Studies i n Contemporary G e r m a n Social Thought (partial listing) O n the Pragmatics of Communication

T h o m a s McCarthy, general editor

James B o h m a n , Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy

James B o h m a n and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's
Cosmopolitan Ideal
Craig C a l h o u n , editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere
Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics
Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy
Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics
Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Sotial Sciences
Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory Jürgen Habermas
Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
Jürgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate
Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures edited by Maeve Cooke
Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles
Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays
Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication (edited by Maeve Cooke)
Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society
Jürgen Habermas, editor, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age"
Axel H o n n e t h , The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Sotial Theory
Axel H o n n e t h , The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Sotial Conflicts
Axel H o n n e t h a n d H a n s Joas, editors, Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Haber-
mas 's T h e T h e o r y of Communicative Action
Axel H o n n e t h , T h o m a s McCarthy, Claus Offe, a n d Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Cul-
tural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
Axel H o n n e t h , T h o m a s McCarthy, Claus Offe, a n d Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Philo-
sophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib, editors, Habermas and the Unfinished
Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on T h e Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
E r n s t Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination
Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity
Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmod-
ernism

T h e M I T Press, C a m b r i d g e , M a s s a c h u s e t t s
 Contents

©1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Editor's Acknowledgments vii

T h i s volume is published by arrangement with Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a m Main, Introduction

Germany. T h e sources on which the translations are based are listed i n the acknowl-
Maeve Cooke 1
edgments.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced i n any form or by any 1 What I s U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics? (1976) 21
electronic or mechanical means, (including photocopying, recording, or information
storage a n d retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n 105
(1981)
T h i s book was set i n Baskeryille by Wellington Graphics and was printed a n d bound
in the United States of America
3 C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the T h e o r i e s o f
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meaning a n d Action (1986) 183

Habermas, Jürgen. 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated

O n the pragmatics of communication / Jürgen Habermas : edited by Maeve Cooke.
p. c m . — (Studies i n contemporary G e r m a n social thought) I n t e r a c t i o n s , a n d the L i f e w o r l d ( 1 9 8 8 ) 215
Essays translated from German.
Includes bibliographical references a n d index. 5 C o m m e n t s on J o h n Searle's "Meaning, Communication,
I S B N 0-262-08265-9 (alk. paper)
a n d R e p r e s e n t a t i o n " (1988) 257
1. Pragmatics. I . Cooke, Maeve. I I . Title. I I I . Series
B831.5.H33 1998
193—dc21 98-18171 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g ( 1 9 8 8 ) 277
CIP
7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t of
Communicative Rationality (1996) 307

8 R i c h a r d R o r t / s Pragmatic T u r n (1996) 343

9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d Communicative
U s e s of Language (1985) 383
vi
Contents

403
10 Q u e s t i o n s a n d C o u n t e r q u e s t i o n s ( 1 9 8 5 )
Editor's Acknowledgments
Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y a n d F u r t h e r Reading 435

Index 447

I w o u l d like to t h a n k T h o m a s M c C a r t h y f o r i n i t i a t i n g this u n d e r t a k -
i n g , f o r f u l f i l l i n g t h e r o l e o f series e d i t o r i n a n e x e m p l a r y m a n n e r ,
a n d for considerable h e l p over a n d above his e d i t o r i a l duties w i t h
r e g a r d t o t r a n s l a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s . M y t h a n k s a r e also d u e t o J ü r g e n
Habermas for encouraging the project, for replying p r o m p t l y to m y
m a n y queries, a n d f o r his u n f a i l i n g cordiality. R o n a l d B ö h m e h e l p e d
with the proofreading, with financial assistance f r o m t h e D e p a r t -
m e n t o f G e r m a n , U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e D u b l i n , a n d h e also c o m p i l e d
the index. H e r e , too, I a m very grateful. Thanks, finally, to M a r t i n
Sauter, n o t j u s t f o r h i s p a i n s t a k i n g h e l p i n c h e c k i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s b u t
f o r h i s l o v e a n d s u p p o r t o v e r t h e m a n y years i t t o o k t o p u t t h i s b o o k
together.
T h e t r a n s l a t i o n s o f m a n y o f t h e c h a p t e r s have b e e n b a s e d on
e a r l i e r p u b l i s h e d t r a n s l a t i o n s , as f o l l o w s :
A translation o f chapter 1 by T h o m a s M c C a r t h y was p u b l i s h e d i n
J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , Communication and the Evolution of Society, © 1 9 7 9
b y B e a c o n Press, B o s t o n .
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 2 b y T h o m a s M c C a r t h y was p u b l i s h e d i n
J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , The Theory of Communicative Action, v o l . 1 , © 1 9 8 4
b y B e a c o n Press, B o s t o n .
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 3 b y J e r e m y G a i n e s a n d D o r i s L . J o n e s was
first p u b l i s h e d i n Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's
T h e T h e o r y o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n , e d i t e d by A x e l H o n n e t h a n d
H a n s J o a s , © 1 9 9 1 b y P o l i t y Press, C a m b r i d g e , U . K .
viii
Editor's Acknowledgments
A p a r t i a l t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 4 was p u b l i s h e d i n Philosophical Prob-
lems Today, e d i t e d b y G u t t o r m F l 0 i s t a d , © 1 9 9 4 b y K l u w e r A c a d e m i c
Publishers, Dordrecht.
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 5 was p u b l i s h e d i n John Searle and His
edited by Ernest Lepore a n d R o b e r t Van Gulick, ©1991
Blackwell, O x f o r d , U.K.
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 6 b y W i l l i a m M . H o h e n g a r t e n was p u b l i s h e d
i n J u r g e n H a b e r m a s , Postmetaphysical Thinking, ©1992 by Massachu-
setts I n s t i t u t e o f T e c h n o l o g y , C a m b r i d g e , Mass.
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 9 b y F r e d e r i c k G . L a w r e n c e was p u b l i s h e d
i n J u r g e n H a b e r m a s , The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,
b y M a s s a c h u s e t t s I n s t i t u t e o f T e c h n o l o g y , C a m b r i d g e , Mass.
A translation of chapter 10 b y J a m e s B o h m a n was p u b l i s h e d i n
Habermas and Modernity, e d i t e d b y R i c h a r d B e r n s t e i n , © 1 9 8 5 b y P o l i t y
Press, C a m b r i d g e , U . K .
C h a p t e r s 7 a n d 8 a n d t h e f i n a l p a r t o f c h a p t e r 4 have b e e n t r a n s l a t e d
by Maeve C o o k e a n d appear i n E n g l i s h f o r the first t i m e .
Introduction
Critics,
Maeve Cooke
by Basil
©1985
T h i s a n t h o l o g y b r i n g s t o g e t h e r f o r t h e first t i m e , i n revised o r n e w
t r a n s l a t i o n , t e n essays t h a t p r e s e n t t h e m a i n c o n c e r n s o f H a b e r m a s ' s
p r o g r a m i n f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s . I t s a i m is t o c o n v e y a sense o f t h e
overall p u r p o s e o f his linguistic investigations, w h i l e i n t r o d u c i n g t h e
r e a d e r t o t h e i r specific d e t a i l s . H a b e r m a s ' s f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s f u l f i l l s
t w o m a i n f u n c t i o n s . F i r s t , i t serves as t h e t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r p i n n i n g
f o r h i s t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , w h i c h is a c r u c i a l e l e m e n t
i n h i s t h e o r y o f society. S e c o n d , i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o o n g o i n g p h i l o -
sophical discussion o f p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n i n g t r u t h , rationality, a c t i o n ,
and m e a n i n g . Correspondingly, the a i m o f the present anthology
is t w o f o l d . F i r s t , i n p r o v i d i n g b e t t e r access t o essays b y Habermas
t h a t focus e x p l i c i t l y o n language, i t may h e l p those interested i n
s o c i a l t h e o r y t o assess c r i t i c a l l y t h e l i n g u i s t i c basis f o r his a c c o u n t s
o f communicative action a n d communicative rationality. Second, i t
may h e l p those interested i n m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b -
lems to u n d e r s t a n d a n d to appreciate Habermas's treatment of
them.
H a b e r m a s ' s o r i g i n a l t e r m f o r h i s l i n g u i s t i c r e s e a r c h p r o g r a m was
" u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . " T h e a d j e c t i v e " u n i v e r s a l " was m e a n t t o i n d i -
cate t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n h i s l i n g u i s t i c p r o j e c t a n d o t h e r p r a g -
m a t i c analyses o f l a n g u a g e . W h e r e a s e a r l i e r p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o
l a n g u a g e h a d t e n d e d t o analyze p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t s o f l a n g u a g e use,
H a b e r m a s set o u t t o r e c o n s t r u c t u n i v e r s a l f e a t u r e s o f u s i n g l a n -
guage. T h i s explains the title o f h i s p r o g r a m m a t i c essay, " W h a t

2
Introduction
Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ? , " first p u b l i s h e d i n 1976. However, i n a
f o o t n o t e t o t h e 1979 E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n , H a b e r m a s expresses d i s -
satisfaction w i t h the label "universal" a n d a preference f o r the t e r m
" f o r m a l pragmatics." O n e advantage o f the latter t e r m i n o l o g y , i n his
view, is t h a t i t r e m i n d s us t h a t f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s is r e l a t e d t o f o r m a l
s e m a n t i c s . A s w e s h a l l see, t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p is p a r t i c u -
larly crucial i n Habermas's accounts o f m e a n i n g a n d t r u t h .
W h a t is m e a n t b y u n i v e r s a l or, as w e s h o u l d n o w say, f o r m a l p r a g -
matics? H a b e r m a s ' s s t a r t i n g p o i n t is t h a t f o r m a l analysis o f l a n g u a g e
s h o u l d n o t b e r e s t r i c t e d t o s e m a n t i c analysis, f o r f o r m a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n
o f t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n s o f l a n g u a g e is e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e and
i m p o r t a n t . By the "pragmatic" dimensions o f language, Habermas
m e a n s t h o s e p e r t a i n i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e employment o f s e n t e n c e s i n
u t t e r a n c e s . H e m a k e s c l e a r t h a t " f o r m a l " is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n a
t o l e r a n t sense t o r e f e r t o t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f general
i n t u i t i o n s o r c o m p e t e n c i e s . F o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s , t h e n , a i m s a t a sys-
tematic reconstruction of the intuitive linguistic knowledge of com-
p e t e n t subjects, t h e i n t u i t i v e " r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s " t h a t a c o m p e t e n t
s p e a k e r has o f h e r o w n l a n g u a g e . I t a i m s t o e x p l i c a t e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l
knowledge o f a g e n e r a l s o r t , as o p p o s e d t o t h e c o m p e t e n c i e s o f
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s a n d g r o u p s . F o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s t h u s calls t o
mind the unavoidable presuppositions that guide l i n g u i s t i c ex-
c h a n g e s b e t w e e n speakers a n d h e a r e r s i n e v e r y d a y processes o f c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n i n a n y l a n g u a g e . I t m a k e s us a w a r e t h a t , as speakers a n d
h e a r e r s , t h e r e are c e r t a i n t h i n g s w e m u s t — a s a m a t t e r o f n e c e s s i t y —
always a l r e a d y h a v e p r e s u p p o s e d i f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t o b e success-
f u l . I n focusing o n the f o r m a l properties o f speech situations i n
general, Habermas's p r o g r a m may thus be distinguished f r o m e m -
pirical pragmatics—for example, sociolinguistics—which looks p r i -
m a r i l y a t p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s o f use.
Habermas's f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c investigations i n t o everyday linguis-
t i c p r a c t i c e s i n m o d e r n societies a r e a t t e m p t s t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e
u n i v e r s a l c o m p e t e n c i e s t h a t a r e i n v o l v e d w h e n social a c t o r s i n t e r a c t
w i t h the a i m o f achieving m u t u a l understanding {Verständigung)}
C o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e is c r u c i a l f o r H a b e r m a s ' s s o c i a l t h e o r y ,
w h i c h is b a s e d o n t h e thesis t h a t a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t y p e o f social a c t i o n . H i s n a m e f o r
3
Introduction
a c t i o n o f t h i s s o r t is " c o m m u n i c a t i v e , " a n d h i s analysis o f i t t u r n s o n
t h e thesis t h a t e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e has a n i n - b u i l t c o n n e c t i o n with
v a l i d i t y . M o r e precisely, l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s as t h e y are u s e d in
e v e r y d a y processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n b e c o n s t r u e d as claims t o
v a l i d i t y . F r o m h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , e v e r y d a y l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n is p r i -
m a r i l y a m a t t e r o f r a i s i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g to validity claims. Haber¬
mas d o e s a l l o w f o r o t h e r f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n , s u c h as
strategic, figurative, or symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n , b u t he contends that
these a r e p a r a s i t i c o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n .
I n its s i m p l e s t t e r m s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is a c t i o n w h o s e success
d e p e n d s o n t h e h e a r e r ' s r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e validity claim r a i s e d b y
t h e s p e a k e r w i t h a "yes" o r a " n o . " H e r e , H a b e r m a s i d e n t i f i e s t h r e e
basic types o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t a r e r a i s e d b y a speaker w i t h h e r
s p e e c h act: a claim t o t h e t r u t h o f w h a t is s a i d o r p r e s u p p o s e d , a
claim t o t h e normative Tightness o f t h e s p e e c h a c t i n t h e given
context or of the u n d e r l y i n g n o r m , a n d a claim to the truthfulness
o f t h e speaker. I n u s i n g a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n communicatively, t h e
s p e a k e r raises a l l t h r e e o f these c l a i m s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I n a t y p i c a l
c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x c h a n g e , h o w e v e r , j u s t o n e o f t h e c l a i m s is r a i s e d
explicitly; the other two r e m a i n implicit presuppositions o f under-
s t a n d i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e . T h e t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are d e s c r i b e d as
" u n i v e r s a l " b y H a b e r m a s , i n t h e sense o f b e i n g r a i s e d w i t h every
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y u s e d s p e e c h act.
T h e three universal validity claims—to t r u t h , normative lightness,
a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s — p r o v i d e a basis f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts. T h u s ,
c o m m u n i c a t i v e utterances can be d i v i d e d i n t o three b r o a d catego-
r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e x p l i c i t c l a i m s t h e y raise: c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts
are c o n n e c t e d i n t h e first instance w i t h t r u t h claims, regulative
s p e e c h acts w i t h claims to n o r m a t i v e lightness, a n d expressive
s p e e c h acts w i t h c l a i m s t o t r u t h f u l n e s s .
T h e thesis o f t h r e e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r
b o t h language t h e o r y a n d social t h e o r y . O n t h e o n e h a n d , i t is
m e a n t t o p r o v i d e a m o r e c o n v i n c i n g basis f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts
t h a n , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e proposals o f A u s t i n a n d his followers o r t h e
m o r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d t y p o l o g i e s o f Searle a n d h i s f o l l o w e r s .
On the other h a n d , i t proposes that language has an in-built
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , t h e r e b y g i v i n g rise t o a p a r t i c u l a r
4 5
Introduction
conception o f s o c i a l o r d e r as r e p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i v e
action.
I n s h o w i n g t h a t everyday l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n d e p e n d s o n r a i s i n g
a n d r e c o g n i z i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , H a b e r m a s p r e s e n t s a p i c t u r e o f so-
c i a l o r d e r as a n e t w o r k o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t
h a v e t w o s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h e y a r e , first, c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a -
tionships o f c o m m i t m e n t a n d responsibility: participants i n c o m m u -
n i c a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n undertake t o b e h a v e i n c e r t a i n ways, a n d t h e
success o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h e cooperation o f b o t h p a r t i e s
involved. Second, the relationships of m u t u a l recognition charac-
t e r i s t i c f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n h a v e a n i n h e r e n t rational d i m e n -
sion: the communicative actor undertakes a n o b l i g a t i o n to provide
r e a s o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e c l a i m s h e raises w i t h h i s u t t e r a n c e s ,
w h i l e his c o u n t e r p a r t i n a c t i o n may e i t h e r accept the proffered
r e a s o n s o r c h a l l e n g e t h e m o n t h e basis o f b e t t e r reasons. I n t h i s
sense, e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n v o l v e s a r u d i m e n t a r y p r a c -
t i c e o f " a r g u m e n t a t i o n . " F u r t h e r m o r e , these e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s
g i v i n g reasons f o r a n d against c o n t r o v e r s i a l validity claims—some-
t i m e s r e f e r r e d t o b y H a b e r m a s as n a i v e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action—
p o i n t t o w a r d the possibility o f other, m o r e d e m a n d i n g f o r m s
a r g u m e n t a t i o n , w h i c h h e calls " d i s c o u r s e . " E v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e
a c t i o n n o r m a l l y operates o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e reasons sup-
p o r t i n g t h e validity claims raised are g o o d ones. W h e n this back-
g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s is s h a k e n — a s will happen more frequently i n
posttraditional societies—communicative action cannot continue
r o u t i n e l y . P a r t i c i p a n t s t h e n have t h r e e o p t i o n s : they can switch t o
strategic a c t i o n ; they can b r e a k o f f c o m m u n i c a t i o n altogether; o r
they can r e c o m m e n c e t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i v e activity at a d i f f e r e n t ,
m o r e reflective level—namely, argumentative speech. I n the proc-
esses o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n k n o w n as d i s c o u r s e s , c e r t a i n i d e a l i z i n g s u p -
positions already operative i n everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action are
f o r m a l i z e d . T h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a r e u n a v o i d a b l e i n t h e sense t h a t
t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e v e r y m e a n i n g o f w h a t i t is t o t a k e p a r t i n a r g u -
m e n t a t i o n ; t h e y are i d e a l i z i n g i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y a r e t y p i c a l l y
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l a n d w i l l n o t as a r u l e b e s a t i s f i e d m o r e t h a n a p p r o x i -
mately. T h u s , H a b e r m a s claims, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n nec-
essarily s u p p o s e , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e y share t h e common
Introduction
a i m o f reaching agreement w i t h r e g a r d to the validity o f the disputed
v a l i d i t y c l a i m , t h a t n o f o r c e e x c e p t t h a t o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t is
e x e r t e d , t h a t n o c o m p e t e n t parties have b e e n e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e
discussion, that no r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t has k n o w i n g l y b e e n sup-
p r e s s e d , t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s are u s i n g t h e s a m e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s
i n t h e s a m e way, a n d so o n . T h e s e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s r e f e r b o t h
t o t h e p r a c t i c e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d t o its o u t c o m e . F o r H a b e r m a s ,
the various idealizing suppositions unavoidably g u i d i n g a r g u m e n -
t a t i o n a r e w h a t give m e a n i n g t o t h e i d e a s o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e as
ideas t h a t t r a n s c e n d a l l l o c a l c o n t e x t s o f validity. T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t
t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d i n e v e r y d a y processes o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n
have a c o n n e c t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h possible v i n d i c a t i o n i n dis-
course, they have a n i n h e r e n t c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d e n t power. This
power is t h e r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l b u i l t i n t o e v e r y d a y processes of
communication.
H a b e r m a s ' s p i c t u r e o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h u s has
of
i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r critical social theory. F o r one t h i n g , i n
p r e s e n t i n g s o c i a l o r d e r as a n e t w o r k o f c o o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v i n g c o m -
m i t m e n t a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t o p p o s e s m o d e l s o f social o r d e r t h a t
of
t a k e i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a t e g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects as f u n d a m e n -
tal, for example, models g r o u n d e d i n decision o r game theory. For
another, i n the context-transcendent p o t e n t i a l o f the validity claims
r a i s e d i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e processes, i t l o c a t e s a basis f o r a
" p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l " c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y a n d , ac-
cordingly, a standard f o r critique. As that conception refers t o a
p o t e n t i a l already b u i l t i n t o everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, i t situ-
ates r e a s o n i n e v e r y d a y l i f e : t h e ideas o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e t o w a r d
w h i c h i t p o i n t s are g r o u n d e d i n i d e a l i z i n g suppositions that are p a r t
o f e v e r y d a y h u m a n activity. M o r e o v e r , c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is
n o t reducible to the standards o f validity p r e v a i l i n g i n any local
c o n t e x t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e activity. R a t h e r , t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i -
tions o n w h i c h i t rests p r o v i d e s t a n d a r d s f o r c r i t i c i z i n g l o c a l p r a c t i c e s
o f justification, b o t h w i t h regard to the outcomes o f the agreements
reached a n d w i t h r e g a r d to practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n themselves.
T h u s t h e i d e a o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is m e a n t t o p r o v i d e a
postmetaphysical alternative to traditional conceptions of t r u t h a n d
j u s t i c e t h a t nonetheless avoids value-relativism.

6
Introduction
F r o m a m o r e s t r i c t l y l i n g u i s t i c - p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f view, H a b e r -
mas's f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s offers a n a p p r o a c h t o questions o f m e a n i n g
a n d t r u t h t h a t radicalizes t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n w i t h i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o -
p h y . I n h i s view, t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m a l - s e m a n t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o m e a n i n g
have b e e n g u i l t y o f t h r e e k i n d s o f a b s t r a c t i v e fallacies: a s e m a n t i c i s t
abstraction, a cognitivist abstraction, a n d a n objectivist o n e . T h e
s e m a n t i c i s t a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t t h e analysis o f l i n g u i s t i c
m e a n i n g c a n c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o t h e analysis o f sentences, a b s t r a c t i n g
f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n t e x t s o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s .
T h e c o g n i t i v i s t a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t a l l m e a n i n g c a n b e t r a c e d
back to the propositional content o f utterances, thus indirectly re-
d u c i n g m e a n i n g t o t h e m e a n i n g o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s . T h e o b j e c -
tivist a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t m e a n i n g is t o b e d e f i n e d i n t e r m s
o f objectively ascertainable truth c o n d i t i o n s , as o p p o s e d t o t h e
knowledge o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s t h a t c a n b e i m p u t e d t o speakers o r
hearers. F o r H a b e r m a s , p r a g m a t i c theories o f m e a n i n g have t h e
a d v a n t a g e t h a t t h e y f o c u s n o t o n s e n t e n c e s b u t o n u t t e r a n c e s ( h e is
t h i n k i n g here primarily o f t h e use-oriented theories o f m e a n i n g
suggested b y t h e later w o r k o f W i t t g e n s t e i n , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d
t h e w o r k o f A u s t i n a n d Searle, o n t h e o t h e r ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , p r a g -
m a t i c theories o f m e a n i n g d o n o t emphasize o n l y t h e assertoric o r
descriptive m o d e s o f language use; they d r a w a t t e n t i o n t o t h e m u l -
tiplicity o f m e a n i n g f u l ways o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e . F i n a l l y , s u c h t h e o r i e s
stress t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f u t t e r a n c e s a n d s o c i a l
practices; they draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e institutions a n d conventions
o f t h e f o r m s o f l i f e i n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i v i t y is always e m -
bedded.
I n H a b e r m a s ' s view, h o w e v e r , e x i s t i n g p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o
m e a n i n g h a v e weaknesses c o m p l e m e n t a r y t o t h o s e o f f o r m a l s e m a n -
tics. T h e g r e a t s t r e n g t h o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s h a s b e e n i t s a t t e m p t t o
r e t a i n a c o n n e c t i o n between t h e m e a n i n g o f linguistic expressions
a n d some n o t i o n o f context-transcendent validity. I n t h e m a i n p r a g -
matic approaches, however, this c o n n e c t i o n e i t h e r slips f r o m v i e w
c o m p l e t e l y o r is i n t e r p r e t e d t o o n a r r o w l y i n a c o g n i t i v i s t way. F o r
e x a m p l e , use t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g d e r i v e d f r o m t h e l a t e r w o r k o f
W i t t g e n s t e i n have i n effect r e n o u n c e d a context-transcendent n o -
tion o f validity by r e d u c i n g i t t o t h e prevailing validity o f local
7
Introduction
language games a n d p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s o f life. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t h a t have a t t e m p t e d t o a v o i d such a r e d u c -
tion—Habermas m e n t i o n s Searle's s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y — t y p i c a l l y h a v e
succumbed t o t h e cognitivist abstraction, i n t e r p r e t i n g validity t o o
n a r r o w l y as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . H a b e r m a s sees h i s o w n p r a g m a t i c
t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as a n a t t e m p t t o c o m b i n e t h e p r o d u c t i v e i n s i g h t s
o f existing formal-semantic a n d pragmatic approaches to m e a n i n g
w h i l e a v o i d i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e weaknesses. H e r e g a r d s s p e e c h - a c t
t h e o r y as a f r u i t f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t , b u t i n s u f f i c i e n t as i t stands, a n d
attempts t o b u i l d i n t o i t the formal-semantic emphasis o n t r u t h o r
a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s . I n a sense, t h e n , H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e -
o r y o f m e a n i n g c a n b e r e g a r d e d as t h e p r o p o s e d h a p p y m a r r i a g e o f
A u s t i n a n d Searle w i t h F r e g e a n d D u m m e t t .
F r o m t h e s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y o f A u s t i n a n d Searle ( w h o m h e praises
f o r r e n d e r i n g A u s t i n ' s t h e o r y m o r e p r e c i s e ) , H a b e r m a s takes o v e r
t h e e m p h a s i s o n u t t e r a n c e s r a t h e r t h a n s e n t e n c e s as t h e c e n t r a l u n i t
o f analysis. H e also associates h i m s e l f w i t h t h e i r m o v e b e y o n d t h e
t r a d i t i o n a l n a r r o w focus o n assertoric a n d descriptive m o d e s o f l a n -
g u a g e use t o i n c l u d e — p o t e n t i a l l y o n a n e q u a l f o o t i n g — o t h e r ways
o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e , s u c h as acts o f p r o m i s i n g , r e q u e s t i n g , w a r n i n g , o r
c o n f e s s i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , h e finds f r u i t f u l s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y ' s e m p h a -
sis o n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f u t t e r a n c e s , t h a t is, o n t h e f a c t t h a t a
s p e a k e r i n s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g also does s o m e t h i n g . H o w e v e r , i t m a y b e
helpful here to notice Habermas's distinctive conception o f illocu-
t i o n a r y f o r c e , w h i c h goes b e y o n d A u s t i n ' s i n a n u m b e r o f s i g n i f i c a n t
respects. A u s t i n u s e d t h e n o t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n t o r e f e r t o t h e act o f
u t t e r i n g sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . F o r h i m , t h e force o f
a n u t t e r a n c e consists i n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — i n t h e a t t e m p t t o
reach a n u p t a k e ; h e contrasted t h e force o f a n utterance w i t h its
m e a n i n g , c o n c e i v e d as a p r o p e r t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d . H a b e r -
mas's o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s is t h r e e f o l d : first, A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
f o r c e a n d m e a n i n g o v e r l o o k s t h e f a c t t h a t u t t e r a n c e s have a m e a n -
i n g d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences they employ; second,
i t is c o n n e c t e d w i t h a p r o b l e m a t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i n t o
constatives a n d p e r f o r m a t i v e s , w h e r e b y i n i t i a l l y , f o r A u s t i n , o n l y c o n -
statives a r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ; t h i r d , i t n e g l e c t s t h e r a -
tional f o u n d a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y force. By contrast, Habermas
8 9
Introduction
p r o p o s e s a n a c c o u n t o f u t t e r a n c e m e a n i n g t h a t brings together t h e
c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g a n d f o r c e ; h e extends t h e n o d o n o f i l l o c u t i o n -
a r y force t o a l l utterances t h a t are used c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y ; a n d h e
e m p h a s i z e s t h e rational f o u n d a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e . A s w e s h a l l
see, H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y gives a n a c c o u n t o f t h e m e a n i n g
o f u t t e r a n c e s as i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e a c t o f u t t e r i n g t h e m , a n d
d e f i n e s u t t e r a n c e s as acts o f r a i s i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . H i s d e f i n i t i o n o f
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e f o l l o w s f r o m t h i s : i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e consists i n a
s p e e c h act's c a p a c i t y t o m o t i v a t e a h e a r e r t o act o n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t
t h e c o m m i t m e n t s i g n a l l e d b y t h e s p e a k e r is s e r i o u s l y m e a n t . O n t h i s
c o n c e p t i o n , i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is b o u n d u p w i t h t h e speaker's as-
s u m p t i o n o f a warranty, i f c h a l l e n g e d , t o p r o v i d e reasons i n s u p p o r t
o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e c l a i m s she raises. So u n d e r s t o o d , i l l o c u t i o n a r y
f o r c e is a r a t i o n a l f o r c e , f o r i n p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h act, t h e s p e a k e r
u n d e r t a k e s t o s u p p o r t w h a t she says w i t h reasons, i f necessary. T h u s ,
a l t h o u g h H a b e r m a s acknowledges s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y as t h e most
f r u i t f u l p o i n t o f departure for his p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l pragmatics, he
e n g a g e s w i t h i t c r i t i c a l l y , m a k i n g use o f s o m e o f its c e n t r a l c a t e g o r i e s
i n d i s t i n c t i v e ways.
F r o m the p o i n t o f view o f Habermas's p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l p r a g m a t -
ics, t h e m a i n w e a k n e s s o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is its f a i l u r e t o c o n n e c t
all c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used utterances w i t h validity claims t h a t are i n
principle context-transcendent. He attempts to make good this
deficiency by d r a w i n g o n M i c h a e l D u m m e t t ' s account of under-
standing m e a n i n g i n terms o f k n o w i n g assertibility conditions. I n
a n a l o g y w i t h D u m m e t t ' s f o r m u l a t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e
m e a n i n g o f a n assertoric e x p r e s s i o n , H a b e r m a s p r o p o s e s t h a t w e
u n d e r s t a n d a n utterance w h e n we k n o w w h a t makes i t acceptable.
T r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics r u n s i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s w h e n i t explains
t h e m e a n i n g o f sentences i n t e r m s o f t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w i t h o u t
m e d i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e knowledge t h e s p e a k e r o r h e a r e r m a y h a v e o f
such conditions. T h u s Habermas adopts D u m m e t t ' s "epistemic t u r n "
a n d criticizes D o n a l d Davidson f o r o f f e r i n g an objectivist r e a d i n g o f
F r e g e ' s a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s thesis t h a t t o u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r a n c e is
t o k n o w w h a t is t h e case i f i t is t r u e . H e r e j e c t s t h i s o b j e c t i v i s t r e a d i n g
as t a c i t l y a s s u m i n g t h a t f o r e v e r y s e n t e n c e , o r a t least f o r every
assertoric sentence, p r o c e d u r e s are available f o r effectively d e c i d i n g
Introduction
w h e n t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are s a t i s f i e d . S u c h a n a s s u m p t i o n , he
argues, i m p l i c i t l y relies o n a n e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y o f knowledge that
regards t h e simple predicative sentences o f a n observational l a n -
guage as fundamental. Habermas then follows Dummett, who
suggests r e p l a c i n g t h e e m p h a s i s o n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w i t h a c o n s i d -
e r a t i o n o f w h a t i t is f o r a s p e a k e r t o know when the truth conditions
w o u l d b e s a t i s f i e d . T h i s is w h a t h e r e f e r s t o as D u m m e t t ' s e p i s t e m i c
t u r n ; h e , however, wants to t u r n even f u r t h e r . As H a b e r m a s reads i t ,
D u m m e t t ' s t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g has t w o m a i n s h o r t c o m i n g s t h a t p r e -
vent his developing fully the i n h e r e n t potentials o f the epistemic
t u r n . T h e f i r s t is a p r i o r i t i z a t i o n o f t r u t h c l a i m s o v e r o t h e r k i n d s o f
validity claims: D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f assertibility conditions accords
p r i o r i t y t o assertoric utterances. I n o r d e r t o m a k e r o o m o n a n e q u a l
f o o t i n g f o r n o n a s s e r t o r i c u t t e r a n c e s s u c h as p r o m i s e s , i m p e r a t i v e s ,
o r avowals, H a b e r m a s p r e f e r s t o s p e a k o f acceptability c o n d i t i o n s . T h e
s e c o n d is t h a t D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s is i n -
s u f f i c i e n t l y p r a g m a t i c : i t r e m a i n s o n t h e s e m a n t i c l e v e l o f analysis
i n a s m u c h as i t r e l i e s o n a n i d e a l o f v a l i d i t y t h a t is c o n c e p t u a l l y
i n d e p e n d e n t o f discursive practices o f r e d e e m i n g validity claims.
T h i s last o b j e c t i o n takes us t o t h e h e a r t o f H a b e r m a s ' s pragmatic
theory of meaning.
B e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g i t , however, i t m a y be h e l p f u l to clarify t h e
status o f t h e t h e o r y . B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , i t seems p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n -
g u i s h b e t w e e n t w o a c c o u n t s o f its status. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e first, a
p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is m e r e l y a n e x t e n s i o n o f t r u t h - c o n d i -
t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s i n t h e sense t h a t i t b r o a d e n s its f o c u s . O n t h i s view,
H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y leaves t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e f o r m a l - s e m a n -
tic a c c o u n t o f t h e m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s i n t a c t , w h i l e e x p a n d i n g its
range, first, t o i n c l u d e nonassertoric l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s a n d , sec-
o n d , t o e m b r a c e utterances as w e l l as s e n t e n c e s . H i s e a r l i e r essay
" W h a t I s U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ? " suggests t h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e tasks o f
a pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . However, i n most o f his later writ-
i n g s , h e seems t o o f f e r a m o r e r a d i c a l a c c o u n t . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s , a
pragmatic theory of meaning undercuts the formal-semantic ap-
p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g . T h i s v i e w is s u g g e s t e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i n c h a p t e r s
2 a n d 3 i n the present volume, where D u m m e t t ' s assertibility-condi-
tional t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is c r i t i c i z e d f o r f a i l i n g t o c a r r y t h r o u g h
10 11
Introduction Introduction

completely the move f r o m the semantic to the pragmatic level o f

r e m a i n s u n c l e a r , h o w e v e r , i n w h a t sense s u c h a t h e o r y is p r a g m a t i c .
analysis. I n a r e c e n t response to objections raised by Herbert
A s i n d i c a t e d , i n h i s e a r l i e r essay o n u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , H a b e r m a s
Schnadelbach (see c h a p t e r 7 ) , H a b e r m a s c l a r i f i e s t h e status o f h i s
h a d j u s t i f i e d his preference for the category o f acceptability c o n d i -
p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g i n a w a y t h a t suggests t h a t b o t h of
t i o n s , as o p p o s e d t o t r u t h o r a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s , o n t h e g r o u n d s
t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are c o r r e c t . S t a r t i n g f r o m a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
t h a t i t avoids t h e p r i o r i t i z a t i o n o f the assertoric m o d e o f language
t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , h e ac-
use i m p l i c i t i n t h e l a t t e r c a t e g o r i e s . I n t h e s e l a t e r w r i t i n g s , h o w e v e r ,
knowledges that epistemically used p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences and
h i s o b j e c t i o n t o t r u t h o r a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s seems t o g o beyond
t e l e o l o g i c a l l y u s e d i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s have a m e a n i n g content
t h i s . T h e y a r e s a i d t o rest o n f a u l t y p i c t u r e s o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n
t h a t is i n s o m e sense i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n w h i c h
t h a t f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e i n t e r n a l , c o n c e p t u a l l i n k s w i t h pragmatic contexts
t h e y c a n b e e m b e d d e d . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l sen-
of justification a n d t h u s r e m a i n t r a p p e d i n a b s t r a c t i v e fallacies o f a
t e n c e s t h a t s e r v e p u r e l y t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s o r facts, i t is
c o g n i t i v i s t a n d s e m a n t i c i s t k i n d . I n H a b e r m a s ' s view, v a l i d i t y a n d
sufficient.to k n o w their t r u t h conditions. I n order to u n d e r s t a n d
j u s t i f i c a t i o n — a n d h e n c e utterance m e a n i n g — a r e inescapably p r a g -
i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s t h a t serve t o c a l c u l a t e a c t i o n c o n s e q u e n c e s
matic notions. T h e y cannot be explicated i n d e p e n d e n d y o f discur-
m o n o l o g i c a l l y — w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o a s e c o n d p e r s o n — i t is s u f f i -
sive processes o f r e d e e m i n g d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . W h i l e
c i e n t t o k n o w t h e i r success c o n d i t i o n s . S u c h s e n t e n c e s , w h i c h a r e
D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f assertibility c o n d i t i o n s pushes i n the d i r e c t i o n
used noncommunicatively, can be analyzed exhaustively w i t h the
o f a p r a g m a t i c a c c o u n t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d validity, i t does n o t q u i t e
t o o l s o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s . H o w e v e r , t h e y are s p e c i a l cases o f l a n -
arrive t h e r e ; i t r e m a i n s a semantic t h e o r y t o t h e e x t e n t that i t fails
g u a g e use, d u e t o a f e a t o f a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t s u s p e n d s t h e i r p r a g m a t i c
t o e x p l i c a t e these n o t i o n s as conceptually l i n k e d t o discursive p r o c -
d i m e n s i o n : t h e possible c o m m u n i c a t i v e situations i n w h i c h a speaker
esses o f r e d e e m i n g d i s p u t e d — a s s e r t o r i c a n d n o n a s s e r t o r i c — v a l i d i t y
w o u l d assert t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "p," o r d e c l a r e t h e i n t e n t i o n "p," w i t h
claims.
t h e a i m o f f i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n addressee a r e a b s t r a c t e d f r o m .
As a r u l e , however, p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sen- H a b e r m a s proposes t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a speech

t e n c e s a r e e m b e d d e d i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n t h e f o r m o f a s s e r t i o n s act w h e n w e k n o w w h a t m a k e s i t a c c e p t a b l e . W e k n o w w h a t m a k e s a

and announcements. The m e a n i n g o f assertions and announce- s p e e c h a c t a c c e p t a b l e w h e n w e k n o w t h e kinds o f reasons t h a t a

m e n t s , w h i c h are p a r t o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , c a n b e speaker can offer, i f challenged, i n o r d e r to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g

e x p l i c a t e d o n l y p r a g m a t i c a l l y . F r o m t h i s w e c a n see t h a t H a b e r m a s w i t h a hearer c o n c e r n i n g t h e validity o f t h e d i s p u t e d c l a i m . I n every-

does n o t reject the f o r m a l semantic approach to m e a n i n g , f o r he d a y processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t a h e a r e r

a c k n o w l e d g e s its a b i l i t y t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f noncommu- m u s t k n o w i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e are c i r c u m -

nicatively used p r o p o s i t i o n a l a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sentences. A t t h e same s c r i b e d c o n t e x t u a l l y . L e t us i m a g i n e a r e q u e s t t o a passenger b y a n

time, he does challenge the claims o f formal-semantic theories to a i r l i n e steward to stop s m o k i n g . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d this request,

e x p l a i n t h e m e a n i n g o f utterances s u c h as assertions a n d announce- t h e p a s s e n g e r has t o b e a b l e t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t

m e n t s , o r m o r e generally, o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used linguistic expres- the a i r l i n e steward c o u l d p r o v i d e i n o r d e r to justify his request, i f

sions. M o r e o v e r , i f f o r m a l - s e m a n t i c t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g c a n a c c o u n t necessary. T h e s e r e a s o n s m i g h t i n c l u d e t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t s m o k i n g

only for the noncommunicative use o f language, t h e n their re- is u n p l e a s a n t f o r o t h e r passengers o r t h a t i t is a g a i n s t t h e r e g u l a t i o n s

s t r i c t e d s c o p e suggests t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g is i t s e l f l i m i t e d . o f t h e a i r l i n e o r against a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l code o f a i r l i n e practice.

T h e s e r e a s o n s a r e o f c e r t a i n k i n d s . I f o t h e r k i n d s o f responses w e r e
W e h a v e a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y is r e q u i r e d t o e x p l i - o f f e r e d as r e a s o n s — f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t i t is r a i n i n g o u t s i d e , o r t h a t
cate t h e m e a n i n g o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used linguistic expressions. I t Finnegans Wake is J a m e s J o y c e ' s best b o o k , o r t h a t t h e r e a r e n o snakes
 13
12
Introduction
Introduction

in I r e l a n d — t h e context i n question w o u l d render t h e m irrelevant a d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t i t is e q u a l l y i n t h e

a n d , i n d e e d , u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . T h u s , a l t h o u g h t h e set o f r e a s o n s c o n s t i - interest o f all affected. Therefore, agreement reached i n discourse—

t u t i n g a g i v e n kind o f reasons is always i n p r i n c i p l e o p e n - e n d e d , i n i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y — c o n t r i b u t e s c o n s t r u c t i v e l y t o t h e va-

everyday contexts of communication contextual considerations l i d i t y o f m o r a l n o r m s . I t is c l e a r f r o m t h i s t h a t H a b e r m a s c o n c e i v e s

a c t as a c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t t o m o r a l v a l i d i t y as i n t e r n a l l y l i n k e d t o t h e i d e a o f d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d

justification. consensus a n d hence to pragmatic contexts o f justification.

T h e h e a r e r n o t o n l y has t o k n o w t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h e s p e a k e r H a b e r m a s also p r o p o s e s a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f t r u t h . Discussion

c o u l d a d d u c e i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e , h e has t o k n o w h o w t h e s p e a k e r o f t h i s is c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t h e s i g n i f i c a n t l y a m e n d e d the

m i g h t use t h e m i n o r d e r t o e n g a g e i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w i t h a h e a r e r a c c o u n t h e o r i g i n a l l y p r e s e n t e d i n t h e 1973 essay, " W a h r h e i t s t h e o ¬

c o n c e r n i n g the validity o f a d i s p u t e d c l a i m . T h i s focus o n k n o w i n g r i e n , " w i t h o u t subsequently p r e s e n t i n g a fully revised version. H o w -

h o w t h e s p e a k e r m i g h t use r e a s o n s t o s u p p o r t a d i s p u t e d v a l i d i t y ever, a r e c e n t essay o n R i c h a r d R o r t y ' s n e o p r a g m a t i s m (included

claim clearly recalls D u m m e t t ' s epistemic turn. Like Dummett, h e r e as c h a p t e r 8 ) c a n b e seen as a n a t t e m p t t o r e c t i f y t h i s d e f i c i e n c y .

H a b e r m a s also stresses t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e reasons c a n n e v e r i n F o r o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , w h a t is m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a b o u t these r e -

p r i n c i p l e be d e c i d e d once a n d for a l l . Rather, t h e i r validity m u s t be c e n t r e m a r k s is t h e i r c o n t i n u e d i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r a g m a t i c n a t u r e

c o n s t r u e d f a l l i b i l i s t i c a l l y , t h a t is, as always i n p r i n c i p l e s u b j e c t to o f t r u t h . H a b e r m a s associates h i m s e l f w i t h R o r t y ' s a i m o f r a d i c a l i z i n g

revision i n l i g h t o f new a r g u m e n t s based o n new evidence and the linguistic t u r n w i t h i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y by m o v i n g to a p r a g -

i n s i g h t s . T h i s is o n e sense i n w h i c h t h e q u e s t i o n o f v a l i d i t y is tied t o m a t i c l e v e l o f analysis. H e c r i t i c i z e s h i m , h o w e v e r , f o r d r a w i n g t h e

pragmatic contexts o f justification, a n d i t constitutes a f u r t h e r rea- w r o n g conclusions f r o m his c r i t i q u e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f language.

son for describing Habermas's theory of meaning (and, indeed, R o r t y reduces t r u t h to practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , thus losing sight o f

D u m m e t t ' s ) as p r a g m a t i c . H o w e v e r , t h e r e is a s e c o n d , p o s s i b l y m o r e the p o t e n t i a l power o f validity claims to e x p l o d e actual contexts of

contentious sense, i n w h i c h H a b e r m a s ties v a l i d i t y t o pragmatic j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H a b e r m a s , by contrast, wants t o h o l d o n t o t h e m o m e n t

c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n t h i s s e c o n d sense, v a l i d i t y is n o t o n l y o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y t h a t is p a r t o f t h e i d e a o f t r u t h , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g

always s u b j e c t i n p r i n c i p l e t o d i s c u r s i v e r é é v a l u a t i o n , i t is in itself an internal relation between t r u t h a n d justifiability. His aim, i n other

p r a g m a t i c . T h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n is n o t s o m e t h i n g a t t a c h e d t o w o r d s , is t o w o r k o u t a t h e o r y o f t r u t h t h a t is i n h e r e n t l y p r a g m a t i c

t h e i d e a o f v a l i d i t y e x t e r n a l l y , as i t w e r e ; r a t h e r , i t is i n t e r n a l t o t h e yet retains t h e idea o f a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m t h a t reaches b e y o n d

v e r y c o n c e p t o f v a l i d i t y . A t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t sees i t s e l f as a l l t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us a t a n y g i v e n t i m e . W h a t w o u l d s u c h

p r a g m a t i c i n t h i s s t r o n g e r sense m u s t t h e r e f o r e o f f e r a p r a g m a t i c a t h e o r y l o o k l i k e ? I n t h e 1980s, H a b e r m a s d e f e n d e d a v i e w n o t

a c c o u n t o f v a l i d i t y itself. T o t h i s e x t e n t , H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e o - unlike Hilary Putnam's conception o f t r u t h as i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l

ries o f t r u t h ( e m p i r i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l validity) a n d justice ( m o r a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y : a p r o p o s i t i o n was s a i d t o b e t r u e i f i t c o u l d b e j u s t i f i e d

v a l i d i t y ) — a n d , i n d e e d , his accounts o f e t h i c a l a n d aesthetic v a l i d - u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f a n i d e a l s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n . T r u t h , o n t h i s ac-

i t y — a r e crucial ingredients o f his pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . c o u n t , is a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a , t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a n i n f i n i t e r a t i o n a l

c o n s e n s u s . I n t h e r e c e n t essay, h o w e v e r , Habermas acknowledges
H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l v a l i d i t y has b e e n t h e s u b j e c t o f e x t e n - convincing objections to this earlier c o n c e p t i o n . O n e set o f o b j e c -
sive c o m m e n t a r y a n d c r i t i c i s m . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h e t h e o r y t i o n s is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t s o m e c o n c e p t u a l difficulties w i t h the very
o f m e a n i n g , o u r q u e s t i o n is t h e f o l l o w i n g : h o w is t h e c o n c e p t i o n of n o t i o n o f a n ideal speech situation, i n particular, the paradox i n -
m o r a l v a l i d i t y i t p r o p o s e s i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h processes o f volved i n a i m i n g for "complete" o r "conclusive knowledge." The
d i s c u r s i v e l y r e d e e m i n g v a l i d i t y claims? A n o r m o r p r i n c i p l e is m o r - o b j e c t i o n has b e e n r a i s e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t i t w o u l d b e p a r a d o x i c a l
a l l y v a l i d ( r i g h t o r j u s t ) , f o r H a b e r m a s , i f i t is t h e p o s s i b l e o b j e c t o f
14
Introduction
f o r h u m a n b e i n g s t o strive t o r e a l i z e a n i d e a l , t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f
w h i c h w o u l d b e t h e e n d o f h u m a n h i s t o r y . A n o t h e r set o f objections
draws a t t e n t i o n to the difficulties involved i n conceptualizing the
connection between t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i e d acceptability. O n t h e one
h a n d , i f t h e r e is a n u n b r i d g e a b l e g a p b e t w e e n d e f a c t o a n d i d e a l
a c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e i d e a o f a n i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s seems so f a r
r e m o v e d f r o m a c t u a l h u m a n p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as t o u n d e r -
m i n e the regulative role ascribed to i t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , such a
g a p seems t o b e necessary i n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t
t r u t h has a m o m e n t o f context-transcendence.
I n t h e face o f these a n d o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s , H a b e r m a s n o longer
c o n c e i v e s t r u t h as i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . H e n o w focuses o n
t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s g u i d i n g t h e process o f r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n -
t a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s m a r k i n g its outcome.
T h e f o r m e r idealizations p e r t a i n to the c o n d u c t o f discourse r a t h e r
than to the agreement to w h i c h participants i n discourse aspire.
T h e y i n c l u d e t h e i d e a l i z i n g suppositions that p a r t i c i p a n t s are m o t i -
vated only by the force o f the better a r g u m e n t , that all c o m p e t e n t
parties are e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e o n equal terms i n discussion, t h a t
n o r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t is s u p p r e s s e d o r e x c l u d e d , a n d so o n . I t is
f r o m such idealizations, w h i c h g u i d e t h e process o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n ,
t h a t t h e i d e a o f t r u t h d r a w s its p o w e r as a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a . T h i s p o w e r
is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e i d e a t h a t a c l a i m , i f t r u e , c o u l d w i t h s t a n d a l l
a t t e m p t s t o refute i t u n d e r i d e a l discursive c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i d e a o f
t r u t h has a " d e c e n t e r i n g " f u n c t i o n t h a t serves t o r e m i n d us t h a t w h a t
is c u r r e n d y r e g a r d e d as r a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e m a y c o n c e i v a b l y be
c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e , as t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f o u r c u r r e n t
understanding of argumentation become apparent.
I t is i m p o r t a n t h e r e t o b e w a r e o f c o n f u s i n g H a b e r m a s ' s explica-
t i o n o f the idea o f t r u t h w i t h an explanation o f what makes a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g are s u s p e n d e d i n t h e
p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e . T h e thesis t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n , i f t r u e , c a n s t a n d u p
to attempts to refute i t u n d e r the d e m a n d i n g conditions o f r a t i o n a l
a r g u m e n t a t i o n e x p l i c a t e s t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t r u t h . I t is n o t ,
however, a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h a t makes t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e . As to
t h e l a t t e r , H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n is t h e s t a n d a r d o n e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n
is t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied. A l t h o u g h w e
c a n establish w h e t h e r t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a g i v e n p r o p o s i t i o n a r e
15
Introduction
satisfied o n l y i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h e i r satisfaction o r nonsatisfaction
is n o t i t s e l f a n e p i s t e m i c f a c t . W h e r e a s , as w e have seen, i d e a l i z e d
r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y constitutes t h e v a l i d i t y o f m o r a l n o r m s , i t m e r e l y
indicates t h e t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s . N o n e t h e l e s s , i t is c l e a r f r o m t h e
f o r e g o i n g t h a t , o n H a b e r m a s ' s a c c o u n t , t h e concept o f t r u t h m u s t b e
u n p a c k e d p r a g m a t i c a l l y ; w e have n o access t o t r u t h e x c e p t b y w a y o f
a concept o f validity explicated i n terms o f h o w we talk about t r u t h ,
t h a t is, i n t e r m s o f a n i d e a l i z e d p r a c t i c e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n .
A f u r t h e r c o n c e r n o f Habermas's p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l pragmatics
is t o a r g u e t h a t t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s is
t h e basic m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use o n w h i c h o t h e r m o d e s , f o r e x a m p l e ,
strategic o r fictional ones, are parasitic. O t h e r w i s e , i n i g n o r i n g these
o t h e r modes, t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n that everyday communicative ac-
t i o n has a n i n - b u i l t c o n n e c t i o n with context-transcendent validity
c l a i m s w o u l d b e s e r i o u s l y l i m i t e d . I n a r g u i n g f o r t h e d e r i v a t i v e status
o f t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e , H a b e r m a s i n i t i a l l y d r e w o n A u s t i n ' s
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o c u t i o n s (see c h a p t e r 2 ) . I n
response to criticisms o f his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f this d i s t i n c t i o n , how-
ever, H a b e r m a s subsequendy m o d i f i e d and c l a r i f i e d his under-
s t a n d i n g o f A u s t i n ' s c a t e g o r i e s (see chapters 3, 4, a n d 7) while
c o n t i n u i n g t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e is p a r a s i t i c o n
t h e use o f l a n g u a g e w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g under-
s t a n d i n g . H i s a r g u m e n t f o r t h e p a r a s i t i c status o f t h e s y m b o l i c , t h e
figurative, and the fictional m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use is t h a t t h e e v e r y -
d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e f u l f i l l s i n d i s p e n s a b l e problem-
solving functions that require idealizing suppositions not demanded
b y t h e w o r l d - c r e a t i n g a n d w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g use o f l a n g u a g e charac-
t e r i s t i c f o r t h e a e s t h e t i c r e a l m . T h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s of, f o r
example, consistency o f m e a n i n g or a shared o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d
fictional use o f l a n -
guage, a n d w i t h these, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g p o w e r
o f e v e r y d a y s p e e c h acts (see c h a p t e r s 9 a n d 1 0 ) .
Finally, Habermas's pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g attempts to d o
justice to t h e relations between utterances a n d t h e situations a n d
c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h t h e y are e m b e d d e d . F o r t o u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r -
a n c e is always t o u n d e r s t a n d i t as a n u t t e r a n c e i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n ,
w h i c h i n t u r n may be p a r t o f m u l t i p l e , e x t e n d e d contexts. Here,

