeline Breaks
Contingency plans for subsea pipeline breaks will be included in the AERCP and its supporting
documentation. These will include:
• isolation procedures for ruptured flowlines, which include ‘securing the area’ and notifying vessels
in the vicinity of the hazard area;
• containment and clean up of spilled hydrocarbons, using on-site and/or specialized third-party
sourced equipment;
• repair procedures including the mobilization of necessary equipment and services;
• inspection procedures for assessing the damage, adequacy of repairs and restart of operations;
• compensation procedures for damage caused by flowline incidents; and
• documentation procedures to report and monitor spill causes, and to meet regulatory requirements.
11.2.3 Platform Incidents
Contingency plans for platform incidents are included in the AERCP and its supporting documentation,
as noted previously. These incidents would include: injury to personnel from operational or
environmental hazards, sickness, death, structural failure resulting from environmental or operational
forces, gas leak, hydrogen sulphide, fire/explosion, severe weather (storm winds and/or waves, ice
accretion/impact), man overboard, manned diving emergency, and abandon platform.
11.2.4 Collision
To a large extent, fixed installations in the open sea rely on the skill and vigilance of mariners to avoid
collision. With proper procedures and the provision of special equipment, the risk of collision can be
reduced to a very low and acceptable level. PanCanadian has an existing “Collision Avoidance
Procedure” that will be reviewed for the Project.

A ‘safety zone’ will be established 500 m around the facilities rising above the sea surface. This ‘safety
zone’ is mandated by international law and offshore regulations. Standby boats and other Project
vessels will be instructed to monitor potential incursions near and into this zone and to communicate
with other vessels prior to their entering the zone.
Where appropriate, PanCanadian will install active and passive navigational aids, such as radar
transponders, fog horns and lights on all surface facilities. In addition, anti-collision radar will be
operated in the area of the primary installation. This will give early warning to the personnel on
platforms and standby boats of a potential collision hazard. This will give time for the vessel concerned
to be warned and diverted. If the vessel cannot be diverted prior to collision there will be time to secure
the production and/or drilling equipment, and evacuate personnel in a safe and orderly manner.
Operations and emergency procedures will be prepared and exercised to handle this contingency.
The installations and platforms will be protected from damage in normal day-to-day dealings with
supply boats and other vessels, by guards and fenders. The mariners on these vessels will be
familiarized with the facilities to reduce the risk of accidental contact and damage.
11.2.5 Marine Incidents
Guidelines for the safe and effective operation of all vessels chartered by PanCanadian East Coast
Project are addressed by the “PanCanadian Standby/Supply Vessels Operating Manual”. Project-specific
procedures will be outlined for both routine and emergency marine applications. PanCanadian may
elect to review and adopt the marine operations manuals of the chartered vessel, including operating
practices and procedures. Any inconsistencies identified through this review will be addressed by way of
bridging documents to this manual. Emergency procedures relating to marine incidents will be detailed
in the PanCanadian AERCP.
11.2.6 Aviation Incidents
Project facilities will be designed to minimize the number of personnel involved in the operation of the
offshore manned facilities to reduce overall risk to the workers.
Installation helidecks will be analyzed to ensure that they are designed to fully meet the standards
required by regulations and the helicopter contractor for the Project. PanCanadian will only use
companies that have offshore flying experience and experienced pilots and ground staff. Routine audits
of maintenance, safety and operational documentation will be performed.

