CONTROL IN GRAMMAR AND PRAGMATICS

LINGUISTIK AKTUELL
This series provides a platform for studies in the syntax,
semantics, and pragmatics of the Germanic languages
and their historical developments.
The focus of the series is represented by its German title
Linguistik Aktuell (Linguistics Today).
Texts in the series are in English.

Series Editor
Werner Abraham
Germanistisch Instituut
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Oude Kijk in ’t Jatstraat 26
9712 EK Groningen
The Netherlands
E-mail: Abraham@let.rug.nl

Advisory Editorial Board

Guglielmo Cinque (University of Venice)
Günther Grewendorf (University of Stuttgart)
Liliane Haegeman (University of Geneva)
Hubert Haider (University of Salzburg)
Christer Platzack (University of Lund)
Ian Roberts (University of Stuttgart)
Ken Safir (Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ)
Höskuldur Thráinsson (University of Iceland, Reykjavik)
Lisa deMena Travis (McGill University)
Sten Vikner (University of Stuttgart)
C. Jan-Wouter Zwart (University of Groningen)

Volume 27
° zi†ka
Rudolf Ru

Control in Grammar and Pragmatics. A cross-linguistic study.

CONTROL IN GRAMMAR
AND PRAGMATICS
A CROSS-LINGUISTIC STUDY

°
IC
RUDOLF RUZ
KA
University of Leipzig

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY

AMSTERDAM / PHILADELPHIA
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° zi

Ru
c ka, Rudolf.
Control in grammar and pragmatics : a cross-linguistic study / Rudolf Ru
° zi

c ka.
p. cm. -- (Linguistik aktuell / Linguistics today, ISSN 0166-0829; v. 27)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Control (Linguistics) 2. Grammar, Comparative and general. 3. Pragmatics. I. Title. II.
Series: Linguistik aktuell ; Bd. 27.
P299.C596R89 1999
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Preface

This study has grown out of a series of papers starting with “Remarks on
Control” (Linguistic Inquiry, 1983), and reflects a gradual process of clarify-
ing my insights into the phenomena of Control and what is related to it. I have
presented my views in lectures and courses at the Universities, academic
institutions or Congresses in Brighton (Sussex), Leeds, Stockholm, Lund,
Gothenburg, Prague, Kiew, Zagreb, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich,
Leipzig, and Jena.
I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments and criticisms of a number
of colleagues and friends, including Adriana Belletti, Manfred Bierwisch,
Guglielmo Cinque, Milka Ivić, John Lyons, Jarmila Panevová, Barbara
Partee, Luigi Rizzi, Inger Rosengren, Petr Sgall, Peter Suchsland, and Ljubov
Vladimirovna Zlatoustova. I am particularly indebted to Werner Abraham for
his valuable suggestions and comments on both content and exposition.
Naturally, the final decisions have all been mine.
Finally, I want to express my gratitude to María del Mar Rodríguez
Fernández and Ralf Růzicka for much technical help.
Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction 1

Chapter 2. Preliminaries
2.1. Reflections on Control and its domains 3
2.1.1. Control and economy conditions 3
2.1.2. On the array of Control – Its central domain – 5
2.1.3. Other major domains of Control 6
2.1.3.1. Controlled complement clauses with filled C(P) 6
2.1.3.2. Controlled clauses as adjuncts 9
2.1.3.2.1. Infinitival S-structures 9
2.1.3.2.2. Control in free participial and nominal adjuncts 10
2.2. Approaches to Control 12
2.2.1. Emergence of Control 12
2.2.2. The configurational approach 13
2.2.2.1. Manzini’s theory 13
2.2.2.2. Kayne’s similar approach 16
2.2.2.3. On the arbitrariness of PROarb 19
2.2.2.4. Configurational and binding approaches extended 22
2.2.3. Questions posed to Control 23
2.2.4. Clausal status of the controlled phrase or the propositional
vs. the attributive account of Control 23
2.2.5. Θ-roles and Control 24
2.2.6. Specification of thematic properties and Control domains 25
2.3. Organization of the study and languages considered 27

Chapter 3. The theory outlined

3.1. Object Control – a pilot demonstration 29
3.2. Constraints on “object” Control 30
3.2.1. Shape of the constraint 30
viii Contents

3.2.2. Markedness as opposite feature values 34

3.2.3. Unmarked and marked Control constraint as a
functional instantiation of lexical features 38
3.2.4.1. Interpreting and extending effects of the markedness
distinction in constraint (B,b) 40
3.2.4.2. Violations of constraint (B,b). 41
3.2.5. Violating the m(arked) constraint and cross-linguistic
variation. Multiple options 43
3.3. Grammar and recourse to pragmatics 44
3.4. Nominalized Russian prosit’(sja) 49
3.5. When pro takes over 51
3.6. A Comparison with an alternative analysis 52

Chapter 4. The persuade subclass and cognate ones subject to the

general constraint
4.1. persuade versus ask. Parameterization in pragmatics 55
4.2. On complement unaccusatives and unergatives 64
4.3. Neutralization of the null object parameter with respect
to Control of persuade complements 65
4.4. Further subclasses obeying constraint (B,b) 67
4.4.1. The teach subclass 67
4.4.2. The case of signal as a Control verb 69
4.4.3. teach and ask. Larson’s comparison 72
4.4.4. A subclass of Control verbs subcategorizing for an
oblique object 76
4.5. Ambiguous allow in Control and ECM-contexts 81
4.6. Lexically saturated theta-roles 85

Chapter 5. The case of promise

5.1. Tenacity and untenability of subject Control 87
5.2. A classical violation 93
5.3. Violating the unmarked constraint 97
5.4. A structural-pragmatic conflict? 99
5.5. Larson’s division of labor 104
5.6. The analogous case of threaten 105
5.7. Considering the raising analysis of promise and threaten 106
5.8. Intervention of modal verbs 109
Contents ix

Chapter 6. No Choice of Controller

6.1. Matrix active clauses 113
6.1.1. The case of try / attempt 113
6.1.2. try vs. intend 117
6.1.3. Effects on passive controlled clauses and unspecified PRO 119
6.1.4. Non-passive controlled clauses failing condition (D) 121
6.2. Matrix passive clauses 123
6.3. Raising contexts 127

Chapter 7. Reflexive clitic impersonal clauses in Control structures

7.1. The situation in Slavic languages 129
7.2. Control and reflexive passive The status of pro in
impersonal reflexive clauses as a prerequisite for
controlling 130

Chapter 8. “Self-control” with evaluating and attitudinal predicates

8.1. Adjectival predicates 137
8.1.1. Two basic situations 137
8.1.1.1. Situation (a) and Epstein’s formula 138
8.1.1.2. Situation (b) 141
8.1.2. For “better” or “worse” 147
8.2. Verbal predicates of evaluational or attitudinal character 148
8.2.1. The oblique object controller 148
8.2.2. The subject controller 148

Chapter 9. Aspects of control in the “grain problem” and in

VP-deletion
9.1. The “grain problem” and reciprocal constructions 151
9.2. Freedom of constraints as a precondition for strict identity in
anaphoric contexts 153

Chapter 10. Summary and conclusions, with some remaining

questions
10.1. Essentials and main general proposal 155
10.2. The constraints and markedness 157
10.3. The classes of Control 158
10.3.1. Control class (B,b) (=II) and its main subclasses 158
10.3.1.1. The ask-type subclass (II)a 158
x Contents

10.3.1.2. The persuade subclass (II)b 160

10.3.1.3. Subclass (II)c 162
10.3.1.4. Verbs of peculiar behavior in (II) 163
10.3.2. Control class subject to (B, a) (= I) 163
10.3.3. Self-regulating Control 165
10.3.3.1. The case of try and related verbs 165
10.3.3.2. A related Control process of evaluating and attitudinal
Control elements 166
10.3.3.3. Verbal predicates indifferent to thematic feature 167
constraints
10.4. Thematic and nonthematic Control 168
10.4.1. Two particular verbs 168
10.4.1.1. The German control verb vorschlagen 168
10.4.1.2. agree as control verb 169
10.4.2. Control in infinitival adjuncts introduced by ohne 169
(without)
10.5. Closing remarks 171

Chapter 11. Turning to the Minimalist Program

11.1. On the status of control 175
11.2. Derivational and inherent economy 176
11.3. Thematic features 176
11.4. Control treated with the PRO-theoreme 177
11.4.1. Conceptual considerations 177
11.4.2. Syntactic treatment 178
11.4.3. A different class of control verbs 179
11.4.4. Markedness 180
11.5. Can pragmatics be parametrized? 180
11.6. On approaches that give up postulating PRO 181
11.6.1. General conditions 181
11.6.2. Control in terms of a calculus of features 182
11.6.3. An illustration of control relations described without
positing PRO 184
11.6.4. Dispensing with PRO and pro 186

Notes 187
References 197
Subject index 205
Chapter 1

Introduction

This monograph is devoted to a study of cross-linguistic variation and accord

in control conditions, and to a unifying account that explicitly relates to
grammar the conceptual-pragmatic factors indispensable to the full under-
standing of control. A particular but pivotal area of control phenomena has
been chosen, which I will claim is the best access to the empirical understand-
ing and adequate methodological treatment of control in general. The area
comprises infinitival complement clauses and, occasionally, relevant cognate
fields. The result arrived at in this area will help to understand and distinguish
more clearly the principled mechanisms of control in its different domains.
The present study in a sense is complementary to the articles in the volume
Control and Grammar (1992), which, in the editors’ introductory words, “… do
not much address the vexed question of what determines whether a complement
can be controlled and, if so, what syntactic and semantic properties of the clause
determine the choice of controller. It seems that complex properties of the
lexical items are involved.” (Larson et al. 1992: XVI) In particular, “…
argumental infinitives in complement position get their understood subjects by
the lexical control relation (whatever that turns out to be).” (Will-
iams 1992: 314) In general, I adhere to the assumption that “… control is best
treated in the context of lexical semantics of the verb or predicate in ques-
tion …” (Joseph 1992: 200), an assumption which I started to elaborate in the
°
context of thematic roles (Ruzicka 1983). Treatments of control in a similar
spirit can be found in the works of Comrie (1985), Farkas (1988), Laduslaw and
Dowty (1988), Abraham (1983), Wegener (1989). The present investigation
goes a radical step further in its attempt to establish unifying constraints, which
are shaped into conjunctions of feature specification values. The distinct pairs
of values are associated with respective classes of control verbs or predicates.
The constraints mediate between the richness of lexical information potentially
relevant to control, and principled regulations for exercising licit control. They
2 Chapter 1

provide firm ground for relating language particular variations in control

behaviour to other parameters, and, last but not least, for considering concep-
tual-pragmatic factors and backing them up grammatically.
Fundamental points that will emerge in the investigation are:
(a) Cross-linguistic variation in control conditions can be captured by con-
straints that generalize over the control behaviour as determined by the
respective lexically semantic classes into which the control verbs and
adjectives can be grouped. Such constraints interface the natural lexically
bound control regulations and the range of language-particular options
still available within lexical restrictions. In other words, the chances of
accounting for cross-linguistic variation in control arise through the
mediation of a formal apparatus of particular constraints that interlink
lexical information with control conditions. Crucially, the format of the
constraints allows for independently justified unmarked and marked
interpretation.
(b) Control conditions, however they are formulated, must contain, and refer
to, theta-properties of the licit controller NP and the controllee.
(c) Cross-linguistic variation in control, still squaring with lexical restric-
tions in (b), may be due to different settings of independent parameters,
e.g., the null object parameter. Constraints, then, must be related to
certain parameter values if they are to be instrumental in accounting for
variation in control.
(d) In describing and explaining control behaviour one cannot avoid crossing
the boundaries of grammar proper, but the passage to conceptual-prag-
matic or other areas can be justified and related to the grammatical
“core”. Here again, the respective constraints mentioned above are in-
volved in an empirically natural way.
(e) The idea that pragmatics can be parameterized has been substantiated by
putting forward interface parameters which mediate between pragmatics
and grammar.
(f) What comes to be at issue is the methodological justification for laying
claim to control theory as a fully-fledged component or module of
grammar, a “subsystem of principles” (Chomsky 1981: 5).
Chapter 2

Preliminaries

2.1. Reflections on Control and its domains

2.1.1. Control and economy conditions

The empirical problems usually assembled under the notion of Control cannot
be properly understood and accommodated in a chosen theoretical framework
unless the linguistic devices are identified and surveyed from which the
grammatical phenomena are isolated that have been given that half-metaphori-
cal name. Theorizing on Control, we find ourselves committed to facts and
principles of economy in the design of language, which empirically legitimize
economy of derivation and explanation. Indeed, they manifest themselves
consistently in the grammatical areas to be considered, demonstrating more
conspicuously than elsewhere that they “… play a significant role in account-
ing for the phenomena of language and its use.” (Chomsky 1992)
Why is Control a particular instantiation of economy? Speaking in terms
of the external interface levels, that is, the articulatory-perceptual level PF and
the level that constitutes the instructions for the conceptual-intentional system,
LF (following Chomsky & Lasnik (1993) and Chomsky (1992)), we are
concerned in principle with economy conditions displayed in pairings of PF
and LF representations. Language(s) have to cope with a particular task of
verbalization, which consists in rendering the intended conceptual relationship
between two events, where event is understood in the abstract sense, as, e.g. in
Davidson (1987), Higginbotham (1985), or in Bierwisch (1989), the latter
interpreting event as the instantiation of a proposition. The key situation
invoking Control as a phenomenon of “… understood reference for an argu-
ment position … if there is no expression in that position …” (Higginbotham
4 Chapter 2

1992: 79) arises when one and the same entity is involved in both interrelated
events figuring as an NP-argument in both event descriptions. Setting aside
conjunction or embedding as a finite clausal complement or adjunct, we are
concerned with a different syntactic option, namely, infinitival complements or
adjuncts, and participial adjuncts. This option is not taken on the chance of the
reference of the “empty” element being reconstituted, but on condition that it
readily can.
The choice, e.g., of an infinitival S-complement creates the problem of
reconstituting its empty subject. But we rather have to proceed in the opposite
direction by claiming that the choice of the nonfinite complement (or adjunct)
is determined by the presumed identifiability of the empty element. Syntactic
organization is guided by economy principles in that phonetic absence of the
recurring element in subject position is forced by the nonfinite verb. Note that
if economy can dispense with assignment of phonetic shape, it cannot exclude
the resulting empty category from the “overt” syntax, since it is pertinent to
the LF-component, which channels instructions for cognitive “reality”.
Which factors should naturally be expected to impose conditions or
restrictions on the theoretical reconstruction of the elements left empty. In
other words, how are the particular interface conditions realized in the rel-
evant pairing of PF- and LF-representations possibly projected into concep-
tual-pragmatic mapping. The outward mechanism of control hinges upon the
syntactic status of the nonfinite embedded clause. If it is an infinitival
S-complement (and sentential argument) of the matrix verb, control is affected
by the relationship set between the two events, more exactly the event descrip-
tions. A second consequence that affects control directly: The controllee is an
argument in the predicate-argument structure of the complement clause and
carries a thematic characterization of its θ-grid. The complement clause in
turn is a (sentential) argument of the matrix predicate and carries a θ-role
assigned by the matrix verb. Since the matrix (control) verb determines
thematic and, possibly, semantic properties of the potential controller NP as
well as of the clausal complement whose empty subject NP argument (at S- or
LF-structure) is the controllee, the identification of both NP’s is, presumably,
sensitive to compatibility restrictions. For example, if the controlled NP is the
subject of an active infinitival S-complement of promise, it can take only the
subject of the matrix active clause as its controller. It is cross-clausal quasise-
lectional restrictions of this basic type which, developed into self-consistent
devices, legitimize the economy of dispensing with the assignment of pho-
Preliminaries 5

netic shape to the respective pertinent NP-arguments. Since economy prin-

ciples capitalize on such devices — on which we are going to enlarge — they
cannot but produce, and admit to the language, delicate mechanisms which
can be distinguished by at least three characteristics and their respective
methodological consequences:
(a) Compatibility restrictions can extend to less transparent thematic and
semantic ground invoking subtler and possibly less elucidatory consider-
ations and inferences. If it becomes imperative to leave grammar, the
conceptual-pragmatic notions adopted must interrelate with grammar,
and be referred to by it.
(b) The linguistic and pragmatic issues sketched under (a) can be expected to
be particularly sensitive to possibly parameterized cross-linguistic varia-
tion. An interesting aspect to be examined here turns on the hypothesis of
parameterization extending into pragmatics. Corresponding parameter
values fixed for certain phenomena may be distributed to grammar and
pragmatics, respectively. Or one language allows for a certain structure
pragmatically, and the other(s) set the parameter negatively.
(c) There are exterior consequences linked to the characteristics given in (a),
(b). Judgements of grammaticality and/or acceptability of the relevant
structures tend to vacillate, to be subtle or to be hedged by pointing out
“preferred” or “not preferred” readings, by indications or suggestions of
degrees of grammaticality or typical or untypical instantiations of a
structure.

2.1.2. On the array of Control — Its central domain

What has been described in (a)-(c) may be regarded as a counterbalance to the

effects of economy, that is, as the way that the grammatical organization reacts
to principles of economy, “experimenting” with grammatical ones on suitable
pairings of PF and LF. The interaction between deterministic stringency of
principles or rules and the pursuit of economy principles is easily recognizable
in the differentiated dependence of control on lexically determined properties
of the matrix verb or adjective. Appropriate generalizing treatments of this
dependence will require us to find the principles that mediate between the-
matic specifications and control conditions. They will have a common shape
with distinct pairings of feature values determined by the lexical classes
relevant for control behaviour. Most interesting and elucidatory in its ramify-
6 Chapter 2

ing effects on control are, for example, verbs like promise, ask, persuade, try,
endeavour, signal, teach, threaten, help (and their cross-linguistic counter-
parts), which are distributed among lexical classes. It will become predictable
from the character of the respective control conditions that the controlled
element (PRO) is bound to be an argument: “Why is PRO always an argu-
ment?” (Brody 1993: 2)
On the opposite side of the classificatory spectrum, we find verbs which
do not seem to exercise any influence or impose selectional restrictions on
thematic properties of the controlled subject of their infinitival S-complement.
These are verbs like, e.g. hope, wish, be afraid, expect, hate, like, choose,
want.
hates 
  kiss her )
(1) He is afraid  (PRO to be kissed 
likes   

It is this indifference which is responsible for, or at least involved in, what has
been called “non-obligatory” control (Williams 1980: 208).
(2) They expected (him to cheat her)
(3) They hated (him to do that)
The infinitival verb is often interchangeable with a gerund complement,
which, possibly, is another consequence of specific properties of these verbs.
See (4) and (5).
(4) She was afraid of (PRO asking for help)
(5) He dislikes (PROi being spoken to ti like that)
If one can roughly speak of this group of verbs as attitudinal verbs, the
indifference indicated above seems plausible.

2.1.3. Other major domains of Control

2.1.3.1. Controlled complement clauses with filled C(P)

Controlled infinitival complements with non-zero C(P) furnish further evi-
dence that control is sensitive to the interpretation of the matrix verb. Control
reacts to distinct event structures even when they are associated with one and
the same verb. Let us take for example ask, which subcategorizes for a wh- or
question-operator.
Preliminaries 7

(6) Johni asked (CPhow (PROi to behave himself))

(7) John asked (CPhow (PRO to behave oneself))
(8) Johni was asked ti (CPhow (PRO to behave oneself))
(Manzini’s (1983) (adapted) examples (35)-(37))
(6)–(8) differ from each other in their respective control relations. Their
control behaviour seems to be indifferent to the matrix (control) verb. How-
ever, the apparent indifference to the eligibility of an antecedent is induced by
lexical properties of ask and, e.g. wonder, which seem to form a natural class
relevant to control. Querying or wondering about something does not imply
that the only available NP-argument of the matrix clause has the same in-
tended referent as PRO. The event description of the matrix verb bears no or
little relation to the internal structure of the event described in the controlled
clause. In this respect, much similarity is observed between these matrix verbs
and those of the attitudinal type of the preceding section. Consider (9) and
(10).
(9) Johni asked the policeman (CPwhere (PRO(i) to go))
(9) is felicitous, e.g. if John is a guide who asks the policeman about the way
he is going to lead others.
(10) Ann was just wondering (CP howi (PRO to do it ti))
(10) is compatible with the interpretation that Ann was curious to know how
jugglers did some magic trick. Thus, in (9), (10), e.g., John and Ann, respec-
tively, can be controllers, but, in spite of their saliency, they do not exclude
other “arbitrary”, better: discourse-related coreferents. Wellformed control
cannot be computed here grammatically, that is, thematically or semantically.
Control, which is implied by the choice of the independently licensed infiniti-
val S-complement, is licensed in turn on the grounds that it warrants reconsti-
tution of the intended referent of PRO to the extent of meeting reasonably
relevant pragmatic requirements. Control is acceptable if compatible with
discourse-related or situationally intended reference of PRO. In this lexical
area of matrix verbs, grammatical wellformedness is determined before coin-
dexing of PRO.
There are, of course, natural independent restrictions to “arbitrarity” or
options of control. Reflexive anaphors with PRO as their antecedent — as
they are sometimes used heuristically — must rely on the overt occurrence of
an intrasentential controller of PRO. The minimal contrast between (11) and
8 Chapter 2

(12) shows that in the former only John is available as a masculine gender
controller of PRO, which cannot bind herself. In (12) John and Anne are
available as not quite equally felicitous controllers of PRO. In (13), tell allows
arbitrary, that is, context-related PRO and, thus, oneself. PRO, if controllable
by John and binding himself, results in a bizarre interpretation.
*herself 
(11) John asked how to behave himself 
 

himself 
(12) John asked Anne how to behave herself 
 

 herself 
 ?? 
(13) John told Mary how to wash  himself 
 oneself 

The particularity of control in indirect infinitival questions is evidenced (a) by

the fact that they are completely disallowed in German, at least with the
particle zu, and (b), e.g. in Russian, by the optional occurrence of an overt
dative subject. See (14a) vs. (14b). Abbreviations of languages p. 28.
(14a)G *Wir wußten nicht was zu sagen
In Austrian-Bavarian, infinitivals without zu is usual (Werner Abraham, per-
sonal communication).
(14a′)G Ich habe nicht gewußt, was sagen
I didn’t know what (*to) talk
(14b)R My ne znali o cemnam govorit’
[dat] [infinitive]
we not knew about what for us to talk
‘We didn’t know about what to talk.’
While the non-allowance of infinitives in German may be evidence of the
negative setting of a configurational parameter, the admission to this structure
of an overt dative subject replacing PRO in Russian is a variation induced by
the possible occurrence of lexically overt dative subjects in infinitivals. Both
these facts are indicative of the peculiar control behavior of ask or other verbs
subcategorizing for indirect questions.
Preliminaries 9

2.1.3.2. Controlled clauses as adjuncts

2.1.3.2.1. Infinitival S-structures

When the infinitival controlled clause is not an argument of the matrix verb,
control is handled very differently: The controllee is not intrinsically related to
its control verb by virtue of being the subject (at S-structure and LF) of its
sentential argument. Crucially, it is not the membership of the matrix verb in a
particular class which, when associated with pertinent principles, accounts
for, or contributes to accounting for, control. Assuming that the relationship
between the matrix clause and its controlled clause is given by a conjunction
or complementizer, for example, in order to or by inherent modality of the
bare infinitival as a purposive or rationale clause, identifying PRO needs and
looks for cooperation in the whole expression and its discourse setting. Choice
of the null subject infinitival relies on the reasonable certainty of its reconstitu-
tion, which is a combined grammatical and pragmatical effort to achieve a
meaningful interpretation. See the following quote from Chomsky (1981). “In
purposive infinitivals, reference of the subject PRO may be arbitrary as in (15)
or determined by properties of the matrix verb as in (16):
(15) The books were sold (PRO to help the refugees)
(16) (i) I sold the book [PRO to help the refugees]
(ii) I bought Bill a book [PRO[PRO to give t to Mary]]
(iii) I got a book from Bill [PRO[PRO to give t to Mary]]
(iv) I bought a book from Bill [PRO[PRO to give t to Mary]]
In (16)(i), I is the controller. In (ii)-(iv), book controls the PRO in COMP
which is the antecedent of the trace t, a variable in LF; PRO in the subject
position is controlled by Bill in (ii) and by I in (iii),(iv), … again suggesting
that semantic or pragmatic considerations are operative.” (Chomsky 1981: 77)
From (i) of (16), the “arbitrary” interpretation of (15) would follow, with
the unknown or discourse-related sellers of the books, the implicit Agent as
controller. The distinctions between (i)-(iv) of (16) are of quite a different
nature from those between (15), on the one hand, and (16) (i)-(iv), on the
other. Properties of the embedded verb can contribute to determining control
as well as the matrix verb. Consider (17), (18).
(17) Henry gave Maryi (many of his books)j (Oj(PROi to read tj))
Oj is the moved null relative operator (or pronoun), tj its trace.
10 Chapter 2

(18) Henryi gave Mary many of his books (PROi to reduce his library)
Cases that cannot be disambiguated without resorting to discourse and situa-
tions are quite in order as the Russian example (19) shows.
(19)R On prines kniguj (Oj (PRO pocitat’ tj))
he brought a book to read
It is open whether he brought a book to read it himself or to give it to
somebody to read. The choice is clear in the Russian example (20).
(20)R On prines mnei (svoi stichi) (Oj (PROi procitat’ tj))
[dat]
he brought me his poems to read
I will conclude the illustration by two straightforward instances of this type of
control, in Russian and English, and a subtle one in Czech. See (21) – (23).
(21)R Jai narocno ne zakavycival eti
I on purpose not put into quotes these
stroki (ctoby (PROi zaintrigovat’ citatelja))
lines in order to arouse the curiosity of the reader
‘I purposely did not put these lines into quotes in order to
arouse the curiosity of the reader.’
(22) ((PROi To tell you the truth) Ii have never really thought of
them that way.)
(ex. from Stump (1984))
(23)C Zenui (pro) povezou do Budejovic (Oi (PRO spálit ti))
[acc] [3 ps pl perf.]
the woman (they) will take to Budejovice to burn (her)
(ex. from Svoboda (1962))
The pro-subject of povezou, which is [+plural], is not necessarily identical
with PRO. ‘They will take the woman to B. for her to be burnt there.’ pro
refers to a discourse-related domain of people no single person of whom is
identified.

2.1.3.2.2. Control in free participial and nominal adjuncts

In this short synopsis of the main types of control, it remains to deal with free
participial and nominal adjuncts. Let us assume, following Chomsky’s (1992)
Preliminaries 11

suggestion, that conditions of economy in UG determine the notion of “optimal-

ity”, when linguistic expressions are considered to be optimal realizations of the
interface conditions. “The derivation of a particular linguistic expression, then,
involves a choice of items from the lexicon and a computation that derives the
pair of interface representations (A-P, C-I) … A-P constitutes the instructions
for the articulatory-perceptual system and C-I for the conceptual-intentional
system. These are the interface levels.” Optimal pairings should meet the
preconditions for warranting meaningful interpretation. If this must be set as the
boundaries of the efficacy of economy conditions, a wide range of pragmatic
considerations opens in judging fulfilment of those prerequisites. Consider
(24), an example from Stump (1985).
(24) Noticing that a crowd had gathered, Bill immediately called the fire
department.
“What relation is inferred to hold between the free adjunct and the superordi-
nate clause in this sentence depends importantly on context. A causal relation
might at first glance, seem most plausible … but in the context … a merely
temporal or circumstantial relation is inferred for the free adjunct …” (Stump
1985: 21).
Or take French examples (25), (26) in which the BE-auxiliary, as in other
languages, is dropped:
(25)F Ils esperèrent qu’ ainsi plongés dans
they hope that so driven to
la misère les peuples chasseront leur dirigents
misery the peoples will chase away their leaders
(26)F Pousseés au désespoir, les victims
driven to despair the victims
du blocus auraient plutôt
of the blockade have rather
tendance à se rassembler derière leur leader
the tendency to rally behind their leader
With étant (pouseés) dropped, the interpretation does not suffer. It is neither
decidable nor subject to grammatical decision whether the intended relation is
one of causality, of temporal precedence, condition or concession or some
other. Some plausible if not definite conceptual value is required to be
inferable which again tends to verge on critical situations in judgments of
acceptability.1
12 Chapter 2

Unlike the preceding types of control structures, the relationship of the

controlled participial clause to the matrix clause is less influenced by the
thematic status of arguments and subject to strongly-marked variability. Its
“logical” specification is not guided by grammatical indicators. While there
are instances of a typified lexical equipment that can determine the respective
°
relationships (cf. Stump (1985), Ruzicka (1982)), the dominant situation is the
conceptual-pragmatic construal of (an approach to) the intended relation.
What remains, then, for control of the PRO-subject in the participial
clause to lean on? “The problems of control in free adjuncts are fascinating
and not simple …” (Stump 1985: 8) The natural assumption suggests itself
that saliency, a prominent position in the syntactic and thematic hierarchy or
in information structure, presents itself as a consistent and most reliable pivot
of support for identifying the antecedent of PRO. Not surprisingly, a varying
understanding and divergent opinions of standards in correct language use
have collided in this peripheral but, in particular genres, very lively mode of
structuring expressions. Not only purists may misunderstand acceptability and
lay claim to self-declared statutes of correctness of language use. Ideas of
control grasping at the “subject” status of the potential controller, get stuck
when, for example, in passive structures, the surface subject NP and the
“subject” of the action differ. The judgments often run that control structures
which cannot hold on to antecedents with a predetermined grammatical status
are carried beyond the bounds of acceptability or literary norm (cf. e.g.
Ickovic W.A. 1974). These subjective and accidental factors notwithstanding,
we find ourselves in an important experimental field for observing how a good
balance is achieved between derivations satisfying economy conditions and
an outcome that warrants reasonably meaningful interpretation. Subtleties of
judgments on grammaticality and acceptability seem to be inevitable con-
comitants of balancing optimal interface pairings against structural options
that differ in interpretive accessibility.

2.2. Approaches to Control

2.2.1. Emergence of Control

The concept and term control circumscribe phenomena that have figured in
traditional grammar under different notions like, e.g. subject and object infini-
Preliminaries 13

tive, which betray the fact that (the interpretation of) the infinitival VP must
have recourse to the higher subject or the object depending on the lexical class
of its embedding verb (e.g. promise or persuade). If “the theory of control is
concerned with the choice of antecedents of PRO” (Chomsky 1982: 7), PRO
in turn is understood as a term coined for the theory of control. PRO is the
symbol for a particular empty category which, at the relevant point in the
derivation is present in the subject position of nonfinite VP’s at S-structure
and/or LF, if no lexical subject can take this place (“obligatory” control).
Being invariably an argument (Brody 1993: 2), PRO needs identification with
an antecedent or binding by a quantifier. If neither an antecedent nor a
quantifier is available, some other interpretation must be looked for, a case
which has been treated under the general heading of arbitrary (arb) control.
The theory of control is concerned, then, with the nonredundant predictability
of identifying or, more generally, understanding what is the content and
reference of each instance of representing PRO. Nonredundancy is important
for laying claim to a theory of its own. Chomsky/Lasnik (1993: 73) suggest
that “… there is considerable evidence for the existence of a distinct Control
module in the theory of grammar.” Crucially, nonredundancy requires isolat-
ing issues of control from problems of identifying or binding empty categories
of types different to PRO.
On the general assumption of autonomous syntax, predictability in con-
trol has been thought to be achievable by an essentially configurational theory.
The question has been whether solutions to the problems raised by the empty
category PRO can be attained by subsuming them in theories already existing
for other empty categories, or by taking or adapting concepts from them while
upholding the claim to a distinct theory of control. I would like to sketch now
the generalized main approaches to control with a view to appreciating how
they probe into what are the substantive conditions of Control.

2.2.2. The configurational approach

2.2.2.1. Manzini’s theory

Manzini’s (1983: 421) declared “essentially configurational theory … (of the)
essentially configurational phenomenon (of control) is constructed on essen-
tially the same notions on which binding theory is constructed in Chomsky
(1981).” Her unification of “… control theory and binding theory as one
theory” (1983: 421) anticipates crucial empirical problems configurational
14 Chapter 2

approaches have to face. She constructs a “geometrical” solution to notori-

ously critical cases which are left unaccounted for in later modifications of the
configurational approach. Take, for example, Iwakura’s approach: “… core
cases of antecedent-PRO relations fall under the binding theory , if the
‘binding theory’ version is adopted over the ‘governing category’ version …”
(Iwakura 1990: 137) But then, “… It remains unclear how to account for
examples like (i)” (Iwakura 1990: 130). See (27) (for Iwakura’s (i) in the
above quote).
(27) John was promised to be allowed to leave.
Clearly, although the fact that “… antecedent-PRO relations and antecedent-
NP trace relations overlap in core cases” (Iwakura 1990: 121) has justified
every endeavor to draw on proven theories, there remain some phenomena
undoubtedly falling under Control that cannot be accommodated to principles
of binding and/or Government. It seems questionable, then, whether even
those that can should be treated by them considering their explanatory value in
this field. Let us have a look first at cases of control which are hard to handle
“geometrically”. Manzini (1983: 423) notes an obvious problem2 with her
descriptive condition stated as the generalization (28), (her (20)), with respect
to a PRO in an object sentence S; viz. (28).
(28) A PRO in an object sentence of a sentence S is bound in S.
Examples (29)–(32) (her (12)–(15)) and (33)–(36) (her (21)–(24)) illustrate
her point.
(29) John asked Bill [PRO to shave himself]
(30) John asked Bill [PRO to be allowed to shave himself]
(31) John promised Bill [PRO to shave himself]
(32) John promised Bill [PRO to be allowed to shave himself]
(33) Bill was asked [PRO to shave himself]
(34) *Bill was asked [PRO to be allowed to shave himself]
(35) *Bill was promised [PRO to shave himself]
(36) Bill was promised [PRO to be allowed to shave himself]
Manzini (1983: 423) decides to relegate the obvious problem somewhat
vaguely to semantics: “However, with respect to this problem, it appears quite
possible to assume that on syntactic grounds all of (29)–(32) and (33)–(36) are
indeed well formed with both object and subject control; and that either
Preliminaries 15

subject or object control is excluded for other reasons — say, on semantic

grounds.” This distribution of the weight of responsibility for wellformedness
is the price to be paid for keeping up the validity of (28) (her (20)).3 (28) holds
for PRO in object sentences, qualifying sentence types as (34), (35) — among
the others — as syntactically wellformed. PRO has a domain-governing
category and is bound in S, by a subject or an object.
For PRO in a subject sentence Manzini (1983: 424) proposes the gener-
alization (37), (her (30)).
(37) A PRO in a subject sentence (co)refers freely.4
If subject sentences involve configuration (38) (= her (34)), “… where we
assume that S’ and Agr are cosuperscripted, by (31) (=(i) of fn (3), RR) PRO
does not have a domain-governing category; … (32 (=ii)) then does not apply,
and PRO is correctly predicted to (co)refer freely.”5
(38) S

S′j Inflj VP
(Agr)

PRO
Manzini’s ingeniously constructed syntactic device accounts for the funda-
mental difference between control in object sentences and control in subject
sentences with no more effort than drawing on the i-within-i condition and its
effect in a newly introduced domain-governing category. Two generalized
binding conditions, (28) and (37) (Manzini’s (20), (30)) take up notions of
binding theory in Chomsky (1981). Under this approach, one must be pre-
pared to judge, e.g. (29), (32) and (33)–(36) to be equally wellformed on
syntactic grounds.
Once the cost in either empirical adequacy or syntactic wellformedness is
tolerated, Manzini’s configurational approach is important since she has laid
the emphasis on the gulf in control conditions existing between object and
subject clauses. The question is, whether she has put it in its true perspective,
that is, whether substantive factors regulating Control must still be conjec-
16 Chapter 2

tured to exist behind her configurational distinction. The import of a funda-

mental bipartition of control conditions that hinges on the relation of the
controlled clause (e.g. subject vs. object sentence) to its matrix clause strongly
suggests the likelihood of an account with higher explanatory value.
Manzini’s solution is compatible with the account I am going to propose in
chapters (3) and (5) and may be construed to be incidental to it.

2.2.2.2. Kayne’s similar approach

Kayne (1991: 677) considers his approach to PRO as “… significantly similar
to that of Manzini (1983) … in having binding theory determine a governing
category for PRO and hence delimit the possible positions for the antecedent
of PRO … but (it) has the advantage that there is no need to add to binding
theory any notion of domain-governing category.”
Kayne’s approach differs from Manzini’s in that the deep division in
control between object controlled clauses and subject ones does not come out
prominently as it does in Manzini’s paper. Second, Manzini acknowledges
syntactic wellformedness of both object and subject control with either subject
or object control being excluded for unspecified other reasons. Kayne deals
with this problem as a possible theory-internal barrier and seems resigned to
not solving it by means of binding theory: “The question also arises whether
the binding theory approach to PRO tells us anything directly about the
difference between subject and object control … Although such cases are
numerous, they are not typical …” (Kayne 1991: 678, fn. 77) What is at stake
here, however, can hardly be dismissed as “untypical”, as we are going to
show in this study.
Kayne, trying to surmount the PRO-dilemma (“PRO is either a pronomi-
nal or an anaphor but never both at the same time.” (Bouchard 1985: 471)
capitalizes on Chomsky’s (1986b: 169 ff.) slight revision of binding theory,
which was meant to account for the contrast exhibited by (39) and (40):
(39) the children like (each other’s friends)
(40) the children like (their friends)
“As the binding theory now stands, it is satisfied by (229ii) (= our (40)) but
violated by (229i)” (= our (39)). (1986b: 170)
Extending Chomsky’s revision of binding theory clad in Binding Theory-
compatibility of indexing (I) and a licensing condition (Chomsky 1986b: 171
ff.) to PRO and control in a way clearly not considered in Chomsky’s (1986b)
Preliminaries 17

“Knowledge of Language”, Kayne (1991: 675 ff.) emphasizes that “the PRO
theorem follows from the strict parallelism between Principles A and B of the
binding theory. To the extent that strict parallelism fails to hold over some
range of environments, the PRO theorem will fail to hold for that range. More
specifically, it will fail to hold for any subject PRO governed by a lexical
category found within the category of which PRO is the subject, since in such
a case the governing category for PRO qua anaphor will not be identical to the
governing category for PRO qua pronoun.” In other words, if the PRO
theorem is violated only by violating the conjunction of Principles A and B,
distinct (local) domains for A and B immunize against such violations. If PRO
in particular is lexically governed by the infinitival verb, the IP of which it is
the subject is not its governing category insofar as PRO is anaphor, since
within this local domain it could not satisfy the role of an anaphor, that is, it
could not satisfy the binding theory with some indexing. Thus, the term
governing category would be senseless with respect to the anaphorical proper-
ties of PRO. The relevant governing category for an expression α has been
identified with “… the least CFC (complete functional complex) containing a
governor of α in which α could satisfy the binding theory with some indexing
…” (Chomsky 1986b: 171) For PRO qua pronoun, however, the IP of which it
is subject is a legitimate governing category, and if PRO is lexically bound by
the infinitive, there is no violation of the PRO theorem, the IP being the
smallest category that contains a subject position and the governor of the
pronoun PRO.
Kayne’s original construal seems to run the risk of partly voiding the
PRO theorem or what remains of it by associating PRO qua anaphor with a
governing category within which it could satisfy (contain a suitably accessible
binder) as well as violate the PRO-theorem, whereas PRO qua pronoun is
given a governing category in which it necessarily satisfies it. This asymmetry
is reinforced in Kayne’s modified version of the PRO theorem by virtually
excluding PRO qua pronoun from it, which might turn out to be the price of
this approach: “… the PRO theorem continues to hold for all PROs other than
those that are in subject position and governed by an internal governor.”
(Kayne 1991: 679) If such PROs are not governed, they must be made to be
governed: “All controlled PROs are governed at some level of representa-
tion.” (Kayne 1991: 679, numbered 92) In French, then, for cases like Kayne’s
(91) Jean veut aller au cinema (Jean wants to go to the movies), the infinitive
must move at LF, by analogy to S-structure movement in Italian, since at
18 Chapter 2

S-structure it does not govern PRO, which means, following Kayne, that PRO
has an antecedent only at LF. Kayne gives as “… reason for the existence of
(92) … that it is via government that PRO qua anaphor receives a governing
category … that an antecedent for PRO must be within PRO’s governing
category (that is, that an ungoverned PRO would be able to be associated with
any antecedent at all).” (Kayne 1991: 679)
These assumptions, while allowing Kayne to accomodate control to the
binding theory, seem to beg the question whether control and the “reversed”
PRO theorem can still be taken to follow from the conceptual rationale and
range of binding. Kayne’s claim, however, about locality of the controller
(antecedent), that is, about the local domain of control, is important, since it
establishes what might be called an Adjacency principle of control: “In assign-
ing to PRO qua anaphor the next IP up as governing category, the binding
theory adopted here excludes the possibility that the antecedent of PRO …
could be taken to be a subject NP two IPs up.” (Kayne 1991: 677)
I have dwelt on Kayne’s approach because it may be considered to be the
most intricate attempt to incorporate important aspects of control into binding
theory and to derive variations in the existence of control structures (e.g.
between Italian and French) from independent parametric differences of in-
finitive moving.6 But there are crucial aspects of control about which Kayne’s
approach says nothing, in particular the eligibility of the controller, or as
mentioned above, the fundamental question of subject and object Control. It is
those aspects though not elucidated under this name, which will receive the
main attention in this study, again with respect to the problematic claim on a
distinct theory of control.
Under this approach, we share Chomsky/Lasnik’s (1993: 72) suggestion
that “… Control is different enough from anaphor binding that a separate
mechanism for antecedent assignment is, in fact, justified.” Their arguments
seem conclusive: The optionality concerning choice of binder does not regu-
larly exist for choice of Controller:
herselfi 
(41) John j told Mary i about himself 
 j

(42) Johnj told Maryi (PROi*j to leave)

(Chomsky/Lasnik’s modified examples)
The Controller is a specifically designated argument, which, in (42), not only
can but must be the object-NP, given the membership of the matrix verb in a
Preliminaries 19

certain class. If it is easy to show that Control cannot be subsumed under

anaphor binding and there is enough evidence to consider the existence of a
distinct Control module or at least the specificity of PRO in the theory of
grammar, the exact nature and status of control are still unclear. Some difficul-
ties are particularly conspicuous in Chomsky/Lasnik’s discussion (1993: 81)
of the Case problems of PRO ending up in assigning PRO “… a Case different
from the familiar ones … it is the sole NP that can bear null Case (though it
may have other Cases as well …, which makes it possible to maintain a
simplified Visibility condition: (= Chomsky/Lasnik’s (315))
(43) “A chain is visible for θ-marking if it contains a Case-position.”
This proposal resumes the thread of suggestions made in Chomsky (1981:
147, fn. 106; 188; 262) concerning idiosyncratic Case assignment to PRO
(e.g. in Russian).

2.2.2.3. On the arbitrariness of PROarb

“All PRO are controlled if apparent uncontrolled PRO actually has a hidden
controller …” (Chomsky/Lasnik 1993: 20), and so-called “PROarb is really a
subcase of controlled PRO …” (Kayne 1991: 680; Epstein 1984)
The controversial discussion of PROarb is an appropriate occasion for an
anticipatory comparison between the spirit of the configurational treatment
and the prevailing idea of this approach. Consider an analysis of Brody
(1993): “The contrast between (42a) and (42b) (my (44) and (45): RR) …
reinforces the conclusion that antecedentless PRO with arbitrary interpreta-
tion in fact exists: without such a PRO the lack of a disjointness effect in (42b)
would be difficult to explain.
(44) *PRO to teach themx math is easy for the childrenx.
(45) PRO to teach themx math is useful for the childrenx.
In (44) them and the children cannot be coreferential since the latter NP
controls PRO obligatorily and Principle B prevents the pronoun from being
coreferential with PRO. Since (my emphasis: RR) no disjointness effect
obtains in (45), we must conclude that the for-complement does not control
PRO — but there is no other potential controller around either syntactically
realized or implicit argument. Hence, PRO has no antecedent.” (Brody 1993:
19) I think the argument can be strengthened. The conclusion that
antecedentless PRO with arbitrary interpretation exists presupposes that non-
20 Chapter 2

antecedentless PRO exists. The former kind of PRO in (45) is contrasted with
the latter in (44). Both instances of PRO, the antecedentless arbitrary and the
controlled one, are not independent of the distinct adjectivals, easy and useful,
respectively. That is why (44) and (45) differ in their respective control
relations, which are the basis of Brody’s argument. The principled common
dependence of control behaviour on lexical properties seems to effect the
control status of antecedent and antecendentless PRO. The disjointness effect
in (44) and the lack of it in (45) are indeed by-products of control conditions.
As to the basic motive for Brody’s argument, there can be no doubt that
“antecedentless PRO with arbitrary interpretation in fact exists”. The real
problems are whether and how “arbitrariness” could be qualified or specified,
and more importantly, in which cases an antecedent must be assumed and
represented although it has no phonetic shape.
By way of a second preliminary illustration of differences between a
configurational, in particular Case-theoretic approach and the approach pur-
sued in this study, which does not exclude configurational restrictions, let us
take a look at two examples juxtaposed by Chomsky/Lasnik (1993: 71).
(46) *It is likely (PRO to solve the problem)
(47) It is important [PRO to solve the problem]
(Chomsky/Lasnik’s examples (255), (256))
“Since PRO in (255) is not in a configuration of Case assignment (a lexical NP
is impossible here), that example might be expected to be grammatical,
presumably with an “arbitrary” interpretation for PRO as in (256) … And
(257) (our (48): RR) might be expected to be grammatical with an arbitrary
interpretation, or possibly with PRO controlled by John, given the general
lack (or at least amelioration) of condition A effects in clauses with expletive
subjects, as illustrated in (258) (our (49): RR).
(48) *John believes [it to be likely (PRO to solve the problem)]
(49) Johni believes (it to be likely [that pictures of himselfi will be on
display])
If the crucial factor determining the distribution of PRO is government and PRO
must be ungoverned (Chomsky 1981) “… this will entail that PRO will not be
Case-marked. But the requirement is now broader, since there is government
without Case-marking. This is what we find in … (255), (257) … The
distribution of PRO is thus correctly described.” (Chomsky/Lasnik 1993: 72)
Preliminaries 21

The ungrammaticality of (46) entails the ungrammaticality of (48). In

both “… there is government without Case-marking.” (p.72) Thus, if the
difference between (46) and (47) is taken to be accounted for, in (47), PRO is
not governed and has no Case. Let us assume that this is a correct configura-
tional and/or Case-theoretic account of the difference. We will try to ascertain
whether we can rest assured that this explanation is sufficient and need not be
substantiated. Leaving raising out of consideration, I suggest that in (46) the
two-place relation of Control cannot be implemented , that is, the identifica-
tion fails because no pairing of two arguments with identical interpretability is
available. Why? Let us take a semantic path. Suppose we interpret arbitrary as
discourse-related. Then, in (47), (the set of) individual(s) to whom something,
namely the (incidence of) event described in the infinitival clause, is consid-
ered to be important can be identical (coindexed) with the PRO argument of
this event description. For example, in (47), PRO can have a generic interpre-
tation (For mankind it is important to solve the ecological problems). Or PRO
may have an “understood” or implicit antecedent in the matrix clause. The
burden of identifying the (domain of) persons to whom something is important
rests with the matrix clause. PRO “inherits” its interpretation from the matrix
clause. Of course, there is another interpretation of (47) in which the interpre-
tation of PRO is independent of an optional prepositional argument in the
matrix clause. Cf. (50).
(50) It is important to the preservation of wildlife (PRO to solve this
problem).
Some such independent “arbitrary” interpretation might appear to be ame-
nable to (46) as well. But it isn’t. This seems particularly surprising in view of
the perfectly grammatical (51).
(51) It is likely that the problems will be solved.
What’s the difference between (46) and (47)? The potential prepositional
θ-position in (47) is not available in (46). If we could insert a prepositional
phrase in the latter (as in it seems to me), it would be the “psychological”
subject of the epistemic attitude expressed by likely, that is, the attitude
towards the existence or nonexistence of the state of affairs, the event identi-
fied by the infinitival complement. The assessment or evaluation predicate
important does not concern the existence of a state of affair but takes it as
feasible or given, relating its evaluation to somebody or something as de-
22 Chapter 2

scribed above. It is this lexically optional argument which by virtue of being a

potential antecedent of PRO is a prerequisite for, or licenses, the control
relation as the identification of two arguments. Thus, PRO is licensed in (47),
even with its possible arbitrary interpretation, which hinges on the general
precondition of relating PRO to a matrix argument. Differing from (47), no
presumable PP in the matrix clause of (46) can control the PRO-argument in
the event description of its infinitival complement.

