Introduction PDF

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
INTRODUCTION
G.R. No. 128448 February 1, 2001
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MlRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO.,
INC., respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 22,
1996, in CA-G.R. CY No. 38607, as well as of its resolution of January 23, 1997, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision reversed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 14725.
The factual background of this case, as gleaned from the records, is as follows:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-1974, they produced 70,501.08
piculs1 of sugar, 25,662.36 of which were assigned for export. The following crop year, their
acreage planted to the same crop was lower, yielding 65,100 piculs of sugar, with 23,696.40
piculs marked for export.
Private respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production
venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under
said scheme, the Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops,
and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the
petitioners' attorney-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latter's sugar in both domestic and export
markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
Exercising his law-making powers under Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 5792 in November, 1974. The decree authorized private
respondent Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to
the United States and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity was determined by the
Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry, and finally, by the
Office of the President. The decree further authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases.
Finally, the decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar
abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national government, after commissions,
overhead expenses and liabilities had been deducted. The government offices and entities
tasked by existing laws and administrative regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the
purchase price of export sugar in crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 at P180.00 per picul.
PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols for crop years 1975-1976 and
1976-1977. These crop loans and similar obligations were secured by real estate mortgages
over several properties of the Mirasols and chattel mortgages over standing crops. Believing
that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough
to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of
their export sugar. PNB ignored the request. Meanwhile, petitioners continued to avail of other
loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their current accounts with said bank.
PNB then asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result of these
demands for payment, petitioners on August 4, 1977, conveyed to PNB real properties valued at
P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid overdrawn account of
P1,513,347.78.
On August 10, 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by petitioners
to PNB stood at P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due anti
demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially for close the mortgaged
properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged realties, PNB still
had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar for
crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could
offset their outstanding obligations with the batik. PNB remained adamant in its stance that
under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the
export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and were subject to the disposition
of the President of the Philippines for public purposes.1âwphi1.nêt
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages
against PNB with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, docketed as Civil Case No. 14725.
On June 16, 1987, the complaint was amended to implead PHILEX as party-defendant.
The parties agreed at pre-trial to limit the issues to the following:
"1. The constitutionality and/or legality of Presidential Decrees numbered 338, 579, and
1192;
"2. The determination of the total amount allegedly due the plaintiffs from the defendants
corresponding to the allege(d) unliquidated cost price of export sugar during crop years
1973-1974 and 1974-1975."3
After trial on the merits, the trial court decided as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX):
(1) Declaring Presidential Decree 579 enacted on November 12, 1974 and all circulars,
as well as policies, orders and other issuances issued in furtherance thereof,
unconstitutional and therefore, NULL and VOID being in gross violation of the Bill of
Rights;
(2) Ordering defendants PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs the
whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of
25,662 piculs in export sugar for crop year 1973-1974 at an average price of P300.00
per picul, deducting therefrom however, the amount of P180.00 already paid in advance
plus the allowable deductions in service fees and other charges;
(3) And also, for the same defendants to pay, jointly and severally, same plaintiffs the
whole amount corresponding to the unpaid actual price of 14,596 piculs of export sugar
for crop year 1974-1975 at an average rate of P214.14 per picul minus however, the
sum of P180.00 per picul already paid by the defendants in advance and the allowable
deducting (sic) in service fees and other charges.
"The unliquidated amount of money due the plaintiffs but withheld by the defendants,
shall earn the legal rate of interest at 12% per annum computed from the date this action
was instituted until fully paid; and, finally -
(4) Directing the defendants PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs the
sum of P50,000.00 in moral damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees,
plus the costs of this litigation.
"SO ORDERED."4
The same was, however, modified by a Resolution of the trial court dated May 14, 1992, which
added the following paragraph:
"This however whatever benefits that may have accrued in favor of the plaintiffs with the
massage and approval of Republic Act. 7202 otherwise known as the 'Sugar Restitution
Law,' authorizing the restitution of losses suffered by the plaintiffs from Crop year 1974-
1975 to Crop year 1984-1985 occasioned by the actuations of government-owned and
controlled agencies. (Underscoring in the original).
"SO ORDERED."5
The Mirasols then filed an appeal with the respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. CY No.
38607, faulting the trial court for not nullifying the dacion en pago and the mortgage contracts,
as well as the foreclosure of their mortgaged properties. Also faulted was the trial court's failure
to award them the full money claims and damages sought from both PNB and PHILEX.
On July 22, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment REVERSING the appealed Decision and entering
the following verdict:
"1. Declaring the dacion en pago and the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties valid;
"2. Ordering the PNB to render an accounting of the sugar account of the Mirasol[s]
specifically stating the indebtedness of the latter to the former and the proceeds of
Mirasols' 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 sugar production sold pursuant to and in
accordance with P.D. 579 and the issuances therefrom;
"3. Ordering the PNB to recompute in accordance with RA 7202 Mirasols' indebtedness
to it crediting to the latter payments already made as well as the auction price of their
foreclosed real estate and stipulated value of their properties ceded to PNB in
the dacon (sic) en pago;
"4. Whatever the result of the recomputation of Mirasols' account, the outstanding
balance or the excess payment shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of RA
7202.
"SO ORDERED."6
On August 28, 1996, petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied on
January 23, 1997.
Hence, the instant petition, with petitioners submitting the following issues for our resolution:
"1. Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without
notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for
the resolution of the Trial Court.
"2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances7 thereof are unconstitutional.
"3. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed manifest error in not applying the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil between respondents PNB and PHILEX.
"4. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed manifest error in upholding the
validity of the foreclosure on petitioners property and in upholding the validity of
the dacion en pago in this case.
"5. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed manifest error in not awarding
damages to petitioners grounds relied upon the allowance of the petition. (Underscored
in the original)"8
On the first issue. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order.9 The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not.
only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.10 In J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Court of
Appeals, 3 SCRA 696 (1961) we held:
"Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in
cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of
final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in
issue."11
Furthermore, B.P. BIg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the conformity
of laws or treaties with the Constitution, thus:
"SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;"
The pivotal issue, which we must address, is whether it was proper for the trial court to have
exercised judicial review.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that it was improper for the trial court
to have declared P.D. No. 57912 unconstitutional, since petitioners had not complied with Rule
64, Section 3, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that said Rule specifically refers only to
actions for declaratory relief and not to an ordinary action for accounting, specific performance,
and damages.
Petitioners' contentions are bereft of merit. Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. - In any action which involves the validity of a
statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the
party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be
heard upon such question."
This should be read in relation to Section 1 [c] of P.D. No. 478,13 which states in part:
"SECTION 1. Functions and Organizations - (1) The Office of the Solicitor General
shall...have the following specific powers and functions:
xxx
"[c] Appear in any court in any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, executive
order or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his judgment his intervention is
necessary or when requested by the court."
It is basic legal construction that where words of command such as "shall," "must," or "ought"
are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. 14 Thus, where, as in
Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the word "shall" is used, a mandatory duty is imposed,
which the courts ought to enforce.
The purpose of the mandatory Notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to
decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of
his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule
itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving
declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the true, there is no room for
constnlction.15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order,
or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the
trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or
memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did
not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon
the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.
As regards the second issue, petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing
issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of
private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power
of judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there
must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the
validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must
have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.16
As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy can be
settled on other grounds.17 The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions
and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied
by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution
before it was finally enacted and approved.18
The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific performance. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be
determined, without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is
nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNB's intransigence in refusing to give an
accounting. The governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted
as petitioners' agent. In other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question
be the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 579.
Petitioners further contend that the passage of R.A. No. 720219 rendered P.D. No. 579
unconstitutional, since R.A. No. 7202 affirms that under P.D. 579, the due process clause of the
Constitution and the right of the sugar planters not to be deprived of their property without just
compensation were violated.
A perusal of the text of R.A. No. 7202 shows that the repealing clause of said law merely reads:
"SEC. 10. All laws, acts, executive orders and circulars in conflict herewith are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly."
The settled rule of statutory construction is that repeals by implication are not favored.20 R.A.
No. 7202 cannot be deemed to have repealed P.D. No. 579. In addition, the power to declare a
law unconstitutional does not lie with the legislature, but with the
21
courts. Assuming arguendo that R.A. No. 7202 did indeed repeal P.D. No. 579, said repeal is
not a legislative declaration finding the earlier law unconstitutional.
To resolve the third issue, petitioners ask us to apply the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction with respect to PNB and PHILEX. Petitioners submit that PHILEX was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of PNB prior to the latter's privatization.
We note, however, that the appellate court made the following finding of fact:
"1. PNB and PHILEX are separate juridical persons and there is no reason to pierce the
veil of corporate personality. Both existed by virtue of separate organic acts. They had
separate operations and different purposes and powers."22
Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding upon this Court unless said
findings are not supported by the evidence.23 Our jurisdiction in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to reviewing questions of law and factual issues are not
within its province.24 In view of the aforequoted finding of fact, no manifest error is chargeable to
the respondent court for refusing to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.
On the fourth issue, the appellate court found that there were two sets of accounts between
petitioners and PNB, namely:
"1. The accounts relative to the loan financing scheme entered into by the Mirasols with
PNB (PNB's Brief, p. 16) On the question of haw much the PNB lent the Mirasols for
crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, the evidence recited by the lower court in its
decision was deficient. We are offered (sic) PNB the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY TWO PESOS and
NINETY THREE Centavos (Ps15,964,252.93) but this is the alleged balance the
Mirasols owe PNB covering the years 1975 to 1982.
"2. The account relative to the Mirasol's current account Numbers 5186 and 5177
involving the amount of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND Pesos
(P3,400,000.00). PNB claims against the Mirasols. (PNB's Brief, p. 17)
"In regard to the first set of accounts, besides the proceeds from PNB's sale of sugar
(involving the defendant PHILEX in relation to the export portion of tile stock), the PNB
foreclosed the Mirasols' mortgaged properties realizing therefrom in 1981 THREE
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND pesos (P3,413,000.00), the PNB
itself having acquired the properties as the highest bidder.
"As to the second set of accounts, PNB proposed, and the Mirasols accepted, a dacion
en pago scheme by which the Mirasols conveyed to PNB pieces of property valued at
ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX
Pesos (Ps1,410,466.00) (PNB's Brief, pp. 16-17)."25
Petitioners now claim that the dacion en pago and the foreclosure of their mortgaged properties
were void for want of consideration. Petitioners insist that the loans granted them by PNB from
1975 to 1982 had been fully paid by virtue of legal compensation. Hence, the foreclosure was
invalid and of no effect, since the mortgages were already fully discharged. It is also averred
that they agreed to the dacion only by virtue of a martial law Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order
(ASSO).
We find petitioners' arguments unpersuasive. Both the lower court and the appellate court found
that the Mirasols admitted that they were indebted to PNB in the sum stated in the latter's
counterclaim.26 Petitioners nonetheless insist that the same can be offset by the unliquidated
amounts owed them by PNB for crop years 1973-74 and 1974-75. Petitioners' argument has no
basis in law. For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set forth in Articles 1278
and 1279 of the Civil Code must be present. Said articles read as follows:
"Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are
creditors and debtors of each other.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a
principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they
be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts are due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third
persons and communicated in due time to the debtor."
In the present case, set-off or compensation cannot take place between the parties because:
First, neither of the parties are mutually creditors and debtors of each other. Under P.D. No.
579, neither PNB nor PHILEX could retain any difference claimed by the Mirasols in the price of
sugar sold by the two firms. P.D. No. 579 prescribed where the profits from the sales are to be
paid, to wit:
"SECTION 7. x x x After deducting its commission of two and one-half (2-1/2%) percent
of gross sales, the balance of the proceeds of sugar trading operations for every crop
year shall be set aside by the Philippine Exchange Company, Inc,. as profits which shall
be paid to a special fund of the National Government subject to the disposition of the
President for public purposes."
Thus, as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, "there was nothing with which PNB was
supposed to have off-set Mirasols' admitted indebtedness."27
Second, compensation cannot take place where one claim, as in the instant case, is still the
subject of litigation, as the same cannot be deemed liquidated.28
With respect to the duress allegedly employed by PNB, which impugned petitioners' consent to
the dacion en pago, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that there was no
evidence to support said claim. Factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court,
are conclusive upon this Court.29
On the fifth issue, the trial court awarded petitioners P50,000.00 in moral damages and
P50,000.00 in attorney's fees. Petitioners now theorize that it was error for the Court of Appeals
to have deleted these awards, considering that the appellate court found PNB breached its duty
as an agent to render an accounting to petitioners.
An agent's failure to render an accounting to his principal is contrary to Article 1891 of the Civil
Code.30 The erring agent is liable for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which
states:
"Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages."
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, however, must be construed in relation to Article 2217 of said
Code which reads:
"Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury .Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission."
Moral damages are explicitly authorized in breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.31 Good faith, however, is always presumed and any person who
seeks to be awarded damages due to the acts of another has the burden of proving that the
latter acted in bad faith, with malice, or with ill motive. In the instant case, petitioners have failed
to show malice or bad faith32 on the part of PNB in failing to render an accounting. Absent such
showing, moral damages cannot be awarded.
Nor can we restore the award of attorney's fees and costs of suit in favor of petitioners. Under
Article 2208 (5) of the Civil Code, attorney's fees are allowed in the absence of stipulation only if
"the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff s plainly
valid, just, and demandable claim." As earlier stated, petitioners have not proven bad faith on
the part of PNB and PHILEX. 1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the respondent court
in CA-G.R. CY 38607 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by
petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of
Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya,
who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a
member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a
resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C

of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are
hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in
section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment
of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall
have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which
he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore,
class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory
provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective
officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which
shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not
be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall
be conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of
such fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials — ... The election shall be held on
January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be fixed by
the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the
Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979
and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the
accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution,
which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of
harassment and discrimination. "The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case
but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been
squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities,
hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties
and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan
Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint,
nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory
provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The
action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although
petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only
a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and
Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties
have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed
by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said
provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No
petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no
ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on
Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition
for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual
record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion
of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent
COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of
which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
1) xxx
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns

and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective
provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his
receipt of a copy thereof.
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their
Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that
neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified
from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have
been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest
at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial
redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and
that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The
Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who
will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public
funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
In the same vein, it has been held:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite

standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not
only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may,
therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public
moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als.,
15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and
sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While,
concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation
of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine
Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citingPhilippine Constitution
Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per
se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677
[1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to
whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of
an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e.,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an
"appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are
actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not
being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard
was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and
in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases
having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the
paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a
few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him

personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates
for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the
COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's
contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should
not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone,
might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old
may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees
from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify
retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65,
who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he
had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the
same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume
again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it
permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are
sinlilarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional
guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions,
where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging
to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA
606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336
[1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to
allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible
to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The
Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the
questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.
Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid
unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs.
COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on
Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to
prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are
reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section
4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in
two parts. The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be

conclusive evidence of such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set
aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra).
We are constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for
public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of
the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may
be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary
proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts
rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of
findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will
thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not
be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph
of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article

XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which
are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal
official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang

52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall
be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an
accused.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief separate opinion.
De Castro, J., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art.
XI I is more expensive than the equal protection clause.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to
paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being
similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas
Pambansa Big. 52 should be one which is final and unappealable.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.
It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the
Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of the standard that must be met before the power
of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in the
two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v. Vera, 2 did not constitute
an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for
concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent past had
shown less than full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application
whenever the exercise of this awesome and delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a
statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3While this Court cannot be accused of being bound by
the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested
concepts should be given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on
asserted constitutional deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes without saying. For the
judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that
sense, this Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its
allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however, limits to judicial
activism. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an
orderly proceeding that cannot be oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a
pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the exercise of judicial
power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of
the Solicitor General should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts.
Necessarily then, whenever objections based on refusal to abide by the procedural principles
are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the petition is dismissed for non-
observance of the controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the controversy is of
such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional
limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with
the opinion of the Court.
It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may
not be amiss on what for me is the proper approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court
to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of petitioner's
argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental concept of fairness
of which the due process clause is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the
disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.
1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known
fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed
precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as governor
of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly attuned to discriminate against
herein petitioner because every condition imposed as disqualification grounds are known to be
possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who has received his
retirement benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of
the term of office to which he now seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of
age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the motive attributed to the
Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in
character. The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be
cited in support of such a proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review
if a court can roam far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the reasons,
the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or against a proposed legislation. It
is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive.
That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v.
United States: 5 "The decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the
beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the
exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the
power to be exerted. 6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States
v. O' Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a
hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to
statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit
to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of
misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a
statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer
than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech
about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are
sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it
is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be
reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8
2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial
of equal protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response.
As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving of credence. The
classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as
well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into
any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was pointed out in J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that
others similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that
can be said is that he falls within the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why
should national officials be excluded in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is
nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did under the
challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity
of the local officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits
once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A
portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was
confronted with a situation that caned for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its
deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining
the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal
protection. We have given our sanction to the principle underlying the exercise of police power
and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not required by
the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by
petitioner of the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing ." 11
3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie
evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of
the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled.
That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I would add that
such a provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due
process clause. Such a constitutional right, to quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is
"not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious
concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate
sense of justice." 13 As rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may
invariably preclude a full hearing on the charge against him and thus effectively negate the
opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as has been invariably the
case, a prosecutor, whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many
complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human propensity to take the easy way
out and to file charges, then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense
of realism for me compels a declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently
offensive to the Constitution.
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining
to rule on the invalidity of the first part of Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the
pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause for disqualification is
void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory
and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special
disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from running for the elective local office of
governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his
province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a
retired provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected."
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from
running for the same elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from
which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are
not similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for
governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office
from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other
lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of
governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary discrimination against petitioner
who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to
frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 —
(since no other case by a former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never
be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee
that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every person, under
analogous if not Identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special
disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local governments but the classification (that would bar
65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not rational nor
reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood"
because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not
disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-
governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and Sangguniang Bayan, other than the local elective
office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches
of government are not in any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the
case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who retired
with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and now at past 71
years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in
the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have
received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which
amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive officials and members
of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified.
Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old
blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have
received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences that would justify the special disqualification of
petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials who have
retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as those
who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a
candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more
efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition er who has had
experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit.
Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs,
General Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan
Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81 years of age and has been hailed by the
President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al.
the most, a minimum age to hold public office has been required as a
qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the
present batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification
for elect public office since the right and win of the people to elect the candidate
of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been
recognized as supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which
mandates that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The
guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand
and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other. The questioned
provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would
disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated.
Where no valid distinction could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for
consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary
selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full
within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the
group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C,
section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free
from any form of harassment and discrimination.
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of
Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of charges of
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of an act of
disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a
provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be
headed for election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous
and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate who may not be to their filing through the
filing of last-hour charges against him.
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a
judgment of conviction may be deemed "as conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to
the State and of his disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction must be final and
unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election
Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate substantive
due process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of
innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973 Constitution protecting candidates for
public office from any form of harassment and discrimination.
ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a
majority in favor of the declarations and pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding
paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil sought to be avoided. However, as
of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been dissipated
by the view that the action to nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question
is premature and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under the strict procedural
require . If this be the case, my above views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as
dissents against the majority action.
Separate Opinions
void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory
and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special
disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from running for the elective local office of
governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his
province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a
retired provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected."
ADDENDUM
Separate Opinions
void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the
discriminatory and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which
would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from
running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva
Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his province from electing him to
said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired provincial
governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected.
ADDENDUM
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT.
REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001
RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR
LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001
THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which
allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were
filed before the Court –
(1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent
application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction)
filed by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G. R. No. 147781
for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, with prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G. R. No.
147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari and
prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no
basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo
ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the
instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the
proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless
arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific
persons in connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions
to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as
stated in respondents' Joint Comments:
[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police
authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary
investigations will henceforth be conducted.
(Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p.
16; G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)
With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based
on the declaration of a "state of rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-

Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies
of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his
defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he
should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person
subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the
periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could
be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal
ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is
without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32
of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail
themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time
(Section 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).1âwphi1.nêt
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the
dismissal of the petitions at bar.
G.R. No. 147780
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and
mancao pray that the "appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are
filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the
instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this
date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And
in the event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution
conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in
pursuant of a duly issued warrant.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared
null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the
subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave
the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose
is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a
matter which remains speculative up to this very day.
G.R. No. 147781

The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is
basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the
performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and
complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award
(Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has
not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact,
the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.
G.R. No. 147799
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part,
argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional
prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration
of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the
governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion…" Thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides
the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts.
Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that
there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. x x x
(at pp.22-23)
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of
this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been
lifted.
G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that
a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can
be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction
and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf (KMU Labor Center v.
Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself
which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus,
it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders,
members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the
crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has
been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or
infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner
claiming that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the
Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner,
this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article
VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in G.R.
No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking
earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in
their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial
warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of
Malacañang.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, separate opinion.
Kapunan, dissenting opinion.
Pardo, join the dissent of J. Kapunan.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., on leave.
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

vs.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

vs.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I concur insofar as the resolution enjoins any continued warrantless arrests for acts
related to, or connected with, the May 1st incident but respectfully dissent from the order
of dismissal of the petitions for being said to be moot and academic. The petitions have
raised important constitutional issues that, in my view, must likewise be fully addressed.
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

vs.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

vs.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

vs.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001

vs.
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been characterized as belonging "in
the catalog of indispensable freedoms."
Among deprivation of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the

spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure
is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people know
that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where
homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and
seizure by the police.1
Invoking the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, petitioners Panfilo Lacson,
Michael Ray Aquino and Cezar O. Mancao II now seek a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction from the Court against their impending warrantless arrests upon order of the
Secretary of Justice.2 Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), likewise, seeks to
enjoin the arrests of its senatorial candidates, namely, Senator Juan Ponce-Enrile, Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan and General Panfilo
Lacson.3 Separate petitioners were also filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile.4 Former
Ambassador Ernesto M. Maceda,5 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago,6Senator Gregorio B.
Honasan,7 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8
Briefly, the order for the arrests of these political opposition leaders and police officers stems
from the following facts:
On April 25, 2001, former President Joseph Estrada was arrested upon the warrant issued by
the Sandiganbayan in connection with the criminal case for plunder filed against him. Several
hundreds of policemen were deployed to effect his arrest. At the time, a number of Mr. Estrada's
supporters, who were then holding camp outside his residence in Greenhills Subdivision, sought
to prevent his arrest. A skirmish ensued between them and the police. The police had to employ
batons and water hoses to control the rock-throwing pro-Estrada rallyists and allow the sheriffs
to serve the warrant. Mr. Estrada and his son and co-accused, Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, were
then brought to Camp Crame where, with full media coverage, their fingerprints were obtained
and their mug shots taken.
Later that day, and on the succeeding days, a huge gathered at the EDSA Shrine to show its
support for the deposed President. Senators Enrile, Santiago, Honasan, opposition senatorial
candidates including petitioner Lacson, as well as other political personalities, spoke before the
crowd during these rallies.
In the meantime, on April 28, 2001, Mr. Estrada and his son were brought to the Veterans
memorial Medical Center for a medical check-up. It was announced that from there, they would
be transferred to Fort Sto. Domingo in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
In the early morning of May 1, 2001, the crowd at EDSA decided to march to Malacañang
Palace. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was called to reinforce the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to guard the premises of the presidential residence. The marchers were
able to penetrate the barricades put up by the police at various points leading to Mendiola and
were able to reach Gate 7 of Malacañan. As they were being dispersed with warning shots, tear
gas and water canons, the rallyists hurled stones at the police authorities. A melee erupted.
Scores of people, including some policemen, were hurt.
At noon of the same day, after the crowd in Mendiola had been dispersed, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila:
Presidential Proclamation No. 38
DECLARING STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the mass
gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated and
incited and, acting upon the instigation and under the command and direction of known
and unknown leaders, have and continue to assault and attempt to break into
Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted Government
and forcibly seize power, and have and continue to rise publicly, shown open hostility,
and take up arms against the duly constituted Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and to deprive the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and prerogatives which
constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and
plotters have continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly
constituted Government and seize political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the
President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out
such armed forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers

vested in me by law hereby recognize and confirm the existence of an actual and on-
going rebellion compelling me to declare a state of rebellion;
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order NO. 1 in accordance with Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution calling upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
City of Manila, May 1, 2001.
The President likewise issued General Order No. 1 which reads:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 1
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPIENS AND THE PHILIPPINE

NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION
WHEREAS, the angry and violent mob, armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons, in great part coming from the mass
gathering at the EDSA Shrine, and other armed groups, having been agitated and
incited and, acting upon the instigation and under the command and direction of known
and unknown leaders, have and continue to assault and attempt to break into
Malacañang with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the duly constituted Government
and forcibly seize political power, and have and continue to rise publicly, show open
hostility, and take up arms against the duly constituted Government certain bodies of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and to deprive the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly and partially, of her powers and
prerogatives which constitute the continuing crime of rebellion punishable under Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code;
WHEREAS, armed groups recruited by known and unknown leaders, conspirators, and
plotters have continue (sic) to rise publicly by the use of arms to overthrow the duly
constituted Government and seize political power;
WHEREAS, under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, whenever necessary, the
President as the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out
such armed forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers

vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 38, dated May 1, 2001, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine national police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of
the Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due
regard to constitutional rights.
City of Manila, May 1, 2001.
Pursuant to the proclamation, several key leaders of the opposition were ordered arrested.
Senator Enrile was arrested without warrant in his residence at around 4:00 in the afternoon.
Likewise arrested without warrant the following day was former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda.
Senator Honasan and Gen. Lacson were also ordered arrested but the authorities have so far
failed to apprehend them. Ambassador Maceda was temporarily released upon recognizance
while Senator Ponce Enrile was ordered released by the Court on cash bond.
The basic issue raised by the consolidated petitions is whether the arrest or impending arrest
without warrant, pursuant to a declaration of "state of rebellion" by the President of the above-
mentioned persons and unnamed other persons similarly situated suspected of having
committed rebellion is illegal, being unquestionably a deprivation of liberty and violative of the
Bill of Rights under the Constitution.
The declaration of a "state of rebellion" is supposedly based on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution which reads:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative
of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment
of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to call out the armed forces
in cases of (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion and (3) invasion.9 In the latter two cases, i.e.,
rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public safety requires, also (a) suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. However, in the exercise of this calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a "state
of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless violence or invasion). The term "state of rebellion"
has no legal significance. It is vague and amorphous and does not give the President more
power than what the Constitution says, i. e, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice
Mendoza observed during the hearing of this case, such a declaration is "legal surplusage." But
whatever the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights, such as
the right to due process,10 the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances,11and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures,12 among others.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al.,13 the Court held that:
x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one hand, and the power to
suspend the privilege of the write of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the
other hand) places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three
powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
xxx
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights
the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the
"calling out" power because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of
certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating affirmation by
Congress and, in appropriate cases, review by this Court.
On the other hand, if the motive behind the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is to arrest
persons without warrant and detain them without bail and, thus, skirt the Constitutional
safeguards for the citizens' civil liberties, the so-called "state of rebellion" partakes the nature of
martial law without declaring on its face, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye so as to practically make it unjust and oppressive, it is within the prohibition of
the Constitution.14 In an ironic sense, a "state of rebellion" declared as a subterfuge to effect
warrantless arrest and detention for an unbailable offense places a heavier burden on the
people's civil liberties than the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the
declaration of martial law because in the latter case, built-in safeguards are automatically set on
motion: (1) The period for martial law or suspension is limited to a period not exceeding sixty
day; (2) The President is mandated to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation or suspension; (3) The proclamation or suspension is subject to review by
Congress, which may revoke such proclamation or suspension. If Congress is not in session, it
shall convene in 24 hours without need for call; and (4) The sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof or its extension is subject to review by the Supreme Court in an appropriate
proceeding.15
No right is more fundamental than the right to life and liberty. Without these rights, all other
individual rights may not exist. Thus, the very first section in our Constitution's Bill of Rights,
Article III, reads:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
And to assure the fullest protection of the right, more especially against government impairment,
Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Indeed, there is nothing in Section 18 which authorizes the President or any person acting
under her direction to make unwarranted arrests. The existence of "lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion" only authorizes the President to call out the "armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
Not even the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of
martial law authorizes the President to order the arrest of any person. The only significant
consequence of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is to divest the courts of the power
to issue the writ whereby the detention of the person is put in issue. It does not by itself
authorize the President to order the arrest of a person. And even then, the Constitution in
Section 18, Article VII makes the following qualifications:
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
In the instant case, the President did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Nor did she
declare martial law. A declaration of a "state of rebellion," at most, only gives notice to the
nation that it exists, and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it, as in fact
she did. Such declaration does not justify any deviation from the Constitutional proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
As a general rule, an arrest may be made only upon a warrant issued by a court. In very
circumscribed instances, however, the Rules of Court allow warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule
113 provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A police officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
xxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It must be noted that the above are exceptions to the constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of
Rights that a person may only be arrested on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by a
"judge" after determining "personally" the existence of "probable cause" after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Its requirements
should, therefore, be scrupulously met:
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrests is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd
or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the
rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right
so often violated and so deserving of full protection.16
A warrantless arrest may be justified only if the police officer had facts and circumstances
before him which, had they been before a judge, would constitute adequate basis for a finding of
probable cause of the commission of an offense and that the person arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense. That is why the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that when
arrested, the person "arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense" in the presence of the arresting officer. Or if it be a case of an offense which had
"just been committed," that the police officer making the arrest "has personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it."
Petitioners were arrested or sought to be arrested without warrant for acts of rebellion ostensibly
under Section 5 of Rule 113. Respondents' theory is based on Umil vs. Ramos,17 where this
Court held:
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assault against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.18
Following this theory, it is argued that under Section 5(a), a person who "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit" rebellion and may be arrested without a warrant
at any time so long as the rebellion persists.
Reliance on Umil is misplaced. The warrantless arrests therein, although effected a day or days
after the commission of the violent acts of petitioners therein, were upheld by the Court because
at the time of their respective arrests, they were members of organizations such as the
Communist Party of the Philippines, the New Peoples Army and the National United Front
Commission, then outlawed groups under the Anti-Subversion Act. Their mere membership in
said illegal organizations amounted to committing the offense of subversion19 which justified
their arrests without warrants.
In contrast, it has not been alleged that the persons to be arrested for their alleged participation
in the "rebellion" on May 1, 2001 are members of an outlawed organization intending to
overthrow the government. Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), there
must be a showing that the persons arrested or to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit the offense of rebellion.20 In other words, there must be
an overt act constitutive of rebellion taking place in the presence of the arresting officer.
In United States vs. Samonte,21 the term" in his [the arresting officer's] presence" was defined
thus:
An offense is said to be committed in the presence or within the view of an arresting

officer or private citizen when such officer or person sees the offense, even though at a
distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof; or the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the
arrest is made.22
This requirement was not complied with particularly in the arrest of Senator Enrile. In the Court's
Resolution of May 5, 2001 in the petition for habeas corpus filed by Senator Enrile, the Court
noted that the sworn statements of the policemen who purportedly arrested him were
hearsay.23 Senator Enrile was arrested two (2) days after he delivered allegedly seditious
speeches. Consequently, his arrest without warrant cannot be justified under Section 5(b) which
states that an arrest without a warrant is lawful when made after an offense has just been
committed and the arresting officer or private person has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person arrested has committed the
offense.
At this point, it must be stressed that apart from being inapplicable to the cases at bar, Umil is
not without any strong dissents. It merely re-affirmed Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,24 a case decided
during the Marcos martial law regime.25 It cannot apply when the country is supposed to be
under the regime of freedom and democracy. The separate opinions of the following Justices in
the motion for reconsideration of said case26 are apropos:
FERNAN C.J., concurring and dissenting:
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officers are not sure
what particular provision of law had been violated by the person arrested. True it is that
law enforcement agents and even prosecutors are not all adept at the law. However,
erroneous perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it would
result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested
person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution, p. 18)
that he was exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is
beside the point. No person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the
law enforcers wrongly perceived his action.27(Underscoring supplied)
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting opinion
Insofar as G.R. NO. 81567 is concerned, I joint the other dissenting Justices in their
observations regarding "continuing offenses." To base warrantless arrests on the
doctrine of continuing offense is to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on
pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political offenses where the line
between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a
court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be
arrested. But until a person is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a
personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight
whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If warrantless
searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not this Court which should
draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or
obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms against
the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well-grounded on past events,
that the petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not
validate warrantless arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide
their time, await the petitioner's surfacing from underground, and ounce on him with no
legal authority instead of securing warrants of arrest for his
apprehension.28(Underscoring supplied)
CRUZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the
illegal arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when
individual rights were wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It
seem some of us have short memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not
one to forget so soon. As the ultimate defender of the Constitution, this Court should not
gloss over the abuses of those who, out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty
in the dubious name of national security. Whatever their ideology and even if it be hostile
to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights, no more and no
less than any other person in this country. That is what democracy is all
about.29 (Underscoring supplied)
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own
legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for
weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where
no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged are shown
to have been committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime"
doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed
elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the
arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes"
doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of
unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as
the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal detention or arson) but
rather or such problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a
member of, a subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the overt
constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of the acts
a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for instance, the
following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive
association:"
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization;
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such or association or organization in any form
whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments,

loans or in any other forms;
xxx
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in

furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof;
xxx
g) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to

promote the objectives and purposes of such association or organization;
xxx
k) Participating in any way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of

such association or organization.
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless
arrests and seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to
carry out. It is not our Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed,
to make life easy for police forces but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals.
Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to
enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law.
Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or excess of
zeal, the very freedoms which make our policy worth protecting and
saving.30 (Underscoring supplied)
It is observed that a sufficient period has lapsed between the fateful day of May 1, 2001 up to
the present. If respondents have ample evidence against petitioners, then they should forthwith
file the necessary criminal complaints in order that the regular procedure can be followed and
the warrants of arrest issued by the courts in the normal course. When practicable, resort to the
warrant process is always to be preferred because "it interposes an orderly procedure involving
'judicial impartiality' whereby a neutral and detached magistrate can make informed and
deliberate determinations on the issue of probable cause."31
The neutrality, detachment and independence that judges are supposed to possess is precisely
the reason the framers of the 1987 Constitution have reposed upon them alone the power to
issue warrants of arrest. To vest the same to a branch of government, which is also charged
with prosecutorial powers, would make such branch the accused's adversary and accuser, his
judge and jury.32
A declaration of a state of rebellion does not relieve the State of its burden of proving probable
cause. The declaration does not constitute a substitute for proof. It does not in any way bind the
courts, which must still judge for itself the existence of probable cause. Under Section 18, Article
VII, the determination of the existence of a state of rebellion for purposes of proclaiming martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusrests for which the President
is granted ample, though not absolute, discretion. Under Section 2, Article III, the determination
of probable cause is a purely legal question of which courts are the final arbiters.
Justice Secretary Hernando Perez is reported to have announced that the lifting of the "state of
rebellion" on May 7, 2001 does not stop the police from making warrantless arrests. 33 If this is
so, the pernicious effects of the declaration on the people's civil liberties have not abated
despite the lifting thereof. No one exactly knows who are in the list or who prepared the list of
those to be arrested for alleged complicity in the "continuing" crime of "rebellion" defined as
such by executive fiat. The list of the perceived leaders, financiers and supporters of the
"rebellion" to be arrested and incarcerated could expand depending on the appreciation of the
police. The coverage and duration of effectivity of the orders of arrest are thus so open-ended
and limitless as to place in constant and continuing peril the people's Bill of Rights. It is of no
small significance that four of he petitioners are opposition candidates for the Senate. Their
campaign activities have been to a large extent immobilized. If the arrests and orders of arrest
against them are illegal, then their Constitutional right to seek public office, as well as the right
of he people to choose their officials, is violated.
In view of the transcendental importance and urgency of the issues raised in these cases
affecting as they do the basic liberties of the citizens enshrined in our Constitution, it behooves
us to rule thereon now, instead of relegating the cases to trial courts which unavoidably may
come up with conflicting dispositions, the same to reach this Court inevitably for final ruling. As
we aptly pronounced in Salonga vs. Cruz Paño:34
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on
the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
Petitioners look up in urgent supplication to the Court, considered the last bulwark of
democracy, for relief. If we do not act promptly, justly and fearlessly, to whom will they turn to?
WHEREFORE, I vote as follows:
(1) Give DUE COURSE to and GRANT the petitions;
(2) Declare as NULL and VOID the orders of arrest issued against petitioners;
(3) Issue a WRIT OF INJUNCTION enjoining respondents, their agents and all other
persons acting for and in their behalf from effecting warrantless arrests against
petitioners and all other persons similarly situated on the basis of Proclamation No. 38
and General Order No. 1 of the President.
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

vs.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

vs.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

vs.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001

vs.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The exercise of certain powers by the President in an atmosphere of civil unrest may sometimes
raise constitutional issues. If such powers are used arbitrarily and capriciously, they may
degenerate into the worst form of despotism.
It is on this premise that I express my dissent.
The chain of events which led to the present constitutional crisis are as follows:
On March 2, 2001, the Supreme Court rendered the landmark decision that would bar further
questions on the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency.1 In a unanimous decision,
the Court declared that Joseph Ejercito Estrada had effectively resigned his post and that
Macapagal-Arroyo is the legitimate President of the Philippines. Estrada was stripped of all his
powers and presidential immunity from suit.
Knowing that a warrant of arrest may at any time be issued against Estrada, his loyalists rushed
to his residence in Polk Street, North Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan, Metro Manila. They
conducted vigil in the vicinity swearing that no one can take away their "president."
Then the dreadful day for the Estrada loyalists came.
On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against
Estrada, his son Jinggoy, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas.2Emotions ran high as an estimated 10,000 Estrada loyalists,
ranging from tattooed teenagers of Tondo to well-heeled Chinese, gathered in Estrada's
neighborhood.3 Supporters turned hysterical. Newspapers captured pictures of raging men and
wailing women.4 When policemen came, riots erupted. Police had to use their batons as well as
water hoses to control the rock-throwing Estrada loyalists.5
It took the authorities about four hours to implement the warrant of arrest. At about 3:30 o'clock
in the afternoon of the same day, Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Director General
Leandro R. Mendoza, with the aid of PNP's Special Action Force and reinforcements from the
Philippine Army and Marines, implemented the warrant of arrest against Estrada. 6
Like a common criminal, Estrada was fingerprinted and had his mug shots taken at the
detention center of the former Presidential Anti-Organized Task Force at Camp Crame. The
shabby treatment, caught on live TV cameras nationwide, had sparked off a wave of protest all
over the country. Even international news agencies like CNN and BBC were appalled over the
manner of Estrada's arrest calling it "overkill." In a taped message aired over radio and
television, Estrada defended himself and said, "I followed the rule of law to the letter. I asked
our people now to tell the powers to respect our constitution and the rule of law."
Being loyal to the end, the supporters of Estrada followed him to Camp Crame. About 3,000 of
them massed up in front of the camp. They were shouting "Edsa Three! Edsa Three! They
vowed not to leave the place until Estrada is released. When asked how long they planned to
stay, the protesters said, "Kahit isang buwan, kahit isang taon.7
At about 6:00 o' clock in the afternoon, also of the same day, the PNP's anti-riot squads
dispersed them. Thus, they proceeded to the Edsa Shrine in Mandaluyong City where they
joined forces with hundreds more who came from North Greenhills. 8 Hordes of Estrada loyalists
began gathering at the historic shrine.
On April 27, 2001, the crowd at Edsa begun to swell in great magnitude. Estrada loyalists from
various sectors, most of them obviously belonging to the "masses," brought with them placards
and streamers denouncing the manner of arrest done to the former president. 9 In the afternoon,
buses loaded with loyalists from the nearby provinces arrived at the Edsa Shrine. One of their
leaders said that the Estrada supporters will stay at Edsa Shrine until the former president gets
justice from the present administration.10
An estimated 1,500 PNP personnel from the different parts of the metropolis were deployed to
secure the area.11On April 28, 2001, the PNP and the Armed Forces declared a "nationwide red
alert."12 Counter-intelligence agents checked on possible defectors from the military top officials.
Several senators were linked to an alleged junta plot.
During the rally, several Puwersa Ng Masa candidates delivered speeches before the crowd.
Among those who showed up at the rally were Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Gregorio
Honasan, Juan Ponce Enrile, Edgardo Angara, Vicente Sotto and former PNP Director General
Panfilo Lacson and former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda.13
On April 30, 2001, the government started to prepare its forces. A 2,000-strong military force
backed up by helicopter gunships, Scorpion tanks and armored combat vehicles stood ready to
counter any attempt by Estrada loyalists to mount a coup. And to show that it meant business,
the task force parked two MG-520 attack helicopters armed to the teeth with rockets on the
parade ground at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. Also deployed were two armored personnel
carriers and troops in camouflage uniforms.14 Over 2,500 soldiers from the army, navy, and air
force were formed into Task Force Libra to quell the indignant Estrada loyalists.15
On May 1, 2001, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning, the huge crowd at Edsa started their
march to Malacañang.16Along the way, they overran the barricades set up by the members of
the PNP Crowd Dispersal Control Management.17
Shortly past 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, the marchers were at the gates of
Malacañang chanting, dancing, singing and waving flags.18
At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the police, with the assistance of combat-ready soldiers,
conducted dispersal operations. Some members of the dispersal team were unceasingly firing
their high-powered firearms in the air, while the police, armed with truncheons and shields, were
slowly pushing the protesters away from the gates of Malacañang. Television footages showed
protesters hurling stones and rocks on the advancing policemen, shouting invectives against
them and attacking them with clubs. They burned police cars, a motorcycle, three pick-ups
owned by a television station, construction equipment and a traffic police outpost along
Mendiola Street.19 They also attacked Red Cross vans, destroyed traffic lights, and vandalized
standing structures. Policemen were seen clubbing protesters, hurling back stones, throwing
teargas under the fierce midday sun, and firing guns towards the sky. National Security Adviser
Roilo Golez said the Street had to be bleared of rioters at all costs because "this is like an
arrow, a dagger going all the way to (Malacañang) Gate 7."20
Before noontime of that same day, the Estrada loyalists were driven away.
The violent street clashes prompted President Macapagal-Arroyo to place Metro Manila under a
"state of rebellion."
Presidential Spokesperson Rigoberto Tiglao told reporters, "We are in a state of rebellion. This
is not an ordinary demonstration."21 After the declaration, there were threats of arrests against
those suspected of instigating the march to Malacañang.
At about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested in his house in
Dasmariñas Village, Makati City by a group led by Reynaldo Berroya, Chief of the Philippine
National Police Intelligence Group.22Thereafter, Berroya and his men proceeded to hunt re-
electionist Senator Gregorio Honasan, former PNP Chief Panfilo Lacson, former Ambassador
Ernesto Maceda, Brig. Gen. Jake Malajakan, Senior Superintendents Michael Ray Aquino and
Cesar Mancao II, Ronald Lumbao and Cesar Tanega of the People's Movement Against
Poverty (PMAP).23 Justice Secretary Hernando Perez said that he was "studying" the possibility
of placing Senator Miriam Defensor – Santiago "under the Witness protection program."
Director Victor Batac,24 former Chief of the PNP Directorate for Police Community Relations,
and Senior Superintendent Diosdado Valeroso, of the Philippine Center for Transnational
Crime, surrendered to Berroya. Both denied having plotted the siege.
On May 2, 2001, former Ambassador Ernesto Maceda was arrested.
The above scenario presents three crucial queries: First, is President Macapagal-Arroyo's
declaration of a "state of rebellion" constitutional? Second, was the implementation of the
warrantless arrests on the basis of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" constitutional? And
third, did the rallyists commit rebellion at the vicinity of Malacañang Palace on May 1, 2001?
The first and second queries involve constitutional issues, hence, the basic yardstick is the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines. The third query requires a factual analysis of the events which
culminated in the declaration of a state of rebellion, hence, an examination of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code is in order.
On May 7, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 39, "DECLARING THAT
THE STATE OF REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION HAS CEASED TO
EXIST", which in effect, has lifted the previous Proclamation No. 38.
I beg to disagree with the majority opinion in ruling that the instant petitions have been rendered
moot and academic with the lifting by the President of the declaration of a "state of rebellion".
I believe that such lifting should not render moot and academic the very serious and
unprecedented constitutional issues at hand, considering their grave implications involving the
basic human rights and civil liberties of our people. A resolution of these issues becomes all the
more necessary since, as reported in the papers, there are saturation drives (sonas) being
conducted by the police wherein individuals in Metro Manila are picked up without warrants of
arrest.
Moreover, the acts sought to be declared illegal and unconstitutional are capable of being
repeated by the respondents. In Salva v. Makalintat (G.R. No. 132603, Sept. 18, 2000), this
Court held that "courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of
repetition, yet evading review' …"
I & II – President Macapagal-Arroyo's declaration of a "state of rebellion" and the

implementation of the warrantless arrests premised on the said declaration are
unconstitutional.
Nowhere in the Constitution can be found a provision which grants upon the executive the
power to declare a "state of rebellion," much more, to exercise on the basis of such declaration
the prerogatives which a president may validly do under a state of martial law. President-
Macapagal-Arroyo committed a constitutional short cut. She disregarded the clear provisions of
the Constitution which provide:
"Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment
of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released."25
Obviously, the power of the President in cases when she assumed the existence of rebellion is
properly laid down by the Constitution. I see no reason or justification for the President's
deviation from the concise and plain provisions. To accept the theory that the President could
disregard the applicable statutes, particularly that which concerns arrests, searches and
seizures, on the mere declaration of a "state of rebellion" is in effect to place the Philippines
under martial law without a declaration of the executive to that effect and without
observing the proper procedure. This should not be countenanced. In a society which
adheres to the rule of law, resort to extra-constitutional measures is unnecessary where the law
has provided everything for any emergency or contingency. For even if it may be proven
beneficial for a time, the precedent it sets is pernicious as the law may, in a little while, be
disregarded again on the same pretext but for evil purposes. Even in time of emergency,
government action may vary in breath and intensity from more normal times, yet it need
not be less constitutional.26
My fear is rooted in history. Our nation had seen the rise of a dictator into power. As a matter of
fact, the changes made by the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the martial law text of the
Constitution were to a large extent a reaction against the direction which the Supreme Court
took during the regime of President Marcos.27 Now, if this Court would take a liberal view, and
consider that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" carries with it the prerogatives given to the
President during a "state of martial law," then, I say, the Court is traversing a very dangerous
path. It will open the way to those who, in the end, would turn our democracy into a totalitarian
rule. History must not be allowed to repeat itself. Any act which gears towards possible
dictatorship must be severed at its inception.
The implementation of warrantless arrests premised on the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is

unconstitutional and contrary to existing laws. The Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."28 If a state of martial law "does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians, where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ,"28(a) then it is with
more reason, that a mere declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about the
suspension of the operation of the Constitution or of the writ of habeas corpus.
Neither can we find the implementation of the warrantless arrests justified under the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Pertinent is Section 5, Rule 113, thus:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
x x x."
Petitioners cannot be considered "to have committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

commit an offense" at the time they were hunted by Berroya for the implementation of the
warrantless arrests. None of them participated in the riot which took place in the vicinity of the
Malacañang Palace. Some of them were on their respective houses performing innocent acts
such as watching television, resting etc. The sure fact however is that they were not in the
presence of Berroya. Clearly, he did not see whether they had committed, were committing or
were attempting to commit the crime of rebellion. But of course, I cannot lose sight of the legal
implication of President Macapagal-Arroyo's declaration of a "state of rebellion." Rebellion is a
continuing offense and a suspected insurgent or rebel may be arrested anytime as he is
considered to be committing the crime. Nevertheless, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional, it is imperative that the said declaration be
reconsidered. In view of the changing times, the dissenting opinion of the noted jurist, Justice
Isagani Cruz, in Umil v. Ramos,29 quoted below must be given a second look.
"I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile that
subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any person
at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed under surveillance on
suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested when
he is doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his
supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the 'continuing'
offense of subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed
during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is willing to
sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the disgraceful
vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject
the past oppression and commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that
the military should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that
fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe that
in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are precisely what
we are fighting against. I submit that our more important motivation should be what are
we fighting for."
I need not belabor that at the time some of the suspected instigators were arrested, (the others
are still at-large), a long interval of time already passed and hence, it cannot be legally said that
they had just committed an offense. Neither can it be said that Berroya or any of his men had
"personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons to be arrested have committed
a crime." That would be far from reality.
III – The acts of the rallyists at the vicinity of Malacañang Palace on May 1, 2001 do not
constitute rebellion.
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
"ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection – How committed. – The crime of rebellion or

insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory
of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives." (As amended by RA No. 6968, O.G. 52, p. 9864,
1990)
From the foregoing provisions, the elements o the crime of rebellion may be deduced,
thus: first, that there be (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
government; second, that the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from
the allegiance to said government or its laws (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part
thereof; or (2) anybody of land, naval or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief
Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. 30
Looking at the events on a magnified scale, I am convinced that the two elements of the crime
of rebellion are lacking.
First, there was no "taking of arms" against the government. To my mind, "taking arms"
connotes the multitude's deliberate and conscious resort to arms or weapons for the purpose of
aiding them in accomplishing any of the purposes of rebellion. Admittedly, the Estrada loyalists
pelted the policemen with rocks and stones and attacked them with sticks and clubs, but such
was merely a result of the heightening tension between opposite camps during the period of
dispersal. The stones, rocks, sticks, clubs and other improvised weapons were not deliberately
resorted to by the Estrada loyalists to further any of the purposes of rebellion. They availed of
them, at the precise moment of dispersal (this explains why their weapons were those which
could be easily gathered on the street) and only for the purpose of stopping the policemen from
dispersing them. In this age of modernity, one who intends to overthrow the government will not
only settle for stones, woods, rocks, sticks or clubs as means to disable the government. It will
be extremely pathetic and the result will only be in vain. Unlike a true rebellion which
is organized, what happened at the vicinity of Malacañang was merely a riot, a mob violence, or
a tumultuous uprising. At this juncture, it bears stressing that the crime of rebellion is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.31 It must be distinguished from riot
and offenses connected with mob violence. In rebellion/insurrection, there is an organized and
armed uprising against authority.32
Second, the purpose of the Estrada loyalists was neither (a) to remove from the allegiance to
the government or its laws (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any part
of land, naval or other armed forces; nor (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly
or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. I looked at the chronology of events, and one
thing surfaced – the Estrada loyalists mainly demanded that their beloved "president" should not
be incarcerated. The crowd at Edsa swelled in great magnitude on April 25, 2001, the day
Estrada was arrested. In fact, when they followed Erap at Camp Crame, they were shouting
"Edsa! Edsa! And they vowed not to leave until Estrada is released."33
One must not be swayed by the theory of respondents that the purpose of those people who
gathered in Edsa and marched to Malacañang was to commit rebellion. For sure, there were a
thousand and one reasons why they proceeded to Edsa. In determining their purpose, one must
trace the roots, - what prompted them to go to Edsa? They were the Estrada loyalists who
wanted him to be freed. If indeed there were minorities who advocated another cause, the same
should not be considered as the prevailing one in the determination of what crime was
committed. Facts should not be stretched just to build a case of rebellion. This runs counter to
the principle of due process.
As a final word, I subscribe to the principle that the rule of law implies the precept that similar
cases be treated similarly. Men can not regulate their actions by means of rule if this precept is
not followed. Edsa I, Edsa II and Edsa III are all public uprisings. Statements urging people to
overthrow the government were uttered in all these occasions. Injuries were sustained,
policemen were attacked, standing structures were vandalized… in all these scenarios, one
cannot be said to be extremely away from the other. The only difference is that the first two
succeeded, while the last failed. This should not result to an unbridled or unlimited exercise of
power by the duly constituted authorities. It is during these trying times that fealty to the
Constitution is strongly demanded from all, especially the authorities concerned.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, I vote to give DUE COURSE to the petitions and GRANT the same and to
enjoin the respondents from arresting the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 147780, 147781, and 147799
without the corresponding warrants.
[G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004]
SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA,

represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR.
GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 159103. February 3, 2004]
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON
DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES,
and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 159185. February 3, 2004]
REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP.
HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-
SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 159196. February 3, 2004]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY

ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES,
AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et
al., respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions and
explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee
hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among
other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP).[1]
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation No. 427 reads in full:
PROCLAMATION NO. 427
DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-powered
firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known and
unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared
withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue
to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the
Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her
powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being
supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the
government service and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes
necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me

by law, hereby confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion, compelling me to
declare a state of rebellion.
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance with Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to immediately carry out the necessary actions and measures to suppress and
quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
General Order No. 4 is similarly worded:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-powered
firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known and
unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared
withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue
to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the
Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her
powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 et
seq. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being
supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the
government service and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes
necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines,
may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of
all the armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27,
2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine
National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long
negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through
Proclamation No. 435:
DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, a state of rebellion was
declared;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003, which was issued on the
basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, and pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were
directed to suppress and quell the rebellion;
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police have
effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue

of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of rebellion has ceased to
exist.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging the validity of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.),[2] party-list
organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces.[3] They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there
exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for
an indefinite period.[4]
Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.)
are officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS), Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law
professors and bar reviewers.[5] Like Sanlakas and PM, they claim that Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion. [6] They contend that
the declaration is a constitutional anomaly that confuses, confounds and misleads because
[o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to
violate the constitutional right of private citizens.[7] Petitioners also submit that the proclamation
is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law.[8] Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power
to the President.[9]
In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive
Secretary Romulo), petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the House of
Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration
of a state of rebellion.[10] Petitioners do not challenge the power of the President to call out the
Armed Forces.[11] They argue, however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a
superfluity, and is actually an exercise of emergency powers.[12] Such exercise, it is contended,
amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution.[13]
In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner Senator assails the subject
presidential issuances as an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power
that has no basis under the Constitution.[14] In the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests
for the crime of rebellion.[15]
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered
moot by the lifting of the declaration.[16] In addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing
of the petitioners to bring suit.[17]
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435,
declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule,
courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination
of actual controversies.[18] Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.[19] The case at bar is one such case.
Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon
the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order
No. 1. On that occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to break into
Malacaang.[20] Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the Presidents
declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The
mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases[21] precluded this Court
from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest
the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the Presidents calling out
power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have
standing to challenge the subject issuances. In Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, [22] this Court recognized that:
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a
case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the
President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress emergency powers, thus impairing the
lawmakers legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a subterfuge to
avoid congressional scrutiny into the Presidents exercise of martial law powers.
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus
standi to bring suit. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[23]
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs,

petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests,
and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of
Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including
political and civil rights, of the citizens.
3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in the
exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of
expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly
ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the
same.[24] [Emphasis in the original.]
Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez:
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the
Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened
by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being
threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be
brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose
legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner
claiming that it[]s right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the
declaration of a state of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the
Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner,
this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article
VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.[25]
Even assuming that petitioners are peoples organizations, this status would not vest them
with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances, as this Court
made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato: [26]
The Constitution provides that the State shall respect the role of independent peoples
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their
legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means, that their
right to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. (Art. XIII, 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those
with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court,
even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy
requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is
what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.[27]
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily
endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.[28] No such illegal
disbursement is alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he
can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[29] Again, no such injury is alleged
in this case.
Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they raise are
of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not
require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII
provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.]
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of

graduated power[s].[30] From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial
law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise
of such power.[31] However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora,[32] [t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only
criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the
President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: The executive power shall
be vested in the President. As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The provisions trace their history to the Constitution
of the United States.
The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S. President executive and
commander-in-chief powers have remained in their original simple form since the Philadelphia
Constitution of 1776, Article II of which states in part:
Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America . . . .
....
Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States. . . .
....
Section 3. he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. [Article II Executive Power]
Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of the above-quoted
provisions, as juxtaposed against the corresponding action of the U.S. Supreme Court, is
instructive. Clad with the prerogatives of the office and endowed with sovereign powers, which
are drawn chiefly from the Executive Power and Commander-in-Chief provisions, as well as the
presidential oath of office, the President serves as Chief of State or Chief of Government,
Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Foreign Relations and Chief of Public Opinion.[33]
First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State, as the protector of the
people, was President Andrew Jackson. Coming to office by virtue of a political revolution,
Jackson, as President not only kept faith with the people by driving the patricians from
power. Old Hickory, as he was fondly called, was the first President to champion the
indissolubility of the Union by defeating South Carolinas nullification effort.[34]
The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did not pacify the hotspurs
from South Carolina. Its State Legislature ordered an election for a convention, whose members
quickly passed an Ordinance of Nullification. The Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts
unconstitutional, prohibited South Carolina citizens from obeying them after a certain date in
1833, and threatened secession if the Federal Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The
Legislature then implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive laws aimed at any who
sought to pay or collect customs duties.[35]
Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be easy. Technically, the
President might send troops into a State only if the Governor called for help to suppress an
insurrection, which would not occur in the instance. The President could also send troops to see
to it that the laws enacted by Congress were faithfully executed. But these laws were aimed at
individual citizens, and provided no enforcement machinery against violation by a
State. Jackson prepared to ask Congress for a force bill.[36]
In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his position. He wrote: . . . when a
faction in a State attempts to nullify a constitutional law of Congress, or to destroy the Union, the
balance of the people composing this Union have a perfect right to coerce them to
obedience. Then in a Proclamation he issued on December 10, 1832, he called upon South
Carolinians to realize that there could be no peaceable interference with the execution of the
laws, and dared them, disunion by armed force is treason. Are you ready to incur its guilt? [37]
The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and tight-rope walkers. Soon, State
Legislatures began to adopt resolutions of agreement, and the President announced that the
national voice from Maine on the north to Louisiana on the south had declared nullification and
accession confined to contempt and infamy.[38]
No other President entered office faced with problems so formidable, and enfeebled by
personal and political handicaps so daunting, as Abraham Lincoln.
Lincoln believed the Presidents power broad and that of Congress explicit and restricted,
and sought some source of executive power not failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage. He
seized upon the Presidents designation by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it
to the executive power provision and joined them as the war power which authorized him to do
many things beyond the competence of Congress.[39]
Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the Presidents independent power and duty
under his oath directly to represent and protect the people. In his Message of July 4, 1861,
Lincoln declared that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power in defense of the
government forced upon him. He could not but perform the duty or surrender the existence of
the Government . . . . This concept began as a transition device, to be validated by Congress
when it assembled. In less than two-years, it grew into an independent power under which he
felt authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, issue the Emancipation
Proclamation, and restore reoccupied States.[40]
Lincolns Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 troops. Their first service,
according to the proclamation, would be to recapture forts, places and property, taking care to
avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of
peaceful citizens.[41]
Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President Lincolns report to use the war
powers without the benefit of Congress. The decision was handed in the celebrated Prize
Cases[42] which involved suits attacking the Presidents right to legally institute a
blockade. Although his Proclamation was subsequently validated by Congress, the claimants
contended that under international law, a blockade could be instituted only as a measure of war
under the sovereign power of the State. Since under the Constitution only Congress is
exclusively empowered to declare war, it is only that body that could impose a blockade and all
prizes seized before the legislative declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court
upheld Lincolns right to act as he had.[43]
In the course of time, the U.S. Presidents power to call out armed forces and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without prior legislative approval, in case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized and accepted. The United States introduced the
expanded presidential powers in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1902.[44] The use
of the power was put to judicial test and this Court held that the case raised a political question
and said that it is beyond its province to inquire into the exercise of the power.[45] Later, the grant
of the power was incorporated in the 1935 Constitution.[46]
Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the presidency to mean that it made
him the trustee of all the people. Guided by the maxim that Public office is a public trust, which
he practiced during his incumbency, Cleveland sent federal troops to Illinois to quell striking
railway workers who defied a court injunction. The injunction banned all picketing and
distribution of handbills. For leading the strikes and violating the injunction, Debs, who was the
union president, was convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the Supreme Court, the
principal issue was by what authority of the Constitution or statute had the President to send
troops without the request of the Governor of the State.[47]
In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al,[48] the Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction. It ruled
that it is not the governments province to mix in merely individual present controversies. Still, so
it went on, whenever wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in
respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation and
concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all citizens of securing to them their common
rights, then the mere fact that the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is
not sufficient to exclude it from the Courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully
discharge those constitutional duties.[49] Thus, Clevelands course had the Courts attest.
Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore Roosevelt launched what political
scientists dub the stewardship theory. Calling himself the steward of the people, he felt that the
executive power was limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the
Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its constitutional powers.[50]
The most far-reaching extension of presidential power T.R. ever undertook to employ was
his plan to occupy and operate Pennsylvanias coal mines under his authority as Commander-in-
Chief. In the issue, he found means other than force to end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he
had made detailed plans to use his power as Commander-in-Chief to wrest the mines from the
stubborn operators, so that coal production would begin again.[51]
Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take over the operation of vital
utilities in the public interest was accepted. In the Philippines, this led to the incorporation of
Section 6,[52] Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which was later carried over with modifications
in Section 7,[53] Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, and thereafter in Section 18, [54] Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-in-
Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the
provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the
powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats
which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State.
In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Justice Irene R.
Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was vested with residual power and that this is
even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this distinction to the unitary and
highly centralized nature of the Philippine government. She noted that, There is no counterpart
of the several states of the American union which have reserved powers under the United
States constitution. Elaborating on the constitutional basis for her argument, she wrote:
. The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments of the government in
this manner: The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines. The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as may be provided by law. These provisions not only establish a separation
of powers by actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. For as the Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, a
grant of legislative power means a grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial
power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government. If
this is true of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined
membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the judicial power which is vested in a
hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply to the executive power which is
vested in one official the president. He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the
executive branch absent from the two other branches of government. The president is not the
chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more
immediate and direct than the United States president because he is given by express provision
of the constitution control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.[55]
The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of the 1935 Constitution,
the framers of which, early on, arrived at a general opinion in favor of a strong Executive in the
Philippines.[56] Since then, reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our most recent Charter has
restricted the Presidents powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same, however, cannot be said
of the Presidents powers as Chief Executive.
In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into
jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the Presidents power to forbid the
return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majoritys ruling rested on the Presidents
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President
are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and
in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.[57] [Underscoring supplied. Italics in the
original.]
Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for such a
declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the
President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the
force of an executive order. [Emphasis supplied.]
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a
state of rebellion is an utter superfluity.[58] At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a
state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.[59] Perhaps the
declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the
entire nation. But this Courts mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the
declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all
legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected
rights.[60] Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,[61] then it is with more reason
that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions.[62] At any
rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due
regard to constitutional rights.
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to
warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court
held that [i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court,[63] if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus,
not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion.[64] In other words, a person may be
subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has
declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion
that the President acted without factual basis.[65]
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial
law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic.There is no
indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of
curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised
judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted
to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) .
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has
exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief.The
President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to
the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993
DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, PROF.
RICARTE M. PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL, INGRID
SANTAMARIA, CORAZON FIEL, AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ, FLORENCIO R.
JACELA, JR., MAURO MALANG, FEDERICO AGUILAR ALCUAZ, LUCRECIA R. URTULA,
SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE SANTOS, EPHRAIM SAMSON, SOLER SANTOS, ANG KIU
KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN, LUCRECIA KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID PEREZ, VIRGILIO
ALMARIO, LIWAYWAY A. ARCEO, CHARITO PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA MARIA
L. HARPER, ROSALINDA OROSA, SUSAN CALO MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ, BONNIE RUIZ,
NELSON NAVARRO, MANDY NAVASERO, ROMEO SALVADOR, JOSEPHINE DARANG,
and PAZ VETO PLANAS, petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG,
JR., in his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T.
CAPARAS, respondents.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on
11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th
century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed
in the custody of the Central Bank.
The antecedents: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then
President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and
Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the scheduled
sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized
from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.
On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing
Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines.
On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York.
According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the
eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well
as the silverware contained in seventy-one (71) cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of
the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and
accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.1
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C.
Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the
Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former PCGG
Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; (b) the
contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in
asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were historical relics
and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. 2
On 15 November 1990, PCGG through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote President
Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman
Domingo.3 On the same date, Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a
certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the
classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino
cultural heritage.4 Hence, this petition originally filed on 7 January 1991 by Dean Jose Joya,
Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Prof. Ricarte M. Puruganan, Irma Potenciano,
Adrian Cristobal, Ingrid Santamaria, Corazon Fiel, Ambassador E. Aguilar Cruz, Florencio R.
Jacela, Jr., Mauro Malang, Federico Aguilar Alcuaz, Lucrecia R. Urtula, Susano Gonzales,
Steve Santos, Ephraim Samson, Soler Santos, Ang Kiu Kok, Kerima Polotan, Lucrecia Kasilag,
Ligaya David Perez, Virgilio Almario and Liwayway A. Arceo.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution
denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks
on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and
that proper parties had not been impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.5
On 5 February 1991, on motion of petitioners, the following were joined as additional petitioners:
Charito Planas, Helena Benitez, Ana Maria L. Harper, Rosalinda Orosa, Susan Carlo Medina,
Patricia Ruiz, Bonnie Ruiz, Nelson Navarro, Mandy Navasero, Romeo Salvador, Josephine
Darang and Paz Veto Planas.
On the other hand, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as former Executive Secretary, the
incumbent Executive Secretary, and Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas were impleaded as
additional respondents.
Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the
instant petition; (b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in
the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" which is under the protection of the state pursuant to
the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural properties" contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise
known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act;" (c) whether the paintings
and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint
concurrence of the President and Congress;
(d) whether respondent, PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with
Christie's of New York for the sale of the artworks; (e) whether, PCGG has complied with the
due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject
items; and, (f) whether the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the
above issues warrant resolution from this Court.
The issues being interrelated, they will be discussed jointly hereunder. However, before
proceeding, we wish to emphasize that we admire and commend petitioners' zealous concern to
keep and preserve within the country great works of art by well-known old masters. Indeed, the
value of art cannot be gainsaid. For, by serving as a creative medium through which man can
express his innermost thoughts and unbridled emotions while, at the same time, reflecting his
deep-seated ideals, art has become a true expression of beauty, joy, and life itself. Such artistic
creations give us insights into the artists' cultural heritage — the historic past of the nation and
the era to which they belong — in their triumphant, glorious, as well as troubled and turbulent
years. It must be for this reason that the framers of the 1987 Constitution mandated in Art. XIV,
Sec. 14, that is the solemn duty of the state to "foster the preservation, enrichment, and
dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity in a
climate of free artistic and intellectual expression." And, in urging this Court to grant their
petition, petitioners invoke this policy of the state on the protection of the arts.
But, the altruistic and noble purpose of the petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal
question which must first be resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal
requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party;
that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.6 But the most important are the first two (2)
requisites.
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action.7 This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all
persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be
joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought
before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.8 Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. 9
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal
standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public
duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, 10 and when a taxpayer
questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds. 11
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to
restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to
conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs.
14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation
and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important
cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view
and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling
the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due
process of law in violation of the Constitution. 12
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves
allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations
established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady
Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership
of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof,
although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when
they were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos
couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and
anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the
revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacañang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation
of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean
that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation.
If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory
defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper
parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary
rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are
the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned,
petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorized disposition.
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not
fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 13 this Court laid
down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to
be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required
of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official
act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued
enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is
unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can
qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can
prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds
upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. 14 Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any
expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties.
It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired
from private sources and not with public money.
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be
resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although
the sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving
the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the issues raised by the petition
deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the issues in this
case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's
priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole. 15
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy —
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other
similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. 16 A case becomes moot and
academic when its purpose has become stale, 17 such as the case before us. Since the purpose
of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale
of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised
in the petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing
when paramount public interest is involved. 18We find however that there is no such justification
in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.
Section 2 of R.A. 4846, as amended by P.D. 374, declares it to be the policy of the state to
preserve and protect the important cultural properties and national cultural treasures of the
nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. As to what kind of artistic and cultural properties
are considered by the State as involving public interest which should therefore be protected, the
answer can be gleaned from reading of the reasons behind the enactment of R.A. 4846:
WHEREAS, the National Museum has the difficult task, under existing laws and
regulations, of preserving and protecting the cultural properties of the nation;
WHEREAS, inumerable sites all over the country have since been excavated
for cultural relics, which have passed on to private hands, representing priceless
cultural treasure that properly belongs to the Filipino people as their heritage;
WHEREAS, it is perhaps impossible now to find an area in the Philippines,

whether government or private property, which has not been disturbed by
commercially-minded diggers and collectors, literally destroying part of our
historic past;
WHEREAS, because of this the Philippines has been charged as incapable of

preserving and protecting her cultural legacies;
WHEREAS, the commercialization of Philippine relics from the contact period,

the Neolithic Age, and the Paleolithic Age, has reached a point perilously placing
beyond reach of savants the study and reconstruction of Philippine
prehistory; and
WHEREAS, it is believed that more stringent regulation on movement and a

limited form of registration of important cultural properties and of designated
national cultural treasures is necessary, and that regardless of the item, any
cultural property exported or sold locally must be registered with the National
Museum to control the deplorable situation regarding our national cultural
properties and to implement the Cultural Properties Law (emphasis supplied).
Clearly, the cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are
classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." "Important
cultural properties" are cultural properties which have been singled out from among the
innumerable cultural properties as having exceptional historical cultural significance to the
Philippines but are not sufficiently outstanding to merit the classification of national cultural
treasures. 19 On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally,
possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly
significant and important to this country and nation. 20 This Court takes note of the certification
issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this
petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the
Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.
We agree with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the law, it is the Director of
the Museum who is authorized to undertake the inventory, registration, designation or
classification, with the aid of competent experts, of important cultural properties and national
cultural treasures. 21 Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not
only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence and
are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields
of specialization to which they are assigned. 22
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition. Petitioners
have failed to show that respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions
with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of their jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors,
and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE
SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO,
AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by
her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA
VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents
FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN
T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and
THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO,
JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented
by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether
the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for
the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in

his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or

approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable;
they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance
as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result
of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of
the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of
multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the
earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or
25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included —
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of
fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
— especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with
a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary

to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life

of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned

TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion,
the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
(2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in
this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause
of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing,
to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would
be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did
not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a
class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous,
it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil
case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have
but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against

all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment

necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby

disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to

ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to
the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources

shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As
its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to
the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect
or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in
the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary
should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself
stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It
bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course,
is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization

and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,

and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting
it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal

instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
27
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
28
Corp. this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that
both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply
with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal,
the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few
years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of
the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in
the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There
is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-
and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the
use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss
of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon
the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies"
and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an
extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which
give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does
not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right

comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored
in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Section 1. . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded
in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of
the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few
years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of
the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in
the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There
is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-
and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the
use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss
of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon
the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies"
and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an
extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which
give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does
not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right

comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored
in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the
general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Section 1. . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded
in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of
the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
G.R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003
DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR., JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B. REUNILLA,

MANUEL ANTONIO B. BOÑE, MAMERTO S. CLARA, REUEL E. DIMALANTA, MORY V.
DOMALAON, CONRADO G. DIMAANO, LOLITA R. HIZON, REMEDIOS P. ADOLFO,
BIENVENIDO C. HILARIO, MIASCOR WORKERS UNION - NATIONAL LABOR UNION
(MWU-NLU), and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
and SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, respondents,
MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION, DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS
CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST SERVICES, INC., MACROASIA-MENZIES
AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION,
MIASCOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS
CORPORATION, petitioners-in-intervention,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 155547 May 5, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ and CONSTANTINO G.