16
Introduction
H a b e r m a s draws a t t e n t i o n to various k i n d s o f b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l -
edge: f o r instance, k n o w l e d g e o f t h e speaker's p e r s o n a l h i s t o r y o r
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e ( c u l t u r a l l y specific) contexts i n w h i c h a given
t o p i c is n o r m a l l y discussed. These kinds o f knowledge, although
u s u a l l y o n l y i m p l i c i t i n acts o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , are r e l a t i v e l y close t o
the f o r e g r o u n d a n d can be r e n d e r e d explicit w i t h o u t difficulty. T h u s
they can be contrasted w i t h the deep-seated, prereflective, taken-for-
g r a n t e d b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d t h a t , as a h o r i z o n o f
shared, u n p r o b l e m a t i c convictions, c a n n o t be s u m m o n e d to
sciousness a t w i l l o r i n its e n t i r e t y . T h i s b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e
the lifeworld forms the indispensable context for the communicative
use o f l a n g u a g e ; i n d e e d w i t h o u t i t , m e a n i n g o f a n y k i n d w o u l d b e
i m p o s s i b l e . I t also f u n c t i o n s t o a b s o r b t h e r i s k o f social d i s i n t e g r a -
tion t h a t arises w h e n a s o c i a l o r d e r is r e p r o d u c e d p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h
m e c h a n i s m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I t is t h u s a n e c e s s a r y c o m p l e -
m e n t to Habermas's theories o f m e a n i n g a n d communicative action
(see, i n p a r t i c u l a r , c h a p t e r s 2, 4, a n d 8 ) .
T h e essays c o l l e c t e d i n t h i s a n t h o l o g y w e r e s e l e c t e d w i t h t h e a i m
o f p r o v i d i n g g e n e r a l access t o H a b e r m a s ' s t r e a t m e n t o f f o r m a l p r a g -
m a t i c s , f r o m h i s e a r l i e s t p r o g r a m m a t i c essay ( c h a p t e r 1) t o h i s m o s t
r e c e n t a t t e m p t s t o resolve s o m e p e r c e i v e d p r o b l e m s w i t h h i s ac-
counts o f m e a n i n g a n d t r u t h (chapters 7 a n d 8). Whereas, i n the
process o f translating, revising e x i s t i n g translations, a n d retranslat-
i n g , e v e r y e f f o r t has b e e n m a d e t o ensure t e r m i n o l o g i c a l consis-
tency, n o a t t e m p t has b e e n m a d e to impose consistency on
a r g u m e n t s as t h e y a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e v a r i o u s essays. W e h a v e s e e n ,
f o r instance, that Habermas's earliest proposal for a pragmatic the-
o r y o f m e a n i n g differs i n s o m e respects f r o m his subsequent propos-
als, a n d that he h i m s e l f has modified his d i s t i n c t i o n between
i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o c u t i o n s as i n i t i a l l y d r a w n . I n l a t e r w r i t i n g s
c h a p t e r 7) h e i n t r o d u c e s a d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f Ver-
stdndigung b e t w e e n a w e a k a n d s t r o n g o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e n s u s ,
a n d (see c h a p t e r 8 ) h e takes o n b o a r d o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n
o f t r u t h h i n t e d at i n c h a p t e r 3 o f t h e p r e s e n t v o l u m e . W i t h
e x c e p t i o n o f t h e last t w o p i e c e s , w h i c h a r e n o t d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d
w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f m e a n i n g , t h e a n t h o l o g y p r e s e n t s t h e essays i n
17
Introduction
r o u g h c h r o n o l o g y i n o r d e r t o show d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d revisions; t h e
r e a d e r is e n c o u r a g e d t o l o o k o u t f o r t h e m .
I n c h a p t e r 1 w e a r e i n t r o d u c e d t o f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s as a r e s e a r c h
program aimed a t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y basis of
speech. T h e procedure of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is elucidated
t h r o u g h reference b o t h to empirical-analytic approaches a n d to
K a n t i a n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis. T h i s is f o l l o w e d b y a s k e t c h o f a
t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h d i v e r g e s f r o m A u s t i n ' s a n d Searle's
t h e o r i e s i n several i m p o r t a n t respects, a n d i n w h i c h s p e e c h acts a r e
con-
characterized i n terms o f claims to validity.
of
C h a p t e r s 2, 3, 4, a n d 6, t h o u g h s i t u a t i n g f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s i n
r e l a t i o n t o H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , focus o n t h e
t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . T h e c o o r d i n a t i n g p o w e r o f s p e e c h acts is e x -
plained t h r o u g h an account of understanding utterance meaning i n
terms o f k n o w i n g acceptability conditions. T h i s pragmatic theory o f
m e a n i n g is p r e s e n t e d as a n a t t e m p t t o o v e r c o m e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f
semantic theories t h r o u g h d r a w i n g o n K a r l Buhler's schema o f lan-
g u a g e f u n c t i o n s a n d o n speech-act t h e o r y . I n a d d i t i o n , a t y p o l o g y o f
s p e e c h acts b a s e d o n t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o n e o f t h r e e u n i v e r s a l
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is set u p i n c h a p t e r 2, f o r m i n g t h e b a c k g r o u n d f o r
H a b e r m a s ' s discussion i n subsequent chapters. T h e c o n c e p t o f life-
w o r l d as a k i n d o f d e e p - s e a t e d , i m p l i c i t , b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e is
also i n t r o d u c e d i n c h a p t e r 2 a n d d e v e l o p e d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n c h a p t e r
4. H a b e r m a s stresses t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s c o n c e p t , o n t h e one
h a n d , as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g u t t e r a n c e meaning
the
a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , as a r i s k - a b s o r b i n g c o u n t e r p o i s e t o t h e p o t e n t i a l l y
d i s i n t e g r a t i v e effects o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g under-
standing. Further, Austin's distinction between illocutions a n d per-
l o c u t i o n s is a t h r e a d r u n n i n g t h r o u g h these c h a p t e r s , a n d is u s e d b y
H a b e r m a s t o s u p p o r t h i s thesis t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c m o d e o f l a n g u a g e
(see
use is p a r a s i t i c o n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use. T h i s i n v o l v e s h i m i n
discussion a b o u t t h e status o f s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s ( f o r example,
t h r e a t s ) , w h i c h as a t y p e o f u t t e r a n c e n o t a p p a r e n t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h
validity claims, seem to u n d e r m i n e his c l a i m t h a t strategic utterances
the
h a v e a d e r i v a t i v e status.
C h a p t e r 5 is a c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f Searle's t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as
d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e l a t e 1970s o n w a r d s . H a b e r m a s exposes s o m e
18 19
Introduction Introduction

problems attached t o Searle's view, w h i c h h e r e a d s as a modified Note

i n t e n t i o n a l i s t o n e , a r g u i n g t h a t h i s o w n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y is b e t t e r
able to a c c o u n t for the m e a n i n g of, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i m p e r a t i v e s and 1. Verständigung ( n . ) : "reaching understanding," "mutual understanding," or "com-
promises. munication. T h e corresponding verb is sich verständigen. As Habermas acknowl-
edges, this term is ambiguous even in G e r m a n . Although it embraces linguistic
Chapter 7 responds to Herbert Schnadelbach's criticisms of comprehension (Verstehen), it goes beyond this to refer to the process of reaching
Habermas's concept of communicative rationality. Accepting understanding, in the sense of reaching an agreement with another person or per-
sons. However, despite having previously used the two terms interchangeably, Haber-
S c h n a d e l b a c h ' s c r i t i c i s m t h a t h e has h i t h e r t o a c c o r d e d i t a p r i v i - mas now distinguishes between Verständigung a n d Einverständnis, agreement or
leged position, Habermas now identifies three core structures of consensus in the strict sense (see chapter 7). Finally, Verständigung can also be used
as a synonym for "communication"; thus, for example, communicative rationality is
r a t i o n a l i t y ; t h i s leads h i m t o m a k e s o m e n e w d i s t i n c t i o n s between
occasionally rendered by Habermas as Verständigungsrationaätät.
d i f f e r e n t m o d a l i t i e s o f l a n g u a g e use. O n e n o t e w o r t h y modification
h e r e is h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a c t i o n oriented
toward reaching understanding i n a w e a k e r sense a n d a c t i o n ori-
e n t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t i n t h e s t r i c t sense a n d , correspondingly,
between weak and strong communicative action. Some implications
o f t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s f o r t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a r e also discussed.
Chapter 8 examines Richard Rorty's neopragmatism, interpreted
b y H a b e r m a s as a n a t t e m p t t o c a r r y t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n t h r o u g h t o
its c o n c l u s i o n , a n d c r i t i c i z e s i t f o r its a s s i m i l a t i o n o f t r u t h c l a i m s t o
j u s t i f i e d assertibility.
C h a p t e r 9 focuses o n t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e fictional or poetic
use o f l a n g u a g e a n d l a n g u a g e as i t is u s e d i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a -
tive a c t i o n ; i t criticizes D e r r i d e a n s for faulty accounts o f everyday
a n d poetic language, for a consequent problematic leveling o f the
distinction between literature and communicative action, and for a
failure to appreciate the distinctive m e d i a t i n g roles o f p h i l o s o p h y
and literary criticism.
I n c h a p t e r 10, H a b e r m a s r e s p o n d s t o several c r i t i c i s m s o f his
t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. Against Rorty, he defends his view
o f p h i l o s o p h y as g u a r d i a n o f r e a s o n , w h i l e a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t t h i s
r o l e m u s t b e d e f i n e d i n a n e w way. H e t h e n c l a r i f i e s h i s p o s i t i o n w i t h
respect to m o d e r n art a n d the validity claims c o n n e c t e d w i t h i t ,
reaffirms his position t h a t interpretive u n d e r s t a n d i n g inescapably
i n v o l v e s e v a l u a t i o n , c l a r i f i e s h i s i d e a o f t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n as a n
interplay o f validity dimensions, a n d concludes w i t h a discussion o f
t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t his t h e o r y concentrates o n justice at t h e expense
o f happiness.
1
What Is Universal Pragmatics? (1976)

T h e task o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is t o i d e n t i f y a n d r e c o n s t r u c t u n i -
v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). 1

I n o t h e r c o n t e x t s , o n e also speaks o f " g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of

c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " b u t I p r e f e r to speak o f g e n e r a l presuppositions of
communicative a c t i o n because I t a k e t h e t y p e o f a c t i o n a i m e d a t
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o be f u n d a m e n t a l . T h u s I start f r o m t h e
assumption (without u n d e r t a k i n g to demonstrate it here) that other
f o r m s o f s o c i a l a c t i o n — f o r e x a m p l e , c o n f l i c t , c o m p e t i t i o n , strategic
a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l — a r e derivatives o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e l a n g u a g e is t h e
specific m e d i u m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g at t h e sociocultural
stage o f e v o l u t i o n , I w a n t t o g o a step f u r t h e r a n d s i n g l e o u t e x p l i c i t
speech actions f r o m o t h e r forms o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. I shall
ignore n o n v e r b a l actions a n d bodily expressions. 2

T h e V a l i d i t y Basis o f S p e e c h

Karl-Otto A p e l proposes the f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a t i o n i n regard to the

g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f c o n s e n s u a l s p e e c h acts: t o i d e n t i f y s u c h
presuppositions w e m u s t , h e t h i n k s , leave t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of the
o b s e r v e r o f b e h a v i o r a l facts a n d c a l l t o m i n d " w h a t w e m u s t n e c e s -
sarily always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e i n r e g a r d t o o u r s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s as
22
Chapter 1
n o r m a t i v e conditions o f the possibility o f reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g ;
a n d i n t h i s sense, w h a t w e m u s t necessarily always a l r e a d y have
a c c e p t e d . " A p e l h e r e uses t h e a p r i o r i s t i c p e r f e c t (immer schon: always
3
a l r e a d y ) a n d a d d s t h e m o d e o f necessity i n o r d e r t o e x p r e s s t h e
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s t r a i n t t o w h i c h w e , as speakers, are s u b j e c t as
s o o n as w e p e r f o r m o r u n d e r s t a n d o r r e s p o n d t o a s p e e c h act. I n o r
a f t e r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h i s act, w e c a n b e c o m e a w a r e t h a t w e h a v e
i n v o l u n t a r i l y m a d e c e r t a i n a s s s u m p t i o n s , w h i c h A p e l calls " n o r m a -
tive c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h e
a d j e c t i v e " n o r m a t i v e " m a y g i v e rise t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O n e can
say, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e g e n e r a l a n d u n a v o i d a b l e — i n t h i s sense t r a n -
scendental—conditions o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g have
normative content w h e n one thinks n o t only o f the validity d i m e n -
sion o f n o r m s o f action o r evaluation, o r even o f the validity d i m e n -
s i o n o f r u l e s i n g e n e r a l , b u t also o f t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h across
its e n t i r e s p e c t r u m . As a p r e l i m i n a r y , I w a n t t o i n d i c a t e b r i e f l y w h a t
I m e a n b y t h e " v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h . "
I s h a l l d e v e l o p t h e thesis t h a t a n y o n e a c t i n g communicatively
m u s t , i n p e r f o r m i n g a n y s p e e c h act, raise u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
a n d s u p p o s e t h a t t h e y c a n b e v i n d i c a t e d (einlösen). I n s o f a r as she
wants to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , she
c a n n o t avoid raising the f o l l o w i n g — a n d i n d e e d precisely t h e follow-
i n g — v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . She c l a i m s t o b e
a. u t t e r i n g s o m e t h i n g intelligibly,
b . g i v i n g ( t h e h e a r e r ) something t o u n d e r s t a n d ,
c. m a k i n g herself t h e r e b y u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , a n d
d . c o m i n g t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h another person.
T h e s p e a k e r m u s t c h o o s e a n i n t e l l i g i b l e (verständlich) e x p r e s s i o n
so t h a t s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r c a n comprehend one another. T h e s p e a k e r
m u s t have t h e i n t e n t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g a t r u e (wahr) p r o p o s i t i o n
(or a prepositional content, the existential presuppositions o f w h i c h
a r e satisfied) so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n share the knowledge o f t h e speaker.
T h e s p e a k e r m u s t w a n t t o e x p r e s s h e r i n t e n t i o n s truthfully (wahr-
haftig) so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n find the utterance o f the speaker
credible (can trust h e r ) . Finally, the speaker m u s t choose a n u t t e r -
23
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
a n c e t h a t is r i g h t (richtig) w i t h r e s p e c t t o p r e v a i l i n g n o r m s a n d v a l u e s
so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n a c c e p t t h e u t t e r a n c e , a n d b o t h s p e a k e r a n d
h e a r e r c a n , i n t h e u t t e r a n c e , t h e r e b y agree with one another w i t h
respect to a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d . Moreover, commu-
n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n c o n t i n u e u n d i s t u r b e d o n l y as l o n g as a l l p a r t i c i -
p a n t s s u p p o s e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h e y r e c i p r o c a l l y raise are
raised justifiably.
T h e a i m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) is t o b r i n g
a b o u t a n a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) t h a t t e r m i n a t e s i n t h e i n t e r s u b -
jective mutuality of reciprocal comprehension, shared knowledge,
m u t u a l t r u s t , a n d a c c o r d w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . A g r e e m e n t is b a s e d o n
a r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e four corresponding v a l i d i t y c l a i m s : comprehensi-
b i l i t y , t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness. W e c a n see t h a t t h e word
"Verständigung" is a m b i g u o u s . I n its n a r r o w e s t m e a n i n g i t i n d i c a t e s
t h a t t w o s u b j e c t s u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e same way;
i n its b r o a d e s t m e a n i n g i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t a n a c c o r d exists b e t w e e n t w o
subjects concerning t h e Tightness o f a n utterance i n relation t o a
mutually recognized normative background. I n a d d i t i o n , the partici-
pants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n can reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g about s o m e t h i n g
i n the w o r l d , a n d they can make their i n t e n t i o n s understandable to
one another.
I f f u l l a g r e e m e n t , e m b r a c i n g a l l f o u r o f these c o m p o n e n t s , were
a n o r m a l state o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i t w o u l d n o t b e neces-
sary to analyze t h e process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m the
dynamic perspective o f bringing about a n a g r e e m e n t . T h e typical
states a r e i n t h e g r a y areas b e t w e e n , on the one h a n d , lack of
understanding and misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary
untruthfulness, concealed and open discord, and, on the other
h a n d , p r e e x i s t i n g o r a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s . R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is
t h e process o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n a g r e e m e n t o n the presupposed
basis o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t are m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d . I n e v e r y d a y l i f e ,
we start f r o m a b a c k g r o u n d consensus p e r t a i n i n g t o those i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n s t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s . A s s o o n as t h i s c o n -
sensus is s h a k e n , a n d as s o o n as t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m s a r e satisfied ( o r c o u l d b e v i n d i c a t e d ) is s u s p e n d e d i n t h e case
o f a t least o n e o f t h e f o u r c l a i m s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n n o t be
continued.
 25
24
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

T h e task o f m u t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e n , is t o a c h i e v e a n e w d e f i n i - i n t u i t i o n s a n d experiences or t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t s a n d action conse-

t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s can share. I f this a t t e m p t quences, justifies the claim's worthiness to be r e c o g n i z e d a n d b r i n g s
f a i l s , o n e is b a s i c a l l y c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s o f s w i t c h i n g t o a b o u t a s u p r a s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f its v a l i d i t y . I n accepting a v a l i d -
strategic a c t i o n , b r e a k i n g o f f c o m m u n i c a t i o n altogether, o r recom- i t y c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker, t h e h e a r e r r e c o g n i z e s t h e v a l i d i t y o f
m e n c i n g a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g at a d i f f e r - the symbolic s t r u c t u r e s ; t h a t is, h e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a s e n t e n c e is
ent level, the level of argumentative speech (for purposes of grammatical, a statement true, an i n t e n t i o n a l expression t r u t h f u l , or
discursively e x a m i n i n g the p r o b l e m a t i c validity claims, w h i c h are an u t t e r a n c e correct. T h e validity o f these symbolic s t r u c t u r e s is
n o w r e g a r d e d as h y p o t h e t i c a l ) . I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I s h a l l t a k e i n t o justified b y v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y satisfy c e r t a i n a d e q u a c y c o n d i -
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o n l y c o n s e n s u a l s p e e c h acts, l e a v i n g aside b o t h d i s - t i o n s ; b u t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e v a l i d i t y consists i n t h e i r worthiness t o
course a n d strategic a c t i o n . b e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t is, i n t h e g u a r a n t e e t h a t i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i -
I n communicative action, participants presuppose that they k n o w tion can be b r o u g h t about u n d e r suitable c o n d i t i o n s . 4

w h a t m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f reciprocally raised validity claims means. I have p r o p o s e d t h e n a m e " u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s " f o r t h e r e s e a r c h

5

I f i n a d d i t i o n they can rely o n a shared d e f i n i t i o n o f the situation program aimed a t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y basis of

a n d t h e r e u p o n act consensually, t h e b a c k g r o u n d consensus i n c l u d e s speech. 6
I w o u l d n o w like to d e l i m i t t h e t h e m e o f this research
the f o l l o w i n g : p r o g r a m i n a p r e l i m i n a r y way. T h u s b e f o r e p a s s i n g o n ( i n p a r t I I )
t o t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, I s h a l l p r e f i x a f e w g u i d i n g r e m a r k s
a. S p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r k n o w i m p l i c i t l y t h a t e a c h o f t h e m has t o r a i s e
dealing w i t h (i) an initial d e l i m i t a t i o n o f the object d o m a i n o f the
t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i f t h e r e is t o b e communication
proposed p r o g r a m o f universal pragmatics; (ii) an elucidation o f the
a t a l l ( i n t h e sense o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g under- procedure o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , as o p p o s e d t o a n e m p i r i c a l -
standing) . a n a l y t i c p r o c e d u r e i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense; ( i i i ) a f e w methodological
b . B o t h r e c i p r o c a l l y s u p p o s e t h a t t h e y a c t u a l l y d o satisfy t h e s e p r e - d i f f i c u l t i e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s c l a i m s t h e status o f
suppositions o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h a t is, t h a t t h e y j u s t i f i a b l y raise a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e ; a n d finally ( i v ) t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e
t h e i r validity claims. p r o p o s e d u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s assumes t h e status o f a t r a n s c e n d e n -

c. T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e r e is a c o m m o n c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a n y v a l i d i t y tal t h e o r y o f r e f l e c t i o n o r t h a t o f a n e m p i r i c a l l y substantive r e c o n -

c l a i m s r a i s e d e i t h e r are a l r e a d y v i n d i c a t e d , as i n t h e case o f the structive science. I shall restrict myself t o g u i d i n g r e m a r k s because,

c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e s u t t e r e d , or, as i n t h e case o f w h i l e these questions are f u n d a m e n t a l a n d deserve t o be examined

t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness, c o u l d b e v i n d i c a t e d b e c a u s e t h e independently, they f o r m only the c o n t e x t o f the topic I shall treat

a n d must thus remain i n the background.
s e n t e n c e s , p r o p o s i t i o n s , e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s , a n d u t t e r a n c e s satisfy
t h e corresponding a d e q u a c y c o n d i t i o n s .
Preliminary Delimitation of the Object D o m a i n
T h u s I d i s t i n g u i s h ( i ) t h e conditions f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f a g r a m m a t i -
cal sentence, t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n , t r u t h f u l i n t e n t i o n a l expression, or
I n several o f h i s w o r k s , A p e l has p o i n t e d t o t h e a b s t r a c t i v e f a l l a c y
n o r m a t i v e l y c o r r e c t u t t e r a n c e a p p r o p r i a t e t o its c o n t e x t f r o m ( i i )
that u n d e r l i e s the a p p r o a c h to the logic o f science favored by c o n -
the claims w i t h w h i c h s p e a k e r s d e m a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n
t e m p o r a r y a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y . T h e l o g i c a l analysis o f l a n g u a g e t h a t
7

for the well-formedness o f a sentence, t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , t r u t h -

o r i g i n a t e d w i t h C a r n a p focuses p r i m a r i l y o n s y n t a c t i c a n d s e m a n t i c
f u l n e s s o f a n i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , a n d Tightness o f a s p e e c h act,
properties o f linguistic formations. L i k e structuralist linguistics, i t
as w e l l as f r o m ( i i i ) t h e vindication o f j u s t i f i a b l y r a i s e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
d e l i m i t s its o b j e c t d o m a i n b y first a b s t r a c t i n g f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c
V i n d i c a t i o n means that the p r o p o n e n t , whether t h r o u g h appeal to
26 27

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

properties o f language, a n d subsequentiy i n t r o d u c i n g the pragmatic o f s i g n s ) . I f t h e s p e a k i n g p r o c e s s is c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i n t h i s way, t h e

d i m e n s i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n n e c t i o n between
t h e g e n e r a t i v e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g a n d
acting, o n the one h a n d , a n d the general structures o f speech, o n
t h e o t h e r , c a n n o t c o m e i n t o view. I t is c e r t a i n l y l e g i t i m a t e t o d r a w
a n a b s t r a c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e as s t r u c t u r e a n d speak-
i n g as p r o c e s s . A l a n g u a g e w i l l t h e n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a system o f
rules f o r g e n e r a t i n g expressions, such t h a t a l l w e l l - f o r m e d expres-
f u n d a m e n t a l question o f universal pragmatics concerning the gen-
e r a l c o n d i t i o n s o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung)
c a n n o t b e p o s e d i n a n a p p r o p r i a t e way. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e i n t e r s u b -
j e c t i v i t y o f m e a n i n g s t h a t a r e i d e n t i c a l f o r a t least t w o speakers d o e s
n o t e v e n b e c o m e a p r o b l e m ( i ) i f t h e i d e n t i t y o f m e a n i n g s is reduced
t o e x t e n s i o n a l l y e q u i v a l e n t classes o f b e h a v i o r a l p r o p e r t i e s , as is
d o n e i n l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r i s m , o r ( i i ) i f i t is p r e e s t a b l i s h e d a t t h e
9

sions (e.g., sentences) m a y c o u n t as e l e m e n t s o f t h i s l a n g u a g e . On a n a l y t i c l e v e l t h a t t h e r e exists a c o m m o n c o d e a n d s t o r e o f signs

t h e o t h e r h a n d , subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g c a n e m p l o y s u c h ex-
pressions as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a p r o c e s s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; f o r i n -
s t a n c e , t h e y c a n u t t e r s e n t e n c e s as w e l l as u n d e r s t a n d t h e m a n d
r e s p o n d t o t h e m . T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n o f language f r o m t h e use o f l a n -
g u a g e i n speech (langue versus parole), w h i c h is m a d e i n b o t h t h e
l o g i c a l a n d t h e s t r u c t u r a l i s t analysis o f l a n g u a g e , is m e a n i n g f u l .
N o n e t h e l e s s , t h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l step is n o t s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r t h e
b e t w e e n s e n d e r a n d receiver, as is d o n e i n i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y .
I n a d d i t i o n t o e m p i r i c i s t a p p r o a c h e s t h a t issue, i n o n e w a y o r
another, f r o m the semiotics o f M o r r i s , t h e r e are i n t e r e s t i n g ap-
p r o a c h e s t o t h e l o g i c a l analysis o f g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h a n d
a c t i o n . T h e f o l l o w i n g analyses c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t r i b u t i o n s
a l o n g t h e way t o a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . B a r - H i l l e l p o i n t e d o u t q u i t e
e a r l y t h e necessity f o r a p r a g m a t i c e x t e n s i o n o f l o g i c a l s e m a n t i c s . 10

view that the pragmatic d i m e n s i o n o f language from which one A l s o o f n o t e a r e t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r a deontic logic ( H a r e , H . v o n W r i g h t ,
abstracts is b e y o n d f o r m a l ( o r l i n g u i s t i c ) analysis. A n a b s t r a c t i v e N . Rescher) 1 1
and corresponding a t t e m p t s at a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f
f a l l a c y arises i n t h a t t h e successful, o r a t least p r o m i s i n g , r e c o n s t r u c - s p e e c h acts s u c h as assertions a n d q u e s t i o n s ( A p o s t e l ) ; 1 2
approaches
t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c r u l e systems is seen as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e s t r i c t i n g to a logic o f nondeductive a r g u m e n t a t i o n ( T o u l m i n , Botha) b e l o n g
f o r m a l analysis t o t h i s o b j e c t d o m a i n . T h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e t w o h e r e as w e l l . 1 3
F r o m t h e side o f l i n g u i s t i c s , t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p r e -
a n a l y t i c levels, language a n d speech, s h o u l d n o t b e m a d e i n s u c h a way suppositions (Kiefer, Petöfi), conversational postulates (Grice, L a k -
14

t h a t t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f l a n g u a g e is l e f t t o e x c l u s i v e l y e m - off), 1 5
s p e e c h acts (Ross, M c C a w l e y , W u n d e r l i c h ) , 1 6
and dialogues
p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s — t h a t is, t o e m p i r i c a l sciences s u c h as p s y c h o l i n g u i s - a n d texts ( F i l l m o r e , P o s n e r ) 1 7
lead to a consideration of the prag-
tics a n d s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f l a n g u a g e f r o m a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t p o i n t o f view.

I w o u l d l i k e t o d e f e n d t h e thesis t h a t n o t o n l y l a n g u a g e b u t s p e e c h T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n semantic t h e o r y ( L y o n s , Katz) p o i n t i n the same

t o o — t h a t is, t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s — i s accessi- direction. 1 8

F r o m t h e side o f formal semantics, i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e d i s -

b l e t o f o r m a l analysis. L i k e t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s o f l a n g u a g e (sen- cussion—going back to Frege and Russell—of the structure of

tences), the elementary units o f speech (utterances) can be analyzed propositions, o f referential terms a n d predicates (Strawson) 1 9
is sig-

f r o m t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l stance o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e . n i f i c a n t f o r a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . T h e s a m e h o l d s f o r analytic action

theory ( D a n t o , H a m p s h i r e , S c h w a y d e r ) 2 0
a n d f o r t h e discussion t h a t
Approaches to a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n have been
has a r i s e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e l o g i c o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f i n t e n -
d e v e l o p e d f r o m the semiotics o f Charles M o r r i s . I n t h e i r f r a m e w o r k
8

tional a c t i o n ( W i n c h , Taylor, v o n W r i g h t ) . 2 1
T h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n -
o f f u n d a m e n t a l concepts they integrate the m o d e l o f linguistic be-
ing introduced b y W i t t g e n s t e i n has u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c aspects
haviorism (the symbolically m e d i a t e d behavioral reaction o f the
(Alston), 2 2
as d o e s t h e a t t e m p t b y G r i c e t o t r a c e t h e m e a n i n g of
stimulated individual organism) with the model of information
s e n t e n c e s b a c k t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e speakers ( B e n n e t t , Schif-
transmission (encoding a n d decoding signals b e t w e e n s e n d e r a n d
fer). 2 3
As the most p r o m i s i n g p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e for a universal
r e c e i v e r f o r a g i v e n c h a n n e l a n d a n a t least p a r t i a l l y c o m m o n store
28 29

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

pragmatics, I shall draw p r i m a r i l y o n t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts a m n o t u s i n g f o r m a l analysis i n a sense t h a t r e f e r s , say, t o t h e s t a n -

i n i t i a t e d b y A u s t i n (Searle, W u n d e r l i c h ) , 2 4
d a r d p r e d i c a t e l o g i c o r t o a n y s p e c i f i c l o g i c . T h e t o l e r a n t sense i n
These approaches developed f r o m logic, linguistics, a n d t h e ana- which I understand formal analysis can best be characterized
lytic p h i l o s o p h y o f language have t h e c o m m o n g o a l o f c l a r i f y i n g t h r o u g h the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l attitude we a d o p t i n the rational recon-
processes o f l a n g u a g e use f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f f o r m a l analysis. s t r u c t i o n o f concepts, criteria, rules, a n d schemata. T h u s we speak
H o w e v e r , i f o n e evaluates t h e m w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h e y of the explication o f meanings a n d c o n c e p t s , o f t h e analysis of
m a k e t o a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , t h e i r weaknesses also b e c o m e a p p a r - presuppositions a n d r u l e systems, a n d so f o r t h . O f c o u r s e , recon-
e n t . I n m a n y cases I see a d a n g e r t h a t t h e analysis o f c o n d i t i o n s of s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e s a r e also i m p o r t a n t f o r e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c r e -
p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is f o r e s h o r t e n e d , e i t h e r s e a r c h , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r e x p l i c a t i n g f r a m e w o r k s o f basic c o n c e p t s ,
for f o r m a l i z i n g assumptions initially f o r m u l a t e d i n ordinary lan-
a. b e c a u s e these a p p r o a c h e s d o n o t g e n e r a l i z e r a d i c a l l y e n o u g h a n d
guage, for clarifying deductive relations a m o n g particular hypothe-
d o n o t p u s h t h r o u g h the level o f f o r t u i t o u s contexts to general a n d
ses, f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g r e s u l t s o f m e a s u r e m e n t , a n d so o n . N o n e t h e l e s s ,
unavoidable presuppositions—as is t h e case, f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h m o s t r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e s are n o t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f sciences t h a t d e -
o f the linguistic investigations o f semantic a n d pragmatic presuppo- velop n o m o l o g i c a l hypotheses a b o u t d o m a i n s o f observable objects
sitions; o r a n d events; r a t h e r , these p r o c e d u r e s a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h o s e sci-
b . because they restrict themselves to t h e i n s t r u m e n t s d e v e l o p e d i n e n c e s t h a t systematically reconstruct the intuitive knowledge of competent
logic a n d g r a m m a r , even w h e n these are i n a d e q u a t e f o r c a p t u r i n g subjects.
p r a g m a t i c relations—as, f o r e x a m p l e , i n syntactic e x p l a n a t i o n s of I n clarifying the distinction between empirical-analytic and recon-
the performative character o f speech acts; 25
or s t r u c t i v e sciences, I w o u l d l i k e t o b e g i n w i t h t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
c. b e c a u s e t h e y m i s l e a d o n e i n t o a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f basic c o n c e p t s s e n s o r y e x p e r i e n c e o r observation a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o r
t h a t have n o t b e e n satisfactorily analyzed—as c a n , i n m y view, b e understanding ( Verstehen). O b s e r v a t i o n is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d p e r c e p t i b l e
s h o w n i n t h e case o f t h e l o g i c s o f n o r m s w h i c h t r a c e n o r m s o f a c t i o n t h i n g s a n d events ( o r states); u n d e r s t a n d i n g is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e
back to commands; or finally meaning of utterances. 2 7
I n e x p e r i e n c i n g , t h e o b s e r v e r is i n p r i n c i -
p l e a l o n e , e v e n i f t h e c a t e g o r i a l n e t i n w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e s are o r g a n -
d . b e c a u s e t h e y start from the model o f the isolated, purposive-
i z e d as e x p e r i e n c e s l a y i n g c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v i t y is always a l r e a d y s h a r e d
rational actor a n d thereby fail—as do, for instance, Grice and
b y several ( o r e v e n a l l ) i n d i v i d u a l s . I n c o n t r a s t , t h e i n t e r p r e t e r w h o
L e w i s — t o r e c o n s t r u c t i n a n a p p r o p r i a t e way t h e s p e c i f i c m o m e n t
2 6

o f mutuality i n the understanding o f identical meanings or i n the
r e c o g n i t i o n o f intersubjective validity claims.
I t is m y i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts is l a r g e l y f r e e o f
t h e s e a n d s i m i l a r weaknesses.
Some Remarks o n the Procedure o f Rational Reconstruction
I have b e e n e m p l o y i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n " f o r m a l analysis" i n o p p o s i -
t i o n t o e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c p r o c e d u r e s ( i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense) w i t h -
o u t p r o v i d i n g a d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s is, a t least, m i s l e a d i n g . I
u n d e r s t a n d s m e a n i n g u n d e r g o e s h e r e x p e r i e n c e s f u n d a m e n t a l l y as
a p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e basis o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e
r e l a t i o n established t h r o u g h symbols w i t h o t h e r individuals, even i f
she is i n f a c t a l o n e w i t h a b o o k , a d o c u m e n t , o r a w o r k o f a r t . I s h a l l
n o t h e r e analyze t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n o b s e r v a t i o n a n d
u n d e r s t a n d i n g any further; I w o u l d like to direct attention to j u s t
o n e aspect o f this: t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n level b e t w e e n p e r c e p t i b l e reality
a n d the understandable m e a n i n g o f a symbolic f o r m a t i o n . Sensory
e x p e r i e n c e is r e l a t e d t o s e g m e n t s o f r e a l i t y w i t h o u t m e d i a t i o n , c o m -
m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o n l y m e d i a t e l y , as i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e d i a g r a m
below:
 31
30
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

T h e two pairs o f concepts—"perceptible r e a l i t y " versus " s y m b o l i -

Level 1 O b s e r v a b l e events Observation (Observer)
cally prestructured reality" and "observation" versus "under-
A
I Understanding s t a n d i n g " — c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a n o t h e r p a i r : " d e s c r i p t i o n " versus
Level 2 '- - O b s e r v a t i o n sentence p )
( I n t e r r e t e r
" e x p l i c a t i o n . " W i t h the aid o f a sentence that represents a n observa-
t I tion, I c a n describe t h e o b s e r v e d a s p e c t o f r e a l i t y . W i t h t h e a i d o f a
Level 3 i Interpretation
sentence t h a t represents an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a sym-
b o l i c f o r m a t i o n , I c a n explicate t h e m e a n i n g o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e .
T h i s d i a g r a m represents three d i f f e r e n t relationships: N a t u r a l l y , o n l y w h e n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n is u n -

a. E p i s t e m i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n e x p e r i e n t i a l acts a n d t h e i r o b j e c t s . I n clear does the e x p l i c a t i o n n e e d t o b e set o f f as a n independent

t h i s sense, t h e act o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e l a t e s t o t h e s y m b o l i c expres- a n a l y t i c step. I n r e g a r d t o s e n t e n c e s t h a t w e use t o d e s c r i b e o b j e c t s

s i o n ( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) , i n a way s i m i l a r t o h o w t h e a n d events, t h e r e c a n b e a l a c k o f c l a r i t y a t v a r i o u s levels. D e p e n d i n g

o n the level, we d e m a n d explications o f d i f f e r e n t kinds. I f the p h e -
act o f o b s e r v a t i o n relates t o t h e o b j e c t s a n d events observed.
n o m e n o n d e s c r i b e d is i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n , w e d e m a n d a n e x p l i -
b . Relations o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a n aspect o f reality i n a p r o p o s i t i o n a l
cation that makes clear how reality operates and how the
s e n t e n c e . I n t h i s sense, t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s t h e s e m a n t i c
phenomenon i n question comes about. I f , by contrast, the descrip-
c o n t e n t ( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) , i n a way s i m i l a r t o h o w
tion i t s e l f is i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , we demand an explication that
t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e r e p r e s e n t s c e r t a i n o b j e c t s a n d events.
makes clear w h a t t h e observer m e a n t by his u t t e r a n c e a n d h o w t h e
c. R e l a t i o n s o f e x p r e s s i n g i n t e n t i o n a l acts. I n t h i s sense, t h e u n d e r - symbolic expression i n need o f elucidation comes about. I n the first
standing ( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e case, a s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l i c a t i o n w i l l h a v e t h e f o r m o f a n e x p l a n a t i o n
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , j u s t as t h e o b s e r v a t i o n w e u n d e r t a k e w i t h t h e a i d o f a causal h y p o t h e s i s . I n t h e s e c o n d case,
is expressed in the propositional content of the observation we speak o f e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g . ( O f course, explications of
sentence. m e a n i n g n e e d n o t be l i m i t e d t o descriptive sentences; any m e a n i n g -
fully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m a t i o n can be subjected to the operation of
A p a r t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t a l l t h r e e types o f r e l a t i o n s i m p l y p o i n t t o
meaning explication.)
f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s , t h e r e is a n a d d i t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t y i n s p e c i f y i n g
t h e precise differences b e t w e e n the epistemic r e l a t i o n s o f t h e ob- D e s c r i p t i o n s a n d e x p l i c a t i o n s h a v e d i f f e r e n t r a n g e s ; t h e y c a n be-
server a n d t h e i n t e r p r e t e r to t h e i r respective objects a n d between g i n o n t h e surface a n d p u s h t h r o u g h to u n d e r l y i n g structures. We
the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l relations o f t h e observation sentence to reality, are f a m i l i a r w i t h this fact f r o m t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f n a t u r a l p h e n o m -
o n the one h a n d , a n d t h a t o f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n sentence to (sym- e n a — t h e m o r e general t h e theories are w i t h w h i c h we e x p l a i n n a t u -
bolically p r e s t r u c t u r e d ) reality, o n the other. T h i s specification ral phenomena, the more penetrating the corresponding theoretical
w o u l d require a comparison between observation and interpreta- d e s c r i p t i o n s . T h e same is t r u e o f e x p l i c a t i o n s o f m e a n i n g . O f c o u r s e ,
tion, between description a n d explication. For the time being, the i n t h e case o f m e a n i n g e x p l i c a t i o n s , t h e r a n g e o f e x p l i c a t i o n d o e s
d i a g r a m is i n t e n d e d m e r e l y t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e t w o levels o f r e a l i t y t o n o t d e p e n d o n the level o f generality o f theoretical knowledge a b o u t
w h i c h sensory a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e experience respectively relate. t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f a n e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y accessible t o o b s e r v a t i o n b u t
T h e difference i n level between p e r c e p t i b l e a n d symbolically p r e - on knowledge of the deep structures o f a r e a l i t y accessible to
structured r e a l i t y is r e f l e c t e d i n the gap between direct access understanding—a reality of symbolic formations produced ac-
t h r o u g h o b s e r v a t i o n of r e a l i t y a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y m e d i a t e d access c o r d i n g to rules. T h e explication o f natural p h e n o m e n a pushes
t h r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n u t t e r a n c e concerning reality. in a different direction f r o m the explication o f the meaning of
expressions.
32
Chapter 1
F u r t h e r m o r e , I w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t w o levels o f e x p l i c a t i o n of
m e a n i n g . I f the m e a n i n g o f a w r i t t e n sentence, action, gesture, w o r k
o f a r t , t o o l , t h e o r y , c o m m o d i t y , t r a n s m i t t e d d o c u m e n t , a n d so o n is
u n c l e a r , t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g is d i r e c t e d first t o t h e s e m a n t i c
c o n t e n t o f t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n . I n t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d its c o n -
t e n t , w e t a k e u p t h e same p o s i t i o n as t h e " a u t h o r " a d o p t e d w h e n h e
w r o t e the sentence, p e r f o r m e d the gesture, used the t o o l , a p p l i e d
t h e t h e o r y , a n d so f o r t h . O f t e n , t o o , w e m u s t g o b e y o n d w h a t was
m e a n t a n d i n t e n d e d by the a u t h o r a n d take i n t o consideration a know-how, t h e a b i l i t y o f a c o m p e t e n t s u b j e c t w h o u n d e r s t a n d s h o w t o
c o n t e x t o f w h i c h h e was n o t c o n s c i o u s . 2 8
T y p i c a l l y , h o w e v e r , the un-
derstanding of content p u r s u e s c o n n e c t i o n s t h a t l i n k t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c -
tures o f t h e i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e surface structures
o f other, familiar f o r m a t i o n s . T h u s , linguistic expressions can be
e x p l i c a t e d t h r o u g h paraphrase i n t h e same language or through
t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o e x p r e s s i o n s o f a n o t h e r l a n g u a g e ; i n b o t h cases, c o m -
p e t e n t speakers d r a w o n i n t u i t i v e l y k n o w n m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s t h a t
o b t a i n w i t h i n the l e x i c o n o f one language o r between t h e léxica o f
two languages.
I f she c a n n o t a t t a i n h e r e n d i n t h i s way, t h e i n t e r p r e t e r m a y find
i t n e c e s s a r y t o a l t e r h e r a t t i t u d e . She t h e n e x c h a n g e s t h e a t t i t u d e o f
understanding content (directed t o w a r d surface structures)—in
w h i c h she, as i t w e r e , l o o k s t h r o u g h s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e w o r l d
a b o u t w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is u t t e r e d — f o r a n a t t i t u d e i n w h i c h she
focuses o n t h e g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s .
T h e i n t e r p r e t e r t h e n attempts to explicate the m e a n i n g o f a sym-
bolic f o r m a t i o n w i t h the help o f the rules according to w h i c h the
a u t h o r m u s t have p r o d u c e d i t . I n n o r m a l p a r a p h r a s e a n d t r a n s l a -
tion, the i n t e r p r e t e r draws o n semantic m e a n i n g relations (for i n -
stance b e t w e e n the different words o f a language) i n an ad hoc
m a n n e r , so t o speak, i n t h a t she s i m p l y a p p l i e s a k n o w l e d g e shared
w i t h c o m p e t e n t speakers o f t h a t l a n g u a g e . I n t h i s sense, t h e r o l e o f
interpreter can ( u n d e r suitable conditions) be attributed to the
a u t h o r h i m s e l f . T h e a t t i t u d e c h a n g e s , h o w e v e r , as s o o n as t h e i n t e r -
p r e t e r t r i e s n o t o n l y t o apply t h i s i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f s p e a k e r s b u t
t o reconstruct i t . She t h e n t u r n s away f r o m t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e o f
t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n ; she n o l o n g e r l o o k s t h r o u g h i t intentione
recta t o t h e w o r l d . She a t t e m p t s i n s t e a d t o p e e r i n t o t h e symbolic
33
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
f o r m a t i o n — p e n e t r a t i n g t h r o u g h its s u r f a c e , as i t w e r e — i n o r d e r t o
d i s c o v e r t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h i s s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n was
p r o d u c e d ( i n o u r example, the rules according to w h i c h the lexicon
o f a l a n g u a g e is c o n s t r u c t e d ) . T h e o b j e c t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g is n o
l o n g e r t h e content o f a s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n o r w h a t specific a u t h o r s
m e a n t b y i t i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s b u t r a t h e r t h e i n t u i t i v e rule conscious-
ness t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has o f h i s o w n language.
F o l l o w i n g a suggestion m a d e by R y l e , 2 9
we can d i s t i n g u i s h between
p r o d u c e o r a c c o m p l i s h s o m e t h i n g , a n d know-that, t h e e x p l i c i t k n o w l -
e d g e o f h o w i t is t h a t h e is a b l e t o d o so. I n o u r case, w h a t t h e a u t h o r
m e a n s b y a n u t t e r a n c e a n d w h a t a n i n t e r p r e t e r u n d e r s t a n d s o f its
c o n t e n t are a first-level k n o w - t h a t . T o t h e e x t e n t that his utterance
is c o r r e c t l y f o r m e d a n d t h u s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , the author produced
i t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c e r t a i n r u l e s o r o n t h e basis o f c e r t a i n s t r u c -
t u r e s . H e k n o w s h o w t o use t h e system o f r u l e s o f h i s l a n g u a g e a n d
u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i r c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n ; h e has a p r e t h e o r e t i -
cal k n o w l e d g e o f t h i s r u l e system, w h i c h is a t least s u f f i c i e n t t o
enable h i m to produce the utterance i n question. This implicit r u l e
c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a k n o w - h o w . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r , i n t u r n , w h o n o t o n l y
shares b u t w a n t s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o m -
p e t e n t speaker, m u s t t r a n s f o r m t h i s k n o w - h o w i n t o e x p l i c i t k n o w l -
e d g e , t h a t is, i n t o a s e c o n d - l e v e l k n o w - t h a t . T h i s is t h e task of
r e c o n s t r u c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, o f m e a n i n g e x p l i c a t i o n i n t h e
sense o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s u n d e r l y i n g
the p r o d u c t i o n o f symbolic f o r m a t i o n s . Since t h e r u l e consciousness
t o b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d is a c a t e g o r i a l k n o w l e d g e , the reconstruction
d e p e n d s first o f a l l o n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f c o n c e p t u a l e x p l i c a t i o n .
Carnap p u t f o r w a r d four requirements that the explication o f a
c o n c e p t m u s t f u l f i l l i n o r d e r to be adequate:
i . T h e e x p l i c a n s s h o u l d b e similar t o t h e e x p l i c a n d u m , t h a t is, f r o m
n o w o n the explicans s h o u l d be able to be used i n place o f the
e x p l i c a n d u m i n a l l r e l e v a n t cases.
i i . R u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o v i d e d t h a t f i x t h e use o f t h e e x p l i c a n s (in
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s c i e n t i f i c c o n c e p t s ) i n a n exact m a n n e r .
i i i . T h e e x p l i c a n s s h o u l d p r o v e t o b e fruitful w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
f o r m u l a t i o n o f general statements.
34 35

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

iv. ( P r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t r e q u i r e m e n t s i - i i i c a n b e m e t ) t h e e x p l i e a n s particular competencies of individual groups (e.g., t h e a b i l i t y t o

s h o u l d b e as simple as p o s s i b l e . 30
W u n d e r l i c h s u m s u p h i s r e f l e c t i o n s o n t h e status o f c o n c e p t e x p l i -
c a t i o n as f o l l o w s :
Explication always proceeds ( i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h Carnap's requirements
i - i v ) -with regard to theories; either such c e n t r a l concepts (as "meaning") are
explicated that entire theories correspond to t h e m as explieans, o r d i f f e r e n t
concepts are explicated interconnectedly.
We explicate always with regard to clear cases, so as to be able ( i n c o n n e c t i o n
u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n a L o w - G e r m a n d i a l e c t o r t o solve p r o b l e m s i n
q u a n t u m physics) or, i n d e e d , t o t h e a b i l i t y o f p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s
(e.g., t o w r i t e a n e x e m p l a r y Entwicklungsroman even i n the m i d d l e o f
the twentieth c e n t u r y ) . W h e n the pretheoretical knowledge to be
r e c o n s t r u c t e d expresses a u n i v e r s a l c a p a b i l i t y , a g e n e r a l c o g n i t i v e ,
linguistic, or interactive competence (or subcompetence), then what
b e g i n s as a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g a i m s a t t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f
species c o m p e t e n c i e s . I n s c o p e a n d status, these r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s c a n
be c o m p a r e d w i t h general t h e o r i e s . 3 2

w i t h these) to replace our i n t u i t i o n s w i t h exact arguments. However, the

t h e o r y can t h e n also provide answers to b o r d e r l i n e cases; o r we explicate
separately what a clear b o r d e r l i n e case is.
T h e language o f explication is at the same level as the e x p l i c a n d u m lan-
guage (e.g., o r d i n a r y language o r a standardized version derived f r o m i t ) .
Accordingly, i t is n o t a question here o f a descriptive language o r a metalan-
guage relative to the language o f the e x p l i c a n d u m (the explieans does n o t
describe the explicandum) . 31
I n these r e f l e c t i o n s o n t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f c o n c e p t s , o n e point
s t r i k e s m e as i n s u f f i c i e n t l y w o r k e d o u t — t h e evaluative accomplishments
of rule consciousness. R e c o n s t r u c t i v e proposals are d i r e c t e d t o w a r d
I t is t h e g r e a t m e r i t o f C h o m s k y t o h a v e d e v e l o p e d t h i s i d e a i n t h e
case o f g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y ( f o r t h e first time i n Syntactic Structures,
1 9 5 7 ) . R o u g h l y s p e a k i n g , i t is t h e task o f g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y t o
r e c o n s t r u c t the intuitive r u l e consciousness c o m m o n to all compe-
t e n t speakers i n s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
r e p r e s e n t t h e system o f r u l e s t h a t p e r m i t s p o t e n t i a l speakers, i n a t
least o n e l a n g u a g e L , t o a c q u i r e t h e c o m p e t e n c e t o p r o d u c e a n d t o
u n d e r s t a n d a n y s e n t e n c e s t h a t c o u n t as g r a m m a t i c a l i n L , as w e l l as
t o d i s t i n g u i s h these s e n t e n c e s w e l l - f o r m e d i n L f r o m u n g r a m m a t i c a l
sentences. 33

d o m a i n s o f p r e t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge, t h a t is, n o t t o j u s t a n y i m p l i c i t
o p i n i o n , b u t to a proven intuitive preknowledge. T h e r u l e conscious-
R e c o n s t r u c t i v e versus E m p i r i c i s t L i n g u i s t i c s
ness o f c o m p e t e n t speakers f u n c t i o n s as a c o u r t o f e v a l u a t i o n , f o r
i n s t a n c e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f sentences. W h e r e a s t h e
I h o p e I have sufficiently c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o n t e n t is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n y u t t e r a n c e w h a t e v e r ,
of sciences t h a t t r a n s f o r m a p r a c t i c a l l y m a s t e r e d pretheoretical
reconstructive u n d e r s t a n d i n g refers o n l y to symbolic objects charac-
k n o w l e d g e ( k n o w - h o w ) o f c o m p e t e n t subjects i n t o a n o b j e c t i v e a n d
t e r i z e d as " w e l l f o r m e d " b y c o m p e t e n t subjects t h e m s e l v e s . T h u s , f o r
e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e ( k n o w - t h a t ) , so t h a t i t is c l e a r i n w h a t sense I a m
e x a m p l e , syntactic t h e o r y , p r o p o s i t i o n a l l o g i c , t h e t h e o r y o f s c i e n c e ,
using the expression " f o r m a l analysis." B e f o r e m e n t i o n i n g some
a n d ethics start w i t h syntactically w e l l f o r m e d sentences, c o r r e c t l y
methodological difficulties w i t h reconstructive linguistics, I w o u l d
fashioned propositions, well-corroborated theories, a n d m o r a l l y u n -
like t o contrast, i n b r o a d strokes, two versions o f linguistics, o n e
objectionable resolutions o f n o r m conflicts, i n order to reconstruct
e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c a n d o n e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e . ( W u n d e r l i c h speaks o f a n
t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h these f o r m a t i o n s c a n b e p r o d u c e d . To
empirical-descriptive and an empirical-explicative linguistics. ) I will 3 4

t h e e x t e n t t h a t , as i n t h e f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e s , u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
compare b o t h approaches u n d e r f o u r headings.
( t h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f sentences, t h e consistency of propositions,
t h e t r u t h o f h y p o t h e s e s , t h e Tightness o f n o r m s o f a c t i o n ) u n d e r l i e
Data
i n t u i t i v e e v a l u a t i o n s , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s relate t o p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l -
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l basis is s u p p o s e d t o b e secured
e d g e o f a g e n e r a l sort, t o universal capabilities, a n d n o t m e r e l y t o
t h r o u g h o b s e r v a t i o n a l o n e , t h e d a t a o f l i n g u i s t i c s consist o f m e a s -
36 37

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

u r e d v a r i a b l e s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r . B y c o n t r a s t , i n s o f a r as recon- Theory and Everyday Knowledge

s t r u c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is p e r m i t t e d , t h e d a t a a r e p r o v i d e d b y t h e
r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f c o m p e t e n t speakers, m a i e u t i c a l l y a s c e r t a i n e d
(i.e., t h r o u g h suitable q u e s t i o n i n g w i t h t h e a i d o f systematically or-
d e r e d examples). T h u s t h e data are d i s t i n g u i s h e d , i f y o u w i l l , accord-
i n g t o t h e i r o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l : a c t u a l l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r is p a r t o f
p e r c e p t i b l e reality, a n d r u l e consciousness p o i n t s to t h e p r o d u c t i o n
o f s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n s i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is u t t e r e d a b o u t r e a l i t y . 3 5
F u r t h e r m o r e , o b s e r v a t i o n s always m e a n a k n o w l e d g e o f s o m e t h i n g
particular, whereas r u l e consciousness contains categorical k n o w l -
edge. Finally, observational data are selected o n l y f r o m t h e analytic
v i e w p o i n t s o f t h e l i n g u i s t , w h e r e a s , i n t h e o t h e r case, competent
s p e a k e r s t h e m s e l v e s evaluate a n d p r e s e l e c t p o s s i b l e d a t a f r o m t h e
p o i n t o f view o f t h e i r g r a m m a t i c a l well-formedness.
Theory and Object Domain
A s l o n g as n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s c o u n t as t h e o b j e c t o f l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p -
tion a n d n o t as t h e f o r m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e
p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y r e l a t e s t o its o b j e c t d o -
m a i n as a causal-analytic t h e o r y t h a t e x p l a i n s l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s
o f linguistic reality w i t h the aid o f n o m o l o g i c a l hypotheses. I f , o n the
c o n t r a r y , l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y is s u p p o s e d t o serve t o r e c o n s t r u c t p r e -
theoretical knowledge, t h e o r y r e l a t e s t o its o b j e c t d o m a i n as a n
e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g t o its e x p l i c a n d u m . W h e r e a s i n t h e e m p i r i -
cist v e r s i o n t h e r e l a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o t h e l a n g u a g e t o b e
e x p l a i n e d is basically i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h a t b e t w e e n theory
a n d r e a l i t y i n o t h e r n o m o l o g i c a l sciences, i n t h e e x p l i c a t i v e v e r s i o n
t h e l i n g u i s t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e o b j e c t necessitates a r e l a t i o n t h a t c a n
T h e r e is y e t a n o t h e r p e c u l i a r i t y a r i s i n g f r o m these d i f f e r e n d y o r i -
ented conceptualizations. A n empirical-analytic theory i n the n a r r o w
sense c a n ( a n d as a r u l e w i l l ) r e f u t e t h e e v e r y d a y k n o w l e d g e o f a n
o b j e c t d o m a i n t h a t w e i n i t i a l l y possess p r i o r t o s c i e n c e a n d r e p l a c e
it w i t h a correct theoretical knowledge r e g a r d e d p r o v i s i o n a l l y as
true. A proposal for reconstruction, by contrast, can represent pre-
t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e m o r e o r less e x p l i c i t l y a n d a d e q u a t e l y , b u t i t
c a n n e v e r falsify i t . A t m o s t , t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a s p e a k e r ' s i n t u i -
tion c a n p r o v e t o b e false, b u t n o t t h e i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f . 3 7
T h e latter
belongs to the data, a n d data can be e x p l a i n e d b u t n o t criticized. A t
m o s t , d a t a c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d as b e i n g u n s u i t a b l e , t h a t is, e i t h e r e r r o -
neously gathered or w r o n g l y selected f o r a specific theoretical
purpose.
T o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s m a k e a n essentialist c l a i m . O n e
c a n say, o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s "correspond" (if
t r u e ) t o c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r e s o f r e a l i t y i n t h e s a m e sense as recon-
structions "bear a likeness" ( i f correct) to t h e deep structures e x p l i -
c a t e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e asserted c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n a
d e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r y a n d its o b j e c t a d m i t s m a n y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l inter-
p r e t a t i o n s a p a r t f r o m t h e r e a l i s t i c (e.g., i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t o r c o n v e n -
tionalist) ones. Rational reconstructions, by contrast, can reproduce
t h e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e y e x p l i c a t e o n l y i n a n essential-
ist sense; i f t h e y a r e t r u e , t h e y have t o c o r r e s p o n d precisely to t h e
r u l e s t h a t a r e o p e r a t i v e l y e f f e c t i v e i n t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n — t h a t is, t o
t h e r u l e s t h a t a c t u a l l y d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f surface s t r u c -
tures. 3 8
T h u s Chomsky's correlation assumption, according to w h i c h
l i n g u i s t i c g r a m m a r is r e p r e s e n t e d o n t h e p a r t o f t h e s p e a k e r b y a

h o l d o n l y between d i f f e r e n t linguistic expressions: the r e l a t i o n be- m e n t a l g r a m m a r t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s e x a c t l y t o i t , is, a t least i n t h e first

tween explication a n d e x p l i c a n d u m , whereby the language o f expli- instance, consistent.

cation ( t h a t is, t h e c o n s t r u c t l a n g u a g e o f l i n g u i s t i c s , w h i c h is a
standardized version o f o r d i n a r y language) belongs i n p r i n c i p l e to Methodological Difficulties
t h e same l e v e l as t h e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e t o b e e x p l i c a t e d . ( N e i t h e r i n T o be sure, serious m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulties have arisen i n c o n -
t h e e m p i r i c i s t n o r i n t h e e x p l i c a t i v e case o f t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n c a n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e C h o m s k i a n p r o g r a m f o r a g e n e r a l science o f l a n -
t h e r e l a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o its o b j e c t d o m a i n b e c o n c e i v e d as g u a g e as t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . I
that of metalanguage to object language. ) 3 6 w o u l d l i k e t o consider, f r o m a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l perspective, two o f
 39
38
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

the problem complexes t h a t have developed. O n e concerns the
status a n d r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f c o m p e t e n t speak-
ers; t h e o t h e r , t h e a f o r m e n t i o n e d relation between linguistic a n d
mental grammar.
T h e r e h a v e b e e n t w o p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n s a g a i n s t c h o o s i n g speak-
e r s ' i n t u i t i o n s as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i v e t h e o r y f o r m a -
tion. 39
F i r s t , t h e q u e s t i o n has b e e n r a i s e d w h e t h e r a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e
linguistics can ever a r r i v e a t a t h e o r y o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e ;
w h e t h e r o n t h e c h o s e n d a t a basis i t is n o t l i m i t e d t o d e v e l o p i n g , a t
b e s t , a t h e o r y o f t h e i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t c o m p e t e n t speak-
ers have o f t h e i r o w n l a n g u a g e . S i n c e t h e m e t a l i n g u i s t i c use o f o n e ' s
o w n o r d i n a r y language, to w h i c h a science t h a t appeals t o speakers'
j u d g m e n t s m u s t have r e c o u r s e , is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e d i r e c t
use o f l a n g u a g e ( a n d is p r o b a b l y s u b j e c t t o d i f f e r e n t l a w s ) , a g r a m -
o f the grammaticality o f linguistic expressions. T h e object o f recon-
s t r u c t i o n is t h e p r o c e s s o f p r o d u c t i o n o f t h o s e sentences h e l d b y
c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s t o b e l o n g t o t h e set o f g r a m m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s .
By c o n t r a s t , t h e m e t a l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s i n w h i c h c o m p e t e n t speak-
ers e v a l u a t e t h e s e n t e n c e s p u t b e f o r e t h e m a r e n o t t h e o b j e c t o f
reconstruction b u t part of the data gathering.
ii. B e c a u s e o f t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s , speak-
i n g a b o u t w h a t has b e e n s p o k e n , direct or indirect mention of
speech c o m p o n e n t s , b e l o n g s t o t h e n o r m a l l i n g u i s t i c process of
reaching understanding. T h e expression "metalinguistic j u d g m e n t s "
i n a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e a b o u t s e n t e n c e s o f t h e s a m e l a n g u a g e suggests
a d i f f e r e n c e i n l e v e l t h a t d o e s n o t e x i s t . I t is o n e o f t h e m o s t i n t e r -
e s t i n g f e a t u r e s o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s t h a t t h e y c a n b e u s e d as t h e i r
own languages o f explication. ( I shall c o m e back to this p o i n t

m a t i c a l t h e o r y o f t h e C h o m s k i a n type can at best r e c o n s t r u c t t h a t below.)

special p a r t o f linguistic c o m p e t e n c e t h a t regulates the m e t a l i n g u i s - Hi. H o w e v e r , i t seems t o m e t h a t t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g lies, a b o v e

tic use; i t c a n n o t r e c o n s t r u c t t h e c o m p e t e n c e t h a t d i r e c d y u n d e r l i e s all, i n Levelt's considering t h e recourse to speakers' i n t u i t i o n s i n
speaking a n d understanding a language. abstraction f r o m the u n d e r l y i n g research paradigm. Only i f one
p r e s u p p o s e s a n e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c a p p r o a c h ( i n t h e n a r r o w sense) t o
T h e e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r a c o m p l e t e t h e o r y o f l i n g u i s t i c i n t u i t i o n s
the reality o f a natural language a n d the utterances i n i t can one
is i d e n t i c a l w i t h a c o m p l e t e t h e o r y o f h u m a n l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . . . .
view speaking a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g language, o n the one h a n d , a n d
C h o m s k y h a s n o d o u b t as to t h i s identity. . . . T h e t h e o r y o f o n e k i n d o f
l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r , n a m e l y m e t a l i n g u i s t i c j u d g m e n t o n s u c h t h i n g s as g r a m - j u d g m e n t s i n a l a n g u a g e a b o u t t h a t l a n g u a g e , o n t h e o t h e r , as t w o
m a t i c a l i t y a n d p a r a p h r a s e , w o u l d t h e n as a w h o l e b e b u i l t i n t o t h e o r i e s o n d i f f e r e n t object d o m a i n s . I f one chooses a reconstructive approach,
o t h e r f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r s u c h as s p e a k i n g a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . . then one thereby c h o o s e s a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f the object d o m a i n
I f w e w i s h to t h i n k i n t e r m s o f p r i m a r y a n d d e r i v e d f o r m s o f v e r b a l b e h a v i o r , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the linguistic k n o w - h o w o f a c o m p e t e n t speaker
t h e s p e a k i n g a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e fall p r e c i s e l y i n t o t h e
is a t t h e r o o t o f t h e s e n t e n c e s she p r o d u c e s w i t h t h e h e l p o f (and
category o f p r i m a r y forms, while metalinguistic j u d g m e n t s will be consid-
e r e d h i g h l y d e r i v e d , artificial f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r , w h i c h m o r e o v e r
o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p of) this k n o w - h o w . W h i l e this research paradigm
a r e a c q u i r e d late i n d e v e l o p m e n t . . . . T h e e m p i r i c a l p r o b l e m i n t h e psy- m a y p r o v e to be u n f r u i t f u l , this c a n n o t be s h o w n at the level o f a
c h o l o g y o f l a n g u a g e is i n t u r n d i v i d e d i n two, t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p s y c h o - c r i t i q u e that already presupposes a c o m p e t i n g p a r a d i g m ; i t may be
logical factors in primary language usage, and the psychological s h o w n o n l y i n t e r m s o f t h e success o r f a i l u r e o f t h e t h e o r i e s and
investigation o f linguistic i n t u i t i o n s . 4 0

e x p l a n a t i o n s t h e c o m p e t i n g r e s e a r c h p a r a d i g m s m a k e possible.