2.2.2.4. Configurational and binding approaches extended

The configurational approaches or pertinent aspects of it continue to be
pursued. Recently, Larson (1991) has resumed attempts to give a configura-
tional account of control with promise, relying on a Minimal Distance Prin-
ciple analogous to that of Rosenbaum (1970). I will return to this account in
due course (section 5.5)
Grodzinsky/Reinhart (1993: 73) do not hesitate to treat PRO — “…
ignoring here the issue of the precise interpretation of arbitrary PRO,” — as a
bound variable: “All of the anaphoric elements in (8) (our (52): RR) also share
a semantic property: they are all interpreted as bound variables. Although on
the GB framework this has been explicitly stated only for reflexive anaphors
and wh-traces (Chomsky 1982), there is no reason why it should not be
extended to control PRO.”
(52) a. Luciei adores herselfi
b. Whoi ti smiled?
c. Felixi was fired ti.
d. Alfredi promised PROi to cook well.
(Grodzinsky/Reinhart’s examples)
Although we do not adopt this as a general approach, Grodzinsky/Reinhart
encompass an important problem of control raised and discussed by
Nishigauchi (1984: 233): “… thematically controlled PRO is essentially a
bound variable (in a broader sense of the term than is used in the government
and binding framework); but that pragmatically determined PRO shows prop-
erties of pronouns, and may serve either as a bound variable or as a deictic
pronoun (for this important distinction, cf. Partee 1972, 1975, 1978).” I will
return to this problem. Iwakura (1985, 1990) considers the hypothesis that
PRO can be divided into two types in a similar spirit. She proposes “… a
principled way to account for core cases of antecedent-PRO relations in terms
of the binding theory that accounts for the distribution of other types of NPs.”
Preliminaries 23

(1990: 122) Following Bouchard (1984), she assumes that there are two types
of PRO, anaphoric PRO (locally controlled PRO) and pronominal PRO (“long
distance controlled PRO” and “arbitrary PRO”). On this assumption, “…
antecedent-PRO relations fall under the binding theory if ‘governing cat-
egory’ is replaced by ‘binding theory’”. (Iwakura 1990: 123)
Iwakura argues in support of her approach by analyzing a series of
control verbs. She adapts Chomsky’s (1980: 33) control rule to suit her
analysis, modifying the i-within i condition in the attempt to maintain the
configurational essence of Control. Her analyses observe important accompa-
nying restrictions on Control, but I will claim do not concentrate on the
substantive conditions of Control.

2.2.3. Questions posed to Control

The empirical questions: What constitutes an eligible controller for a given

controllee? Note that “eligible” has a double sense: (a) Which of two (or more)
NP arguments is suitable to be chosen as the controller? (b) Is the single
available NP suitable for control? (a) and (b) collapse to (c): Does an element
in the set (possibly the unit set) of potential controllers qualify as the effective
controller and how is it licensed?7 The problems posed by (b) are not consid-
ered in approaches restricted to the alternative of subject vs. object control, or
to a “semantic version of Rosenbaum’s Minimal Distance Principle” (cf.
Gazdar et al. 1985: 219).
The controllee is “given” in that it is subject to (i)–(iii).
(i) Only subjects (at S- or LF-Structure) are controlled.
(ii) Only nonfinite clauses have controlled subjects (can be controlled
clauses).
(iii) The controlled element PRO is the head of a chain. PRO and its controller
are not members (a link) of the same chain. They are assigned θ-specifi-
cations from distinct θ-grids. “PRO does not participate in Â-chains …”
(Safir 1996: 331)

2.2.4. Clausal status of the controlled phrase or the propositional vs. the
attributive account of Control

It will be obvious that my approach to control implies the propositional

account. I would rather endorse the arguments advanced by Higginbotham
(1992) in his discussion with Chierchia, which elucidates subtle problems
24 Chapter 2

crucial for preferring the propositional account. I would like to provide some
more arguments in favour of PRO, capitalizing first on evidence that accep-
tance of PRO is consequent on the assumption of traces for Raising. Thus,
consider (53), which illustrates an interesting interaction between Control and
Raising, when a Raising construction is embedded under a control verb (cf.
Jacobson 1992: 188). See (53)–(53′)
(53) John tries to seem to be nice.
(53′) Johni tries ((PROi to seem (ti to be nice))).
Assuming that Raising is involved in (53), the Raised subject must end up as
PRO-subject of the clausal complement of try. PRO is the head of the A-chain
(PRO, t) and should receive a θ-specification originating from try (see below,
6.1.1.). Although much is unclear, Control and Raising match with each other
through the interdependence of the trace and PRO. Second, the appearance of
PRO seems imperative if ambiguous long-distance and local binding of re-
flexives is to be represented in the most natural way. Consider Russian (54).
(54) Komendanti prikazal ad-jutantuj ((PROj
commandant ordered (his)aide-de-camp
sojedinit’ sebjai,j s nacal’nikom štaba))
to connect him(self) with the chief of staff
°
(cf. Ruzicka 1973: 444 – 481)
Coindexing of the local binding variant requires PRO to be available. Other-
wise, this kind of subject-oriented anaphora would not find its local anteced-
ent represented. Most recently, E. Torrego (1996: 119) presents “… several
types of evidence, drawn from the morphology, syntax and semantics of the
floating unit, that confirm that control clauses have a PRO subject.”

2.2.5. Θ-roles and Control

A fundamental result that has emerged in recent work is that control in at least
a major class of relevant construction types is not independent of thematic
relations meshing with semantic roles. Originating with Jackendoff (1972,
1974) and Gruber (1965), this basic approach was supplemented with, or
diverted to, a search for configurational solutions (Chomsky 1980). But
Chomsky followed up his ideas with “… the natural suggestion … that choice
of controller is determined by θ-roles or other semantic properties of the verb,
Preliminaries 25

or perhaps pragmatic conditions of some sort.” (Chomsky 1981: 76). The

convergence on acknowledging θ-roles as a crucial factor operative in major
domains of control — an assumption compatible with a more complex net-
work of determining factors — is well documented in the literature of the
field. I would like to draw attention to Abraham (1983), Nishigauchi (1984),
Koster (1984), Chierchia (1983, 1984), Melvold (1985), Culicover and
Wilkins (1986), Rizzi (1986), Vanden Wyngaerd (1987), Williams (1985,
1987, 1989), Jackendoff (1987), and others. Notions basically cognate with
the rationale of θ-roles have been advanced by Siebert-Ott (1985) and
Wegener (1989), Köpcke/Panther (1991, 1993).8
A crucially distinct treatment of thematic relations in control theory was
°
proposed in Ruzicka (1983a,b). Pared down to its basic rationale, the claim was
advanced that it is the principled relation between the θ-role assigned to the
potential controller argument and the θ-role assigned to the controllee that
licenses control over wide areas. Farkas (1988: 54, 57) endorsing the essen-
tially relational character of control, modifies its content in the spirit of
situational semantics: “What is relevant to control is therefore not the thematic
role or grammatical function of the controller but rather the semantic relation
the participant linked to it bears to the participant linked to the controlled
constituent.” Likewise, the relational concept underlies Wegener’s (1989)
exclusively semantic analysis of control in German infinitival complements.

2.2.6. Specification of thematic properties and Control domains

Under this approach, abstract thematic specifications related to a particular

conceptual content are taken as the central notion and effective instrument to
deal with control conditions over a family of construction types. They operate
differently, constituting distinct subtypes that are correlated with lexical sub-
classes. They can do this, when their content is brought to bear on, and
account for, control behaviour by being arrayed in the format of general
constraints of a characteristic design, in particular as conjunctions of distinct
combinations of feature values. The respective constraints predict the range
and degree of interaction with independent linguistic or extralinguistic factors.
If the lexical properties of a given class of (control) verbs/adjectives do not
lend themselves to be associated with a general constraint of the presumed
type, well-formed control is not a function of lexical properties, that is, a
restrictive relationship between values of thematic specification.
26 Chapter 2

°
Taking up the thread of previous work (Ruzicka 1983a,b, 1986, 1987), I
will develop a strongly modified and extended framework, with the particular
intention to relate general principles to cross-linguistic variation, considering
interaction with independent factors as well as idiosyncratic developments.
Control is assumed to be mainly a lexically driven syntactic process. And if
“… θ-marking … amounts to establishing a correspondence between syntac-
tic and conceptual arguments of a verb …” (Jackendoff 1987: 409), “… what
grammatical relations (alternatively, syntactic positions, RR) a θ-role links to
depends on the verb. However, for a particular verb, linking is largely predict-
able.” (Carrier-Duncan 1985: 6), (Ostler 1979). These ideas suggest chains as
the target of control (Chomsky (1986b: 135). Roughly speaking, a mapping
relation established between pertinent lexically semantic properties and func-
tional chains can be the target of control conditions. CHAINS consisting of an
expletive-argument pair at D-structure Chomsky (1986b: 135), cannot be a
target of control conditions which are operative at LF-structure. I will assume
that θ-marking includes or consists in transferring θ-specifications from the θ-
grids of lexical entries to functional chains. The operation of control principles
must include LF, if only because of the fact that PRO can be the variable
bound by a quantifier. Clearly, if θ-grids are “… devoid of semantic content
… just an indexing device” (Jackendoff (1987: 379): Jackendoff refers to
Higginbotham (1985: 555)), they can hardly be suitable for sustaining control
relations. On the other hand, the traditional global characterizations of the-
matic roles merging in (names of) semantic roles, such as Agent, Goal, Theme
etc., have not proven to be appropriate for a theoretical implementation of the
relational concept of control. I deviate here from former work (1983a: 311 ff.).
°
In Ruzicka (1987), I suggest that the relevant conditions, that is, the thematic
Identity condition and the thematic Distinctness conditions should be replaced
by thematic feature specifications. I will take up that suggestion and modify
and elaborate it in the much broader framework of this comparative study.
Thematic feature specifications in the spirit of Gazdar et al. (1985: 21), i.e.,
ordered pairs of the form 〈feature, feature value〉, will be the conceptual
material out of which the generalizing constraints are constructed. As we said
above, the lexical subclasses established on the grounds of properties deter-
mining control behaviour come to be definable by pertinent respective con-
straints associable with each of them. The format of the constraints is such that
they can be applied to the pairs of DP’s potentially constituting the control
relation, alternatively, to the corresponding chains. The conjunction of values
Preliminaries 27

of the relevant θ-specifications in the matrix and the controlled clause respec-
tively, provides the appropriate format.
The crucial relation between the θ-specifications of the potential control-
ler and PRO is particularly effective iff the complement clause of which PRO
is the subject is itself an internal argument of the matrix “control” verb, θ-
governed and/or L-marked by it. Subject complement clauses of which PRO is
the subject, which are external arguments and selected rather by VP, are less
able to sustain the relation formulated in the constraints. Subject complement
clauses are indeed a case in point: “A PRO in a subject sentence (co)refers
freely.” (Manzini 1983: 424)).
I will argue, then, that the substantive Control conditions can be ex-
pressed by pairings of specific feature values which, while basically grounded
on conceptual thematic or semantic content, may function as relations of
abstract F(eature) values. Crucially, distinct parameterized language particu-
lar properties may react differently to the general constraints of Control.

2.3. Organization of the study and languages considered

The study is constructed as follows. Chapter 3 describes the basic theoretical

approach demonstrating how it works on a characteristically problematic type
of control. In Chapter 4 an illuminating contrast between “object” control
verbs is explained on a principled basis. It deals with notorious and controver-
sial control problems, discussing recent approaches and revealing distinctions
that disintegrate “object control” but can be captured by an integrated ap-
proach. Chapter 5 is dedicated to an account of what is concealed under the
summary notion of “subject control”. Chapter 6 deals with the particular
control mechanism of try and cognate verbs. In Chapter 7 the special case of
control with reflexive clitic impersonal clauses is discussed. Chapter 8 aims at
supporting the general approach by discussing classes of control verbs and
adjectives which produce “selfcontrol” and render constraints superfluous on
the very basis that makes them necessary in other control classes. Chapter 9
deals with the “grain problem” and VP-deletion touching Control, and chapter
10 gives a summary of conclusions and empirical results. I have added a short
chapter 11, in which I discuss some adjustments to my approach and to the
relevant points of the minimalist program in view of accommodating the facts
of Control.
28 Chapter 2

I would like to rely on cross-linguistic data of Russian (R), German (G),

English, Czech (C), Italian (I), Polish (P), French (F), Dutch (D), Serbo-
Croatian (S-C), Slovak (SL), Spanish (SP).
Chapter 3

The theory outlined

3.1. Object Control – a pilot demonstration

“A recurrent problem in linguistic theory has been trying to provide a prin-

cipled base for the distinction between subject and object control verbs …”
(Comrie 1985: 74)).
Under this approach, the substance of the problem is of a different
character. I will illustrate the point with the following examples, confronting
“expected” object control with subject control exercised by the same object
control verb.
Consider the Russian examples (55) vs. (56).
(55)R Ja poprosila ego ne byt’ zestokim
[femin sg subj(agreem)] [acc] [instrum masc sg]
I asked him not to be cruel
(56) Ja poprosila ego ne byt’ iskljucennoj iz školy
[femin sg] [part pass sg femin]
I asked him not to be expelled from school
Neidle (1982: 410) comments on (55), (56) (her examples (45) and (46): “For
prosit’, which seems fairly representative, there is no grammatical control of
the infinitive. Consider (45) and (46) … In (45) the subject of zestokim is
interpreted as the matrix object ego, while in (46) the subject of iskljucennoj is
the matrix subject ja (which is also the semantic object of the verb ‘expel’).
(The gender markings on the verb make these the only readings.) Since the
interpretation of the subject of the embedded verb depends on the context, the
subject is not grammatically controlled. Prosit’ can also occur without any
overt object, as in (57) (Neidle’s example (47), RR).
30 Chapter 3

(57)R on prosil [pro] pomolcat’

[nom] [acc]
he asked (pro = them, e.g.) to be quiet
The absence of a possible controller in (47) again shows that there is no
grammatical control.” Neidle explains the issue away, that is, out of grammar,
giving it over to some unspecified notion of context. As concerns (57), it is
irrelevant to the current argument that prosit’ “… can also occur without any
overt object”. What will deserve discussion is the fact that the covert zero
object is syntactically active in Russian and supplies a licit controller (cf.
section 3.3.). The difference between (55) and (56) can be accounted for
within grammar, as we will show presently.

3.2. Constraints on “object” Control

3.2.1. Shape of the constraint

As suggested above, I propose that general constraints can transform and

transmit lexically determined control properties to their syntactic effects,
establishing and defining lexical classes with respect to those inherent proper-
ties. The force of the respective constraints, then, should extend and generalize
beyond language particular variation in control relations to cross-linguistic,
possibly parameterized, distinctions subsisting within the respective lexical
classes that are associated with control properties. This way of displaying the
lexical-syntactic interface in control conditions, including, occasionally, prag-
matic effects, will make transparent that neither a purely syntactic-configura-
tional approach nor a purely semantic one can give an adequate account of
control. The relevance of thematic properties to control is embodied as a feature
specification whose (feature) value is expressed by the variable α ranging over
{+, –}. The specific constraint associated, for example, with the lexical class
containing ask, R. (po)prosit’, order, R. prikaz(yv)at’, C. rozkázat, persuade,
R. ugovorit’, C. umluvit’ and other verbs has the format of a conjunction of two
thematic feature specifications, one referring to (the chain of) the licit controller
NP, the other to (the chain of) PRO-NP. Quasiindices CON and PRO mark the
respective conjuncts as regards the respective DP-targets. Intuitively, con-
straints on control in the area of control verbs to be discussed are constraints on
The theory outlined 31

relations between θ-specifications of the controller argument and the

controllee. They are part of the lexical information of the pertinent verb (class)
and are best applied to functional chains at LF-structure.
Assume that Int(entional) Act(ion) can be taken as the interpretation of
the relevant feature specification and enters into a constraint as (A).
(A) 〈intact, ~α〉CON & 〈intact, α〉PRO
Intentional action is a minimal characterization which I interprete in the spirit
of D. Davidson (1980: 44 ff, 100, 101, 61): “To intend to perform an action is,
on my account, to hold that it is desirable to perform an action of a certain sort
in the light of what one believes is and will be the case … what is believed
about the future course of affairs, …”9
Thus, e.g., if one believes that an act of sneezing can be performed
intentionally, a sentence like (58) is not bizarre.
(58) He asked himi [PROi to sneeze].
If α = +, (58) satisfies (A).
Choosing the negative value of α will license, e.g., (59), Manzini’s (1983)
example (13).
(59) Johni asked Bill [PROi to be allowed ti [PROi to shave himselfi]].
“In (13) PRO is coreferential with the most distant controller, not with the
nearest one … it appears quite possible to assume that on syntactic grounds
(all of) (12) (my (60), RR) - (13) …
(60) John asked Billi [PROi to shave himself]
… are indeed well formed with both object and subject control; and that either
subject or object control is excluded for other reasons — say, on semantic
grounds.” (Manzini 1983: 423, 429)), (cf. above, 2.2.2.1.).
Indeed, there is no syntactic way-out. The quotation from Manzini (1983)
states the issue clearly, if indirectly: Can the relatedness between lexical
properties and syntactic positions and domains be captured and systematically
generalized beyond vague hints at semantic factors? Constraint (A) and the
following ones, together with independent settings of parameters and clearly
defined pragmatic factors, I would like to claim, can do this work. Applying
(A) to (55), I assume that the singleton chain ego (him) carries the thematic
specification satisfying 〈intact, ~α〉CON, and PRO is assigned 〈intact, α〉 (α = +).
32 Chapter 3

The former specification is projected from (the θ-grid of) (po)prosit’, the latter
from zestokij, characterizing its intentional meaning, analogous to Polish (61)
and Russian (62).
(61) pro poprosiÑem Janai [PROi być szczerym ]
[1 ps sg pret] [acc/gen] [instr masc]
I asked John to be sincere
(Example from St. Franks)
(62) Maša poprosila Vanjui [PROi spat’ golym]
[acc] [instr masc]
Masha asked Vanja to sleep naked
Example (56) obeys (A) with α = –. The licit controller (ja) carries intentional
action (α = –, thus ~α = +). The chain consisting of the head PRO and its trace
is assigned 〈intact, –〉 (α = –). I repeat (56).
(63) Jai poprosila ego [PROi ne byt’ iskljucennoj ti iz
[sg fem pret] [sg fem pass]
I asked him not to be expelled from
školy]
school
Clearly, constraints like (A) can be taken here as matching conditions requir-
ing that designated pairings of values of a given feature specification are
observed. With the variable α = {+, –} the shape of constraints analogous to
(A) extends to, and exhausts, the relevant pairs of matching values.
(B) a. 〈F,α〉con & 〈F,α〉pro
b. 〈F,-α〉con & 〈F,α〉pro
The Control feature F, interpreted as 〈intact, (α)〉, is available in all the
hypothesized constraints. It has proven workable in a family of distinct lexical
classes of Control verbs, where in every case both predicates, the Control verb
and the complement verb discharge the respective contents of 〈F,α〉. Distinct
Control behaviour of the lexical classes of Control verbs which are embraced
by (B) is captured by the different values of the feature specifications as they
are distributed among the potential Controller and PRO. I will claim that in
this way intrinsic unified Control principles can be kept up which establish the
interface between lexically semantic restrictions and their syntactic obser-
vance.
The theory outlined 33

Working in the traditional framework of θ theory, we would have to

assume that the Agent role entails 〈+F〉, that is, 〈intact, +〉 and each of the rest
entails 〈–F〉, 〈intact, –〉.
Notice that no theta-theoretical redundancy is concealed here. I will
anticipate three reasons: (a) Primary theta specifications are never given as
their negative value. (b) Theta specifications contained in a theta grid cannot
project into a clause whose theta roles are determined by the distinct theta grid
of this clause (see chapter 6). (c) Theta specifications assigned to an NP from
a given theta grid must tolerate to stand side by side with a contradictory
thematic specification that licenses Control (see (G), in 4.1.). More motiva-
tions for the autonomous operation of the feature specifications used in the
Control constraints will emerge in the following discussions.
Spelling out the Control constraints (B) gives (C), with the matching
effect produced by the distinct pairings of values of α.
(C): a′ and a″ covers (B,a):
a′ +Fcon & +Fpro
a″ –Fcon & –Fpro
b′ and b″ covers (B,b):
b′ –Fcon & +Fpro
b″ +Fcon & –Fpro
The assignment of distinct values to α carries an important conceptual burden.
The order of the indexed conjuncts (con, pro) in each conjunction is of course
irrelevant.
We are left with two constraints (B,a) and (B,b), which will be associated
respectively with distinct nonintersecting sets of lexical classes of Control
verbs. The application of the constraints consists in checking the potential
Controller-DP’s and PRO. Importantly, differences of control behaviour
within a lexical class, whether subject to parametric variation or not, and
however related to other modules of grammar or pragmatics, are accounted for
by intermediate construals which in turn are referred to by the respective
constraints. Further, if control behaviour in infinitival complements (or ad-
juncts, cf. above 2.1.3.2.), is not subject or amenable to the constraints, it
should be “computable” by independent syntactic, semantic or pragmatic
considerations.
Notice that I will occasionally continue rendering the constraints with the
Control feature F represented as its interpretation, that is 〈intact, α〉con/pro.
34 Chapter 3

3.2.2. Markedness as opposite feature values

At least two questions immediately arise, on which I will have to expand.

(1) How is the apparent stipulation of reversing and using the respective
values of α in (B) empirically justified?
(2) More importantly still, can the parallelled value pairs (of α) in the
conjuncts of (C), that is, in (a′), (a″) and (b′), (b″), be functionally imple-
mented by being adjusted to the notion of markedness? Suppose constraints (B
a,b) are considered unmarked if α = +, and marked if α has the negative value.
Then: (55) satifies the unmarked version of (B,b), (56) and, e.g. Manzini’s
(59), the marked one. Note that in (55) as well as in (56), the subject NP, by
projection from the lexicon, is marked 〈intact,+〉 and the object-NP receives
〈intact, –〉. Thus, only in (55), with PRO being assigned 〈intact, +〉(PRO), the
matrix object NP is a licit controller sanctioned by constraint (C,b′), (α = +). In
other words, the “natural” conceptual-semantic identification of the person(s)
to whom the request is directed with the person(s) intended to come to comply
with it substantiates the control relation in (55). In (56) or (59), however, the
controllee PRO does not refer to the person that is intended to comply with the
request, and, consequently, the natural identification cannot sustain, or trans-
fer to, the control relation. Any interpretive construal of (59), of course,
includes an entity that represents the person designated to comply with the
request. In (55), but not in (59), this entity is syntactically present as the PRO-
subject of the clausal complement. Thus, in (56) or (59) the direct transfer
from lexically determined relational properties of ask, prosit’ to their syntacti-
cal control relations cannot materialize. But, as indicated, (59) displays a licit
control relation, which should assert itself on other “natural” grounds in
satisfying constraint (C,b″).
To account for this and a wide array of facts, I would like to propose
corollary (D).
(D) A non-singleton chain headed by PRO can carry the feature specifi-
cation value 〈intact, –〉 (〈F,–〉) iff the theta grid (or – inventory)
pertinent to the controlled clause domain contains 〈intact, +〉
(〈F,+〉).
(D) is a specification on the marked application of (B,a) and (B,b), that is, on
all cases in which the chain headed by PRO does not receive 〈F,+〉 and, thus,
cannot meet the unmarked version of (B,b). (D) requires 〈intact, +〉 to be
The theory outlined 35

contained in the theta-grid of the complement verb for the marked application
of constraint (B,a) and (B,b) to license wellformed control. As we shall see
later (D) extends its force to the positively set parameters (G) and (H).
I will discuss now and motivate its particular application to (C,b″). If
PRO is moved and heads an A-chain, it cannot transfer a theta-specification
〈intact, +〉pro, which is assumed to be linked to D-structure subject position. If
the moved DP, that is PRO, does carry 〈intact, +〉, it must come from some-
where else, non-locally. Now consider (64).
(64) Hei asked him ((PROi to be believed (ti to be his follower)))
Assume that the chain headed by PRO is theta-marked by (be) follower of …
with the coda of the chain being in the external argument position of the
sentential argument theta-marked by believe. The theta-grid of believe con-
tains the theta specification which is linked to the “subject” of the epistemic
predicate, say Experiencer. In (64), the recipient of the putative specification
is implicit. The matrix object him is very likely to corefer with, or to be
included in the referent of, the implicit nominal argument of believe, depend-
ing on discourse-related factors. Note that if this is the intended coreference
relation, it would embody the identification which in active embeddings of
believe emerges as the unmarked control relation licensed by (C,b′).
(65) He asked himi (PROi to believe that …)
In (64) it manifests itself as an at least conceptually suggested coreference that
is backed by the incidental work of the control constraint (C,b′): 〈intact, –〉con
& 〈intact, +〉pro.
I have tacitly assumed that the implicit believer-argument of believe
receives 〈intact, +〉, which in conjunction with 〈intact, –〉 of him would satisfy
— in the active configuration (65) — the constraint (C,b′). If we are not
prepared to acknowledge the need for providing PRO in (65) and, conse-
quently, the corresponding implicit argument in (64) with the specification
〈intact, +〉 (〈F,+〉), we might lose what can be considered a prerequisite for a
rational interpretation of ask (ask somebody to resolve to believe). I will leave
this case of (co)reference solution for the moment. Control in (64) is instanti-
ated in its marked version. (C,b″) licenses he as controller. What is problem-
atic is the thematic specification of PRO that is relevant to control. A-moved
PRO carries along the assignment it receives from be follower, presumably
〈intact, +〉. Consider (66).
36 Chapter 3

(66) He asked himi (PROi to be his follower)

It does not seem relevant to control whether we assume 〈intact, +〉 or 〈intact,
–〉 to be the correct assignment to PRO. If, as I claim, in (64), he controls PRO,
satisfying the marked version of constraint (B,b), PRO must be assigned
〈intact, –〉pro. Then, we either have an apparent counterexample — if PRO
continues carrying 〈intact, +〉 —, or an artificial assignment of 〈intact, –〉 as the
correct specification of PRO simply begs the question. Such documentation as
(64), however, can be interpreted as showing that movement to a particular
landing site of a theta-marked DP, which must be a non-theta position, affects
its thematic “understanding” and, consequently, its sensitivity to control.
I would like to add (E) as a subsidiary to (D).
(E) Any PRO that is the non-thematic head of the A-chain produced
by passive movement is thematically specified like a moved
object-DP.
In (64), which is an instance of (E), PRO is marked 〈intact, –〉pro, which is
generally transferred from (with) the moved object-DP, although, originally, it
is rather marked 〈intact, +〉 by be the follower of. It seems natural that derived
passive subjects coming under control conditions function homogeneously in
so far as they can override transferred (non-local) thematic features — as 〈F,+〉
for PRO in (64) which would not obey marked (B,b) — turning them into
〈F,–〉 typical of their landing site.
How is (D) met in (64). The specificatiom 〈intact, +〉, which PRO
receives in its original position from (be) follower of …, does not count since
it is not taken from the θ-grid of the predicate (verb) of the controlled clause
domain, namely believe. As suggested above, believe, if assigning Experi-
encer, can arguably be assumed to discharge 〈intact, +〉 (〈F,+〉) as the specifi-
cation sensitive to control.10 In other words, (control) verbs that are associated
with constraints (B,b) may be assumed to describe events that are subject to
potentially intentional action. Believe-events can reasonably be assumed to be
not necessarily nonintentional. Intuitively, the critical boundary runs between
believe and, e.g., sneeze, resemble.

(67) He asked him i (PRO i 

to resemble his father 
)
to sneeze 
If somebody thinks that in some “world” resemble or sneeze may be subject to
intentional action, the um constraint (B,b) can be referred to, licensing (67).
The theory outlined 37

Further, were it not for the conditon (D), (67) could meet the marked con-
straint (C,b″), with he licensed as controller. Marking the subject argument of
resemble or sneeze as 〈F,+〉 is taken to be a decision exclusively at the
pragmatic level, which would lead to the acceptability of (67), since the
pragmatic marking in turn is referred to by the grammatical um constraint
(B,b). Thus, (D) distinguishes, e.g. (64) from (67). In (64), 〈intact, +〉, as
required by (D) and (E) is linked, possibly, to the argumental passive mor-
pheme of the controlled clause as proposed by Jaeggli (1986) and Baker et al.
(1989). (67), since there is no position for 〈F,+〉 to be projected, is ruled out
grammatically, if, possibly, acceptable at a conceptual-pragmatic level. Not
much of a serious problem seems to be left. Now consider (68).
(68) ?*He asked him (PRO to receive the whole sum)
PRO, if assigned GOAL, by (D) does not receive 〈intact, –〉, since the theta-
grid of receive lacks 〈intact, +〉. Thus, (68) is excluded by (C,b″), since it
cannot obey (D). Nor can it meet the um version (C,b′) of course. (68) does not
warrant a well-formed interpretation, or it is semantically undefined.
Corollary (D) applies to unaccusative verbs as well as to passive verbs in
the controlled clause, which is not surprising if, following Belletti (1988: 6)
“… verbs with passive morphology can be considered unaccusative in the
same theoretical sense as lexical unaccusative verbs — namely, passive verbs
do not have the capacity to assign structural accusative.”
Assume that PRO is the head of the relevant A-chain that carries 〈intact,
–〉. Then, again, condition (D), will prevent the marked application of (B,b)
from licensing control, as the theta-grid of the unaccustive verb does not
contain 〈intact, +〉. Recall that the thematic feature specification pertinent to
control should be closely associated with the theta-grid of (classes of) verbs.
Agent, e.g., could be assumed to entail 〈intact, +〉. (69) is excluded by the
um(j,j) and, by virtue of (D), by the m(i,i) application of (B,b).
(69) *He asked himj (PROi,j to arrive home)
i

Consider now (70) versus (71).

(70) We asked him (PRO to rest from his strict training for two days)
Unmarked (B,b) is met with idiomatic rest assured if PRO is marked 〈F,+〉.
Since, in (71) PRO cannot carry 〈F,–〉 by virtue of (D), (71) is ruled out by m
(B,b) or rather already by um (B,b).
38 Chapter 3

(71) ?We asked him (PRO to rest assured that we will do all we can).
Compare further (72) and (73) with (74).
(72) *We asked them (PRO to come of age)
(73) *We asked him (PRO to come of a good family)
(74) We asked him (PRO to be patient)
Clearly, if Agent entails 〈intact, +〉, the latter does not entail the former, as in
(74). The control principles cannot be reduced to θ-roles (cf. above 3.2.1.).
An hierarchical restriction is imposed on marked applications of (B,b).
(F) 〈intact, +〉con is required to be carried by a DP in (D)-structure
subject position.
The hierarchical condition could be expressed as m-commanding of PRO by
the controller.
(75) *The coachi was asked ti by Peterj (PROj to be included in the select
team)
The transparent linking of 〈intact, +〉con to the basic subject position must be
maintained to be targeted on by the “weaker” marked applications of (B,b). As
we shall see later (5.1.), a DP in adjunct-(argument) position that carries 〈F,+〉
may be accessible to the um application of constraint (B,a), which is associ-
ated with other lexical classes. Clearly, markedness distinctions related to the
projection of thematic properties into syntax will prove to be sensitive to
parameterized variation.

3.2.3. Unmarked and marked Control constraint as a functional instantiation

of lexical features

Lexical information, however represented, for a verb of the class associated

with constraint (B,b) predicts that two pairs of “arguments” are typically
involved in the ask- (and its ilk) event descriptions, with the arguments of
either pair ocurring in the matrix clause and the complement clause, respec-
tively. Importantly, the arguments of either pair have restrictive (co)referential
properties for independent conceptual reasons, which are construed so as to
function as control relations by virtue of their syntactic distribution in control
configurations. The first pair consists of the argument associated with the
The theory outlined 39

addressee of the request and the argument associated with the person(s)
expected to comply with the request. The former is linked to the direct object-
DP or, in the passive, to the A-chain headed by the subject-DP binding its
trace in object position. The latter is projected as the PRO-subject in nonpas-
sive infinitival complements. The clear intended coreference of the two DP-
arguments functions as control relation licensed by the um application of (B,b)
if the first argument is rightly characterized as 〈intact, –〉 and the second (PRO)
as 〈intact, +〉. The second pair consists of the argument referring to the
person(s) who do(es) the asking, and of the argument presumed to represent
the benefactive of the fulfilled request. The latter is very likely to be coreferen-
tial with the former if embodied as PRO in a passive infinitival complement
clause. This coreference, again predictable from the lexical structure of ask-
verbs, is employed as the control relation to be licensed in turn by the marked
application of (B,b) together with corollaries (D) and (E): The matrix subject
is assigned 〈intact, +〉, PRO receives 〈intact, –〉. With respect to the unmarked
constraint (B.b) in passive complements, the lexically induced coreference
pairing the addressee-DP and the Agent-DP, which backs the um application
of (B,b), has no syntactic counterpart through which it could be channeled into
the (unmarked) control relation: The relevant DP involved in the pairing
cannot be PRO in passive complements.
The principled distinction between unmarked and marked applications of
the constraint (B,b) clearly correlates with lexical and syntactic facts including
considerations of economy: The um version can be met by syntactically less
complex structures, that is, active and passive matrix clauses and nonpassive
complement clauses. It is substantiated by the prominent lexically induced
coreference condition between arguments. The marked version is met by
syntactically less transparent control relations, mainly occuring in passive
controlled clauses. They are substantiated by the less conspicuous lexically
induced coreference pairing of arguments. Recall that the marked application
of (B,b) needs to be specified by corollaries (D) and (E). The correlation with
independent thematically induced coreference provides strong factual and
conceptual support for the chosen constraint type analysis and its markedness
specification. We shall see that this approach maintains its strength in other
domains of control.
40 Chapter 3

3.2.4.1. Interpreting and extending effects of the markedness distinction in

constraint (B,b)
Overall and parameterized effects on well-formed control relations correlate
with, and are predictable by, the observance and violation of the unmarked
and the marked version of constraint (B,b), respectively. Of course, violations
of the unmarked version would formally coincide with violations of the
marked one.
Violations of unmarked (B,b).
α 〈intact, –〉CON & *〈intact, –〉PRO
β *〈intact, +〉CON & 〈intact, +〉PRO
Violations of marked (B,b), that is, (C,b″).
α′ 〈intact, +〉CON & *〈intact, +〉PRO
β′ *〈intact, –〉CON & 〈intact, –〉PRO
The offending part is marked by an asterisk. Can the undesirable double be
rationalized or should it be removed? Assuming that a subset of the set of
control verbs associated with the general constraint (B,b) avails itself of both
of its versions, e.g., the ask-type subset, it is natural to expect that the case of
straightforward ungrammatically be linked with violations of its unmarked
version. And it seems equally natural to expect that violations opening par-
ticular parametrized variations, possibly at the pragmatic level, rather result
from disobeing the marked constraint. We shall see presently that not only
ask-type verbs support this account by violations like α and α′, respectively.
Thus, this system selects α and α′ as relevant violations, that is, those with the
offending PRO-part. The theoretical decision is richly supported empirically.
The contingency of violation is considered a function of the thematic status of
the controller (〈intact, α〉CON) of PRO. β and β′ seem to be rendered superflu-
ous. Note that they are related to um (B,b) and m (B,b) respectively. If
(violations of) control is encoded in this way, that is, as the respective
offending values of the PRO-conjunct in (C,b′)=α and (C,b″)=α′, a depth of
empirical explanation is achieved to the extent that wellformedness of control
can be systematically related to specified aspects of lexical semantics. Both
versions of constraint (B,b), in connection with their respective violations α
and α′ mediate between syntactic control conditions and lexically defined
classes (and subclasses) of control verbs. As will be shown, transitional
phenomena can be located within the boundaries set up by the constraints.
The theory outlined 41

3.2.4.2. Violations of constraint (B,b)

As mentioned above, violations of the unmarked constraint (B,b), that is,
instances of α can be expected to lead to ungrammaticality, while violations of
type α′ still may not preclude control, given specific settings of independent
parameters that conspire with semantic construals to license control relations.
Consider (76) satisfying um constraint (B,b), and (77) violating it.
(76)R Odin iz nich vstaet i prosit sudejj [[PROi
[gen] [acc-gen pl]
One of them rises and asks the judges
prigovorit’ drugogo k smertnoj kazni]]
[acc-gen] [dat]
to sentence the other to capital punishment.
(77) *Odin iz nich vstaet i prosit sudeji [[PROi byt’
[acc-gen pl]
One of them rises and asks the judges to be
prigovorennymii ti k smertnoj kazni]]
[part pret pass instr(umental Case) pl]
sentenced to capital punishment
PRO is assigned 〈intact, –〉 in (77) in accordance with corollary (D). (77) can
be interpretable, if bizarre, with “subject”-control, that is with pro controlling
PRO, when the participle has singular agreement.
(78) [Odin iz nich]i vstaet i proi prosit sudej
One of them rises and asks the judges
[[PROi byt’ prigovorënnym ti k smertnoj kazni]]
[part pret pass sing masc]
to be sentenced to capital punishment
Under the present theory, (78) satifies the marked version of constraint (B,b).
Recall (2.2.2.1.) Manzini’s (1983: 423) judgment on her (12)′, (13)′ repeated
here.
(79) John asked Billi [PROi to shave himself]
(80) Johni asked Bill [PROi to be allowed ti [PROi to shave himself]]11
The matrix passive counterpart of (79), with 〈intact, –〉 assigned to the chain
(Billi ti), is wellformed according to um constraint (B,b).
42 Chapter 3

(81) Billi was asked ti [PROi to shave himself]

(Manzini’s example (21): Manzini 1983: 423)
However, recalling condition (F), there is no well-formed passive correspond-
ing to (80), a control structure that could obey the marked constraint (B,b).
(82) *Billi was asked ti (by NPj) [PROj to be allowed to shave himself]
(j ≠ i)
The markedness characterization is supported by this gap. Constraint (B,b)
could be met only by an “Agent” by-phrase, bearing 〈intact, +〉. But the
“marked” control relation cannot materialize without syntactic “superiority”
as observed above. Thus, the controller may be required, in addition, to
m-command the controllee, which seems quite natural for a secondary control
construal founded on a specification, say BENEFACTIVE, that ranks lower
on the thematic hierarchy. Note, however, that an antecedent NP within a by-
phrase or its cross-linguistic counterparts is not generally excluded in specifi-
cations on control constraints (see below, 5.1.), which will lead to a broader
generalization.
The shift in control as accounted for by the um and the m version of
constraint (B,b), with theta-specifications 〈intact,α〉 assigned to the respective
chains, seems to be perfectly natural.
See some more illustrations from German in (83) – (85).
(83)G Eri bat sie ((PROi schon 5 Uhr
he asked her already at five o’clock
geweckt zu werden))
woken to be
‘He asked her to be woken already at five o’clock.’
(84)G Ai bittet B [PROi ti mitgenommen zu werden]
A asks B to be given a lift
(85)G Bi wird (von Aj) ti gebeten [PROi ihnj
B is (by A) asked him
mitzunehmen]
to give a lift
(84) and (85) are from Wegener (1989: 206 – 208))
(85) satisfies the um-constraint, namely C, b′ (see 3.2.1. and 3.2.2.), (83), (84)
satisfies its marked version.
The theory outlined 43

3.2.5. Violating the m(arked) constraint and cross-linguistic variation.

Multiple options

Ask and the like evidence violations of marked type (B,b).

〈intact, +〉CON & *〈intact, +〉PRO (= α′ in 3.2.4.1.)
They do not rule out wellformedness everywhere. Instances of the control
verb ask and its cross-linguistic equivalents that violate m constraint (B,b)
either emerge as perfectly wellformed, though marked to such an extent that
they have been thought to exhibit a lexical homonym, or they are downright
ungrammatical. The former situation is found in English and in Spanish. The
latter obtains, e.g. in Russian and German. E.Bach (1979, 521) considers
ambiguity in (86)a. and b. (his (36)a and (36)b).
(86) a. They asked the teacher to go to the bathroom. (“ambiguous for
some”)
b. The teacher was asked to go to the bathroom.
“Ambiguous verbs are disambiguated in the passive.” (Bach) And “… accord-
ing to Radford (1981), the preferred interpretation of (i)b for many American
speakers would be one in which John is understood as the antecedent of PRO
… (i)b. John asked the teacher (PRO to leave early).” (Iwakura 1985: 48)) The
disambiguation, e.g., in (86)b is accounted for by the condition (F) on m
applications of (B,b).
The problems posed by the foregoing instances of control can be system-
atically interrelated. In English, ambiguous (following Bach) (86)a either
satisfies um constraint (B,b) with the teacher controlling as in the unambigu-
ous (86)b, or, in the other correct reading, it violates m constraint (B,b), since
the relevant feature value of the PRO-conjunct is positive. What appears to
weaken m (B,b), in fact reveals its pertinence to the solution to a cross-
linguistic puzzle of control: Ambiguity, as in (86)a, disappears not only in the
passive but also in the absence of an overt object.
(87) Johni asked (PROi to leave)
°
(cf. Ruzicka 1983: 319)).
Disambiguation here proceeds in the reverse order. The only reading of (86)b
is excluded. The character of the null object will turn out to be a crucial factor.
Exhibiting ambiguous control in (86)a, English seems to join with, e.g.,
44 Chapter 3

Spanish in contrast with German and Russian. The latter shun this ambiguity.
Subject control that violates the m version of (B,b), as in one reading of (86)a
and in (87), as opposed to subject control obeying it, as in (64), is completely
ruled out. As to Spanish, numerous informants do not agree with Chomsky’s
(1988) judgement that “… sentence (61b) (= (88)) in Spanish has a single
interpretation: María must be understood as the subject of hablar. Here the
subject of hablar in the mental representation is PRO, and it is a semantic
property of the verb pedir that the PRO subject of its complement must be
bound by the subject of pedir, rather as in the English constructions ‘María
asked permission of Juan to speak to the boys’, where María must be the
subject of speak. Note that the situation in English is different. Here, Juan
would normally be taken as the subject of speak that is, the antecedent of the
PRO subject of speak, in (61b). The verbs pedir and ask are thus slightly
different in their syntactic-semantic properties.
(88) María le pidió a Juan [hablar con los muchachos]
María him asked to Juan [to speak to the boys]
‘María asked Juan to speak to the boys’.” (Chomsky 1988: 127,
128)).
Ambiguity of (88), as in (86a), seems to be sufficiently supported by judge-
ments, which can be systematically traced to the complex working device
(B,b).

3.3. Grammar and recourse to pragmatics

This somewhat bewildering picture raises the issue of selecting the appropri-
ate theoretical tools that could capture the greatly diverging cross-linguistic
facts. The conflicting effects of the violation of m (B,b) strongly suggest that
to the extent that they significantly differ from each other they might provide
criteria for deciding whether and at which point to cross the boundaries of
grammar proper. Importantly, if violation of m (B,b) marks a crossroads at
which different “solutions” can be chosen, one seems to feel justified in
crossing from grammar to pragmatic considerations. A fair justification could
arise if the specific setting of a syntactic parameter prevents a given language
from developing a particular pragmatic pattern. Assume that in Spanish a
pattern of conventionalized politeness has developed that allows the control
The theory outlined 45

relation as illustrated by Chomsky in (88). The verb pedir has “withdrawn” to

a condensed conventional pattern of use which is essentially the equivalent to
(89), in terms of which its control relation can be reconstructed (recall
Chomsky’s paraphrase of (88): María asked permission of J. to speak …”).
Thus, pedir may “include” ask to be allowed.

