DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW
2018-19

SUBJECT:-Law Of Contracts

PROJECT ON:- An agreement which provides that suit should be brought for
the breach of any terms of agreement within a shorter time than the period of
limitation prescribed by law, is void to that extent.

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Dr. VISALAKSHI VEGESNA Siddhant Gupta

Associate Professor(law) Roll no.- 135

Section B

1st Year (2nd Semester)

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 Acknowledgement

First of all, I would like to extend our sincere thanks to Dr. VISALAKSHI VEGESNA Ma’am for giving

us the opportunity to make the project on such an immense topic and all the support and guidance that I

have received from her, without which this project could not have turned into a reality. I would also like to

thank all our colleagues and seniors for providing us support and material facts and figures related to this

topic. Last but not the least; I would like to further extend our thanks to Dean (Academics), Prof. C.M.

JARIWALA for his encouragement and enthusiasm. All the above mentioned people have very whole

heartedly helped me to make this project in the present shape.

 SIDDHANT GUPTA

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 Declaration
I, hereby declare that the work reported in this project report entitled An agreement which provides that

suit should be brought for the breach of any terms of agreement within a shorter time than the period

of limitation prescribed by law, is void to that extent submitted at DR RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW is an outcome of our work carried out under the

supervision of Dr. VISALAKSHI VEGESNA. I have duly acknowledged all the sources from which the

ideas and extracts have been taken, to the best of our understanding; the project is free from any plagiarism

issue.

SIDDHANT GUPTA.

Dr. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

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LIST OF CONTENTS

 INTRODUCTION

 LIMITATION OF TIME

 AMENDMENT ACT

 EFFECTS OF AMENDMENT

 CASES

1. Harsud Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. V United India Fire and General Insurance Co

Ltd.

2. National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Sujir Ganesh Nayak & Co. & Anr

3. Hirabhai Narotamdas vs The Manufacturers Life Insurance

4. The Baroda Spinning And Weaving Cooperative vs The Satyanarayan Marine And Fire

 CONCLUSION

 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 INTRODUCTION

As per section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, agreements in restraint of legal proceedings are void.

Since our project topic is based on sec 28 (b) of the Indian Contract Act which is against restraint on legal

proceedings, section 28 (b) states that:

Any agreement which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto, from any

liability, under or in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party

from enforcing his rights, is void to that extent1.

In other words an agreement is rendered void where an attempt is made by the parties to restrict the time

period within which an action may be brought so as to make it shorter than the time prescribed by the law

of limitation.2

Since there is an exception to this general rule (exception 3 under section 28) stated as:

Exception 3.—Saving of a guarantee agreement of a bank or a financial institution.—This section shall

not render illegal a contract in writing by which any bank or financial institution stipulate a term in a

guarantee or any agreement making a provision for guarantee for extinguishment of the rights or discharge

of any party thereto from any liability under or in respect of such guarantee or agreement on the expiry of

a specified period which is not less than one year from the date of occurring or non-occurring of a specified

event for extinguishment or discharge of such party from the said liability3.

1
Sec. 28 (b), THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872.
2
AVTAR SINGH, CONTRACT AND SPECIFIC ACT 340 (2015).
3
Sec. 28 (b), THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872.
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 LIMITATION OF TIME

According to the Limitation Act, 1963, there is a time limit for various actions. If an agreement between

the parties stipulates a smaller time limit than the prescribed under the Indian Limitation Act, the agreement

is void under sec 28.4

For Example, according to the Limitation Act, 1963, an action for breach of contract may be brought within

three years from the date of breach. If a clause in an agreement provides that no action should be brought

within three years from the date of breach, but if a clause in an agreement provides that no action should

be brought after 2 years than this clause is void.