I t h i n k t h i s o b j e c t i o n is b a s e d o n a c o n f u s i o n o f t h e t w o r e s e a r c h T h e s e c o n d o b j e c t i o n is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f i n t u i -
paradigms elucidated above, the empirical-analytic a n d the recon- tively f o u n d e d s p e a k e r s ' j u d g m e n t s , f o r w h i c h t h e r e exists i m p r e s s i v e
structive. I wish to make three c o m m e n t s i n this regard: empirical evidence. 4 1
Nonetheless, i t seems t o m e h e r e t h a t o n c e
i. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e l a t e s t o a p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e o f c o m p e - again a n e m p i r i c i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f speakers' j u d g m e n t s stimulates
t e n t s p e a k e r s t h a t is e x p r e s s e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n false e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d suggests t h e w r o n g r e m e d i e s . T h e e x p r e s s i o n
o f sentences i n a n a t u r a l language a n d , o n the other, i n the appraisal " i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e " s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as m e a n i n g t h a t a
40 41

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

speaker's p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e about the grammaticality of a u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n n o t , i n t h e o p i n i o n o f Bever, W a t t , a n d o t h e r s , b e

sentence (about the r i g o r o f a derivation, about the cogency o f a
t h e o r y , a n d so f o r t h ) is t h e k i n d o f d i r e c t l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e i n t u i t i o n
t h a t is i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e
i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e has t o b e b r o u g h t t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h r o u g h t h e
choice o f suitable examples a n d counterexamples, t h r o u g h contrast
a n d s i m i l a r i t y r e l a t i o n s , t h r o u g h t r a n s l a t i o n , p a r a p h r a s e a n d so o n —
t h a t is, t h r o u g h a w e l l - t h o u g h t - o u t , m a i e u t i c m e t h o d o f i n t e r r o g a -
t i o n . A s c e r t a i n i n g t h e so-called i n t u i t i o n s o f a s p e a k e r is a l r e a d y t h e
f i r s t step t o w a r d t h e i r e x p l i c a t i o n . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e procedure
p r a c t i c e d b y C h o m s k y a n d m a n y o t h e r s seems t o m e t o m a k e sense
a n d t o b e a d e q u a t e . O n e starts w i t h c l e a r cases, i n w h i c h t h e r e a c -
t i o n s o f t h e subjects c o n v e r g e , i n o r d e r t o d e v e l o p s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p -
t i o n s o n t h i s basis; t h e n , i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e h y p o t h e s e s g a i n e d , o n e
a t t e m p t s t o r e n d e r t h e less c l e a r cases m o r e p r e c i s e i n s u c h a w a y
t h a t t h e process o f i n t e r r o g a t i o n can l e a d to a n adequate clarifica-
tion o f these cases as w e l l . I d o n o t see a n y t h i n g w r o n g i n this
c i r c u l a r p r o c e d u r e ; every research process moves i n such a circle
e x p l a i n e d i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m p e t e n c e t h e o r y , t h a t is, o f a
reconstructively o r i e n t e d linguistics. I a m n o t very certain h o w to
j u d g e t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y ; b u t I w o u l d l i k e t o suggest t w o p o i n t s o f v i e w
t h a t h a v e n o t , so f a r as I c a n see, b e e n s u f f i c i e n t l y t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t
i n t h e discussion.
i. H o w s t r o n g d o t h e essentialist a s s e r t i o n s o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e
l i n g u i s t i c s r e g a r d i n g t h e p s y c h i c r e a l i t y o f r e c o n s t r u c t e d systems o f
r u l e s h a v e t o be? C h o m s k y ' s m a t u r a t i o n i s t a s s u m p t i o n — t h a t g r a m -
matical t h e o r y represents exactly the i n n a t e dispositions that enable
t h e c h i l d to develop the hypotheses t h a t d i r e c t language acquisition
a n d t h a t process t h e l i n g u i s t i c data i n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t — s e e m s to
me too s t r o n g . 4 4
W i t h i n t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v i s t c o n c e p t u a l strategy, t h e
m o r e plausible assumption that g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y represents the
l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e o f t h e a d u l t s p e a k e r is s u f f i c i e n t . T h i s c o m p e -
t e n c e i n t u r n is t h e r e s u l t o f a l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s t h a t m a y e v e n — i n a
m a n n e r similar to cognitive development or the development of
m o r a l consciousness—follow a rationally reconstructible p a t t e r n . 4 5

between theory formation and a more precise rendering of the A s B e v e r suggests, e v e n t h i s thesis c a n b e w e a k e n e d to allow for
object d o m a i n . 4 2
restrictions placed o n the acquisition a n d application o f grammati-
T h e s e c o n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n is m o r e d i f f i c u l t . I t is o n e cal rule-knowledge by n o n l i n g u i s t i c p e r c e p t u a l mechanisms or n o n -
t h a t has b e e n t r e a t e d as a n e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n i n t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s - l i n g u i s t i c e p i s t e m i c systems i n g e n e r a l , w i t h o u t s u r r e n d e r i n g t h e
tics o f t h e p a s t d e c a d e , a n d as s u c h has i n s p i r e d a g r e a t a m o u n t o f categorial framework o f a competence theory.
r e s e a r c h : i t asks w h e t h e r t h e r e is a d i r e c t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n ii. I t is n o t c l e a r t o m e t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c c r i t i q u e
t h e l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y o f g r a m m a r a n d t h e m e n t a l g r a m m a r t h a t is, so o f t h e a d m i t t e d l y essentialist i m p l i c a t i o n s o f C h o m s k y ' s c o m p e t e n c e
t o speak, " i n t h e m i n d " o f t h e s p e a k e r . 43
According to the correlation t h e o r y can be traced back to a confusion o f research paradigms. T h i s
hypothesis, linguistic reconstructions are not simply l u c i d and c o u l d be adequately discussed o n l y i f t h e r e w e r e clarity a b o u t t h e
economical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f l i n g u i s t i c d a t a ; i n s t e a d , t h e r e is a w a y i n w h i c h c o m p e t e n c e t h e o r i e s c a n b e t e s t e d a n d , as t h e case m a y
psychological complexity of the actual p r o d u c t i o n process that be, falsified. I have the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t psycholinguistic investiga-
corresponds, supposedly, to the transformational complexity that tions p r o c e e d e m p i r i c a l l y a n d a n a l y t i c a l l y , a n d n e g l e c t a limine t h e
c a n be r e a d o f f t h e s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f linguistic expressions. I distinction between competence a n d performance. 4 6

c a n n o t deal w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l research projects a n d the various

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s h e r e . A p p a r e n t l y , i n p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s t h e r e is a g r o w - U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s versus T r a n s c e n d e n t a l H e r m e n e u t i c s
i n g t e n d e n c y t o m o v e away f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l c o r r e l a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s ;
the m e n t a l g r a m m a r that underlies the psychologically demonstra- H a v i n g p r e s e n t e d t h e idea o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e science a n d b r i e f l y
ble p r o d u c t i o n o f language and the corresponding processes o f elucidated i t t h r o u g h a consideration o f reconstructive linguistics
42
Chapter 1
( a n d t w o o f its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s ) , I w o u l d l i k e t o t o u c h o n
o n e f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n : W h a t is t h e r e l a t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g e n e r a l a n d u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f possi-
b l e processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o t h e t y p e o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n
t h a t has, s i n c e K a n t , b e e n c a l l e d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis? K a n t t e r m s
" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t i d e n t i f i e s a n d analyzes t h e a
p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e u n d e r l y i n g i d e a is
clear: i n a d d i t i o n to the e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t relates to objects
o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e r e is, s u p p o s e d l y , a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l k n o w l e d g e o f
concepts o f objects i n g e n e r a l t h a t p r e c e d e experience. T h e m e t h o d
b y w h i c h these a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l c a n b e s h o w n
t o b e v a l i d c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e is less clear. T h e r e is
a l r e a d y d i s a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e thesis: " [ T ] h e
a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e i n g e n e r a l a r e a t t h e same
t i m e c o n d i t i o n s o f the possibility o f objects o f e x p e r i e n c e . " 4 7
T h e analytic r e c e p t i o n o f t h e K a n t i a n p r o g r a m (Strawson's w o r k
is a w e l l - k n o w n e x a m p l e ) 4 8
leads t o a m i n i m a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
the transcendental. Every coherent experience is o r g a n i z e d i n a
c a t e g o r i a l n e t w o r k ; t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e d i s c o v e r t h e same i m p l i c i t
c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e i n any c o h e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e whatsoever, we m a y
c a l l t h i s basic c o n c e p t u a l system o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e " t r a n s c e n -
dental." This conception renounces the claim that Kant w a n t e d to
v i n d i c a t e w i t h h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n ; i t gives u p a l l c l a i m t o
a p r o o f o f t h e objective validity o f o u r concepts o f objects o f possible
experience i n general. 4 9
T h e strong apriorism of Kantian philosophy
gives w a y t o a w e a k e r v e r s i o n . F r o m n o w o n , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i -
g a t i o n m u s t r e l y o n t h e c o m p e t e n c e o f k n o w i n g subjects w h o j u d g e
w h i c h experiences may be called coherent experiences i n o r d e r t h e n
t o analyze t h i s m a t e r i a l w i t h a v i e w t o finding g e n e r a l a n d necessary
c a t e g o r i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . E v e r y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a basic c o n c e p -
t u a l system o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e has t o b e r e g a r d e d as a h y p o t h e t i -
c a l p r o p o s a l t h a t c a n b e t e s t e d a g a i n s t n e w e x p e r i e n c e s . A s l o n g as
t h e a s s e r t i o n o f i t s necessity a n d u n i v e r s a l i t y has n o t b e e n r e f u t e d ,
we t e r m " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " t h e c o n c e p t u a l structure r e c u r r i n g i n a l l
c o h e r e n t experiences. I n this weaker version, the c l a i m that this
s t r u c t u r e c a n b e d e m o n s t r a t e d a p r i o r i is d r o p p e d .
43
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
F r o m this weaker i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , consequences ensue that are
scarcely c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e o r i g i n a l p r o g r a m . W e c a n n o longer
e x c l u d e t h e possibility t h a t o u r c o n c e p t s o f objects o f possible expe-
r i e n c e c a n b e a p p l i e d successfully o n l y u n d e r c o n t i n g e n t b o u n d a r y
conditions that have, for example, heretofore regularly been
fulfilled by natural constants. 5 0
Further, we can n o longer exclude
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e basic c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i -
e n c e has d e v e l o p e d p h y l o g e n e t i c a l l y a n d arises a n e w i n e v e r y n o r -
m a l ontogenesis, i n a process t h a t c a n be analyzed e m p i r i c a l l y . 5 1
We
c a n n o t even exclude the possibility that a n a p r i o r i o f experience
t h a t is r e l a t i v i z e d i n t h i s sense is v a l i d o n l y f o r s p e c i f i c , a d m i t t e d l y
a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l l y deep-seated, b e h a v i o r a l systems, e a c h o f w h i c h
m a k e s p o s s i b l e a specific s t r a t e g y f o r o b j e c t i v a t i n g reality. T h e t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l l y o r i e n t e d p r a g m a t i s m i n a u g u r a t e d b y C. S. P e i r c e a t -
t e m p t s t o s h o w t h a t t h e r e is s u c h a s t r u c t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n
experience and instrumental a c t i o n ; 5 2
the hermeneutics stemming
f r o m D i l t h e y a t t e m p t s — o v e r against this a p r i o r i o f e x p e r i e n c e — t o
do justice to an additional a priori of understanding or communica-
tive e x p e r i e n c e . 5 3
F r o m the perspective o f a t r a n s f o r m e d transcendental p h i l o s o p h y
( i n A p e l ' s sense), t w o f u r t h e r r e n u n c i a t i o n s called f o r b y t h e analytic
r e c e p t i o n o f K a n t seem precipitate: the r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the concept
o f the constitution o f experience a n d the r e n u n c i a t i o n o f an explicit
t r e a t m e n t o f t h e p r o b l e m o f validity. I n m y o p i n i o n , the reservation
r e g a r d i n g a s t r o n g a p r i o r i s m i n n o way d e m a n d s l i m i t i n g oneself t o
a logical-semantic analysis o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e s . I f
we s u r r e n d e r the c o n c e p t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject—the subject
that accomplishes t h e synthesis a n d t h a t , t o g e t h e r w i t h its k n o w l -
e d g e - e n a b l i n g s t r u c t u r e s , is r e m o v e d f r o m a l l e x p e r i e n c e — t h i s d o e s
n o t m e a n t h a t w e have t o r e n o u n c e t h e u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis
o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f o u r concepts o f objects o f possible experience,
t h a t is, r e n o u n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e . 5 4
It
is j u s t as l i t t l e a c o n s e q u e n c e o f g i v i n g u p t h e p r o j e c t o f a t r a n s c e n -
dental d e d u c t i o n that one must h a n d over p r o b l e m s o f validity to
o t h e r d o m a i n s o f investigation, f o r instance, t o t h e t h e o r y o f science
o r o f t r u t h . O f c o u r s e , t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f possi-
44 45

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

ble experience a n d the t r u t h o f propositions looks different t h a n i t u t t e r a n c e s . C o n c e p t s s u c h as m e a n i n g a n d i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , t h e a b i l i t y

d o e s u n d e r K a n t i a n p r e m i s e s . A p r i o r i d e m o n s t r a t i o n is r e p l a c e d b y t o speak a n d act (agency), i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s a n d t h e l i k e ,
transcendental investigation o f the conditions for argumentatively w o u l d b e l o n g to this conceptual f r a m e w o r k .
r e d e e m i n g t h e validity claims t h a t l e n d themselves to possible discur- T h e expression "situation o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g " that,
sive v i n d i c a t i o n . 5 5
f r o m t h i s p o i n t o f view, w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e e x p r e s s i o n "object
T o b e s u r e , i n m y view t h e q u e s t i o n is m o r e t h a n s i m p l y t e r m i - o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , " a l r e a d y shows, h o w e v e r , t h a t a c q u i r i n g t h e
n o l o g i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g w h e t h e r we may still call such investigations e x p e r i e n c e s w e have i n processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is s e c o n d a r y t o
of general and unavoidable presuppositions of communication t h e g o a l o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e s e processes serve. T h e
"transcendental" ( i n t h i s case, p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of argumentative g e n e r a l structures o f speech m u s t t h e r e f o r e first be investigated
s p e e c h ) . I f w e w a n t t o s u b j e c t processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m the perspective o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d n o t f r o m that
( " s p e e c h " ) t o a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis o r i e n t e d t o g e n e r a l a n d u n - o f e x p e r i e n c e . A s s o o n as w e a d m i t t h i s , h o w e v e r , t h e p a r a l l e l s w i t h
avoidable presuppositions i n t h e s a m e w a y as has b e e n d o n e for transcendental philosophy (however conceived) recede i n t o the
cognitive processes, 56
then the m o d e l of transcendental philosophy b a c k g r o u n d . T h e idea u n d e r l y i n g transcendental philosophy i s — t o
u n d e n i a b l y suggests i t s e l f — a l l t h e m o r e so since t h e t h e o r y o f l a n - o v e r s i m p l i f y — t h a t we constitute experiences by objectivating reality
g u a g e a n d a c t i o n has n o t ( d e s p i t e H u m b o l d t ) f o u n d its K a n t . N a t u - f r o m i n v a r i a n t p o i n t s o f view. T h i s o b j e c t i v a t i o n shows i t s e l f i n t h e
r a l l y , r e c o u r s e t o t h i s m o d e l is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e o n l y i f o n e has i n v i e w o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l t h a t necessarily a r e p r e s u p p o s e d i n e v e r y c o h e r e n t
o n e o f t h e weaker versions o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y m e n t i o n e d e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e s e o b j e c t s i n t u r n c a n b e a n a l y z e d as a system o f basic
a b o v e . I n t h i s sense, A p e l — i n o r d e r t o c h a r a c t e r i z e h i s approach concepts. However, I do n o t find any correspondent to this idea
programmatically—speaks of "transcendental hermeneutics" or u n d e r w h i c h t h e analysis o f g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f communica-
"transcendental pragmatics." I w o u l d like to m e n t i o n two reasons f o r t i o n m i g h t be carried out. Experiences a r e , i f w e f o l l o w t h e basic
h e s i t a t i n g t o a d o p t t h i s usage. K a n t i a n idea, constituted; utterances are, at most, generated. A t r a n -

a. S o m e t h i n g l i k e a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f processes o f s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n t r a n s p o s e d t o processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -

r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g seems p l a u s i b l e t o m e as l o n g as w e v i e w s t a n d i n g w o u l d t h u s have t o be g u i d e d b y another m o d e l — n o t the

t h e s e u n d e r t h e aspect o f processes o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t is i n t h i s sense epistemological m o d e l o f the constitution o f experience b u t perhaps

t h a t I speak o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e experience; i n understanding the the m o d e l o f d e e p a n d surface s t r u c t u r e .

u t t e r a n c e o f a n o t h e r s p e a k e r as a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a c o m m u n i c a t i o n
process, t h e h e a r e r (like t h e o b s e r v e r w h o perceives a s e g m e n t o f
r e a l i t y ) has a n e x p e r i e n c e . F r o m t h i s c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e , con-
crete utterances w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to e m p i r i c a l objects, a n d u t t e r -
ances i n g e n e r a l t o o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l ( i n t h e sense o f o b j e c t s o f
p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e ) . J u s t as w e c a n analyze o u r a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f
o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l — t h a t is, t h e c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e o f a n y c o h e r e n t
experience whatsoever—we w o u l d also b e able to analyze o u r a Against this, the distinction between d r a w i n g o n a p r i o r i
p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f u t t e r a n c e s i n g e n e r a l — t h a t is, t h e basic c o n c e p t s
o f s i t u a t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g {Verständigung), t h e
c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t e n a b l e s us t o e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s i n c o r r e c t
b. M o r e o v e r , a d o p t i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " m i g h t c o n -
c e a l t h e b r e a k w i t h a p r i o r i s m t h a t has b e e n m a d e i n t h e m e a n t i m e .
K a n t h a d t o s h a r p l y separate e m p i r i c a l a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis.
I f w e n o w u n d e r s t a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t h e sense o f a
reconstruction o f general a n d unavoidable presuppositions o f expe-
riences t h a t c a n lay c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v i t y , t h e n t h e r e c e r t a i n l y r e m a i n s
a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c analysis.
knowledge
and drawing o n a posteriori knowledge becomes b l u r r e d . O n the
o n e h a n d , t h e r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s is f o r t h e m
a n a p r i o r i knowledge; o n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f this
46
Chapter 1
k n o w l e d g e calls f o r i n q u i r i e s u n d e r t a k e n w i t h e m p i r i c a l s p e a k e r s —
the linguist procures for herself a knowledge a posteriori. T h e i m -
plicit knowledge o f c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s is so d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e
explicit f o r m o f linguistic description that the individual linguist
c a n n o t rely o n reflection o n h e r o w n speech intuitions. T h e proce-
dures e m p l o y e d i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a n d testing hypotheses, i n apprais-
i n g c o m p e t i n g reconstructive proposals, i n g a t h e r i n g a n d selecting
d a t a , a r e i n m a n y ways l i k e t h e p r o c e d u r e s c u s t o m a r i l y u s e d i n t h e
n o m o l o g i c a l sciences. M e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t c a n b e t r a c e d
b a c k t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f d a t a ( o b s e r v a b l e events versus
c o m p r e h e n s i b l e signs) a n d t o d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f
laws a n d r u l e s d o n o t s u f f i c e , f o r e x a m p l e , t o b a n i s h l i n g u i s t i c s f r o m
t h e sphere o f e m p i r i c a l science.
T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e f o r o n t o g e n e t i c t h e o r i e s t h a t , l i k e P i a g e t ' s
cognitivist d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology, c o n n e c t t h e structural descrip-
t i o n o f c o m p e t e n c i e s (as w e l l as o f r e c o n s t r u c t e d p a t t e r n s o f d e v e l -
o p m e n t o f these c o m p e t e n c i e s ) w i t h a s s u m p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c a u s a l
mechanisms. 5 7
T h e paradigms i n t r o d u c e d by C h o m s k y a n d Piaget
have p r o m p t e d a type o f research d e t e r m i n e d by a p e c u l i a r c o n n e c -
t i o n b e t w e e n f o r m a l a n d e m p i r i c a l analysis r a t h e r t h a n b y t h e i r
classical s e p a r a t i o n . T h e e x p r e s s i o n " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , " w i t h w h i c h w e
associate a c o n t r a s t t o e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e , is t h u s u n s u i t e d t o c h a r a c -
t e r i z i n g , w i t h o u t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a l i n e o f r e s e a r c h s u c h as u n i -
versal p r a g m a t i c s . B e h i n d t h e t e r m i n o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n can be f o u n d
t h e systematic q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e as-yet i n s u f f i c i e n t l y c l a r i f i e d
status o f n o n n o m o l o g i c a l e m p i r i c a l sciences o f t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e
t y p e . I s h a l l have t o leave t h i s q u e s t i o n aside h e r e . I n a n y case, t h e
attempt to play d o w n the interesting methodological differences that
arise h e r e , a n d t o i n t e r p r e t t h e m away i n t h e sense o f t h e u n i f i e d
s c i e n c e p r o g r a m , seems t o h a v e l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f s u c c e s s . 58
II
T h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts has g i v e n rise t o ideas
o n w h i c h the f u n d a m e n t a l assumptions o f universal pragmatics can
be based. 5 9
T h e universal-pragmatic p o i n t o f view f r o m w h i c h I shall
47
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
select a n d discuss these ideas leads, h o w e v e r , t o a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
t h a t d i v e r g e s i n several i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m A u s t i n ' s a n d Searle's
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f speech-act t h e o r y , w h i c h r e m a i n s a s e m a n t i c a l l y
determined one.
T h r e e Aspects o f Universal Pragmatics
T h e basic u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c i n t e n t i o n o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is e x -
pressed i n t h e fact that i t thematizes t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s o f speech
( u t t e r a n c e s ) f r o m a stance s i m i l a r t o t h a t f r o m w h i c h l i n g u i s t i c s
thematizes the units o f language (sentences). T h e goal of recon-
s t r u c t i v e l a n g u a g e analysis is a n e x p l i c i t d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e r u l e s t h a t
a competent speaker m u s t master i n o r d e r to f o r m g r a m m a t i c a l
s e n t e n c e s a n d t o u t t e r t h e m i n a n a c c e p t a b l e way. T h e t h e o r y o f
s p e e c h acts shares t h i s task w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s . W h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r starts
f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e v e r y a d u l t s p e a k e r possesses a r e c o n ¬
structible i m p l i c i t knowledge i n w h i c h his linguistic rule compe-
tence (to produce sentences) is expressed, speech-act theory
postulates a corresponding communicative rule competence,
n a m e l y t h e c o m p e t e n c e t o e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s i n s p e e c h acts. I t is
f u r t h e r a s s u m e d t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e has j u s t as u n i v e r -
sal a c o r e as l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . A g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts
w o u l d t h u s d e s c r i b e p r e c i s e l y t h a t f u n d a m e n t a l system o f r u l e s t h a t
a d u l t speakers m a s t e r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y c a n f u l f i l l the conditions
for a happy employment of sentences in utterances, n o m a t t e r t o w h i c h
p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e t h e sentences m a y b e l o n g a n d i n w h i c h r a n d o m
contexts the utterances may be embedded.
T h e p r o p o s a l t o i n v e s t i g a t e l a n g u a g e use i n competence-theoretic
t e r m s calls f o r a r e v i s i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t s o f c o m p e t e n c e a n d p e r f o r -
m a n c e . C h o m s k y i n i t i a l l y u n d e r s t a n d s these c o n c e p t s i n s u c h a way
t h a t i t m a k e s sense t o r e q u i r e t h a t t h e p h o n e t i c , s y n t a c t i c , a n d
s e m a n t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f s e n t e n c e s be i n v e s t i g a t e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y w i t h i n
the framework o f a reconstruction o f linguistic competence a n d that
the p r a g m a t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f utterances be left to a t h e o r y o f linguis-
tic p e r f o r m a n c e . 6 0
T h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n gives rise t o t h e q u e s t i o n
o f w h e t h e r " c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e " is n o t a h y b r i d c o n c e p t . I

48
Chapter 1
have, to b e g i n w i t h , based the d e m a r c a t i o n o f linguistics f r o m u n i -
versal pragmatics o n t h e c u r r e n t d i s t i n c t i o n between sentences a n d
utterances. T h e p r o d u c t i o n o f sentences a c c o r d i n g to t h e r u l e s o f
g r a m m a r is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h pragmatic rules that shape the infrastructure o f speech situ-
a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l . B u t t h i s raises t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o q u e s t i o n s , (i)
C o u l d n o t t h e u n i v e r s a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h — w h a t is c o m m o n t o a l l
utterances independendy of their particular contexts—be ade-
quately d e t e r m i n e d t h r o u g h universal sentential structures? I n this
case, w i t h h i s l i n g u i s t i c a l l y r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e ,
the s p e a k e r w o u l d also b e equipped for mastering situations o f
p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung), f o r t h e g e n e r a l task
o f u t t e r i n g sentences; a n d t h e p o s t u l a t e o f a g e n e r a l communicative
competence distinguishable f r o m linguistic competence c o u l d not
b e j u s t i f i e d . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n ( i i ) w h e t h e r t h e
s e m a n t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f s e n t e n c e s ( o r w o r d s ) m a y n o t , i n t h e sense o f
the use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , b e e x p l i c a t e d i n a n y case o n l y w i t h
reference to situations o f possible typical e m p l o y m e n t . T h e n the
d i s t i n c t i o n between sentences a n d utterances w o u l d be i r r e l e v a n t , at
least t o s e m a n t i c t h e o r y (so l o n g as s u f f i c i e n t l y t y p i c a l c o n t e x t s of
u t t e r a n c e w e r e t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ) . A s s o o n as t h e d i s t i n c t i o n
b e t w e e n t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f s e n t e n c e s a n d t h e p r a g m a t i c a n a l y -
sis o f u t t e r a n c e s b e c o m e s hazy, h o w e v e r , t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n o f u n i -
v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is also i n d a n g e r o f b e c o m i n g b l u r r e d .
W i t h r e g a r d to the first question, I w o u l d agree, w i t h c e r t a i n
qualifications, 6 1
t h a t a speaker, i n transposing a well-formed sen-
t e n c e i n t o a n act o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , m e r e l y
actualizes w h a t is i n h e r e n t i n t h e s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e s . B u t t h i s is n o t
to deny the difference between the production of a grammatical
s e n t e n c e a n d t h e use o f t h a t s e n t e n c e i n a s i t u a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e
m u t u a l understanding, or the difference between the universal pre-
s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has t o f u l f i l l i n e a c h case. I n
o r d e r to u t t e r a sentence, the speaker m u s t f u l f i l l general presuppo-
s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . E v e n i f she f u l f i l l s t h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s
i n c o n f o r m i t y t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s t h a t a r e a l r e a d y g i v e n w i t h t h e sen-
t e n c e e m p l o y e d , she m a y v e r y w e l l f o r m t h e s e n t e n c e i t s e l f w i t h o u t
49
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
at t h e s a m e t i m e f u l f i l l i n g t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s specific t o speech.
T h i s can be m a d e clear by l o o k i n g at t h e relations to reality i n w h i c h
e v e r y s e n t e n c e is first e m b e d d e d t h r o u g h t h e a c t o f u t t e r a n c e . I n
b e i n g u t t e r e d , a s e n t e n c e is p l a c e d i n r e l a t i o n t o (a) t h e e x t e r n a l
reality o f that w h i c h can be perceived, (b) the i n t e r n a l reality o f that
w h i c h a s p e a k e r w o u l d l i k e t o e x p r e s s as h e r i n t e n t i o n s , a n d (c) t h e
n o r m a t i v e r e a l i t y o f t h a t w h i c h is s o c i a l l y a n d c u l t u r a l l y recognized.
I t is t h e r e b y s u b j e c t e d t o v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t i t n e e d n o t a n d c a n n o t
f u l f i l l as a n o n s i t u a t e d s e n t e n c e , as a p u r e l y g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m a t i o n .
A c h a i n o f s y m b o l s " c o u n t s " as a s e n t e n c e o f a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e , L ,
i f i t is w e l l f o r m e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e system o f g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s , GL.
T h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f a sentence means ( f r o m a pragmatic perspec-
t i v e ) t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e , w h e n u t t e r e d b y a speaker, is comprehensible
t o a l l h e a r e r s w h o h a v e m a s t e r e d GL. C o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y is t h e o n l y
u n i v e r s a l c l a i m t h a t is t o b e f u l f i l l e d i m m a n e n t l y t o l a n g u a g e that
can be raised by p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d to a
sentence. T h e validity o f a stated p r o p o s i t i o n , by contrast, d e p e n d s
o n w h e t h e r the p r o p o s i t i o n represents a fact o r experience (or o n
whether the existential presuppositions o f the m e n t i o n e d proposi-
tional c o n t e n t h o l d ) ; the validity o f an expressed i n t e n t i o n depends
o n w h e t h e r i t c o r r e s p o n d s t o w h a t is a c t u a l l y i n t e n d e d b y the
speaker; a n d t h e validity o f the speech act p e r f o r m e d d e p e n d s o n
whether this action conforms to a recognized normative back-
g r o u n d . W h e r e a s a g r a m m a t i c a l sentence f u l f i l l s t h e c l a i m t o c o m p r e -
h e n s i b i l i t y , a successful utterance m u s t satisfy t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l v a l i d i t y
c l a i m s : i t m u s t c o u n t as t r u e f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n s o f a r as i t r e p r e -
sents s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d ; i t m u s t c o u n t as t r u t h f u l i n s o f a r as i t
expresses s o m e t h i n g i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r ; a n d i t m u s t c o u n t as
r i g h t i n s o f a r as i t c o n f o r m s t o s o c i a l l y r e c o g n i z e d expectations.
We can, o f course, i d e n t i f y features i n t h e surface structures o f
s e n t e n c e s t h a t have a s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e t h r e e g e n e r a l p r a g -
m a t i c f u n c t i o n s o f t h e utterance: t o r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g , to express
an i n t e n t i o n , to establish an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Sentences
w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t are used to represent a n experience o r a
state o f a f f a i r s ( o r t o r e f e r t o these i n d i r e c t l y ) ; i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s -
sions, m o d a l f o r m s , a n d so o n a r e u s e d t o e x p r e s s t h e s p e a k e r ' s
50 51
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

i n t e n t i o n s ; p e r f o r m a t i v e phrases are used t o establish i n t e r p e r s o n a l d o m a i n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s has b e e n p u r s u e d w i t h i n a n a l y t i c p h i -

relations between speaker a n d hearer. T h u s , the general structures
o f s p e e c h a r e also r e f l e c t e d a t t h e l e v e l o f s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e . B u t
i n s o f a r as w e c o n s i d e r a s e n t e n c e as a g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m a t i o n , t h a t
is, i n d e p e n d e n d y o f speech situations i n w h i c h i t can be u t t e r e d ,
t h e s e g e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s are n o t y e t " o c c u p i e d . " I n o r d e r
to p r o d u c e a grammatical sentence—as an example, say, f o r lin-
g u i s t s — a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r n e e d satisfy o n l y t h e c l a i m t o compre-
h e n s i b i l i t y . H e has t o have m a s t e r e d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g system of
g r a m m a t i c a l rules; this we call his l i n g u i s t i c ability, a n d i t can be
a n a l y z e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y . I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r w i t h r e g a r d t o h i s
a b i l i t y t o c o m m u n i c a t e ; t h i s is s u s c e p t i b l e o n l y t o p r a g m a t i c analysis.
By " c o m m u n i c a t i v e competence," I understand the ability o f a ances, a r e o n l y b e g i n n i n g s .
speaker o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g to e m b e d a w e l l -
f o r m e d s e n t e n c e i n r e l a t i o n s t o r e a l i t y — t h a t is,
losophy f r o m Frege to D u m m e t t . 6 2
T h a t t h i s is a m a t t e r o f u n i v e r s a l -
p r a g m a t i c investigation can be seen i n t h e fact t h a t the t r u t h value
o f p r o p o s i t i o n s is systematically t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . T h e t h e o r y o f
p r e d i c a t i o n d o e s n o t i n v e s t i g a t e s e n t e n c e s i n g e n e r a l (as d o e s l i n -
g u i s t i c s ) b u t s e n t e n c e s i n t h e i r f u n c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t i n g facts. A n a l y -
sis is d i r e c t e d a b o v e a l l t o t h e l o g i c o f u s i n g p r e d i c a t e s a n d t h o s e
expressions t h a t e n a b l e us t o r e f e r t o objects. T o be sure, this p a r t
o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is n o t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f o r a t h e o r y o f
communication. The analysis o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , t h e d i s c u s s i o n of
avowals, a n d t h e d e b a t e o n p r i v a t e s p e e c h , i n so f a r as t h e y c l e a r t h e
way t o a u n i v e r s a l pragmatics o f t h e expressive f u n c t i o n o f u t t e r -
6 3
Finally, speech act t h e o r y provides a
useful p o i n t o f departure for the p a r t o f universal pragmatics related
to the interpersonal f u n c t i o n o f utterances.

W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s e c o n d q u e s t i o n r a i s e d a b o v e , o n e m i g h t see a
i . t o c h o o s e t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e i n s u c h a way t h a t e i t h e r t h e
further difficulty with my proposal for conceptualizing universal
t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f the p r o p o s i t i o n stated o r the existential presup-
p r a g m a t i c s i n t h e f a c t t h a t f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s d o e s n o t fit w e l l i n t o
positions o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t m e n t i o n e d are supposedly
the distinction between a l i n g u i s t i c analysis c o n c e r n e d w i t h sen-
f u l f i l l e d (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n s h a r e t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s p e a k e r ) ;
t e n c e s a n d a p r a g m a t i c analysis c o n c e r n e d w i t h u t t e r a n c e s . T h e r e is
i i . T o e x p r e s s h i s i n t e n t i o n s i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s - a b r o a d s p e c t r u m o f different approaches to semantic theory. Lin-
s i o n r e p r e s e n t s w h a t is i n t e n d e d (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n t r u s t t h e guistically oriented theories of meaning * 6
t r y t o g r a s p systematically t h e
speaker); a n d s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s . I n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f trans-
i i i . T o p e r f o r m t h e s p e e c h a c t i n s u c h a way t h a t i t c o n f o r m s to formational grammar, e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e s o f sen-
r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s o r t o a c c e p t e d self-images (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n tences e i t h e r start w i t h semantic d e e p structures o r rely o n semantic
be i n a c c o r d w i t h the speaker i n shared value o r i e n t a t i o n s ) . p r o j e c t i o n s i n t o s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s a p p r o a c h leads as a r u l e
t o a c o m b i n a t o r y system, c o n s t r u c t e d u s i n g e l e m e n t a r y sentences,
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t these decisions d o not depend o n particular
o f g e n e r a l s e m a n t i c m a r k e r s . Lexical semantics p r o c e e d s i n a s i m i l a r
epistemic presuppositions and changing contexts b u t cause sen-
m a n n e r ; i t clarifies t h e m e a n i n g structures o f a given l e x i c o n by way
t e n c e s i n g e n e r a l t o assume t h e u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s of
o f a f o r m a l analysis o f m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s . T h e w e a k n e s s o f t h e s e
representation, expression, and the production of interpersonal
l i n g u i s t i c a p p r o a c h e s lies i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a c c o m m o d a t e t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w h a t is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e m is p r e c i s e l y t h e c o m m u n i c a -
p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s o n l y i n a n a d h o c way.
tive c o m p e t e n c e f o r w h i c h I a m p r o p o s i n g a universal-pragmatic H o w e v e r , t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e w o r k o f
investigation. W i t t g e n s t e i n has p r o v i d e d g o o d r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g t h a t t h e m e a n -
T h e p a r t o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t is f u r t h e s t d e v e l o p e d is t h a t i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c expressions can be i d e n t i f i e d o n l y w i t h reference to
related to the representational f u n c t i o n o f utterances, for example situations o f possible e m p l o y m e n t .
to the use of elementary p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences. This classic
52 53

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

F o r t h e i r p a r t , pragmatic theories of meaning 65

are faced w i t h the
difficulty o f d e l i m i t i n g a linguistic expression's typical situations o f
e m p l o y m e n t f r o m contexts t h a t h a p p e n b y c h a n c e t o have a d d i -
tional meaning-generating power b u t d o n o t affect t h e semantic
core o f the linguistic expression. A c c o r d i n g to w h i c h criteria may we
e x t r a p o l a t e t y p i c a l b e h a v i o r f r o m a c t u a l l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r ? Reference
semantics, 66
w h e t h e r f r a m e d as a t h e o r y o f e x t e n s i o n a l o r o f i n t e n -
sional d e n o t a t i o n , determines the m e a n i n g o f a n expression by the
class o f o b j e c t s t o w h i c h i t c a n b e a p p l i e d i n t r u e s e n t e n c e s . O n t h i s
premise, one can explicate t h e m e a n i n g o f expressions that appear
i n s e n t e n c e s w i t h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . I d o n o t see, however,
w h y semantic t h e o r y s h o u l d m o n o p o l i s t i c a l l y single o u t the r e p r e -
sentational f u n c t i o n o f language a n d neglect t h e specific mean-
ings that language d e v e l o p s i n its expressive a n d interpersonal
functions.
These p r e l i m i n a r y reflections are i n t e n d e d merely to s u p p o r t t h e
c o n j e c t u r e t h a t s e m a n t i c t h e o r y c a n n o t f r u i t f u l l y b e d e v e l o p e d as a
u n i f i e d t h e o r y . B u t i f i t is h e t e r o g e n e o u s l y composed, no objection
t o t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e analysis o f s e n t e n c e s t r u c -
tures f r o m that o f utterance structures can be i n f e r r e d f r o m the
difficulties o f d e m a r c a t i n g semantics f r o m pragmatics (difficulties
t h a t are equally present i n d e m a r c a t i n g semantics f r o m syntax). T h e
analysis o f g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h c a n i n d e e d b e g i n w i t h g e n -
e r a l s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e s . H o w e v e r , i t is d i r e c t e d t o f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s
o f sentences o n l y f r o m t h e perspective o f the possibility o f using
sentences as e l e m e n t s o f s p e e c h , t h a t is, f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l , e x p r e s -
sive, a n d i n t e r p e r s o n a l f u n c t i o n s . U n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , t o o , c a n b e
u n d e r s t o o d as s e m a n t i c analysis. B u t i t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o t h e r
theories o f m e a n i n g i n that the meanings o f linguistic expressions
a r e r e l e v a n t o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s a r e u s e d i n s p e e c h acts
t h a t satisfy t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s o f t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d n o r m a t i v e
l i g h t n e s s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is d i s t i n g u i s h e d
f r o m e m p i r i c a l pragmatics, f o r example, sociolinguistics, i n that the
m e a n i n g o f linguistic expressions comes u n d e r consideration only
i n s o f a r as i t is d e t e r m i n e d b y formal p r o p e r t i e s o f s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n s
i n g e n e r a l , a n d n o t b y p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s o f use.
I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o s u m u p t h e d i f f e r e n t levels o f analysis a n d
c o r r e s p o n d i n g object d o m a i n s o f semiotics.
Sentences versus Utterances
I f w e s t a r t w i t h c o n c r e t e s p e e c h acts e m b e d d e d i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s
a n d t h e n d i s r e g a r d a l l aspects t h a t t h e s e u t t e r a n c e s o w e t o t h e i r
p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s , we are left w i t h linguistic expressions. Whereas
t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t o f s p e e c h is t h e s p e e c h act, t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t
o f l a n g u a g e is t h e s e n t e n c e . T h e d e m a r c a t i o n is o b t a i n e d b y a t t e n d -
i n g to c o n d i t i o n s o f validity: a grammatically w e l l - f o r m e d sentence
satisfies t h e c l a i m t o c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y ; a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y successful
speech act r e q u i r e s , b e y o n d t h e c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f the l i n g u i s t i c
expression, t h a t the participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n be p r e p a r e d to
r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h a t t h e y raise c l a i m s t o t r u t h , t r u t h f u l -
ness, a n d Tightness, a n d r e c i p r o c a l l y i m p u t e t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n . S e n -
t e n c e s a r e t h e o b j e c t o f linguistic analysis, s p e e c h acts o f p r a g m a t i c
analysis.
Individual Languages versus Language in General
T h e f i r s t task o f l i n g u i s t i c s is t o d e v e l o p a g r a m m a r f o r e a c h i n d i v i d -
u a l l a n g u a g e so t h a t a s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h
any sentence o f the language. O n the o t h e r h a n d , general g r a m m a t i -
c a l t h e o r y is c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system that
u n d e r l i e s t h e ability o f a subject to generate w e l l - f o r m e d sentences
i n a n y l a n g u a g e whatsoever. G r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y claims to recon-
s t r u c t t h e u n i v e r s a l l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y o f a d u l t speakers. ( I n a strong
version, this linguistic competence means the ability to develop hy-
p o t h e s e s t h a t g u i d e l a n g u a g e a c q u i s i t i o n o n t h e basis o f a n i n n a t e
disposition; i n a weaker version, linguistic competence represents
t h e r e s u l t o f l e a r n i n g processes i n t e r p r e t e d c o n s t r u c t i v i s t i c a l l y i n
Piaget's sense.)
Aspects of Linguistic Analysis
Every linguistic expression c a n be c o n s i d e r e d f r o m a t least t h r e e
a n a l y t i c v i e w p o i n t s . P h o n e t i c s e x a m i n e s l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s as i n -
s c r i p t i o n s i n a n u n d e r l y i n g m e d i u m ( i . e . , as f o r m a t i o n s o f sound).
54 55
Chapter 1 What Is Universal Pragmatics?

S y n t a c t i c t h e o r y investigates l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e e x a m i n e s i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n s i n s o f a r as t h e y f u n c t i o n i n first-per-
f o r m a l c o n n e c t i o n s o f the smallest m e a n i n g f u l units. Semantic t h e - s o n s e n t e n c e s . F i n a l l y , t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts e x a m i n e s i l l o c u t i o n -
o r y examines the m e a n i n g c o n t e n t o f linguistic expressions. Evi- ary force f r o m the viewpoint of the establishment o f legitimate
dendy, only phonetic and syntactic theory are self-sufficient i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations. These semiotic d i s t i n c t i o n s are s u m m a r i z e d
linguistic theories; semantic t h e o r y , by contrast, c a n n o t be con- i n the f o l l o w i n g table:
d u c t e d solely i n t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n o f l a n g u a g e , t h a t is,
T h e o r e t i c a l level Object domain
i n d i s r e g a r d o f p r a g m a t i c aspects.
Linguistics Sentences
Particular versus Universal Aspects of Speech Acts Grammar Sentences o f an i n d i v i d u a l
T h e task o f e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s consists, t o b e g i n w i t h , i n d e s c r i b -
language
i n g s p e e c h acts t y p i c a l o f a c e r t a i n m i l i e u , w h i c h c a n i n t u r n be
Grammatical theory Rules f o r generating
analyzed f r o m sociological, ethnological, a n d psychological points o f
sentences i n any language
view. G e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is c o n c e r n e d
w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system t h a t u n d e r l i e s t h e a b i l i t y o f a whatever

s u b j e c t t o u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n a n y r e l e v a n t s i t u a t i o n whatsoever. Uni- A s p e c t s o f l i n g u i s t i c analysis

v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t h e r e b y raises t h e c l a i m t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e a b i l i t y Phonetic theory Inscriptions (language

o f a d u l t speakers to e m b e d sentences i n r e l a t i o n s to r e a l i t y i n such sounds)
a way t h a t they can take o n the general pragmatic functions of Syntactic t h e o r y Syntactical rules
representation, expression, a n d establishing legitimate interpersonal
Semantic theory Lexical units
r e l a t i o n s . T h i s c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e is e x p r e s s e d i n t e r a l i a i n
Pragmatics S p e e c h acts
those accomplishments t h a t h e r m e n e u t i c s stylizes t o a n a r t (Kunst¬
lehre), n a m e l y p a r a p h r a s i n g u t t e r a n c e s b y m e a n s o f c o n t e x t - s i m i l a r Empirical pragmatics C o n t e x t - b o u n d s p e e c h acts
u t t e r a n c e s o f t h e same l a n g u a g e o r t r a n s l a t i n g t h e m i n t o c o n t e x t - Universal pragmatics R u l e s f o r u s i n g sentences
comparable utterances i n a f o r e i g n language. i n utterances
Aspects o f universal-pragmatic
Universal-Pragmatic Aspects
analysis
T h e three general pragmatic functions o f an utterance—to repre-
Theory of elementary Acts o f reference a n d
sent something i n the w o r l d u s i n g a sentence, to express the
propositions predication
speaker's i n t e n t i o n s , a n d to establish l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela-
tions—are t h e basis o f a l l t h e p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s t h a t a n u t t e r a n c e Linguistic expression o f
Theory of first-person sentences
c a n assume i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s . T h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h o s e general intentions
f u n c t i o n s is m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r u t h , t r u t h - Establishment of
f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness. T h u s e v e r y s p e e c h a c t c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d f r o m T h e o r y o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts interpersonal relations
the corresponding analytic viewpoints. F o r m a l semantics examines
t h e s t r u c t u r e o f e l e m e n t a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e acts o f r e f e r e n c e For a theory of communicative a c t i o n , t h e t h i r d aspect o f u t t e r -

a n d p r e d i c a t i o n . A s t i l l scarcely d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ances, n a m e l y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f legitimate interpersonal rela-

tions, is c e n t r a l . I s h a l l t h e r e f o r e t a k e t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts as
my point of departure.
 57
56
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

T h e Standard F o r m o f the Speech Act—Searle's Principle o f p r o m i s e , a s s e r t i o n , s u g g e s t i o n , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h u s t h e g e n e r a t i v e

Expressibility p o w e r consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e speaker, i n p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h
act, c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e h e a r e r i n s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e l a t t e r c a n t a k e
T h e p r i n c i p a l task o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is t o c l a r i f y t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e up an interpersonal relation with her. 6 8
I t c a n , o f c o u r s e , be s a i d o f
status o f l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s . A u s t i n a n a l y z e d t h e sense i n w h i c h I e v e r y i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d n o t o n l y o f s p e e c h acts, t h a t t h e y e s t a b l i s h
c a n u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n s p e e c h acts as t h e illocutionary force o f s p e e c h i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y have a n e x p l i c i t l y l i n -
acts. I n u t t e r i n g a p r o m i s e , a n a s s e r t i o n , o r a w a r n i n g , I s i m u l t a n e - g u i s t i c f o r m , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s a r e r e l a t e d t o a c o n t e x t o f ac-
ously execute an action w i t h the c o r r e s p o n d i n g sentences: I t r y t o tion norms a n d values. W i t h o u t t h e normative background of
make a p r o m i s e , t o put forward a n a s s e r t i o n , t o issue a w a r n i n g — I d o routines, roles, h a b i t u a l i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e — i n short, conventions—

t h i n g s by saying s o m e t h i n g . A l t h o u g h t h e r e are o t h e r m o d e s of the individual action w o u l d remain indeterminate. A l l communica-

employing language—Austin mentions, a m o n g others, w r i t i n g po- tive actions satisfy or violate normative social expectations or

e m s a n d t e l l i n g j o k e s — t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y use seems t o b e t h e f o u n - conventions. Satisfying a c o n v e n t i o n i n a c t i n g means t h a t a subject

dation on w h i c h these o t h e r k i n d s o f e m p l o y m e n t rest. T o be c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g takes u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n

w i t h a t least o n e o t h e r s u c h s u b j e c t . T h u s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a n
u n d e r s t o o d i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , e v e r y u t t e r a n c e m u s t a t least i m p l i c -
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n is a c r i t e r i o n t h a t is n o t selective e n o u g h for
i t l y e s t a b l i s h a n d give e x p r e s s i o n t o a c e r t a i n relation b e t w e e n the
o u r purposes. I emphasized at t h e start t h a t I a m r e s t r i c t i n g m y
s p e a k e r a n d h e r c o u n t e r p a r t . W e c a n also say t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
analysis t o p a r a d i g m a t i c cases o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y e x p l i c i t a c t i o n t h a t is
f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act consists i n f i x i n g t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n
oriented toward reaching understanding. This restriction must now
o f the content uttered.
b e d r a w n s o m e w h a t m o r e precisely. I n d o i n g so, w e c a n b e g i n w i t h
T h e current distinction between the content and the relational
t h e s t a n d a r d e x a m p l e s f r o m w h i c h s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y was d e v e l o p e d .
aspects o f a n u t t e r a n c e has, t o b e g i n w i t h , a t r i v i a l m e a n i n g . 6 7
I t says
T h e f o l l o w i n g are typical speech-act f o r m s : 6 9

t h a t , i n b e i n g u t t e r e d , t h e s e n t e n c e u s e d is e m b e d d e d i n a c o n t e x t ,
m o r e precisely, i n s p e c i f i c i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I n a c e r t a i n way,
"I . . . you that...
e v e r y e x p l i c i d y p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e b o t h establishes a n d r e p r e -
[verb] [sentence]
sents a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a t least t w o s u b j e c t s c a p a b l e
e.g., " I ( h e r e b y ) p r o m i s e y o u t h a t I w i l l c o m e t o m o r r o w . "
o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n . T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e is t r i v i a l so l o n g as u n d e r
t h e r e l a t i o n a l aspect we m e r e l y c o n t r a s t t h e u t t e r a n c e c h a r a c t e r of "You are . . . ... ."
s p e e c h w i t h its s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . I f n o t h i n g m o r e w e r e m e a n t b y t h e [verb] [p. part.] [sentence]
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act, t h e c o n c e p t " i l l o c u t i o n a r y " c o u l d e.g., " Y o u a r e r e q u e s t e d t o s t o p s m o k i n g . "
s e r v e a t best t o e l u c i d a t e t h e f a c t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s h a v e t h e
" I ••. ... you that ...
c h a r a c t e r o f a c t i o n s , t h a t is, a r e s p e e c h actions. T h e p o i n t o f t h e
[auxiliary verb] [verb] [sentence]
c o n c e p t c a n n o t l i e t h e r e i n . I find i t r a t h e r i n t h e p e c u l i a r l y g e n e r a -
e.g., " I c a n assure y o u t h a t i t w a s n ' t I . "
tive p o w e r o f s p e e c h acts.
I t is t o t h i s g e n e r a t i v e p o w e r t h a t I t r a c e t h e f a c t t h a t a s p e e c h a c t I shall h o l d to the f o l l o w i n g t e r m i n o l o g i c a l rules. A n explicit
c a n s u c c e e d ( o r f a i l ) . W e c a n say t h a t a s p e e c h a c t succeeds i f a s p e e c h a c t satisfies t h e standard form i n its s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e i f i t is
r e l a t i o n between the speaker a n d hearer comes to pass—the r e l a t i o n m a d e u p o f a n illocutionary a n d a propositional c o m p o n e n t . T h e i l l o -
i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r — a n d i f t h e h e a r e r c a n understand and accept c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t consists i n a n illocutionary a c t c a r r i e d o u t w i t h
t h e c o n t e n t u t t e r e d b y t h e s p e a k e r i n t h e sense i n d i c a t e d (e.g., as a t h e a i d o f a performative sentence. T h i s s e n t e n c e is f o r m e d i n t h e
58 59

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

p r e s e n t i n d i c a t i v e , a f f i r m a t i v e , a n d has as its l o g i c a l s u b j e c t t h e first t o state s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e w o r l d , e i t h e r d i r e c d y i n t h e f o r m o f a n

person a n d as its l o g i c a l (direct) object the second person; the a s s e r t i o n o r i n d i r e c d y , i n n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, t h r o u g h m e n -
predicate, constructed w i t h the help of a performative expression, tioning a propositional content.
permits i n general the particle "hereby." 7 0
This performative compo- E x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts always have a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t i n
n e n t needs to be c o m p l e t e d by a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t c o n - w h i c h a state o f a f f a i r s is e x p r e s s e d . N o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s n o r m a l l y
structed with the help of a sentence w i t h propositional content. lack this c o m p o n e n t ; thus they cannot fulfill representational func-
W h e n e v e r i t is u s e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h t i o n s . S i g n a l i n g t o a t a x i so t h a t I c a n b e g i n w o r k i n m y o f f i c e b y
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t takes t h e f o r m o f a propositional sentence (Aus- eight i n the m o r n i n g , reacting to the news o f m y child's miserable
sagesatz) . I n its e l e m e n t a r y f o r m , t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e c o n t a i n s school grades w i t h a desperate look, j o i n i n g a d e m o n s t r a t i o n m a r c h ,
(i) a n a m e or a r e f e r r i n g expression, with the aid of w h i c h the expressing n o n a c c e p t a n c e o f an i n v i t a t i o n by n o t s h o w i n g u p , shak-
s p e a k e r d e n o t e s a n o b j e c t a b o u t w h i c h she w a n t s t o assert s o m e - i n g a c a n d i d a t e ' s h a n d a f t e r h e has passed t h e e x a m , a n d so o n a n d
t h i n g ; a n d (ii) a predicate expression for the general specification so f o r t h , I o b s e r v e o r v i o l a t e c o n v e n t i o n s . N a t u r a l l y , these n o r m a t i v e
t h a t the speaker wants to g r a n t o r d e n y to the object. I n n o n c o n s t a - expectations have a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ; however, the proposi-
tive s p e e c h acts, t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is n o t s t a t e d , b u t men- tional content m u s t a l r e a d y be k n o w n to the participants i f the
tioned, i n t h i s case, p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t c o i n c i d e s w i t h w h a t is e x p r e s s e d b e h a v i o r is t o be c o m p r e h e n s i b l e as a r r i v i n g at w o r k , a
usually called the unasserted p r o p o s i t i o n . ( T h u s I d i s t i n g u i s h be- p a r e n t ' s r e a c t i n g , t a k i n g p a r t i n a d e m o n s t r a t i o n — i n s h o r t as a n
t w e e n t h e n o m i n a l i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n " t h a t p," w h i c h expresses a state action. T h e nonverbal utterance itself cannot b r i n g the proposi-
o f affairs, a n d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n w h i c h represents a fact a n d w h i c h t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m t o e x p r e s s i o n because i t
owes its assertoric f o r c e t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t i t is e m b e d d e d i n cannot take o n representational functions. I t can, o f course, be
a s p e e c h act o f t h e t y p e " a s s e r t i o n , " a n d is t h e r e b y c o n n e c t e d w i t h understood as a n i n d i c a t o r t h a t calls t o m i n d t h e propositional

a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act o f asserting. I n f o r m a l logic, o f course, we treat content o f the presupposed n o r m .

p r o p o s i t i o n s as a u t o n o m o u s u n i t s . O n l y t h e t r u t h v a l u e w e assign t o O w i n g to their representational function, propositionally differen-