PanCanadian’s “Helicopter Operations Manual” and “Helideck Operating Procedures Manual” will
provide support to helicopter operations. PanCanadian may elect to review the operations manuals of
chartered aircraft owners and adopt their aviation operating practices and procedures. Inconsistencies
identified will be addressed by way of bridging documents. PanCanadian will exercise its existing
crews to cover crash landings on the facilities and in the sea. These exercises may involve platform
personnel, standby boats, other marine vessels and aircraft. Military and Canadian Coast Guard
resources and other government services will also be requested when appropriate and available.
Personnel using helicopter transportation will receive training on how to react in the event of a
helicopter accident, including underwater escape and egress. The use of helicopter survival suits will be
mandatory.
11.2.7 Fire / Explosion
The AERCP will address all levels of fires and explosions at onshore facilities including:
• small fires in a non-critical area of a facility;

• fires that can be controlled with on-site personnel and equipment; and
• fires that are out of control, and that have the potential to cause major equipment loss, release of an
explosive mixture, unconfined vapor cloud expansion or boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion.
Contingency planning will also deal with the resultant contingencies that may be required to address the
protection of any nearby residential or commercial premises and the protection of the general public.
11.2.8 Hydrogen Sulphide Release
To support the AERCP, a Hydrogen Sulphide Contingency Plan currently exists for PanCanadian’s East
Coast Operations drilling programs. The purpose of this contingency plan is to ensure the consequences
of an escape of hydrogen sulphide or sulphur dioxide related to sour gas are limited as much as possible.
This plan informs all Project personnel including contractors on the dangers of hydrogen sulphide that
may be encountered during activities offshore and the control measures to address these risks. This
contingency plan will be reviewed and updated to reflect operations for the Deep Panuke Project.
Specific components of the Hydrogen Sulphide Contingency Plan include:
• dangers of hydrogen sulphide;

• detection and monitoring systems;
• personnel protective equipment;
• hydrogen sulphide safety precautions during normal platform operations;

• hydrogen sulphide alert/emergency response duties; and
• temporary Safe Refuges (TSR), down-manning and evacuation philosophy.
11.2.9 Spills
The AERCP will contain specific information on how PanCanadian will respond to spills or pipeline
break and will be supplemented by PanCanadian’s Spill Response Plan. Spills will be treated in
accordance with procedures outlined in the Environmental Protection Plan. This will include exposure
evaluation, environmental sensitivity analyses and other pertinent activities.
PanCanadian will modify the Spill Response Plan to address all aspects of the Project to ensure that
appropriate policies and procedures are in place. The Plan will also outline PanCanadian’s philosophy
and strategies for spill response. The primary focus of the Plan will be on prevention; however, it will
also include initial response, contact information, training and exercises and regulatory reporting. The
Plan will be compliant with PanCanadian’s AERCP and will also outline specific aspects of
environmental effects monitoring related to the spill.
11.3 Accountability
A key component of the AERCP is the accountability of personnel and their roles within the emergency
response management system. These accountabilities are at all levels of the organization and dictates
various actions prior, during and after a response.
Senior management is accountable for endorsing the AERCP as the system that PanCanadian will use
and will also ensure that response performance is of highest importance. Field supervisors are expected
to ensure that the system is properly implemented at their worksite and that an appropriate response is
carried out. Each employee’s responsibility is to ensure that they report emergencies immediately and
conduct the on-site emergency response in compliance with their experience and training.
11.4 Training
All training records are maintained throughout an employee’s tenure with the company.
PanCanadian evaluates contractors’ competency in awarding contracts – this includes an initial and
ongoing evaluation of the Contractor’s HSE Management Systems, including emergency response
training and exercises.

11.5 Drills and Exercises
Conducting emergency exercises allows PanCanadian to validate and improve response capability
without actually going through real-life incidents. The proven benefits of this type of activity for
PanCanadian are numerous. While adding tremendous understanding and value to the organization,
they also meet the needs and requirements of external parties.
The internal benefits of exercising include:
• enhances capability;
• improves co-ordination and proficiency;
• identifies areas in need of program improvements;
• identifies resource requirements;
• validates existing plans and procedures; and
• meets regulatory requirements.
11.5.1 Philosophy of Exercising
PanCanadian’s overall philosophy to emergency response exercising is based upon the following
principles:
1. Validate vs. Test – a test tends to imply a pass/fail relationship or the possibility of performing
poorly. PanCanadian conducts exercises in order to identify areas for improvement, rather than
to indicate a failure to perform.
2. Training - PanCanadian’s second principle of emergency response exercising is that it should