(89) X j asked SOME PERSON(S) Yi [PRO i TO 

PERMIT 

{ALLOW} 
Xj [PROj to leave]]
The first Xj and PROj display the control relation which ends up and is
concealed in (88). English, in particular American English, giving way to the
same option, maintains, if ambiguously, the standard um control, as shown in
(86)a. But, importantly for the discussion to follow, English has to keep to the
“Spanish” option if no overt direct object shows up. Why is English impervi-
ous to object control in this case, e.g. in (90).
(90) *He asks ei [PROi to leave]
Within the settings of the null object parameter, a sweeping argument could be
that “… languages those like English … do not allow null objects of any type.”
(Cole 1987: 603, 608)). Specifically, “… no structurally represented zero
object is possible in English — that is, no structural position is available
between the verb and the control clause … In object control structures the
object NP must be structurally represented: a direct object controller cannot be
omitted.” (Rizzi 1986: 503)). Rizzi’s version of “Bach’s generalization”12 can
account for (90), in conjunction with the availability of the construal type (89)
as in Spanish. In his comparative study, Rizzi observes that “… Italian allows
null V-governed NP-positions carrying arbitrary interpretation or functioning
as expletives, whereas English lacks both options.” (Rizzi 1986: 546)). The
Italian parametric contrast to English is mirrored by Russian and German. I
suggest that the English value of the null object parameter, as opposed to the
respective German and Russian settings, is responsible for the incisive differ-
ence in control behaviour among these languages. Object control, including
null objects, is the only option available in German and Russian. In English,
following Rizzi’s assumptions (1986: 552), if the direct object theta-role is
saturated in the lexicon and, thus, not syntactically visible, it cannot act as a
controller, or, alternatively, if it is not saturated in the lexicon, it could control,
but English has no appropriate null filler for the direct object position which is
46 Chapter 3

obligatorily projected by the Projection principle. In German and Russian, the

theta-role of the null object is structurally projected, syntactically noninert,
and representable as governed pro, its appropriate null filler. The upshot of
these facts is that a zero direct object is never capable of controlling in
English, whereas in Russian and German it is undistinguishable in control
behaviour from its overt counterpart. It follows that there can be no German or
Russian control structure correspondent with English (90), repeated here in its
grammatical version.
(91) Hei asked [PROi to leave]
(92)G Er bat [pro]i [PROi zu gehen]
He asked prox [PROx to leave]
(93)R On prosil [pro]i [PROi uchodit’]
He asked prox [PROx to leave]
If we want to render (91) into German, the nearest equivalent is (95), a
structure that joins in with (59) (repeated here) in satisfying m constraint
(B,b); dürfen translates as be allowed/permitted to VP.
(59) Johni asked Bill [PROi to be allowed ti [PROi to shave himselfi]]
(94)G Johni bat Bill [PROi sichi rasieren (PROi) zu dürfen
… himself shave to be allowed
(95)G Er bat, gehen zu dürfen
(95) has the simplified structure (96), in which the first PRO carries
〈intact, –〉, which is assigned from dürfen or via its decomposed lexical
representation ((BE) ALLOWED __).
(96) [Eri bat proj [PROi [VP [S’ PROi gehen] [ zu dürfen]]]]
he asked to leave to be allowed
The second PROi, the external argument of gehen, in turn matching um (B,b),
is controlled by the S-structure subject of dürfen, which corresponds to the
object-DP of allow. I cannot let it go unnoticed of course that informants can
be found that would not reject the “English” interpretation of (92), that is,
subject control, in addition to null object control. This contingency again
sheds light on the conflict indicated with respect to (88) above and immedi-
ately below. Subject control is ruled out in (97), an example from Comrie
(1985); his numbering is (20).
The theory outlined 47

(97)G Die Mutter bat proi [[PROi das Geschirr abzuräumen]]

“The German sentence (20) has an interpretation not available to its literal
English translation, ‘Mother asked to carry away the dishes’” (Comrie 1985:
50)).
Conversely, (97) does not share the only interpretation of its English
word by word translation: “Mother asked for permission that she (Mother) be
allowed to take away the dishes”. (97) is not ambiguous, I differ with Comrie
on the judgment of (97).13 The only interpretation of (97) is (in Comrie’s
paraphrase): ‘Mother requested of someone unspecified that that unspecified
person carry away the dishes.’ If the equivalent of (97) in Italian is ambiguous,
as A. Belletti and L. Rizzi think (p.c.), we can conjecture that the availability
of pro reveals a further control parameter: pro behaves as nonempty DP’s do
in obeying the um constraint (B,b), that is, it must control as in Russian or
German. Or pro can give way, if not preferably, to the English patterns in
which controlling pro is not available, or the Spanish pattern, in which a
pro-object as well as an overt DP-object are compatible with subject control.
These variations should not come as a surprise in strongly conventionalized
utterance types that are sensitive to idiomatic moulding. Note that this varying
control behaviour is not left unrelated to principled control constraints but is
encompassed and in turn referred to by them. Control, which we try to bring as
near as seems possible to grammatical principles, is a phenomenon which
tends to yield to conceptual-pragmatic construal and reinterpretation, in par-
ticular in conventionalized utterance patterns of daily use.
The control instance dürfen reveals the dominance of the relevant seman-
tic theta-specification over configurational control conditions. Consider (98),
which differs from (99) only in the modal verb.
(98)G Eri bittet ihn [PROi sich erholen zu dürfen]
he asks him to take a rest to be permitted
‘He asks him to be permitted to take a rest.’
(99)G Er bittet ihni [PROi sich erholen zu wollen]
he asks him to take a rest to want
‘He asks him to want /be willing//choose/ to take a rest.’
°
This juxtaposition goes back to Bech (1955, 1957) (cf. Ruzicka 1983a: 319).
The Russian literal translation of (97) is equivalent to the German, not the
English interpretation.
48 Chapter 3

(100)R Mat’ poprosila proi [[PROi ubrat’ posudu]]

Mother asked (somebody) to carry away the dishes
Complicity of two pro’s is shown in (101).
(101)R Vikaj daval svoj apparat oficiantui i proj prosil
Vika gave his camera to the waiter and asked
proi [[PROi nas sfotografirovat’]]
(him) us to photograph
‘… to take a picture of us.’
Null subject and null object in the shape of proj,i are anaphorically referring
pronouns in (101). For Russian and German, then, the only chance of licens-
ing subject control, beyond the standard cases of obeying m constraint (B,b)
(see example 83), could be provided by disposing of the syntactic position of
the direct object. Russian can do it by affixing the reflexive clitic -sja/-s’ to
(po)prosit’-sja. While saturating the object theta-role lexically, the affixed
verb prosit’sja precludes the syntactic object position, exhibiting control
behaviour like ask in, e.g., one reading of (86). The syntactically inert null
object in English and the syntactically removed argument position (and theta-
position) in Russian lead to the same consequence: The subject is a licit
controller under the interpretive construal as in (89).
(102)R Oni stal prosit’sja [[PROi posmotret’
He started to ask to have a look
staryj dom]]
at the old house
(103)R Onii proposilis’ [[PROi u nego zit’]]
they asked at/with him to live
Interestingly, in the standard dictionaries (po)prosit’sja is defined as
“(po)prosit’ dlja sebja razrešenija (pozvolenija) delat’ cto-libo” (‘ask for
oneself for permission to do something’).
In conclusion, Russian like Italian (cf. Rizzi 1986: 541)) has null V-
governed and Case-marked pro, which can be an arbitrary pronoun as well as
a referential definite pronoun (cf. ex. (101)). Drawing upon the classification
in Rizzi (1986: 541), it appears that Russian manifests the type of pro which
can function as a “nonargument, quasi argument, and referential argument”.
I have shown that structural conditions, in particular positional restric-
The theory outlined 49

tions of chains combine with symmetry effects of two thematic pairings to

sustain the unmarked and the marked version of the Control constraint that
licenses control relations. In the marked version (B,b), a secondary layer of
quasi-theta-specifications emerges strong enough to establish control. That is
why ask-type verbs exhibit marked control behaviour, besides unmarked one,
of course. Disobedience to the marked version can still yield acceptable
control by pragmatic processing that interposes conceptual material (like
PERMIT HIM/HER TO …). A hyphothetical parameter (H) (p. 62) is offered
to capture the crosslinguistic facts.
ask-type verbs are highly susceptible to such conventionally communica-
tive patterning, being the commonly used cliché word in everyday conversa-
tion.14 I would still like to suggest that pragmatic control as in (87) and the
“permission” option of (88) — construed in (89) — is systematically licensed
and sustained by parameterized modality switching, which divides English
and Spanish from German and Russian. In German counterparts, the modal
verb dürfen is used (ex. 96, 98). The corresponding parameter (H) is paralleled
by parameter (G). See section 4.1.

3.4. Nominalized Russian prosit’(sja)

As is well known, in Russian, in contrast to Polish, nominalizations of

reflexive verbs and their respective nonreflexive partners exhibit the same
nonreflexive noun, mostly neutralizing the aspectual opposition.
(104)R Vozvrašcenie detej k roditeljam
[gen sg]
the return of the children to their parents
relates to vozvratit’sja / vosvrašcat’sja
(105)R Vozvrašcenie knig
[gen pl]
return of the books
relates to vozvratit’/vozvrašcat’.
Control behaviour of pros’ba exhibits relationship to prosit’ and prosit’sja.
50 Chapter 3

(106)R Pros’ba ne kurit’ (Notice in a room)

[nom sg]
request not to smoke
(X’s request directed to Y that Y should not smoke)
‘You are requested not to smoke’.
(106) corresponds to standard um control cases according to (B,b), pros’ba is
related to prosit’. Relationship of pros’ba to prosit’sja shows up in (107).
Recall that prosit’sja “absorbs” object position, thus leaving only its subject as
possible controller.
(107)R Posle vyslušannogo prigovora v pros’be
[part pret pass gen sg] [gen sg] [loc sg]
after (the) listened to sentence in (the) request
sobrat’sja nami v odnu kameru, ctoby provesti
[infinitive] [dat pl] [acc sg]
to gather us in one cell so as to spend
poslednie casy vmeste, otkazano ne bylo
[acc pl] [part pret pass neuter] [neuter]
(the) last hours together refused not (it) was
‘After we had listened to the sentence, (our) petition to be
(gather) in one cell so as to spend the last hours together was
not refused’ (from Ju. Trifonov’s “Starik”).
A puzzle arises here, because nam is the overt subject of the apparently
controlled clause sobrat’sja … and is assigned default dative case by [+infini-
tive] under Inflection. Nam could hardly be the indirect dative object of
otkazano, which assigns inherent dative, in the position it occupies in (107).
The pronoun is presumably inserted to avert (empty) object control, in which
case there would be no question of control. In reverse order, then, the subject
of pros’ba is identified, preferably, by nam, or as a member (members) of the
set denoted by nam. I conclude that control relations in complements of
nominal abstracts of verbs, can be obviated in the marked but potentially
ambiguous cases of subject control, which, in Russian, hinges on the reflexive
affix (see p. 48). This affix, as mentioned above, is neutralized in verbal
nouns. Dispensing with nam and positing a PRO-subject of sobrat’sja v odnu
kameru in (107) would leave the latter without clarifying its identification. A
functional motivation for dispensing with control and resorting to an overt
subject seems justified.
The theory outlined 51

3.5. When pro takes over

The analysis proposed for the control behaviour of ask, R. prosit’ receives
strong support from the situation which obtains in “pro-drop”-languages in
which finite complements can adjust to control relations. The empty pronomi-
nal category pro takes the place of PRO. Indeed what structural and functional
properties pro can display in the role of the controllee presents enough
evidence to prove that the constraints and principles advanced above are able
to capture the empirical facts and explain them. Serbo-Croatian is a null-
subject-language suitable for demonstration.
(a) If the um constraint (B,b) is satified, pro must appear, not the overt
pronoun ona.
(108)S-C Petar je molio Marijui da proi (*onai) ostane
Petar Aux asked Marija comp stay
na veceri
at dinner
‘Petar asked Maryi to stay for dinner.’
(The examples (108) – (110) are from Zec (1987) slightly modified.)
(b) If m constraint (B,b) is violated, under the construal (89) and in the
strong version demonstrated by the Spanish example (88), pro must
appear, not the pronoun. Clearly, in finite complement control, this
peculiar option, described above has a better chance to be realized.
(109)S-C Petari je molio Mariju da proi (*oni) ostane
Petar Aux asked Marija comp (he) stay
na veceri
at dinner
It is exactly in the respective cases (a) and (b) that on(a) must be dispensed
with. Independently of control, pro can of course occur iff agreement (or φ–)
features of the finite verb transferred to pro identify it, which implies that they
are different from those inherent to either the potential subject or object
controller in the immediate matrix clause.
52 Chapter 3

(110)S-C Petar me je molio da pro

[+3 pers +sing] [+1 pers]
Petar me asked that (they)
ostanu na veceri
[+3 pers +plural]
stay for dinner
I should add — following Zec (1987: 154 f.) — that in cases (a) and (b) above
on and ona can replace pro iff they are stressed.

3.6. A Comparison with an alternative analysis

I would like to conclude this chapter by juxtaposing the analysis of two

relevant cases of control that follows from my approach with the analysis put
forward by Franks/Hornstein (1992: 41, fn. 15). The sentences instantiating
the control phenomena analyzed are (111) – (113) (Frank/Hornstein’s (i) –
(iii))
(111) Johni told Fredj that PRO hanging each otheri,j’s pictures
would be fun.
(112) Johni said Billj asked where (PRO to hang each otheri,j’s
pictures/pictures of each otheri,j.
(113) *Johni said Billj asked PROi,j to hang each otheri,j’s pictures/
pictures of each otheri,j.
Frank/Hornstein’s account runs as follows: “In (i) and (ii), (111, 112: RR),
PRO can be indexed by both Johni and Fredj. This allows each other to be
bound by a plural antecedent, viz. PROi,j. In (iii), PRO is governed, hence
anaphoric. Therefore, it does not permit split antecedents. Consequently, each
other is not properly bound. The contrast between (ii) and (iii) (my (112),
(113): RR) is of particular interest as the only apparent difference is whether
there is a +WH COMP. If there is a WH in COMP, the embedded PRO cannot
be anaphoric. If there is nothing filling the COMP, the PRO can be governed.
It appears, then, that to a first approximation, with respect to split antecedents,
the binding properties of governed PROs parallel those of anaphors while
those of ungoverned PRO do not. This is what a theory of governed PRO leads
us to expect.” (Franks/Hornstein 1992: 41, fn. 15) I will concentrate on (ii),
The theory outlined 53

(iii) (112, 113), which indeed are of particular interest, whereas (i), (111) is
not directly pertinent to the contrast between them and their respective analy-
ses. The (non)occurrence of +WH COMP is not the only difference.
In (112), ask used as query or request information does not belong to the
lexical control class subject to constraint (B,b). There is no inherent cross-
clausal thematic relationship between two arguments that could be captured
by such a constraint. PRO is considerably less constrained in choosing an
available and suitable antecedent, though of course not freely identifiable.
Essentially, control may be logophoric and split up nonlocally, or be arbitrary.
The fact that PRO is ungoverned if Spec(C) is filled, is incidental to the
control situation as described under my approach. Indexing PRO in (112) by
both Johni and Billi is induced by the reciprocal.
Why is (113), (iii) ruled out? First, since in English the null object
parameter is fixed negatively, in accordance with Bach’s Generalization no
object controller is available for the “object” control verb ask. Second, Bill is
the only possible and local controller, and it is licensed by marked application
of (B,b) in virtue of construing ask (permission) as obeying m (B,b), which has
been discussed in detail and can be understood as setting the pragmatic
parameter (H) (4.1.) positively. Note that judgements may be subtle, as is
natural when boundaries of grammar are crossed. John, in the casual embed-
ding John said, is irrelevant to control: Being no argument of the control verb
ask, it is not targeted by constraint (B,b). Third, since Bill remains as the only
possible controller of PRO, each other is not bound by a plural antecedent.
Replacing Bill in (113), for example, by Bill and Steven would make the
sentence acceptable with the above proviso.
Chapter 4

The persuade subclass and cognate ones

subject to the general constraint

4.1. Persuade versus ask. Parameterization in pragmatics.

The control effects of lexical properties of ask-type verbs are easily distinguish-
able from those of persuade-type verbs. Members of the ask-subset are, e.g.,
beg, request, implore, conjure, beseech, entreat; Russian: uprosit’/uprašivat’,
umolit’/umoljat’; German: ersuchen (request), beschwören (implore). For
example, (114) obeys the m constraint exactly as, e.g. (87), or (89).
(114) The boyi begged [[PROi (to be allowed) to come with us]]
persuade-type control verbs, though constituting an opposite subset of direct
object verbs in regard to control conditions, are subject to the generality of
constraint (B,b) as well as ask-verbs. But the subsets mainly differ in exhibit-
ing complementary control effects in the passive infinitival clause.
(115) Peterj persuaded Billi (PROi,*j to be examined by a doctor)
(116) Peterj persuaded Billi (PROi,*j to be replaced at half-time)
(117) Peterj asked Billi (PROj,*i to be replaced at half-time)
(118) Peterj asked Billi (PROj,*i to be examined by a specialist)
At least three problems are posed by the control behaviour of persuade-type
verbs:
(I): First, (115) is perfectly acceptable though violating the um constraint
(B,b). (II): the second problem is posed by the ungrammaticality of the lexical
and syntactic counterparts of (115), (116) in German and Russian. (III): Last
but not least, persuade complement control does not enjoy wellformedness in
accord with the m version of contraint (B,b): “Subject” control is widely
56 Chapter 4

barred. The standard case, however, is accounted for by um (B,b), as in the

ask-type subclass.15
Let us take a closer look at the three problems raised by persuade-type
subclass. To start with, why are (115), (116) grammatical though they violate
the um constraint (B,b)? Note first that the theta-grid of the complement verb
meets (D) (3.2.2.), the specification on the marked application of (B,b), as can
be read off of Dowty’s analysis given in fn 15. Though they satisfy (D),
passive infinitival complements of the persuade-class verbs, in contrast to ask,
resist the marked application of (B,b). Basically, (D) posits that 〈intact, –〉 in
PRO is visible to the application of m (B,b), iff 〈intact, +〉 is available in the
theta-grid of the complement verb. 16 Note that persuade type verbs select a
lexically overt object. (cf. sect. 4.3.)
Control in (115), (116), thus, must be prevented from being licensed by
the m application of (B,b). Assume that they need access to the unmarked
version of constraint (B,b). The only access to it is by providing PRO with
〈intact, +〉. I suggest that in English this feature value is projected by persuade
onto PRO marking conceptual-pragmatic causative switch, analogous with
modality switch in the ask-class (parameters (G) and (H)). Let us consider two
perfectly natural aspects of this proposal. First, in complements of persuade,
the referent of PRO gets involved in a decision to do something to bring about
the event described in the infinitival complement. Second, PRO, which in
(115) has been assigned 〈intact, –〉 by examine, can receive the “secondary”
assignment of 〈intact, +〉 only on condition (D) that 〈intact, +〉 has been
“internally” discharged by the complement verb, examine. In (115), e.g., it is
carried by a doctor. The natural rationale of this condition hinges on the
feasibility of influencing the (referent of the) designated Agent-DP, e.g., in the
PP [by DP] to do what is described in the passive complement. It is (the
referent of) PRO who influences, that is, is persuaded to do the influencing.
Clearly, (D), which provides for availability of 〈intact,+〉, is a prerequisite
for assigning it to PRO secondarily, but does not license it. This assignment,
which salvages um (B,b) from being violated, is dependent on the positive
setting of a parameter, as we shall see presently. Note that, as this subclass
(persuade) evidences, violations of the unmarked (B,b) are restored to gram-
mar without introducing quasi-lexical material that assigns “conceptual” theta
specifications, as, e.g. be allowed in control of ask-type verbs, when marked
(B,b) is violated. In this latter subclass, violations of the unmarked (B,b) are
taken up by the marked application (B,b) (see ex. (118), (83)), since PRO
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 57

carries unchangeable 〈intact, –〉. Recall that violations of (B,b) are defined on
the feature value of PRO.
We feel justified in hypothesizing that a particular parameter is involved
in the persuade subclass. Its values concern the interface between grammar
and pragmatics. This leads to the second problem mentioned above. German,
Russian and Czech, for example, fix this presumed parameter differently, that
is, negatively. They grammatically resist the assignment of 〈intact, +〉 to PRO,
which appears to be a natural option as well considering that the only theta-
theoretical and functional interpretation of passive structures on which there is
general consensus amounts to suppressing or defocusing the agent. This
seems to do the reverse of what the presumed secondary assignment of 〈intact,
+〉 to PRO does. Note that PRO is structurally prominent as the argument in
the highest A-position of this clause. The negative parameter setting keeps the
original thematic specification of this position as induced by passive immune
to conceptual-pragmatic change.

*Petr 
ugovoril 
(119)R  Tanjui (PROi byt′
ubedi 
[acc]
Peter persuaded Tanja to be
osmotrennoj vracom.
[part pass instr fem sing] [instr case]
examined by a doctor
(ex. from Comrie (1981)).

*Peter 
überredete 
(120)G  Tanjai (PROi von einem Artzt
überzeugte
Peter persuaded Tanja by a doctor
untersucht zu werden
examined to be

*Petr 
presvedcil 
(121)C  otcei (PROi být osetren
umluvil 
[acc]
Peter persuaded father to be examined
v nemocnici)
in a hospital
58 Chapter 4

The intended interface parameter leads to the prediction that, in rendering

sentence types as literally as possible, those three languages and others that fix
the parameter negatively must rely on PRO being solely and unchangeably
provided with 〈intact, +〉. This is incompatible with controlled passive comple-
ments. An idiomatic lexical near equivalent is available. Czech and German use
causative nechat and lassen, respectively.

Petr 
umluvil 
(122)C  otcei (PROi nechat
 presvedcil 
Peter persuaded father to have (somebody)
se ošetrit v nemocnici)
himself examine in a hospital
‘Peter persuaded his father to have himself examined in a
hospital’

Peter 
überzeugte
(123)G  seinen Vateri (PROi sichi
überredete 
Peter persuaded his father himself
von einem Facharzt untersuchen zu lassen
by a specialist examine to have
‘Peter persuaded his father to have himself examined by a
specialist’.

Petr 
ugovoril 
(124)R  otca (PRO podvergnut′
ubedil 
[acc]
Peter persuaded father to submit
sebja osmotru vracom)
[dat] [instr]
himself to an examination by a doctor
‘Peter persuaded his father to undergo medical examination.’
Thus, German, Russian and Czech rely on a radical syntactic and lexical
solution to the conceptually inherent aspect of their respective counterparts of
persuade. In all examples (122) – (124) PRO is assigned 〈intact, +〉 contained
in the θ-grid of Czech nechat, German lassen and Russian podvergnut’ sebja,
respectively. They are licensed by um (B,b).
The parameter associated with the lexical subclass of persuade-type
control verbs, which interfaces grammar and pragmatics, can be formulated as
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 59

in (G), with (D) again as its corollary.

(G) In the designated lexical subclass of the control verbs associated
with constraint (B,b), its unmarked application can(not) be
satisfied by assignment to derived PRO of feature specification
〈intact, +〉.17 licensing conceptual-pragmatic causative switch.
The parameter consists in the choice between allowing the assignment to PRO
of the nonlocal or secondary thematic specification 〈F,+〉, or not allowing it.
The relevant assignment is conceptual-pragmatically driven but referred to in
turn by grammar, which by the um application of (B,b) can license the result if
the parameter is set positively in the respective languages. 〈intact, +〉 is the
only characterization that the chain headed by PRO can receive pragmatically.
If the parameter is set negatively, the “original” syntactic assignment of
〈intact, –〉 to (the chain headed by) PRO resists being pragmatically overrid-
den by the feature 〈intact, +〉. In other words, 〈intact, –〉 remains visible for
checking by (B,b) and would be expected to satisfy its marked version in the
same way as ask-type control sentences do, e.g., in (59), that is, result in
correct “subject” control. But this expectation is not borne out, which means
that the account of the grammaticality of control in (115), and the like, which
excludes them from being licensed by m (B,b), is not sufficient (problem (III),
mentioned 4.1.). It leaves open the question why, in English sentences as
(115), (116), control can or even must evade licensing by the marked con-
straint, and why in German, Russian and Czech, which set the parameter
negatively, that is, do not touch the feature value 〈intact, –〉 of PRO, the
marked version of (B,b) does not license their counterparts either. The pre-
sumed interface parameter (G), thus, needs refinement with respect to its
conceptual prerequisite conditions.
Recall that the marked application of (B,b) is intrinsically bound up with
pairings of semantic roles which can imply coreference of their respective two
recipients. Coreference established by the interrelated thematic structures of
the matrix clause and the embedded infinitive can be relied on to function as a
control identification, if PRO is one of the paired DP’s (cf. the discussion
above, 3.2.3.). Indirect implementation of control by conferring it on indepen-
dently paired thematic roles that imply coreference of their respective DP-
recipients is characteristic of marked control phenomena. It is exactly the
weakness or conceptual complexity of this thematically driven coreference
that is responsible for the variation of wellformed control in the cross-linguis-
60 Chapter 4

tic persuade-type subclass of control verbs, and for its general resistance to
being licensed by the marked constraint (B,b).
Persuade and its ilk lend themselves by far less easily to a construal in
which the matrix subject can be seen as benefactive of the action described by
the passive infinitiv. Thus, referential pairing of the interested “parts”, that is,
identification of the matrix subject and moved PRO, is not normally amenable
to a marked control relation. That is why (116) does not exhibit subject control
as, for example, (117). Persuade-type events, as opposed to ask-events,
characteristically contain arguing and reasoning, which rather neutralize as-
pects of the action directly related to its benefit for the person(s) doing the
arguing. Thus, the derived PRO-DP that is assigned, say, theme or goal in the
passive complement is not readily construed as referentially identical with the
subject-DP.
Still, if the chances for subject control in passive controlled clauses, in
accord with m (B,b), are slim, persuade-contexts do not fully exclude it and
may sporadically exhibit repercussions of the thematically driven coreference.
Sensitivity to peculiar conceptual construal of thematic roles and their interac-
tion as well as resulting fragility of control judgments have to be taken into
consideration. Take for illustration an example from Rochette discussed by
Vanden Wyngaerd (1987: 92).
(125)F Guillaume a persuadé Béatrice [PPde [NP[S’ PRO l’ aider à
faire ses devoirs]]]
“In this example, control is ambigous, (25) (=(125), RR) being translated as
follows:
a. Guillaume persuaded Béatrice to help him to do his homework.
b. Guillaume persuaded Béatrice to be allowed to help her do her
homework.
… we are dealing with a case of nonobligatory control … (the complemen-
tizer) de appears irrespective of the control properties of the matrix verb. Thus
the exact nature of the structural contrast remains to be determined.” (Vanden
Wyngaerd 1987: 92). As far as a structural contrast is concerned, it can be
captured by the two versions of constraint (B,b): (125) satifies its um version
in the a. interpretation. In the b. interpretation, if correct, we could wonder at
the interpolation of be allowed, which, on this approach, would seem to
induce “object” control as in (115), (116). A reading of (125), as paraphrased
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 61

by b., however seems to be licensed by the marked application of (B,b). This is

quite unexpected considering that control matching marked (B,b) cannot
materialize in seemingly similar cases like (115), since, in contrast to ask-type
verbs, the basic pairing of feature values required by the m constraint (B,b)
(〈intact, +〉con & 〈intact, –〉pro) does not square as easily with linking a concep-
tual-pragmatic specification like benefactive with PRO. In other words, PRO
in (125), if assigned this specification, which sustains marked conditions, does
not suggest that it be identifiable with the matrix subject-DP referring to the
person(s) doing the persuading. Now, one might acquiesce in interpretation b.
if (125) could be construed with the help of a conceptually interposed predi-
cate that assigns benefactive to PRO. Interpretation b. is a literal paraphrase of
a construal through which “subject” control in (125) can become acceptable.
“Silent” be allowed functions as a conceptual intermediary providing PRO
with a characterization which makes (125) satisfy marked (B,b) while, of
course, violating it. (125), if interpretable as in b., thus might be considered to
be analogous with the ask-type Spanish example (88) discussed above. Both
of them violate the m constraint (B,b) and both are reconciled to it by the
conceptual construal intuitively represented as be allowed (or be permitted).
Their outward appearance is the result of conventionally motivated compres-
sion.
Still, the parallelism between the supposed b.-reading of (125) and (88) is
a spurious one with respect to the licensing conditions operative at the inter-
face level. Phenomena that evidence violations of either um or m constraint
(B,b) still tend to be receptive to construals that cope with the menacing
“crash”. They are subject to parametric variations interfacing grammar and
pragmatics.
Upon my general contention that pragmatics can be parameterized, I posit
another parameter (H), which, like (G), interfaces principled constraints of
control and pragmatic interference in them. It consists in interpretive constru-
als that can be referred to by the very constraints they seem to evade. (H),
unlike (G), targets marked application of (B,b) and is meant to account for the
contrast between the potential ambiguity of, e.g. (86a) or (88), and its absence
in their literal German and Russian counterparts. Marked (B,b), by definition,
is weaker than unmarked (B,b), being grounded on a thematic interrelation-
ship between DP’s that is construed as licensing coreference. (see above,
3.2.3.) Clearly, construals that repair violations of m (B,b), as in (86a) or (88),
tend to be obviated by an “ingrained” understanding that corresponds with
62 Chapter 4

unmarked (B,b), requiring 〈F,+〉PRO, that is, sets the parameter negatively.
Ambiguity is excluded, then.
(H) Languages (do not) allow violations of marked (B,b) to be
construed as matching it in the subclass ask, subject to the (B,b)
constraint. Positive value is linked to modality, in particular
deontic switch.
If they do not allow the construal under the conventionalized “pressure” as
suggested above (3.3.), judgements are determined by the um application of
(B,b) alone.
(H) can be assumed to interact with the null object parameter as it is
described by Rizzi (1986). Languages which set this parameter negatively,
that is, in which there is no syntactically “active” pro capable of control are
more susceptible to setting (H) positively, as described above. Let us shortly
compare (G) with (H).
(G) is a substantive interface parameter: Grammatical linking of thematic
specifications gives way to conceptual-pragmatic “reconstruction” (English)
or resists it (German, Russian). The parameter is associated with a subclass
subject to constraint (B,b), covering persuade-type verbs. If it is set positively,
repair is effected by conditions on, and recovering of, thematic specifications.
Acceptability is attained by an allocation of feature specifications which is
referred to and licensed by, the um constraint that was violated.
The parameter (H) presumed to be amenable to the ask-type subclass of
control verbs that is subject to (B,b) is of a different kind. It arises from
violations of marked (B,b) and can be assumed to be purely pragmatic. Set
positively, its work must end up in a thematic configuration that satisfies the
very m constraint (B,b) it has violated. Restoration to interpretive wellformed-
ness, that is, acceptability, consists in the conceptual arrangement of the
thematic conditions on which matching the m constraint depends: PRO must
be made thematically compatible with the subject of the matrix clause. Conse-
quently and more precisely, it must be warranted to be identifiable with the
higher subject. The clearest conceptual interpretation, namely be allowed,
which effects identification and in some examples occurs overtly, is highly
susceptible to conventional compression omitting it and conceptually restor-
ing it. Positive setting of the pragmatic parameter associated with ask-type
verbs (e.g. English, Spanish) consists in the conceptual interpolation of some
equivalent of be allowed under highly conventional favorable auspices. Take
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 63

the critical cases potentially satisfying the um or violating the m constraint

(B,b). I repeat (86) (from Bach) and (88) (from Chomsky).
(86) They asked the teacher to go to the bathroom.
(88)SP María le pidió a Juan (hablar con los muchachos)
‘María asked Juan to speak with the boys’
Following Bach, (86) is “ambiguous for some”. Assume that (88) is ambigu-
ous for some informants, too, though subject control seems dominant, follow-
ing Chomsky (see above). Both languages set the parameter positively, that is,
can “repair” violations of the marked constraint (B,b) if this interpretation is
preferred to the one meeting its um version. The pragmatical arrangement
restores a structure that can be checked by the grammatical constraint (B,b)
straightforwardly. I repeat (89), in which a “distant” unmarked control rela-
tion meeting (B,b) is established by a conceptually constructed “bridge”,
which in turn exhibits control.
(89) Xj asked SOME PERSON(S) Yi (PROi to PERMIT/ALLOW Xj (PROj to
leave))
In languages setting the presumed pragmatic parameter negatively, potential
ambiguity of control is out of the question. Recall that the ambiguity cannot
arise when the positive setting of this parameter combines with instances of
the negative setting of the null object parameter, as in English. The unmarked
application of (B,b) fails, since a syntactically inert null object cannot be a
controller. In languages which set the null object parameter positively like
German and Russian, only unmarked (“object”-) control meeting (B,b) is
possible. The parameter value may be supposed to contribute to the negative
setting of the pragmatic parameter related to the ask-type subclass. The
spuriousness of the superficial structural analogy between (88) and (125)
consists in the wrong step of transferring a systematic device for coping with
violations of the marked constraint, which is parameterized at the pragmatic
level, to a distinct subclass which is systematically associated with an inter-
face parameter concerning violations of the unmarked constraint (B,b). Recall
that the marked application of (B,b) is substantially restricted in the persuade-
subclass. In addition to (125), I will give an illustration from German. In their
incisive widely experiment-aided investigation of control in English and
German (1991, 1993), Köpcke and Panther, though assuming that überreden,
überzeugen, (persuade) convey Benefactive to their subject as well as bitten or
64 Chapter 4

beschwören (implore), seem to arrive at the conclusion that “subject” control

(satisfying marked constraint (B,b) in this approach) of these verbs is rather
bizarre or, in any case, considerably restricted as compared with the ask-
subclass. A comparison between (126) and (127), both interpreted as meeting
m (B,b), shows a clear superiority in acceptability of the latter.
(126)G Renate überzeugt Heide, das Telefon benutzen
Renate is persuading Heide the telephone to use
zu dürfen
to be allowed
‘Renate is persuading Heide to (that she (Renate)) be allowed/
permitted to use the telephone.’
(127)G Renate bittet Heide, das Telefon benutzen zu dürfen
Renate asks Heide to be allowed to use the telephone
As a consequence, violations of m (B,b) made acceptable by the positive
option of the pragmatic parameter (H) require quite a particular interpretive
situation in the persuade-subclass.

4.2. On complement unaccusatives and unergatives

Neither class of intransitive verbs is left out of consideration, at least implic-

itly. We have contended that control behaviour of the lexical persuade- and
ask-type subclasses can be captured by unmarked and marked versions of
constraint (B,b) together with corollary (D) and subject to variation of param-
eters (G) and (H). Persuade and ask differ in their respective reactions to the
marked application of (B,b), that is, in their peripheral and conceptually
driven control behaviour. The differences have been accounted for on the
grounds of matching effects and requirements between the identification of
control and appropriate thematic specifications of the arguments to be coin-
dexed.
The overall condition contained in the um and m constraint (B,b) is the
availability of 〈intact, +〉 in the θ-grid of the complement verb. If marked (B,b)
is violated, its licensing conditions can only be restored by introducing con-
ceptual notions which may be intuitively represented by meta-language lexi-
cal material that in turn induces secondary thematic assignment satisfying m
(B,b). If the unmarked constraint (B,b) is violated, its conditions are reconsti-
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 65

tuted by the conceptual-pragmatic “super assignment” of 〈intact, +〉 to PRO.

Unergatives in the infinitival complement do not seem to pose any
problems for either version of constraint (B,b), if “… unergatives are verbs
which take a single, truly agentive argument: a deep structure subject with no
deep-structure object.” (Fowler/Yadroff 1993: 256). Beyond their purely
structural properties, either class may have an effect on wellformed control. In
unergative complements, PRO should be provided with 〈intact, +〉. Attempts
to associate the two notions with thematic characterizations, however, have
met certain reservations (Levin/Rappaport 1986; Grimshaw 1987).
The only problem that could arise concerns some verbs which have been
considered unergatives, e.g. cough, sneeze, laugh, and others. (cf. Levin/
Rappaport 1986: 654)
sneeze 
 
(128) They persuaded him i (PRO i to cough )
laugh 
These verbs can hardly be taken to denote volitional acts and, thus, to have
〈intact, +〉 in their θ-grids. Under this approach with its licensing conditions,
such cases of control can no more be rescued than unaccusative complement
verbs denoting “… states (and even acts) in which the patient is drawn into the
action conveyed.” (Fowler/Yadroff 1993: 256).
It should be clear that any lacunae in empirical and conceptual coverage
and judgment have to be closed not by control theory but theta theory when
the latter is associated with the bipartition of unergatives and unaccusatives. It
is obvious again that refinement of control theory is also consequent on an
enriched theta theory and in particular refined non amnestying pragmatics.
(128) either violates um (B,b) and reaches no wellformed interpretation, or it
is accepted on the understanding that sneeze etc. can be taken to be intentional
actions (〈intact, +〉pro) in some “world”.

4.3. Neutralization of the null object parameter with respect to Control

of persuade complements

In particular cases of “strong” lexical government that require the overt

appearance of the direct object, as, for example, persuade, g. überreden and
überzeugen, differentiations within the null object parameter, set differently in
66 Chapter 4

Russian, German and English (cf. Cole 1987: 603)), play a minor role in
control (cf. 3.3.). Thus, the strongly marked contrast between English and
German arising in the control behaviour of ask and bitten insofar as it hinges
on the null object disappears in the case of persuade and its German counter-
parts. The Russian counterparts, however, allow null objects, which are
syntactically active and license control.
(129)R On ze ugovoril proi ((PROi otdat’ Rodju
[acc sg]
He (emphasis) (had) persuaded pro to send Rodja
v korpus a Laru v gimnaziju))
[acc sg]
to the military college and Lara to the gymnasium

' He (had) persuaded   ...'

somebody

them / him / her 
(130)R V DS (demokraticeskom sojuze) nikto i nikomu
[nom] [dat]
In (the) democratic alliance nobody and nobody
nicego ne mozet prikazat’, mozet tol’ko ubedit’ proi
[acc]
nothing not can order can only persuade to
((PROi postupit’ tak ili inace))
act so or otherwise
‘In the Democratic Alliance nobody can order anybody any-
thing, can only convince him to act somehow.’
A null object can combine with a null subject, both referring pro’s carrying ϕ-
features.

mat′ k 
(131)R proi ugovoril  pro  PRO j,k ostat’ sja
 j 
persuaded to stay
doma))
at home
‘ He persuaded him / her / them (mother) to stay at home’.

The counterpart to English one would be a plural pro in Russian.

The persuade subclass and cognate ones 67

djadjui 
(132)R pro ugovorili   ((PRO j,i k obedu
 pro j 
[+plural][pret pl] [acc sg]
one  uncle 
  persuaded   for dinner
 they   him / her / them 
ostat’sja))
to stay

Note that in all these examples the pro-object is not available in English and
German, This fact, owing to lexical properties of (counterparts) of persuade,
is independent of the null object parameter and their distinct values of the
interface parameter (G), in contrast with (H).
We take convince, urge, enjoin, incite, and some other verbs and their
cross-linguistic counterparts to be in the persuade-subclass and follow this
verb and their control behaviour most closely: They are subject to constraint
(B,b), show a more or less recalcitrant attitude to its marked application and,
crucially, their cross-linguistic differences in control are parameterized at the
interface level with regard to violations of the unmarked (B,b).
Dividing the class (B,b) up into further subclasses, separating them in
particular from the persuade-type verbs above is motivated (1) by semantic
selection, which allows some verbs to take a DP marked [–human] as their
subject, and by dative case assignment to the controller argument DP (sub-
class under 4.4.4.).

4.4. Further subclasses obeying constraint (B,b)

4.4.1. The teach subclass

Teach and its cross-linguistic equivalents pose no substantially new problems

of control, but their treatment may prove instructive methodologically. As
with persuade, intransitivization is impeded. Teach, g. lehren, r. (na)ucit’
obucat’, c. naucit’ obey constraint (B,b). These verbs do not denote inten-
tional actions aiming to bring about that someone decides to do something
(e.g. ask, persuade). Rather, in their main sense, they describe events, verbal
and/or nonverbal intentional actions that (try to) enable someone to do some-
68 Chapter 4

thing. Imparting wisdom and/or ability to someone hardly lends itself to

construals in which the person that acquires the ability, e.g. second language
faculty, does not figure syntactically as the actor or, e.g. experiencer in
subject position, that is, as PRO. Thus, teach, like persuade allows of violat-
ing the unmarked constraint (B,b) without loss of acceptability.
Acceptability is restored as with analogous persuade cases, provided that
corollary (D) is satisfied.
(133) The soldiersi have been taught ti (PROi not to be spotted ti),
(PROi to camouflage themselvesi).
Correspondingly, in contrast to ask, PRO in passive complements and the
matrix subject cannot be tied together and identified by bonds of something
like Benefactive. Thus, these verbs have no access to the marked version
(B,b).
(134) *Hei taught Anne (PROi to be allowed to ride the bicycle)
(133) shows that the account I have suggested for violations of um (B,b) in
persuade complements (see 4.1.) is suitable here. However, the cross-level or
interface parametrization (G) assumed above to account for persuade e.g. in
(115), (116) and their counterparts (119), (120) does not include teach,
sentence types (135), (136) are acceptable in Russian and German.
(135)G ?Sie lehrten unsi ((PROi nicht gesehen zu werden))
they taught us not to be seen
(136)R ?Oni naucili nasi (PROi ne byt’ zamecennymi))
they taught us not to be noticed
The particular control behavior of teach and its crosslinguistic counterparts is
very revealing insofar as the major framework of the chosen lexical feature
specifications turns out to receive straightforward empirical confirmation
from the subtle interface parameter (G). The possibility of the contrast arising
between the positive value set in English for (G) and the negative value fixed,
e.g., in Russian and German, is contingent upon the actually present intention
of the referent of PRO to act (〈intact,+〉), which is understood to be the result
of persuading and the respective events expressed by cognate verbs subject to
(G). The clausal complement of teach rather has a kind of generic character
indicating that a particular ability how to do something is (being) acquired,
which does not require an actual intention to exercise it. Thus, parameter
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 69

values of (G) may be neutralized with respect to teach in general. While

events of persuading, if successful, bring about intentions to act (examples
(131), (132), events of teaching need not (ex. (133), (135)). In the former case,
German and Russian counterparts to persuade, in consequence of the (nega-
tive) setting of parameter (G), achieve assignment of 〈intact,+〉 to PRO
through particular verbs (cf. (123), (124)) vs. ((119)–(120)), as opposed to
English (115–116)). In the latter case, teach does not require lexical assign-
ment of 〈intact,+〉 to PRO. The distinction between implicit causality switch-
ing, construed as positive value of (G), in descriptions of persuade-events, and
the covert (or overt) interrogative manner adverbial, which is intrinsic to the
complement of teach-event descriptions, surfaces syntactically in the contrast
between (115), (116) and (119)–(124) on the one hand, and the conformity of
(133) with (135), (136), on the other.

4.4.2. The case of signal as a Control verb

A discussion of the control behaviour of signal may elucidate the operative

range of principle (B,b) and its susceptibility to varying thematical instantia-
tions exhibited by one and the same verb. To all appearances, signal belongs
in the ask-subclass associated with (B,b). It clearly is amenable to its un-
marked and marked version. The very evasiveness with which complements
of signal comply with (B,b) throws light on the general mechanism of comple-
ment control. Signal meets the um constraint in (137), (138).
(137) John signaled to Maryi (PROi to behave herself) (ex. from
Manzini)
(138) Pat signaled Loui (PROi to leave) (ex. from Sag/Pollard 1991)
Marked application of (B,b) is illustrated in (139).
(139)G Der verletzte Torwarti signalisierte (dem Trainer)
[dat]
the hurt goalkeeper signaled (to) the coach
(PROi t ausgewechselt zu werden)
substituted to be
How should we articulate the mechanism through which unmarked control
matching (B,b) can be exercised by an empty controller if the latter seems to
do that independently of its syntactic activity or inertness, that is, indepen-
70 Chapter 4

dently of the setting of the null object pro-parameter?

(140) Louise signaled to follow her (ex. from Bresnan)
(141) Pat signaled to leave. (ex. from Pollard/Sag)
(142)R Signaljat (ei) (PROi ostanovit’sja)
[3 ps pl pres] [infinitive]
(They) signal to stop
Do such structures contradict Bach’s generalization, as Bresnan (1982: 418)
and Sag/Pollard (1991: 95) suggest? Bach’s descriptive constraint says that a
direct object controller cannot be omitted. But signal, as I contend, has no
inherent object. It neither subcategorizes for a structural direct object nor has a
corresponding theta role in its theta grid. Signal and its counterparts is inher-
ently subject-oriented. Signaling, one hopes to reach a receiving target and, of
course, in many cases one may have a particular target in mind, but signaling
does not hinge on reaching a recipient and its “success”, the adequate perfor-
mance of signaling, is not dependent on finding a receiver of the signals. If a
recipient is available or a particular “addressee” targeted, they need not end up
as direct objects. They rather may be projected as indirect objects and/or
prepositional phrases.
(143)R Signal’te na slupkiacc vernut’sja
[imperat pl]
Signal to the boats to return
But they need not be in the “numeration” to be computed. The interpretation
of a presumable or intended recipient of the signal can be left to pragmatic
inference.
What can be signaled when the content of signaling is packaged in a bare
infinitival complement? (S)he who signals either sends — in a conventional
code of signs — a message (a) concerning his/her own intended behaviour
supposed to be related or relevant to that of persons possibly involved or
particular persons, or a message (b) to somebody “telling” him/her to do
something. Ambiguity is a possible consequence.
(144) The car signaled to turn left.
(145) Col. Jones signaled to land.
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 71

(146) Col. Jonesi signaled (the control tower) to position himselfi

for a landing.
(147) Col. Jones knew that the control tower had signaled (himi) to
position himself for a landing.
(examples (144)–(147) from Pollard/Sag (1991: 96 f.))
Ambiguity is independent of the phonetic appearance or syntactic “activity”
of the potential “object”-controller. As mentioned above, availability of pro
seems to play no role. In other terms, signal and its cross-linguistic counter-
parts do not assign a theta role linked to object position. Thus, PRO cannot be
“coindexed with the designated θ-role.” (Rizzi 1986: 552). It is not unreason-
able to assume, as suggested above, that directionality is an intrinsically
lexical property of signal and, as a thematical feature, can be saturated in the
lexicon (in the sense of Rizzi 1986: 553).
Whether a (in)direct object-DP expressing the target person(s) of signal-
ing is lexically present or not, being saturated in the lexicon and interpreted in
relation to discourse, the signaler either directs the attention to her/his own
ensuing or imminent behavior, warning the addressee in advance, or (s)he tries
to guide the latter’s behavior.
If at all, then only in this sense, “… the interpretation of the unexpressed
subject (PRO, RR) is free.” (Pollard/Sag 1991: 99). Control in infinitival
complements is not free from the constraint (B,b), which has to adjust to the
lexical peculiarity of signal. Applications of the um and the m version of (B,b)
have been illustrated by examples (137), (139) among others.
Does (144), repeated here, provide empirical evidence supporting this
approach?
(144) The car signaled to turn left.
The two possible readings of (144) should be subject to, or match the two
versions of (B,b), respectively. “… the car in 108a (=(144), RR) could be a
stopped police car signaling an oncoming motorist to take a detour.” (Pollard/
Sag 1991: 96). This meets the unmarked constraint (B,b) in the modified
treatment of a lexically saturated abstract controller being assigned 〈intact, –〉.
The identification may materialize at LF as coindexing PRO with a free
variable which may be bound by relatedness to discourse. The account for
“the more natural interpretations (which) involve the car signaling that it will
make a left turn …” (Pollard/Sag 1991: 96) is less straightforward. This
72 Chapter 4

reading is “more natural” since it describes a perfectly usual and conventional-

ized event type. The car is “metonymically” assigned 〈intact, +〉, which finally
matches marked (B,b) iff PRO can be pragmatically construed as a recipient of
〈intact, –〉. Clearly, the driver gives signs that he will turn left on the under-
standing that his/her decision be taken notice of for her/his benefit of unim-
peded passage. Thus, the sentential argument of the infinitival complement is
the theme of taking notice of and could be assigned 〈intact, –〉, meeting
corollary (D). Percolating down to PRO, the feature specification could be
referred to by the m (B,b). The addressee’s knowledge of (the referent of)
PRO’s turning left is beneficial to the car, the metonymic antecedent of PRO.
There is some analogy to ask-type control in (violations of) m (B,b) (cf. 3.2.5.)
Note that being taken notice of is similar to construals resorting to be allowed.
In both cases we have to do with strongly conventionalized and thus “natural”
usage that obviates violations of the marked constraint since it can be con-
strued to remedy them. Signal differs from ask in that its particular lexically
semantic properties (see above) are responsible for a control behaviour which,
obeying the principled constraint (B,b), evades the null object (pro) parameter
and the pragmatic parameter (H).