In Ma Ywest v Chin Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd, “a clause in a policy of life insurance declaring that””“

no suit to recover under this policy of life insurance shall be brought after one year from the death of the

assured” “was held void. The same stand was taken by the judges in the case of Oriental Insurance Co Ltd

v Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. And also in Mahajan silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. V MV MSC Elena.5”

Similarly, clauses in the standard fire insurance policy of the insurer curtailing limitation to 12 months of

the occurrence of the event or 3 months of rejection of the claim by the insurer were not permitted to be

invoked to bar the claim filed within 3 years.”6

In Harsud Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. V United India Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd, an

action was brought for recovery of compensation of insurance against the risk of damage by fire. This suit

was initiated by the lodging of the plaint on 17-02-1975. The fire which is proved but not admitted by

defendant is alleged to have occurred on 19-02-1972, Article 44(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which deals

with suits based on a policy of insurance enforceable for recovery of sums insured prescribes a period of

three years. Time begins to run from the date (i) of the occurrence causing the loss or (ii) the date of denial

of a claim by the insurer. Considered either way, the plaintiffs' claim is within 3 years of the occurrence

4
R.K. BANGIA, CONTRACT-1 240 (2015)
5
'Section 28 of the indian contract' (Lawteacher.net, April 2018) <https://www.lawteacher.net?vref=1> accessed 3 April
2018.
6
Art 44 (b), LIMITATION ACT, 1963.
6
which took place on 19-02-1972 or 2-04-1972 when the society was intimated of Vulcan's repudiation of

the claim. Thus defendant was ordered to pay compensation.7

However, in a similar case before “Bombay High Court, a clause providing that” “no suit shall be brought

against the company in connection with the said policy later than one year after the time when the cause of

action accrues was held valid, the court saying that the effect of the agreement was not to limit the time but

to provide for the surrender of rights if no action was brought within that time.”8

Similarly In Baroda Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. V Satyanarayan Marine & Fire Ins. Co.Ltd., a clause

in a policy of fire insurance provided that if a claim was made and rejected and an action or suit is not

commenced within three months after such rejection, all benefits under the policy should be forfeited .

“This view taken by the Bombay High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Vulcan Insurance Co.

v Maharaj” Singh9, “where the court observed that” “it has been repeatedly held that such a clause in not

hit by s.28 and is valid.” In National Insurance Co. v Sujir Ganesh Nayak10, “the court held that” “the

curtailment of the period of limitation is not permissible in view of S. 28 but extinction of the right itself

unless exercised within a specified time is permissible and can be enforced. If the policy of insurance

provides that if a claim is made and rejected and no action is commenced within the time stated in the

policy, the benefits flowing from the policy shall stand extinguished and any subsequent action would be

time barred. Such a clause would fall outside the scope of S. 28 of the Contract Act.”

“Rights to be enforced under the contract should continue to exist even beyond the shorter period agreed

for enforcing those rights, to make such an agreement void under S.28. If, for example, beyond the shorter

period agreed upon the rights under the contract cannot be kept alive, no limiting of the time to enforce the

rights under the contract arises and hence the agreement putting a time limit to sue will not be hit by S.28.

So, a condition in a contract that the rights” there under “accruing to a party will be forfeited or released if

he does not sue within a time limit specified therein will not offend S.28. This is because, as per the contract

7
AIR 1992 BOM 341
8
Hirabhai v Manufacturers Life Insurance, (1912) 14 BOMLR 741.
9
(1976) 1 SCC 943
10
(1997) 4 SCC 366
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itself, the rights accrued to the party cease to exist by the expiry of the limited period provided for in the

contract. In such a case, in effect, there is no limiting of the time to sue. So, an agreement which provides

for a simultaneous relinquishment of rights accrued and the remedy to sue for them will not be hit by S.28.

But, at the same time, an agreement relinquishing the remedy only, by providing that if a suit is to be filed

that should be filed within a time limit, the time limit being shorter than the period of limitation under the

Limitation Act - will be hit by S.28. This is because the rights accrued continue even beyond the time limit

as the same is not extinguished. In such a case, there is really a limiting of the time to sue prescribed by the

Limitation Act. In Kerala Electrical & Allied Engineering Co. Ltd. v Canara Bank & Others, it is clear from

Clause.6 of” Electrical & Allied Engineering Co. Ltd. “guarantee that the liability of the bank will be alive

only for a period of six months after the expiry of the period of duration of the guarantee. It is also specified

in Clause.6 that the plaintiff's rights under the guarantee will also be forfeited by the end of that six months.

There is an extinction of the right of the plaintiff under the contract and a discharge of the defendants from

liability. So, the time limit imposed in Clause.6 cannot be hit by S.28 of the Contract Act.