always provide positive learning opportunities and enable participants to demonstrate the use of
skills and knowledge. Successful exercises and simulations maximize learning opportunities by
developing an action plan to capitalize on the lessons learned and areas for improvement. This
leads to a cycle of continuous improvement that extends beyond the participants or the individual
business unit.
3. Mix of Exercise Activities - utilizing a mix of exercise activities ensures an adequate level of
capability is maintained, while ensuring the program is cost-effective. Exercise activities range
from single function drill or table top discussion, to a complex full-scale exercise involving
internal and external personnel.
4. Exercise Scheduling - exercising should be scheduled and part of the overall emergency
preparedness process.

DEVELOPMENT PLAN APPLICATION
PART TWO: BIBLIOGRAPHY
PanCanadian Petroleum Limited hereby declares that certain designated material contained in Part Two
of Deep Panuke Natural Gas Project Development Plan Application contains financial, commercial,
scientific or technical information which:
a. is CONFIDENTIAL under the terms of the Access to Information Act (Canada) and is not to be
released or made public except as provided in the Act;
b. is CONFIDENTIAL under the terms of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
(Nova Scotia) as disclosure would affect the continued access to such information, would affect the
competitive position of the Proponents and result in undue financial loss and access thereto should
be refused pursuant to the Act;
c. is PRIVILEGED under Section 122(2) of the Canada/Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources
Accord Implementation (Canada) Act and is not to be released or made public except as provided in
the Act.
d. is PRIVILEGED under Section 121(2) of the Canada/NovaScotia Offshore Petroleum Resources

Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act and is not be released or made public except as provided
in the Act.
Any notices regarding this matter should be sent to:
PanCanadian Energy Corporation

Deep Panuke Project
7th Floor, Royal Centre
5161 George Street
Halifax, N.S.
B3J 1M7
Attention: Al Reid, Regulatory Manager
Deep Panuke Volume 2 (Development Plan) • March 2002 II-1

Legend
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board: CNSOPB

National Energy Board: NEB
PanCanadian Petroleum Limited: PanCanadian
Ref. # Report Title

Source Year Status
2. GEOLOGY, GEOPHYSICS AND PETROPHYSICS
2.1.1.1 Welsink, H.J., J.D. Dwyer and R.J. Knight. Tectono- 1990
Stratigraphy of the Passive Margin Off Nova Scotia. In:
Extensional Techtonics and Stratigraphy of the North Atlantic
Margins, A.J. Tankard and J.R. Balkwill (Eds.) American
Association of Petroleum Geologists, Memoir 46
2.1.1.2 Withjack, M.O., P.E. Olsen, and R.W. Schlische. Tectonic 1995
Evolution of the Fundy Rift Basin, Canada: Evidence of
and Shortening During Passive Margin Development,
Tectonics, Vol. 14, No. 2
2.1.1.3 Ziegler, P.A. Evolution of the North Atlantic - An Overview, In: 1990
Extensional Tectonics and Stratigraphy off the North Atlantic
Margins, A.J. Tankard and J.R. Balkwill (Eds.) American
Association of Petroleum Geologists, Memoir 46
2.1.2.1 Given, M.M. Mesozoic and Cenozoic Geology of Offshore 1977

Nova Scotia, Bulletin of Canadian Petroleum Geology,
Vol. 25, No.1
2.1.2.2 Jansa L.F. and J.A. Wade. Paleogeography and Sedimentation 1975
in the Mesozoic and Cenozoic, Southeastern Canada. In:
Offshore Geology of Eastern Canada, W.J.M. van der Linden
and J.A. Wade (Eds.), Geological Survey of Canada,
Paper 74-30
2.1.2.3 van Helden, B.G.T., P.F. Johnson. PanCanadian Panuke 2001 Confidential
M-79 Scotian Shelf Biostratgraphic Analysis of the Section
Between 3180 m and 4600 m, PanCanadian Internal Report