4.4.3. teach and ask. Larson’s comparison

Some recent ideas of Larson (1991: 131-135) about control properties of teach
and ask suggest again that a purely configurational approach to control may
fall wide of the mark. Larson observes that “The verb teach is similar to ask in
allowing interrogative as well as nominal and infinitival complements …
Furthermore, again as with ask, an intuitive interrogative semantics appears to
assert itself with infinitives and certain nominals.” (1991: 133). These com-
mon configurational and distributional properties lead Larson to “… suggest
that at least some examples with teach like (61b) (Mary never taught John to
sing) might be analysed parallel to ask …” (p. 134). As we have shown above
(4.4.1.), control properties of ask differ from those of teach with respect to the
unmarked and marked application of constraint (B,b). Larson continues:
“However, there is an important additional fact about teach that bears on
control. Unlike ask, teach is a true dative-shifting verb …” (p. 134). Larson
supposes this fact to indicate that, in addition to control conditions shared with
ask, teach has control properties at least similar to those of the dative-shifting
verb promise. He puts it even more strongly: “Since teach has not only an
interrogative pattern like ask but also a dative pattern like promise, it follows
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 73

that we cannot rest with saying that teach shares the former’s control behav-
iour. Clearly, we must also say something about why it doesn’t seem to show
the control behaviour of promise. Since teach exhibits both of the basic
complementation patterns, why doesn’t it exhibit both control paradigms as
well” (p. 134). Thus, Larson expects that teach combines the control behav-
iour of ask and promise, but it does not come up to his expectations with either
verb. The basic reason is that those expectations are based on the wrong
assumption that the configurational and distributational properties stated by
Larson are essentially related to, or determine, control properties.18 While
teach in fact shares at least the standard unmarked control relation with ask as
with many others, in accord with um constraint (B,b) (cf. John taught Felix to
sing), it has nothing in common with the control pattern of promise. Larson
has some difficulty in accounting for these facts adverse to his approach. Not
unexpectedly, he reverts to what is relevant for control in trying to explain the
difference: “… teach does in fact realize both its ask-type complementation
and its promise-type complementation with infinitives … the latter is repre-
sented by infinitives on their (injunctive) reading. This then suggests why the
expected subject control behaviour of teach is missing. If the promise-type
infinitives with teach always have an injunctive reading … then their under-
stood subjects are always in a sense antecedently fixed. As a matter of
semantics, they must always be construed as referring analogously to generic
you or one in examples like You should always look both ways before crossing
the street … The expected infinitival complementation pattern with teach is
thus present, but promise-type subject control is excluded on independent
grounds.” (Larson 1991: 135)). Thus, promise-type constructions do not
exhibit promise-type subject control. Whatever syntactic similarity joins teach
with promise, it has little effect upon control. Larson has got side-tracked here
following consequently his bent for dealing with control syntactically.19 What
Larson calls the “injunctive” reading of teach has some indirect effect on
control in that it selectively permits a nonhuman subject, which of course is
indifferent to 〈intact,α〉 and immune to m constraint (B,b). The range of
candidates of controller narrows down to one. See (148) – (149).
(148)R Zizn’ naucila egoi ((PROi cenit’ ljudej
life (has) taught him to judge people
ne po vnešnosti
not by (their) exteriors.
74 Chapter 4

(149)C Az tei zivot naucí ((PROi být opatrnejší))

[acc]
When you life will teach to be more cautious
pochopíš ze musíš být opatrnejší
[2 ps sg] [2 ps sg] [compar]
(you) will understand that (you) must be more cautious
i v usudcích o lidech
[loc pl] [locative pl]
too in judgments about people
‘When life will have taught you to be more cautious, you will
understand that you must be more cautious also in your
judgments on people’
(From Václav Havel’s play “Asanace”)
Besides teach and signal (and counterparts), e.g. force, compel, impel, induce,
prompt, tempt, encourage, embolden belong to the subclass of control verbs
that fall under constraint (B,b) and permit subject-DP’s marked [–human].
(150)C Taková reakce verejnosti donutila
[fem sg] [gen sg]
Such a reaction of the public prompted
[príslušné instance]i PROi odlozit
the corresponding authorities to postpone
provedení reformy
the realization of the reform
(151)R Podobnaja reakcija obšcestvennosti pobudila
[sootvetstvujušcie instancii]i PROi otsrocit provedenie
reformy
(gloss as (150))
(152)R Mysl’ ob odnoj vcerašnej vstrece moej
the thought on alone yesterday’s meeting my
soblaznjala menjai (PROi zadat’ emu koj-kakie voprosy
[dat sg]
tempted me to put him some questions
‘The thoughts alone on my meeting yesterday tempted me to
put him some questions.’
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 75

The latter group of control verbs subtly differs from teach in that they more
readily adopt the control case analyzed as an instance of cross-level param-
etrized variation on verbs like persuade and considered to be a violation of the
um version of constraint (B,b), that is, they instantiate the positive value of
parameter (G) which presupposes satisfying (D).

The collapse 
prompted 
(153)  him i (PRO i to be examined by a doctor).
compelled 
The unability of the subclass of control verbs under discussion to accept
licensing by the marked constraint (B,b) is substantiated by the possible
selection of DP-subjects with a [–human]-head noun. Such DP’s of course can
not receive a thematic role as benefactive, the characterization considered to
be a relevant precondition of the m application (B,b) to be successful (3.2.3.).
Selecting a nonhuman DP-subject disqualifies control structures in the
given subclass of verbs from taking part in correlations between “nonreflex-
ive” and “reflexive” verbs. This situation emerges, for example in Russian,
Czech and other Slavic languages. Cliticized “weak” pronominal reflexive
elements regulate grammatical functions and corresponding linkage of the-
matic roles. Compare (154) with (155).
(154)R Ochotnik naucil synai (PROi streljat’ iz
[pret masc sing] [acc]
The hunter taught (his) son to shoot (from)
malen’kogo ruzja pocti bez promacha)
[genitive] [genitive]
a little gun nearly without missing
(155)R Syni naucil-sja (PROi streljat’ iz malen’kogo
[pret masc sing-refl]
son learnt to shoot (from) a little
ruz’ja)
gun …
(156)C Naucila se (PROi bruslit’)
[fem sing pret] [refl clitic]
she taught reflexiv to skate
‘(she) learned to skate’
76 Chapter 4

At PF, the clitic takes second position in Czech, but it is always affixed to the
verb in Russian.
(157)C Nebo se naucila správne mluvit
[refl.] [pret fem sing]
for pro (she) learnt correctly to speak
“Subject”-control obtains after A-movement of the object-DP, which is the
controller in (155)-(157), in accord with um (B,b). Since se (sja) appears to
trigger the movement to nonthematic subject position, it can naturally be held
responsible for, or at least involved in, the mechanism that prevents Case
assignment. Since a DP receiving theme and describing what is taught to
somebody, is Case-marked [+dative] in Russian and Czech, I take the corre-
sponding clausal argument to occupy the same structural position in these
languages. Note that the way the theta roles of the internal arguments of teach
are linked to the direct and oblique object positions in English is the very
opposite of Russian and Czech. The theta role assigned to the DP that is
“dative shifted” in English, is borne by the direct object in the two languages.
That is the reason why I adopt a ternary verbal structure here. (cf. Emonds
1993: 226, fn. 15). X’-licensing, that is, V’-licensing of the dative DP, or
Larson’s (1988, 1990) “shell analysis” are alternatives. The choice of either of
them does not bear on the issue discussed.

4.4.4. A subclass of Control verbs subcategorizing for an oblique object

I turn to another subclass of control verbs within the domain of constraint (B,b):
verbs that in languages considered here inherently assign dative to the NP
which is theta-marked goal, benefactive or addressee. The control verb allow,
promise and their respective cross-linguistic counterparts will be singled out in
(sect. 4.5. and chapt. 5.).
(158)P Krystyna radzila kolezankomi (PROi obejrzeć
[dat pl]
Krystyna advised (her) collegues to see
nowy film)
the new film
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 77

(159)R Ostoroznyj Mazepa sovetoval proi (PRO i idti

[dative]
cautious Mazepa advised to walk
beregom Dnepra)
[gen sg]
along the bank of (the river) Dnepr
(160)C Redaktor doporucil autorovii (PROi provést
[dative]
(An) editor recommended the author to make
nekolik zmen v textu
several changes in the text
(ex. from Panevová, personal communication)
Predictably, these verbs resist being licensed by the marked version of con-
straint (B,b). They do not lend themselves to the Benefactive-pairing “inad-
vertently” functioning as control of PRO by matrix subject in case of passive
complements (see 3.2.3.).20
Recall that inaccessibility to the marked version of constraint (B,b), the
version typically licensing control of ask-type verbs, amounts to a precondi-
tion for using the pragmatic chance of satisfying um (B,b) in case the corre-
sponding interface parameter (G) is set favorably: the case of persuade-type
verbs in English vs. the German and Russian values of the parameter (cf. 4.1.).
Advise- and recommend-type verbs meet the condition, and their “metaac-
tional” character with the dative NP taking on the accessory role of benefac-
tive strongly suggests that they will accept license in the defined way if the
respective parametric settings allow it.
(161) He recommended himi (PROi to be examined by a doctor)
Recall that German and Russian fix the cross-level parameter differently. Not
too unexpectedly, we find the somewhat delicate construction accepted in
Czech.
(162)C (pro) Doporucil Jirkovii (PROi být zarazen
[3 ps pret masc] [dative]
(he) recommended Jirka to be included in
do vyšší kategorie)
[gen sg]
a higher category
(Example from Panevová, personal communication).
78 Chapter 4

Judgments are delicate in languages cognate with languages that set the
parameter negatively like Russian. Sensitivity to lexical environment and the
cross-linguistic parameterized distribution give additional support to a prag-
matic assessment of this type of control. Crucially, we have evidence that
control here is maintained inspite of adverse parametric setting, e.g., in
Russian, when the clausal complement is not passive, although the conceptual
construal is clearly analogous to passive. This is the case in some reflexive
structures that potentially receive a passive interpretation (cf. Růzicka 1992).
Not being in a dethematizised position, their PRO subject is receptive to
〈intact,+〉, satifying um constraint (B,b) at D-structure.

On 
rekomendoval 
(163)R  Borisui (PROi
sovetoval 
[dative]
he 
recommended 
 Boris
advised 
posmotret’sja)
[reflexive]
to be examined (by a doctor)
Typical representatives of this subclass of dative object control verbs within
the grasp of constraint (B,b) are order and forbid, command, tell, instruct,
direct, charge commission. Their cross-linguistic counterparts mostly have an
oblique dative object.
(164)C (pro) rozkázal mui (PROi mlcet)
[3 ps sing pret] [dative]
he told him to be silent
(165)R Major Berezkin prosnulsja, …, pozval avtomatcika
[acc]
major Berezkin woke up, …, called submachine-gunner
Gluškova i velel prinesti sebe pomyt’sja
[3 ps sing pret] [refl dat]
Gluškov and ordered to bring himself to wash (himself)
‘Major Berezkin … ordered him (Gluškov) to bring him
(major Berezkin) things to wash with’
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 79

An approximate simplified LF-structure of (165) is (166).

(166) [[major Berezkin]j … pozval [avtomatcika Gluškova]i] i [proj
velel [DP pro]i [CP PROi prinesti sebej [DP ek [CPOk [IP PROj
pomyt’sja tk]]]]]
The overt element corresponding to the null operator Ok would be cem
(instrumental Case of the relative cto ‘that’). I assume that an empty operator
that after movement leaves a trace in the S-structure binds a conceptually
restricted category, possibly a pronominal (cf. Chomsky 1989), ranging over
things necessary for washing oneself. The exact range of (Ok, tk) is of course
discourse-related. Control of the second PROj depends on the content of the
immediately superordinate predicate (prinesti …). Discourse-related identifi-
cation of proj and proi, which carry case and theta-features, is ensured within
(166). The dative reflexive sebe in (166) has no local antecedent. Long
distance binding of reflexives, which on standard assumptions are instances of
bound anaphora, is not uncommon in Slavic languages, in particular in Rus-
sian and Polish (cf. Růzicka 1973: 445–481)). The crucial issue is whether the
apparent differences between local and unbound antecedents in Slavic lan-
guages can be reduced to precisely the same locality conditions that apply, e.g.
in English, and “… follow from the interaction of the ECP with whether Infl is
a lexical or a functional category.” (Cole/Hermon/Sung 1990: 2, 20)). “Infl”
should be lexical, then, in Russian and Polish, and some other Slavic lan-
guages. Thus, (166) presents the combination of a free relative construction
exhibiting the categorial matching effect without case matching (Ok, if overt,
could be instrumental Case), with an empty operator binding a free pronomi-
nal or, perhaps, variable. We have to do a certain amount of work to impose an
interpretation on (166).
A Czech example licensed by um constraint (B,b).
(167)C Zakázal jsem sii (PROi cokoli chtít)
[aux 1ps sing] [refl dat]
(I) forbad myself whatever to want
‘I forbade myself to want anything (I like)’
(Example from V. Havel’s play ‘Asanace’).
One would expect that order (and counterparts) could not be licensed by the
marked version of (B,b) since the pairing of the interested participants func-
tioning as controlled identification does not seem to be easily realizable. Still,
80 Chapter 4

if it can be, as in the slightly bizarre situation of (168), we have evidence of

licit control favoured possibly by an empty dative object, a discourse related
pro possibly marked [+ dative].
(168)C Šéfi prikázal [proj] (PROi být jmenován
[dative] [part pass]
The principal ordered (someone) to be nominated
clenem nové komise)
[instrumental] [genit sg]
a member of the new comission
(example from Panevová)
Thus, unlike doporucit (see (162)) prikázat is less amenable to um (B,b)
subject to (G), compare (169) and (170).
(169) He ordered himi (PROi to be examined by a doctor.)
(170)C *pro Prikázal mui (PROi být ošetren lekárem)
If the marked application of (B,b) licenses Czech (168), Russian is recalcitrant
in this respect.
(171)R ??Nacal’nik prikazal (PROi byt’ naznacennym
i
[part pret pass masc instrum]
The principal ordered to be nominated
clenom novoj komissii
[instrumental]
a member of the new commission
Russian of course may avail itself of control according to um constraint (B,b)
to express the content of (171).
 proi 
(172)R Nacal’nik j prikazal nam  PROi naznacit’
 i

[dative] [acc]
The principal ordered (us) to nominate
sebjaj clenom novoj komissii)
[instr]
him(self) a member of the new comission
Sebja is long-distance bound by the nonlocal antecedent nacal’nik (Růzicka
1973).
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 81

What, for example, (168) illustrates again is the fact that though anchored
within a firm framework of constraints control can give way even to particular
pragmatical situations choosing the alternative controller. Thus, by meeting
the marked constraint (B,b), (168) does not take the path predicted for the
subclass, namely, violate the um constraint, a violation that is restored to
acceptability by some kind of reconstruction if the corresponding parameter
(G) is set positively. Still, all possible cases are in the grasp of the two versions
of constraint (B,b) and the associated parameters.

4.5. Ambiguous allow in Control and ECM-context

Allow-type verbs belong in the subclass that selects human and nonhuman
subjects. Finer grained selectional features may help resolve the familiar but
not clear-cut deontic versus epistemic ambiguity of allow/permit verbs.
Larson (1991: 136ff.), following Mittwoch (1976), proposes to distinguish
between the two interpretations by identifying a postulated implicit dative
argument either with the Exceptional Case Marking subject (deontic), or by
construing it as a generic or arbitrary pronoun (equivalent to one) (epistemic):
“… allow/permit [α to VP] (to β)
a. Deontic: β=α
b. Epistemic:β=proarb” (Larson 1991: 137)
This analysis is of course tailored to the assumed English ECM-structure of
the sentential argument: “… ECM-structures with allow are actually oblique
dative structures with the ECM complement corresponding to the theme
object and with an implicit oblique dative argument whose identity determines
the understanding of the complement as deontic versus epistemic.” (Larson
1991: 137) Control is not involved at all: “We see that despite superficial
similarity, the pair in (74) (our (173), RR) involves control only in the first
member; the second is an ECM structure.
(173) a. John promised Mary to leave.
b. John allowed Mary to leave.”
(Larson 1991: 137)
The ECM-analysis implies an overt complement subject that “absorbs” the
overt appearance of a matrix oblique argument. Only one of them can “materi-
82 Chapter 4

alize”: Either the oblique argument in the shape of the ECM subject and
identified with it by a. (deontic), or the independent ECM subject, with the
oblique DP reduced to the obligatory proarb (epistemic). Compared to the
Control analysis, the empty category is exchanged, the identification of PRO
is reversed: The identification of PRO with the (overt) oblique object, effected
by control, is replaced by the identification of the oblique part (to ß) with the
ECM subject. The reversed “control” is made optional. It holds for, and “…
determines the understanding of the complement as deontic …” (Larson 1991:
137) Larson seems to face the contingency that a given sentence may receive a
twofold understanding, that is, its ambiguity cannot be resolved. More impor-
tantly: Does Larson’s analysis, or some elements of it, generalize crosslinguis-
tically, in particular apply to languages in which there is no ECM-structure, a
question which may bear on the correctness of the ECM analysis of comple-
ments of allow in English?
First, in non-ECM-languages, the identity condition a. for deontic read-
ings would have to be reinterpreted if possible. As indicated above, Larson’s
deontic reading condition β=α emerges from the control relation and its
reversed reflexion in the shape of an ECM complement in which the ECM
subject takes the “controlling” part identifying the presumed “implicit” ob-
lique argument pro. The ECM-infinitival-subject must be lexically filled and
since no other position is available that could be lexically filled, the oblique
argument must be “silenced” as pro. Second, how can the epistemic reading
condition β=proarb with proarb in the fixed shape of the oblique dative argu-
ment in English ECM-structures, be related to its presumed counterpart in
control structures, for example, in Russian? Epistemic proarb, of course, is not
excluded from corefering with the ECM subject, but is referentially indepen-
dent of it in principle. Under the corresponding control analysis, the dative
oblique argument, lexically overt or covert (pro), implies identity with the
PRO subject of the clausal complement by definition, and that in both deontic
and epistemic variants. Consider (174), a case of possibly ambiguous reading.
(174) Congress has passed a law allowing [juveniles accused of
violent crimes to be tried as adults.]
The presumed proarb does not corefer with the ECM-subject, but may be
construed as corefering with the DP of an implicit by-DP phrase. The nearest
counterpart of (174) in Russian would be (175).
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 83

(175)R Kongress prinjal zakon pozvoljajušcij

[acc sing] [part pres acc sing]
Congress (has) passed a law allowing
podvergat’ sudu junošej obvinjaemych v
[infinitive] [dat sing] [acc pl] [part pres pass acc pl]
to subject (to) court (to try) juveniles accused of
nasil’stvennych prestuplenijach kak vzroslych
[acc pl]
violent crimes as adults
(175)′R … pozvoljajušcij proi (PROi podvergat’ sudu junošej …)
(175) is a control structure with pro controlling PRO.
The crosslinguistic problem, which may bear on the tenability of the
ECM-analysis, seems to hinge on the status of the oblique dative argument
DP, and the contrast between the passive complement in (174) and its Russian
(active) complemental counterpart. The oblique position occupied by pro in
(175′) can of course be filled with lexical elements, e.g. dative sudu (court) or
jurisdikcii (jurisdiction), which controls PRO in accordance with um (B,b).
Forming the counterpart of the passive complement in a Russian control
structure would require that the ECM-subject juvenils … emerges as PRO
controlled by the oblique dative argument junošam (juveniles).
(176) *… pozvoljajušcij junošami (PROi byt’
[dat pl]
allowing juveniles to be
privlecennymi k sudebnoj otvetstvennosti
[part pret pass instr masc pl]
called to legal account
kak vzroslye
as adults
‘… allowing juvenils to be tried as adults.’
(176) violates um (B,b) and is ruled out. We conclude that Larson’s ECM-
approach and the control analysis of allow and its counterparts, e.g. for
Russian, cannot be recoded in each other’s terms. In control structures, the
identity fixed by a. for exclusively deontic readings holds in either case,
deontic and epistemic: The obligatory pro-shape of the implicit dative object
inversely corresponds to the likewise “implicit” complement PRO-subject,
84 Chapter 4

and the lexically overt ECM-subject can be revealed only in the oblique
position of the matrix clause. In other words, the obligatory lexical appearance
of the ECM-subject does the work done by control, e.g., in Russian. It follows
that under the ECM approach there is no means of constructing or computing
a syntactic direct counterpart of the twofold “empty” configuration of pro
identifying PRO as in (175)′. If the controlling element in the matrix clause
itself is empty as pro, its counterpart in English could turn up only out of the
ECM-subject position. In (174), a position that takes an argument correspond-
ing to the argument in the D-structure subject position is available as the
implicit by-phrase which satisfies the wanted nonlexical status. Thus, the
passive shape of the (ECM-) complement is the only syntactic device for
coping with the pro to PRO relation as effected in (175)′. The control relation
in turn has to pay for its privilege by ruling out just the passive complement
clauses considered to be its counterpart to the English hypothesized ECM-
structures as in (174). Before coming to conclusions that again relate to
parameterization of a type already suggested, let us consider another example.

(177)G Der Bildungsgrad gestattet ihmi nicht (PROi zu

[dat]
the degree of education permits him not to
wissen, daß …)
know that …
‘The degree of education does not permit him to know that …’
Clearly, (177) has an unambiguously epistemic reading. Replacing der
Bildungsgrad with sein Vater (his father), and zu wissen with die Disko zu
besuchen (to visit the disco) would result in a deontic reading. In summary,
Larson’s proposal to account for both readings is on the wrong track. The
crucial distinction between construing the presumed implicit dative with the
ECM-subject (deontic reading) and construing it as a generic or arbitrary
pronoun equivalent to one (epistemic reading) is empirically unsupported. In
particular, the construal β=proarb, lifting the identification of β=α which is the
counterpart to the control identification in non-ECM languages, appears to be
an ad hoc adjustment to the ECM structure. The identity of the dative argu-
ment with the complement subject is unaffected by epistemic readings, and
implemented by control, as shown in example (177). Thus, the potential
nonidentity of the two arguments does not appear to be a possible distinctive
property of epistemic readings. There are no conceptual arguments either for
The persuade subclass and cognate ones 85

the syntactic ECM-analysis of allow/permit complements. Abandoning con-

trol and resorting to the ECM-analysis in English is not a necessary answer to
the heterogeneous empirical problems which have appeared to call for it. First,
abiding by the control analysis in English poses the question of how to account
for admissible passive complements, e.g., in (174) — juveniles … would have
to be analyzed as the object DP controlling PRO in the complement — and
their exclusion, e.g., in Russian, cf. ex. (176). On my approach, (175 satisfies
unmarked (B,b), while (174) is a violation of it, which is remedied by the
positive setting of the interface parameter (G) in association with corollary (D)
described above (4.1.) for the persuade subclass.
Second, what has given rise to the “epistemic” understanding, can natu-
rally be understood as metaphorical use of allow/permit and their counterparts
in other languages, which, similar to an attitudinal predicate, means something
like “be compatible with …”. Although this slightly figurative use of allow,
permit could be expected to weaken their sensitivity to the control constraint,
namely, (B,b), they still obey the relevant constraint in its systematic, para-
metrically specified effects. In other words, violations of unmarked constraint
(B,b) are dealt with depending on the respective settings of the interface
parameter.

4.6. Lexically saturated theta-roles

Consider Russian rasporjadit’sja (give instructions) and German anordnen

(arrange, direct). They do not subcategorize for a direct or oblique object but
conceptually implicate a goal- or addressee-argument, which does not show up.
Nor can it taken to be a syntactically active null object. If the conceptually
implicated argument could be materialize as an NP-object, it would qualify as
a controller in a control relation licensed by unmarked (B,b), that is, 〈intact,–〉con,
〈intact,+〉PRO (see 3.2.1.).
(178)R Bolee vaznyj redaktor rasporjadilsja (PRO
(a) more important editor gave instructions
peredat’ skorbnuju novost’ v efir)
[acc sg fem]
to transmit the sad news into the ether
86 Chapter 4

(179)R Slovom, generali vystavil Kosyginaj za dver’

in short the general turned Kosygin out of doors
i rasporjadilsja (PROarb razoruzit proj)
and ordered/gave instructions to disarm (him)
Control verbs participating here, theta-govern (Chomsky 1986a: 70) neither an
overt nor a syntactically noninert null NP-object. The external argument is the
only NP argument, which is precluded from controlling by the um constraint
(B,b), but in case of passive controlled clauses may be a licensed controller by
virtue of its marked version. Thus, PRO stands alone, but it is identified in
accord with constraint (B,b) by the conceptual-pragmatic construal of a do-
main of individuals that participate as “goal” or “addressee” in the event
described by the matrix verb, for example R. rasporjadit’sja (see (178, 179)).
In other words, the construal of the domain of individuals is discourse-related
and the identification of (an) individual(s) referred to by PRO is dependent on
this construal or “arbitrary”. Since no syntactic position for an object NP-
argument and thus no possible filler of it is available21 Rizzi’s notion of
“lexically saturating a theta-role” could help: “… it is not unreasonable to
assume that if a theta-role is saturated in the lexicon, it is not syntactically
visible; hence, in particular, it cannot act as a controller.” (Rizzi 1986: 552)).
The general constraint (B,b), however, extending its force beyond the syntac-
tic processes, maintains the basic rationale of control. Importantly, the posi-
tive setting of the null object parameter (cf. 3.3.) seems to account for
grammaticality, in contrast to English *this leads [PRO to conclude what
follows] (Rizzi’s example), although no null object is involved. A German
counterpart of Russian rasporjadit’sja is anordnen. See (180).
(180)G Peter hat angeordnet (PRO die Zimmer aufzuräumen)
Peter has ordered the rooms to tidy up
‘Peter ordered the rooms to be tidied up’
Chapter 5

The case of promise

5.1. Tenacity and untenability of subject Control

“As is well known, promise is one of a small number of verbs in English that
select an object and an infinitive and show subject control.” (Larson 1991:
103)). Thus, subject control of promise, (g. versprechen, r. (po)obešcat’, c.
slíbit, p. obiec(yw)ać etc.) seems to be taken for granted. Admittedly, these
verbs have raised problems which linger on in current discussion, but they
cannot be plainly considered verbs of subject control, as has been shown in
much previous work (e.g. Růzicka 1983, Farkas 1988, Wegener 1989,
Köpcke/Panther 1993). Besides notorious examples like (181), there are many
others which, on equal terms, would justify calling promise a verb of object
control. I will provide some cross-linguistic facts first.
(181) Johni was promised ti (PROj to be allowed tj (PROk to leave))
(i = j = k)
For discussion see Růzicka (1983a: 310 ff.).
(182)R bez nego (Stalina) obešcano
[part pret pass neuter sg]
without him (Stalin) (it) promised
bylo [NP nyne zivušcemu pokoleniju]i (PROi
[pret neuter] (to) now [part pres dat sg] [dat sg]
was living generation
okazat’sja v Kommunizme)
to find themselves in communism
‘… in the absence of Stalin (without his having had a hand in
the matter) the now living generation was (had been) prom-
ised to find themselves in communism.’
88 Chapter 5

(183)R Emui bylo obešcano (PROi byt’

[dative] [part pass pret neuter]
(to) him was promised to be
vkljucennym v sbornuju
[part pass pret instr sg]
included into the select team
‘He was promised to be included …’
(184)G Ihmi war versprochen worden ((ins Kino) PROi gehen
[dat sg]
him had promised been to the cinema to go
zu dürfen
to be permitted
‘He had been promised to be permitted to go to the cinema’
German dürfen can clearly be paraphrased or “decomposed” as be allowed/
permitted, which requires an account analogous to (181). “Object” control is
not restricted to passive matrix clauses, nor to passive controlled clauses.
(185)F L’entraineur a promis à Platinii d’ PROi être
the coach has promised (to) Platini to be
admis à l’équipe nationale
included into the national team
(Example from Vanden Wyngaerd)
(186)G Peter versprach Pauli (PROi im Auto
Peter promised Paul in the car
mitgenommen zu werden
taken to be
‘… to be given a lift’.
Both clauses are non-passive.
(187)C Petr slíbil Janovii (PROi stát se predsedou)
[dat] [reflexive clitic] [instrum case]
Peter promised John to become (the) chairman
(188)C (pro) Slíbili vítezii (PROi dostat medaili)
[3 ps pl pret] [dat]
(they) promised the winner to get a medal
(example from Panevová)
The case of promise 89

An overt or implicit agentive NP within a PP (by-phrase) may be marginally

acceptable as controller in passive matrix clauses.
(189)G Sogar vom Präsidenteni war ihnen
[dat pl]
Even by the president it had them
versprochen / zugesagt worden (auch den Verlierer PROi
promised/(sent word back) been also the looser
zum Bankett einzuladen)
to the banquet to invite
‘They had been promised even by the president to invite also
the looser to the banquet’ (… that he (the president) would
invite …)’
In previous work (Růzicka 1983a,b), I posited a thematic Identity condition
(TIC), which I claimed could account for all types of control illustrated by
(181) - (189). The somewhat unclear relational notion of the identity of the
theta-roles borne by a licit controller and PRO respectively raised some doubts
about its range of validity. Jackendoff (1987: 370), referring to Ruzicka °
a
(1983 ) writes: “… it (identity of thematic relations, RR) does not account for
the evident object control in (5b) (The promise to Bill to be allowed to leave.)”
I think it does account for it as well as it does for (181), assuming that the
theta-role assigned to John by promise in (181) either identifies with the theta-
role assigned to Bill by to in (5b), or, alternatively, that in both cases, as seems
plausible, the same theta-role is taken from the theta-grid associated with
promise [{+N-V}] and [{-N+V}].
This theta-role was taken to be identical with the the role assigned to
object PRO by allow . Jackendoff (1987: 370) further brings up a notorious
instance of control: “His (Růzicka’s, RR) solution is not restricted enough, in
that it should allow *Bill was promised to receive the letter, where both
subjects are goals.” Similarly, Vanden Wyngaerd (1987: 72) comments that
“… whereas Růzicka can presumably explain (44) (=*? John promised (me)
to get permission to leave RR) as a violation of the TIC, he has no explanation
to propose for (43d).” (=*Bill was promised to get permission to go, RR).
Even though these critical remarks can be answered within the framework of
the thematic Identity condition (TIC) and the thematic Distinctness condition
(TDC) (Růzicka 1983a), the claim that the global thematic roles could be
matched so that they determine wellformed control relations may not be
90 Chapter 5

tenable: The rationale of Θ-theory, even in the uncontroversial part of its

inventory of theta-roles, has not been concerned with the (nontrivial) identity
of, or distinction between, theta-role assignments. Relational and comparative
aspects between theta-assignments, in particular between the theta character-
ization of PRO and that of eligible controller, have gained in theoretical
weight since their impact on considerable areas of control has been observed
°
(Ruzicka 1983a; Farkas 1988; Pollard/Sag 1991). If it is not feasible, however,
to capture this influence on control behaviour by relying on a substantive
comparative analysis of global theta-roles, one cannot feel to be on indepen-
dent firm ground.
The crucial properties of well-matched or ill-matched pairs of theta
characterizations that license or do not license control can be expressed more
substantively and less “costly” in terms of designated abstract lexical features
that are interpretable as thematic feature specification values, as I have done
so far using constraints in the shape of (B,b) and, if necessary, adding
corollaries like (D).
Within this framework, the above critical instances of control put forward
by Jackendoff and Vanden Wyngaerd — the last example had already been
discussed by Chomsky (1980: 35, fn. 40) as one with the expected grammati-
cal status (*John was promised to get permission to leave) — can be ac-
counted for more convincingly. Control phenomena determined by the class
of verbs of the promise-type are captured by the same machinery that captures
control of the preceding class (ask, persuade etc.). We continue to use the
format of constraint (B,b), changing the value of α in its first conjunct, that is,
changing it to (B,a) (3.2.1.), repeated here.
(B,a) 〈intact,α〉CON ^ 〈intact, α〉PRO
Recall that the conjoined thematic feature specifications express properties of
argument-NP’s projected from the matrix verb and the verb (predicate) of the
controlled clause, respectively. There is an analogy between subject-oriented
behaviour of promise and subject-oriented adverbs like willingly, intention-
ally. Paraphrasing the promise-event in the spirit of the entailment (10) (see fn.
15), we would say that some x who is capable of acting intentionally, commits
him/herself to act so as to bring about P, that is the event decribed in the
controlled clause.22 The marked version of constraint (B,a) is arrived at
exactly as the marked version of constraint (B,b), namely by reversing the
values of α. The positive value of α in the PRO-conjunct is chosen as the
The case of promise 91

unmarked and the negative one as the marked version, in both (B,b) and (B,a).
Thus, (B,a)′ is the unmarked, (B,a)″ the marked version of (B,a).
(B,a)′ 〈intact, +〉con^ 〈intact, +〉pro
(B,a)″ 〈intact, −〉con ^ 〈intact, −〉pro
(B,a)′ accounts for standard examples like (190) and the particular case
of (189).
(190) Peteri promised John (PROi to leave).
(B,a)″ accounts for “unexpected” cases like (181), (183) – (186). (182) will be
discussed in the context of broader evidence (below, 5.4.). Marked application
needs a lexical controller: The head of the controlling A-chain must be
“pronounced”.
Crucially, the (un)marked versions of (B,a) and (B,b) respectively, are
licensing instruments that generalize about varying empirical conditions of
control which are associated with respective (sub)classes of control verbs. In
the domain of (B,b), for ask-type verbs, a substantial justification for pursuing
the markedness approach, namely the lucid availability of a second layer of
semantic characterizations pairing, that is, identifying the “interested parts”
(see above, 3.2.3.), subtly divides these verbs from persuade-type verbs, (cf.
above, p. 59ff). Violations of the unmarked version of (B,b) again lead to
different cross-linguistic fates within this event type (see above, 4.1.). In the
domain of (B,a), for promise-type verbs or events, there is no analogous
subdivision either with respect to marked or to unmarked control. In the
former case, controller and PRO are identified through involvements in prom-
ise-type events that are complementary to the unmarked twofold agentive
specification and are captured by 〈intact, –〉con/pro.
The general symmetry of the proposed solution to promise-type control
with the account given for ask/persuade-type control extends to the restriction
that PRO can receive 〈intact, –〉 only from a predicate whose theta-grid
contains 〈intact, +〉, that is, corollary (D) applies to this subclass as well. (D),
thus, unifies two broad domains of complement control defined by the the-
matic constraints (B,a) and (B,b), respectively, singling out their common
interthematic restriction as a generalization about marked control behaviour.
Concerning promise, the clear intuitive basis for (D) is the fact that the
property of the event described in the controlled clause may offer no hold for
the promise to be fullfilled intentionally. If (B,a) and its corollary (D) are not
92 Chapter 5

satisfied in grammar, they still serve as an instrument of systematic, not

amnestying, conceptual-pragmatic construal and explanation of control. The
construal, if undertaken, tends to result in graded and individually differing
acceptability. In the recalcitrant examples repeated here,
(191) *John was promised to get permission to leave
(Chomsky’s example)
(192) *Bill was promised to receive the letter
(ex. from Jackendoff)
receive and get — the thematic properties of these verbs are not entirely clear
(cf. in particular Dowty 1991: 581) — are not assumed to assign 〈intact, +〉,
which , by (D), puts them beyond the reach of marked (B,a), resulting in
ungrammaticality as “default” interim.
The Czech examples (187), (188) violate um (B,a) , since PRO does not
carry 〈intact, +〉. Nor do they meet corollary (D) and, consequently, they
violate m (B,a): 〈intact, +〉 is neither in the theta grid of stát se nor in that of
dostat. But the dative objects Janovi and vítezi, respectively are the exclusive
controllers acknowledged by all informants. How do they come to satisfy
pertinent control conditions? I would like to suggest that (187) and (188) are
readily construed after patterns like (193) and (194), respectively, which could
satisfy corollary (D) and the m contraint (B,a).
(193) Peter promised Jani (PROi to be elected tichairman)
(188) is obviously construed by analogy with (194).
(194) They promised the winneri (PROi to be awarded ti a medal)
In other words, 〈intact, –〉 is reconstituted for PRO through substituting a
concept that “assigns” 〈intact, +〉 at the conceptual-pragmatic level: At this
level, a representation is provided that can be referred to by the grammatical
constraints, marked (B,a) in this case. In other words, (187) – (188) are not
straightforwardly wellformed, as far as grammar reaches. They can prove
acceptable since the lexical and syntactic skeleton suitable for control paves
the way for a pragmatic “detour” that builds up a conceptual structure mirror-
ing, and interpretable as, matched grammatical conditions.
The case of promise 93

5.2. A classical violation

Consider (195), which seems to be a straightforward violation of marked

constraint (B,a) (see 5.1.). But it needs further elucidation.
(195) *John was promised (PRO to leave)
(195) counts as the classical irreparable violation of syntactic constraints (cf.
Chomsky 1980 and Růzicka 1983a), which, under this approach, is expressed
by considering (195) a violation of the marked constraint: *〈intact, +〉PRO …
Recall the directional interpretation of violating um and m constraint. Only the
PRO-conjuncts can be the offending parts. Suppose, then, that the offending
conjunct *〈intact, +〉PRO of m (B,a) is impervious to any conceptual construal
overriding the original feature value and “changing” it into 〈intact, –〉. Still,
constructions of type (195) may be expected to survive, if the um constraint
(B,a) could be taken to apply to it, that is, if an element carrying 〈intact, +〉CON,
which the theta-grid of promise contains, is understood to be present in the
matrix clause. Indeed, some English informants have not downright rejected
(195), apparently imagining an implicit agentive controller. The rationale of
thus doing “violence” to English emerges more transparently in German,
Russian and Czech examples.
(196)G Dem Trainer der Nationalmannschaft war
[dat]
to the coach of the selected team (it) had
von [den Offiziellen des italienischen Klubs ]i versprochen
by the officials of the Italian club promised
worden (PROi van Basten für das Qualifikationsspiel
been van Basten for the qualification match
freizugeben)
to release
‘The coach of the selected team had been promised by the
officials of the Italian club that they would release van Basten
for the qualification match.’
(197)R Borisu bylo obešcano
[dat] [neuter pret] [part neuter]
Boris (it) was promised
94 Chapter 5

[direktorom školy]i ( PROi ne isklucit’ ego

[instrum]
by the headmaster of the school not to exlude him
iz ekskursii)
from the excursion
(198)C Bylo mu slíbeno od [trenera]i (PROi zaradit
[dat] [part pass neut]
(it) was him promised by the coach to include
ho do vybraného muzstva)
[gen]
him into the select team
German and some Slavic languages differ from English in that their exclusive
impersonal passive in the matrix clause and in particular its overt (instrumen-
tal Case) or implicit agent phrase carrying 〈intact, +〉CON matches 〈intact,
+〉PRO, thus satisfying um (B,a), as in (196) – (198). The division suggests a
derivative parameterized variation in the range of syntactic projections associ-
ated with the respective counterparts to promise. The projection of an imper-
sonal passive contrasts with, but functions like, the nonimpersonal passive in
English after dative shift. Attributing the particularity of dative shift in English
to its strong configurational type and excluding its pertinence to control for
(morphological) Case-oriented languages like Russian, Czech and German,
which preserve morphological dative in the passive, we trace back the control
division to more general parameter settings.
In English, agentive by-phrases, overt or not, seem to be unable to
control, depending on the structure of the embedding control element.23 The
problem reduces to the issue, why the NP in a by-phrase of a passive matrix
clause cannot control PRO in an infinitival complement clause. NP’s in by-
phrases figuring as arguments of verbal nouns that derive from control verbs
do control, as shown in (ii) b. c. of fn. (23). I assume that structures like (199)
(199) *The men were promised (by Frank) to leave,
are ruled out since the hierarchically dominant position of the derived subject
does not yield control to the DP in the by-phrase, although the latter would
satisfy unmarked (B,a), the subject itself being not eligible as controller by
virtue of PRO violating marked (B,a). Corresponding passive structures, e.g.,
in German, Russian and Czech, in which the agent phrase is demoted — as in
The case of promise 95

English — but the argument carrying the θ-role Goal or Recipient is left in
oblique (dative) object position — though excluded from controlling by PRO
violating m (B,a) —, have no subject rivalling for control. The counterpart to
the agent phrase is not hindered from controlling in accord with um (B,a) (see
ex. (189), (196) – (198)). In English, when the hierarchical superiority of the
(derived) subject disappears as in the nominals illustrated in footnote (23), the
DP in the by-phrase can maintain control.
The descriptive generalization (I) capturing these differences of control
between English on the one hand, and, e.g., Russian, Czech, German, on the
other, is a specification on the unmarked application of (B,a).
(I) The first controller-related conjunct in the um (B,a) can be
satisfied by a demoted agent phrase (Case-marked as instrumental
or PP), iff there is no raising to subject position, that is, the
subject position is not filled by the head of an nonsingleton
A-chain.
This is the case, for example, in Slavic languages and German (see ex. (189,
(196), (197)), in which the argument-DP corresponding to the DP that is raised
to subject position in English, is assigned morphological dative Case in the
resulting impersonal passive. No syntactically dominant rival for control
appears. Still, control by the demoted agent argument marked Instrumental
Case in Slavonic languages or shaped as a PP as in German may be judged to
be marginal.
Note that (I) is not complementary to (F) (3.2.2.), which syntactically
specifies the marked application of (B,b) to a pertinent subclass of control
verbs. (F) cannot be cancelled under structural consequences of the distinctly
parameterized morphosyntactical treatment of Case, which, e.g., results in the
different phenomena of passive under discussion. Consider first (200).
(200) *Frankyj was asked by mei (PROi,j to be made his partner)
(200), in the i-indexed interpretation, is ruled out by (F) specifying m (B,b).
The unmarked application of (B,b) fails in the offending PRO-conjunct (in-
dexed j).
From a syntactic point of view, we might expect that control verbs falling
under constraint (B,b) which inherently assign dative Case retained in the
impersonal passive (verbs under 4.4.4.), by analogy to (I), override (F) satisfy-
ing the first conjunct of m (B,b) by the demoted agent-DP. This prediction is
96 Chapter 5

not confirmed. Consider (201), an example from Russian.

(201)R *pro emu bylo poruceno [starym znakomym]i
[dative] [neuter sing] [part pass neuter] [instr. Case]
(it) him was charged (by) an old acquaintance
(PROi byt’ vkljucennym v ekskursiju)
[part pass instrum sing]
to be included in the excursion
‘He was charged by an old acquaitance to be included in the
excursion.’
The reason is that the given subclass, while subject to (B,b), cannot respond to
its marked application since the relevant thematic pairing is not available to
support it as it is, e.g., in ask-type control verbs (see above, 3.2.3.)
We might speculate that unmarked licensing as in the case of (B,a)
maintains its strength under syntactic conditions that change hierarchical
relations, the more so when they are levelled by independent factors as in the
impersonal passive in, for example, German and Slavonic languages. In
general, the situation discussed corroborates my predictions of the strength of
relations between lexically thematic features in determining control conditions.
Considering structures like (199) that “crash” by virtue of m (B,a) and (I),
evidence of hierarchical pressure opens the way to a natural explanation of the
contrast between (202) and (203).
(202) The promise to Bill was to leave.
(203) *The promise by Bill was to leave.
The contrast can hardly be elucidated by resorting to a general distinction
between obligatory and nonobligatory control as proposed by Williams (1987a:
370). Let us first turn to the question why (203) is ungrammatical and the
apparently very similar (204) (=(ii) b. of fn. 23) is judged grammatical.
(204) John expects a promise by Mary to remain faithful to him.
The relevant distinction between (204) and (203) consists in the structural
positions of the controlled infinitival predicating of the DP that contains the N
incorporating the control verb. I would like to suggest that if the control
element, that is, a noun incorporating a control verb, is the head of the NP
within a DP in subject position and the controlled infinitival clause is excluded
from, and predicating over, the subject-DP, the agent (by-phrase) within this
The case of promise 97

maximal subject DP cannot contain a licit controller (ex. 203). In other words,
a potential controller within the by-phrase cannot control beyond the maximal
DP containing it, that is, into the predicating infinitival clause. Control in
(204) is licit, since (204) sharply differs from (203) in that the controlled
infinitival clause is part of the maximal DP, with promise heading all the rest.
Assuming by analogy to the hierarchy in clausal structures like (199) that the
DP in the agent by-phrase cannot control beyond its maximal DP by virtue of
the “superiority” of the “subject”-phrase and in particular the Specifier posi-
tion available in the latter, we should predict that a controller marked 〈intact,
+〉 is licensed if within the Specifier position of the subject phrase. Thus we
have the contrast between (205) (=(203)) and (206), (207).
(205) *The promise by Bill was (PROi to leave)
(206) Bill’si promise was (PROi to leave)
(207) Ouri promise was (PROi to work immediately)
It follows that a subject-DP containing an article or other Determiner as in
(202) (repeated here as (208)) but lacking an agent phrase can provide an
implicit controller.
(208) The promise to Bill was (PRO to leave).
(206), (207) satisfy um constraint (B,a), (208) requires the implicit controller
to receive 〈intact, +〉 conceptually.
We should expect now that the marked version of constraint (B,a) applies
as well and, by analogy to (181), licenses experimental sentences like (209), at
least marginally. This expectation seems to be fullfilled.
(209) ?The promise to Billi was (PROi to be allowed to leave).
The account given for the facts illustrated by the contrast between (203) and
(204) and between (202) and (203) fits in with the suggested condition of
immediate proximity (see above, 2.2.2.2.).

5.3. Violating the unmarked constraint

Systematic violations of um constraint (B,a) should be expected to be uniform

cross-linguistically: 〈intact, +〉CON & *〈intact, –〉PRO.
98 Chapter 5

(210) *Hei promised them (PROi to be wronged by such comments).