Clauses found in insurance policies providing that the insurer should not be liable for loss or damage after

expiration of twelve months from the happening of loss or damage unless a claim was subject to pending

action or arbitration or clauses in bills of lading excluding liability for loss or damage unless the plaintiff

brought a suit within one year from date of delivery did not violate s.28. In short, an agreement providing

for the relinquishment of rights and remedies was valid, and an agreement for the relinquishment of

remedies only fell within the mischief of s”.2811.

11
'Section 28 of the indian contract' (Lawteacher.net, April 2018) <https://www.lawteacher.net?vref=1> accessed 3 April
2018
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 AMENDMENT ACT, 1997

Section 28 of the Contract Act has been amended by the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1997. The new

provision contained in section 28 (b) states that every agreement which extinguishes the rights of any party

thereto, or discharges any party thereto, from any liability period so as to restrict any party thereto from

enforcing the rights, is void to that extent12.

“Tracing back to the history of the amendment, it is interesting that the Law Commission of India, in its

13th Report, had deliberated upon this section and had observed that such clauses hinged not on the

interpretation of the section, but on the construction of the contract, and that ‘the principle itself is well

recognised that an agreement providing for the relinquishment of rights and remedies is valid but an

agreement for relinquishment of remedies only falls within the mischief of s.28', and had concluded that no

change was necessary in the section as it stood” earlier13.

“But later the Commission took up the matter suo motu and submitted its 97th Report in 1984. The proposal

to disallow prescriptive clauses which extinguished rights or provided for forfeiture of rights or discharge

of liability on failure of to sue within a certain time rested on the basis of economic justice, avoidance of

hardship to consumers and certainty and symmetry of law. The Commission pointed out that by giving a

clause in an agreement that shape and character of a provision extinguishing the right and not merely

affecting the remedy, a party standing in a superior bargaining position can achieve something which could

not have been achieved by merely barring the remedy. The amendment was also justified on the ground

that it was necessary to make the law simpler. The Commission found the existing provision illogical, based

on ‘a distinction too subtle.' The Commission considered that no provision like s.28 existed in the English

law. However, clauses now prohibited by the amendment are not void under the English” law14.

12
< http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report97.pdf>, accessed on 01-04-2019.
13
VINOD JOSEPH, Live Law, http://www.livelaw.in/should-section-28-of-the-indian-contract-act-be-amended-yet-
again/, accessed on 01-04-2018.
14
Supra at note 13.
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 EFFECTS OF AMENDMENT

The amendment of the section in 1997 has brought about this change that all clauses which reduced the

normal period of limitation would be void to that extent. Thus, the artificial distinction between a clause

cutting short the period of limitation and a clause providing for extinction of rights after a specified period

has been eliminated.15

“The clauses hit by the amendment have been held to have a purpose, especially in contracts of insurance.

They ensure that the claims under the policy are made early, investigated promptly, thereby avoiding the

likelihood of loss of important evidence. If claims were not made early, the insurers might be unable to

meet a fraudulent claim as seen in Baroda Spg & Wvg Co. v Satyanarayanan Marine and Fire Insurance

Co Ltd.”

The IBA’s Notwithstanding Clause – Playing With Words

“In response to the 1997 amendment, the Indian Banks Association came up with a clause, popularly called

the IBA’s standard Notwithstanding Clause, which was to be inserted in all bank guarantees in order to get

around the nuisance caused by the 1997 amendment. The IBA’s standard Notwithstanding Clause read as

follows: Notwithstanding anything contained herein our liability under this Bank guarantee shall not exceed

Rupees ………………./- (Rupees ………………………………… Only) This Bank guarantee shall be

valid upto ………………………. and we are liable to pay the guaranteed amount or any part thereof under

this Bank Guarantee only and only if you serve upon us a written claim or demand ...................... on or

before ……………………….. Please note that the above clause neither extinguishes rights nor prescribes

a period within which any suit has to be filed. Rather, it takes a cue from the Supreme Court decision in

The Food Corporation of India vs.The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others and indirectly provides

that a right to make a claim on the bank would arise only if the claim is served within a certain period.