Ref. # Report Title
Status Year Status
2.1.2.4 Wierzbicki, R.A, J. Weissenberger, N. Harland. Stratigraphy 2001 Confidential

of the Deep Panuke Reservoir, PanCanadian Internal Report
2.1.2.5 Haq, B.U., J. Hardenbol, P.R. Vail. Chronology of Fluctuating 1987

Sea Levels Since the Triassic, Science Vol. 235. pp. 1156-1167
2.1.3.1 Eliuk, L.S. The Abenaki Formation, Nova Scotia Shelf, 1978
Canada - A Depositional and Diagenetic Model for a
Mesozoic Carbonate Platform, Bulletin of Canadian
Petroleum Geology, Vol. 26, No. 4
2.1.3.2 Ellis, P.M., R.C.L. Wilson, and R.R. Leinfelder. Controls on 1990
Upper Jurassic Carbonate Buildup Development in the
Lusitanian Basin, Portugal, Special Publication, International
Association of Sedimentology, No. 9
2.1.3.3 Leinfelder, R.R., W. Werner, M. Nose, D.U. Schmid, M. Krautter, 1996

R. Laternser, M. Takacs, D. Hartmann. Paleoecology, Growth
Parameters and Dynamics of Coral, Sponge, and Microbolite Reefs
from the Late Jurassic. In: Global and Regional Controls on Biogenic
Sedimentation 1. Reef Evolution Research Reports, J. Reitner,
F. Neuweiler, and F. Gunkel (Eds.) Gottinger Arbeiten zur Geologie
und Palaontogie, Sb 2
2.1.3.4 Dravis, J.J. Diagenesis and Porosity Evolution of Abenaki 2001 Confidential
Carbonates, Panuke Field, Offshore Nova Scotia: Implications
for Controls on Reservoir Quality, PanCanadian Internal Report
2.1.3.5 Eliuk, L.S. Deep Panuke Exploratory and Development Wells 2001 Confidential
Detailed Lithologic Descriptions, PanCanadian Internal Report
2.1.3.6 Harris, B. Abridged Scotian Shelf Regional Detailed Lithological 2001 Confidential
Descriptions, Jurassic Carbonate Margin, PanCanadian Internal
Report
2.1.3.7 Potaki, D., R.A. Wierzbicki. Core and Special Core Analysis, 2001 Confidential
Deep Panuke Field, PanCanadian Internal Report

Ref. # Report Title
Source Year Status
2.1.3.8 Wierzbicki, R.A. XRD Analytical Report, Panuke M79-A, 2001 Confidential
PanCanadian Internal Report
2.1.3.9 Wierzbicki, R.A. Facies Model, Deep Panuke Abenaki Formation, 2001 Confidential
2.1.4.1 Powell, T.G. Petroleum Geochemistry of the Verrill Canyon 1982

Formation: A Source for Scotian Shelf Hydrocarbons, Bulletin
of Canadian Petroleum Geology, Vol. 30, No. 2
2.1.4.2 Powell, T.G and L.R. Snowdon. Geochemistry of Crude 1979

Oils and Condensates from the Scotian Basin, Offshore
Eastern Canada, Bulletin of Canadian Petroleum Geology,
Vol. 27, No. 4
2.1.4.3 Williamson, M.A. and K. DesRoches. A Maturation 1993

Framework for Jurassic Sediments in the Sable Subbasin,
Offshore Nova Scotia, Bulletin of Canadian Petroleum
Geology, Vol. 41, No. 2
2.1.5.1 Cox, W. Deep Panuke and Regional Abenaki 2001 Confidential

Hydrodynamic Evaluation, PanCanadian Internal Report
2.1.6.1 Wierzbicki, R.A., R. Riddy, R. Wytsma. Geostatistical 2001 Confidential

Modeling of Porosity, Trap Configuration, Reservoir
Geometry, and Determination of Reserves in the Deep
Panuke Field, PanCanadian Internal Report
2.1.8.1 Deutsch, C. Geostatistical Analysis and Reserve Evaluation, 2001 Confidential