Still, acceptability can be canalized with the support of lexical and contextual
restrictions in discourse. While (211) illustrates the now familiar case of
control licensed by m constraint (B,a),
(211)G Der Lehrer versprach dem Schüleri (PROi
[dative]
the teacher promised the pupil
in die nächste Klasse versetzt zu werden)
to the next class moved up to be
(212) exhibits a violation of um (B,a) which apparently maintains acceptabil-
ity in the same way as violations of um (B,b) in persuade-type control, namely
through according with corollary (D). Crucially, parameter (G) is not opera-
tive here. Languages do not seem to differ in acknowledging acceptance of
structures like (212). Causality switch is evidenced by promise and its coun-
terparts as well as by persuade. It is intrinsic, however, to (passive) comple-
ments of the former verb class by virtue of its commitment content. As to
passive complements of persuade (see (115), (116)), causality switch is
something to be achieved by persuading. It is “underspecified” and full
interpretation is subject to parameterization.
(212)G Der Schüleri versprach seinen Eltern (PROi
[dative]
the pupil promised his parents
in die nächste Klasse versetzt zu werden)
to the next class moved up to be
(examples from Wegener 1989)
Note that the basic syntactic and semantic structure of promise events on
which constraint (B,a) rests is instrumental in interpreting (212): The pupil
commits her/himself to do what is necessary to bring about her/his being
moved up. With control vacillating between subject and object, and partly
depending on their semantic content and relatedness to each other, the basic
control relation embodied in um and m constraint (B,a) is unchangingly the
pivot on which all pertinent instances of control turn.
Corollary (D) enables us to regulate the operation of (B,a) in the neutral
zones of control arising from the distribution and absence of 〈intact, +〉 in the
theta grid marking the arguments of the controlled clause. Recall that corollary
The case of promise 99

(D) is interpreted as a condition which makes the assignment of 〈intact, –〉 to

PRO dependent on the presence of 〈intact, +〉 in the same theta grid. A PRO
which is not specifiable as 〈intact, +〉 or 〈intact, –〉 should be highly sensitive to
controllers marked 〈intact, +〉 and 〈intact, –〉 respectively. Possible shifts of
control are predictable, then, from the theta-grid of the controlled clause and
the content of the lexical insertions. Taking the German verb kommen, at least
in one reading, to lack 〈intact, +〉 in its theta grid, or more neutrally, as an
ergative or unaccusative that lacks this thematic or semantic specification, we
can predict the situation in (213): The relevant construals go beyond the
computation of grammar proper.
(213)G Der Anwalti versprach dem Häftlingj PROi,j bald
the lawyer promised the detainee soon
 aus dem Gefängnis j ) 
aus dem Urlaub )  zu kommen
 i 
from prison 
from holidays to come
 
‘... soon to be discharged from prison.’
‘... soon to return from his holidays.’ 
 
(example from Wegener 1989)

The drastic shift of control would seem to follow from substituting the NP dem
Gefängnis (prison) for dem Urlaub (his holidays) in the [PPX aus NP]. The
choice dem Urlaub implies the construal of standard subject control, the
choice (dem Gefängnis) inclines one to prefer object control. (213) is a
diagnostic example. The standard control relation with der Anwalt controlling
may withstand the bizarre interpretation connected with it in accord with um
(B,a) and from prison. But subject control may be readily overcome by a
simple construal which links PRO aus dem Gefängnis zu kommen (interpreted
as be discharged from prison) to detainee and, thus, may be construed to
satisfy m constraint (B,a), with PRO being conceptually marked 〈intact, –〉PRO.

5.4. A structural-pragmatic conflict?

I will go on experimenting on the sensitivity of “neutral” PRO to independent

semantic changes and the resulting trade-off between the principled con-
100 Chapter 5

straints and lexically effected construal. It would appear, under this approach,
that if a certain amount of interpretive work can be done that achieves some
conformity to the unmarked or marked constraint (B,a), considering their
respective semantic and/or conceptual underpinnings, acceptability can be
lent to deviating structures independently of further grammatical limitations.
But I have not discussed so far that other syntactic or thematic conditions may
prevent sound conceptual-pragmatic construals from being implemented, in
particular that failing Corollary (D) may not be overcome by any pragmatic
construal. Let us focus for a moment on the interpretation of (214) and its
German version (215), where syntactic and pragmatic factors come into
conflict with each other.
(214) Gladys promised Hubert to experience victory again.
(215)G Gladys versprach Hubert, noch einmal einen Sieg zu erleben
Comrie (1985: 63) comments on (214): “The most coherent interpretation of
(59) (= (214), RR) pragmatically, given that a promise is to the benefit of the
addressee, would be that Gladys is promising Hubert that he, Hubert, will
experience victory in the future, but English syntax excludes this interpreta-
tion … Abraham (1983: 221) cites German equivalents of (214) … as fully
grammatical and acceptable in the pragmatically coherent interpretation.”
Does English provide the alternative, but “incoherent” interpretation, or reject
(214) altogether? Or, put differently, why does the possible “coherent” inter-
pretation have the effect of acceptability in German, but not in English? What
is it in English syntax that resists the coherent pragmatical “escape” —
assuming that Comrie’s judgment of (214) is correct? In German, acceptabil-
ity of (215) is not independent of lexical features arrayed as the marked
constraint (B,a). But the construal by which it can be achieved requires a
considerable amount of interpretive work, since corollary (D) is not met.
Gladys must be assumed to have a hand in Hubert’s experiencing victory.
Since PRO is neutralized, which is expressed by violating corollary (D), the
conceptual effort to attain coherence does not seem to override the unmarked
control pattern (B,a), though not complying with it. This is the English value
of the syntactic-pragmatic interface parameter. The contrast, which may rank
as a parameterized variation, in general should be ascribable to the more
unyielding syntactic skeleton of a strongly marked configurational language
like English compared with German.
The case of promise 101

In Russian and Czech, which rely on configurational-geometrical struc-

turing to a considerably lesser degree, the counterparts to (214), (215) are
unobjectionable.
(216)R Boris poobešcal Ivanui (ešce raz PROi ispytat’
[dative]
Boris promised Ivan once more to experience
cuvstvo pobedy)
[genit]
the feeling of victory
(217)C Boris slíbil Ivanovii (ješte jednou PROi
[dative]
Boris promised Ivan once more
zazit vítezství
[acc]
to experience victory
I would like now to experiment on taking Gladys (and Boris, respectively) as
the controller in (214) – (217), construing observance of the um constraint
(B,a). This construal again would have to manipulate PRO which carries
neither 〈intact, +〉 nor, by corollary (D), 〈intact, –〉. Gladys must be held
capable of calling forth her own feelings, an ability which might be repre-
sented as 〈intact, +〉PRO at the pragmatical level. As mentioned above, English
grammar cannot be supposed to endorse this “incoherent” interpretation al-
though it has no “remedy” for it, since it may find support in the standard um
control relation.
Russian (182) again is a case in point. PRO is unambiguously controlled
by the dative DP. Though it violates marked (B,a) it does not resist construal
in spite of failing corollary (D). Absence of 〈intact, +〉 in the thematic specifi-
cations assigned by okazat’sja excludes any construal in the direction of
satisfying um (B,a) with the implicit Agent controlling as the explicit one
does, e.g., in ((196)–(198)). If Comrie’s judgement of (214) is correct, con-
figurationally prominent English Syntax thwarts construal of the “coherent”
control reading although it does not turn subject-controlled (214) into an
coherent one. Note that a construal that results in complying with m (B,a), via
bypasssing corollary (D) — as in the German reading of (215) and Russian
(216) — is much more feasible than construing compliance with um (B,a) by
reconstituting 〈intact, +〉 for PRO.
102 Chapter 5

Such borderline cases of control demonstrate that rather subtle and even
empirically controversial instances of control crystallize around the basic
constraints and their respective m and um interpretations. Even in cases
licensed by m (B,a) like (218), Comrie prefers the “syntactic” reading.
(218) Penelope promised her son to be allowed to leave.
“… for me the interpretation ‘Penelope promised her son that she (Penelope)
would be allowed to leave’ is available, and it is in fact preferable to the
interpretation ‘Penelope promised her son that he (her son) would be allowed
to leave’ … Of course, on the preferred interpretation it is necessary to assume
that Penelope has some influence over whether or not she is given permission
to leave.” (Comrie 1985: 53). Note that in the less preferable (for Comrie)
interpretation it is necessary to assume that Penelope has influence over
whether or not her son is given permission to leave. In the preferable (for
Comrie) control relation, um (B,a) is violated. Acceptability or interpretability
may be restored in the way described above (ex. 212). On the interpretation,
clearly preferable in German, Russian and Czech, in which her son is the
controller, m (B,a) is satisfied.
This discussion strongly suggests that confining oneself to a treatment of
control phenomena that exclusively relies on structural notions of grammar
proper simplifies, even distorts the picture. It seems to be typical of control
phenomena that some questions raised in this section may be unanswerable if
not meaningless on a sound grammatical basis. Grammar, of course, is respon-
sible for fuzzy edges of interpretive capacity in the control design, which
possibly arise because grammar provides and makes available wellformed
bare structural skeletons that satisfy enough principles to leave the linguistic
rest to varying judgments of convergence. I draw two conclusions from these
considerations. First, we need a device that mediates between the fixed, the
“hard” syntactic control structures and the “soft” areas of conceptual-prag-
matic manipulation. Constraints (B,b) and (B,a), if specified by (D) - (I),
constitute these intermediary principles. Second, restriction to configurational
syntactic aspects must fail, since they do not reach and get down to some
substantive or critical issues. We have to face situations which make it very
difficult to intuitively distinguish between interpretability, acceptability and
grammaticality of control expressions.
I would like to speculate that control phenomena have conspired to create
an experimental plot trying out and straining conceptual-pragmatic interpret-
The case of promise 103

ability beyond what can be restrained grammatically. But any such facts,
being observed and grasped in nongrammatical terms, in turn are referred to,
and finally elucidated by, appropriate grammatical principles, or principles
that can be related to grammatical ones under a unifying approach. For
example, if, in a given discourse situation, the choice of a controller in fact
depends on the intersection of the interlocutors’ respective actual knowledge
sets and in particular, on “… sets of (their) matters of current concern”
(Yokoyama 1986: 141 ff.), such factors can be related to general constraints in
the shape of theta-theoretical specifications. A case in point is (219) (example
from Farkas).
(219) The mother promised the children to stay up.
The mother is a licit controller by um (B,a). The discourse situation is quite
usual, of course, which suggests that the children figures as licit controller.
The pragmatical construal by virtue of which the children qualifies as control-
ler amounts to nothing else than interpreting the complement clause as some-
thing like to be allowed to stay up, which can be referred to by the m constraint
(B,a) (cf. ex. (184), (218)). This is exactly the reason why the syntactic and
lexical counterpart in German precludes object control, but of course not
subject control.
(220) *Die Mutter versprach den Kinderni (PROi aufzubleiben)
In German, as already noted (3.3.), a lexical nonpassive equivalent for be
permitted/allowed to is available. The construal of object control is “superflu-
ous”, in German, whose only equivalent to (219), interpreted with object
control, is (221).
(221) Die Mutter versprach den Kinderni (PROi aufbleiben
to stay up
zu dürfen, …
to be permitted
Here is an exact parallel to the preclusion of word for word German counter-
parts of (91), repeated here.
(91) Hei asked PROi to leave
*Eri bat PROi zu gehen
(91) can only be rendered by (222).
104 Chapter 5

(222) Eri bat (PROi gehen zu dürfen)

(219) and (91) are violations of the marked constraints (B,a) and (B,b),
respectively. Conceptual construal, as noted above, makes up for them. The
results are referred to by the respective m constraints and licensed. (221)
satisfies m (B,a) directly.

5.5. Larson’s division of labor

Larson (1991: 125 ff.) takes great pains to defend his configurational theory of
control and in particular his version of Rosenbaums’s (1970) “Minimal Dis-
tance Principle”24 in the face of “… two well-known lines of criticism, one
involving the specific verb promise and one involving other superficially
similar ‘double object’ verbs like ask, teach, and allow … The structural
relations among the complements of promise in (35a) (my (223): RR) do not
appear different from those in the nonpassivized example (35b) (my (224):
RR); hence, a shift in control is unexpected:”
(223) John promised Mary to be allowed to leave.
(224) John promised Mary to leave.
Under our approach, (223) is clearly licensed by m constraint (B,a). Larson
suggests “that the interpretation of the infinitival in (43a) (= (223): RR) is
determined not by control, as in (43b) (= (224): RR), but rather through
entailments, as in (43c) (= (225): RR).
(225) John promised Mary permission to leave.
“… On the suggested view, what governs object construal with promise is
simply the standard set of entailments that this verb carries by virtue of its
dative status. In general, then, construal of the understood subject of an
infinitive has no specific principles here. Construal by control follows from
the (independently motivated) shape of D-structure. And construal by entail-
ment follows from the general entailments of the verb.” (Larson 1991: 126,
128, fn. 17) The “… general ‘division of labour’ suggested here between
control and entailments seems plausible and seems moreover to answer to the
general intuition that examples of ‘shifting control’ differ in status from their
controlled counterparts — that although they can be made acceptable to a
The case of promise 105

degree, they are never as natural as the latter …” (op. cit. 129) Apart from the
vague qualifications of “naturalness” and “status”, Larson’s endeavour to
draw a neat line between independent D-structure shape and construal by
lexical entailments fails to capture their intrinsic relatedness and their interac-
tion and, contrary to his expectation, gives away the chance of drawing a line
of demarcation that marks their interface. If examples like (223), (225) are
held to be determined not by control, but rather through entailments specific to
the lexical element promise, then, on perfectly equal terms, one can claim that
(224), being determined by control, is determined through entailments of the
lexical item promise. In (223) and (224), lexical properties are differently
activated by, and related to, general principles such as (B,a), as a consequence
of the distinct syntactic and functional structures of the embedded predicate.
Larson has to admit that “One important question that I must leave unresolved
here, but which must be addressed ultimately if this suggestion is to amount to
an actual solution, is when precisely an infinitival complement is subject to
control versus construal by entailments.” (op. cit. 129) This question is
misleading. Its empirical rationale and problems can be dealt with in a distinct
and unified system, as should be clear from our approach.

5.6. The analogous case of threaten

Comrie (1985: 59) observes that “… indeed the main difference between a
promise and a threat is whether the speaker believes the outcome to be to the
advantage or to the disadvantage of the addressee.” S/he who threatens does
not commit her/himself to fulfil the “promise” even if the addressee does not
do or does what the threat tried to press or force her/him to do and not to do,
respectively. Still, threaten and its cross-linguistic counterparts mirror the
control behaviour of promise. In English, idiosyncratically, an addressee-NP
does not go with a controlled infinitival clause: “English threaten is a control
verb only in the absence of a main clause object …” (Comrie 1985: 52).
Counterparts to threaten in other languages should be expected to be licensed
by observing the same constraint as promise, that is (B,a). (226), e.g., an
example from Fauconnier (1976), discussed also by Vanden Wyngaerd (1987:
82), meets m constraint (B,a).
106 Chapter 5

(226)F Pierrei a été menacé par Paul (de PROi

Pierre was threatened by Paul
subir les pires tortures)
to undergo the worst tortures
The theta-grid of the “functional” verb subir coalesces with that of torture(s)
in assigning 〈intact, –〉 to PRO.

5.7. Considering the raising analysis of promise and threaten

In general, control behaviour of promise- and threaten-type verbs is more

elastic, it yields more easily to metaphorical use and resulting flexibility.
Metaphorization has gone so far that reanalysis as a distinct syntactic con-
struction type has come to be acknowledged. Zubizarreta (1982) and Johnson
(1985) point out “… that such verbs as threaten and promise have, in addition
to their well-known control use, a raising use as well … Johnson notes that
there are certain restrictions on the theta-role borne by the raised NP … One
such restriction is that the raised NP may not have the role which Johnson calls
‘intentional agent’ … Thus, on the raising interpretation, (34) (= (227): RR) is
ill-formed, and (35) (= (228): RR) is unambiguous, allowing only the theme
interpretation for John and precluding the agent interpretation.
(227) *Mary threatens to slap Bill.
(228) John promises to please Susan.”
I have quoted from Lasnik (1988: 6 ff, his numbering is (34), (35)). Under my
approach, (227) is licensed by observance of um constraint (B,a), (228) is
ruled out by it as a control construction: PRO does not carry 〈intact,+〉. In
addition, it does not meet Corollary (D) (the theta-grid of please does not
contain 〈intact,+〉) and, thus PRO cannot receive 〈intact,–〉, which, indepen-
dently of the single potential controller renders impossible a pragmatical
control construal that matches m (B,a). It is exactly this situation which may
urge one to “withdraw” 〈intact, +〉 from the matrix external argument, a
dethematization that must reduce it to the head of a chain linked to the empty
clausal subject, which becomes its trace. The “resulting” Raising variant
clearly is related to the Control construction: If the theta-specification of the
(empty) complement subject-NP fits in with that of the external argument of
The case of promise 107

promise/threaten, interpretation as an instance of (subject) Raising is ex-

cluded (the case of (227) above). If it does not, that is, neither um nor m
constraint (B,a) can be met, a metaphorization, which includes the removal of
the matrix argument, is one of the possible construals, and a Raising analysis
may be a syntactic account for it. The Raising situation also arises when the
potential controller cannot be a recipient of 〈intact,+〉, which extends to PRO
of course.
(229) The skeleton key promises to open the door.
(230) The missile threatens to destroy the city.
(Lasnik 1988: 6 f.).
A Raising verb “… imposes no ‘selectional restrictions’ and/or ‘thematic
relation’ on this constituent …, one of the … three unusual properties (that a
Raising verb manifests, RR) with respect to a constituent in one of its apparent
(or, surface) argument position …” (Jacobson 1990: 428).
If a Raising analysis tries to capture and interprete the relevant structures
syntactically, it does not seem to provide a satisfactory elucidation for them.
Syntactically, we have no evidence for structures corresponding to the stage of
derivation before Raising. Compare (231), (232) with (233), (234).
(231) It seems that he is unfair
seems 
(232) He is likely  to be unfair
 
(233) John promises to please Susan
(234) *It promises that John pleases Susan
Some version of the Well-formedness constraint is not satisfied (cf. Partee
1979: 275 ff.).
Substantial semantic support and justification of the Raising analysis
might still be provided by considering Raising-type promise and threaten to
be combinations of an epistemic and evaluational verb. A kind of proposi-
tional attitude (similar to seem) towards the event described in the clause
embedded at D-structure, on the one hand, and its positive (promise) or
negative (threaten) evaluation, on the other, have unified. Metaphorization
consists in singling out a participant in the event or state under consideration
and in attributing to it the ‘promise’ or ‘threat’ of its occurrence. Or the event
as a whole, that is its full description, may figure as the entity promising, or
108 Chapter 5

threatening with, its realization in the absence of a subject [+human] as in

(230) or (235).
(235)R [Bumaznoe okno]i vzdulos’ puzyrem, PROi
[instrum case]
(the) paper window swelled like a bubble
ugrozaja PROi lopnut’
threatening to burst
Ugrozaja is a participle adjunct with PROi being controlled by the matrix
subject. Importantly for a Raising analysis, in Russian, in contrast to Czech,
Raising — apart from phrasal verbs — can never be combined with, or result
in, an infinitival VP, which means that the result of Raising is exclusively a
“small clause”. The Raising analysis, thus, is generally questionable at least in
°
Russian (for detailed discussion, see Chvany (1975: 51, 226 ff.) and Ruzicka
1980: 30, 37 ff.).
Let us try to approach a correct analysis by considering (236) – (242).
(236)G Es droht nicht (ei zu regnen)
it does not threaten to rain
ei must be either PRO (Control) or ti (Raising). A third possibility is to assume
a subjectless verb projection, that is, a bare infinitival verb phrase (Bierwisch
1992). The control interpretation would take es to be an argument, a quasiar-
gument (Chomsky 1981: 335), which is not raised.
(237)G *Es drohte zu scheinen, daß …
it threatend to seem that …
(238)R *pro ugrozalo kazat’sja, cto …
threatend to seem that …
(237) suggests that the control interpretation should be preferred as the correct
one for (236), since drohen and its counterpart, e.g., in Russian, do not seem
capable of receiving a Raised expletive subject from scheinen (seem) as by
“Superraising” in (239). The Raising verb seem, differently from drohen in
(237), “accepts” the expletive subject of the Raising adjective likely.
(239) It seems (t to be very likely (that she’ll ring me tonight))
A clear instance of Raising (the quasi-argument) is of course (240), which,
however, need not be syntactically equivalent to (236).
The case of promise 109

(240) It isn’t likely (t to rain).

Now consider (241).
(241)G Es scheint zu drohen
it seems to threaten
Es is an argument DP raised from the subject θ-position discharged by drohen.
(241) does not violate the θ-criterion. Es is the head of the argument chain
(es,t): es scheint t zu drohen. I conclude nevertheless that a Raising analysis of
threaten or drohen is feasible. Further empirical support for this assumption
may be provided by (242), in so far as the threat of rain originates from the
black clouds.
(242) The black clouds threatened rain.

5.8. Intervention of modal verbs

Control processes are subtle in (243), (244), as shown by examples from

Fauconnier (1976: 156) discussed also by Vanden Wyngaerd (1987: 83).
(243)F Mon père m’a menacé d’ aller
My father me has threatened to go
à l’ école du dimanche
to Sunday school
‘My father threatened to [make me] go to Sunday school’
(244)F On a menacé ma soeur d’accoucher sans docteur
They threatened my sister to give birth without doctor
‘They threatened my sister with [having to] give birth without
a doctor.’
The German counterparts of (243) and (244) are unacceptable.
(245)G *Man hat meiner Schwester gedroht, ohne Arzt
[dat]
One has my sister threatened without doctor
zu entbinden
to give birth
110 Chapter 5

(246)G *Mein Vater hat miri gedroht (PROi

[dat]
My father has me threatened
in die Sonntagsschule zu gehen)
to the Sunday school to go
Such cross-linguistic situations should have become familiar by now. (243)
vs. (246) is an instance of a further type of distinct cross-linguistic control
behaviour that is contingent on the availability of particular modal and caus-
ative elements. Recall the differences described with respect to promise and
ask, as illustrated by (219) vs. (221), (91) vs. (96), and the contrast arising in
the persuade-type control regulations (see above, (115) vs. (123)). In the
former type (promise, ask), the construal necessary to meet m constraints (B,a)
and (B,b), respectively, is not required in German, as the modal verb dürfen
that must be introduced to obtain grammatical renderings matching the mean-
ings of (219) and (91) produces sentences directly meeting m constraints
(B,a), (B,b). In the second type, (persuade), the same, that is, satisfying um
(B,b) is done by the causative verb lassen. Third, the German counterparts of
French (243), (244) resort to the modal müssen (must, have to, be forced to). In
(243) and (244), deontic and causality switch seem to combine. The counter-
part to (243) in German is (247).
(247)G Mein Vater drohte miri (PROi die Sonntagsschule
[dat]
my father threatened (me) the Sunday school
besuchen zu müssen)
to go to to have to
‘I was threatened by my father with having to go to the
Sunday school.’
What must be made explicit by using müssen, conceptualized as have to or be
forced to, in rendering French (243), effects satisfaction of m constraint (B,a)
quite analogously to the introduction of dürfen in (219), (91), the latter
satisfying m (B,a), (B,b), respectively. The use of lassen, rendering English
(115), (see 4.1.), results in meeting um constraint (B,b). Thus, what in German
is necessarily elucidated by lexical material and results in more “regular”
control behaviour, in English and French may be left to conceptual inferences
induced by the respective control verbs and the semantic content of the clausal
The case of promise 111

complement, provided that the results of the pragmatic construal in turn can be
referred to by the respective constraints which license them. Note that in either
case, the quasi theta-specification of Benefactive supports identification in
accord with the m constraint, and that on the “negative” interpretation: What is
threatened is not to the benefit but to the disadvantage of the addressee (cf.
5.6.)25
(248) and (249) illustrate typical standard cases in Russian.
(248)R Vitalijaj proi ottuda iskljucili za
[gen-acc] [acc sg]
Vitali (they) from there excluded for
nedisciplinirovannost’ i proi prigrozili (PROi
[3 ps pl pret]
undisciplined behavior and threatened
otpravit’ proj s marševoj rotoj na front)
[acc]
to send (him) with a company on the march to the front
proj (j ≠ i) is a null pronoun Case-marked accusative, which is identified with
the matrix object Vitali. proi is a discourse-related null subject pro, marked
nominative and [+plural, 3ps] in Russian. It refers to a domain of persons no
individual of whom is identified.
(249)R Oteci grozilsja (PROi menjaj vygnat’ i
Father threatened me to turn out and
lišit’ proj nasledstva
[gen sg]
deprive (me) of (my) inheritance
The slightly non-standard form grozit’sja with the attached reflexive affix
closes the position for an object-NP.
Chapter 6

No Choice of Controller

If only one NP-argument is available one has no choice but to take or reject it
as the controller. The question whether a single argument is a suitable control-
ler, has to be answered in any theory of control.

6.1. Matrix active clauses

6.1.1. The case of try / attempt

Dowty proposed an entailment pattern for try that is analogous to (10) (see fn.
15).
“…
(250) ∀x ∀P [δ(P) (x*) ⇒ α(x*)]
∀x ∀P [δ(P) (x*) ⇒ β ([P(x*)] (x*)]
In the case of δ = try’, for example, an instance of the entailment α (x*) would
be ‘x acts intentionally’, and an instance of ß ([P(x*)]) (x*) would be ‘x intends
that x’s action will bring about P (x*)’” (Dowty 1985: 299). (“δ is an intransi-
tive Equi verb, P a variable over VP-meanings …, x an individual variable, α
a property of NP-meanings, and ß a relation between NP-meanings and
propositions.”)
Though stated in terms of a M(ontague)-analysis), Dowty’s entailments
can be related to control conditions in the style of this approach.
I will argue that verbs of the try-type (e. g. manage, dare; R umudrit’sja
(manage, contrive), osmelit’sja (dare) assign the theta-specification 〈intact,+〉
to their respective external arguments and to the s-structure subject position
(PRO) of their infinitival complement. Thus, they “generate” their own con-
straints on control26 .
114 Chapter 6

Assignment of one and the same theta-specification to two arguments,

one of them associated with the distinct theta-grid of the complement verb, is
empirically justified by the fact that ‘trying to do something’ and ‘doing
something’ are inseparable, with respect to intentional action. “Thus if a man
tries to hit a home run and succeeds, his try is his success …” (Davidson 1989:
72)) At LF, then, the subject position of the infinitival occupied by PRO, or e
that is replaced by PRO (in the passive or with ergative verbs, for example),
carries its internal theta-specification and the feature value relevant to control,
which it receives from the matrix verb try, manage, and others of this type.
The twofold assignment implies an inherent identification, that is, control
matching unmarked (B,a).
If it is intuitively arguable that a control verb like try must assign the
lexical control feature value (〈intact,+〉) to its own matrix argument and to
PRO, the formal and conceptual aspects of such an operation may appear
dubious. It is tempting to wonder whether the concept of abstract verb incor-
poration developed by Baker (1985, 1989) and claimed (Grewendorf/Sabel
1994) to be independently viable as a means to derive the pattern of long
Scrambling in German, might provide a natural solution to the control prob-
lems and double argument. Grewendorf and Sabel (1994: 264 ff.) have
pointed out cases of long scrambling in control complements like (251) vs.
(252), (Grewendorf/Sabel’s (2)a. and (2)b.)
(251) [C’ daß [IP[den Hund]i [IP keiner [CP PRO ti zu füttern]
that the dogACC nobodyNOM to feed
versuchte]]]
tried
“The verb versuchen ‘try’ in (2a) but not the subject control verb zögern
‘hesitate’ in (2b) licenses long scrambling of the embedded object into the
matrix clause … lexical properties of verbs play the decisive role in licensing
long scrambling …” (Grewendorf/Sabel 1994: 265)
(252) *[C’ daß [IP den Hund]i [IP keiner [PRO ti zu füttern]
that the dogACC nobodyNOM to feed
zögerte]]]
hesitated
Which is the lexical property that plays the decisive role in licensing long
scrambling in (251) but not in (252), that is, which is the lexical property that
No Choice of Controller 115

is compatible with, or requires, abstract verb incorporation and constitutes the

relevant distinction between versuchen and zögern?27 Zögern says that the
enterprise has not yet been undertaken and may not be at all. The chance of
success or failure is not (yet) taken. The difference can be assumed to be very
near the characterization of try given by Davidson (see above), which applies
to try and its ilk but not to hesitate. The specific lexical properties, however, on
which control behaviour but not long scrambling hinges unify try and hesitate.
The relevant common property is partly brought out in the pair manage
versus fail, which clearly shares it. Manage may be loosely paraphrased as try
something and accomplish it, fail as try something and not accomplish it.

(253) He 
managed 
 to reach the semi - finals
failed 
What is common to manage and try, to fail and hesitate? Let us tentatively call
the property metaactive. It will be represented as the lexical feature (value)
〈metaactive,α〉. Associated with a lexical class of control verbs, it will trigger
the cross-clausal double assignment of 〈intact,+〉. Its intuitive understanding
can be paraphrased as the relation of an agent designate to bringing about, or
causing to happen, the event described by the embedded verb. For illustration,
I will give a, of course, incomplete list of the verbs in this control class in
English, Russian, Czech, German.
(a) try, attempt, seek, endeavour, aim; (b) dare, venture; (c) manage, fail; (d)
hesitate, hurry; (e) be able to; (f) arrange, plan; (g) be determined, be
prepared to; (h) agree, refuse
Russian: (a) (po)pytat’sja, probovat’, starat’sja, stremit’sja; (b) osmelit’sja,
otvazit’sja; (c) udat’sja, (+dative-DP), ne uda(va)t’sja (fail); (d) lenit’sja (be
too lazy to), spešit’; (e) umet’; (f) rešit’; (g) zatrudnjat’sja/zatrudnit’sja (find
it difficult to); (h) soglašat’sja; (i) byt’ gotov (be ready)
Czech: (a) pokusit se, hledet (seek), snazit se (endeavour); (b) odvázit se
(dare); (c) dokázat, nedokázat (manage/fail); (d) váhat (hesitate), pospíšit si
(hurry); (e) umet (know (how to VP)), být s to; (f) chystat se.
German: (a) versuchen, sich bemühen (endeavour); (b) wagen, sich erkühnen;
(c) (es ) (nicht) fertig bringen, (es) (nicht) schaffen (manage/(fail)); (d)
zögern, sich beeilen; (e) fähig sein; (f) planen, vorhaben (g) entschlossen sein,
bereit sein.
This approach, which presupposes a propositional view of infinitives, helps
cope with a spurious puzzle that has arisen with this view and has been used as
116 Chapter 6

an argument against it by Chierchia and Turner (1988: 292): “… if (8) [= try’

(m, read’ (m, Principia’))] is the meaning of (6d) [= Mary tries to read/reading
Principia] and (7a) [= ∀x (try’ (m,x) ⇒ try’ (j,x))] the meaning of (6a) [= John
tries everything that Mary tries], then what (6a) and (6d) should entail is
something like (9) a. b.:
(9) a. try’ (j, read’ (m, Principia’))
b. John tries to bring about a situation where Mary’s reading
Principia occurs.
But this is just not true. In conclusion, it would seem, prima facie, that on any
variety of propositional analysis of infinitives and gerunds the validity of
reasoning patterns such as those in (6) will be a total mystery.”
The instance of sloppy identity can be cleared up by revising (7a). In (7a),
x, by hypothesis, in particular in accord with (8), is a propositional variable. Its
value must be constant, of course, in both occurrences. It is well known that
“sloppy identity” phenomena involve variable binding (see, e.g. Reinhart
1983). The global propositional variable x in (7a), however, blurs the fact that
the hidden subject argument contained in either occurrence of x is itself a
bound variable: Within the first occurrence of x in (7a), it is bound by m,
within the second by j, a legitimate variant of control. Under our approach, the
“external”, cross-clausal assignment of 〈intact,+〉 to PRO — in addition to its
“internal” assignment to the matrix subject — effected by try — is equivalent
to or entails, the intrinsic referential identification of the two arguments,
covered by the occurrences of x in the antecedent and consequent in (7a), with
their respective overt arguments m and j. This would exclude (9a). The
respective necessarily distinct values of the NP-argument variable hidden in
the first and in the second occurrence of x clear up the puzzle of the two
apparently identical x’s in (7a). The logical formula (7a) distorts the gram-
matical situation. I would rather propose (7a)′.
(7a)′ ∀P (try’ (m,P(m)) ⇒ try’ (j,P(j)))
Thus (9) a. b. is not entailed by (6a) and (6d). Zec (1987: 139-145) refutes
Chierchia’s entailment (9) a. b. on the basis of control in finite clausal
complements in Serbo-Croatian.
A simpler illustration is (254).
(254) John tried to understand Kant and Peter tried it, too.
No Choice of Controller 117

Such instances of sloppy identity are not restricted to try.

Analogous cases reappear in controlled complements of promise.
(255) Peter promised to take part and so did John.
Thus, cross-clausal assignment of the lexical feature 〈intact,+〉 is a sufficient,
but not a necessary condition of “sloppy” or — in Higginbotham’s (1992: 90)
terminology — covariant interpretation under it- or that-anaphora as the only
available interpretation. Saying that “just because it is a verb of strong obliga-
tory control, try is a verb for which, by virtue of its meaning, only covariant
interpretation is possible …” (Higginbotham 1992: 106) could count as a
terminological proposal.
If the clause internal and the external assignment, the latter effected by
try, coincide, that is, PRO receives 〈intact,+〉 two times, no problem is posed.
This is the uninteresting standard case of control. The extension of assigning
〈intact,+〉 to the embedded subject position proves to be of import when it
comes to less customary instances of control: “English speakers accept with-
out hesitation sentences like (i) Karen tried to be elected … in the interpreta-
tion dictated by syntax … literal translations of (ii) Quintus versuchte bestraft
zu werden into English Quintus tried to be punished are fully acceptable, even
if the situations described especially in the case of (ii), are rather bizarre.”
(Comrie 1985: 54, 63) Superficially, the presumed cross-clausal assignment,
which presupposes the matrix intra-clausal one, creates a situation that
matches um constraint (B,a). PRO in (ii) receives 〈intact,+〉 from the matrix
verb as stated above. But in contrast to control of promise-type verbs, control
of try need not be licensed by matching um (B,a) or, for that matter, some other
constraint. This is what I have in mind talking of self-generating control. The
case of promise is fundamentally different. PRO can only be specified by the
theta-grid of the complement verb. Otherwise, the control mechanism of
promise, determining cases like (211) – (213), would be evened out. In
particular, the difference between (256) and (257) would get lost.
(256) Karen tried to be elected.
(257) Karen promised him to be elected.

6.1.2. try vs. intend

Consider (258), which is acceptable, and (259), which is not.

118 Chapter 6

(258) I tried to be allowed to go.

(259) *I intendend to be allowed to go
Jackendoff (1972: 233) takes (259) to be ungrammatical, Vanden Wyngaerd’s
judgment is “unacceptable” but “semantically grammatical” (1987: 64) How
does this theory reflect or deal with the situation, in particular, why is (259)
not grammatical or unacceptable, but (258) is? With respect to control, try
differs from intend, although the meaning of the former can be understood to
imply that of the latter. As demonstrated above, (the process of) trying to do
something is inseparable from doing something, but intend to do something
clearly is separate from doing it. Thus, trying involves acting, but intending
does not. I assume that intend, in contrast to try, does not assign 〈intact,+〉 to its
matrix subject and complement subject position, which is a natural conse-
quence of the separation of intend to do something from doing something.
This accounts for the ungrammaticality of (259): PRO receives 〈intact,–〉 from
allow as in (258), but not (across clause) 〈intact,+〉 from intend. Differing from
try, the matrix subject of intend alone is assigned 〈intact,+〉. Thus, um con-
straint (B,a) is not matched “automatically”. (260) is grammatical, of course,
satisfying um (B,a): the subject of intend receives 〈intact,+〉 and PRO is
assigned 〈intact,+〉 from the theta-grid of go.
(260) He intended to go.
Recall that we distinguish between the stronger part of the control relation and
its weaker part: 〈 〉PRO is the stronger part. (cf. above, 3.2.4.1.). Now, the
particular constraint (J) on the application of (B,a) will capture the contrast
between (261) and (262) left over for explanation.
(J) Control relations in the designated class are not licensed iff the lexical
meaning of the verb in the controlled clause is equivalent to a proper
part of the thematic specification assigned by the control verb. The
inverse does not hold. Alternatively: A control verb of the designated
class (e.g. try) cannot control the PRO-subject of its proper part verb.
(261) He intends (PRO to try to take part in the competition)
(262) *He tries (PRO to intend to take part in the competition).
In (261), PRO is characterized by 〈intact,+〉, he receives 〈intact,+〉 as well by
intend, whose meaning is represented roughly as λpλx (x INTENDS p)
No Choice of Controller 119

considered a proper part of 〈intact,+〉. It is licensed by um (B,a), since the

stronger conjunct 〈intact,+〉 satisfied by PRO contains intend predicated of he.
In (262) the relation is reversed: the stronger conjunct of constraint (B,a) is
determined by INTEND, which is included in the instantiation 〈intact,+〉 of the
weaker one. In accordance with (J), this results in ungrammaticality.
I will summarize the preceding discussion by formulating a condition on
lexical information and control for the items try and cognate verbs like
manage, r. umudrit’sja, c. být s to (be capable of) and verbs in the list above.
(K) Specification 〈intact,+〉 of the theta grid of try and cognate verbs,
beyond its projection onto an NP-argument or (PP-adjunct) in its own
clause, is assigned to the S- (or LF-) structure PRO-subject of the
clausal complement (in addition to the theta-specifications internal to,
and distributed among, the arguments of the clausal complement).
Recall that intend, whose meaning is considered equivalent to a proper part of
〈intact,+〉 that lacks -act(ion), does not obey (K). Still it assigns 〈intact,+〉 to its
external argument, where the action intuitively relates to mental decision.
Thus, (261) and (262) are captured straightforwardly.
(K) holds and applies in active matrix clauses and in the (impersonal)
passive ones, in which 〈intact,+〉 is assigned to crosslinguistic counterparts of
the by NP-phrase (see sect. 6.2.)).

6.1.3. Effects on passive controlled clauses and unspecified PRO

In passive controlled clauses, the derived PRO-subject carries a specification

〈F, −〉 that clashes with the specification that PRO is assigned by (K) from
“outside”. From the viewpoint of grammatical control conditions, the internal
theta-specification that PRO bears is not irrelevant to the external one it
receives from the theta-grid of try by (K). Thus far grammar, in particular
syntax, can go and has to go with respect to the passive controlled clauses on
the assumption that the passive verb assigns 〈intact,+〉. Availability of
〈intact,+〉 satisfies condition (D), which, thus, also is a specification on the
application of (K). Intuitively, if the content of the controlled complement
clause is an intentional action, it provides a natural target for trying to affect it.
Consider (263).
120 Chapter 6

(263)R Oni pytalsja PROi byt’ osmotrennym specialistom

[part/pret/pass/sg/masc/instr] [instr sg]
he tried to be examined by a specialist
Let’s see what it would be like to take an extreme position or accept a “null
hypothesis”: “… in terms of control, anything goes with a verb like try … we
suggest … to treat like on a par with try, which means that no restriction on
control holds.” (Vanden Wyngaerd 1987: 75/76)) If try is treated on a par with
like, the impact of passivization on control should be the same with try and like
or hate.

(264) John likes  

to praise

 to be praised 

(265) John hates  

to cheat at cards
 to be cheated at cards 

(266) John tries 

to be cheated at cards 

 to cheat at cards 
(267) John tries  
to praise everybody
 ?to be praised by everybody 

Clearly, (264), (265), with active and passive controlled clauses, are perfectly
acceptable, whereas, to say the least, we have to do a certain amount of work
to impose an interpretation on the passive variants of (266), (267), which has
an effect on their acceptability. The conflict between 〈intact,–〉 and 〈intact,+〉
coexisting in PRO reflects this situation. Its settlement depends on pragmatic
settings of discourse, situation and knowledge. There appears some appar-
ently paradoxical evidence in favour of this approach on inverting the strat-
egy: Passive controlled clauses may prove to be more readily acceptable than
corresponding active ones. Compare (268) and (269).

staralsja 
 
(268)R Nikto ne  pytalsja  (PRO zapodozrit’ ego
stremilsja 

Nobody (not)  
tried
 to suspect him
 endeavoured 
v eresi)
of heresy28
No Choice of Controller 121

staralsja 
 
(269)R On  pytalsja  (PROi ne být’ zapodozrennym t i
stremilsja 
[part pret pass masc sing]
tried 
he endeavoured  not to be suspected
 
v eresi)
of heresy
(269) is less bizarre than (268). In (268), zapodozrit’ does not seem to assign
〈intact,+〉 to PRO. If the theta role experiencer is assigned to PRO it will clash
with 〈intact,+〉 projected from the matrix verb. The minor or absent oddness of
(269) can be attributed to the natural behaviour of trying to avoid suspicion. In
other words, the specification 〈intact,–〉 assigned to the chain (PROi, ti) from
the theta-grid of zapodozrit’ in (269) is easier to reconcile with 〈intact,+〉 than
the internal specification of PRO is in (268). (cf footnote 26).

6.1.4. Non-passive controlled clauses failing condition (D)

When 〈intact,+〉 is not available in the controlled clause, the clash between the
feature value 〈intact,+〉 assigned to PRO by the matrix verb try or its ilk and the
internal theta role it carries, cannot be handled in grammatical terms alone.
The coexistence, compatibility and conceptual-pragmatic balance of the two
characterizations modulate acceptability, more or less ready acceptance or
rejection of the pertinent sentences. The problem is again whether the event or
state described in the controlled clause can be construed as conceptually
compatible with, or accessible to, trying it. Lasnik and Fiengo (1974: 553)
mark (270) as ungrammatical.
(270) Billi tried (PROi to resemble Harry)
(271)R Chotja jai i pytajus’ (PROi byt’ pochozim
although I try to be like
na Christa …)
Christ …
‘… to resemble Christ’
122 Chapter 6

For Vanden Wyngaerd (1987: 75), (270) is “… good … if read with an

appropriate context.” Judgments like “ungrammatical” can miss the point. By
(K), PRO in (270), (271) is assigned 〈intact,+〉 cross-clausally, and, thus, they
and their counterparts in other languages, are grammatical, as far as grammar
goes. The conflict between 〈intact,+〉 and the theta-specification assigned to
PRO by (the theta-grid of) resemble is settled at a postgrammatical concep-
tual-pragmatic level. Control in cases like (270) can be said “… to have
obligatory pragmatic and semantic attachments.” (Fillmore et al. 1988: 504)
Their ground is prepared by the conflicting specifications in PRO. Analogous
situations recur in (272) – (273).
(272)R Petri pytalsja (PROi ispytat’ cuvstvo oblegcenija)
[acc] [gen sg]
Peter tried to experience the feeling of relief
(273)C (proi) Snazilii se (PROi být veseli)
[3ps pl] [lexical refl. clitic]
(they) endeavoured to be cheerful
‘They were at pains …’
(274)C Ve dne proi se snazilai (PROi verit
[refl. clitic]
in the day-time (she) endeavoured to believe
tomu, co Tomáš ríká …)
[dat]
that what Tomas was saying
In (272) – (274), there is again a conflict between 〈intact,+〉 and Experiencer
both present in PRO. This is of course independent of the D-structure position
of PRO. If PRO is not the external argument, the pair of internal and external
specifications is assigned to the chain (PROi ti), e.g. in the case of monadic
ergative verbs like arrive, escape, or verbs like Russian nravit’sja (to please).
(275) Hei tried (PROi to arrive ti (at ten)).
(276)R Onai umudrilas’ (PROi nravit’sja)
she managed to please
‘… to be attractive …’or
‘she managed to make people like her’29
No Choice of Controller 123

On this approach, it must be expected that “… adverbial modification often

suffices to create a complement of the appropriate type as seen in the contrast
between the two cases in (277) and (278).
(277) I tried to receive the good news
*(with good grace)
(278) I tried to suffer the insults
*(good humoredly)
(Lasnik’s (i), (ii))
(Lasnik 1992: 248, fn. 6). An anonymous reviewer of Lasnik’s paper observed
“… that the ‘controllability’ phenomenon does not always reduce to theta role
assignment in any straightforward way.” Clearly, under this approach, the
conceptual conflict between the two assignments PRO receives from matrix
try 〈intact,+〉 and receive, suffer, respectively, is considerably relieved with
the adverbial implying intentional endeavour. Thus, (277), (278) are to be
judged as grammatical with the adverbial, since the latter’s occurence implies
an at least conceptual modification or extension of the theta-grid of suffer and
receive that provides for 〈intact,+〉 being assigned to PRO. The adverbials do
what condition (D) requires. PRO must end up with the local assignment
〈intact,+〉, independently of whether the respective adverbials effect it alone or
in tandem with the verbs. The verbs alone cannot assign 〈intact,+〉. What they
assign to PRO clashes with the external assignment by try so strongly that
(277), (278), without the adverbial, are not interpretable, which amounts to
ungrammatical at an interface level.

6.2. Matrix passive clauses

The respective constraints on control including their concomitant role of

guiding potential pragmatic construal of control extend to the passive forms of
control verbs and, thus, “Visser’s Generalization”. To start with, I assume that
(279) and (280) are ungrammatical on different grounds.
(279) *John was tried [e to go]
tried 
(280) *it was attempted  [e to see Bill]
 
124 Chapter 6

Koster (1984: 431, 433) argues that both are ruled out by the common labor of
binding theory (A) and Control theory. Accounting for (279) and (280)
distinctly, I assume that (279) is a violation of the theta-criterion, following
Vanden Wyngaerd (1987: 76): “… because try does not subcategorize for an
NP object, i. e. because the argument John receives no theta-role.” In other
words, a wrong lexical property (of try) is projected. Similarly, Iwakura
(1985: 31) argues against Koster’s analysis. As regards (280), its ungrammati-
cality revolves around two parameters.
The first can be roughly characterized as lexical sensitivity to the matrix
impersonal passive. I will sketch the problem first. “It is not possible at the
moment to give necessary and sufficient conditions for such structures. As
Williams (1980) points out, not all verbs with for-complements permit this
construction. But if these constructions are possible at all, the complement is
usually a for-complement.” (Koster 1984: 434)).
Williams (1980: 215) illustrates the unclear situation: “Decide is another
verb with an antecedentless passive: (53) It was decided to have dinner at 6. …
But decide does not allow lexical NP: (54) *John decided (for) Bill to get the
prize.” (Williams’ enumeration). (281) is an example in which the passive is
not antecedentless.
(281) It was decided by John to behave himself.
(281) is judged grammatical by Manzini (1983: 427) and Vanden Wyngaerd
(1987: 121), but a very similar example (282) is taken to be not acceptable by
Chomsky (1980: 35).
(282) *It is preferred to arrive a few minutes late.
Possibly, the ergative verb is responsible for the judgement. (283), however, is
considered grammatical by Williams (1980: 215) and Iwakura (1985: 47).
(283) It was preferred to have dinner at six.
German (284) is perfectly acceptable.
(284)G Es wurde vorgezogen, schon 7 Uhr zu frühstücken
it was preferred already at 7 to have breakfast
The range of well-formed impersonal passive control structures of type (281),
(283) does not seem to correlate with the occurrence of a complementizer
(for). The complementizer effects are epiphenomenal. Cross-linguistically at
No Choice of Controller 125

least, distinct fixations of a pertinent parameter seem to interact with, or be

dependent on, other basically lexical properties. Some parallelism between
French and Slavic languages and German suggests itself. “… impersonal
passives in French … are possible only if the verb takes an internal PP
argument: (iii) Il a été parlé de vos frères hier soir.” (Kayne 1984) Another
example is (i): Il sera procédé à la révision de ce procès. (It will be proceeded
to the revision of this trial. ‘One will proceed to the revision of these proceed-
ings.’) (Examples from Postal/Pullum (1988: 639)30 . This varying situation
has effects on control when the passive verb is a control verb.

essayé de 
secourir 
(285)F * Il a été  Paul.
visiter 
it has been tried to   help 
 Paul.
 to visit 
The German counterparts are fully grammatical.