JARAULA, petitioners,
vs.
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M.
MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, and SECRETARY SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, in his capacity as Head
of the Department of Public Works and Highways, respondents,
JACINTO V. PARAS, RAFAEL P. NANTES, EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, WILLY BUYSON
VILLARAMA, PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., HARLIN CAST
ABAYON, and BENASING O. MACARANBON, respondents-intervenors,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 155661 May 5, 2003
CEFERINO C. LOPEZ, RAMON M. SALES, ALFREDO B. VALENCIA, MA. TERESA V.

GAERLAN, LEONARDO DE LA ROSA, DINA C. DE LEON, VIRGIE CATAMIN RONALD
SCHLOBOM, ANGELITO SANTOS, MA. LUISA M. PALCON and SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA SA PALIPARAN NG PILIPINAS (SMPP), petitioners,
vs.
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed the instant petitions for prohibition under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary
from implementing the following agreements executed by the Philippine Government through
the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO): (1)
the Concession Agreement signed on July 12, 1997, (2) the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement dated November 26, 1999, (3) the First Supplement to the Amended
and Restated Concession Agreement dated August 27, 1999, (4) the Second Supplement to the
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated September 4, 2000, and (5) the Third
Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated June 22, 2001
(collectively, the PIATCO Contracts).
The facts are as follows:
In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct
a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine
whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010.
The study consisted of two parts: first, traffic forecasts, capacity of existing facilities,
NAIA future requirements, proposed master plans and development plans; and second,
presentation of the preliminary design of the passenger terminal building. The ADP
submitted a Draft Final Report to the DOTC in December 1989.
Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew
Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then
President Fidel V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and
operation of a new international airport terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue
the project, they formed the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993.
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government

through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957
as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law).1
On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III
project.
On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the proposal of AEDC to the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). A revised proposal, however, was
forwarded by the DOTC to NEDA on December 13, 1995. On January 5, 1996, the NEDA
Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA ICC) – Technical Board favorably endorsed the project
to the ICC – Cabinet Committee which approved the same, subject to certain conditions, on
January 19, 1996. On February 13, 1996, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which
approved the NAIA IPT III project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an
invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's unsolicited proposal, in
accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended. The alternative bidders were required to
submit three (3) sealed envelopes on or before 5:00 p.m. of September 20, 1996. The first
envelope should contain the Prequalification Documents, the second envelope the Technical
Proposal, and the third envelope the Financial Proposal of the proponent.
On June 20, 1996, PBAC Bulletin No. 1 was issued, postponing the availment of the Bid
Documents and the submission of the comparative bid proposals. Interested firms were
permitted to obtain the Request for Proposal Documents beginning June 28, 1996, upon
submission of a written application and payment of a non-refundable fee of P50,000.00
(US$2,000).
The Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among others that the proponent must have
adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for the detailed engineering, design,
construction, operation, and maintenance phases of the project. The proponent would be
evaluated based on its ability to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project, and its
capacity to secure external financing for the project.
On July 23, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 2 inviting all bidders to a pre-bid
conference on July 29, 1996.
On August 16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 amending the Bid Documents. The
following amendments were made on the Bid Documents:
a. Aside from the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment, the proponent shall include in its
financial proposal an additional percentage of gross revenue share of the Government,
as follows:
i. First 5 years 5.0%

ii. Next 10 years 7.5%
iii. Next 10 years 10.0%
b. The amount of the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment shall be subject of the price
challenge. Proponent may offer an Annual Guaranteed Payment which need not be of
equal amount, but payment of which shall start upon site possession.
c. The project proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the financing
requirement for the detailed engineering, design, construction, and/or operation and
maintenance phases of the project as the case may be. For purposes of pre-
qualification, this capability shall be measured in terms of:
i. Proof of the availability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to

provide the minimum amount of equity for the project; and
ii. a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project proponent
and/or the members of the consortium are banking with them, that the project
proponent and/or the members are of good financial standing, and have
adequate resources.
d. The basis for the prequalification shall be the proponent's compliance with the
minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the Bid Documents and the
IRR of the BOT Law. The minimum amount of equity shall be 30% of the Project Cost.
e. Amendments to the draft Concession Agreement shall be issued from time to time.
Said amendments shall only cover items that would not materially affect the preparation
of the proponent's proposal.
On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held where certain clarifications were
made. Upon the request of prospective bidder People's Air Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc
(Paircargo), the PBAC warranted that based on Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the BOT Law, only the proposed Annual Guaranteed Payment submitted by
the challengers would be revealed to AEDC, and that the challengers' technical and financial
proposals would remain confidential. The PBAC also clarified that the list of revenue sources
contained in Annex 4.2a of the Bid Documents was merely indicative and that other revenue
sources may be included by the proponent, subject to approval by DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore,
the PBAC clarified that only those fees and charges denominated as Public Utility Fees would
be subject to regulation, and those charges which would be actually deemed Public Utility Fees
could still be revised, depending on the outcome of PBAC's query on the matter with the
Department of Justice.
In September 1996, the PBAC issued Bid Bulletin No. 5, entitled "Answers to the Queries of
PAIRCARGO as Per Letter Dated September 3 and 10, 1996." Paircargo's queries and the
PBAC's responses were as follows:
1. It is difficult for Paircargo and Associates to meet the required minimum equity
requirement as prescribed in Section 8.3.4 of the Bid Documents considering that the
capitalization of each member company is so structured to meet the requirements and
needs of their current respective business undertaking/activities. In order to comply with
this equity requirement, Paircargo is requesting PBAC to just allow each member of (sic)
corporation of the Joint Venture to just execute an agreement that embodies a
commitment to infuse the required capital in case the project is awarded to the Joint
Venture instead of increasing each corporation's current authorized capital stock just for
prequalification purposes.
In prequalification, the agency is interested in one's financial capability at the time of

prequalification, not future or potential capability.
A commitment to put up equity once awarded the project is not enough to establish that
"present" financial capability. However, total financial capability of all member companies
of the Consortium, to be established by submitting the respective companies' audited
financial statements, shall be acceptable.
2. At present, Paircargo is negotiating with banks and other institutions for the extension
of a Performance Security to the joint venture in the event that the Concessions
Agreement (sic) is awarded to them. However, Paircargo is being required to submit a
copy of the draft concession as one of the documentary requirements. Therefore,
Paircargo is requesting that they'd (sic) be furnished copy of the approved negotiated
agreement between the PBAC and the AEDC at the soonest possible time.
A copy of the draft Concession Agreement is included in the Bid Documents. Any
material changes would be made known to prospective challengers through bid bulletins.
However, a final version will be issued before the award of contract.
The PBAC also stated that it would require AEDC to sign Supplement C of the Bid Documents
(Acceptance of Criteria and Waiver of Rights to Enjoin Project) and to submit the same with the
required Bid Security.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People's Air Cargo and Warehousing
Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp.
(Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the
PBAC. On September 23, 1996, the PBAC opened the first envelope containing the
prequalification documents of the Paircargo Consortium. On the following day, September 24,
1996, the PBAC prequalified the Paircargo Consortium.
On September 26, 1996, AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its reservations as regards the
Paircargo Consortium, which include:
a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAIRCARGO;
b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAGS;
c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the General Banking Act) on the
amount that Security Bank could legally invest in the project;
d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the PAIRCARGO Joint Venture, for

prequalification purposes; and
e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in view of the Philippine
requirement in the operation of a public utility.
The PBAC gave its reply on October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had considered the issues
raised by the latter, and that based on the documents submitted by Paircargo and the
established prequalification criteria, the PBAC had found that the challenger, Paircargo, had
prequalified to undertake the project. The Secretary of the DOTC approved the finding of the
PBAC.
The PBAC then proceeded with the opening of the second envelope of the Paircargo
Consortium which contained its Technical Proposal.
On October 3, 1996, AEDC reiterated its objections, particularly with respect to Paircargo's
financial capability, in view of the restrictions imposed by Section 21-B of the General Banking
Act and Sections 1380 and 1381 of the Manual Regulations for Banks and Other Financial
Intermediaries. On October 7, 1996, AEDC again manifested its objections and requested that it
be furnished with excerpts of the PBAC meeting and the accompanying technical evaluation
report where each of the issues they raised were addressed.
On October 16, 1996, the PBAC opened the third envelope submitted by AEDC and the
Paircargo Consortium containing their respective financial proposals. Both proponents offered to
build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 million at no cost to the government and
to pay the government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five years of operation, 7.5%
share in gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues
for the last ten years of operation, in accordance with the Bid Documents. However, in addition
to the foregoing, AEDC offered to pay the government a total of P135 million as guaranteed
payment for 27 years while Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the government a total of
P17.75 billion for the same period.
Thus, the PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by
the Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days or until November 28, 1996 within
which to match the said bid, otherwise, the project would be awarded to Paircargo.
As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period, then DOTC Secretary Amado
Lagdameo, on December 11, 1996, issued a notice to Paircargo Consortium regarding AEDC's
failure to match the proposal.
On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its
objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On April 11, 1997, the DOTC submitted the concession agreement for the second-pass
approval of the NEDA-ICC.
On April 16, 1997, AEDC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against the Secretary of the DOTC, the
Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in his
capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee.
On April 17, 1997, the NEDA-ICC conducted an ad referendum to facilitate the approval, on a
no-objection basis, of the BOT agreement between the DOTC and PIATCO. As the ad
referendum gathered only four (4) of the required six (6) signatures, the NEDA merely noted the
agreement.
On July 9, 1997, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and
PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the "Concession Agreement for the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to
operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees,
rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997
Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for
twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option
of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the
concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
On November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA). Among the provisions of the 1997 Concession Agreement that
were amended by the ARCA were: Sec. 1.11 pertaining to the definition of "certificate of
completion"; Sec. 2.05 pertaining to the Special Obligations of GRP; Sec. 3.02 (a) dealing with
the exclusivity of the franchise given to the Concessionaire; Sec. 4.04 concerning the
assignment by Concessionaire of its interest in the Development Facility; Sec. 5.08 (c) dealing
with the proceeds of Concessionaire's insurance; Sec. 5.10 with respect to the temporary take-
over of operations by GRP; Sec. 5.16 pertaining to the taxes, duties and other imposts that may
be levied on the Concessionaire; Sec. 6.03 as regards the periodic adjustment of public utility
fees and charges; the entire Article VIII concerning the provisions on the termination of the
contract; and Sec. 10.02 providing for the venue of the arbitration proceedings in case a dispute
or controversy arises between the parties to the agreement.
Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to the ARCA. The First
Supplement was signed on August 27, 1999; the Second Supplement on September 4, 2000;
and the Third Supplement on June 22, 2001 (collectively, Supplements).
The First Supplement to the ARCA amended Sec. 1.36 of the ARCA defining "Revenues" or
"Gross Revenues"; Sec. 2.05 (d) of the ARCA referring to the obligation of MIAA to provide
sufficient funds for the upkeep, maintenance, repair and/or replacement of all airport facilities
and equipment which are owned or operated by MIAA; and further providing additional special
obligations on the part of GRP aside from those already enumerated in Sec. 2.05 of the ARCA.
The First Supplement also provided a stipulation as regards the construction of a surface road
to connect NAIA Terminal II and Terminal III in lieu of the proposed access tunnel crossing
Runway 13/31; the swapping of obligations between GRP and PIATCO regarding the
improvement of Sales Road; and the changes in the timetable. It also amended Sec. 6.01 (c) of
the ARCA pertaining to the Disposition of Terminal Fees; Sec. 6.02 of the ARCA by inserting an
introductory paragraph; and Sec. 6.02 (a) (iii) of the ARCA referring to the Payments of
Percentage Share in Gross Revenues.
The Second Supplement to the ARCA contained provisions concerning the clearing, removal,
demolition or disposal of subterranean structures uncovered or discovered at the site of the
construction of the terminal by the Concessionaire. It defined the scope of works; it provided for
the procedure for the demolition of the said structures and the consideration for the same which
the GRP shall pay PIATCO; it provided for time extensions, incremental and consequential
costs and losses consequent to the existence of such structures; and it provided for some
additional obligations on the part of PIATCO as regards the said structures.
Finally, the Third Supplement provided for the obligations of the Concessionaire as regards the
construction of the surface road connecting Terminals II and III.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA
Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer
international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and
ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and
other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. Some of these service providers are
the Miascor Group, DNATA-Wings Aviation Systems Corp., and the MacroAsia Group. Miascor,
DNATA and MacroAsia, together with Philippine Airlines (PAL), are the dominant players in the
industry with an aggregate market share of 70%.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that
they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the questioned agreements,
filed before this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said agreements.2
On October 15, 2002, the service providers, joining the cause of the petitioning workers, filed a
motion for intervention and a petition-in-intervention.
On October 24, 2002, Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino
Jaraula filed a similar petition with this Court.3
On November 6, 2002, several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the
legality of the various agreements.4
On December 11, 2002. another group of Congressmen, Hon. Jacinto V. Paras, Rafael P.
Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie B. Villarama, Prospero C. Nograles, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing O. Macaranbon, moved to intervene in the case as
Respondents-Intervenors. They filed their Comment-In-Intervention defending the validity of the
assailed agreements and praying for the dismissal of the petitions.
During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, on
November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacañang
Palace, stated that she will not "honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch's legal
offices have concluded (as) null and void."5
Respondent PIATCO filed its Comments to the present petitions on November 7 and 27, 2002.
The Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel filed
their respective Comments in behalf of the public respondents.
On December 10, 2002, the Court heard the case on oral argument. After the oral argument, the
Court then resolved in open court to require the parties to file simultaneously their respective
Memoranda in amplification of the issues heard in the oral arguments within 30 days and to
explore the possibility of arbitration or mediation as provided in the challenged contracts.
In their consolidated Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel prayed that the present petitions be given due course and that
judgment be rendered declaring the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the
Supplements thereto void for being contrary to the Constitution, the BOT Law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
On March 6, 2003, respondent PIATCO informed the Court that on March 4, 2003 PIATCO
commenced arbitration proceedings before the International Chamber of Commerce,
International Court of Arbitration (ICC) by filing a Request for Arbitration with the Secretariat of
the ICC against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines acting through the DOTC and
MIAA.
In the present cases, the Court is again faced with the task of resolving complicated issues
made difficult by their intersecting legal and economic implications. The Court is aware of the far
reaching fall out effects of the ruling which it makes today. For more than a century and
whenever the exigencies of the times demand it, this Court has never shirked from its solemn
duty to dispense justice and resolve "actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."6 To be sure, this Court will not begin to do
otherwise today.
We shall first dispose of the procedural issues raised by respondent PIATCO which they
allege will bar the resolution of the instant controversy.
Petitioners' Legal Standing to File
the present Petitions
a. G.R. Nos. 155001 and 155661
In G.R. No. 155001 individual petitioners are employees of various service providers7 having
separate concession contracts with MIAA and continuing service agreements with various
international airlines to provide in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support,
aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing and other services. Also
included as petitioners are labor unions MIASCOR Workers Union-National Labor Union and
Philippine Airlines Employees Association. These petitioners filed the instant action for
prohibition as taxpayers and as parties whose rights and interests stand to be violated by the
implementation of the PIATCO Contracts.
Petitioners-Intervenors in the same case are all corporations organized and existing under
Philippine laws engaged in the business of providing in-flight catering, passenger handling,
ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and
warehousing and other services to several international airlines at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport. Petitioners-Intervenors allege that as tax-paying international airline and
airport-related service operators, each one of them stands to be irreparably injured by the
implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. Each of the petitioners-intervenors have separate and
subsisting concession agreements with MIAA and with various international airlines which they
allege are being interfered with and violated by respondent PIATCO.
In G.R. No. 155661, petitioners constitute employees of MIAA and Samahang Manggagawa sa
Paliparan ng Pilipinas - a legitimate labor union and accredited as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the employees in MIAA. Petitioners anchor their petition for prohibition on
the nullity of the contracts entered into by the Government and PIATCO regarding the build-
operate-and-transfer of the NAIA IPT III. They filed the petition as taxpayers and persons who
have a legitimate interest to protect in the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts.
Petitioners in both cases raise the argument that the PIATCO Contracts contain stipulations
which directly contravene numerous provisions of the Constitution, specific provisions of the
BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and public policy. Petitioners contend
that the DOTC and the MIAA, by entering into said contracts, have committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which can be remedied only by a writ of
prohibition, there being no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In particular, petitioners assail the provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA
which grant PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial international passenger
terminal within the Island of Luzon, except those international airports already existing at the
time of the execution of the agreement. The contracts further provide that upon the
commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III, the Government shall cause the closure of
Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminals I and II as international passenger
terminals. With respect to existing concession agreements between MIAA and international
airport service providers regarding certain services or operations, the 1997 Concession
Agreement and the ARCA uniformly provide that such services or operations will not be carried
over to the NAIA IPT III and PIATCO is under no obligation to permit such carry over except
through a separate agreement duly entered into with PIATCO.8
With respect to the petitioning service providers and their employees, upon the commencement
of operations of the NAIA IPT III, they allege that they will be effectively barred from providing
international airline airport services at the NAIA Terminals I and II as all international airlines
and passengers will be diverted to the NAIA IPT III. The petitioning service providers will thus be
compelled to contract with PIATCO alone for such services, with no assurance that subsisting
contracts with MIAA and other international airlines will be respected. Petitioning service
providers stress that despite the very competitive market, the substantial capital investments
required and the high rate of fees, they entered into their respective contracts with the MIAA
with the understanding that the said contracts will be in force for the stipulated period, and
thereafter, renewed so as to allow each of the petitioning service providers to recoup their
investments and obtain a reasonable return thereon.
Petitioning employees of various service providers at the NAIA Terminals I and II and of MIAA
on the other hand allege that with the closure of the NAIA Terminals I and II as international
passenger terminals under the PIATCO Contracts, they stand to lose employment.
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."9 Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing
the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only
that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.10
We hold that petitioners have the requisite standing. In the above-mentioned cases, petitioners
have a direct and substantial interest to protect by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO
Contracts. They stand to lose their source of livelihood, a property right which is zealously
protected by the Constitution. Moreover, subsisting concession agreements between MIAA and
petitioners-intervenors and service contracts between international airlines and petitioners-
intervenors stand to be nullified or terminated by the operation of the NAIA IPT III under the
PIATCO Contracts. The financial prejudice brought about by the PIATCO Contracts on
petitioners and petitioners-intervenors in these cases are legitimate interests sufficient to confer
on them the requisite standing to file the instant petitions.
b. G.R. No. 155547
In G.R. No. 155547, petitioners filed the petition for prohibition as members of the House of
Representatives, citizens and taxpayers. They allege that as members of the House of
Representatives, they are especially interested in the PIATCO Contracts, because the contracts
compel the Government and/or the House of Representatives to appropriate funds necessary to
comply with the provisions therein.11 They cite provisions of the PIATCO Contracts which
require disbursement of unappropriated amounts in compliance with the contractual obligations
of the Government. They allege that the Government obligations in the PIATCO Contracts
which compel government expenditure without appropriation is a curtailment of their
prerogatives as legislators, contrary to the mandate of the Constitution that "[n]o money shall be
paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."12
Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Although we are not unmindful of the cases of Imus Electric Co. v. Municipality of
Imus13 and Gonzales v. Raquiza14 wherein this Court held that appropriation must be made
only on amounts immediately demandable, public interest demands that we take a more
liberal view in determining whether the petitioners suing as legislators, taxpayers and
citizens have locus standi to file the instant petition. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona,15 this Court held "[i]n line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic
organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this Court to question the
constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government
agencies or instrumentalities."16 Further, "insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned . . . (this
Court) is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained."17 As such ". . .
even if, strictly speaking, they [the petitioners] are not covered by the definition, it is still within
the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."18 In view of the serious
legal questions involved and their impact on public interest, we resolve to grant standing to the
petitioners.
Other Procedural Matters
Respondent PIATCO further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the instant
cases as factual issues are involved which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve. Moreover,
PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this Court at the first instance is a
violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. They contend that trial courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court with respect to a special civil action for prohibition and hence,
following the rule on hierarchy of courts, resort must first be had before the trial courts.
After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues involved, this Court is of the view
that the crux of the instant controversy involves significant legal questions. The facts
necessary to resolve these legal questions are well established and, hence, need not be
determined by a trial court.
The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over
the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.19
It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the
relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are
of transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation of the country's
premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for resolution are of first
impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution,
the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the
controversy before the Court, procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy
disposition of the instant cases.
Legal Effect of the Commencement
of Arbitration Proceedings by
PIATCO
There is one more procedural obstacle which must be overcome. The Court is aware that
arbitration proceedings pursuant to Section 10.02 of the ARCA have been filed at the instance
of respondent PIATCO. Again, we hold that the arbitration step taken by PIATCO will not oust
this Court of its jurisdiction over the cases at bar.
In Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals,20 even after finding that the arbitration
clause in the Distributorship Agreement in question is valid and the dispute between the parties
is arbitrable, this Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend
Proceedings pursuant to the arbitration clause under the contract. In so ruling, this Court held
that as contracts produce legal effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, only the
parties to the Distributorship Agreement are bound by its terms, including the arbitration clause
stipulated therein. This Court ruled that arbitration proceedings could be called for but only with
respect to the parties to the contract in question. Considering that there are parties to the case
who are neither parties to the Distributorship Agreement nor heirs or assigns of the parties
thereto, this Court, citing its previous ruling in Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation, 21 held
that to tolerate the splitting of proceedings by allowing arbitration as to some of the parties on
the one hand and trial for the others on the other hand would, in effect, result in multiplicity of
suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay.22 Thus, we ruled that the interest of
justice would best be served if the trial court hears and adjudicates the case in a single and
complete proceeding.
It is established that petitioners in the present cases who have presented legitimate interests
in the resolution of the controversy are not parties to the PIATCO Contracts. Accordingly,
they cannot be bound by the arbitration clause provided for in the ARCA and hence, cannot be
compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. A speedy and decisive resolution of all the
critical issues in the present controversy, including those raised by petitioners, cannot
be made before an arbitral tribunal. The object of arbitration is precisely to allow an
expeditious determination of a dispute. This objective would not be met if this Court were to
allow the parties to settle the cases by arbitration as there are certain issues involving non-
parties to the PIATCO Contracts which the arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve.
Now, to the merits of the instant controversy.
Is PIATCO a qualified bidder?

Public respondents argue that the Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO's predecessor, was not a
duly pre-qualified bidder on the unsolicited proposal submitted by AEDC as the Paircargo
Consortium failed to meet the financial capability required under the BOT Law and the Bid
Documents. They allege that in computing the ability of the Paircargo Consortium to meet the
minimum equity requirements for the project, the entire net worth of Security Bank, a
member of the consortium, should not be considered.
PIATCO relies, on the other hand, on the strength of the Memorandum dated October 14, 1996
issued by the DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal stating that the Paircargo Consortium is
found to have a combined net worth of P3,900,000,000.00, sufficient to meet the equity
requirements of the project. The said Memorandum was in response to a letter from Mr. Antonio
Henson of AEDC to President Fidel V. Ramos questioning the financial capability of the
Paircargo Consortium on the ground that it does not have the financial resources to put up the
required minimum equity of P2,700,000,000.00. This contention is based on the restriction
under R.A. No. 337, as amended or the General Banking Act that a commercial bank cannot
invest in any single enterprise in an amount more than 15% of its net worth. In the said
Memorandum, Undersecretary Cal opined:
The Bid Documents, as clarified through Bid Bulletin Nos. 3 and 5, require that financial
capability will be evaluated based on total financial capability of all the member
companies of the [Paircargo] Consortium. In this connection, the Challenger was found
to have a combined net worth of P3,926,421,242.00 that could support a project costing
approximately P13 Billion.
It is not a requirement that the net worth must be "unrestricted." To impose that as a
requirement now will be nothing less than unfair.
The financial statement or the net worth is not the sole basis in establishing financial
capability. As stated in Bid Bulletin No. 3, financial capability may also be established by
testimonial letters issued by reputable banks. The Challenger has complied with this
requirement.
To recap, net worth reflected in the Financial Statement should not be taken as the
amount of the money to be used to answer the required thirty percent (30%) equity of
the challenger but rather to be used in establishing if there is enough basis to believe
that the challenger can comply with the required 30% equity. In fact, proof of sufficient
equity is required as one of the conditions for award of contract (Section 12.1 IRR of the
BOT Law) but not for pre-qualification (Section 5.4 of the same document).23
Under the BOT Law, in case of a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement, the contract

shall be awarded to the bidder "who, having satisfied the minimum financial, technical,
organizational and legal standards" required by the law, has submitted the lowest bid
and most favorable terms of the project.24 Further, the 1994 Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the BOT Law provide:
Section 5.4 Pre-qualification Requirements.
xxx xxx xxx
c. Financial Capability: The project proponent must have adequate capability to sustain
the financing requirements for the detailed engineering design, construction and/or
operation and maintenance phases of the project, as the case may be. For purposes of
pre-qualification, this capability shall be measured in terms of (i) proof of the ability of
the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide a minimum amount of
equity to the project, and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting
that the project proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking with
them, that they are in good financial standing, and that they have adequate
resources. The government agency/LGU concerned shall determine on a project-to-
project basis and before pre-qualification, the minimum amount of equity needed.
(emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this provision, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 dated August 16, 1996
amending the financial capability requirements for pre-qualification of the project proponent as
follows:
6. Basis of Pre-qualification
The basis for the pre-qualification shall be on the compliance of the proponent to the
minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the Bid Documents and in the
IRR of the BOT Law, R.A. No. 6957, as amended by R.A. 7718.
The minimum amount of equity to which the proponent's financial capability will be based
shall be thirty percent (30%) of the project cost instead of the twenty percent (20%)
specified in Section 3.6.4 of the Bid Documents. This is to correlate with the required
debt-to-equity ratio of 70:30 in Section 2.01a of the draft concession agreement. The
debt portion of the project financing should not exceed 70% of the actual project cost.
Accordingly, based on the above provisions of law, the Paircargo Consortium or any challenger
to the unsolicited proposal of AEDC has to show that it possesses the requisite financial
capability to undertake the project in the minimum amount of 30% of the project
cost through (i) proof of the ability to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project, and (ii)
a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project proponent or members of the
consortium are banking with them, that they are in good financial standing, and that they have
adequate resources.
As the minimum project cost was estimated to be US$350,000,000.00 or roughly

P9,183,650,000.00,25 the Paircargo Consortium had to show to the satisfaction of the PBAC that
it had the ability to provide the minimum equity for the project in the amount of at
least P2,755,095,000.00.
Paircargo's Audited Financial Statements as of 1993 and 1994 indicated that it had a net worth
of P2,783,592.00 and P3,123,515.00 respectively.26 PAGS' Audited Financial Statements as of
1995 indicate that it has approximately P26,735,700.00 to invest as its equity for the
project.27 Security Bank's Audited Financial Statements as of 1995 show that it has a net worth
equivalent to its capital funds in the amount of P3,523,504,377.00.28
We agree with public respondents that with respect to Security Bank, the entire amount of its
net worth could not be invested in a single undertaking or enterprise, whether allied or non-allied
in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 337, as amended or the General Banking Act:
Sec. 21-B. The provisions in this or in any other Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Monetary Board, whenever it shall deem appropriate and necessary to further national
development objectives or support national priority projects, may authorize a
commercial bank, a bank authorized to provide commercial banking services, as
well as a government-owned and controlled bank, to operate under an expanded
commercial banking authority and by virtue thereof exercise, in addition to
powers authorized for commercial banks, the powers of an Investment House as
provided in Presidential Decree No. 129, invest in the equity of a non-allied
undertaking, or own a majority or all of the equity in a financial intermediary other than
a commercial bank or a bank authorized to provide commercial banking
services: Provided, That (a) the total investment in equities shall not exceed fifty
percent (50%) of the net worth of the bank; (b) the equity investment in any one
enterprise whether allied or non-allied shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the
net worth of the bank; (c) the equity investment of the bank, or of its wholly or majority-
owned subsidiary, in a single non-allied undertaking shall not exceed thirty-five percent
(35%) of the total equity in the enterprise nor shall it exceed thirty-five percent (35%) of
the voting stock in that enterprise; and (d) the equity investment in other banks shall be
deducted from the investing bank's net worth for purposes of computing the prescribed
ratio of net worth to risk assets.
xxx xxx xxx

Further, the 1993 Manual of Regulations for Banks provides:
SECTION X383. Other Limitations and Restrictions. — The following limitations and
restrictions shall also apply regarding equity investments of banks.
a. In any single enterprise. — The equity investments of banks in any single enterprise
shall not exceed at any time fifteen percent (15%) of the net worth of the investing bank
as defined in Sec. X106 and Subsec. X121.5.
Thus, the maximum amount that Security Bank could validly invest in the Paircargo Consortium
is only P528,525,656.55, representing 15% of its entire net worth. The total net worth therefore
of the Paircargo Consortium, after considering the maximum amounts that may be validly
invested by each of its members is P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the project cost,29 an
amount substantially less than the prescribed minimum equity investment required for the
project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost.
The purpose of pre-qualification in any public bidding is to determine, at the earliest opportunity,
the ability of the bidder to undertake the project. Thus, with respect to the bidder's financial
capacity at the pre-qualification stage, the law requires the government agency to examine and
determine the ability of the bidder to fund the entire cost of the project by considering the
maximum amounts that each bidder may invest in the project at the time of pre-
qualification.
The PBAC has determined that any prospective bidder for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the NAIA IPT III project should prove that it has the ability to provide equity in
the minimum amount of 30% of the project cost, in accordance with the 70:30 debt-to-equity
ratio prescribed in the Bid Documents. Thus, in the case of Paircargo Consortium, the PBAC
should determine the maximum amounts that each member of the consortium may commit for
the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III project at the time of pre-
qualification. With respect to Security Bank, the maximum amount which may be invested by
it would only be 15% of its net worth in view of the restrictions imposed by the General Banking
Act. Disregarding the investment ceilings provided by applicable law would not result in a proper
evaluation of whether or not a bidder is pre-qualified to undertake the project as for all intents
and purposes, such ceiling or legal restriction determines the true maximum amount which a
bidder may invest in the project.
Further, the determination of whether or not a bidder is pre-qualified to undertake the project
requires an evaluation of the financial capacity of the said bidder at the time the bid is
submitted based on the required documents presented by the bidder. The PBAC should not be
allowed to speculate on the future financial ability of the bidder to undertake the project on the
basis of documents submitted. This would open doors to abuse and defeat the very purpose of
a public bidding. This is especially true in the case at bar which involves the investment of
billions of pesos by the project proponent. The relevant government authority is duty-bound to
ensure that the awardee of the contract possesses the minimum required financial capability to
complete the project. To allow the PBAC to estimate the bidder's future financial capability
would not secure the viability and integrity of the project. A restrictive and conservative
application of the rules and procedures of public bidding is necessary not only to protect the
impartiality and regularity of the proceedings but also to ensure the financial and technical
reliability of the project. It has been held that:
The basic rule in public bidding is that bids should be evaluated based on the required
documents submitted before and not after the opening of bids. Otherwise, the foundation
of a fair and competitive public bidding would be defeated. Strict observance of the
rules, regulations, and guidelines of the bidding process is the only safeguard to a
fair, honest and competitive public bidding.30
Thus, if the maximum amount of equity that a bidder may invest in the project at the time the
bids are submittedfalls short of the minimum amounts required to be put up by the bidder, said
bidder should be properly disqualified. Considering that at the pre-qualification stage, the
maximum amounts which the Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project fell short of the
minimum amounts prescribed by the PBAC, we hold that Paircargo Consortium was not a
qualified bidder. Thus the award of the contract by the PBAC to the Paircargo Consortium, a
disqualified bidder, is null and void.
While it would be proper at this juncture to end the resolution of the instant controversy, as the
legal effects of the disqualification of respondent PIATCO's predecessor would come into play
and necessarily result in the nullity of all the subsequent contracts entered by it in pursuance of
the project, the Court feels that it is necessary to discuss in full the pressing issues of the
present controversy for a complete resolution thereof.
II
Is the 1997 Concession Agreement valid?
Petitioners and public respondents contend that the 1997 Concession Agreement is invalid as it
contains provisions that substantially depart from the draft Concession Agreement included in
the Bid Documents. They maintain that a substantial departure from the draft Concession
Agreement is a violation of public policy and renders the 1997 Concession Agreement null and
void.
PIATCO maintains, however, that the Concession Agreement attached to the Bid Documents is
intended to be a draft, i.e., subject to change, alteration or modification, and that this intention
was clear to all participants, including AEDC, and DOTC/MIAA. It argued further that said
intention is expressed in Part C (6) of Bid Bulletin No. 3 issued by the PBAC which states:
6. Amendments to the Draft Concessions Agreement
Amendments to the Draft Concessions Agreement shall be issued from time to time.
Said amendments shall only cover items that would not materially affect the preparation
of the proponent's proposal.
By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public the best
possible advantages through open competition. Thus:
Competition must be legitimate, fair and honest. In the field of government contract law,
competition requires, not only `bidding upon a common standard, a common basis, upon
the same thing, the same subject matter, the same undertaking,' but also that it be
legitimate, fair and honest; and not designed to injure or defraud the
government.31
An essential element of a publicly bidded contract is that all bidders must be on equal footing.
Not simply in terms of application of the procedural rules and regulations imposed by the
relevant government agency, but more importantly, on the contract bidded upon. Each bidder
must be able to bid on the same thing. The rationale is obvious. If the winning bidder is allowed
to later include or modify certain provisions in the contract awarded such that the contract is
altered in any material respect, then the essence of fair competition in the public bidding is
destroyed. A public bidding would indeed be a farce if after the contract is awarded, the winning
bidder may modify the contract and include provisions which are favorable to it that were not
previously made available to the other bidders. Thus:
It is inherent in public biddings that there shall be a fair competition among the bidders.
The specifications in such biddings provide the common ground or basis for the bidders.
The specifications should, accordingly, operate equally or indiscriminately upon all
bidders.32
The same rule was restated by Chief Justice Stuart of the Supreme Court of Minnesota:
The law is well settled that where, as in this case, municipal authorities can only let a
contract for public work to the lowest responsible bidder, the proposals and
specifications therefore must be so framed as to permit free and full competition. Nor
can they enter into a contract with the best bidder containing substantial
provisions beneficial to him, not included or contemplated in the terms and
specifications upon which the bids were invited.33
In fact, in the PBAC Bid Bulletin No. 3 cited by PIATCO to support its argument that the draft
concession agreement is subject to amendment, the pertinent portion of which was quoted
above, the PBAC also clarified that "[s]aid amendments shall only cover items that would
not materially affect the preparation of the proponent's proposal."
While we concede that a winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain
provisions of the contract bidded upon, such changes must not constitute substantial or
material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would
constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.
Hence, the determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a contract bidded
out constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken as a whole,
would contain substantially different terms and conditions that would have the effect of altering
the technical and/or financial proposals previously submitted by other bidders. The alterations
and modifications in the contract executed between the government and the winning bidder
must be such as to render such executed contract to be an entirely different contract from
the one that was bidded upon.
In the case of Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Delgado Brothers, Inc.,34 this Court quoted with
approval the ruling of the trial court that an amendment to a contract awarded through public
bidding, when such subsequent amendment was made without a new public bidding, is null and
void:
The Court agrees with the contention of counsel for the plaintiffs that the due execution
of a contract after public bidding is a limitation upon the right of the contracting parties to
alter or amend it without another public bidding, for otherwise what would a public
bidding be good for if after the execution of a contract after public bidding, the
contracting parties may alter or amend the contract, or even cancel it, at their
will?Public biddings are held for the protection of the public, and to give the public the
best possible advantages by means of open competition between the bidders. He who
bids or offers the best terms is awarded the contract subject of the bid, and it is obvious
that such protection and best possible advantages to the public will disappear if the
parties to a contract executed after public bidding may alter or amend it without another
previous public bidding.35
Hence, the question that comes to fore is this: is the 1997 Concession Agreement the same
agreement that was offered for public bidding, i.e., the draft Concession Agreement attached to
the Bid Documents? A close comparison of the draft Concession Agreement attached to the Bid
Documents and the 1997 Concession Agreement reveals that the documents differ in at least
two material respects:
a. Modification on the Public
Utility Revenues and Non-Public
Utility Revenues that may be
collected by PIATCO
The fees that may be imposed and collected by PIATCO under the draft Concession Agreement
and the 1997 Concession Agreement may be classified into three distinct categories: (1) fees
which are subject to periodic adjustment of once every two years in accordance with a
prescribed parametric formula and adjustments are made effective only upon written approval
by MIAA; (2) fees other than those included in the first category which maybe adjusted by
PIATCO whenever it deems necessary without need for consent of DOTC/MIAA; and (3) new
fees and charges that may be imposed by PIATCO which have not been previously imposed or
collected at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I, pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, as amended. The glaring distinctions between the
draft Concession Agreement and the 1997 Concession Agreement lie in the types of fees
included in each category and the extent of the supervision and regulation which MIAA is
allowed to exercise in relation thereto.
For fees under the first category, i.e., those which are subject to periodic adjustment in
accordance with a prescribed parametric formula and effective only upon written approval by
MIAA, the draft Concession Agreementincludes the following:36
(1) aircraft parking fees;
(2) aircraft tacking fees;
(3) groundhandling fees;
(4) rentals and airline offices;
(5) check-in counter rentals; and
(6) porterage fees.
Under the 1997 Concession Agreement, fees which are subject to adjustment and effective
upon MIAA approval are classified as "Public Utility Revenues" and include:37
(1) aircraft parking fees;
(2) aircraft tacking fees;
(3) check-in counter fees; and
(4) Terminal Fees.
The implication of the reduced number of fees that are subject to MIAA approval is best
appreciated in relation to fees included in the second category identified above. Under
the 1997 Concession Agreement, fees which PIATCO may adjust whenever it deems
necessary without need for consent of DOTC/MIAA are "Non-Public Utility Revenues" and is
defined as "all other income not classified as Public Utility Revenues derived from operations of
the Terminal and the Terminal Complex."38 Thus, under the 1997 Concession Agreement,
ground handling fees, rentals from airline offices and porterage fees are no longer subject to
MIAA regulation.
Further, under Section 6.03 of the draft Concession Agreement, MIAA reserves the right to
regulate (1) lobby and vehicular parking fees and (2) other new fees and charges that may be
imposed by PIATCO. Such regulation may be made by periodic adjustment and is effective only
upon written approval of MIAA. The full text of said provision is quoted below:
Section 6.03. Periodic Adjustment in Fees and Charges. Adjustments in the aircraft
parking fees, aircraft tacking fees, groundhandling fees, rentals and airline offices,
check-in-counter rentals and porterage fees shall be allowed only once every two years
and in accordance with the Parametric Formula attached hereto as Annex F. Provided
that adjustments shall be made effective only after the written express approval of the
MIAA. Provided, further, that such approval of the MIAA, shall be contingent only on the
conformity of the adjustments with the above said parametric formula. The first
adjustment shall be made prior to the In-Service Date of the Terminal.
The MIAA reserves the right to regulate under the foregoing terms and conditions
the lobby and vehicular parking fees and other new fees and charges as
contemplated in paragraph 2 of Section 6.01 if in its judgment the users of the
airport shall be deprived of a free option for the services they cover.39
On the other hand, the equivalent provision under the 1997 Concession Agreement reads:
Section 6.03 Periodic Adjustment in Fees and Charges.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Concessionaire shall at all times be judicious in fixing fees and charges constituting
Non-Public Utility Revenues in order to ensure that End Users are not unreasonably
deprived of services. While the vehicular parking fee, porterage fee and greeter/well
wisher fee constitute Non-Public Utility Revenues of Concessionaire, GRP may
intervene and require Concessionaire to explain and justify the fee it may set from
time to time, if in the reasonable opinion of GRP the said fees have become exorbitant
resulting in the unreasonable deprivation of End Users of such services.40
Thus, under the 1997 Concession Agreement, with respect to (1) vehicular parking fee, (2)
porterage fee and (3) greeter/well wisher fee, all that MIAA can do is to require PIATCO
to explain and justify the fees set by PIATCO. In the draft Concession Agreement, vehicular
parking fee is subject to MIAA regulation and approval under the second paragraph of Section
6.03 thereof while porterage fee is covered by the first paragraph of the same provision. There
is an obvious relaxation of the extent of control and regulation by MIAA with respect to the
particular fees that may be charged by PIATCO.
Moreover, with respect to the third category of fees that may be imposed and collected by
PIATCO, i.e., new fees and charges that may be imposed by PIATCO which have not been
previously imposed or collected at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I,
under Section 6.03 of the draft Concession Agreement MIAA has reserved the right to
regulate the same under the same conditions that MIAA may regulate fees under the first
category, i.e., periodic adjustment of once every two years in accordance with a prescribed
parametric formula and effective only upon written approval by MIAA. However, under the 1997
Concession Agreement, adjustment of fees under the third category is not subject to MIAA
regulation.
With respect to terminal fees that may be charged by PIATCO, 41 as shown earlier, this was
included within the category of "Public Utility Revenues" under the 1997 Concession
Agreement. This classification is significant because under the 1997 Concession
Agreement, "Public Utility Revenues" are subject to an "Interim Adjustment" of fees upon the
occurrence of certain extraordinary events specified in the agreement. 42 However, under
the draft Concession Agreement, terminal fees are not included in the types of fees that may
be subject to "Interim Adjustment."43
Finally, under the 1997 Concession Agreement, "Public Utility Revenues," except terminal
fees, are denominated in US Dollars44 while payments to the Government are in Philippine
Pesos. In the draft Concession Agreement,no such stipulation was included. By stipulating
that "Public Utility Revenues" will be paid to PIATCO in US Dollars while payments by PIATCO
to the Government are in Philippine currency under the 1997 Concession Agreement, PIATCO
is able to enjoy the benefits of depreciations of the Philippine Peso, while being effectively
insulated from the detrimental effects of exchange rate fluctuations.
When taken as a whole, the changes under the 1997 Concession Agreement with respect to
reduction in the types of fees that are subject to MIAA regulation and the relaxation of such
regulation with respect to other fees are significant amendments that substantially distinguish
the draft Concession Agreement from the 1997 Concession Agreement. The 1997 Concession
Agreement, in this respect, clearly gives PIATCO more favorable terms than what was
available to other bidders at the time the contract was bidded out. It is not very difficult to
see that the changes in the 1997 Concession Agreement translate to direct and concrete
financial advantages for PIATCO which were not available at the time the contract was
offered for bidding. It cannot be denied that under the 1997 Concession Agreement only "Public
Utility Revenues" are subject to MIAA regulation. Adjustments of all other fees imposed and
collected by PIATCO are entirely within its control. Moreover, with respect to terminal fees,
under the 1997 Concession Agreement, the same is further subject to "Interim Adjustments" not
previously stipulated in the draft Concession Agreement. Finally, the change in the currency
stipulated for "Public Utility Revenues" under the 1997 Concession Agreement, except terminal
fees, gives PIATCO an added benefit which was not available at the time of bidding.
b. Assumption by the
Government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's
default thereof
Under the draft Concession Agreement, default by PIATCO of any of its obligations to
creditors who have provided, loaned or advanced funds for the NAIA IPT III project does not
result in the assumption by the Government of these liabilities. In fact, nowhere in the said
contract does default of PIATCO's loans figure in the agreement. Such default does not directly
result in any concomitant right or obligation in favor of the Government.
However, the 1997 Concession Agreement provides:
Section 4.04 Assignment.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In the event Concessionaire should default in the payment of an Attendant Liability,
and the default has resulted in the acceleration of the payment due date of the Attendant
Liability prior to its stated date of maturity, the Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire
shall immediately inform GRP in writing of such default. GRP shall, within one hundred
eighty (180) Days from receipt of the joint written notice of the Unpaid Creditors and
Concessionaire, either (i) take over the Development Facility and assume the Attendant
Liabilities, or (ii) allow the Unpaid Creditors, if qualified, to be substituted as
concessionaire and operator of the Development Facility in accordance with the terms
and conditions hereof, or designate a qualified operator acceptable to GRP to operate
the Development Facility, likewise under the terms and conditions of this Agreement;
Provided that if at the end of the 180-day period GRP shall not have served the Unpaid
Creditors and Concessionaire written notice of its choice, GRP shall be deemed to have
elected to take over the Development Facility with the concomitant assumption of
Attendant Liabilities.
(c) If GRP should, by written notice, allow the Unpaid Creditors to be substituted as
concessionaire, the latter shall form and organize a concession company qualified to
take over the operation of the Development Facility. If the concession company should
elect to designate an operator for the Development Facility, the concession company
shall in good faith identify and designate a qualified operator acceptable to GRP within
one hundred eighty (180) days from receipt of GRP's written notice. If the concession
company, acting in good faith and with due diligence, is unable to designate a qualified
operator within the aforesaid period, then GRP shall at the end of the 180-day period
take over the Development Facility and assume Attendant Liabilities.
The term "Attendant Liabilities" under the 1997 Concession Agreement is defined as:
Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts recorded and from time to time outstanding in
the books of the Concessionaire as owing to Unpaid Creditors who have provided,
loaned or advanced funds actually used for the Project, including all interests,
penalties, associated fees, charges, surcharges, indemnities, reimbursements and other
related expenses, and further including amounts owed by Concessionaire to its
suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors.
Under the above quoted portions of Section 4.04 in relation to the definition of "Attendant
Liabilities," default by PIATCO of its loans used to finance the NAIA IPT III project triggers
the occurrence of certain events that leads to the assumption by the Government of the
liability for the loans. Only in one instance may the Government escape the assumption of
PIATCO's liabilities, i.e., when the Government so elects and allows a qualified operator to take
over as Concessionaire. However, this circumstance is dependent on the existence and
availability of a qualified operator who is willing to take over the rights and obligations of
PIATCO under the contract, a circumstance that is not entirely within the control of the
Government.
Without going into the validity of this provision at this juncture, suffice it to state that Section
4.04 of the 1997 Concession Agreement may be considered a form of security for the loans
PIATCO has obtained to finance the project, an option that was not made available in the draft
Concession Agreement. Section 4.04 is an important amendment to the 1997 Concession
Agreement because it grants PIATCO a financial advantage or benefit which was not
previously made available during the bidding process. This financial advantage is a
significant modification that translates to better terms and conditions for PIATCO.
PIATCO, however, argues that the parties to the bidding procedure acknowledge that the draft
Concession Agreement is subject to amendment because the Bid Documents permit financing
or borrowing. They claim that it was the lenders who proposed the amendments to the draft
Concession Agreement which resulted in the 1997 Concession Agreement.
We agree that it is not inconsistent with the rationale and purpose of the BOT Law to allow the
project proponent or the winning bidder to obtain financing for the project, especially in this case
which involves the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III. Expectedly,
compliance by the project proponent of its undertakings therein would involve a substantial
amount of investment. It is therefore inevitable for the awardee of the contract to seek alternate
sources of funds to support the project. Be that as it may, this Court maintains that amendments
to the contract bidded upon should always conform to the general policy on public bidding if
such procedure is to be faithful to its real nature and purpose. By its very nature and
characteristic, competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public
the best possible advantages through open competition.45 It has been held that the three
principles in public bidding are (1) the offer to the public; (2) opportunity for competition; and (3)
a basis for the exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these
factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its
adoption.46 These are the basic parameters which every awardee of a contract bidded out must
conform to, requirements of financing and borrowing notwithstanding. Thus, upon a concrete
showing that, as in this case, the contract signed by the government and the contract-awardee
is an entirely different contract from the contract bidded, courts should not hesitate to strike
down said contract in its entirety for violation of public policy on public bidding. A strict
adherence on the principles, rules and regulations on public bidding must be sustained if only to
preserve the integrity and the faith of the general public on the procedure.
Public bidding is a standard practice for procuring government contracts for public service and
for furnishing supplies and other materials. It aims to secure for the government the lowest
possible price under the most favorable terms and conditions, to curtail favoritism in the award
of government contracts and avoid suspicion of anomalies and it places all bidders in equal
footing.47 Any government action which permits any substantial variance between the
conditions under which the bids are invited and the contract executed after the award
thereof is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which
warrants proper judicial action.
In view of the above discussion, the fact that the foregoing substantial amendments were made
on the 1997 Concession Agreement renders the same null and void for being contrary to
public policy. These amendments convert the 1997 Concession Agreement to an entirely
different agreement from the contract bidded out or the draft Concession Agreement. It is not
difficult to see that the amendments on (1) the types of fees or charges that are subject to MIAA
regulation or control and the extent thereof and (2) the assumption by the Government, under
certain conditions, of the liabilities of PIATCO directly translates concrete financial
advantages to PIATCO that were previously not available during the bidding process.
These amendments cannot be taken as merely supplements to or implementing provisions of
those already existing in the draft Concession Agreement. The amendments discussed above
present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have
altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they known that such terms
were available.
III
Direct Government Guarantee
Article IV, Section 4.04(b) and (c), in relation to Article 1.06, of the 1997 Concession Agreement
provides:
Section 4.04 Assignment
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In the event Concessionaire should default in the payment of an Attendant

Liability, and the default resulted in the acceleration of the payment due date of the
Attendant Liability prior to its stated date of maturity, the Unpaid Creditors and
Concessionaire shall immediately inform GRP in writing of such default. GRP shall within
one hundred eighty (180) days from receipt of the joint written notice of the Unpaid
Creditors and Concessionaire, either (i) take over the Development Facility and assume
the Attendant Liabilities, or (ii) allow the Unpaid Creditors, if qualified to be substituted
as concessionaire and operator of the Development facility in accordance with the terms
and conditions hereof, or designate a qualified operator acceptable to GRP to operate
the Development Facility, likewise under the terms and conditions of this Agreement;
Provided, that if at the end of the 180-day period GRP shall not have served the Unpaid
Creditors and Concessionaire written notice of its choice, GRP shall be deemed to
have elected to take over the Development Facility with the concomitant
assumption of Attendant Liabilities.
(c) If GRP, by written notice, allow the Unpaid Creditors to be substituted as

concessionaire, the latter shall form and organize a concession company qualified to
takeover the operation of the Development Facility. If the concession company should
elect to designate an operator for the Development Facility, the concession company
shall in good faith identify and designate a qualified operator acceptable to GRP within
one hundred eighty (180) days from receipt of GRP's written notice. If the concession
company, acting in good faith and with due diligence, is unable to designate a qualified
operator within the aforesaid period, then GRP shall at the end of the 180-day
period take over the Development Facility and assume Attendant Liabilities.
….
Section 1.06. Attendant Liabilities
Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts recorded and from time to time outstanding
in the books of the Concessionaire as owing to Unpaid Creditors who have
provided, loaned or advanced funds actually used for the Project, including all interests,
penalties, associated fees, charges, surcharges, indemnities, reimbursements and other
related expenses, and further including amounts owed by Concessionaire to its
suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors.48
It is clear from the above-quoted provisions that Government, in the event that PIATCO
defaults in its loan obligations, is obligated to pay "all amounts recorded and from time to
time outstanding from the books" of PIATCO which the latter owes to its creditors. 49 These
amounts include "all interests, penalties, associated fees, charges, surcharges, indemnities,
reimbursements and other related expenses."50 This obligation of the Government to pay
PIATCO's creditors upon PIATCO's default would arise if the Government opts to take over
NAIA IPT III. It should be noted, however, that even if the Government chooses the second
option, which is to allow PIATCO's unpaid creditors operate NAIA IPT III, the Government is still
at a risk of being liable to PIATCO's creditors should the latter be unable to designate a qualified
operator within the prescribed period.51 In effect, whatever option the Government chooses
to take in the event of PIATCO's failure to fulfill its loan obligations, the Government is
still at a risk of assuming PIATCO's outstanding loans. This is due to the fact that the
Government would only be free from assuming PIATCO's debts if the unpaid creditors would be
able to designate a qualified operator within the period provided for in the contract. Thus, the
Government's assumption of liability is virtually out of its control. The Government under
the circumstances provided for in the 1997 Concession Agreement is at the mercy of the
existence, availability and willingness of a qualified operator. The above contractual provisions
constitute a direct government guarantee which is prohibited by law.
One of the main impetus for the enactment of the BOT Law is the lack of government funds to
construct the infrastructure and development projects necessary for economic growth and
development. This is why private sector resources are being tapped in order to finance these
projects. The BOT law allows the private sector to participate, and is in fact encouraged to do so
by way of incentives, such as minimizing the unstable flow of returns, 52 provided that the
government would not have to unnecessarily expend scarcely available funds for the project
itself. As such, direct guarantee, subsidy and equity by the government in these projects are
strictly prohibited.53 This is but logical for if the government would in the end still be at a
risk of paying the debts incurred by the private entity in the BOT projects, then the
purpose of the law is subverted.
Section 2(n) of the BOT Law defines direct guarantee as follows:
(n) Direct government guarantee — An agreement whereby the government or any of its
agencies or local government units assume responsibility for the repayment of debt
directly incurred by the project proponent in implementing the project in case of a
loan default.
Clearly by providing that the Government "assumes" the attendant liabilities, which consists of
PIATCO's unpaid debts, the 1997 Concession Agreement provided for a direct government
guarantee for the debts incurred by PIATCO in the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project. It
is of no moment that the relevant sections are subsumed under the title of "assignment". The
provisions providing for direct government guarantee which is prohibited by law is clear from the
terms thereof.
The fact that the ARCA superseded the 1997 Concession Agreement did not cure this fatal
defect. Article IV, Section 4.04(c), in relation to Article I, Section 1.06, of the ARCA provides:
Section 4.04 Security
xxx xxx xxx
(c) GRP agrees with Concessionaire (PIATCO) that it shall negotiate in good faith
and enter into direct agreement with the Senior Lenders, or with an agent of such
Senior Lenders (which agreement shall be subject to the approval of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas), in such form as may be reasonably acceptable to both GRP and Senior
Lenders, with regard, inter alia, to the following parameters:
xxx xxx xxx
(iv) If the Concessionaire [PIATCO] is in default under a payment obligation

owed to the Senior Lenders, and as a result thereof the Senior Lenders have
become entitled to accelerate the Senior Loans, the Senior Lenders shall have
the right to notify GRP of the same, and without prejudice to any other rights of
the Senior Lenders or any Senior Lenders' agent may have (including without
limitation under security interests granted in favor of the Senior Lenders), to
either in good faith identify and designate a nominee which is qualified under
sub-clause (viii)(y) below to operate the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3]
or transfer the Concessionaire's [PIATCO] rights and obligations under this
Agreement to a transferee which is qualified under sub-clause (viii) below;
xxx xxx xxx
(vi) if the Senior Lenders, acting in good faith and using reasonable efforts, are
unable to designate a nominee or effect a transfer in terms and conditions
satisfactory to the Senior Lenders within one hundred eighty (180) days after
giving GRP notice as referred to respectively in (iv) or (v) above, then GRP and
the Senior Lenders shall endeavor in good faith to enter into any other
arrangement relating to the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] (other than a
turnover of the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] to GRP) within the
following one hundred eighty (180) days. If no agreement relating to the
Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] is arrived at by GRP and the Senior
Lenders within the said 180-day period, then at the end thereof
the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] shall be transferred by the
Concessionaire [PIATCO] to GRP or its designee and GRP shall make a
termination payment to Concessionaire [PIATCO] equal to the Appraised
Value (as hereinafter defined) of the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3]
or the sum of the Attendant Liabilities, if greater. Notwithstanding Section
8.01(c) hereof, this Agreement shall be deemed terminated upon the transfer of
the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal 3] to GRP pursuant hereto;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1.06. Attendant Liabilities
Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts in each case supported by verifiable

evidence from time to time owed or which may become owing by Concessionaire
[PIATCO] to Senior Lenders or any other persons or entities who have provided,
loaned, or advanced funds or provided financial facilities to Concessionaire
[PIATCO] for the Project [NAIA Terminal 3], including, without limitation, all
principal, interest, associated fees, charges, reimbursements, and other related
expenses (including the fees, charges and expenses of any agents or trustees of such
persons or entities), whether payable at maturity, by acceleration or otherwise, and
further including amounts owed by Concessionaire [PIATCO] to its professional
consultants and advisers, suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors.54
It is clear from the foregoing contractual provisions that in the event that PIATCO fails to fulfill its
loan obligations to its Senior Lenders, the Government is obligated to directly negotiate and
enter into an agreement relating to NAIA IPT III with the Senior Lenders, should the latter fail to
appoint a qualified nominee or transferee who will take the place of PIATCO. If the Senior
Lenders and the Government are unable to enter into an agreement after the prescribed period,
the Government must then pay PIATCO, upon transfer of NAIA IPT III to the Government,
termination payment equal to the appraised value of the project or the value of the attendant
liabilities whichever is greater. Attendant liabilities as defined in the ARCA includes all
amounts owed or thereafter may be owed by PIATCO not only to the Senior Lenders with whom
PIATCO has defaulted in its loan obligations but to all other persons who may have loaned,
advanced funds or provided any other type of financial facilities to PIATCO for NAIA IPT III. The
amount of PIATCO's debt that the Government would have to pay as a result of PIATCO's
default in its loan obligations -- in case no qualified nominee or transferee is appointed by the
Senior Lenders and no other agreement relating to NAIA IPT III has been reached between the
Government and the Senior Lenders -- includes, but is not limited to, "all principal, interest,
associated fees, charges, reimbursements, and other related expenses . . . whether payable at
maturity, by acceleration or otherwise."55
It is clear from the foregoing that the ARCA provides for a direct guarantee by the
government to pay PIATCO's loans not only to its Senior Lenders but all other entities
who provided PIATCO funds or services upon PIATCO's default in its loan obligation with
its Senior Lenders. The fact that the Government's obligation to pay PIATCO's lenders for the
latter's obligation would only arise after the Senior Lenders fail to appoint a qualified nominee or
transferee does not detract from the fact that, should the conditions as stated in the contract
occur, the ARCA still obligates the Government to pay any and all amounts owed by PIATCO to
its lenders in connection with NAIA IPT III. Worse, the conditions that would make the
Government liable for PIATCO's debts is triggered by PIATCO's own default of its loan
obligations to its Senior Lenders to which loan contracts the Government was never a party to.
The Government was not even given an option as to what course of action it should take in case
PIATCO defaulted in the payment of its senior loans. The Government, upon PIATCO's default,
would be merely notified by the Senior Lenders of the same and it is the Senior Lenders who
are authorized to appoint a qualified nominee or transferee. Should the Senior Lenders fail to
make such an appointment, the Government is then automatically obligated to "directly deal and
negotiate" with the Senior Lenders regarding NAIA IPT III. The only way the Government would
not be liable for PIATCO's debt is for a qualified nominee or transferee to be appointed in place
of PIATCO to continue the construction, operation and maintenance of NAIA IPT III. This "pre-
condition", however, will not take the contract out of the ambit of a direct guarantee by the
government as the existence, availability and willingness of a qualified nominee or transferee is
totally out of the government's control. As such the Government is virtually at the mercy of
PIATCO (that it would not default on its loan obligations to its Senior Lenders), the Senior
Lenders (that they would appoint a qualified nominee or transferee or agree to some other
arrangement with the Government) and the existence of a qualified nominee or transferee who
is able and willing to take the place of PIATCO in NAIA IPT III.
The proscription against government guarantee in any form is one of the policy
considerations behind the BOT Law. Clearly, in the present case, the ARCA obligates the
Government to pay for all loans, advances and obligations arising out of financial facilities
extended to PIATCO for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project should PIATCO default
in its loan obligations to its Senior Lenders and the latter fails to appoint a qualified nominee or
transferee. This in effect would make the Government liable for PIATCO's loans should the
conditions as set forth in the ARCA arise. This is a form of direct government guarantee.
The BOT Law and its implementing rules provide that in order for an unsolicited proposal for a
BOT project may be accepted, the following conditions must first be met: (1) the project involves
a new concept in technology and/or is not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct
government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required, and (3) the government agency or
local government unit has invited by publication other interested parties to a public bidding and
conducted the same.56 The failure to meet any of the above conditions will result in the denial of
the proposal. It is further provided that the presence of direct government guarantee, subsidy or
equity will "necessarily disqualify a proposal from being treated and accepted as an unsolicited
proposal."57 The BOT Law clearly and strictly prohibits direct government guarantee, subsidy
and equity in unsolicited proposals that the mere inclusion of a provision to that effect is fatal
and is sufficient to deny the proposal. It stands to reason therefore that if a proposal can be
denied by reason of the existence of direct government guarantee, then its inclusion in the
contract executed after the said proposal has been accepted is likewise sufficient to invalidate
the contract itself. A prohibited provision, the inclusion of which would result in the denial of a
proposal cannot, and should not, be allowed to later on be inserted in the contract resulting from
the said proposal. The basic rules of justice and fair play alone militate against such an
occurrence and must not, therefore, be countenanced particularly in this instance where the
government is exposed to the risk of shouldering hundreds of million of dollars in debt.
This Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal maxim that those that cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly.58 To declare the PIATCO contracts valid despite the clear
statutory prohibition against a direct government guarantee would not only make a
mockery of what the BOT Law seeks to prevent -- which is to expose the government to
the risk of incurring a monetary obligation resulting from a contract of loan between the
project proponent and its lenders and to which the Government is not a party to -- but
would also render the BOT Law useless for what it seeks to achieve –- to make use of the
resources of the private sector in the "financing, operation and maintenance of
infrastructure and development projects"59which are necessary for national growth and
development but which the government, unfortunately, could ill-afford to finance at this
point in time.
IV
Temporary takeover of business affected with public interest
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency, and in the
exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with
public interest. In the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the term "national emergency" was
defined to include threat from external aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not
strikes "unless it is of such proportion that would paralyze government service." 60 The duration
of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover by the
government would last.61 The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the
operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the government is not
required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no
transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by
the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said
business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of
its police power and not of its power of eminent domain.
Article V, Section 5.10 (c) of the 1997 Concession Agreement provides:
Section 5.10 Temporary Take-over of operations by GRP.
….
(c) In the event the development Facility or any part thereof and/or the operations of
Concessionaire or any part thereof, become the subject matter of or be included in any
notice, notification, or declaration concerning or relating to acquisition, seizure or
appropriation by GRP in times of war or national emergency, GRP shall, by written
notice to Concessionaire, immediately take over the operations of the Terminal and/or
the Terminal Complex. During such take over by GRP, the Concession Period shall be
suspended; provided, that upon termination of war, hostilities or national emergency, the
operations shall be returned to Concessionaire, at which time, the Concession period
shall commence to run again. Concessionaire shall be entitled to reasonable
compensation for the duration of the temporary take over by GRP, which
compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost for the use of the
Terminal and/or Terminal Complex, (which is in the amount at least equal to the
debt service requirements of Concessionaire, if the temporary take over should occur
at the time when Concessionaire is still servicing debts owed to project lenders), any
loss or damage to the Development Facility, and other consequential damages. If the
parties cannot agree on the reasonable compensation of Concessionaire, or on the
liability of GRP as aforesaid, the matter shall be resolved in accordance with Section
10.01 [Arbitration]. Any amount determined to be payable by GRP to Concessionaire
shall be offset from the amount next payable by Concessionaire to GRP.62
PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision

on temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay "reasonable cost
for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex."63 Article XII, section 17 of the 1987
Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the
government to "temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest." It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the
paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular
business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power.
Police power is the "most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers."64 Its exercise therefore
must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the
government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise.65 Thus, requiring the
government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to
the operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.
Regulation of Monopolies
A monopoly is "a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies,
consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of a particular commodity." 66 The
1987 Constitution strictly regulates monopolies, whether private or public, and even
provides for their prohibition if public interest so requires. Article XII, Section 19 of the 1987
Constitution states:
Sec. 19. The state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Clearly, monopolies are not per se prohibited by the Constitution but may be permitted to exist
to aid the government in carrying on an enterprise or to aid in the performance of various
services and functions in the interest of the public.67 Nonetheless, a determination must first
be made as to whether public interest requires a monopoly. As monopolies are subject to
abuses that can inflict severe prejudice to the public, they are subject to a higher level of State
regulation than an ordinary business undertaking.
In the cases at bar, PIATCO, under the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA, is granted
the "exclusive rightto operate a commercial international passenger terminal within the Island
of Luzon" at the NAIA IPT III.68 This is with the exception of already existing international
airports in Luzon such as those located in the Subic Bay Freeport Special Economic Zone
("SBFSEZ"), Clark Special Economic Zone ("CSEZ") and in Laoag City.69 As such, upon
commencement of PIATCO's operation of NAIA IPT III, Terminals 1 and 2 of NAIA would cease
to function as international passenger terminals. This, however, does not prevent MIAA to use
Terminals 1 and 2 as domestic passenger terminals or in any other manner as it may deem
appropriate except those activities that would compete with NAIA IPT III in the latter's operation
as an international passenger terminal.70 The right granted to PIATCO to exclusively operate
NAIA IPT III would be for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the In-Service Date71 and
renewable for another twenty-five (25) years at the option of the government.72 Both the 1997
Concession Agreement and the ARCA further provide that, in view of the exclusive right
granted to PIATCO, the concession contracts of the service providers currently servicing
Terminals 1 and 2 would no longer be renewed and those concession contracts whose
expiration are subsequent to the In-Service Date would cease to be effective on the said
date.73
The operation of an international passenger airport terminal is no doubt an undertaking imbued

with public interest. In entering into a Build–Operate-and-Transfer contract for the construction,
operation and maintenance of NAIA IPT III, the government has determined that public interest
would be served better if private sector resources were used in its construction and an exclusive
right to operate be granted to the private entity undertaking the said project, in this case
PIATCO. Nonetheless, the privilege given to PIATCO is subject to reasonable regulation and
supervision by the Government through the MIAA, which is the government agency authorized
to operate the NAIA complex, as well as DOTC, the department to which MIAA is attached.74
This is in accord with the Constitutional mandate that a monopoly which is not prohibited must
be regulated.75 While it is the declared policy of the BOT Law to encourage private sector
participation by "providing a climate of minimum government regulations,"76 the same does not
mean that Government must completely surrender its sovereign power to protect public interest
in the operation of a public utility as a monopoly. The operation of said public utility can not be
done in an arbitrary manner to the detriment of the public which it seeks to serve. The right
granted to the public utility may be exclusive but the exercise of the right cannot run riot. Thus,
while PIATCO may be authorized to exclusively operate NAIA IPT III as an international
passenger terminal, the Government, through the MIAA, has the right and the duty to ensure
that it is done in accord with public interest. PIATCO's right to operate NAIA IPT III cannot also
violate the rights of third parties.
Section 3.01(e) of the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA provide:
3.01 Concession Period
xxx xxx xxx
(e) GRP confirms that certain concession agreements relative to certain services
and operations currently being undertaken at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
passenger Terminal I have a validity period extending beyond the In-Service Date.
GRP through DOTC/MIAA, confirms that these services and operations shall not be
carried over to the Terminal and the Concessionaire is under no legal obligation to
permit such carry-over except through a separate agreement duly entered into with
Concessionaire. In the event Concessionaire becomes involved in any litigation initiated
by any such concessionaire or operator, GRP undertakes and hereby holds
Concessionaire free and harmless on full indemnity basis from and against any loss
and/or any liability resulting from any such litigation, including the cost of litigation and
the reasonable fees paid or payable to Concessionaire's counsel of choice, all such
amounts shall be fully deductible by way of an offset from any amount which the
Concessionaire is bound to pay GRP under this Agreement.
During the oral arguments on December 10, 2002, the counsel for the petitioners-in-
intervention for G.R. No. 155001 stated that there are two service providers whose
contracts are still existing and whose validity extends beyond the In-Service Date. One
contract remains valid until 2008 and the other until 2010.77
We hold that while the service providers presently operating at NAIA Terminal 1 do not have an
absolute right for the renewal or the extension of their respective contracts, those contracts
whose duration extends beyond NAIA IPT III's In-Service-Date should not be unduly prejudiced.
These contracts must be respected not just by the parties thereto but also by third parties.
PIATCO cannot, by law and certainly not by contract, render a valid and binding contract
nugatory. PIATCO, by the mere expedient of claiming an exclusive right to operate, cannot
require the Government to break its contractual obligations to the service providers. In contrast
to the arrastre and stevedoring service providers in the case of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation
v. Lazaro78 whose contracts consist of temporary hold-over permits, the affected service
providers in the cases at bar, have a valid and binding contract with the Government, through
MIAA, whose period of effectivity, as well as the other terms and conditions thereof, cannot be
violated.
In fine, the efficient functioning of NAIA IPT III is imbued with public interest. The provisions of
the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA did not strip government, thru the MIAA, of its
right to supervise the operation of the whole NAIA complex, including NAIA IPT III. As the
primary government agency tasked with the job,79 it is MIAA's responsibility to ensure that
whoever by contract is given the right to operate NAIA IPT III will do so within the bounds of the
law and with due regard to the rights of third parties and above all, the interest of the public.
VI
CONCLUSION
In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the
Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the
contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.
Further, considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial
amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement
into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997 Concession
Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. The provisions under
Sections 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997 Concession Agreement and
Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a direct government
guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being accessory contracts to the ARCA,
are likewise null and void.
WHEREFORE, the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession
Agreement and the Supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate (dissenting) opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., no jurisdiction, please see separate opinion of J. Vitug in which he concurs.
Carpio, J., no part.
Callejo, Sr., J., also concur in the separate opinion of J. Panganiban.
Azcuna, J., joins the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
VITUG, J.:
This Court is bereft of jurisdiction to hear the petitions at bar. The Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over, among other actual controversies,
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.1 The cases in
question, although denominated to be petitions for prohibition, actually pray for the nullification
of the PIATCO contracts and to restrain respondents from implementing said agreements for
being illegal and unconstitutional.
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states:
"When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require."
The rule is explicit. A petition for prohibition may be filed against a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. What the petitions
seek from respondents do not involve judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. In
prohibition, only legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved
may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.2 The parties allege, respectively, contentious
evidentiary facts. It would be difficult, if not anomalous, to decide the jurisdictional issue on the
basis of the contradictory factual submissions made by the parties.3 As the Court has so often
exhorted, it is not a trier of facts.
The petitions, in effect, are in the nature of actions for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. The Rules provide that any person interested under a contract may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties
thereunder.4 The Supreme Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief
which are cognizable by regional trial courts.5
As I have so expressed in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,6 reiterated in Santiago vs.

