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It has been usually held by postmodern thinkers that the current process of
globalization and all the events we have witnessed over the past, at least,
thirty years refute definitively the modern conception of History. They take
History as the great narrative of progress, be it in the Marxist version or in
the liberal one (Lyotard 1979). And they are right in that nowadays we
cannot be satisfied with the notion of one World History by which modern
thinkers, from the eighteenth century on, conceived of Western history and
its expansion all over the world; that kind of universal history which, as
Odo Marquard put it, “is universal because it turns all stories into only one
history, the unique History of Progress of Mankind”1. Instead of that
unique History of Mankind, we have many different stories and narratives
coming from many different individuals and collectives: postcolonial sto-
ries, stories of exile, stories by women, by the poor and immigrants, stories
of the losers and those defeated by progress, all of which cannot be inte-
grated in one Great History. An optimistic, conservative thinker like
Marquard tends to perceive all this as a liberation, inasmuch as those many
stories and narratives used and told by everyone come to free us from the
yoke imposed by rationalization and progress. They give us our lives back:
“There should be not just one, but lots of histories”2, for only in that way
can we “have more than just one life and, therefore, many histories”3. Such
an optimistic view, indeed, might very well be the stance of the well-fed
1
“Eine Geschichte, die universal ist, weil sie alle Geschichten in eine wendet, in die
eine einzige Fortschritts- und Vollend ungsgeschichte der Menschheit” (Marquard 1986:
56).
2
“Es darf nicht nur eine Geschichte, sondern viele Geschichten geben” (Marquard
1986: 71).
3
"Nur so können wir mehrere Leben und dadurch viele Geschichten haben" (Marquard
1986: 73)
Antonio Gómez Ramos
giving up the idea of History and learning to live with many different sto-
ries. Optimists tend to see that you can live very well with it: the narrative
of each story gives you an identity –your own particular identity- with
which you can install yourself very comfortably in the world. Pessimists –
i.e. critics of globalization - wouldn’t deny this, but they cannot help feel-
ing that each one’s story is continuously threatened by the stories of the
others. The latter becomes especially serious if you consider that this is not
just a literary competition of narratives, but a struggle for power. Those
others’ stories can be stories of immigrants coming to the First World, as
the European philistine usually fears; but the Other’s story can also be the
old great World-History again, nowadays represented by the G-8 or, if you
like, by those statements such as the one Tony Blair made when, address-
ing the U.S. Congress, he appealed to History to forgive him for the
invasion of Iraq.
Ambivalences are not necessarily wrong; very often they are just the
way things are. Modernity is ambivalent in itself, as Zygmunt Bauman has
suggested, and in order to be modern you ought not to eliminate the am-
bivalence, but rather to learn to live with it: even with the possibility of not
being modern anymore. The question is whether we have the tools or the
concepts to cope with such ambivalence. Can we think rationally of many
incompatible stories and hold on to the idea of one World-History which is
the History of Mankind, even a rational one?
The ambivalence is surely as old as modernity itself, although moder-
nity – i.e. modern thinkers – were not aware of it. Immanuel Kant is
probably the best example, and I want to explore his case because – and
this is my contention – he might be offering the tool we were searching for:
a faculty to come to terms with the plurality and fragmentation of these
times.
This might seem surprising. If you read Kant’s seminal essay on the phi-
losophy of history, the Idea for a universal History with a Cosmopolitan
Purpose, published in 1785, you first get a teleological interpretation of
nature and history, just as any Whig would like to think of it. By such a
reading, Kant proves himself a naive Enlightenment philosopher, who be-
lieves in the possibility of discerning an overall order in human history.
That order would be dictated by some secret plan of nature (in itself, a
Antonio Gómez Ramos
4
The consideration of the Philosophy of History as a secularization was defended above
all by Karl Löwith, (1949). An interesting reply came from Blumenberg (1973), Die
Legitimation der Neuzeit, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp.
5
The second page number refers to the English edition.