"jf>" i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o " t h a t p" is a r e m i n d e r o f t h e embedding
o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n i n s o m e c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h act, a n e m b e d d i n g that
is systematically n e g l e c t e d . ) 7 1
I s h a l l c a l l s p e e c h acts t h a t h a v e t h i s s t r u c t u r e propositionally differ-
entiated. T h e y are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m s y m b o l i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c -
t i o n s — f o r i n s t a n c e , a s h o u t o f " F i r e ! " t h a t releases complementary
a c t i o n s , assistance o r f l i g h t — i n t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f
s p e e c h is u n c o u p l e d f r o m t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, so t h a t ( i ) t h e p r o -
p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t can b e h e l d i n v a r i a n t across c h a n g e s i n i l l o c u t i o n -
ary potential, and (ii) the holistic m o d e of speech, i n which
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , expression, a n d b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n are still one,
can be r e p l a c e d by d i f f e r e n t i a l m o d e s o f speech. I shall r e t u r n to
t h i s p o i n t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . F o r t h e p r e s e n t , i t suffices t o
p o i n t o u t t h a t t h i s l e v e l o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f s p e e c h is a p r e c o n d i t i o n
f o r a n a c t i o n ' s a b i l i t y t o t a k e o n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s , t h a t is,
t i a t e d speech acts a l l o w t h e a c t o r a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f f r e e d o m in
f o l l o w i n g n o r m s . I f w o r k b e g i n s a t e i g h t i n t h e m o r n i n g , t h e r e is t h e
o p t i o n o n l y o f a p p e a r i n g o r n o t a p p e a r i n g ; i n t h e f o r m e r case, t o b e
o n t i m e o r t o b e l a t e ; i n t h e l a t t e r case, t o b e e x c u s e d o r n o t e x c u s e d ,
a n d so o n . N o n v e r b a l a c t i o n s are o f t e n t h e r e s u l t o f s u c h " t r e e s " o f
"yes" o r " n o " d e c i s i o n s . B u t i f t h e a c t o r c a n e x p r e s s h e r s e l f v e r b a l l y ,
h e r s i t u a t i o n is rich w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e s . She can express t h e same
s p e e c h act, say a c o m m a n d , i n a v e r y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d way; she w i l l
f u l f i l l t h e s a m e r o l e s e g m e n t , say t h a t o f a n E n g l i s h t e a c h e r d u r i n g
class d i c t a t i o n , w i t h v e r y d i f f e r e n t s p e e c h acts. I n s h o r t , p r o p o s i t i o n -
a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p e e c h leaves t h e a c t o r m o r e d e g r e e s o f freedom
i n r e l a t i o n t o a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d t h a n does a n o n -
linguistic interaction.
O f c o u r s e , p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d u t t e r a n c e s d o n o t always
h a v e a l i n g u i s t i c f o r m , as is s h o w n b y t h e e x a m p l e o f a g r a m m a t i c a l -
60
Chapter 1
ized sign language, for instance, the standardized language o f the
d e a f a n d m u t e . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , o n e m i g h t also m e n t i o n p o i n t i n g
g e s t u r e s , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t a n e q u i v a l e n t f o r t h e use o f r e f e r e n t i a l
terms, thereby s u p p l e m e n t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n a l speech. O n the o t h e r
h a n d , t h e r e a r e also s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e n o t p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r -
e n t i a t e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d s p e e c h acts s u c h as
" H e l l o ! " as a g r e e t i n g f o r m u l a , o r " C h e c k ! " a n d " C h e c k m a t e ! " as
p e r f o r m a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s f o r m o v e s i n a g a m e o f chess a n d t h e i r
c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t is
l a c k i n g places t h e s e v e r b a l u t t e r a n c e s o n a l e v e l w i t h n o r m a l n o n -
v e r b a l a c t i o n s ; w h i l e t h e l a t t e r a c t i o n s d o refer t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
c o n t e n t o f a p r e s u p p o s e d c o n v e n t i o n , t h e y d o n o t represent i t .
A s a first step i n d e l i m i t i n g t h e p r a g m a t i c u n i t s o f analysis, w e c a n
specify—out o f t h e set o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions t h a t rest o n the
consensual f o u n d a t i o n o f reciprocally raised a n d recognized validity
c l a i m s — t h e subset o f propositionally differentiated speech acts. B u t e v e n
t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n is n o t y e t selective e n o u g h ; f o r a m o n g t h e s e u t t e r -
a n c e s w e find s u c h s p e e c h acts as " b e t t i n g , " " c h r i s t e n i n g , " " a p p o i n t -
i n g , " a n d so o n . D e s p i t e t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n t e n t
(betting o n / f o r . . . , christening as/with . . . , appointing to . . . ) ,
they are b o u n d to a single i n s t i t u t i o n (or to a narrowly circum-
s c r i b e d set o f i n s t i t u t i o n s ) ; t h e y c a n t h e r e f o r e b e seen as t h e e q u i v a -
l e n t o f actions that fulfill presupposed n o r m s , either n o n v e r b a l l y o r
i n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d way. T h a t t h e s e s p e e c h acts a r e
institutionally bound c a n b e seen i n ( a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s ) t h e f a c t t h a t
the permissible p r o p o s i t i o n a l contents are n a r r o w l y l i m i t e d by t h e
normative meaning of betting, christening, appointing, marrying,
a n d so o n . O n e bets f o r stakes, c h r i s t e n s w i t h n a m e s , a p p o i n t s t o
o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s , m a r r i e s a p a r t n e r , a n d so o n . W i t h i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
b o u n d s p e e c h acts, s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n always b e s p e c i f i e d . W i t h
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, o n l y g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i -
tions can be specified—conditions that typically m u s t be m e t for a
c o r r e s p o n d i n g act t o s u c c e e d . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts e x -
press a s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e s a m e u n m e d i a t e d w a y t h a t p r o p o -
sitionally nondifferentiated and nonverbal actions express a
p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m . T o e x p l a i n w h a t acts o f b e t t i n g o r c h r i s t e n i n g
m e a n , I must refer to the institutions o f betting or christening. By
61
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
contrast, c o m m a n d s o r advice o r questions d o n o t represent i n s t i t u -
tions b u t types o f s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n fit v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s .
T o be sure, t h e c r i t e r i o n o f b e i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d does n o t
always p e r m i t a n u n a m b i g u o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . C o m m a n d s can exist
wherever relations o f a u t h o r i t y are i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ; a p p o i n t m e n t s
presuppose special, bureaucratically d e v e l o p e d organizations; and
m a r r i a g e s r e q u i r e a s i n g l e i n s t i t u t i o n ( w h i c h is, h o w e v e r , t o b e f o u n d
u n i v e r s a l l y ) . B u t this does n o t devalue t h e usefulness o f the analytic
v i e w p o i n t . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, i n s o f a r as t h e y h a v e
a n y r e g u l a t i v e m e a n i n g a t a l l , r e f e r t o g e n e r a l aspects o f action
n o r m s ; they are n o t , however, d e f i n e d by p a r t i c u l a r institutions.
We can n o w define t h e d e s i r e d a n a l y t i c u n i t s as propositionally
differentiated a n d institutionally unbound speech acts. T o b e s u r e , o n l y
t h o s e w i t h a n e x p l i c i t l y linguistic f o r m a r e s u i t a b l e f o r analysis. F r e -
q u e n t l y , o f c o u r s e , t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h s p e e c h acts are e m b e d d e d
makes standard linguistic f o r m s superfluous; for example, w h e n the
p e r f o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is d e t e r m i n e d e x c l u s i v e l y b y t h e c o n t e x t of
u t t e r a n c e ; o r w h e n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is m e r e l y i n d i c a t e d ,
t h a t is, e x p r e s s e d t h r o u g h i n f l e c t i o n , p u n c t u a t i o n , w o r d p o s i t i o n , o r
p a r t i c l e s s u c h as " i s n ' t i t ? , " " r i g h t ? , " " i n d e e d , " " c l e a r l y , " "surely," a n d
similar expressions.
F i n a l l y , w e s h a l l e x c l u d e t h o s e e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts i n s t a n d a r d
f o r m t h a t a p p e a r i n c o n t e x t s t h a t p r o d u c e shifts o f m e a n i n g . T h i s is
the case w h e n the pragmatic meaning of a context-dependent
speech act diverges f r o m the m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences used i n i t
( a n d f r o m t h e i n d i c a t e d g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t have t o
b e f u l f i l l e d f o r t h e t y p e o f s p e e c h act i n q u e s t i o n ) . Searle's " p r i n c i p l e
o f e x p r e s s i b i l i t y " takes t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i n t o a c c o u n t : a s s u m i n g t h a t
t h e s p e a k e r expresses h i s i n t e n t i o n precisely, e x p l i c i d y , a n d l i t e r a l l y ,
i t is p o s s i b l e i n p r i n c i p l e f o r e v e r y s p e e c h act c a r r i e d o u t o r c a p a b l e
o f b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t to be specified unequivocally by a complex
sentence.
K a n n g i e s s e r has g i v e n t h i s p r i n c i p l e t h e f o l l o w i n g f o r m : " F o r e v e r y
m e a n i n g x, i t is t h e case t h a t , i f t h e r e is a s p e a k e r S i n a l a n g u a g e
c o m m u n i t y P w h o m e a n s (meint) x, t h e n i t is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e b e
a n e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e l a n g u a g e s p o k e n b y P w h i c h is a n e x a c t e x p r e s -
s i o n o f x." 72
For o u r purposes, we can weaken this postulate to
 63
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W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

r e q u i r e that i n a given language, f o r every interpersonal r e l a t i o n that I have n o t e l u c i d a t e d t h e e m b e d d i n g of communicative action

a speaker wants to take u p e x p l i c i t l y w i t h a n o t h e r m e m b e r o f his ( " a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ) i n o t h e r types o f
language c o m m u n i t y , a suitable p e r f o r m a t i v e expression is e i t h e r a c t i o n . I t seems t o m e t h a t strategic action ( " a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
a v a i l a b l e o r , i f necessary, c a n b e o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h a s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e a c t o r ' s success" s u c h as c o m p e t i t i v e b e h a v i o r o r c o m b a t g a m e s —
available expressions o r newly i n t r o d u c e d . W i t h this m o d i f i c a t i o n , i n general, modes of action that correspond to the utilitarian m o d e l
we can take i n t o a c c o u n t reservations t h a t have b e e n expressed o f p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l a c t i o n ) as w e l l as t h e s t i l l i n s u f f i c i e n d y a n a l y z e d
c o n c e r n i n g Searle's p r i n c i p l e . 7 3
I n a n y case, t h e h e u r i s t i c m e a n i n g c a t e g o r y o f symbolic action ( s u c h as a c t i o n m a n i f e s t e d i n a c o n c e r t o r
is c l e a r — i f t h e p o s t u l a t e o f e x p r e s s i b i l i t y is v a l i d , analysis c a n be a d a n c e — i n general, m o d e s o f a c t i o n t h a t are b o u n d to n o n p r o p o -

l i m i t e d t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d , e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts i n s t a n d a r d s i t i o n a l systems o f s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n ) differ f r o m communicative

form. a c t i o n i n that i n d i v i d u a l validity claims are suspended ( i n strategic

T h e f o l l o w i n g d i a g r a m sums u p t h e v i e w p o i n t s f r o m w h i c h I have
d e l i m i t e d t h e class o f s p e e c h acts basic f o r analysis.
D e r i v a t i o n o f the Analytic U n i t s o f t h e T h e o r y o f Speech Acts
I n s t r u m e n t a l actions Social actions
action, truthfulness, i n symbolic action, t r u t h ) . 7 4
M y previous analy-
ses o f " l a b o r " a n d " i n t e r a c t i o n " h a v e n o t y e t a d e q u a t e l y c a p t u r e d t h e
m o s t g e n e r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f i n s t r u m e n t a l a n d so-
cial (or c o m m u n i c a t i v e ) action. I c a n n o t pursue this here.

O n the D o u b l e Structure o f Speech

S y m b o l i c actions C o m m u n i c a t i v e actions Strategic actions
I w o u l d l i k e t o r e t u r n n o w t o t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c double structure t h a t
c a n b e r e a d o f f f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m o f s p e e c h acts. O b v i o u s l y ,
N o t propositionally Propositionally
the two components, the illocutionary a n d the propositional, can
differentiated differentiated
vary independently o f one another. We can h o l d a propositional
c o n t e n t i n v a r i a n t vis-a-vis t h e d i f f e r e n t types o f s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h
i t o c c u r s . I n t h i s a b s t r a c t i o n o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e as-
Nonverbal Verbal Nonverbal Verbal serted p r o p o s i t i o n , a f u n d a m e n t a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f o u r language
(illocutionarily is e x p r e s s e d . P r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p e e c h d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t -
abbreviated s e l f t h e r e i n f r o m t h e s y m b o l i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n we c a n a l -
speech acts) Institutionally Institutionally ready observe a m o n g p r i m a t e s . 7 5
A n y n u m b e r o f examples o f the
bound unbound invariance of propositional content d e s p i t e v a r i a n c e i n s p e e c h act m o d e
can be p r o v i d e d — f o r instance, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t "Peter's
s m o k i n g a p i p e , " t h e r e are t h e f o l l o w i n g :
Implicit Explicit
" I assert t h a t P e t e r s m o k e s a p i p e . "

" I beg y o u (Peter) to smoke a p i p e . "

Context- Context-
" I ask y o u ( P e t e r ) , d o y o u s m o k e a p i p e ? "
dependent independent
" I w a r n y o u (Peter) against s m o k i n g a p i p e . "

Analytic units
64
Chapter 1
I n a genetic perspective, t h e speech-act invariance o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l
c o n t e n t s a p p e a r s as a n uncoupling of the illocutionary and propositional
components i n t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts. T h i s
u n c o u p l i n g is a c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e d o u b l e s t r u c -
t u r e o f s p e e c h , t h a t is, f o r t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t w o c o m m u n i c a t i v e levels
o n w h i c h s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r m u s t simultaneously c o m e t o a n u n d e r -
standing i f they want to c o m m u n i c a t e their intentions to one an-
o t h e r . I w o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h ( i ) t h e level of intersubjectivity o n w h i c h
s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , t h r o u g h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, e s t a b l i s h t h e r e l a -
tions that p e r m i t t h e m to come to an understanding w i t h one an-
o t h e r , a n d ( i i ) t h e level of propositional content a b o u t w h i c h t h e y w i s h
to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the communicative f u n c t i o n specified i n
( i ) . C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e r e l a t i o n a l a n d t h e c o n t e n t aspects, f r o m
t h e p o i n t o f view o f w h i c h every u t t e r a n c e can be analyzed, t h e r e are
(in the standard f o r m ) the illocutionary a n d the propositional com-
p o n e n t s o f t h e s p e e c h act. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act fixes t h e sense i n
w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is e m p l o y e d , a n d t h e act-comple-
m e n t d e t e r m i n e s t h e c o n t e n t t h a t is u n d e r s t o o d "as s o m e t h i n g ..."
i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n s p e c i f i e d . ( T h e h e r m e n e u t i c "as" c a n
b e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o n b o t h c o m m u n i c a t i v e levels. W i t h a p r o p o s i t i o n
"p," a n i d e n t i f i a b l e o b j e c t w h o s e e x i s t e n c e is p r e s u p p o s e d c a n be
characterized "as s o m e t h i n g " — e . g . , as a " r e d , " " s o f t , " o r "ideal,"
object. I n connection w i t h a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, t h a t is, t h r o u g h
b e i n g e m b e d d e d i n a s p e e c h act, t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t c a n , i n
t u r n , b e uttered "as s o m e t h i n g " — e . g . , as a c o m m a n d o r a s s e r t i o n ) .
A basic f e a t u r e o f l a n g u a g e is c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h i s d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e
o f s p e e c h , n a m e l y , its i n h e r e n t r e f l e x i v i t y . T h e s t a n d a r d i z e d p o s s i b i l i -
ties f o r d i r e c d y a n d i n d i r e c t l y m e n t i o n i n g s p e e c h m e r e l y m a k e ex-
p l i c i t a self-reference t h a t is a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d i n e v e r y s p e e c h act.
In filling o u t the double structure o f speech, participants i n dialogue
c o m m u n i c a t e o n t w o levels s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T h e y c o m b i n e commu-
nication of a content with "metacommunication"—communication
a b o u t t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e c o m m u n i c a t e d c o n t e n t is u s e d . The
expression " m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n " m i g h t be m i s l e a d i n g h e r e because
it c o u l d be associated w i t h metalanguage a n d suggest a n i d e a of
l a n g u a g e levels s u c h t h a t , a t e v e r y h i g h e r l e v e l , m e t a l i n g u i s t i c state-
ments about the object language o f t h e n e x t lower level can be
65
W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ?
m a d e . B u t t h e c o n c e p t o f a h i e r a r c h y o f l a n g u a g e was i n t r o d u c e d
f o r f o r m a l languages, i n w h i c h j u s t that reflexivity o f o r d i n a r y l a n -
g u a g e is l a c k i n g . M o r e o v e r , i n a m e t a l a n g u a g e o n e always r e f e r s t o
a n object language i n the objectivating a t t i t u d e o f someone asserting
facts o r o b s e r v i n g events; o n e f o r m s m e t a l i n g u i s t i c statements. B y
c o n t r a s t , o n t h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l e v e l o f s p e e c h , i t is p r e c i s e l y
statements t h a t are n o t possible. I n s t e a d , at this level, one chooses
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e i n w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is t o be
used; a n d this m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n a b o u t t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e
s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is t o b e e m p l o y e d r e q u i r e s a
p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o n the p a r t o f those c o m m u n i c a t i n g . Thus, the
p e c u l i a r r e f l e x i v i t y o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e rests in the first instance o n t h e
combination of a communication of content—effected i n an objec-
tivating a t t i t u d e — w i t h a m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n concerning the rela-
tional aspect—effected i n a performative a t t i t u d e — f r o m the p o i n t
o f v i e w o f w h i c h t h e c o n t e n t is t o b e understood.
O f c o u r s e , p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d i a l o g u e n o r m a l l y have t h e o p t i o n o f
o b j e c t i f y i n g e v e r y i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t p e r f o r m e d as t h e c o n t e n t o f a
further (constative) s p e e c h act. T h e y c a n a d o p t a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g
attitude t o w a r d the i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f a n already per-
f o r m e d speech act a n d shift this c o m p o n e n t t o t h e level o f p r o p o s i -
tional c o n t e n t s . N a t u r a l l y , t h e y c a n d o so o n l y b y p e f o r m i n g a n e w
speech act t h a t contains, i n t u r n , a n o n o b j e c t i f i e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m -
p o n e n t . T h e d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t m e n t i o n o f speech standardizes this
possibility o f r e n d e r i n g explicit the reflexivity o f natural language.
T h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t takes p l a c e o n t h e l e v e l o f i n t e r s u b -
j e c t i v i t y i n a s p e e c h act tn c a n b e d e p i c t e d o n t h e l e v e l o f p r o p o s i -
t i o n a l c o n t e n t i n a f u r t h e r ( c o n s t a t i v e ) s p e e c h act tn+1. O n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , i t is n o t p o s s i b l e simultaneously t o p e r f o r m a n d t o o b j e c t i f y a n
illocutionary act. 7 6
T h i s o p t i o n is s o m e t i m e s t h e o c c a s i o n f o r a d e s c r i p t i v i s t f a l l a c y t o
w h i c h e v e n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r i e s f a l l p r e y . W e c a n analyze t h e s t r u c -
tures o f speech, j u s t like every o t h e r object, o n l y i n a n objectivating
a t t i t u d e . I n d o i n g so, t h e r e l e v a n t a c c o m p a n y i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m -
p o n e n t c a n n o t , as w e saw a b o v e , b e c o m e uno acto t h e o b j e c t . T h i s
circumstance misleads m a n y language theorists i n t o the view that
c o m m u n i c a t i o n processes t a k e p l a c e a t a s i n g l e l e v e l , n a m e l y t h a t o f
66
Chapter 1
t r a n s m i t t i n g c o n t e n t (i.e., i n f o r m a t i o n ) . F r o m t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , the
r e l a t i o n a l a s p e c t loses its i n d e p e n d e n c e vis-à-vis t h e c o n t e n t aspect;
the communicative r o l e o f a n u t t e r a n c e loses its c o n s t i t u t i v e sig-
n i f i c a n c e a n d is c o u n t e d as p a r t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t . The
pragmatic operator of the statement, w h i c h i n formalized presenta-
tions (e.g., d e o n t i c l o g i c s ) r e p r e s e n t s t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t
o f a n u t t e r a n c e , is t h e n n o l o n g e r i n t e r p r e t e d as a s p e c i f i c m o d e o f
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s b u t falsely as
p a r t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d . I d o n o t w i s h t o analyze this
fallacy here; I merely p o i n t to o n e o f its c o n s e q u e n c e s : t h a t t h e
c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n i n g o f t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e o f s p e e c h is n e g l e c t e d
i n theoretical approaches.
A s o p p o s e d t o t h i s , I c o n s i d e r t h e task o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t o
be the r a t i o n a l reconstruction o f the double structure o f speech.
T a k i n g A u s t i n ' s t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts as m y p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ( i n
t h e n e x t t w o sections) I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o r e n d e r t h i s task m o r e
precise i n r e l a t i o n to the p r o b l e m s o f m e a n i n g a n d validity.
Universal-Pragmatic Categories o f M e a n i n g
A u s t i n ' s c o n t r a s t i n g o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts set o f f a
b r o a d discussion t h a t has also b r o u g h t s o m e c l a r i f i c a t i o n t o the
theory o f meaning. Austin reserved t h e c o n c e p t meaning f o r the
m e a n i n g o f sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , w h i l e he used t h e
c o n c e p t force o n l y f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t o f u t t e r i n g s e n t e n c e s w i t h
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h i s leads t o t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s t e l l a t i o n s :
M e a n i n g : sense a n d r e f e r e n c e , l o c u t i o n a r y act
Force: a t t e m p t t o reach a n u p t a k e , i l l o c u t i o n a r y act
A u s t i n c o u l d p o i n t to t h e fact t h a t sentences w i t h t h e same p r o p o -
s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t c o u l d b e u t t e r e d i n s p e e c h acts o f d i f f e r e n t types,
t h a t is, w i t h d i f f e r i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o r i n d i f f e r e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y
m o d e s . Nevertheless, t h e p r o p o s e d d i s t i n c t i o n is u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . I f
one i n t r o d u c e s m e a n i n g solely i n a l i n g u i s t i c sense, as s e n t e n c e
m e a n i n g ( w h e r e b y e i t h e r s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g is c o n c e i v e d as a f u n c -
t i o n o f w o r d m e a n i n g s or, w i t h F r e g e , w o r d m e a n i n g s a r e c o n c e i v e d
67
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
as f u n c t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g s ) , t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t o t h e
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s o f s p e e c h acts is n o t p l a u s i b l e . O b v i o u s l y ,
t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s also h a v e a m e a n i n g i n a l i n g u i s t i c
sense. I n t h e case o f a n e x p l i c i t l y p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e , t h e p e r -
formative verb employed has a l e x i c a l m e a n i n g , a n d t h e perfor-
m a t i v e s e n t e n c e c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h its h e l p has a m e a n i n g i n a m a n n e r
similar t o t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t d e p e n d e n t o n i t .
" W h a t A u s t i n calls t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a n u t t e r a n c e is t h a t
a s p e c t o f its m e a n i n g w h i c h is e i t h e r c o n v e y e d b y its e x p l i c i d y p e r -
f o r m a t i v e p r e f i x , i f i t has o n e , o r m i g h t h a v e b e e n so c o n v e y e d b y
t h e use o f s u c h a n expression." 7 7
T h i s p l a u s i b l e a r g u m e n t n e g l e c t s , h o w e v e r , t h e f a c t t h a t f o r c e is
s o m e t h i n g t h a t , i n a s p e c i f i c sense, b e l o n g s o n l y t o u t t e r a n c e s a n d
n o t t o s e n t e n c e s . T h u s , o n e m i g h t first h i t u p o n t h e i d e a o f r e s e r v i n g
"force" for the meaning content that accrues to the sentence
t h r o u g h its b e i n g u t t e r e d , t h a t is, e m b e d d e d i n s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h .
We can qertainly distinguish the p h e n o m e n o n of meaning that
comes about t h r o u g h the e m p l o y m e n t o f a sentence i n an utterance
f r o m the phenomenon o f s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g . W e c a n speak i n a
p r a g m a t i c sense o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e , as we d o in a
l i n g u i s t i c sense o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e . T h u s A l s t o n has t a k e n
t h e fact t h a t t h e same speech act can be p e r f o r m e d w i t h v e r y d i f f e r -
e n t s e n t e n c e s as a r e a s o n f o r g r a n t i n g p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g a c e r t a i n
p r i o r i t y o v e r l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a c o n s i s t e n t use
t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , h e suggests t h a t s e n t e n c e ( a n d w o r d ) meanings
a r e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h t h e y a r e
"principally" used. 7 8
T h e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a l is t h a t i t d o e s
n o t a d e q u a t e l y t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f sen-
tence meanings i n relation to the c o n t i n g e n t changes o f m e a n i n g
that a sentence can u n d e r g o w h e n used i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. M o r e -
over, t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e is o b v i o u s l y less d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e s p e a k e r t h a n is t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e .
E v e n i f a s e n t e n c e is v e r y o f t e n u s e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t i n t e n t i o n s a n d
i n a c o n t e x t t h a t p r a g m a t i c a l l y shifts m e a n i n g , its l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g
d o e s n o t have t o c h a n g e . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n c e r t a i n s o c i a l
roles prescribe t h a t c o m m a n d s be u t t e r e d i n t h e f o r m o f requests,
t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t h e u t t e r a n c e (as a c o m m a n d ) i n n o w a y
68 69
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

a l t e r s t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d (as a r e q u e s t ) . (1') " I hate you."

T h i s is a n a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n f o r s i n g l i n g o u t t h e s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s
instead o f to the sentence
u n d e r w h i c h the p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f a n e x p l i c i t speech act c o i n -
cides w i t h t h e linguistic m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences e m p l o y e d i n i t . (2') " H e hates her."
Precisely i n t h e case o f a n e x p l i c i t s p e e c h act i n s t a n d a r d f o r m ,
O n l y b e c a u s e a n d so l o n g as t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f m e a n i n g is
however, t h e categorial d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e ex-
b i a s e d i n f a v o r o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l i z e d f o r m s (2 o r 2') is i t n e c e s s a r y
pressions o r i g i n a l l y used i n p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences, o n t h e one
to supplement t h e m e a n i n g o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences w i t h the
h a n d , a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s (as w e l l as o f ex-
m e a n i n g o f the illocutionary force o f an utterance (and the inten-
p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s ) , o n t h e o t h e r , c o m e s i n t o view. T h i s shows t h a t
t i o n o f the speaker). N o d o u b t this circumstance m o t i v a t e d A u s t i n
i t d o e s n o t m a k e sense t o e x p l i c a t e t h e c o n c e p t s " m e a n i n g " versus
to draw his d i s t i n c t i o n between m e a n i n g a n d force. To m y m i n d , i t
"force" w i t h reference to the distinction between the linguistic m e a n -
w o u l d be b e t t e r to start w i t h t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o f a n expression,
i n g o f a sentence a n d the pragmatic m e a n i n g o f an utterance.
as o p p o s e d t o t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; t h e l i n g u i s t i c
T h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g t e n d s t o a b s t r a c t f r o m
m e a n i n g o f expressions w o u l d t h e n be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g to
c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s t o r e a l i t y i n t o w h i c h a s e n t e n c e is p u t as s o o n as i t
t h e u n i v e r s a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r u s i n g t h e m i n s p e e c h acts ( a n d a c c o r d -
is u t t e r e d a n d f r o m t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n d e r w h i c h i t is t h e r e b y
ing to the corresponding validity claims), w i t h reference to the
p l a c e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a c o n s i s t e n t analysis o f m e a n i n g is n o t
o r i g i n a l o c c u r r e n c e o f such expressions. B u t w h a t does " o r i g i n a l "
p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t s o m e r e f e r e n c e t o s i t u a t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e use. E v e r y
m e a n i n t h i s c o n t e x t ? L e t us c o n s i d e r t w o s e n t e n c e s as e x a m p l e s :
linguistic expression can be used to f o r m statements. Even i l l o c u -
t i o n a r y phrases ( a n d o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l expressions) can be ob- (3) " I ' m t e l l i n g y o u t h a t f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r is y e l l o w . "
j e c t i f i e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f a f u r t h e r s t a t e m e n t . T h i s suggests t h a t i t
m a k e s sense t o secure a c e r t a i n u n i f o r m i t y f o r t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis (4) " I ' m a s k i n g y o u , is f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r y e l l o w ? "

o f t h e m e a n i n g s o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s b y r e l a t i n g i t i n e v e r y case U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e t w o ( d i f f e r e n t ) i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts is t i e d t o
t o t h e possibilities f o r u s i n g these expressions i n p r o p o s i t i o n s . B u t o t h e r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a n is u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i r ( c o n c o r d a n t ) pro-
t h i s m a k e s sense o n l y f o r s u c h e x p r e s s i o n s as c a n a p p e a r exclusively p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e c o m e s p e r c e p t i b l e as s o o n as
i n p r e p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s o f speech. By contrast, the m e a n i n g o f one r e t u r n s to the conditions that m u s t be f u l f i l l e d by situations i n
p e r f o r m a t i v e expressions s h o u l d be clarified by r e f e r r i n g to the w h i c h s o m e o n e w h o d o e s n o t k n o w E n g l i s h m i g h t l e a r n (i.e., o r i g i -
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r u s i n g t h e m i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts ( a n d t h e m e a n i n g nally understand) the meanings. A hearer can understand the mean-
o f o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l expressions by r e f e r r i n g to the possibilities i n g o f the sentence w i t h the propositional content "the being yellow
f o r u s i n g t h e m t o express i n t e n t i o n s d i r e c d y ) . T h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p l i - o f f a t h e r ' s c a r " o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e has l e a r n e d t o c o r r e c d y use t h e
cation o f the m e a n i n g o f "to p r o m i s e " should o r i e n t itself a r o u n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentence:
t h e possibilities f o r using the sentence
(5) " F a t h e r ' s n e w car is y e l l o w "
(1) " I hereby promise you that ..."
i n order, f o r e x a m p l e , t o express a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e , i n this
a n d n o t a r o u n d the possibilities f o r using the sentence case h i s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r is y e l l o w . T h e a b i l i t y t o
make this or a similar observation must be presupposed, for a p r o p e r
(2) " H e promises her t h a t . . . "
use o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e i n ( 5 ) d e m a n d s a t least t h e f o l l o w -
Correspondingly, the explication o f the m e a n i n g o f "to hate" should i n g o f t h e speaker:
refer to the sentence
70 71

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

a. T h e e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n : t h a t t h e r e is o n e a n d o n l y one Understanding (5) presupposes the possibility of sensory ex-

object to w h i c h the designation "father's new car" applies. periences (experiences of the type, observation); by contrast,
b. T h e presupposition o f identifiability: that the (denotatively em- u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( 6 ) a n d ( 7 ) i t s e l f represents a c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i -
ployed) prepositional content contained i n the designation "father's ence (an experience o f the type, p a r t i c i p a t o r y observation): i l l o c u -

n e w c a r " is a s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n , i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t , f o r a h e a r e r t o t i o n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n e x p e r i e n c e m a d e p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h

select t h e ( a n d o n l y t h e ) o b j e c t t o w h i c h t h e d e s i g n a t i o n a p p l i e s . communication.
T h e difference between originally illocutionary a n d originally pro-
c. T h e act o f p r e d i c a t i o n : t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e " y e l l o w " c a n b e a t t r i b -
p o s i t i o n a l m e a n i n g s ( " f o r c e " a n d " m e a n i n g " i n A u s t i n ' s sense) c a n
u t e d t o t h e o b j e c t t h a t is d e s i g n a t e d .
be traced back to differences i n possible l e a r n i n g situations. We
Correspondingly, understanding the meaning of the prepositional l e a r n t h e m e a n i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o n l y i n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e
sentence c o n t a i n e d i n (5) d e m a n d s o f t h e hearer t h a t h e a t t i t u d e o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n s p e e c h acts. B y c o n t r a s t , w e l e a r n t h e
m e a n i n g o f sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t i n t h e n o n p e r f o r -
a', s h a r e t h e speaker-presupposition,
mative—objectivating—attitude o f observers w h o correctly repre-
b'. fulfill the speaker-presupposition, t h a t is, a c t u a l l y i d e n t i f y t h e sent their experiences i n propositional sentences. 79
We acquire
object designated, a n d originally illoctionary meanings i n connection with communicative
c'. u n d e r t a k e f o r his p a r t t h e act o f p r e d i c a t i o n . e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t w e have i n e n t e r i n g t h e l e v e l o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d
establishing an interpersonal relation. We learn originally proposi-
I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r so f a r as t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s o f
tional meanings t h r o u g h r e p o r t i n g experiences w i t h objects a n d
u t t e r a n c e s ( 3 ) a n d (4) a r e c o n c e r n e d . A h e a r e r c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e
events i n t h e w o r l d .
m e a n i n g o f n o t i f y i n g o r a s k i n g o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e has l e a r n e d t o
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g this d i f f e r e n c e , meanings learned in a perfor-
t a k e p a r t i n successful s p e e c h acts o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t y p e :
m a t i v e a t t i t u d e c a n , o f c o u r s e , also o c c u r i n s e n t e n c e s w i t h p r o p o s i -
(6) " I ( h e r e b y ) n o t i f y y o u t h a t . . ." tional content:

(7) " I ( h e r e b y ) ask y o u w h e t h e r . . ." (8) " I assure y o u t h a t h e n o t i f i e d m e y e s t e r d a y t h a t . . ."

T h e h e a r e r , t h a t is, has l e a r n e d t o a s s u m e b o t h t h e r o l e o f the (9) " I ' m r e p o r t i n g t o y o u t h a t she asked m e yesterday w h e t h e r . . ."
( a c t i n g ) s p e a k e r as w e l l as t h a t o f t h e ( c o o p e r a t i n g ) hearer. The
T h i s fact may e x p l a i n why the i n d i c a t e d difference between the two
performance o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t c a n n o t serve t o r e p o r t a n o b -
c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g is o f t e n n o t n o t i c e d . I n s e n t e n c e s w i t h p r o p o -
s e r v a t i o n as t h e use o f a p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e c a n ; n o r m u s t t h e
sitional c o n t e n t , however, we can d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m e a n i n g s o f expres-
a b i l i t y t o have p e r c e p t i o n s e s s e n t i a l l y b e p r e s u p p o s e d h e r e . R a t h e r ,
sions t h a t m a y be used i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e f r o m t h e w o r d
conversely, t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a s p e e c h a c t is a c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y
meanings t h a t — l i k e the n o m i n a l a n d predicative expressions i n
o f a n experience, n a m e l y t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e experience that the
( 5 ) — a r e p e r m i t t e d only as m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t s i n sentences w i t h
h e a r e r has w h e n h e a c c e p t s t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n t h e a t t e m p t e d
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . I n utterances like (8) a n d ( 9 ) , " n o t i f y " a n d
speech act and enters into an interpersonal relation with the
"ask" b e a r a s h a d e o f m e a n i n g d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p o w e r t h a t t h e y have
speaker, a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n o n e w h o n o t i f i e s o r i n f o r m s a n d o n e w h o
o n l y i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y roles—as i n (6) a n d ( 7 ) .
r e c e i v e s t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n o r i n f o r m a t i o n — o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , takes u p
We can retain Austin's distinction between "force" a n d " m e a n i n g "
the relation between a person w h o questions a n d a person who
i n t h e sense o f t h e s e t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g . " F o r c e " t h e n stands
answers.
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f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t are o r i g i n a l l y u s e d i n c o n n e c -
tion w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a n d " m e a n i n g " f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f e x -
pressions o r i g i n a l l y used i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h propositions. T h u s we
d i s t i n g u i s h " f o r c e " a n d " m e a n i n g " as t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g t h a t
arise w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e g e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s o f communica-
tion: the establishment o f interpersonal relations, o n the one h a n d ,
a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( r e p o r t i n g o f facts o r states o f a f f a i r s ) , o n t h e
o t h e r . ( I s h a l l h e r e leave t o o n e side t h e t h i r d c a t e g o r y o f m e a n i n g ,
w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e f u n c t i o n o f expression, t h a t is, t o t h e d i s c l o -
s u r e o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse), a l t h o u g h reflections simi-
l a r t o t h o s e c a r r i e d o u t f o r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a p p l y t o i n t e n t i o n a l
s e n t e n c e s as w e l l . )
I w o u l d like t o h o l d o n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g results:
a. I t is n o t advisable t o r e s e r v e t h e c o n c e p t meaning f o r t h e p r e p o -
s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f a speech act a n d t o characterize t h e m e a n i n g
o f an illocutionary c o m p o n e n t only by a pragmatic operator (which
d e s i g n a t e s a specific i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e ) .
b . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i t is also u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e
m e a n i n g o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e i n e x a c d y t h e s a m e w a y as t h e
m e a n i n g o f a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content; the i l l o c u t i o n a r y
c o m p o n e n t o f a s p e e c h a c t n e i t h e r expresses a p r o p o s i t i o n
mentions a propositional content. 8 0
c. I t is e q u a l l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o e q u a t e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e w i t h t h e
m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t that accrues to the m e a n i n g o f a sentence
t h r o u g h t h e act o f u t t e r i n g i t i n a given context.
d . R a t h e r , f r o m a u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c p o i n t o f view, t h e m e a n i n g o f
linguistic expressions can be categorically d i s t i n g u i s h e d a c c o r d i n g t o
w h e t h e r they may appear o n l y i n sentences that take o n a r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o r w h e t h e r t h e y c a n s e r v e s p e c i f i c a l l y t o estab-
lish i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations o r t o express speaker i n t e n t i o n s . 8 1
Thematization o f Validity Claims a n d Modes o f C o m m u n i c a t i o n
A u s t i n ' s c o n t r a s t i n g o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts has
c o m e i m p o r t a n t n o t o n l y f o r the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ; the discussion
73
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
a b o u t basic types o f s p e e c h acts a n d basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use has
also t a k e n t h i s p a i r o f c o n c e p t s as i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t . A t f i r s t A u s t i n
w a n t e d to draw the b o u n d a r y i n such a way that "the p e r f o r m a t i v e
s h o u l d b e d o i n g s o m e t h i n g as o p p o s e d t o j u s t s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g ; a n d
t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e is h a p p y o r u n h a p p y as o p p o s e d t o t r u e and
false." 8 2
F r o m this the f o l l o w i n g correlations resulted:
L o c u t i o n a r y acts: constatives, t r u e / u n t r u e
I l l o c u t i o n a r y acts: p e r f o r m a t i v e s , happy/unhappy
B u t t h i s d e m a r c a t i o n o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts c o u l d n o t
be m a i n t a i n e d w h e n i t became a p p a r e n t that a l l speech acts—the
constatives included—contain a locutionary component (in the
f o r m o f a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content) a n d an i l l o c u t i o n a r y
c o m p o n e n t ( i n the f o r m o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e sentence) , 8 3
What Austin
h a d i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e d as t h e l o c u t i o n a r y act was n o w r e p l a c e d b y
(a) t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t c o n t a i n e d i n e v e r y e x p l i c i t s p e e c h
act, a n d ( b ) a s p e c i a l class o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — c o n s t a t i v e speech
acts—that i m p l y the validity claim o f t r u t h . A u s t i n himself later
r e g a r d e d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as o n l y o n e a m o n g several d i f f e r e n t
classes o f s p e e c h acts. T h e t w o s e n t e n c e s
nor
(1) " I assert t h a t . . . "
(2) " I ' m warning you t h a t . . . "
equally express i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. 84
B u t t h i s has t h e i n t e r e s t i n g c o n -
s e q u e n c e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m c o n t a i n e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts
( t r u t h / f a l s i t y ) r e p r e s e n t s m e r e l y a s p e c i a l case a m o n g t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m s t h a t speakers, i n s p e e c h acts, raise a n d o f f e r f o r v i n d i c a t i o n
vis-à-vis h e a r e r s .
I n general we may say this: w i t h b o t h statements (and, for example, descrip-
tions) a n d warnings, etc., the question o f whether, g r a n t i n g that y o u d i d
w a r n a n d h a d the r i g h t to w a r n , d i d state o r d i d advise, y o u were right to
state or to w a r n o r advise, can arise—not i n the sense o f whether i t was
be- o p p o r t u n e or expedient, b u t whether, o n the facts a n d y o u r knowledge o f
the facts a n d the purpose for w h i c h y o u were speaking, a n d so o n , this was
the p r o p e r t h i n g to say. 85
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I n t h i s passage, A u s t i n e m p h a s i z e s t h e c l a i m t o be right, o r c l a i m
t o validity, t h a t w e raise w i t h a n y ( a n d n o t j u s t w i t h c o n s t a t i v e ) s p e e c h
acts. B u t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e s e o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y f r o m t h e g e n e r a l
c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s — r e s t r i c t e d a c c o r d i n g t o speech-act t y p e — t h a t
l i k e w i s e m u s t be f u l f i l l e d i f a s p e e c h act is t o s u c c e e d ( t h a t is, f r o m
happiness/unhappiness c o n d i t i o n s i n g e n e r a l ) . I t is t r u e o f asser-
tions, i n t h e same way as i t is o f w a r n i n g s , pieces o f a d v i c e , p r o m i s e s ,
a n d so f o r t h , t h a t t h e y c a n s u c c e e d o n l y i f both c o n d i t i o n s are
f u l f i l l e d : (a) t o b e i n o r d e r , a n d ( b ) t o b e r i g h t .
B u t t h e r e a l c o n c l u s i o n m u s t s u r e l y be t h a t we n e e d . . . to e s t a b l i s h w i t h
r e s p e c t to e a c h k i n d o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — w a r n i n g s , e s t i m a t e s , v e r d i c t s ,
s t a t e m e n t s , a n d d e s c r i p t i o n s — w h a t i f a n y is t h e s p e c i f i c way i n w h i c h t h e y
a r e i n t e n d e d , first to b e i n o r d e r o r n o t i n o r d e r , a n d s e c o n d , to b e " r i g h t "
o r " w r o n g ; " w h a t t e r m s o f a p p r a i s a l a n d d i s a p p r a i s a l a r e u s e d for e a c h a n d
w h a t t h e y m e a n . T h i s is a w i d e f i e l d a n d c e r t a i n l y w i l l n o t l e a d to a s i m p l e
d i s t i n c t i o n o f t r u e a n d false; n o r w i l l it l e a d to a d i s t i n c t i o n o f s t a t e m e n t s
f r o m t h e rest, for stating is o n l y o n e a m o n g v e r y n u m e r o u s s p e e c h acts o f
the illocutionary c l a s s . 8 6
S p e e c h acts c a n b e i n o r d e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t y p i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d
c o n t e x t s ( a ) ; b u t t h e y c a n b e v a l i d (gültig) o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e a k e r raises w i t h h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t
( b ) . I s h a l l c o m e b a c k t o b o t h o f t h e s e classes o f c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m u s t
b e f u l f i l l e d i n o r d e r f o r s p e e c h acts t o s u c c e e d . A t t h i s p o i n t I a m
interested only i n the fact that the comparison between constative
a n d n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts t h r o w s l i g h t o n t h e v a l i d i t y basis t h a t
m a n i f e s t l y u n d e r l i e s all s p e e c h a c t i o n s .
T o be sure, this does i n i t i a l l y clarify t h e special p o s i t i o n o f consta-
t i v e s p e e c h acts. A s s e r t i o n s d o n o t d i f f e r f r o m o t h e r types o f s p e e c h
acts i n t h e i r p e r f o r m a t i v e / p r o p o s i t i o n a l d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e , n o r do
they d i f f e r by v i r t u e o f g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s , f o r these v a r y
i n a t y p i c a l way f o r a l l s p e e c h a c t i o n s ; b u t t h e y d o differ f r o m
( a l m o s t ) a l l o t h e r types o f s p e e c h acts i n t h a t t h e y p r i m a f a c i e i m p l y
a n u n m i s t a k a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m , a c l a i m t o t r u t h . I t is u n d e n i a b l e t h a t
o t h e r types o f s p e e c h acts also i m p l y some or other v a l i d i t y c l a i m ; b u t
i n d e t e r m i n i n g exacdy w h a t validity c l a i m they imply, we seldom
e n c o u n t e r such a clearly d e f i n e d a n d universally recognized validity
c l a i m as " t r u t h " ( i n t h e sense o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ) . I t is easy t o see
75
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
t h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s ; t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts is
p r e s u p p o s e d i n a c e r t a i n way b y s p e e c h acts o f every t y p e . T h e m e a n -
i n g o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l content m e n t i o n e d i n nonconstative speech
acts c a n b e m a d e e x p l i c i t t h r o u g h t r a n s f o r m i n g a s e n t e n c e o f p r o p -
o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , " t h a t />," i n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e and
t h e t r u t h c l a i m b e l o n g s essentially t o t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n
thereby expressed. T r u t h claims are thus a type o f validity c l a i m b u i l t
i n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p o s s i b l e s p e e c h i n g e n e r a l . T r u t h is a u n i v e r s a l
v a l i d i t y c l a i m ; its u n i v e r s a l i t y is r e f l e c t e d i n t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e o f
speech.
L o o k i n g b a c k , A u s t i n assures h i m s e l f o f w h a t h e o r i g i n a l l y h a d i n
m i n d w i t h h i s c o n t r a s t o f c o n s t a t i v e a n d n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts
( c o n s t a t i v e s versus p e r f o r m a t i v e s ) :
W i t h the constative utterances, we abstract f r o m the i l l o c u t i o n a r y . . . as-
pects o f the speech act, a n d we concentrate o n the locutionary; moreover,
we use an oversimplified n o t i o n o f correspondence w i t h the facts. . . . We
a i m at the ideal o f what w o u l d be r i g h t to say i n all circumstances, for any
purposes, to any audience, etc. Perhaps this is sometimes realized. W i t h the
performative we a t t e n d as m u c h as possible to the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f the
utterance, a n d abstract f r o m the d i m e n s i o n o f correspondence w i t h facts. 87
A f t e r h e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts r e p r e s e n t o n l y o n e
o f several types o f s p e e c h acts, A u s t i n gave u p t h e aforementioned
c o n t r a s t i n f a v o r o f a set o f u n o r d e r e d f a m i l i e s o f s p e e c h acts. I a m
o f t h e o p i n i o n , however, t h a t w h a t h e i n t e n d e d w i t h the contrast
" c o n s t a t i v e " versus " p e r f o r m a t i v e " c a n b e a d e q u a t e l y reconstructed.
W e h a v e seen t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n l a n g u a g e c a n t a k e p l a c e o n l y
when the participants, i n communicating with one another about
s o m e t h i n g , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e n t e r t w o levels o f communication—the
level o f intersubjectivity o n w h i c h they take u p i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela-
tions a n d t h e level o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l contents. However, i n speaking,
we can m a k e e i t h e r t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
content more c e n t r a l l y t h e m a t i c ; i n so d o i n g , w e m a k e a more
i n t e r a c t i v e o r a m o r e c o g n i t i v e use o f o u r l a n g u a g e . I n t h e interactive
use of language, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e r e l a t i o n s i n t o w h i c h s p e a k e r a n d
hearer enter—as a warning, promise, r e q u e s t — w h i l e we merely
m e n t i o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s . I n t h e cognitive
use of language, b y c o n t r a s t , w e t h e m a t i z e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e
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as a s t a t e m e n t a b o u t s o m e t h i n g t h a t is h a p p e n i n g i n t h e w o r l d ( o r
t h a t c o u l d b e t h e case), w h i l e w e e x p r e s s t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n
o n l y i n d i r e c d y . T h i s i n c i d e n t a l character can be seen, f o r example,
i n the fact that i n E n g l i s h the e x p l i c i t f o r m o f assertion ("I am
a s s e r t i n g ( t o y o u ) t h a t . . . " ) , a l t h o u g h g r a m m a t i c a l l y c o r r e c t , is r a r e
in comparison to the short f o r m that disregards the i n t e r p e r s o n a l
relation.
A s t h e c o n t e n t is t h e m a t i z e d i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , o n l y
s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s c a n assume t h e e x p l i c i t
f o r m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s a r e p e r m i t t e d . W i t h these c o n s t a t i v e
s p e e c h acts, w e raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n asserted. I n
t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , i n w h i c h t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n
is t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed, w e r e f e r i n v a r i o u s ways t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e
n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e s p e e c h act.
F o r t h i s l a t t e r use, t h e ( a u t h o r i z e d ) c o m m a n d has a p a r a d i g m a t i c
s i g n i f i c a n c e s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e a s s e r t i o n f o r t h e c o g n i t i v e use of
language. T r u t h is m e r e l y t h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s — n o t t h e only—
validity c l a i m reflected i n the f o r m a l structures o f speech. T h e i l l o -
c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f t h e s p e e c h act, w h i c h g e n e r a t e s a l e g i t i m a t e ( o r
illegitimate) interpersonal relation between t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , is d e -
r i v e d f r o m t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e (bindende Kraft) o f r e c o g -
nized n o r m s o f action (or o f evaluation); to the extent that a speech
a c t is a n a c t i o n , i t actualizes a n a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n o f r e l a -
tions. T h e validity o f a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d o f institutions, roles,
s o c i o c u l t u r a l l y h a b i t u a l i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e — t h a t is, o f conventions—is
always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e d . T h i s b y n o m e a n s h o l d s t r u e o n l y f o r
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts s u c h as b e t t i n g , g r e e t i n g , c h r i s t e n -
i n g , a p p o i n t i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , e a c h o f w h i c h satisfies a specific n o r m
o f a c t i o n ( o r a n a r r o w l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d class o f n o r m s ) . I n p r o m i s e s ,
too, i n recommendations, prohibitions, prescriptions, a n d the like,
w h i c h are n o t r e g u l a t e d f r o m t h e outset by i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e speaker
i m p l i e s a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t m u s t , i f t h e s p e e c h acts a r e t o s u c c e e d ,
b e c o v e r e d b y e x i s t i n g n o r m s , a n d t h a t m e a n s b y ( a t least) d e facto
r e c o g n i t i o n o f the claim that these norms rightfully exist. T h i s i n t e r n a l
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d i n s p e e c h acts
a n d t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e i r n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is e m p h a s i z e d i n t h e
i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , j u s t as is t h e t r u t h c l a i m i n t h e c o g n i t i v e
use o f language.
77
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
J u s t as o n l y c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a r e p e r m i t t e d f o r t h e c o g n i t i v e
use o f l a n g u a g e , so f o r t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e o n l y t h o s e
s p e e c h acts a r e p e r m i t t e d t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e a s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n t h a t
speaker a n d hearer can adopt to the n o r m a t i v e contexts o f t h e i r
a c t i o n . I c a l l t h e s e regulative s p e e c h a c t s . 88
W i t h the illocutionary
f o r c e o f s p e e c h acts, t h e n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m — l i g h t n e s s o r a p -
propriateness (Richtigkeit, Angemessenheit)—is b u i l t j u s t as u n i v e r s a l l y
i n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h as t h e t r u t h c l a i m . B u t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m
o f a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is e x p l i c i t i y i n v o k e d o n l y i n r e g u l a t i v e
s p e e c h acts ( i n c o m m a n d s a n d a d m o n i t i o n s , i n p r o h i b i t i o n s a n d
r e f u s a l s , i n p r o m i s e s a n d a g r e e m e n t s , n o t i f i c a t i o n s , excuses, r e c o m -
m e n d a t i o n s , a d m i s s i o n s , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h e t r u t h r e f e r e n c e o f t h e
m e n t i o n e d propositional content remains, by contrast, merely i m -
p l i c i t ; i t p e r t a i n s o n l y t o its e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . Conversely,
i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w h i c h e x p l i c i t l y raise a t r u t h c l a i m , t h e
n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r e m a i n s i m p l i c i t , a l t h o u g h these too (e.g.,
reports, explications, communications, elucidations, narrations, a n d
so f o r t h ) m u s t c o r r e s p o n d t o a n e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n o f r e l a t i o n s —
t h a t is, t h e y m u s t b e covered by a recognized normative back-
g r o u n d — i f t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations i n t e n d e d w i t h t h e m are to
c o m e t o pass.
I t seems t o m e t h a t w h a t A u s t i n h a d i n m i n d w i t h his (later
a b a n d o n e d ) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i n t o c o n s t a t i v e versus p e r -
f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s is c a p t u r e d i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o g -
n i t i v e a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i v e uses o f l a n g u a g e . I n t h e cognitive use of
language, w i t h t h e h e l p o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; i n t h e interactive use of lan-
guage, w i t h t h e h e l p o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e k i n d
o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n established. T h e difference i n thematiza-
tion r e s u l t s f r o m stressing o n e o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n i v e r s a l l y i n h e r -
e n t i n s p e e c h , t h a t is, f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use of
l a n g u a g e w e raise t r u t h c l a i m s f o r p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e
use o f l a n g u a g e w e lay c l a i m t o ( o r c o n t e s t ) t h e v a l i d i t y o f a n o r m a -
tive b a c k g r o u n d f o r i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . A u s t i n h i m s e l f d i d n o t
d r a w this c o n s e q u e n c e because, o n t h e o n e h a n d , h e t o o k o n l y o n e
universal validity claim i n t o consideration, namely, propositional
t r u t h interpreted i n terms of the correspondence theory of t r u t h ;
b u t he w a n t e d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , to m a k e this single validity c l a i m
78
Chapter 1
c o m p a t i b l e w i t h m a n y types o f s p e e c h acts ( a n d n o t j u s t c o n s t a t i v e
s p e e c h a c t s ) . I n h i s w o r d s : " I f , t h e n , w e l o o s e n u p o u r ideas o f t r u t h
a n d f a l s i t y w e s h a l l see t h a t s t a t e m e n t s , w h e n assessed i n r e l a t i o n t o
t h e facts, a r e n o t so d i f f e r e n t a f t e r a l l f r o m p i e c e s o f a d v i c e , w a r n -
i n g s , v e r d i c t s a n d so o n . " 8 9
T o b e s u r e , t h i s l o o s e n i n g u p o f t h e ideas
o f t r u t h a n d falsity i n favor o f a b r o a d d i m e n s i o n o f e v a l u a t i o n , i n
w h i c h a n a s s e r t i o n c a n j u s t as w e l l be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as exaggerated
o r p r e c i s e o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e as t r u e o r false, r e s u l t s , o n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , i n the assimilation o f all validity claims to the universal validity
c l a i m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . "We see t h a t , w h e n w e have a n o r d e r
o r a w a r n i n g o r a p i e c e o f a d v i c e , t h e r e is a q u e s t i o n a b o u t h o w t h i s
is r e l a t e d t o f a c t w h i c h is n o t p e r h a p s so d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e k i n d o f
q u e s t i o n t h a t arises w h e n w e discuss h o w a s t a t e m e n t is r e l a t e d t o
fact." 9 0
I t seems t o m e that A u s t i n confuses the validity c l a i m o f
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h , w h i c h c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e first i n s t a n c e i n
t e r m s o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n s t a t e m e n t s a n d facts, w i t h t h e
v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f n o r m a t i v e Tightness, w h i c h c a n n o t i n a n y w a y b e
interpreted i n terms of the correspondence theory of t r u t h .
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w a r n i n g s o r p i e c e s o f a d v i c e rest o n p r e d i c t i o n s ,
t h e y a r e p a r t o f a c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . W h e t h e r t h o s e i n v o l v e d
w e r e r i g h t t o u t t e r c e r t a i n w a r n i n g s o r pieces o f a d v i c e i n a g i v e n
s i t u a t i o n d e p e n d s i n t h i s case o n t h e t r u t h o f t h e corresponding
p r e d i c t i o n s . A s p a r t o f a n i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , w a r n i n g s a n d
p i e c e s o f a d v i c e c a n also have a n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g . T h e n t h e r i g h t
t o issue c e r t a i n w a r n i n g s a n d a d v i c e d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e p r e -
s u p p o s e d n o r m s t o w h i c h t h e y r e f e r a r e v a l i d ( t h a t is, a r e i n t e r s u b -
j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d ) o r n o t ( a n d , a t a n e x t stage, o u g h t o r o u g h t n o t
t o b e v a l i d , t h a t is, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d ) .
M o s t types o f s p e e c h acts, h o w e v e r , c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a s i n g l e
m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use. W h e t h e r a n e s t i m a t e is g o o d o r b a d c l e a r l y
d e p e n d s o n t h e t r u t h o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g statement; estimates usu-
a l l y a p p e a r i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . L i k e w i s e , w h e t h e r t h e
verdict o f a court, the r e p r i m a n d o f a person, or the c o m m a n d o f a
superior to a subordinate w i t h r e g a r d to certain behavior are "justly"
pronounced, "deservedly" delivered, o r " r i g h t f u l l y " given d e p e n d s
j u s t as c l e a r l y o n w h e t h e r a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m has b e e n c o r r e c d y
a p p l i e d t o a g i v e n case ( o r w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t n o r m has b e e n a p p l i e d
79
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
to t h e case); legal verdicts, r e p r i m a n d s , a n d o r d e r s can only be p a r t
o f a n i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . A u s t i n h i m s e l f o n c e c o n s i d e r e d t h e
o b j e c t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e a t w o r k i n these cases:
A l l o w i n g that, i n d e c l a r i n g t h e a c c u s e d guilty, y o u h a v e r e a c h e d y o u r v e r d i c t
p r o p e r l y a n d i n g o o d faith, it still r e m a i n s to a s k w h e t h e r t h e v e r d i c t was
j u s t , o r fair. A l l o w i n g t h a t y o u h a d t h e r i g h t to r e p r i m a n d h i m as y o u d i d ,
a n d t h a t y o u h a v e a c t e d w i t h o u t m a l i c e , o n e c a n still a s k w h e t h e r y o u r
r e p r i m a n d w a s d e s e r v e d . . . . T h e r e is o n e t h i n g t h a t p e o p l e will be p a r t i c u -
larly t e m p t e d to b r i n g u p as a n o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s t a n y c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n
this s e c o n d k i n d o f c r i t i c i s m a n d t h e k i n d a p p r o p r i a t e to s t a t e m e n t s , a n d
t h a t is this: a r e n ' t t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g g o o d , o r j u s t , o r
fair, o r d e s e r v e d e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d f a l s e h o o d ?
T h a t , surely, is a v e r y s i m p l e b l a c k - a n d - w h i t e b u s i n e s s ; e i t h e r t h e u t t e r a n c e
c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e facts o r it d o e s n ' t , a n d that's t h a t . 9 1
I n compressing the universal validity claim o f t r u t h together w i t h
a h o s t o f p a r t i c u l a r e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a i n t o a s i n g l e class, A u s t i n
b l u r r e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between the clear-cut universal validity claims
o f propositional t r u t h and normative lightness (and truthfulness).
B u t t h i s p r o v e s t o b e u n n e c e s s a r y i f i n a g i v e n s p e e c h act we d i s t i n -
guish a m o n g
a. t h e i m p l i c i t l y p r e s u p p o s e d g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s ,
b. t h e specific m e a n i n g o f the i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n to be estab-
lished, a n d
c. t h e i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d g e n e r a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m .
W h e r e a s a. a n d b . fix t h e d i s t i n c t classes ( d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t
l a n g u a g e s ) o f s t a n d a r d i z e d s p e e c h acts, c. d e t e r m i n e s t h e u n i v e r s a l
modes o f communication, t h a t is, m o d e s i n h e r e n t i n s p e e c h i n
general.
B e f o r e g o i n g i n t o a. a n d b . , I w o u l d l i k e a t least t o r e m a r k t h a t
the Austinian starting p o i n t o f the distinction between performative
a n d constative utterances provides a n overly n a r r o w view; the validity
s p e c t r u m o f s p e e c h is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e t w o m o d e s o f c o m m u n i -
cation that I developed f r o m this d i s t i n c t i o n . Naturally, there can be
no mode of communication i n which the comprehensibility of an
u t t e r a n c e is t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed; f o r e v e r y s p e e c h act m u s t f u l f i l l
t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f comprehensibility i n t h e s a m e way. I f i n s o m e
80 81

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e r e is a b r e a k d o w n o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , t h e r e q u i r e -
m e n t o f c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y c a n b e m a d e t h e m a d c o n l y t h r o u g h pass-
i n g over to a h e r m e n e u t i c discourse, a n d t h e n i n c o n n e c t i o n with
t h e r e l e v a n t l i n g u i s t i c system. T h e truthfulness w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r
expresses h e r i n t e n d o n s c a n , h o w e v e r , b e e m p h a s i z e d a t t h e l e v e l o f
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e s a m e way as t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n
a n d the lightness (or appropriateness) of an interpersonal relation.
Truthfulness guarantees the transparency o f a subjectivity r e p r e -
s e n t i n g i t s e l f i n l a n g u a g e . I t is e s p e c i a l l y e m p h a s i z e d i n t h e expressive
use of language. T h e p a r a d i g m s a r e f i r s t - p e r s o n s e n t e n c e s i n w h i c h
t h e s p e a k e r ' s wishes, f e e l i n g s , i n t e n t i o n s , etc. ( w h i c h a r e e x p r e s s e d
i n c i d e n t a l l y i n e v e r y s p e e c h act) a r e t h e m a t i z e d as s u c h , d i s c l o s i n g
s p e a k e r m u s t , i n a t r i v i a l sense, t r u t h f u l l y e x p r e s s h i s t h o u g h t s , o p i n -
i o n s , a s s u m p t i o n s , a n d so f o r t h ; h o w e v e r , i n a s s e r t i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n ,
w h a t m a t t e r s is n o t t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f h i s i n t e n t i o n s b u t t h e t r u t h
o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e
s p e a k e r expresses t h e i n t e n t i o n o f p r o m i s i n g , r e p r i m a n d i n g , r e f u s -
i n g , a n d so f o r t h ; b u t i n b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n
w i t h a h e a r e r , t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f h i s i n t e n t i o n is o n l y a necessary
c o n d i t i o n , w h e r e a s w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is t h a t t h e a c t i o n fit a r e c o g -
nized normative context.
T h u s w e have t h e f o l l o w i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s :
Type o f

s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s s u c h as Mode of speech Thematic

communication act Theme validity claim
(3) " I long for you."
Cognitive Constatives Propositional Truth
(4) " I wish that ..." content

Interactive Regulatives Interpersonal Rightness,

I t is u n u s u a l f o r s u c h s e n t e n c e s t o b e e x p l i c i t l y e m b e d d e d i n a n
relation appropriateness
i l l o c u t i o n a r y act:
Expressive Avowals Speaker's Truthfulness
(3') " I h e r e b y express t o y o u t h a t I l o n g f o r y o u . "
intention
T h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n , w h i c h can take o n t h e f u n c t i o n of
N.B.: T h e m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use c a n b e d e m a r c a t e d f r o m one
s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , is n o t t h e m a t i c i n t h e expressive use o f l a n g u a g e
another o n l y paradigmatically. I a m n o t c l a i m i n g t h a t every se-
a n d thus n e e d be m e n t i o n e d o n l y i n situations i n w h i c h the presup-
q u e n c e o f s p e e c h acts c a n b e u n e q u i v o c a l l y classified u n d e r t h e s e
p o s i t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s t r u t h f u l n e s s is n o t t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d ; f o r
v i e w p o i n t s . I a m c l a i m i n g o n l y t h a t e v e r y c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has i n
t h i s , avowals are t h e p a r a d i g m : p r i n c i p l e the possibility o f unequivocally selecting one mode be-

(5) " I m u s t confess t o y o u that..." cause w i t h e v e r y s p e e c h act she must raise f o u r u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y

c l a i m s , so t h a t she can s i n g l e o u t o n e o f three universal validity
(6) " I d o n ' t w a n t t o c o n c e a l f r o m y o u t h a t . . ." claims i n o r d e r to thematize a c o m p o n e n t o f speech.