Deep Panuke Field, PanCanadian Internal Report
2.2.1.1 Lasmo. CNSOPB – Program Number NS-24-L023-2E 1991
2.2.1.2 Walia, R. and C. Milne. Marine Reservoir Processing and 2001 Confidential
LMR Flow – Panuke 3D Case Study. PanCanadian Internal
Report

Ref. # Report Title
Source Year Status
2.2.1.3 Cieslewicz, D. Seismic Inversion of Panuke with Strata. 2001 Confidential

2.2.2.1 Riddy, R. Deep Panuke Seismic Interpretation Report. 2001 Confidential

2.2.3.1 Riddy, R. Deep Panuke Velocity Model and Depth 2001 Confidential
Conversion Report. PanCanadian Internal Report
2.2.4.1 Riddy, R. Deep Panuke Linear Porosity Transforms. 2001 Confidential

2.2.4.2 Tonn, R. Deep Panuke Porosity Prediction. PanCanadian 2001 Confidential

Internal Report
2.3.1.1 Uswak, G. Petrophysical Model Description, Application 2001 Confidential

and Results for Panuke PP3-C. PanCanadian Internal
Report

and Results for Panuke PI-1A. PanCanadian Internal
Report

and Results for Panuke PI-1B. PanCanadian Internal Report

and Results for Panuke H-08. PanCanadian Internal Report

and Results for Panuke M-79. PanCanadian Internal Report

and Results for Panuke M-79-A. PanCanadian Internal Report

and Results for Panuke F09. PanCanadian Internal Report

Ref. # Report Title
Source Year Status

and Results for Panuke B90. PanCanadian Internal Report
2.3.1.9 Peeters, M. and R. Visser. “A Comparison of Petrophysical 1991

Evaluation Packages: LOGIC, FLAME, ELAN, OPTIMA,
and ULTRA”, The Log Analyst, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 350-357
2.3.1.10 Herron, M. and A. Matteson. “Elemental Composition and 1993

Nuclear Parameters of Some Common Sedimentary Minerals,
“Nuclear Geophysics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 383-406
2.3.1.11 “Geolog Multimin Reference Guide”, Paradigm Geophysical 1999

Limited, 1999, PTGL 0022.008
2.3.1.12 “Geolog Reference Guide”, Paradigm Geophysical 1999

Limited, 1999, PTGL 0020.008
2.3.1.13 Ellis, A., J. Howard, C. Flaum, D. McKeon, H. Scott., 1988

O. Serra, and G. Simmons. “Mineral Logging Parameters:
Nuclear and Acoustic”, The Technical Review, Schlumberger,
Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 38-52
2.3.4.1 Watfa, M. and R. Nurmi. “Calculation of Saturation, 1987

Secondary Porosity and Producibility in Complex Middle
East Carbonate Reservoirs, “Transactions of the SPWLA 28th
Annual Logging Symposium
2.3.5.1 Uswak, G. Gross and Net Distribution of Petrophysical 2001 Confidential

Reservoir Parameters in the Abenaki Formation, Deep Panuke
Field. PanCanadian Internal Document
3. RESERVOIR ENGINEERING
3.1.2.1 Carle, D., Adam Pearson Associates Inc. Well Test Report, 1999
PanCanadian NSRL Panuke PP-3C, PanCanadian Internal
Report

Ref. # Report Title
Source Year Status
3.1.2.2 Carle, D., Adams Pearson Associates Inc. Well Test Report 2000
PanCanadian PI-1B (Abenaki V), PanCanadian Internal Report
3.1.2.3 Carle, D., Adams Pearson Associates Inc., Well Test Report 2000
PanCanadian H-08 (Abenaki V), PanCanadian Internal Report
3.1.2.4 Werth, J. Baker Atlas GEOScience. Panuke M-79A Well 2001 Confidential
Test Report DST#1 – Abenaki V Zone, PanCanadian
Internal Report
3.1.3.1 Lucia, F.J. Rock-Fabric/Petrophysical Classification of 1995