Banks started to use the above mentioned clause and took the position that unless a claim was received

15
Supra at note 2.
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within the prescribed period, the bank had no further liability under the guarantee. By a simple play of

words, the impact of the amendment was neatly deflected.”

CASES:

CASE 1: Harsud Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. V United India Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd

CITATION: AIR 1992 BOM 341

This is an action for recovery of compensation on the basis of a contract of insurance against the risk of

damage by fire.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Plaintiff No. 1 is a co-operative society based at Harsud and Plaintiff No. 2 a co-operative bank with its

head quarters at Khandwa. Plaintiff No. 1 was in the cotton business and plaintiff No. 2 was advancing

money to it under different heads.

Plaintiff No. 1 had in 1970-1971 purchased raw cotton worth Rs. 10,00,000/-. The residue of the ginning

operation left it with cotton seeds worth about Rs. 3,50,000/-. The said seeds were stored in a godown of

the society near the Harsud Railway Station which the society had taken on rent from Ratilal Gujarathi.

These goods were pledged with plaintiff No. 2 (bank) against certain credit facilities granted to it.

The same day seeds lying in the compound of the society's factory were insured through the same agent.

The day after taking out the insurance i.e. on 19-2-1972, a fire broke out in the godown and the goods stored

there were considerably damaged. Vulcan's Jalgaon office was telegraphically informed of the mishap. As

directed by the then Jalgaon Branch Manager, Bhandari, the damaged seeds were placed in separate heaps

on 23-1-1972. The gradation was according to quality in preparation for further steps. Vulcan was called

upon by letter dated 19-3-1972 to pay the sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- for the loss occasioned by the fire.

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Defendant denies the correctness of any part of the factual narration of the claim summarised above.

Question arises

The first question is whether plaintiffs' claim is within limitation. This suit was initiated by the lodging of

the plaint on 17-2-1975. The fire which is proved but not admitted by defendant is alleged to have occurred

on 19-2-1972. Article 44(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which deals with suits based on a policy of

insurance enforceable for recovery of sums insured prescribes a period of three years. Time begins to run

from the date (i) of the occurrence causing the loss or (ii) the date of denial of a claim by the insurer.

Considered either way, the plaintiffs' claim is within 3 years of the occurrence which took place on 19-2-

1972 or 2-4-1972 when the society was intimated of Vulcan's repudiation of the claim. Defendant however

relies upon clauses appearing in Vulcan's standard fire policies. This clause is said to stipulate the raising

of a claim by the assured within 12 months of the occurrence of the event leading to loss. Another clause

requires the institution of a claim within 3 months of its rejection by the insurer. Plaintiffs were hit by both

the clauses. No insurance policy incorporating terms and conditions was issued.

Judgement

Decreed that defendant do pay to plaintiff No. 1 society a sum of Rupees 1,96,910.00 together with interest

at 6% per annum from date of suit till realisation. Plaintiffs shall get their costs from defendant who shall

in addition bear its own costs.

CASE 2: National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Sujir Ganesh Nayak & Co. & Anr

CITATION: (1997) 4 SCC 366

FACTS OF THE CASE:

“The respondent No.1 Sujir Ganesh Nayak & Company is a registered partnership with its head office at

Quilon carrying on business in import and export of Cashew. It has four factories at Kunnikode, Mulavana,
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perumpuzha and Ayathil for processing cashew. The respondent No.1 obtained two fire policies from the

appellant Insurance Company dated 5.1.1976 and 2.5.1977 both for a period of twelve months, and for the

amount of Rs. 6,00,000/- and Rs. 1,20,000/- respectively. Both the policies had a Riot and strike

Endorsement.

Loss of or damage to the property insured directly caused by:-

1. The act of any person taking art together with others on any disturbance of the public peace (whether in

connection with a strike or lock-out or not) not being an occurrence mentioned in condition 6 of the special

condition thereof.

2. The action of any lawfully constituted authority in suppressing or attempting to suppress any such

disturbance or in minimising the consequences of any such disturbances.

3. The willful act of any striker or locked out worker done in furtherance of a strike or in resistance to a

lock-out.

4. The action of any lawfully constituted authority in preventing or attempting to prevent any such act or in

minimising the consequences of any such act."