F o r t h i s r e a s o n , expressive s p e e c h acts s u c h as d i s c l o s i n g , concealing,

r e v e a l i n g , a n d t h e l i k e c a n n o t b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i v e use T h e Rational F o u n d a t i o n o f I l l o c u t i o n a r y Force

o f language ( w h i c h c a n , i n a way, d i s p e n s e w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts)

i n t h e same m a n n e r as c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts are c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e H a v i n g e l u c i d a t e d t h e m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e a n d v a l i d i t y basis o f basic

c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e a n d r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts w i t h t h e i n t e r - types o f s p e e c h acts, I w o u l d l i k e t o r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n , i n w h a t

a c t i v e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t r u t h f u l n e s s , t o o , is a u n i v e r s a l i m p l i c a t i o n o f d o e s t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a n u t t e r a n c e consist? A t t h i s stage, w e

s p e e c h , as l o n g as t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n k n o w o n l y w h a t i t results i n i f t h e speech act succeeds—in b r i n g i n g

g e n e r a l a r e n o t s u s p e n d e d . I n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e the a b o u t a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n . A u s t i n a n d Searle a n a l y z e d i l l o c u -

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Chapter 1
t i o n a r y f o r c e b y l o o k i n g f o r c o n d i t i o n s o f success o r f a i l u r e o f s p e e c h
acts. A n u t t e r e d c o n t e n t receives a s p e c i f i c c o m m u n i c a d v e f u n c t i o n
t h r o u g h the fact that the s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s f o r the c o m i n g a b o u t
o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n are f u l f i l l e d . W i t h the
i l l o c u d o n a r y act, t h e s p e a k e r m a k e s a n o f f e r t h a t c a n b e a c c e p t e d
o r rejected. T h e a t t e m p t a speaker makes w i t h a n i l l o c u d o n a r y act
m a y f o u n d e r f o r c o n t i n g e n t reasons o n t h e refusal o f t h e addressee
t o e n t e r i n t o t h e p r o f f e r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h i s case is o f n o i n t e r e s t
i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . W e s h a l l b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e o t h e r case,
i n w h i c h t h e speaker h i m s e l f is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e
s p e e c h act because t h e u t t e r a n c e is u n a c c e p t a b l e . W h e n t h e s p e a k e r
makes a n u t t e r a n c e t h a t m a n i f e s d y contains n o serious offer, he
c a n n o t c o u n t o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t e n d e d by h i m c o m i n g about.
I s h a l l speak o f t h e success o f a s p e e c h act o n l y w h e n t h e h e a r e r
n o t o n l y u n d e r s t a n d s t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d b u t also
a c t u a l l y e n t e r s i n t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t e n d e d b y t h e speaker. A n d I
s h a l l analyze t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e success o f s p e e c h acts i n t e r m s
o f t h e i r "acceptability." Since I have restricted m y e x a m i n a t i o n f r o m
t h e o u t s e t t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n — t h a t is, a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a s p e e c h a c t c o u n t s as a c c e p t a b l e o n l y i f
t h e speaker n o t m e r e l y feigns b u t sincerely makes a serious o f f e r .
A serious offer d e m a n d s a c e r t a i n c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e
speaker. B u t b e f o r e g o i n g i n t o t h i s , I w o u l d l i k e t o m e n t i o n a d d i -
tional r e a s o n s f o r t h e u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f i l l o c u d o n a r y acts.
Austin developed his d o c t r i n e o f "infelicities" p r i m a r i l y o n the
basis o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts; f o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e e x a m -
p l e s o f " m i s f i r e s " (i.e., m i s i n v o c a t i o n s , m i s e x e c u t i o n s , m i s a p p l i c a -
t i o n s ) a r e t y p i c a l f o r a l l p o s s i b l e cases o f r u l e v i o l a t i o n . T h u s , t h e
u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f s p e e c h acts c a n s t e m f r o m t r a n s g r e s s i o n s o f u n -
d e r l y i n g n o r m s o f a c t i o n . I f i n a w e d d i n g c e r e m o n y a priest recites
the prescribed marriage f o r m u l a i n c o r r e c d y or n o t at a l l , the mis-
t a k e lies a t t h e same l e v e l as, l e t us say, t h e c o m m a n d o f a u n i v e r s i t y
l e c t u r e r i n class t o o n e o f h e r s t u d e n t s , w h o c a n r e p l y t o h e r ( r i g h t l y ,
l e t us a s s u m e ) : "You c a n i n d e e d request a favor o f m e , b u t y o u
cannot command me." The c o n d i t i o n s o f acceptability are not
f u l f i l l e d ; b u t i n b o t h cases, these c o n d i t i o n s a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e
presupposed n o r m s o f a c t i o n . W e a r e l o o k i n g , b y c o n t r a s t , f o r c o n d i -
83
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
tions o f acceptability that lie w i t h i n the institutionally unbound
speech act itself.
Searle analyzed the conventional presuppositions of different
types o f s p e e c h acts t h a t m u s t b e f u l f i l l e d i f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e
is t o b e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e a n d a c c e p t a b l e . U n d e r t h e t i d e " p r e p a r a -
t o r y r u l e s , " h e specifies g e n e r a l i z e d o r r e s t r i c t e d contexts f o r p o s s i b l e
types o f s p e e c h acts. A p r o m i s e , f o r e x a m p l e , is n o t a c c e p t a b l e i f t h e
f o l l o w i n g conditions, a m o n g others, are n o t fulfilled: (a) H (the
h e a r e r ) p r e f e r s S's ( t h e s p e a k e r ' s ) d o i n g A (a s p e c i f i c a c t i o n ) t o h i s
n o t d o i n g A, a n d S m o r e o v e r believes t h i s t o b e t h e case; ( b ) i t is n o t
obvious to b o t h S a n d H that S w o u l d d o A anyhow i n the n o r m a l
course o f events. 93
I f c o n v e n t i o n a l presuppositions o f this k i n d are
n o t f u l f i l l e d , t h e a c t o f p r o m i s i n g is p o i n d e s s , t h a t is, t h e a t t e m p t b y
a s p e a k e r t o c a r r y o u t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t a n y w a y m a k e s n o sense
a n d is c o n d e m n e d t o f a i l u r e f r o m t h e o u t s e t . 9 4
T h e general contextual conditions for institutionally u n b o u n d
s p e e c h acts a r e t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a p p l y i n g
established n o r m s o f a c t i o n . 9 5
T h e t w o sets o f c o n d i t i o n s o f a p p l i c a -
tion, t h o s e f o r types o f s p e e c h acts a n d t h o s e f o r e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m s
o f a c t i o n , m u s t vary (largely) i n d e p e n d e n d y o f one another i f (insti-
9 2
t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d ) s p e e c h acts a r e t o r e p r e s e n t a r e p e r t o r y f r o m
w h i c h t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t , w i t h t h e h e l p o f a finite n u m b e r o f types,
can p u t t o g e t h e r any n u m b e r o f n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e actions.
T o be s u r e , t h e p e c u l i a r f o r c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y — w h i c h i n t h e
case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts c a n n o t b e d e r i v e d directly
f r o m the validity o f established n o r m s o f a c t i o n — c a n n o t be ex-
p l a i n e d by means o f t h e speech-act-typical c o n t e x t u a l restrictions. I t
is p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h i s f o r c e o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e s p e c i f i c
presuppositions t h a t Searle i n t r o d u c e s u n d e r t h e t i d e " e s s e n t i a l
r u l e s . " I n d o i n g so, h e a d m i t t e d l y a p p e a r s t o a c h i e v e n o m o r e t h a n
a paraphrase o f the m e a n i n g o f the corresponding performative
v e r b s ( f o r e x a m p l e , r e q u e s t s : " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t t o g e t Hto d o A;"
o r q u e s t i o n s : " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t t o e l i c i t i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m H"). I t
is i n t e r e s t i n g , h o w e v e r , t h a t c o m m o n t o these c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n s is t h e
s p e c i f i c a t i o n , " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t . . . . " T h e e s s e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i -
tion f o r t h e success o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t consists i n t h e s p e a k e r ' s
t a k i n g o n a s p e c i f i c commitment (Engagement), so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n
84 85
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

r e l y o n h i m . A n u t t e r a n c e c a n c o u n t as a p r o m i s e , a s s e r t i o n , r e q u e s t , h e r s e l f i n a s p e c i f i c w a y a n d takes o n o b l i g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c e r t a i n
q u e s t i o n , o r avowal i f a n d o n l y i f t h e speaker makes a n offer t h a t he c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r a c t i o n ; I c a n e s t a b l i s h a t b e s t w h e t h e r t h e r e are
is r e a d y t o m a k e g o o d i n s o f a r as i t is a c c e p t e d b y t h e h e a r e r . The sufficient indicators for the conjecture that the offer w o u l d w i t h -
s p e a k e r m u s t c o m m i t h i m s e l f , t h a t is, i n d i c a t e t h a t i n c e r t a i n s i t u - stand testing.
ations he w i l l draw c e r t a i n consequences f o r a c t i o n . T h e type of T h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t o w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r is
o b l i g a t i o n d e t e r m i n e s t h e content o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t , f r o m w h i c h w i l l i n g t o e n t e r w i t h t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act s i g n i f i e s
t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d . 9 6
This condi- a g u a r a n t e e t h a t , i n c o n s e q u e n c e o f h e r u t t e r a n c e , she w i l l f u l f i l l
t i o n , i n t r o d u c e d b y Searle as t h e " s i n c e r i t y r u l e , " m u s t always b e c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s — f o r e x a m p l e , r e g a r d a q u e s t i o n as s e t d e d w h e n
fulfilled i n t h e case o f a c t i o n oriented toward reaching under- a s a t i s f a c t o r y a n s w e r is g i v e n ; d r o p a n a s s e r t i o n w h e n i t p r o v e s t o be
standing. T h u s , i n w h a t follows I shall, i n speaking o f t h e speaker's false; f o l l o w h e r o w n a d v i c e w h e n she f i n d s h e r s e l f i n t h e s a m e
c o m m i t m e n t , p r e s u p p o s e b o t h t h a t t h e c o m m i t m e n t has a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n as t h e h e a r e r ; p l a c e e m p h a s i s o n a r e q u e s t w h e n i t is n o t
c o n t e n t a n d t h a t t h e s p e a k e r s i n c e r e l y is w i l l i n g t o t a k e o n his c o m p l i e d w i t h ; act i n accordance w i t h an i n t e n t i o n disclosed by a n
c o m m i t m e n t . So f a r as I c a n see, p r e v i o u s analyses o f s p e e c h acts a v o w a l , a n d so o n . Thus, the illocutionary force of an acceptabk speech act
h a v e b e e n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , as t h e y h a v e n o t c l a r i f i e d t h e c o m m i t m e n t consists in the fact that it can move a hearer to rely on the speech-act-typical
o f t h e speaker o n w h i c h t h e acceptability o f his utterance specifically obligations of the speaker. B u t i f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e has m o r e t h a n a
depends. m e r e l y suggestive i n f l u e n c e , w h a t c a n m o t i v a t e t h e h e a r e r t o base
T h e discernible a n d sincere readiness o f t h e speaker t o e n t e r i n t o his action o n the premise t h a t t h e speaker seriously i n t e n d s t h e
a specific k i n d o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p c o m m i t m e n t she indicates? W h e n i t is a q u e s t i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
has, c o m p a r e d with the general contextual conditions, a peculiar b o u n d s p e e c h acts, h e c a n p e r h a p s r e l y o n t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g
status. T h e r e s t r i c t e d c o n t e x t s t h a t s p e c i f i c types o f s p e e c h acts p r e - f o r c e o f a n e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m o f a c t i o n . I n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
s u p p o s e m u s t (a) exist a n d ( b ) b e s u p p o s e d t o e x i s t b y t h o s e i n - u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, h o w e v e r , i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e c a n n o t be t r a c e d
volved. Thus, the following two statements must hold: (a) a b a c k directly t o t h e b i n d i n g f o r c e o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d . I
s t a t e m e n t to t h e effect t h a t c e r t a i n contexts o b t a i n , i n d e e d those w o u l d t h u s l i k e t o p r o p o s e t h e thesis t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e w i t h
r e q u i r e d b y t h e type o f s p e e c h a c t i n q u e s t i o n ; a n d ( b ) a s t a t e m e n t w h i c h t h e speaker, i n c a r r y i n g o u t h e r s p e e c h act, i n f l u e n c e s the
to t h e effect t h a t speaker a n d h e a r e r suppose these contexts to hearer can be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y if, over a n d above i n d i v i d u a l speech
o b t a i n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i t d o e s n o t m a k e sense t o analyze t h e specific acts, w e t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e "yes" o r " n o " responses o f t h e
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t i n t h e same way, t h a t h e a r e r t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d a t least i m p l i c i d y b y t h e speaker.
is, so t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o s t a t e m e n t s w o u l d h o l d : (a) a s t a t e m e n t W i t h t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r raise v a l i d i t y
t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e r e is a c e r t a i n c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e claims a n d d e m a n d that they be recognized. B u t this r e c o g n i t i o n
speaker; a n d (b) a statement t o t h e effect that t h e h e a r e r supposes n e e d n o t f o l l o w i r r a t i o n a l l y , s i n c e t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s have a c o g n i t i v e
this c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f the speaker to o b t a i n . O n e could character a n d can be tested. I w o u l d l i k e , t h e r e f o r e , to d e f e n d the
c h o o s e t h i s strategy o f analysis; b u t I r e g a r d i t as u n s u i t a b l e . I t w o u l d f o l l o w i n g thesis: In the final analysis, the speaker can illocutionarily
suggest t h a t w e speak o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t influence the hearer, and vice versa, because speech-act-typical obligations are
o f a s p e a k e r i n t h e s a m e sense as w e s p e a k o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of connected with cognitively testable validity claims—that is, because t h e
restricted contexts. I can ascertain i n an appropriate manner r e c i p r o c a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p has a r a t i o n a l basis.
t h r o u g h observation or questioning whether certain contexts ob- T h e speaker w h o c o m m i t s herself n o r m a l l y connects the specific
t a i n ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , I c a n o n l y test w h e t h e r a s p e a k e r c o m m i t s sense i n w h i c h she w o u l d l i k e t o t a k e u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n -
86 87
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

s h i p w i t h a t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed v a l i d i t y c l a i m a n d t h e r e b y c h o o s e s d i s p e l a n a d h o c d o u b t , w e c a n pass o v e r t o t h e l e v e l o f discourse,

a specific mode of communication. Thus, the content of the i n t h i s case, p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n s u c h a d i s c o u r s e , however, the
s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y b o t h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : s u b j e c t o f d i s c u r s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n is n o t t h e Tightness c l a i m d i r e c t l y
c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h act, b u t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f t h e u n d e r l y -
• t h e s p e c i f i c m e a n i n g o f t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n t h a t is t o be
i n g norm. F i n a l l y , i n t h e expressive use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e s p e a k e r also
established, a n d
enters into a s p e e c h - a c t - i m m a n e n t obligation, namely, t h e obligation
• a t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m . to prove trustworthy (Bewahrungsverpflichtung)—that is, t o s h o w i n t h e
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f h i s a c t i o n t h a t h e has e x p r e s s e d j u s t t h a t i n t e n t i o n
I n t h i s way, assertions, d e s c r i p t i o n s , classifications, e s t i m a t e s , p r e -
t h a t a c t u a l l y g u i d e s h i m . I n case t h e i m m e d i a t e assurance e x p r e s s i n g
d i c t i o n s , o b j e c t i o n s , a n d t h e l i k e h a v e , respectively, s p e c i f i c m o d a l
w h a t is evident t o t h e s p e a k e r h i m s e l f c a n n o t d i s p e l a d h o c doubts,
m e a n i n g s ; b u t t h e c l a i m p u t f o r w a r d i n these d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p e r s o n a l
t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e u t t e r a n c e can be c h e c k e d o n l y against t h e
r e l a t i o n s is, o r is b a s e d o n , t h e t r u t h o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g propositions
consistency o f his subsequent behavior. I n the consequences o f his
o r o n t h e ability o f a subject t o have cognitions. Correspondingly,
a c t i o n , t h e o b l i g a t i o n t a k e n o n w i t h t h e s p e e c h a c t i t s e l f is p r o v e n
requests, orders, a d m o n i t i o n s , promises, agreements, excuses, a d -
t o h a v e b e e n m e t — a n d n o t t h e v a l i d i t y o f a c l a i m t h a t , as i n t h e case
m i s s i o n s , a n d t h e l i k e have a s p e c i f i c m o d a l m e a n i n g ; b u t t h e c l a i m
o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , is a n c h o r e d o u t s i d e o f t h e u t t e r a n c e .
p u t f o r w a r d i n these d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s is, o r r e -
fers t o , t h e lightness o f n o r m s o r to t h e ability o f a subject to assume Every speech-act-immanent o b l i g a t i o n can be m a d e g o o d at two

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . W e m i g h t say t h a t i n d i f f e r e n t s p e e c h acts t h e c o n t e n t levels, namely, direcdy, in the context of utterance—whether

o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t is determined by a specific way of appealing t h r o u g h recourse to an experiential certainty, t h r o u g h indicating a

to the same, thematically stressed, universal validity claim. A n d , s i n c e as a c o r r e s p o n d i n g n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , o r t h r o u g h assurance o f w h a t

result o f this appeal to universal validity claims, the speech-act-typical is s u b j e c t i v e l y e v i d e n t — a n d i n d i r e c t l y , i n d i s c o u r s e o r i n t h e s e q u e l

obligations take o n t h e character o f obligations to p r o v i d e grounds o f consistent a c t i o n s . B u t o n l y i n t h e case o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n s to

o r to prove trustworthy, the hearer can be rationally m o t i v a t e d by g r o u n d a n d t o prove trustworthy, i n t o w h i c h we e n t e r w i t h constative

t h e speaker's signaled c o m m i t m e n t t o accept t h e latter's offer. I a n d w i t h e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts, d o w e r e f e r — o n b o t h l e v e l s — t o t h e

w o u l d like to elucidate this for each o f the three modes o f c o m m u - same t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s c l a i m . T h e o b l i g a t i o n t o j u s t i f y , i n t o

nication. w h i c h w e e n t e r w i t h r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, r e f e r s d i r e c t l y t o t h e
c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e e c h act p e r f o r m e d fits a n e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e b a c k -
I n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e s p e a k e r p r o f f e r s a s p e e c h -
g r o u n d ; whereas w i t h the e n t r a n c e i n t o practical discourse, the topic
a c t - i m m a n e n t obligation to provide grounds (Begründungsverpflichtung).
o f discussion is t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o r m itself f r o m w h i c h the
C o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts c o n t a i n t h e o f f e r t o r e c u r i f n e c e s s a r y t o t h e
s p e a k e r ' s l i g h t n e s s c l a i m is m e r e l y d e r i v e d .
experiential source f r o m w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r d r a w s t h e certainty t h a t h i s
O u r r e f l e c t i o n s have l e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n a l results:
s t a t e m e n t is t r u e . I f t h i s i m m e d i a t e g r o u n d i n g d o e s n o t d i s p e l a n a d
hoc d o u b t , the persistently p r o b l e m a t i c t r u t h c l a i m can b e c o m e the a. A s p e e c h a c t succeeds, t h a t is, i t b r i n g s a b o u t t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l
s u b j e c t o f a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , r e l a t i o n t h a t 5 i n t e n d s w i t h i t , i f i t is:
the speaker proffers a speech-act-immanent obligation to provide
• comprehensible a n d acceptable, a n d
justification (Rechtfertigungsverpflichtung). O f course, regulative speech
acts c o n t a i n o n l y t h e o f f e r o n t h e p a r t o f t h e s p e a k e r t o i n d i c a t e , i f • accepted by the hearer.

necessary, t h e normative context t h a t gives h i m t h e conviction t h a t h i s b. T h e acceptability o f a speech act d e p e n d s o n (among other
u t t e r a n c e is r i g h t . A g a i n , i f t h i s i m m e d i a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n d o e s n o t things) the f u l f i l l m e n t o f two pragmatic presuppositions:
88 89
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

. t h e existence o f speech-act-typical r e s t r i c t e d contexts ( p r e p a r a t o r y He claims t r u t h f o r t h e stated p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t or f o r the

rule); and existential presuppositions of a mentioned propositional content.
• a recognizable c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f the speaker to enter H e c l a i m s r i g h t n e s s ( o r a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ) f o r n o r m s ( o r values) t h a t ,
i n t o c e r t a i n speech-act-typical obligations (essential r u l e , s i n c e r i t y i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t , j u s t i f y a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n t h a t is t o be
rule). established performatively. Finally, he claims truthfulness f o r the
s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) e x p r e s s e d . O f c o u r s e , i n d i v i d u a l
c. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act consists i n its c a p a c i t y t o
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s c a n b e t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed: t h e t r u t h o f t h e p r o p o s i -
m o v e a h e a r e r t o act u n d e r t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e c o m m i t m e n t sig-
tional c o n t e n t c o m e s t o t h e f o r e i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f language,
n a l l e d b y t h e s p e a k e r is s e r i o u s l y m e a n t :
the rightness (or appropriateness) o f the interpersonal relation i n
• i n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r c a n
t h e i n t e r a c t i v e , a n d t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e s p e a k e r i n t h e expressive.
borrow this force directly f r o m the obligating force o f existing B u t i n e v e r y i n s t a n c e o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h e system o f a l l f o u r
norms; v a l i d i t y c l a i m s c o m e s i n t o p l a y ; t h e y m u s t always b e r a i s e d simultane-
• i n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r c a n ously a n d r e c o g n i z e d as j u s t i f i e d , a l t h o u g h t h e y c a n n o t a l l b e t h e -
d e v e l o p this f o r c e by m o t i v a t i n g t h e h e a r e r t o t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of m a t i c at t h e same time.
validity claims. T h e universality o f the validity claims i n h e r e n t i n the structure o f
d. Speaker a n d hearer can reciprocally motivate one another to s p e e c h c a n p e r h a p s b e e l u c i d a t e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e systematic
recognize validity claims because t h e c o n t e n t o f the speaker's c o m - p l a c e o f l a n g u a g e . L a n g u a g e is t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h speakers
m i t m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y a s p e c i f i c w a y o f a p p e a l i n g t o a t h e m a t i - a n d hearers realize certain f u n d a m e n t a l demarcations. T h e subject
c a l l y stressed v a l i d i t y c l a i m , w h e r e b y t h e speaker, i n a t e s t a b l e way, d e m a r c a t e s h e r s e l f ( i ) f r o m a n e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t she o b j e c t i f i e s i n
assumes: the third-person attitude o f an observer; (ii) f r o m an e n v i r o n m e n t
t h a t she c o n f o r m s t o o r deviates f r o m i n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e
• w i t h a t r u t h claim, obligations to provide grounds;
o f a p a r t i c i p a n t ; ( i i i ) f r o m h e r o w n s u b j e c t i v i t y t h a t she expresses o r
• w i t h a rightness claim, obligations to provide justification; a n d
conceals i n the first-person attitude; and finally (iv) f r o m t h e m e -
• w i t h a truthfulness claim, obligations to prove trustworthy. d i u m o f l a n g u a g e itself. F o r these d o m a i n s o f r e a l i t y I have p r o p o s e d
t h e s o m e w h a t a r b i t r a r i l y c h o s e n t e r m s external nature, society, internal
A M o d e l of Linguistic C o m m u n i c a t i o n nature, and language. T h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n a v o i d a b l y i m p l i e d i n
every speech act show t h a t i n speech o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n -
The analysis o f w h a t A u s t i n c a l l e d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f an d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s e f o u r r e g i o n s m u s t always s i m u l t a n e o u s l y appear. I
u t t e r a n c e leads us b a c k t o t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y shall characterize t h e way i n w h i c h these regions appear w i t h a few
u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts o w e t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e t o a c l u s t e r o f phenomenological indications.
validity claims that m u s t be raised reciprocally by speaker a n d hearer, B y external nature I m e a n t h e o b j e c t i v a t e d s e g m e n t o f r e a l i t y t h a t
a n d be r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e m as j u s t i f i e d , i f g r a m m a t i c a l ( t h a t is, the a d u l t subject ( e v e n i f o n l y i n d i r e c d y ) is a b l e t o p e r c e i v e a n d
comprehensible) s e n t e n c e s a r e t o b e e m p l o y e d i n s u c h a w a y as t o m a n i p u l a t e . T h e subject can, o f course, a d o p t a n objectivating atti-
r e s u l t i n successful c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n t u d e n o t o n l y t o w a r d i n a n i m a t e n a t u r e b u t t o w a r d a l l objects a n d
acts w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n l y u n d e r states o f a f f a i r s t h a t a r e d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y accessible t o s e n s o r y
the condition that, i n e m p l o y i n g comprehensible sentences, he e x p e r i e n c e . Society d e s i g n a t e s t h a t s y m b o l i c a l l y p r e s t r u c t u r e d seg-
raises w i t h h i s s p e e c h acts t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n a n a c c e p t a b l e way. m e n t o f reality t h a t the a d u l t subject can u n d e r s t a n d i n a n o n o b j e c -
90
Chapter 1
t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e , t h a t is, as o n e a c d n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y (as a p a r t i c i -
p a n t i n a system o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) . L e g i t i m a t e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a -
tions belong here, as do sentences and actions, institutions,
t r a d i t i o n s , c u l t u r a l values, o b j e c t i v a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l w i t h a s e m a n t i c
c o n t e n t , as w e l l as t h e s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g subjects t h e m s e l v e s . We
can replace this p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e w i t h a n objectivating a t t i t u d e
t o w a r d society; conversely, w e c a n s w i t c h t o a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e
i n domains i n w h i c h (today) we n o r m a l l y behave objectivatingly—
f o r e x a m p l e , i n r e l a t i o n t o a n i m a l s a n d p l a n t s . I class as internal
nature a l l wishes, f e e l i n g s , i n t e n t i o n s , a n d so f o r t h t o w h i c h a n "I"
has p r i v i l e g e d access a n d c a n e x p r e s s as its o w n s u b j e c t i v e experi-
ences. I t is p r e c i s e l y i n t h i s e x p r e s s i v e a t t i t u d e t h a t t h e " I " knows
i t s e l f n o t o n l y as s u b j e c t i v i t y b u t also as a n a u t h o r i t y t h a t has always
already transcended the b o u n d s o f m e r e subjectivity i n c o g n i t i o n ,
language, a n d i n t e r a c t i o n simultaneously. T o be sure, i f t h e subject
a d o p t s a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e t o w a r d h e r s e l f , t h i s d i s t o r t s t h e sense
i n w h i c h i n t e n t i o n s c a n b e e x p r e s s e d as my i n t e n t i o n s . 9 7
F i n a l l y , I i n t r o d u c e d t h e m e d i u m o f o u r u t t e r a n c e s as a r e g i o n o f
its o w n ; p r e c i s e l y because language ( i n c l u d i n g n o n p r o p o s i t i o n a l s y m -
b o l systems) r e m a i n s i n a p e c u l i a r h a l f - t r a n s c e n d e n c e i n t h e p e r f o r -
m a n c e o f o u r c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions a n d expressions, i t presents
itself t o t h e speaker a n d actor ( p r e c o n s c i o u s l y ) as a s e g m e n t of
reality sui generis. A g a i n , this does n o t p r e c l u d e o u r b e i n g able to
a d o p t , i n r e g a r d t o l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s o r systems o f s y m b o l s , e i t h e r
an objectivating attitude directed to the material substratum or a
p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude directed to the semantic content o f i l l o c u t i o n -
a r y acts.
T h e m o d e l i n t u i t i v e l y i n t r o d u c e d h e r e is t h a t o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n
i n w h i c h g r a m m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s a r e e m b e d d e d , b y way o f u n i v e r s a l
validity claims, i n t h r e e r e l a t i o n s t o reality, t h e r e b y assuming the
corresponding pragmatic functions o f representation, establishing
i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations, a n d expressing one's o w n subjectivity.
External nature r e f e r s t o e v e r y t h i n g t h a t c a n b e e x p l i c i t l y asserted
as t h e c o n t e n t o f s t a t e m e n t s . H e r e , " o b j e c t i v i t y " m i g h t d e s i g n a t e t h e
w a y i n w h i c h o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h . A n d " t r u t h " is t h e
c l a i m w i t h w h i c h we assert v a l i d i t y f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g proposition.
91
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
T h e social reality o f n o r m s o f a c t i o n a n d values e n t e r s s p e e c h b y way
o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s o f s p e e c h acts ( p e n e t r a t i n g t h r o u g h
t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f t h e s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , as i t w e r e ) as a
slice o f n o n o b j e c t i f i e d reality. I n t h e s a m e m a n n e r , t h e internal nature
o f t h e s u b j e c t s i n v o l v e d m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n s p e e c h b y way o f speakers'
i n t e n t i o n s as a f u r t h e r slice o f n o n o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y . I w o u l d l i k e t o
p r o p o s e t h e t e r m s " n o r m a t i v i t y " a n d "subjectivity" f o r the way i n
w h i c h n o n o b j e c t i f i e d s o c i e t y or, as t h e case m a y b e , nonobjectified
i n n e r n a t u r e a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h . " R i g h t n e s s " is t h e c l a i m w i t h w h i c h
w e assert v a l i d i t y f o r t h e n o r m a t i v i t y o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; " t r u t h f u l n e s s "
is t h e c l a i m w i t h w h i c h w e assert v a l i d i t y f o r t h e i n t e n t i o n e x p r e s s e d
i n t h a t u t t e r a n c e . I n t h i s way, t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h e n s u r e
n o t o n l y a r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y , t h e y e q u a l l y o p e n u p space
f o r t h e n o r m a t i v i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s as w e l l as t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e
i n t e n t i o n s e x p r e s s e d t h e r e i n . F i n a l l y , I use t h e t e r m " i n t e r s u b j e c t i v -
i t y " t o r e f e r t o t h e c o m m o n a l i t y e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n subjects c a p a b l e
o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n b y way o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i d e n t i c a l
meanings a n d t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f universal claims. W i t h respect to
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , t h e c l a i m f o r w h i c h v a l i d i t y is asserted is c o m p r e -
h e n s i b i l i t y — t h i s is t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s p e c i f i c t o s p e e c h .
We can examine e v e r y u t t e r a n c e t o see w h e t h e r i t is t r u e o r
u n t r u e , j u s t i f i e d o r u n j u s t i f i e d , a n d t r u t h f u l o r u n t r u t h f u l because
i n s p e e c h , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e e m p h a s i s , g r a m m a t i c a l sentences a r e
e m b e d d e d i n relations t o reality i n such a way t h a t i n an acceptable
s p e e c h a c t s e g m e n t s o f e x t e r n a l n a t u r e , society, a n d i n t e r n a l n a t u r e
always a p p e a r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . L a n g u a g e i t s e l f also a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h ,
f o r s p e e c h is a m e d i u m i n w h i c h t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s t h a t a r e e m -
p l o y e d i n s t r u m e n t a l l y are also r e f l e c t e d . I n s p e e c h , s p e e c h sets i t s e l f
o f f f r o m t h e r e g i o n s o f e x t e r n a l n a t u r e , society, a n d i n t e r n a l n a t u r e
as a r e a l i t y s u i g e n e r i s , as s o o n as t h e s i g n - s u b s t r a t u m , m e a n i n g , a n d
d e n o t a t i o n o f a linguistic utterance can be distinguished.
T h e f o l l o w i n g table represents schematically the correlations that
obtain for
a. t h e d o m a i n s o f r e a l i t y t o w h i c h e v e r y s p e e c h a c t takes u p r e l a t i o n ,
b. the attitudes o f the speaker p r e v a i l i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r m o d e s of
communication,
92 93
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

c. t h e v a l i d i t y claims u n d e r w h i c h t h e r e l a t i o n s t o reality are estab- 2. [Added to 1979 English translation:] I shall focus on a n idealized case of commu-
lished, and nicative action, namely, "consensual interaction," i n which participants share a tradi-
tion and their orientations are normatively integrated to such an extent that they
d. t h e g e n e r a l f u n c t i o n s t h a t g r a m m a t i c a l sentences assume i n t h e i r start from the same definition of the situation a n d do not disagree about the claims
to validity that they reciprocally raise. T h e following schema locates the extreme case
r e l a t i o n s to reality.
of consensual interaction in a system of different types of social action. Underlying

Modes of General Social action

Domains of communication: Validity functions of
reality Basic a t t i t u d e s claims speech

'The" world Cognitive: Truth Representation

Action oriented toward Consensual Openly strategic Latently strategic
of external Objectivating o f facts
reaching understanding action action action

/\
nature attitude

"Our" world Interactive: Rightness Establishment

Action Discourse Manipulation Systematically
o f society Conformative of legitimate
distorted
attitude interpersonal communication
relations this typology is the question of which categories of validity claims participants are
supposed to raise a n d react to.
"My" world Expressive: Truthfulness Disclosure of
These action types can be distinguished by virtue of their relations to the validity basis
of internal Expressive speaker's of speech:
nature attitude subjectivity
a. Communicative versus Strategic Action. I n communicative action, a basis of mutually
Language Comprehen- recognized validity claims is presupposed; this is not the case in strategic action. I n
the communicative attitude, it is possible to reach a direct mutual understanding
sibility oriented toward validity claims; in the strategic attitude, by contrast, only an indirect
mutual understanding via determinative indicators is possible.

Acknowledgment
I w o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k E. T u g e n d h a t a n d G. G r e w e n d o r f f o r
helpful c r i t i c i s m s o f a f i r s t d r a f t o f t h i s essay. T h e y w i l l h a v e
d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h t h i s r e v i s e d v e r s i o n as w e l l . J. H .
Notes
1. [Added to 1979 English translation:] Hitherto the term "pragmatics" has referred
to the analysis of particular contexts of language use and not to the reconstruction
of universal features of using language (or o f employing sentences in utterances). T o
mark this contrast, I introduced a distinction between "empirical" a n d "universal"
pragmatics. I a m no longer happy with this terminology; the term "formal pragmat-
i c s " — a s an extension of "formal semantics"—would serve better. "Formalpragmatik" is
the term preferred by F. Schütze, Sprache Soziologisch Gesehen, 2 vols. (Munich, 1975);
cf. the summary, pp. 911-1024.
b. Action Oriented toward Reaching Understanding versus Consensual Action. I n consen-
sual action, agreement about implicitly raised validity claims can be presupposed as a
background consensus by reason of common definitions of the situations; such
their agreement is supposed to be arrived at in action oriented toward reaching under-
standing. I n the latter case strategic elements may be employed under the proviso
their
that they are meant to lead to a direct mutual understanding.
c. Action versus Discourse. I n communicative action, it is naively supposed that i m -
plicitly raised validity claims can be vindicated (or made immediately plausible by way
of question and answer). I n discourse, by contrast, the validity claims raised for
statements a n d norms are hypothetically bracketed a n d thematically examined. As
in communicative action, the participants in discourse retain a cooperative attitude.
d. Manipulative Action versus Systematically Distorted Communication. Whereas in sys-
tematically distorted communication at least one o f the participants deceives himself
about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparendy being maintained,
the manipulator deceives at least one of the other participants about her own strategic
attitude, in which she deliberately behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner.
3. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprechakttheorie u n d transzendentale Sprachpragmatik—zur Frage
ethischer N o r m e n , " in K . - 0 . Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt,
1976), pp. 10-173.
94
Chapter 1
4. I n the framework of Southwest G e r m a n Neo-Kantianism, E m i l Lask has earlier
reconstructed the concept of "transsubjective validity"—in connection with the
meaning of linguistic expressions, the truth of statements, and the beauty of works
of t — a s worthiness to be recognized. Lask's philosophy of validity combines motifs
a r
from Lotze, Bolzano, Husserl, and, naturally, Rickert. "Valid value (geltender Wert) is
worthiness to be recognized, recognition-value, that which deserves devotion, that to
which devotion is due, thus that which demands or requires devotion. To be valid is
value, demand, norm. . . . All such terms as 'worthiness,' 'deserve,' 'be due,' 'de-
m a n d ' are correlative concepts; they point to a subjective behavior corresponding to
validity: worthy to be treated or regarded in a certain way—this demands a certain
behavior." E . Lask, " Z u m System der Logik," Ges. Schriften, vol. 3 (Tubingen, 1924),
p. 92.
5. [Editor's note:] Cf. note 1 above.
6. Y Bar-Hillel fails to appreciate this i n his critique " O n Habermas's Hermeneutic
Philosophy of Language," Synthese26 (1973): 1-12. His critique is based on a paper
I characterized as provisional. "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der
kommunikativen Kompetenz," in J . Habermas and N . L u h m a n n , Theorie der Gesell¬
schaft oder Sozialtechnobgie (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 101-141. Bar-Hillel has, I feel, mis-
understood me on so many points that it would not be fruitful to reply in detail. I
only hope that in the present sketch I can make my (still strongly programmatic)
approach clear even to readers who are aggressively inclined and hermeneutically
not especially open.
7. E . g . , K - O . Apel, Transformation derPhilosophie, vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 406ff,
and "Programmatische Bemerkungen zur Idee einer transzendentalen Sprachprag¬
matik," in Annates Universitatis Tukuensis Sarja, Series B, O s a Tom, 126 ( T u k u , 1973),
pp. 11-35.
8. Charles Morris, "Foundations of the T h e o r y of Signs," i n Encylopedia of Unified
Science, vol. 1, no. 2 (Chicago, 1938), and Signs, Language, Behavior (New York, 1955).
9. Cf. my remarks on Morris in On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen
and G . A . Stark (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 63ff.
10. Y Bar-Hillel, "Indexical Expressions," in Aspects of Language (Jerusalem, 1970),
pp. 69-88, and "Semantics and Communication," in H . Heidrich, Semantics and Com-
munication (Amsterdam, 1974), pp. 1-36. Taking Bar-Hillel as his point of departure,
A . Kasher has proposed a formal representation embedding linguistic expressions in
extralinguistic contexts. " A Step Forward to a T h e o r y of Linguistic Performance," in
Y Bar-Hillel, ed., Pragmatics of Natural Languages (Dordrecht, 1971), pp. 84-93; cf.
also R. C . Stalnaker, "Pragmatics," i n D. Davidson and G . H a r m a n , Semantics of Natural
Language (Dordrecht, 1972), pp. 380-387.
11. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952); G . H . von Wright, Norm and
Action ( L o n d o n , 1963); N. Rescher, Topics in Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht, 1968).
12. L . Apostel, " A Proposal on the Analysis of Questions," in Logique et Analyse 12
(1969): 376-381; W. K u h l m a n n , Reflexion zzvischen Theorie und Kritik (Frankfurt, 1975).
13. S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1974); W. C . Salmon, The Founda-
tion of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh, 1967); cf. the summary chapter on "nondemon-
95
W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?
strative inference" in R. P. Botha, The Justification of Linguistic Hypotheses (The Hague,
14. F. Kiefer, " O n Presuppositions," in F. Kiefer and N . Ruwet, eds., Generative Gram-
mar in Europe (Dordrecht, 1973), pp. 218-242; K. H . Ebert, "Präsuppositionen im
Sprechakt," in A. ten-Cate and P. Jordens, eds., Papers from the Seventh Linguistic
Colloquium at Nijmegen (Tübingen, 1973), pp. 45-60; F. Petöfi, Präsuppositionen in
Linguistik und Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1974).
15. H . P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," i n P. Cole and J . L . Morgan, eds., Syntax
and Semantics, vol. 3 (New York, 1974); and D . G o r d o n and G . Lakoff, "Conversational
Postulates" MS (1973).
16. J . R. Ross, " O n Declarative Sentences," i n j . Rosenbaum, ed., Readings in English
Transformational Grammar (Waltham, Mass., 1970), pp. 222-277; J . D. MacCawley,
' T h e Role of Semantics in a Grammar," in E . B a c h and T. Harms, eds., Universals in
Linguistic Theory (New York, 1968), pp. 125-170; D . Wunderlich, "Sprechakte," i n
U . Maas and D . Wunderlich, Pragmatik und sprachliches Handeln (Frankfurt, 1972),
pp. 69-188, and " Z u r Konventionalität von Sprechhandlungen," in D. Wunderlich,
ed., Linguistische Pragmatik (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 11-58.
17. C . J . Fillmore, "Pragmatics and the Description of Discourse," in P. Cole, ed.,
Radical Pragmatics (New York, 1981); G . Posner, Textgrammatik (Frankfurt, 1973).
18. J . Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (New York, 1968); J . J . Katz, Semantic
Theory (New York, 1972).
19. P. F. Strawson, Logico-LinguisticPapers ( L o n d o n , 1971).
20. A. C . Danto, Analytic Philosophy of Action (Cambridge, 1973); S. Hampshire,
Thought and Action ( L o n d o n , 1960); D. S. Schwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour
( L o n d o n , 1965); Care and Landesman, eds., Readings in the Theory of Action ( L o n d o n ,
1968).
21. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London, 1958);
C. Taylor, " E x p l a i n i n g Action," Inquiry 13 (1973): 54-89; H . von Wright, Explanation
and Understanding ( L o n d o n , 1971), and " O n the Logic and Epistemology of the
Causal Relation," in P. Suppes, ed., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, vol. 4
(Stanford, 1973), pp. 239-312.
22. W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).
23. J . Bennett, ' T h e Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," Foundations of Language 10
(1973): 141-168; S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972).
24. Cf. the bibliography by E . von Savigny, in J . L . Austin, Zur Theorie aer Sprechakte
(Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 203ff.
25. G . Grewendorf, "Sprache ohne Kontext," in Wunderlich, ed., Linguistische Prag-
matik, pp. 144-182.
26. H . P. Grice, "Meaning," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388, and "Utterer's
Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," reprinted in Grice, Studies in the
96
Chapter 1
Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 117ff.; D. K. Lewis, Convention (Cam-
bridge, 1969).
27. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, pp. 89ff.
28. H . - G . Gadamer emphasizes this in Truth and Method (New York, 1975).
29. G . Ryle, The Concept of Mind ( L o n d o n , 1949); cf. the interpretation of E . von
Savigny in Die Philosophie der normalen Sprache (Frankfurt, 1974), pp. 91ff.
30. R. Carnap and W. Stegmüller, Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wien, 1959),
p. 15.
31. D . Wunderlich, Grundlagen der Linguistik (Hamburg, 1974), p. 209.
32. For an analysis of what explication in the sense of rational reconstruction means,
cf. H . Schnädelbach, Reflexion und Diskurs (Frankfurt, 1977), the chapter on " E x p l i -
kativer Diskurs," pp. 277-336.
33. N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
34. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 210-218.
35. Botha, Justification, pp. 75ff., speaks i n this connection of external versus internal
linguistic evidence.
36. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, p. 216. I f I understand him correctly, H . Schnelle gives
an empirical interpretation to the model-theoretic version of linguistics in Sprachphi-
losphie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973), pp. 82-114.
37. Botha, Justification, p. 224, thinks that a speaker can not only report correct
linguistic intuitions falsely but can also have false linguistic intuitions; but the con-
struct of pretheoretical knowledge does nor permit this possibility. I think it makes
sense to assume that linguistic intuitions can be "false" only if they come from
incompetent speakers. Another problem is the interplay of grammatical and non-
grammatical (for example, perceptual) epistemic systems in the formation of diffuse
judgments about the acceptability of sentences, that is, the question of isolating
expressions of grammatical rule consciousness or, as the case may be, of isolating
genuinely linguistic intuitions. Cf. T. G . Bever, ' T h e Ascent of the Specious," in
D. C o h e n , ed., Explaining Linguistic Phenonema (New York, 1974), pp. 173-200.
38. I n this connection, U . Oevermann points out interesting parallels with Piaget's
concept of reflecting abstraction (cf. J . Piaget, The Principles of Genetic Epistemohgy
(New York, 1972)): perhaps the procedure of rational reconstruction is merely a
stylized and, as it were, controlled form of the reflecting abstraction the child carries
out when, for example, she "reads off" her instrumental actions the schema that
underlies them.
39. W. J . M. Levelt, Formal Grammars in Linguistics and Psycholinguistics, vols. 1-3
(Amsterdam, 1974).
40. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 5-7.
97
W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ?
41. Ibid., pp. 14ff.
42. I n responding to the doubts that Botha raises against the "clear case principle"
(Justification, p. 224), I would like to reproduce an argument that J . J . Katz and T. G .
Bever have brought against similar doubts in a paper critical of empiricism, " T h e Fall
and Rise of E m p i r i c i s m , " in T. G. Bever, J . J . Katz, and D. T. Langendoen, eds., An
Integrated Theory of Linguistic Ability (New York, 1976):
Such a theory . . . seeks to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of
phonological properties in terms of a theory of the phonological component, to
explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of syntactic properties in terms
of a theory of the syntactic component, and to explicate intuitions about the
interconnectedness of semantic properties in terms of a theory of the semantic
component. T h e theory of grammar seeks finally to explicate intuitions of relat-
edness among properties of different kinds in terms of the systematic connections
expressed in the model of a grammar that welds its components in a single
integrated theory of the sound-meaning correlation in a language.
These remarks are, of course, by way of describing the theoretical ideal. But as the
theory of grammar makes progress toward this ideal, it not only sets limits on the
construction of grammars and provides a richer interpretation for grammatical struc-
tures but it also defines a wider and wider class of grammatical properties and
relations. I n so doing, it marks out the realm of the grammatical more clearly,
distinctly, and securely than could have been done on the basis of the original
intuitions. As Fodor has insightfully observed, such a theory literally defines its own
subject matter in the course of its progress:
T h e r e is then an important sense in which a science has to discover what it is
about; it does so by discovering that the laws and concepts it produced in order
to explain one set of phenomena can be fruitfully applied to phenomena of other
sorts as well. It is thus only in retrospect that we can say of all the phenomena
embraced by a single theoretical framework that they are what we meant, for
example, by the presystematic term "physical event," "chemical interaction," or
"behavior." To the extent that such terms, or their employments, are neologistic,
the neologism is occasioned by the insights that successful theories provide into
the deep similarities that underlie superficially heterogeneous events. (J. A. Fodor,
Psychological Explanation [New York, 1968], pp. 10-11.)
43. H . Leuninger, M. H . Miller, and F. Müller, Psycholinguistik (Frankfurt, 1973), and
H . Leuninger, M. H . Miller, and F. Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie (Frankfurt,
1974); H . Leuninger, "Linguistik u n d Psychologie," in R. Bartsch and T. Vennemann,
eds., Linguistik und Nachbarwissenschaften (Kronberg, 1973), pp. 225-241.
44. E . H . Lenneberg, Biologische Grundlagen der Sprache (Frankfurt, 1972), and " E i n
Wort unter u n s , " in Leuninger, Miller, and Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie,
pp. 53-72.
45. L . Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," in D . Goslin, ed., Handbook of Socialization
Theory and Research (Chicago, 1969), and " F r o m Is to Ought," in T. Mischel, ed.,
Cognitive Development and Epistemohgy (New York, 1971), pp. 151-236.
46. O n this point, cf. U . Oevermann, "Kompetenz u n d Performanz" (Max-Planck¬
Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974).
98
Chapter 1
47. I . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (New York, 1961), p. 138.
48. B. Stroud, T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Journal of Philosophy 9 (1968): 241-254;
J . Hintikka, T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Nous 6 (1972): 174-281; and M. S. G r a m ,
"Categories and Transcendental Arguments," Man and World 6 (1973): 252-269, and
T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Nous 5 (1971): 15-26.
49. R. Bittner, T r a n s z e n d e n t a l , " i n Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 5 (Mu-
nich, 1974), pp. 1524-1539.
50. F o r example, the reception of Kant by the Erlangen school assumes a transcen-
dental status for the basic concepts of protophysics only in a limited sense; cf. the
discussion volume edited by G . Böhme, Protophysik (Frankfurt, 1975).
51. Piaget's Kantianism is typical of this approach.
52. Cf. K . - 0 . Apel's introductions to Volumes 1 and 2 of C . S. Peirce's Schriften
(Frankfurt, 1967 and 1970).
53. Cf. my "Postscript," in Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston,
1971); cf. also R. Bubner, Transzendentale Hermeneutik," in R. Simon-Schäfer and
C. W. Zimmerli, eds., Wissenschaftstheorie der Geisteswissenschaften (Hamburg, 1975),
pp. 57-70.
54. F. Kambartel, Erfahrung und Struktur (Frankfurt, 1968).
55. J . Habermas, "Wahrheitsfheorien," in Festschrift für Walter Schulz (Pfullingen,
1973), pp. 211-265, reprinted i n Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984).
56. W. Seilars, "Presupposing," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 197-215; P. F. Strawson,
" A Reply to Mr. Seilars," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 216-231.
57. U . Oevermann, T h e o r i e der individuellen Bildungsprozesse" (Max-Planck¬
Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974).
58. O n this point, cf. the controversy between Q u i n e and Chomsky: N . Chomsky,
"Quine's Empirical Assumptions," and W. V. O. Q u i n e , "Replies," both in D. Davidson
and J . Hintikka, eds., Words and Objections (Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 53-68 and 292-352;
W. V. O . Quine, "Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory," in
Davidson and H a r m a n , eds., Semantics of Natural Language. H . Schnelle, Sprachphiloso-
phie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973) is also typical of methodological behaviorism i n
linguistics.
59. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962); cf. the bibliography on
the theory of speech acts compiled by E . von Savigny for the G e r m a n edition of this
work (see note 24 above), pp. 204-209; J . L . Austin, "Performative Utterances," i n
his Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1970), pp. 233-252, and "Performative-Constative,"
in C . E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111., 1963), pp. 22-33.
Additional Austin bibliography can be found in von Savigny, Die Philosophie der nor-
malen Sprache, pp. 162-166.
See also J . R. Searle, "What Is a Speech Act?," in M. Black, ed., Philosophy in America
(Ithaca, 1965), pp. 221-239, reprinted i n j . Rosenberg and C . Travis, eds., Readings
99
W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?
in the Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), pp. 614-628, "Austin on
Locutionary and Elocutionary Acts," Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 405-424, re-
printed in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, pp. 262-275, Speech Acts (Cambridge,
1969), and "Linguistik u n d Sprachphilosophie," in Bartsch and Vennemann, Linguis-
tik und Nachbarwissenschaften, pp. 111-126.
O t h e r sources include: W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1964), and "Linguistic Acts," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964): 138-146; L . J .
C o h e n , " D o Illocutionary Forces Exist?," Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1964): 118-137,
reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 580-598, and "Speech Acts," Current
Trends in Linguistics 12 (1970); R. M. Hare, "Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical
Review 79 (1970): 3-24, and "Austin's Distinction between Locutionary and Illocu-
tionary Acts," in R. M. Hare, Practical Inferences ( L o n d o n , 1972); D. Holdcroft, "Per-
formatives and Statements," Mind 83 (1974): 1-18; P. F. Strawson, "Intention and
Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 439-460, reprinted in
Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 599-613; S. T h a u , T h e Distinction between
Rhetic and Illocutionary Acts," Analysis 32 ( 1 9 7 1 / 7 2 ) : 177-183; C. Travis, "A Genera-
tive T h e o r y of Speech Acts," in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 629-644; G . J .
Warnock, " H a r e on Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 80-84;
Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 309-352.
60. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, pp. 3ff.
61. These qualifications are stated below in the discussion of Searle's principle of
expressibility.
62. P. F. Strawson, Individuals ( L o n d o n , 1959); M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Lan-
guage ( L o n d o n , 1973); E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A.
G o r n e r (Cambridge, 1982).
63. O n the analysis of intentionality and the expression of intentions, cf. W. Sellars,
"Empiricism and the Philosophy of M i n d , " in Metaphysics ( L o n d o n , 1968); W. Sellars
and R. Chisholm, "Intentionality and the Mental," i n Minnesota Studies, vol. 1 (Min-
neapolis, 1963), pp. 507-539; W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics (London, 1968);
E . Tugendhat, "Phänomenologie u n d Sprachanalyse," in Festschrift für Gadamer, vol. 2
(Tübingen, 1970), pp. 3 - 2 4 ; J . Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief(Ithaca, 1962); C . Taylor,
"Explaining Action," Inquiry 13 (1970): 54-89. O n the analysis of expressive speech
acts, cf. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Oxford, 1972), chs. 7-9.
64. Cf. D . Steinberg and L . Jakobovits, eds., Semantics (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 157¬
484; H . E . Boekle, Semantik (Munich, 1972).
65. T h e work of P. W. Alston is a good example.
66. F. von Kutschera, Sprachphilosophie (Munich, 1971), pp. 117-161; Schnelle, Sprach-
philosophie und Linguistik, pp. 190-240; Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 238-273.
67. P. WatzlawickJ. H . Beavin, and D. D.Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication
(New York, 1967).
68. A communication theory that is supposed to reconstruct conditions of action
oriented toward reaching understanding does not necessarily require as its basic unit
of analysis pairs of complementary speech acts—that is, reciprocally performed and
accepted speech acts; but it does require, at least, a speaker's utterance that can not