Guingona, Jr.7 , the Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the
awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Pervasive and limitless, such as it
may seem to be under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power still succumbs to the paramount
doctrine of separation of powers. The Court may not at good liberty intrude, in the guise of
sovereign imprimatur, into every affair of government. What significance can still then remain of
the time-honored and widely acclaimed principle of separation of powers if, at every turn, the
Court allows itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal, independent and coordinate
branch in our system of government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties that such an
undue interference can lead to.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.

Quisumbing, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The five contracts for the construction and the operation of Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Terminal III, the subject of the consolidated Petitions before the Court, are replete with
outright violations of law, public policy and the Constitution. The only proper thing to do is
declare them all null and void ab initio and let the chips fall where they may. Fiat iustitia ruat
coelum.
The facts leading to this controversy are already well presented in the ponencia. I shall not
burden the readers with a retelling thereof. Instead, I will cut to the chase and directly address
the two sets of gut issues:
1. The first issue is procedural: Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the Petitions? Corollarily, do petitioners have locus standi and should this Court decide
the cases without any mandatory referral to arbitration?
2. The second one is substantive in character: Did the subject contracts violate the Constitution,
the laws, and public policy to such an extent as to render all of them void and inexistent?
My answer to all the above questions is a firm "Yes."
The Procedural Issue:

Jurisdiction, Standing and Arbitration
Definitely and surely, the issues involved in these Petitions are clearly of transcendental
importance and of national interest. The subject contracts pertain to the construction and the
operation of the country's premiere international airport terminal - an ultramodern world-class
public utility that will play a major role in the country's economic development and serve to
project a positive image of our country abroad. The five build-operate-&-transfer (BOT)
contracts, while entailing the investment of billions of pesos in capital and the availment of
several hundred millions of dollars in loans, contain provisions that tend to establish a
monopoly, require the disbursements of public funds sans appropriations, and provide
government guarantees in violation of statutory prohibitions, as well as other provisions equally
offensive to law, public policy and the Constitution. Public interest will inevitably be affected
thereby.
Thus, objections to these Petitions, grounded upon (a) the hierarchy of courts, (b) the need for
arbitration prior to court action, and (c) the alleged lack of sufficient personality, standing or
interest, being in the main procedural matters, must now be set aside, as they have been in past
cases. This Court must be permitted to perform its constitutional duty of determining whether
the other agencies of government have acted within the limits of the Constitution and the laws,
or if they have gravely abused the discretion entrusted to them.1
Hierarchy of Courts
The Court has, in the past, held that questions relating to gargantuan government contracts
ought to be settled without delay.2 This holding applies with greater force to the instant cases.
Respondent Piatco is partly correct in averring that petitioners can obtain relief from the regional
trial courts via an action to annul the contracts.
Nevertheless, the unavoidable consequence of having to await the rendition and the finality of
any such judgment would be a prolonged state of uncertainty that would be prejudicial to the
nation, the parties and the general public. And, in light of the feared loss of jobs of the
petitioning workers, consequent to the inevitable pretermination of contracts of the petitioning
service providers that will follow upon the heels of the impending opening of NAIA Terminal III,
the need for relief is patently urgent, and therefore, direct resort to this Court through the special
civil action of prohibition is thus justified.3
Contrary to Piatco's argument that the resolution of the issues raised in the Petitions will require
delving into factual questions,4 I submit that their disposition ultimately turns on questions of
law.5 Further, many of the significant and relevant factual questions can be easily addressed by
an examination of the documents submitted by the parties. In any event, the Petitions raise
some novel questions involving the application of the amended BOT Law, which this Court has
seen fit to tackle.
Arbitration
Should the dispute be referred to arbitration prior to judicial recourse? Respondent Piatco
claims that Section 10.02 of the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA)
provides for arbitration under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce to settle
any dispute or controversy or claim arising in connection with the Concession Agreement, its
amendments and supplements. The government disagrees, however, insisting that there can be
no arbitration based on Section 10.02 of the ARCA, since all the Piatco contracts are void ab
initio. Therefore, all contractual provisions, including Section 10.02 of the ARCA, are likewise
void, inexistent and inoperative. To support its stand, the government cites Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government:6"The void agreement will not be rendered
operative by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. A
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights
and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all."
As will be discussed at length later, the Piatco contracts are indeed void in their entirety; thus, a
resort to the aforesaid provision on arbitration is unavailing. Besides, petitioners and petitioners-
in-intervention have pointed out that, even granting arguendo that the arbitration clause
remained a valid provision, it still cannot bind them inasmuch as they are not parties to the
Piatco contracts. And in the final analysis, it is unarguable that the arbitration process provided
for under Section 10.02 of the ARCA, to be undertaken by a panel of three (3) arbitrators
appointed in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce, will not be able to address, determine and definitively resolve the constitutional and
legal questions that have been raised in the Petitions before us.
Locus Standi
Given this Court's previous decisions in cases of similar import, no one will seriously doubt that,
being taxpayers and members of the House of Representatives, Petitioners Baterina et al.
have locus standi to bring the Petition in GR No. 155547. In Albano v. Reyes,7 this Court held
that the petitioner therein, suing as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the House of
Representatives, was sufficiently clothed with standing to bring the suit questioning the validity
of the assailed contract. The Court cited the fact that public interest was involved, in view of the
important role of the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) in the country's economic
development and the magnitude of the financial consideration. This, notwithstanding the fact
that expenditure of public funds was not required under the assailed contract.
In the cases presently under consideration, petitioners' personal and substantial interest in the
controversy is shown by the fact that certain provisions in the Piatco contracts create obligations
on the part of government (through the DOTC and the MIAA) to disburse public funds without
prior congressional appropriations.
Petitioners thus correctly assert that the injury to them has a twofold aspect: (1) they are
adversely affected as taxpayers on account of the illegal disbursement of public funds; and (2)
they are prejudiced qua legislators, since the contractual provisions requiring the government to
incur expenditures without appropriations also operate as limitations upon the exclusive power
and prerogative of Congress over the public purse. As members of the House of
Representatives, they are actually deprived of discretion insofar as the inclusion of those items
of expenditure in the budget is concerned. To prevent such encroachment upon the legislative
privilege and obviate injury to the institution of which they are members, petitioners-legislators
have locus standi to bring suit.
Messrs. Agan et al. and Lopez et al., are likewise taxpayers and thus possessed of standing to
challenge the illegal disbursement of public funds. Messrs. Agan et al., in particular, are
employees (or representatives of employees) of various service providers that have (1) existing
concession agreements with the MIAA to provide airport services necessary to the operation of
the NAIA and (2) service agreements to furnish essential support services to the international
airlines operating at the NAIA.
On the other hand, Messrs. Lopez et al. are employees of the MIAA. These petitioners (Messrs.
Agan et al. and Messrs. Lopez et al.) are confronted with the prospect of being laid off from their
jobs and losing their means of livelihood when their employer-companies are forced to shut
down or otherwise retrench and cut back on manpower. Such development would result from
the imminent implementation of certain provisions in the contracts that tend toward the creation
of a monopoly in favor of Piatco, its subsidiaries and related companies.
Petitioners-in-intervention are service providers in the business of furnishing airport-related

services to international airlines and passengers in the NAIA and are therefore competitors of
Piatco as far as that line of business is concerned. On account of provisions in the Piatco
contracts, petitioners-in-intervention have to enter into a written contract with Piatco so as not to
be shut out of NAIA Terminal III and barred from doing business there. Since there is no
provision to ensure or safeguard free and fair competition, they are literally at its mercy. They
claim injury on account of their deprivation of property (business) and of the liberty to contract,
without due process of law.
And even if petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention were not sufficiently clothed with legal
standing, I have at the outset already established that, given its impact on the public and on
national interest, this controversy is laden with transcendental importance and constitutional
significance. Hence, I do not hesitate to adopt the same position as was enunciated
in Kilosbayan v. Guingona Jr.8 that "in cases of transcendental importance, the Court may relax
the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even when there is no direct injury to the
party claiming the right of judicial review."9
The Substantive Issue:

Violations of the Constitution and the Laws
From the Outset, the Bidding Process Was Flawed and Tainted
After studying the documents submitted and arguments advanced by the parties, I have no
doubt that, right at the outset, Piatco was not qualified to participate in the bidding process for
the Terminal III project, but was nevertheless permitted to do so. It even won the bidding and
was helped along by what appears to be a series of collusive and corrosive acts.
The build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) project for the NAIA Passenger Terminal III comes under
the category of an "unsolicited proposal," which is the subject of Section 4-A of the BOT
Law.10 The unsolicited proposal was originally submitted by the Asia's Emerging Dragon
Corporation (AEDC) to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), which reviewed and approved the proposal.
The draft of the concession agreement as negotiated between AEDC and DOTC/MIAA was
endorsed to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA-ICC), which in turn reviewed
it on the basis of its scope, economic viability, financial indicators and risks; and thereafter
approved it for bidding.
The DOTC/MIAA then prepared the Bid Documents, incorporating therein the negotiated Draft
Concession Agreement, and published invitations for public bidding, i.e., for the submission of
comparative or competitive proposals. Piatco's predecessor-in-interest, the Paircargo
Consortium, was the only company that submitted a competitive bid or price challenge.
At this point, I must emphasize that the law requires the award of a BOT project to the bidder
that has satisfied the minimum requirements; and met the technical, financial, organizational
and legal standards provided in the BOT Law. Section 5 of this statute states:
"Sec. 5. Public bidding of projects. - . . .
"In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement, the contract shall be awarded

to the bidder who, having satisfied the minimum financial, technical, organizational
and legal standards required by this Act, has submitted the lowest bid and most
favorable terms for the project, based on the present value of its proposed tolls, fees,
rentals and charges over a fixed term for the facility to be constructed, rehabilitated,
operated and maintained according to the prescribed minimum design and performance
standards, plans and specifications. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
The same provision requires that the price challenge via public bidding "must be conducted
under a two-envelope/two-stage system: the first envelope to contain the technical proposal and
the second envelope to contain the financial proposal." Moreover, the 1994 Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) provide that only those bidders that have passed the prequalification
stage are permitted to have their two envelopes reviewed.
In other words, prospective bidders must prequalify by submitting their prequalification

documents for evaluation; and only the pre-qualified bidders would be entitled to have their bids
opened, evaluated and appreciated. On the other hand, disqualified bidders are to be informed
of the reason for their disqualification. This procedure was confirmed and reiterated in the Bid
Documents, which I quote thus: "Prequalified proponents will be considered eligible to move to
second stage technical proposal evaluation. The second and third envelopes of pre-disqualified
proponents will be returned."11
Aside from complying with the legal and technical requirements (track record or experience of
the firm and its key personnel), a project proponent desiring to prequalify must also demonstrate
its financial capacity to undertake the project. To establish such capability, a proponent must
prove that it is able to raise the minimum amount of equity required for the project and to
procure the loans or financing needed for it. Section 5.4(c) of the 1994 IRR provides:
"Sec. 5.4. Prequalification Requirements. - To pre-qualify, a project proponent must

comply with the following requirements:
xxx xxx xxx
"c. Financial Capability. The project proponent must have adequate capability to sustain
the financing requirements for the detailed engineering design, construction, and/or
operation and maintenance phases of the project, as the case may be. For purposes of
prequalification, this capability shall be measured in terms of: (i) proof of the ability of the
project proponent and/or the consortium to provide a minimum amount of equity to the
project, and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project
proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking with them, that they are in
good financial standing, and that they have adequate resources. The government
Agency/LGU concerned shall determine on a project-to-project basis, and before
prequalification, the minimum amount of equity needed. . . . ." (Italics supplied)
Since the minimum amount of equity for the project was set at 30 percent 12 of the minimum
project cost of US$350 million, the minimum amount of equity required of any proponent stood
at US$105 million. Converted to pesos at the exchange rate then of P26.239 to US$1.00 (as
quoted by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), the peso equivalent of the minimum equity was
P2,755,095,000.
However, the combined equity or net worth of the Paircargo consortium stood at only
P558,384,871.55.13 This amount was only slightly over 6 percent of the minimum project cost
and very much short of the required minimum equity, which was equivalent to 30 percent of the
project cost. Such deficiency should have immediately caused the disqualification of the
Paircargo consortium. This matter was brought to the attention of the Prequalification and
Bidding Committee (PBAC).
Notwithstanding the glaring deficiency, DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal, concurrent chair
of the PBAC, declared in a Memorandum dated 14 October 1996 that "the Challenger
(Paircargo consortium) was found to have a combined net worth of P3,926,421,242.00 that
could support a project costing approximately P13 billion." To justify his conclusion, he asserted:
"It is not a requirement that the networth must be `unrestricted'. To impose this as a requirement
now will be nothing less than unfair."
He further opined, "(T)he networth reflected in the Financial Statement should not be taken as
the amount of money to be used to answer the required thirty (30%) percent equity of the
challenger but rather to be used in establishing if there is enough basis to believe that the
challenger can comply with the required 30% equity. In fact, proof of sufficient equity is required
as one of the conditions for award of contract (Sec. 12.1 of IRR of the BOT Law) but not for
prequalification (Sec. 5.4 of same document)."
On the basis of the foregoing dubious declaration, the Paircargo consortium was deemed
prequalified and thus permitted to proceed to the other stages of the bidding process.
By virtue of the prequalified status conferred upon the Paircargo, Undersecretary Cal's findings
in effect relieved the consortium of the need to comply with the financial capability requirement
imposed by the BOT Law and IRR. This position is unmistakably and squarely at odds with the
Supreme Court's consistent doctrine emphasizing the strict application of pertinent rules,
regulations and guidelines for the public bidding process, in order to place each bidder - actual
or potential - on the same footing. Thus, it is unarguably irregular and contrary to the very
concept of public bidding to permit a variance between the conditions under which bids are
invited and those under which proposals are submitted and approved.
Republic v. Capulong,14 teaches that if one bidder is relieved from having to conform to the
conditions that impose some duty upon it, that bidder is not contracting in fair competition with
those bidders that propose to be bound by all conditions. The essence of public bidding is, after
all, an opportunity for fair competition and a basis for the precise comparison of bids. 15 Thus,
each bidder must bid under the same conditions; and be subject to the same guidelines,
requirements and limitations. The desired result is to be able to determine the best offer or
lowest bid, all things being equal.
Inasmuch as the Paircargo consortium did not possess the minimum equity equivalent to 30
percent of the minimum project cost, it should not have been prequalified or allowed to
participate further in the bidding. The Prequalification and Bidding Committee (PBAC) should
therefore not have opened the two envelopes of the consortium containing its technical and
financial proposals; required AEDC to match the consortium's bid; 16 or awarded the
Concession Agreement to the consortium's successor-in-interest, Piatco.
As there was effectively no public bidding to speak of, the entire bidding process having been
flawed and tainted from the very outset, therefore, the award of the concession to Paircargo's
successor Piatco was void, and the Concession Agreement executed with the latter was
likewise void ab initio. For this reason, Piatco cannot and should not be allowed to benefit from
that Agreement.17
AEDC Was Deprived of the Right to Match PIATCO's Price Challenge
In DOTC PBAC Bid Bulletin No. 4 (par. 3), Undersecretary Cal declared that, for purposes of
matching the price challenge of Piatco, AEDC as originator of the unsolicited proposal would be
permitted access only to the schedule of proposed Annual Guaranteed Payments submitted by
Piatco, and not to the latter's financial and technical proposals that constituted the basis for the
price challenge in the first place. This was supposedly in keeping with Section 11.6 of the 1994
IRR, which provides that proprietary information is to be respected, protected and treated with
utmost confidentiality, and is therefore not to form part of the bidding/tender and related
documents.
This pronouncement, I believe, was a grievous misapplication of the mentioned provision. The
"proprietary information" referred to in Section 11.6 of the IRR pertains only to the proprietary
information of the originator of an unsolicited proposal, and not to those belonging to
a challenger. The reason for the protection accorded proprietary information at all is the fact
that, according to Section 4-A of the BOT Law as amended, a proposal qualifies as an
"unsolicited proposal" when it pertains to a project that involves "a new concept or technology",
and/or a project that is not on the government's list of priority projects.
To be considered as utilizing a new concept or technology, a project must involve the

possession of exclusive rights (worldwide or regional) over a process; or possession of
intellectual property rights over a design, methodology or engineering concept. 18 Patently, the
intent of the BOT Law is to encourage individuals and groups to come up with creative
innovations, fresh ideas and new technology. Hence, the significance and necessity of
protecting proprietary information in connection with unsolicited proposals. And to make the
encouragement real, the law also extends to such individuals and groups what amounts to a
"right of first refusal" to undertake the project they conceptualized, involving the use of new
technology or concepts, through the mechanism of matching a price challenge.
A competing bid is never just any figure conjured from out of the blue; it is arrived at after
studying economic, financial, technical and other, factors; it is likewise based on certain
assumptions as to the nature of the business, the market potentials, the probable demand for
the product or service, the future behavior of cost items, political and other risks, and so on. It is
thus self-evident that in order to be able to intelligently match a bid or price challenge, a bidder
must be given access to the assumptions and the calculations that went into crafting the
competing bid.
In this instance, the financial and technical proposals of Piatco would have provided AEDC with
the necessary information to enable it to make a reasonably informed matching bid. To put it
more simply, a bidder unable to access the competitor's assumptions will never figure out how
the competing bid came about; requiring him to "counter-propose" is like having him shoot at a
target in the dark while blindfolded.
By withholding from AEDC the challenger's financial and technical proposals containing the
critical information it needed, Undersecretary Cal actually and effectively deprived AEDC of the
ability to match the price challenge. One could say that AEDC did not have the benefit of a
"level playing field." It seems to me, though, that AEDC was actually shut out of the game
altogether.
At the end of the day, the bottom line is that the validity and the propriety of the award to Piatco
had been irreparably impaired.
Delayed Issuance of the Notice of Award Violated the BOT Law and the IRR
Section 9.5 of the IRR requires that the Notice of Award must indicate the time frame within
which the winner of the bidding (and therefore the prospective awardee) shall submit the
prescribed performance security, proof of commitment of equity contributions, and indications of
sources of financing (loans); and, in the case of joint ventures, an agreement showing that the
members are jointly and severally responsible for the obligations of the project proponent under
the contract.
The purpose of having a definite and firm timetable for the submission of the aforementioned
requirements is not only to prevent delays in the project implementation, but also to expose and
weed out unqualified proponents, who might have unceremoniously slipped through the earlier
prequalification process, by compelling them to put their money where their mouths are, so to
speak.
Nevertheless, this provision can be easily circumvented by merely postponing the actual
issuance of the Notice of Award, in order to give the favored proponent sufficient time to comply
with the requirements. Hence, to avert or minimize the manipulation of the post-bidding process,
the IRR not only set out the precise sequence of events occurring between the completion of
the evaluation of the technical bids and the issuance of the Notice of Award, but also specified
the timetables for each such event. Definite allowable extensions of time were provided for, as
were the consequences of a failure to meet a particular deadline.
In particular, Section 9.1 of the 1994 IRR prescribed that within 30 calendar days from the time
the second-stage evaluation shall have been completed, the Committee must come to a
decision whether or not to award the contract and, within 7 days therefrom, the Notice of Award
must be approved by the head of agency or local government unit (LGU) concerned, and its
issuance must follow within another 7 days thereafter.
Section 9.2 of the IRR set the procedure applicable to projects involving substantial government
undertakings as follows: Within 7 days after the decision to award is made, the draft contract
shall be submitted to the ICC for clearance on a no-objection basis. If the draft contract includes
government undertakings already previously approved, then the submission shall be for
information only.
However, should there be additional or new provisions different from the original government
undertakings, the draft shall have to be reviewed and approved. The ICC has 15 working days
to act thereon, and unless otherwise specified, its failure to act on the contract within the
specified time frame signifies that the agency or LGU may proceed with the award. The head of
agency or LGU shall approve the Notice of Award within seven days of the clearance by the ICC
on a no-objection basis, and the Notice itself has to be issued within seven days thereafter.
The highly regulated time-frames within which the agents of government were to act evinced the
intent to impose upon them the duty to act expeditiously throughout the process, to the end that
the project be prosecuted and implemented without delay. This regulated scenario was likewise
intended to discourage collusion and substantially reduce the opportunity for agents of
government to abuse their discretion in the course of the award process.
Despite the clear timetables set out in the IRR, several lengthy and still-unexplained delays
occurred in the award process, as can be observed from the presentation made by the counsel
for public respondents,19 quoted hereinbelow:
"11 Dec. 1996 - The Paircargo Joint Venture was informed by the PBAC that AEDC
failed to match and that negotiations preparatory to Notice of Award should be
commenced. This was the decision to award that should have commenced the running
of the 7-day period to approve the Notice of Award, as per Section 9.1 of the IRR, or to
submit the draft contract to the ICC for approval conformably with Section 9.2.
"01 April 1997 - The PBAC resolved that a copy of the final draft of the Concession
Agreement be submitted to the NEDA for clearance on a no-objection basis. This
resolution came more than 3 months too late as it should have been made on the 20th of
December 1996 at the latest.
"16 April 1997 - The PBAC resolved that the period of signing the Concession
Agreement be extended by 15 days.
"18 April 1997 - NEDA approved the Concession Agreement. Again this is more than 3
months too late as the NEDA's decision should have been released on the 16th of
January 1997 or fifteen days after it should have been submitted to it for review.
"09 July 1997 - The Notice of Award was issued to PIATCO. Following the provisions of
the IRR, the Notice of Award should have been issued fourteen days after NEDA's
approval, or the 28th of January 1997. In any case, even if it were to be assumed that
the release of NEDA's approval on the 18th of April was timely, the Notice of Award
should have been issued on the 9th of May 1997. In both cases, therefore, the release of
the Notice of Award occurred in a decidedly less than timely fashion."
This chronology of events bespeaks an unmistakable disregard, if not disdain, by the persons in
charge of the award process for the time limitations prescribed by the IRR. Their attitude flies in
the face of this Court's solemn pronouncement in Republic v. Capulong,20 that "strict
observance of the rules, regulations and guidelines of the bidding process is the only safeguard
to a fair, honest and competitive public bidding."
From the foregoing, the only conclusion that can possibly be drawn is that the BOT law and its
IRR were repeatedly violated with unmitigated impunity - and by agents of government, no less!
On account of such violation, the award of the contract to Piatco, which undoubtedly gained
time and benefited from the delays, must be deemed null and void from the beginning.
Further Amendments Resulted in a Substantially Different Contract, Awarded Without

Public Bidding
But the violations and desecrations did not stop there. After the PBAC made its decision on
December 11, 1996 to award the contract to Piatco, the latter negotiated changes to the
Contract bidded out and ended up with what amounts to a substantially new contract without
any public bidding. This Contract was subsequently further amended four more times through
negotiation and without any bidding. Thus, the contract actually executed between Piatco and
DOTC/MIAA on July 12, 1997 (the Concession Agreement or "CA") differed from the contract
bidded out (the draft concession agreement or "DCA") in the following very significant respects:
1. The CA inserted stipulations creating a monopoly in favor of Piatco in the business of

providing airport-related services for international airlines and passengers.21
2. The CA provided that government is to answer for Piatco's unpaid loans and debts
(lumped under the term Attendant Liabilities) in the event Piatco fails to pay its senior
lenders.22
3. The CA provided that in case of termination of the contract due to the fault of
government, government shall pay all expenses that Piatco incurred for the project plus
the appraised value of the Terminal.23
4. The CA imposed new and special obligations on government, including delivery of

clean possession of the site for the terminal; acquisition of additional land at the
government's expense for construction of road networks required by Piatco's approved
plans and specifications; and assistance to Piatco in securing site utilities, as well as all
necessary permits, licenses and authorizations.24
5. Where Section 3.02 of the DCA requires government to refrain from competing with
the contractor with respect to the operation of NAIA Terminal III, Section 3.02(b) of the
CA excludes and prohibits everyone, including government, from directly or indirectly
competing with Piatco, with respect to the operation of, as well as operations in, NAIA
Terminal III. Operations in is sufficiently broad to encompass all retail and other
commercial business enterprises operating within Terminal III, inclusive of the
businesses of providing various airport-related services to international airlines, within
the scope of the prohibition.
6. Under Section 6.01 of the DCA, the following fees are subject to the written approval
of MIAA: lease/rental charges, concession privilege fees for passenger services, food
services, transportation utility concessions, groundhandling, catering and miscellaneous
concession fees, porterage fees, greeter/well-wisher fees, carpark fees, advertising fees,
VIP facilities fees and others. Moreover, adjustments to the groundhandling fees, rentals
and porterage fees are permitted only once every two years and in accordance with a
parametric formula, per DCA Section 6.03. However, the CA as executed with Piatco
provides in Section 6.06 that all the aforesaid fees, rentals and charges may be adjusted
without MIAA's approval or intervention. Neither are the adjustments to these fees and
charges subject to or limited by any parametric formula.25
7. Section 1.29 of the DCA provides that the terminal fees, aircraft tacking fees, aircraft
parking fees, check-in counter fees and other fees are to be quoted and paid in
Philippine pesos. But per Section 1.33 of the CA, all the aforesaid fees save the terminal
fee are denominated in US Dollars.
8. Under Section 8.07 of the DCA, the term attendant liabilities refers to liabilities
pertinent to NAIA Terminal III, such as payment of lease rentals and performance of
other obligations under the Land Lease Agreement; the obligations under the Tenant
Agreements; and payment of all taxes, fees, charges and assessments of whatever kind
that may be imposed on NAIA Terminal III or parts thereof. But in Section 1.06 of the
CA, Attendant Liabilities refers to unpaid debts of Piatco: "All amounts recorded and
from time to time outstanding in the books of (Piatco) as owing to Unpaid Creditors who
have provided, loaned or advanced funds actually used for the Project, including all
interests, penalties, associated fees, charges, surcharges, indemnities, reimbursements
and other related expenses, and further including amounts owed by [Piatco] to its
suppliers, contractors and subcontractors."
9. Per Sections 8.04 and 8.06 of the DCA, government may, on account of the
contractors breach, rescind the contract and select one of four options: (a) take over the
terminal and assume all its attendant liabilities; (b) allow the contractor's creditors to
assign the Project to another entity acceptable to DOTC/MIAA; (c) pay the contractor
rent for the facilities and equipment the DOTC may utilize; or (d) purchase the terminal
at a price established by independent appraisers. Depending on the option selected,
government may take immediate possession and control of the terminal and its
operations. Government will be obligated to compensate the contractor for the
"equivalent or proportionate contract costs actually disbursed," but only where
government is the one in breach of the contract. But under Section 8.06(a) of the CA,
whether on account of Piatco's breach of contract or its inability to pay its creditors,
government is obliged to either (a) take over Terminal III and assume all of Piatco's
debts or (b) permit the qualified unpaid creditors to be substituted in place of Piatco or to
designate a new operator. And in the event of government's breach of contract, Piatco
may compel it to purchase the terminal at fair market value, per Section 8.06(b) of the
CA.
10. Under the DCA, any delay by Piatco in the payment of the amounts due the
government constitutes breach of contract. However, under the CA, such delay does not
necessarily constitute breach of contract, since Piatco is permitted to suspend payments
to the government in order to first satisfy the claims of its secured creditors, per Section
8.04(d) of the CA.
It goes without saying that the amendment of the Contract bidded out (the DCA or draft
concession agreement) - in such substantial manner, without any public bidding, and after the
bidding process had been concluded on December 11, 1996 - is violative of public policy on
public biddings, as well as the spirit and intent of the BOT Law. The whole point of going
through the public bidding exercise was completely lost. Its very rationale was totally subverted
by permitting Piatco to amend the contract for which public bidding had already been concluded.
Competitive bidding aims to obtain the best deal possible by fostering transparency and
preventing favoritism, collusion and fraud in the awarding of contracts. That is the reason why
procedural rules pertaining to public bidding demand strict observance.26
In a relatively early case, Caltex v. Delgado Brothers,27 this Court made it clear that substantive
amendments to a contract for which a public bidding has already been finished should only be
awarded after another public bidding:
"The due execution of a contract after public bidding is a limitation upon the right of the
contracting parties to alter or amend it without another public bidding, for otherwise what
would a public bidding be good for if after the execution of a contract after public bidding,
the contracting parties may alter or amend the contract, or even cancel it, at their will?
Public biddings are held for the protection of the public, and to give the public the best
possible advantages by means of open competition between the bidders. He who bids or
offers the best terms is awarded the contract subject of the bid, and it is obvious that
such protection and best possible advantages to the public will disappear if the parties to
a contract executed after public bidding may alter or amend it without another previous
public bidding."28
The aforementioned case dealt with the unauthorized amendment of a contract executed after
public bidding; in the situation before us, the amendments were made also after the bidding, but
prior to execution. Be that as it may, the same rationale underlying Caltex applies to the present
situation with equal force. Allowing the winning bidder to renegotiate the contract for which the
bidding process has ended is tantamount to permitting it to put in anything it wants. Here, the
winning bidder (Piatco) did not even bother to wait until after actual execution of the contract
before rushing to amend it. Perhaps it believed that if the changes were made to a contract
already won through bidding (DCA) instead of waiting until it is executed, the amendments
would not be noticed or discovered by the public.
In a later case, Mata v. San Diego,29 this Court reiterated its ruling as follows:
"It is true that modification of government contracts, after the same had been awarded
after a public bidding, is not allowed because such modification serves to nullify the
effects of the bidding and whatever advantages the Government had secured thereby
and may also result in manifest injustice to the other bidders. This prohibition, however,
refers to a change in vital and essential particulars of the agreement which results in a
substantially new contract."
Piatco's counter-argument may be summed up thus: There was nothing in the 1994 IRR that
prohibited further negotiations and eventual amendments to the DCA even after the bidding had
been concluded. In fact, PBAC Bid Bulletin No. 3 states: "[A]mendments to the Draft
Concession Agreement shall be issued from time to time. Said amendments will only cover
items that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponent's proposal."
I submit that accepting such warped argument will result in perverting the policy underlying
public bidding. The BOT Law cannot be said to allow the negotiation of contractual stipulations
resulting in a substantially new contract after the bidding process and price challenge had been
concluded. In fact, the BOT Law, in recognition of the time, money and effort invested in an
unsolicited proposal, accords its originator the privilege of matching the challenger's bid.
Section 4-A of the BOT Law specifically refers to a "lower price proposal" by a competing
bidder; and to the right of the original proponent "to match the price" of the challenger. Thus,
only the price proposals are in play. The terms, conditions and stipulations in the contract for
which public bidding has been concluded are understood to remain intact and not be subject to
further negotiation. Otherwise, the very essence of public bidding will be destroyed - there will
be no basis for an exact comparison between bids.
Moreover, Piatco misinterpreted the meaning behind PBAC Bid Bulletin No. 3. The
phrase amendments . . . from time to time refers only to those amendments to the draft
concession agreement issued by the PBAC prior to the submission of the price challenge; it
certainly does not include or permit amendments negotiated for and introduced after the bidding
process, has been terminated.
Piatco's Concession Agreement Was Further Amended, (ARCA) Again Without Public
Bidding
Not satisfied with the Concession Agreement, Piatco - once more without bothering with public
bidding - negotiated with government for still more substantial changes. The result was the
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) executed on November 26, 1998. The
following changes were introduced:
1. The definition of Attendant Liabilities was further amended with the result that the
unpaid loans of Piatco, for which government may be required to answer, are no longer
limited to only those loans recorded in Piatco's books or loans whose proceeds were
actually used in the Terminal III project.30
2. Although the contract may be terminated due to breach by Piatco, it will not be liable
to pay the government any Liquidated Damages if a new operator is designated to take
over the operation of the terminal.31
3. The Liquidated Damages which government becomes liable for in case of its breach
of contract were substantially increased.32
4. Government's right to appoint a comptroller for Piatco in case the latter encounters
liquidity problems was deleted.33
5. Government is made liable for Incremental and Consequential Costs and Losses in
case it fails to comply or cause any third party under its direct or indirect control to
comply with the special obligations imposed on government.34
6. The insurance policies obtained by Piatco covering the terminal are now required to
be assigned to the Senior Lenders as security for the loans; previously, their proceeds
were to be used to repair and rehabilitate the facility in case of damage.35
7. Government bound itself to set the initial rate of the terminal fee, to be charged when
Terminal III begins operations, at an amount higher than US$20.36
8. Government waived its defense of the illegality of the contract and even agreed to be
liable to pay damages to Piatco in the event the contract was declared illegal.37
9. Even though government may be entitled to terminate the ARCA on account of breach
by Piatco, government is still liable to pay Piatco the appraised value of Terminal III or
the Attendant Liabilities, if the termination occurs before the In-Service Date.38 This
condition contravenes the BOT Law provision on termination compensation.
10. Government is obligated to take the administrative action required for Piatco's
imposition, collection and application of all Public Utility Revenues.39 No such obligation
existed previously.
11. Government is now also obligated to perform and cause other persons and entities
under its direct or indirect control to perform all acts necessary to perfect the security
interests to be created in favor of Piatco's Senior Lenders.40 No such obligation existed
previously.
12. DOTC/MIAA's right of intervention in instances where Piatco's Non-Public Utility

Revenues become exorbitant or excessive has been removed.41
13. The illegality and unenforceability of the ARCA or any of its material provisions was
made an event of default on the part of government only, thus constituting a ground for
Piatco to terminate the ARCA.42
14. Amounts due from and payable by government under the contract were made
payable on demand - net of taxes, levies, imposts, duties, charges or fees of any kind
except as required by law.43
15. The Parametric Formula in the contract, which is utilized to compute for
adjustments/increases to the public utility revenues (i.e., aircraft parking and tacking
fees, check-in counter fee and terminal fee), was revised to permit Piatco to input its
more costly short-term borrowing rates instead of the longer-terms rates in the
computations for adjustments, with the end result that the changes will redound to its
greater financial benefit.
16. The Certificate of Completion simply deleted the successful performance-testing of

the terminal facility in accordance with defined performance standards as a pre-condition
for government's acceptance of the terminal facility.44
In sum, the foregoing revisions and amendments as embodied in the ARCA constitute very
material alterations of the terms and conditions of the CA, and give further manifestly undue
advantage to Piatco at the expense of government. Piatco claims that the changes to the CA
were necessitated by the demands of its foreign lenders. However, no proof whatsoever has
been adduced to buttress this claim.
In any event, it is quite patent that the sum total of the aforementioned changes resulted
in drastically weakening the position of government to a degree that seems quite excessive,
even from the standpoint of a businessperson who regularly transacts with banks and foreign
lenders, is familiar with their mind-set, and understands what motivates them. On the other
hand, whatever it was that impelled government officials concerned to accede to those grossly
disadvantageous changes, I can only hazard a guess.
There is no question in my mind that the ARCA was unauthorized and illegal for lack of public
bidding and for being patently disadvantageous to government.
The Three Supplements Imposed New Obligations on Government, Also Without Prior
Public Bidding
After Piatco had managed to breach the protective rampart of public bidding, it recklessly went
on a rampage of further assaults on the ARCA.
The First Supplement Is as Void as the ARCA
In the First Supplement ("FS") executed on August 27, 1999, the following changes were made
to the ARCA:
1. The amounts payable by Piatco to government were reduced by allowing additional

exceptions to the Gross Revenues in which government is supposed to participate.45
2. Made part of the properties which government is obliged to construct and/or maintain
and keep in good repair are (a) the access road connecting Terminals II and III - the
construction of this access road is the obligation of Piatco, in lieu of its obligation to
construct an Access Tunnel connecting Terminals II and III; and (b) the taxilane and
taxiway - these are likewise part of Piatco's obligations, since they are part and parcel of
the project as described in Clause 1.3 of the Bid Documents .46
3. The MIAA is obligated to provide funding for the maintenance and repair of the
airports and facilities owned or operated by it and by third persons under its control. It
will also be liable to Piatco for the latter's losses, expenses and damages as well as
liability to third persons, in case MIAA fails to perform such obligations. In addition, MIAA
will also be liable for the incremental and consequential costs of the remedial work done
by Piatco on account of the former's default.47
4. The FS also imposed on government ten (10) "Additional Special Obligations,"

including the following:
(a) Working for the removal of the general aviation traffic from the NAIA airport
complex48
(b) Providing through MIAA the land required by Piatco for the taxilane and one
taxiway at no cost to Piatco49
(c) Implementing the government's existing storm drainage master plan50
(d) Coordinating with DPWH the financing, the implementation and the
completion of the following works before the In-Service Date: three left-turning
overpasses (EDSA to Tramo St., Tramo to Andrews Ave., and Manlunas Road to
Sales Ave.);51 and a road upgrade and improvement program involving widening,
repair and resurfacing of Sales Road, Andrews Avenue and Manlunas Road;
improvement of Nichols Interchange; and removal of squatters along Andrews
Avenue.52
(e) Dealing directly with BCDA and the Phil. Air Force in acquiring additional land
or right of way for the road upgrade and improvement program. 53
5. Government is required to work for the immediate reversion to MIAA of the Nayong
Pilipino National Park.54
6. Government's share in the terminal fees collected was revised from a flat rate of P180
to 36 percent thereof; together with government's percentage share in the gross
revenues of Piatco, the amount will be remitted to government in pesos instead of US
dollars.55 This amendment enables Piatco to benefit from the further erosion of the peso-
dollar exchange rate, while preventing government from building up its foreign exchange
reserves.
7. All payments from Piatco to government are now to be invoiced to MIAA, and
payments are to accrue to the latter's exclusive benefit.56 This move appears to be in
support of the funds MIAA advanced to DPWH.
I must emphasize that the First Supplement is void in two respects. First, it is merely an
amendment to the ARCA, upon which it is wholly dependent; therefore, since the ARCA is void,
inexistent and not capable of being ratified or amended, it follows that the FS too is void,
inexistent and inoperative. Second, even assuming arguendo that the ARCA is somehow
remotely valid, nonetheless the FS, in imposing significant new obligations upon government,
altered the fundamental terms and stipulations of the ARCA, thus necessitating a public bidding
all over again. That the FS was entered into sans public bidding renders it utterly void and
inoperative.
The Second Supplement Is Similarly Void and Inexistent
The Second Supplement ("SS") was executed between the government and Piatco on
September 4, 2000. It calls for Piatco, acting not as concessionaire of NAIA Terminal III but as a
public works contractor, to undertake - in the government's stead - the clearing, removal,
demolition and disposal of improvements, subterranean obstructions and waste materials at the
project site.57
The scope of the works, the procedures involved, and the obligations of the contractor are
provided for in Parts II and III of the SS. Section 4.1 sets out the compensation to be paid, listing
specific rates per cubic meter of materials for each phase of the work - excavation, leveling,
removal and disposal, backfilling and dewatering. The amounts collectible by Piatco are to be
offset against the Annual Guaranteed Payments it must pay government.
Though denominated as Second Supplement, it was nothing less than an entirely new public
works contract. Yet it, too, did not undergo any public bidding, for which reason it is also void
and inoperative.
Not surprisingly, Piatco had to subcontract the works to a certain Wintrack Builders, a firm
reputedly owned by a former high-ranking DOTC official. But that is another story altogether.
The Third Supplement Is Likewise Void and Inexistent
The Third Supplement ("TS"), executed between the government and Piatco on June 22, 2001,
passed on to the government certain obligations of Piatco as Terminal III concessionaire, with
respect to the surface road connecting Terminals II and III.
By way of background, at the inception of and forming part of the NAIA Terminal III project was
the proposed construction of an access tunnel crossing Runway 13/31, which. would connect
Terminal III to Terminal II. The Bid Documents in Section 4.1.2.3[B][i] declared that the said
access tunnel was subject to further negotiation; but for purposes of the bidding, the proponent
should submit a bid for it as well. Therefore, the tunnel was supposed to be part and parcel of
the Terminal III project.
However, in Section 5 of the First Supplement, the parties declared that the access tunnel was
not economically viable at that time. In lieu thereof, the parties agreed that a surface access
road (now called the T2-T3 Road) was to be constructed by Piatco to connect the two terminals.
Since it was plainly in substitution of the tunnel, the surface road construction should likewise be
considered part and parcel of the same project, and therefore part of Piatco's obligation as well.
While the access tunnel was estimated to cost about P800 million, the surface road would have
a price tag in the vicinity of about P100 million, thus producing significant savings for Piatco.
Yet, the Third Supplement, while confirming that Piatco would construct the T2-T3 Road,
nevertheless shifted to government some of the obligations pertaining to the former, as follows:
1. Government is now obliged to remove at its own expense all tenants, squatters,
improvements and/or waste materials on the site where the T2-T3 road is to be
constructed.58 There was no similar obligation on the part of government insofar as the
access tunnel was concerned.
2. Should government fail to carry out its obligation as above described, Piatco may
undertake it on government's behalf, subject to the terms and conditions (including
compensation payments) contained in the Second Supplement.59
3. MIAA will answer for the operation, maintenance and repair of the T2-T3 Road.60
The TS depends upon and is intended to supplement the ARCA as well as the First
Supplement, both of which are void and inexistent and not capable of being ratified or amended.
It follows that the TS is likewise void, inexistent and inoperative. And even if, hypothetically
speaking, both ARCA and FS are valid, still, the Third Supplement - imposing as it does
significant new obligations upon government - would in effect alter the terms and stipulations of
the ARCA in material respects, thus necessitating another public bidding. Since the TS was not
subjected to public bidding, it is consequently utterly void as well. At any rate, the TS created
new monetary obligations on the part of government, for which there were no prior
appropriations. Hence it follows that the same is void ab initio.
In patiently tracing the progress of the Piatco contracts from their inception up to the present, I
noted that the whole process was riddled with significant lapses, if not outright irregularity and
wholesale violations of law and public policy. The rationale of beginning at the beginning, so to
speak, will become evident when the question of what to do with the five Piatco contracts is
discussed later on.
In the meantime, I shall take up specific, provisions or changes in the contracts and highlight the
more prominent objectionable features.
Government Directly Guarantees Piatco Debts
Certainly the most discussed provision in the parties' arguments is the one creating an
unauthorized, direct government guarantee of Piatco's obligations in favor of the lenders.
Section 4-A of the BOT Law as amended states that unsolicited proposals, such as the NAIA
Terminal III Project, may be accepted by government provided inter alia that no
direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required. In short, such guarantee is
prohibited in unsolicited proposals. Section 2(n) of the same legislation defines direct
government guarantee as "an agreement whereby the government or any of its agencies or
local government units (will) assume responsibility for the repayment of debt directly incurred by
the project proponent in implementing the project in case of a loan default."
Both the CA and the ARCA have provisions that undeniably create such prohibited government
guarantee. Section 4.04 (c)(iv) to (vi) of the ARCA, which is similar to Section 4.04 of the CA,
provides thus:
"(iv) that if Concessionaire is in default under a payment obligation owed to the Senior
Lenders, and as a result thereof the Senior Lenders have become entitled to accelerate
the Senior Loans, the Senior Lenders shall have the right to notify GRP of the same . . .;
(v) . . . the Senior Lenders may after written notification to GRP, transfer the
Concessionaire's rights and obligations to a transferee . . .;
(vi) if the Senior Lenders . . . are unable to . . . effect a transfer . . ., then GRP and the
Senior Lenders shall endeavor . . . to enter into any other arrangement relating to the
Development Facility . . . If no agreement relating to the Development Facility is arrived
at by GRP and the Senior Lenders within the said 180-day period, then at the end
thereof the Development Facility shall be transferred by the Concessionaire to GRP or
its designee and GRP shall make a termination payment to Concessionaire equal to the
Appraised Value (as hereinafter defined) of the Development Facility or the sum of the
Attendant Liabilities, if greater. . . ."
In turn, the term Attendant Liabilities is defined in Section 1.06 of the ARCA as follows:
"Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts in each case supported by verifiable evidence
from time to time owed or which may become, owing by Concessionaire to Senior
Lenders or any other persons or entities who have provided, loaned or advanced funds
or provided financial facilities to Concessionaire for the Project, including, without
limitation, all principal, interest, associated fees, charges, reimbursements, and other
related expenses (including the fees, charges and expenses of any agents or trustees of
such persons or entities), whether payable at maturity, by acceleration or otherwise, and
further including amounts owed by Concessionaire to its professional consultants and
advisers, suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors."
Government's agreement to pay becomes effective in the event of a default by Piatco on any of
its loan obligations to the Senior Lenders, and the amount to be paid by government is the
greater of either the Appraised Value of Terminal III or the aggregate amount of the moneys
owed by Piatco - whether to the Senior Lenders or to other entities, including its suppliers,
contractors and subcontractors. In effect, therefore, this agreement already constitutes the
prohibited assumption by government of responsibility for repayment of Piatco's debts in case of
a loan default. In fine, a direct government guarantee.
It matters not that there is a roundabout procedure prescribed by Section 4.04(c)(iv), (v) and (vi)
that would require, first, an attempt (albeit unsuccessful) by the Senior Lenders to transfer
Piatco's rights to a transferee of their choice; and, second, an effort (equally unsuccessful) to
"enter into any other arrangement" with the government regarding the Terminal III facility, before
government is required to make good on its guarantee. What is abundantly clear is the fact that,
in the devious labyrinthine process detailed in the aforesaid section, it is entirely within the
Senior Lenders' power, prerogative and control - exercisable via a mere refusal or inability to
agree upon "a transferee" or "any other arrangement" regarding the terminal facility - to push
the process forward to the ultimate contractual cul-de-sac, wherein government will be
compelled to abjectly surrender and make good on its guarantee of payment.
Piatco also argues that there is no proviso requiring government to pay the Senior Lenders in
the event of Piatco's default. This is literally true, in the sense that Section 4.04(c)(vi) of ARCA
speaks of government making the termination payment to Piatco, not to the lenders. However, it
is almost a certainty that the Senior Lenders will already have made Piatco sign over to them,
ahead of time, its right to receive such payments from government; and/or they may already
have had themselves appointed its attorneys-in-fact for the purpose of collecting and receiving
such payments.
Nevertheless, as petitioners-in-intervention pointed out in their Memorandum,61 the termination

payment is to be made to Piatco, not to the lenders; and there is no provision anywhere in the
contract documents to prevent it from diverting the proceeds to its own benefit and/or to ensure
that it will necessarily use the same to pay off the Senior Lenders and other creditors, in order to
avert the foreclosure of the mortgage and other liens on the terminal facility. Such deficiency
puts the interests of government at great risk. Indeed, if the unthinkable were to happen,
government would be paying several hundreds of millions of dollars, but the mortgage liens on
the facility may still be foreclosed by the Senior Lenders just the same.
Consequently, the Piatco contracts are also objectionable for grievously failing to adequately
protect government's interests. More accurately, the contracts would consistently weaken and
do away with protection of government interests. As such, they are therefore grossly lopsided in
favor of Piatco and/or its Senior Lenders.
While on this subject, it is well to recall the earlier discussion regarding a particularly noticeable
alteration of the concept of "Attendant Liabilities." In Section 1.06 of the CA defining the term,
the Piatco debts to be assumed/paid by government were qualified by the phrases recorded and
from time to time outstanding in the books of the Concessionaire and actually used for the
project. These phrases were eliminated from the ARCA's definition of Attendant Liabilities.
Since no explanation has been forthcoming from Piatco as to the possible justification for such a
drastic change, the only conclusion, possible is that it intends to have all of its debts covered by
the guarantee, regardless of whether or not they are disclosed in its books. This has particular
reference to those borrowings which were obtained in violation of the loan covenants requiring
Piatco to maintain a minimum 70:30 debt-to-equity ratio, and even if the loan proceeds were not
actually used for the project itself.
This point brings us back to the guarantee itself. In Section 4.04(c)(vi) of ARCA, the amount
which government has guaranteed to pay as termination payment is the greater of either (i) the
Appraised Value of the terminal facility or (ii) the aggregate of the Attendant Liabilities. Given
that the Attendant Liabilities may include practically any Piatco debt under the sun, it is highly
conceivable that their sum may greatly exceed the appraised value of the facility, and
government may end up paying very much more than the real worth of Terminal III. (So why did
government have to bother with public bidding anyway?)
In the final analysis, Section 4.04(c)(iv) to (vi) of the ARCA is diametrically at odds with the spirit
and the intent of the BOT Law. The law meant to mobilize private resources (the private sector)
to take on the burden and the risks of financing the construction, operation and maintenance of
relevant infrastructure and development projects for the simple reason that government is not in
a position to do so. By the same token, government guarantee was prohibited, since it would
merely defeat the purpose and raison d'être of a build-operate-and-transfer project to be
undertaken by the private sector.
To the extent that the project proponent is able to obtain loans to fund the project, those risks
are shared between the project proponent on the one hand, and its banks and other lenders on
the other. But where the proponent or its lenders manage to cajol or coerce the government into
extending a guarantee of payment of the loan obligations, the risks assumed by the lenders are
passed right back to government. I cannot understand why, in the instant case, government
cheerfully assented to re-assuming the risks of the project when it gave the prohibited
guarantee and thus simply negated the very purpose of the BOT Law and the protection it gives
the government.
Contract Termination Provisions in the Piatco Contracts Are Void
The BOT Law as amended provides for contract termination as follows:
"Sec. 7. Contract Termination. - In the event that a project is revoked, cancelled or

terminated by the government through no fault of the project proponent or by mutual
agreement, the Government shall compensate the said project proponent for its actual
expenses incurred in the project plus a reasonable rate of return thereon not exceeding
that stated in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation or
termination: Provided, That the interest of the Government in this instances [sic] shall be
duly insured with the Government Service Insurance System or any other insurance
entity duly accredited by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner: Provided, finally,
That the cost of the insurance coverage shall be included in the terms and conditions of
the bidding referred to above.
"In the event that the government defaults on certain major obligations in the contract
and such failure is not remediable or if remediable shall remain unremedied for an
unreasonable length of time, the project proponent/contractor may, by prior notice to the
concerned national government agency or local government unit specifying the turn-over
date, terminate the contract. The project proponent/contractor shall be reasonably
compensated by the Government for equivalent or proportionate contract cost as defined
in the contract."
The foregoing statutory provision in effect provides for the following limited instances when
termination compensation may be allowed:
1. Termination by the government through no fault of the project proponent
2. Termination upon the parties' mutual agreement
3. Termination by the proponent due to government's default on certain major

contractual obligations
To emphasize, the law does not permit compensation for the project proponent when contract
termination is due to the proponent's own fault or breach of contract.
This principle was clearly violated in the Piatco Contracts. The ARCA stipulates that government
is to pay termination compensation to Piatco even when termination is initiated by government
for the following causes:
"(i) Failure of Concessionaire to finish the Works in all material respects in accordance
with the Tender Design and the Timetable;
(ii) Commission by Concessionaire of a material breach of this Agreement . . .;
(iii) . . . a change in control of Concessionaire arising from the sale, assignment, transfer
or other disposition of capital stock which results in an ownership structure violative of
statutory or constitutional limitations;
(iv) A pattern of continuing or repeated non-compliance, willful violation, or non-

performance of other terms and conditions hereof which is hereby deemed a material
breach of this Agreement . . ."62
As if that were not bad enough, the ARCA also inserted into Section 8.01 the phrase "Subject to
Section 4.04." The effect of this insertion is that in those instances where government may
terminate the contract on account of Piatco's breach, and it is nevertheless required under the
ARCA to make termination compensation to Piatco even though unauthorized by law, such
compensation is to be equivalent to the payment amount guaranteed by government - either a)
the Appraised Value of the terminal facility or (b) the aggregate of the Attendant Liabilities,
whichever amount is greater!
Clearly, this condition is not in line with Section 7 of the BOT Law. That provision permits a
project proponent to recover the actual expenses it incurred in the prosecution of the project
plus a reasonable rate of return not in excess of that provided in the contract; or to be
compensated for the equivalent or proportionate contract cost as defined in the contract, in case
the government is in default on certain major contractual obligations.
Furthermore, in those instances where such termination compensation is authorized by the

BOT Law, it is indispensable that the interest of government be duly insured. Section 5.08 the
ARCA mandates insurance coverage for the terminal facility; but all insurance policies are to be
assigned, and all proceeds are payable, to the Senior Lenders. In brief, the interest being
secured by such coverage is that of the Senior Lenders, not that of government. This can hardly
be considered compliance with law.
In essence, the ARCA provisions on termination compensation result in another unauthorized

government guarantee, this time in favor of Piatco.
A Prohibited Direct Government Subsidy, Which at the Same Time Is an Assault on the
National Honor
Still another contractual provision offensive to law and public policy is Section 8.01(d) of the
ARCA, which is a "bolder and badder" version of Section 8.04(d) of the CA.
It will be recalled that Section 4-A of the BOT Law as amended prohibits not only direct
government guarantees, but likewise a direct government subsidy for unsolicited proposals.
Section 13.2. b. iii. of the 1999 IRR defines a direct government subsidy as encompassing "an
agreement whereby the Government . . . will . . . postpone any payments due from the
proponent."
Despite the statutory ban, Section 8.01 (d) of the ARCA provides thus:
"(d) The provisions of Section 8.01(a) notwithstanding, and for the purpose of preventing
a disruption of the operations in the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex, in the event that
at any time Concessionaire is of the reasonable opinion that it shall be unable to meet a
payment obligation owed to the Senior Lenders, Concessionaire shall give prompt notice
to GRP, through DOTC/MIAA and to the Senior Lenders. In such circumstances, the
Senior Lenders (or the Senior Lenders' Representative) may ensure that after making
provision for administrative expenses and depreciation, the cash resources of
Concessionaire shall first be used and applied to meet all payment obligations owed to
the Senior Lenders. Any excess cash, after meeting such payment obligations, shall be
earmarked for the payment of all sums payable by Concessionaire to GRP under this
Agreement. If by reason of the foregoing GRP should be unable to collect in full all
payments due to GRP under this Agreement, then the unpaid balance shall be payable
within a 90-day grace period counted from the relevant due date, with interest per
annum at the rate equal to the average 91-day Treasury Bill Rate as of the auction date
immediately preceding the relevant due date. If payment is not effected by
Concessionaire within the grace period, then a spread of five (5%) percent over the
applicable 91-day Treasury Bill Rate shall be added on the unpaid amount commencing
on the expiry of the grace period up to the day of full payment. When the temporary
illiquidity of Concessionaire shall have been corrected and the cash position of
Concessionaire should indicate its ability to meet its maturing obligations, then the
provisions set forth under this Section 8.01(d) shall cease to apply. The foregoing
remedial measures shall be applicable only while there remains unpaid and outstanding
amounts owed to the Senior Lenders." (Emphasis supplied)
By any manner of interpretation or application, Section 8.01(d) of the ARCA clearly mandates
the indefinitepostponement of payment of all of Piatco's obligations to the government, in order
to ensure that Piatco's obligations to the Senior Lenders are paid in full first. That is nothing
more or less than the direct government subsidy prohibited by the BOT Law and the IRR. The
fact that Piatco will pay interest on the unpaid amounts owed to government does not change
the situation or render the prohibited subsidy any less unacceptable.
But beyond the clear violations of law, there are larger issues involved in the ARCA. Earlier, I
mentioned that Section 8.01(d) of the ARCA completely eliminated the proviso in Section
8.04(d) of the CA which gave government the right to appoint a financial controller to manage
the cash position of Piatco during situations of financial distress. Not only has government been
deprived of any means of monitoring and managing the situation; worse, as can be seen from
Section 8.01(d) above-quoted, the Senior Lenders have effectively locked in on the right to
exercise financial controllership over Piatco and to allocate its cash resources to the payment of
all amounts owed to the Senior Lenders before allowing any payment to be made to
government.
In brief, this particular provision of the ARCA has placed in the hands of foreign lenders the
power and the authority to determine how much (if at all) and when the Philippine government
(as grantor of the franchise) may be allowed to receive from Piatco. In that situation,
government will be at the mercy of the foreign lenders. This is a situation completely contrary to
the rationale of the BOT Law and to public policy.
The aforesaid provision rouses mixed emotions - shame and disgust at the parties'
(especially the government officials') docile submission and abject servitude and
surrender to the imperious and excessive demands of the foreign lenders, on the one
hand; and vehement outrage at the affront to the sovereignty of the Republic and to the
national honor, on the other. It is indeed time to put an end to such an unbearable,
dishonorable situation.
The Piatco Contracts Unarguably Violate Constitutional Injunctions

I will now discuss the manner in which the Piatco Contracts offended the Constitution.
The Exclusive Right Granted to Piatco to Operate a Public Utility Is Prohibited by the
Constitution
While Section 2.02 of the ARCA spoke of granting to Piatco "a franchise to operate and
maintain the Terminal Complex," Section 3.02(a) of the same ARCA granted to Piatco, for the
entire term of the concession agreement, "the exclusive right to operate a commercial
international passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon" with the exception of those three
terminals already existing63 at the time of execution of the ARCA.
Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution prohibits the grant of a "franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility" that is "exclusive in character."
In its Opinion No. 078, Series of 1995, the Department of justice held that "the NAIA Terminal III
which . . . is a 'terminal for public use' is a public utility." Consequently, the constitutional
prohibition against the exclusivity of a franchise applies to the franchise for the operation of
NAIA Terminal III as well.
What was granted to Piatco was not merely a franchise, but an "exclusive right" to operate an
international passenger terminal within the "Island of Luzon." What this grant effectively means
is that the government is now estopped from exercising its inherent power to award any other
person another franchise or a right to operate such a public utility, in the event public interest in
Luzon requires it. This restriction is highly detrimental to government and to the public interest.
Former Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez expressed this point well in his Memorandum
for the President dated 21 May 2002:
"Section 3.02 on 'Exclusivity'
"This provision gives to PIATCO (the Concessionaire) the exclusive right to operate a
commercial international airport within the Island of Luzon with the exception of those
already existing at the time of the execution of the Agreement, such as the airports at
Subic, Clark and Laoag City. In the case of the Clark International Airport, however, the
provision restricts its operation beyond its design capacity of 850,000 passengers per
annum and the operation of new terminal facilities therein until after the new NAIA
Terminal III shall have consistently reached or exceeded its design capacity of ten (10)
million passenger capacity per year for three (3) consecutive years during the
concession period.
"This is an onerous and disadvantageous provision. It effectively grants PIATCO

a monopoly in Luzon and ties the hands of government in the matter of developing new
airports which may be found expedient and necessary in carrying out any future plan for
an inter-modal transportation system in Luzon.
"Additionally, it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the operation of the Clark