The Special condition No.5 (i) (b) which is relevant for the determination of the appellant's case is as under:

"SPECIAL CONDITIONS For the purposes of this endorsement but not otherwise there shall be substituted

for the respectively numbered Condition of the policy the following:-

This insurance does not cover :-

Clause 5(i)(b) : Loss or damage resulting from total or partial cessation of work or the retarding or

interruption or cessation of any process or operation.”

The workers of the respondent No.1 raised a demand for hike in wages during the period there was no work

and this demand led to a strike. The striking workers physically obstructed the movement of goods . By a

letter dated 28.4.1977, the respondent No.1 informed the appellant that the staff members and labour in its

factories have gone on strike from 26.3.1977 and that the striking workers have restricted the movement of

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the goods lying in the baskets are exposed to the risk of deterioration and damage. By a letter dated

10.5.1977, the appellant communicated to the respondent No.1 that the loss sustained by the respondent

No.1 was not covered by the policy. The respondent No.1 by a letter dated 17.8.1977 asked the appellant

for an advance Payment of Rs. 4,00,000/- and by another letter dated 25.8.1977 asked for payment of Rs.

4,28,827.01p. By the letter dated 22.9.1977, appellant reiterated that in view of condition 5(i)(b) of the Riot

and strike Endorsement, the Insurance Company had no liability for the loss incurred by the respondent

No.1. On 25.10.1978, the respondent No.1 served a legal notice. The suit for recovery of the claim was

filed on 2.6.1980.

The appellants contested the suit inter alia on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation as well as by

condition No. 19 of the policy and on the ground that the claim made by the respondent No.1 was not

covered by the policy. Condition 19 of the policy which was set up by way of defence runs as under:

"Condition No. 19 - In no case whatever shall the company be liable for any loss or damage after the

expiration of 12 months from the happening of loss or the damage unless the claim is the subject of pending

action or arbitration."

On behalf of the respondent No.1, it was contended that Condition No. 19 was hit by section 28 of the

contract act Inasmuch as it seeks to shorten the time within which legal action can be commenced from that

provided under the law of limitation.

Judgement

Trial court

“The Trial Court also found that the damage was not covered by the Insurance Policy in view of the special

Condition 5(i)(b) of the Riot and Strike Endorsement.”

HIGH COURT

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“In appeal, the High Court allowed the claim holding that the condition No. 19 could not limit the period

during which the suit was to be filed and that it simply required the respondent No.1 to make its claim

known within the period of 12 months from the happening of the loss or damage. It also reversed the finding

of the Trial Court that the claim was not covered by the two policies. so far as limitation is concerned, the

High Court further observed that the letter dated 10.5.1977 could not be read as a letter of repudiation of

claim as by then no claim whatsoever was preferred by the respondent No.1 and further that in any case the

last date of three years from 10.5.1977 fell within the summer vacation and the suit filed on 2.6.1980 on

reopening of the Court was within limitation.”

CASE ANALYSIS

From “the case law referred to above the legal position that emerges is that an agreement which in effect

seeks to curtail the period of limitation and prescribes a shorter period than that prescribed by law would

be void as offending section 28 of the Contract Act. That is because such a an agreement would seek to

restrict the party from enforcing his right in Court after the period prescribed under the agreement expires

even though the period prescribed by law for the enforcement of his right has yet not expired.”

CASE 3: Hirabhai Narotamdas vs The Manufacturers Life Insurance

Citation: (1912) 14 BOMLR 741

The clause, which is to be construed in this case and on the strength of which the lower Court has dismissed

the suit, is as follows : " No suit shall be brought against the Company in connection with the said policy

later than one year after the time when the cause of action accrues." This clause is to be found in the

declaration made by the applicant for an insurance policy which is Ext. n. That is the contract between the

parties.

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It is argued for the appellant that the deceased who had insured his life could not contract himself out of

his right to resort to a Court of justice and agree to lessen the period prescribed for a suit by the Legislature

in the Limitation Act. In support of that argument the learned Counsel for the appellant has invoked the aid

of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act.

“If the words in the clause be interpreted literally there might be considerable force in the argument

addressed to us. But the terms used in an insurance contract must be interpreted with reference to the object

and exigencies of insurance. It is true that where there is a right the party cannot enter into a contract and

agree that he shall resort to a Court of justice within a period other than that provided by the Limitation

Act.”