100
Chapter 1
only be comprehended but can also be accepted by at least one other subject capable
of speech and action.
69. D . Wunderlich, "Zur Konventionalitât von Sprechhandlungen," in Wunderlich,
ed., Linguistische Pragmatik, p. 16; cf. also the linguistic characterization of the stan-
dard form given there (which I do not deal with h e r e ) , and Wunderlich's analysis of
advising in Grundlagen, pp. 349ff.
70. Exceptions are avowals that, when rendered explicit, can also take on a negative
form, for example, " I do not want (hereby) to conceal from you that. . . ."
71. Deviating from a widespread practice, I do not think it advisable to distinguish
propositions (Aussagen) from assertions (Behauptungen) in such a way that, although
a proposition is embedded i n a specific speech situation through being asserted, it
does not receive its assertoric force therefrom. I am of the opinion, rather, that the
assertoric force of a proposition cannot be reconstructed except through reference
to the validity claim that anyone i n the role of a competent speaker raises for it in
asserting it. Whether this claim can, if necessary, be discursively vindicated, that is,
whether the proposition is 'Valid" (true), depends on whether it satisfies certain truth
conditions. We can, to be sure, view propositions monologically, that is, as symbolic
formations with an abstract truth value without reference to a speaker; but then we
are abstracting precisely from the speech situation i n which a prepositional content,
owing to the fact that it is asserted as a proposition, receives a relation to reality, that
is, fulfills the precondition of being true or false. T h i s abstraction naturally suggests
itself (and often remains hidden even from the logician) because the truth claim
raised by the speaker is universaUst—that is, precisely of such a nature that, although
it is raised i n a particular situation, it could be defended at any time against anyone's
doubts.
72. S. Kanngiesser, "Aspekte zur Semantik u n d Pragmatik," Linguistische Berichte 24
(1973): 1-28, here p. 5.
73. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 337ff.
74. Cf. the schema in note 2 above.
75. I . Dornbach, "Primatenkommunikation" MS., (1975). O n the relatively early
differentiation of different types of speech acts in the linguistic development of the
child, see the pioneering dissertation of M. Miller, "Die Logik der frûhen Spra¬
chentwicklung" (University of Frankfurt, 1975).
76. I n a letter to me, G. Grewendorf cites the following counterexample: signing a
contract, petition, and so forth, while simultaneously objectifying the corresponding
illocutionary act. But only the following alternative seems possible: either the con-
tract signing is carried out, in such a way that it has legal force, with the help of a
performative utterance—in which case there is no objectification—or the nonverbal
contract signing is accompanied by a statement: " S signs contract x"—in which case
it is a question of two independent illocutionary acts carried out parallel to one
another (in such a way that there is, normally, a division of roles: the statesman signs,
the reporter reports the signing).
77. C o h e n , "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?," p. 587.
101
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
78. W. P. Alston, "Meaning and U s e , " in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, p. 412:
" I can find no cases in which sameness of meaning does not hang on sameness of
illocutionary act."
79. F o r ontogenetic studies, a combination of a Piagetian theory of meaning for the
cognitive schemata developed in connection with manipulated objects (cf. H . G .
Furth, Piaget and Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969)) and a Meadian theory of
meaning for the concepts developed in connection with interactions (cf. Arbeits¬
gruppe Bielefelder Soziologen, eds., Alltagswissen, Interaktion und gesellschaftliche Wirk¬
lichkeit, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1973)) seems promising to me.
80. B. Richards argues against this in "Searle o n Meaning and Speech Acts," Founda-
tions of Language 7 (1971): 536: "Austin argued that sentences such as R a (I promise
that I shall pay within one year) never assert anything that is either true or false, i.e.,
never assert propositions. H e r e we agree; but this in no way upsets the claim that R a
nevertheless expresses a proposition . . . viz. the proposition that R a . " Richards does
not equate the prepositional content of the speech act, R a , with the prepositional
content of the dependent sentence: " I shall pay within one year," but with the content
of the objectified speech act, Ra, which must, however, then be embedded in a
further speech act, Rv; for example, " I tell you, I promised him that I shall pay within
one year." I regard the confusion of performative sentences with the assertoric
reporting of their content as a category mistake (which, incidentally, diminishes the
value of Richards's argument against Searle's principle of expressibility, in particular
against his proposal to analyze the meaning of speech acts in standard form in terms
of the meaning of the sentences used in the speech acts).
81. It follows from this proposal that each of the universal-pragmatic subtheories,
that is, the theory of illocutionary acts as well as the theory of elementary sentences
(and that of intentional expressions) can make its specific contribution to the theory
of meaning. I n Austin's choice of the terms " m e a n i n g " and "force," the descriptivist
prejudice continues to resonate; it is a prejudice, I might add, that has been out of
date since Wittgenstein at the latest, if not since Humboldt, according to which the
theory of the elementary sentence, which is to clarify sense and reference, can claim
a monopoly on the theory of meaning. ( O f course, this prejudice also keeps refer-
ence semantics alive.)
82. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 132.
83. Ibid., pp. 147-148; Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 64ff.
84. Austin, "Performative Utterances," p. 248.
85. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 144.
86. Ibid., pp. 145ff. Cf. also Austin, "Performative-Constative," p. 31:
T o begin with, it is clear that if we establish that a performative utterance is not
unhappy, that is, that its author has performed his act happily and in all sincerity,
that still does not suffice to set it beyond the reach of all criticism. It may always
be criticized in a different dimension. L e t us suppose that I say to you " I advise
you to do it;" and let us allow that all the circumstances are appropriate, the
conditions for success are fulfilled. I n saying that, I actually do advise you to do
102 103
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

i t — i t is not that I state, truely or falsely, thatl advise you. It is, then, a performative
utterance. T h e r e does still arise, all the same, a little question: was the advice good
or bad? Agreed, I spoke in all sincerity, I believed that to do it would be in your
interest; but was I right? Was my belief, in these circumstances, justified? O r
again—though perhaps this matters less—was it in fact, or as things turned out,
in your interest? T h e r e is confrontation of my utterance with the situation i n , and
the situation in respect to which, it was issued. I was fully justified perhaps, but
was I right?
87. Austin, How to do Things with Words, pp. 144-145.
88. Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen," pp. l l f f .
95. D. Holdcroft ignores this distinction, "Performatives and Statements," Mind 83
(1974): 1-18, and thus comes to the false conclusion that only the speech acts that
we call institutionally bound are subject to conventional regulations in the sense of
the sentence: " A sentence type is a performative if and only if its literal and serious
utterance can consütute the performance of an act which is done in accordance with
a convention, which convention is not merely a grammatical or semantical one."
96. I n Wunderlich's analysis of advising (see Grundlagen, p. 350), his conditions
B 4-6 make up the content of the obligations.
97. H . Delius, " Z u m Wahrheitscharakter egologischer Aussagen," in Brockman and
Hofer, eds., Die Wirklichkeit des Unverständlichen ( T h e Hague, 1974), pp. 38-77.

89. Austin, "Performative Utterances," pp. 250-251.

90. Ibid., p. 251.

91. Austin, "Performative-Constative," pp. 31-32.

92. [Added i n 1983:] I n casually mentioning this restriction, I was unaware of the
problems connected with i t What I took at the time to be trivial is in fact in need of
careful justification: the thesis that the use of language oriented toward reaching
understanding represents the original mode of language use. Cf. chapter 2 i n the
present volume, pp. 122ff.

93. Searle, Speech Acts, p. 63.

94. O n Wunderlich's analysis of advising (Grundlagen, pp. 349ff.) the general con-
textual conditions would be as follows:

(A) S makes it understood in a conventional manner that (that is, S should give the
advice only if these conditions obtain, and H should accordingly believe that they
obtain):

1. S knows, believes, or assumes (depending on preceding communication) that

a. H finds himself i n an unpleasant situation Z;

b. H wants or desires to reach some other, more pleasant situation Z' ^ Z;

c. H does not know how Z' can be reached;

d. H is in a position to do a.

2. S believes or assumes that

e. H does not already want to do a;

f. H can reach a more pleasant situation Z " (relative optimum) with a than with any
alternative action a'.
3. T h e following obligations are established for H :
(7) if one of the subconditions listed under (a) through (f) does not obtain (or,
more precisely, i f H knows, believes, or assumes that it does not obtain), then H will
make this understood to S in a conventional manner.
2
Social Action, Purposive Activity, and
Communication (1981)

I f w e f o l l o w W e b e r ' s s t u d i e s i n t h e s o c i o l o g y o f r e l i g i o n , i t is a n
e m p i r i c a l — a n d thus to begin w i t h an o p e n — q u e s t i o n why all three
rationality complexes differentiated o u t after the disintegradon o f
t r a d i t i o n a l w o r l d v i e w s have n o t f o u n d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l embodiment
t o a n e q u a l e x t e n t i n t h e o r d e r s o f l i f e o f m o d e r n societies, a n d w h y
they d o n o t d e t e r m i n e the c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices o f everyday life
e a c h t o t h e same d e g r e e . T h r o u g h h i s basic a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a s s u m p -
tions, h o w e v e r , W e b e r p r e j u d i c e d t h i s q u e s t i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t
processes o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n c o u l d c o m e i n t o v i e w o n l y f r o m
the standpoint o f purposive rationality. I w o u l d like, therefore, to
discuss t h e c o n c e p t u a l b o t d e n e c k s i n h i s t h e o r y o f a c t i o n a n d t o use
t h i s c r i t i q u e as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a n a l y z i n g f u r t h e r t h e c o n c e p t
of communicative action.

I n this sketch I shall n o t be d e a l i n g w i t h the analytic t h e o r y o f

a c t i o n d e v e l o p e d i n t h e A n g l o - S a x o n w o r l d . T h e studies c a r r i e d o u t
1

u n d e r t h i s title ( t h e r e s u l t s o f w h i c h I h a v e d r a w n u p o n e l s e w h e r e ) 2

b y n o m e a n s r e p r e s e n t a u n i f i e d a p p r o a c h . W h a t t h e y d o have i n
c o m m o n is t h e m e t h o d o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis a n d a r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w
f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m . A n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y is f r u i t f u l for
c l a r i f y i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y . H o w e v e r , i t is l i m i t e d
to the atomistic m o d e l o f action by a n isolated actor a n d neglects
the mechanisms for coordinating action t h r o u g h which interper-
sonal relations c o m e about. I t conceptualizes action o n the o n t o l o g i -
c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f e x a c t l y o n e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s
106 107
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

a n d n e g l e c t s t h o s e a c t o r - w o r l d r e l a t i o n s t h a t are essential t o s o c i a l
i n t e r a c t i o n . As actions are r e d u c e d t o purposive i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t h e
o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f m e a n s - e n d s r e l a t i o n s stands i n t h e
f o r e g r o u n d . F i n a l l y , a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y u n d e r s t a n d s its task t o b e
a m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f basic c o n c e p t s ; i t is n o t c o n c e r n e d
w i t h t h e e m p i r i c a l usefulness o f basic a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c assumptions
a n d t h u s is scarcely c o n n e c t e d w i t h c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n i n t h e social
sciences. I t g e n e r a t e s a set o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t are too
unspecific f o r the purposes o f social theory.
O n the field o f a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y , e m p i r i c i s m is r e p e a t i n g
batdes l o n g since f o u g h t . O n c e again t h e r e are debates c o n c e r n i n g
t h e r e l a t i o n o f m i n d a n d b o d y ( i d e a l i s m versus m a t e r i a l i s m ) , c o n -
c e r n i n g r e a s o n s a n d causes ( f r e e w i l l versus d e t e r m i n i s m ) , c o n c e r n -
ing behavior and action (objectivistic versus nonobjectivistic
d e s c r i p t i o n s o f a c t i o n ) , c o n c e r n i n g t h e l o g i c a l status o f e x p l a n a t i o n s
o f a c t i o n , c o n c e r n i n g causality, i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d so o n . T o p u t t h e
m a t t e r i n a p o i n t e d way: a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y t r e a t s t h e v e n e r a b l e
p r o b l e m s o f t h e p r e - K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness i n a n e w
p e r s p e c t i v e , w i t h o u t p u s h i n g t h r o u g h t o t h e basic q u e s t i o n s of a
sociological t h e o r y o f action.
I n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s is b a s e d o n t h e c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e i d e a t h a t
u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f a symbolic expression X c a n be traced
b a c k t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n o f s p e a k e r S t o give h e a r e r H
t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g b y m e a n s o f a s i g n . I n t h i s way, a d e r i v a t i v e
m o d e o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o w h i c h s p e a k e r s c a n have r e -
c o u r s e i f t h e d i r e c t r o a d t o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) is
o b s t r u c t e d , is s t y l i z e d i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l m o d e o f r e a c h i n g under-
s t a n d i n g . T h e a t t e m p t o f i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s t o base t h e m e a n -
i n g o f t h e s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n X o n w h a t S m e a n s (mdnt) b y X, o r
i n d i r e c t l y gives t o u n d e r s t a n d b y X, m i s c a r r i e s . F o r a h e a r e r to
u n d e r s t a n d w h a t S m e a n s b y X — t h a t is, t h e m e a n i n g (Bedeutung) of
X — a n d f o r h i m t o b e a w a r e o f t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t S is p u r s u i n g i n
u s i n g X — t h a t is, t h e p u r p o s e t h a t S w a n t s t o a c c o m p l i s h w i t h h e r
a c t i o n — a r e t w o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . S w i l l o n l y t h e n have c a r r i e d o u t
successfully her intention of inducing i n H a meaning-intention
(Bedeutungsintention) i f H r e c o g n i z e s S"s i n t e n t i o n t o communicate
w i t h h i m a n d u n d e r s t a n d s what S m e a n t (gemeint hat) i n c a r r y i n g o u t
h e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n . H, i f h e k n o w s o n l y t h e communica-
tive i n t e n t i o n o f S, w i l l n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h a t Smeans (mdnt), t h a t is,
that concerning which she w a n t s t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h h i m . 9

F r o m a sociological p o i n t o f view, i t m a k e s sense t o b e g i n with For a t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , o n l y those analytic theories

c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . ' T h e necessity f o r c o o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n g e n e r -
ates i n s o c i e t y a c e r t a i n n e e d f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h m u s t b e m e t
i f i t is t o b e p o s s i b l e t o c o o r d i n a t e a c t i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e
o f satisfying n e e d s . " A n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , w i t h t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n -
3
i n g a t its c o r e , d o e s o f f e r a p r o m i s i n g p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e f o r a t h e o r y
o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h a t p l a c e s l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g (sprachliche Verständigung), as t h e m e c h a n i s m f o r co-
o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n , a t t h e f o c a l p o i n t o f i n t e r e s t . T h i s is less t r u e o f
t h e a p p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g t h e o r y t h a t stands closest t o a c t i o n t h e o r y
i n o n e respect, namely, t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics 4
t h a t goes b a c k
o f m e a n i n g are i n s t r u c t i v e t h a t start f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e o f linguistic
expressions r a t h e r t h a n f r o m speakers' i n t e n t i o n s . T h e theory, h o w -
ever, m u s t k e e p i n v i e w t h e p r o b l e m o f h o w t h e a c t i o n s o f several
actors can be l i n k e d up with one another with the help of the
mechanism o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, h o w t h e y c a n be
i n t e r l a c e d i n s o c i a l spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s . T h e o r g a n o n model
o f K a r l B ü h l e r is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c l i n e
o f i n q u i r y . B ü h l e r starts f r o m t h e s e m i o t i c m o d e l o f a l i n g u i s t i c s i g n
used by a speaker (sender) w i t h t h e a i m o f c o m i n g to an u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g w i t h a h e a r e r ( r e c e i v e r ) a b o u t o b j e c t s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . 1 0

t o s t u d i e s b y G r i c e , was f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d b y L e w i s , a n d l a t e r was
5 6
H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h r e e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e use o f signs: t h e c o g n i t i v e
w o r k e d o u t by S c h i f f e r 7
and Bennett. This nominalistic theory of
8
f u n c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a state o f a f f a i r s , t h e expressive f u n c t i o n o f
m e a n i n g is n o t s u i t a b l e f o r c l a r i f y i n g t h e c o o r d i n a t i n g mechanism m a k i n g k n o w n s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) o f t h e speaker, a n d
o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n b e c a u s e i t analyzes t h e a c t o f t h e a p p e l l a t i v e f u n c t i o n o f d i r e c t i n g r e q u e s t s t o addressees. F r o m
reaching understanding according to a m o d e l o f action o r i e n t e d t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e l i n g u i s t i c s i g n f u n c t i o n s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as s y m -
t o w a r d consequences. b o l , s y m p t o m , a n d s i g n a l . " I t is a symbol i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g c o r r e l a t e d
108
Chapter 2
w i t h o b j e c t s a n d states o f a f f a i r s , a symptom ( i n d i c a t i o n , i n d e x ) i n
v i r t u e o f its d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e sender, w h o s e i n w a r d n e s s i t ex-
presses, a n d a signal i n v i r t u e o f its a p p e a l t o t h e h e a r e r , w h o s e
e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l b e h a v i o r i t steers l i k e o t h e r t r a f f i c s i g n s . " 11
T h e r e is n o n e e d h e r e t o g o i n t o t h e r e c e p t i o n a n d c r i t i q u e o f t h i s
m o d e l o f language i n linguistics a n d psychology 1 2
since t h e decisive
d e v e l o p m e n t s o f i t have c o m e , w i t h o n e e x c e p t i o n , 1 3
f r o m the ana-
l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . A t least t h e t h r e e m o s t i m p o r t a n t a n a -
lytic theories o f m e a n i n g can be w o r k e d i n t o B i d d e r ' s m o d e l i n such
a w a y t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y is f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d f r o m w i t h i n —
t h r o u g h t h e f o r m a l analysis o f r u l e s f o r u s i n g l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s -
sions—and n o t f r o m w i t h o u t — t h r o u g h a cybernetic r e f o r m u l a t i o n
o f t h e transmission process. T h i s m e a n i n g - t h e o r e t i c l i n e o f develop-
m e n t o f t h e o r g a n o n m o d e l l e a d s u s away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v i s t i c
c o n c e p t i o n o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as i n f o r m a t i o n
flows b e t w e e n senders a n d r e c e i v e r s 1 4
a n d i n the direction o f the
f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t o f i n t e r a c t i o n a m o n g subjects c a p a b l e o f
s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g , i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t is m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h acts o f
reaching understanding.
L i n k i n g u p w i t h t h e p r a g m a t i s t t h e o r y o f signs i n t r o d u c e d b y
Peirce a n d developed by M o r r i s , C a r n a p m a d e the symbolic com-
p l e x , w h i c h B ü h l e r h a d f i r s t c o n s i d e r e d o n l y f u n c t i o n a l i s t i c a l l y , ac-
cessible t o a n i n t e r n a l l y d i r e c t e d analysis o f l a n g u a g e f r o m s y n t a c t i c
a n d s e m a n t i c p o i n t s o f view. T h e c a r r i e r s (Träger) o f m e a n i n g are
n o t i s o l a t e d signs b u t e l e m e n t s o f a l a n g u a g e system, t h a t is, sen-
t e n c e s w h o s e f o r m is d e t e r m i n e d b y s y n t a c t i c r u l e s a n d w h o s e se-
m a n t i c c o n t e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e r e f e r e n c e t o d e s i g n a t e d o b j e c t s
o r states o f a f f a i r s . W i t h C a r n a p ' s l o g i c a l syntax a n d t h e basic as-
s u m p t i o n s o f r e f e r e n c e s e m a n t i c s , t h e w a y was o p e n e d f o r a f o r m a l
analysis o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e . O n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , C a r n a p c o n s i d e r e d t h e a p p e l l a t i v e a n d expressive f u n c t i o n s o f
l a n g u a g e as p r a g m a t i c aspects o f l a n g u a g e use t h a t s h o u l d b e l e f t t o
e m p i r i c a l analysis. O n t h i s view, t h e p r a g m a t i c s o f l a n g u a g e is n o t
d e t e r m i n e d b y a g e n e r a l system o f r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e r u l e s i n s u c h a
w a y t h a t i t c o u l d b e o p e n e d u p t o c o n c e p t u a l analysis l i k e s y n t a x a n d
semantics.
109
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
T h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g was finally e s t a b l i s h e d as a f o r m a l s c i e n c e
o n l y w i t h t h e step f r o m r e f e r e n c e semantics to t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l
semantics. T h e semantics f o u n d e d by Frege a n d d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h
t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n t o D a v i d s o n a n d D u m m e t t gives c e n t e r stage
t o t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e a n d state o f a f f a i r s , b e t w e e n l a n -
guage a n d the w o r l d . 1 5
W i t h this o n t o l o g i c a l t u r n , semantic t h e o r y
disengaged itself f r o m t h e view t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n
c a n be c l a r i f i e d o n t h e m o d e l o f n a m e s t h a t d e s i g n a t e objects. The
m e a n i n g o f sentences, a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentence m e a n i n g s ,
cannot be separated f r o m language's i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n to the validity
o f s t a t e m e n t s . Speakers a n d h e a r e r s u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a
s e n t e n c e w h e n t h e y k n o w u n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s i t is t r u e . C o r r e -
spondingly, they u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a w o r d w h e n they k n o w
w h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n that w o r d makes to t h e capacity for t r u t h o f a
s e n t e n c e f o r m e d w i t h its h e l p . T h u s , t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s
d e v e l o p e d t h e thesis t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e is d e t e r m i n e d
b y its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e mean-
ing o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n a n d t h e v a l i d i t y o f a s e n t e n c e f o r m e d
w i t h its h e l p was first w o r k e d o u t , t h e n , f o r t h e d i m e n s i o n o f t h e
l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s .
T o b e s u r e , t h i s t h e o r y is c o m m i t t e d t o a n a l y z i n g a l l s e n t e n c e s o n
t h e m o d e l o f assertoric sentences. T h e l i m i t s o f this a p p r o a c h be-
c o m e v i s i b l e as s o o n as t h e d i f f e r e n t m o d e s o f u s i n g s e n t e n c e s are
brought under formal consideration. Frege had already distin-
g u i s h e d b e t w e e n t h e assertoric o r i n t e r r o g a t i v e f o r c e o f assertions o r
questions a n d the s t r u c t u r e o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences e m p l o y e d
in these utterances. A l o n g the line f r o m the later Wittgenstein
t h r o u g h A u s t i n t o Searle, t h e f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s o f s e n t e n c e s was
extended t o s p e e c h acts. I t is n o longer limited to the repre-
s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e b u t is o p e n t o a n u n b i a s e d analysis
o f t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s . T h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g
m a k e s t h e p r a g m a t i c aspects o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n , t o o , acces-
sible t o c o n c e p t u a l analysis. T h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h e n m a r k s
t h e first s t e p t o w a r d a f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t e x t e n d s t o n o n c o g n i -
tive m o d e s o f e m p l o y m e n t . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , as t h e a t t e m p t s a t a
s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n o f speech-act classes f r o m S t e n i u s t h r o u g h K e n n y t o
110
Chapter 2
Searle show, i t r e m a i n s t i e d t o t h e n a r r o w o n t o l o g i c a l presupposi-
tions o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics. T h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g can
attain t h e level o f i n t e g r a t i o n o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n theory that
B u h l e r a d v a n c e d i n a p r o g r a m m a t i c way o n l y i f i t is a b l e t o p r o v i d e
a systematic g r o u n d i n g f o r t h e a p p e l l a t i v e a n d expressive f u n c t i o n s
o f language ( a n d p e r h a p s also f o r t h e " p o e t i c " f u n c t i o n , r e l a t e d t o
t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h is e m p h a s i z e d byjakobson),
i n t h e s a m e way t h a t t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s has d o n e f o r t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . I have t a k e n t h i s p a t h w i t h m y r e f l e c t i o n s
o n universal pragmatics. 1 6
Buhler's t h e o r y o f language functions c o u l d be c o n n e c t e d w i t h
the m e t h o d s a n d insights o f t h e analytic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a n d be
m a d e the centerpiece o f a theory o f communicative action oriented
t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i f we c o u l d generalize the c o n c e p t
o f validity beyond the t r u t h of propositions a n d identify validity
c o n d i t i o n s n o l o n g e r o n l y o n t h e semantic level, f o r sentences, b u t
o n the pragmatic level, f o r utterances. For this purpose, the para-
d i g m c h a n g e i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e t h a t was i n t r o d u c e d b y
A u s t i n ( a n i l l u m i n a t i n g h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t o f w h i c h has b e e n g i v e n
by A p e l ) 1 7
m u s t be radicalized i n such a way t h a t the b r e a k w i t h t h e
" l o g o s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e , " t h a t is, w i t h t h e p r i v i l e g i n g o f
its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , also has c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e c h o i c e
o f o n t o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n t h e t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e . I t is n o t
m e r e l y a q u e s t i o n o f a d m i t t i n g o t h e r m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use o n a n
e q u a l f o o t i n g w i t h t h e a s s e r t o r i c ; w e have t o e s t a b l i s h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
a n d w o r l d r e l a t i o n s f o r t h e s e o t h e r m o d e s as was d o n e f o r the
assertoric m o d e . 1 8
I t is w i t h t h i s i n m i n d t h a t I have p r o p o s e d t h a t
we d o n o t oppose the i l l o c u t i o n a r y role to the propositional c o m p o -
n e n t , s e e i n g t h e f o r m e r as a n i r r a t i o n a l f o r c e a n d t h e l a t t e r as t h a t
w h i c h g r o u n d s validity; rather, we s h o u l d conceive the i l l o c u t i o n a r y
r o l e as t h e c o m p o n e n t t h a t specifies which v a l i d i t y c l a i m a s p e a k e r is
r a i s i n g w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e , how she is r a i s i n g i t , a n d f o r what.
W i t h the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f a n utterance, a speaker can m o t i -
vate a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n h e r s p e e c h a c t a n d
t h e r e b y t o e n t e r i n t o a rationally motivated binding and bonding rela-
tionship (Bindung). This conception presupposes that acting and
s p e a k i n g subjects c a n r e l a t e t o m o r e t h a n o n l y o n e w o r l d , a n d t h a t
111
S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
w h e n they c o m e to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h one another about some-
t h i n g i n o n e w o r l d , t h e y base t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i o n o n a c o m m o n l y
s u p p o s e d system o f w o r l d s . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n I h a v e p r o p o s e d t h a t
we differentiate the external w o r l d i n t o an objective w o r l d a n d a
s o c i a l w o r l d , a n d t h a t w e i n t r o d u c e t h e i n t e r n a l w o r l d as a c o m p l e -
m e n t a r y concept to the external w o r l d . T h e corresponding validity
c l a i m s o f t r u t h , Tightness, a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhafiigkeit) c a n t h e n
s e r v e as a g u i d e i n t h e c h o i c e o f t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s f o r j u s t i f y -
i n g t h e basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use, o r f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e , a n d
classifying the speech acts t h a t v a r y w i t h individual languages.
B u h l e r ' s a p p e l l a t i v e f u n c t i o n w o u l d a c c o r d i n g l y have t o b e s p l i t u p
i n t o r e g u l a t i v e a n d i m p e r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . I n t h e r e g u l a t i v e use of
l a n g u a g e , p a r t i c i p a n t s raise n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n v a r i o u s ways
a n d relate t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e i r shared social w o r l d ; i n the i m p e r a -
tive use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e y r e l a t e t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ,
w h e r e b y t h e s p e a k e r raises a c l a i m t o p o w e r vis-a-vis t h e addressee i n
o r d e r t o g e t h i m t o a c t i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d state o f a f f a i r s
comes i n t o existence. A t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w o r k e d o u t a l o n g
these lines i n f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t e r m s c o u l d be m a d e f r u i t f u l f o r a
sociological t h e o r y o f a c t i o n i f we c o u l d show h o w communicative
a c t s — t h a t is, s p e e c h acts o r e q u i v a l e n t n o n v e r b a l expressions—take
o n the function of coordinating action a n d make their contribution
to the construction o f interactions.
Finally, c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is d e p e n d e n t o n situational con-
texts, w h i c h i n t u r n represent segments o f t h e l i f e w o r l d o f t h e p a r -
ticipants i n i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e c o n n e c t i o n o f a c t i o n t h e o r y t o t h e basic
concepts o f social t h e o r y can be r e n d e r e d secure o n l y by m e a n s o f
t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d ; t h i s c a n b e i n t r o d u c e d as a c o m p l e m e n -
t a r y c o n c e p t t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n v i a t h e analyses o f b a c k g r o u n d
k n o w l e d g e s t i m u l a t e d by W i t t g e n s t e i n . 1 9
W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f these i n t e r m e d i a t e r e f l e c t i o n s , I c a n a t
best h o p e t o m a k e this p r o g r a m plausible. S t a r t i n g f r o m two versions
o f W e b e r ' s a c t i o n t h e o r y , I w o u l d l i k e first t o m a k e c l e a r t h e c e n t r a l
i m p o r t a n c e o f the p r o b l e m o f c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. F o l l o w i n g this,
I shall t r y to make Austin's distinction between illocutionary a n d
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts f r u i t f u l f o r d e m a r c a t i n g a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. O n
 113
112
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

t h e basis o f t h i s , I s h a l l e x a m i n e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d - f r o m a t e l e o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f a c t i o n a n d specifies "subjective mean-

i n g (bindende) f o r c e o f t h e o f f e r s c o n t a i n e d i n s p e e c h acts a n d t h e
r o l e o f criticizable validity claims. A discussion o f c o m p e t i n g p r o p o s -
als f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts w i l l s e r v e t o c o n f i r m m y views. F i n a l l y ,
I w a n t t o s h o w a few o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n s f r o m t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c
l e v e l o f analysis t o e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s , a n d , o n t h e basis o f t h e
relation between the literal a n d context-dependent meanings
s p e e c h acts, t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n has
i n g " as a ( p r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e ) a c t i o n i n t e n t i o n . A n actor can e i t h e r
p u r s u e h i s o w n i n t e r e s t s , s u c h as a c q u i r i n g p o w e r o r w e a l t h , o r h e
c a n a t t e m p t t o l i v e u p t o values s u c h as p i e t y o r h u m a n d i g n i t y , o r
h e c a n seek s a t i s f a c t i o n i n l i v i n g o u t affects a n d desires. T h e s e utili-
tarian, value-related, o r affectual g o a l s , w h i c h a r e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o
of situation-specific purposes, are f o r m s o f t h e subjective m e a n i n g t h a t
a c t i n g subjects c a n c o n n e c t w i t h t h e i r g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i v i t y . 22

t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d by a c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . S i n c e W e b e r starts f r o m a m o n o l o g i c a l l y c o n c e i v e d m o d e l o f ac-
t i o n , h e is u n a b l e t o i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t o f " s o c i a l a c t i o n " b y w a y
T w o Versions of Weber's T h e o r y o f Action o f a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f m e a n i n g . I n s t e a d , h e has to
e x p a n d t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y w i t h t w o f u r t h e r specifica-
W e b e r i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e s " m e a n i n g " (Sinn) as a basic c o n c e p t o f t i o n s so t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n a r e satisfied: (a) a n
a c t i o n t h e o r y a n d , w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h i s c a t e g o r y , d i s t i n g u i s h e s ac- o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r a c t i n g subjects, a n d ( b ) a
t i o n s f r o m o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r : "We s h a l l speak o f ' a c t i o n ' i n s o f a r r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n t o o n e a n o t h e r o f t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s o f several
as t h e a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l a t t a c h e s a s u b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g t o h i s b e h a v - i n t e r a c t i n g subjects. T o be s u r e , W e b e r v a c i l l a t e s as t o w h e t h e r h e
i o r — b e i t overt o r covert, omission o r acquiescence." 20
Weber does s h o u l d r e g a r d c o n d i t i o n (a) as s u f f i c i e n t f o r s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n o r
n o t rely here o n a theory of m e a n i n g b u t o n an intentional theory s h o u l d also r e q u i r e ( b ) . I n s e c t i o n 1 o f Economy and Society h e says
o f consciousness. H e does n o t elucidate " m e a n i n g " i n connection m e r e l y : " A c t i o n is ' s o c i a l ' i n s o f a r as its s u b j e c t i v e meaning takes
w i t h the m o d e l o f linguistic m e a n i n g s a n d does n o t relate i t to the a c c o u n t o f t h e b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r s a n d is t h e r e b y o r i e n t e d i n its
linguistic m e d i u m o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t to the course." 2 3
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n s e c t i o n 3 W e b e r stresses t h a t t h e
beliefs a n d i n t e n t i o n s o f a n a c t i n g subject, w h o is p r e s e n t e d in a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s o f p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e t o b e reciprocally r e l a t e d t o
i s o l a t i o n t o b e g i n w i t h . A t t h i s first s w i t c h p o i n t , W e b e r p a r t s c o m - o n e a n o t h e r : " T h e t e r m 'social r e l a t i o n s h i p ' w i l l be used t o d e n o t e
p a n y w i t h a t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . W h a t c o u n t s as f u n d a - t h e b e h a v i o r o f a p l u r a l i t y o f a c t o r s i n s o f a r as, i n its m e a n i n g f u l
mental is n o t the interpersonal relation between a t least two c o n t e n t , t h e a c t i o n o f e a c h takes a c c o u n t o f t h a t o f t h e o t h e r s a n d
speaking a n d a c t i n g subjects—a r e l a t i o n t h a t refers back to l i n g u i s t i c is o r i e n t e d i n t h e s e t e r m s . " 2 4

processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g — b u t t h e p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y o f For the construction o f a t h e o r y o f action, another decision is

a s o l i t a r y a c t i n g subject. A s i n i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s , t h e p r o c e s s even m o r e i m p o r t a n t . S h o u l d Weber i n t r o d u c e the rationalizable
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n l a n g u a g e is c o n c e i v e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e aspects o f a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n m o d e l , or
m o d e l o f i d e o l o g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects r e c i p r o c a l l y i n f l u e n c i n g o n e s h o u l d t h e c o n c e p t o f social i n t e r a c t i o n serve as a basis f o r t h a t
a n o t h e r . " A l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i t y is r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e i d e a l - t y p i c a l , p u r p o s e ? I n t h e first case, W e b e r has t o l i m i t h i m s e l f t o t h e r a t i o n -
' p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l ' l i m i t case b y n u m e r o u s i n d i v i d u a l acts . . . w h i c h a l i z a b l e aspects y i e l d e d b y t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e activity, t h a t is, t o
are o r i e n t e d to the expectation of gaining 'understanding' (Ver- t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f m e a n s a n d e n d s . I n t h e s e c o n d case, t h e q u e s t i o n
stdndnis') f r o m others for an i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g . " 2 1
Reaching under- arises w h e t h e r t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n s of
s t a n d i n g c o u n t s as a d e r i v a t i v e p h e n o m e n o n t h a t is t o b e construed a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d t h u s also a d d i t i o n a l aspects u n d e r w h i c h
w i t h t h e h e l p o f a p r i m i t i v e c o n c e p t o f i n t e n t i o n . T h u s , W e b e r starts actions can be rationalized.
114 115
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

T h e Official Version Table 2.1

The official typology of action

Weber distinguishes between p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l , v a l u e - r a t i o n a l , af- Types of action in Subjective meaning covers these elements:
f e c t u a l , a n d t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n . T h i s t y p o l o g y is b a s e d o n c a t e g o r i e s descending order
of rationality Means Ends Values Consequences
o f a c t i o n goals t o w a r d w h i c h a n actor can o r i e n t herself i n her
purposive activity: u t i l i t a r i a n , value-related, a n d affectual goals. T h e n Purposive-rational + + + +
" t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n " f o l l o w s as a r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r y t h a t is, t o begin Value-rational + + + -
w i t h , n o t f u r t h e r d e t e r m i n e d . T h i s t y p o l o g y is o b v i o u s l y g u i d e d b y
Affectual + + - -
Traditional + - - -
a n i n t e r e s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e d e g r e e s t o w h i c h a c t i o n is r a t i o n -
a l i z a b l e . H e r e , W e b e r d o e s n o t s t a r t f r o m t h e social r e l a t i o n s h i p . H e
r e g a r d s as r a t i o n a l i z a b l e o n l y t h e m e a n s - e n d s r e l a t i o n o f ideologi-
r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l ; i n a f f e c t u a l a c t i o n , t h i s is t r u e o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s
cally conceived, m o n o l o g i c a l action. I f one adopts this perspective,
a n d t h e values; i n a c t i o n t h a t is m e r e l y h a b i t u a l i z e d , o f t h e e n d s as
t h e o n l y aspects o f a c t i o n o p e n t o o b j e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l are t h e effective-
well (table 2.1).
ness o f a causal i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o a n e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e truth
O f course, Weber can a c c o m m o d a t e "value-rational" action i n this
o f the e m p i r i c a l statements t h a t u n d e r l y the m a x i m or the p l a n o f
c o n s t r u c t i o n o n l y by attaching to i t a restrictive m e a n i n g . T h i s type
a c t i o n — t h a t is, t h e s u b j e c t i v e b e l i e f a b o u t a p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l o r -
can i n c l u d e o n l y action o r i e n t a t i o n s o f a n ethics o f c o n v i c t i o n and
g a n i z a t i o n o f m e a n s . T h u s W e b e r c h o o s e s p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l (zweck-
n o t o f a n ethics o f responsibility. Moreover, i t does n o t take i n t o
rationat) a c t i o n as t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r h i s t y p o l o g y :
a c c o u n t t h e p r i n c i p l e d c h a r a c t e r o n t h e basis o f w h i c h t h e P r o t e s -
Social action, like all action, may be o r i e n t e d i n f o u r ways. I t may be: (1) t a n t e t h i c , f o r e x a m p l e , q u a l i f i e s as a f r a m e w o r k f o r a m e t h o d i c a l
instrumentally rational [zweckrational), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by expectations as c o n d u c t o f life. T h e p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l structures o f consciousness t h a t
to the behavior o f objects i n the e n v i r o n m e n t a n d o f other h u m a n beings; W e b e r finds i n e t h i c a l l y r a t i o n a l i z e d w o r l d v i e w s c a n n o t , o n a n a l y t i c
these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the a t t a i n m e n t
grounds a l o n e , b e i n c l u d e d i n a n a c t i o n t y p o l o g y t h a t rests o n a
o f the actor's own rationally pursued a n d calculated ends; (2) value-rational
(wertrational), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by a conscious belief i n the value f o r its c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f nonsocial a c t i o n s ; f o r m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is r e l a t e d
o w n sake o f some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other f o r m o f behavior, t o t h e c o n s e n s u a l r e g u l a t i o n o f interpersonal c o n f l i c t s o f a c t i o n .
i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its prospects o f success; (3) affectual (especially emotional),
that is, d e t e r m i n e d by the actor's specific affects a n d feeling states; (4) T h e Unofficial Version
traditional, that is, d e t e r m i n e d by i n g r a i n e d h a b i t u a t i o n . 25

If one follows an interpretation advanced by Wolfgang W h e n W e b e r a t t e m p t s t o set u p a t y p o l o g y o n t h e c o n c e p t u a l level

Schluchter, 2 6
this typology can be r e c o n s t r u c t e d i n accordance w i t h o f s o c i a l a c t i o n , h e e n c o u n t e r s a d d i t i o n a l aspects o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y

t h e f o r m a l properties o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . A n actor behaves o f a c t i o n . Social actions can be distinguished according to the

p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l l y w h e n she c h o o s e s ends f r o m a c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d mechanisms f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l actions, f o r instance, ac-

h o r i z o n o f values a n d o r g a n i z e s s u i t a b l e means i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r a social r e l a t i o n is b a s e d o n interest positions a l o n e

a l t e r n a t i v e consequences. I n t h e series o f types o f a c t i o n s p r o p o s e d b y o r also o n normative agreement. I n t h i s way, W e b e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e

W e b e r , t h e r a n g e o f w h a t t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h e e r f a c t i c i t y o f a n e c o n o m i c o r d e r f r o m t h e social v a l i d i t y o f a l e g a l

n a r r o w s step b y step. I n v a l u e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e o r d e r . I n t h e o n e case, social r e l a t i o n s g a i n s t a b i l i t y t h r o u g h a f a c t u a l

screened o u t o f t h e subjective m e a n i n g a n d thus w i t h d r a w n f r o m i n t e r m e s h i n g o f interest positions; i n the other, t h r o u g h the recog-

n i t i o n o f n o r m a t i v e validity claims. T o be sure, c o o r d i n a t i o n of
 117
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

Table 2.2
actions secured, to begin w i t h , merely t h r o u g h a c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f
An alternative typology of action
interests can be superimposed n o r m a t i v e l y by the a d d i t i o n o f "valid-
ity-based a g r e e m e n t , " t h a t is, b y " d e f e r e n c e t o c o n v e n t i o n o r l e g a l Degree of rationality of action

norms." 2 7
W e b e r elucidates this i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the development Coordination Low High
o f t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m " c u s t o m " (Sitte) t o "convention":
Through interest positions De facto customary Strategic action.
" I t is b y way o f c o n v e n t i o n a l r u l e s t h a t m e r e l y f a c t u a l r e g u l a r i t i e s o f action (Sitte) ( Interessenhandeln)
a c t i o n , i.e., usages, are f r e q u e n d y t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o b i n d i n g n o r m s , Through normative agreement Conventional action Postconventional action
g u a r a n t e e d p r i m a r i l y by psychological coercion." 2 8 based on agreement based on agreement
( Gemeinschaftshandeln) ( Gesellschaftshandeln)
I n t e r a c t i o n b a s e d o n complementarity of interests exists n o t o n l y i n
t h e f o r m o f c u s t o m — t h a t is, o f d u l l , i n s e n s i b l e h a b i t u a t i o n — b u t also
at t h e level o f r a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i v e behavior, f o r e x a m p l e i n m o d e r n meinschaftshandeln) n o t t h r o u g h the purposive-rational action orien-
c o m m e r c e , i n w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s have f o r m e d a clear consciousness tations o f the participants, b u t t h r o u g h the higher, postconventional
o f t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y as w e l l as o f t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t stage o f m o r a l - p r a t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y . B e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t d o t h i s , a
p o s i t i o n s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n t e r a c t i o n b a s e d o n normative consen- specific c o n c e p t o f v a l u e - r a t i o n a l i t y c a n n o t g a i n t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e for
sus d o e s n o t o n l y take t h e f o r m o f t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d , c o n v e n t i o n a l a c t i o n t h e o r y t h a t i t w o u l d have t o b e a c c o r d e d i f t h e e t h i c a l r a t i o n -
a c t i o n ; t h u s , t h e m o d e r n l e g a l system is d e p e n d e n t o n a n e n l i g h t - a l i z a t i o n t h a t W e b e r e x a m i n e d a t t h e l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s is t o
e n e d belief i n legitimacy, w h i c h r a t i o n a l n a t u r a l l a w — w i t h the idea b e g r a s p e d i n t e r m s o f its c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r systems o f social a c t i o n .
o f a basic c o n t r a c t a m o n g f r e e a n d e q u a l s — t r a c e s b a c k t o p r o c e - W e b e r was n o t a b l e t o m a k e his u n o f f i c i a l typology o f action
d u r e s o f r a t i o n a l w i l l - f o r m a t i o n . I f o n e p u r s u e s these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , f r u i t f u l f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . T h e official ver-
t h e n i t m a k e s sense t o c o n s t r u e types o f social a c t i o n (a) according s i o n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is so n a r r o w l y c o n c e i v e d t h a t w i t h i n its
to the k i n d of coordination involved, and (b) according to the f r a m e w o r k social a c t i o n c a n b e assessed o n l y u n d e r t h e aspect o f
d e g r e e o f r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p (see t a b l e 2 . 2 ) . purposive rationality. F r o m this conceptual perspective, the r a t i o n -
T h e r e a r e s o m e i n d i c a t i o n s s u g g e s t i n g s u c h a t y p o l o g y i n Economy a l i z a t i o n o f a c t i o n systems has t o b e r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t
and Society, 29
t h e r e is r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g e v i d e n c e f o r i t i n t h e essay a n d d i f f u s i o n o f types o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s p e c i f i c t o subsys-
"Some Categories o f Interpretive S o c i o l o g y . " 1 shall n o t pursue this
3 0
t e m s . I f processes o f s o c i e t a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n a r e t o b e i n v e s t i g a t e d in
h e r e , h o w e v e r , because W e b e r d o e s n o t c l e a r l y c a r r y t h r o u g h , a t t h e their entire breadth, o t h e r a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s are r e q u i r e d .
level o f t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s themselves, the interesting distinc- I w o u l d like therefore to take u p o n c e again the concept o f c o m -
tion between social r e l a t i o n s m e d i a t e d by interest positions and municative action e x p o u n d e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n 3 1
a n d , by d r a w i n g
those m e d i a t e d by n o r m a t i v e agreement. ( I shall r e m e d y this b e l o w upon speech-act theory, to a n c h o r i n its c o n c e p t u a l foundations
i n t h e s e c t i o n b e g i n n i n g o n p a g e 119.) M o r e s e r i o u s is t h e f a c t t h a t t h o s e r a t i o n a l i z a b l e aspects o f a c t i o n n e g l e c t e d i n W e b e r ' s o f f i c i a l
w h i l e W e b e r does distinguish between t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d a n d r a t i o n a l a c t i o n t h e o r y . I n t h i s way, I h o p e t o c a p t u r e i n a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c t e r m s
a g r e e m e n t , h e e x p l a i n s t h i s r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t i n a d e q u a t e l y , as w e t h e c o m p l e x c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t W e b e r d i d e m p l o y i n his
have seen above, u s i n g t h e m o d e l o f a r r a n g e m e n t s a m o n g subjects c u l t u r a l analyses. I s h a l l b e s t a r t i n g f r o m a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f a c t i o n
o f p r i v a t e law. A t a n y r a t e , h e d o e s n o t t r a c e i t b a c k t o t h e m o r a l - that relies o n t h e u n o f f i c i a l version o f Weber's a c t i o n t h e o r y insofar
practical foundations of discursive will-formation. Otherwise it as social a c t i o n s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d a c c o r d i n g t o t w o a c t i o n o r i e n t a -
would have b e c o m e clear at this p o i n t that action in society tions, corresponding to the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f action t h r o u g h interest
(Gesellschaftshandeln) is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c t i o n i n c o m m u n i t y (Ge- positions and t h r o u g h normative agreement (see t a b l e 2.3).
 118
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Chapter 2
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

Table 2.3
Types of action t i o n s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n is a n essential c o m p o n e n t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e
accomplishments required for communicative action.
Action orientation

Oriented toward Oriented toward reaching Orientation toward Success versus Orientation toward Reaching
Action situation success understanding
Understanding
Nonsocial Instrumental action —
Social Strategic action Communicative action I n i d e n t i f y i n g s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n as types, I
a m assuming that concrete actions can be classified f r o m these
p o i n t s o f view. I use t h e t e r m s " s t r a t e g i c " a n d " c o m m u n i c a t i v e " n o t
T h e m o d e l o f purposive-rational a c t i o n takes as its p o i n t o f d e p a r -
m e r e l y t o d e s i g n a t e t w o a n a l y t i c aspects u n d e r w h i c h o n e a n d t h e
t u r e t h e v i e w t h a t t h e a c t o r is p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d a t t a i n i n g a n
same a c t i o n can be d e s c r i b e d — o n t h e o n e h a n d , as a r e c i p r o c a l
e n d ( w h i c h has b e e n r e n d e r e d s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e c i s e i n t e r m s o f p u r -
i n f l u e n c i n g o f o n e a n o t h e r by agents a c t i n g i n a purposive-rational
p o s e s ) , t h a t h e selects m e a n s t h a t s e e m t o h i m a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e
m a n n e r a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , as a p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
given situation, and that he calculates other forseeable conse-
s t a n d i n g a m o n g m e m b e r s o f a l i f e w o r l d . Rather, social actions c a n
q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n as s e c o n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f success. Success is
be distinguished according to w h e t h e r the participants adopt either
d e f i n e d as t h e o c c u r r e n c e i n t h e w o r l d o f a d e s i r e d state, w h i c h c a n ,
a success-oriented a t t i t u d e or one o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , be causally e f f e c t e d b y g o a l - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n o r
s t a n d i n g . A n d , u n d e r suitable c o n d i t i o n s , these attitudes s h o u l d be
o m i s s i o n . T h e effects o f a c t i o n t h a t o c c u r c o m p r i s e t h e results o f
i d e n t i f i a b l e o n t h e basis o f t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f the partici-
a c t i o n ( t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e set p u r p o s e has b e e n a c h i e v e d ) , the
p a n t s t h e m s e l v e s . T o b e g i n w i t h , t h e r e f o r e , a c o n c e p t u a l analysis o f
consequences o f action ( w h i c h t h e actor foresaw a n d i n t e n d e d , o r
t h e t w o a t t i t u d e s is r e q u i r e d .
m a d e a l l o w a n c e f o r ) , a n d t h e side-effects ( w h i c h t h e a c t o r d i d n o t
W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c t i o n t h e o r y , c o n c e p t u a l analysis o f t h e
f o r e s e e ) . W e c a l l a n a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success instrumentalwhen
t w o a t t i t u d e s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l task. I t is n o t
we c o n s i d e r i t u n d e r the aspect o f f o l l o w i n g t e c h n i c a l r u l e s o f a c t i o n
m y a i m to characterize behavioral dispositions empirically, b u t to
a n d assess t h e d e g r e e o f e f f i c i e n c y o f a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o a c o m p l e x
g r a s p g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
o f circumstances a n d events. W e call an action o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
f r o m w h i c h conditions f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n can be derived that may be
success strategic w h e n w e c o n s i d e r i t u n d e r t h e aspect o f f o l l o w i n g
characterized formally. To e x p l a i n w h a t I m e a n by "an attitude o r i -
r u l e s o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d assess t h e d e g r e e o f e f f i c i e n c y o f its
e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , " I have t o analyze t h e c o n -
i n f l u e n c i n g the decisions o f a r a t i o n a l c o u n t e r p a r t i n action. I n s t r u -
cept o f "reaching understanding" (Verständigung). T h i s is n o t a
m e n t a l actions can be c o n n e c t e d w i t h social i n t e r a c t i o n s ; strategic
q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s a n o b s e r v e r uses w h e n d e s c r i b i n g p r o c -
a c t i o n s a r e themselves s o c i a l a c t i o n s . B y c o n t r a s t , I s h a l l s p e a k o f
esses o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t o f t h e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l -
communicative action, whenever the plans o f action o f the actors
edge of competent speakers, who can themselves distinguish
involved are c o o r d i n a t e d n o t t h r o u g h egocentric calculations of
intuitively situations i n w h i c h they are e x e r t i n g a n i n f l u e n c e upon
success b u t t h r o u g h acts o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n c o m m u n i c a -
others f r o m those i n w h i c h they are c o m i n g to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g
tive a c t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e i r o w n
with t h e m , a n d w h o f u r t h e r k n o w w h e n t h e i r a t t e m p t s at r e a c h i n g
i n d i v i d u a l successes; t h e y p u r s u e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l goals o n c o n d i t i o n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g f a i l . I f w e w e r e a b l e t o specify e x p l i c i t l y t h e s t a n d a r d s
t h a t t h e y c a n h a r m o n i z e t h e i r p l a n s o f a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f c o m -
o n w h i c h t h e speakers i m p l i c i t l y base t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s , we w o u l d b e
m o n situation definitions. To this extent the negotiation o f d e f i n i -
i n a position to explain the concept o f reaching understanding.
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Reaching understanding (Verständigung) is c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a w i t h a communicative intent. T h e concepts o f speaking a n d reaching

p r o c e s s o f a c h i e v i n g u n i t y (Einigung) a m o n g speaking and acting u n d e r s t a n d i n g reciprocally i n t e r p r e t one another. For this reason,
subjects. H o w e v e r , a g r o u p o f p e r s o n s c a n f e e l at o n e i n a m o o d t h a t we can analyze t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c features o f the attitude o r i -
is so d i f f u s e t h a t i t is d i f f i c u l t t o specify t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t or ented toward reaching understanding i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the m o d e l
t h e i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t t o w h i c h i t is d i r e c t e d . S u c h a c o l l e c t i v e like- of the attitude o f participants i n communication, one of w h o m — i n
m i n d e d n e s s (Gleichgestimmtheit) d o e s n o t satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n s for t h e s i m p l e s t c a s e — c a r r i e s o u t a s p e e c h act, t o w h i c h t h e o t h e r takes
t h e t y p e o f a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) i n w h i c h a t t e m p t s at r e a c h i n g a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n ( e v e n t h o u g h u t t e r a n c e s i n t h e communica-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t e r m i n a t e w h e n t h e y a r e successful. A communica- tive p r a c t i c e s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e u s u a l l y d o n o t h a v e a s t a n d a r d l i n g u i s -
tively a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t , o r o n e t h a t is m u t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e d i n tic f o r m a n d o f t e n h a v e n o v e r b a l f o r m at a l l ) .
communicative a c t i o n , is p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . O w i n g to I f w e a p p r o a c h t h e task o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
this linguistic structure, i t c a n n o t m e r e l y be i n d u c e d t h r o u g h o u t - success f r o m a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y way
side i n f l u e n c e ; i t has t o b e a c c e p t e d ( o r p r e s u p p o s e d ) as v a l i d b y t h e o f a n analysis o f s p e e c h acts, w e e n c o u n t e r t h e f o l l o w i n g d i f f i c u l t y .
participants. T o this extent i t can be distinguished f r o m merely de O n t h e o n e h a n d , w e are r e g a r d i n g t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts, w i t h t h e
f a c t o a c c o r d (Übereinstimmung). Processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g h e l p o f w h i c h speakers a n d hearers c o m e t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t
a i m at a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t m e e t s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f r a t i o n a l l y m o t i - s o m e t h i n g , as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. T h e c o n c e p t
v a t e d assent (Zustimmung) to the content o f an utterance. A commu- of communicative a c t i o n is p r e s e n t e d i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e acts o f
n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t has a r a t i o n a l basis; i t c a n n o t be reaching understanding, w h i c h l i n k the teleologically structured
i m p o s e d by e i t h e r party, w h e t h e r i n s t r u m e n t a l l y t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n - plans o f action o f different participants a n d thereby first combine
tion in the situation directly, or strategically through exerting i n d i v i d u a l acts i n t o a n i n t e r a c t i o n c o m p l e x , c a n n o t t h e m s e l v e s b e
i n f l u e n c e o n t h e d e c i s i o n s o f o n e p a r t y o n t h e basis o f a c a l c u l a t i o n reduced to teleological actions. T o this extent, the paradigmatic
o f success. A g r e e m e n t c a n i n d e e d o b j e c t i v e l y be o b t a i n e d b y f o r c e ; c o n c e p t o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a
b u t w h a t c o m e s t o pass manifestly t h r o u g h o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e o r t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g that, like i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics, tries to c o n c e p -
use o f v i o l e n c e c a n n o t s u b j e c t i v e l y c o u n t as a g r e e m e n t . Agreement t u a l i z e r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as t h e s o l u t i o n t o a p r o b l e m o f co-
rests o n c o m m o n convictions. T h e s p e e c h act o f o n e p e r s o n succeeds o r d i n a t i o n a m o n g subjects a c t i n g w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success.
o n l y i f t h e o t h e r accepts t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n i t b y t a k i n g ( h o w e v e r O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , n o t e v e r y l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is
i m p l i c i d y ) a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t is i n an example of action oriented toward reaching understanding.
p r i n c i p l e c r i t i c i z a b l e . B o t h E g o , w h o raises a v a l i d i t y c l a i m w i t h h i s W i t h o u t d o u b t , t h e r e are c o u n t l e s s cases o f i n d i r e c t m u t u a l u n d e r -
u t t e r a n c e , a n d A l t e r , w h o r e c o g n i z e s o r r e j e c t s i t , base t h e i r d e c i s i o n s s t a n d i n g (indirekte Verständigung), w h e t h e r w h e r e o n e s u b j e c t , i n g i v -
o n p o t e n t i a l reasons. i n g a n o t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g t h r o u g h signals, i n d i r e c d y gets
h i m t o f o r m a c e r t a i n o p i n i o n o r t o a d o p t c e r t a i n i n t e n t i o n s by way
I f we were n o t i n a p o s i t i o n to refer to the m o d e l o f speech, we
o f an inferential processing o f perceptions o f the situation, or where
c o u l d n o t even b e g i n t o analyze w h a t i t m e a n s f o r two subjects t o
one subject, o n t h e basis o f a l r e a d y h a b i t u a l i z e d e v e r y d a y c o m -
come to an understanding with one another. Reaching under-
m u n i c a t i v e practices, i n c o n s p i c u o u s l y harnesses a n o t h e r f o r h e r o w n
s t a n d i n g is t h e i n h e r e n t t e l o s o f h u m a n l a n g u a g e (Sprache). T o be
p u r p o s e s , t h a t is, i n d u c e s h i m t o b e h a v e i n a d e s i r e d way b y m a n i p u -
s u r e , l a n g u a g e a n d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g are n o t r e l a t e d t o one
latively e m p l o y i n g linguistic means, thereby i n s t r u m e n t a l i z i n g h i m
a n o t h e r as m e a n s t o e n d . B u t w e c a n e x p l a i n t h e c o n c e p t o f r e a c h -
f o r h e r o w n success. S u c h e x a m p l e s o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e w i t h a n
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n l y i f w e specify w h a t i t m e a n s t o use s e n t e n c e s
122 123