International Airport which could adversely affect the operation and development of the
Clark Special Economic Zone to the economic prejudice of the local constituencies that
are being benefited by its operation." (Emphasis supplied)
While it cannot be gainsaid that an enterprise that is a public utility may happen to constitute a
monopoly on account of the very nature of its business and the absence of competition, such a
situation does not however constitute justification to violate the constitutional prohibition and
grant an exclusive franchise or exclusive right to operate a public utility.
Piatco's contention that the Constitution does not actually prohibit monopolies is beside the
point. As correctly argued,64 the existence of a monopoly by a public utility is a situation created
by circumstances that do not encourage competition. This situation is different from the grant of
a franchise to operate a public utility, a privilege granted by government. Of course, the grant of
a franchise may result in a monopoly. But making such franchise exclusive is what is expressly
proscribed by the Constitution.
Actually, the aforementioned Section 3.02 of the ARCA more than just guaranteed exclusivity; it
also guaranteed that the government will not improve or expand the facilities at Clark - and in
fact is required to put a cap on the latter's operations - until after Terminal III shall have been
operated at or beyond its peak capacity for three consecutive years.65 As counsel for public
respondents pointed out, in the real world where the rate of influx of international passengers
can fluctuate substantially from year to year, it may take many years before Terminal III sees
three consecutive years' operations at peak capacity. The Diosdado Macapagal International
Airport may thus end up stagnating for a long time. Indeed, in order to ensure greater profits for
Piatco, the economic progress of a region has had to be sacrificed.
The Piatco Contracts Violate the Time Limitation on Franchises
Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitution also provides that "no franchise, certificate or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be . . . for a longer period
than fifty years." After all, a franchise held for an unreasonably long time would likely give rise to
the same evils as a monopoly.
The Piatco Contracts have come up with an innovative way to circumvent the prohibition and
obtain an extension. This fact can be gleaned from Section 8.03(b) of the ARCA, which I quote
thus:
"Sec. 8.03. Termination Procedure and Consequences of Termination. -
a) x x x xxx xxx
b) In the event the Agreement is terminated pursuant to Section 8.01 (b) hereof,
Concessionaire shall be entitled to collect the Liquidated Damages specified in
Annex 'G'. The full payment by GRP to Concessionaire of the Liquidated
Damages shall be a condition precedent to the transfer by Concessionaire to
GRP of the Development Facility. Prior to the full payment of the Liquidated
Damages, Concessionaire shall to the extent practicable continue to operate the
Terminal and the Terminal Complex and shall be entitled to retain and withhold
all payments to GRP for the purpose of offsetting the same against the
Liquidated Damages. Upon full payment of the Liquidated Damages,
Concessionaire shall immediately transfer the Development Facility to GRP on
'as-is-where-is' basis."
The aforesaid easy payment scheme is less beneficial than it first appears. Although it enables
government to avoid having to make outright payment of an obligation that will likely run into
billions of pesos, this easy payment plan will nevertheless cost government considerable loss of
income, which it would earn if it were to operate Terminal III by itself. Inasmuch as payments to
the concessionaire (Piatco) will be on "installment basis," interest charges on the remaining
unpaid balance would undoubtedly cause the total outstanding balance to swell. Piatco would
thus be entitled to remain in the driver's seat and keep operating the terminal for an indefinite
length of time.
The Contracts Create Two Monopolies for Piatco
By way of background, two monopolies were actually created by the Piatco contracts. The first
and more obvious one refers to the business of operating an international passenger terminal in
Luzon, the business end of which involves providing international airlines with parking space for
their aircraft, and airline passengers with the use of departure and arrival areas, check-in
counters, information systems, conveyor systems, security equipment and paraphernalia,
immigrations and customs processing areas; and amenities such as comfort rooms, restaurants
and shops.
In furtherance of the first monopoly, the Piatco Contracts stipulate that the NAIA Terminal III will
be the only facility to be operated as an international passenger terminal; 66 that NAIA Terminals
I and II will no longer be operated as such;67 and that no one (including the government) will be
allowed to compete with Piatco in the operation of an international passenger terminal in the
NAIA Complex.68 Given that, at this time, the government and Piatco are the only ones engaged
in the business of operating an international passenger terminal, I am not acutely concerned
with this particular monopolistic situation.
There was however another monopoly within the NAIA created by the subject contracts for
Piatco - in the business of providing international airlines with the following: groundhandling, in-
flight catering, cargo handling, and aircraft repair and maintenance services. These are lines of
business activity in which are engaged many service providers (including the petitioners-in-
intervention), who will be adversely affected upon full implementation of the Piatco Contracts,
particularly Sections 3.01(d)69 and (e)70 of both the ARCA and the CA.
On the one hand, Section 3.02(a) of the ARCA makes Terminal III the only international
passenger terminal at the NAIA, and therefore the only place within the NAIA Complex where
the business of providing airport-related services to international airlines may be conducted. On
the other hand, Section 3.01(d) of the ARCA requires government, through the MIAA, not to
allow service providers with expired MIAA contracts to renew or extend their contracts to render
airport-related services to airlines. Meanwhile, Section 3.01(e) of the ARCA requires
government, through the DOTC and MIAA, not to allow service providers - those with subsisting
concession agreements for services and operations being conducted at Terminal I - to carry
over their concession agreements, services and operations to Terminal III, unless they first
enter into a separate agreement with Piatco.
The aforementioned provisions vest in Piatco effective and exclusive control over which service
provider may and may not operate at Terminal III and render the airport-related services needed
by international airlines. It thereby possesses the power to exclude competition. By necessary
implication, it also has effective control over the fees and charges that will be imposed and
collected by these service providers.
This intention is exceedingly clear in the declaration by Piatco that it is "completely within its
rights to exclude any party that it has not contracted with from NAIA Terminal III."71
Worse, there is nothing whatsoever in the Piatco Contracts that can serve to restrict, control or
regulate the concessionaire's discretion and power to reject any service provider and/or impose
any term or condition it may see fit in any contract it enters into with a service provider. In brief,
there is no safeguard whatsoever to ensure free and fair competition in the service-provider
sector.
In the meantime, and not surprisingly, Piatco is first in line, ready to exploit the unique business
opportunity. It announced72 that it has accredited three groundhandlers for Terminal III. Aside
from the Philippine Airlines, the other accredited entities are the Philippine Airport and Ground
Services Globeground, Inc. ("PAGSGlobeground") and the Orbit Air Systems, Inc. ("Orbit").
PAGSGlobeground is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Airport and Ground Services,
Inc. or PAGS,73 while Orbit is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Friendship Holdings, Inc.,74 which is
in turn owned 80 percent by PAGS.75 PAGS is a service provider owned 60 percent by the
Cheng Family;76 it is a stockholder of 35 percent of Piatco77 and is the latter's designated
contractor-operator for NAIA Terminal III.78
Such entry into and domination of the airport-related services sector appear to be very much in
line with the following provisions contained in the First Addendum to the Piatco Shareholders
Agreement,79 executed on July 6, 1999, which appear to constitute a sort of master plan to
create a monopoly and combinations in restraint of trade:
"11. The Shareholders shall ensure:
a. x x x xxx x x x.;
b. That (Phil. Airport and Ground Services, Inc.) PAGS and/or its designated Affiliates
shall, at all times during the Concession Period, be exclusively authorized by (PIATCO)
to engage in the provision of ground-handling, catering and fueling services within the
Terminal Complex.
c. That PAIRCARGO and/or its designated Affiliate shall, during the Concession Period,
be the only entities authorized to construct and operate a warehouse for all cargo
handling and related services within the Site."
Precisely, proscribed by our Constitution are the monopoly and the restraint of trade being
fostered by the Piatco Contracts through the erection of barriers to the entry of other service
providers into Terminal III. In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,80 the Court ruled:
". . . [S]ection 19 of Article XII of the Constitution . . . mandates: 'The State shall regulate
or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint
of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.'
"A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or

companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or
trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a
particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms
dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a combination in
restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the
form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the
purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain
commodity, controlling its production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with
freedom of trade without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to
the means while monopoly refers to the end.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses
competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against
restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for
regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of
[S]ection 19, Article XII of our Constitution, . . ."81
Gokongwei Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission82 elucidates the criteria to be employed:
"A 'monopoly' embraces any combination the tendency of which is to prevent competition in the
broad and general sense, or to control prices to the detriment of the public. In short, it is the
concentration of business in the hands of a few. The material consideration in determining its
existence is not that prices are raised and competition actually excluded, but that power exists
to raise prices or exclude competition when desired."83 (Emphasis supplied)
The Contracts Encourage Monopolistic Pricing, Too
Aside from creating a monopoly, the Piatco contracts also give the concessionaire virtually
limitless power over the charging of fees, rentals and so forth. What little "oversight function" the
government might be able and minded to exercise is less than sufficient to protect the public
interest, as can be gleaned from the following provisions:
"Sec. 6.06. Adjustment of Non-Public Utility Fees and Charges
"For fees, rentals and charges constituting Non-Public Utility Revenues, Concessionaire
may make any adjustments it deems appropriate without need for the consent of GRP or
any government agency subject to Sec. 6.03(c)."
Section 6.03(c) in turn provides:
"(c) Concessionaire shall at all times be judicious in fixing fees and charges constituting
Non-Public Utility Revenues in order to ensure that End Users are not unreasonably
deprived of services. While the vehicular parking fee, porterage fee and
greeter/wellwisher fee constitute Non-Public Utility Revenues of Concessionaire, GRP
may require Concessionaire to explain and justify the fee it may set from time to time, if
in the reasonable opinion of GRP the said fees have become exorbitant resulting in the
unreasonable deprivation of End Users of such services."
It will be noted that the above-quoted provision has no teeth, so the concessionaire can defy the
government without fear of any sanction. Moreover, Section 6.06 - taken together with Section
6.03(c) of the ARCA - falls short of the standard set by the BOT Law as amended, which
expressly requires in Section 2(b) that the project proponent is "allowed to charge facility users
appropriate tolls, fees, rentals and charges not exceeding those proposed in its bid or as
negotiated and incorporated in the contract x x x."
The Piatco Contracts Violate Constitutional Prohibitions Against

Impairment of Contracts and Deprivation of Property Without Due Process
Earlier, I discussed how Section 3.01(e)84 of both the CA and the ARCA requires government,
through DOTC/MIAA, not to permit the carry-over to Terminal III of the services and operations
of certain service providers currently operating at Terminal I with subsisting contracts.
By the In-Service Date, Terminal III shall be the only facility to be operated as an international
passenger terminal at the NAIA;85 thus, Terminals I and II shall no longer operate as such,86 and
no one shall be allowed to compete with Piatco in the operation of an international passenger
terminal in the NAIA.87 The bottom line is that, as of the In-Service Date, Terminal III will be the
only terminal where the business of providing airport-related services to international airlines
and passengers may be conducted at all.
Consequently, government through the DOTC/MIAA will be compelled to cease honoring

existing contracts with service providers after the In-Service Date, as they cannot be allowed to
operate in Terminal III.
In short, the CA and the ARCA obligate and constrain government to break its existing contracts
with these service providers.
Notably, government is not in a position to require Piatco to accommodate the displaced service
providers, and it would be unrealistic to think that these service providers can perform their
service contracts in some other international airport outside Luzon. Obviously, then, these
displaced service providers are - to borrow a quaint expression - up the river without a paddle.
In plainer terms, they will have lost their businesses entirely, in the blink of an eye.
What we have here is a set of contractual provisions that impair the obligation of contracts and
contravene the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of
law.88
Moreover, since the displaced service providers, being unable to operate, will be forced to close
shop, their respective employees - among them Messrs. Agan and Lopez et al. - have very
grave cause for concern, as they will find themselves out of employment and bereft of their
means of livelihood. This situation comprises still another violation of the constitution prohibition
against deprivation of property without due process.
True, doing business at the NAIA may be viewed more as a privilege than as a right.
Nonetheless, where that privilege has been availed of by the petitioners-in-intervention service
providers for years on end, a situation arises, similar to that in American Inter-fashion v.
GTEB.89 We held therein that a privilege enjoyed for seven years "evolved into some form of
property right which should not be removed x x x arbitrarily and without due process." Said
pronouncement is particularly relevant and applicable to the situation at bar because the
livelihood of the employees of petitioners-intervenors are at stake.
The Piatco Contracts Violate Constitutional Prohibition

Against Deprivation of Liberty Without Due Process
The Piatco Contracts by locking out existing service providers from entry into Terminal III and
restricting entry of future service providers, thereby infringed upon the freedom - guaranteed to
and heretofore enjoyed by international airlines - to contract with local service providers of their
choice, and vice versa.
Both the service providers and their client airlines will be deprived of the right to liberty, which
includes the right to enter into all contracts,90 and/or the right to make a contract in relation to
one's business.91
By Creating New Financial Obligations for Government,

Supplements to the ARCA Violate the Constitutional
Ban on Disbursement of Public Funds Without Valid Appropriation
Clearly prohibited by the Constitution is the disbursement of public funds out of the treasury,
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.92 The immediate effect of this
constitutional ban is that all the various agencies of government are constrained to limit their
expenditures to the amounts appropriated by law for each fiscal year; and to carefully count
their cash before taking on contractual commitments. Giving flesh and form to the injunction of
the fundamental law, Sections 46 and 47 of Executive Order 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provide as follows:
"Sec. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation
therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover
the proposed expenditure; and . .
"Sec. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. - Except in the case of a
contract for personal service, for supplies for current consumption or to be carried in
stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three (3) months, or banking
transactions of government-owned or controlled banks, no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or
authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have
certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated
for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the
current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to
verification by the auditor concerned. The certificate signed by the proper accounting
official and the auditor who verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of
the proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for
expenditure for any other purpose until the obligation of the government agency
concerned under the contract is fully extinguished."
Referring to the aforequoted provisions, this Court has held that "(I)t is quite evident from the
tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds
are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government
contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of
the proposed contract."93
Notwithstanding the constitutional ban, statutory mandates and Jurisprudential precedents, the
three Supplements to the ARCA, which were not approved by NEDA, imposed on government
the additional burden of spending public moneys without prior appropriation.
In the First Supplement ("FS") dated August 27, 1999, the following requirements were imposed
on the government:
• To construct, maintain and keep in good repair and operating condition all airport
support services, facilities, equipment and infrastructure owned and/or operated by
MIAA, which are not part of the Project or which are located outside the Site, even
though constructed by Concessionaire - including the access road connecting Terminals
II and III and the taxilane, taxiways and runways
• To obligate the MIAA to provide funding for the upkeep, maintenance and repair of the
airports and facilities owned or operated by it and by third persons under its control in
order to ensure compliance with international standards; and holding MIAA liable to
Piatco for the latter's losses, expenses and damages as well as for the latter's liability to
third persons, in case MIAA fails to perform such obligations; in addition, MIAA will also
be liable for the incremental and consequential costs of the remedial work done by
Piatco on account of the former's default.
• Section 4 of the FS imposed on government ten (10) "Additional Special Obligations,"

including the following:
o Providing thru MIAA the land required by Piatco for the taxilane and one taxiway,
at no cost to Piatco
o Implementing the government's existing storm drainage master plan
o Coordinating with DPWH the financing, implementation and completion of the
following works before the In-Service Date: three left-turning overpasses (Edsa to
Tramo St., Tramo to Andrews Ave., and Manlunas Road to Sales Ave.) and a
road upgrade and improvement program involving widening, repair and
resurfacing of Sales Road, Andrews Avenue and Manlunas Road; improvement
of Nichols Interchange; and removal of squatters along Andrews Avenue
o Dealing directly with BCDA and the Philippine Air Force in acquiring additional
land or right of way for the road upgrade and improvement program
o Requiring government to work for the immediate reversion to MIAA of the
Nayong Pilipino National Park, in order to permit the building of the second west
parallel taxiway
• Section 5 of the FS also provides that in lieu of the access tunnel, a surface access
road (T2-T3) will be constructed. This provision requires government to expend funds to
purchase additional land from Nayong Pilipino and to clear the same in order to be able
to deliver clean possession of the site to Piatco, as required in Section 5(c) of the FS.
On the other hand, the Third Supplement ("TS") obligates the government to deliver, within 120
days from date thereof, clean possession of the land on which the T2-T3 Road is to be
constructed.
The foregoing contractual stipulations undeniably impose on government the expenditures of

public funds not included in any congressional appropriation or authorized by any other statute.
Piatco however attempts to take these stipulations out of the ambit of Sections 46 and 47 of the
Administrative Code by characterizing them as stipulations for compliance on a "best-efforts
basis" only.
To determine whether the additional obligations under the Supplements may really be
undertaken on a best-efforts basis only, the nature of each of these obligations must be
examined in the context of its relevance and significance to the Terminal III Project, as well as of
any adverse impact that may result if such obligation is not performed or undertaken on time. In
short, the criteria for determining whether the best-efforts basis will apply is whether the
obligations are critical to the success of the Project and, accordingly, whether failure to perform
them (or to perform them on time) could result in a material breach of the contract.
Viewed in this light, the "Additional Special Obligations" set out in Section 4 of the FS take on a
different aspect. In particular, each of the following may all be deemed to play a major role in the
successful and timely prosecution of the Terminal III Project: the obtention of land required by
PIATCO for the taxilane and taxiway; the implementation of government's existing storm
drainage master plan; and coordination with DPWH for the completion of the three left-turning
overpasses before the In-Service Date, as well as acquisition and delivery of additional land for
the construction of the T2-T3 access road.
Conversely, failure to deliver on any of these obligations may conceivably result in substantial
prejudice to the concessionaire, to such an extent as to constitute a material breach of the
Piatco Contracts. Whereupon, the concessionaire may outrightly terminate the Contracts
pursuant to Section 8.01(b)(i) and (ii) of the ARCA and seek payment of Liquidated Damages in
accordance with Section 8.02(a) of the ARCA; or the concessionaire may instead require
government to pay the Incremental and Consequential Losses under Section 1.23 of the
ARCA.94The logical conclusion then is that the obligations in the Supplements are not to be
performed on a best-efforts basis only, but are unarguably mandatory in character.
Regarding MIAA's obligation to coordinate with the DPWH for the complete implementation of
the road upgrading and improvement program for Sales, Andrews and Manlunas Roads (which
provide access to the Terminal III site) prior to the In-Service Date, it is essential to take note of
the fact that there was a pressing need to complete the program before the opening of Terminal
III.95 For that reason, the MIAA was compelled to enter into a memorandum of agreement with
the DPWH in order to ensure the timely completion of the road widening and improvement
program. MIAA agreed to advance the total amount of P410.11 million to DPWH for the works,
while the latter was committed to do the following:
"2.2.8. Reimburse all advance payments to MIAA including but not limited to interest,
fees, plus other costs of money within the periods CY2004 and CY2006 with payment of
no less than One Hundred Million Pesos (PhP100M) every year.
"2.2.9. Perform all acts necessary to include in its CY2004 to CY2006 budget allocation
the repayments for the advances made by MIAA, to ensure that the advances are fully
repaid by CY2006. For this purpose, DPWH shall include the amounts to be
appropriated for reimbursement to MIAA in the "Not Needing Clearance" column of their
Agency Budget Matrix (ABM) submitted to the Department of Budget and Management."
It can be easily inferred, then, that DPWH did not set aside enough funds to be able to complete
the upgrading program for the crucially situated access roads prior to the targeted opening date
of Terminal III; and that, had MIAA not agreed to lend the P410 Million, DPWH would not have
been able to complete the program on time. As a consequence, government would have been
in breach of a material obligation. Hence, this particular undertaking of government may likewise
not be construed as being for best-efforts compliance only.
They also Infringe on the Legislative Prerogative and Power Over the Public Purse
But the particularly sad thing about this transaction between MIAA and DPWH is the fact that
both agencies were maneuvered into (or allowed themselves to be maneuvered into) an
agreement that would ensure delivery of upgraded roads for Piatco's benefit, using funds not
allocated for that purpose. The agreement would then be presented to Congress as a done
deal. Congress would thus be obliged to uphold the agreement and support it with the
necessary allocations and appropriations for three years, in order to enable DPWH to deliver on
its committed repayments to MIAA. The net result is an infringement on the legislative power
over the public purse and a diminution of Congress' control over expenditures of public funds - a
development that would not have come about, were it not for the Supplements. Very clever but
very illegal!
EPILOGUE
What Do We Do Now?
In the final analysis, there remains but one ultimate question, which I raised during the Oral
Argument on December 10, 2002: What do we do with the Piatco Contracts and Terminal
III?96 (Feeding directly into the resolution of the decisive question is the other nagging issue:
Why should we bother with determining the legality and validity of these contracts, when the
Terminal itself has already been built and is practically complete?)
Prescinding from all the foregoing disquisition, I find that all the Piatco contracts, without
exception, are void ab initio, and therefore inoperative. Even the very process by which the
contracts came into being - the bidding and the award - has been riddled with irregularities
galore and blatant violations of law and public policy, far too many to ignore. There is thus no
conceivable way, as proposed by some, of saving one (the original Concession Agreement)
while junking all the rest.
Neither is it possible to argue for the retention of the Draft Concession Agreement (referred to in
the various pleadings as the Contract Bidded Out) as the contract that should be kept in force
and effect to govern the situation, inasmuch as it was never executed by the parties. What
Piatco and the government executed was the Concession Agreement which is entirely different
from the Draft Concession Agreement.
Ultimately, though, it would be tantamount to an outrageous, grievous and unforgivable
mutilation of public policy and an insult to ourselves if we opt to keep in place a contract - any
contract - for to do so would assume that we agree to having Piatco continue as the
concessionaire for Terminal III.
Despite all the insidious contraventions of the Constitution, law and public policy Piatco
perpetrated, keeping Piatco on as concessionaire and even rewarding it by allowing it to operate
and profit from Terminal III - instead of imposing upon it the stiffest sanctions permissible under
the laws - is unconscionable.
It is no exaggeration to say that Piatco may not really mind which contract we decide to keep in
place. For all it may care, we can do just as well without one, if we only let it continue and
operate the facility. After all, the real money will come not from building the Terminal, but
from actually operating it for fifty or more years and charging whatever it feels like, without any
competition at all. This scenario must not be allowed to happen.
If the Piatco contracts are junked altogether as I think they should be, should not AEDC
automatically be considered the winning bidder and therefore allowed to operate the facility? My
answer is a stone-cold 'No'. AEDC never won the bidding, never signed any contract, and never
built any facility. Why should it be allowed to automatically step in and benefit from the greed of
another?
Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses incurred in the construction of the
Terminal? Indeed it should, otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the expense of Piatco
and, in particular, its funders, contractors and investors - both local and foreign. After all, there is
no question that the State needs and will make use of Terminal III, it being part and parcel of the
critical infrastructure and transportation-related programs of government.
In Melchor v. Commission on Audit,97 this Court held that even if the contract therein was void,
the principle of payment by quantum meruit was found applicable, and the contractor was
allowed to recover the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered (regardless of any
agreement as to the supposed value), in order to avoid unjust enrichment on the part of
government. The principle of quantum meruit was likewise applied in Eslao v. Commission on
Audit,98 because to deny payment for a building almost completed and already occupied would
be to permit government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of the contractor. The same
principle was applied in Republic v. Court of Appeals.99
One possible practical solution would be for government - in view of the nullity of the Piatco
contracts and of the fact that Terminal III has already been built and is almost finished - to bid
out the operation of the facility under the same or analogous principles as build-operate-and-
transfer projects. To be imposed, however, is the condition that the winning bidder must pay the
builder of the facility a price fixed by government based on quantum meruit; on the real,
reasonable - not inflated - value of the built facility.
How the payment or series of payments to the builder, funders, investors and contractors will be
staggered and scheduled, will have to be built into the bids, along with the annual guaranteed
payments to government. In this manner, this whole sordid mess could result in something truly
beneficial for all, especially for the Filipino people.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the Petitions and to declare the subject

contracts NULL and VOID.
Footnotes
1
An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector.
2
G.R. No. 155001.
3
G.R. No. 155547.
4
G.R. No. 155661.
5
An international airport is any nation's gateway to the world, the first contact of
foreigners with the Philippine Republic, especially those foreigners who have not been in
contact with the wonderful exports of the Philippine economy, those foreigners who have
not had the benefit of enjoying Philippine export products. Because for them, when they
see your products, that is the face of the Philippines they see. But if they are not
exposed to your products, then it's the airport that's the first face of the Philippines they
see. Therefore, it's not only a matter of opening yet, but making sure that it is a world
class airport that operates without any hitches at all and without the slightest risk to
travelers. But it's also emerging as a test case of my administration's commitment to
fight corruption to rid our state from the hold of any vested interest, the Solicitor
General, and the Justice Department have determined that all five agreements
covering the NAIA Terminal 3, most of which were contracted in the previous
administration, are null and void. I cannot honor contracts which the Executive
Branch's legal offices have concluded (as) null and void.
I am, therefore, ordering the Department of Justice and the Presidential

Anti-Graft Commission to investigate any anomalies and prosecute all
those found culpable in connection with the NAIA contract. But despite all
of the problems involving the PIATCO contracts, I am assuring our people,
our travelers, our exporters, my administration will open the terminal even
if it requires invoking the whole powers of the Presidency under the
Constitution and we will open a safe, secure and smoothly functioning
airport, a world class airport, as world class as the exporters we are
honoring today. (Speech of President Arroyo, emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 131124 March 29, 1999
OSMUNDO G. UMALI, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR., CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1997, which set aside the Amended Decision dated
December 13, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 94-3078, and
dismissed the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner against the
respondents.
The antecedent facts leading to the filing of the present are as follows:
On October 27, 1993, petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue by the then President Fidel V. Ramos. He was assigned in Manila, from
November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994, and in Makati, from March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994.
On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the

petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his
incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance, to wit:
A. Issuance of Letters of Authority (LA's) to investigate taxpayers
despite the ban on investigations as ordered in Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 31-93. In numerous cases, revenue
officers whose names appeared in the LA's as investigating
officers were unaware that such LA's were issued to them. He
issued LA's to favored revenue examiners such as his Secretary,
Natividad Feliciano;
B. Termination of tax cases without the submission of the required

investigation reports, thus exempting the same from examination
and review;
C. Terminated cases with reports were submitted directly to and

approved by respondent Umali without being reviewed by the
Assistant Division, thus eliminating the check and balance
mechanism designed to guard against abuses or errors;
D. Unlawful issuance of LA's to taxpayers who were thereafter

convinced to avail of the BIR's compromise and abatement
program under RMO's 45093 and 54-93, for which the taxpayers
were made, for a monetary consideration, to pay smaller amounts
in lieu of being investigated;
E. Despite the devolution of the authority to issue LA's from

Regional Directors to the Revenue District Officers under RMO
26-94, dated April 14, 1994, respondent Umali continued to issue
antedated LA's in absolute defiance of the aforesaid issuance,
using old LA's requisitioned by him when still Regional Director of
San Pablo Region. In one instance, he issued a termination letter
bearing the San Pablo Region letterhead even when he was
already Makati Regional Director; and
F. In his attempt to cover up his tracks and to muddle the real

issue of his violations of the ban in the issuance of LA's and basic
revenue rules and regulations, respondent enlisted the support of
other regional directors for the purposes of questioning particularly
the devolution/centralization of the functions of the Bureau.1
On August 2, 1994, upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President Ramos
authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of Umali and immediately
referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.
Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. In its Order, dated August 9, 1994, the
PCAGC directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for
the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994,
at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required Answer.
On August 25, 1994, petitioner appeared with his lawyer. Atty. Bienvenido Santiago before the
PCAGC. Counsel for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue submitted a Progress Report,
dated August 24, 1994, on the audit conducted on the petitioner. As prayed for, petitioner and
his lawyer were granted five (5) days to file a supplemental answer.
The hearing was reset to August 30, 1994, during which the parties were given a chance to ask
clarificatory questions. Petitioner and his counsel did not ask any question on the genuineness
and authenticity of the documents attached as annexes to the Complaint. Thereafter, the parties
agreed to submit the case for resolution upon the presentation of their respective memoranda.
Petitioner filed his Memorandum on September 6, 1994 while the BIR sent in its Memorandum
on the following day.
After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23,
1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against
petitioner, to wit:
1. On the First Charge — Respondent issued 176 Letters of

Authority in gross disobedience to and in violation of RMOs 31-93
and 27-94.
xxx xxx xxx
3. On the Third Charge — There is sufficient evidence of a prima

facie case of falsification of official documents as defined in Art.
171, par. 2 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, against the
respondent for the issuance of 9 LA's and who did not investigate
the tax cases, each LA being a separate offense.
xxx xxx xxx
7. On the Seventh Charge — There is sufficient evidence of

a prima facie case of falsification of official documents against
respondent for antedating the four LA's cited in the charge, each
LA constituting a separate offense, under Art. 171 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code.
8. On the Ninth (sic) Charge — There is sufficient evidence to

support a prima facie case of falsification of an official document
under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code against the
respondent in the tax case of Richfield International Corp., Inc. for
indicating a false date on the letter of termination he issued to the
company. There is, however, insufficient evidence against
respondent in the other tax case of Jayson Auto Supply Co.
9. On the Ninth Charge — There is sufficient evidence of a prima

facie case of falsification of official documents in each of the two
cases cited in his charge, under the provisions of Art. 171 (4) of
the Revised Penal Code, as the dates of Termination Letters were
false.
10. On the Tenth Charge — Respondent, by his own admission,

violated RMO 36-87 requiring turn over of all properties and forms
to his successor upon transfer as head of office, and RMO 27-94
requiring the surrender of all unused old forms of Letters of
Authority. The Commission noted the defiant attitude of
respondent, as expressed in his admission, towards valid and
legal orders of the BIR, and his propensity to defy and ignore such
orders and regulations. 2
xxx xxx xxx
On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of
retirement and all benefits under the law.
On October 24, 1994, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his dismissal but the Office of
the President denied the motion for reconsideration on November 28, 1994.
On December 1, 1994, petitioner brought a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3079 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, alleging, among
others:
I. That the petitioner was suspended and dismissed from the
service in violation of his constitutional right to due process of law;
and
II. That the constitutional right of the petitioner to security of tenure

was violated by the respondents.
The case was raffled off to Branch 133 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati, which issued on
December 2, 1994, a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining the respondents and/or their
representatives from enforcing Administrative Order No. 152, and directing the parties to
observe the status quo until further orders from the said Court.
On December 23, 1994, the said Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. On January 10,
1995, the petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration, this time, theorizing that the
Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption is an unconstitutional office without
jurisdiction to conduct the investigation against him.
Respondents submitted their Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration. Then, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit Judge Inoturan on the ground that the latter was formerly a
Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General and could not be expected to decide the case with
utmost impartiality.
The case was then re-raffled to Hon. Teofilo L. Guadiz, Jr. who, on December 13, 1995, handed
down an Amended Decision, granting the petition and practically reversing the original Decision.
Not satisfied with the Amended Decision of Judge Guadiz, Jr., the respondents appealed
therefrom to the Court of Appeals.
On April 8, 1997, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals 3 promulgated its decision, reversing
the Amended Decision of the trial court of origin, and dismissing Civil Case No. 94-3079.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration met the same fate. It was denied on October 28, 1997.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the petition under scrutiny.
In the interim that the administrative and civil cases against the petitioner were pending, the
criminal aspect of such cases was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation.
On July 25, 1995, after conducting the investigation, Ombudsman Investigators Merba Waga
and Arnulfo Pelagio issued a Resolution finding a probable cause and recommending the
institution in the courts of proper jurisdiction criminal cases for Falsification of Public Documents
(13 counts) and Open Disobedience (2 counts) against the petitioner.
However, acting upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration Special Prosecution Officer II
Lemuel M. De Guzman set aside the said Resolution of July 25, 1995, and in lieu thereof,
dismissed the charges against petitioner, in the Order dated November 5, 1996, which was
approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Accordingly, all the Informations against the
petitioner previously sent to the Office of the City Prosecutor, were recalled.
On August 10, 1998, Commissioner Beethoven L. Rualo of the Bureau of Internal Revenue sent
a letter to the Solicitor General informing the latter that "the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no
longer interested in pursuing the case against Atty. Osmundo Umali" on the basis of the
comment and recommendation submitted by the Legal Department of the BIR. 4
Petitioner raised the issues:
1. WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 152 VIOLATED

PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE;
2. WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS IN

THE ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 152;
3. WHETHER THE PCAGC IS A VALIDLY CONSTITUTED
GOVERNMENT AGENCY AND WHETHER PETITIONER CAN
RAISE THE ISSUE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY BELATEDLY
IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION; AND
5. WHETHER IN THE LIGHT OF THE OMBUDSMAN

RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE CHARGES AGAINST
PETITIONER, THERE IS STILL BASIS FOR PETITIONER'S
DISMISSAL WITH FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS AS RULED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 152.
Petitioner contends that as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue he belongs to
the Career Executive Service. Although a Presidential appointee under the direct authority of
the President to discipline, he is a career executive service officer (CESO) with tenurial
protection, who can only be removed for cause. In support of this theory, petitioner cited the
case of Larin vs. Executive Secretary 5 where the Court held:
. . . petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career service of the

Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct
disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the settled principle that
the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" conferred to the
President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. . . . This power of
removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must
be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. . . . Specifically, Section
36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy
security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said
law. In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not
give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure
for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the
law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only removed for cause and
in accordance with procedural due process.
Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for
cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987,6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal
causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss
confidence violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized.
After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled
correctly on the first three issues. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process
before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with
respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the
hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-
observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis.
Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of
tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is
CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is
anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible
but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is
fatal.
As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to
raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.
How about the fourth issue, whether in view of the Resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the
charges against petitioner, there still remains a basis for the latter's dismissal with forfeiture of
benefits, as directed in Administrative Order No. 152?
It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the
petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in
Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the
PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman.
In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the issues posited by the petitioner do not
constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of
Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned,
the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the
charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation
by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in
pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General,7 that there is no more basis
for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot
be overlooked.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive supervening events, and in the
exercise of its equity powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition. Accordingly,
Administrative Order No. 152 is considered LIFTED, and petitioner can be allowed to retire with
full benefits. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may
be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different
bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in
1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to
R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than
those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate
Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to
70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable
views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one

hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred
and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-
one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per
cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered
as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If
they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a
more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data
are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No.
972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555
968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have
filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but
failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades
in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of
which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been
already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as
to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente
J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of
counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio
Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped
us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation
for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority
opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now
it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because
they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To
the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during
those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition
of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history
of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a
case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity
cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of
the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our
power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been
cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of
Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature
or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public
office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and
who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had
previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they
possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon
admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission
of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over
this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of
the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of
must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether
the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that
the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of
Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law,
which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal
examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of
study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently,
and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study
required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite
period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant,
and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater
scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature
designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution;
and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the
college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a
diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended
to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the
applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-
existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject.
(p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases
upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in
the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on
the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute,
its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.
The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of
the English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been
much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the
ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and
the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports
to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an
assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section
1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it
sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will
serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose
other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent,
and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act
as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the
scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we
exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4
Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts
cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus
committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute.
(p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars,
at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to
Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's
at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the
courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should
be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to
isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power
of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that
it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution,
but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They
took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should
constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which
indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any
manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of
our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent
with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express
constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power
to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which
the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the
ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There
is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them
unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite

likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in
pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous
that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the
states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their
admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P.
646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep.
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney
to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it
seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of
the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that

there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public
be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y.
456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private
gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever
justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law
the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this
country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are
other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made
open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is
an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work,
and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and
those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and
with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled,
by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor,
and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test
oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as
follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been
the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the
parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the
states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is
regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the
statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the
parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled
to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become
officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold
their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a
mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the
application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing
his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in
this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the
inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is
that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in
matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary
determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a
vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of
them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so
directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering
the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the
progress of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in
mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of
the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over
which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit
that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on
the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar
or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.
Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according
to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys
at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation
being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission
to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the
lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within
their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and
failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one
who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without
a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of
Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he
holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings
in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under
the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the
office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of
Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province,
or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts
of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court
and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and
failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated
March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various
branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of
the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to
the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of
the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to
practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite
his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination
"upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting
the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section
of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates
without examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively
required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2,
16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case
such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in
the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the
provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact
that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had
been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was
not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he
was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission
to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think
that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his
possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore
that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points
short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of
the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the
Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the
performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service
by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under
the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary
examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court
upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to
present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In
re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer
from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after
the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly
passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend
section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and
counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as
it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following:
"And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court
in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study
of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license
under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al,
54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder
of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws
of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an
attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that
the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with
the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any
student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law
office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining
board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission
exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights
and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,

prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to
admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and
could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be
done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right
to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer
of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and
to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and
has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which
furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of
the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People,
155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the
place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish
such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void
(State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say
what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in
such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of
law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those
presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899;
and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this
latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission.
As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the
two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for
the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its
managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who
began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years
as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend
only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three
years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the
other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject
sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to
its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has
power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must
admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in
the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which
will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the
Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233,
32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to
follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right
may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for
their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate"
acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great
value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their
real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy
equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring
medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts
have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas
Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101
Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice
law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or
favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one
time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that
right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great
body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court
to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or
naval forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the
Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924
and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage
of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the
quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W.
Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-

153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be
valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has
sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and
real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law
that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial
difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not
apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there
must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members
of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in
relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural
cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is
a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on
all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5
per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5
per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75
per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature
indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none
has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general
average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful
candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the
exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that
this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned
may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it
is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972
intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in
1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more;
in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per
cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the
Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the
passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is
desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not
obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to
do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented
is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946
to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates
be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the
law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have
done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was
done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has
granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this
manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect
only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons,
to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations
of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary
to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable
reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum
norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a
class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is
void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of
the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two
of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take
part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946
to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or
dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo
Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty.
Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose
Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon.
Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la
Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava,
Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per 1
cent
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2
(by resolution of the Court).
Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and
68.1 per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were
not benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the
Examiner in Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon.
Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty.
Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera,
Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
71's 29
70's 35
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando
Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218
(74's)
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo
B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation
and authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor
M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V.
Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
(74's)
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon.
Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
(74's)
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in
which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration
without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:
PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
29. Condevillamar, Antonio 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
V.
MRD- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
30.
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
D.
84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
1950
MRD- Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
98.
99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
MRD- Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
102.
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
MRD- Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
104.
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
110.
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
115.
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2
MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25
117. D.
MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
118.
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
120.
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD- Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
126.
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD- Castillo, Dominador 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
131. Ad.
MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
132.
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
134. Cabangbang, Santiago 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
B.
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
138.
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25
140.
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
148.
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
151.
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
161.
MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
162.
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
165.
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
167. S.
MRD- Montero, Leodegario 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
168. C.
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
171.
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
173.
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
175.
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
177. Ramos-Balmori, 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
Manuela
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
MRD- Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
179.
MRD- Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35
180.
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
182.
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
MRD- 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Tiausas, Miguel V.
196.
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
204.
MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
205.
MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
206.
MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
207.
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
210.
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
213.
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
218.
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
Felicidad
MRP- Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
220.
MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
221.
MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
222.
223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
226.
MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
227.
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
230.
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
233.
MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
234. D.
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
239.
MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
240.
MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
241.
MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
242. O.
MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
243.
MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
244.
MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
245.
MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
246.
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
250.
MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5
251.
MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
252.
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
255.
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8
257.
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
263.
MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
264.
MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
265.
MRP- Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
266.
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
268. Cartagena, Herminio 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
R.
MRP- Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15
269.
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85
276. B.
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
279.
MRP- Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
280.
MRP- Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
281.
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
285.
MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
286.
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
288.
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
290.
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
292.
MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
293.
MRP- Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
294.
MRP- Domingo, Dominador 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
295. T.
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
297.
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
302.
MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
303. B.
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
306.
MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
307.
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
309. Evangelista, Felicidad 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
P.
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
313.
MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
314.
MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
315.
MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
316.
MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
317.
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
319.
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
325.
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
331.
MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
332.
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
336.
MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
337.
MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
338.
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP- Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
341.
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
343. Guzman, Salvador T. 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
de
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
350.
MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
351.
MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
352.
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
MRP- Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
354.
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
356.
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
364.
MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
365.
366. Magbiray, Godofredo 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
V.
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
368.
MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
369.
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75
MRP- Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
374.
MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
375.
MRP- Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
376.
MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
377.
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
379.
MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
380.
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
382. D.
MRP- Montero, Leodegario 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
383. C.
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
386. L.
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
MRP- Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15
389.
MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05
390.
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
MRP- Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
392.
MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
393.
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
395.
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
399.
MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
400.
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
403.
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
405.
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
E.
MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
409.
MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
410.
MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
411.
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
413.
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
415.
MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
416.
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP- Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
420.
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
423.
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
426.
MRP- Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
427.
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
430.
MRP- Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
431.
MRP- Ramos-Balmori, 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
432. Manuela
MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4
433.
MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
434.
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
440.
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
443. A.
MRP- Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
444.
445. Rodriguez, Orestes 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
Arellano
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
del
448. Rosario, Restituto F. 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
del
MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95
449.
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95
453. M.
MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
454.
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
457.
MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
458.
MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
459.
MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
460.
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
462.
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
466.
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95
468.
MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
469.
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
MRP- Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
472.
MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
473.
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
475.
MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
476.
MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
477.
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
479.
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
482.
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
486.
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
488.
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
MRP- Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
490.
MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
491.
MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
492.
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRP- Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15
494.
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP- Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1
497.
MRP- Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
498.
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in
previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together
with their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration
which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraña, Arsenio s.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Peña, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented
motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No.
972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56)
from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
M.
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

Av.
1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
Concepcion
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding
490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general
average in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per
cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising
to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951,
in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12,
14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the
practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed
the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the
foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent;
Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law,
10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20
per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent;
Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another
examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher
and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general average in any
subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general
average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the
subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per
cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise
found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe
before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be

compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not
the case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been
amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has
previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested
the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven
Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the
matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides
that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to
pass the examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination.
This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three
subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it
easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination
prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time
that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be several years away from
the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the
principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of the one
or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar
examinations every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate,
on this plan, must pass the examination in no more that three installments; but there is
no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between each examination
taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court in
admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be
presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law
and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be
able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service required by
prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have
obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects
one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present
system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in
any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all
around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath
of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any
examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite
their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a
passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision
is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are
not exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per
cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive,
we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar
examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also
rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
present amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have
obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general passing average
fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase
of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one
member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or
promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or
rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not
affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of
revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to
the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and
qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to
a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per
cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally
and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and
qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of
the passing general average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the
Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and
even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared, undeserving
and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this
Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the
question to be carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard
of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent
in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held
after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the
corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it
does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme
Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every
bar examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also
rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the
passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the
Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have
failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed
by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill
No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP
TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in
the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the
1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided,
however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half
or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may
take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946
to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were
arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The
Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In
order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all
parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages
for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per
cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for
1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in
1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not
obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard
75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as
well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved
from those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by
the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill
would admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good
conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme
Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the
passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for
who this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar
examination on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme Court and
were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were
unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been
altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the
rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when
the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being
inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid
classification" as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American
Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess
a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and
substantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves
untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split
and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules
established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions
which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the
members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the
condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the
mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits
them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope.
The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last
analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the
lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In
Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup.
Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent
of the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first
deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The
President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are
taking the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in
May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to
the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing
it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered
972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and
the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this
Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to
determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The
power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should
be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this
power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the
Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the
holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the
scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has
not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who
obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955
should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege
and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different
years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an
arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as
discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to
have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the
rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court
to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has
always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73
per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered
only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent
by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful
candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were
included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on
motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to
pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948,
in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28,
1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and
for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an
amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents
set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors,
practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing
general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after
July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of
Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important
difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and
Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the
examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by
bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No.
972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the
President gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to
repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent
in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations;
and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included
in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic
Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or
separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of
said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein.
In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said
petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations,
were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing
being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in
so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public
interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the
Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are
hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme
Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners,
thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view
is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods
after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on
motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this
Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been
the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the
practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no
judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar
examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second
place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would
be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due
process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no
one the right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere
curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this
Court of different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart
from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It
may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by
Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings,
and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited
by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been
vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating
appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic
Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of
one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions
passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule
127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that
those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80
per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those
whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by
reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who
obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the
examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at
75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general
average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947
bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire
into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the
legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments,
and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the
general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public
hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this
Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the
Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people
who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept
Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court
may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and
should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this
Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to
determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The
power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should
be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this
power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the
Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the
holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the
scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has
not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who
obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955
should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege
and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different
years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an
arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as
discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to
have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the
rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court
to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has
always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73
per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered
only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent
by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful
candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were
included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on
motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to
pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948,
in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28,
1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and
for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an
amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents
set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors,
practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing
general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after
July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of
Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important
difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and
Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the
examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by
bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No.
972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the
President gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to
repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent
in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations;
and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included
in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic
Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or
separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of
said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein.
In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said
petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations,
were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing
being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in
so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public
interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the
Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are
hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme
Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners,
thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view
is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods
after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on
motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this
Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been
the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the
practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no
judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar
examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second
place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would
be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due
process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no
one the right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere
curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this
Court of different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart
from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It
may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by
Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings,
and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited
by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been
vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating
appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic
Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of
one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions
passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule
127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that
those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80
per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those
whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by
reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who
obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the
examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at
75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general
average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947
bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire
into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the
legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments,
and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the
general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public
hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this
Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the
Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people
who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept
Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court
may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and
should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.
G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS

SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own
behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH
ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-
appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183752 October 14, 2008
CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT,

City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of
Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A.
FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING
PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY
CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as
the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process,respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008
THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH

CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH
ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly appointed
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary. respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON.

ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in
his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st Congressional District, HON.
CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, and Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely, HON. SETH
FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M.
MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L.
ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON.
NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON
and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners,
vs.
PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners,

vs.
PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC
LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman
MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N.
DEANO, petitioners-in-intervention,
x--------------------------------------------x
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P.

SANTOS-AKBAR,petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in

his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan
Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.
x-------------------------------------------x
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in
Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and

RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT

(MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing
the peace process.While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in
Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal
issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing
armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must
uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her
discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts
the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to
enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.
I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of
the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then
headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the
manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however,
for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled
signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement
on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that
the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations,
protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific
settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage
while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.2
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-
MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and
carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the
MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF,
according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when
President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its
Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the
GRP.4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the
Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General
Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF
thereafter suspended all its military actions.5
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the
outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the
negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With
regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed
"that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which
ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless,
there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to
2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was
replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's
position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually
leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be
signed last August 5, 2008.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an
instrument - the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket
numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain7 and the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. 9 Invoking the right
to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose
and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and
to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the
MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that
the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for
Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the City of Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma.
Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs.
Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro
Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be
declared null and void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding
and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the
MOA-AD.13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners
the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed
as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the
same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as
respondent.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis
Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members18 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia,
that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents
be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition
for Prohibition,20docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any
other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF
Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-
/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former
Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela21 and Mayor
Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the
Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo
tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of
Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag,
Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf)
and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their
respective Comments-in-Intervention.
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents
filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies.
Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive
Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the
issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of
pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.
The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the
following principal issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of

official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is
concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the
finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public

concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including
public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate

state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of

Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte
in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable
question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.24
The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the
parties submitted their memoranda on time.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD
As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five
petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-
intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA.
The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.
Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier
agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the
MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of
the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of
President Fidel Ramos.
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26 and
several international law instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the
Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.
The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment
emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or
territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device."
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a
simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode
of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second
denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or
ineffective.27 This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the
centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-
governmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-
harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving
non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-
sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained
peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by
treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which,
though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.28
It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-
mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the
Philippine government - the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement - that
partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn
agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties
which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS,"
and starts with its main body.
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and
Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines
"Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
"Moros" as traditionally understood even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.33
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right
is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of
their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states
or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state
in the modern sense.34
The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past
suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro
homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by
the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong)
each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.35
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce
with foreign nations."
The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that
territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is
equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively
by the plural "First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro
people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs
from the Canadian usage of the term.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of
the Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM -
thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan,
and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte
that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
which are grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to
be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus,
Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following
the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the
other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a
separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its "internalwaters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the
coastline of the BJE area;42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch
beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south
east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and
the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction,
authority and management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the jurisdiction over
the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."
The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the
Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and
economic cooperation agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on
the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural
resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety
measures.45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with
respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade
relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression
against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government.
The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's
participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and
delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection
and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or
between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy,
petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be
vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries
the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central
Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by
both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources.48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to
natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any
unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their
marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation
is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or
agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA),
Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted
by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the
implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for
the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation"
of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not
in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.52
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as
"associative," characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the
structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal
framework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting
the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and
within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be
discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil
service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and
internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be
discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and
Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF,
respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as
"the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of
the negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is
"WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of
Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern
Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign
Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all
of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the
provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the
discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic
questions.55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.56
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.57 The Court can decide the
constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is
submitted for judicial determination.58
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A

question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture,60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. 61 He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.62
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial
review in the present petitions, reasoning that
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further

negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at
attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal
that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list
of operative acts required have been duly complied with. x x x
xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority
to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or
interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD,
there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights
since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a
final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is
merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere
conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
xxxx
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
xxxx
d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government

stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12)
months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as
enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the
"Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Toward
this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all
outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the
signing of the MOA-AD.
xxxx
GOVERNANCE
xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of
this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such
steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework
shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting
the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact.64 (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.
xxxx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws
x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.66
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that
the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and
speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led
under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face.68
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example,
in New York v. United States,69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the
action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until
January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to
avoid the provision's consequences.70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition
are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of
certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.72 Mandamus is a
remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials.74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3),
issued on February 28, 2001.75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy
framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for
carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order."76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms
of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor
informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by
itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The
MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF
the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again,
these points will be discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority,
by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the
petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case
or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77
B. LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect
other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional
question raised.79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 80 When the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the
execution of the laws.81
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally
disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion whether or
not to allow a taxpayer's suit.83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the
institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be
questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members,85 but the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the
duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing.86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an
interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given
the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised
being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of
the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.90 The Court's
forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose
the protection of fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine
whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside
technical rules of procedure.91
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of
Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of
Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan
Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct
and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in
part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did
not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory.
Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel
III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would
be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they
are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro,
respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental
importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert
that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing.
Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental
importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the
Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to
be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an
intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of
Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members
of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they
failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court
exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount
public interest in the issues at hand.
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an

advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao;
and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim
lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the
resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on
the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.
B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of
all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive
Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not
sign the MOA."92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President
had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not
being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public;97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is

a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is
filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive
the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot
especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible
recurrence of the violation.99
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of
judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as
they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v.
Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that
would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears
emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of
consensus points," especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or
initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional
implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of
respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for
certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not
confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-
going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have
not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-
AD,102 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not
withstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a
significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected
LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including
possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court
to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this
case, the government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues
which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm
than good to the nation as a whole."
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was
assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a
national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the
government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific
government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion
in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to
the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of

agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on
the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be
undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and
the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the
Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the
government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out
the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form,
which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of
the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is
both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be
assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the
government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition
yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has
been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They
contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be
invoked.
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original
jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and
Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications
and raises questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over
most if not the rest of the petitions.
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine
immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. 106 There is
a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato,
Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as
respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot,
respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been
furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two
SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was
negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the
right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as

provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.107
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to
examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the
1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.109
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public
records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public
concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of
social and political significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of
free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public
of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the
flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x111
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-
making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation112 so that
they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible,
reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of
ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes
desired by the people.113
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public
concern114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of
public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate
transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the public of
the various laws,117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee,118 the proper management of
GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials,119 the recovery of the Marcoses'
alleged ill-gotten wealth,120 and the identity of party-list nominees,121 among others, are matters
of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or
commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:
x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the

consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never
exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be
too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract,
which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait
accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern,
a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a
requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of
any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State
of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."122 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the
policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.124
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section

28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill
of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands.125
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public
affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a
mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.126 These provisions are vital to
the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.127
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission so disclose:
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or
will not be in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course,
the implementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer. 128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the
issue, is enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I
get the Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It
would require a legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an

amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest
are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law"
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect
and Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national
interest?
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should
immediately influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course,
Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this
principle, which is inconsistent with this policy.129 (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of
a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for
"reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the
broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not
enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of

communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will.131Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to
participate? Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people
can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to
provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part
of the government implementing operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these
courses take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways.
xxxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public
officials but also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations
that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the
private network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not
think we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the making.132(Emphasis supplied)
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the
"marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to
conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by
E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further
enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people's participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and
"shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but
by all Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace
process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing
consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and
process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process."135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate
"continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more
than sufficient consultation."136
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is
to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners
to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and
timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process."137 E.O. No. 3 mandates
the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek
advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both
national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well
as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and
initiatives."138
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way
or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the
functions within the authority granted by the President.139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in
justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the
manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such
disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct
toward token provisos that border on classic lip service.140 It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the
premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit
provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels.
The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the
GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite
propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information,
comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of
their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By
unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the
document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex
abundante ad cautelam.
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy
to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate
local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions"142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into
this avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by

government authorities unlessthe consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26
hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained:
Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution.143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted
provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in
a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.145 The MOA-
AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose

interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD,
the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making
in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. 147 The MOA-AD, an instrument
recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms
ordained in said Act,148 which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD,
without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to
make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is
cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of
their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary
changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of
all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be
discussed in the following section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny
and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from
them.149
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be
accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much
in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend
the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents,
nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions
therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the
necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered
later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded
therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted
to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM.
Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE,
however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the
different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association.
Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually
framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and

paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-
AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical
entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and
responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial
and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive
compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more
precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a
concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international
law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of
association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the
MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish
durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international
status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between
integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The
currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet
they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international
legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN
membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally
have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity
extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil
aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is
obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it
(U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government
has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S.
government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities
within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country
from having access to these territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is
understood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free
Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and
each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been
said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized
that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of
independence.152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as
a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states
that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St.
Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become
independent states.153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international
legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic
and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure
the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies,
and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover,
the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of
water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the
right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S.
government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in
the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does
not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires
for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of
Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful

entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and
a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept
of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and
the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of
the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in
conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region."
(Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming
that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the
MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to
2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of
Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi,
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without
need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier
in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned
municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was
their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not

comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD
would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere
passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision
would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-
AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to
merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate
paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such
relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who
has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded
as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole
representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs.
Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned
in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes
and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold
national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between
the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a
status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with
prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM,
and the IPRA.157
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and
Principles states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to
those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their
descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous
people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of
the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other
indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people
and Tribal peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers
to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have
retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political
institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the
Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the
Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he
Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the
following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral

domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be

initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for
Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including

census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the
Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned.
Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all
times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the communities
concerned;
d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of
elders or community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to
the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the
concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements,

burial grounds, sacred places and old villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries

entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting

grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains,

rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the
community.
e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact
based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map,
complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and
landmarks embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary

census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office
of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the

native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein
for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local,
provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants
to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided,
That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a
valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both
newspaper and radio station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the
inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP
endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof.
However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require
the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall
reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds
for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in
cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral
domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet
and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without
prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.
xxxx
To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a
discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in
order, for
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."
Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it
ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had
not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159 applied the
aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals.
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood
not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the
question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the
Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had occasion to
acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in
international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond ‘convention' and is
considered a general principle of international law."
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights161 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights162 which
state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination,
"freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development."
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a

unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and
external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-
determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination -
a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development
within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination
(which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then,
under carefully defined circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from

the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or

integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a peopleconstitute modes of implementing the right of
self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a

framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various
international documents that support the existence of a people's right to self-
determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the
exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing
state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.
x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-
determination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign
domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a
number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-
determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to
secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived
of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development,
citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions
within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND
ISLANDS QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations the
question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by
plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the
kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an International
Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether
the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of
Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows:
x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of

disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of
every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national
groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by
the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States
to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a
portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by
some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every
State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such
a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International
Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any
other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would
involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be
contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the interests
of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of
a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be
attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question
which is left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the
exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule,
however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when
Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was,
according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required
for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil
war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the
people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out
its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of
these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively
constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the
right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a right which
sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in
scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct
cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly
incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since
they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others.
Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups
that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and
conquest.164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori
of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not
have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international
law,165 but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right
to internal self-determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General
Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among
those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S.
The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination,
encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right

to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political,
legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate
fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has

been understood as equivalent to "internal self-determination."166 The extent of self-
determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles,
some of which are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced
assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as
distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands,
territories or resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating
or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic

discrimination directed against them.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their
economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education,
employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social
security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to
ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular
attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women,
youth, children and persons with disabilities.
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands,
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other
traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs,
traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples,
unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested
by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned,
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions,
prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies
for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories
and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such
activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental,
economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of
treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their
successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights

of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the
appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this
Declaration.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be
regarded as embodying customary international law - a question which the Court need not
definitively resolve here - the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic
to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and
powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are
general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous
peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the
State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced
dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the
protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the
responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such
peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of
the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in
Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state.
All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the
Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to
render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be
reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer,
however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or
grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite
paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced
below for convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation
of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such
steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework
shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior
Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from
coming into force until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the
word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under consideration or
anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to
include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of

incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of
Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall
be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial
integrityof the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already
discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an
independent status already prevailing.
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective
because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on
E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace
Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President
as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with
rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the
conduct and progress of the negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem
through its negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options
available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive
peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of
social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional
amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125, 167 states:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace
process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component
processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued
simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not
be limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component

involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and
projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and
social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even
constitutional amendments.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to

address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in
Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they
negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and
political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal
framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it
must be asked whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the
GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President,
in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation
and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions
which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the extent
of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a
state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court
held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into
jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to
forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested
on the President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit
the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution
of the general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main
from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more
specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.169
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will
show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes,
changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure
is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form
the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and
Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political
environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral
assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more
than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a
substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important
role in the political and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an
opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to
get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework
setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.170
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace
agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm
mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional
structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions.171
In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has
been recognized by no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the
Constitution on autonomous regions172 is the framers' intention to implement a particular peace
agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by
then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur
Misuari.
MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I
will reserve my right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have
only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the
Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the
problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into
something new?
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup
Abubakar is right that certain definite steps have been taken to implement the
provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in
Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question that this is merely a
partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of
regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state
policy.173(Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to
the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced
with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is
to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in
Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations,
solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely
vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a
singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an
end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable,
but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which
could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article
XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or
revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question
of calling such a convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised
only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum -
she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not
involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly
submitting proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim
National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to
propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim
National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute
necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no
interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices
Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however,
is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that
which was not disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the
President may directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in
his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action along with the
majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals
through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of
government, defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the
exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has
been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's
questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the
people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the
power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that
require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as
a certainty.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose
amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her
recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to
what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these
recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's
suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief
Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative
recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated
in Lambino v. COMELEC:177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the ‘people's voice.' However, the
Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification
of their petition with the COMELEC, that ‘ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.'
The Lambino Group thus admits that their ‘people's' initiative is an ‘unqualified support
to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns
the Court to be wary of incantations of ‘people's voice' or ‘sovereign will' in the present
initiative."
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only
to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need
not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to

propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new legislation is not in
controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new
legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly
State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general
appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for
all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President.179
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed

standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guaranteeto any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals
as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which
cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing
of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil
law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary
changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being
contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the
contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior
Compact."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the
legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional
amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that,
By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among
the "prior agreements" from which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing
details for these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated
changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the
President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee
that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to
conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down
as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision
appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most
instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two
phases. Phase Icovered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new
administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and
Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
(SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous
government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of
the ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded
autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions
of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the
MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be
put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions
[on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the
amendatory or repealing law."
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international
law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on
the ground that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a
unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would
grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds
sufficient support in international law, however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign
dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its
signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD
would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An
examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary
conclusion.
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty180 (the Lomé Accord case) of
the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace agreement
signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict
for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the
agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic
Community of West African States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the
Sierra Leone Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government
whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special
Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of
Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.
Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members
of the RUF with respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of
that organization since the conflict began.
In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally
binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing,
among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the
finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that
the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights
between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is
ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.
"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is

easy to assume and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel
for the defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the
parties to the conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by
foreign heads of state or their representatives and representatives of international
organizations, means the agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to
create obligations in international law.
xxxx
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the
mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the
settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting
parties and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any
obligation from the settlement.
41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and
the RUF which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a
faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lomé Agreement
were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the
Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith
by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled
that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an
understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including certain
international crimes.
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and
obligations regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach
determined under international law which will also provide principle means of
enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable
of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lomé
Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a
factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting
through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to
an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in
international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a
peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to
peace in the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual
situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new
situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council
pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from
the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the
breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be
ascribed the same status as one which settles an international armed conflict
which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States. The Lomé
Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x"
(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and
international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a
binding character under international law.
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral
declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with all
the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution
accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia
v. France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear
tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its
President, and similar statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence,
that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the
case.182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the
international community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become
effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the
international community in issuing its public statements, viz:
43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning
legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations
of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State
making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that
intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State
being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with
the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be
bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding.
In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent
acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is
required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be
inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the
pronouncement by the State was made.
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to
take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of
being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When
States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive
interpretation is called for.
xxxx
51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the
French Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other
States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The
validity of these statements and their legal consequences must be considered
within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the
confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the
actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their
making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The
objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the international
community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking
possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic,
in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the
international community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative
may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the
statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be
bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements
would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations
arise only in peculiar circumstances.
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided
by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier
Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President of
Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be
issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending
between Mali and Burkina Faso.
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a
unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on
the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:
40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be
taken of all the factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the
Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States were
not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing
by the French Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had
‘conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to
terminate these tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the
particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not
express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is
difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with
each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct
was lawful. The circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here,
there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept
the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity
Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of
reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the
Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's
head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the
present case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral
declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine
panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international
community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and
international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected
signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as
facilitator. As held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the
conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international
organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations
in international law.
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to
such commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the
trust and confidence essential in the relations among States.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that
of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to
be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder
the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that
intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the
inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international
community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the
participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment.
Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the
Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the difficulties that
prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other countries.
That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no
intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not
be considered a unilateral declaration under international law.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the
legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave
abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of
a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an
act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress,
a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the
only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an
undue influence or interference with that process.
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own
territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so
long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus
Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any
branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the
present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the
grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001.
Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain
similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of
the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the
final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the
Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision
on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of

communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the
design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a
species of these public rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of
the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national
and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-
cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among
other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to
information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions
fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense
after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial
compliance and public scrutiny.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does
not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither
the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing
amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions
are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III,

BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA

represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented
by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr.
Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito
Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado,
GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented
by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by
Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned
Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health
Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human
Rights,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.

x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,

TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS,
JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR.

VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR,

JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE

CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R.

OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO
LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V.

SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO
A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987
Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7
of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." 6 These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. 7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the
COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition
since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims
that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an
expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent
COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the
COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition
despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as
an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the
petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor
General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary
devises to implement the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the
Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file
the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino
Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an
initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the
proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After
receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution
for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the
present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in
Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an

amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment
ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal.
The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them."
The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given
the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of
the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the
United States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all
States15 which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must
first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their
assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various
courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the

signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant
potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative
petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This
danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing
and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly
are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to
provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate
whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended
constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the
section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently,
he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote
in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and
effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which
renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth
the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full
text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a
petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative
and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must
sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure
the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the
people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed
their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral
arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to
the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in
full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of

Legislative District: Barangay:
Verified
Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein
which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support
for the filing thereof.
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number
Last Name, First MM/DD/YY
Name, M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_________________ _________________ __________________
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the
oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are
asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the
framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February
to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed
copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on
30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both.
However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August
2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started
gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25
August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the
COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal

capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of
the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as
representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present
petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S

CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP)
to adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's
Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP
Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the
majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October
2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her

Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final
report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which
militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of
Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously
agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and
Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE

MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January
2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25
August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic)
Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of
amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission24 are vastly
different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30
August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of
the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed
revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the
existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The
Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing
Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before
the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the
Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets,
six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition
together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to
the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino
Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments
alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of
Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly
reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended
petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-
gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition
together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present
petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition
is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group
first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a
signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the
act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the
registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have
understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative
filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had
pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their
Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative"
but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated
during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30
August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did
not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the
ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an
authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even
the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to
the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the
petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be

incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present
initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to,
the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundumpulls the rug from
under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to
August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition
they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in
their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the
petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated
the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000
copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty.
Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition
but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters
printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies
because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group
expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of
100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x." 25 This admission binds the Lambino
Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full
text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the
signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty
one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty.
Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000
signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space
for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the
attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a
great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the
signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to
the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one
million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed
changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the
signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from
a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the
text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition"
envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not
see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature
and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are
almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary
elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration
of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's
signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were
proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The
people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the
people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would
be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007
local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended
petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election
of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held
simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for
the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying
the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could
have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials."
This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next
local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the
word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of
office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond
their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of
regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty.
Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty.
Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present
initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino
and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed
changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe
that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature
sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions,
provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a
strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the
Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision
invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this
as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same
petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the
entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one
of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and
not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of
Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling,"

which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The
very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the
electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic
explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate
fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the
instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to
state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed
amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the
Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-
subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or
the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage,
and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-
by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or
supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while
remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to
the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present
their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read
the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for
amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or
revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who
signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim
Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the
proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section
4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the
Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising
again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific
amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why
there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the
dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative
is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and
effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30
August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the
interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010.
However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of
Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than
that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister
exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections
for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present
members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures
would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that
their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's
choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic
fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the
nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden
from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do
not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the
people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to
comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must
be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution
and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.

people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third
mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as
shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant
to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative.
This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission
of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a

separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of
Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand
into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was
the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would
only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment

on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined
by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus,
in McFadden v. Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x

x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and
amendments to the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a
constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed
by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the
scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before
us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present
state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to
the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and
the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be
amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other
change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself
recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is
obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section
1. The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the constitution
drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to
receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article
XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the
plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be

submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed
at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments.
There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a
deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in

the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost
invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is
universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly
manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the
people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may
alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-
imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from
its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ―
that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition
should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental
difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature,
and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people
that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial
entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the
other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change
within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry
out the purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is
also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution
just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan
also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of
check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and
not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two
articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the
basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the
legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On
the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the
changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution.
Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The
guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to
what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system
to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State
constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on
whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would
x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking
down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for
a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution
but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government,
which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the
nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American
form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of
government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but
would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by
the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to
submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and
conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the
people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of
this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1
of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be
other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and
many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to
eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant,
homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we
were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43(Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The
Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it
also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not
even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that
would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino
Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be
affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. 44 There is no doubt that
the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is
only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative
body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called
"revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes.
However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an
"occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly
provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and
constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for
"amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is
based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in
general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution
because that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the
legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the
same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the
difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the
process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting
the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot
reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in
the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted
the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes
would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the
proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as
private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law
of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution
are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and
language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves
scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the
form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential
mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the
Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical
structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions
have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution
proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a
procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but
it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the
constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the
distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and
subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal
overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far
reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts
on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship
with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot
measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial
court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the
ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit
revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court
concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative,
because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1,
relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the
initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar
sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only
section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it
excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure
before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not
apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of
the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments
and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and
difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative
is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present
initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles
of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment
and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15
years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of
mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to
the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect
the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three
branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the
far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A
change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or
"theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of
government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as
well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-
balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,

a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A
revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with
those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be
deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a
prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However,
the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of
construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision
"shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect
is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily
conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a
"surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that
the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is
not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory

Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the
proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be
resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's

proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models,
which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government ―
the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which
have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that
they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form
of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the
Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of
the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross
absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to
this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system
of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which
effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case
before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical
consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on
initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present
petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present
initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before
complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the
"petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of
the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the
people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of
30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B.
Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels
for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino
Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature
sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with
the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino
Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No
petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x."
The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than
one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate.
Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino
Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed
this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is
attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright
dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be
attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this
Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June
10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and
obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly
amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and
revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered
waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows
today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes,
tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the
same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for
the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes
cast53 − approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That
approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's
sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising
the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino
Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their
sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-
constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding
the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect
the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot
override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Otherwise, the Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring
stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political
groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the
bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino
Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition
with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her
Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group
thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of
incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The
Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court
exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative,
propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to
allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this
Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity and certainly no
liberty.
Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties' respective
arguments -- both oral and written -- as well as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions
submitted by my esteemed colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present Petition must be
dismissed.
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with my previous
Opinions and votes on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to change the
Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined "that taken together and interpreted
properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and
Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
__________________
'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall
be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist.
It is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the
patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should
reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of
initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of
initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do
the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,

the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes —
intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough
provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the
inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo
J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of
the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no
longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en
banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that
"provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to
facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in
Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives
ought to be rejected."
"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of
this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And
pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such
Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the
incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson
Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution."
__________________
E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B.
Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from
the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an
honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.
"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and
local legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis
for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law,
R.A. 6735.
"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the
Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300
provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's
power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa

Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and
the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such
restraining order as against private respondents should not have been issued, in the first
place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and
government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has
no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose
amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free
assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from
speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent
Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your
right to say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice
Holmes wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'
Epilogue
"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative,
like referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power.
Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty.
They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as
Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec,3 I joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a
unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in
dismissing the petition filed by
__________________
Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties
in Santiago, nonetheless the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY
petition, not just the Delfin petition which was the immediate subject of said case. As a
dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred in
rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec for
complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the
land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the
Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and
would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard
of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the
Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in
said law are satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation
of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
vests upon the Comelec the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The
Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the electoral body to "promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the
Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x." Finally and most relevantly,
Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec "to promulgate rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."
"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at
the right time and for the right reason." Let me explain further.
The Right Thing
"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens may
avail themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino
constitutional system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value and worth in our
legal firmament when it implored Congress "not to tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right (of initiative) of the
people x x x." Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs.
Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996], this Court unanimously held that
"(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of
expressing popular
PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago Decision.
__________________
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to
nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise."
The Right Way

"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and
interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA
6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement,
effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution." Let me now
demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms, the steps to be
taken – the right way – to amend the Constitution through a people's initiative.
"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the petition
which shall contain the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec.
5(c) thereof, the petition shall state the following:
'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x

x x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100)
words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition.'
"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition include a
formal designation of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.
"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition

precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite
signatures, the Commission shall motu proprio reject the petition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may
thence file the petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency
thereof and to verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits and voters' identification cards. In deciding whether the petition is sufficient, the
Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it consists
of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the electoral body
may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice.
I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec
Resolution 2300 will not ipso
__________________
"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its
sufficiency, the Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. The
conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than
ninety (90) days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The
proposition, if approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of RA
6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA
petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it.
Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of elective officials --
constitute a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This
question is relevant considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in
the 1995 national elections was voided after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997,
while the new list may be used starting only in the elections of May 1998.
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from the
people who signed the petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term extension
who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified
warm bodies comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?
"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason. Question
Nos. 1 and 2 above, while important, are basically legal in character and can be
determined by argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4 involves not
only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This to my mind is the
crucible, the litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by
PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just alleging -- that six million voters of this country
indeed want to amend the Constitution, what power on earth can stop them? Not this
Court, not the Comelec, not even the President or Congress.
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the
Constitution. Far from it." I stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among others:
__________________
"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very
rafters and foundations of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On
the other hand, PIRMA and its co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered six
million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million signatures are fraudulent,
then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a signature-verification process
conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.
"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a citizen
of this country, would like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on
an entirely new doctrine of statutory inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the
quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA
6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does
the clamor for the proposed change to the Constitution really emanate from the people
who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term extension who are
in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interests? In other
words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to initiative being done in accordance with our
Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted exercise legitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with referendum,
as the 'ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and
misfeasance.' In Subic Bay, we specified that 'initiative is entirely the work of the
electorate x x x a process of lawmaking by the people themselves without the
participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives.' As ponente
of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare on this principle: The right to amend through
initiative belongs only to the people – not to the government and its minions. This
principle finds clear support from utterances of many constitutional commissioners like
those quoted below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied with
the National Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback position of the people in the event
that they are dissatisfied." -- Commissioner Ople
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if the
legislature is not as responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner
Gascon
(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials -- "constitute[s] a mere
amendment and not a revision of the Constitution."
_________________
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the people
[which] should not be frivolously resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo
"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it, our
Charter itself provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional
convention or constituting Congress into a constituent assembly. These are officialdom's
weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.
"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's organizations
or are they merely fronts for incumbents who want to extend their terms? This is a
factual question which, unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered anymore, because
the Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements it, RA 6735, is inadequate
or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions are concerned. With such ruling,
the majority effectively abrogated a constitutional right of our people. That is why in my
Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such precipitate action "is equivalent to
burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him
of pain." I firmly maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is no need to "burn" the
constitutional right to initiative. If PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can be exposed
as such in the ways I have discussed – short of abrogating the right itself. On the other
hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate – if it hurdles the four issues I
outlined earlier – by all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's
theory of statutory inadequacy has pre-empted – unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view
– any judicial determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest
for truth into the interstices of the PIRMA petition.
The Right Time
"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be proposed.
Section 2 of Article XVII precludes amendments "within five years following [its]
ratification x x x nor oftener than once every five years thereafter." Since its ratification,
the 1987 Constitution has never been amended. Hence, the five-year prohibition is now
inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed at any time.
"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present circumstances – that there is no more
time to lift term limits to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls.
Between today and the next national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really belong to qualified
warm bodies comprising at
__________________
elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the
sufficiency of RA 6735 was resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two
(2) months to decide the motion for reconsideration. The instant case, where the same
issue is also raised by the petitioners, took two months, not counting a possible motion
for reconsideration. These time spans could not be abbreviated any further, because
due process requires that all parties be given sufficient time to file their pleadings.
"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 – as I
believe it should – and allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-
month period will not be enough to tackle the four weighty issues I mentioned earlier,
considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The Comelec's decision
on any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, and reconsiderations
on our decisions on each of those issues may again be sought.
"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is
enormously time-consuming, considering that any person may question the authenticity
of each and every signature, initially before the election registrar, then before the
Comelec on appeal and finally, before this Court in a separate proceeding. Moreover,
the plebiscite itself – assuming such stage can be reached – may be scheduled only
after sixty (60) but not more than ninety (90) days, from the time the Comelec and this
Court, on appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.
"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations or

coalitions may start selecting their official candidates for President, Vice President and
Senators on November 27, 1997; the period for filing certificates of candidacy is from
January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period and campaign for national officials
start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other elective officials, on
March 17, 1998. This means, by the time PIRMA's proposition is ready – if ever – for
submission directly to the voters at large, it will have been overcome by the elections.
Time will simply run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for the 1998
elections.
"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's
initiative does not detract one whit from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient
and adequate to implement this constitutional right and, more important, (2) my faith in
the power of the people to initiate changes in local and national laws and the
Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even more
serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free from the din and distraction of the
1998 elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but, more so,
for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by way of epilogue, my
unbending credo in favor of our people's right to initiative.
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented
by at least 3% of the registered voters therein."
__________________
Epilogue
"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.
"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people to
express their will and chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution,
internal chaos and civil strife. It is an inherent right of the people – as basic as the right
to elect, the right to self-determination and the right to individual liberties. I believe that
Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of
initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their
posterity.
"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular
official or group of officials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to
democracy. My firm conviction that there is an adequate law implementing the
constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the victory of the PIRMA
petition or of any proposed constitutional change. There are, after all, sufficient
safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right and to forestall its
misuse and abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution, only to
amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be validated against an existing list of
voters and/or voters' identification cards. Third, initiative is a reverse power of and by the
people, not of incumbent officials and their machinators. Fourth and most important of
all, the signatures must be verified as real and genuine; not concocted, fictitious or
fabricated. The only legal way to do this is to enable the Commission on Elections to
conduct a nationwide verification process as mandated by the Constitution and the law.
Such verification, it bears stressing, is subject to review by this Court.
"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at
EDSA in 1986, and yet they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times
that number, not just from the National Capital Region but from all over the country. Is
this claim through the invention of its novel theory of statutory insufficiency, the Court's
majority has stifled the only legal method of determining whether PIRMA is real or not,
whether there is indeed a popular clamor to lift term limits of elected officials, and
whether six million voters want to initiate amendments to their most basic law. In
suppressing a judicial answer to such questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded
to PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of legality and regularity. In its misplaced
zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously
divested the people of a basic constitutional right.
In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative] in the right way
at the right time and for the right reason."
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions

in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested against them, the present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico
Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is being rushed in
the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me explain.
No Grave Abuse
of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino Petition.
After all, the Commission merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail.
This mission is undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to
build the pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process of adversarial
litigation is the verity of facts and the application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out
in this mission of discovery, our country and our people have been deprived not only of a
basic constitutional right, as earlier noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the
truth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the system."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any
jurisprudence.4 Neither can whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to
the Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently followed this Court's jurisprudence
in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very
difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion
to the poll body with respect to that action.6
The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in 1997. The
differences pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It is
argued that, unlike the present Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not contain verified signatures.
These are distinctions that do not make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a
remand, because the verification issue is "contentious" and remains unproven by
petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino Petitions contain unverified
signatures. Therefore, they both deserve the same treatment: DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec was that
the Commission had "only complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason
given by Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one
argued, even remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed because the
signatures were unverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the

number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is
jurisdictional.7 Without those signatures, the Comelec shall motu proprio reject the petition."
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the
exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in
accord with this Court's pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no discretion,
under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this Court.8 The refusal of
the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its only recourse. Any other mode of action
would appear not only presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have constituted
defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and
contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter of justiciable
controversies.
Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons given in my
Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to implement an
initiative to amend the Constitution, still, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
Comelec for merely following prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its ruling in
question.
Only Amendments,
Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an
initiative to change the Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's
reading of the basic law.9
I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary and the
form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of the structure
of government. The ponencia has amply demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and
the executive branches under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any legal test and under
any jurisdiction," will "radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have an overall implication on the entire
Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important and basic provisions. The prolixity and
complexity of the changes cannot be categorized, even by semantic generosity, as
"amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or
amendments) may be proposed only through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional
convention. Under the third mode -- people's initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many of
the justices' Opinions have cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of their
respective positions. I will not add to the woes of the reader by reiterating them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is
found in the Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change can
be drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and agreed upon after a mature and
democratic debate in a deliberative body like Congress or a Convention. The changes
proposed must necessarily be scrutinized, as their adoption or non-adoption must result from
an informed judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had
to spend many months of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of voting
before they could agree on the wordings covering the philosophy, the underlying principles, and
the structure of government of our Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local governments take
several weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and debating before Congress can approve
them. How much more when it comes to constitutional changes?
A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to parliamentary-

unicameral is monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this fact. So, why should a
revision be rammed down our people's throats without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a
deliberative assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735 expressly
prohibiting petitions for initiative from "embracing more than one subject matter."10 The present
initiative covers at least two subjects: (1) the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of
government; and (2) the change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. 11 Thus, even
under Republic Act 6735 -- the law that Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and valid -- the
Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds

Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional
requirement that it be supported by at least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of
which at least 3 percent of the registered voters in every legislative district must be represented.
As pointed out by Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a
failure to meet the minimum percentages required.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements
involve "contentious facts," which have not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is
urging a remand to the Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself
mandates the said requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not
show the required percentages is fatally defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin
Petition was, in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void and
unconstitutional. It points out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional
requirement that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people. Specifically, the ponencia
has amply established that petitioners were unable to show that the Lambino Petition contained,
or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the
Commission, the Petition must still be dismissed for proposing a revision, not an
amendment, in gross violation of the Constitution. At the very least, it proposes more than
one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.
Summation
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the words of Justice
Puno who supports them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."
I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA that
"initiative is a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart their
history. x x x. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves,
to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and
their posterity."
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to change the
Constitution, because the present Petition violates the following:
· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions, and
requires definite percentages of verified signatures)
· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more than one
subject)
· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under
consideration on the ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not gravely
abused its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile. More
tellingly, it is a cop-out, a hand-washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of
finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the issues head on, because the people expect no
less from this august and venerable institution of supreme justice.
Epilogue
At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative, like referendum and
recall, is a treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our world-
admired and often-imitated People Power, but its misuse and abuse must be resolutely
rejected. Democracy must be cherished, but mob rule vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the people,
between each individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly
expressed their will that all of them shall be governed by laws, and their rights limited by agreed-
upon covenants to promote the common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of Law and reject
the rule of the mob, we must faithfully abide by the processes the Constitution has
ordained in order to bring about a peaceful, just and humane society.
Assuming arguendo that six million people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed changes
in the Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the social covenant -- the present
Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority almost twenty years ago. 14 I do not
denigrate the majesty of the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest perch,
because our government must remain as one of laws and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to uphold
the Constitution. Being the protectors of the fundamental law as the highest expression of the
sovereign will, they must subject to the strictest scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be
trivialized and degraded by the assaults of the mob and of ill-conceived designs. The
Court must single-mindedly defend the Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to
the sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged against
incessant voices from the more powerful branches of government, it should never cower in
submission. On the other hand, I daresay that the same weakness of the Court becomes its
strength when it speaks independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the supremacy
of the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of
brute power, but in its moral courage to perform its constitutional duty at all times against all
odds. Its might is in its being right.15
During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes about
alleged carrots offered and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this case.16 There
being no judicial proof of these allegations, I shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to
quote the Good Book, which says, "There is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and
nothing secret that will not be known and come to light."17
Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and
each of its members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or
even a thousand years -- from now, what the Court did here, and how each justice opined and
voted, will still be talked about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius
Pilate, the abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to this
day.
Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the
nation and the world for its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q.

SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR. and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A.
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the Court's
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC1 is not a binding precedent. However, it is my position that even
if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient law for
the purpose of people's initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition for initiative in this case
must nonetheless be dismissed.
There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735, even as they
blindly invoke the said law to justify their alleged people's initiative. Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735
requires that "[a] petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein." On the other hand, Section 5(c)2 of the same law requires that the petition
should state, among others, the proposition3 or the "contents or text of the proposed law sought
to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to apply Section 5(c) to
an initiative to amend the Constitution, as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by
the required number of voters should incorporate therein a text of the proposed changes to the
Constitution. However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere 100,000 copies
of the text of the proposed changes to the Constitution. According to him, these were
subsequently distributed to their agents all over the country, for attachment to the sheets of
paper on which the signatures were to be affixed. Upon being asked, however, if he in fact knew
whether the text was actually attached to the signature sheets which were distributed for
signing, he said that he merely assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell the
Court for certain whether their representatives complied with this requirement.
The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this Court, indubitably
establish that the full text of the proposed changes was not attached to the signature sheets. All
that the signature sheets contained was the general proposition and abstract, which falls short
of the full text requirement of R.A. 6735.
The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the petition for
initiative to be signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article XVII,
Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally states that "[a]mendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein." Evidently, for
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know
exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that they merely possess a general idea of the
proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a "direct" proposal by the people.
Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the constitutional right of
initiative to Congress, it might be noted that they themselves reasonably assumed that the draft
of the proposed constitutional amendments would be shown to the people during the process of
signature gathering. Thus –
MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides: "upon petition of
at least 10 percent of the registered voters." How will we determine that 10 percent has
been achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire, is it by signature?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.
MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready
to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.4
It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735, the full text of the
proposed changes must necessarily be stated in or attached to the initiative petition. The
signatories to the petition must be given an opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and
effect of the proposed changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-informed
choice on the matter.
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes in
the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception. If the whole text of the
proposed changes is contained in or attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be
duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the people
and that the signatories have been fully apprised of its implications.
If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or deception in the initiative
and referendum process, such provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and
failure to substantially comply therewith is fatal.5 The failure of petitioners in this case to comply
with the full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally defective.
The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule
under Section 10(a) of R.A. 6735:
SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.— The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x
x
The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same object
and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)6 of the
Constitution.7 To elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to do away with the
practice of inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one
provision would be compelled to adopt the others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of
both provisions could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing alone, could
succeed on its own merits.
As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent
surprise and fraud on the electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative
process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are concealed within the terms of the proposed
amendment. This in turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope
and purpose of the proposed amendment.
Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for initiative relate only to
one subject matter, that is – the shift from presidential to a parliamentary system of government.
According to petitioners, all of the other proposed changes are merely incidental to this main
proposal and are reasonably germane and necessary thereto.8An examination of the text of the
proposed changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.
The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the main
proposal espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift from the presidential to a parliamentary
form of government, the proposed changes include the abolition of one House of
Congress,9 and the convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to
the Constitution.10 Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration that those
constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent with the unicameral-
parliamentary form of government, shall be deemed amended to conform thereto.
It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the
form of government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to
the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary system
of government does not necessarily result in the adoption of a unicameral legislature. A
parliamentary system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms of government, which may or
may not embrace unicameralism.11 In other words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary
structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor effect of the
other.
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed change in
our system of government. As a subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to
amend the Constitution presents a range of issues that is far removed from the subject of a shift
in government. Besides, the constituent assembly is supposed to convene and propose
amendments to the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of government has
already taken place. This only goes to show that the convening of the constituent assembly is
not necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system of government.
The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are inconsistent with a
unicameral-parliamentary system of government shall be deemed amended is equally
bothersome. The statement does not specify what these inconsistencies and amendments may
be, such that everyone is left to guess the provisions that could eventually be affected by the
proposed changes. The subject and scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be
spelled out with certainty. There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the other
constitutional provisions.
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people's initiative under Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution. Taken together, the proposed changes indicate that the
intendment is not simply to effect substantial amendments to the Constitution, but a revision
thereof. The distinction between an amendment and revision was explained by Dean Vicente G.
Sinco, as follows:
"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different

portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole
constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions.
But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act
of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention
and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to
determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document
should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few
specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of
changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is
to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed
essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem
obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect."12
The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has
indeed guided us throughout our constitutional history. However, the distinction between the two
terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context of our past constitutions, as it should be
now under the 1987 Constitution. The reason for this is apparent. Under our past constitutions,
it was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional
convention, that exercised authority to either amend or revise the Constitution through the
procedures therein described. Although the distinction between the two terms was theoretically
recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to highlight the difference
was not as material because it was only Congress that could effect constitutional changes by
choosing between the two modalities.
However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for the two modes
of either Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional
convention, a third mode was introduced for proposing changes to the Constitution. This mode
refers to the people's right to propose amendments to the fundamental law through the filing of
a petition for initiative.
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under the past
constitutions is not determinative of what the two terms mean now, as related to the exercise of
the right to propose either amendments or revision. The changes introduced to both the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 could have indeed been deemed an amendment or
revision, but the authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since the
same belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly limits the right of
the people to directly propose constitutional changes to amendments only. We must
consequently not be swayed by examples of constitutional changes effected prior to the present
fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are revisory or amendatory in nature.
In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary13 related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a
completely new charter proposed by a constitutional convention. The authority or right of the
constitutional convention itself to effect such a revision was not put in issue in that case. As far
as determining what constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a people's initiative, therefore,
we have neither relevant precedent nor prior experience. We must thus confine ourselves to
Dean Sinco's basic articulation of the two terms.
It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may either be of the whole or only part
of the Constitution. The part need not be a substantial part as a change may qualify as a
revision even if it only involves some of the important provisions. For as long as the intention
and plan to be carried out contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution
"to determine which should be altered or suppressed, or whether the whole document should be
replaced with an entirely new one," the proposed change may be deemed a revision and not
merely an amendment.
Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the same may be
considered as either an amendment or revision. In so determining, another overriding factor is
the "original intention and plan authorized to be carried out" by the proposed changes. If the
same relates to a re-examination of the entire document to see which provisions remain
relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on the entire document, then the same constitutes a
revision and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative and qualitative
test is necessary in assessing what may be considered as an amendment or revision. It is not
enough that we focus simply on the physical scope of the proposed changes, but also consider
what it means in relation to the entire document. No clear demarcation line can be drawn to
distinguish the two terms and each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own
peculiar conditions. The determination lies in assessing the impact that the proposed changes
may have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of the specific
provisions which it seeks to affect.
In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the
combination of quantitative and qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional changes, in
order to determine whether the same is revisory or merely amendatory. In that case,
the McFadden court found the proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles
contained in the California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or substantially
altered, and four new topics would be introduced. However, it went on to consider the qualitative
effects that the proposed initiative measure would have on California's basic plan of
government. It observed that the proposal would alter the checks and balances inherent in
such plan, by delegating far-reaching and mixed powers to an independent commission
created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the proposal in McFadden was not only
deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a substantive
effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of California.
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California Supreme
Court in Raven v. Deukmeijan.15 Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case was called,
would vest in the United States Supreme Court all judicial interpretative powers of the California
courts over fundamental criminal defense rights in that state. It was observed that although
quantitatively, the proposition did "not seem so extensive as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions," the
same, nonetheless, "would substantially alter the substance and integrity of the state
Constitution as a document of independent force and effect." Quoting Amador Valley Joint
Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization,16 the Raven court said:
". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and amendments
involving many constitutional articles, 'even a relatively simple enactment may
accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision also…[A]n enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in
the Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either to the length or
complexity of the measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by such
change.'" (Underscoring supplied and citations omitted)
Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines both the
quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposed measure on its constitutional scheme.
Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a revision.17
I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner. The experience of
the courts in California is not far removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco
when he set out to differentiate between amendment and revision. It is actually consistent, not
only with our traditional concept of the two terms, but also with the mindset of our constitutional
framers when they referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.18 We must thus
consider whether the proposed changes in this case affect our Constitution in both its
substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are simple
or substantial, amount to a revision as to be excluded from the people's right to directly
propose amendments to the fundamental law?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of
the proposed changes. These tests are consistent with Dean Sinco's traditional concept of
amendment and revision when he explains that, quantitatively, revision "may result in the
rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its
provisions." In any case, he continues, "the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is
the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out." Unmistakably, the latter statement
refers to the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.
It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the proponents in this
case will affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely,
Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), as well as provisions
that will ensure the smooth transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a parliamentary-
unicameral structure of government. The quantitative effect of the proposed changes is neither
broad nor extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.
However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious qualitative consequences
on the Constitution. The initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic
governmental plan, but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to government. The
proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will strike at the very foundation of our
basic constitutional plan. It is therefore an impermissible constitutional revision that may not be
effected through a people's initiative.
Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from the
presidential to the parliamentary system. An examination of their proposal reveals that there will
be a fusion of the executive and legislative departments into one parliament that will be elected
on the basis of proportional representation. No term limits are set for the members of parliament
except for those elected under the party-list system whose terms and number shall be provided
by law. There will be a President who shall be the head of state, but the head of government is
the Prime Minister. The latter and his cabinet shall be elected from among the members of
parliament and shall be responsible to parliament for the program of government.
The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the executive and
legislature shall be one and the same, such that parliament will be the paramount governing
institution. What this implies is that there will be no separation between the law-making and
enforcement powers of the state, that are traditionally delineated between the executive and
legislature in a presidential form of government. Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent
in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential system will be eliminated. The workings of
government shall instead be controlled by the internal political dynamics prevailing in the
parliament.
Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the three
branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the
executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the application of laws. This separation
is intended to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group that might lead to an
irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. In the
words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to secure action, to
forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain efficiency.19
In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal institutional checks on
the legislative and executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the
members of his cabinet are drawn from parliament. There are no effective limits to what the
Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority. This goes
against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme that distributes the powers of
government and provides for counteraction among the three branches. Although both the
presidential and parliamentary systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional
democracy, the underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are nonetheless
radically different.
Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government cannot be

regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will require a total overhaul of our governmental
structure and involve a re-orientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-
up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure.20 It cannot, by any standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional
amendment.
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or
to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific
portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision,
however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for
the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be
altered.21 (Underscoring supplied)
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of
the proponents to effect even more far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the original
intent were to simply shift the form of government to the parliamentary system, then there would
have been no need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose further amendments
to the Constitution. It should be noted that, once convened, a constituent assembly can do away
and replace any constitutional provision which may not even have a bearing on the shift to a
parliamentary system of government. The inclusion of such a proposal reveals the proponents'
plan to consider all provisions of the constitution, either to determine which of its provisions
should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one.
Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the alleged people's
initiative. The proposal to convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory,
will practically jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds. The
plan of the proponents, as reflected in their proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of
government from the presidential to the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to
the "fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state."
To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government is therefore a
fallacy. To repeat, the combined effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those
pertaining to the Transitory Provisions under Article XVIII indubitably establish the intent and
plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the constitutions of liberty and sovereignty.
Indeed, no valid reason exists for authorizing further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution if the intention of the proposed changes is truly what it purports to be.
There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be undertaken through
a people's initiative and not a revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution itself. This
conclusion is inevitable especially from a comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to
Sections 1 and 4 of Article XVII, which state:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
xxxx
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the certification by the Commission of Elections of the sufficiency of the
petition. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution is limited to
amendments and does not include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it would have been
unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to distinguish its scope from the rights vested in Congress
under Section 1. The latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both amendments and a
revision of the Constitution by either convening a constituent assembly or calling for a
constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other hand, textually commits to the people the right
to propose only amendments by direct action.
To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments amounting to revision

obliterates the clear distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may
be seen from a cursory perusal of the above provisions, is to provide differing fields of
application for the three modes of effecting changes to the Constitution. We need not even
delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to see that the distinction in scope is definitely
marked. We should thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard for this distinction.
Again, McFadden22 is instructive:
". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately it is
between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each
procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be
understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be x x x a mere alternative
procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to denote,
respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its
procedure. The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear when they adopted
article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark
of a constitutional convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or any other)
revision, that they understood that there was a real difference between amendment and
revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of
1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the
distinction appears to be x x x scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the
amendment x x x that the power to propose and vote on "amendments to the
Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while leaving
unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to constitutional revision, which
revisional power and procedure, it will be remembered, had already been specifically
treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors' contention--that any change less than a
total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so
carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of amendment, as
contrasted with revision, of the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own
facts."
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution, with
the provisions on amendments and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our people
cannot be any clearer when they limited people's initiative to mere amendments of the
fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope. In this regard, the task of the Court is to
give effect to the people's voice, as expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of sovereignty" because it

defines the constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of the people." It is through these provisions
that the sovereign people have allowed the expression of their sovereign will and have
canalized their powers which would otherwise be plenary. By approving these provisions, the
sovereign people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in the exercise of
their sovereign power.23 They are thus bound by the constitution and are powerless, whatever
their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through the means prescribed by the
Constitution itself.24
It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution through
people's initiative because their representatives, whose power is merely delegated, may do
so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a provision delegating the
sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a
self-limitation on that sovereign power. In the words of Cooley:
x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign
powers to the several departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the
sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do
so, a power to control the governments they create, and the three departments are
responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them. But
this control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed
upon. The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force
only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have
prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with the
Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute; and if by any
portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the
regular working of the agencies of government at any other time or in any other mode
than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be
revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by the officers who, for
the time being, represent legitimate government.25 (Underscoring supplied)
Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source." Nor is it one where
the people's sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser plane than that of Congress. In
choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of even a fraction of the
sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign
power. The people have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power by virtue of the
Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if
the people choose to defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a
revolutionary situation.26
It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican state.27 Even as
we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and
foremost, we are a constitutional democracy. To uphold direct democracy at the expense of
the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse.
This is clearly beyond the powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and
keeper of the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. NO. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND
VICTORINO F. BALAIS,petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III,
BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-
intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FROUM,
MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS,LEONARDO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO,
AND DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, oppositors-intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA,
TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS,
JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS AND AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R.
OSMENA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM, AND PANFILO M. LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-
intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-
intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR AND RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR,
JR., oppositor-intervenor;
G.R. NO. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q.

SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
SR. AND COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER
DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
CONCURRING OPINION
SANDOVAL–GUTIERREZ, J.:
Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised in
choosing one's battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one's cause. In its original context,
the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently
taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, "nec
audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae
proxima sit," meaning, "And those people should not be listened to who keep on saying,
'The voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the riotousness of the crowd is always
very close to madness."1 Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin
phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies – that they may reflect upon
the sincerity and authenticity of their "people's initiative."
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were
waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justified – all these transpired as man boasted of
God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this
Court that the people's initiative is the "voice of the people" and, therefore, the "voice of God."
After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his
ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God. It is against this
kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.
The facts of the case are undisputed.

In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

than once every five years thereafter,
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria
Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto
Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative
for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents."2 The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners,
holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative
and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5)
subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of
R.A. No. 6735.
On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One
(1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the
thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority
opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.3
A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case,
entitled People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on
Elections4 on the ground that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed PIRMA's Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution "it
appearing that that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court in
G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-examine
its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred,
but on the different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such re-
examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed
amendments to the Constitution, which entail a change in the form of government
from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law,
to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand
inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district
shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and
each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one
year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of
five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list
system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty
per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended
to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive
power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The
Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from
among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of
government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-

Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a
new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the
expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to
exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two
thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case
of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent
President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers
and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary
system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all
references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to
"Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all
references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime
Minister."
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which
are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with
Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a
unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to
"Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives"
shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim
Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have
been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the
Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and
shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside
over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from
among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent
with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from
among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall
oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as
may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament
which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local
government officials. The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and
perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the
abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987
Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to
a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency,
simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with
the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter, they
filed an Amended Petition alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and
together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the
signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters
appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered
voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per
cent (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election
officers.
Several organizations opposed the petition. 6
In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition, citing
as basis this Court's ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it "from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system."
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court set aside the
COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter tocomply with Section 4, Article XVII of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x
ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of
the petition.
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of Mar-
len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman
and Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished for contempt7 of court
for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the
present petition hinges on this singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of
discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the
basis of this Court's Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate
yardstick is the attendance of "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in
grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility.8
The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the
basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as
"capricious or whimsical," "patent and gross," or "arbitrary and despotic." On the contrary,
it was the most prudent course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court
permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted." It being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law,
respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is vulnerable
to a citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (then
Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:9
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed
with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the
highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute
grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse
open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the
Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts,
tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to
its pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any
justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings.10 As a warning to lower court judges
who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,11 held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases,
that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of
reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather
than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that
it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that
any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a
sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if
despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then
he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly
avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he
has only one legal way to do that.
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition of
Lambino, et al. for it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.
Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that its ruling
in Santiago is the established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in invoking it, thus:
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience and
respect to the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago
It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or eight (8) Justices
(as against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the
motion for reconsideration was denied via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not
mean that the Decision was overturned. It only shows that the opposite view fails to muster
enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was
upheld.13 In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14 this Court ruled that the
denial of a motion or reconsideration signifies that the ground relied upon have been
found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to
warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.
With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative, petitioners
persistently stress that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.
I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates "stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is settled."15 As used in our jurisprudence, it means that
"once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same as in the earlier controversy."16
There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad
one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability
and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in
his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the
opposite way between another. 'If a group of cases involves the same point, the
parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I
was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To
decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it
would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to
precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in
the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.17
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by
considering the observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes
injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in
similar circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In
this case, the cry of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and
unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all
between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as
charged.18
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling
prior decisions, "It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent
usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently
by the current justices. This policy x x x 'is based on the assumption that certainty,
predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e.,
that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with
reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.19 Accordingly, a party urging overruling
a precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a
number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and
private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here,
petitioners failed to discharge their task.
Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9)
years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law
professors, law students, the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized this Court's Decision
as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the subsequent case
of PIRMA. Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been
introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be
overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Court's
conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned
remains a precedent and must be upheld.
III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not mere amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2) A Constitutional Convention.

number of registered votes, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the
people can directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the
distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process.
This is not so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a
revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system of people's
initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII
covers only amendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
to the mandate given us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative which came about
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the

amendment yield to a few questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment

on line I refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined
by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision"
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to
examine whether petitioners' proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not
revisions.
The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the
following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The
Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It
further includes Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly
transition from the bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the Philippines
to an Interim National Assembly; change in the terms of Members of Parliament; and the
election of a Prime Minister who shall be vested with executive power.
Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence, within
the coverage of a "people's initiative."
I disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as
follows:

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts
or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress
specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-
examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have
over-all implications for the document to determine how and to what extent they
should be altered.21
Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two
must be based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court
of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in

the charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential
difference between them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without

obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to
fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine
the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired
changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the
general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its
purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a
correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government
may be accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve
statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.23 However, as in
Maine law, where the statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter
amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change in the form of
government of a home rule city may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by
its amendment."24
In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and scheme would
probably be interpreted as a "revision" and should be achieved through the more thorough
process of deliberation.
Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific
provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes
will alter the very structure of our government and create multifarious ramifications. In
other words, the proposed changes will have a "domino effect" or, more appropriately, "ripple
effect" on other provisions of the Constitution.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect changes
in the Constitution includes the power to amend anysection in such a manner that the proposed
change, if approved, would "be complete within itself, relate to one subject and not
substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or require further
amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose."25 This is clearly not the case
here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well-
enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by
providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of
government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect
support of the Parliament, as expressed through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this
doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that
any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through
ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for
that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative measure
now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision
of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere
amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter27:
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide
for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of
the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic
in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole
pattern of the government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on
government.
Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments,
especially, with the inclusion of the following "omnibus provision":
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a

unicameral-Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions" which shall read, as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article VII
shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,unless
they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be
deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system of
government x x x x x x .
xxxxxxxxx
Section 4. (1) x x x
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim Parliament
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent
The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other provisions of the
Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of
government. With one sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise some
provisions of the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court to
be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote
the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles
and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed.
It purports only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include the
omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any section, subsection,
sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of
this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such
conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative
measure now before us is so broad that if such measure become law a substantial
revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected, then the measure may
not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention.28
Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will
only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of
revisions which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of
our form of government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are
connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has been
held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the
provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of
the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a
convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed."29
I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the
Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father Bernas
expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which one
can easily glean from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in the
1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is to formulate the
revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is
nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional structure. Who were
involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued? What records are there for
future use in interpreting the provisions which may be found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are

reached after much purifying debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the public has
the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an authorized body has been
completed that it is presented to the electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is
important because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it even
sight unseen.30
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

than once every five years thereafter,
On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is
imperative for its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life
into this constitutional provision. However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law
in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress
neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn, enumerating three
(3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to
initiate changes to the Constitution;
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to
use it as instrument to implement the people's initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate

the legislative intent to use it as instrument to implement people's initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives
on national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the Constitution are few,
isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on national and local legislation, where R.A.
No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their
implementation,31 however, as regards initiative on the Constitution, the law merely:
(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32
(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three
systems of initiative in Section 3;33
(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;34
(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign
the petition;35 and
(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution
may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed
out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision
in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for
a complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such as:
· Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;
· A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be

amended and the proposed amendment;
· The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any individual,

group, political party or coalition with members in the congressional district;
· The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local
language;
· Signature stations to be provided for;
· Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures
shall have been verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at
least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls where the signatures were
obtained;
· Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the

signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the
filing of said protest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating
its incompleteness and inadequacy.
V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative
VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6735
I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and inseparable. The
determination of whether petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf of
the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an examination of whether they have complied
with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution
nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
(Underscoring supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a people's
initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be present:
1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose" "amendments" to the

Constitution;
2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters;" and
3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters "must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters" of "every
legislative district."
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit of
Non-Forum Shopping" contained in their petition, they alleged under oath that they have caused
the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters "and as
representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters. This goes to show that the
questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million people who allegedly comprised
at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2.
Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures of the 6.3 million
registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed
therein "as representatives" of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition for
people's initiative contemplated by the Constitution.
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the petition "as
representatives" of the alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is
constitutionally proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the
Constitution shall be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously, the phrase
"directly proposed by the people" excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the
12% of the total number of registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people
the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by
anyone under the guise of being the people's representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not
recognize acts of representation. For it is only "the people" (comprising the minimum of 12% of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are the proper parties to initiate
a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the
COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a people's initiative.
Necessarily, it must fail.
Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's voice" is baseless
and misleading. There is no people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for
initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their
allies.
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) "the
validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their
will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of the
Petition for initiative is a purely political question;" and (2) "[t]he power to propose
amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people.
Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under
the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a political
question."
The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court in Luther v.
Borden.37 Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate
institution to define the substantive content of republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in every State resides in
the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the circumstances of the
case, a political question to be settled by the political power." In other words, the
responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to the legislative and executive
branches of the government.
The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of Rhode Island. Due to
increased migration brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the urban population of Rhode
Island increased. However, under the 1663 Royal Charter which served as the State
Constitution, voting rights were largely limited to residents of the rural districts. This severe mal-
apportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining remedies for
their disenfranchisement from the state government, suffrage reformers invoked their rights
under the American Declaration of Independence to "alter or abolish" the government and to
institute a new one. The reformers proceeded to call for and hold an extralegal constitutional
convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the document for popular ratification,
and held elections under it. The State government, however, refused to cede power, leading to
an anomalous situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing state
governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.
The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and searched the house of
Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the
US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel argued that since the State's archaic Constitution
prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances through democratic processes, the people
of Rhode Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty of
replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The US Supreme Court deemed the
controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate for judicial resolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket" to
describe situations where Federal courts should not intervene in political questions which they
have neither the competence nor the commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme
Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in Illinois "as a
political question and that the invalidation of the districts might, in requiring statewide
elections, create an evil greater than that sought to be remedied."
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket," nonetheless, it has
sought to come up with a definition of the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v.
Avelino,39 this Court ruled that properly, political questions are "those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government." In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,40 the Court held that the
term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr42 in
determining whether a question before it is political, rather than judicial in nature, to wit:
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a

coordinate political department; or
2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent resolution

without expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of government; or
5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already

made; or
6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on one question.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court.
Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are political in
nature, it is not precluded from resolving them under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it
by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, following Daza v. Singson.43 As pointed out
in Marcos v. Manglapus,44 the present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would have
normally and ordinarily left to the political departments to decide.
CONCLUSION
In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the so-called
people's initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our
politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in this case, that the
6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In fact,
petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and the proposed
amendments were not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means
of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what petitioners and
their group asked them to sign.
Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary.45 The Court then ruled that "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect," although it had
notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly
ratified by the people in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among
others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies "was and is null and void ab initio."
That was during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the dictator.
Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no reason why
this Court should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called people's
initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present government
structure. Consequent1y, we must not change it. America has a presidential type of
government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has become a super power. It is then safe to conclude
that what we should change are some of the people running the government, NOT the
SYSTEM.
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more
economical and more responsive government.
Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be elected as
members and leaders of the unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the Lower
House continue to hold their respective positions with limitless terms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalized?
Will it be able to provide homes for the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and
protection for the weak?
This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial with
transcendental significance. And history will judge us on how we resolve this issue – shall we
allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are duty bound to guard and revere, on the
basis of a doubtful people's initiative?
Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is a herculean

task affecting the entire Filipino people and the future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this
duty to more knowledgeable people elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.
Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances in this case,
the voice of God is not audible.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in
G.R. No. 174299.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153

VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
G.R. No. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q.

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER
DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not
commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the amended petition before it. The proposals of
petitioners incorporated in said amended petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution.
Further, the amended petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the
COMELEC a petition entitled "IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE
1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING
ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The case was
docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an amended petition. For
brevity, it is referred to as the petition for initiative.
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf and together
with those who have affixed their signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are
Filipino citizens, residents and registered voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at least
twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district
is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their
constitutional right to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of people's
initiative, as recognized in Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he Congress shall provide for
the implementation of the exercise of this right," the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along
with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,1are sufficient enabling details for the people's
exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5. Requirements. – (a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five
(5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
xxxx
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards
used in the immediately preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation to give due
course to the petition for initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for the
COMELEC to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."2
Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be
incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the
Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the
Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution denying due course
and dismissing the petition for initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case,
initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the
Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by

the people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision

needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the
constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution,
Congress enacted RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on
Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition
cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA 6735 as
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the
people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the
pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of
the people remains nothing but an "empty right," and that this Commission is
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition

for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Petitioners' Case
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO
RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION
OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS
RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10 JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE
WAS SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE,
INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189
AND EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT
DETAILS AND AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS,
EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN
EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING AND
CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.
A.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE

INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE

PEOPLE THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH

1997, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN
POWER OF INITIATIVE AND RECALL HAS BEEN INVARIABLY
UPHELD
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS

A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY
BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE

PETITION FOR INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION
OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS
SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE

INSTANT PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY

APPLIES TO THE DELFIN PETITION.
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT

OTHER STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT
GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR

PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR

PLEBISCITE.3
Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential

Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition
and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. x x x4
The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion
was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative
in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.5
There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.6 The only question involved is
jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment.7 An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.8
In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the
petition for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission
on Elections.9 In said case, the Court En Banc permanently enjoined the COMELEC from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system. When the COMELEC denied the petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law
enacted by Congress to provide for the implementation of the system.
It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the
petition for initiative as "capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or applied,
as it ought to do, the Court's ruling in Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the system of initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an
enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court to be
"incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the
constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC was "permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system." The decision of the Court En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms
part of the legal system of the Philippines.10 And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court
En Banc may be modified or reversed except by the Court En Banc,11 certainly not by the
COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound
to follow the same.12 As succinctly held in Fulkerson v. Thompson:13
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled. The
inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and must carry
it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or judicially
examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can give no other or further relief as
to any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or in
any manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and settle such
matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme Court….
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by the authority of
adjudged cases. And any further departure from them would inevitably mar the harmony
of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into conflict, and produce therein
disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides, any rule
allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme Court, or to
refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to the principles
established by the constitution, and therefore void.14
At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the pronouncement
made by the Court therein. Like petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin,
the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution as they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, By People's Initiative" (the Delfin petition).
They asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and date for signature gathering all
over the country; causing the necessary publications of said order and their petition in
newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing municipal election registrars in all
regions all over the country and to assist petitioners in establishing signing stations. Acting
thereon, the COMELEC issued the order prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it declared:
1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as

initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned";
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 230015 invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without
authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and
3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of signatures of
registered voters.
The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
system." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to

the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition

(UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent as
against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.16
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with the Court by
PIRMA and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago) docketed
as PIRMA v. Commission on Elections.17 The said petitioners, undaunted by Santiago and
claiming to have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC
praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures collected in
behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for
the purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Like the Delfin petition
in Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a plebiscite the amendment
to the Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of elected officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no
basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing
the permanent restraining order issued against it by the Court in Santiago. PIRMA and the
spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby dismissing,
their petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses
Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in
the decision of the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave
abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition before it:
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this
10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as
regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the
Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted
that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-
examination of said second issue since the case a bar is not the proper vehicle for that
purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco,
Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a re-
examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.18 (Underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and
argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for
initiative because the permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG
buttresses this argument by pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December
18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.
The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's decision
in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately
but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the
true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the
same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in
other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.19
The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently enjoining the
COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments
to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system" is thus as much a part of the Court's decision as its dispositive
portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature of an in rem judgment barring any and all
Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due
course to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution conformably with
the Court's ruling in Santiago did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its
actuation is in keeping with the salutary principle of hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find the
COMELEC to have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the
ruling of this Court in Santiago would be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings."20 This truism applies with equal force to
the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting
laws or the Constitution "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty
bound to enforce obedience thereto."21
Petitioners Cannot Ascribe

Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion of
the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed
by the minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that
the Court's declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735
to implement the system of initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the
majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,22 or the majority of the
members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand,
five Justices,23 while voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency,
dissented from the majority opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to
implement the system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the
decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned" constitutes a definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the Santiago decision
were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same.
The Resolution expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the
requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977." 24 In fine, the
pronouncement in Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the
definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by
them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the
Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there
was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need for
the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the
law of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago,
the Court should have resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and to
grant the motion for reconsideration and the petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively
and unequivocally declared that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court
in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno
concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of
the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground that there was
no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither did Chief Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly propose constitutional
amendments through the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled
in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less
than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of
Representatives,25 have filed separate bills to implement the system of initiative under Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate, the
three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to
Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No.
2189 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a
System of People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator
Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281
filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee
Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026
filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An Act
Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly recognize that
there is, to date, no law to govern the process by which constitutional amendments are
introduced by the people directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago
and absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to
implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would
warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present
case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown, Congress and
other government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court can do no less with
respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law cannot be
made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose it – the Supreme
Court, as an institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or
is concerned" and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in the Court's
composition.26 Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in the courts in adhering to decisions
deliberately made after ample consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek re-
examination of determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every change
in the expounders of it.27
Proposals to Revise the Constitution,

As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement
in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement
the system of initiative, still, the amended petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the
denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to change the form of government
from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government
are actually for the revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:
"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least
per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts."
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to
read, as follows:
"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive
power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The
Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from
among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of
government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a

unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read as follows:
expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to
exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two
thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.,
Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary
references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "House of
Congress," "Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" and "House of
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to
"Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of
Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall
be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are
hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all
"Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Parliament" and
any and all references to the "President" and of "Acting President" shall be changed to
read "Prime Minister."
over its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
among themselves.
"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate,
from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall
be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall
may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament,
government officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member of Parliament, shall
immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the
purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its
members, from among themselves.] The duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime
Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.28
Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have been
complied with, i.e., the signatories to the petition constitute twelve percent (12%) of all the
registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three
percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. Certifications allegedly executed by the
respective COMELEC Election Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these
signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The verification was allegedly done on the
basis of the list of registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list used in the
immediately preceding election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a

plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?29
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more
efficient, more economical and more responsive government. The parliamentary system would
allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and executive branches of government,
promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more decisive governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
Article XVII
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures for
proposals for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may
be proposed by –
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly
proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and "revision" and
provided for their respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of the Constitution
fully cognizant of the distinction between the two concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the
Chairman of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions, explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However,
the Committee finally agreed to use the terms – "amendment" or "revision" when our
attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the
connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we
came up with the observations made in the famous – or notorious – Javellana doctrine,
particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the
following distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution:
"Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act
of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention
of an act to amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement
of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the
needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a

completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be
employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new
Constitution.30
Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to reserve the power to propose a
revision of the Constitution to Congress or the constitutional convention. Stated in another
manner, it was their manifest intent that revision thereof shall not be undertaken through the
system of initiative. Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by Congress or
by a constitutional convention.
It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative was included in
Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section
__ of the Constitution.31
However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission agreed to
remove the provision on the system of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it under a
separate provision, Section 2. It was explained that the removal of the provision on initiative
from the other "traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was precisely to limit the former
(system of initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the system of
initiative should not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative.
This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to
the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. x x x32
The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be undertaken
through the system of initiative was reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in
response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section 4,
except that in Section 4, as it is presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day
and 90-day periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing
amendments to the Constitution which would further require the process of submitting it
in a plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of

initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it
were a self-executing provision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this

process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage
of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the
process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.33
Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the clarification with
respect to the observation of Commissioner Regalado Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on

line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."34
After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of Section 2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY

PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF
WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY
FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII

people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution
nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial
differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their
respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII
as a mode of effecting changes in the Constitution is strictly limited to amendments – not to a
revision – thereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for "amendment" and "revision"
as different modes of changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction between
the two terms. They particularly relied on the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his
concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the controversial decision which gave
imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing

constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of
amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only specific
provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire constitution,
but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution of the addition of
provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of
parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times. The 1973
Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new
fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.36
Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is enlightening. For
example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an eminent authority on political law, distinguished the two
terms in this manner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different

But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act
to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed
essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed
obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.37
In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees38 had the
occasion to make the distinction between the two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an
instrument which "amended" the 1877 Constitution of Georgia. It explained the term
"amendment:"
"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes
some provision, or adds something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or in
part permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way
changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to
accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other object or
purpose.39
On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US appellate court:
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same

location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new
house? Some of the materials contained in the old house may be used again, some of
the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have
altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as contained in
Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the constitution of 1877; but
on the contrary it is a completely revised or new constitution.40
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission, expounded
on the distinction between the two terms thus:

provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or
to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific
portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision,
however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate a re-examination of the
entire document – or of provisions of the document (which have overall implications for
the entire document or for the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of the
document) – to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. Thus, for
instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a
revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other
important provisions of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of
change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects
revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural form of
"amendments" means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction of a multiplicity
of amendments!41
Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching effects on
the Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system of initiative.
It should be recalled that it took the framers of the present Constitution four months from June 2,
1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as described by the
venerable Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional Commission of
1986, "gradually and painstakingly took shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes
passionate and often exhilarating debates that intersected all dimensions of the national life."42
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in like manner,
be a product of the same extensive and intensive study and debates. Consequently, while
providing for a system of initiative where the people would directly propose amendments to the
Constitution, they entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a deliberative body, the
Congress or Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the
government is founded, and regulating the division of sovereign powers, directing to what
persons each of those powers is to be confided and the manner in which it is to be
exercised.43 The Philippines has followed the American constitutional legal system in the sense
that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic
instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed.44
The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An overwhelming
16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the
present Constitution on February 2, 1987.45 In expressing that will, the Filipino people have
incorporated therein the method and manner by which the same can be amended and revised,
and when the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner in
which the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that express will
is a direct violation of the fundamental law.46
Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the validity of a
constitutional amendment or revision depends upon whether such provisions have been
complied with, such question presents for consideration and determination a judicial question,
and the courts are the only tribunals vested with power under the Constitution to determine such
question.47
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment" and "revision,"
clearly makes a differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures
and their respective fields of application. On this point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan48 is
instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative amendment" (referred to as the proposed
measure) to the State Constitution of California, then being proposed to be submitted to the
electors for ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as
"California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208 subsections which
would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the California State
Constitution and add at least four new topics. Among the likely effects of the proposed measure
were to curtail legislative and judicial functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation
system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure also
included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the
electors for ratification because it was not an "amendment" but a "revision" which could only be
proposed by a convention. It held that from an examination of the proposed measure itself,
considered in relation to the terms of the California State Constitution, it was clear that the
proposed initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision, rather than
amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State Constitution specifies (Article
XVIII §2 thereof) that it may be revised by means of constitutional convention but does not
provide for revision by initiative measure, the submission of the proposed measure to the
electorate for ratification must be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the differentiation
required (between amendment and revision) is not merely between two words; more accurately
it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure,
if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a
substantial field of application, not to be a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of
the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also
a field of application appropriate to its procedure.49
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of
safety-valves – they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too
great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other
hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is
sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the problem of the Constitution maker is, in this
particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for progress
with the requisites for safety.50
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution is,
despite its denomination, one for its revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of Articles
VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide transitory provisions. However, as will be
shown shortly, the amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous
provisions of the Constitution particularly those pertaining to the specific powers of Congress
and the President. These powers would have to be transferred to the Parliament and the Prime
Minister and/or President, as the case may be. More than one hundred (100) sections will be
affected or altered thereby:
1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;
3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):
- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the

jurisdiction of various courts;
- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of

lower courts;
- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes

representatives of Congress as ex officio members and on the power of the
President to appoint the regular members of the JBC;
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the

Supreme Court and judges of lower courts;
- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President

and Congress.
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);
- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the
President and Congress;
- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of

compensation of government officials;
- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer shall accept, without
the consent of Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x"
- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments;
- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress

measures to minimize election spending x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President
the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any
other disciplinary action x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and
Congress a report on the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;
- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable recommendation
of the COMELEC, to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence
for violation of election laws, rules and regulations;
- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization

registered under party-list system;
- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list

system;
- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the
Commission of Appointments;
- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and
Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;
- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over

local government units (LGUs);
- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x,

subject to such guidelines as Congress may provide;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political

subdivisions;
- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional development

councils x x x;
- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over

autonomous regions;
- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous
region as well as the power of the President to appoint the representatives to the
regional consultative commission;
- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution to
pass the organic act for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):
- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.);
- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to

initiate complaint and sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment
cases);
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his
deputies;
- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or guaranty shall be

granted to the President, Vice-President, etc.
- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public officials
including the President, Vice-President, etc.
9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of

natural resources and power of the President to enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public

domain;
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands;
- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary

laws;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic and

planning agency to be headed by the President;
- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic

corporations(at least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment;
- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities;
- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of

cooperatives;
- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form
private corporations;
- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power
of Congress to adjust the same;
- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):
- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of

measures that protect and enhance the right of people x x x
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian

reform;
- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend

to Congress effective measures to promote human rights;
- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in

educational institutions;
- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the
Government shall sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official
communication;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language
commission;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote

scientific research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new
national anthem, etc.;
- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by
the President in times of war or national emergency declared by Congress;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass

media;
- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the

President on indigenous cultural communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):
- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;
- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the

system of initiative;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend

or revise the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not
be affected."51Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend only Articles VI and
VII of the Constitution and providing transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or
repeal other numerous articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative effects,
however, the revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent from the qualitative effects
it will have on the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a
constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the
procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be
added to or to be altered in a constitution.52
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sinco's more
comprehensive differentiation of the terms:

But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act
to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed
essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed
obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.53
A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary,

following the above distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it will involve "alteration
of different portions of the entire document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole
constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions."
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt, fundamentally change
the basic plan and substance of the present Constitution. The tripartite system ordained by our
fundamental law divides governmental powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the
legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral
body consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws and
to alter them at discretion. Executive power, vested in the President who is directly elected by
the people, is the power to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced. Judicial power,
vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the power to construe and apply the law
when controversies arise concerning what has been done or omitted under it. This separation of
powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which guards against the establishment of
an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is

dissolved as there is a fusion between the executive and legislative powers. Essentially, the
President becomes a mere "symbolic head of State" while the Prime Minister becomes the head
of government who is elected, not by direct vote of the people, but by the members of the
Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by legislative
districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government, does not have a fixed term of office and
may only be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament. Under this form of government,
the system of checks and balances is emasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to
mention that the Constitution's basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government
and the principle of separation of powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely
destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et
al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or "such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed."54 As has been shown, the effect of the
adoption of the petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the original instrument"
constitute "an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed," is to
"substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the
Constitution as now cast."55
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than a total one is
amendatory would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and
preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the question would be occasion to
undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure.
So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision
from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental
qualitative alteration that effects revision."56
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners Lambino, et al.,
being in truth and in fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of
initiative upon any legally permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on

Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of
initiative and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the
following:
1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,

amended or repealed, as the case may be;
2. The proposition;
3. The reason or reasons therefor;
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a
solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any
other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons
other than the election registrars has no legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the
verification of signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For
example, the certification of the election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION57
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials in
this City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same Barangays,
which is part of the 2nd Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names
appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed initiative on
Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of bonafide resident of the
said Barangays and correspond to the names found in the official list of registered voters
of the Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or voters' identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for the
City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed
signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Underscoring supplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the certifications, similarly worded as above-
quoted, of the election registrars of Buldon, Maguindanao;58 Cotabato City (Special
Province);59 Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao;60 Matanog, Maguindanao;61 Parang,
62 63
Maguindanao; Kabantalan, Maguindanao; Upi, Maguinadano;64 Barira,
Maguindanao; Sultan, Mastura; Ampatuan, Maguindanao; Buluan, Maguindanao;68 Datu
65 66 67
Paglas, Maguindanao;69 Datu Piang, Maguindanao;70 Shariff Aguak,

Maguindanao;71 Pagalungan, Maguindanao;72Talayan, Maguindanao;73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun,
Maguindanao;74 Mamasapano, Maguindanao;75 Talitay, Maguindanao;76 Guindulungan,
77
Maguindanao; Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao;78 Datu Unsay,
79 80
Maguindanao; Pagagawan, Maguindanao; Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;81 Indanan,
Sulu;82 Jolo, Sulu;83Maimbung, Sulu;84 Hadji Panglima, Sulu;85 Pangutaran, Sulu;86 Parang,
Sulu;87 Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu;88 Luuk, Sulu;89 Panamao, Sulu;90 Pata, Sulu;91 Siasi,
Sulu;92 Tapul, Sulu;93 Panglima Estino, Sulu;94 Lugus, Sulu;95 and Pandami, Sulu. 96
Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by the election
registrar, and by no one else, including the barangay officials. The foregoing certifications
submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their cause, justify the outright dismissal of their
petition for initiative. Because of the illegal verifications made by barangay officials in the above-
mentioned legislative districts, it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative has failed to
comply with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because they
themselves submitted the same to the COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to
support their contention that the requirements of RA 6735 had been complied with and that their
petition for initiative is on its face sufficient in form and substance. They are in the nature of
judicial admissions which are conclusive and binding on petitioners.97 This being the case, the
Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative for being, on its face,
insufficient in form and substance. The Court should make the adjudication entailed by the facts
here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases.98
It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in relying
on Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot be
used to legitimize its refusal to heed the people's will. The fact that there is no enabling law
should not prejudice the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which right has already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and
resounding act of the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC
should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ
of mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to compel the
persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the Constitution.99 However, under
Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be
shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on
the part of the board, officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public official and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a writ
of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the

COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for initiative has
complied with the requisite number of signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. The dissenting
opinion cites the petitioners' claim that they have complied with the same while the oppositors-
intervenors have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging, inter alia, that the signatures were not
properly verified or were not verified at all. Other oppositors-intervenors have alleged that the
signatories did not fully understand what they have signed as they were misled into signing the
signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its
compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a
question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands the
case to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is nothing in RA
6735, as well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the
former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-blown
or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that "[a]n initiative shall be conducted
under the control and supervision of the Commission in accordance with Article III hereof."
Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III of the said implementing rules provide as
follows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. – The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. – The Commission shall act on the findings
of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not been obtained, the
petition shall be deemed defeated and the Commission shall issue a declaration to that
effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been obtained, the
Commission shall set the initiative or referendum in accordance with the succeeding
sections.
Sec. 32. Appeal. – The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency and
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to conduct
any kind of hearing to receive any evidence for or against the sufficiency of the petition for
initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the
annexes submitted by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form
and substance. The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the
parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted rules of
the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered to do.
The Present Petition Presents a

Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.102 A political question has two
aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity; and (2) matters which have been specifically designated to some other department or
particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act.103
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,104 Senior Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno explained the doctrine of political question vis-à-vis the express mandate of
the present Constitution for the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject
the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For
Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "...
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM [Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous power to
our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive
and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety
that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
xxxx
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to protect
other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with new power to
review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction."
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly
more than six million registered voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend
the Constitution, the same still constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political
question. There is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article XVII, has explicitly provided for
the manner or method to effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question,
therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the terms of the Constitution is for the
Court to pass upon.105
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,106 the State Supreme Court of Minnesota exercised
jurisdiction over the petition questioning the result of the general election holding that "an
examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the
authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional
amendments." The cases cited were Dayton v. St. Paul,107 Rice v. Palmer,108 Bott v.
Wurtz,109 State v. Powell,110 among other cases.
There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."111 However, I find to
be tenuous the asseveration that "the argument that the people through initiative cannot
propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty in its head. At the
very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct
sovereignty of the people."112 In effect, it is theorized that despite the unambiguous text of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the system of
initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently disregard the said provision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard
the Constitution altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional
theory that while indeed "the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all
legitimate authority"; nonetheless, "by the Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up
the hands of their official agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the
state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to
this fundamental law."113 The Constitution, it should be remembered, "is the protector of the
people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people against injury by the
people."114 This is the essence of constitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and

ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even
despotic, might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound
ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a government
of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men,
would try to live by their word.115
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to proposals
to amend to the Constitution, and does not extend to its revision. The Filipino people have
bound themselves to observe the manner and method to effect the changes of the Constitution.
They opted to limit the exercise of the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative, but did not extend the same to the revision thereof. The petition for initiative,
as it proposes to effect the revision thereof, contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law
of the state prescribes the limitations under which the electors of the state may change the
same, and, unless such course is pursued, the mere fact that a majority of the electors are in
favor of a change and have so expressed themselves, does not work a change. Such a course
would be revolutionary, and the Constitution of the state would become a mere matter of
form.116
The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of the people that the underlying
principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature.117
The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision in Article
XVII of the Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied in
the Constitution to guard against improvident and hasty changes thereof are not easily trifled
with. To be sure, by having overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people believed
that it is "a good Constitution" and in the words of the learned Judge Cooley:
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or

passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood,
but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be
allowed efficiency. Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain.
As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not
necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and worse.118
Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance.
Accordingly, I have approached and grappled with them with full appreciation of the
responsibilities involved in the present case, and have given to its consideration the earnest
attention which its importance demands. I have sought to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution at whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:119 "it
is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed. Sometimes constitutions must be
interposed for the protection of majorities even against themselves. Constitutions are adopted in
times of public repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the
surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if courts could be coerced by popular
majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become mere 'ropes of sand,'
and there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of
temperance can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be at all
comparable to the injury to republican institutions which a violation of the constitution would
inflict. That large and respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands the
observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its first reformatory step by a violation
of the constitution. How can it consistently demand of others obedience to a constitution which it
violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact the amendment. In the manner of a great
moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of republican
freedom. The young men coming forward upon the stage of political action must be educated to
venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever interest may be
advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be 'voted up or voted down,' no sacrilegious
hand must be laid upon the constitution."120
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in
G.R. No. 174299.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 (RAUL LAMBINO, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.) and
G.R. No. 174299 (MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET
AL.).
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
AZCUNA, J.:
"Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."
-- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.
Article XVII of the Constitution states:
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this section shall
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.
Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held
not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
the petition.
This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.
Constitutions have three parts – the Constitution of Liberty, which states the fundamental rights
of the people; the Constitution of Government, which establishes the structure of government,
its branches and their operation; and the Constitution of Sovereignty, which provides how the
Constitution may be changed.
Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.
As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So when Congress acts
under this provision, it acts not as a legislature exercising legislative powers. It acts as a
constituent body exercising constituent powers.
The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply, or do not apply
strictly, to the actions taken under Article XVII.
Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of the people's right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, the act of Congress pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a
constituent act.
As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the people of the
right to propose a law or amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the right to propose
amendments to the Constitution, a constituent measure, not a mere legislative one.
The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates to proposing
amendments to the Constitution, is that the requirements for statutory enactments, such as
sufficiency of standards and the like, do not and should not strictly apply. As long as there is a
sufficient and clear intent to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right, it should
be sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by the
Constitution.
Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the procedure for
proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings
perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec1 should be re-examined and, after
doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of the
measure to sustain a people's initiative to amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in
favor of allowing the exercise of this sovereign right.
And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,2 penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of this Court interpreting a law forms part
of the law interpreted as of the time of its enactment, Republic Act No. 6735 should be deemed
sufficient and adequate from the start.
This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the petition for initiative herein
involved complies with the requirements of that law as well as those stated in Article XVII of the
Constitution.
True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of Principles, to
emphasize precisely that there are instances recognized and provided for in the Constitution
where our people directly exercise their sovereign powers, new features set forth in this People
Power Charter, namely, the powers of recall, initiative and referendum.
Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a democracy under the rule of law.
This equally important point is emphasized in the very Preamble to the Constitution, which
states:
". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . ."
Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the Constitution. The power is
subject to limitations under the Constitution itself, thus: The power could not be exercised for the
first five years after the Constitution took effect and thereafter can only be exercised once every
five years; the power only extends to proposing amendments but not revisions; and the power
needs an act of Congress providing for its implementation, which act is directed and mandated.
The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the Constitution set forth in the
petition for initiative herein involved are mere amendments or rather are revisions.
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it.
The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people through
initiative is a practical one, namely, there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3
million people cannot conceivably come up with a single extensive document through a direct
proposal from each of them. Someone would have to draft it and that is not authorized as it
would not be a direct proposal from the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form
of proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or a Constitutional
Convention created under the same provision. Furthermore, there is a need for such
deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings and debates are duly and officially
recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be properly aided by resort to the record of
their proceedings.
Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition for initiative herein
involved will show on its face that the proposed changes constitute a revision of the
Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of government from that which is bicameral-
presidential to one that is unicameral-parliamentary.
While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as the petition and text
of the proposed changes themselves state, every provision of the Constitution will have to be
examined to see if they conform to the nature of a unicameral-parliamentary form of government
and changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII on Judicial
Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a system, the
Parliament is supreme, and thus the Court's power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion
and thus void would be an anomaly.
Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and how should the
changes be worded? The proposed initiative does not say who nor how.
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision but it also
suffers from being incomplete and insufficient on its very face.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in providing for the power
under the Constitution.
Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that not more
than one subject shall be proposed as an amendment or amendments to the Constitution. The
petition herein would propose at the very least two subjects – a unicameral legislature and a
parliamentary form of government. Again, for this clear and patent violation of the very act that
provides for the exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot lie.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.
For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in nature – a
unicameral legislature is one; a parliamentary form of government is another. The first is a mere
amendment and contains only one subject matter. The second is clearly a revision that affects
every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not even the proponents could
at present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing changes the
nature and extent of which they do not as yet know exactly what.
The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a change in the
legislature from a bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a unicameral or one-chamber body,
is sustainable. The text of the changes needed to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in
nature. Once it is limited to this proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion and insertions,
the wordings of which are practically automatic and non-discretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the Constitution would
read if we were to change Congress from one consisting of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to one consisting only of the House of Representatives. It only affects Article VI
on the Legislative Department, some provisions on Article VII on the Executive Department, as
well as Article XI on the Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions. These are mere amendments, substantial ones indeed but still only amendments,
and they address only one subject matter.
Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind the present initiative,
which is to provide for simplicity and economy in government and reduce the stalemates that
often prevent needed legislation.
For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution to change Congress into a
unicameral body. This is not say that I favor such a change. Rather, such a proposal would
come within the purview of an initiative allowed under Article XVII of the Constitution and its
implementing Republic Act, and should, therefore, be submitted to our people in a plebiscite for
them to decide in their sovereign capacity. After all is said and done, this is what democracy
under the rule of law is about.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
and Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe
and Peter Doe
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
"It is a Constitution we are expounding…"1
– Chief Justice John Marshall
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy is the critical
understanding of the first and foremost of our constitutional principles — "the Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them."2 Constitutionalism dictates that this creed must be respected
with deeds; our belief in its validity must be backed by behavior.
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the
Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own
behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures
thereon, and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC
to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments to the
Constitution in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement for People's
Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign people's power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its
founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a
"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" (Delfin Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting the provisions on the
term limits for all elective officials.
The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to the people
and would be formally filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve per cent
(12%) of the total number of registered voters in the country. It thus sought the assistance of
the COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by fixing the dates and time therefor
and setting up signature stations on the assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that
the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature gathering all over the
country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the petition for initiative in newspapers of
general and local circulation; and, (3) instructing the municipal election registrars in all the
regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the volunteers in establishing signing stations
on the dates and time designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition before this Court, seeking to restrain the
COMELEC from further considering the Delfin Petition. They impleaded as respondents the
COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was
likewise engaged in signature gathering to support an initiative to amend the Constitution. They
argued that the constitutional provision on people's initiative may only be implemented by a law
passed by Congress; that no such law has yet been enacted by Congress; that Republic Act
No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative to amend the Constitution; and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules adopted by the COMELEC on the
conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to amend the Constitution was
concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v. Commission on
Elections.3
Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition. The
Court ruled that the constitutional provision granting the people the power to directly amend the
Constitution through initiative is not self-executory. An enabling law is necessary to implement
the exercise of the people's right. Examining the provisions of R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8)
members of the Court held that said law was "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
concerned,"4 and thus voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It was also held
that even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to amend the Constitution and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the Delfin Petition should still be dismissed as
it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law. Under Section 2, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution
must be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered
voters therein. The Delfin Petition did not contain signatures of the required number of
voters. The decision stated:
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the

Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under
that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard
for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on

Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN

petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent

against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
(ponente), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado,
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr.
and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.
While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation6 agreed that the Delfin
Petition should be dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely,
Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J.
Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to
implement the people's right to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details for the actual exercise of such right. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the
issue of whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law on
initiative, and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. 6735.
The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the
Court's decision.
After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7 of the eight (8) majority
members maintained their position that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision
on the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while
Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that
R.A. 6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen (13)
members of the Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief
Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan
voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members, namely, Associate Justices
Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same.
Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. The
motions for reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or
reverse the decision of March 19, 1997.8
On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose
Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by
around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in
Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order all
election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and submit these to
the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition would be
submitted to the people for ratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance
to be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the
highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and
also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino
voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII,
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order
issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the
COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court's
decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as
said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for
reconsideration, and because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the
two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated
September 23, 1997. It explained:
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this
Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June
10, 1997.
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as
regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the
Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted
that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-
examination of said second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that
purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco,
Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re-
examination x x x x9
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that
the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the system
of initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of government from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary system.
Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP), embarked on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to support the move
to adopt the parliamentary form of government in the country through charter change. They
proposed to amend the Constitution as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a

unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be
provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts,
and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at
least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least
one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district
for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of
his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof,
except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and
whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership
coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended
to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The
executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of
the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members
of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament
for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-

Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a
new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall
continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached
by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of

the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as
President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from
office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime
Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under
Article VII as amended.
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to
"Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress"
shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to
"Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of
Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any
and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed
to read "Prime Minister."
Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12
which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be
inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended
so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided,
however, that any all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of
Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read
"Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress,"
"Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to
read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President"
and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an
interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular
Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be
composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of
executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament

until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the
cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim
Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim
Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote
of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament
until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and
a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall
nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime
Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The
interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent
President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall
continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the
interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President
and Vice President.10
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were written the
abstract of the proposed amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987
Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to
a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency,
simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory
Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government organizations

and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials. Copies of the draft petition for
initiative containing the proposition were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral
groups.
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on March 24,
25 and 26, 2006, to inform the people and explain to them the proposed amendments to the
Constitution. Thereafter, they circulated the signature sheets for signing.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for
verification based on the voters' registration record. Upon completion of the verification
process, the respective local election officers issued certifications to attest that the
signature sheets have been verified. The verified signature sheets were subsequently
transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of the signatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the
COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled "In the Matter of Proposing
Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral
Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and
Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary
System." They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text of the proposed
amendment that was actually presented to the people. They alleged that they were filing the
petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have
affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Petitioners appended to the
petition signature sheets bearing the signatures of registered voters which they claimed to have
been verified by the respective city or municipal election officers, and allegedly constituting at
least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative
district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5 (b)
and (c), together with Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the
people's exercise of the power. Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an
Order:
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino
people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition for
initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L.
Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law
Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osmeña III,
Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy
Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia
Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante,
Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San
Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra,
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and
Randall C. Tabayoyong.
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative. It cited this
Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC11 permanently enjoining the Commission from
system.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
praying that the Court set aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct
respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the
date of the plebiscite. They state the following grounds in support of the petition:
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

refusing to take cognizance of, and to give due course to the petition for initiative,
because the cited Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be considered the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court en banc, considering that upon its reconsideration and
final voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to declare Republic Act No.
6735 as inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189 and existing
appropriation of the COMELEC provide for sufficient details and authority for the
exercise of people's initiative, thus, existing laws taken together are adequate and
complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

refusing to take cognizance of, and in refusing to give due course to the petition for
initiative, thereby violating an express constitutional mandate and disregarding and
contravening the will of the people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law, respondent COMELEC

cannot ignore the will of the sovereign people and must accordingly act on the
petition for initiative.
1.
The framers of the Constitution intended to give the people the power to
propose amendments and the people themselves are now giving vibrant
life to this constitutional provision.
2.
Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997, the right of the
people to exercise the sovereign power of initiative and recall has been
invariably upheld.
3.
The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a political
question which shall be determined solely by the sovereign people.
4.
By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition for initiative duly
verified by the election officers, the people have chosen to perform this
sacred exercise of their sovereign power.
B.
The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the instant petition for
initiative filed by the petitioners.
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC only applies to the
Delfin petition.
1.
It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other statements in the
body of the decision that governs the rights in controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or perform a

duty mandated by law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative for

plebiscite.12
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel

L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative
Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela,
Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo
Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M.
Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P.
Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-
Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador,
and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this case and filed their respective
Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M.

Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat
Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate of the
Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective
motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald
L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization, and Victorino F. Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a
Petition-in-Intervention. All interventions and oppositions were granted by the Court.
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying due course to the petition for initiative as it merely followed this Court's
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the
principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law providing for the authority and the details
for the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution; that the proposed changes to
the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative does
not meet the required number of signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution; that it was not shown that the people have been informed of the proposed
amendments as there was disparity between the proposal presented to them and the proposed
amendments attached to the petition for initiative, if indeed there was; that the verification
process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition for
initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the
signatories in the petition for initiative.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court's resolution of
September 5, 2006, filed its Comment to the petition. Affirming the position of the petitioners,
the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition at bar and render judgment: (1) declaring R.A.
6735 as adequate to cover or as reasonably sufficient to implement the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards for subordinate
legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting aside the assailed resolution
of the COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC to grant the petition for initiative and set
the corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and other
pertinent election laws and regulations.
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the petition for
initiative is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this
Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared that R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement
the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the Constitution. It invoked the permanent
injunction issued by the Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have been passed
by Congress. It asserted that the permanent injunction covers not only the Delfin Petition, but
also all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.
On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required to argue on the
following issues:13
1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present
Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to
amend the Constitution.
2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections complied
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19,
1997) bars the present petition.
4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that there is
no sufficient law implementing or authorizing the exercise of people's initiative to amend
the Constitution.
5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative filed with the
COMELEC have complied with its provisions.
5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.
5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.
6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the

Constitution.
6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.
7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is a
political question to be determined solely by the sovereign people.
8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing the Petitions for Initiative filed before it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition
in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to
amend the Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper
parties to file the instant petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition for
initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition for initiative
should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters
therein. The petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was
accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of the
signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated above their signatures in the signature
sheets is the following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.14
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate
documents to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file the
petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of
Rule 65 read:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer
may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino
and Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by the
COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts.15 Blackstone observed that at
the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where
the same points come again in litigation."16 As the rule evolved, early limits to its application
were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable;" (2) where courts
of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was
the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to
reach the decision."17
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution.18 According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent
"arbitrary discretion in the courts."19 Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected."20 Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the
countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." 21 He
added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the
rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the
Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."22
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation
although stare decisisdeveloped its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare
decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.23 The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals
with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the
same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must
follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has
been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as
a policy, imposing choice but not a command.24 Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts
set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis —

constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.25 Constitutional stare
decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more
flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view
on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing
prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The
rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided."26 In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it."27 In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is
more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this
Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a
meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress
itself."28 This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts'
limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,29 viz: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where30 (1)
its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy
for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
reversed its decisions in 192 cases.31 The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board
of Education32 which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's33 "separate but equal
doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on
public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . .
is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine
setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to
promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,34 we reversed our
original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly,
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,35 we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are
agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These
are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In
addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting,
age of the prior decision and its merits.36
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.37 It established a 4-pronged test.
The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to
have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of significant application or justification.
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the
reexamination of Santiago. On the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices
in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it provided no standard to guide COMELEC in
issuing its implementing rules. The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without
striking it down as unconstitutional is an intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in our
planet. It improperly assails the ability of legislators to write laws. It usurps the exclusive right of
legislators to determine how far laws implementing constitutional mandates should be crafted. It
is elementary that courts cannot dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws, anymore
than Congress can tell courts how to write literate decisions. The doctrine of separation of
powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress for courts can
construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the ruling of the six (6) justices
that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of the
people to amend the Constitution via an initiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce any
expectation from the people. On the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that
they could amend the Constitution by direct action. Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in the
case at bar for it is more appropriate to consider in decisions involving contracts where private
rights are adjudicated. The case at bar involves no private rights but the sovereignty of the
people.
On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground cannot be blinked
away. The urgent need to adjust certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the
country to compete in the new millennium is given. The only point of contention is the mode to
effect the change - - - whether through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or
people's initiative. Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million registered voters
who want to amend the Constitution through people's initiative and that their signatures have
been verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient to implement the direct right of the people to amend the Constitution through
an initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers of our
sovereignty and from whom all government authority emanates. New developments in our
internal and external social, economic, and political settings demand the reexamination of
the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for this Court to allow the people to
step into the future with a blindfold.
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the

people's initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to
implement Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the
Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through initiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of
legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to
implement the right of the people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by
direct action. This all-important intent is palpable from the following:
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to initiate
changes to the Constitution:
The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the

Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people."
It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:
(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein;"38 and
(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter."39
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite."
Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to
use it as the instrument to implement people's initiative. No less than former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago, concedes:40
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate beyond
doubt this intent. In his sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of
the House of Representatives) emphasized the intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the
people can propose amendments to the Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks:41
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee, we wish to speak in
support of House Bill No. 497, entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987,
which later on may be called Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this particular bill. The
grant of plenary legislative power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle that any power deemed to
be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a citation from Vera
vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the
principle of separation of powers. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973
Constitution the principle remained applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981 amendments
to the 1973 Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative power between the
legislature and the executive.
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the
Philippine Constitution that he Philippines is a Republican State where sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its citizens participating
through the right of suffrage and indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress. However,
to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there
is a practical recognition of what we refer to as people's sovereign power. This is the
recognition of a system of initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have
plenary powers. There is a reserved legislative power given to the people expressly.
Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution provides,
and I quote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, or which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes legislative power,
there are reserved powers given to the people. In Section 32, we are specifically told to
pass at the soonest possible time a bill on referendum and initiative. We are specifically
mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII, Mr.
Speaker. Under the provision on amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I
quote:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people

through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to implement the
exercise by the people of the right of initiative and referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr. Speaker, is the response to such a constitutional
duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and
referendum under Philippine law has occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a very limited extent,
the system is provided for in our Local Government Code today. On initiative, for
instance, Section 99 of the said code vests in the barangay assembly the power to
initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports of the sangguniang
barangay. There are variations of initiative and referendum. The barangay assembly is
composed of all persons who have been actual residents of the barangay for at least six
months, who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the Philippines. The holding of
barangay plebiscites and referendum is also provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the
same Code.
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but will just submit the
same to the Secretary to be incorporated as part of my speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively applied by the Local
Government Code as it is now mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of initiative and referendum
similar to what is now contained in House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions
and House Bill No. 21505, the various constitutions of the states in the United States
recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or to reject
any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states are Alaska, Alabama,
Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum applies is
also without ay limitation, except for emergency measures, which is likewise
incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill – from the filing of the petition, the requirement
of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition to submission to electors –
is substantially similar to those of many American laws. Mr. Speaker, those among us
who may have been in the United States, particularly in California, during election time
or last November during the election would have noticed different propositions posted in
the city walls. They were propositions submitted by the people for incorporation during
the voting. These were in the nature of initiative, Mr. Speaker.
Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative and referendum is a

tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the
various consolidated bills is patterned after American experience in a great respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to bring our colleagues
slowly through the bill. The bill has basically only 12 sections. The constitutional
Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this system of initiative and referendum as an
instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs
of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely, since we seem to be amply
criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to pass this bill on referendum and initiative
now. While indifference would not be an appropriate term to use at this time, and surely
it is not the case although we are so criticized, one must note that it is a felt necessity of
our times that laws need to be proposed and adopted at the soonest possible time to
spur economic development, safeguard individual rights and liberties, and share
governmental power with the people.
With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone, together with the Senators
when they are minded to agree with us, are left with the burden of enacting the needed
legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what the
term connotes. It means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit fore the
consideration and voting of the general electorate a bill or a piece of legislation.
Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative. One is an initiative to
amend the Constitution. This can occur once every five years. Another is an initiative to
amend statutes that we may have approved. Had this bill been an existing law, Mr.
Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming majority of the barangays in the
Philippines would have approved by initiative the matter of direct voting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing to enact regional,
provincial, city, municipal or barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from the people and
it must be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a definite procedure and
allows the COMELEC to define rules and regulations to give teeth to the power of
initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the people to approve or
reject something that Congress has already approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or the barangays into two
or three, we must first get the consent of the people affected through plebiscite or
referendum.
Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However, referendum can also be

petitioned by the people if, for instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and it
is approved subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had already become a law, then the
people could petition that a referendum be conducted so that the acts of Congress can
be appropriately approved or rebuffed.
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As envisioned in the bill, the
initiative comes from the people, from registered voters of the country, by presenting a
proposition so that the people can then submit a petition, which is a piece of paper that
contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I have been citing is whether
there should be direct elections during the barangay elections. So the petition must be
filed in the appropriate agency and the proposition must be clear stated. It can be
tedious but that is how an effort to have direct democracy operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all that easy to have
referendum or initiative petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the committee
report, we are given certain limitations. For instance, to exercise the power of initiative or
referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters thereof,
shall sign a petition. These numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are
mandated by the Constitution. There must be a requirement of 10 percent for ordinary
laws and 3 percent representing all districts. The same requirement is mutatis
mutandis or appropriately modified and applied to the different sections. So if it is, for
instance, a petition on initiative or referendum for a barangay, there is a 10 percent or a
certain number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a district, there is also a
certain number required of all towns of the district that must seek the petition. If it is for a
province then again a certain percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these
are based with reference to the constitutional mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised and shall be upon the
call of the Commission on Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from receipt of
the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the
same and set the date of the referendum which shall not be earlier than 45 days but not
later than 90 days from the determination by the commission of the sufficiency of the
petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be determined by the
commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution requires that no bill can be
approved unless it contains one subject matter. It is conceivable that in the fervor of an
initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more than two topics sought to be
approved and that cannot be allowed. In fact, that is one of the prohibitions under this
referendum and initiative bill. When a matter under initiative or referendum is approved
by the required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective 15 days
following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr.
Speaker, all the bill seeks to do is to enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the
Filipino people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot ignore or cannot be
insensitive to the call for initiative and referendum. We should have done it in 1987 but
that is past. Maybe we should have done it in 1988 but that too had already passed, but
it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have enough time this year at least to
respond to the need of our people to participate directly in the work of legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues to approve House
Bill No. 21505 as incorporated in Committee Report No. 423 of the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my speech, together with
the footnotes since they contain many references to statutory history and foreign
jurisdiction, be reproduced as part of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of former
Representative Salvador Escudero III, viz:42
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years highlighted the need to
heed the clamor of the people for a truly popular democracy. One recalls the impatience
of those who actively participated in the parliament of the streets, some of whom are
now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of the population
feel increasingly that under the system, the people have the form but not the reality or
substance of democracy because of the increasingly elitist approach of their chosen
Representatives to many questions vitally affecting their lives. There have been
complaints, not altogether unfounded, that many candidates easily forge their campaign
promises to the people once elected to office. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
deemed it wise and proper to provide for a means whereby the people can exercise the
reserve power to legislate or propose amendments to the Constitution directly in case
their chose Representatives fail to live up to their expectations. That reserve power
known as initiative is explicitly recognized in three articles and four sections of the 1987
Constitution, namely: Article VI Section 1; the same article, Section 312; Article X,
Section 3; and Article XVII, Section 2. May I request that he explicit provisions of these
three articles and four sections be made part of my sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory. There is a need for an
implementing law that will give meaning and substance to the process of initiative and
referendum which are considered valuable adjuncts to representative democracy. It is
needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will probably open the door to
strong competition of the people, like pressure groups, vested interests, farmers' group,
labor groups, urban dwellers, the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of
legislation.
Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider that through this bill
we can hasten the politization of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming
an enlightened public opinion, and hopefully produce better and more responsive and
acceptable legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of the streets and cause-
oriented groups an opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic forum, thus,
the competition which they will offer to Congress will hopefully be a healthy one.
Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are common interests dear to all
Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals can still take place in an
atmosphere of reason and moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished Gentleman from
Camarines Sur and this Representation filed our respective versions of the bill in 1987,
we were hoping that the bill would be approved early enough so that our people could
immediately use the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject matter or as a take-off point.
However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on Local Government, it
took sometime before the committee could act on these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli
man daw at magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of this bill therefore, my dear
colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can set aside our personal and
political consideration for the greater good of our people. I therefore respectfully urge
and plead that this bill be immediately approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts have the duty to
interpret the law as legislated and when possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as
revealed by its language, purpose and history."43
The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices, nevertheless, ruled that
"x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" for the following reasons:
(1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2)
the Act does not provide for the contents of the petition for initiative on the Constitution; and
(3) while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the right of the
sovereign people to amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed
the legislative policy for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct
action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing the
people's initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient.
What were omitted were mere details and not fundamental policies which Congress alone
can and has determined. Implementing details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC
and can be the subject of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been recognized by this
Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional, the six (6)
justices failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of the sovereign people to amend
the Constitution.
IV
The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments

and can be undertaken through people's initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, only
allow the use of people's initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They theorize
that the changes proposed by petitioners are substantial and thus constitute a revision which
cannot be done through people's initiative.
In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing substantial
amendments amounting to revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite the following deliberations
during the Constitutional Commission, viz:44
MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to
be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1
of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of

initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it
were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that
was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage
of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process
of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view: 45
MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by initiative, to submit a
proposal for amendment only, not for revision, only once every five years x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on

line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also
clarified this point46 -
MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add to
"Amendments" "OR REVISIONS OF" to read: "Amendments OR REVISION OF this
Constitution."
MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.
MR. OPLE. How is that again?
MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by initiative
but merely by amendments.
MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.
MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will "change the
very system of government from presidential to parliamentary, and the form of the legislature
from bicameral to unicameral," among others. They allegedly seek other major revisions like the
inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants per district, a change in the period for a term of a
Member of Parliament, the removal of the limits on the number of terms, the election of a Prime
Minister who shall exercise the executive power, and so on and so forth.47 In sum, oppositors-
intervenors submit that "the proposed changes to the Constitution effect major changes in the
political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of the branches of the
government, the political rights of the people, and the modes by which political rights may be
exercised."48 They conclude that they are substantial amendments which cannot be done
through people's initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that only simple but not
substantial amendments can be done through people's initiative.
With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words "simple" and "substantial" are not
subject to any accurate quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative
test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will result in some one hundred (100)
changes in the Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also arguable that petitioners
seek to change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987
Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department),
together with the complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential
bicameral system to a parliamentary unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987
Constitution will not be affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial
Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI (Accountability of
Public Officers), XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights),
XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family), XVI
(General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe
ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are
"simple" or "substantial."
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine whether the
said changes are "simple" or "substantial" as to amount to a revision of the Constitution. The
well-regarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good constitution should contain at least
three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of liberty which sets forth the fundamental rights
of the people and imposes certain limitations on the powers of the government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of government which deals with the
framework of government and its powers, laying down certain rules for its administration and
defining the electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the mode or
procedure for amending or revising the constitution.49 It is plain that the proposed changes
will basically affect only the constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and
sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes will not change the
fundamental nature of our state as "x x x a democratic and republican state."50 It is self-
evident that a unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less
democratic or any less republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative
test resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."
For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative
test to determine whether an "amendment" is "simple" or "substantial." Nor did they
provide that "substantial" amendments are beyond the power of the people to propose to
change the Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional
distinction between "amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means change, including
complex changes while "revision" means complete change, including the adoption of an
entirely new covenant. The legal dictionaries express this traditional difference between
"amendment" and "revision." Black's Law Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal
revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other
instrument; specifically, a change made by addition, deletion, or correction."51 Black's also refers
to "amendment" as "the process of making such a revision."52 Revision, on the other hand, is
defined as "[a] reexamination or careful review for correction or improvement." 53 In
parliamentary law, it is described as "[a] general and thorough rewriting of a governing
document, in which the entire document is open to amendment."54 Similarly, Ballentine's Law
Dictionary defines "amendment" – as "[a] correction or revision of a writing to correct errors or
better to state its intended purpose"55 and "amendment of constitution" as "[a] process of
proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution."56 In
contrast, "revision," when applied to a statute (or constitution), "contemplates the re-
examination of the same subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution), and the
substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule."57
One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot of intellectual
debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of the University of the Philippines College of Law, (later
President of the U.P. and delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly spelled
out the difference between "amendment" and "revision." He opined: "the revision of a
constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the
procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be
added to or to be altered in a constitution."58
Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in our
1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the changes to the 1935 Constitution which included
the conversion from a unicameral system to a bicameral structure, the shortening of the
tenure of the President and Vice-President from a six-year term without reelection to a four-year
term with one reelection, and the establishment of the COMELEC, together with the
complementary constitutional provisions to effect the changes, were considered amendments
only, not a revision.
The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was,

however, considered a revision since the 1973 Constitution was "a completely
new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts."59 Among
those adopted under the 1973 Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the
presidential system, with the leadership in legislation and administration vested with the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet; the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking body instead of the
two-chambered, which would be more suitable to a parliamentary system of government; the
enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years of age instead of twenty-one (21),
and the abolition of literacy, property, and other substantial requirements to widen the basis for
the electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the civil service
system, and the Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of the ownership and
management of mass media; the giving of control to Philippine citizens of all
telecommunications; the prohibition against alien individuals to own educational institutions, and
the strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the conditions of the masses.60
The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes in 1976, 1980, 1981,
and 1984. The two significant innovations introduced in 1976 were (1) the creation of
an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of the interim National Assembly, and (2) Amendment
No. 6 which conferred on the President the power to issue decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for any
reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave emergency or threat or
imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to form part of the law of the land.
In 1980, the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and judges was restored. In 1981, the
presidential system with parliamentary features was installed. The transfer of private land for
use as residence to natural-born citizens who had lost their citizenship was also allowed. Then,
in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned by provinces, cities, or
districts in Metro Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created
while the executive committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social housing
programs were strengthened.61 These substantial changes were simply considered as mere
amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973
Constitution. She governed under Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite and
superseded the Provisional or Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz underscored
the outstanding features of the 1987 Constitution which consists of eighteen articles and is
excessively long compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, on which it was largely
based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those pertaining to
the legislative and executive departments, have been restored because of the revival of the
bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The independence of
the judiciary has been strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto and an
increase in its authority, which now covers even political questions formerly beyond its
jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like those on the
Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still the new 1987 Constitution was deemed
as a revision of the 1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and revision was
abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of Article XVII gives the power to
amend or revise to Congress acting as a constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional
Convention duly called by Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said,
limited the people's right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple amendments.
In other words, the people cannot propose substantial amendments amounting to revision.
With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors who peddle the
above proposition rely on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the
debate on how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It
is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if
inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an
unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its force as a
fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the people) who
have ratified and adopted it.62 "Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give
us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law.'"63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional
Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no abandonment of
the traditional distinction between "amendment" and "revision." For during the debates,
some of the commissioners referred to the concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio
in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,64 that stressed the traditional distinction between
amendment and revision, thus:65
MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is,
"amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms – "amendment"
or "revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the
substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a
result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous – or
notorious – Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice
Makasiar,66 wherein he made the following distinction between "amendment" and
"revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole
Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change
of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the
entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of
provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of
parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a

completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be
employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new
Constitution.
To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his concurring opinion, used an analogy
– "When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you
have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the
material contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed
the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new house."67
Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word "revision,"
they had in mind the "rewriting of the whole Constitution," or the "total overhaul of the
Constitution." Anything less is an "amendment" or just "a change of specific provisions only,"
the intention being "not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of
specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs
of the times." Under this view, "substantial" amendments are still "amendments" and thus can
be proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the

Commissioners on the difference between "simple" and "substantial" amendments or whether
"substantial" amendments amounting to revision are covered by people's initiative, it behooves
us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give effect to
the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its rationale
well, viz:68
x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but
from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is
not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words
employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the
common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense
designed to be conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the proper
construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction
of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the
former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussion
and deliberations of their representatives. The history of the calling of the convention,
the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before the people at the time
of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as
anything to be gathered form the proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally

and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out
the great principles of government – not to defeat them.69 One of these great principles is
the sovereignty of the people.
Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a mode to
amend the 1987 Constitution. We start with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
which Sinco describes as "the basic political creed of the nation"70 as it "lays down the policies
that government is bound to observe."71 Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution and
Section 1, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is
a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." In a republican state, the power of the sovereign people is exercised and
delegated to their representatives. Thus in Metropolitan Transportation Service v. Paredes,
this Court held that "a republican state, like the Philippines x x x (is) derived from the will of the
people themselves in freely creating a government 'of the people, by the people, and for the
people' – a representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers
and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare." 72
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated to Congress or to
a convention, the power to amend or revise our fundamental law. History informs us how
this delegated power to amend or revise the Constitution was abused particularly during
the Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed several times to satisfy the power
requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving unprecedented
legislative powers to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of circumstances from
above and below, however, brought down the Marcos regime through an extra constitutional
revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the people. A main reason for the people's revolution
was the failure of the representatives of the people to effectuate timely changes in the
Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly or by calling a constitutional
convention. When the representatives of the people defaulted in using this last peaceful
process of constitutional change, the sovereign people themselves took matters in their
own hands. They revolted and replaced the 1973 Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987 Constitution as
it stressed the power of the people to act directly in their capacity as sovereign people.
Correspondingly, the power of the legislators to act as representatives of the people in
the matter of amending or revising the Constitution was diminished for the spring cannot
rise above its source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1, Article II of the 1987
Constitution was reworded. It now reads: "the Philippines is a democratic and republican
state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The
commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained the addition of the word
"democratic," in our first Declaration of Principles, viz:
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we are now
adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have provisions on
recall, initiative, the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that
recognize the validity of interference by the people through people's organizations x x x x73
MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and,
therefore, the first sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic state
xxxx
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to
"republican"? The constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were
content with "republican." Was this done merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x "democratic" was added because of the need to emphasize

people power and the many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved
related to recall, people's organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the
participation of the people in policy-making in certain circumstances x x x x
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does
meet a need x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is

understood as participatory democracy. 74 (emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna is
of the same import:75
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to

representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and
1935 Constitutions which used the words "republican state" because "republican state"
would refer to a democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the
participation of the people x x x x So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular
representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view
of the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or
recall, it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism, of
representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word "democratic" to
emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people
would act directly, and not through their representatives. (emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative, referendum, and
recall were enthroned as polestars in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F.
Ople who introduced the provision on people's initiative said:76
MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when we should introduce
an innovative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting in the
people and their organizations the right to formulate and propose their own
amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a manner that will be binding upon
the government. It is not that I believe this kind of direct action by the people for
amending a constitution will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to know
that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon the people and that in
the exercise of that power, they can propose amendments or revision to the
Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's initiative as a safety valve, as a
peaceful way for the people to change their Constitution, by citing our experiences under the
Marcos government, viz:77
MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but we
are providing a channel for the expression of the sovereign will of the people through this
initiative system.
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not sufficient channel for
expression of the will of the people, particularly in the amendment or revision of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened during
the 20 years under the Marcos administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a
manner of speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime Minister or the
President as the case may be, and the required number of votes could not be obtained,
we would have to provide for a safety valve in order that the people could ventilate in a
very peaceful way their desire for amendment to the Constitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National
Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent assembly or to call a constitutional
convention, the members thereof would not heed the people's desire and
clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are providing for the implementation of what is
now popularly known as people's power. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people's initiative could avert a
revolution, viz:78
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actually

avert a revolution by providing a safety valve in bringing about changes in the
Constitution through pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes what political law
authors call the "prescription of sovereignty." (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed the right of
the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action or through
initiative. To that extent, the delegated power of Congress to amend or revise the
Constitution has to be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution has to be reminted and now provides: "The legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum."
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through initiative
cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty
on its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the
exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who
they claim can only be trusted with the power to propose "simple" but not
"substantial" amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty
should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law. 79 Legal
sovereignty, he explained, is "the possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor
is the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party endowed with legally superior
powers and privileges. It is not subject to law 'for it is the author and source of law.' Legal
sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence."80
To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the people's will
over the state which they themselves have created. The state is created by and subject to the
will of the people, who are the source of all political power. Rightly, we have ruled that "the
sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism.
Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its
broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right
to govern."81
James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in the
United States in the 1780s, laid down the first principles of popular sovereignty during the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention of the 1787 Constitution of the United States:82
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no appeal,
and which, for that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.
x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our
political systems, would answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was
vested in the constitutions x x x x This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth, but
does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our
legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this
last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our constitution, control in
act, as well as right. (emphasis supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the people is
sovereign - - - not the elected President, not the elected Congress, not this unelected Court.
Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which is indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of
government. Only its exercise may be delegated to any of them. In our case, the people
delegated to Congress the exercise of the sovereign power to amend or revise the
Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this power to amend or revise the
Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign people who delegated the power has no power
to substantially amend the Constitution by direct action? If the sovereign people do not have this
power to make substantial amendments to the Constitution, what did it delegate to Congress?
How can the people lack this fraction of a power to substantially amend the Constitution when
by their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It will take some mumbo jumbo to argue
that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point:83
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often is. It is
delegated to the organs and agents of the state which constitute its government, for it is
only through this instrumentality that the state ordinarily functions. However ample and
complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless subject to withdrawal at any
time by the state. On this point Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government

and reserve to themselves a right to control of so slight and so negative a
character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet so long
as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is
conceded to be founded upon a grant and continuing consent of the mother
countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and
they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not
political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution is
shared with the people. We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign
power of the people to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution especially
when the proposed amendments will adversely affect the interest of some members of
Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public weal to private interest and worse,
will enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate the power of the people to determine their
destiny (the principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging the right of the
people to exercise initiative and referendum are liberally and generously construed in favor
of the people.84 Initiative and referendum powers must be broadly construed to
maintain maximum power in the people.85 We followed this orientation in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections.86 There is not an iota of reason to depart
from it.
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to
amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered
voters indicated their support of the Petition for Initiative, is a purely political question which is
beyond even the very long arm of this Honorable Court's power of judicial review. Whether or
not the 1987 Constitution should be amended is a matter which the people and the people alone
must resolve in their sovereign capacity."87 They argue that "[t]he power to propose
amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people.
Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under
the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a 'political
question.'"88
The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections, viz:89
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular
act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested
act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is
not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power
of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that
power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the
contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and
the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the people
ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious cycle. Is it
not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973?
Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably
a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves – of course – who exercise no
power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves
vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must
be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the
people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for the exercise of
the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The amendments must be proposed by the
people "upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter."90Compliance with these requirements is clearly a justiciable and not a political
question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be resolved by the people is addressed to them
and to them alone.
VI
Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of fact which
should first be resolved by the COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks the required number
of signatures under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Said provision requires that the
petition for initiative be supported by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors contend that no proper
verification of signatures was done in several legislative districts. They assert that mere
verification of the names listed on the signature sheets without verifying the signatures reduces
the signatures submitted for their respective legislative districts to mere scribbles on a piece of
paper.
Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification dated August 23,
2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer IV, Third District and OIC, First and
Second District, Davao City, stating that his office has not verified the signatures submitted by
the proponents of the people's initiative. The certification reads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City)
HAS NOT VERIFIED the signatures of registered voters as per documents submitted in
this office by the proponents of the People's Initiative. Consequently, NO ELECTION
DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY HIGHER SUPERIORSused as basis for
such verification of signatures.91
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that although Atty.
Casquejo and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First District, Davao City, later
issued certifications stating that the Office of the City Election Officer has examined the list of
individuals appearing in the signature sheets,92 the certifications reveal that the office had
verified only the names of the signatories, but not their signatures. Oppositors-intervenors
submit that not only the names of the signatories should be verified, but also their signatures to
ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the signature sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed to obtain the
signatures of at least three per cent (3%) of the total number of registered voters in the First
Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First District of South Cotabato, petitioners
submitted 3,182 signatures for General Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308 signatures
for Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488
registered voters of said district. Antonino, however, submitted to this Court a copy of the
certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8, 2006, showing that
the signatures from Polomolok were not verified because the Book of Voters for the whole
municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
Polomolok, South Cotabato.93 Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from the total number of
signatures from the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a total of 8,676 signatures
which falls short of the three per cent (3%) requirement for the district.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino likewise submitted to
this Court a certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de
Oro City, stating that the list of names appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the
names of registered voters in the city, thereby implying that they have not actually verified the
signatures.94
The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered by Alternative Law
Groups, Inc., which submitted copies of similarly worded certifications from the election officers
from Zamboanga del Sur95 and from Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further
assails the regularity of the verification process as it alleged that verification in some areas were
conducted by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election officers. It filed with this Court
copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing that the verification was
conducted by local officials instead of COMELEC personnel.97
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the election
officers sufficiently complied with the requirements of the Constitution and the law on initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of verification in Davao City

and in Polomolok, South Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed that the same election officers
cited by the oppositors-intervenors also issued certifications showing that they have verified the
signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. He presented copies of the
certifications issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third Legislative Districts
of Davao City stating that he verified the signatures of the proponents of the people's initiative.
His certification for the Second District states:
This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals as appearing in
the Signature Sheets of the Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted on
April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS, Punong Barangay, Centro, Davao City for
verification which consists of THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO
(30,662) signatures.
Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO
(30,662) individuals, only TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT
(22,668) individuals were found to be REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized List
of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY.98
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification regarding the
verification process conducted in Davao City. It reads:
Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has
previously issued two (2) separate certifications for the 2nd and 3rd Districts of Davao City
on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006, respectively, specifically relating to the voters who
supported the people's initiative. It was stated therein that the names submitted,
comprising 22,668 individual voters in the 2nd District and 18,469 individual voters in the
3rd District, were found [to] be registered voters of the respective districts mentioned as
verified by this Office based on the Computerized List of Voters.
It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in error and by
mistake for the reason that the signature verification has not been fully completed as of
that date.
I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as
appearing in the signature sheets and has compared these with the signatures
appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x 99
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8, 2006 issued by
Polomolok Election Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their claim that said officer had conducted
a verification of signatures in said area. The certification states:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as of
the May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with signatures were submitted for
verification and out of which 10,301 were found to be legitimate voters as per official list
of registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of registered
voters of this Municipality.100
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous legislative districts,
allegations of fraud and irregularities in the collection of signatures in Makati City were cited by
Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit:
(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be concerned, by
the Makati COMELEC Office that signature sheets have already been submitted to it for
"verification." The camp of Mayor Binay was able to witness the "verification process"
only because of their pro-active stance;
(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for
verification. 36,219 alleged voters' signatures (83% of the number of signatures
submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186 signatures allegedly "passed" COMELEC's
initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len
Abigail Binay, the said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay manually
counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word "OK" and 3,443 signatures marked with
a check, giving only 6,236 "apparently verified signatures." Before the COMELEC officer
issued the Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted to the said office not less than 55
letters of "signature withdrawal," but no action was ever taken thereon;
(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged voters'
signatures (80% of those submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures
which allegedly passed the COMELEC's initial scrutiny, some more will surely fail upon
closer examination;
(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel did
not know how to treat the objections and other observations coming from the camp of
Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did not know where to go for their remedy when the
COMELEC personnel merely "listened" to their objections and other observations. As
mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even know what to do with the many
"letters of signature withdrawal" submitted to it;
(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on the
Sigaw ng Bayan Signature Sheets. There is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;
(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;
(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature
Sheets.101
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what they have
signed as they were merely misled into signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these
allegations are rulings that a person who affixes his signature on a document raises the
presumption that the person so signing has knowledge of what the document contains. Courts
have recognized that there is great value in the stability of records, so to speak, that no one
should commit herself or himself to something in writing unless she or he is fully aware and
cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on him.102 In the same vein, we have held that a
person is presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a document he has signed. 103 But as
this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot resolve the issue.
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the constitutional requirement
that the petition for initiative be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of
cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its resolution will
require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the COMELEC according to its
rules. During the oral argument on this case, the COMELEC, through Director Alioden Dalaig of
its Law Department, admitted that it has not examined the documents submitted by the
petitioners in support of the petition for initiative, as well as the documents filed by the
oppositors to buttress their claim that the required number of signatures has not been met. The
exchanges during the oral argument likewise clearly show the need for further clarification and
presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.104
The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was this Court's
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the
sufficiency of the form and substance of the petition. I respectfully submit that this issue
should be properly litigated before the COMELEC where both parties will be given full
opportunity to prove their allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its compliance with
the requirements of R.A. 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should
be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance, as it is the body that is mandated by the
Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.105
VII
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the
Lambino and Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC relied on this
Court's ruling in Santiagopermanently enjoining it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the firm
doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the constitutional provision allowing
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the records show that in
the original decision, eight (8) justices106 voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five
(5) justices107 voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1) justice108 abstained from voting on
the issue holding that unless and until a proper initiatory pleading is filed, the said issue is not
ripe for adjudication.109
Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration. On June
10, 1997, the Court denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion for Justice
Torres inhibited himself.110 Of the original majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6)
reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice Hermosisima, originally
part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and joined the minority of five (5)
justices. He opined without any equivocation that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law, thus:
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster; another to think under fire
– to think for action upon which great interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and so I am guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the holding of the
majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation" and now to interpose my dissent thereto.
xxx
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal basis
for the exercise by the people of their right to amend the Constitution through
initiative proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
insofar as it does not sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for initiative proceedings
to amend the Constitution without the required names and/or signatures of at least 12%
of all the registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least 3% of the registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In fine,
the final vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting
himself and another justice refusing to rule on the ground that the issue was not ripe for
adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient
law failed to establish a doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a
deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with
precedential value. The opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is instructive, viz:
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue of
whether the motion for reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be
granted or not, only the following justices sided with Mr. Justice Davide, namely: Chief
Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices
Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant
the motion; while Justice Vitug "maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for
judicial adjudication." In other words, only five, out of the other twelve justices, joined Mr.
Justice Davide's June 10, 1997 ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its
failure to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency standards" tests. The
"concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations"
which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to declare a law
unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not complied with. And even assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the
"majority" was initially reached in the March 19, 1997 ponencia, the same is inconclusive
as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration. It was only on June
10, 1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was settled with finality, sans the
constitutionally required "majority." The Court's declaration, therefore, is manifestly
grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in my view, the reexamination of
the Court's decision in G.R. No. 127325. It behooves the Court "not to tarry any longer"
nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the
Court's pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is well-settled. Thus,
in the United States, an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of
opinion is not an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that Court or in the
inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers,111 which was a habeas corpusstate proceeding by a
state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioner's
state court conviction was not an "actual adjudication" barring subsequent consideration by the
district court on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-binding effect of an equal division
ruling, the Court reviewed the history of cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an
equally divided Court:"
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally
divided Court." On what was apparently the first occasion of an equal division, The
Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply affirmed on the point of
division without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a similar division during
the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining that "the
principles of law which have been argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is
affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it." Etting v. Bank of United States, 11
Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later elaborated in such cases, it is the
appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's decree. "If the
judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order can be made. The judgment
of the court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such
case to enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of
expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the action of
the court below, and that that court can proceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect
would be the same if the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed." Durant v. Essex Co.,
7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided Court
entitled to precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct.
1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1708 (1960).xxx"
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with approval in
a number of subsequent cases,112 and has been applied in various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor Child,113 wherein a putative
father sought to set aside a decree granting petition for adoption of an Indian child on grounds
of noncompliance with the requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court
of Alaska held that its decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),114 which lacked majority
opinion supporting holding that an action such as the putative father's would be governed by
the state's one-year statute of limitations, was not entitled to stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a
majority of the justices sitting did not agree on a common rationale, as two of four
participating justices agreed that the state's one-year statute of limitations applied, one justice
concurred in the result only, and one justice dissented. There was no "narrower" reasoning
agreed upon by all three affirming justices. The concurring justice expressed no opinion on the
statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he reasoned that ICWA did not give
the plaintiff standing to sue.115 The two-justice plurality, though agreeing that the state's one-
year statute of limitations applied, specifically disagreed with the concurring justice on the
standing issue.116 Because a majority of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any
one ground for affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis effect by the state Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply
to plurality decisions in which no majority of the justices participating agree to the reasoning
and as such are not authoritative interpretations binding on the Supreme Court.117
In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally

divided opinion on the matter,119 held that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to
stand, dismissing a quo warranto suit without prejudice. The Court held:
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared

unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor operation judicially interfered with, except by the
concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court sitting in the cause
wherein the constitutionality of the statute is brought in question or judicial relief sought
against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state Constitution.
Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of this court in
holding unconstitutional said chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it follows that
the statute in controversy must be allowed to stand and accordingly be permitted to be
enforced as a presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that this proceeding in quo
warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt (Fla.) 147 So. 282. This
decision is not to be regarded as a judicial precedent on the question of constitutional
law involved concerning the constitutionality vel non of chapter 15938. State ex rel.
Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the court on
question of constitutionality of statute involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by an equally
divided vote of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that property of a New York
branch of a Russian insurance company was outside the scope of the Russian Soviet
government's decrees terminating existence of insurance companies in Russia and seizing their
assets, while conclusive and binding upon the parties as respects the controversy in that
action, did not constitute an authoritative "precedent."
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, in holding that
printed lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs' lyrics, but which were in form a parody of
the latter, did not constitute infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights, ruled that the prior case
of Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,122 which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was not
binding upon it, viz:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by reason as well as by
authority, an affirmance by an equally divided court is as between the parties, a
conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of
law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the
case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or in
inferior courts.123
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the
appeal as it was unable to reach a decision because two judges recused themselves and the
remaining members of the Court were so divided, it was impossible to secure the concurrence
of four judges as is constitutionally required. The Court followed the procedure employed by the
U.S. Supreme Court when the Justices of that Court are equally divided, i.e. affirm the judgment
of the court that was before it for review. The affirmance is a conclusive determination and
adjudication as between the parties to the immediate case, it is not authority for the
determination of other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in any other court. It is not "entitled
to precedential weight." The legal effect of such an affirmance is the same as if the appeal was
dismissed.125
The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents,126 an affirmance by
an equally divided Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication
of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a
majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination
of other cases, either in that or in inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is that, the
affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as between
the parties and settles no issue of law; the affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law
presented by the case and is not entitled to precedential weight or value. In other words, the
decision only has res judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon
other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.
Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the Delfin
Petition in the Santiago case which will prevent the Santiago ruling from binding the present
petitioners. To start with, the parties are different. More importantly, the Delfin Petition did not
contain the signatures of the required number of registered voters under the Constitution: the
requirement that twelve per cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters
therein was not complied with. For this reason, we ruled unanimously that it was not the
initiatory petition which the COMELEC could properly take cognizance of. In contrast, the
present petition appears to be accompanied by the signatures of the required number of
registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed that an Order be issued fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado petition,
prayed for the calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on
the proposition. COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material differences.
Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition on the basis of its mistaken notion
that Santiago established the doctrine that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As aforestressed,
that ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the majority lacks precedential status and is
non-binding on the present petitioners.
The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to say that we dismissed
the PIRMA petition on the principle of res judicata. This was stressed by former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in
Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the
fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the
roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable,
parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and
prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,

MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization
duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403,
Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO
PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the
PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged
in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive for a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were
sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the
hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner
therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said
movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the
PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by their
arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his
cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS,
as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata,
which needs no further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first
and second actions identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action.127
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res judicata
are present. For sure, our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated
on 19 March 1997, and the motions for reconsideration thereof denied with finality on 10
June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was rendered by this Court which
had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule 65. Our judgment therein was
on the merits, i.e., rendered only after considering the evidence presented by the parties
as well as their arguments in support of their respective claims and defenses. And, as
between Santiago v. COMELEC case and COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001 subject
of the present petition, there is identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the
parties in the instant case as some of the petitioners in the latter case were not parties to
the former case. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the parties in Santiago v.
COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses Alberto and Carmen
Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete
Quirino-Quadra, another founding member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as
respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the spouses
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made parties to
the petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it appear that the PIRMA
Petition was filed by an entirely separate and distinct group by removing some of the
parties involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in
Geralde v. Sabido128-
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply
including additional parties in the subsequent case or by not including as parties
in the later case persons who were parties in the previous suit. The joining of
new parties does not remove the case from the operation of the rule on res
judicata if the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a
party in the first action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by simply
joining new parties.
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA petition but were
not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior judgment
against those parties to the PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties in Santiago v.
COMELEC, as they are bound by such prior judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res judicata binds
only PIRMA but not the petitioners.
VIII
Finally, let the people speak.
"It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the great Chief Justice John
Marshall of the United States in the 1819 case of M'cCulloch v. Maryland.129 Our Constitution
is not a mere collection of slogans. Every syllable of our Constitution is suffused with
significance and requires our full fealty. Indeed, the rule of law will wither if we allow the
commands of our Constitution to underrule us.
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the people.
We ought to be concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people
to decide whether to amend the Constitution. Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all
about who has the sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly
and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all government
authority emanates. This right of the people to make decisions is the essence of
sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this Court. If there is
any principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it is this sovereign
right of the people to decide.
This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise of their
sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or destroy the sovereign right of the people to decide
be warned. Let not their sovereignty be diminished by those who belittle their brains to
comprehend changes in the Constitution as if the people themselves are not the source and
author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of manipulation
who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the people.
Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that complies with the requirement that it
"must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein" is but the first
step in a long journey towards the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed, the case
at bar involves but a proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be debated by
the people and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe method of telling what will be the result of
the debate. There will still be a last step to the process of amendment which is the ratification of
the proposal by a majority of the people in a plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the
proposal is approved by a majority of the people in the plebiscite will it become an
amendment to the Constitution. All the way, we cannot tie the tongues of the people. It is
the people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in our Constitution.
The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let us heed them. Let
us not only sing paens to the people's sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor too late
to let the people speak.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the Commission on
Elections dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million
registered voters who affixed their signatures thereon and to REMAND the petition at bar to the
Commission on Elections for further proceedings.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent; TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND
GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-
Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L.
QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN
MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE,
GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR.
REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA
THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER
AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and
PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG
PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU
CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT,
ANTONIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q.

SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and the dissent
of J. Reynato S. Puno, I view the matter before us in this petition as one mainly involving a
complex political question.1 While admittedly the present Constitution lays down certain
numerical requirements for the conduct of a People's Initiative, such as the percentages of
signatures – being 12% of the total number of registered voters, provided each legislative
district is represented by at least 3% – they are not the main points of controversy. Stated in
simple terms, what this Court must decide is whether the Commission on Elections gravely
abused its discretion when it denied the petition to submit the proposed changes to the
Constitution directly to the vote of the sovereign people in a plebiscite. Technical
questions, e.g. whether petitioners should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration before
coming to us, are of no moment in the face of the transcendental issue at hand. What deserve
our full attention are the issues concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and
constitutional limitations on the conduct of the People's Initiative.
2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the people to
"directly" propose amendments through their own "initiative." The subject of the instant petition
is by way of exercising that initiative in order to change our form of government from presidential
to parliamentary. Much has been written about the fulsome powers of the people in a
democracy. But the most basic concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people and
that all government authority emanates from them. Clearly, by the power of popular initiative,
the people have the sovereign right to change the present Constitution. Whether the initial
moves are done by a Constitutional Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a People's
Initiative, in the end every amendment -- however insubstantial or radical -- must be submitted
to a plebiscite. Thus, it is the ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that matters. 2
3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of Messrs. Lambino, et al.
For the COMELEC was just relying on precedents, with the common understanding that,
pursuant to the cases of Santiago v. COMELEC3 and PIRMA v. COMELEC,4 the COMELEC
had been permanently enjoined from entertaining any petition for a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution by no less than this Court. In denying due course below to Messrs. Lambino
and Aumentado's petition, I could not hold the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion
when they merely relied on this Court's unequivocal rulings. Of course, the Santiago and
the PIRMA decisions could be reviewed and reversed by this Court, as J. Reynato S. Puno
submits now. But until the Court does so, the COMELEC was duty bound to respect and obey
this Court's mandate, for the rule of law to prevail.
4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition of Messrs. Lambino
and Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further examination of the factual requisites before
a plebiscite is conducted. On page 4 of the assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August
31, 2006, the COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that "even if the signatures in the instant
Petition appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered
voters", the COMELEC could not give the Petition due course because of our view that R.A. No.
6735 was inadequate. That, however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice Puno's scholarly ponencia.
Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is only one clear task for
COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left for the COMELEC, once factual issues are
heard and resolved, is to give due course to the petition for the initiative to amend our
Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on whether a parliamentary system of
government should replace the present presidential system.
5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of the form of
government as a political question soonest. (This I say without fear of media opinion that our
judicial independence has been tainted or imperiled, for it is not.) Thus I vote for the remand of
the petition. Thereafter, as prayed for, COMELEC should forthwith certify the Petition as
sufficient in form and substance and call for the holding of a plebiscite within the period
mandated by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days from said
certification. Only a credible plebiscite itself, conducted peacefully and honestly, can bring
closure to the instant political controversy.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
G. R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q.

vs.
HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J.:
The life of the law is not logic but experience.1 Our collective experience as a nation breathes
life to our system of laws, especially to the Constitution. These cases promise to significantly
contribute to our collective experience as a nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional principle
that the Philippines is not merely a republican State but a democratic one as well behooves this
Court to affirm the right of the people to participate directly in the process of introducing
changes to their fundamental law. These petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is an
opportune time for this Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the people.
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently explained the rationale
for upholding the people's initiative. However, I wish to share my own thoughts on certain
matters I deem material and significant.
Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin Petition
The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly on the basis of
this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC2 that: (1) RA 6753 was inadequate to cover the
system of initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was
regarding amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the initiative provision.
However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin in 1997. It
would be unreasonable to make it apply to all petitions which were yet unforeseen in 1997. The
fact is that Santiago was focused on the Delfin petition alone.
Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate changes to the Constitution via
initiative claim that Santiago barred any and all future petitions for initiative by virtue of the
doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata. The argument is flawed.
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating to stare decisis.
Hence, I will address the argument from the viewpoint of res judicata.
Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes
an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.3 It
has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must
be a judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must be identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of cause of action between the first and second actions.4
There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the COMELEC was also
the respondent in Santiago, the petitioners in that case and those in this case are different.
More significantly, there is no identity of causes of action in the two cases. Santiago involved
amendments to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article X
of the Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of Article VI and
Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that the present petition for initiative was barred
by Santiago and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.
The present petition and that in Santiago are materially different from each other. They are not
based on the same facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate and defeat the present
direct action of the people to exercise their sovereignty by proposing changes to their
fundamental law.
People's Initiative Should Not

Be Subjected to Conditions
People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively. Neither
Congress nor the COMELEC has the power to curtail or defeat this exclusive power of the
people to change the Constitution. Neither should the exercise of this power be made subject to
any conditions, as some would have us accept.
Oppositors to the people's initiative point out that this Court ruled in Santiago that RA 6735 was
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and, thus, no law
existed to enable the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is
seriously objectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It was
unprecedented and dangerously transgressed the domain reserved to the legislature.
While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the validity and
sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution,5 that procedure cannot unnecessarily restrict
the initiative privilege.6 In the same vein, this Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably
restrain the people's right to directly propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law
inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions.
Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people will be severely emasculated, if not
rendered illusory.
People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly Should not be
Unreasonably Curtailed
If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere representative bodies, can
propose changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic itself –
the people – may not do so directly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of "direct

democracy" as opposed to "representative democracy." The system of initiative allows citizens
to directly propose constitutional amendments for the general electorate to adopt or reject at the
polls, particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government was envisioned to "refine and
enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and
love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations," 7 the
exercise of "direct democracy" through initiative reserves direct lawmaking power to the people
by providing them a method to make new laws via the constitution, or alternatively by enacting
statutes.8 Efforts of the represented to control their representatives through initiative have been
described as curing the problems of democracy with more democracy.9
The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that "sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."10 Unless the present
petition is granted, this constitutional principle will be nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of
substance for those whom it seeks to empower.
The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the Constitution is a
fundamental right and must be jealously guarded.11 The people should be allowed to directly
seek redress of the problems of society and representative democracy with the constitutional
tools they have reserved for their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT,
ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION,
INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN
V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD,
ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA,
DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI
ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN,
JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE
MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA
III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA
NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER
and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA
A. LAT, ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 entitled

vs.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J:
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-froid, inimitable
lucidity, and luminous scholarship are all so characteristic of the author that it is hardly a waste
of pen and ink to write separately if only to express my deep admiration for his disquisition. It is
compelling because it derives from the fundamental democratic ordinance that sovereignty
resides in the people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual empowerment
of the sovereign people. Justice Puno's opinion will in the short term engender reactions on its
impact on present attempts to amend the Constitution, but once the political passion of the
times have been shorn, it will endure as an unequivocal message to the taongbayan that they
are to be trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's opinion. I only write separately to highlight
a few other points which also inform my vote to grant the petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and PIRMA v. COMELEC2 had not
acquired value as precedent and should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court has long
been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a
decision can stand as precedent. That principle has informed the members of this Court as they
deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this consideration is not ultimately
reflected on the final draft released for promulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act
No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All the Court
said then was that the law was "inadequate". Since this "inadequate" law was not annulled by
the Court, or repealed by Congress, it remained part of the statute books.3
I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly "inadequate", the Court in Santiago should not
have simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the law itself.
Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."4As explained by the Court recently
in Reyes v. Lim,5 "[Article 9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in the revered Justice
Cardozo's words,] 'fills the open spaces in the law.'"6 Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on
an action premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the law is "inadequate" would have
been found in grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to "fill the open
spaces" in Santiago further highlights that decision's status as an unfortunate aberration.
I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of having recently decried a
majority ruling that was clearly minded to reverse several precedents but refused to explicitly
say so.7 Yet the principle is not immutable.8The passionate words of Chief Justice Panganiban
in Osmeña v. COMELEC9 bear quoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining
the ad ban to be consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus,
respondent urges reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that
more important than consistency and stability are the verity, integrity and correctness of
jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand
still." Verily, it must correct itself and move in cadence with the march of the electronic
age. Error and illogic should not be perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many
cases, has deviated from stare decisis and reversed previous doctrines and
decisions.10 It should do no less in the present case.11
Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as constitutional, yet
declare its provisions as inadequate to accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred the
enforcement of the law. That ruling is erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.
II.
Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why Santiago should not be respected as
precedent, I agree that the COMELEC's failure to take cognizance of the petitions as mandated
by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible through the petitions
before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v. COMELEC12, Sanchez v.
COMELEC13, and Sambarani v. COMELEC14 that "the functions of the COMELEC under the
Constitution are essentially executive and administrative in nature".15 More pertinently, in Buac
v. COMELEC16, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to the enforcement
and administration of a law relative to a plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of the poll body
under its constitutional mandate "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of a xxx plebiscite".17
Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of the
COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law, functions that
are essentially executive and administrative in nature. Even the subsequent duty of the
COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have been filed is
administrative in character. By any measure, the COMELEC's failure to perform its executive
and administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under Republic Act No.
6735 as they allegedly embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735
classifies as a "prohibited measure," a petition submitted to the electorate that embraces more
than one subject.18 On this point, reliance is apparently placed on the array of provisions which
are to be affected by the amendments proposed in the initiative petition.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-enshrined constitutional principle that
the laws passed by Congress "shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof".19 The one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of
the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.20 An act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general object.21
The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the Constitution should apply as
well in the interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be established
that an initiative petition embraces a single general subject, the petition may be allowed no
matter the number of constitutional provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments are
germane to the subject of the petition.
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the changing of
the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a
proposal may strike as comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of the
executive and legislative branches of government, nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses only
a single general subject still.
The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is susceptible to division into several
general spheres. To cite the broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III
enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people under the Bill of Rights; Articles VI, VII and VIII
provide for the organizational structure of government; while Articles II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and
XVI enunciate policy principles of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under Section 10
of Rep. Act No. 6735 is an initiative petition that seeks to amend provisions which do not belong
to the same sphere. For example, had a single initiative petition sought not only to change the
form of government from presidential to parliamentary but also to amend the Bill of Rights, said
petition would arguably have been barred under Section 10, as that petition ostensibly
embraces more than one subject, with each subject bearing no functional relation to the other.
But that is not the case with the present initiative petitions.
Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more than one subject since the
proposed amendments seek to affect two separate branches of government. The very purpose
of the initiative petitions is to fuse the powers of the executive and legislative branches of
government; hence, the amendments intended to effect such general intent necessarily affects
the two branches. If it required that to propose a shift in government from presidential to
parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII (Executive Branch) have to be segregated to a
different petition from that which would propose amendments to Article VI (Legislative Branch),
then the result would be two initiative petitions ─ both subject to separate authentications,
consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one general proposition. This scenario, which
entertains the possibility that one petition would ultimately fail while the other succeeds, could
thus allow for the risk that the executive branch could be abolished without transferring
executive power to the legislative branch. An absurd result, indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10. The
Constitution indubitably grants the people the right to seek amendment of the charter through
initiative, and mandates Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right." In doing so, Congress may not restrict the right to initiative on grounds that are not
provided for in the Constitution. If for example the implementing law also provides that certain
provisions of the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that prohibition should not
be sustained. Congress is tasked with the implementation, and not the restriction of the right to
initiative.
The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a bar to amendment under
the Constitution. Arguments can be supplied for the merit of such a requirement, since it would
afford a measure of orderliness when the vital question of amending the Constitution arises. The
one-subject requirement does allow the voters focus when deliberating whether or not to vote
for the amendments. These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to detract from the fact that
the one-subject requirement imposes an additional restriction on the right to initiative not
contemplated by the Constitution. Short of invalidating the requirement, a better course of action
would be to insist upon its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has consistently adhered to a
liberal interpretation of the one-subject, one-title rule.22 There is no cause to adopt a stricter
interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735.
IV.
During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the Constitution
amended through initiative would not have the benefit of a reference source from the record of a
deliberative body such as Congress or a constitutional convention. It was submitted that this
consideration influenced the Constitutional Commission as it drafted Section 2, Article XVII,
which expressly provided that only amendments, and not revisions, may be the subject of
initiative petitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to the record of
deliberations of a constitutional convention or commission in the interpretation of the charter.
Yet if the absence of a record of deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or
constrict processes which change a constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative
process authorized by the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these petitions, I would like
to point out that resort to the records of deliberations is only one of many aids to constitutional
construction. For one, it should be abhorred if the provision under study is itself clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity. As the Court held in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk . . . We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face."24
Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional interpretation, the
constitutional record does not provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the
provision. The intent of a constitutional convention is not controlling by itself, and while the
historical discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily
decisive. The Court has even held in Vera v. Avelino25 that "the proceedings of the
[constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the proper construction of the fundamental law
than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since in the latter case it
is the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former courts are endeavoring to
arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives."26 The proper interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than the framers' understanding thereof.27
If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for interpretation of any
amendments adopted via initiative, such absence would not preclude the courts from
interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent with how courts generally construe the
Constitution. For example, reliance will be placed on the other provisions of the Constitution to
arrive at a harmonized and holistic constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly
the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.
V.
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the sufficiency of the initiative petitions
should be remanded to the COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly reposes on the COMELEC
the task of determining the sufficiency of the petitions, including the ascertainment of whether
twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in
every legislative district have indeed signed the initiative petitions.28 It should be remembered
that the COMELEC had dismissed the initiative petitions outright, and had yet to undertake the
determination of sufficiency as required by law.
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative petitions that the
Court may at this juncture pronounce the initiative petitions as insufficient. The derivation of the
factual predicates leading to the suggestion is uncertain, considering that the trier of facts, the
COMELEC in this instance, has yet to undertake the necessary determination. Still, the premise
has been floated that petitioners have made sufficient admissions before this Court that
purportedly established the petitions are insufficient.
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we should ask, I
submit, is whether it serves well on the Court to usurp trier of facts even before the latter
exercises its functions? If the Court, at this stage, were to declare the petitions as insufficient, it
would be akin to the Court pronouncing an accused as guilty even before the lower court trial
had began.
Matugas v. COMELEC29 inveighs against the propriety of the Court uncharacteristically

assuming the role of trier of facts, and resolving factual questions not previously adjudicated by
the lower courts or tribunals:
[P]etitioner in this case cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's findings by introducing new
evidence before this Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then ask it
to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the COMELEC.
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first
time on appeal, and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court
will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action. This is true whether the
decision elevated for review originated from a regular court or an administrative agency
or quasi-judicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil case, a special proceeding,
or a criminal case. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with
orderly justice.30
Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the petitions constitutes in effect a
trial de novo, the Justices of the Supreme Court virtually descending to the level of trial court
judges. This is an unbecoming recourse, and it simply is not done.
VI.
The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a plea that it make the choice
whether to amend the Constitution or not. This is a matter which should not be left to fifteen
magistrates who have not been elected by the people to make the choice for them.
A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987 Constitution. It is merely a vote to
allow the people to directly exercise that option. In fact, the position of Justice Puno which I
share would not even guarantee that the Lambino and Sigaw ng Bayan initiative petitions would
be submitted to the people in a referendum. The COMELEC will still have to determine the
sufficiency of the petition. Among the questions which still have to be determined by the poll
body in considering the sufficiency of the petitions is whether twelve percent (12%) of all
registered voters nationwide, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every
legislative district, have indeed signed the initiative petitions.31
And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter of whether the
Constitution should be amended would still depend on the choice of the electorate. The
oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the amendments proposed, or the imputed motives
behind the amendments. A referendum, should the COMELEC find the petitions as sufficient,
would allow them to convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the proponents
of the amendment to defend their proposal. The campaign period alone would allow the public
to be involved in the significant deliberation on the course our nation should take, with the
ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more politically aware populace. And of course, the
choice on whether the Constitution should be amended would lie directly with the people. The
initiative process involves participatory democracy at its most elemental; wherein
the consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or the
hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the
academic yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the affluent and
the impoverished alike.
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change engaged in by a

people who are actually empowered in having a say whether these changes should be enacted,
gives fruition to the original vision of pure democracy, as formulated in Athens two and a half
millennia ago. The great hero of Athenian democracy, Pericles, was recorded as saying in his
famed Funeral Oration, "We differ from other states in regarding the man who keeps aloof from
public life not as 'private' but as useless; we decide or debate, carefully and in person all
matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and deeds go ill together, but that acts are
foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed."32
Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has been peddled that an act or
vote that assists the initiative process is one for the willful extinction of democracy or democratic
institutions. Such a consideration should of course properly play its course in the public debates
and deliberations attendant to the initiative process. Yet as a result of the harum-scarum, the
temptation lies heavy for a member of this Court perturbed with the prospect of constitutional
change to relieve those anxieties by simply voting to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates the
amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the expense of the people's will or what
the Constitution allows. A vote so oriented takes the conservative path of least resistance, even
as it may gain the admiration of those who do not want to see the Constitution amended.
Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and the
elements of democracy on which our rule of law is founded. Direct democracy, as embodied in
the initiative process, is but a culmination of the evolution over the centuries of democratic rights
of choice and self-governance. The reemergence of the Athenian democratic ideal after
centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to favored
classes. The Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and self-governance only
to a few English nobles; the American Constitution was originally intended to give a meaningful
voice only to free men, mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding requirements set by the
states for voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as it may have already been
within the first few years of the American Union, met resistance from no less a revered figure as
Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian Howard Zinn attributes these
disconcerting words:
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally
this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent
and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a
distinct permanent share in the government… Can a democratic assembly who annually
revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to pursue the public good?
Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy…33
This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age of modern
democracy where a person's poverty, color, or gender no longer impedes the exercise of full
democratic rights. Yet a democracy that merely guarantees its citizens the right to live their lives
freely is incomplete if there is no corresponding allowance for a means by which the people
have a direct choice in determining their country's direction. Initiative as a mode of amending a
constitution may seem incompatible with representative democracy, yet it embodies an even
purer form of democracy. Initiative, which our 1987 Constitution saw fit to grant to the people, is
a progressive measure that is but a continuation of the line of evolution of the democratic ideal.
By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional amendments, the
initiative process should be acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under
law. This right granted to over sixty million Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of less than
eight magistrates for reasons that bear no cogitation on the Constitution.
I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT,
ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION,
INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.
MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN
V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD,
ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA,
DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI
ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN,
JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE
MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA
III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA,
ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA
NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER
and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA
A. LAT, ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299

vs.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will,
and lives only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make or unmake, resides
only in the whole body of the people; not in any subdivision of them."
-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the persuasive and
erudite dissent of Justice Reynato S. Puno. However, I make some additional observations in
connection with my concurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of
1987 for being the supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an
ultimate authority to which the Constitution is also subordinate – the will of the people. No less
than its very first paragraph, the Preamble,1expressly recognizes that the Constitution came to
be because it was ordained and promulgated by the sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle
reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which explicitly declares that
"[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." Thus, the resolution of the issues and
controversies raised by the instant Petition should be guided accordingly by the foregoing
principle.
If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in the event that the
people change their will, so must the Constitution be revised or amended to reflect such
change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend the Constitution inherently resides in the
sovereign people whose will it is supposed to express and embody. The Constitution itself,
under Article XVII, provides for the means by which the revision or amendment of the
Constitution may be proposed and ratified.
Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the Constitution may be made
(a) by Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (b) by constitutional
convention. The Congress and the constitutional convention possess the power to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution not simply because the Constitution so
provides, but because the sovereign people had chosen to delegate their inherent right to make
such proposals to their representatives either through Congress or through a constitutional
convention.
On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly empowered by the People
Power Revolution of 1986, reserved to themselves the right to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through initiative, to wit –

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 2
The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to amend the
Constitution because, as previously discussed, such right is inherent in them. The section only
reduces into writing this right to initiate amendments to the Constitution where they collectively
and willfully agreed in the manner by which they shall exercise this right: (a) through the filing of
a petition; (b) supported by at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters
nationwide; (c) with each legislative district represented by at least three percent (3%) of the
registered voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that no such petition may be filed within
five years after the ratification of the Constitution, and not oftener than once every five years
thereafter; and (e) a delegation to Congress of the authority to provide the formal requirements
and other details for the implementation of the right.
It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to Congress or
to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution. The initiative process gives
the sovereign people the voice to express their collective will, and when the people speak, we
must be ready to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees
the sovereign people's right to initiative, rather than limits it. The enabling law which Congress
has been tasked to enact must give life to the said provision and make the exercise of the right
to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it in any way that would render the people's
option of resorting to initiative to amend the Constitution more stringent, difficult, and less
feasible, as compared to the other constitutional means to amend or revise the Constitution. In
fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution, the
legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent reserved to the people by the
provisions on initiative and referendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions, and which has
led me to the conclusions, in support of the dissent of Justice Puno, that (a) The Commission on
Election (COMELEC) had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution filed by herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino
and Erico B. Aumentado; (b) The Court should revisit the pronouncements it made in Santiago
v. Commission on Elections;3 (c) It is the sovereign people's inherent right to propose changes
to the Constitution, regardless of whether they constitute merely amendments or a total revision
thereof; and (d) The COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition
for initiative and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, determine the factual issues raised by the
oppositors before this Court.
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed
Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative entirely on the basis of the Santiago case which,
allegedly, permanently enjoined it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution in the absence of a sufficient law.
After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in earnest that the permanent
injunction actually issued by this Court against the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for
initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the
Constitution.
The Conclusion4 in the majority opinion in the Santiago case reads –
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
implementation of the system.

that system.
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition

(UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as

against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court made permanent the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on 18 December 1996 against the COMELEC.
The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative.5 It was this restraining
order, more particularly the portion thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which was expressly
made permanent by the Court. It would seem to me that the COMELEC and all other oppositors
to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative gave unwarranted significance and weight to
the first paragraph of the Conclusion in the Santiago case. The first and second paragraphs
of the Conclusion, preceding the dispositive portion, merely express the opinion of the
ponente; while the definite orders of the Court for implementation are found in the
dispositive portion.
We have previously held that –
The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the court
and which is the subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision may be
resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for such a resolution. Where there is
conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text of
the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive
portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence
execution must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive
portion of the decision.6
Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and the dispositive portion of
the Santiago case? Apparently, there is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion states that the
COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until the enactment of a valid law.
On the other hand, the fallo only makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC enjoining it
from proceeding with the Delfin Petition. While the permanent injunction contemplated in the
Conclusion encompasses all petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
the fallo is expressly limited to the Delfin Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of the
Court as it is stated in the dispositive portion or the fallo should be controlling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative on the basis
of this Court's Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in the case of People's Initiative for
Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. The Commission on Elections, et al.8 The Court
therein found that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
PIRMA Petition for initiative to amend the Constitution for it only complied with the Decision in
the Santiago case.
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on the basis of res
judicata because PIRMA participated in the proceedings of the said case, and had knowledge of
and, thus, must be bound by the judgment of the Court therein. As explained by former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case –
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and
in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of
the fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of
the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not
indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are
raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,

MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization
duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403,
Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO
PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the
PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged
in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive for a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were
sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the
hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner
therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said
movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the
PEDROSA'S did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by their
arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his
cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS,
as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata,
which needs no further elaboration.9
While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata, the same cannot be said
to the Petition at bar. Res judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same
cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or
order must be one on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.10
Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the last has not
been complied with. Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the present Petition involve different
parties, subject matter, and causes of action, and the former should not bar the latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Delfin
alone. His petition does not qualify as the initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC can
acquire jurisdiction, being unsupported by the required number of registered voters, and actually
imposing upon the COMELEC the task of gathering the voters' signatures. In the case before
us, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and Aumentado, on
behalf of the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures on the signature sheets
attached thereto. Their petition prays that the COMELEC issue an Order –
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino
people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution,
the personalities concerned and the other factual circumstances attendant in the two cases
differ. Also dissimilar are the particular prayer and reliefs sought by the parties from the
COMELEC, as well as from this Court. For these reasons, I find that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed the petition for initiative filed by Lambino
and Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord due course to a petition which on its face
complies with the rudiments of the law. COMELEC was openly negligent in summarily
dismissing the Lambino and Aumentado petition. The haste by which the instant Petition was
struck down is characteristic of bad faith, which, to my mind, is a patent and gross evasion of
COMELEC's positive duty. It has so obviously copped out of its duty and responsibility to
determine the sufficiency thereof and sought protection and justification for its craven decision in
the supposed permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the Santiago case. The
COMELEC had seemingly expanded the scope and application of the said permanent
injunction, reading into it more than what it actually states, which is surprising, considering that
the Chairman and majority of the members of COMELEC are lawyers who should be able to
understand and appreciate, more than a lay person, the legal consequences and intricacies of
the pronouncements made by the Court in the Santiago case and the permanent injunction
issued therein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4,
imposes upon the COMELEC the mandate to set a date for plebiscite after a positive
determination of the sufficiency of a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution, viz
–
SEC. 4. x x x
the petition.
As a rule, the word "shall" commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion, and that the presumption is that the word "shall" when used, is
mandatory.11 Under the above-quoted constitutional provision, it is the mandatory or imperative
obligation of the COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency of the petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and issue a certification on its findings; and (b) in case such
petition is found to be sufficient, to set the date for the plebiscite on the proposed amendments
not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its certification. The COMELEC should not
be allowed to shun its constitutional mandate under the second paragraph of Article XVII,
Section 4, through the summary dismissal of the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and
Aumentado, when such petition is supported by 6.3 million signatures of registered voters.
Should all of these signatures be authentic and representative of the required percentages of
registered voters for every legislative district and the whole nation, then the initiative is a true
and legitimate expression of the will of the people to amend the Constitution, and COMELEC
had caused them grave injustice by silencing their voice based on a patently inapplicable
permanent injunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by the Court in its
Decision in the Santiago case, especially as regards the supposed insufficiency or inadequacy
of Republic Act No. 6735 as the enabling law for the implementation of the people's right to
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually
gave rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a
judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The
confusion over such a declaration thereby impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,
the ponente in the Santiago case, to provide the following clarification in his separate opinion to
the Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus –
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A. No.
6735 relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the "completeness and
sufficient standard tests" with respect to permissible delegation of legislative power or
subordinate legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the language in Santiago,
the conclusion is inevitable; the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case pronounced
repeatedly that Republic Act No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate, there is no categorical
declaration therein that the said statute was unconstitutional. The express finding that Republic
Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can only be found in the separate opinion of former Chief
Justice Davide to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, which was not concurred in by the other
members of the Court.
Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago case, that Republic Act No. 6735
is insufficient and inadequate, is already tantamount to a declaration that the statute is
unconstitutional, it was rendered in violation of established rules in statutory construction, which
state that –
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt
(Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact, this Court
does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis mota presented (Tropical Homes v.
National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).
First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well avoided the issue of constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 6735 by ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition for the simple
reason that it does not constitute an initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC could acquire
jurisdiction. And second, the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 has not been
adequately shown. It was by and large merely inferred or deduced from the way Republic Act
No. 6735 was worded and the provisions thereof arranged and organized by Congress. The
dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in the Santiago case reveal the other side to
the argument, adopting the more liberal interpretation that would allow the Court to sustain the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735. It would seem that the majority in the Santiago case
failed to heed the rule that all presumptions should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of
the statute.
The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the Santiago case
and again open to judicial review the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735; in which case, I
shall cast my vote in favor of its constitutionality, having satisfied the completeness and
sufficiency of standards tests for the valid delegation of legislative power. I fully agree in the
conclusion made by Justice Puno on this matter in his dissenting opinion12 in the Santiago case,
that reads –
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in
promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated,
Section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system
of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body
upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the
delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing.
Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative,
directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, what the COMELEC should do upon
filing of the petition for initiative, how a proposition is approved, when a plebiscite may
be held, when the amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject of
any initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate.
III
The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on the difference between
an "amendment" and a "revision" of the Constitution. Allow me also to articulate my additional
thoughts on the matter.
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative argue that the proposed changes
therein to the provisions of the Constitution already amount to a revision thereof, which is not
allowed to be done through people's initiative; Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution on
people's initiative refers only to proposals for amendments to the Constitution. They assert the
traditional distinction between an amendment and a revision, with amendment referring to
isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision as a revamp or rewriting of the whole
instrument.13
However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no quantitative or qualitative
test that can establish with definiteness the distinction between an amendment and a revision,
or between a substantial and simple change of the Constitution.
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative
basically affect only Article VI on the Legislative Department and Article VII on the Executive
Department. While the proposed changes will drastically alter the constitution of our government
by vesting both legislative and executive powers in a unicameral Parliament, with the President
as the Head of State and the Prime Minister exercising the executive power; they would not
essentially affect the other 16 Articles of the Constitution. The 100 or so changes counted by the
oppositors to the other provisions of the Constitution are constituted mostly of the nominal
substitution of one word for the other, such as Parliament for Congress, or Prime Minister for
President. As eloquently pointed out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the changes proposed to
transform our form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary,
would not affect the fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state. It will
still be a representative government where officials continue to be accountable to the people
and the people maintain control over the government through the election of members of the
Parliament.
Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion or even the
whole of the Constitution, what or who is to stop them? Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution
which, by the way it is worded, refers only to their right to initiative on amendments of the
Constitution? The delegates to the Constitutional Convention who, according to their
deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution to amendments? This
Court which has the jurisdiction to interpret the provision? Bearing in mind my earlier declaration
that the will of the sovereign people is supreme, there is nothing or no one that can preclude
them from initiating changes to the Constitution if they choose to do so. To reiterate, the
Constitution is supposed to be the expression and embodiment of the people's will, and should
the people's will clamor for a revision of the Constitution, it is their will which should prevail.
Even the fact that the people ratified the 1987 Constitution, including Article XVII, Section 2
thereof, as it is worded, should not prevent the exercise by the sovereign people of their
inherent right to change the Constitution, even if such change would be tantamount to a
substantial amendment or revision thereof, for their actual exercise of the said right should be a
clear renunciation of the limitation which the said provision imposes upon it. It is the inherent
right of the people as sovereign to change the Constitution, regardless of the extent thereof.
IV
Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due course to and take
cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. I
reiterate that it would be a greater evil if one such petition which is ostensibly supported by the
required number of registered voters all over the country, be summarily dismissed.
Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not necessarily mean that the
same would be found sufficient and set for plebiscite. The COMELEC still faces the task of
reviewing the petition to determine whether it complies with the requirements for a valid exercise
of the right to initiative. Questions raised by the oppositors to the petition, such as those on the
authenticity of the registered voters' signatures or compliance with the requisite number of
registered voters for every legislative district, are already factual in nature and require the
reception and evaluation of evidence of the parties. Such questions are best presented and
resolved before the COMELEC since this Court is not a trier of facts.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 31
August 2006 denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado
be reversed and set aside for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, and that the Petition be remanded to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

VOTERS, petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

SAGUISAG, petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John
Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Introduction
The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the

Sovereignty of the people, depends on the choices it makes between
these opposite principles: absolute power on the one hand, and on the
other the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition.
—John Acton
In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly persuasive
opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno upholding the people's initiative and raise some points of my
own.
The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the Constitution was once
discussed in the landmark case of Santiago v. COMELEC.1 Almost a decade later, the issue is
once again before the Court, and I firmly believe it is time to reevaluate the pronouncements
made in that case.
The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its proponents and
opponents will understandably take all measures to advance their position and defeat that of
their opponents. The wisdom or folly of Charter Change does not concern the Court. The only
thing that the Court must review is the validity of the present step taken by the proponents of
Charter Change, which is the People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people

through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that section had
been fulfilled. It determined that Congress had not provided for the implementation of the
exercise of the people's initiative, when it held that Republic Act No. 6735, or "The Initiative and
Referendum Act," was "inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation."2
With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.
Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments and it
should not have been considered inadequate.
The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the law,
in the failings of the way the law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law was
inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators' intent, but disregarded this intent. The
law was found wanting. The Court then saw the inclusion of the Constitution in RA 6735 as an
afterthought. However, it was included, and it should not be excluded by the Court via a strained
analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people the power to propose amendments as
they saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the
controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.3 The intent of the legislature was clear, and
yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It was not specifically struck down or declared
unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost sight
of what RA 6735 was.
It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should have been more flexible. It is also a
basic precept of statutory construction that statutes should be construed not so much according
to the letter that killeth but in line with the purpose for which they have been enacted.4 The
reading of the law should not have been with the view of its defeat, but with the goal of
upholding it, especially with its avowed noble purpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose amendments to
the Constitution, in accordance with the Constitution itself. It should not be the Supreme Court
that stifles the people, and lets their cries for change go unheard, especially when the
Constitution itself grants them that power.
The court's ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present petition because the
fallo in the Santiago case is limited to the Delfin petition.
The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al.,
against the COMELEC, et al., which sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the
"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment, the Court made the following
conclusion, viz:
This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition or initiative on amendments on the
implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).

that system.
In the said case, the Court's fallo states as follows:
b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments

to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on

Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to
the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition

(UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as

against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary that when
there is conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and the opinion of the
court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order
of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision. 5 The dispositive
portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of execution. The other parts of the
decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for the disposition. Where
there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in
the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that
the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering
nothing. Hence, the execution must conform with that which is ordained or decreed in the
dispositive portion of the decision.6
A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal expression of the
views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be
combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction
between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its
decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not
infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially
those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions
lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are
apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as
expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.7
Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately becomes apparent that
the disposition in the latter case categorically made permanent the December 18, 1996
Temporary Restraining Order issued against the COMELEC in the Delfin petition but did NOT
formally incorporate therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining the COMELEC "from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably, the
perpetual proscription against the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over any other petition
on Charter Change through a People's Initiative is just a conclusion and cannot bind the poll
body, for such unending ban would trench on its constitutional power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the COMELEC the
jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition on the initiative under Section 8, Rule 11
and the form of the petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred from entertaining
any such petition.
In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition on initiative
under RA 6735 and it can rule on the petition and its action can only be passed upon by the
Court when the same is elevated through a petition for certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred
from acting on said petitions since jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said law has
not been declared unconstitutional and hence still valid though considered inadequate in
the Santiago case.
Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA v. Commission
on Elections8confirmed the statement of the Court in the Santiago case that the COMELEC was
"permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments." Much reliance is placed on the ruling contained in a Minute Resolution which
reads:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of Discretion could be
attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA
therein, it appearing that it only Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this
10, 1997.
Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision.
To reiterate, the dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer specifically to the December
18, 1996 TRO being made permanent against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a permanent
injunction against any other petition for initiative on amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or
even affirmed in the Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the December 18,
1996 TRO which became permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735, and the
annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly not the alleged perpetual
injunction against the initiative petition. Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA case cannot be
considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.
Amendment or Revision
One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under RA 6735, since
only amendments to the Constitution may be the subject of a people's initiative.
The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it is merely an
attempt to amend it. The term amendment has to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the
people's efforts to amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9 explained:

But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act
to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed
essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem
obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.
In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution. It was
never its intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself with amending a few
provisions in our fundamental charter.
When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign
people's political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the
people's right to exercise their sovereign power.
Conclusion
Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus deserves the
highest respect even from the courts. It is not something that can be overruled, set aside,
ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of
the law.
As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the People's Initiative, I vote to
grant the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The
Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
should be remanded to the COMELEC for determination whether or not the petition is sufficient
under RA 6735, and if the petition is sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as
required by RA 6735.
It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it was twenty years ago. And should
this voice demand a change in the Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be one to stand
in its way.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Including Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP).
2
This provision states: "Requirements. — x x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five
(5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition."
3
This provision states: "Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification
cards used in the immediately preceding election."
4
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least
per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
5
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall
be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall
be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be
responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
6
Sections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of
their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers
under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the
interim parliament.
deleted, all other sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary
references therein to "Congress", "Senate", "House of Representatives" and "Houses of
"Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives"
shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister".
Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are
hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered
unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided however that any and all
references therein to "Congress", "Senate", "House of Representatives" and "Houses of
"Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives"
shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister".
over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall
among themselves.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from
among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall
may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.
government officials. Thereafter, the Vice President, as Member of Parliament, shall
immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the
purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all
its members, from among themselves. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime
Minister until the expiration of the term of incumbent President and Vice President.
7
As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4 (paragraph 3) and a modified
paragraph 2, Section 5, thus:
Section 4. x x x x
xxxx
Section 5. x x x x
government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and
perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
8
336 Phil. 848 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.
9
The COMELEC held:
We agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this
case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the
Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non self-executory provision

needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the
constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago vs. Commission on
Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
concerned.
The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required
minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least three per centumof the registered voters therein, still
the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court categorically declared
R.A. No. 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the
people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the
pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of
the people remains nothing but an "empty right", and that this Commission is
on amendments to the Constitution.
Considering the foregoing, We are therefore constrained not to entertain or give due
course to the instant Petition.
10
Arturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya; Philippine
Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO); Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines; Sulong Bayan Movement Foundation, Inc.
11
Onevoice Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T.
Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete
Quirino Quadra; Bayan, Bayan Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum,
Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Jojo
Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Loretta Ann P. Rosales, and Mario Joyo
Aguja, Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine Constitution
Association (PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan
M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate of
the Philippines; Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L.
Salvador and Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cebu City and Cebu
Province Chapters; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio R.
Osmeňa III, Jamby Madrigal, Jinggoy Estrada, Alfredo S. Lim and Panfilo Lacson; Joseph
Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino.
12
This provision states: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years."
13
I RECORD, 387-388.
14
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
made the following report (I RECORD 389):
MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, I am happy that the Committee on Amendments

and Transitory Provisions decided to retain the system of initiative as a mode of
amending the Constitution. I made a survey of American constitutions and I discovered
that 13 States provide for a system of initiative as a mode of amending the Constitution
— Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. The initiative for
ordinary laws only is used in Idaho, Maine, Montana and South Dakota. So, I am happy
that this was accepted or retained by the Committee.
xxxx
The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss beginning in 1898
when South Dakota adopted the initiative in its constitution. The Swiss cantons
experimented with initiatives in the 1830s. In 1891, the Swiss incorporated the initiative
as a mode of amending their national constitution. Initiatives promote "direct democracy"
by allowing the people to directly propose amendments to the constitution. In contrast,
the traditional mode of changing the constitution is known as "indirect democracy"
because the amendments are referred to the voters by the legislature or the
constitutional convention.
15
Florida requires only that the title and summary of the proposed amendment are "printed in
clear and unambiguous language." Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General RE Right of
Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, No. 90160, 22 January 1998, Supreme Court of
Florida.
16
State ex. rel Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933); Whitman v. Moore, 59
Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942); Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 99 Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E.
2d 644 (1954); Christen v. Baker, 138 Colo. 27, 328 P.2d 951 (1958); Stop the Pay Hike
Committee v. Town Council of Town of Irvington, 166 N.J. Super. 197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979);
State ex rel Evans v. Blackwell, Slip copy, 2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.), 2006-Ohio-
2076.
17
407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990). Affirmed by the District Court of Massachusetts in Henry v.
Conolly, 743 F. Supp. 922 (1990) and by the Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Henry v. Conolly,
9109 F. 2d. 1000 (1990), and cited in Marino v. Town Council of Southbridge, 13 Mass.L.Rptr.
14 (2001).
18
89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).
19
Stumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).
20
Exhibit "B" of the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006.
21
Annex "B" of the Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra filed on 7
September 2006.
22
www.ulap.gov.ph.
23
www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.html.
24
The full text of the proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter Change can be
downloaded at its official website at www.concom.ph.
25
The Lambino Group's Memorandum, p. 5.
26
Under the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution, members of Parliament shall
be elected for a term of five years "without limitation as to the number thereof."
27
Under the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the
interim Parliament "shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been
elected and shall have qualified." Also, under the proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII, of the
same Transitory Provisions, the interim Parliament "shall provide for the election of the
members of Parliament."
28
Under the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the
interim Parliament, within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, "shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution."
29
448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.
30
698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).
31
I RECORD 386, 392, 402-403.
32
196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948). See also Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or.App. 1, 882 P.2d 91 (1994).
33
392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964).
34
930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.
35
Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).
36
Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1286 (1978).
37
Id.
38
Legislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509 (1991).
39
California Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 836 (2003).
40
See note 44, infra.
41
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p.
1294 (2003).
42
238 So.2d 824 (1970).
43
Id. at 830-832.
44
As stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the 26 September 2006 oral
arguments.
45
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003, 415 SCRA
44; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970); Gold Creek
Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
46
882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994). On the merits, the Court in Lowe v. Keisling found the amendment
in question was not a revision.
47
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
48
Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution.
49
Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution.
50
This section provides: "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."
51
Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760 (2001); Intia Jr. v. COA, 366 Phil. 273
(1999).
52
G.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.
53
Presidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987, entitled "Proclaiming the
Ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance Appended thereto."
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
1
Chief Justice McLachlin spoke on "Liberty, Prosperity and the Rule of Law" in her speech
before the Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity held on October 18-20, 2006 in Manila. She
further stated: "Without the rule of law, government officials are not bound by standards of
conduct. Without the rule of law, the dignity and equality of all people is not affirmed and their
ability to seek redress for grievances and societal commitments is limited. Without the rule of
law, we have no means of ensuring meaningful participation by people in formulating and
enacting the norms and standards which organize the kinds of societies in which we want to
live."
2
GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 336 Phil. 848. For ease of reference, my Separate Opinion is
reproduced in full:
"Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority,
holds that:
'(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the 'initiatory' Delfin Petition.
'(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to 'be directly proposed by the people
through initiative,' there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is 'incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.'
'(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2300, 'insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.'
"I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the
required number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the
Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent
and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution.
Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures.
However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me
explain.
"Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution
cannot be amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by PIRMA, not
by anyone, not even by all the voters of the country acting together. This decision will
effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right
to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority holds the right hostage to
congressional discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is
already one existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing,
is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and
misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency,
accountability and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their
misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise
should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
"WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to
DIRECT Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the
ground of prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also
vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it
prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right
to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution."
3
GR No. 129754, September 23, 1997 (still unpublished in the Philippine Reports or in
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated). Again, for ease of reference, I reproduce my Separate
Opinion in full:
"Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent Commission dismissing

their petition for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Said petition before the
Comelec (henceforth, PIRMA petition) was backed up by nearly six (6) million signatures
constituting about 16% of the registered voters of the country with at least 3% in each
legislative district. The petition now before us presents two grounds:
"1. In refusing to act on the PIRMA petition, the Comelec allegedly acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
"2. In declaring R.A. 6735 "inadequate to cover its system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution" and "declaring void those parts of Resolution 2300 of the Commission
on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of [an] initiative [on]
amendments to the Constitution," the Supreme Court's Decision in G.R. No. 127325
entitled Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Commission on Elections (hereafter referred to
as Santiago) should be reexamined because said Decision is allegedly
"unconstitutional," and because, in any event, the Supreme Court itself, in reconsidering
the said issue per its June 10, 1997 Resolution, was deadlocked at six votes one each
side.
"The following in my position on each of these two issues:
First Issue:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in Comelec's Refusal to Act
"The Respondent Commission's refusal to act on the "prayers" of the PIRMA petition
cannot in any wise be branded as "grave abuse of discretion." Be it remembered that the
Court's Decision in Santiago permanently enjoined the Comelec "from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
4
Republic v. COCOFED, 423 Phil. 735, December 14, 2001.
5
Well-entrenched is this definition of grave abuse of discretion. Id.; Benito v. Comelec, 349
SCRA 705, January 19, 2001; Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 359 Phil. 276, November 18,
1998; and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994.
6
In PIRMA, I submitted as follows: "I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred in
rendering such a sweeping injunction [that covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition], but
I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said
decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of
the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Regusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other
mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down
as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final
arbiter of justiciable controversies."
7
42 Am. Jr. 2d, §26, citing Birmingham Gas Co. v. Bessemer; 250 Ala 137, 33 So 2d 475, 250
Ala 137; Tacker v. Board of Comrs., 127 Fla 248, 170 So 458; Hoxie V. Scott, 45 Neb 199, 63
NW 387; Gill v. Board of Comrs., 160 NC 176, 76, SE 204.
8
Partido ng Manggagawa v. Comelec, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006.
9
Article XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
"SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon the vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
"SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

people though initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
"SEC. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.
"SEC. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held
not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
"Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
the petition."
10
Republic Act 6735, Sec. 10, provides:
"SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures. – The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are

specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity."
11
The principle of separation of powers operates at the core of a presidential form of
government. Thus, legislative power is given to the legislature; executive power, to a separate
executive (from whose prominent position in the system, the presidential nomenclature is
derived); and judicial power, to an independent judiciary. This system embodies
interdependence by separation.
On the other hand, a parliamentary system personifies interdependence by integration, its

essential features being the following: "(1) The members of the government or cabinet or the
executive arm are, as a rule, simultaneously members of the legislature. (2) The government or
cabinet, consisting of the political leaders of the majority party or of a coalition who are also
members of the legislative, is in effect a committee of the legislature. (3) The government or
cabinet has a pyramidal structure, at the apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent.
(4) The government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoys the support of the
majority of the legislature. (5) Both government and legislature are possessed of control devices
with which each can demand of the other immediate political responsibility." These control
devices are a vote of no-confidence (censure), whereby the government may be ousted by the
legislature; and the power of the government to dissolve the legislature and call for new
elections. (J. BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A
COMMENTARY, Vol. II, 17-18 (1988 ed.).
With respect to the transformation from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, the change
involves the form of representation and the lawmaking process.
12
Attached to the Opposition-in-Intervention of Intervenors OneVoice Inc., etc., is a photocopy
of the Certification dated August 23, 2006, issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, the election
officer for the 3rd District and the officer-in-charge for the 1st and the 2nd Districts of Davao City.
The Certification states that "this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) has not
verified the signatures of registered voters x x x."
13
In People v. Veneracion, the Court held: "Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of
our system of justice. If judges, under the guide of religious or political beliefs were allowed to
roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men,
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under
this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought 'to protect and enforce it without
fear or favor,' resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of
their own personal beliefs." (249 SCRA 244, October 13, 1995, per Kapunan, J.)
14
An American professor on legal philosophy, A. Altman, puts it thus: "By ratifying the
constitution that included an explicit amendment process, the sovereign people committed
themselves to following the rule of law, even when they wished to make changes in the basic
system of government." A. ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW 94 (2001).
15
See my Separate Opinion in Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 45,
November 10, 2003.
16
See, for instance, the front page Malaya report entitled "Lobbyists soil dignity of Supreme
Court" (October 23, 2006).
17
Lk 8:17.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
2
SEC. 5. Requirements.— x x x
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
c.3. the reason or reasons therefore;

c.6. an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
3
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

4
I Record, Constitutional Commission 387-389 (July 9, 1986).
5
Community Gas and Service Company, Inc. v. Walbaum, 404 P.2d 1014, 1965 OK 118
(1965).
6
Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof.
7
The late Senator (then Congressman) Raul S. Roco stated this fact in his sponsorship
presentation of H.B. No. 21505, thus:
xxxx
D. Prohibited Subjects.
The bill provides for two kinds of measures which cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition. A petition that embraces more than one subject cannot be
submitted to the electorate as it would be violative of the constitutional proscription on
passing bills containing more than one subject, and statutes involving emergency
measures cannot be subject to referendum until 90 days after its effectivity. [Journal and
record of the house of representatives, Second Regular Session, Vol. 6, p. 975
(February 14, 1989).]
8
Memorandum of petitioner Aumentado, p. 117.
9
The proposed Section 4(3) of Article XVIII of the Constitution states that Senators whose term
of office ends in 2010 shall be members of parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010. No counterpart provision was provided for members of the House of Representatives
who, as members of the interim parliament under the proposed changes, shall schedule the
elections for the regular parliament in its discretion.
10
The proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII of the Constitution states that the interim parliament
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution within 45 days from
ratification of the proposed changes.
11
The United Kingdom, for instance, has a two-house parliament, the House of Lords and the
House of Commons.
12
Philippine Political Law [1954 ed.], Vicente G. Sinco, pp. 43-44, quoted in Separate Opinion of
J. Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997, p. 7.
13
151-A Phil. 35 (1973).
14
196 P. 2d 787 (Cal. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
15
801 P. 2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
16
583 P. 2d 1281 (Cal. 1982).
17
Raven v. Deukmeijan, supra, citing Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P. 2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
18
Supra note 13. It may well be pointed out that in making the distinction between amendment
and revision, Justice Antonio relied not only in the analogy presented in Wheeler v. Board of
Trustees, 37 S.E. 2d 322, but cited also the seminal ruling of the California Supreme Court
in McFadden v. Jordan, supra.
19
Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., Justice Isagani A. Cruz, p. 71, citing Pangasinan
Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 57.
20
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., p. 1161.
21
Id.
22
Supra note 14.
23
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.,
p. 567, citing B. Schwartz, I The Powers of Government (1963).
24
16 C.J.S. §3 at 24.
25
14 T.M. Cooley, II Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (1927), p. 1349.
26
A bogus revolution, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2006, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
p. A15.
27
Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
1
Works, Letter 164.
2
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
3
Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
4
G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its founding
members, spouses Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa.
5
Entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's
Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by
Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the
Presidential to the Parliamentary System."
6
Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III,
Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc.,
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmeña III, Jamby A.S.
Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada,
Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-
Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela
Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs.
Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C.
Tabayoyong.
7
"Grounds for contempt
3. From the time the so-called People's Initiative (hereafter PI) now subject of Lambino v.
Comelec, was initiated, respondents did nothing to stop what was clearly lawless,
and even arguably winked at, as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste
and misuse of its personnel, time, facilities and resources on an enterprise that
had no legal basis and in fact was permanently enjoined by this Honorable Court
in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is time to disenthrall them.
3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the Senate on August 29,
2006 (on other business) when respondent Chair sought to be stopped by the body from
commenting on PI out of prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On
contentious issues, he volunteered that Sigaw ng Bayan would not cheat in Makati
as it was the opposition territory and that the fact that out of 43,405 signatures,
only 7,186 were found authentic in one Makati District, to him, showed the
"efficiency" of Comelec personnel. He could not appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no
choice but to get the constitutionality-required 3% in every district, [Const., Art.
VII, Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise, including administration critics' turfs, and 2)
that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) falsus in omnibus, in an exercise that could never be
free, orderly, honest and credible, another constitutional requirement. [Nothing has
been heard about probing and prosecuting the falsifiers.]
xxxxxxxxx
3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers that respondent
Chairman, straining at the leash, was lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It
was discomfiting that he would gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of
96.30% of the signatures in an exercise with no credibility! Even had he been
asked, he should have pled to be excused from answering as the matter could
come up before the Comelec for an official collegial position (different from
conceding that it is enjoined).
xxxxxxxxx
4. Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, for their part, even
issued widely-publicized written directives to the field, [Annex C, as to
Commissioner Brawner; that as to Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the
Commission itself was trying to be careful not to be explicit in what it was abetting
implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997.
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),

MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the
people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987
Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the
main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution,
characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution
were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by
a constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein
Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to

assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and
on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people
power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal
election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before
the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and
dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC;
and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise
necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of
the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and
7 of Article VI,7Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached
to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the
proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the
provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4
AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it
is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will
be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to
cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature
form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own
expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December
1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and
Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers,
and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the
following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution

can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has
been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and
Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner
Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it
failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.
This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend
the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino
stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the
Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered
as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication
in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national
and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules
and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.
Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not

to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither
the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has
realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that
in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by
PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters
amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses
which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental
importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for
prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and
calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition
within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining
order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.
15
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment on the
petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL

TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO
AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF
THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN
BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES
SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY
PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE

SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO
SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION"
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING

LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE
ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16,

1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE
COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R.
NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND
LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290

CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO
"PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12,
S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT
A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT.
"AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO
WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992,
1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which
starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6
December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary
to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather
signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the
petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which
governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein
of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for
the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in
an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted
by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of
R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific
provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term
limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of
P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there
will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund
requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the
exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office
of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes,
and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three
systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same
as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A.

No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed
included in the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that
nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No.
6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to

the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A.
No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by
this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b)
noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed
by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he
is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he
filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997
by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement
of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for
Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced
by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of,
the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would
involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one
that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for
all other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of
governance, "to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective
proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the
noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a
conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may
be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of
their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling
law that implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It
fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate
agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures
of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who
may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the
COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition,
(h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite,
and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there
being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to
legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former
does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's
right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law
to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent
Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for
initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also submits that the
proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's
role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the
initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in
Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required
implementing law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the
required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be
proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed
by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by
LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions
in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a
nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in
Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible
period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a
nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal
issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the
pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as
worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as
proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would
constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a
petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or
causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition
when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit
copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations
and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have
dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the
Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the
Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as
well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter
filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC

OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer.
Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by
private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the
Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65,
Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not
legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent
necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental
consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The
consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial
statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by
the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the
Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the
arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to
submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on
6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to
cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the
signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's
failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered
ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal,

corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial,
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over
the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number
of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number
of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil
action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in

the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised.
In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this
technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE
TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by

the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this

mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional
action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No.
332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___
Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee
submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section
2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully

call attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to
the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least
ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory

questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at

least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to
carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving
this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as

long as the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing
law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the

committee hearing, especially with respect to the budget
appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the
plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be
left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be
called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be
proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be
after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year
period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate
rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the

details on how this is to be carried out — is it possible that, in
effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the
work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this
provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because

even the legislature itself as a body could propose that
amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster
the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent
assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification
through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention

in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend
the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the

proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the
drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I
would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of
Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all
other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal
mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of

constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution
that would specifically cover the process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions

are drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or
the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be
placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would
adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to
proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that

this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from
the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of
initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing

this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified

a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to

distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to
include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in

the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner

Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to

substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed

amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted
by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners
Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The
modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will
now read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed

amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it

possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry
out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not

prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the

implementation of this particular right would be subject to
legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the
percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of

the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to
legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to

initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by
the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded
here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the

procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's

proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla
when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and

"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative
is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this

proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution.
To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by
the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a
constitutional convention would require a higher number.
Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional
convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the
import being that the process of amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation
or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by
way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would
require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as
precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might
present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the
National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final
version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as
follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as

amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second

reading on 9 July 1986. 41Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner
Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third
Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by
changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in
the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of
the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer
the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point
to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last
minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section
2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
with
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the
rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the
right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of
the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill
No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt
with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under
Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII
of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning
ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of
Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or
in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from
Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative
and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject"
and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and
that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of
the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems
of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed
law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It
does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in
full as follows:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100)
words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735
to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local
Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on
the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can
pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis
and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments

to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not
germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1)
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of

the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast
in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative
bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as

defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the
findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which
could be petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local
initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to
this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details
in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving
them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for
the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the
petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the
petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the
power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government
unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the
registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of
its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines
"initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative
in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on
the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional
requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the
date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system
of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as
follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to

promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard —
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND

REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient
standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of
Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly
vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition
for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin
himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is
primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures,
the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition
then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en
banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition
are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and
Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300,
for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere
scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term
limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.
Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for
the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution;
and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-
96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against
the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it
orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view
that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition
with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No.
6735 should start with the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is
critical for the intent of the legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its
interpretation.1 Stated otherwise, intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its
enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal
clear from the history of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate
Bill No. 17.4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or
Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body." Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not
include people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast,
House Bill No. 21505 5expressly included people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional
basis of the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was
introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of
separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle
remained applicable, the 1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers
between the Legislature and the Executive departments. Transcending changes
in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution
that the Philippines is a republican state where sovereignty resides in the people
and all sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in

Congress; however, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified
in the 1986 Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of the people,
through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have
plenary powers since reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section
32 of the same Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest possible time,
a bill on referendum and initiative, and to share its legislative powers with the
people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the
people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of registered
voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty
imposed on Congress to implement the exercise by the people of the right to
initiative and referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system of
initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the Local
Government Code which vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate
legislative processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the
Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of the power of initiative and
referendum. He added that the holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum
are likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on
the subject which he will later submit to the Secretary of the House be
incorporated as part of his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in

the instant Bill among which are the constitutions of states in the United States
which recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any
statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These
states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which
initiative and referendum apply is also without limitation, except for emergency
measures, which are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added
that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the petition, the
requirements of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition, to
the submission to electors are substantially similar to the provisions in American
laws. Although an infant in Philippine political structure, the system of initiative
and referendum, he said, is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and
the Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the
Constitutional Commissioners saw the system of the initiative and referendum as
an instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself to be
indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he claimed, why now is
an opportune time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt necessity of the times
to pass laws which are necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as
advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill
for the consideration of the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend
the Constitution once every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved
by Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on
measures that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a
mode of plebiscite by presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations,
such as the signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of registered
voters at which every legislative district is represented by at least three percent of
the registered voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the
COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and
set the date of the referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required

number of votes, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members
cannot ignore the people's call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body
to approve House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech
together with the footnotes be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was stressed by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:7
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly
popular democracy ever since, especially in the so-called parliament of the
streets. A substantial segment of the population feels, he said, that the form of
democracy is there, but not the reality or substance of it because of the
increasingly elitist approach of their representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a
means whereby the people can exercise the reserved power of initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32,
Article VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be
made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited
Constitutional provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it will
hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the government in forming an
enlightened public opinion, and produce more responsive legislation. The
passage of the Bill will also give street parliamentarians the opportunity to
articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill
so that it can be initially used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the
passage of House Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside their
personal and political consideration for the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were
threshed out in a Bicameral Conference Committee.8 In the meeting of the Committee on
June 6, 1989,9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that
the consolidated version should include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as
contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because

this is new in our political system, the Senate decided on a more
cautious approach and limiting it only to the local government
units because even with that stage where . . . at least this has
been quite popular, ano? It has been attempted on a national
basis. Alright. There has not been a single attempt. Now, so, kami
limitado doon. And, second, we consider also that it is only fair
that the local legislative body should be given a chance to adopt
the legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect
system of initiative. If after all, the local legislative assembly or
body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any
reason for initiative, ano for initiative. And, number 3, we feel that
there should be some limitation on the frequency with which it
should be applied. Number 4, na the people, thru initiative, cannot
enact any ordinance that is beyond the scope of authority of the
local legislative body, otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila ng
power that is broader and greater than the grant of legislative
power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5, because of that, then a
proposition which has been the result of a successful initiative can
only carry the force and effect of an ordinance and therefore that
should not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to declare it null and
void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond powers of
local government units to enact. Iyon ang main essence namin, so
we concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang sa inyo
naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on that,
alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a dead statute.
Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito,
and magiging basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and
magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it
is the House bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa
amin eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the Senate kaya
ang number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating
pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng national at
saka constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation
of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House

Bill No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman
Roco upon interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it
covered people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The record of the House
Representative states: 11
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from

Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the

disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505 which
refers to the system providing for the initiative and referendum,
fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the
House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the bill. The
Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and
the House Representatives correctly provided for initiative and
referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the
Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few

questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please

proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in
the two bills was that in the Senate version there was a provision
for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has
none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local
initiative and referendum, whereas in the House version, we
provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two

provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and

referendum both in the constitutional amendment and national
legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance

with the provision of the Constitution whereby it mandates this
Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a
system which can be done every five years. Is it five years in the
provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional

amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives

and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial

difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which,
as I said earlier, ironically was about local, provincial and
municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this

consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was
intended by the legislature. We have ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be
enforced even if it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is
as old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is susceptible of more than
one interpretation, that interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest
intent of the legislature will be adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the
text of said law to reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of

affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.
Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
legislative district must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein." It also states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5)
years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to
defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither
germane nor relevant to the policy thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not
accurate. These lapses are to be expected for laws are not always written in impeccable
English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our legislators to be word-smiths with the
ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like Winston
Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to effectuate the intent of a law
on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco 13 reminds us:
"Many laws contain words which have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or
inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be
ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical
expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from
the literal meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend
the Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of
helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters
and sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn
therefrom are entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the
enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest
intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It
blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for
the letter of the law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner

Haydee Yorac, then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. This is in accord with the delegated power granted
by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is
hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation of power be assailed as infirmed. In
the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court, thru former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine whether there is undue delegation of
legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the

power to fill details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) to fix standard — the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law, and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not
only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our republican
system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise
to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2
spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over
R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to
promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of
signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, 18 directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, 20 how a
proposition is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be held, 22 when the amendment takes
effect 23 and what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24
By any measure, these
standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to
map out the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the
sufficient standard is to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking
body to the delegate." 25 In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally
transferred its power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close
look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided the procedure to
effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. The debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of
procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is

out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx



here.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise
affirmed: "In response to questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the
extent of the power of the legislature over the process: it could for instance, prescribe
the 'proper form before (the amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize
another body to check the proper form. It could also authorize the COMELEC, for
instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As
long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is to impair the
substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not,
however, prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the people's right of
initiative or to delegate it to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their
promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not
expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in
order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which
orders of the military commander are to conform, or require findings to be made
as a prerequisite to any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and
the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a
single program and must be judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an
adoption by Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The
Proclamations themselves followed a standard authorized by the Executive
Order — the necessity of protecting military resources in the designated areas
against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-
20 look at the law cannot miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible
ink. The policy and standards can also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the
standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other cases we have
upheld as adequate more general standards such as "simplicity and dignity," 30 "public
interest," 31 "public welfare," 32 "interest of law and order," 33 "justice and
equity,"34 "adequate and efficient instruction," 35 "public safety," 36 "public
policy", 37 "greater national interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and
subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in
government." 40 A due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate
branch of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate
laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the
Pedrosas. The inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show
that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the
COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by
People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to
intervene and was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before the
COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed by the petitioners with this
Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in
their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation
against the Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to
undertake the signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the
PIRMA itself as an organization was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed
that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from conducting a signature drive for a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the
Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining order against the
Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them without
equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act.
Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle
proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican state
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The
Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of the voice of the people. They may
constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can trivialize them for sovereignty is
indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people
and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political
and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the
1987 Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting
signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-
making process of our people. The Constitution says their right cannot be abridged without any
ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an
exercise of their freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. We have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws
from the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our
rulings that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our
people. Undeniably, freedom of speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think
and let think. For this reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the
speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo.
To be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions.
Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long
recognized the truism that the only constant in life is change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987
Constitution. On October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an
article of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30, 1994, we postulated that people power
can be trusted to check excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged
that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect
and promote their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few days ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a
unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City involving the mayor and
ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the
people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque abstraction
to a robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom in
full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution without
setting back the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the
lips of people who are pro-change but not those who are anti-change without concerting the
debate on charter change into a sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not
by a monologue for in a democracy nobody can claim any infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to engross, let alone to
commit, itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this
time would only be to resolve whether or not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative" and seeking through a people initiative certain modifications on the 1987 Constitution,
can properly be regarded and given its due course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed
amendment under this method, is explicit. Section 2, Article XVII, thereof provides:
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional
imperatives, the petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the
COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the
country," to cause the necessary publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local
circulation," and to instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to
assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made
permanent under theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be
so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people
initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the governed
themselves. The postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable
reality. The past has taught us that the vitality of government lies not so much in the strength of
those who lead as in the consent of those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it
can only have its true meaning if it comes with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and substance, it behooves
the Court, I most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision
on right of the people to directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view
formulated by the Court at this point would at best be only a non-binding, albeitpossibly
persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier
issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly
and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735
is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.1 Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution
has given more significance to this declaration of principle for the people are now vested with
power not only to propose, enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local
legislative body, but to propose amendments to the constitution as well. 2 To implement these
constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989 enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as
"The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, amply covers an initiative on the
constitution. The contrary view maintained by petitioners is based principally on the alleged lack
of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. [And] [t]his indicates that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws
and not constitutional amendments, because constitutional amendments take
effect upon ratification not after publication.3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the law, for under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum
Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may
not be interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the
statute as a whole.5
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to
propose amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose".6The same section, in enumerating the three systems of
initiative, included an "initiative on the constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the constitution"7 Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as
"the electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution is approved or rejected by the
people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative on the Constitution, Section 5(b)
distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of the registered voters as signatories, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the constitution may be
exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for
the implementation of the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of
initiative. "A legal provision", the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to
be a useless surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing
to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8 That this is the legislative intent is
further shown by the deliberations in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of the Conference

Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505, it was noted:

disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and the
consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system
providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so
both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically
provided for local initiative and referendum and the House of
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum
an the Constitution and on national legislation.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.

questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please

proceed.
none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two


legislation.

with the provision of the Constitution to enact the enabling law, so
that we shall have a system which can be done every five years.
Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?

amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years." (Id.
[Journal and Record of the House of Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8
June 1989, p. 960; quoted in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279,
292-293 [1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have comprehended initiatives on the
Constitution. When consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and
as approved and enacted into law, the proposal included initiative on both the
Constitution and ordinary laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other
construction as what petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent
and spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take
any action (such as those contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12,
1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over private
respondents' petition. This is so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it
would appear that proof of procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the
time the petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This

defect notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once
compliance with the required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents.
In the absence, therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on
Elections, any determination of whether private respondents' proposal constitutes an
amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735
is an "inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. I, however, register my concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private
respondents' petition for initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until the
same be supported by proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
"initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the people through
initiative," there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or
is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required
number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at
least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot
even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from
the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot
be amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not
even by all the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but
unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic
law. At the very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on
whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at present. This
right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution, as follows:

With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve
him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not
thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The
fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its
proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right
reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735 and Comelec
Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended
by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate
an initiative on the Constitution.1 I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law
on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly
consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights
granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of
people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, RA
6735 wisely empowered 4 the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto,
the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very
words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by
one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr.,
Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these
Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we
cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to
give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local
legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such
differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than
sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution.

I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses
Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as
against private respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that
the Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help
them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from
exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a
species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and
despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her
beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend
to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but
as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like
referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All
three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and
plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic
rights of our people to be used as their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism,
inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact
transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand,
their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT
Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of
prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the
temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin,
Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it
orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view
that R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition
with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No.
6735 should start with the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is
critical for the intent of the legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its
interpretation.1 Stated otherwise, intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its
enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal
clear from the history of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate
Bill No. 17.4 Senate Bill No. 17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and the Exception Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can
Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or
Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body." Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not
include people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. In checkered contrast,
House Bill No. 21505 5expressly included people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship remarks:6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO

At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional
basis of the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was
introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of
separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle
remained applicable, the 1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers
between the Legislature and the Executive departments. Transcending changes
in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution
that the Philippines is a republican state where sovereignty resides in the people
and all sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in

Congress; however, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified
in the 1986 Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of the people,
through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have
plenary powers since reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section
32 of the same Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest possible time,
a bill on referendum and initiative, and to share its legislative powers with the
people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the
people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of registered
voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty
imposed on Congress to implement the exercise by the people of the right to
initiative and referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system of
initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the Local
Government Code which vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate
legislative processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the
Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of the power of initiative and
referendum. He added that the holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum
are likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on
the subject which he will later submit to the Secretary of the House be
incorporated as part of his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in

the instant Bill among which are the constitutions of states in the United States
which recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any
statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These
states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which
initiative and referendum apply is also without limitation, except for emergency
measures, which are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added
that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the petition, the
requirements of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition, to
the submission to electors are substantially similar to the provisions in American
laws. Although an infant in Philippine political structure, the system of initiative
and referendum, he said, is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and
the Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the
Constitutional Commissioners saw the system of the initiative and referendum as
an instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself to be
indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he claimed, why now is
an opportune time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt necessity of the times
to pass laws which are necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as
advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill
for the consideration of the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend
the Constitution once every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved
by Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on
measures that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a
mode of plebiscite by presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations,
such as the signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of registered
voters at which every legislative district is represented by at least three percent of
the registered voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the
COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and
set the date of the referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required

number of votes, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members
cannot ignore the people's call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body
to approve House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech
together with the footnotes be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was stressed by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:7
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly
popular democracy ever since, especially in the so-called parliament of the
streets. A substantial segment of the population feels, he said, that the form of
democracy is there, but not the reality or substance of it because of the
increasingly elitist approach of their representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a
means whereby the people can exercise the reserved power of initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32,
Article VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be
made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited
Constitutional provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it will
hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the government in forming an
enlightened public opinion, and produce more responsive legislation. The
passage of the Bill will also give street parliamentarians the opportunity to
articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill
so that it can be initially used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the
passage of House Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside their
personal and political consideration for the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were
threshed out in a Bicameral Conference Committee.8 In the meeting of the Committee on
June 6, 1989,9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that
the consolidated version should include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as
contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because

this is new in our political system, the Senate decided on a more
cautious approach and limiting it only to the local government
units because even with that stage where . . . at least this has
been quite popular, ano? It has been attempted on a national
basis. Alright. There has not been a single attempt. Now, so, kami
limitado doon. And, second, we consider also that it is only fair
that the local legislative body should be given a chance to adopt
the legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect
system of initiative. If after all, the local legislative assembly or
body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any
reason for initiative, ano for initiative. And, number 3, we feel that
there should be some limitation on the frequency with which it
should be applied. Number 4, na the people, thru initiative, cannot
enact any ordinance that is beyond the scope of authority of the
local legislative body, otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila ng
power that is broader and greater than the grant of legislative
power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5, because of that, then a
proposition which has been the result of a successful initiative can
only carry the force and effect of an ordinance and therefore that
should not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to declare it null and
void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond powers of
local government units to enact. Iyon ang main essence namin, so
we concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang sa inyo
naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on that,
alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a dead statute.
Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito,
and magiging basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and
magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it
is the House bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa
amin eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the Senate kaya
ang number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating
pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng national at
saka constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation
of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House

Bill No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman
Roco upon interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it
covered people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The record of the House
Representative states: 11
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from

Camarines Sur is recognized.

disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505 which
refers to the system providing for the initiative and referendum,
fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the
House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the bill. The
Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and
the House Representatives correctly provided for initiative and
referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.


questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please

proceed.
none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two


legislation.

with the provision of the Constitution whereby it mandates this
Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a
system which can be done every five years. Is it five years in the
provision of the Constitution?

amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives

and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial

difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which,
as I said earlier, ironically was about local, provincial and
municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this

consolidated bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was
intended by the legislature. We have ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be
enforced even if it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is
as old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is susceptible of more than
one interpretation, that interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest
intent of the legislature will be adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the
text of said law to reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of

affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution.
Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
legislative district must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein." It also states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5)
years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to
defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither
germane nor relevant to the policy thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not
accurate. These lapses are to be expected for laws are not always written in impeccable
English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our legislators to be word-smiths with the
ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like Winston
Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to effectuate the intent of a law
on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco 13 reminds us:
"Many laws contain words which have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or
inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be
ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical
expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from
the literal meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend
the Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of
helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters
and sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn
therefrom are entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the
enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest
intent or spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It
blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for
the letter of the law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner

Haydee Yorac, then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. This is in accord with the delegated power granted
by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is
hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation of power be assailed as infirmed. In
the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court, thru former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine whether there is undue delegation of
legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the

power to fill details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) to fix standard — the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law, and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not
only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress,
thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our republican
system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise
to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2
spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over
R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to
promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of
signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, 18 directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, 20 how a
proposition is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be held, 22 when the amendment takes
effect 23 and what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure, these
standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to
map out the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the
sufficient standard is to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking
body to the delegate." 25 In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally
transferred its power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close
look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided the procedure to
effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. The debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of
procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is

out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx


here.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise
affirmed: "In response to questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the
extent of the power of the legislature over the process: it could for instance, prescribe
the 'proper form before (the amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize
another body to check the proper form. It could also authorize the COMELEC, for
instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As
long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right
conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is to impair the
substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not,
however, prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the people's right of
initiative or to delegate it to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their
promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not
expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in
order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling
in Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which
orders of the military commander are to conform, or require findings to be made
as a prerequisite to any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and
the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a
single program and must be judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an
adoption by Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The
Proclamations themselves followed a standard authorized by the Executive
Order — the necessity of protecting military resources in the designated areas
against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-
20 look at the law cannot miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible
ink. The policy and standards can also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the
standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other cases we have
upheld as adequate more general standards such as "simplicity and dignity," 30 "public
interest," 31 "public welfare," 32 "interest of law and order," 33 "justice and
34 35
equity," "adequate and efficient instruction," "public safety," 36 "public
policy", 37 "greater national interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and
subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in
government." 40 A due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate
branch of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate
laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the
Pedrosas. The inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show
that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the
COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by
People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to
intervene and was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before the
COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed by the petitioners with this
Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in
their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation
against the Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to
undertake the signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the
PIRMA itself as an organization was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed
that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from conducting a signature drive for a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the
Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining order against the
Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them without
equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act.
Their solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle
proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican state
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The
Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of the voice of the people. They may
constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can trivialize them for sovereignty is
indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people
and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political
and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the
1987 Constitution strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting
signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-
making process of our people. The Constitution says their right cannot be abridged without any
ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an
exercise of their freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. We have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws
from the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our
rulings that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our
people. Undeniably, freedom of speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think
and let think. For this reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the
speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo.
To be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions.
Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long
recognized the truism that the only constant in life is change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987
Constitution. On October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an
article of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30, 1994, we postulated that people power
can be trusted to check excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged
that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect
and promote their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few days ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a
unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City involving the mayor and
ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the
people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque abstraction
to a robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom in
full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution without
setting back the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the
lips of people who are pro-change but not those who are anti-change without concerting the
debate on charter change into a sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not
by a monologue for in a democracy nobody can claim any infallibility.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to engross, let alone to
commit, itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this
time would only be to resolve whether or not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative" and seeking through a people initiative certain modifications on the 1987 Constitution,
can properly be regarded and given its due course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed
amendment under this method, is explicit. Section 2, Article XVII, thereof provides:

The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional
imperatives, the petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the
COMELEC. The petition would require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the
country," to cause the necessary publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local
circulation," and to instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to
assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made
permanent under theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be
so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people
initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the governed
themselves. The postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable
reality. The past has taught us that the vitality of government lies not so much in the strength of
those who lead as in the consent of those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it
can only have its true meaning if it comes with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and substance, it behooves
the Court, I most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision
on right of the people to directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view
formulated by the Court at this point would at best be only a non-binding, albeitpossibly
persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier
issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly
and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735
is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.1 Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution
has given more significance to this declaration of principle for the people are now vested with
power not only to propose, enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local
legislative body, but to propose amendments to the constitution as well. 2 To implement these
constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989 enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as
"The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my mind, amply covers an initiative on the
constitution. The contrary view maintained by petitioners is based principally on the alleged lack
of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. [And] [t]his indicates that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws
and not constitutional amendments, because constitutional amendments take
effect upon ratification not after publication.3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the law, for under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum
Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may
not be interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the
statute as a whole.5
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to
propose amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose".6The same section, in enumerating the three systems of
initiative, included an "initiative on the constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the constitution"7 Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as
"the electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution is approved or rejected by the
people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative on the Constitution, Section 5(b)
distinctly enumerates the following:
centum (12%) of the total number of the registered voters as signatories, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the constitution may be
exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for
the implementation of the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of
initiative. "A legal provision", the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to
be a useless surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing
to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8 That this is the legislative intent is
further shown by the deliberations in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of the Conference

Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505, it was noted:

disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and the
consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system
providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so
both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically
provided for local initiative and referendum and the House of
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum
an the Constitution and on national legislation.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.


questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please

proceed.
none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two


legislation.


with the provision of the Constitution to enact the enabling law, so
that we shall have a system which can be done every five years.
Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?

amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years." (Id.
[Journal and Record of the House of Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8
June 1989, p. 960; quoted in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279,
292-293 [1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have comprehended initiatives on the
Constitution. When consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and
as approved and enacted into law, the proposal included initiative on both the
Constitution and ordinary laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other
construction as what petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent
and spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take
any action (such as those contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12,
1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over private
respondents' petition. This is so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it
would appear that proof of procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the
time the petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This

defect notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once
compliance with the required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents.
In the absence, therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on
Elections, any determination of whether private respondents' proposal constitutes an
amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735
is an "inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. I, however, register my concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private
respondents' petition for initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until the
same be supported by proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
"initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the people through
initiative," there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or
is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required
number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at
least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot
even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from
the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot
be amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not
even by all the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but
unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic
law. At the very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on
whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at present. This
right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution, as follows:

With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve
him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not
thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The
fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its
proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right
reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735 and Comelec
Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended
by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate
an initiative on the Constitution.1 I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law
on initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly
consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights
granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of
people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, RA
6735 wisely empowered 4 the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto,
the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very
words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by
one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr.,
Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these
Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we
cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to
give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local
legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such
differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than
sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution.

I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses
Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as
against private respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that
the Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help
them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from
exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a
species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and
despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her
beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend
to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but
as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like
referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All
three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and
plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic
rights of our people to be used as their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism,
inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact
transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand,
their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT
Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of
prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the
temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin,
Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
Footnotes
1 Commissioner Blas Ople.
2 Commissioner Jose Suarez.
3 I Record of the Constitutional Commission, 371, 378.
4 Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1(1), Article XVI of
the 1973 Constitution.
5 Annex "A" of Petition, Rollo, 15.
6 Later identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and

Action, or PIRMA for brevity.
7 These sections read:
Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term
of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
8 The section reads:
Sec. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of
the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection.
No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more
than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length or time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.
9 The section reads:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from
performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the
constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of
Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from
printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing
in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913;
and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum
of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)
member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the

convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be
"elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so
as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to
the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17,
1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on October 28,
1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David
and counsel for the Philippine Constitution Association — hereinafter referred to as the
PHILCONSA — were allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr.
Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred until after a
substantially identical case brought by said organization before the Commission on
Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all
probability, be appealed to this Court — had been submitted thereto for final determination, for a
joint decision on the identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the
PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review by certiorari of the
resolution of the Commission on Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases
were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of
respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-
28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a
voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens,
taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General have
filed an answer denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they have no
knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear to be
a perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed
himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the
objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution
against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement in
L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merely
political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before
the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was
allowed to appear before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the
Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the
legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted,
would, in effect, render in operational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of
Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of rendering
illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court — speaking through one of the
leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional
Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito,5 this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to
pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for
ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of
this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Tañada vs. Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on
Elections.9In the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the
latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for
a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party
having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first
party, as members, for the second party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we
declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts
for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made
as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected
the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political
questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included
in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent powers of the
people — as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours11 — to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. 12 Hence, when exercising
the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as
such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people,
when performing the same function,13 for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution
— they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the

members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily,
that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to
the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon
the Supreme Court,14 the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly
— violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court
are unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by

Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of
"three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote
of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the
resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose — amendments or call a
convention therefore but may not avail of both — that is to say, propose amendment and call a
convention — at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for
ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national
and local governments — such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 —
will be chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment
shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions — which,
allegedly, do not exist — as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of
the nature and implications of said amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen

The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and
twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall
have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within
three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such
apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the
same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and compact
territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having
been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election
of its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de
facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed
Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are
null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three years after
the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act
No. 3040,17 purporting to make said apportionment. This Act was, however, declared
unconstitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been
made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to
make a valid apportionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an
"unconstitutional Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of
Representatives are de facto officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the
constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation
to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with
such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have
become de facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a
valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been
envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall
have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who
shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the
apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the
contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the representative
districts existing at the time of the expiration of said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in 1935. This theory
assumes that an apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first elections to be held
after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938. 19 The assumption, is,
however, unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell
when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be
certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration, would
expire after the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly those on the
legislative department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a bicameral Congress, those
who drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original
Constitution regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have known
that the three-year period therefor would expire after the elections scheduled to be held and
actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original Constitution
in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision concerning
said apportionment and the effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to
conditions obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration was
submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make
the apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There
can be no question, therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or
constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de
jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three
years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House
of Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices, and were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a reapportionment,
had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the
House of Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant
such conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House
automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse of
said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in
particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be,
would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of
Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to
make an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the
general elections in 1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the
legal provisions creating Congress — with a House of Representatives composed of members
elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said elections
— remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the House of Representatives can
be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a
reapportionment within the period aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President, the Vice-
President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable
violation of the Constitution,20 the enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but
also, their main function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory
duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to
a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the
loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de
facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are
null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public
interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid
statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished from the officer in
question — is concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of the
Government would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the
positions they hold, before dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying
their commands, even if they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their
respective offices, positions or employments.22 One can imagine this great inconvenience,
hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.23 It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer,
if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts therein
involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is
untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs. Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit
being heard before Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason
that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held that the objection could
not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be
assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge
was concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge
Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No
rights had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's
objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards
the Resolutions herein contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has
nothing else to do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose
amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at
the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in
the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of
other circumstances — and none has brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion
drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or
vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional
provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967,
whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to
the Constitution, in general. In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from
that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3,
will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions were
passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the
other. In other words, they were not passed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that
would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of
the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or different days of the same
congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the
denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose
amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise,
proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said convention is
held? The force of this argument must be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the
action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to permit
Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and
participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not
this should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the

Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special,"
not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution
had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments,
that the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public
officials. And there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits
proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded
by the choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial and
municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the
wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officer. They do not
deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election"
used, without qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority
becomes even more patent when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the
choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in
Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but
"plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution,
should be construed as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court even feel that
said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public
officers. They opine that constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such
important, if not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be
focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no
more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed
amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone
the partisan political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be
promoted. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether the
Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under
such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion
admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect,
reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be
deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer
speculation.
The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act
No. 4913 unconstitutional — as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is,
however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the
Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by
November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on
the amendments in question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette,
at least twenty days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in
every municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than
October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made
available for examination by the qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by
the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in
English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distributing:" and
(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the ballots which shall
be used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to comply with
the constitutional requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for
their ratification," and that said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional
viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the subject
submitted to them for ratification, from the original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment.
Thus, referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published in the Official
Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days
prior to said election, and a printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance
appended thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and
provincial government office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-
second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of the
Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be
kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified electors during
election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local dialects as may be
determined by the Secretary of the Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English
and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election,
and the said Article V shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and
provincial office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day
of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein continually until after
the termination of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution,
in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination
by the qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the
principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall
also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 amendments, is of the
following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy
thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial
government office building and in every polling place not later than May eighteen,
nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At
least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made
available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable,
copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the
Interior, shall also be kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect that:
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy
thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial
government office building and in every polling place not later than February eleven,
nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the
election. At least, ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to
be made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When
practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the
former proposals does not arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the
circumstance that the major political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the
Constitution — except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage — and, consequently, debated thereon
at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have
not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested and have, accordingly,
refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics
as may have taken place — on a rather limited scale — on the latest proposals for amendment,
have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant
members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however,
be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently.
Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at
the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing
agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency,
from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November
14, 1967, depends — in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this
phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No.
4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said
proposals, which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in
the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority
given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if
elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in
Congress. We — who constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies
such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of
representative districts are actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the
Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are not interested in the details of the
apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear
vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten
themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public
places, the copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed in
full on the back of the ballots they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the
effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our
Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the
provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R.
B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for
and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who
opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and
that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not the authority of Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the
Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in
derogation of the principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is
supreme within its own sphere. The determination of the conditions under which the proposed
amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the
legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has
exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done
something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is
perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would
be constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B.
H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R.
B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as
they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the question of
jurisdiction.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the foregoing opinion of the Chief Justice. I would make some additional
observations in connection with my concurrence. Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act No. 4913
provide:
Sec. 2. The amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted
in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and in
every polling place not later than October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven,
and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least five copies of the said
amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by
the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each
polling place. The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of each
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal native
languages, for free distribution.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. The ballots which shall be used in the election for the approval of said
amendments shall be printed in English and Pilipino and shall be in the size and form
prescribed by the Commission on Elections: Provided, however, That at the back of said
ballot there shall be printed in full Resolutions of both Houses of Congress Numbered
One and Three, both adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven,
proposing the amendments: Provided, further, That the questionnaire appearing on the
face of the ballot shall be as follows:
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to Section five of Article VI of our
Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?
Are you in favor of the proposed amendment to section sixteen of Article VI of our
Constitution printed at the back of this ballot?
To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall write the word
"yes" or its equivalent in Pilipino or in the local dialect in the blank space after each
question; to vote for the rejection thereof, he shall write the word "No" or its equivalent in
Pilipino or in the local dialect.
I believe that intrinsically, that is, considered in itself and without reference to extraneous factors
and circumstances, the manner prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is sufficient for the
purpose of having the proposed amendments submitted to the people for their ratification, as
enjoined in Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution. I am at a loss to say what else should have
been required by the Act to make it adhere more closely to the constitutional requirement.
Certainly it would have been out of place to provide, for instance, that government officials and
employees should go out and explain the amendments to the people, or that they should be the
subject of any particular means or form of public discussion.
The objection of some members of the Court to Republic Act No. 4913 seems to me predicated
on the fact that there are so many other issues at stake in the coming general election that the
attention of the electorate, cannot be entirely focused on the proposed amendments, such that
there is a failure to properly submit them for ratification within the intendment of the Constitution.
If that is so, then the defect is not intrinsic in the law but in its implementation. The same
manner of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for ratification may, in a different
setting, be sufficient for the purpose. Yet I cannot conceive that the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of a law may be made to depend willy-nilly on factors not inherent in its
provisions. For a law to be struck down as unconstitutional it must be so by reason of some
irreconcilable conflict between it and the Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or
invalid, according to circumstances not found in its provisions, such as the zeal with which they
are carried out. To such a thesis I cannot agree. The criterion would be too broad and relative,
and dependent upon individual opinions that at best are subjective. What one may regard as
sufficient compliance with the requirement of submission to the people, within the context of the
same law, may not be so to another. The question is susceptible of as many views as there are
viewers; and I do not think this Court would be justified in saying that its own view on the matter
is the correct one, to the exclusion of the opinions of others.
On the other hand, I reject the argument that the ratification must necessarily be in a special
election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be
preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of "an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification," and I do not subscribe to the restrictive
interpretation that the petitioners would place on this provision, namely, that it means only a
special election.
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
It is the glory of our institutions that they are founded upon law, that no one can exercise any
authority over the rights and interests of others except pursuant to and in the manner authorized
by law.1 Based upon this principle, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution
Association (PHILCONSA) come to this Court in separate petitions.
Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru class
suit of all citizens of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
restrain the Commission on Elections, Director of Printing and Auditor General from
implementing and/or complying with Republic Act 4913, assailing said law as unconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the