Carbonate Pore Space for Reservoir Characterization,
American Association of Petroleum Geologists, Bulletin,
Vol. 79, No. 9
3.3.1 Brown, S. Deep Panuke Abenaki 5 Simulation Report. 2001 Confidential

4. WELL CONSTRUCTION
4.3.3.1 Huskins, L. and S. LeBlanc, Existing Deep Panuke Casing 2001 Confidential
and Cement Details, PanCanadian Internal Report
4.3.3.2 McCoubrey, D., Preliminary Casing and Tubing Design, 2001 Confidential
5. PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
5.3.1 Deep Panuke Project – Environmental Design Criteria, 2001 Confidential

Design Databook, PanCanadian Internal Report
5.4.1 Report on Geotechnical Investigation Development Sites, 1990 Confidential

Jacques/McClelland Geosciences Inc.

Ref. # Report Title
Source Year Status
5.7.4.1 Slade, John, Acid Gas Reinjection Simulation, PanCanadian 2002 Confidential
Internal Report
5.10.1.1 Substructure Verification Study (Phase 2), Accent-Saipem 2001
5.10.2.1 Process Platform Modularization Study, Accent-Saipem 2001
5.10.2.2 Process Platform Modularization Study (Phase 2), 2001

Accent-Saipem
5.10.3.1 Study Report, Deep Panuke Feed, Co-Locating Quarters 2001

On Process Platform, Accent-Saipem
5.10.7.1 PanCanadian Energy Corp., Deep Panuke Acid Gas Injection, 2002
Simultaneous Acid Gas + Water Injection, John Carroll,
Ph.D., P. Eng.
7. DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
7.1 Deep Panuke Development Econonmics: Input Assumptions, 2001 Confidential


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6 CONSTRUCTION AND INSTALLATION

6.1 Contracting Philosophy

6.2 Management Philosophy

Deep Panuke Volume 2 (Development Plan) • March 2002 6-1

6.4 Project Execution Plan

6.4.1 Wellhead Platform

6.4.2 Production Platform

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Execution Phase Pre-Eng Pipeline Eng, Procure, Coating, & Install

Operations Phase Production

P:\EnvSci\15xxx\15999 PanCan\500 RAS Coordination\Development Plan Application\DPA Report January\Figures\Fig6_1.cdr

Figure 6.1 Preliminary Master Schedule

Figure 6.3 Thialf SSCV

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6.4.4 Offshore Pipeline

Figure 6.4 Castoro Sei Pipelaying Vessel

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6.4.6 Onshore Facilities and Pipeline

6.4.7 Offshore Hook-up and Commissioning

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7.1 Production Profile

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935 BCF Case

Figure 7.1 Average Daily Gas Production Rate

7.2 Preliminary Development Capital Costs

Engineering/Project Management $127 Million

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Year 2001 $ 20 Million

7.3 Preliminary Operating Costs

• Logistics: supply and standby boats, helicopters, supply base;

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8.2 Environmental Protection

8.3 Legislative and Regulatory Requirements

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8.4 Voluntary Compensation

For additional details on fisheries compensation, please refer to Section 10.1.4.

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9.1.1 Health, Safety and Environment Corporate Statement

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1. leadership, commitment and accountability;

9.1.3 Health, Safety and Environment Management System

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9.1.4 Organization and Responsibilities

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Prepare Detailed Design

Operate and Manage facility

Appraise and Modify Facility

Evaluate and Propose Development Concepts

Develop HSE Plan

Collate and Develop HSE Data

Social & Economic Impact Assessment

Physical Effects Modeling

Pre Start up Safety Audit

Fire & Explosion Review

Human Factors Review

Escape, Evacuation & Rescue Analysis

Emergency System Survivability Analysis

Permit to Work System

Job Hazard Analysis

Process Hazard Review

Safety Integrity Analysis

Compile Hazards Register

Document HSE Case