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d consequences seem t o decrease t h e value of i n g o n l y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n s t h e i r a u t h o r is p u r s u i n g

s p e e c h acts as t h e m o d e l f o r a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r - a n d t h e e n d s h e w a n t s t o r e a l i z e . J u s t as the meaning of what is said is

standing. c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, the intention of the actor is c o n s t i t u -

T h i s w i l l t u r n o u t n o t t o b e t h e case o n l y i f i t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t tive f o r t e l e o l o g i c a l actions.

t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e W h a t A u s t i n calls perlocutionary effects arise f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i l l o -

original mode o f l a n g u a g e use u p o n w h i c h i n d i r e c t l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r - c u t i o n a r y acts t a k e o n a r o l e i n a t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t o f a c t i o n .

standing, giving to understand something or letting something be S p e e c h acts, l i k e a c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l , c a n p r o d u c e s i d e effects t h a t t h e

u n d e r s t o o d — i n g e n e r a l , t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l use o f l a n g u a g e — i s p a r a - a c t o r d i d n o t f o r e s e e ; these a r e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects i n a t r i v i a l

s i t i c . I n m y view, A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o - sense, w h i c h I s h a l l n o t c o n s i d e r h e r e . Less t r i v i a l a r e t h e p e r l o c u -

cutions accomplishes j u s t that. t i o n a r y effects t h a t r e s u l t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts s o m e -

t i m e s t a k e o n r o l e s i n c o n t e x t s o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e s e effects
A s is w e l l k n o w n , A u s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n l o c u t i o n a r y , i l l o c u -
e n s u e w h e n e v e r a s p e a k e r acts w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success
tionary, a n d perlocutionary acts. 32
H e applies the t e r m " l o c u t i o n a r y "
a n d , i n d o i n g so, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o n n e c t s s p e e c h acts w i t h i n t e n -
t o t h e c o n t e n t o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s ("/>") o r o f n o m i n a l i z e d
tions a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e s t h e m f o r purposes t h a t are o n l y c o n t i n -
p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences ( " t h a t p"). Through locutionary acts, t h e
g e n d y r e l a t e d t o t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d .
s p e a k e r expresses states o f a f f a i r s ; she says s o m e t h i n g . T h r o u g h illo-
cutionary acts, t h e s p e a k e r p e r f o r m s a n a c t i o n b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g .
T h e r e yet is a f u r t h e r sense i n w h i c h to p e r f o r m a locutionary act, a n d
The i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e establishes the m o d e o f a sentence (Mp) t h e r e i n an i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, may also be to p e r f o r m an act o f another k i n d .
employed as a s t a t e m e n t , p r o m i s e , c o m m a n d , a v o w a l , o r t h e l i k e . Saying s o m e t h i n g w i l l often, or even normally, produce certain consequen-
U n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s , t h e m o d e is e x p r e s s e d b y m e a n s o f a tial effects u p o n the feelings, thoughts, or actions o f the audience, or o f the
p e r f o r m a t i v e v e r b i n t h e first p e r s o n p r e s e n t ; t h e a c t i o n m e a n i n g speaker, or o f o t h e r persons: a n d i t may be d o n e w i t h the design, i n t e n t i o n ,
or purpose o f p r o d u c i n g t h e m ; a n d we may t h e n say, t h i n k i n g o f this, that
c a n b e seen p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e f a c t t h a t " h e r e b y " c a n b e a d d e d to
the speaker has p e r f o r m e d an act i n the n o m e n c l a t u r e o f w h i c h reference
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act: " I h e r e b y promise is made either only obliquely . . . or even . . . n o t at all, to the performance
y o u ( c o m m a n d y o u , c o n f e s s t o y o u ) t h a t p." F i n a l l y , t h r o u g h perlocu- o f the l o c u t i o n a r y or i l l o c u t i o n a r y act. We shall call the performance o f an
tionary acts, t h e s p e a k e r p r o d u c e s a n e f f e c t u p o n the hearer. By act o f this k i n d the performance o f a perlocutionary act or perlocution. 3i

c a r r y i n g o u t a s p e e c h act she b r i n g s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d .
T h e d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts has
T h u s , t h e t h r e e acts t h a t A u s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s c a n b e characterized
g i v e n rise t o a n e x t e n d e d c o n t r o v e r s y . 35
F r o m i t have e m e r g e d f o u r
w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g phrases: t o say something; t o act by s a y i n g s o m e -
criteria o f demarcation.
t h i n g ; t o b r i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g through a c t i n g b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g .
a. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m a speaker pursues w i t h an utterance
A u s t i n makes his conceptual incisions i n such a way t h a t the
f o l l o w s f r o m t h e m e a n i n g — c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r s p e e c h a c t s — o f w h a t is
s p e e c h a c t (Mp), composed of an illocutionary and a prepositional
s a i d i t s e l f ; s p e e c h acts a r e , i n t h i s sense, s e l f - i d e n t i f y i n g . W i t h t h e
3 6

component, is p r e s e n t e d as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t act t h a t t h e s p e a k e r
h e l p o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, a s p e a k e r lets i t b e k n o w n t h a t she w a n t s
always p e r f o r m s w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t , t h a t is, w i t h t h e a i m
w h a t she says t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a g r e e t i n g , c o m m a n d , w a r n i n g ,
t h a t a hearer may u n d e r s t a n d a n d accept his u t t e r a n c e . 3 3
T h e self-
e x p l a n a t i o n , a n d so f o r t h . H e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t does n o t go
s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e s p e e c h a c t is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e sense t h a t
beyond w a n t i n g the hearer to understand the manifest content of
the c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f t h e speaker a n d the i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m
t h e s p e e c h act. B y c o n t r a s t , t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f a speaker, l i k e
h e is p u r s u i n g f o l l o w f r o m t h e m a n i f e s t m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . I t
t h e e n d s p u r s u e d w i t h g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , does n o t f o l -
is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r w i t h t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s . W e i d e n t i f y t h e i r m e a n -
124 125
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

l o w f r o m t h e m a n i f e s t c o n t e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act; t h i s a i m c a n be (3) T h r o u g h i n f o r m i n g H t h a t she h a d g i v e n n o t i c e t o h e r firm,

i n f e r r e d o n l y b y way o f t h e a c t o r ' s i n t e n t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , a h e a r e r S gave H a f r i g h t (as she i n t e n d e d t o d o ) .
w h o u n d e r s t a n d s a r e q u e s t d i r e c t e d t o h i m c a n j u s t as l i t t l e k n o w
F r o m t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f t h e
t h e r e b y w h a t else t h e s p e a k e r h a s i n v i e w i n u t t e r i n g i t as a n o b s e r v e r
a s s e r t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n (1) is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r a c h i e v i n g
w h o sees a n a c q u a i n t a n c e h u r r y i n g a l o n g t h e s t r e e t c a n k n o w w h y
a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t . I n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t , t h e h e a r e r c o u l d j u s t as
h e is i n a h u r r y . T h e addressee c o u l d a t best i n f e r t h e speaker's
w e l l react t o t h e same u t t e r a n c e w i t h relief. T h e same holds f o r
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y aims f r o m the c o n t e x t . 3 7
T h e three r e m a i n i n g crite-
ria h a v e t o d o w i t h t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h (4) H m a d e S uneasy w i t h his w a r n i n g against g i v i n g notice to
acts. her firm.
b. F r o m t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a s p e e c h act, as i n (1) a n d ( 2 ) below,
I n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t t h e same w a r n i n g c o u l d j u s t as w e l l s t r e n g t h e n S
we can deduce the conditions for the corresponding i l l o c u t i o n a r y
i n h e r r e s o l v e , f o r i n s t a n c e i f S h a r b o r s a s u s p i c i o n t h a t H does n o t
success o f t h e speaker, b u t n o t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
w i s h h e r w e l l . T h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects m u s t t h e r e -
success t h a t a speaker a c t i n g w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success
f o r e r e f e r t o a c o n t e x t o f t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n t h a t goes beyond t h e
m i g h t w a n t t o a c h i e v e , o r d i d a c h i e v e , i n a g i v e n case b y c a r r y i n g
speech a c t . 3 8

o u t t h i s s p e e c h act. I n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p e r l o c u t i o n s , as i n ( 3 ) a n d
c. F r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h i s k i n d , A u s t i n c o n c l u d e d t h a t i l l o c u -
( 4 ) b e l o w , k i n d s o f success a r e i n c l u d e d t h a t g o b e y o n d t h e m e a n i n g
t i o n a r y success s t a n d s i n a conventionally r e g u l a t e d o r internal c o n n e c -
o f w h a t is s a i d a n d t h u s b e y o n d w h a t a n addressee c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d
t i o n w i t h t h e s p e e c h act, w h e r e a s p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects r e m a i n
directly.
e x t e r n a l t o t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . T h e p o s s i b l e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
(1) 5 a s s e r t e d t o / / t h a t she gave n o t i c e t o h e r f i r m . effects o f a s p e e c h a c t d e p e n d o n f o r t u i t o u s c o n t e x t s a n d , u n l i k e t h e
success o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a r e n o t fixed by c o n v e n t i o n s . 3 9
Of
S w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y success w i t h t h e u t t e r a n c e r e p r e -
course, o n e m i g h t use (4) as a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e . O n l y i f t h e a d -
s e n t e d b y ( 1 ) i f H u n d e r s t a n d s h e r a s s e r t i o n a n d a c c e p t s i t as t r u e .
dressee takes t h e w a r n i n g s e r i o u s l y is u n e a s e a p l a u s i b l e r e a c t i o n ,
T h e same h o l d s f o r
a n d o n l y i f she d o e s n o t t a k e i t s e r i o u s l y is a f e e l i n g o f reassurance
(2) / / w a r n e d S n o t to give n o t i c e t o h e r f i r m . p l a u s i b l e . I n s o m e cases, t h e m e a n i n g c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e a c t i o n
p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a r e f o r m e d e x c l u d e c e r t a i n
H w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y success w i t h t h e u t t e r a n c e r e p r e -
classes o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. N o n e t h e l e s s , these effects are c o n -
s e n t e d b y ( 2 ) i f S u n d e r s t a n d s h i s w a r n i n g a n d accepts i t as t r u e o r
n e c t e d w i t h s p e e c h acts n o t m e r e l y i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l way. W h e n a
r i g h t — d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t i t has m o r e t h e
h e a r e r a c c e p t s a n a s s e r t i o n b y S as t r u e , a c o m m a n d as r i g h t , a n
sense o f a p r o g n o s i s o r o f a m o r a l a p p e a l . I n a n y case, a c c e p t i n g t h e
a d m i s s i o n as t r u t h f u l , h e t h e r e w i t h i m p l i c i d y d e c l a r e s h i m s e l f r e a d y
u t t e r a n c e described i n (2) provides g r o u n d s f o r o b l i g a t i o n s t o act i n
to b i n d his f u r t h e r action to c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n a l obligations. By
a c e r t a i n way o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a d d r e s s e e a n d f o r c o r r e s p o n d i n g
contrast, t h e f e e l i n g o f unease w h i c h a f r i e n d arouses i n S w i t h a
e x p e c t a t i o n s o n t h e p a r t o f t h e speaker. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e ex-
w a r n i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e r takes s e r i o u s l y is a state t h a t m a y o r m a y n o t
p e c t e d s e q u e l o f a c t i o n a c t u a l l y c o m e s t o pass has n o e f f e c t o n t h e
ensue.
i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f t h e speaker. I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , S d o e s n o t give
d. S i m i l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a v e m o t i v a t e d S t r a w s o n t o r e p l a c e t h e
n o t i c e , t h i s is n o t a p e r l o c u t i o n a r i l y a c h i e v e d e f f e c t b u t t h e c o n s e -
criterion of conventionality with another criterion of demarcation. 4 0

quence o f a communicatively achieved agreement and thus the

A speaker, i f she w a n t s t o b e successful, m a y n o t l e t h e r p e r l o c u t i o n -
f u l f i l l m e n t o f a n o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e addressee t o o k u p o n h i m s e l f
a r y a i m s b e k n o w n , w h e r e a s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s c a n be a c h i e v e d o n l y
w i t h h i s "yes" t o a s p e e c h a c t o f f e r . C o n s i d e r n o w :
 127
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Chapter 2

s t a n d i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t w h e n these a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o strategic
t h r o u g h b e i n g expressed. E l o c u t i o n s are expressed openly; p e r l o c u -
interactions. W h a t we m e a n by r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d an
tions m a y n o t b e " a d m i t t e d " as s u c h . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e c a n also b e s e e n
a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , has t o b e c l a r i f i e d
i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w h i c h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts a r e
solely i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. A n a t t e m p t a t r e a c h i n g
d e s c r i b e d ( t o give a f r i g h t t o , t o cause u n e a s e , t o p l u n g e i n t o d o u b t ,
u n d e r s t a n d i n g u n d e r t a k e n w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s p e e c h act succeeds
to p u t someone i n a bad m o o d , to mislead, to offend, to infuriate,
w h e n a s p e a k e r achieves h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m i n A u s t i n ' s sense.
t o h u m i l i a t e , a n d so f o r t h ) c a n n o t a p p e a r a m o n g t h o s e predicates
F r o m t h i s i t also f o l l o w s t h a t w e c a n n o t e x p l a i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success
used t o c a r r y o u t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts w i t h t h e h e l p o f w h i c h
i n t e r m s o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e p u r p o s i v e l y a c h i e v e d success o f a
c o r r e s p o n d i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c a n b e a c h i e v e d . P e r l o c u t i o n -
teleological a c t i o n . I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims are d i f f e r e n t f r o m those p u -
a r y acts c o n s t i t u t e t h a t subclass o f t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s t h a t c a n be
poses t h a t c a n b e a c h i e v e d under the description o f s o m e t h i n g t o b e
c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e a g e n t
brought about i n the world.
d o e s n o t d e c l a r e o r a d m i t t o h e r a i m s as s u c h .
P e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects, l i k e t h e successful r e s u l t s o f teleological
W h e r e a s t h e sense o f t h e d i v i s i o n i n t o l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n -
a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , m a y b e d e s c r i b e d as states i n t h e w o r l d b r o u g h t
a r y acts is t o separate t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e m o d e o f
a b o u t t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the w o r l d . By contrast, i l l o c u t i o n a r y
s p e e c h acts as a n a l y t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t aspects, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
successes a r e a c h i e v e d at t h e level o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations on
t h e s e t w o types o f acts, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts,
which participants i n communication c o m e to an understanding
o n t h e o t h e r , is b y n o m e a n s a n a l y t i c a l i n c h a r a c t e r . P e r l o c u t i o n a r y
w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . I n t h i s sense, t h e y
effects c a n b e a c h i e v e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts o n l y i f t h e l a t t e r
a r e n o t i n n e r w o r l d l y , b u t e x t r a m u n d a n e . A t m o s t , successful i l l o c u -
a r e incorporated as means i n t o t e l e o l o g i c a l , s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n s .
tionary acts o c c u r w i t h i n t h e l i f e w o r l d t o w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n
P e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts are a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f s p e e c h
communication belong and that forms the background for their
acts i n t o c o n t e x t s o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e y a r e p a r t o f t h e i n -
processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y c a n n o t b e i n t e n d e d u n -
t e n d e d sequel o f a c t i o n o r o f t h e results o f a teleological a c t i o n t h a t
d e r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f causally p r o d u c e d effects. T h i s m o d e l o f ac-
an actor undertakes w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f i n f l u e n c i n g a hearer i n a
tion oriented toward reaching understanding, which I develop
c e r t a i n w a y w i t h t h e h e l p o f successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. T o b e s u r e ,
b e l o w , is o b s c u r e d r a t h e r t h a n i l l u m i n a t e d b y A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n
s p e e c h acts c a n serve t h i s nonillocutionary aim of influencing hearers
between illocutions and perlocutions.
o n l y i f they are suited to achieving i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims. I f t h e h e a r e r
f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e s p e a k e r was s a y i n g , a ideologically F r o m the f o r e g o i n g i t appears that we can conceive perlocutions
a c t i n g , success-oriented speaker w o u l d n o t be able to b r i n g the as a s p e c i a l class o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n s a r e
h e a r e r , b y m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts, t o b e h a v e i n t h e d e s i r e d employed as m e a n s i n t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t s o f a c t i o n . A s S t r a w s o n
way. T o t h i s e x t e n t , w h a t w e i n i t i a l l y d e s i g n a t e d as " t h e use o f l a n - has shown, this employment is s u b j e c t to certain provisos. A
g u a g e w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e q u e n c e s " is n o t a n o r i g i n a l i d e o l o g i c a l l y a c t i n g s p e a k e r has t o a c h i e v e h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m —
use o f l a n g u a g e b u t t h e s u b s u m p t i o n o f s p e e c h acts t h a t serve i l l o - t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d w h a t is s a i d a n d e n t e r i n t o t h e o b l i g a -
c u t i o n a r y a i m s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. tions c o n n e c t e d w i t h the acceptance o f the offer contained i n the
speech a c t — w i t h o u t b e t r a y i n g his p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m . T h i s proviso
A s s p e e c h acts b y n o m e a n s always f u n c t i o n i n t h i s way, h o w e v e r ,
lends to perlocutions the peculiarly asymmetrical character of
i t m u s t also b e p o s s i b l e t o c l a r i f y t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u -
c o n c e a l e d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n s . T h e s e are i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h a t least
n i c a t i o n w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o s t r u c t u r e s o f p u r p o s i v e activity. T h e
one o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s is a c t i n g s t r a t e g i c a l l y , w h i l e h e deceives
t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t o r o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success is n o t c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r
o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t h e is not satisfying t h e
the successful a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of processes o f reaching under-
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Chapter 2
presuppositions u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u d o n a r y aims n o r m a l l y can be
a c h i e v e d . F o r t h i s r e a s o n also, t h i s t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n is n o t s u i t a b l e
as t h e m o d e l f o r a n analysis t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o e x p l a i n t h e l i n g u i s d c
mechanism o f coordinating action w i t h the help o f the illocutionary
b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects o f s p e e c h acts. F o r t h i s p u r p o s e i t w o u l d
b e advisable t o select a t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t is n o t b u r d e n e d w i t h
t h e a s y m m e t r i e s a n d p r o v i s o s o f p e r l o c u t i o n s . I have c a l l e d t h e t y p e
o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n w h i c h all p a r t i c i p a n t s h a r m o n i z e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l
p l a n s o f a c t i o n w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d t h u s unreservedly p u r s u e t h e i r
i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims "communicative action."
A u s t i n , t o o , analyzes s p e e c h acts i n c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n . I t is
precisely the p o i n t o f his a p p r o a c h to work out the performative
character o f linguistic utterances on t h e basis o f institutionally
b o u n d s p e e c h acts s u c h as b a p t i z i n g , b e t t i n g , a p p o i n t i n g , a n d t h e
like, i n w h i c h the obligations issuing f r o m the performance o f the
speech act are u n a m b i g u o u s l y r e g u l a t e d by a c c o m p a n y i n g institu-
tions o r n o r m s o f action. However, A u s t i n confuses t h e p i c t u r e by
n o t t r e a t i n g t h e s e i n t e r a c t i o n s , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h w h i c h h e analyzes
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e o f s p e e c h acts, as differ-
ent in type f r o m t h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects
o c c u r . S o m e o n e w h o m a k e s a b e t , a p p o i n t s a n o f f i c e r as s u p r e m e
c o m m a n d e r , gives a c o m m a n d , a d m o n i s h e s o r w a r n s , m a k e s a p r e -
d i c t i o n , tells a story, m a k e s a c o n f e s s i o n , reveals s o m e t h i n g , a n d so
f o r t h is a c t i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a n d c a n n o t , at the same level of inter-
action, p r o d u c e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects a t a l l . A s p e a k e r c a n pursue
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s o n l y w h e n h e deceives h i s c o u n t e r p a r t c o n c e r n -
i n g t h e f a c t t h a t h e is a c t i n g s t r a t e g i c a l l y — w h e n , f o r e x a m p l e , he
gives t h e c o m m a n d t o a t t a c k i n o r d e r t o g e t h i s t r o o p s t o r u s h i n t o
a trap, o r w h e n he proposes a bet o f $3,000 i n o r d e r to embarrass
s o m e o n e , o r w h e n h e tells a s t o r y late i n t h e e v e n i n g i n o r d e r to
d e l a y a guest's d e p a r t u r e , a n d so o n . I t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i n
c o m m u n i c a t i v e action u n i n t e n d e d consequences may o c c u r at any
time; b u t as s o o n as t h e r e is a d a n g e r t h a t t h e s e w i l l b e a t t r i b u t e d t o
t h e s p e a k e r as i n t e n d e d effects, t h e l a t t e r f i n d s i t n e c e s s a r y t o o f f e r
explanations a n d denials, a n d i f n e e d be, apologies, i n o r d e r to
d i s p e l t h e false i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e s e side effects a r e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
effects. O t h e r w i s e , h e has t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l
129
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
f e e l d e c e i v e d a n d a d o p t i n t u r n a s t r a t e g i c a t t i t u d e , b r e a k i n g away
f r o m action o r i e n t e d toward reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O f course, i n
c o m p l e x a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , a s p e e c h a c t t h a t is p e r f o r m e d and ac-
cepted directly according to the presuppositions o f communicative
a c t i o n c a n a t t h e same t i m e have a s t r a t e g i c status a t other levels o f
i n t e r a c t i o n , t h a t is, c a n have p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o n third parties.
T h u s , I c o u n t as c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h o s e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i -
ated interactions i n w h i c h all participants pursue i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims,
a n d only i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s , w i t h t h e i r s p e e c h acts. O n t h e other
h a n d , I r e g a r d as l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n t h o s e i n t e r -
a c t i o n s i n w h i c h a t least o n e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s w a n t s t o p r o d u c e
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o n h i s o p p o s i t e n u m b e r w i t h h i s s p e e c h acts.
A u s t i n d i d n o t k e e p these t w o cases s e p a r a t e as d i f f e r e n t types of
i n t e r a c t i o n , b e c a u s e h e was i n c l i n e d t o i d e n t i f y s p e e c h a c t s — t h a t is,
acts o f r e a c h i n g understanding—with the linguistically mediated
i n t e r a c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . H e d i d n o t see t h a t s p e e c h acts f u n c t i o n as
a coordinating mechanism f o r other a c t i o n s . T h e y m u s t be disen-
gaged f r o m such contexts o f communicative action before they can
b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s . A n d t h i s is p o s s i b l e i n
t u r n o n l y because s p e e c h acts h a v e a r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e i n r e l a -
t i o n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ; h o w e v e r , t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said
always p o i n t s t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f i n t e r a c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c o m -
municative action. T h e difference between a s p e e c h act a n d the
c o n t e x t o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e s t h r o u g h its a c t i o n - c o o r d i -
nating accomplishments can be r e c o g n i z e d m o r e easily i f , u n l i k e
A u s t i n , one does n o t r e m a i n fixated o n the m o d e l o f institutionally
b o u n d speech acts. 41
M e a n i n g a n d Validity
O n t h e basis o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, I h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o s h o w t h a t w h i l e s p e e c h acts
c a n i n d e e d b e e m p l o y e d strategically, t h e y h a v e a c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n -
i n g o n l y f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . T h e l a t t e r is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
strategic a c t i o n by t h e fact t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s unreservedly pursue
i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims i n o r d e r to arrive at an agreement that provides
t h e basis f o r a c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l l y p u r s u e d p l a n s
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

o f action. I n w h a t follows I w o u l d like to explicate the conditions d i r e c d y f r o m t h e social validity o f n o r m s (as i t is i n t h e case o f
t h a t have t o b e satisfied b y a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d agreement i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts) n o r o w e d t o a c o n t i n g e n t l y a v a i l -
t h a t is t o f u l f i l l t h i s f u n c t i o n o f c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n . I n d o i n g so, I a b l e r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s (as i t is i n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e
s h a l l t a k e as m y m o d e l e l e m e n t a r y p a i r s o f u t t e r a n c e s , e a c h o f w h i c h expressions o f will)? F r o m the perspective o f a hearer to w h o m a n
consists o f t h e s p e e c h a c t o f a s p e a k e r a n d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e u t t e r a n c e is a d d r e s s e d , w e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e levels o f r e a c t i o n t o
o f a hearer. Consider the f o l l o w i n g examples: 4 2 a ( c o r r e c d y p e r c e i v e d ) s p e e c h act: t h e h e a r e r understands t h e u t t e r -
a n c e , t h a t is, h e grasps t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d ; w i t h h i s "yes" o r
(1) I (hereby) promise y o u that I shall come a r o u n d t o m o r r o w . " n o " t h e h e a r e r takes a position o n t h e c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h
act, t h a t is, h e a c c e p t s o r rejects t h e s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r ; a n d i n c o n s e -
(2) You are requested to stop s m o k i n g .
quence o f an achieved agreement, t h e h e a r e r d i r e c t s his a c t i o n
(3) I confess t o y o u t h a t I find y o u r a c t i o n s loathsome. a c c o r d i n g t o conventionally fixed obligations to act in a certain way. T h e
pragmatic l e v e l o f t h e a g r e e m e n t e f f e c t i v e f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n c o n n e c t s
(4) I can predict (to you) that the vacation w i l l be spoiled by
t h e semantic l e v e l o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g m e a n i n g w i t h t h e empirical l e v e l
rain.
of further developing—in a manner dependent o n the context—the
W e c a n r e c o g n i z e i n e a c h case w h a t a n a f f i r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e w o u l d a c c o r d relevant to t h e sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . H o w this connection
m e a n a n d w h a t k i n d o f i n t e r a c t i o n sequel i t w o u l d g r o u n d . comes a b o u t can be e x p l a i n e d by means o f the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ;
admittedly, for this purpose, the formal-semantic approach limited
(1') Yes, I s h a l l d e p e n d o n i t .
t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g s e n t e n c e s has t o b e expanded. 4 3

(2') Yes, I s h a l l c o m p l y . The formal-pragmatic approach to m e a n i n g t h e o r y begins w i t h

the q u e s t i o n o f what it means to understand an utterance—that is, a
(3') Yes, I b e l i e v e y o u d o .
sentence e m p l o y e d communicatively. F o r m a l semantics makes a c o n -
(4') Yes, w e ' l l have t o t a k e t h a t i n t o a c c o u n t . c e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g (Bedeutung) o f a sentence
a n d t h e m e a n i n g (Meinung) o f t h e speaker, w h o , w h e n she uses t h e
W i t h h i s "yes," t h e h e a r e r a c c e p t s a s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r a n d g r o u n d s a n
s e n t e n c e i n a s p e e c h act, c a n say s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n w h a t i t
a g r e e m e n t ; t h i s a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n s t h e content of the utterance o n t h e
literally means. B u t this distinction cannot be developed i n t o a m e t h -
o n e h a n d , a n d o n t h e o t h e r c e r t a i n guarantees immanent to speech acts
o d o l o g i c a l s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e f o r m a l analysis o f s e n t e n c e m e a n -
a n d c e r t a i n obligations relevant for the sequel of interaction. T h e a c t i o n
i n g s a n d t h e e m p i r i c a l analysis o f s p e a k e r s ' m e a n i n g s e x p r e s s e d i n
p o t e n t i a l t y p i c a l o f a s p e e c h act finds e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e c l a i m t h a t
utterances; for the literal m e a n i n g o f a sentence cannot be ex-
t h e s p e a k e r raises f o r w h a t she s a y s — i n a n e x p l i c i t s p e e c h a c t w i t h
p l a i n e d a t a l l a p a r t f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s f o r its c o m m u n i c a -
the h e l p o f a performative verb. I n acknowledging her claim, the
tive employment. To be s u r e , f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s m u s t also t a k e
h e a r e r a c c e p t s a n o f f e r m a d e w i t h t h e s p e e c h act. T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y
p r e c a u t i o n s t o e n s u r e t h a t i n t h e s t a n d a r d case w h a t is m e a n t d o e s
success is r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c t i o n i n s o f a r as a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n
n o t d e v i a t e f r o m t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . F o r t h i s r e a s o n ,
b e t w e e n s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r is t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t is e f f e c t i v e
o u r analysis is l i m i t e d t o s p e e c h acts c a r r i e d o u t under standard
f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n , t h a t o r d e r s t h e p o s s i b l e scope o f a c t i o n a n d se-
conditions. T h i s is i n t e n d e d t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s (meint)
quels o f i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d t h a t opens u p to the hearer possible points
n o t h i n g else t h a n t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f w h a t she says.
o f c o n n e c t i o n b y way o f g e n e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r a c t i o n .
I n a d i s t a n t a n a l o g y t o t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l
T h e q u e s t i o n n o w arises, f r o m w h e r e d o s p e e c h acts d r a w t h e i r
semantics, I n o w w a n t to trace back u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n utterance to
p o w e r t o c o o r d i n a t e a c t i o n s , w h e n t h i s a u t h o r i t y is n e i t h e r b o r r o w e d
132 133
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r m a y a c c e p t i t . We u t t e r a n c e t h a t S is a t t e m p t i n g t o g e t h i m t o p e r f o r m a n a c t i o n a. 4 7

understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable. F r o m t h e H o w e v e r , t h i s v i e w fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g of

s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e speaker, t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y a r e i d e n t i - s u c h i m p e r a t i v e s . I n u t t e r i n g a n i m p e r a t i v e , a s p e a k e r says what H is
c a l t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success. A c c e p t a b i l i t y is t o d o . T h i s direct form o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e n d e r s s u p e r f l u o u s
n o t d e f i n e d h e r e i n a n o b j e c t i v i s t i c sense, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n a speech act by means o f w h i c h t h e speaker c o u l d i n d i r e c d y get a
observer, b u t i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m - hearer to p e r f o r m a certain action. T h e illocutionary meaning
m u n i c a t i o n . A s p e e c h a c t m a y b e c a l l e d " a c c e p t a b l e " i f i t satisfies t h e o f imperatives can better be described through the following
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a r e necessary i n o r d e r f o r t h e h e a r e r t o t a k e a "yes" paraphrases: 48

p o s i t i o n o n t h e c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker. T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t
be satisfied one-sidedly, e i t h e r relative to the speaker o r to the
h e a r e r . T h e y a r e r a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e intersubjective recognition o f
a l i n g u i s t i c c l a i m , w h i c h , i n a w a y t y p i c a l o f a g i v e n class o f s p e e c h
acts, g r o u n d s a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h a s p e c i f i e d content concerning
obligations relevant for the sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n .
F r o m the standpoint o f a sociological t h e o r y o f action, m y p r i m a r y
interest m u s t be to m a k e clear t h e m e c h a n i s m relevant to the coor-
d i n a t i n g a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f s p e e c h acts. T o t h i s e n d I s h a l l c o n c e n -
trate o n t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r is m o t i v a t e d t o
a c c e p t t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n a s p e e c h act, a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e l i n g u i s -
tic expressions e m p l o y e d are g r a m m a t i c a l l y w e l l f o r m e d a n d t h a t t h e
g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s typical f o r a given type o f speech act
are satisfied. 44
A hearer understands the meaning o f an utterance
w h e n , i n a d d i t i o n to grammatical conditions o f well-formedness and
general contextual conditions, 4 5
h e k n o w s t h o s e essential conditions
u n d e r w h i c h he c o u l d be m o t i v a t e d by a speaker t o a n a f f i r m a t i v e
response. 4 6
T h e s e acceptability conditions in the narrower sense r e l a t e t o
t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e t h a t S i n t h e s t a n d a r d case
expresses w i t h t h e h e l p o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e a c t i o n p r e d i c a t e .
B u t l e t us l o o k first a t a g r a m m a t i c a l l y c o r r e c t i m p e r a t i v e sen-
t e n c e , f o r m u l a t e d as a n i m p e r a t i v e u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t e x t u a l
conditions:
(5) I (hereby) request y o u to stop s m o k i n g .
I m p e r a t i v e s are o f t e n u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
acts, as a t t e m p t s b y a n a c t o r S t o g e t i f t o c a r r y o u t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n .
O n t h i s view, S p e r f o r m s a n i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e o n l y w h e n she
connects with her utterance the i n t e n t i o n that H infer f r o m the
(5a) S t o l d H t h a t h e s h o u l d t a k e c a r e t o see t h a t "p" c o m e s t o
pass.
(5b) S s i g n i f i e d t o / / t h a t h e s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t "p."
(5c) T h e request (demand) u t t e r e d b y S is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n
t h e sense t h a t / / s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t "p."
H e r e "p" d e s i g n a t e s a state i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t , r e l a t i v e t o t h e
time o f t h e u t t e r a n c e , lies i n t h e f u t u r e a n d t h a t , o t h e r conditions
r e m a i n i n g constant, can come i n t o existence t h r o u g h an i n t e r v e n -
t i o n o r o m i s s i o n b y t h e a d d r e s s e e — f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e state o f n o t
s m o k i n g that H brings about by p u t t i n g o u t his l i t cigarette.
A h e a r e r accepts t h e i m p e r a t i v e (5) by r e s p o n d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o
it with:
(5') Yes, I s h a l l d o w h a t is r e q u e s t e d o f m e .
I f we restrict ourselves t o c o n d i t i o n s o f acceptability i n the n a r r o w e r
sense, t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h H a c c e p t s ( 5 ) f a l l i n t o t w o c o m -
ponents.
a. T h e h e a r e r s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g of
i m p e r a t i v e s i n s u c h a way t h a t h e c o u l d p a r a p h r a s e t h i s m e a n i n g
w i t h sentences l i k e (5a), ( 5 b ) , o r (5c) a n d c o u l d i n t e r p r e t t h e p r o -
p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t " t o s t o p s m o k i n g " as a n i m p e r a t i v e d i r e c t e d t o
h i m . I n fact, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i m p e r a t i v e (5) i f he k n o w s
t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h "p" w o u l d o c c u r a n d i f h e k n o w s w h a t
h e h i m s e l f w o u l d have t o d o o r n o t t o d o i n t h e g i v e n circumstances
i n o r d e r t h a t these c o n d i t i o n s be satisfied. As o n e m u s t k n o w t h e
t r u t h conditions of a proposition i n order to understand i t , one
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Chapter 2
must, i n order to understand an imperadve, k n o w the conditions
u n d e r w h i c h i t w o u l d c o u n t as satisfied. W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a
p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , t h e s e conditions of satisfaction—formu-
lated to begin w i t h i n semantic t e r m s — a r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f
obligations relevant for the sequel o f interaction. T h e hearer u n d e r -
stands a n i m p e r a t i v e i f he k n o w s w h a t he m u s t d o o r n o t d o i n o r d e r
t o b r i n g a b o u t a state "p" d e s i r e d b y S; h e t h e r e b y also k n o w s how
h e c o u l d l i n k u p h i s a c t i o n s w i t h t h o s e o f S.
b. A s s o o n as w e c o n c e p t u a l i z e the understanding o f imperatives
f r o m this perspective, b r o a d e n e d to include the context o f interac-
tion, i t b e c o m e s clear t h a t k n o w l e d g e o f " s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s " is
n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r k n o w i n g w h e n a n i m p e r a t i v e is a c c e p t a b l e . A sec-
o n d c o m p o n e n t is l a c k i n g , n a m e l y , k n o w l e d g e o f the conditions of the
agreement t h a t first grounds adherence t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r
the sequel o f interaction. T h e hearer fully understands the i l l o c u -
tionary m e a n i n g o f the imperative only i f he knows w h y t h e speaker
e x p e c t s t h a t she c a n i m p o s e h e r w i l l o n h i m . W i t h h e r i m p e r a t i v e ,
t h e s p e a k e r raises a claim t o p o w e r , t o w h i c h t h e h e a r e r , i f h e a c c e p t s
it, yields. I t belongs to t h e m e a n i n g o f a n i m p e r a t i v e t h a t the speaker
h a r b o r s a justified e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t she w i l l b e a b l e t o c a r r y t h r o u g h
h e r c l a i m to power; a n d this holds only u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n that S
k n o w s t h a t h e r addressee has r e a s o n s t o y i e l d t o h e r p o w e r c l a i m .
S i n c e , t o b e g i n w i t h , w e have u n d e r s t o o d i m p e r a t i v e s as s h e e r e x -
p r e s s i o n s o f w i l l , these r e a s o n s c a n n o t l i e i n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n -
ing o f t h e s p e e c h act i t s e l f ; t h e y c a n r e s i d e o n l y i n a r e s e r v o i r of
p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s t h a t is e x t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h act.
T h u s the conditions of satisfaction have to be supplemented with conditions
of sanction i n o r d e r t o c o m p l e t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y .
A h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s a n i m p e r a t i v e ( 5 ) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n -
d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a n a d d r e s s e e c a n b r i n g a b o u t t h e d e s i r e d state
(not smoking) a n d (b) t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S has good
reasons to expect that H w i l l feel c o n s t r a i n e d to y i e l d to the w i l l o f
S ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e t h r e a t o f p e n a l t i e s f o r v i o l a t i n g safety r e g u l a -
tions). O n l y b y k n o w i n g b o t h c o m p o n e n t s (a) a n d ( b ) does the
h e a r e r k n o w w h a t c o n d i t i o n s have t o b e m e t i f a h e a r e r is t o b e a b l e
t o r e s p o n d a f f i r m a t i v e l y , as i n ( 5 ' ) , t o t h e i m p e r a t i v e ( 5 ) . I n k n o w i n g
these c o n d i t i o n s , he k n o w s w h a t makes t h e u t t e r a n c e acceptable.
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Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
T h i s p i c t u r e is c o m p l i c a t e d i n a n i n s t r u c t i v e way w h e n w e pass
f r o m g e n u i n e o r simple i m p e r a t i v e s t o normatively authorized i m p e r a -
tives o r c o m m a n d s . L e t us c o m p a r e ( 5 ) w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g — a v a r i a n t
of (2):
(6) I (hereby) d i r e c t y o u to stop s m o k i n g .
T h i s utterance presupposes recognized n o r m s (for example, the
safety r e g u l a t i o n s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r t r a v e l ) a n d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
f r a m e w o r k a u t h o r i z i n g t h o s e h o l d i n g c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s (e.g., f l i g h t
attendants) u n d e r certain conditions (e.g., p r e p a r i n g t o l a n d ) to
d i r e c t a c e r t a i n class o f p e r s o n s ( h e r e , t h e passengers) t o s t o p s m o k -
i n g by appealing to certain regulations.
O n c e again, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g can be specified initially
t h r o u g h the conditions mentioned under ( a ) , b u t i n t h e case o f
d i r e c t i v e s (Anweisungen), the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g does n o t o n l y
point t o c o n d i t i o n s ( b ) , w h i c h have t o b e c o m p l e t e d o n t h e basis o f
t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e s p e e c h act; r a t h e r , t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c c e p t i n g
t h e l i n g u i s t i c c l a i m , a n d t h u s f o r a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n S a n d H, result
from t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act itself. I n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s
o f w i l l , S has g o o d r e a s o n s t o e x p e c t t h a t / / w i l l y i e l d t o h e r w i l l o n l y
i f she has a t h e r d i s p o s a l s a n c t i o n s w i t h w h i c h she c a n , i n a r e c o g -
n i z a b l e m a n n e r , t h r e a t e n o r e n t i c e H. So l o n g as S d o e s n o t a p p e a l
to the validity o f n o r m s , i t makes n o difference w h e t h e r the reservoir
o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s is d e j u r e o r d e f a c t o . F o r so l o n g as S u t t e r s
a g e n u i n e ( s i m p l e ) i m p e r a t i v e , t h a t is, expresses n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
h e r o w n w i l l , she i n f l u e n c e s H's m o t i v e s i n a m e r e l y e m p i r i c a l way
by t h r e a t e n i n g h i m w i t h h a r m o r by o f f e r i n g h i m rewards. The
g r o u n d s f o r accepting expressions o f w i l l are r e l a t e d to motives o f
the hearer t h a t t h e speaker can i n f l u e n c e o n l y empirically, i n the
final i n s t a n c e b y m e a n s o f v i o l e n c e o r g o o d s . I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r
w i t h n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s s u c h as c o m m a n d s a n d d i -
rectives. I n c o n t r a s t t o ( 5 ) , w i t h (6) t h e speaker appeals to the
v a l i d i t y o f safety r e g u l a t i o n s a n d , i n i s s u i n g d i r e c t i v e s , raises a c l a i m
to validity.
R e g i s t e r i n g a validity claim is n o t t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a c o n t i n g e n t
w i l l ; a n d r e s p o n d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o a v a l i d i t y c l a i m is n o merely
e m p i r i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d d e c i s i o n . B o t h acts, p u t t i n g f o r w a r d a n d rec-
136
Chapter 2
o g n i z i n g a validity c l a i m , are subject to c o n v e n t i o n a l restrictions,
because such a c l a i m can be rejected o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f c r i t i c i s m
a n d can be d e f e n d e d against a criticism o n l y i n the f o r m o f a force o f a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions ( c o n t i n g e n t l y l i n k e d w i t h
r e f u t a t i o n . S o m e o n e w h o resists a d i r e c t i v e is r e f e r r e d t o p r e v a i l i n g
regulations a n d n o t to t h e penalties that can be e x p e c t e d i f they are
n o t followed. A n d one w h o doubts the validity o f the u n d e r l y i n g
n o r m s has t o give reasons—whether challenging the legality o f the
r e g u l a t i o n , t h a t is, c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l a w f u l n e s s o f its s o c i a l v a l i d i t y , o r
c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e r e g u l a t i o n , t h a t is, its c l a i m t o b e
r i g h t o r j u s t i f i e d i n a m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l sense. V a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e inter-
nally c o n n e c t e d w i t h r e a s o n s . T o t h i s e x t e n t , t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e
acceptability o f directives can be t a k e n f r o m the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n -
i n g o f a s p e e c h act itself; t h e y d o n o t n e e d t o b e c o m p l e t e d by
additional c o n d i t i o n s o f s a n c t i o n .
T h u s a h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e d i r e c t i v e (6) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e
c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a n addressee c o u l d b r i n g a b o u t t h e d e s i r e d
state ( n o t s m o k i n g ) , a n d ( b ) t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S c o u l d
have c o n v i n c i n g reasons t o r e g a r d a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e c o n t e n t
(a) as v a l i d — t h a t is, as n o r m a t i v e r / j u s t i f i e d . T h e c o n d i t i o n s (a)
p e r t a i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n w a y t h a t arise o u t o f a n
a g r e e m e n t based o n the intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e n o r m a t i v e
validity c l a i m raised f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g imperative. 4 9
The condi-
tions (b) p e r t a i n to t h e acceptance o f t h e validity c l a i m itself. We
have t o d i s t i n g u i s h h e r e b e t w e e n t h e validity o f a n a c t i o n o r o f t h e
n o r m u n d e r l y i n g i t , t h e claim t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s v a l i d i t y a r e
s a t i s f i e d , a n d t h e redemption o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d , t h a t is, t h e
justification (of the claim) that the conditions for the validity o f an
a c t i o n o r o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m are satisfied. W e a r e n o w i n a
p o s i t i o n t o say t h a t a s p e a k e r c a n rationally motivate a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t
h e r s p e e c h act o f f e r b e c a u s e — o n t h e basis o f a n i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n
between validity, validity c l a i m , a n d the r e d e m p t i o n o f a validity
c l a i m — s h e c a n assume t h e w a r r a n t y (Gewähr) f o r p r o v i d i n g , i f n e c -
essary, c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t w o u l d s t a n d u p t o a h e a r e r ' s c r i t i c i s m
o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . T h u s a s p e a k e r owes t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g
f o r c e o f h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success n o t t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is s a i d
b u t t o the coordinating effect of the warranty t h a t she o f f e r s — a w a r r a n t y
t o r e d e e m , i f necessary, t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h h e r s p e e c h act.
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Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
I n a l l cases i n w h i c h t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e expresses n o t a power
claim b u t a validity claim, the place o f the empirically m o t i v a t i n g
s p e e c h acts) is t a k e n b y t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e o f the
speaker's assuming a w a r r a n t y f o r validity claims.
T h i s h o l d s n o t o n l y f o r r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , b u t
also f o r e x p r e s s i v e a n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 3 ) a n d ( 4 ) . J u s t
as w i t h (1) a s p e a k e r produces a n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r her
i n t e n t i o n t o b r i n g a b o u t a d e s i r e d state, a n d j u s t as w i t h ( 2 ) she raises
a normative validity claim for her imperative that H b r i n g about a
state d e s i r e d b y S, so w i t h ( 3 ) t h e s p e a k e r m a k e s a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l -
ness f o r a d i s c l o s e d i n t e n t i o n a l s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e (Erlebnis), and
w i t h ( 4 ) a t r u t h c l a i m f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n . I n ( 3 ) i t is t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f
a previously c o n c e a l e d e m o t i o n a l a t t i t u d e , i n (4) the p u t t i n g f o r -
w a r d o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r assumes
a w a r r a n t y i n m a k i n g a confession (3) o r a p r e d i c t i o n (4). T h u s a
h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e a v o w a l (3) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s
u n d e r w h i c h a p e r s o n c o u l d e x p e r i e n c e l o a t h i n g f o r "p," a n d ( b ) t h e
c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S says w h a t she m e a n s a n d t h e r e b y takes o n
a w a r r a n t y f o r the consistency o f h e r f u r t h e r behavior w i t h this
a v o w a l . A h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s (4) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t
w o u l d make the p r e d i c t i o n true, a n d (b) the conditions u n d e r w h i c h
S c o u l d have c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g a s t a t e m e n t w i t h t h e
c o n t e n t (a) t o b e t r u e .
O f c o u r s e , t h e r e a r e also i m p o r t a n t a s y m m e t r i e s . T h u s t h e c o n d i -
tions m e n t i o n e d u n d e r (a) d o not, i n t h e cases o f expressive a n d
c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e (3) a n d ( 4 ) , h a v e t o d o w i t h o b l i g a t i o n s
to act i n a c e r t a i n way r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n
o f the validity claims i n question; they relate only to u n d e r s t a n d i n g
the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a first-person s e n t e n c e o r a n assertoric
s e n t e n c e f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s v a l i d i t y . I n t h e case o f r e g u l a -
tive s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , t h e c o n d i t i o n s (a) l i k e w i s e r e l a t e
to understanding the propositional content o f an intention or i m -
perative sentence for w h i c h the speaker produces o r claims n o r m a -
tive v a l i d i t y ; b u t h e r e t h e c o n t e n t simultaneously c i r c u m s c r i b e s the
o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t arise f o r t h e
hearer f r o m acceptance o f the validity claim.
138 139

Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

I n g e n e r a l , obligations t o act i n a c e r t a i n way result f r o m t h e whereas i n t e n t i o n a l sentences a c q u i r e a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y role only

m e a n i n g o f expressive s p e e c h acts o n l y i n t h e sense t h a t t h e s p e a k e r t h r o u g h being transformed i n t o declarations o f i n t e n t i o n or an-
specifies a c t i o n s w i t h w h i c h h e r b e h a v i o r m a y n o t b e inconsistent. nouncements. W h e r e a s i m p e r a t i v e s have i n t h e m s e l v e s a n i l l o c u t i o n -
T h a t a s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t she says c a n b e m a d e c r e d i b l e o n l y i n ary force—albeit one that calls for supplementation by
t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f w h a t she d o e s a n d n o t t h r o u g h p r o v i d i n g r e a s o n s . s a n c t i o n s — i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s , w h i c h h a v e , so t o speak, lost t h e i r
T h u s , addressees w h o h a v e a c c e p t e d a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s c a n i m p e r a t i v e f o r c e in foro interno, c a n r e g a i n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e
e x p e c t a c o n s i s t e n c y o f b e h a v i o r i n c e r t a i n respects; h o w e v e r , this t h r o u g h b e i n g c o n n e c t e d w i t h validity claims, w h e t h e r i n the f o r m
expectation follows f r o m the conditions given u n d e r (b). O f course, o f e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e
c o n s e q u e n c e s also arise f r o m t h e w a r r a n t i e s o f f e r e d w i t h t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m s i n r e g u l a t i v e a n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, b u t t h e s e validity- (7) I c o n f e s s t o y o u t h a t i t is m y i n t e n t i o n t o . . .
related o b l i g a t i o n s t o p r o v i d e , i f necessary, j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r n o r m s o r
o r i n t h e f o r m o f n o r m a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e
g r o u n d i n g for propositions have relevance for action only o n a
m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level. O n l y those obligations to prove t r u s t w o r - (8) I (hereby) declare to y o u m y i n t e n t i o n to . . .
t h y {Bewdhrungsverpflichtungen) t h a t t h e s p e a k e r takes o n w i t h ex-
W i t h a n n o u n c e m e n t s like (8) the speaker enters i n t o a weak n o r m a -
pressive s p e e c h acts have d i r e c t r e l e v a n c e f o r t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f
tive b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t o w h i c h t h e addressee c a n
i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e y c o n t a i n a n offer to the hearer to check against the
a p p e a l i n a s i m i l a r w a y as t o a p r o m i s e .
c o n s i s t e n c y o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s s e q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n w h e t h e r she m e a n s
T h e n o r m a t i v i z a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s c a n serve as a m o d e l
w h a t she says. 50

for grasping the transformation o f simple imperatives into n o r m a -

I n g e n e r a l , n o special o b l i g a t i o n s t o act i n a c e r t a i n way f o l l o w f r o m tively a u t h o r i z e d imperatives, o r o f sheer imperatives i n t o com-
t h e m e a n i n g o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts. O b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e mands. The imperative (5), by b e i n g boosted w i t h a n o r m a t i v e
s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n arise f r o m t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y validity c l a i m , can be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e directive (6). W i t h this,
c o n d i t i o n s stated u n d e r (a) a n d (b) o n l y i n s o f a r as s p e a k e r a n d the c o m p o n e n t o f the acceptability conditions given u n d e r (b)
h e a r e r o b l i g a t e themselves t o base t h e i r a c t i o n o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f changes; the c o n d i t i o n s o f sanction s u p p l e m e n t i n g the imperative
s i t u a t i o n s t h a t d o n o t c o n t r a d i c t t h e s t a t e m e n t s a c c e p t e d as t r u e . p o w e r c l a i m are replaced by t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r
We have distinguished genuine (or simple) imperatives, with accepting a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . B e c a u s e these conditions
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c o n n e c t s a c l a i m t o p o w e r , f r o m s p e e c h acts w i t h can be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e itself, n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o -
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r raises a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . W h e r e a s v a l i d i t y rized imperatives gain an autonomy t h a t is m i s s i n g f r o m simple
claims are i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h reasons a n d a c c o r d a r a t i o n a l l y imperatives.
m o t i v a t i n g force t o t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e , p o w e r claims have to be
T h i s m a k e s i t c l e a r o n c e a g a i n t h a t o n l y t h o s e s p e e c h acts w i t h
covered by a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions i f they are to be capable
w h i c h a speaker connects a criticizable validity c l a i m can, by v i r t u e
o f b e i n g c a r r i e d t h r o u g h . H o w e v e r , i m p e r a t i v e s a d m i t o f a secondary
of their own power a n d o w i n g t o t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f l i n g u i s t i c
normativization. T h i s can be illustrated by the r e l a t i o n that holds
communication oriented toward reaching understanding, motivate
between i n t e n t i o n a l sentences a n d declarations o f i n t e n t i o n . I n t e n -
a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t a speech-act o f f e r , a n d t h e r e b y b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e
t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s b e l o n g i n t h e s a m e c a t e g o r y as t h e i m p e r a t i v e sen-
as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n . 5 2

tences with which imperatives are formed. We can interpret

F o l l o w i n g these reflections, t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ,
i n t e n t i o n a l sentences as i n t e r n a l i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s a d d r e s s e d b y t h e
w h i c h w e have i n t r o d u c e d i n a p r o v i s i o n a l way, n o w n e e d s t o be
speaker to herself. 51
O f c o u r s e , i m p e r a t i v e s are i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts,
r e n d e r e d m o r e precise. We b e g a n by i n c l u d i n g i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e
 141
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

action all interactions i n w h i c h those involved coordinate t h e i r i n d i - r e s p o n s e , t h e addressee c o n t e s t s t h e l i g h t n e s s o f ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , t h e

v i d u a l p l a n s u n r e s e r v e d l y o n t h e basis o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d
agreement. W i t h the specification "unreservedly p u r s u i n g i l l o c u t i o n -
a r y a i m s , " w e m e a n t t o e x c l u d e cases o f l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n , i n
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r inconspicuously e m p l o y s successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y
acts f o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y p u r p o s e s . H o w e v e r , i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s o f
w i l l a r e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r openly d e c l a r e s h e r
a i m o f i n f l u e n c i n g the decisions o f her opposite n u m b e r , whereby
she has t o r e l y f o r t h e success o f h e r p o w e r c l a i m o n supplementary
sanctions. For this reason, w i t h g e n u i n e imperatives o r nonnorma-
tively a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s , s p e a k e r s c a n u n r e s e r v e d l y p u r s u e i l l o -
c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d n o n e t h e l e s s a c t strategically.
N o t a l l s p e e c h acts a r e c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , b u t
t r u t h f u l n e s s o f ( 3 ) , a n d t h e t r u t h o f ( 4 ) . T h i s p i c t u r e is i n c o m p l e t e ,
h o w e v e r , i n a s m u c h as e v e r y s p e e c h a c t c a n b e c o n t e s t e d ( t h a t is,
r e j e c t e d as i n v a l i d ) u n d e r m o r e t h a n o n e aspect.
L e t us assume t h a t a s e m i n a r p a r t i c i p a n t u n d e r s t a n d s t h e f o l l o w -
i n g imperative addressed to h i m by the professor
(9) Please b r i n g m e a glass o f w a t e r .
n o t as a n a k e d i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n o f w i l l b u t as a s p e e c h a c t
carried out i n an attitude oriented toward reaching understanding.
T h e n he can i n p r i n c i p l e reject this request u n d e r three validity
aspects. H e c a n e i t h e r c o n t e s t t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness o f t h e u t t e r -
ance:

o n l y those w i t h w h i c h the speaker connects criticizable validity

(9') N o . You can't treat m e like one o f y o u r employees.
c l a i m s . I n t h e o t h e r cases, w h e n a s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g undeclared
a i m s w i t h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a i m s w i t h r e g a r d t o w h i c h t h e h e a r e r o r h e c a n contest t h e subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e u t t e r a n c e :
c a n t a k e n o p o s i t i o n a t a l l , o r w h e n a s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g i l l o c u -
(9") N o . You really only want to p u t m e i n a b a d light i n f r o n t o f
tionary aims r e g a r d i n g w h i c h the hearer c a n n o t take a grounded
the other seminar participants.
p o s i t i o n , as i n r e l a t i o n t o i m p e r a t i v e s , t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a b i n d i n g
a n d b o n d i n g relationship m o t i v a t e d by i n s i g h t i n t o reasons—a po- or he can deny that certain existential presuppositions obtain:
tential that is always contained in linguistic communication—
(9"') N o . T h e n e a r e s t w a t e r t a p is so f a r away t h a t I c o u l d n ' t g e t
remains unexploited.
b a c k b e f o r e t h e e n d o f t h e session.