constitutionality not only of Republic Act 4913 but also of Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1
and 3 of March 16, 1967.
Republic Act 4913, effective June 17, 1967, is an Act submitting to the Filipino people for
approval the amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of
the Philippines in Resolutions of Both Houses Numbered 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967.
Said Republic Act fixes the date and manner of the election at which the aforesaid proposed
amendments shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.
Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two amendments to the Constitution: the first,
to amend Sec. 5, Art. VI, by increasing the maximum membership of the House of
Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160 of said 180 seats and eliminating the
provision that Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return
of every enumeration; the second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by allowing Senators and
Representatives to be delegates to a constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
Since both petitions relate to the proposed amendments, they are considered together herein.
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales' objections are as follows: (1) Republic Act 4913
violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, in submitting the proposed amendments to the
Constitution, to the people for approval, at the general election of 1967 instead of at a special
election solely for that purpose; (2) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitution, since it was not passed with the 3/4 vote in joint session required when Congress
proposes amendments to the Constitution, said Republic Act being a step in or part of the
process of proposing amendments to the Constitution; and (3) Republic Act 4913 violates the
due process clause of the Constitution (Sec. 1, Subsec. 1, Art. III), in not requiring that the
substance of the proposed amendments be stated on the face of the ballot or otherwise
rendering clear the import of the proposed amendments, such as by stating the provisions
before and after said amendments, instead of printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed
amendments.
Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the procedure for amending the Constitution is
concerned, the issue is cognizable by this Court under its powers to review an Act of Congress
to determine its conformity to the fundamental law. For though the Constitution leaves Congress
free to propose whatever Constitutional amendment it deems fit, so that
the substance or content of said proposed amendment is a matter of policy and wisdom and
thus a political question, the Constitution nevertheless imposes requisites as to
the manner or procedure of proposing such amendments, e.g., the three-fourths vote
requirement. Said procedure or manner, therefore, from being left to the discretion of Congress,
as a matter of policy and wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that extent, all questions
bearing on whether Congress in proposing amendments followed the procedure required by the
Constitution, is perforce justiciable, it not being a matter of policy or wisdom.
Turning then to petitioner Gonzales' first objection, Sec. 1, Art. XV clearly does not bear him on
the point. It nowhere requires that the ratification be thru an election solely for that purpose. It
only requires that it be at "an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification." To join it with an election for candidates to public office, that is, to make it
concurrent with such election, does not render it any less an election at which the proposed
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. To prohibition being found in the
plain terms of the Constitution, none should be inferred. Had the framers of requiring
Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose only of the proposed
amendments, they could have said so, by qualifying the phrase with some word such as
"special" or "solely" or "exclusively". They did not.
It is not herein decided that such concurrence of election is wise, or that it would not have been
better to provide for a separate election exclusively for the ratification of the proposed
amendments. The point however is that such separate and exclusive election, even if it may be
better or wiser, which again, is not for this Court to decide, is not included in the procedure
required by the Constitution to amend the same. The function of the Judiciary is "not to pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation".2 It is limited to determining
whether the action taken by the Legislative Department has violated the Constitution or not. On
this score, I am of the opinion that it has not.
Petitioner Gonzales' second point is that Republic Act 4913 is deficient for not having been
passed by Congress in joint session by 3/4 vote.
Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
the votes cast at an election to which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.
Does Republic Act 4913 propose amendments to the Constitution? If by the term "propose
amendment" is meant to determine WHAT said amendment shall be, then Republic Act 4913
does not; Resolutions of Both Houses 1 and 3 already did that. If, on the other hand, it means,
or also means, to provide for how, when, and by what means the amendments shall
be submitted to the people for approval, then it does.
A careful reading of Sec. 1, Art. XV shows that the first sense. is the one intended. Said Section
has two sentences: in the first, it requires the 3/4 voting in joint session, for Congress to
"propose amendments". And then in the second sentence, it provides that "such amendments . .
. shall be submitted to the people for their ratification". This clearly indicates that by the term
"propose amendments" in the first sentence is meant to frame the substance or the content or
the WHAT-element of the amendments; for it is this and this alone that is submitted to the
people for their ratification. The details of when the election shall be held for approval or
rejection of the proposed amendments, or the manner of holding it, are not submitted for
ratification to form part of the Constitution. Stated differently, the plain language of Section 1,
Art. XV, shows that the act of proposing amendments is distinct from — albeit related to — that
of submitting the amendments to the people for their ratification; and that the 3/4 voting
requirement applies only to the first step, not to the second one.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be done thru an ordinary statute
passed by Congress. The Constitution does not expressly state by whom the submission shall
be undertaken; the rule is that a power not lodged elsewhere under the Constitution is deemed
to reside with the legislative body, under the doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore
validly enacted Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner of submitting the
proposed amendments to the people for their ratification. Since it does not "propose
amendments" in the sense referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, but merely provides
for how and when the amendments, already proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same
does not need the 3/4 vote in joint session required in Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution.
Furthermore, Republic Act 4913 is an appropriation measure. Sec. 6 thereof appropriates
P1,000,000 for carrying out its provisions. Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution states that "All
appropriation . . . bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives". Republic Act
4913, therefore, could not have been validly adopted in a joint session, reinforcing the view that
Sec. 1, Art. XV does not apply to such a measure providing for the holding of the election to
ratify the proposed amendments, which must perforce appropriate funds for its purpose.
Petitioner Gonzales contends, thirdly, that Republic Act 4913 offends against substantive due
process. An examination of the provisions of the law shows no violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The publication in the Official Gazette at least 20 days before the
election, the posting of notices in public buildings not later than October 14, 1967, to remain
posted until after the elections, the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling
places, aside from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to
the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due process refers only to providing fair
opportunity; it does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the
look-out of the voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable
opportunity to be informed is given, and it is, the due process clause is not infringed.
Non-printing of the provisions to be amended as they now stand, and the printing of the full
proposed amendments at the back of the ballot instead of the substance thereof at the face of
the ballot, do not deprive the voter of fair opportunity to be informed. The present wording of the
Constitution is not being veiled or suppressed from him; he is conclusively presumed to know
them and they are available should he want to check on what he is conclusively presumed to
know. Should the voters choose to remain ignorant of the present Constitution, the fault does
not lie with Congress. For opportunity to familiarize oneself with the Constitution as it stands has
been available thru all these years. Perhaps it would have been more convenient for the voters
if the present wording of the provisions were also to be printed on the ballot. The same however
is a matter of policy. As long as the method adopted provides sufficiently reasonable chance to
intelligently vote on the amendments, and I think it does in this case, it is not constitutionally
defective.
Petitioner Gonzales' other arguments touch on the merits or wisdom of the proposed
amendments. These are for the people in their sovereign capacity to decide, not for this Court.
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress cannot both call a convention and
propose amendments; second, that the present Congress is a de facto one, since no
apportionment law was adopted within three years from the last census of 1960, so that the
Representatives elected in 1961 are de facto officers only. Not being de jure, they cannot
propose amendments, it is argued.
As to the first point, Sec. 1 of Art. XV states that Congress "may propose amendments or call a
convention for that purpose". The term "or", however, is frequently used as having the same
meaning as "and" particularly in permissive, affirmative sentences so that the interpretation of
the word "or" as "and" in the Constitution in such use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg S.
& P. R. Co. v. Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it should be pointed out that the
resolutions proposing amendments (R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3) are different from that calling for a
convention (R.B.H. No. 2). Surely, if Congress deems it better or wise to amend the Constitution
before a convention called for is elected, it should not be fettered from doing so. For our
purposes in this case, suffice it to note that the Constitution does not prohibit it from doing so.
As to the second argument, it is also true that Sec. 5 of Art. VI of the Constitution provides in
part that "The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return
of every enumeration, and not otherwise". It however further states in the next sentence: "Until
such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
qualified electors from the present assembly districts." The failure of Congress, therefore, to
pass a valid redistricting law since the time the above provision was adopted, does not render
the present districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself provides for its
continuance in such case, rendering legal and de jure the status quo.
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act 4913, and fully
concur with the opinion of the Chief Justice.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
At the outset, we are faced with a question of jurisdiction. The opinion prepared by the Chief
Justice discusses the matter with a fullness that erases doubts and misgivings and clarifies the
applicable principles. A few words may however be added.
We start from the premise that only where it can be shown that the question is to be solved by
public opinion or where the matter has been left by the Constitution to the sole discretion of any
of the political branches, as was so clearly stated by the then Justice Concepcion in Tañada v.
Cuenco,1 may this Court avoid passing on the issue before it. Whatever may be said about the
present question, it is hard to speak with certitude considering Article XV, that Congress may be
entrusted with the full and uncontrolled discretion on the procedure leading to proposals for an
amendment of the Constitution.
It may be said however that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,2 this Court through Justice Tuason
followed Coleman v. Miller,3 in its holding that certain aspects of the amending process may be
considered political. His opinion quoted with approval the view of Justice Black, to which three
other members of the United States Supreme Court agreed, that the process itself is political in
its entirety, "from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not
subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." In a sense that would solve the
matter neatly. The judiciary would be spared the at times arduous and in every case soul-
searching process of determining whether the procedure for amendments required by the
Constitution has been followed.
At the same time, without impugning the motives of Congress, which cannot be judicially
inquired into at any rate, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a failure to observe the
requirements of Article XV would occur. In the event that judicial intervention is sought, to rely
automatically on the theory of political question to avoid passing on such a matter of delicacy
might under certain circumstances be considered, and rightly so, as nothing less than judicial
abdication or surrender.
What appears regrettable is that a major opinion of an esteemed jurist, the late Justice Tuason,
would no longer be controlling. There is comfort in the thought that the view that then prevailed
was itself a product of the times. It could very well be that considering the circumstances
existing in 1947 as well as the particular amendment sought to be incorporated in the
Constitution, the parity rights ordinance, the better part of wisdom in view of the grave economic
situation then confronting the country would be to avoid the existence of any obstacle to its
being submitted for ratification. Moreover, the Republic being less than a year old, American
Supreme Court opinions on constitutional questions were-invariably accorded uncritical
acceptance. Thus the approach followed by Justice Tuason is not difficult to understand. It may
be said that there is less propensity now, which is all to the good, for this Court to accord that
much deference to constitutional views coming from the quarter.
Nor is this mode of viewing the opinion of Justice Tuason to do injustice to his memory. For as
he stated in another major opinion in Araneta v. Dinglasan,4 in ascertaining the meaning to be
given the Emergency Powers Act,5 one should not ignore what would ensue if a particular mode
of construction were followed. As he so emphatically stated, "We test a rule by its results."
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed amendment on the economic survival
of the country, an erroneous appraisal it turned out later, constituted an effective argument for
its submission. Why not then consider the question political and let the people decide? That
assumption could have been indulged in. It could very well be the inarticulate major premise.
For many it did bear the stamp of judicial statesmanship.
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystal-clear why as of this date and in the
foreseeable future judicial inquiry to assure the utmost compliance with the constitutional
requirement would be a more appropriate response.
SANCHEZ, J., in separate opinion:
Right at the outset, the writer expresses his deep appreciation to Mr. Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar
and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro for their invaluable contribution to the substance and form of
the opinion which follows.
Directly under attack in this, a petition for prohibition, is the constitutionality of Republic Act
4913, approved on June 17, 1967. This Act seeks to implement Resolutions 1 and 3 adopted by
the Senate and the House of Representatives on March 16, 1967 with the end in view of
amending vital portions of the Constitution.
Since the problem here presented has its roots in the resolutions aforesaid of both houses of
Congress, it may just as well be that we recite in brief the salient features thereof. Resolution
No. 1 increases the membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members,
and immediately apportions 160 seats. A companion resolution is Resolution No. 3 which
permits Senators and Congressmen — without forfeiting their seats in Congress — to be
members of the Constitutional Convention1 to be convened, as provided in another resolution —
Resolution No. 2. Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the Constitution
(Resolutions I and 3) are to be submitted to the people for their ratification next November 14,
1967. Resolution No. 2 just adverted to calls for a constitutional convention also to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The delegates thereto are to be elected on the second
Tuesday of November 1970; the convention to sit on June 1, 1971; and the amendments
proposed by the convention to be submitted to the people thereafter for their ratification.
Of importance now are the proposed amendments increasing the number of members of the
House of representatives under Resolution No. 1, and that in Resolution No. 3 which gives
Senators and Congressmen the right to sit as members of the constitutional convention to be
convened on June 1, 1971. Because, these are the two amendments to be submitted to the
people in the general elections soon to be held on November 14, 1967, upon the provisions of
Section 1, Republic Act 4913, which reads:
The amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the
Philippines in Resolutions of both Houses Numbered One and Three, both adopted on
March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixty- seven, shall be submitted to the people for
approval at the general election which shall be held on November fourteen, nineteen
hundred and sixty- seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust upon us — the manner in
which the amendments proposed by Congress just adverted to be brought to the people's
attention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that proposed amendments to the
Constitution may become effective, Section 1, Article XV thereof commands that such
amendments must be "approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."2 The accent is on two words
complementing each other, namely, "submitted" and "ratification."
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the problem facing us. And this, because
the amendments submitted are transcendental and encompassing. The ceiling of the number of
Congressmen is sought to be elevated from 120 to 180 members; and Senators and
Congressmen may run in constitutional conventions without forfeiting their seats. These
certainly affect the people as a whole. The increase in the number of Congressmen has its
proportional increase in the people's tax burdens. They may not look at this with favor, what with
the constitutional provision (Section 5, Article VI) that Congress "shall by law make an
apportionment", without the necessity of disturbing the present constitutionally provided number
of Congressmen. People in Quezon City, for instance, may balk at the specific apportionment of
the 160 seats set forth in Resolution No. 1, and ask for a Congressman of their own, on the
theory of equal representation. And then, people may question the propriety of permitting the
increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in the forthcoming constitutional convention and
future conventions for fear that they may dominate its proceedings. They may entertain the
belief that, if at all, increase in the number of Congressmen should be a proper topic for
deliberation in a constitutional convention which, anyway, will soon take place. They probably
would ask: Why the hurry? These ponderables require the people's close scrutiny.
2. With these as backdrop, we perforce go into the philosophy behind the constitutional directive
that constitutional amendments be submitted to the people for their ratification.
A constitutional amendment is not a temporary expedient. Unlike a statute which may suffer
amendments three or more times in the same year, it is intended to stand the test of time. It is
an expression of the people's sovereign will.
And so, our approach to the problem of the mechanics of submission for ratification of
amendments is that reasoning on the basis of the spirit of the Constitution is just as important as
reasoning by a strict adherence to the phraseology thereof. We underscore this, because it is
within the realm of possibility that a Constitution maybe overhauled. Supposing three-fourths of
the Constitution is to be amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the all important; Bill of Rights
in its entirety. We believe it to be beyond debate that in some such situations the amendments
ought to call for a constitutional convention rather than a legislative proposal. And yet, nothing
there is in the books or in the Constitution itself. which would require such amendments to be
adopted by a constitutional convention. And then, too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we
are sure, forbids that proposals therefor be initiated by Congress and thereafter presented to the
people for their ratification.
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words "submitted to the people for their
ratification", if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution — a fundamental charter
that is legislation direct from the people, an — expression of their sovereign will — is that it can
only be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained by
the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing
or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They
must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions compare them with the
proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience
suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly in insidious influences. We believe, the
word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should
strain every effort to inform very citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood
as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is
no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution.
What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as
we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair
submission, intelligent, consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve
the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For, the people decree
their own fate.
Aptly had it been said:
. . . The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect had the mental
vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who has said "A good Constitution
should beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is
needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the
whim of the people, or the thought evolved the excitement or hot blood, but the sober
second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. .
. . Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign
says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily
succeed evil; another evil may succeed and a worse." Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 3113
3. Tersely put, the issue before us funnels down to this proposition: If the people are not
sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon,
to express their will in a genuine manner can it be said that in accordance with the constitutional
mandate, "the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification?" Our answer is
"No".
We examine Republic Act 4913, approved on June 17, 1967 — the statute that submits to the
people the constitutional amendments proposed by Congress in Resolutions 1 and 3. Section 2
of the Act provides the manner of propagation of the nature of the amendments throughout the
country. There are five parts in said Section 2, viz:
(1) The amendment shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette
at least twenty days prior to the election.
(2) A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality,
city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October
fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after
the election.
(3) At least five copies of the said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be
made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day.
(4) When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by
the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place.
(5) The Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in
English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distribution.
A question that comes to mind is whether the procedure for dissemination of information
regarding the amendments effectively brings the matter to the people. A dissection of the
mechanics yields disturbing thoughts. First, the Official Gazette is not widely read. It does not
reach the barrios. And even if it reaches the barrios, is it available to all? And if it is, would all
under stand English? Second, it should be conceded that many citizens, especially those in the
outlying barrios, do not go to municipal, city and/or provincial office buildings, except on special
occasions like paying taxes or responding to court summonses. And if they do, will they notice
the printed amendments posted on the bulletin board? And if they do notice, such copy again is
in English (sample submitted to this Court by the Solicitor General) for, anyway, the statute does
not require that it be in any other language or dialect. Third, it would not help any if at least five
copies are kept in the polling place for examination by qualified electors during election day. As
petitioner puts it, voting time is not study time. And then, who can enter the polling place, except
those who are about to vote? Fourth, copies in the principal native languages shall be kept in
each polling place. But this is not, as Section 2 itself implies, in the nature of a command
because such copies shall be kept therein only "when practicable" and "as may be determined
by the Commission on Elections." Even if it be said that these are available before election, a
citizen may not intrude into the school building where the polling places are usually located
without disturbing the school classes being held there. Fifth, it is true that the Comelec is
directed to make available copies of such amendments in English, Spanish or whenever
practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distribution. However, Comelec is not
required to actively distribute them to the people. This is significant as to people in the
provinces, especially those in the far-flung barrios who are completely unmindful of the
discussions that go on now and then in the cities and centers of population on the merits and
demerits of the amendments. Rather, Comelec, in this case, is but a passive agency which may
hold copies available, but which copies may notbe distributed at all. Finally, it is of common
knowledge that Comelec has more than its hands full in these pre-election days. They cannot
possibly make extensive distribution.
Voters will soon go to the polls to say "yes" or "no". But even the official sample ballot submitted
to this Court would show that only the amendments are printed at the back. And this, in
pursuance to Republic Act 4913 itself.
Surely enough, the voters do not have the benefit of proper notice of the proposed amendments
thru dissemination by publication in extenso. People do not have at hand the necessary data on
which to base their stand on the merits and demerits of said amendments.
We, therefore, hold that there is no proper submission of the proposed constitutional
amendments within the meaning and intendment of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.
4. Contemporary history is witness to the fact that during the present election campaign the
focus is on the election of candidates. The constitutional amendments are crowded out.
Candidates on the homestretch, and their leaders as well as the voters, gear their undivided
efforts to the election of officials; the constitutional amendments cut no ice with them. The truth
is that even in the ballot itself, the space accorded to the casting of "yes" or "no" vote would give
one the impression that the constitutional amendments are but a bootstrap to the electoral
ballot. Worse still, the fortunes of many elective officials, on the national and local levels, are
inextricably intertwined with the results of the votes on the plebiscite. In a clash between votes
for a candidate and conscience on the merits and demerits of the constitutional amendments,
we are quite certain that it is the latter that will be dented.
5. That proper submission of amendments to the people to enable them to equally ratify them
properly is the meat of the constitutional requirement, is reflected in the sequence of uniform
past practices. The Constitution had been amended thrice — in 1939, 1940 and 1947. In each
case, the amendments were embodied in resolutions adopted by the Legislature, which
thereafter fixed the dates at which the proposed amendments were to be ratified or rejected.
These plebiscites have been referred to either as an "election" or "general election". At no time,
however, was the vote for the amendments of the Constitution held simultaneously with the
election officials, national or local. Even with regard to the 1947 parity amendment; the record
shows that the sole issue was the 1947 parity amendment; and the special elections
simultaneously held in only three provinces, Iloilo, Pangasinan and Bukidnon, were
merely incidental thereto.
In the end we say that the people are the last ramparts that guard against indiscriminate
changes in the Constitution that is theirs. Is it too much to ask that reasonable guarantee be
made that in the matter of the alterations of the law of the land, their true voice be heard? The
answer perhaps is best expressed in the following thoughts: "It must be remembered that the
Constitution is the people's enactment. No proposed change can become effective unless they
will it so through the compelling force of need of it and desire for it."4
For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be stricken down as in violation
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Angeles, JJ., concur in the result.
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
I concur in the result with the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez. To approve a mere
proposal to amend the Constitution requires (Art. XV) a three-fourths (3/4) vote of all the
members of each legislative chamber, the highest majority ever demanded by the fundamental
charter, one higher even than that required in order to declare war (Sec. 24, Article VI), with all
its dire consequences. If such an overwhelming majority, that was evidently exacted in order to
impress upon all and sundry the seriousness of every constitutional amendment, is asked for a
proposal to amend the Constitution, I find it impossible to believe that it was ever intended by its
framers that such amendment should be submitted and ratified by just "a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification", if
the concentration of the people's attention thereon to be diverted by other extraneous issues,
such as the choice of local and national officials. The framers of the Constitution, aware of the
fundamental character thereof, and of the need of giving it as much stability as is practicable,
could have only meant that any amendments thereto should be debated, considered and voted
upon at an election wherein the people could devote undivided attention to the subject. That this
was the intention and the spirit of the provision is corroborated in the case of all other
constitutional amendments in the past, that were submitted to and approved in special elections
exclusively devoted to the issue whether the legislature's amendatory proposals should be
ratified or not.
Dizon, Angeles, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press.
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law.
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act
originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by
virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a
newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution.
Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner
maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his
opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes
that said provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent punishment
for those who may violate it because it contains a penal provision, as follows:
Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or Activities. — Except to
the extent that the same may not be applicable plebiscite. the banned acts/activities and
offenses defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election Code ('Sections 261, 262,
263 and Article' XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall
be aplicable to the plebiscite governed by this Resolution.
Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and
opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and
desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.
On November 28, 1989, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent

Commission on Elections from enforcing and implementing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167.
We also required the respondent to comment on the petition.
On January 9, 1990, respondent Commission on Elections, through the Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Comment.
Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167
is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.
Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media
during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner from
expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still
express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.
This is provided under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881:
Section 90. Comelec Space. — Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in
the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or
periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein
candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge
equally and impartially within the area in which the newspaper is circulated.
Section 92. Comelec Time. — The Commission shall procure radio and television time to
be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
the campaign.
Respondent Comelec has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11
of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution 2167.
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space,
and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Similarly, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987) likewise
provides:
Prohibited forms of election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election

propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful: ...
(b) for any newspaper, radio, broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided
under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer, or personality who is a candidate for any elective office shall
take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis
ours)
However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the
Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits
or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in
terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to
take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A.
6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be
more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave
of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory
basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality of the
prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the
prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the perversion and
prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection of the laws." The evil
sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a
plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special political matter unlike in an
election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other words, the
electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not
absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or
against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec
radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may
express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold
that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for
no justifiable reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by
the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum
where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may
provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167
is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is hereby
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,

vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO
G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice
representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.
GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election
contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L.
ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two
branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could
be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to
intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government,
was all too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its
head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which
is that 'where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign
capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the
government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party
proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter,
the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative
or executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we
pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident
exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional
grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be
done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the
courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the
fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the
President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome
task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a
justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or
prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is —
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to
administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power
to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party
(NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the
province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a
protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short)
which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and
the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Congressman
1st District
Benguet LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Congressman
1st District Palawan
LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
Congressman
2nd District Nueva Ecija
LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Congressman
1st District Davao del Sur
LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Congressman
4th District Batangas
LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Congressman
2nd District Zamboanga del Sur

(formerly GAD, now NP)
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda,
Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin
of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a
reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least
four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over
Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his
'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in
the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self-
respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they
would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot1 Congressman Camasura's
revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate
moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at
2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on
March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman
Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP
Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled
him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize
the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP
members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only
inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and
objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee
unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster
of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the
Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina
M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter
from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991,
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to
the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the
House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-
explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be
relieved from their assignments in the HRET because —
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the
electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled
for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12
September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation, the
decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be
overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been
defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of
23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal
requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be
deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in
favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-
Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G.
Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with
Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and
Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a
conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the
confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely
difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8
integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to
us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all
costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its
constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases
before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional
representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the
1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party
having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three
(3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can
dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as
the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there
should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the
resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon
designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest
themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their
independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should
have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No.
21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET
Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated
task of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the

chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The
resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the
House of Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had
voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the
promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for
this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision
lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the
Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of
the opinion that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and
derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in
a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to
resign as a member of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and
Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera,
Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court
observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole
judge' of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by
purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the
contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of
their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further
bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof
should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not
be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal
for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera,

Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties
therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the
proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs
functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its
membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral
Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to
REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal
in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep.
Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc,
otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio
A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita
G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw
the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be

designated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging
functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume

and discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to
comment5 on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing
and allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is
designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the
election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of
Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39,
Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on
Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon
recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it
allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of
the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death,
incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party;6 that a Tribunal member's term of office
is not co-extensive with his legislative term,7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his
party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified;8 and that the expulsion
of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9 and the decision
to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-
of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of
judicial review.10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has
no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for
membership in the HRET.11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of
Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew
and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET.12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of
the HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action
against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation
of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member
of the HRET.13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal
indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it
acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25
to his (Bondoc's) prejudice.14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it
is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in
the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the
Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from
the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman
Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of
Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in
the HETH several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives
would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the
Tribunal.16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere
with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of
"reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of
three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the
Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House,
three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the
party having the second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any
political party to control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the
1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as
judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647,
February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-
thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this
Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals
of the Senate and House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election
and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent
bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and
control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent.
Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with
the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the

legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution
as the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the
electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these
tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution
but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or
the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional

restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it
ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would
that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate
departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are
constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would
like to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would
still be applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court
said that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan
influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate
proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a
separate branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the
invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the determination of controversies with
respect to the election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this
Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this
rule because apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the
Gentleman will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House
and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both
bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these
bodies are independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the

Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-
Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral
tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the
ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are
supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an
political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we could
achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the
opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of
this Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be
independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as
distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the
party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House
Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be
powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of
the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of
the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion,
an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that
it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole
judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of
the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be
expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his
expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right
to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral
Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court
Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced
by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice
Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale
University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the
HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman
Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on
Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid
reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to
punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how
he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to
nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so
that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman
Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is
clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the
judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights
against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot
be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its
judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of
the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be
the highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio
Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House
of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's
decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the
constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We,
therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is
entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of
Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby
declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita
G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991,
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs.
Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the
promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the
Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the
said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to
be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of Representatives, assuming
that said act were politically motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its
authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so on the strength of the
second paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House of Representatives in
withdrawing and rescinding its nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot
join the majority's posture which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine of
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for this reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are
distributed among three (3) great departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these
departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its
authority directly from the fundamental law.1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three
departments are not only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While interdependent,
in the sense that each is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without the other,
they are nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to say, one
department may not control or even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular
functions.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to
the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in
authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not
binding in every other department.3 In other words, one department must not encroach upon nor
interfere with acts done within the constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary
authority has been delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department alone, to
the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from any encroachment or
interference of whomsoever.4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the judiciary through the
exercise of its power of judicial review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases
involving political questions.5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the House of Representatives
withdrew and rended the nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House
Electoral Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated by a letter of Congressman Jose S.
Cojuangco, Jr. informing the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the expulsion of
Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize
the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP
members to join the said political party. As a result of this letter, the nomination of Camasura to
the House Electoral Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of
Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal was informed of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of Representatives as it is, he
alleges, but a employ to thwart the promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by
him (petitioner Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), and which decision would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that
not only does the action of the House of Representatives violate the independence of the House
Electoral Tribunal but that it also violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr.
in said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that the House of
Representatives has the sole authority to nominate and select from among its members who are
to sit in the House Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the political parties therein,
hence, it also has the sole power to remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever
the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed on
account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion of a House member from a political party. A
Tribunal member's term of office in said electoral tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues,
co-extensive with his legislative term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating
representation in the electoral tribunal based on political affiliation may be completely nullified in
the event that a member of the Tribunal changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of the House Electoral Tribunal.
Three (3) of the members of the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six (6) members come from the
members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system. 6 The House of
Representatives has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal
(representing the House) provided, of course, that the proportional representation of parties is
maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination extended to a member of the
electoral tribunal (representing the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the
House has expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint or designate a
member of the House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must,
to my mind, necessarily include the power to remove said member. A withdrawal of the
nomination of a member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the proportional
representation of the political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and
respected, no matter how politically motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is
concerned with power not with policy, wisdom or expediency.7The question that must be asked
in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the House of Representatives have the
power to do what it has done and not whether the House of Representatives should have done
what it has done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act done within the
constitutional authority to the legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the
House cannot question the act of the Chief Justice, should he deem it proper to change the
Justices who sit as members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be
designated or nominated as members of the electoral tribunal, how they should vote — surely
are matters that not merely concern political action as far as members of the House are
concerned, but are the very essence of political action, if political life has any connotation at all.
To open courts of justice to such political controversies would have courts sit in judgment over
the manifold disputes engendered by political manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the
courts into the political arena which in the long run could undermine and destroy their
independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively
to it by the Constitution.8 It is not within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or
oversee legislative acts as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and common
sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively of legislative concern. 9 To hold otherwise
would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand so aptly
observed, "one cannot find among the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the
validity of the decisions of another 'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's' powers.
Indeed, it is to be understood that the three (3), Departments' were separate and co-equal, each
being, as it were, a Leibnizian monad, looking up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without
any mutual dependence. What could be better evidence of complete dependence than to
subject the validity of the decision of one 'Department' as to its authority on a given occasion to
review and reversal by another? Such a doctrine makes supreme the Department that has the
last word. "10 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the division of power tacitly accepted
by society runs counter to its own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This may
be because the society is still unsure of what the best division of power would be and so
temporarily accepts the existing one, or because the society has vacated its decisionmaking
function and special interest groups have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court
can neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution, and thereby subject its role as
guardian to claims of fraud, nor invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be
ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige which is the Court's primarily
source of power."11
Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the
nomination of Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in
one of the electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to
invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its
constitutional power. Besides, what other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not
politically motivated? After all, that branch of government is a political branch and necessarily or
pragmatically all of its acts are and will always be politically motivated.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered opinion, bring it within the Court's
power to strike down the legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not this court
— who should ultimately judge the act when they cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate
unto itself the power to institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in the last analysis
on which all else depend, the vitality of a political system would be greatly weakened by reliance
on the judiciary for any and all political reforms and, in time, a complacent body politic will result.
It is the responsibility of the people and none other, to remain ever vigilant about their
government to the end that they can continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy. To leave this task to the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive
of democratic government itself
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
SARMIENTO, J., disssenting:
Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am unable to agree with the
majority. I believe that the questions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of
Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in
which the Court can not intervene.
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle
principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political
maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should
be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their
independence.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of Representatives, assuming
that said act were politically motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its
authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so on the strength of the
second paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House of Representatives in
withdrawing and rescinding its nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot
join the majority's posture which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine of
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for this reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are
distributed among three (3) great departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these
departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its
authority directly from the fundamental law.1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three
departments are not only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While interdependent,
in the sense that each is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without the other,
they are nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to say, one
department may not control or even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular
functions.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to
the point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in
authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not
binding in every other department.3 In other words, one department must not encroach upon nor
interfere with acts done within the constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary
authority has been delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department alone, to
the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from any encroachment or
interference of whomsoever.4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the judiciary through the
exercise of its power of judicial review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases
involving political questions.5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the House of Representatives
withdrew and rended the nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House
Electoral Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated by a letter of Congressman Jose S.
Cojuangco, Jr. informing the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the expulsion of
Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize
the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP
members to join the said political party. As a result of this letter, the nomination of Camasura to
the House Electoral Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of
Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal was informed of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of Representatives as it is, he
alleges, but a employ to thwart the promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by
him (petitioner Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), and which decision would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that
not only does the action of the House of Representatives violate the independence of the House
Electoral Tribunal but that it also violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr.
in said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that the House of
Representatives has the sole authority to nominate and select from among its members who are
to sit in the House Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the political parties therein,
hence, it also has the sole power to remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever
the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed on
account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion of a House member from a political party. A
Tribunal member's term of office in said electoral tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues,
co-extensive with his legislative term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating
representation in the electoral tribunal based on political affiliation may be completely nullified in
the event that a member of the Tribunal changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of the House Electoral Tribunal.
Three (3) of the members of the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six (6) members come from the
members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the partylist system. 6 The House of
Representatives has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal
(representing the House) provided, of course, that the proportional representation of parties is
maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination extended to a member of the
electoral tribunal (representing the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the
House has expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint or designate a
member of the House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must,
to my mind, necessarily include the power to remove said member. A withdrawal of the
nomination of a member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the proportional
representation of the political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and
respected, no matter how politically motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is
concerned with power not with policy, wisdom or expediency.7The question that must be asked
in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the House of Representatives have the
power to do what it has done and not whether the House of Representatives should have done
what it has done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act done within the
constitutional authority to the legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the
House cannot question the act of the Chief Justice, should he deem it proper to change the
Justices who sit as members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be
designated or nominated as members of the electoral tribunal, how they should vote — surely
are matters that not merely concern political action as far as members of the House are
concerned, but are the very essence of political action, if political life has any connotation at all.
To open courts of justice to such political controversies would have courts sit in judgment over
the manifold disputes engendered by political manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the
courts into the political arena which in the long run could undermine and destroy their
independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively
to it by the Constitution.8 It is not within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or
oversee legislative acts as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and common
sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively of legislative concern. 9 To hold otherwise
would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand so aptly
observed, "one cannot find among the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the
validity of the decisions of another 'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's' powers.
Indeed, it is to be understood that the three (3), Departments' were separate and co-equal, each
being, as it were, a Leibnizian monad, looking up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without
any mutual dependence. What could be better evidence of complete dependence than to
subject the validity of the decision of one 'Department' as to its authority on a given occasion to
review and reversal by another? Such a doctrine makes supreme the Department that has the
last word. "10 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the division of power tacitly accepted
by society runs counter to its own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This may
be because the society is still unsure of what the best division of power would be and so
temporarily accepts the existing one, or because the society has vacated its decisionmaking
function and special interest groups have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court
can neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution, and thereby subject its role as
guardian to claims of fraud, nor invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be
ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige which is the Court's primarily
source of power."11
Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the
nomination of Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in
one of the electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to
invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its
constitutional power. Besides, what other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not
politically motivated? After all, that branch of government is a political branch and necessarily or
pragmatically all of its acts are and will always be politically motivated.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered opinion, bring it within the Court's
power to strike down the legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not this court
— who should ultimately judge the act when they cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate
unto itself the power to institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in the last analysis
on which all else depend, the vitality of a political system would be greatly weakened by reliance
on the judiciary for any and all political reforms and, in time, a complacent body politic will result.
It is the responsibility of the people and none other, to remain ever vigilant about their
government to the end that they can continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy. To leave this task to the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive
of democratic government itself
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
SARMIENTO, J., disssenting:
Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am unable to agree with the
majority. I believe that the questions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of
Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in
which the Court can not intervene.
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle
principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political
maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should
be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their
independence.
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-

ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-
intervention,
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER
OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-
intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN,
MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR
ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA
CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-
HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA
JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN,
ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS,
JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO
MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III,
ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO
TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS,
CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE,
CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA,
JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA,
JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS,
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA,
ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,
JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO
AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG,

RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO
SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO
MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO
BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO,
RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR.,
EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA,
RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA,
MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE
VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED

BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING
PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V.
ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN
S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN
B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES
AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION
OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M.

MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL
BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY
OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY
ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L.
JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE
NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN
DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and
seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent
branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,
dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one
such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy
subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year
bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a
political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither
necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in
adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative,
executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in
the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they
are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a
relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate
functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people.
Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between
these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II RULE V
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
Impeachment. – Impeachment SAME OFFICIAL
shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by Section 16. – Impeachment
any Member of the House of Proceedings Deemed
Representatives or by any citizen Initiated. – In cases where a
upon a resolution of endorsement Member of the House files a
by any Member thereof or by a verified complaint of
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment or a citizen files a
impeachment filed by at least one- verified complaint that is
third (1/3) of all the Members of endorsed by a Member of the
the House. House through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings
against such official are deemed
initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that
the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official,
as the case may be, is sufficient
in substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or affirm
the finding of the said Committee
that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is
not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified

complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be,
by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the
House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment
with the Secretary General.
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a period
of one (1) year from the date
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings are
impeachment proceedings shall be deemed initiated as provided in
initiated against the same official Section 16 hereof, no
more than once within the period impeachment proceedings, as
of one (1) year. such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." 3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
(Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in
the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5)
of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records
of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers,
alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the
Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens,
taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their
petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to
conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that
he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v.
PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his
petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the
legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House
of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul
M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal
interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be
protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary,
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray
that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate
and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors
and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and
taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the
Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections
16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the
Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr.
Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III
of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition
for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens,
citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray
for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate
from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court
declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent
House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the
issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as
an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the
unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate
from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for
Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of
the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that
as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to
inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined
from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but
alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the
Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays
in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction"
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays
in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of
Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the
resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the
eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of
the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on
October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion
was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but
it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum, 19 and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug
offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28,
2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives
and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at
10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this
Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties
and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the
petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose
C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin
the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government
under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a
Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as
the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments
on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M.
Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly
premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to
constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain
exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution
issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put
Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R.
No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated
Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World
War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with
Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3,
2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke
it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at
this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of

Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant
petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of
the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the
threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising
from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise
of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining.
These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to
determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P.
Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present
provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the

Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and

perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels,for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the

nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for
the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is
in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred
upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence
for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case
of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the
supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the
United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral

component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.

It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of
the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored
in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience

during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the
role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release
of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of
the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame

Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a

provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others.When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of

the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential

application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review. 47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the
scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator
Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case
of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system
of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary;
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise
point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review
in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution
and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole
power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check
and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the
case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have
long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the
U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also
a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution
with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings.
While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one
year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the
perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support
of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in
point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the
legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review
over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the
House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-
elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to
it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like
almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not
have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal
injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly
contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this
Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in
cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that
procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches
of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental
importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable
to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for
ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant
petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on
standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to
distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of
the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the
personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of
their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit;
and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine, when the proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove
that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute
or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of
the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation
that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing
trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court
to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the
numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will
stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive

determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are
instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants,
this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality
does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter
is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it
not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to
allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they
raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to
join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene,
alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been
complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to
raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the
Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et

al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in
the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of
making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He
alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine
the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against
which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial
issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier
stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he
asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to
any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to
clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture." 96 Only
then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged
in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The
questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed
with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated
and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be
no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on
questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and
Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to
this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment
Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate.
The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the
Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their
signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional
infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of
Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of
Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither
the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with
definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or
otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power
to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term
"political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government."
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason,
this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political
questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and
refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. 101 Even in
the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a
political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take
jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion,
when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review
and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment
that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the
legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to
enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which,
after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception.
x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect
of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not
lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on
the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The
obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial
law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In
fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were
under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had
not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to
that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was
our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished
what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the
President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a
plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree
which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public
concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use
a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however,
the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted
in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under
the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then
designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into
existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers
thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers
given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the
referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme
Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President
declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming
majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after
the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case
was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation
declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and
void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political
question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast
majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court
were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their
respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum.
None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members
of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference

between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was
set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was
clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There
are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a
decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as
a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is
bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to
human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided
into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further
clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power
is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be
created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had
abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme
Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political

question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,

amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away
with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the
reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this
Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly
political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would
have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court
declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under
the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and
non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political
questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker
v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These
standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review
is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this
Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require
this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment,
two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In
fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional

question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other
ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in
which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this
Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and
violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of
the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome
of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of
the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related
cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the
second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling
for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to
likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers;
(c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an
assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of
this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general,
which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already
been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows
then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining
the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the
application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the
exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are
alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to
the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the

abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for
said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and
for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely
endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should
have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2),
Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who
signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by
the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit
the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling
considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions
would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but
the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination
of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have
joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute
the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate,
sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of
review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the
Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the
Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of
the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec.
1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it,
it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office,
the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him]
to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in
[his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in
the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-
Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all
of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not
sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of
the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no
less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication
in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What
we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them,
is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And
if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his
court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial
power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the
very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its
power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of
limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-
adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a
personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from
different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of
judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be
confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano
echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against
Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and
faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court
to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon
their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded
as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences.
Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently,
failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there
were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims," 140 the
pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the
martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches
of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to
uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any
of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine
in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect
and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16

and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of
our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section
3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to
file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as
the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz
Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of
"initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado)
as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November
5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on
the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article
XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to

commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts

consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles
of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments
leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation
is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the
Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition
that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a
time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of
the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its
records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action,
calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial
and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is
that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples
in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It
is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been
bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The
Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I
have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I
just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on
page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or
to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned
on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the
House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam
President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the
Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in
deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote
of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section
3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas,
who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used
in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate,"
appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
xxx
once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object
in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists
of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects
or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing;
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a
vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public
official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal
to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not
found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning
of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people,
both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it
and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and
is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of
the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment

proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning
from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed
during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded
utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in
their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because
of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present
only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief
Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the
records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear
and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of
Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly
behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes
judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method
are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia,
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic
as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into
the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of
power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view
the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as
to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or
clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it
is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one
has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by
the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did
not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to

categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover
up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It
was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution.
The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive
and the Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch
or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches
of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators
being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what
it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should
not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our
trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this
new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of
judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by
undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third
parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing
that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that
"the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing
more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the
Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state
that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different
from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in
the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that
takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our
characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the
seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two
weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience.
Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe
to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets
armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of
society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered
suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental
branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any
kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present
petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-
interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-
justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may
have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full
of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in
fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only
the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go
about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to
bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is
that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been
entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,
unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations
or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and
the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it
is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by
the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of
the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire
institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this
Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law
than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in
life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by
this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has
resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would
ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to
have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through
this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without
the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents
maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy
and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic
partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH

GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by
October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the
right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of
Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the

GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC

PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after
the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later

than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee

on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel) are obtained.3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a
subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust
Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the
Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender
of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS
and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition
and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was
referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It
is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-
owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the
tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction
involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate,
there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as
cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events
that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall
under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed
to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and
distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional
provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.
Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the
bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it
only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.
Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could
still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the
privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since
respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it
did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition
for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the
authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it
is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of
citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather

than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not
self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission —
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as

the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
"PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be
understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos
who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To
qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner

Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We

use the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or
prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which
business may be done. For example, qualifications on the setting
up of other financial structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by
respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature
is not precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long
as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate
the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision
of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are
simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the
youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of
education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social
justice and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites
provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the
youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and development. 33A
reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions
manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa
loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that
— qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains
—
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not
only to out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It
also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should
develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also
the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the
1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth.
Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and
Memory of a City. 37During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture
Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places
fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a
renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino
talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for
vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land
upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the

Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would consist in
substituting the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following:
"CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR
ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK
IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is

agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a
corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it
preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an
individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by
Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we

say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because

"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to
juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the

amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF

RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word
"Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner

Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a
question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES

AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign

enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified,
will the Filipino enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than

the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL —

THE STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be
given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the
national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject
provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all

economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This
provision was never found in previous Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to
those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because
of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the
pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are
incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice

has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the
latter shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent
GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been
found to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has
significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject
provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The
attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too
distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to
the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need
implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial
remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to
enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including

the Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that there are
discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it
must be guided by its own understanding of the constitutional command and of
applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution
and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive
would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every
time the executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument
again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried
out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.
As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts
of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is
so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power — legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in
this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For
in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding
rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law
that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which
violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per
47
share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of
shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction
itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm
the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to
public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines
or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations
under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to
Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could
participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to
the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before
us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the
constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus
it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid.
Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the
award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a
Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated
as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution
lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987
Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be
enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will
never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this
Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from
it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position
of the Court on this matter could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice
Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and
feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been
spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and
development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's
First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its
partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that
injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major
obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court
to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of
whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they
do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will
never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed
criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing
further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-
material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the
expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-
material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance
of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican
state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority
emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The
nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must
adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a
policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to
the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece
of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of
the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking
about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their
desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines.
Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that
has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell
the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For,
indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be
less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a
nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot
be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all
that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity
will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified,
zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the
Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to
respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a
bit more on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning
institutions such as the Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which
qualified Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision
on point states:
xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos.1
Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I)
consisting of land, sea, and air.2study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national
patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more
comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a
concept embracing not only their natural resources of the country but practically everything that
belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the
spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop
with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may
be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only
the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony).3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race.4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its
operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the
venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest
House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.5
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President
Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we
should do so with. an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of
today are the trustees of the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and
reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our
Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources,
one expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws, and; not make the nationalization
of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional
enactment"6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespassers in their own
country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens
and encumbrances".7
Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful,

must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect
the very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that
pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino
to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when
the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the
qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the
preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our
country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country.
While government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a
trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we
should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national
identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors
have established themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula,
and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the
Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of
the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural
heritage in the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., concurring:

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although
it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.
Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also
to its cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres,
Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an
act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat
difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the
particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the
qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that
literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of
the magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to
stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of
preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a
letdown that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding
along with the peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also
regrettable that the Court at time is seen, to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate
which create the perception that it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is to allow petitioner
Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of
the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a
qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right,
privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner
and the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the
bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"2 so that petitioner bid for more shares, it
would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a
Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien
corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is
mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks.3 That, to me, is what "preference to
qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to
Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls."5 This Court upheld the cancellation of
existing leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the
award thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of
Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente,6 this Court sustained the validity of a
municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of
public market stalls and granting preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses
for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo,7 the preference granted under the
statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by
alien vendors in the public markets even if there were available other stalls as good as those
occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest
between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the
right to preference immediately arises."8
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the
1970s in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse
discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such
areas as employment, contracting and licensing.9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy,
there are situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as
contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least
stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or
deprive the country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with
common trades of common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with
the sale of government property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and
concessions covering the national economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we
give preferential treatment to our citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution.
For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization
should result in the relinquishment of the business in favor of private individuals and groups who
are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be
trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are
qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding
that is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the
highest bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do
would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder
has submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not
possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum
bid required (P36.87 per share for a range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum
will not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification
process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign
firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly submitted bids." 14 The
suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in
the case at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the
side of history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is worth a volume of logic."
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and
cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of
the nation".
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national goals and priorities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy

effectively by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in
the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings thus:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN

THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS". And the word "Filipinos" here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-Controlled
entities fully controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records
of the Constitutional Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as

Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and
this body already approved what is known as the
Filipino First policy which was suggested by
Commissioner de Castro. So that it is now in our
Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:
MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges

and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a

foreign enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some

aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred:?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p.

616, Records of the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no
reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said —
The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution.

. . . It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and
spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the
product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is
witness to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84
years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the
legal largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively
discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel
should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits
subverts the cherished historical values of our people.
As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in
the words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it
keeps flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If
you look towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful
currents that push the river or people towards the future, and if you look the other way, you
progress."
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let
us not jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.
I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that
he makes mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err
upholding the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.
I vote GRANT the petition.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling
the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the
sale violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the
Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel
was included in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to
interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in
the Manila Hotel Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of
shares offered for sale was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel" 1 The proposal was approved
by respondent Committee on Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules
were furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and
Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified.2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification
and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS
DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the
Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
First — Pass the prequalification process;
Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of
Shares;
Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995;
xxx xxx xxx
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION
A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide

management expertise and/or an international marketing
reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context,
the GSIS is inviting to the prequalification process any local and/or
foreign corporation, consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with
at least one of the following qualifications:
a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel

industry; or
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board

representation) in another hotel company; or
c. Overall management and marketing expertise to

successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide

access to the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE
The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration

Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within
the period specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists
of the following:
a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization
b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The
Manila Hotel Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and

Bidding Conference
xxx xxx xxx
4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE
A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The

Manila Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the
Applicant to seek clarifications and further information regarding
the guidelines and procedures. Only those who purchased the
prequalification documents will be allowed in this conference.
Attendance to this conference is strongly advised, although the
Applicant will not be penalized if it does not attend.
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification

documents (1 original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office
between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the
period specified in Section III.
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC

with the assistance of the TEC based on the
Information Package and other information
available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture,

the evaluation will consider the overall qualifications
of the group, taking into account the contribution of
each member to the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the

results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to

the criteria set forth below:
a. Business management expertise,

track record, and experience
b. Financial capability.
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the

proposed strategic plan for the
Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may

deem appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding —

ITT Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels
International Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may
participate in the Public Bidding without having to undergo the
prequalification process again.
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of

Qualified Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the
date specified in Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by

member whose qualification was a material consideration for
being included in the shortlist is ground for disqualification of the
Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING
A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to

participate in the Public Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three

Hundred Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing
Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and
outstanding shares of MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding
by the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will have the Option of
determining the number of shares within the range to bid for. The
range is intended to attract bidders with different preferences and
objectives for the operation and management of The Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum

bid required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is
Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the

minimum required will not considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a

copy of which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must
be properly accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment
may be a sufficient basis for disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the
Official Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in
a sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be

submitted along with the bid in a separate envelop marked
"SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS":
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the

Qualified Bidder should submit a Board resolution which
adequately authorizes such representative to bid for and in behalf
of the corporation with full authority to perform such acts
necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each

member of the Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board
resolution authorizing one of its members and such member's
representative to make the bid on behalf of the group with full
authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the
Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos

(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of:
i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft

payable to the "Government Service Insurance
System" and issued by a reputable banking
institution duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable

banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:
i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less

than the required amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or

unconditional demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid
Security will be for the account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic

Partner, the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on
the Qualified Bidder's offered purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned

immediately after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not
declared the Highest Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the

Highest Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC
the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract or other types of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor

of GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract specified by the Highest Bidder or other types of
contract in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses
to:
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement
with GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price

not later than October 23, 1995; or
iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for

any other reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the

following location:
New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public

Bidding to accept any and all bids and supporting requirements.
Representatives from the Commission on Audit and COP will be
invited to witness the proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid
Form. The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents

in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS"
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM,
Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No
bid shall be accepted after the closing time. Opened or tampered
bids shall not be accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of

submission of the two sealed envelopes. The actual time of
submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on the face of
the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in

the corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These
boxes will be in full view of the invited public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public

Bidding, the PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and
acceptance. Those who submitted incomplete/insufficient
documents or document/s which is/are not substantially in the
form required by PBAC will be disqualified. The envelope
containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately returned to
the disqualified bidders.
2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened
at 3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price
will be read publicly as the envelopes are opened.
3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will

formally announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis.
In the event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same
equivalent price per share, priority will be given to the bidder
seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:
a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed

period; or
b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and

acceptable to the PBAC.

GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth
below by October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right
to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the
Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute

with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila
Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is intending to provide
only financial support to The Manila Hotel, a
separate institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock

Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy
of which will be distributed to each of the Qualified
Bidder after the prequalification process is
completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management

Contract for The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the
management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept
in the Management Contract are as follows:
a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of

gross revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross

operating profit(1) after deducting undistributed
overhead expenses and the basic management
fee.
c. Fixed component of the international

marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of
2.0% of gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant
should indicate in its Information Package if it is
wishes to charge this fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters

for the hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with
the Highest Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public
Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The

Manila Hotel should determine whether or not the management
fee structure above is acceptable before submitting their
prequalification documents to GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the

Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.
2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will

be in accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their
respective bids in their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority
will be given to the Qualified Bidders that submitted the second
and third highest bids on the price per share basis, respectively,
and so on.

PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic

Partner after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contract with

GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and

COP/OGCC are obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than
October 23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of
Shares after deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Check

or unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government
Service Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking
institution licensed to do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all

applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such
application as maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS.
The GSIS similarly reserves the right to require the submission of
any additional information from the Applicant as the PBAC may
deem necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding
prior to acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding
under amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any
or all the Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid
Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the
submission of the prequalification documents, the date of the
Public Bidding or other pertinent activities at least three (3)
calendar days prior to the respective deadlines/target dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it

has on the Block of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified

Bidders, except the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public

Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the
Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept and abide
by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, suit
or allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified
Bidders who have participated in the Public Bidding.3
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per
share for 15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000
shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned
petitioner's bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match
the bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second
paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three
million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and
conditions of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to
entertain petitioner's request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October
18, 1995.
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the
Constitution4 on the "National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect;
(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the

controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a
foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies
and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law
and government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced
without further legislative action.6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only
through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to

hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in
its language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a
present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for
completion and enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context
of the provision in question.8
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,9 rather than as
requiring future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the
sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of
the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but
congressional in action should not suffocate them. 12
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches
and seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an
accused, 15 and the privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a that legislation is
unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the
fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. 17 The same treatment is
accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use
without just compensation.18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing
where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the
means by which the policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the
provisions in Article II of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies"
should generally be construed as mere statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also
ruled that some provisions of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article
XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture end Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of
judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress
though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their policy content. 24
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country 25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to
enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent
Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the
entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges
covering the national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State
to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain
areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of
wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in
esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically,
this paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The
provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong
v. Hernandez, 28where we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize
certain areas of investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of
section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in
favor of Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and
not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their
coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign
investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments."
Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by
law the policy of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges
covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the
State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any
reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the
third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of

Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-
important Filipino First policy in our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word
"shall," directs its enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half- pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning.
According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 30 By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls
within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the Manila
Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes
beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on
July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular Government for Americans living
in, or passing through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively used by
American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American
Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests
during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military
headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the
Intramuros that the Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the
war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers
and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports celebrities were housed in the
Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it
was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has
reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic
Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846,
"The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure
whereby a particular cultural property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an
"important cultural property. 32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974,
the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing section 10,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and
cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent
GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government
employees and the government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which
cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability
and life insurance benefits of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of
the GSIS, 35Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures
for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus contended that the GSIS investment in the Manila
Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a
public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public
purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission
on Audit. 38 As state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies
spelled out in the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy
which the people elevated as a constitutional command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their
"preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to
be for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet
today's manifest needs and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with
elasticity can grow as a living constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to

define the phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He
explained that present and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its
interpretation, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED"
because the existing laws or the prospective laws
will always lay down conditions under which
business map be done, for example, qualifications
on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other
financial structures, et cetera.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as
giving preference to qualified Filipinos as against
Filipinos who are not qualified.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the

intention of the proponents. The committee has
accepted the amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy
is addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not
be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable
rules and regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the
exercise of their rule-making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations
set forth the standards to measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners
alike. It is not seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have
accorded petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of
preference gives it a second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the
second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It
is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does
not absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited
from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the
weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task
of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the
need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and,
second, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the
Constitution did not define the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos.
They knew that for the right to serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that
can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the
right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and
circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the
right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege
at any given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the
right primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other
branches of government, and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to
enforce this state policy. Within the limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and
regulations defining the degree of this right of preference in cases where they have to make
grants involving the national economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike
down acts of the state that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right.
Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee
Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a
qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that
they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder.
Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that they do not grant any degree
of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed
part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which demand that we
interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal,
and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the
bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we
examine the rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the
rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot
be awarded block of shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong
Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest
bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It
deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a
qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant,
petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no power to
extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. The
parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose
determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the State.
We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their
judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long as the right
of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the right that
the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting
an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even
during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to
respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If
sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on he essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and
regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the government to
maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty that must be
discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are
carefully written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their
financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the
parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege to know the
winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a
bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro
M. Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in
his own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the
Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an
alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we
are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are
written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection
clause of the Constitution protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without
unfairness to foreigner.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno, may I just add
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding
process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest
foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that
"in the grant of rights . . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent
or degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to
increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering
law, the majority's strained interpretation, I respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial
legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no
foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and, viewed
properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the
guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their
own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids
of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to
remain unchallenged by their nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as
pariahs in the global marketplace with absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our
country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness,
greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-term, self-destructing.
The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do unto you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where
all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and
without being unfair to the foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are
tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a
bit more on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning
institutions such as the Manila Hotel.
It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which
qualified Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision
on point states:
xxx xxx xxx
and patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos.1
Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I)
consisting of land, sea, and air.2study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national
patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more
comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a
concept embracing not only their natural resources of the country but practically everything that
belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the
spiritual assets and possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop
with conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may
be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only
the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony).3
Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race.4
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its
operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the
venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest
House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.5
It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President
Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we
should do so with. an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of
today are the trustees of the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and
reserve it for Filipinos was the intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our
Constitution. Thus, in debating the need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources,
one expounded that we should "put more teeth into our laws, and; not make the nationalization
of our lands and natural resources a subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional
enactment"6 To quote further: "Let not our children be mere tenants and trespassers in their own
country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens
and encumbrances".7
Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful,

must refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect
the very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that
pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino
to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when
the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should
undisputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the
qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the
preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our
country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country.
While government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a
trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we
should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national
identity, culture and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors
have established themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula,
and Mandarin Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the
Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of
the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural
heritage in the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:
First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos"1 is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although
it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.
Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also
to its cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres,
Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an
act of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat
difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the
particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the
qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that
literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of
the magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to
stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of
preference.
It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a
letdown that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding
along with the peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also
regrettable that the Court at time is seen, to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate
which create the perception that it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.
All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" 1 is to allow petitioner
Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of
the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a
qualified Filipino of Philippine corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right,
privilege or concession given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national corporation.
Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner
and the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the
bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"2 so that petitioner bid for more shares, it
would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a
Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien
corporation is the highest bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is
mandated not by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks.3 That, to me, is what "preference to
qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno4 to a 1947 statute giving "preference to
Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls."5 This Court upheld the cancellation of
existing leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the
award thereafter of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of
Finance. Similarly, in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente,6 this Court sustained the validity of a
municipal ordinance passed pursuant to the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of
public market stalls and granting preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses
for the occupancy of the stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo,7 the preference granted under the
statute was held to apply to cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by
alien vendors in the public markets even if there were available other stalls as good as those
occupied by aliens. "The law, apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest
between Filipino applicants and aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the
right to preference immediately arises."8
Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the
1970s in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse
discrimination programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such
areas as employment, contracting and licensing.9 Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy,
there are situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as
contemplated in the Constitution 10 is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least
stand on equal footing with aliens.
There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or
deprive the country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with
common trades of common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, 11 but with
the sale of government property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and
concessions covering the national economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we
give preferential treatment to our citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution.
For the Manila Hotel is a business owned by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization
should result in the relinquishment of the business in favor of private individuals and groups who
are Filipino citizens, not in favor of aliens.
Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be
trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are
qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process. 12 It is only the result of the public bidding
that is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.
Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the
highest bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do
would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder
has submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not
possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum
bid required (P36.87 per share for a range of 9 to 15 million shares). 13 Bids below the minimum
will not be considered. On the other hand, if the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification
process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign
firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly submitted bids." 14 The
suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no basis in fact.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in
the case at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the
side of history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., a "page of history is worth a volume of logic."
I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and
cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of
the nation".
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
national goals and priorities.
The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy

effectively by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in
the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings thus:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN

THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE
SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS". And the word "Filipinos" here, as
intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-Controlled
entities fully controlled by Filipinos (Vol. III, Records
of the Constitutional Commission, p. 608).
MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as

Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and
this body already approved what is known as the
Filipino First policy which was suggested by
Commissioner de Castro. So that it is now in our
Constitution (Vol. IV, Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 225).
Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:
MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges

and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a

foreign enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some

aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred:?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p.

616, Records of the Constitutional Commission).
The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no
reneged on this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said —
The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution.

. . . It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and
spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid or unconstitutional (Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).
I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the
product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.
The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is
witness to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84
years.
As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the
legal largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively
discussed in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel
should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits
subverts the cherished historical values of our people.
As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in
the words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it
keeps flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If
you look towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful
currents that push the river or people towards the future, and if you look the other way, you
progress."
Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let
us not jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.
I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that
he makes mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err
upholding the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.
I vote GRANT the petition.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling
the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the
sale violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the
Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel
was included in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to
interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in
the Manila Hotel Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of
shares offered for sale was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel" 1 The proposal was approved
by respondent Committee on Privatization.
In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules
were furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and
Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified.2
The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification
and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:
I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the
Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:
First — Pass the prequalification process;
Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of
Shares;
Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995;
xxx xxx xxx
IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION
A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION
The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide

management expertise and/or an international marketing
reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context,
the GSIS is inviting to the prequalification process any local and/or
foreign corporation, consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with
at least one of the following qualifications:
a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel

industry; or
b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board

representation) in another hotel company; or
c. Overall management and marketing expertise to

successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide

access to the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.
xxx xxx xxx
D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE
1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE
The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration

Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within
the period specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists
of the following:
a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization
b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The
Manila Hotel Corporation
c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and

Bidding Conference
xxx xxx xxx
4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE
A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The

Manila Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the
Applicant to seek clarifications and further information regarding
the guidelines and procedures. Only those who purchased the
prequalification documents will be allowed in this conference.
Attendance to this conference is strongly advised, although the
Applicant will not be penalized if it does not attend.
5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS
The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification

documents (1 original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office
between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the
period specified in Section III.
F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS
1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC

with the assistance of the TEC based on the
Information Package and other information
available to the PBAC.
2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture,

the evaluation will consider the overall qualifications
of the group, taking into account the contribution of
each member to the venture.
3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the

results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.
4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to

the criteria set forth below:
a. Business management expertise,

track record, and experience
b. Financial capability.
c. Feasibility and acceptability of the

proposed strategic plan for the
Manila Hotel
5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may

deem appropriate.
6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding —

ITT Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels
International Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may
participate in the Public Bidding without having to undergo the
prequalification process again.
G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of

Qualified Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the
date specified in Section III.
2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by

member whose qualification was a material consideration for
being included in the shortlist is ground for disqualification of the
Applicant.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING
A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING
All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to

participate in the Public Bidding.
B. BLOCK OF SHARES
A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three

Hundred Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing
Thirty Percent to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and
outstanding shares of MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding
by the GSIS. The Qualified Bidders will have the Option of
determining the number of shares within the range to bid for. The
range is intended to attract bidders with different preferences and
objectives for the operation and management of The Manila Hotel.
C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS
1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum

bid required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is
Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).
2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.
3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the

minimum required will not considered.
D. TRANSFER COSTS
xxx xxx xxx
E. OFFICIAL BID FORM
1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a

copy of which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must
be properly accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment
may be a sufficient basis for disqualification.
2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the
Official Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in
F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be

submitted along with the bid in a separate envelop marked
"SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS":
1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).
If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the

Qualified Bidder should submit a Board resolution which
adequately authorizes such representative to bid for and in behalf
of the corporation with full authority to perform such acts
necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.
If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each

member of the Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board
resolution authorizing one of its members and such member's
representative to make the bid on behalf of the group with full
authority to perform such acts necessary or requisite to bind the
Qualified Bidder.
2. BID SECURITY
a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos

(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of:
i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft

payable to the "Government Service Insurance
System" and issued by a reputable banking
institution duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines and acceptable to GSIS; or
ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable

banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.
b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:
i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or
ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less

than the required amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or

unconditional demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid
Security will be for the account of GSIS.
d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic

Partner, the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on
the Qualified Bidder's offered purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned

immediately after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not
declared the Highest Bidder.
f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the

Highest Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC
the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract or other types of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.
g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor

of GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation
System Contract specified by the Highest Bidder or other types of
contract in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses
to:
i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement
with GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or
ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price

not later than October 23, 1995; or
iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for

any other reason.
G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS
1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the

following location:
New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public

Bidding to accept any and all bids and supporting requirements.
Representatives from the Commission on Audit and COP will be
invited to witness the proceedings.
3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid
Form. The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents

in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS"
a. Written Authority Bid
b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM,
Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No
bid shall be accepted after the closing time. Opened or tampered
bids shall not be accepted.
6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of

submission of the two sealed envelopes. The actual time of
submission will also be indicated by the Secretariat on the face of
the two envelopes.
7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in

the corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These
boxes will be in full view of the invited public.
H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS
1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public

Bidding, the PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and
acceptance. Those who submitted incomplete/insufficient
documents or document/s which is/are not substantially in the
form required by PBAC will be disqualified. The envelope
containing their Official Bid Form will be immediately returned to
the disqualified bidders.
2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened
at 3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price
will be read publicly as the envelopes are opened.
3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will

formally announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.
4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis.
In the event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same
equivalent price per share, priority will be given to the bidder
seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC.
5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:
a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed

period; or
b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and

acceptable to the PBAC.

GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth
below by October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right
to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the
Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute

with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila
Hotel. If the Highest Bidder is intending to provide
only financial support to The Manila Hotel, a
separate institution may enter into the
aforementioned contract/s with GSIS/MHC.
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock

Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy
of which will be distributed to each of the Qualified
Bidder after the prequalification process is
completed.
2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management

Contract for The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the
management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept
in the Management Contract are as follows:
a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of

gross revenues.(1)
b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross

operating profit(1) after deducting undistributed
overhead expenses and the basic management
fee.
c. Fixed component of the international

marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of
2.0% of gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant
should indicate in its Information Package if it is
wishes to charge this fee.
Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.
The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters

for the hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with
the Highest Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public
Bidding.
A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The

Manila Hotel should determine whether or not the management
fee structure above is acceptable before submitting their
prequalification documents to GSIS.
J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS
1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the

Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.
2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will

be in accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their
respective bids in their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority
will be given to the Qualified Bidders that submitted the second
and third highest bids on the price per share basis, respectively,
and so on.

PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic

Partner after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contract with

GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995; and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and

COP/OGCC are obtained.
I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES
1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than
October 23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of
Shares after deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.
2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Check

or unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government
Service Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking
institution licensed to do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS.
M. GENERAL CONDITIONS
1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all

applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such
application as maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS.
The GSIS similarly reserves the right to require the submission of
any additional information from the Applicant as the PBAC may
deem necessary.
2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding
prior to acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding
under amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any
or all the Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid
Security.
3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the
submission of the prequalification documents, the date of the
Public Bidding or other pertinent activities at least three (3)
calendar days prior to the respective deadlines/target dates.
4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it

has on the Block of Shares.
5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified

Bidders, except the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.
6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public

Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the
Public Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept and abide
by these results.
7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, suit
or allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified
Bidders who have participated in the Public Bidding.3
The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per
share for 15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000
shares. The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned
petitioner's bid security.
On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match
the bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second
paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three
million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.
Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and
conditions of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to
entertain petitioner's request.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October
18, 1995.
Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the
Constitution4 on the "National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect;
(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the

controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation;
(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;
(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a
foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation;
(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation.
Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies
and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law
and government.5 As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced
without further legislative action.6 Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only
through appropriate laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.
To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to

hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in
its language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a
present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for
completion and enforcement.7 The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context
of the provision in question.8
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,9 rather than as
requiring future legislation for their enforcement. 10 The reason is not difficult to discern. For if
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the
sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. 11 Suffused with wisdom of
the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but
congressional in action should not suffocate them. 12
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches
and seizures, 13 the rights of a person under custodial investigation, 14 the rights of an
accused, 15 and the privilege against self-incrimination, 16 It is recognize a that legislation is
unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the
fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. 17 The same treatment is
accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use
without just compensation.18
Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing
where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the
means by which the policy shall be carried into effect. 19 Accordingly, we have held that the
provisions in Article II of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies"
should generally be construed as mere statements of principles of the State. 20 We have also
ruled that some provisions of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights," 21 and Article
XIV on "Education Science and Technology, Arts, Culture end Sports" 22 cannot be the basis of
judicially enforceable rights. Their enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress
though they provide the framework for legislation 23 to effectuate their policy content. 24
Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:
Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that
will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly
owned by Filipinos.
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country 25 to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent 26 of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to
enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent
Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the
entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges
covering the national economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State
to regulate foreign investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.
The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain
areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of
wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in
esse. Congress has to breathe life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically,
this paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 27 The
provision in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong
v. Hernandez, 28where we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize
certain areas of investments. 29 By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of
section 10 affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in
favor of Filipinos.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and
not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their
coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign
investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments."
Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by
law the policy of giving preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges
covering our national economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the
State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any
reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the
third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of

Principles and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-
important Filipino First policy in our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word
"shall," directs its enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half- pause in time.
The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning.
According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. 30 By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls
within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the Manila
Hotel to our history and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes
beyond pesos and centavos. As chronicled by Beth Day Romulo, 31 the hotel first opened on
July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by the American Insular Government for Americans living
in, or passing through, Manila while traveling to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino
craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For sometime, it was exclusively used by
American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official guesthouse" of the American
Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began coming to the Hotel as guests
during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied Manila, it served as military
headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It was at the Hotel and the
Intramuros that the Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of Manila. After the
war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and kings, premiers
and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports celebrities were housed in the
Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local scene, it
was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel has
reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.
The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic
Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846,
"The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure
whereby a particular cultural property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an
"important cultural property. 32 Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974,
the law is limited in its reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing section 10,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and
cultural property as synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent
GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled
corporation that administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government
employees and the government. 33 The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which
cannot be disposed of indifferently. 34 They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability
and life insurance benefits of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of
the GSIS, 35Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures
for the benefit of the employees.36 It is thus contended that the GSIS investment in the Manila
Hotel Corporation is a simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a
public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public
purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission 37 and the Commission
on Audit. 38 As state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies
spelled out in the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy
which the people elevated as a constitutional command.
The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their
"preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to
be for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet
today's manifest needs and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with
elasticity can grow as a living constitution.
Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to

define the phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He
explained that present and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its
interpretation, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED"
because the existing laws or the prospective laws
will always lay down conditions under which
business map be done, for example, qualifications
on capital, qualifications on the setting up of other
financial structures, et cetera.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as
giving preference to qualified Filipinos as against
Filipinos who are not qualified.
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the

intention of the proponents. The committee has
accepted the amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy
is addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not
be understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable
rules and regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the
exercise of their rule-making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations
set forth the standards to measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners
alike. It is not seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad. 39
Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have
accorded petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of
preference gives it a second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.
With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the
second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It
is pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does
not absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited
from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the
weal of the nation.
In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task
of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the
need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and,
second, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the
Constitution did not define the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos.
They knew that for the right to serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that
can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the
right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and
circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the
right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice verse.
Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege
at any given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the
right primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other
branches of government, and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to
enforce this state policy. Within the limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and
regulations defining the degree of this right of preference in cases where they have to make
grants involving the national economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike
down acts of the state that violate the policy.
To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right.
Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee
Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a
qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that
they are silent on the degree of preferential right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder.
Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to mean that they do not grant any degree
of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed
part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal hermeneutics which demand that we
interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I submit that the right of preference of
petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal,
and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.
It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the
bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we
examine the rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the
rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot
be awarded block of shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong
Berhad. It qualified as bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest
bid. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It
deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a
qualified Filipino privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant,
petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties may be with petitioner but the court has no power to
extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. The
parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of facts and factors whose
determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and agencies of the State.
We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their
judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long as the right
of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the right that
the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.
Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting
an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even
during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to
respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If
sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on he essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and
regulations require highest bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the government to
maximize its capacity to deliver essential services to our people. This is a duty that must be
discharged by Filipinos and foreigners participating in a bidding contest and the rules are
carefully written to attain this objective. Among others, bidders are prequalified to insure their
financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids are sealed to prevent collusion among the
parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant petitioner that privilege to know the
winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second chance to bid will encourage a
bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.
We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro
M. Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in
his own land. The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the
Filipino First policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an
alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we
are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are
written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection
clause of the Constitution protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without
unfairness to foreigner.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno, may I just add
1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding
process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest
foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that
"in the grant of rights . . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent
or degree of such preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to
increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering
law, the majority's strained interpretation, I respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial
legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no
foreigner can win. Only in the Philippines!.
2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and, viewed
properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the
guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their
own jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids
of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to
remain unchallenged by their nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as
pariahs in the global marketplace with absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our
country. Even authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness,
greed and isolation are self-defeating and in the long-term, self-destructing.
The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do unto you.
3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where
all the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and
without being unfair to the foreigner.
In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are
tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

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CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

G.R. No. 128448 February 1, 2001

SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MlRASOL and LILIA E. MIRASOL, petitioners,

The parties agreed at pre-trial to limit the issues to the following:

After trial on the merits, the trial court decided as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

"2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances7 thereof are unconstitutional.

Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:

(3) That the two debts are due;

(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,

Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

I . The procedural Aspect

A. Actual case and controversy.

2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns

In the same vein, it has been held:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite

C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.

II. The substantive viewpoint.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him

a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang

Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief separate opinion.

De Castro, J., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

BARREDO, J., concurring:

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

BARREDO, J., concurring:

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners,

G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,

G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,

Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-

G.R. No. 147780

G.R. No. 147781

G.R. No. 147799

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

G.R. No. 147810

Vitug, separate opinion.

Kapunan, dissenting opinion.

Pardo, join the dissent of J. Kapunan.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.