Reflecting Upon the Splendid Misery
6
Kant, I. (1795)
7
See also White, H. (1973), who also remarks on the irony within Kant's (and other
Enlightment thinkers') belief in progress.
8
“denn seine Natur ist nicht von der Art, irgendwo im Besitze und Genusse aufzuhören
und befriedigt zu warden”.
9
Kant, I. (1790). In quotations, the first page number refers to the German edition, the
second one to the English translation.
Antonio Gómez Ramos
10
“wo dem Abbruche der einander wechselseitig widerstreitenden Freiheit gesetzmäs-
sige Gewalt in einem Ganzen, welches bürgerliche Gesellschaft heisst, entgegengesetzt
wird.”
11
“ein weltbürgerliches Ganze s, d.i. ein System aller Staaten, die auf einander
nachteilig zu wirken in Gefahr sind ”.
Reflecting Upon the Splendid Misery
flections and inspires our actions. Up to this point, we can take current in-
terpretations of Kant here for granted. However, regarding our initial
considerations on History and the place of the globalization process within
it, it is interesting to note that the regulative idea of cosmopolitanism was
not given from the beginning. It emerges with the processes of civilization,
and cannot be conceived outside of the splendid misery of the progressing
culture, as Kant describes it in the § 83 of the Critique of Judgement. The
idea of a cosmopolitanism through which the world-citizen is herself con-
cerned with everything that goes on in the world and does not restrict her
mind to the tribe or the country to which she belongs, emerges only as long
as culture detaches itself from nature and produces the fine arts, science,
the refinement of taste (Kant 1790: 392, 321), alongside all sorts of evil
that, from war and repression to cruelty and inequality, seem to accompany
culture. It is the very progress of culture to catastrophe at the same time as
it develops the “natural tendencies” of humanity towards a cosmopolitan
society. Now, not much imagination or historical knowledge is necessary in
order to realize that our present globalizing world is probably the highest
performance of that splendid misery ever seen. Technological development,
luxury, unprecedented wealth, famines, poverty, brutality and the so-called
“humanitarian catastrophes” are, taken together, the experience of our time.
But there belongs to the same experience a cosmopolitanism that finds ex-
pression in growing internationalization and multiculturalism, as well as in
those waves of solidarity across countries when a catastrophe happens in a
far and foreign region, or else in the surprising formation and vanishing of
something like a global public opinion (think of the massive opposition to
the Iraq war all over the world). Never before was there such truth to Kant's
description in Perpetual Peace, “that a violation of rights in one place is
felt through-out the world, [so that] the idea of a law of world-citizenship is
no high-flown or exaggerated notion” (Kant 1795: 45, 105) 12. And never
before was the world so far away from any perpetual peace.
At his point, one can come easily to the conclusion that a modern
thinker like Kant already had many intuitions as to what the world would
look like when Modernity reaches its full development and changes into
Postmodernity. Since such intuitions came from his lifetime experience,
you could also say that there is already a lot of Postmodernity in Modernity
itself when you look at it very thoroughly. At least, “you must have been
12
The second page number refers to the English edition.
Antonio Gómez Ramos
13
Wellmer (1985), Habermas (1982), Ricoeur (1998), Beiner (1992)
Reflecting Upon the Splendid Misery
world where all general rules which supposedly ruled modernity have bro-
ken down and we have to deal with particularities and contingencies.14
What Hannah Arendt stresses in her reading of Kant is that this realm of
particularity, fragmentation and contingency, the lack of any necessary law
or rule being generally valid for every standpoint is, in fact, the realm of
the political. Reflective judgement, therefore, in spite of its origins as mere
taste, is the political operation par excellence.
Judgement is social, because you always need the plurality of the others.
You can certainly think by yourself and for yourself, when you are alone.
When you judge, however, when you state something to be right or wrong,
beautiful or ugly, you need the plurality of the others: you expect them to
agree with you, although there are no concepts to prove that you are right.