Es ist versucht worden, Paul zu 

besuchen
(286)G 
helfen 
The implicit agent NP receives 〈intact,+〉, it is a controller licensed by (B,a).
Try assigns the feature value to PRO independently of its voice of course.
Russian offers no syntactic parallel.

poprobovano 
pomogat’ Pavlu 
(287)R *Bylo 
 posetit’ Pavla 
[part pret pass neuter]
(it) was tried to help / visit Paul
Thus, control could be well-formed, as in the active, wherever the structural
type is grammatical, which depends on a parametrized variation whose factors
are not completely lucid. (For details, cf. Růzicka 1986a, 1988, 1992). The
parameter of impersonal passive constructions, if set positively, is still sensi-
tive to lexical properties (and projected syntactical effects, e. g. unergative vs.
ergative).
The second parameter that can be set up with respect to impersonal
passive constructions as well as to some associated control regularities con-
cerns conditions of well-formed occurrence of (the respective counterparts) of
by-phrases. Following Jaeggli (1986: 600) and Roeper (1987: 276 ff.), I
assume that “… an NP in a by-phrase is assigned the ‘pure’ external theta-role
126 Chapter 6

of the passive predicate.” (Jaeggli) This NP, overt or implicit, receives 〈intact,
+〉 from the theta-grid of pertinent predicates like try in the same way as the
external argument in subject position at D-structure in the active. The hypoth-
esized (cf. Dowty 1991: 605 ff; Burzio 1986); Růzicka 1992) parameter
consists in observing this parallelism or not. Clearly, the second parameter is
dependent on the first. But, as we will see immediately, they cannot be united.
Importantly, the parameters are effective in particular lexical classes, e.g. for
try, versuchen; dance, tanzen.
English sets the first parameter and, consequently, the second negatively,
differing, e.g. from German. If the parameter is fixed positively, (K) applies to
the passive as to active matrix clauses, 〈intact,+〉 being assigned to the NP of
the counterparts of by-NP and to PRO.
(288)G Es ist [PP von [vielen]i] versucht worden
it is (has) by many tried been
([dieses Problem]j (PROi tj zu lösen))
this problem to solve
This treatment extends to functional verb passive and verbal noun.
(289)R Byla sdelana popytka [NPe]i (PROi
was made (an) attempt (by somebody)
ugovorit’ ego)
to persuade him
Under Safir’s (1987: 562, 584) approach, the implicit (empty) instrumental-NP
is not mapped onto a syntactic position. The notion of “lexically satisfying a
theta-role” (Rizzi 1986) might be invoked here. I leave this problem unresolved.
The status of the second parameter is slightly complicated by cross-
linguistic variations in the (im)possibility of overt appearance of (the counter-
part to) a by-phrase with the NP carrying 〈intact,+〉. This is evidenced by
modern Czech. Judgments on the grammaticality of the occurrence of the
agent instrumental-NP vary.
(290)C … aby bylo *úcastniky provozu)
[pret neuter] [instrum pl]
in order that (it) was/be by the participants of the traffic
dbáno predpisu°
[part pret pass neuter] [genit pl]
observed (the) regulations
No Choice of Controller 127

We should hesitate to allow the assignment of a feature value, that is, 〈intact,+〉
to an implicit NP that can never appear overtly.

6.3. Raising contexts

Instances of control that involve Raising, like (291) – (292), provide evidence
and further support for this approach.
(291)R Borisi pytalsja (PROi pokazat’sja (ti molodym
Boris tried to seem (to be) (a) young
[sportsmenom])INSTR
(sportsman)
(292)R Jai riskuju (PROi pokazat’sja vam (ti suevernym
I risk to seem (to) youDAT superstitious
i nedalekim)INSTR
and limited
(293) John tries to seem to be nice
(example from P. Jacobson 1990)
R. riskovat’ (riskuju) is among the verbal class which is subject to (K).31
Following Levin/Rappaport (1986: 646), I assume that “The XP assigns a
theta-role to the NP of which it is predicated, so this NP may be called the
external argument.” XP in (291), (292) is AP suevernym, NP molodym
sportsmenom).
The NP affected by Raising ends up as PRO in a non-theta-position, but
receives a theta-characterization through the chain (PROi ti). PRO now is
assigned 〈intact,+〉 by cross-clausal projection rule (K), e.g. in the derivation
of (291), (292). The two theta-specifications, that is, 〈intact,+〉 assigned across
clause boundaries and the internal specification of the chain (PRO, t) pro-
jected from the theta-grid of the predicative A(P) in (292) – (293), have to
come to terms with each other. The arising conflict is rather one-sided with the
theta-specification assigned by the AP- or NP-predicate to its external argu-
ment, the coda of the chain (PROi, ti), being quite a feeble characterization.
Thus, 〈intact,+〉, which PRO has received by virtue of (K), prevails over it to
its suppression, and the interpretation of, e.g., (291), (293), clearly, takes the
attempt (pytalsja, tries) to be directed towards giving the impression
128 Chapter 6

(pokazat’sja, to seem, to appear to) that Boris is a young sportsman, and John
is nice. This, indeed, is (part of) the well-formed meaning of (291) – (293).
The cross-clausal assignment of 〈intact,+〉 to PRO in virtue of (K) bears the
empirical burden of accounting for this meaning, capturing the special case of
two theta-specifications competing with each other.
Chapter 7

Reflexive clitic impersonal clauses in

Control structures

7.1. The situation in Slavic languages

In Slavic languages, impersonal structures constituted by their respective

clities se, sa, siøe, -sja, which are near equivalents to Italian si (cf. Růzicka
1992), cannot figure as infinitival clauses. They are exclusively finite. Thus,
the problem discussed by Belletti (1982: 14 ff.) does not arise, namely, the “…
incompatibility of control PRO with si … impersonal si and control PRO are
mutually exclusive.” Violation of the Case Filter is answerable for it (Cinque
1988: 23).
In the light of Cinque’s work, this incompatibility could still be accounted
for by the obligatory argumental status which he assumes for si in nonfinite
clauses. (Cinque 1988: 531) If si is an argument, the NP-subject is pleonastic
pro (l.c. 534), which cannot identify with “chain breaking” argumental PRO.
On the other hand, we do not expect a matrix pleonastic pro (subject) to be a
controller. This is trivial, but may serve as a criterion which one could use when
judging the argumental status of a pro subject. If, in the corresponding
exclusively finite reflexive impersonal structures of Slavic languages, it is not
the reflexive clitic but pro that has argumental status, as I have argued in
Růzicka (1992), pro should qualify as a controller licensed by the relevant
theta-specification. The following Czech examples substantiate this prediction.
(294)C [pro]i Zamyšlelo sei (PROi zmenit
[3 ps sg pret neuter] refl
intended reflexive to change
organizacní strukturu podniku
[gen sg]
the organisational structure of the factory
‘One planned to change the organisational structure of the
factory’.
130 Chapter 7

(295)C [pro]i Rozhodlo sei (PROi neorganizovat

[3 ps sg pret neuter] refl
decided not to organise
hromadné oslavy)
mass celebrations
‘One had decided not to organize mass cebebrations.’
(296)C [proi] Zkusilo sei (PROi to zvednout)
[3 ps pret sg neuter] refl
tried that to lift
‘One (has) tried to lift it.’
The Czech verb rozhodnout (of (295)) has a variant with the lexical clitic se:
rozhodnout se, pro, the controller, is a discourse-related anaphor here.
(297)C [pro]i Rozhodl se (PROi být zamilován do Terezy)
[pret masc sg] [part pret pass masc]
(he) decided to be in love with Tereza
In (297), the pro-subject controlling the external argument PRO of the adjecti-
val participle (phrase) carries [masc], [sg] by Spec-head agreement. PRO
receives 〈intact,+〉 across clause boundaries by (K). In (294) – (296), the
Czech reflexive clitic corresponds to Italian nominative si, which “… corre-
sponds to man ‘one’ constructions in German”. (Dobrovie-Sorin 1998: 410)
Dobrovie-Sorin (1998: 426, 427) points out a clear contrast between Spanish
and Italian on the one hand and Romanian on the other hand. In Spanish and
Italian, constructions equivalent to Czech (294) – (296) are available “…
because se is a nominative clitic that is able to control the embedded subject.
Since Romanian does not have nominative se, there is no available controller.”
Besides c. zkoušet/zkusit (try), rozhodnout (se) (decide) is taken to be
subject to (K), zamyšlet is treated like intend.

7.2. Control and reflexive passive

The status of pro in impersonal reflexive clauses as a prerequisite for
controlling

In sentences like (294) – (296) the crucial issue is how the controller is
“concealed” and how it is identified in the visible matrix clause structure. I
Reflexive clitic impersonal clauses in Control structures 131

have assumed so far that PRO is controlled by the pro-subject and its accom-
plice se whose interpretation is straightforward: It has either an “anonymous”,
that is, indefinite specific, or a generic reading. The latter is illustrated in the
Slovak example (298).
(298)SL Najviac sa dnes (pro) umiera na
[reflexive] [3 ps sg]
mostly today (one) dies of
srdcové chorobyACC
heart diseases
The assumption that in (294), (295) pro is the controller implies that it is an
argument. How does it relate to the reflexive clitic se or sa, siøe (Polish)? The
clitic is a lexical nominal element and I follow Cinque (1988: 536) in assum-
ing that it “… is part of a CHAIN with [NP,IP] …” The concept of CHAIN is
theoretically suitable to account for what the clitic does. Certain properties of
the zero subject-DP are a function of the reflexive clitic.
In the examples (296), (298), se, sa “conspires” with pro to furnish the
(subject) position occupied by the latter with a designated content, that is, to
reduce it to “anonymous” or generic meaning. This is nearly equivalent to
saying that the reflexive clitic enables pro (and the rest of the clause) to satisfy
F(ull) I(nterpretation) (see Chomsky 1986: 98 ff.): In an otherwise unchanged
context without the reflexive clitic, one would either have to look for some
quite different non-autonomous, e.g., discourse-anaphorical interpretation of
the zero subject, or consider the sentence defective. Compare (299) with (300)
(299)C (pro) Zadalo se, ze S
[neuter sing] refl
‘one demanded that S’

(300)C (pro) Zadalo ze S

 it 
 
something  demanded that
somebody 
In (300) bare pro must provide its own discourse-related or deictic, possibly
logophoric antecedent. It follows that se, sa (Polish sie) etc. carry or provide
the feature specifications necessary for the self-sufficient interpretation and,
being part of a CHAIN with [NP,IP], that is, with pro, and, by transitivity, with
132 Chapter 7

Agr, share relevant features and index with both. Besides [+person] (personal
Agr), there is no other (number) feature specification required in the CHAIN.
The reflexive structures of this type are incompatible with reciprocal anaphors
(see Růzicka 1992: 152). But we don’t have to specify pro as [–plural], since in
Slavic languages [3 ps sing (neuter)] is the default Phi-feature agreement
specification if the s-structure subject position is occupied by a non-lexical
(pro)noun lacking an inherent number feature [+pl] or by a (pro)noun carrying
[–nominative].32
The nonargumental clitic does what Cinque (1988: 530) — with respect
to Italian si — calls “… serve(s) as a syntactic means to supplement personal
Agr with the features able to ‘identify’ … the content of pro as an unspecified
(generic) person pronominal, an interpretation that would not be available to
the ordinary person inflection paradigm.” Note that the feature [+human] is
not a result of s-selection. The typical range of [+human]-external argument
interpretation rather is the result of an interplay of principles identical with, or
complementary to, those that result in passive. In other words, the particular
type of structures “inserts” compatible verbs that in turn select [+human]
subjects. Or, we might say, the reflexive formative licenses pro carrying
[+human].
I will try to elucidate how the impersonal structures under discussion
interrelate with the passive. The question arises how the reflexive clitic comes
to function in this way. I would like to suggest that what ends up as the two
structures just mentioned are consistent arrays resulting from the (co-)opera-
tion of identical and complementary principles, the latter being associated
with distinct sets of lexical predicates (verbs), transitive vs. nonergative. In the
reflexive passive, for example in Czech, the subject A-position is dethema-
tizid by the clitic se, which, being argumental in these structures, binds or
“withholds” (Cinque 1988: 535) the external theta-role, and becomes the
target of object movement. With intransitives, in particular unergative verbs,
the subject position is held open again by constituting a CHAIN with the clitic,
but in this case no object is available to move in. So if the reflexive clitic need
not dethematize the subject position and can be taken to be nonargumental, it
seems to be obvious from the viewpoint of linguistic economy that what the
reflexive clitic provides for by being part of a CHAIN with [NP, IP], namely
the empty subject position be utilized as an argumental pro for Full Interpreta-
tion: pro is an argument to be interpreted so to speak according to its phonetic
content, namely as “anonymous”, indefinite specific or generic. In both
Reflexive clitic impersonal clauses in Control structures 133

related structures, the theta role Agent is affected, with its respective
DP-recipients being demoted and suppressed (in the passive) or deprived of
referential readings (in the impersonal reflexive structures). As we shall see,
the reflexive clitic se (or sa, siøe) on which these properties hinge must be
marked [+person] in the reflexive passive as well.
(301)C Kongresi se peclive pripravil ti
[nom masc sing] [+person] [masc sing]
congress self carefully prepared

‘The Congress 
has been 
 carefully prepared.
 was 

While the pro-subject is available as recipient of the external θ-role in the

intransitive structures like (294) – (296), the subject position in the reflexive
passive is occupied and no recipient of the external role, withheld by the
reflexive from subject position, is available at all, for example, in Czech,
Slovak, Polish and Serbo-Croatian, as the counterpart to a by-phrase (see
Růzicka 1992).
In accordance with Cinque (1988: 530), I assume that in both relevant
structures the most plausible position of the reflexive clitic is the adjunction
site under Agr. Its effects on the shape of VP and its membership in the
CHAIN with the subject-DP in the impersonal structures justify this location.
Agr itself of course carries the “strong” agreement features corresponding
with the subject pro. But pro does not transfer gender or number and the
presumable intrinsic or conceptual plural of pro and se does not “come out”
morphologically. Thus, the minimal and maximal set of agreement features of
Agr consist of the default features [+neuter] as in (294) or [+3 ps, +sing] and
the intrinsic feature [+person]. This is a case of Spec-head agreement with Agr
dividing the agreement load between itself and its adjunct se. I neglect Case
assignment. The reflexive clitic, a nominal element should receive [+nomina-
tive] in both structures. An alternative analysis has been suggested by
Dobrovie-Sorin (1998). For its relevance to Control, see subsection 7.1.
Summing up, in the passive, which may be considered to be a “transitive”
nonimpersonal contextual variant of the main type of impersonal reflexive
clitic, we assume that se is an argument and is assigned the external theta role,
or, varying the metaphor, withholds it. As under Burzio’s Generalization, it
deprives the verb of its capacity to assign accusative. Since the A-position and
134 Chapter 7

structural Case position of the direct object is closed, it seems natural that
another argument position, the subject position, must open in compensation.
Controlled clauses are incompatible with the reflexive passive in Slavic
languages, a fact which conforms with Cinque’s (1988: 561) observation that
“Infinitival control structures are generally taken to be incompatible with
passive si …” Cinque continues “… passive si appears to be compatible with
control … where … pure middle interpretation is possible …” But, for example,
in Russian, even control cases in which an embedding noun “prompts” pure
middle interpretation seem barred.
(302)R *Eti okna imejut svojstvo (PRO legko myt’sja)
these windows have the property easily to wash-refl
(303) illustrates that reflexive non-middle passive cannot be realized in con-
trolled clauses.

ne zamecat' sja 

(303)R * Boris pytalsja (PRO  priglasat' sja 

not to be noticed 
Boris tried  to be invited 

Of course, this is not due to the passive interpretation as such.

Borisi pytalsja (PROi 

ne byt' zamecennym 
priglasennym 
(304)R

[ part pass pret instrum sg]
not to be noticed 
Boris tried  invited 

The participle (analytic) passive construction is compatible with control, as
many examples besides (304) have evidenced. Cinque (1988: 558, 561)
attributes the ungrammaticality of near Italian analogues like (305), (his (83))
to a violation of the Case filter, following Burzio (1986: 44) and others.
(305)I *Quei prigionierii vorrebbero [PROi essersi già liberati ei]
‘Those prisoners would want si to be already freed’.
“… the ungrammaticality of such cases as (83) does not follow unless we
assume that si continues to require nominative Case as in (2b) (= *Sarebbe
meglio lavorarsi un po’ di più ‘It would be better si to work a bit more’)”
Reflexive clitic impersonal clauses in Control structures 135

(Cinque 1998: 558). Cinque turns to “… a solution to this apparent paradox

(“… si appears to absorb both accusative and nominative, with nominative
being in fact shared by si and the NP determining agreement”) … suggested in
Chomsky (1986b: 132 ff.).” He assumes si to be [+ arg] in examples like (306)
(his (84)),
(306)I Gli spaghetti si sono già comprati
‘The spaghettis si are already bought
(“have already been bought”)’
which means “… that si will have to be in a CHAIN assigned nominative Case
and will withhold the external theta-role.” (loc. cit. 558) Since in (305) PRO
has no Case, “… The unsatisfied need for nominative is, then, what causes the
ungrammaticality of (305) …, where a pure middle interpretation of si is not
available.” (p. 561)33
The grammaticality of Russian (303) need not founder as a result of a
violation of Case-theory in the same way as (305), if the PRO-subject is
correctly assumed to receive default dative Case. Rather than turning to Case
theory, I would like to suggest that the potential contingency of analyzing
pertinent reflexive structures as passive plays a significant part in the failure of
control. This assumption is supported by the fact that the S-structure subject of
reflexive passive is predominantly [–human], which often backs the under-
standing as passive and simultaneously may prevent infinitival sentential
embeddings getting involved in Control. We generalize the conclusion that the
reflexive passive, which may be contingent on the help of particular lexical
factors and, thus, borders on construal, does not lend itself to the construal of
Control.
Approaching now an account for the contrast between “analytic” passive
as in (304) and reflexive passive as in (301), (303), we may rely on a
conceptually similar analysis of the former in the attempt to draw a distinctive
parallel. “… like other clitics, -en forms a chain with a full NP (see, for
example, Jaeggli (1982), Borer (1984)). The NP that forms the coda of the
chain may be overtly realized as a by-phrase, giving rise to ‘long passives’ …
If the NP is not overt, a ‘short passive’ is formed. The existence of a clitic
chain in passives implies that -en has a referential index … in short passives,
our claim is that there is an empty category linked to the argument -en.”
(Baker et al. 1989: 223)) Thus, -en and se etc. are taken to be arguments in the
respective passive constructions.
136 Chapter 7

Capturing the difference between the two passive constructions and their
respective CHAINS34 hinges on the elements which are linked to the clitics.
In Slavic, “transitive” reflexive passives have the as yet unfilled subject
position e linked to, and dethematized by, the argumental reflexive clitic, an
operation falling under the notion of functional CHAIN. In -en-passives, the
by-phrase, its counterparts, or the corresponding implicit (IMP) is linked to the
clitic -en. In these considerations, I assume that the Russian or other Slavic
“analytic” passive is similar to the -en-passive in the relevant aspects. In the
-en-passive (and its counterparts), the morpheme is an argumental affix tied to
the Infl node which unequivocally “identifies” the argument and the theta-
role, as the subject-NP explicitly does in the corresponding active. In contrast,
the occurrence of counterparts to the by-phrase is strongly restricted and in
some languages even excluded in the reflexive passive. Besides, object move-
ment, common to both types of passive, is unique to passive structure only in
the analytic type (cf. Růzicka 1992: 138).
Crucially, the passivization process is not unequivocally determined by
the reflexive element, that is, the surface subject of verbs to which the
reflexive clitic is attached may retain external argument position, and it is
privileged to contain a moved d-structure object of ergatives (cf. Růzicka
1992). Properties of the s-structure subject and other contingent lexical prop-
erties take essential part in determing a passive or non-passive interpretation
of reflexive structures. In general, passive interpretation in reflexive structures
is impeded by the presence of [+human] in the PRO-matrix. Control verbs,
however, predominantly are accompanied by [+human] for PRO in their
complement. As a consequence, pertinent Control constraints, in particular
(K), often have no unequivocal theta-specification, namely 〈intact,–〉 to apply
to in potential reflexive passive structures, in contrast with the analytic pas-
sive. Cf. (307).
(307)R *Otec popytalsja (PROi vozvrašcat’sja
[+refl.]
‘(Their) father tried to be given back
detjam)
[dative]
to (his) children.’
This seems to be the intuitive empirical underpinning of the preclusion of
controlled reflexive passive, beyond its possible Case-theoretical account.
Chapter 8

“Self-control” with evaluating and

attitudinal predicates

The controlled clause is the propositional (event) argument of predicates

which are taken in a broad sense to include epistemic, deontic, emotional,
moral, and psychological states, properties or attitudes. They are verbs or
adjectives that constitute a straightforward case of self-regulating control. No
particular constraints licensing control need be imposed either in terms of
relations between theta-specifications or in other terms. Their inherent control
mechanism is not any different than with verbs obeying (K), that is try,
manage, etc., apart from even dispensing with (K) in the subset (a).
Intuitively, it is quite natural that the evaluating attitude taken towards an
event, be it epistemic, deontic, “psychological” or otherwise, is compatible
with, or may result from, any specific part the referent of PRO takes in the
event described in the controlled clause. Another intuition suggests that the
identification of PRO poses few problems because either the only overt
argument of the immediately superordinate clause is the antecedent of PRO,
or if the single matrix NP argument is empty or implicit or there is no projected
NP-argument at all, the problem of identification arises in the matrix clause,
but not, originally, for PRO. Control, then, is determined indirectly by resolv-
ing identification in the matrix clause.

8.1. Adjectival predicates

8.1.1. Two basic situations

There are two basically distinct situations that circumscribe the range of
control and constitute two distinct subsets (a) and (b):
138 Chapter 8

(a) The participation or involvement of the referent of PRO in the event

described by the controlled clause calls forth the — evaluated — state s/he
experiences in taking part in this event. Thus, PRO effects being identified
with the matrix controller, namely the experiencer-NP.
(b) Any or a particular instance of the event described by the controlled
clause is evaluated, e.g. morally, intellectually or otherwise, by a speaker or a
person mentioned or understood, which implies evaluating the person(s)
responsible for the event. In particular, the evaluation is expressed in relation
to, and depending on, its specific responsible agent. If the latter, the only
candidate for controller, is nonovert, the notion of arbitrary PROarb may prove
practicable as in cases of propositions about an unlimited range of PRO, or of
unequivocal pragmatic control. Importantly, only in (b) the thematic specifi-
cation 〈intact,+〉 is involved in control,which can be considered a case of
cross-clausal s-selection, implementable by (K).

8.1.1.1. Situation (a) and Epstein’s formula.

“(∀x) if x plays baseball, it is fun for x …”, applied to It is fun to play baseball.
“… the correct LF-representation of the sentence is (308)” (Epstein 1984: 502
ff., (8)).
(308) [S’ (∀x1) [S It is fun (for) x1 [S’ (for) [S x1 to play baseball]]]]
Syntactic evidence for the existence of these two NP positions (each occupied
by a variable in (308)) is provided by, for example (309), (Epstein’s (9)).
(309) It is fun for Lucy for Joe to play baseball.
“With respect to the LF representation (308) … in the correct S-structure
representation of the sentence, so-called PROarb is controlled by … a base-
generated quantificational empty category, namely, pro, occupying the gov-
erned complement NP position to the adjective.” (Epstein 1984: 502 ff.))
At S-structure, “quantificational” pro is the special case of the matrix NP
which is subject to a “reverse control” process — participating in an event
“precedes” the evaluated feeling arising from it — in the same way as an overt
NP. This process is reflected in Epstein’s LF-representation (308), in which
the Raised Quantifier (pro at S-structure) binds the two occurrences of the
argument variable x1, identifying controller and controllee35 .
Apart from basic differences in their respective approaches to control,
Borer’s (1986) as well as Epstein’s analysis try to reflect the semantically
“Self-control” with evaluating and attitudinal predicates 139

driven and self-generating “reverse” control mechanism of (a). Epstein’s

version, which more easily generalizes over overt controller NP’s, seems
preferable, if the notion of universal quantifier is modified as restricted
universal quantifier or as Borer’s set concept, which is more flexible and
adaptable to the interpretive procedures, that is, accessing an antecedent or
construing the content of the null element from the knowledge set of the
addressee and/or the speaker, respectively. The problem comes out clearly in
sentences like (310) (Epstein’s ex. (4)).
(310) Josh said it is fun to play baseball.
Epstein (l.c. 502) argues that “A representation of the coreferential interpreta-
tion of PRO is obtained only if pro is freely coindexed with the NP Josh. If pro
is freely contraindexed (and is therefore antecedentless), a representation of
the quantifier-bound variable interpretation of PRO is derived. The fact that
there exist two possible interpretations in such sentences is thus explained.”
Borer (1986) simply comments that: “… the null operator in control structures
could optionally be coreferential with an NP in the clause.” Either account,
however, records rather than explains what goes on here. Embedding the
control structure in a higher superordinate clause, as in (310), is
epiphenomenal to the identification of pro, the empty argument of the matrix
predicate. If such an embedding clause happens to contain an NP referring to a
person who says or thinks that, e.g., ‘it is fun, or easy, difficult or tiring for
someone to VP’, the interpretation will naturally be prompted to include, or at
least to consider including, that person into the (unit) set which it should be
possible to access “cooperatively” in a given discourse situation. Accessing an
antecedent of pro and, consequently, PRO, in particular choosing between an
NP in the adjacent or higher clause, or in discourse, on the one hand, and
“arbitrary” reference, on the other, when the former choice is not compelling
in virtue, e. g., of gender agreement (ex. (311)), are contingencies that cannot
be divided among areas definable by principles of grammar proper. Consider
(311).

thinks  that Mary j 

thinks
(311) Kate said  
  said 
 to feed oneself x 
 
that it is easy pro i, j,x (PRO i, j,x herself 
(to solve the problem 
140 Chapter 8

Desirable representations of these identification procedures must include

specifiable parts of the “pragmatic universe of discourse” in particular mutual
knowledge assessments (cf. Yokoyama 1986: 46 ff.). Consider now the differ-
ence between (312) and (313).
(312)R Legko lgat’, znaja cto otveta ne
(it) (is) easy to lie knowing that (no) answer (not)
posleduet
will follow
A simplified S-structure of (312).
(312)′R (( pro (ø legko (pro)i (PROi lgat’)))
[pleonastic] [copula pres] [adj neuter]
it (is) easy for X to lie
(PRO’i znaja (cto (otveta ne posleduet))))
[part. adjunct] [gen. sg]
knowing that answer not will follow
The indexed proi, which carries [+human], [+pl], is the controller of the first
PROi, which in turn controls the PRO’i-subject of the participle adjunct. pro is
interpreted [+generic], alternatively as bound by a restricted universal quanti-
fier.
(313)R Osudit’ bylo nelegko
to convict (him) was not easy
(313)′R ((PROj osudit proi)k ((bylo nelegko proj) (tk)))
[acc]
‘(For them) to convict (him (Jesus)) was not easy (for them)’ Both occurrences
of pro are clearly discourse-related. The first, in direct object position, pos-
sible in a null object language like Russian, refers to Jesus, the second to a set
of people concerned with convicting Jesus.
(314)C Bylo proi nesnesitelné (PROi zůstat v Curychu)
[adj. neuter]
(it) was (for him) unbearable to stayin Zürich
pro in (314) exhibits again a clear case of discourse anaphora, compare (315).
“Self-control” with evaluating and attitudinal predicates 141

(315)C Kolegovii bylo líto (PROi zabíjet

[dat sg]
for the colleague (it) was grievous to kill
malé bastardy)
the little dogs

8.1.1.2. Situation (b)

In situation type (a), participating or being involved in the event — in any
“semantic role” — evokes the psychological or other, e. g., intellectual, state
described (it is fun) or evaluated (it is easy) by the matrix predicate. Control is
determined automatically in reversing the directionality as suggested above.
Control constructions, while enforcing this identification, do not exhaust the
referential pairings. For example, x may get his fun out of y doing something,
as illustrated in (309) above. Such examples in turn show that two arguments
belonging to different clausal structures are involved, which is a precondition
to control.
In situation type (b), the evaluating predicate (“mental property adjec-
tives” in the terminology of Stowell (1991)) of the matrix clause is not related
to the (mostly psychological) state that is engendered by participating in the
event described in the complement clause. Rather, the way of intentional
(responsible) acting that is chosen, as described in the infinitival complement,
is evaluated, and, thus, the evaluating property must be attributed to the
(human) agent as well.
The consequence is “obligatory” control: The referent of PRO cannot be
distinct from the target (person) of the evaluation given in the matrix clause.
This is another distinction between (a) and (b).
(316) *It is foolish of Peter for Joe to neglect this problem.
(Compare (316) with (309)) The intrinsic relationship between the matrix
predicate and the event argument, which distinguishes (a) from (b), that is, the
difference between the event “engendering” a property (fun, for example in
(310)) in type (a), and the event being characterized with respect to a property
attributable to its responsible agent in type (b) may account for the contrast
between (317) and (318), for which Stowell (1991) has “… no account to offer
…” (Stowell’s (i), (ii) in fn. 9, p. 133)
(317) *It was stupid of John washing the car.
142 Chapter 8

(318) It was fun washing the car.

A present participle adjunct (comp. washing the car was stupid of John)
constitutes a relation to the main predicate restricting its merger with the latter
to adverbial modification. A merger of the adjoined event phrase (washing the
car) with predicating evaluations of its responsible agent (stupid) seems to be
ruled out. The syntactic LF-construal and parsing would rather tend to direct
the interpretation towards something like It was stupid of John to do x (while)
washing the car. The experience of fun and the washing event, however,
coincide or merge naturally, the latter “engendering” or accompanying the
former. The distinction between the sets (a) and (b) finds support.
Predicates (a), (b) otherwise induce control mechanisms which do not
require an independent account. They both are stage-level predicates contain-
ing an event argument, following Kratzer (1989) and Diesing (1988). In (b),
the event is an action denoting argument. Predicates of (a) and (b) have an
obligatory, possibly nonovert, human argument. (319), (320) illustrate type
(b): The question of a matrix antecedent will be taken up presently.
(319)R Byvajut slucai, kogda ø bolee celovecno (PRO
[copula]
(there)are situations when (it) is more humane
solgat’)
to lie
(320)R On napominal nam o tom, cto naivno (PRO
[pret] [dative]
he reminded us about it that (it) is naive
ob-jasnjat’ nacional’nuju katastrofu zlovešcej
[instrum.]
to explain a national catastrophy (by) the sinister
rol’ju odnogo celoveka)
[gen]
role of one man
‘… by pointing out the sinister role played by one man’
If in type (a) the psychological state characterized by the matrix predicate is
engendered in taking part or being involved in the (often “generic”) event
described in the complement, in type (b) the property by which the (inten-
tional) action is characterized in the matrix clause is exhibited in doing what is
“Self-control” with evaluating and attitudinal predicates 143

described in the complement. Importantly, whether somebody to whom the

quality expressed in the matrix predicate is attributed shows up lexically or
not, depends, to a certain degree, on the particular quality in question and the
content of the complement. Thus, the assertion that it is naive, humane to VP’
in (319), (320) is not taken to be valid only with respect to particular individu-
als or groups of them. Now consider (321), in which the matrix predicate is
related to an individual.
(321)R Bylo glupo (PP s tvoeji storony) (PROi
[gen]
(it) was stupid from your side
vystupat’ v ego zašcitu
[acc]
to stand up in his defense
‘It was stupid of you …’
Tvoej, a possessive, genitive-like pronoun, “incorporates”, and functions as
the antecedent of PRO (comp. Italian da parte di). Glupo is related to you and
considered valid with respect to this individual. Incidentally, in many lan-
guages a prepositional phrase is the only syntactic means to express the
restriction to individuals or sets of them. The relatedness of the matrix predi-
cate to an NP that is syntactically expressed or understood raises the question
whether predicates of type (b) project an NP argument. The corresponding
adjectivals can take head nouns that are descriptions of persons as well as of
actions or behaviour: a stupid boy (r. glupyj mal’cik), a stupid decision/
behaviour, action etc. Relatedness to individuals seems to be established
indirectly via the event or action associated with their agents. If no overt NP is
associated with the predicate, the default case is a generalized interpretation
over human values, as in (319) or (320). Semantic differences dividing
celovecno, in (319), and glupo, in (321), influence or may even determine the
appearance of NP specifying individuals as in (321). This NP or D(P) will of
course be the antecedent of PRO. But it is the construal of PRO that is
transmitted to its antecedent and, thus, “precedes” it.
In contrast to type (a) constructions, in which there is an inherent event-
internal identification of PRO with an argument in theta-position, in type (b),
relatedness of the matrix predicate (adjective) to an argument is achieved by
PRO, to whose referent the “mental property” predicate is attributed, exclu-
sively by virtue of her/his decision to do what is described in the clausal
144 Chapter 8

complement. In other words, only one argument or at least only one theta role
is available, basically (the chain headed by) PRO, which either is resumed in
the matrix clause in overt shape or is left in the impliciteness or “arbitrariness”
of PRO. Note that the evaluation associated with the matrix DP is inseparable
from, or identical with, the evaluation of the intentional action of the comple-
ment clause and valid only with respect to it. Expressions like Peter is clever
are understood as relating to his cleverness at something. Stowell (1991: 112)
clearly recognizes that “… MP (mental property, RR) adjectives cannot
attribute a property to an action without simultaneously attributing this prop-
erty to the agent of that action … the human argument in question must be
understood as the agent of the action-denoting argument.” I would like to put
forward the suggestion that the matrix PP, e.g.. in it is stupid of John does not
occupy a theta-position, and that its DP is raised from the embedded subject
position leaving the chain (Johni, ti). By of-insertion, which adjectives permit
(Chomsky 1986b: 89), the Case filter is met. The PP s tvoej storony is a clearly
idiomatic variant. I will not pursue this radical proposal of a unified theta-role
here, returning to a standard treatment, which can be transformed into the
proposed one.
Quite independently of whatever thematic specification PRO receives as
an argument of the complement predicate (VP or AP), its intended referent is
accessible to the matrix characterization only if s/he is understood as “a
decision taking” individual, a fact which might be expressed by PRO being
provided with 〈intact,+〉, via projection from the matrix predicate somehow
inherently marked with it. But this proposal cannot be fully maintained.
Consider (322), in which PRO receives 〈intact,+〉 originally from the theta
grid of otsizivat’sja.
(322)R No edva lirazumnee bylo (PROi otsizivat’sja
[pret neuter]
but hardly more sensible(it) was to take shelter
odnimi bez oruzija sredi etoj pustyni)
[gen sg]
alone without arms in the middle of this desert
The dative plural of the semipredicative odnim, which is coindexed with PRO,
refers to the discourse-related set of people to the exclusion of others. It must
not be exactly this set of people whose potential decision is judged compara-
tively. But now consider (323), which must be ruled out since no decision
“Self-control” with evaluating and attitudinal predicates 145

taking individual or set of people are available. Only PRO could provide one
saving (323) if it were supplied with 〈intact,+〉 on the strength of feature
transfer or discharge.
(323)R Bylo glupo (PROi byt’ priglašennym ti na etu
(it) was stupid to be invited to this
konferenciju)
conference
Compare: It was stupid to invite him to this conference. Thus, transclausal
projection of 〈intact,+〉 to PRO from matrix predicates of type (b) cannot be
admitted generally. This restriction will be stated as (L), which is similar to
(K), a specification on the application of the latter with respect to predicates of
type (b)
(L) The presence of 〈intact,+〉 somewhere else in the complement clause
prevents another instance of it from being assigned to PRO, (across
clausal boundaries)
As a third case, consider (324), which is perfectly acceptable.

glupo 
(324)R Bylo by nerazumno (PRO predavat’ sja
 
[modal particle]
stupid 
(it) would be insensible  to indulge
 
melancholii
[dat sg]
in melancholy

〈intact,+〉 is not discharged in the complement clause. The matrix predicate,

however, requires that 〈intact,+〉 is present in PRO, if additionally, provided
that, in view of (L) it is nowhere else in the complement. The across clause-
assignment to PRO in cases like (322), though problematic, is induced by the
necessity to identify a target person that exhibits the property expressed in the
matrix clause in deciding to act as described in the complement. Note that the
problem of cross-clausal assignment of 〈intact,+〉 to PRO disappears if the
Raising analysis suggested above proves feasible, since the chain must be
marked 〈intact,+〉. The control problem in (b) can further be elucidated by
146 Chapter 8

syntactic variants of the same conceptual content.

(325)R Oni postupil glupo predavšis’
[participal adjunct]
he acted stupidly indulging
having indulged
melancolii
[dat]
in melancholy
(326)R Oni postupil glupo / naivno / necelovecno, (PROi
he acted stupidly / naively / inhumanely
sdelav eto)
[part. adjunct]
doing that
‘Hei acted stupidly … in that hei did so.’
‘It was stupid/naive of himi to do so.’
The Pro-VP postupil (3 ps sg pret) in (325) is explicit about what is construed
in (324): In (324), the matrix adjective is a predication about the action- and
decision-event of the complement clause. In (326), the adjective-adverb, an
instance of a non-omisssible modifier, directly evaluates the action expressed
by the Pro-VP, which functions as a dummy-antecedent of the discourse- or
situation-related Pro-VP of the participial adjunct. The sole function of the
matrix Pro-VP is to mediate between the evaluating modifier and the matrix
subject, whose referent is characterized by it on the strength of doing or
deciding to do so (sdelav eto in (326)). The two Pro-VP’s can be exchanged
easily. But then postupit’ must receive an anaphorical marker, the manner Pro-
adverbial tak, the contextual variant of eto, which combines with the Pro-VP
(s)delat’. Tak and eto are in complementary (s-structure) distribution with the
evaluating adverb, either of them an indispensable part of the Pro-VP.
(327)R Oni glupo sdelal (PROi postupiv tak)
he stupidly did acting thus
The equivalence of the construction types exemplified by postupil glupo/
naivno (325), (326) and bylo glupo, naivno (in (321), (324)) as to their clausal
adjunct and complement clause, respectively, clearly supports the necessary
presence of the specification 〈intact,+〉 in the complement subject of the latter,
“Self-control” with evaluating and attitudinal predicates 147

which is assigned clause-internally, or across clausal boundaries, as in (322),

if (L) is observed.

8.1.2. For “better” or “worse”

Control adjectives like good or bad, more characteristically their respective

comparatives better and worse, differ from the preceding ones in that any
thematic specification or, for that matter, semantic role carried by PRO is
compatible with a well-formed control relation, that is, provides a self-reliant
identification. In the default case, it should be expected that PRO be identified
with an overt matrix argument or an “implicit” one that directly or
anaphorically refers to, or “arbitrarily” generalizes over, the set of people for
whom the (non) occurrence of the event described in the complement clause is
better or worse. The default case cannot emerge if the set of persons referred
to, or an implicit “arbitrary” universal set, (those for whom it is better or
worse) is not a participant in the complement event description, and, thus,
cannot show up as PRO in it. One would expect them (her/him) to be specified
in the matrix clause as those for whom the evaluation holds. This expectation
is not quite fulfilled, as can be seen in (328). The interpretation may be left to
inference.
(328)P Ani poczøatku, ani końca tym razem
[gen sg] [gen sg] [instrum case]
neither the beginning nor the end this time
ø lepiej (PRO nie ujawniać
[zero copula]
(it is) better (not)to report
The interpretation of PRO is discourse-related. It refers to the author of the
monthly review of films. The default interpretation would be it is better for me
this time not to tell about either the end or the beginning (of the film). But the
more natural one is: … it is better for the readers (the potential audience of the
film) for me not to tell about … Both interpretations might even combine.
Indeed, any combination of discourse-related and “arbitrary”, generic or
generalizing interpretation is possible, which again would obviate special
control regulations. I will add one example with an obvious default case of
control.
148 Chapter 8

(329)R I mne kazetsja, cto ocen chorošo bylo by

[dat]
and to me (it) seems that very good (it) would be
(novomu našemu agrarnomu komitetu)i (PROi
[dative]
for the new our agrarian committee
zaimstvovat’ iz raboty russkogo zemstva
to borrow from the work of the Russian zemstvo
(before 1917 organs of agricultural self-administration)

8.2. Verbal predicates of evaluational or attitudinal character

8.2.1. The oblique object controller

Such verbal predicates, which subcategorize for infinitival complements, pose

no new problems. The other element they subcategorize for, an oblique object-
NP with inherent dative in Slavic languages and German, provides the con-
troller. The controller receives Experiencer with these verbs. No thematic
restriction is imposed on PRO.
(330)C Líbí se mii (PROi vyprávet)
[lexical refl. [dat clitic]
(it) pleases me to tell (stories)
(331)C (PROi Cist) se mui líbí
[dat]
to read him pleases
‘He likes to read.’

8.2.2. The subject controller

Corresponding personal constructions present an analogous picture with the

controller NP occupying the S-structure subject position.
(332)C Petri bál se (PROi ho urazit)
[lexical refl.] [acc]
Peter was afraid him to offend
‘Peter was afraid of offending him’
“Self-control” with evaluating and attitudinal predicates 149

(333)R Oni ne boitsja [PROi komu-to ne ponravit’sja]

[dative]
he not is afraid somebody not to please
‘he is not afraid of displeasing somebody’
(334)C A ted’ dokonce [nekteri lidé]i se domnívají (PROi
[lexic. refl.]
and now even some people believe
být povoláni (PROi naplnovat deijnnou
to be authorized to fulfil historical
spravedlnost
justice
Chapter 9

Aspects of control in the “grain problem”

and in VP-deletion

This short chapter has been included in the investigation of Control since
independent solutions to the grain problem as it emerges in Control, and to
anaphoric contexts in VP-deletion, are perfectly consistent with the theory put
forward in this study, providing instances of its formal indexing conse-
quences.

9.1. The “grain problem” and reciprocal constructions

The problem pointed out by Higginbotham (1985) and called “grain” problem
“… reasserts itself in an even more pernicious form when simple control
constructions, such as those in (45) and (46), are brought into the picture.
(45) John and Mary persuaded each other to leave.
(46) John and Mary promised each other to leave,
… But the rub is that (45) and (46) are not ambiguous in the same way as
(43). …
(43) John and Mary told each other that they should leave.
… this sentence is at least three ways ambiguous between what we termed the
‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘we’ readings … (45) has only a ‘you’ reading, (46) only an ‘I’
reading …” (Heim, Lasnik, May (1991: 79)) The authors continue that “It
would seem then that unless we build the theory of control (redundantly) (my
emphasis, RR)) into the semantics of these sentences, we are left without a
satisfactory account of their interpretation.” Any description of control, of
course, must account for the distinct control properties inherent to persuade
and promise, respectively. Since the reciprocal each other occurs in object
152 Chapter 9

position but in fact conceals a subject-object relation, it must be taken apart for
“subject”- and “object”-control to be theoretically reconstructed. But the
complex reciprocal cannot be simply taken asunder, as each “instance” of
other is determined by, and must be related to, its distinct “distributing”
partner each. Heim, Lasnik and May (1991: 80) present a basic representation
of reciprocal sentences which “… provides three loci of anaphoric binding:
relative to the distribution index contributed by each, relative to the index of e
other, the reciprocator, and relative to the range index of the antecedent
subject NP.”
Resolving the complex reciprocal into the subject-part each and the
object-part e other, with the empty element coindexed with each, enables the
authors to construe the respective LF-representations (50), (51) (their number-
ing) for (45), (46).
(50) (John and Mary1 each2) (persuaded (e2 other)3 (PRO3 to leave))
(51) (John and Mary1 each2) (promised (e2 other)3 (PRO2 to leave))
PRO is coindexed with the subject-part each for promise, and, for persuade,
with the object-part (e other) of the reciprocal each other. Either isolated
element is to be considered an argument and recipient of a theta-specification,
that corresponds to their respective subject and object positions.
Thus, both of them are accessible to the generalized lexically-driven
constraints (B,b) and (B,a), respectively. These constraints and the above
indexing and binding device at LF-representations combine to give a full
account for the control behaviour of the two classes of verbs in reciprocal
constructions. An analogous analysis would be practicable, e. g. for the
German, Czech, Russian counterparts of each other control constructions:
g. ein-ander, c. jeden druhý, -ého, and r. drug druga. The Slavic languages
exhibit the object function of the second part by morphological Case36 .
I would like to stress that the success of the intriguing indexing system of
Heim, Lasnik, May (1991) on its application to differences of scope interpre-
tation and to control properties interacting with reciprocal constructions,
substantially relies on “… inherent semantic properties of the controlling verb
and properties of control PRO … narrow scope is excluded when the control-
ling NP must be under the scope of a distributor, as a function of the lexical
meaning of the predicate of which it is an argument … the possibility of broad
or narrow scope is a function of the semantic status of the controller of PRO.”
(Heim, Lasnik, May 1991: 99). Thus, the main claim of this study that, in the
Aspects of control in the “grain problem” and in VP-deletion 153

circumscribed area of infinitival complement constructions, control properties

are derivable from the lexically-semantic structure of specifiable classes of
control verbs on which generalizing control constraints are imposed, is cor-
roborated in this particular field.
Interaction with scope problems is a special case of the interaction
between selected semantic properties of the controlling verbs, which are
channelled through the respective pertinent constraints and general principles
of binding as well as distinct settings of relevant parameter values.

