REPUBLIC V.

CA
132 SCRA 514
FACTS:
Respondents sought the registration of land adjacent to their fishpond. T
hey are the registered owners of parcel of lot bordering on the Bocaue
and Meycauyan rivers. The lower and appellate court allowed registration
but this was opposed by the government.

HELD:
There is no accretion if by man-made causes.

IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND

VALERIANO
108 SCRA 335

FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land
(mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion
since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His
application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano
Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public
domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that
said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at
bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES

1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the

present case because it refers to accretion or deposits on the
banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay,
which is held to be part of the sea

2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands

added to shores by accretions caused by actions of the sea form
part of the pubic domain when they are no longer necessary
for purposes of public utility, only the executive and the
legislative departments have the authority and the power to
make the declaration that any said land is no longer necessary
for public use. Until such declaration is made by said
departments, the lot in question forms part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.

There is no precise meaning of “public use” and the term is susceptible of

myriad meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited meaning
attached to “public use” is “use by the public” or “public employment”, that “a
duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding property
appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use
intended, and that there must be a right on the part of the public, or some
portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to
use the property after it is condemned.” The more generally accepted view
sees “public use” as “public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that
anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial
energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable number of
inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and
the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, which
contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community.” In this jurisdiction, “public use” is defined as “whatever is
beneficially employed for the community.

Sources of Philippine Civil Law

1. Constitution
2. Administrative or general orders not contrary to the
constitution.
3. Statutes, laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,
or batas pambansa.
4. Jurisprudence and judicial customs.
5. Decisions of foreign courts if applicable.
6. Principles governing analogous cases.
7. Principles of legal hermeneutics.
8. Equity and general principles of law (morals).

It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation

cannot depend on the “numerical count of those to be served or the smallness
or largeness of the community to be benefited.” The number of people is not
determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use; provided the use is
exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals. Thus, the
first essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the
expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use. In
Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, the Court explicated that expropriation ends
with an order of condemnation declaring “that the plaintiff has a lawful right
to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two

constitutional provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section
9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property
without due process of law under Article III, Sec. 1. (Barangay Sindalan, et al.
v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 150640, March 22, 2007).

The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with
just compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation
which can only be justified by a higher good – which is public use – and can
only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the
taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void,
but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an
individual’s basic right to property as well.

Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government. This rule holds true when the property is taken before the
filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings
the action for compensation. The nature and character of the land at the time
of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just
compensation should be given to the landowner. In determining just
compensation, all the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
(EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No. 59603, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 305; NPC v. Dr.
Antero Bongbong, et al., G.R. No. 164079, April 3, 2007).