To achieve that, you must use your imagination and mentally shift your
own ground to the standpoint of the others in order to eventually reach the
"universal standpoint" accessible only to the enlarged mentality (erweiterte
Denkungsart). This universal standpoint, which is the standpoint of no-one
and, therefore, literally non-subjective, is the space where a plurality of
mankind finds a possible self-representation.
Many debates on Arendt's conception of judgement have dealt with the
question of the actual place judgment has within human activities.15 It
seems clear that, at least for the late Arendt, judgement has nothing to do
with thinking, because humans only think when they are alone and retreat
from the world. Nor has it to do with acting, since it is not the actor, but the
spectator who judges. Kant could make sense of human history as progress
by appealing to the “sympathy, bordering on enthusiasm” he and many of
his contemporaries felt for the French Revolution. But, as he liked to em-
phasize, it was the spectator, not the actor, who felt that enthusiasm. Only
by looking at events, and above all, by looking back on them -that is,
somehow, always only too late- can we know what was right or wrong.
Certainly, this means a limitation for judgement, especially if you expect it
to be a full guide for trouble-shooting, so to speak. But the whole matter
can be considered the other way round: “The public realm is constituted by
the critics and the spectators, and not by the actors and the makers” (Arendt
14
see Ferrara, A. (1998) Reflective Authenticity. Rethinking the Project of Modernity,
London, Routledge.
15
Ricoeur (1998), Wellmer (1991), Beiner (1992), Villa (1999)
Antonio Gómez Ramos
16
Arendt adds: “and this critic and spectator sits in every actor”.
Reflecting Upon the Splendid Misery
different from the tourist who travels through the world as though it were a
theme park.
To such a judicious world-spectator (Weltbetrachter), the space of rep-
resentation is a conflictive space of irreconcilable narratives. Because she is
capable of an “enlarged mentality”, she can see the fragmentation of the
different stories clashing in the globalized world. Through judgement, that
is, by imagining the general meaning in the particular story she is con-
fronted with (usually a story of losses in History) she develops a sense for
the particular pain of the others and can perceive what went unnoticed in
actions. It is as though the Kantian enthusiasm before the French Revolu-
tion had been transformed into the horror felt by Benjamin's Angelus
Novus gazing at the past.17 If this comparison holds -and I agree that it is in
principle not that obvious-, that transformation could tell us a lot about
what has happened in Modernity, about the combination of splendor and
misery. In any case, enthusiasm and horror are certainly different, though
not unrelated states of mind. Only she who can become enthusiastic can
also become horrified. For both, you need to be a spectator with judgement.
To be sure, judgement does not reconcile the many contradictions in
globalized Postmodernity. Such contradictions are very likely irreconcil-
able in themselves. In any case, judgement does not act: it only represents
particulars and establishes general meanings and values in its representa-
tion. It does this through that kind of self-reflectivity that creates an
universal, non-subjective standpoint. The representation takes place then in
a public realm where all voices – and cries – really sound and are heard. It
usually happens that the representation becomes a big non-reflective spec-
tacle shown on television, where contradictions are played down in a
neutral succession, regulated by the market, of terrible news and splendid
films. Unavoidable as that is, it can also happen that a reflective judgement
begins to work in this succession and restores succession every contradic-
tion to the particular story from which it comes. She who can do that is the
real cosmopolitan.
17
Was that too, perhaps, the horror the spectator inside Conrad's Kurz exclaimed at his
death?
Antonio Gómez Ramos
Literature
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------------- (1992), Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, Chicago, U. Chicago P.
Beiner, R. (1992) “Hannah Arendt on Judging.” Interpretive Essay to Arendt, (1992),
Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, Chicago, U. Ch. P., 89-156.
Benjamin, W. “Über den Begriff der Geschichte”, Gesammelte Schriften, Frankfurt,
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Kant, I., (1795) “Idee für eine Universalgeschic hte im Weltbürgerlichen Absicht”, (AK
VIII, 15-31) [English Edition, in (1963), On History, ed. Lewis White Black, tr.
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