9.2. Freedom of constraints as a precondition for strict identity in

anaphoric contexts

PRO — in Higginbotham’s (1992: 90) terminology — “… covaries with

focus, clefts, and various ellipses, notably VP-deletion; … admits invariant
interpretations in some other anaphoric contexts.” His example (24) is from
Tanya Reinhart.
(24) John wants [PRO to be a doctor], but his mother doesn’t want that.
Which are those contexts, in which PRO may be invariant, as in (24)?
Invariant (strict identity) interpretations depends on freedom from both main
constraints (B,a) and (B,b), that is, roughly, only the control predicates of the
family assembled under chapter 8 are free from them. Thus, the constraints
correlate with the exclusion or option of invariant interpretation. In other
words, the respective thematic interrelationships fixed between licit control-
lers and PRO by (B,a), (B,b) and (K) are not consistent with strict identity in
VP-deletion by conceptual necessity. If a control verb like, e.g., want imposes
no restrictions on the mutual thematic relationship between the licit controller
and PRO, anaphoric “recovery” of the reference of the PRO subject of the
deleted VP doesn’t seem to be impeded. The fact of restricted identifiability
correlating with the posited constraints provide further empirical evidence in
support of them.
Chapter 10

Summary and conclusions

With some remaining questions

10.1. Essentials and main general proposal

What has received the slighty metaphoric name control is a linguistic syn-
drome rather than a module or subsystem of grammar that could be cast in a
unified form. The complex of problems posed by the phenomena standardly
subsumed under control nevertheless can be disentangled and organised into
an array of constraints that determine control behavior and set aside factors
which are epiphenomenal to, if necessarily accompanying, control.
The natural prerequisite of attaining descriptive generalizations about
control conditions is to specify the structural descriptions that must or can
display control. The specification proposed divides the realm of control into
relevant domains and selects for analysis those that are related and subject to
principled constraints which can extend a certain homogeneity to the whole
field. Crucially, the interplay between lexical semantics, thematic structure,
syntax and explicated pragmatics hinges on the respective constraints and
their format.
In the major syntactic control domains, nonfinite adjunct clauses differ
fundamentally from complement clauses. In the former domain, control prop-
erties of participial adjuncts differ from those of purpose or rationale infiniti-
val clauses. Control in nonfinite adjuncts has not been dealt with here — for
modern Standard Russian, a detailed description of control in participial
°
adjuncts is Ruzicka (1982) with further literature — but the theoretical spirit in
which it could be approached, as well as the methodological line to be taken
have been suggested (2.1.3.).
In the area of infinitival nonadjunct clauses, control in subject clauses
differs considerably from control in object clauses. “Object position is pro-
156 Chapter 10

jected only from thematic structure …” (Rothstein 1995: 500). Subject posi-
tion is projected syntactically and need not be thematically related to the
predicate. Object clauses but not subject clauses exhibit strongly marked
lexical determination of control, a fact which has to do with the assumption
that the theta role of the subject — if it has one — is determined composition-
ally by the VP (Chomsky 1981: 105). Object complement clauses are internal
sentential arguments of the control verb which theta-marks them. Their PRO-
argument, which is the head of an A-chain, needs identification. It has been
shown in this study that the identification of PRO ultimately hinges on
specific properties and functions of the internal clause argument, the con-
trolled clause. That is why there is a fundamental difference between control
in object sentences and control in subject sentences, which, among other
things, has contributed to the use of notions like arbitrary and logophoric
control.
The distinct types of control verbs, by thematically differentiating be-
tween their respective clausal complements, indicate how the content of the
latter is to be incorporated in the sentence. In the literature, distinctions
between thematic properties of clausal complements that arise from lexical
characteristics of control verbs and in turn induce control conditions have not
been given careful consideration. The clausal complements of, e.g. ask, prom-
ise, or try and their respective crosslinguistic counterparts have been treated
with a certain disregard of such particular pairing of thematic specifications as
could possibly attend or determine control conditions. Distinctions and influ-
ences that have this effect are taken to be a precondition of the main general
thesis of this study:
Thematical properties of clausal complements that are determined by their
respective matrix control verbs are projected to, and distributed among, argu-
ment positions of the clausal complement and come out clearly to the effect
that they impose distinct restrictions on control relations.
Thus, conditions of coreference for the complement PRO are created by
lexically thematic properties of the matrix control verb. PRO is required to
have thematic specifications meeting those of a licit controller. How it must
meet them depends on, and varies with, lexical classes of control verbs, which
in turn are established by the respective types of referential interdependence
they command.
Summary and conclusions 157

10.2. The constraints and markedness

Implementing this relationship, each lexical class is associated with a particu-

lar constraint defining it as a control class. The constraints have the general
format of a two-membered conjunction of feature specification values that are
required of controller and controllee in the respective control classes. If F is
the designated general control feature — which may be interpreted as inten-
tional action (see section 3.2.1.) but can be taken to do the work indepen-
dently of this particular interpretation — and α ranges over {+, –}, two
constraints distinguished by a minimal difference suffice to cover two major
clearly demarcated areas of control. They specify the respective pairs of
feature values to be satisfied by controller and controllee. The conjuncts are
distinguished by the superscripts CON(troller) and PRO, which mark where
the required feature value belongs. Either constraint is associated in the
lexicon with the verbs constituting the respective classes as regards control
behavior.
(B, a): 〈F, α〉 CON & 〈F, α〉 PRO
or: 〈intact, α〉 CON & 〈intact, α〉 PRO
(B, b): 〈F, -α〉 CON & 〈F, α〉PRO
or: 〈intact, -α〉 CON & 〈intact, α〉 PRO
Both generalized constraints have clearly defined unmarked (um) and marked
(m) application: α is valued “+” on unmarked applications, “−” on marked
ones (section 3.2.2.). Only failure in meeting the value of the second conjunct
〈…〉 PRO counts as violation of 〈B, a〉 or 〈B, b〉 on unmarked as well as marked
application (section 3.2.4.1.). Spelling out (B, a) gives (I)
(I) 〈F,+〉CON & 〈F, +〉 PRO (unmarked)
〈F,−〉CON & 〈F, −〉 PRO (marked)
Spelling out (B,b) gives (II).
(II) 〈F, −〉CON & 〈F, +〉PRO (unmarked)
〈F, +〉CON & 〈F, –〉PRO (marked)
Unravelling the oversimplified notion of “object control”, we can say that the
unmarked version of (II) consistently accounts for it, which means that the
distinction between object and subject control can cut through one and the
same control verb and, thus, it is at least inaccurate to speak of subject control
158 Chapter 10

verbs as against object control verbs. Ask. beg, for example, are verbs of
“object” control if control is licensed on the unmarked application of (II), but
they are verbs of “subject” control on the marked application of it, (sec-
tion 3.2.4.2). Promise-type verbs behave in the opposite way with regard to (I)
(section 5). I have explained why this is so. Importantly, if we rely on a
markedness concept as specified here for complement control, various forms
of more intricate and subtle control behavior can be included in, and captured
by, the basic system of constraints. Specifications on the unmarked and
marked application of (B, a) and (B, b) provide us with criteria substantiating
a subclassification of the main control classes associated with the respective
constraints.

10.3. The classes of Control

I will present now a survey of the lexical control classes associated with the
respective constraints and specifications on their application. More or less
exemplary lists of members of the respective classes are added. The introduc-
tion of a systematic cross-linguistic perspective has justified the attempt to
formulate interface (conceptual-pragmatic) and syntactic parameters, which
suggests that pragmatics could be parameterized. The combined framework of
the respective constraints, corollaries specifying their application, and param-
eters, namely (B) – (L), is taken to account for the complement control mecha-
nism. (Order of succession as in the main body of the study)

10.3.1. Control class (B,b) (=II) and its main subclasses.

10.3.1.1. The ask-type subclass (II)a

Members of the ask-type subclass (II)a: ask, beg, request, entreat, implore,
beseech, conjure, pester, bother.
German: bitten, ersuchen (request), anflehen (implore), beschwören (con-
jure).
Russian: (po)prosit’(sja) (ask), umolit’/ umoljat’ (conjure), molit’ (implore),
uprosit’/ uprašivat’ (entreat)
Verbs in this subclass can satisfy unmarked and marked (II). (D), with the
corollary (E), is a condition on the marked application of (II) and (I) and on
Summary and conclusions 159

parameters (G) and (H). Marked control under (II) is substantiated by the
activation of the “rest” of available thematical specifications, which display
complicity in control by inducing a less “conspicuous” referential pairing of
arguments (section 3.2.3.).
(1)G Siei hatte gebeten (PROi im Kloster
she had asked in a convent
ti untergebracht zu werden)
accomodated to be
‘She had asked to enter a convent.’
A natural restriction put on the “weaker” marked control in this subclass is
expressed by (F): The more transparent linking of the relevant thematic
feature value 〈F, +〉CON to the underived subject position must be maintained
for it to be targeted by the marked application of (II) (3.2.2.).
Violations of marked (II) (*…〈F, +〉PRO ) give rise to a parameterization in
pragmatics which consists in rescinding them by means of the allowance
construal — which is considered the positive setting of the parameter — and
ends up in a thematic two-place configuration that satifies the very marked
constraint (II) that has been violated. The presumed parameter
((H), section 4.1.) is contingent upon the strength of the effect the null object
parameter has on the availability of (marked) subject and (unmarked) object
control. Positive setting of that parameter, as in Russian, may exclude marked
(subject) control — via the allowance construal as in the English example
(91) — since the null object satisfies unmarked (II).
(2)R Ja ne prosil proi (PROi menja spasat’)
I not asked me to save
‘I did not ask (anybody) to save me.’
English, for example, which has no syntactically overt pro excludes it from
functioning as an unmarked controller in accordance with Bach’s Generaliza-
tion. If in Russian or German, for example, control by the pro-object is
mandatory — given that unmarked (II) is met —, English has to rely entirely
on “derived” marked (subject) control, a situation which induces the allow-
ance pragmatic-conventional construal (see example 91). Spanish evidences a
strong instantiation of the conventionally pragmatic parameter (H) which is
not linked with the null object parameter (section 3.3.). The presence of a
lexical object argument does not exclude the interpretation licensed by the
160 Chapter 10

“remedied” violation of the marked constraint (II). Thus, ambiguity overrides

a lexical object DP which is licensed by umarked (II) (example 88), which
seems to imply the possibility of ambiguous unmarked and marked (through
allowance construal) control in the presence of a pro object in null object
languages like Italian (see comment on example 97). Thus, the situation is
complex but transparent though judgements are subtle. Violations of un-
marked (II) are illustrated by example (72, 73).
Empirical evidence of ambiguity of control supports the assumption of
predictable conflicts between the grammatical and the conceptual-pragmatic
mechanism of control as well as their interplay. Note that control structures
determined by lexical properties and affected by specified pragmatic factors
are subject to a construal which in turn is referred to by principles of grammar,
the constraints and specification on their application.

10.3.1.2. The persuade subclass (II)b

The second major subclass (II)b associated with (II) (=B, b) includes these
members:
persuade, convince, prevail on, urge, advice, enjoin, invite;
prompt, tempt, compel, encourage, incite, force;
German: überreden (persuade), raten (advise), drängen (urge), veranlassen
(prompt), auferlegen (enjoin), ermutigen (encourage);
Russian: ugovorit’ / ugovarivat’, ubedit’ / ubezdat’ (persuade), sovetovat’
(advise), pobudit’ / pobuzdat’ (prompt);
Czech: presvedcit, umluvit / umlouvat (persuade), pudit (urge).
We have to distinguish subclass (II)b from (II)a. (II)b has to do without marked
application of (II), which cannot license control because of the absence of
complicity in fulfilling control by induced referential pairing of DP’s that
carry corresponding relevant thematic specifications. Such pairs do not step in
here to sustain coreference functioning as a control relation, as they do, for
example, in the area of (II)a. Structures that would appear to be candidates for
being licensed by marked (II) behave in accordance with, and are subject to,
unmarked (II), provided that the interface parameter G (4.1.) is set positively
in the respective languages. In this case, condition (D) must be met, as it must
for “repairing” violations of marked (II) in the ask-subclass. Compare (3),
which meets (D), with (4) and (5), which do not.
Summary and conclusions 161

(3) John convinced himi (PROi to be examined by a specialist)

(4) *Johnj convinced Anni (PROi/ j to interest/ amuse/ bother Pat)
(on the THEME reading of PRO)
(5) *John forced mei (PROi to interest Sarah)
examples (4), (5) from Thomas Stroik.
In (6), which is acceptable, the straightforward reading which half metaphori-
cally understands worry themselves as intentional meets unmarked (II), with
PRO receiving 〈F, +〉.
(6) PROi Invited ti, on high authority, (PROi to worry themselvesi)
Britonsi sensibly did just that.
Britons controls the chain headed by the first PRO which in turn controls the
PRO subject of worry … .
The parameter (G) is fixed positively, e.g., in English, and negatively,
e.g., in Russian, German, Czech (section 4.1). The latter languages have resort
to lexically causative verbs which yield direct compliance with unmarked (II)
(example 122–124).
In English, ask and persuade-type verbs evidence “complementary distri-
bution” in control, with respect to the unmarked and marked application of (II)
(= (B,b)). This variation is captured by (G) and (H). Control under ask-type
verbs can be licensed by unmarked as well as marked (II), and by the
positively set parameter (H), which through ‘deontic switch’ handles viola-
tions of marked (II), but it has no remedy against violations of unmarked (II).
Control under persuade-type verbs can be licensed by unmarked (II) and by
virtue of positive settings of parameter (G) handling through ‘causative
switch’ violation of unmarked (II), but it can not be licensed by its marked
application, much less by undoing violations of marked (II).
The dominant role of relations between thematic specifications in control
is again evident from the dependence of variations in unmarked and marked
control on options of coreference induced by thematic specifications which
suggest or determe that the DP’s bearing them in the respective clauses are
referentially identical. Since verbs that select [± human] subject (prompt,
tempt) are members of (II)b, the nearly complete exclusion of the external
argument from controlling finds independent support.
162 Chapter 10

10.3.1.3. Subclass (II)c

(II)c includes the following verbs:
order, command, instruct, direct, tell, charge, commission, forbid, recom-
mend, allow;
Russian: prikaz(yv)at’, velet’(order), porucit’ / porucat’ (charge), zapretit’ /
zaprešcat (forbid);
Czech: rozkázat / rozkazovat, prikázat / prikazovat, porucit / poroucet (or-
der); zakázat / zakazovat, zapovedet / zapovídat (forbid);ulozit / ukládat,
narídit (charge); bránit (hinder); dovolit / dovolovat (allow); radit (ad-
vise); doporucit / doporucovat (recommend).
German: befehlen (order); verbieten, untersagen (forbid); erlauben, gestatten
(allow); raten (advise); auftragen (charge); empfehlen (recommend).
Singling out subclass (II)c of verbs (section 4.4.4.) subject to (II) is not as
neatly supported as it is in the preceding subclass, by their distinct behavior in
regard to parameters (G), (H) and conditions (D), (F). Example (168) is
evidence for licensing by marked (II). Control tends to vary with the lexical
content of the infinitival complement, receiving license from marked (II) or
from unmarked (II) through (G). Some cases have been taken to be amenable
to ECM analysis. Judgements can be subtle. Compare (7) with (8).
(7) The medical officer ordered himi (PROi to be examined ti by a
specialist)
(8) The medical officer persuaded himi (PROi to be examined ti by a
specialist)
Clearly, subclass (II)c ist not susceptible of following parameter (H). Separat-
ing (II)c from the other subclasses is primarily based on the fact that in many
languages (e.g. German, Slavic languages), its members theta-mark the object
indirectly, selecting dative Case. Thus, the verbs can serve for a comparison
with English, where “… dative control contrasts with object control in that a
dative controller can be omitted … an understood dative can control …”
(Rizzi 1986: 550 ff.)
(9) a. John shouted/ said/ gave the order (to Bill ) to leave.
b. John told/ ordered* (Bill) to leave.
(Rizzi’s example (104) a. b., adapted from Roeper)
We can extent Rizzi’s summarizing statement b. to German and Slavic lan-
Summary and conclusions 163

guages. ″b. Both Italian and English have an understood null dative that is not
restricted to generic contexts, can be pragmatically interpreted (can be dis-
course-related, RR), and can function as a controller, but not as a binder.”
(Rizzi 1986: 551)
In German and Slavic languages (morphological) dative is the counter-
part of the direct object controller in English, a fact which simply means that
for (II)c the internal dative argument carrying the indirect object theta role
gains broader access to control. For the passive matrix sentences, it follows
that derived subject control in English corresponds to unchanged dative
control in the languages mentioned above. The result is impersonal sentences,
since no object is moved.
(10)R Emui bylo poruceno (PROi napisat’
[dative] [partic. pass. neuter]
(to) him (it) was directed to write
neskol’ko bumag v St. Peterburg
[genitve pl.]
some papers to St.-Peterburg.
‘He was charged to write some papers to St.-Peterburg.’
The dative controller can occur as a pro-DP in the passive as well. I would like
to emphasize that dative control is not affected by theories taking dative to be
configurational, not inherent.

10.3.1.4. Verbs of peculiar behavior in (II)

Some verbs that exhibit particular control behavior, which still is fully
capturable within the range of (II), parameters (G), (H) and attendant corollar-
ies, have been described individually, in particular signal (section 4.4.1.),
teach (4.4.1.), allow (4.5.), with counterparts in other languages.

10.3.2. Control class subject to (B, a) (= I)

A major class of control verbs somewhat erroneously called verbs of subject
control is assembled around promise and its cross-linguistic counterparts.
Their control conditions are captured by (B, a) (section 5) (= I), repeated here.
(I) 〈F,α〉CON & 〈F, α〉 PRO
α = (+) fixes unmarked application, α = (–) marked application of (I). The
constraint differs minimally from (II).
164 Chapter 10

Whereas the ask-type and persuade-type subclasses of (II) are subtly set
apart by their respective reactions to, and remedies against, violations of
unmarked and marked application of (II), which imply cross-linguistic varia-
tion, there is no analogous division in the domain of (I) for promise-type
verbs. The marked application of (I) is straightforwardly complementary to
the unmarked one, reversing the value of α.
Example (181–184) illustrate marked control under (I) with passive
matrix clauses, (185–188) do the same with active ones. The particularly
elucidating example (182) combines constraining grammar and conceptual
construal by reinterpreting the complement verb in a way that matches marked
(I). Passive is impersonal since the internal dative object is not moved to
subject position. If no nonpleonastic subject-DP competes, as in German and
Slavic languages, unmarked control by the demoted Agent-DP is facilitated
(example 189, 196–198). In English the derived subject argument may be
responsible for ruling out unmarked control under (I) by the demoted agent in
the by-PP (cf. English glosses of (196) and (198)). The descriptive generaliza-
tion (I) (in 5.2.) captures the cross-linguistic variation, that is, Case distinc-
tions resulting in different control behavior.
If marked (I) (B,a) is not met because (D) is not satisfied — recall that (D)
is a condition or specification on the marked application of (I) and (II) as well
as on the operation of (G), (H), acceptability can only be salvaged by a
conceptual construal which amounts to the restitution of a structure that in turn
meets (D) and can be referred to by the marked constraint (I): (187, 188) are
handled by analogy to (193, 194) respectively. Another striking example is
(219) as compared with (218). The former is clearly ambiguous, with the
second reading which takes the children as controller being forced on the
sentence by its pragmatic naturalness. The “natural” interpretation is not
indifferent to grammar. To become acceptable, it must find its way to a
licensing constraint, which is the marked application of (I). The conceptual
construal can be made visible by the insertion of be allowed taken as a
metalanguage “bridge” from pragmatics to grammar. (218) has be allowed in
its structure and apparently meets marked (I) including (D). It should prove
unproblematic. Still, there are judgements that prefer “subject” control. This
situation may throw some light on the conceptual status and firmness of the
grammatical notion of Control. Control may prove susceptible to a complex
array of factors in which the syntactic ones appear more reliable but can lead
astray. The available control structures may offer options of Full Interpreta-
Summary and conclusions 165

tion, a reasonable price for the inherent economy delivered to language by

control phenomena.
It is by relying on the very constraints that are violated that solutions to
mismatches become available through processes which can be shared by (I)
and (II). Take example (211), a clear case of matching marked (I). Slight
lexical changes resulting in (212) lead to acceptability by a conceptual-
pragmatic construal salvaging (212) on the strength of unmarked (I) that is
violated. The interpretation has no choice but to understand that der Schüler
promises to endeavour to do all he can to be moved up, a conceptual structure
which “returns” and conforms to unmarked (I). Abandoning license by
marked (I) is enforced lexically and pragmatically. Functional exchange of the
matrix DP’s in (212) would result in licensing by m (I). Such construals, as
required for (212), however, are sensitive to lexical properties of the comple-
ment verb. (210) does not easily give way to them. Marked application of (I)
may fail owing to the fact that the thematical underpinning of coreferential
partners which in principle is pertinent to marked control (cf. end of section
5.1.) is not available. Bizarre, in particular ironical use , of course, is not
inappropriate to (210) licensed by m (I). Grammatical evasiveness of control
does not threaten to get out of hand if licensing shifts from unmarked (I) to
marked (I) through slight lexical changes, as illustrated by example (213).
Marked application of (I) is straightforward if aus dem Gefängnis zu kommen
is naturally understood as be released from prison.
As the discussion of (214) elucidates, the situation is particularly difficult
and judgments are subtle when condition (D) is not matched. Convictions that
syntactic configurations can override coherent pragmatically induced control
relations vary with the typological status of the relevant language. Neverthe-
less, attempts to push back the boundaries of capturing the control device have
to cross from grammar to pragmatics but can avoid amnestying pragmatic
explanation if pragmatics is not released from grammar.

10.3.3. Self-regulating Control

10.3.3.1. The Case of try and related verbs

A major class of control verbs centres round try as its prototypical member.
Control is intrinsic to the thematic and semantic properties of these verbs,
which do not pose a control problem. Principle (K), which licenses control
(6.1.2.), is very similar to a lexical redundancy generalization. Its result is an
166 Chapter 10

instance of feature values that matches unmarked (I). An exemplary list of

verbs in this class is in 6.1.1.
The unique availability of try and V, and of try V-ing, the latter with an
interpretation nearly as the sole V-ing-form, support the account stated as (K).
The analysis is valid independently of whether we choose the VP-internal
subject hypothesis as (11) (Baltin 1995: 240) or a traditional one.
(11) I tried [C″[C′[C∅][I″[D″ PRO][I′[Ito][V″[D″ t][V′ be polite]]]]]]
Idiomatically, in this class again, the controller-DP can be marked dative.
(12)G (Rechtzeitig PROi da zu sein ) gelang (ihm i) nicht
[dative]
not late to be succeeded him not
‘He didn’t succeed in not being late.’
(Bierwisch’s example)
Without ihm, the understood object DP, syntactically overt as controlling pro,
has a discourse-related interpretation.
A particular, not fully conclusive discussion has dealt with impersonal passive
main clauses and their overt or covert adjunct, prepositional or (in Slavic
languages) Instrumental Case DP’s, as the source of the feature transfer (K).
Independent, not fully clear parameterized variation influences licensing of
control. Subtle judgments in English as in other languages discussed are in
order (section 6.1.3., 6.1.4., 6.2.).

10.3.3.2. A related Control process of evaluating and attitudinal Control

elements
The control mechanism of the try-class is intrinsically akin to a family of
adjectives and verbs exercising “self-control” as a lexically redundant process
(section 8). Adjectival predicates can be divided into two subclasses accord-
ing to their control behavior:
(a) The participation or involvement of the referent of PRO in the event
described in the controlled clause calls forth the — evaluated — state s/he
experiences in taking part in the event. PRO effects being identified with
the matrix “controller”, namely the Experiencer-DP.
(13) It is fun (for mei) (PROi to play basket-ball)
(14) It is frightening (PROi to be visited ti by a werewolf)
Summary and conclusions 167

(15) ((PROi to be visited ti by a werewolf) would be frightening)

It would trouble himi (PROi to be interrupted ti by questioning)
The experiencer-bound control relation in type (a) obliterates the distinction
between control in object and subject sentences (section 2.2.2.1.). The theta-
marked CP-argument can be moved to subject position.
Independently of whether syntactic status is given to an implicit
experiencer in the matrix clause (section 8.1.1.1.), the control relation is, as it
were, reversed, since participation or involvement in something includes
experiencing the psychological or other affects, if any, it has on the involved
person(s). If other persons are affected, control structures of course do not
occur (example 309).
(b) In subclass (b) (8.1.1.2.), the evaluating predicate does not concern a state
that is engendered by participating in the event described in the object or
subject clause. Rather, the decision, the way of acting that is chosen, as
described in the infinitival clause, is characterized with the evaluating
predicate transferring to the (responsible) agent. The automatic control
mechanism of (a) recurs in (b), though of course differently, but still in
the “reverse” direction since the property attributed to the DP-referent in
the main clause follows on associating the referent of PRO with the
action that is characterized. Syntactically, however, the individual to
whom the evaluation is related can be overtly accomodated only in the
matrix clause, mostly by a prepositional phrase. (Examples 317, 321).
The characterization by the main predicate itself may lexically imply a
referential extension to a whole species.
(17) (PRO to err ) is human.
Or see example (313).
Note that the application of (K) with respect to predicates of types (b) has to be
restricted by (L) (8.1.1.2.), which accounts for the intrinsic interrelationship of
the control device in different lexical control classes.

10.3.3.3 Verbal predicates indifferent to thematic feature constraints

These are mostly “psychological” predicates as like, hate, please, fear and
cross-linguistic counterparts. Control by the Experiencer-DP, be it in subject
or object (direct or oblique) position, may still display subtle sensitiveness to
thematic and semantic properties. Let us take want, for example, which
168 Chapter 10

reveals great freedom from thematic restrictions, belonging to the group of

verbs under section 8.2.2. which are at once ECM-verbs and control verbs, a
property for which a certain thematic indifference is a precondition. Such
verbs are want, like, hate, expect, prefer, choose, and others.

(18) John i wants PRO i  

to kiss Mary

 to be kissed by Mary 
(19) Hei wants PROi to live to a great age
(20) Hei wants PROi to arrive early

(21) *He i wants PRO i to 

interest 
 Tom
irritate 
Th. Stroik (1994) is right in ascribing unacceptable (21) to the THEME
reading of PRO as an argument of PSYCH verbs. (22) and (23) are further
examples from him.
(22) *(PRO to frighten Bill) would be a remarkable feat
(23) *It is impossible (PRO to concern Sue)
In (18)–(20) intentional behavior or action exerting influence upon attaining
what is wanted may be inherent in the respective events described in the
clausal complements, but it is not in (21)–(23). (22) borders on lexical-
thematic contradiction, a sortal incongruousness subsisting between feat and
frighten, again on the THEME-reading of PRO. (23) is an instance of evalua-
tion in the spirit of (b) which is subject to a control mechanism presuming that
there is someone to whom the impossibility is relativized and who is held
responsible for what is done or happens. But nobody can be held responsible
for, much less capable of, concerning somebody. Thematic incompatibility
rules (23) out.

10.4. Thematic and nonthematic Control.

10.4.1. Two particular verbs.

10.4.1.1 The German control verb vorschlagen
A well-known puzzle of complement control should not be omitted. I will
discuss it in the light of the verb vorschlagen. Its infinitival complement
contains the description of an event which, for varying reasons, is considered
worth realizing. What is at issue is the range of the referents of PRO. Basi-
Summary and conclusions 169

cally, vorschlagen is a verb of control that belongs under control class (B, b)
(= II). The application of the pertinent constraint, however, needs refinement.
The oblique (dative) argument, the Addressee argument of the event of
proposing, is (one of) the controller(s) whenever the corresponding DP is
lexically overt. The strength of the probability that the proposing person will
include herself into the participants of the proposed event or action is fully
discourse-related depending on the pragmatic situation. Even third persons
may be viewed as participant(s) of the proposed event, but still the addressee’s
consent or agreement about what is proposed is requested. Other persons may
come into question again depending on the discourse situation.
(24)G Ichi schlage vor (PROi,X in der Bibliothek zu arbeiten,
I propose, suggest in the library to work
während du das Zimmer aufräumst)
while you the room are tidying up
In German, the occurence of reflexive versus logophoric anaphors in the
complement clause may clear or disambiguate the possibilities of coreference
(Kamp/Roßdeutscher 1994). The issue of varying pronouns and their possible
help in interpreting coreference is beyond the scope of this study.

10.4.1.2. agree as control verb

The way of incorporating the content of the infinitival complement in the
sentence as it is dictated by agree determines the range of its control proper-
ties. Agreeing with a decision to do what is described in the infinitival clause
is independent of participating in the action under discussion. The person(s)
expressing agreement may be involved, take part in it or not. Their status of
course must be such that it is necessary or desirable to be in agreement with
them.
(25) Hei agreed (PROj to let me go)
(i = j, or i ≠ j)
(26) Wei agreed (PROi to leave at once.)

10.4.2. Control in infinitival adjuncts introduced by ohne (without)

In his paper “Nachdenken über PRO” (1993), M. Bierwisch brought up the

question of control in German infinitival adjuncts introduced by the preposi-
tion ohne. Such clausal modifiers correspond to English without V-ing except
170 Chapter 10

that in English lexically overt subjects are available. What conditions on

control operate in the particular case of ohne-modifiers? The constraints that
handle complement control are not applicable, requirements of thematic fea-
ture specifications would clearly be too strong. The event argument of the
main clause can be related to the ohne-modifier by a (partial) matching
function M. (cf. Rothstein 1995: 522). Since ohne is equivalent to NOT, ne-
gating the existence of an event e′ — as described in the clausal complement
of the preposition — “within” the event e of the whole sentence would require
a PRO argument or -quasiargument to be selectionally compatible with the
main predicate. The predicates must have a semantic selectional intersection.
Thus, Bierwisch’s (27) is acceptable, because baden and … kalt werden
(become cold) share the selectional feature [+ human].
(27)G Er badet ohne kalt zu werden anzufangen
he is bathingwithout cold to become to begin
‘He is bathing without him beginning to get cold.’
Note that in (27) 〈intact, +〉 is valid for the controller only.
(28)G *Er badet ohne zu regnen anzufangen
he is bathingwithout to rain to begin
‘He is bathing without it beginning to rain.’
The external argument of baden and the subject quasiargument of regnen do
not share selectional features. The requirement of selectional intersection of
the partners in the control relation is certainly too weak. First, I assume that the
external argument or the moved argument-DP in subject position are clearly
qualified as potential controllers. The demoted DP carrying the Agent role
may function only as a more or less marginal controller. In (29), for example,
the overt or implicit Agent-DP (Ag(e)) is a very questionable controller even
when Principle B of binding excludes subject control. See (29).
(29)G ?* Eri ist von [Spezialisten]j operiert worden
he has by specialists operated upon been
(ohne(PROi, j ihn(*i) zu anästhesieren
without him to anaesthetize
‘… without anaesthetizing him.’
If we avoid violating Principle B, the situation does not much improve, neither
in favor of subject nor towards agent control. Witness (30).
Summary and conclusions 171

(30)G Eri wurde (von Spezialisten)j befreit (ohne

he was by specialists freed without
(PRO(j),i jemanden [acc.] zu verletzen))
anybody to injure
(31), on the other hand, is perfectly acceptable.
(31)G Eri wurde operiert (ohne (PROi anästhesiert zu werden
he was operated uponwithout anaesthetized to be.
‘…without being anaesthetized.’
The problem needs further investigation, but it seems obvious that contrary
thematic specifications or a distance between them still to be analysed in detail
are an impediment to control relations in ohne-modifiers as in other cases.
Parallel syntactic hierarchy — as in (31) — may come into play in case of
passive matrix clauses.

10.5. Closing remarks

Subject to determining restrictive conditions, control goes to its limits and

“experiments” with pushing them back. What we call control is an integral
part of a most elaborate complex that provides for the inherent economy of
linguistic structures in particular at the interface between morphosyntax and
full interpretation. Control is not only a result of selecting infinitival, parti-
cipial, small clause, gerund, and derived nominal structures, but an objective
of selecting them as well.
Control is naturally as local as possible. “… it appears that PRO searches
for a possible antecedent within its own clause, and if it can’t find one there,
looks outside.” (Chomsky 1981: 78) With respect to infinitival complements
and subject sentences, where can it look? The search is on if no lexically
visible local antecedent can be found. In this case, partly depending on the null
object parameter value, a syntactically overt pro or a lexically satisfied (ob-
ject) argument (e.g. German anordnen, Russian rasporjadit’sja (section 4.6.)
may implement control. If, in the local environment, no antecedent is found
and, looking beyond it, no discourse-related antecedent is obviously or
logophorically (Williams 1992: 299) recoverable, a situation arises often
dubbed “arbitrary control”, clearly rather an expedient term. Not surprisingly,
Reinhart/Grodzinsky (1993: 73) state: “We ignore here the issue of the precise
172 Chapter 10

interpretation of arbitrary PRO.” A theory under the unifying notion of

arbitrariness is not likely to materialize. PRO is able to search and choose its
reference freely from the discourse, and PRO can (or must) inherit, or is
involved in, the problem of interpreting the reference of an empty argument or
implicit adjunct in the main clause without leaving any problem of its own.
The economy-oriented general device of control relies on, and exploits,
redundant lexical information, in particular argument structure, semantic in-
corporation of the infinitival complement, and theta grids. Heim, Lasnik, May
(1991: 79) have concluded that “it would seem then that unless we build the
theory of control (redundantly) into the semantics of these sentences (recipro-
cal structures, RR), we are left without a satisfactory account of their interpre-
tation.” The conclusion fits the basic claims advanced in this description of
control. The available lexical-thematic and projected semantic information
has to be so arrayed that it can be put into effect for determining control. The
constraints and partly parameterized principles which are meant to do this
work could be considered efficient and wide-ranging enough only if they
proved capable of capturing the interaction and trade-off between grammati-
cal factors and conceptual-pragmatic construal which supports building up the
inherent economy of linguistic structures.
The apparatus of constraints, specifications on their application, and
interface parameters expressing and realizing the idea that pragmatics could
be parameterized, have proven capable of capturing (a) major regularities and
conditions of control, (b) cross-linguistic variation in control and (c) the cross-
linguistically distinct interaction between lexical-thematic properties and con-
ceptual-pragmatic construal in control processes. In other words, the
constraints and parameters are suitable and formally appropriate for being
referred to in accounting for the interplay between grammar and conceptual-
pragmatic factors. Thus, entailments, as a straightforward case of lexical
effects, display complicity in control. Construal by entailments is intrinsically
linked with control. Trying to separate them, Larson (1991: 129) had to admit:
“One important question that I must leave unresolved here, but which must be
addressed ultimately … is when precisely an infinitival complement is subject
to control versus construal by entailments.” I have argued (section 5.5.) that
putting the question like this confuses the issue.
My approach clearly assumes that PRO exists as a syntactic entity
°
(Ruzicka 1994). Denying its syntactic status would complicate the implemen-
tation of the descriptive apparatus but not invalidate the theory and its substan-
tiation.
Summary and conclusions 173

The Case of PRO has been under discussion (see in particular Chomsky/
Lasnik 1993). The results remain inconclusive: “The state of PRO with re-
spect to Case marking and visibility is problematic … the problem arises in
particular in Chomsky’s (1981, 1986b) theory with respect to what constitutes
a visible head of a chain … Either PRO is directly stipulated to be visible, or it
is stipulated to receive some suitably abstract type of Case, so that visibility
follows on standard Case-marking grounds.” (Manzini 1992: 144). Pesetsky
(1993: 558) leaves open the question “… whether quirky zero Case is the
same as null Case for PRO recently discussed by Chomsky and Lasnik.”
Avoiding a theory-internal stipulation, a solution based on empirical
evidence might receive support, for example, from Icelandic and Slavic
languages in which “… PRO may be not only Case-marked, but in fact
marked with one of the standard Cases rather then a special ‘null Case’”.
(Baltin 1995: 242) Baltin points out Sigurdsson’s (1991) work on Icelandic.
In Russian, e.g., the subject of infinitivals is marked standard Dative Case. If
PRO receives a special sort of Case, which is taken to be peculiar to subjects
of infinitives, one theory-internal advantage of this account is — considering
that disjunctive statements are not desirable — that “… a disjunctive require-
ment that A-chains must be headed by Case or PRO may be dispensed with for
one that says that A-chains must be headed by Case.” (Safir 1996: 314) In a
recent publication on Control, Petter (1998: 244) endorses Chomsky/Lasnik’s
(1993) assumption that “… if PRO is syntactically represented it must also be
assigned structural Case.”, but she specifies Case assignment quite differently:
“… we may conclude that PRO is assigned structural nominative Case … in
both non-finite and verbless clauses a(n abstract) Tense head assigns struc-
tural nominative Case to the subject in its specifier position.” (1998: 245). The
conclusion is mainly supported by Icelandic data which “… show that predi-
cate agreement only occurs when the predicate is related to a subject with
structural nominative Case … this type of agreement also occurs when the
subject is PRO.” (245) I perfectly agree with Pepper about drawing on the
nominative as a likely candidate for PRO. Still, language particular and
structural requirements seem to modify and restrict possible generalizations.
Thus, as mentioned above, in Russian, infinitivals strongly suggest structural
Dative Case for PRO, whereas for PRO in participle adjuncts and verbless
constructions which are closely related to them structural nominative is the
°
appropriate Case. (cf. Ruzicka 1982)
Case-marking of PRO, which never is an expletive, does not affect the
174 Chapter 10

central aspects of control discussed in this study. Nor does the categorization
of PRO. I would like to regard PRO as a pronoun like pro, which seems to
come nearest to the truth considering the available theoretical and in particular
conceptual tools. PRO can be an instance of coreference anaphora and it can
be a case of bound variable (Heim, Lasnik, May 1991: 99). “It can enter into
anaphoric relations without binding.” (Reinhart/Grodzinsky 1993: 73) PRO is
replaced by pro, which takes over control in noninfinitival complements. The
need for control principles and constraints, their interaction with syntax and
pragmatics, does not depend on the final categorization of PRO.
Chapter 11

Turning to the Minimalist Program

11.1. On the status of control

It is worth considering how the minimalist program may be assumed to

accomodate the facts and theoretical needs of complement control as seen in
this study. I presume that the actual elaboration of the minimalist program will
continue attending to control problems, which would seem to belong to
“… the huge mass of constructions for which no principled explanation
exists …” (Chomsky 1995, fns. 22 and 93). What is subsumed under the
notion of control hinges on the presence of a conceptual-thematical argument
which has no phonetic content and corresponds to a D(P) ending up in subject
position. Since it must be interpretable for a derivation to converge, it is
identified with a D(P), at least syntactically overt in the immediately superor-
dinate (matrix) clause, or with an antecedent someway discourse-related
(“arbitrary control”).
It has been considered theoretically expedient and suitable to posit in
syntax the existence of a phonetically empty argumental D(P), named PRO,
which is the controllee, controlled by identification. Resolving the substantive
issues of control does not hinge on maintaining PRO or dispensing with it,
That is not to say that the introduction or omission of PRO is a negligible
problem. Obviously, considerations of economy would urge theorists to try
and prefer derivations that can do without positing PRO. Indeed, syntactically
well-founded proposals for parting with the use of PRO have been put forward
by IJbema/Abraham (1998), Manzini/Roussou (1997), and, before the
minimalist phase, by Bierwisch (1993). Advances in this direction, of course,
will involve considering abandonment of PRO elsewhere, e.g. in free ad-
juncts, absolute constructions, versions of small clause and secondary predica-
tion (cf. Legendre (1997; 48–62)).
176 Chapter 11

11.2. Derivational and inherent economy

In the area of control, as in some others, economy of derivation (or representa-

tion), which is laid down as a guideline of the minimalist program, meets
inherent linguistic economy. The latter manifests itself in the relevant struc-
tures by economising on phonetic realization of the “controlled” D(P) argu-
ment. As regards economy of derivation, which I take to involve conceptual
naturalness, nonredundancy and empirical adequacy, what is at issue is the
necessity for the controlled entity to be available at the LF interface. Method-
ologically, it seems suitable to try to balance endeavours to achieve economy
of derivation and the richness of the apparatus which is thought necessary to
capture substantive conditions of control conceptually and empirically.
Positing PRO — as I have done in this study — or not positing it, is a
pertinent issue. Clearly, alternatives to using PRO would have to present
analyses to which control conditions are amenable and which, desirably, are
required independently.

11.3. Thematic features

In this study, I capitalize on thematic feature specifications and values. Con-

trol arises from the thematical status which the control-related arguments have
in their respective event structures. A designated controller is licensed if its
thematic feature value matches that of the controllee in such a way that
identification follows. Given that the control verb has a clausal or VP-
argument (VP-internal subject hypothesis) in which the entity subject to
control in turn is an argument, it is to be expected that eligibility, or failure to
be eligible, as controller is dependent on the thematical feature value of the
controllee. On this approach, what is at the core of control at the LF-interface,
is the predictability of the entity which enters into successful partnership with
the controlled element, PRO on standard assumptions. How to cope with the
problem of syntactically relating the entities is a theoretic sequel to the prior
issue. Various theory internal solutions are available.
Turning to the Minimalist Program 177

11.4. Control treated with the PRO-theoreme

11.4.1. Conceptual considerations

Chomsky (1982, 1995) takes the controllee to be represented as PRO, which is

of category D(P), has semantic properties and, thus, “… may be the locus of
what is loosely called ‘referentiality’” (Chomsky 1995:240). PRO is also
posited as a consequence of the relevant head assigning null case to the subject
(Chomsky 1995:345). (For some discussion of the notorious Case problem of
PRO, see above, 10.5.)
Though, with the minimalist program, D-structure is abandoned, argu-
ments continue to be inserted into their canonical D-structure positions, now
by merge. In these positions, they are assigned thematic characterizations.
PRO is invariably an argument (Brody 1993) and head of a (singleton) chain
in subject position. The controller, head of a chain as well, may occupy subject
or (possibly oblique) object position. Constraints on control relations are
amenable to analyses which use checking of feature values. The information
necessary for licensing the controller must be available in the numeration.
Assume that (meta)features which are instantiated on control verbs can be as
simple as a and ~ a. a reads: the value of the relevant feature on the controller
must be identical with that on PRO. ~ a reads: the feature value on the
controller must be the negation of the feature value on PRO. How these tags
work, I would like to illustrate on three examples. I repeat (256), (270).
(1) John tried to PRO run.
(256) Karin tried to PRO be elected.
(270) Bill tried to PRO resemble Harry.
Assume that John and PRO in (1) carry identical values of 〈F〉, which is a
natural consequence of intrinsic lexical properties of try (cf. 6.1.1). I am
setting aside the question how and when either subject is merged into the
derivation. Note that the subject position of PRO is reached before spell-out,
e.g. after movement in passive. Now let us look at (256): Since PRO receives
〈F,–〉 by virtue of the predicate structure of elect, and 〈F,+〉 by (K), contrary
values of the same feature clash on PRO. But of course 〈F,+〉 is available also
in the theta grid or, alternatively, in the predicate structure of elect. A crucial
assumption is that the presence of 〈F,+〉 in the predicate structure of the
complement, wherever it emerges syntactically, e.g. on the argumental pas-
178 Chapter 11

sive suffix (cf. Baker/Johnson/Roberts (1989)), has the effect of causing 〈F,+〉
to prevail over 〈F,–〉 on PRO, which results in a being satisfied. In other
words, PRO receives 〈F,–〉 in object position and takes it to subject position by
passive movement. Here the contrary value 〈F,+〉, for which try is responsible,
is joined to it. PRO, on which two competing values meet, benefits from the
internal presence of 〈F,+〉, e.g. in passive structures, to establish dominance of
〈F,+〉, which is a natural general characteristic of try-event structures. The
relationship can be taken as a necessary condition: 〈F,–〉 is available on PRO
only if 〈F,+〉 is present in the same predicate structure (see (D) in 3.2.2.). I
assume that grammaticality (or acceptability) judgments are less straightfor-
ward (see, e.g. (267)) if a is satisfied via “strengthening” 〈F,+〉 on PRO. This
will become clearer on discussing (270). PRO in (270) receives 〈F,+〉 on the
strength of intrinsic lexical properties of try implemented by (K) via an
appropriate checking configuration, but — in accordance with the above
condition — does not receive 〈F,–〉. Whatever feature is discharged on PRO
by the predicate resemble, the conceptual distance between it and the properly
interpreted feature value 〈F,+〉 is relevant to judgments on (270), which have
ranged from “anything goes” (Vanden Wyngaerd1987: 75) to “ungrammati-
cal” (Lasnik/Fiengo 1974: 553). Still, we are not faced with a grammatical
decision. Positing the cooccurrence of the two features on PRO is all grammar
can do. Readiness to construe a conceptual-pragmatic interpretation and con-
textual elements (see ex. (277), (278)) decide on (degrees of) acceptability.

11.4.2. Syntactic treatment

As an alternative to (K) (6.1.2), a grammatical procedure is feasible in which

the feature that PRO has received from (the predicate structure of) resemble
via an appropriate checking configuration is LF-attracted — without “pied
piping” — by the matrix subject which of course carries the feature 〈F, +〉
assigned by try. Two distinct features between which the conceptual-prag-
matic trade-off takes place, are assembled on the matrix subject. Clearly, the
double presence of the respective features entails the identification of the two
DP’s and control as its byproduct. The quasimodal contingency in which
predicates of the try-class implicate the event described by its complement
strongly suggests abstract verbal incorporation of the complement verb into
try. The intrinsic semantic relationships between matrix verb and its comple-
ment would become conspicuous in syntax.
Turning to the Minimalist Program 179

11.4.3. A different class of control verbs

Just as try and the like (6.1.1.) are not exactly verbs of subject control (cf.
(284)–(289), so the subclass of ask, beg, etc. (cf. 10.3.1.1.) does not classify
object control verbs either. Criteria for the latter are coherent with those of the
former in the logic of control. Whatever judgement is made on (270) entails
the same judgement on (2).
(2) ?*John asked Bill to PRO resemble Harry.
Nevertheless, the situation changes a lot with verbs of this subclass. Most
importantly, they are tagged in the lexicon with the (meta)feature ~α. Recall
that the feature values are distributed to PRO and to arguments in the immedi-
ately superordinate part of the sentence. Arguments of two distinct argument
structures can enter a principled control relationship since the argument
structure of the complement predicate constitutes a clausal argument of the
matrix predicate. Metafeature ~α, with α ranging over values of a properly
interpreted (intentional action or originator (Manzini/Roussou 1997)) feature
F, projects lexical properties of the ask-class on basic conditions of
(un)marked control.
(2) is gibberish or made acceptable by pragmatic construal on equal terms
with (270): constraint ~α would require that the controller NP have the reverse
feature value to that on PRO, a requirement which no more can be satisfied
than constraint a in (270). Neither John nor Bill in (2), can take a feature value
reverse to that of PRO, since they have 〈F, +〉 and 〈F,–〉 respectively, and PRO
is marked neither 〈F,+〉 nor 〈F,–〉. Recall that the latter is available depending
on the former. Thus, PRO cannot have 〈F,–〉 and be controlled by virtue of 〈F,
+〉 on [NP John]. PRO in derived subject position after passive movement
carries feature value 〈F,–〉 with ~α of ask selecting the DP-subject in situ as
proper controller.
(3) The injured forwardi asked the coach to PROi be substituted at half-
time.
Recall the hierarchical restriction (F) on ~α (ex. (75), (82); 3.2.2)
(4) *The coachi was asked ti by Peterj to PROj be included in the select
team.
180 Chapter 11

11.4.4. Markedness

Conditions a and ~α — which are abbreviations of (I) and (II) in (10.2.)

respectively — are refined by distinguishing between unmarked and marked
application. The former takes α with value 〈+〉, the latter takes α = 〈–〉. Thus,
(3) is an instance of marked application of ~α: Since PRO carries 〈F,–〉, that is,
α = 〈–〉, by ~α the controller must be marked ~α = ~~ = +, which [the injured
forward]i satisfies. The distinction is no stipulation. The substantive themati-
cal underpinning of marked control is less readily available (cf. 3.2.3). There
is more motivation for the distinction (cf. next section).