“But here the parties agreed in substance that if no suit were brought within a year then neither party should

be regarded as having any rights as against the other; in other words, the condition contained in the clause

meant that there was to be a waiver of the rights of the respective parties if no suit was brought within a

year. That was the intention of the parties and the conclusion, therefore, arrived at by the lower Court must

be accepted as correct. We, therefore, confirm the decree with costs.”

CASE 4: The Baroda Spinning And Weaving Cooperative vs The Satyanarayan Marine And Fire

CITATION: (1913) 15 BOMLR 948

One of the conditions in the policy of fire Insurance sued on by the plaintiffs is that " if the claim be made

and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced within three months after such rejection all benefit

under this policy shall be forfeited."

The claim on the defendants was rejected on the 20th of April 1911, but the suit was not commenced till

the 14th of August 1911. Upon this ground the suit was dismissed in the lower Court. “That such a condition

is not unreasonable or opposed to public policy is conceded by the appellants' counsel and can hardly be

disputed in view of the remarks of the Judicial Committee in Home Insurance Company of New York v.

Victoria-Montreal Fire Insurance Company [1907] A.C. 59.” But it is argued that the condition is void as
16
an agreement of the nature described in Section 28 of the Contract Act since it limits the time within which

a party to the contract may enforce his rights under the contract by the usual legal proceedings. “The section

contemplates the suspension permanently or temporarily of the usual remedies for the enforcement of legal

rights. It aims at the prohibition of agreements which could only operate so long as rights were in existence.

The argument of the appellants' counsel was that the forfeiture clause was equivalent to an agreement that

no Court should entertain any suit on the policy unless commenced within three months of the rejection of

the claim. The steps in his argument were : Section 3 of the Limitation Act indicates that the law of

Limitation cannot be modified by agreement of parties as it can in England ; that there is no distinction

under that Act between rights and remedies ; and that a conditional agreement to forfeit rights within the

period within which the remedy is not barred by the Limitation Law is a void agreement.”

CONCLUSION

It is proved by the research that agreements restraining legal proceedings are against public policy as it acts

as a hindrance to the dispensation of justice. . It places one of the parties to a contract in a more

advantageous position than the other. Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 has corrected this

imbalance to some extent and has been successful in ensuring that justice is served in the society. In 2012,

the Banking Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012 introduced a third exception to Section 28, Even after

introduction of the Third Exception, Banks continue to use the IBA’s standard Notwithstanding Clause

since even the provision of one year for making a claim is usually commercially unacceptable. In our

opinion, the rationale behind the IBA’s standard Notwithstanding Clause is legally sound since it makes a

distinction between creation of an enforceable right and the extinguishment of such right. “Usage of this

standard Notwithstanding Clause even after the introduction of the Third Exception would, in our opinion,

entitle a guarantor to claim that no right subsists after expiry of the prescribed claim period, if no claim is

made within such period. In some cases, bank guarantees provide that any claim has to be made the same

day. I doubt if any court would uphold such an unreasonable clause. I also think that it is high time we

asked ourselves if it is proper to prevent parties to a contract from agreeing on a period of limitation which

17
is shorter than the statutory minimum. In most developed Common Law countries, contracting parties have

the freedom to mutually decide on a period within which any suit under such contract must be filed. In our

view if it is against public policy to permit the contractual reduction of the statutory period of limitation for

filing a suit, the extinguishment of rights before the expiry of the remedy should also be void. Ideally, the

Law Commission should have taken the view that since it was permitted to extinguish rights before expiry

of the relevant period of limitation, contracting parties should also be given the freedom to prescribe an

appropriate period for expiry of the remedy.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872

2. THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963

3. Law Commission of India, http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report97.pdf

4. Avtar Singh, contract and specific act, 2015.

5. R.K. Bhangia, Contract- 1, 2009.

6. SUPREME COURT CASES

7. AIR INDIA REPORTS

8. 'Section 28 of the indian contract' (Lawteacher.net, April 2018) https://www.lawteacher.net?vref=1

9. VINOD JOSEPH, Live Law, http://www.livelaw.in/should-section-28-of-the-indian-contract-act-be-

amended-yet-again.

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