11.5. Can pragmatics be parametrized?

Marked application of both checking conditions, abbreviated as a and ~α, is

set apart not only for capturing actual facts of control but also for indicating a
borderline between “regular” control behaviour and control behaviour that is
amenable to conceptual-pragmatic interference with the grammatical con-
straints. Marked application seems to be a precondition for conceptual-prag-
matic handling of control configurations inasmuch as it construes them as
instances of marked control. A particularly illustrative example is (88) (re-
peated here).
(88) María le pidió a Juan hablar con los muchachos
María him asked to Juan to speak to the boys
a. ‘María asked Juan to speak to the boys’
b. ‘María asked permission of Juan to speak to the boys’
Chomsky’s (1988) paraphrase (a) and (b) show that (88) is amenable to
unmarked (a) and (b) marked application of ~α. As an instance of marked
application, an intermediate conceptual structure is created which in its turn
satisfies ~α, licensing the subject María to control. Since [NP María] is
marked 〈F, +〉, PRO is required to have 〈F,–〉, which it can have received only
with conceptual-pragmatic assistance. The proper structure accessible to, and
satisfying, marked ~α can be intuitively elucidated — as Chomsky did — by
“inserting” permission of ( b) as a bridge to the bare infinitival. The construal,
which leads to a structure that can be referred to by grammatical notions,
interfaces LF with cognitive modules by meeting interpretability conditions.
Turning to the Minimalist Program 181

When I resort to conceptual-pragmatic areas, I am not thinking of general

processes of inference, situation- or discourse-related specification and refine-
ments of interpretation. What is at stake here has a more general character.
Concerning (88), I would like to call it modality switch, expressible by a
deontic modality operator. Otherwise it is hard to explain why options, as in
( b) or in (86a), are not available, e.g., in German or Russian. It is arguable that
we have to do with a parameterization of pragmatics: Conceptual-pragmatic
interference is (not) strong enough to override what seems structurally “fixed”
by grammar. Languages which set this conjectural parameter negatively have
to use explicit lexical items, e.g., modal verbs like dürfen in German (cf.
section 3.3.) to create interpretative counterparts of the pragmatically imple-
mented modal switch. There is further evidence for assuming that pragmatics
can be parametrized: The persuade-subclass (sections 4 and 10.3.1.2.) offers
another instance of a general notion of grammar being conceptual-pragmati-
cally implemented: languages fixing a negative value of the presumed param-
eter have to resort to explicit causal verbs like German lassen, Russian
podvergnut’ (sebja), while English, which sets the parameter positively, al-
lows clear interpretation of causality without them (cf. section 4.1.). Presum-
ably, a “light verb” cause introduced at the relevant stage of conceptual
enrichment of LF-interpretation may account for the implicit change to causal
embedding (causality switch).
Recall that the persuade-subclass is not amenable to marked application
of ~α. Consequently, pragmatic interference targets its unmarked application.

11.6. On approaches that give up postulating PRO

11.6.1. General conditions

The approach adopted in the main body of this study is not wedded to the view
that numerations to be mapped to control structures which satisfy output
conditions at the LF-interface must contain PRO. What I think is needed is an
apparatus in which the entities are available on whose properties and interac-
tion control hinges conceptually and empirically and without which an
account of control cannot be a natural explanation. In the spirit of the
minimalist program, positing as well as dispensing with an entity like PRO
should not be the outcome of invoking construction-specific assumptions. If
182 Chapter 11

PRO is given up, it must be abandoned everywhere. IJbema/Abraham (1998)

have argued that principled motivations for positing PRO put forward by
Chomsky (1982, 34) and Chomsky/Lasnik (1993, passim) are no longer
upheld under the minimalist program. More specifically, they propose an
ingenious formal analysis in which the German and Dutch infinitival preposi-
tions zu, te respectively raise to [Spec, vmax] and, thus, prevent an external
argument from moving to this position. The behaviour of the infinitival
preposition is shown to be quite analogous with that of the perfect passive
participle morpheme ge-. Since the external theta role, if available, must be
discharged, an element must be present to receive it, PRO being excluded.
Notwithstanding that “… English to lacks the faculty to suppress the external
argument of the infinitive” (Abraham 1997), and, e.g., Slavic languages lack
the infinitival preposition, the universal PRO-theoreme is of course involved
everywhere if it is weakened or disproved in one language or the other. Thus,
whether we can “… take IPrep to sit in the position obtained by PRO …”
(Abraham 1997) as in German or Dutch, or not, as in Slavic languages, the
loss of PRO needs to be replaced with a new formal solution to the control
relation. What is “left” of PRO must be located in the right place. The
indispensable rest of PRO is its thematic specification: “the subject-θ raises to
the matrix subject or object position.” (Abraham 1997). The crucial issue is
which of the two positions in a given instance of control — excluding an
adjoined PP– argument as a third possibility — proves to be the proper landing
site. Abandoning PRO, we cannot abandon the thematic feature specifications
PRO would have to meet if it could retain its place. The relevant feature
(values) retrievable from the predicate structure and due to an invisible subject
phrase, must be available for either selecting the proper controller phrase or
licensing a single matrix DP to control. Identification realized by control is a
function of cross-clausal thematic dependencies. We indeed move into “… a
new realm of constraints to be stated with respect to the compatibility of
matrix and embedded θ-roles …” (Abraham 1997).This is quite in the right
spirit of earlier work by Abraham (1983), Ruzicka ° (1983a,b), Nishigauchi
(1984), Farkas (1988), Wegener (1989), Köpcke/Panther (1991, 1993).

11.6.2. Control in terms of a calculus of features

To investigate and specify the nature of the compatibility constraints has been
the main concern of this study. In terms of selectional constraints, the matrix
Turning to the Minimalist Program 183

verb, straightforwardly selecting an infinitival complement, selects the con-

trolling entity, since it determines which condition the respective feature
values of the controlled and the controlling element must meet. The distinct
constraints, given in the shape of conjunctions of feature values (cf. 10.2.), are
associated with subclasses of control verbs. They encompass control behav-
iour restrictions at LF as well as grammatical-pragmatic interface phenomena.
A control verb, when selected for the numeration, carries a (meta)feature
marking its membership of a control subclass in the abbreviated form α and
~α. The main classes are divided into subclasses specified and referred to by
lexical restrictions. “At the LF interface, it must be possible to access a lexical
item LI and its nonphonological properties LF(LI): the semantic properties
and the formal properties that are interpreted there.” (Chomsky 1995: 242) As
indicated above, there are no other candidates for doing the work PRO has
been taken to be responsible for than thematic features. Thus far, Manzini/
Roussou’s (1997) skeleton of an account of control in Minimalistic terms is
perfectly consistent with the situation resulting from the loss of PRO. Their
calculus of features, as presented in (1997), if highly formalized, does not
predict distinct control behaviour and shifting control. It reflects given results
of wellformed control relations. In other words, Manzini/Roussou account for
structures which subsist after the choice between two potential controlling
elements is made or a single DP is licensed to be a suitable controller. They
start from the assumption that “… θ-roles are the by-product of the nesting of
arguments within the aspectual structure of the predicate, which includes at
least two Asp(ect) projections, AspM and AspO, O = Originator,
M = Measurer.” For John runs, they suggest a derivation in which “First, the
DP is merged in [Spec, IP] … D(P) then attracts Asp in the covert syntax,
impelling movement of Asp to an I-adjoined position, so as to create a
checking configuration between Asp and D(P).
(3) a. John I [AspO [run]]
b. John [AspO -I][tAspO[run]]“
(3 a,b) in Manzini/Roussou’s numbering.
Now, since “… in general, overt DP-movement from θ- to Case position
reduces to merger of DP into Case position, with subsequent abstract move-
ment of Asp to the checking domain of D(P) …“, as shown in 3.a.b., Asp is
assumed to be susceptible of being detached from association with a D(P) and
DP movement. If Asp is ‚hypostatized‘, “… control can be construed simply
184 Chapter 11

as the movement of two distinct Asp’s to the same D(P).” (Manzini/

Roussou 1997: 42) As PRO is not available, the complement Asp, detached
from a D(P), joins a matrix Asp in the common landing site. Multiple Asp-
movement to I is allowed by Last Resort as a parametric option (Manzini/
Roussou 1997: 42). Control appears to be reduced to independent derivational
requirements. Manzini/Roussou treat (5a), for example, as illustrated by their
5a.b.c.
(5) a. John tried PRO to run
b. John I [AspO1 tried [to[AspO2 run]]]
c. John [AspO2 [ AspO1 — I]] [ tAspO1 tried [to[ tAspO2run]]]
I would like to focus on two intrinsically connected questions which are not
raised in Manzini/Rousson’s treatment of control.
(a) Which AspX in the predicate structure of the complement is chosen for
abstract movement to the pertinent D(P)? In other words, control is derivable
only if abstract AspX-movement can be preceded by some equivalent to
obligatory A-movement, for example DP-raising in the passive. Since PRO is
subject to control as head of a chain, that is, in derived (final) subject position,
an equivalent restriction to syntactic ranking must be projected on targeting
the AspX to be moved.
(b) How is the landing site of abstract AspX-movement predicted, given that
there are more than one potential controller-DP’s? This is not the simple
question of verbs of subject control and verbs of object control.

11.6.3. An illustration of control relations described without positing PRO

I would like to illustrate the situation and eventualities of control behaviour by

ex. (6), in which several controlled complements are recursively embedded.
(6) Peter asked John to try to persuade Bill to run again.
Following Manzini/Roussou, I will use Asp(ect) projections to account for the
predicate structures of matrix and complement, respectively. Besides AspO
(O = originator), at least a second notion AspX must be available in the
apparatus to cope with control conditions on Manzini/Roussou’s method.
AspX is meant to cover at least [theme, +], [oblique, +], both can be unified as
[non [+O]]. I would like to mention before that both feature values of 〈O〉 are
required for thematical characterization to serve the particular purpose of
Turning to the Minimalist Program 185

licensing identification under control. Assume that (6) is structured as (7), a

simplification sufficient for what I want to demonstrate.
(7) Peteri I[ AspO1[ AspX1 asked Johnj [to1 [ AspO2 [try [to2 [ AspO3 [
AspX2 persuade Billk [to3 [ AspO4 run ]]]]]]]]]]
Proceeding cyclically, the first steps are covert movement of AspO4 to create a
checking configuration with the DP Billk, the controller, and doing the same
with AspX2 — presumably via a checking configuration in AgrOP — in view
of the theme role Bill receives from persuade. Notice that contrary values
AspO and AspX (=non [+O]) are checked on Bill. As concerns AspO3 , meant to
reflect the external θ-role of persuade, it, apparently, cannot reach a checking
configuration with a subject-DP, because there is none. We could consider
adjoining AspO3 to to2, as absorbing or binding the external subject role in the
spirit of Abraham (1997). to2 may serve as an intermediate position for AspO3
before it raises to be adjoined to AspO2. Note that the latter is responsible for
controlling the external θ-role of persuade. Neither AspO3 nor AspO2 can get
into a checking configuration with a DP-subject of try. Again we could
consider moving [AspO3 [AspO2]] to to1, construing a checking configuration.
The chances of doing this are better in German and Dutch than in English or
Slavic languages, because “… English to lacks the faculty to supress the
external argument of the infinitive” (Abraham 1997: 7) or, presumably, not
bind it either. In Slavic languages, an infinitival preposition is not available.
Assume that AspO3 and AspO2 are harboured somewhere in the [VP … try …]
cycle, that is, are not left in the respective predicate structures. Collapsible to
AspO2, they still have to do more control work, raising to create a checking
configuration with D(P) Johnj, in which they will meet with feature (value)
[non [+O]] = AspX1 contrary to its own. But why does AspO2 — collapsed
from [AspO3 [AspO2]] — not raise to a checking configuration with the subject
D(P) Peteri, joining with AspO1 instead of John. Peteri is to be placed in a
checking configuration with AspO1, of course, as Johnj with AspX1. This is
independent of control. What is relevant to control is the prediction that AspO2
must reach the landing site [DP John] to join with AspX1 and fix Johnj as
controller of the external subject or external θ-role of try. The choice is
induced by specific selectional properties of ask, which cross the complement
boundary and must be available in the numeration into which ask has entered.
The relevant information, carrried, for example, by the ask-subclass, can be
conveyed, as proposed above, by the (meta)feature ~α, which reads as the
186 Chapter 11

thematic feature value of the controlling element is contrary to that of the

controllee. The junction of AspO2 with AspX1 meets the demand in (7).
Consider again example (3).
(3) The injured forwardi asked the coach to (PROi) be substituted at
half-time.
The structure relevant to control on Manzini/Roussou’s approach could be
(3′).
(3′) The injured forward I [ AspO [AspnonO [asked the coach[to [ AspnonO
be substituted]]]]]
Matrix AspO and AspnonO are moved to create checking configurations with the
injured forward and the coach respectively. It would be unknown whether
AspnonO in the complement has to move to a checking configuration with The
injured forward or with the coach if it were not for the metafeature ~α, which
characterizes the control subclass to which ask belongs.

11.6.4. Dispensing with PRO and pro

If, in addition to the PRO-theoreme, the pro-theoreme is abandoned, together

with the null object and Pro-drop parameter, further provisions for a PRO-less
control theory are needed. The distinction, for example, between syntactically
overt null objects that do control, as in Russian or German, and syntactically
“inert”null objects that do not control would have to be projected onto the
control mechanism of Asp-projections.
In general, it depends of course on the elaboration of the minimalist
program and in particular of Manzini/Roussou’s approach to control whether
it will accomodate control conditions in a natural, conceptually and empiri-
cally satisfying way.
Notes

1. Stump (1985) has documented and interpreted grammatical (including semantical) re-
strictions on the variability of the logical relations between free adjuncts or absolutes and
their respective matrix clauses.
2. “An obvious problem with (20) (our (28), RR) as a sufficient descriptive condition is that,
while (20) predicts that both subject and object control are possible in all of (12)–(15)
(our (29)–(32)), only object control is possible in (12) and (15), and only subject control
is possible in (13) and (14).”
3. (20) (our (28)) is based on a series of formalizations. The c-domain is defined as follows:
″(1) γ is the c-domain of α iff γ is the minimal maximal category dominating α.
(2) α c-commands β iff the minimal maximal category dominating α dominates β.
(3) α governs β iff
a. α is a lexical category, and
b. α and β c-command each other.”
Manzini defines a domain-governing-category for an element as in (i):
″(i) (her (31), RR)
γ is a domain-governing category for α iff
a. γ is a governing category for the c-domain of α, and
b. γ contains a subject accessible to α.
Further,” … PROs like NP-traces are pure anaphors …
″(ii) (her (32), RR) An anaphor without a governing category is bound in its domain-
governing category.” (p. 424)
The examples with PRO in object sentences as in (our) (29)–(32) and (33)–(36), involve
configuration (iii) (her (33)):
(iii) S

NP Infl VP

V S′

PRO
188 Notes

“In (33) the c-domain of PRO is S′, since S′ is the minimal maximal category dominating
PRO. Further, the governing category for the c-domain of PRO is S; for S is the minimal
category containing S′, a governor for S′ (V), and a subject accessible to S′ (NP or Agr).
Finally, S, the governing category for the c-domain of PRO, contains a subject accessible
to PRO (NP or Agr again); for NP and Agr c-command PRO and coindexing of NP or Agr
with PRO does not violate the i-within-i condition. Hence, by (31) (our (i), RR), S is the
domain-governing category of PRO; and by (32) (our (ii)), PRO is correctly predicated to
be bound in S.” (Manzini, l.c. pp. 421, 424, 425)
4. Such cases are illustrated by (i)–(iv) (Manzini’s (26)–(29):
(i) [PRO to behave oneself in public] would help Bill
(ii) [PRO to behave himself in public] would help Bill
(iii) Mary knows that [PRO to behave herself in public] would help Bill
(iv) [PRO to behave himself in public] would help Bill’s development
“The PRO can have arbitrary reference as in (i); or it can corefer into S, as in (ii), into a
phrase superordinate to S, as in (iii), or into a phrase subordinate to S, as in (iv).”
(Manzini, l.c.: 424)
5. “In (34) (our (38)), as in (33) (= (iii) in fn. 3), the c-domain of PRO is S′ and the
governing category for the c-domain of PRO, S′, is S, where the governor and accessible
subject for S′ is Agr. But in (34), S, the governing category for the c-domain of PRO, does
not contain a subject accessible to PRO; for S′ and Agr c-command PRO, but
cosuperscripting of S′ or Agr and PRO would violate the i-within-i condition. Hence, by
(31) (= (i) of fn. 3) PRO does not have a domain-governing category; (32) (= (ii) in fn. 3)
then does not apply, and PRO is correctly predicted to (co)refer freely.” (l.c.: 425)
6. The account of the Italian-French contrast with respect to control in the presence of se/si
(Gianni non sa se andare el cinema, ‘Gianni NEG knows if to go to the movies’ vs French
*Marie ne sait pas si aller au cinema) hinges on Kayne’s assumption “… that in the
infinitive-clitic languages like Italian, the infinitive will in the general case move into a
position that is hierarchically closer to PRO — left adjoined to the l′ — than the position
it moves into in the clitic-infinitive languages. I would like to propose now, that in so
doing the infinitive in (87) = (… se … [IP PRO … [l′ Vinf + [l’ … (Cl+) l …) blocks off
government of PRO by C0 and thereby eliminates the potential PRO theorem violation
induced by that C0.” (Kayne, 1991: 674)). Italian se, thus, does not govern PRO, because
Vinf is a closer governor, with the notion of Minimality slightly modified. The PRO
Theorem is not violated.
7. (c) includes Farkas’s (1) and (4) of “… the main questions any theory of control has to
address … (1) What are the principles which determine the set of possible controllers? (4)
What determines the choice of the controller in case the set of possible controllers is of
cardinality greater then 1?” (Farkas, 1988: 27, 28))
8. Here is a collection of pertinent statements. Control theory “… crucially involves θ-grids
… Control is a syntactic process, consisting of the coindexing of PRO with the designated
θ-role; therefore, the designated θ -role must be visible in the syntax, when the control
module applies.” (Rizzi, 1986: 552). “The system of thematic relations … forms an
important basis for a significant class of control phenomena.” (Nishigauchi, 1984: 217).
Bresnan (1982: 404) assumes “… thematic constraints on anaphoric control …”. A
particular treatment of control in the spirit of thematic relations has been advanced by
Jackendoff (1987: 371 ff.): “All of this is by way of justifying the introduction of
Notes 189

thematic relations as part of the account of control … The fundamental point, from which
all else proceeds, is that thematic relations are part of a level of semantic/conceptual
structure, not part of syntax.” Interestingly, Williams (1992: 316) releases PRO from
being the target of identification in adjunct control: “The adjunct control cases stand apart
as cases that do not involve PRO, but rather direct theta role assignment.” This radical
step is very revealing. The reason seems to be that in adjunct control thematic properties
of lexical items that determine or influence control cannot be systematized and be
marshalled into generalized superordinate contraints. They rather must operate on their
own considering characteristics of individual events, deictically or logophorically fixed
understood reference. Recall the discussion of examples (15)–(16), or consider
Higginbotham’s (1992: 105) example (80) (our (i)), which he adds to Bach’s example
(ii):
(i) Is that a book [PRO to read to each other]?
(ii) Here’s a book to read to each other.
Higginbotham comments on both examples: “We have seen that ‘pragmatic control’ of
PRO is permitted as in Bach’s example (ii). But is it PRO itself that is pragmatically
controlled, or rather an understood benefactive, which in turn serves as antecedent of
PRO? The thrust of my discussion suggests the latter, but, it is not easy to test the
question. Even an example such as (80) (our (i), RR) could, it seems, contain a benefac-
tive … containing within the predicate nominal an understood ‘for NP’, with NP serving
as antecedent of PRO.”
Still, the basic problem of control remains the same. The antecedent of PRO is established
by discourse-related construal. The thematic specification which is assigned to PRO by
read is of course compatible with benefactive, it even predicts the latter for the under-
stood or overt NP in the PP of the matrix clause. In this situation, we might say that
control is reversed with PRO “controlling” the antecedent which it creates and which
necessarily matches it thematically. A similar “reversal” of control will come up even in
complement control (section 8).
Naturally, not the whole community of investigators of control are in unison with a θ–
role-driven approach to it. Emonds (1985: 106) tries to accomodate control to principles
holding in other modules: “It can thus be concluded that all obligatory control can be
reduced to subcategorization and the principles which govern it.” Koster (1984: 431)
relies on control theory and on binding theory in accounting for his (31) *John was tried
[e to go]: “This is, however, the point where the independent theory of control comes into
play … it is this theory that explains (31) …” With respect to the same sentence, he draws
on binding: “It is here that the independent binding theory comes into play.”
9. The above interpretation of “Intentional action” implies the belief that the identified
referents of PRO and its licit controller have control over the action described in the
complement clause, a characteristic feature figuring in Farkas’ (1988) analysis.
Davidson (1989: 46) stresses that “It is a mistake to suppose there is a class of intentional
actions: if we took this tack, we should be compelled to say that one and the same action
was both intentional and not intentional … Hamlet intentionally kills the man behind the
arras, but he does not intentionally kill Polonius.”(p. 46).
10. This assumption finds support in Døabrowska’s discussion of “Dative and nominative
experiencers” (1994: 1029)
11. Larson (1991: fn. 19) states that “… ask is normally (my emphasis, RR) object-con-
trolled. Passive in its complement appears to license subject construal …” Since subject
190 Notes

control in such cases does not fit in with Larson’s straightforward configurational
account of control (in which c-commanding and subject control are harmonised by
assuming a D-structure that places the inner object (of Double object construction) in a
non-c-commanding position relative to the infinitve, and by fixing Controller choice at
D-structure with the help of his Minimal Distance Principle, as in Larson’s
(1991: 108-122) analysis of the verb promise), Larson removes it from the realm of
control altogether: “Suppose then that examples like (ib) John asked Mary to be allowed
to leave, like their counterparts with promise (see below 5.5., RR), do not in fact involve
control but instead involve construal by ‘tranfer of possession’ entailments’. Then we
expect the subject to be associated with the infinitive under (an appropriately modalized
form of) the entailment:
(iii) X – asks – Y – for – Z ⇒ X gets Z″ (Larson, 1991: 133, fn. 19).
I will discuss Larson’s radical step, which he repeats for the recalcitrant behaviour of
promise, below (5.5.).
12. “A predicate phrase must agree with the object of a transitive verb phrase and the subject
of an intransitive verb phrase in number, gender, and person.” (Bach, 1979: 520)).
13. “The German sentence is ambiguous and on one interpretation, subject control, is
synonymous with the English sentence …” (Comrie, 1985: 50).
14. A peculiar but illuminating instance of control is presented by a Greek passage from the
gospel to St. John (4, 9) and its respective translations.
(i) Πωσ ~ σ ὺ ´Ιουδα~ιοσ rν παρ´ ݵου~ πε~ιν αßτε~ισ … ?
How is that you a Jew being from (of) me to drink (you) ask
‘How can you, being a Jew, ask me to drink’
(ii) Old Church Slavonic
Kako ty ijudei sy ot mene piti prosiši …?
(iii) Latin
Quo modo tu ludaeus cum sis, bibere a me proscis ?
The external argument (συ, you) is the controller. The request δüσ µοι πε~ιν give me to
drink) precedes (i). The addressee of the request shows up in the PP παρ ݵου idiomati-
cally linked to the verb αßτÝω (ask) and copied in the translations. Control in (i)–(iii)
seems analogous to the English and Spanish constructions discussed above (3.2.5.),
which retain full acceptability though violating the marked Constraint (B,b). In some
languages, as in Spanish and English, pairing of the interested parts in the ASK-type
events is construed by a conceptual operation, which in the given Greek example is
modified, even strengthened, to something like (iv):
(iv) [… ASK mei [PROi [to give youj [[ something]k [[operatork] [PROj to drink tk]]]]]]
15. We can take advantage of Dowty’s (1985: 300) entailment patterns (his numbering):
″(10) ∀x∀y∀P [δ(P) (y*) (x*) → γ(y*)]
∀x∀y∀P [δ(P) (y*) (x*) → ζ ([P(y*)])(x*)]
“P” is a variable over VP-meanings… For example , if δ=persuade, then an instance of
γ(y*) would be “y is an agent capable of forming intentions to act”, and an instance of
ζ([P(y*)]) (x*) would be “as a result of x’s action, y comes to intend to act so as to bring
P(y*) about.”
(10) can be illustrated by the control relation in (i):
(i) persuade him i [[PROi to VP …]], Russian … ugovorit’ egoi ((PROi VP)) or by (ii):
(ii) Johni was persuaded ti [[PROi to leave]]
Notes 191

〈intact,–〉 is assigned to the tail of the A-chain (Johni ti) and transferred to John. It follows
from (10) (δ=persuade), if applied to (ii), that PRO carries a value α of the theta
specification distinct from that of the internal argument John. If syntax is to satisfy (10),
y must be mapped onto the direct object-NP of the superordinate clause at D-structure.
(The referent of) this NP reproduces the relevant identity in (10) by being the target of x’s
(implicit in (ii)) actions and the agent intending to act so as to bring about P. In other
words, (ii) satisfies um (B,b).
16. Recall that if the chain headed by PRO has received 〈F,+〉 (〈intact,+〉) itself, which must
have been carried along with PRO moved from its departure site to its non-theta-position,
it is assigned 〈intact,–〉 by (D) and (E) automatically (see above, the analysis of (64)).
17. A theta-position is generally permitted to receive multiple theta-roles (cf. Chomsky,
1986b: 97), a license that need not be drawn upon in postgrammatical quasi-θ-assign-
ments.
18. In Russian, for example, the counterparts of teach have distributional properties different
from obešcat’ (promise) (no dative-shift, inherent dative case of the theme-NP) without
effect on control.
(i)R Neuzeli ja vas dolzen knjaz’, ucit’ delikatnosti
[acc pl] [dat sg]
Really I you must, prince, teach tact
‘Do I really have to teach you, prince, tact’
Nor do we have in the German counterpart of teach the analogue to how to + infinitive
construction. In German, embedded question-CP’s are not infinitival generally.
(ii)G *Johannes lehrte ihn, wie zu spielen.
John taught him how to play.
19. Russian obucat’ (teach) has a reflexive partner obucat’sja which is a distinct lexical entry
and has subject control. Its English counterpart is to learn:
(i)R Obucali egoi ((PROi plavat’))
(They) taught himi to swim
(ii)R Oni obucalsja ((PROi plavat’))
He learnt to swim
Note that the attached reflexive clitic -sja is not a quasi-trace of movement.
20. Köpcke/Panther (1991: 162) observe that the verbs empfehlen (recommend) and raten
(advise) are not only unmarked with respect to the factor Benefactive for the matrix
subject, but even exhibit a morphosyntactic marker (dative), which indicates the role of
Benefactive of the matrix object. (“Die Verben empfehlen und raten sind nicht nur
unmarkiert hinsichtlich des Faktors ‘Benefiziens’, für das Matrixsubjekt, sondern weisen
sogar eine morphosyntaktische Markierung auf (Dativ), die auf die Benefizientenrolle
des Matrixobjektes deutet.”)
21. Discourse-related conceptual construal of a domain of individuals is a paraphrase of this
domain being “understood”. A slight modification of the (interpretation of the) projection
principle might be necessary: “A consequence of the projection principle is, to put it
informally, that if some element is ‘understood’ in a particular position, then it is there in
syntactic representation, either as an overt category that is phonetically realized or as an
empty category assigned no phonetic form …” (Chomsky 1986b: 84).
192 Notes

22. The translations (i) and (ii) of (i)’ and (ii)’ respectively, assumed in Gazdar et al.
(1985: 203) do not seem to capture the whole spectrum of control of these two verbs and
cognate ones. Still, the distinct hierarchical positions of the NP argument which may
receive the theta-role goal reveals a basic intuition about the different status the object-
NP has in the respective configurations projected by the two verbs.
(i) persuade’ (leave’) (us*) (Kim*)
(i)′ Kim persuaded us to leave.
(ii) promise (us*) (leave) (Kim*)
(ii)′ Kim promised us to leave.
Control is thought to be captured by (iii):
(iii) “The first NP argument to combine with a functor in which a VP occurs is the
(semantic) controller of that VP” (Gazdar et al. 1985: 202).
23. Bresnan (1982, 405) notes: “The first attempt in transformational grammar to explain the
deviance of examples like (87) (= (i) b. RR) appears to be that of Jenkins (1972, 200 ff.),
who proposed a constraint stating that the object of by cannot be coreferential with an
implicit or expressed subject of a complement.
(i) a. John promised Mary to be on time.
b. *Mary was promised by John to be on time.
If this were true, it would itself require explanation, but the following examples show that
this by-phrase constraint does not express the correct generalization:
(ii) (=(94))
a. John had been promised by Mary that she would meet him at the station.
b. John expects a promise by Mary to remain faithful to him.
c. An attempt by the gang of four to advance themselves now would be foolhardy.
In all of these examples, the object of by is or can be understood as coreferential with the
subject of the complement.”
24. “Minimal Distance Principle (MDP): An infinitive complement of a predicate P selects as
its controller the minimal c-commanding noun phrase in the functional complex of P.”
(Larson, p. 115)
25. Modals even do more, their interference in control behaviour is not restricted to a
particular control type or class. For example, dürfen can intervene in control relations of
counterparts to persuade as in counterparts to ask and promise as above, licensing control
in cases in which it cannot be made acceptable pragmatically in English:
(i) Scipio persuaded the Senate (PRO to have a free hand)
Comrie (1985: 63) comments on his example (61) (= (i)): “… real-world knowledge of
Scipio’s relations with the Senate make the only plausible interpretation that Scipio
persuaded the Senate to allow him, Scipio, to have a free hand, but once again English
syntax disallows this interpretation.” In German, the counterpart of (i) is made grammati-
cal by “inserting” dürfen:
(ii) Scipioi überredete den Senat (PROi frei handeln zu dürfen)
‘… to be permitted to have a free hand’.
(ii) thus satisfies the m version of Constraint (B,b), but this type of modal interference
seems to create the only possibility that persuade-type verbs meet m (B,b) (cf. above 4.1.)
In English, which has to choose passive in paraphrasing dürfen, (ii) seems questionable,
cf. (iii):
(ii) ?*Scipioi persuaded the Senate (PROi to be permitted to have a free hand).
(iii) Scipio persuaded the Senate i (PROi to be examined by a commission).
Notes 193

26. What is implemented in this way compares with independent phenomena observed by
Zubizarreta (1982), it is a kind of their directional reverse: “Zubizarreta explains these
facts in terms of a projection … the rationale clause projects agency onto an argument in
the matrix clause … the subject of the matrix clause receives an agent role from the
rationale clause.
(i) John was arrested by the police to impress his mother.
(ii) Jesus died to save our souls.
(iii) The boy fell to deceive his mother.
(iv) The train derailed to save the child”.
(Roeper 1987: 298), with the examples from Zubizarreta)
27. This question has not been raised by Grewendorf/Sabel although they continue to claim
“… that long scrambling in German is licensed only by members of a special class of
verbs. In the following example with the matrix verb vorwerfen ‘accuse’, long-distance
scrambling out of the complement clause into the matrix clause is not possible:
(i) a. weil keiner diesem Manne [CP PRO den Triumph auszukosten]
since nobody this manDAT the triumphACC to-savor
vorgeworfen hat
accused has
‘since nobody has accused this man of savoring his triumph’)
(i) b. *weil [[den Triumph] i keiner diesem Manne [CP PRO ti
since the triumphACC nobody this manDAT
auszukosten] vorgeworfen hat]”
to-savor accused has
(i)a., (i)b. = Grewendorf/Sabel’s (37a), (37b)
Vorwerfen does not belong, then, in the special lexical class presumed by Grewendorf/
Sabel. Under my approach it is a control verb of the persuade-type subclass that, in
German, contains an oblique (dative) object.
28. Sentence types like (268), (130), in which PRO is bound by a quantifier, support
Nishigauchi’s (1984: 237) assumption that “… it seems clear that we need a mechanism
to assure that PRO is represented as a variable bound by a quantifier or a lambda
operator.”
Incidentally, topicalization at S-structure and IP-adjunction at LF of (negated) quantifier
phrases, with the subject pronominal (nikto) within the scope of the quantified time
adverbial, may end up as conjoined phrases at the top of the sentence at PF, blurring their
respective hierarchical and local origins.
(i)R Nikto i nikogda ne stremitsja eticeski
nobody and never (not) endeavours ethically
ocenit’ javlenija prirody.
to evaluate phenomena of nature
‘Nobody ever ethically evaluates phenomena of nature.
29. The “oddness” of (i), (ii) noted by Hornstein and Lightfoot (1987: 33) is a case in point
again.
(i) John tried to receive the gift.
(ii) John tried to know the answer.
(iii) is the Russian counterpart of (ii):
(iii) Dzon pytalsja znat’ otvet.
Prefixing u to znat’ gives the perfective aspect uznat’ (to learn, to get to know), which in
its result-oriented interpretation cancels the conceptual conflict. (iv) is readily accepted:
194 Notes

(iv)R Dzon pytalsja uznat’ otvet.

John tried to get to know the answer
30. In Czech and Slovak, grammaticality of impersonal passive structures correlates with the
presence of complements of the (passivized) verbal head, quite independently of their
morphological case (excluding of course accusative):
(i)C Kartám musí být rozumeno.
[dat pl] [3 ps sg pres] [infinitive] [part pret pass neuter]
(it) cards must be understood
‘One must understand cards, know (how to play) cards.’
The relevant lexical properties may be interpreted as closer relationship and affinity to
transitivity and subcategorizing complements, which seems to indicate the attraction and
nearness to the typical passive of verbs governing a direct accusative object.
31. I must note that in Russian the clausal complement of (po)kazat’sja (seem, appear)
cannot take infinitival form at any level. Raising is incompatible with the appearance of a
verb in the complement at all. Heads of complemental AP’s or NP’s necessarily exhibit
inherently predicative morphological Instrumental case, adjectives in addition, may take
exclusively their “short” form. “In Czech, infinitival VP’s may occur in the clausal
complement of zdáti se (seem) (Svoboda, 1962: 109)). The situation in Russian has led
some authors to deny or doubt Raising in Russian (cf. Chvany, 1975: 226 ff.): Our
argumentation is not affected by this stance.
(i)R *Oteci kazalsja (ti znat’ eto)
Father seemed to know it
(ii) Kazalos’ (cto otec znaet eto)
(it) seemed that Father knows it
But compare the Czech counterpart:
(iii) Oteci se zdál (ti to vedet)
[refl. clit]
Father seemed it to know
(iv)C Petri se zdá (ti (být) nemocen)
[adj. “short” form]
Peter seems (to be) sick
32. This is similar to Icelandic verb agreement. “When the matrix subject in Icelandic is
nonnominative, the matrix verb does not agree with the subject … the verb is in the third
person singular form.” (Rothstein, 1995: 513, with further literature) Third person,
singular, (neuter (in past tense)) are the minimal syntactic features constituting an
unmarked, default grammatical form in Slavic languages.
There is in Slavic languages a second nonanaphorical generic or “anonymous”, that is,
indefinite specific pro-element which is inherently specified [+plural, 3 person, +hu-
°
man]. (see Ruzicka, 1986: 243)
33. Cinque’s analysis, which follows Chomsky (1986: 217, fn. 120) in assuming “… that si is
a clitic in D-structure and that the relation of subject position to si is that of an expletive-
argument CHAIN …”, may offer a chance of accounting for the radical difference
between (305) and (306). In “transitive” si-structures like (306), the clitic is an argument
that occupies the unique theta-position in the CHAIN, thus withholding the external
theta-role, and the object moves to a non-theta-position. This position and si constitute
the CHAIN assigned nominative Case.
Notes 195

34. (“a chain is a CHAIN …” (following Chomsky, 1986: 132)). Baker et al. (1989: 225) use
a notion of “chain” slightly different from Chomsky (1986: 132 ff.).
35. Borer’s (1986, 395) analysis is similar to Epstein’s: “Though Epstein assumes that that
operator (the operator that binds the infinitival [NP, S] position, RR) is specifically a
small pro …, I will simply assume that it is an abstract operator, the precise nature of
which requires further investigation. I will further deviate from Epstein’s analysis in
assuming that the movement involved is syntactic (rather than LF) and that it adjoins the
null arbitrary operator to S. Further adapting Epstein’s proposal to the system proposed
here, I will assume that the abstract operator A-binds the anaphoric infinitival Agr and
that its index is thus transmitted to the embedded PRO … This S-structure representation
is thus given in (36) (Borer’s numbering, RR):
(36) OPERATORi (it is not easy [e]i (S′ [e]i Agri to solve this problem))”
Differing from Epstein, who treats pro as a universal quantifier, Borer associates a set
interpretation with the null operator: given a set S, it is not easy for a member/members of
S to solve this problem. (1986: 395)
36. A particular analysis, which I will not undertake here, would be necessary for Czech and
Polish variants of reciprocal expressions:
(i)C Navzájem si pomáhají.
[dat] refl clitic [3 ps pres]
(they) each other help
(ii)C Slíbili si navzájem navštívit prednášky toho druhého
[dat refl. clitic] [gen]
(they) promised mutually to visit the lectures (of) the other
‘They promised each other to visit each other’s lectures’.
The adverb navzájem “reciprocally” marks the reciprocal meaning of the clitical dative
reflexive si.
(iii)P Obiecali sobie wzajemnie (PRO pójšć do lekarza)
[dat]
(they) promised themselves reciprocally (mutually) to go to the doctor
They promised each other …’
196 Notes
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Subject index

A essence of control, 172

adjacency principle, 18
adjunct control, 9, 189 note 8
ambiguity, 43 f., 63, 81
arbitrariness, 13, 19 f., 22
B 182 f.
binding and control, 18, 22
C grain problem, 151 f.
Case of PRO, 19, 173
causative switch, 59, 110,181
chains, 26
compatibility of theta specifications, 5,
176, 182
complementary distribution of control
conditions, 55 f.
constraints and lexical classes, 2, 32
control classes, 115, 158, 160, 162
coreference invoking selectional pairing
of semantic roles, 38 f., 59
corollary (D), 34
evaluating and attitudinal adjectives,
137-147
F
feature calculus approach to control,
G
H
hierarchical restriction of controller
positions, 38, 39, 93-97
I
intentional action, 31
interface parameters, 59, 62
L
lexical saturation of theta roles, 85
locality of control, 18, 171

D M
demoted agentives as controllers, 89, markedness, 34 f. 38 f. 59, 161, 180
93-97, 192 note 23 minimal distance principle, 22, 23, 104,
deontic switch, 62, 110, 180 192 note 24
discarding PRO, 181 f. modal verbs intervening, 109, 192 note
discourse-related interpretation, 7, 191 25
note 21 modality switch, 181
division of labor, 104
N
E null object parameter, 43-49, 52 f.
ECM or control, 81 interacting with interface control
entailment, 172, 190 note 11, 14 parameters, 58-62, 65
206 Subject index

O S
object of by and counterparts as control- scrambling and control, 114 f.
lers, 93-97, 192 note 23 selectional cross-clausal underpinnings
oblique object control, 76, 148 of control, 19, 38, 172
specification on the marked application
P of main constraints, 34
parameterization of pragmatics, 2, 5, stage-level predicates, 142
55-63, 180 subject complement clauses, 27
pragmatics, 44, 189 note 8 symmetry and distinction between main
pro as controller and controllee, 51, constraints, 91 f.
129-136
propositional versus attributive account, T
23, 116 f. turn of approach to control in terms of
psychological state predicates, 141 thematical specifications, 25

Q U
questions of control, 23 unaccusatives, 37, 64

R V
raising, 23 f.. 106 verbal noun control, 49 f., 96 f.
reciprocality, 151 f. violation of (marked) constraints, 40,
reflexive impersonal clauses, 129-136 43 f., 165
reflexive passive controlled clauses, VP-deletion, 152
133 f.
In the series LINGUISTIK AKTUELL/LINGUISTICS TODAY (LA) the following titles
have been published thus far, or are scheduled for publication:
1. KLAPPENBACH, Ruth (1911-1977): Studien zur Modernen Deutschen Lexikographie.
Auswahl aus den Lexikographischen Arbeiten von Ruth Klappenbach, erweitert um drei
Beiträge von Helene Malige-Klappenbach. 1980.
2. EHLICH, Konrad & Jochen REHBEIN: Augenkommunikation. Methodenreflexion und
Beispielanalyse. 1982.
3. ABRAHAM, Werner (ed.): On the Formal Syntax of the Westgermania. Papers from
the 3rd Groningen Grammar Talks (3e Groninger Grammatikgespräche), Groningen,
January 1981. 1983.
4. ABRAHAM, Werner & Sjaak De MEIJ (eds): Topic, Focus and Configurationality.
Papers from the 6th Groningen Grammar Talks, Groningen, 1984. 1986.
5. GREWENDORF, Günther and Wolfgang STERNEFELD (eds): Scrambling and Barri-
ers. 1990.
6. BHATT, Christa, Elisabeth LÖBEL and Claudia SCHMIDT (eds): Syntactic Phrase
Structure Phenomena in Noun Phrases and Sentences. 1989.
7. ÅFARLI, Tor A.: The Syntax of Norwegian Passive Constructions. 1992.
8. FANSELOW, Gisbert (ed.): The Parametrization of Universal Grammar. 1993.
9. GELDEREN, Elly van: The Rise of Functional Categories. 1993.
10. CINQUE, Guglielmo and Guiliana GIUSTI (eds): Advances in Roumanian Linguistics.
1995.
11. LUTZ, Uli and Jürgen PAFEL (eds): On Extraction and Extraposition in German. 1995.
12. ABRAHAM, W., S. EPSTEIN, H. THRÁINSSON and C.J.W. ZWART (eds): Minimal
Ideas. Linguistic studies in the minimalist framework. 1996.
13. ALEXIADOU Artemis and T. Alan HALL (eds): Studies on Universal Grammar and
Typological Variation. 1997.
14. ANAGNOSTOPOULOU, Elena, Henk VAN RIEMSDIJK and Frans ZWARTS (eds):
Materials on Left Dislocation. 1997.
15. ROHRBACHER, Bernhard Wolfgang: Morphology-Driven Syntax. A theory of V to I
raising and pro-drop. 1999.
16. LIU, FENG-HSI: Scope and Specificity. 1997.
17. BEERMAN, Dorothee, David LEBLANC and Henk van RIEMSDIJK (eds): Rightward
Movement. 1997.
18. ALEXIADOU, Artemis: Adverb Placement. A case study in antisymmetric syntax.
1997.
19. JOSEFSSON, Gunlög: Minimal Words in a Minimal Syntax. Word formation in Swed-
ish. 1998.
20. LAENZLINGER, Christopher: Comparative Studies in Word Order Variation. Ad-
verbs, pronouns, and clause structure in Romance and Germanic. 1998.
21. KLEIN, Henny: Adverbs of Degree in Dutch and Related Languages. 1998.
22. ALEXIADOU, Artemis and Chris WILDER (eds): Possessors, Predicates and Move-
ment in the Determiner Phrase. 1998.
23. GIANNAKIDOU, Anastasia: Polarity Sensitivity as (Non)Veridical Dependency. 1998.
24. REBUSCHI, Georges and Laurice TULLER (eds): The Grammar of Focus. 1999.
25. FELSER, Claudia: Verbal Complement Clauses. A minimalist study of direct perception
constructions. 1999.
26. ACKEMA, Peter: Issues in Morphosyntax. 1999.
 °
27. RUZICKA, Rudolf: Control in Grammar and Pragmatics. A cross-linguistic study.
1999.
28. HERMANS, Ben and Marc van OOSTENDORP (eds.): The Derivational Residue in
Phonological Optimality Theory. 1999.
29. MIYAMOTO, Tadao: The Light Verb Construction in Japanese. The role of the verbal
noun. 1999.
30. BEUKEMA, Frits and Marcel den DIKKEN (eds.): Clitic Phenomena in European
Languages. 2000.
31. SVENONIUS, Peter (ed.): The Derivation of VO and OV. 2000.
32. ALEXIADOU, Artemis, Paul LAW, André MEINUNGER and Chris WILDER (eds.):
The Syntax of Relative Clauses. 2000.
33. PUSKÁS, Genoveva: Word Order in Hungarian. The syntax of È-positions. 2000.
34. REULAND, Eric (ed.): Arguments and Case. Explaining Burzio’s Generalization.
2000.
35. HRÓARSDÓTTIR, Thorbjörg. Word Order Change in Icelandic. From OV to VO.
2000.
36. GERLACH, Birgit and Janet GRIJZENHOUT (eds.): Clitics in Phonology, Morphol-
ogy and Syntax. 2000.
37. LUTZ, Uli, Gereon MÜLLER and Arnim von STECHOW (eds.): Wh-Scope Marking.
2000.
38. MEINUNGER, André: Syntactic Aspects of Topic and Comment. 2000.
39. GELDEREN, Elly van: A History of English Reflexive Pronouns. Person, ‘‘Self’’, and
Interpretability. 2000.
40. HOEKSEMA, Jack, Hotze RULLMANN, Victor SANCHEZ-VALENCIA and Ton
van der WOUDEN (eds.): Perspectives on Negation and Polarity Items. 2001.
41. ZELLER, Jochen : Particle Verbs and Local Domains. n.y.p.
42. ALEXIADOU, Artemis : Functional Structure in Nominals. Nominalization and
ergativity. n.y.p.
43. FEATHERSTON, Sam: Empty Categories in Sentence Processing. 2001.
44. TAYLAN, Eser E. (ed.): The Verb in Turkish. n.y.p.
45. ABRAHAM, Werner and C. Jan-Wouter ZWART (eds.): Issues in Formal German(ic)
Typology. n.y.p
46. PANAGIOTIDIS, Phoevos: Pronouns, clitics and Empty Nouns. ‘Pronominality’ and
licensing in syntax. n.y.p.