Validity C l a i m s
Having distinguished communicative actions f r o m all o t h e r social
actions t h r o u g h t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effect, i t
m a k e s sense t o o r d e r t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts a c c o r d -
i n g t o types o f s p e e c h acts. A n d t o g u i d e o u r classifying o f s p e e c h
acts w e m a y use t h e o p t i o n s o p e n t o a h e a r e r o f t a k i n g a r a t i o n a l l y
m o t i v a t e d "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a speaker. I n
o u r previous examples, we have assumed t h a t the speaker raises
precisely one validity c l a i m w i t h h e r utterance. W i t h the p r o m i s e (1),
she c o n n e c t s a v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r a d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n ; w i t h t h e d i r e c -
tive ( 2 ) , a validity c l a i m f o r a n i m p e r a t i v e ; w i t h t h e avowal ( 3 ) , a
validity claim for the expression o f a feeling; a n d w i t h the p r e d i c t i o n
(4), a validity claim for a statement. Correspondingly, w i t h a "no"
I n t h e f i r s t case, w h a t is c o n t e s t e d is t h a t t h e a c t i o n o f t h e p r o f e s s o r
is r i g h t i n t h e g i v e n n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t ; i n t h e s e c o n d , t h a t t h e
p r o f e s s o r m e a n s w h a t she says b e c a u s e she w a n t s t o a c h i e v e a c e r t a i n
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect; i n t h e t h i r d , p r o p o s i t i o n s are contested whose
t r u t h t h e p r o f e s s o r has t o p r e s u p p o s e i n t h e g i v e n circumstances.
W h a t we have s h o w n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h this e x a m p l e holds t r u e
f o r all s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n c o n -
texts o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , s p e e c h acts c a n always b e rejected
u n d e r each o f t h r e e aspects: t h e a s p e c t o f t h e l i g h t n e s s t h a t t h e
speaker claims f o r h e r action i n r e l a t i o n to a n o r m a t i v e context (or,
i n d i r e c t l y , f o r these n o r m s themselves); t h e aspect o f t h e t r u t h f u l -
ness t h a t t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s f o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i -
ences t o w h i c h she has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d f i n a l l y , t h e aspect o f
t h e t r u t h t h a t t h e speaker, w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e , c l a i m s f o r a s t a t e m e n t
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(or for the existential presuppositions o f the context o f a n o m i n a l -
i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n ) . T h i s s t r o n g thesis c a n b e t e s t e d a g a i n s t n u m e r o u s
cases a n d m a d e p l a u s i b l e b y r e f l e c t i o n s t h a t t a k e us b a c k t o B i d d e r ' s
m o d e l o f the functions o f language.
T h e t e r m " r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ("Verständigung") m e a n s , a t
t h e m i n i m u m , t h a t at least t w o subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n
u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i n a n i d e n t i c a l way. T h e m e a n i n g
o f an elementary expression consists i n t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t i t
m a k e s t o t h e m e a n i n g o f a n a c c e p t a b l e s p e e c h act. A n d t o u n d e r -
s t a n d w h a t a s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h s u c h a n act, t h e h e a r e r has t o
k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t can be accepted. T o this e x t e n t ,
u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständnis) a n e l e m e n t a r y e x p r e s s i o n a l r e a d y p o i n t s
beyond t h e m i n i m a l m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m Verständigung. W h e n a sible s p e e c h a c t c o n t e s t s a t least o n e
h e a r e r accepts a speech-act o f f e r , a n a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis)
c o m e s a b o u t b e t w e e n ( a t least) t w o subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d
a c t i o n . However, this does n o t rest o n l y o n the intersubjective recog-
n i t i o n o f a single, thematically emphasized validity c l a i m . Rather, a n
agreement o f t h i s s o r t is a c h i e v e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a t t h r e e levels.
T h e s e m a y easily b e i d e n t i f i e d i n t u i t i v e l y i f w e b e a r i n m i n d t h a t i n
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a s p e a k e r selects a c o m p r e h e n s i b l e l i n g u i s t i c
e x p r e s s i o n o n l y i n o r d e r t o r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g with a h e a r e r
about s o m e t h i n g a n d t h e r e b y t o m a k e herself u n d e r s t o o d . I t b e l o n g s
t o t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f t h e s p e a k e r (a) t h a t she p e r f o r m a
s p e e c h act t h a t is right i n r e s p e c t t o t h e g i v e n n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t , so
t h a t a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n t h a t is r e c o g n i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e m a y
c o m e a b o u t b e t w e e n h e r a n d t h e h e a r e r ; ( b ) t h a t she e x p r e s s truth-
fully h e r b e l i e f s , i n t e n t i o n s , f e e l i n g s , wishes, a n d t h e l i k e , so t h a t t h e
h e a r e r w i l l give c r e d e n c e t o w h a t is s a i d ; a n d (c) t h a t she m a k e a true
s t a t e m e n t ( o r correct e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ) , so t h a t t h e h e a r e r
m a y a c c e p t a n d share t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e speaker. T h e f a c t t h a t
the intersubjective c o m m o n a l i t y of a communicatively achieved
a g r e e m e n t exists a t t h e levels o f n o r m a t i v e a c c o r d , m u t u a l t r u s t i n
s u b j e c t i v e s i n c e r i t y , a n d s h a r e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e c a n b e ex-
plained i n t u r n t h r o u g h the functions o f reaching understanding i n
language.
A s t h e m e d i u m f o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , s p e e c h acts s e r v e (a)
t o establish a n d renew i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations, w h e r e b y t h e speaker
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takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r s ;
( b ) t o m a k e m a n i f e s t s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s — t h a t is, t o r e p r e s e n t
oneself—whereby t h e s p e a k e r takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n
t h e s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d t o w h i c h she has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d (c) to
r e p r e s e n t ( o r p r e s u p p o s e ) states a n d e v e n t s , w h e r e b y t h e speaker
takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f
a f f a i r s . C o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t is m e a s u r e d against
precisely t h r e e criticizable validity claims, because actors, i n c o m i n g
to an understanding about something with one another and thereby
making themselves understood, cannot avoid embedding each
speech act i n precisely t h r e e w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s a n d c l a i m i n g validity f o r
i t u n d e r e a c h o f these aspects. S o m e o n e w h o r e j e c t s a c o m p r e h e n -
o f these validity claims. I n
r e j e c t i n g a s p e e c h a c t as ( n o r m a t i v e l y ) w r o n g o r u n t r u e o r u n t r u t h -
f u l , t h e h e a r e r w i t h h i s " n o " gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
u t t e r a n c e d o e s n o t f u l f i l l its f u n c t i o n s o f s e c u r i n g a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p , o f m a n i f e s t i n g subjective experiences, or of repre-
s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s — t o t h e f a c t t h a t i t is n o t i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h
our w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e l y o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , o r w i t h t h e
speaker's w o r l d o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s o r w i t h the w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g
states o f a f f a i r s .
A l t h o u g h s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e
always i n v o l v e d i n t h i s way i n a c o m p l e x n e t o f w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s , t h e
illocutionary r o l e — u n d e r standard conditions, the meaning of the
illocutionary component—determines t h e aspect o f validity u n d e r
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s h e r u t t e r a n c e t o b e u n d e r s t o o d first and
foremost. W h e n she m a k e s a s t a t e m e n t , asserts, n a r r a t e s , e x p l a i n s ,
r e p r e s e n t s , p r e d i c t s , discusses s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , she is s e e k i n g
a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e h e a r e r based o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a t r u t h c l a i m .
W h e n t h e speaker utters a first-person e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence, dis-
closes, reveals, confesses, m a n i f e s t s s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a g r e e -
m e n t c a n c o m e a b o u t o n l y o n t h e basis o f t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a c l a i m
t o t r u t h f u l n e s s . W h e n t h e s p e a k e r gives a n o r d e r o r m a k e s a p r o m -
ise, a p p o i n t s o r w a r n s s o m e b o d y , b a p t i z e s o r w e d s s o m e b o d y , b u y s
s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a g r e e m e n t d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r those i n -
v o l v e d a c c e p t t h e a c t i o n as r i g h t . T h e s e basic m o d e s a p p e a r in
g r e a t e r p u r i t y t h e m o r e c l e a r l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is o r i e n t e d
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toward only one d o m i n a n t validity claim. Consideradons of expedi-
e n c y suggest b e g i n n i n g analysis w i t h i d e a l i z e d o r pure cases of speech
acts. I a m t h i n k i n g h e r e o f
• c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h elementary propositional (assertoric)
sentences a r e u s e d ;
• e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h elementary experiential sentences ( i n
the first person present) appear; a n d o f
• r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h e i t h e r elementary imperative sentences
(as i n c o m m a n d s ) o r elementary intentional sentences (as i n p r o m i s e s )
appear.
I n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e is a n e x t e n s i v e l i t e r a t u r e o n e a c h o f
these complexes. H e r e , i n s t r u m e n t s have b e e n d e v e l o p e d a n d analy-
ses c a r r i e d o u t t h a t m a k e i t p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y
c l a i m s t o w a r d w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r is o r i e n t e d a n d t o characterize
m o r e p r e c i s e l y t h e basic a t t i t u d e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r t h e r e b y a d o p t s . I
a m r e f e r r i n g h e r e t o t h e objectivating attitude i n w h i c h a n e u t r a l
o b s e r v e r behaves t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a p p e n s i n t h e w o r l d ; t o
t h e expressive attitude i n w h i c h a s u b j e c t i n r e p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f r e -
veals t o a p u b l i c s o m e t h i n g w i t h i n h i m t o w h i c h h e has p r i v i l e g e d
access; a n d finally, t o t h e norm-conformative attitude i n w h i c h a m e m -
b e r o f s o c i a l g r o u p s satisfies l e g i t i m a t e b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s . To
e a c h o f these f u n d a m e n t a l a t t i t u d e s t h e r e c o r r e s p o n d s a c o n c e p t o f
"world."
L e t Mp r e p r e s e n t any e x p l i c i t s p e e c h act, w h e r e " M " stands f o r t h e
i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t a n d "p" f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l component; 5 3
and let M c d e s i g n a t e t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , M e the expres-
sive, a n d M r t h e r e g u l a t i v e . W e c a n t h e n , o n t h e basis o f t h e a f o r e -
m e n t i o n e d basic a t t i t u d e s , d i s t i n g u i s h i n t u i t i v e l y t h e senses i n w h i c h
t h e speaker wants the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f h e r speech act t o
b e i n t e r p r e t e d . I n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e o f t h e t y p e M p, c "p" s i g n i f i e s a
state o f a f f a i r s t h a t exists i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; i n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e
o f t h e t y p e M p, e "p" s i g n i f i e s a s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t is m a n i -
f e s t e d a n d a s c r i b e d t o t h e internal world o f t h e speaker; a n d i n a v a l i d
u t t e r a n c e o f t h e type M p, "p" s i g n i f i e s a n a c t i o n t h a t is r e c o g n i z e d
r
as l e g i t i m a t e i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d .
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Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a m o n g e x a c d y t h r e e basic m o d e s o f u s i n g l a n -
guage w i t h an o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o u l d be
g r o u n d e d o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f a n e l a b o r a t e d t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts.
I c a n n o t c a r r y o u t t h e n e c e s s a r y analyses h e r e , b u t I w o u l d l i k e t o
take u p a few p r i m a facie objections to t h e p r o p o s e d p r o g r a m .
L e i s t has f o r m u l a t e d m y basic thesis as f o l l o w s : " F o r a l l S a n d a l l
H, i n a l l s p e e c h acts t h a t b e l o n g t o a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d w h i c h are i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y dif-
f e r e n t i a t e d a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d , i t is m u t u a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t
t h e s p e a k e r is r e q u i r e d t o s p e a k i n t e l l i g i b l y , t o b e t r u t h f u l , t o t a k e
h i s u t t e r a n c e as t r u e , a n d a n o r m r e l e v a n t t o h i s a c t as r i g h t . " 5 4
To
begin w i t h , this f o r m u l a t i o n requires t h e e x p l a n a t o r y c o m m e n t that,
f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f the t h e o r y o f i n t e r a c t i o n , I d e l i m i t speech
acts " o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " f r o m s p e e c h acts t h a t
a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o strategic a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , e i t h e r because t h e
latter, l i k e g e n u i n e imperatives, are c o n n e c t e d o n l y w i t h power
c l a i m s a n d t h u s p r o d u c e n o i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g ef-
f e c t o n t h e i r o w n , o r because t h e s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
a i m s w i t h s u c h u t t e r a n c e s . N e x t , I w o u l d n o t use t h e expression
" m u t u a l k n o w l e d g e , " w h i c h comes f r o m i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics, b u t
speak r a t h e r o f " c o m m o n s u p p o s i t i o n s . " F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e t e r m " r e -
q u i r e d " suggests a n o r m a t i v e sense; I w o u l d r a t h e r — d e s p i t e the
weak transcendental connotations—speak o f "general conditions"
t h a t have to be satisfied i f a c o m m u n i c a t i v e agreement is t o be
a c h i e v e d . F i n a l l y , I find l a c k i n g h e r e a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r between
the well-formedness o r c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f the linguistic expres-
s i o n as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d
the claims to truthfulness, propositional t r u t h , a n d normative Tight-
ness, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d . T h e a c c e p t a n c e o f these c l a i m s brings
about an agreement between S a n d H that grounds obligations that
are relevant f o r t h e sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . I d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m these
the w a r r a n t y assumed by the speaker to r e d e e m t h e validity c l a i m he
raises, as w e l l as t h e r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r t a k e s
w i t h the negation o f a validity claim.
R e s e r v a t i o n s have b e e n e x p r e s s e d m a i n l y i n r e g a r d t o t h e a s s u m p -
t i o n s (a) t h a t w i t h every s p e e c h a c t o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g exactly three v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are r a i s e d ; ( b ) t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y
146 147

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

c l a i m s c a n b e adequately distinguished f r o m o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d (c) t h a t T h e s i t u a t i o n is s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y

v a l i d i t y c l a i m s have t o b e a n a l y z e d i n formal-pragmatic terms, t h a t is, o f t h e c l a i m t o Tightness. I t m a y b e o b j e c t e d t h a t n o r e l a t i o n t o
o n t h e level o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t o f sentences. n o r m a t i v e contexts can be i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f nonregu¬
a. C a n w e m a i n t a i n t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h , e v e n lative speech acts. 56
However, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are sometimes " i n a p -
t h o u g h w e o b v i o u s l y c a n n o t raise a t r u t h c l a i m w i t h nonconstative propriate," reports "out of place," confessions "embarrassing,"
speech acts? 55
I t is c e r t a i n l y t h e case t h a t w e c a n raise t h e c l a i m t h a t disclosures " h u r t f u l . " T h e fact that they can go w r o n g u n d e r this
a n asserted p r o p o s i t i o n "p" is t r u e o n l y w i t h c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts. aspect is b y n o m e a n s e x t r i n s i c t o n o n r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts; r a t h e r
B u t a l l o t h e r s p e e c h acts also c o n t a i n a p r o p o s i t i o n a l component, i t n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t s f r o m t h e i r c h a r a c t e r as s p e e c h acts. F r o m t h e i r
n o r m a l l y i n the f o r m o f a n o m i n a l i z e d propositional sentence "that i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t w e c a n see t h a t t h e s p e a k e r also e n t e r s i n t o
p." T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r also r e l a t e s t o states o f a f f a i r s w i t h i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h c o n s t a t i v e a n d e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts;
n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, n o t d i r e c d y t o b e s u r e — t h a t is, n o t i n t h e a n d w h e t h e r o r n o t these r e l a t i o n s f i t t h e e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t
p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e o f o n e w h o t h i n k s o r is o f t h e o p i n i o n , k n o w s , i n q u e s t i o n , t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e (social) o r d e r s .
o r b e l i e v e s t h a t "/>" is t h e case. T h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s o f s p e a k - T h e r e have also b e e n o b j e c t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s
ers w h o employ first-person e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences i n expressive o f t h e table o f validity claims. I f o n e compares this w i t h the conver-
s p e e c h acts a n d i m p e r a t i v e o r i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s i n r e g u l a t i v e sational postulates p r o p o s e d by G r i c e , 5 7
f o r example, one finds not
s p e e c h acts a r e o f a n o t h e r k i n d . T h e y a r e i n n o way d i r e c t e d t o t h e o n l y c e r t a i n p a r a l l e l s b u t also c e r t a i n a s y m m e t r i e s . T h u s , t h e r e is n o
e x i s t e n c e o f t h e state o f a f f a i r s m e n t i o n e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m - c o u n t e r p a r t t o t h e p o s t u l a t e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r s h o u l d always m a k e a
p o n e n t . H o w e v e r , i n saying w i t h a n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h a c t t h a t she c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e t o p i c t h a t is r e l e v a n t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e g i v e n
desires o r detests s o m e t h i n g , t h a t she w a n t s t o b r i n g a b o u t s o m e - conversation. A p a r t f r o m the fact that such a c l a i m to the relevance
t h i n g o r see i t b r o u g h t a b o u t , t h e s p e a k e r presupposes t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o c o n v e r s a t i o n is r a i s e d b y t h e h e a r e r a n d r e l a t e d
o f other, n o t m e n t i o n e d , states o f a f f a i r s . I t b e l o n g s t o t h e c o n c e p t o f t o a t e x t ( r a t h e r t h a n t o a n i n d i v i d u a l s p e e c h a c t ) — t h a t is, c a n n o t
a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t states o f a f f a i r s a r e l o c a t e d i n a n e x u s a n d d o b e s u b j e c t e d t o a "yes" o r " n o " t e s t — t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f s u c h a r e -
n o t h a n g i s o l a t e d i n t h e air. T h e r e f o r e , t h e s p e a k e r c o n n e c t s existen- q u i r e m e n t w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t to establish. T h e r e are obviously situ-
tial presuppositions w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f h e r s p e e c h ations—informal social gatherings, for example, or even entire
act; i f n e e d b e , t h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s c a n b e r e n d e r e d e x p l i c i t i n t h e c u l t u r a l m i l i e u s — i n w h i c h a c e r t a i n r e d u n d a n c y o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s is
f o r m o f a s s e r t o r i c sentences. T o t h i s e x t e n t , n o n c o n s t a t i v e speech nearly m a n d a t o r y . 5 8

acts, t o o , have a r e l a t i o n t o t r u t h .
b. R e s e r v a t i o n s have also b e e n e x p r e s s e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p o s -
Moreover, this holds n o t only for propositionally differentiated sibility o f sharply d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between claims to t r u t h a n d claims
s p e e c h acts; i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d s p e e c h a c t s — f o r e x a m p l e , a t o t r u t h f u l n e s s . Is i t n o t t h e case t h a t a s p e a k e r w h o t r u t h f u l l y u t t e r s
" h e l l o " u t t e r e d as a g r e e t i n g — a r e u n d e r s t o o d as s a t i s f y i n g n o r m s t h e o p i n i o n "p" m u s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p"? I t
f r o m w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e speech act c a n be a p p e a r s t o b e i m p o s s i b l e " t o e x p e c t o f S t h a t h e is s p e a k i n g t h e t r u t h
s u p p l e m e n t e d — f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e case o f a g r e e t i n g , t h e w e l l - b e i n g i n a n y o t h e r sense t h a n t h a t S w a n t s t o s p e a k t h e t r u t h — a n d t h i s
o f t h e addressee o r t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s social status. T h e e x i s - m e a n s n o t h i n g else t h a n t o b e t r u t h f u l . " 5 9
This objection is n o t
tential presuppositions o f a greeting include, a m o n g other things, r e l e v a n t t o t h e class o f expressive s p e e c h acts i n its e n t i r e t y b u t o n l y
t h e presence o f a person f o r w h o m t h i n g s can go w e l l o r badly, his to those utterances i n whose p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t a c o g n i t i o n
m e m b e r s h i p i n a social g r o u p , a n d so f o r t h . verb i n the first person present ( s u c h as I t h i n k , k n o w , believe,
 149
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Chapter 2

suspect, a m o f t h e o p i n i o n " t h a t p") o c c u r s . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e r e Wittgenstein's private language a r g u m e n t i n o r d e r to show that t h e

is also a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n these p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s , s a m e a s s e r t o r i c v a l i d i t y c l a i m is c o n n e c t e d w i t h s u c h first-person

e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s as
w h i c h can be expressed by means o f c o g n i d o n verbs, a n d constadve
s p e e c h acts. W h e n s o m e o n e asserts o r a s c e r t a i n s o r d e s c r i b e s "p" she (11) I am i n pain.
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y is o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t , k n o w s , o r b e l i e v e s " t h a t p."
M o o r e already p o i n t e d o u t the paradoxical character o f utterances (12) I am afraid of being raped.

like
as w i t h a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e s a m e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t :
(10+) I t is r a i n i n g n o w , b u t I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t i t is r a i n i n g n o w . 6 0

(13) H e is i n p a i n .

Despite these i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n s , however, a h e a r e r can be reject-

(14) S h e is a f r a i d o f b e i n g r a p e d .
i n g t w o different v a l i d i t y c l a i m s w i t h h i s r e j e c t i o n o f
w h e r e b y t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s i n t h e first a n d t h i r d
(10) I t is r a i n i n g n o w . person a r e s u p p o s e d t o have t h e s a m e r e f e r e n c e . I f Tugendhat's

I n t a k i n g a negative position, he can m e a n b o t h a s s i m i l i a t i o n thesis is c o r r e c t , t h e n e g a t i o n o f ( 1 1 ) o r (12) has t h e

same sense as t h e n e g a t i o n o f ( 1 3 ) o r ( 1 4 ) . I t w o u l d be r e d u n d a n t
(10') N o , that isn't true. to postulate a truthfulness claim alongside the claim to t r u t h .
F o l l o w i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n , T u g e n d h a t takes as h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t a n
and
expressive g e s t u r e , t h e c r y " o u c h , " a n d i m a g i n e s t h a t t h i s l i n g u i s t i -
(10") N o , y o u d o n ' t m e a n w h a t y o u are saying. cally r u d i m e n t a r y c r y o f p a i n is r e p l a c e d b y a n expressive u t t e r a n c e
r e p r e s e n t e d at t h e semantic level by t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence (11).
I n t h e f i r s t case, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s ( 1 0 ) as a c o n s t a d v e u t t e r -
W i t t g e n s t e i n denies to such e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences t h e character o f
a n c e , i n t h e s e c o n d , as a n e x p r e s s i v e u t t e r a n c e . O b v i o u s l y , t h e n e g a -
statements. 6 2
H e assumes t h a t a c o n t i n u u m exists b e t w e e n b o t h n o n -
tion o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "p" j u s t as l i t t l e i m p l i e s t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e
cognitive f o r m s o f expressing p a i n , the gesture a n d the sentence. For
b e l i e f " t h a t p" as, conversely, ( 1 0 " ) i m p l i e s t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e p o s i -
T u g e n d h a t , b y c o n t r a s t , t h e c a t e g o r i a l d i f f e r e n c e consists i n t h e f a c t
t i o n t a k e n i n ( 1 0 ' ) . T o b e s u r e , t h e h e a r e r m a y s u p p o s e t h a t whenever
t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e c a n b e false, b u t n o t t h e g e s t u r e . H i s
S asserts "p" she also b e l i e v e s " t h a t p." B u t t h i s d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e
analysis leads t o t h e r e s u l t t h a t w i t h t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e c r y
f a c t t h a t t h e t r u t h c l a i m r e l a t e s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e state o f a f f a i r s
i n t o a n e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence w i t h the same m e a n i n g , "an expression
w h e r e a s t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s c l a i m has t o d o o n l y w i t h t h e m a n i f e s -
is p r o d u c e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h i t is u s e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e same r u l e as
t a t i o n o f t h e o p i n i o n o r t h e b e l i e f " t h a t p." A m u r d e r e r w h o makes
t h e c r y , is t r u e w h e n i t is u s e d c o r r e c t l y ; a n d t h u s t h e r e arises t h e
a c o n f e s s i o n c a n m e a n w h a t h e says a n d y e t , w i t h o u t i n t e n d i n g t o d o
s i n g u l a r case o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s w h i c h c a n b e t r u e o r false b u t
so, b e s a y i n g w h a t is u n t r u e . H e c a n also, w i t h o u t i n t e n d i n g t o d o
w h i c h are nonetheless n o t c o g n i t i v e . " 6 3
For this reason, experiential
so, s p e a k t h e t r u t h a l t h o u g h , i n c o n c e a l i n g his k n o w l e d g e of the
sentences like (11) a r e not s u p p o s e d t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m
facts o f t h e case, h e is l y i n g . A j u d g e w h o h a d s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e a t
assertoric sentences w i t h t h e same p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t l i k e (13)
h e r d i s p o s a l c o u l d c r i t i c i z e t h e t r u t h f u l u t t e r a n c e as u n t r u e i n t h e
o n t h e basis o f t h e c r i t e r i o n o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a d m i t o f t r u t h .
o n e case, a n d t h e t r u e u t t e r a n c e as u n t r u t h f u l i n t h e o t h e r .
B o t h c a n b e t r u e o r false. O f c o u r s e , e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s e x h i b i t
As against this, Ernst T u g e n d h a t tries to m a k e d o w i t h a single
t h e p e c u l i a r i t y t h a t they express a n " i n c o r r i g i b l e k n o w l e d g e ; " t h u s ,
validity c l a i m . 6 1
H e takes u p t h e e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h
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Chapter 2
w h e n e v e r t h e y a r e u s e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r u l e s t h e y must b e true.
Between t h e sentences ( 1 1 ) and (13) t h e r e exists a ' V e r i f i c a t o r y
s y m m e t r y , " i n t h e sense t h a t ( 1 3 ) is t r u e w h e n e v e r ( 1 1 ) is u s e d i n
c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the rules.
T u g e n d h a t explains this c o n n e c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e special proper-
ties o f the singular t e r m " I , " w i t h w h i c h the speaker designates
h e r s e l f w i t h o u t a t t h e same t i m e t h e r e b y i d e n t i f y i n g h e r s e l f . E v e n i f
h i s thesis is c o r r e c t , h o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t solve t h e p r o b l e m of
e x p l a i n i n g h o w a sentence can have a n assertoric character a n d t h u s
a d m i t o f t r u t h a n d yet n o t a d m i t o f b e i n g e m p l o y e d cognitively, t h a t
is, f o r r e p r e s e n t i n g e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s .
I n g e n e r a l , t h e r u l e s f o r e m p l o y i n g a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s indicate a
c o g n i t i o n ; o n l y i n t h e case o f expressive s e n t e n c e s is t h e correct
e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n also s u p p o s e d t o guarantee
its t r u t h . B u t a h e a r e r w h o w a n t s t o a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r a s p e a k e r is
d e c e i v i n g h i m w i t h t h e s e n t e n c e ( 1 1 ) has t o test w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e
s e n t e n c e ( 1 3 ) is t r u e . T h i s shows t h a t expressive s e n t e n c e s i n t h e
f i r s t p e r s o n d o n o t p r i m a r i l y serve t h e p u r p o s e o f e x p r e s s i n g cogni-
t i o n s , t h a t a t m o s t t h e y derive t h e t r u t h c l a i m a s c r i b e d t o t h e m f r o m
t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g assertoric s e n t e n c e s i n t h e t h i r d p e r s o n ; f o r o n l y
t h e l a t t e r c a n represent t h e state o f a f f a i r s t o w h o s e e x i s t e n c e t h e t r u t h
c l a i m refers. T h u s T u g e n d h a t falls i n t o t h e d i l e m m a o f h a v i n g to
characterize i n a c o n t r a d i c t o r y way w h a t a speaker means w i t h expe-
riential s e n t e n c e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h i s is s u p p o s e d t o b e a m a t t e r
o f k n o w l e d g e f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this k n o w l e d g e c a n n o t have
t h e status o f a c o g n i t i o n , f o r c o g n i t i o n s c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y i n
a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s t h a t c a n i n p r i n c i p l e b e c o n t e s t e d as u n t r u e . B u t
t h i s d i l e m m a arises o n l y i f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s — w h i c h
is analagous t o t r u t h — i s identified with t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h . T h e d i -
l e m m a dissolves as s o o n as o n e shifts f r o m t h e s e m a n t i c to the
p r a g m a t i c l e v e l a n d c o m p a r e s s p e e c h acts r a t h e r t h a n s e n t e n c e s .
Consider
(15) I have t o confess ( t o y o u ) t h a t I ' v e b e e n i n p a i n f o r days.
(16) I c a n r e p o r t ( t o y o u ) t h a t h e ' s b e e n i n p a i n f o r days.
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w h e r e b y t h e p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n i n t h e first p e r s o n i n (15) a n d t h e
p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n i n t h e t h i r d p e r s o n i n ( 1 6 ) a r e t o have t h e s a m e
reference. I t b e c o m e s c l e a r a t a g l a n c e t h a t i f ( 1 5 ) is i n v a l i d , t h e
s p e a k e r is d e c e i v i n g t h e h e a r e r , w h e r e a s i f ( 1 6 ) is i n v a l i d , t h e s p e a k e r
is t e l l i n g t h e h e a r e r s o m e t h i n g t h a t is n o t t r u e , a l t h o u g h she n e e d
n o t i n t e n d t o d e c e i v e h i m . T h u s i t is l e g i t i m a t e t o p o s t u l a t e for
e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts a different v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a n f o r constative
s p e e c h acts w i t h t h e same m e a n i n g . W i t t g e n s t e i n c o m e s v e r y close
t o t h i s i n s i g h t a t o n e p o i n t i n h i s Philosophical Investigations, where
h e is s h o w i n g , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p a r a d i g m case o f a c o n f e s s i o n ,
t h a t e x p r e s s i v e u t t e r a n c e s d o n o t have a d e s c r i p t i v e s e n s e — t h a t is,
d o n o t a d m i t o f t r u t h — a n d y e t c a n be valid or invalid.
T h e criteria for the t r u t h o f the confession that I t h o u g h t such-and-such are
n o t the criteria f o r a t r u e description o f a process. A n d the importance o f the
t r u e confession does n o t reside i n the fact that i t is a reliable r e p o r t o f a
certain process. I t resides rather i n the special consequences w h i c h can be
drawn f r o m a confession whose t r u t h is guaranteed by the special criteria
o f truthfulness. * 6
c. W i t h t h e s e a r g u m e n t s w e have a l r e a d y t o u c h e d u p o n t h e t h i r d
g r o u p o f o b j e c t i o n s , w h i c h is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c
approach t o t h e analysis o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . T h e s e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ,
f o l l o w i n g t h e m o d e l o f l e g a l c l a i m s , have t o d o w i t h r e l a t i o n s b e -
tween persons a n d are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n .
T h e y are raised f o r t h e validity o f symbolic expressions, i n the stan-
d a r d case f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t
t h a t is d e p e n d e n t on an illocutionary component. I t thus makes
sense t o r e g a r d a v a l i d i t y c l a i m as a c o m p l e x a n d d e r i v a t i v e p h e -
nomenon that can be traced back to t h e u n d e r l y i n g phenomenon
o f t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f sentences. B u t
t h e n s h o u l d we n o t l o o k f o r these c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e semantic level
o f a n a l y z i n g assertoric, e x p e r i e n t i a l , i m p e r a t i v e , a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sen-
tences, r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e p r a g m a t i c level o f t h e e m p l o y m e n t of
s u c h s e n t e n c e s i n c o n s t a t i v e , expressive, a n d r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts?
Is n o t p r e c i s e l y a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h h o p e s t o e x p l a i n t h e
i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effect t h r o u g h a w a r r a n t y o f f e r e d
b y t h e s p e a k e r f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t she says, a n d t h r o u g h a
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corresponding r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f the hearer, de-
p e n d e n t o n a t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t e x p l a i n s f o r its p a r t u n d e r w h a t
c o n d i t i o n s t h e sentences e m p l o y e d a r e v a l i d ?
A t issue i n t h i s d e b a t e a r e n o t q u e s t i o n s o f t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s
o r o f n o m i n a l d e f i n i t i o n s b u t w h e t h e r t h e concept of the validity o f a
s e n t e n c e c a n b e c l a r i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n d y o f t h e concept of redeeming the
validity claim r a i s e d t h r o u g h t h e u t t e r a n c e o f t h e s e n t e n c e . I a m
d e f e n d i n g t h e thesis t h a t t h i s is n o t p o s s i b l e . S e m a n t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s
o f d e s c r i p t i v e , expressive, a n d n o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s , i f o n l y t h e y a r e
c a r r i e d t h r o u g h c o n s i s t e n t l y e n o u g h , f o r c e us t o c h a n g e t h e l e v e l o f
analysis. T h e v e r y analysis o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f sen-
t e n c e s itself c o m p e l s us t o analyze t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c ¬
tive r e c o g n i t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a l i d i t y claims. A n e x a m p l e o f this
can be found in Dummett's development of truth-conditional
fit*
semantics. D
D u m m e t t starts f r o m t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t
a n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e has t o satisfy t o b e t r u e a n d t h e knowledge
t h a t a s p e a k e r w h o asserts t h e s e n t e n c e as t r u e has o f t h e s e t r u t h
c o n d i t i o n s — c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a t t h e same t i m e d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n -
i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e . K n o w i n g t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s consists i n know-
ing how one ascertains w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a r e satisfied i n a g i v e n case.
T h e o r t h o d o x version o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, w h i c h tries t o
e x p l a i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f a sentence i n terms o f k n o w -
i n g its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , is b a s e d o n t h e u n r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
f o r e v e r y s e n t e n c e , o r a t least f o r e v e r y assertoric s e n t e n c e , p r o c e -
d u r e s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r e f f e c t i v e l y d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t its t r u t h
c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n rests t a c i d y o n a n e m p i r i c i s t
t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e t h a t ascribes a f u n d a m e n t a l status t o t h e s i m p l e
p r e d i c a t i v e sentences o f a n o b s e r v a t i o n l a n g u a g e . B u t n o t e v e n t h e
a r g u m e n t a t i o n game t h a t T u g e n d h a t postulates f o r v e r i f y i n g such
s e e m i n g l y e l e m e n t a r y s e n t e n c e s consists i n a d e c i s i o n procedure
t h a t c o u l d b e a p p l i e d l i k e a n a l g o r i t h m , t h a t is, i n s u c h a w a y t h a t
f u r t h e r d e m a n d s for g r o u n d i n g are e x c l u d e d in principle. 6 6
I t is
e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r i n t h e case o f c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s , u n i v e r s a l e x i s t e n t i a l
sentences, a n d sentences w i t h a t e m p o r a l i n d e x — i n g e n e r a l , any
s e n t e n c e s r e f e r r i n g t o p l a c e s a n d t i m e s t h a t are a c t u a l l y inaccessi-
b l e — t h a t effective d e c i s i o n p r o c e d u r e s a r e l a c k i n g . ' T h e difficulty
153
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
arises b e c a u s e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e is f u l l o f s e n t e n c e s w h i c h a r e n o t
e f f e c t i v e l y d e c i d a b l e , o n e s f o r w h i c h t h e r e exists n o effective p r o c e -
dure for d e t e r m i n i n g whether or n o t their t r u t h conditions are
fulfilled." 6 7
B e c a u s e k n o w i n g t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s is
p r o b l e m a t i c i n m a n y , i f n o t i n m o s t cases, D u m m e t t stresses t h e
difference between k n o w i n g the conditions that make a sentence
true a n d k n o w i n g the grounds t h a t e n t i d e a s p e a k e r t o assert a
s e n t e n c e as t r u e . R e l y i n g o n basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f i n t u i t i o n i s m , h e
goes o n t o r e f o r m u l a t e t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as f o l l o w s : " [ A ] n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a s t a t e m e n t consists i n a c a p a c i t y t o r e c o g n i z e
w h a t e v e r is c o u n t e d as v e r i f y i n g i t , i.e., as c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h i n g i t
as t r u e . I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t w e s h o u l d have a n y m e a n s o f d e c i d i n g
the t r u t h o r falsity o f t h e statement, o n l y t h a t we be capable of
r e c o g n i z i n g w h e n its t r u t h has b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . " 6 8
I t is p a r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s e n t e n c e t h a t w e are c a p a b l e of
r e c o g n i z i n g grounds t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e claim t h a t its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s
a r e s a t i s f i e d could be redeemed. T h u s , t h i s t h e o r y e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g
o f a s e n t e n c e o n l y i n d i r e c d y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f its
v a l i d i t y , b u t d i r e c d y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g g r o u n d s t h a t are objectively
available to a speaker f o r r e d e e m i n g a t r u t h c l a i m .
N o w a speaker m i g h t still p r o d u c e such g r o u n d s a c c o r d i n g to a
p r o c e d u r e t h a t can be a p p l i e d m o n o l o g i c a l l y ; t h e n even an explana-
tion o f t r u t h conditions i n terms o f g r o u n d i n g a t r u t h claim w o u l d
n o t m a k e i t necessary t o m o v e f r o m t h e semantic level o f sentences
to t h e p r a g m a t i c level o f u s i n g sentences communicatively. D u m m e t t
stresses, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is b y n o m e a n s a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e
the r e q u i r e d verifications i n a deductively c o m p e l l i n g m a n n e r on
t h e basis o f r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e . T h e set o f g r o u n d s available i n a n y
g i v e n i n s t a n c e is c i r c u m s c r i b e d b y i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f a u n i v e r s e o f
linguistic structures that can be surveyed only argumentatively. D u m -
m e t t p u r s u e s t h i s i d e a so f a r t h a t i n t h e e n d h e gives u p e n t i r e l y t h e
basic i d e a o f v e r i f i c a t i o n i s m .
A verificationist t h e o r y comes as close as any plausible t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g
can do to e x p l a i n i n g the m e a n i n g o f a sentence i n terms o f the grounds o n
w h i c h i t may be asserted; i t must o f course distinguish a speaker's actual
grounds, w h i c h may n o t be conclusive, or may be i n d i r e c t , from the k i n d
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o f direct, conclusive grounds i n terms o f w h i c h the m e a n i n g is given,
particularly for sentences, like those i n the future tense, for w h i c h the
speaker c a n n o t have grounds o f the latter k i n d at the time o f utterance. B u t
a falsificationist theory . . . links the c o n t e n t o f an assertion w i t h the c o m -
m i t m e n t that a speaker undertakes i n m a k i n g that assertion; an assertion is
a k i n d o f gamble that the speaker w i l l n o t be proved w r o n g . 69
I see t h i s as a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e f a l l i b i l i s t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e d i s -
cursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f validity claims. I c a n n o t go i n t o t h e details o f
D u m m e t t ' s t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g h e r e . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is o n l y t h a t
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c l a i m t h e s p e a k e r raises f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f a sen-
t e n c e b e c r i t i c i z a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e . I n a n y case, t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l se-
m a n t i c s i n its r e v i s e d f o r m takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e f a c t t h a t
t r u t h conditions cannot be explicated independently f r o m k n o w i n g
how to redeem a corresponding truth claim. To understand an
a s s e r t i o n is t o k n o w w h e n a s p e a k e r has g o o d r e a s o n s t o assume a
w a r r a n t y t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e t r u t h o f t h e asserted s e n t e n c e
are satisfied.
A s i n t h e case o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s , i t c a n also
be s h o w n f o r expressive a n d n o r m a t i v e sentences t h a t
analysis p u s h e s b e y o n d i t s e l f . T h e d i s c u s s i o n t h a t has a r i s e n f r o m
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s analysis o f e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s m a k e s c l e a r t h a t t h e
c l a i m c o n n e c t e d w i t h expressions is g e n u i n e l y a d d r e s s e d
The m e a n i n g o f t h e expressive a n d declarative f u n c t i o n already
suggests a p r i m a r i l y c o m m u n i c a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t o f such
sions. 7 0
T h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f n o r m s is e v e n
c l e a r e r . H e r e , t o o , a n analysis t h a t starts w i t h s i m p l e p r e d i c a t e s f o r
s e e m i n g l y subjective e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n s t o v i o l a t i o n s o r
m e n t s o f p e r s o n a l i n t e g r i t y leads step-by-step t o t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e ,
i n d e e d t r a n s s u b j e c t i v e , m e a n i n g o f basic m o r a l c o n c e p t s . 7 1
O n the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f S p e e c h A c t s
I f o u r thesis h o l d s t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be contested u n d e r precisely t h r e e u n i -
v e r s a l aspects, w e m i g h t c o n j e c t u r e t h a t a system o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
also u n d e r l i e s t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f types o f s p e e c h acts. I f so, t h e
u n i v e r s a l i t y thesis w o u l d also h a v e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a t t e m p t s t o class-
ify s p e e c h acts f r o m t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view. T h u s f a r I h a v e t a c i d y
155
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b e e n d i v i d i n g s p e e c h acts i n t o t h r e e classes: r e g u l a t i v e , expressive,
a n d constative. I w o u l d n o w like t o justify this classification by way
o f a critical e x a m i n a t i o n o f o t h e r classificatory schemes.
A s is w e l l k n o w n , a t t h e e n d o f h i s series o f l e c t u r e s o n " H o w t o
D o T h i n g s w i t h Words," A u s t i n t r i e d his h a n d at a typology o f speech
acts. H e o r d e r e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o n t h e basis o f p e r f o r m a t i v e v e r b s
a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e d f i v e types ( v e r d i c t i v e s , e x e r c i t i v e s , commissives,
behabitives, a n d expositives), w i t h o u t d e n y i n g the provisional char-
acter o f this classification. 72
I n f a c t , i t is o n l y f o r t h e class o f c o m m i s -
sives t h a t A u s t i n gives us a c l e a r c r i t e r i o n o f d e m a r c a t i o n : with
p r o m i s e s , t h r e a t s , a n n o u n c e m e n t s , vows, c o n t r a c t s , a n d t h e l i k e , t h e
speaker c o m m i t s h i m s e l f t o c a r r y i n g o u t c e r t a i n actions i n t h e f u -
t u r e . T h e speaker enters i n t o a n o r m a t i v e b i n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t
o b l i g e s h i m t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way. T h e r e m a i n i n g classes a r e n o t
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y d e f i n e d , e v e n i f o n e takes i n t o a c c o u n t t h e d e s c r i p t i v e
character o f the classification. T h e y d o n o t m e e t the r e q u i r e m e n t s
o f distinctness a n d disjunctiveness; 7 3
A u s t i n ' s classificatory scheme
d o e s n o t r e q u i r e us always t o assign d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a to dif-
semantic f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s n o r t o assign e a c h p h e n o m e n o n to at m o s t one
category.
T h e class o f v e r d i c t i v e s c o m p r i s e s utterances w i t h w h i c h ' j u d g -
t o others.
m e n t s " o r " v e r d i c t s " — i n t h e sense o f a p p r a i s a l s a n d assessments—
are m a d e . A u s t i n does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h h e r e between j u d g m e n t s w i t h
expres-
d e s c r i p t i v e c o n t e n t a n d t h o s e w i t h n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t . T h u s t h e r e is
s o m e o v e r l a p w i t h b o t h t h e e x p o s i t i v e s a n d t h e e x e r c i t i v e s . T h e class
o f e x e r c i t i v e s c o m p r i s e s , t o b e g i n w i t h , a l l d e c l a r a t i v e s , t h a t is e x p r e s -
impair-
sions f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y — f o r t h e m o s t p a r t , l e g a l l y — a u t h o r i z e d d e c i -
sions (such as sentencing, adopting, appointing, nominating,
r e s i g n i n g , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h e r e is o v e r l a p n o t o n l y w i t h v e r d i c t i v e s
( s u c h as n a m i n g a n d a w a r d i n g ) b u t also w i t h b e h a b i t i v e s ( s u c h as
p r o t e s t i n g ) . T h e s e b e h a b i t i v e s i n t u r n f o r m a class t h a t is p r e t t y
h e t e r o g e n e o u s i n c o m p o s i t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n t o verbs f o r standardized
e x p r e s s i o n s o f f e e l i n g ( s u c h as c o m p l a i n t s a n d c o m m i s e r a t i o n s ) , i t
contains expressions f o r institutionally b o u n d utterances ( c o n g r a t u -
l a t i o n s , curses, toasts, e x p r e s s i o n s o f w e l c o m e ) as w e l l as e x p r e s s i o n s
f o r s a t i s f a c t i o n s ( a p o l o g i e s , t h a n k s , a l l sorts o f m a k i n g g o o d ) . F i n a l l y ,
t h e class o f e x p o s i t i v e s d o e s n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e b e t w e e n constatives,
156 157
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

w h i c h s e r v e t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e s , w h i c h Searle's s h a r p e n e d v e r s i o n o f A u s t i n ' s s p e e c h - a c t t y p o l o g y m a r k s

(like asking, replying, addressing, c i t i n g , a n d so f o r t h ) r e f e r to t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f a d i s c u s s i o n t h a t has d e v e l o p e d i n t w o d i f f e r e n t
s p e e c h itself. A l s o t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e s e a r e t h e e x p r e s s i o n s d i r e c t i o n s . T h e first is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y Searle's o w n e f f o r t s t o p r o -
w i t h w h i c h w e d e s i g n a t e t h e e x e c u t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n s ( s u c h as d e d u c - v i d e a n o n t o l o g i c a l g r o u n d i n g f o r t h e five types o f s p e e c h acts; t h e
i n g , i d e n t i f y i n g , c a l c u l a t i n g , classifying, a n d t h e l i k e ) . o t h e r is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e a t t e m p t t o d e v e l o p t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of
S e a r l e has a t t e m p t e d t o s h a r p e n A u s t i n ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 74
He no s p e e c h acts f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s so as t o
l o n g e r orients h i m s e l f t o w a r d a list o f p e r f o r m a t i v e verbs d i f f e r e n t i - m a k e i t f r u i t f u l f o r t h e analysis o f s p e e c h - a c t s e q u e n c e s i n e v e r y d a y
a t e d w i t h i n a specific l a n g u a g e , b u t t o w a r d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n t e n - communication.
t i o n s o r a i m s t h a t speakers p u r s u e w i t h v a r i o u s types o f s p e e c h acts,
I t is a l o n g t h i s l a t t e r p a t h t h a t w e find the w o r k o f linguists a n d
independendy o f the f o r m s i n w h i c h they are realized i n i n d i v i d u a l
s o c i o l i n g u i s t s s u c h as W u n d e r l i c h , C a m p b e l l , a n d K r e c k e l . 7 5
For em-
languages. H e arrives at a clear a n d i n t u i t i v e l y c o n v i n c i n g classifica-
p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s , social l i f e - c o n t e x t s p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s as c o m m u -
t i o n o f s p e e c h acts: assertive ( o r c o n s t a t i v e ) , c o m m i s s i v e , d i r e c t i v e ,
n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s t h a t i n t e r m e s h i n social spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s .
d e c l a r a t i v e , a n d expressive. T o s t a r t w i t h , Searle i n t r o d u c e s assertive
T h e patterns o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces realized i n p a r t i c u l a r languages
( c o n s t a t i v e , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) s p e e c h acts as a w e l l d e f i n e d class. F r o m
r e f l e c t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f these n e t w o r k s o f a c t i o n s . T h e l i n g u i s t i c
A u s t i n h e f u r t h e r takes o v e r t h e class o f c o m m i s s i v e s a n d c o n t r a s t s
possibilities f o r p e r f o r m i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts—whether i n the fixed
these w i t h t h e directives. W h e r e a s w i t h t h e f o r m e r t h e speaker c o m -
f o r m o f grammatical modes or i n the more flexible forms of perfor-
m i t s h e r s e l f t o a n a c t i o n , w i t h t h e l a t t e r she t r i e s t o m o t i v a t e t h e
mative verbs, sentence particles, sentence i n t o n a t i o n s , a n d the l i k e —
h e a r e r t o c a r r y o u t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . A m o n g t h e d i r e c t i v e s , Searle
provide schemata for establishing interpersonal relations. The
c o u n t s o r d i n a n c e s , requests, i n s t r u c t i o n s , i m p e r a t i v e s , i n v i t a t i o n s , as
i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces constitute the knots i n the n e t w o r k o f commu-
w e l l as q u e s t i o n s a n d entreaties. H e r e , h e does n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e
n i c a t i v e s o c i a l i z a t i o n (Vergesellschaflung); t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y l e x i c o n is,
b e t w e e n n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s — s u c h as p e t i t i o n s , r e p -
as i t w e r e , t h e s e c t i o n a l p l a n e o n w h i c h t h e l a n g u a g e a n d t h e i n s t i -
r i m a n d s , c o m m a n d s , a n d t h e l i k e — a n d s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s , t h a t is,
t u t i o n a l o r d e r o f a society i n t e r p e n e t r a t e . T h i s s o c i e t a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
n o n a u t h o r i z e d expressions o f w i l l . F o r this reason, the d e l i m i t a t i o n
o f l a n g u a g e is i t s e l f i n f l u x ; i t varies i n d e p e n d e n c e o n i n s t i t u t i o n s
o f d i r e c t i v e s f r o m d e c l a r a t i v e s is also n o t v e r y s h a r p . I t is t r u e t h a t
a n d f o r m s o f l i f e . B u t t h e s e v a r i a t i o n s also e m b o d y a l i n g u i s t i c c r e a -
f o r d e c l a r a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d t o se-
t i v i t y t h a t gives n e w f o r m s o f e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e i n n o v a t i v e m a s t e r y o f
c u r e t h e n o r m a t i v e o b l i g a t o r y c h a r a c t e r of, f o r i n s t a n c e , a p p o i n t i n g ,
unforeseen situations. 7 6

a b d i c a t i n g , d e c l a r i n g war, a n d g i v i n g n o t i c e ; b u t t h e i r n o r m a t i v e
Indicators that relate to general dimensions o f the speech situ-
m e a n i n g is s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f c o m m a n d s a n d d i r e c t i v e s . T h e last class
a t i o n a r e i m p o r t a n t f o r a p r a g m a t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts.
c o m p r i s e s expressive s p e e c h acts. T h e s e a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e i r a i m —
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e temporal dimension t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r
namely, that w i t h t h e m , t h e speaker sincerely brings to expression
p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e o r i e n t e d m o r e t o w a r d t h e f u t u r e , t h e past, o r t h e
h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s . B u t S e a r l e is u n c e r t a i n i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n
p r e s e n t , o r w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts a r e t e m p o r a l l y n e u t r a l . W i t h
o f t h i s c r i t e r i o n ; t h u s , t h e e x e m p l a r y cases o f avowals, disclosures,
r e g a r d t o t h e social dimension t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o b l i -
a n d r e v e l a t i o n s are m i s s i n g . A p o l o g i e s a n d e x p r e s s i o n s o f j o y a n d
g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n arise f o r t h e speaker,
s y m p a t h y a r e m e n t i o n e d . E v i d e n d y , Searle has a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o b e
t h e h e a r e r , o r f o r b o t h p a r t i e s . A n d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e dimension of
l e d astray b y A u s t i n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f b e h a b i t i v e s a n d has t a c k e d
objectivity (die sachliche Dimension) t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e
o n t o t h i s class i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts l i k e c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s
t h e m a t i c e m p h a s i s lies m o r e o n t h e o b j e c t s , t h e a c t i o n s , o r t h e a c t o r s
a n d g r e e t i n g s as w e l l .
t h e m s e l v e s . K r e c k e l uses these i n d i c a t o r s t o p r o p o s e a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n
158 159

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d Communication

o n w h i c h she bases h e r analyses o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n (see Table 2.4

Classification according to three paradigmatic indicators
table 2.4).
C e r t a i n l y , t h e a d v a n t a g e o f t h i s a n d s i m i l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s consists Speaker (S) Hearer (H)

i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y p r o v i d e us w i t h a g u i d e l i n e f o r ethnolinguistic Cognition oriented (C) Cognition oriented (C)

a n d s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p d v e systems; t h e y a r e b e t t e r a b l e t o c o p e Does the speaker indicate that he Does the speaker try to
w i t h t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f n a t u r a l settings t h a n are typologies t h a t start has taken up the hearer's message? influence the hearer's view of
the world?
f r o m illocutionary intentions a n d aims rather t h a n f r o m features o f
Present
s i t u a t i o n s . B u t t h e y pay f o r t h i s a d v a n t a g e by r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e i n t u i - Examples: agreeing Examples: asserting, arguing,
tively evident character o f classifications t h a t l i n k u p w i t h semantic acknowledging, rejecting declaring

analyses a n d t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e e l e m e n t a r y f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e Person oriented (P) Person oriented (P)

( s u c h as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , t h e e x p r e s s i o n of Does the speaker refer to himself Does the speaker refer to the
a n d / o r his past action? person of the hearer a n d / o r his
experiences, and the establishment o f interpersonal relations). The
past action?
classes o f s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e a r r i v e d a t i n d u c t i v e l y a n d c o n s t r u c t e d
Past
i n accordance w i t h pragmatic indicators do not consolidate into Examples: justifying, defending, Examples: accusing, criticizing,
i n t u i t i v e l y e v i d e n t types; t h e y l a c k t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p o w e r t o i l l u m i n a t e lamenting teasing

our intuitions. Action oriented (A) Action oriented (A)

Searle m a k e s t h e m o v e t o w a r d a theoretically motivated typology of Does the speaker commit himself Does the speaker try to make
to future action? the hearer do something?
speech acts b y g i v i n g a n o n t o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n -
Future
ary intentions a n d the p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes that a speaker pursues Examples: promising, refusing, Examples: advising, challenging,
o r a d o p t s w h e n she p e r f o r m s assertive ( c o n s t a t i v e ) , d i r e c t i v e , c o m - giving in ordering
missive, declarative, a n d e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts. I n d o i n g so, he Source: M. Kreckel, Communicative Acts and Shared Knowledge in Natural Discourse (London,
d r a w s u p o n t h e f a m i l i a r m o d e l t h a t d e f i n e s t h e w o r l d as t h e t o t a l i t y 1981), p. 188.
o f e x i s t i n g states o f affairs, sets u p t h e s p e a k e r / a c t o r as a n a u t h o r i t y
outside o f this w o r l d , a n d allows f o r precisely two linguistically m e -
w h e r e b y C stands f o r c o g n i t i o n s o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes of
diated relations between actor a n d w o r l d : the cognitive relation o f
t h i n k i n g , b e i n g o f t h e o p i n i o n , b e l i e v i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a n d I stands
a s c e r t a i n i n g facts, a n d t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t r e l a t i o n o f r e a l i z i n g a g o a l
for intentions or the propositional attitudes o f wanting, wishing,
o f a c t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n t e n t i o n s may t h e n be c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n
i n t e n d i n g , a n d t h e l i k e . T h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e s i g n i f i e s t h a t S raises a
t e r m s o f t h e d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h s e n t e n c e s a n d facts a r e s u p p o s e d t o
truth claim for vis-à-vis H; t h a t is, she assumes a w a r r a n t y f o r t h e
b e b r o u g h t i n t o a c c o r d . T h e a r r o w p o i n t i n g d o w n w a r d s (-1) says t h a t
a g r e e m e n t o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e w i t h t h e facts (-1); t h e i m p e r a -
t h e s e n t e n c e s a r e s u p p o s e d t o f i t t h e facts; t h e a r r o w p o i n t i n g u p -
tive f o r c e s i g n i f i e s t h a t 5 raises a p o w e r c l a i m vis-à-vis / / f o r s e e i n g t o
w a r d s (T) says t h a t t h e facts a r e t o b e f i t t e d t o t h e s e n t e n c e s . T h u s ,
it that " / / b r i n g s about t h a t is, she assumes a w a r r a n t y f o r h a v i n g
t h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a n d t h e imperative
t h e facts b r o u g h t i n t o a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e (Î).
f o r c e o f d i r e c t i v e s p e e c h acts a p p e a r as f o l l o w s :
I n d e s c r i b i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces by means o f the r e l a t i o n between
l a n g u a g e a n d t h e w o r l d , Searle has r e c o u r s e t o c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e
Constative h ^C(p)
v a l i d i t y o f a s s e r t o r i c a n d i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . H e finds h i s t h e o r e t i -
Directive! tl(H b r i n g s a b o u t p) c a l s t a n d p o i n t f o r classifying s p e e c h acts i n t h e dimension of validity.
 161
160
S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Chapter 2

B u t h e restricts h i m s e l f to t h e perspective o f the speaker a n d disre- I t is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a d e c l a r a t i o n o f war, a

gards the dynamics of the n e g o d a d o n a n d intersubjecdve recogni- r e s i g n a t i o n , t h e o p e n i n g o f a session, t h e r e a d i n g o f a b i l l , o r t h e
tion o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s — t h a t is, consensus-formation. T h e m o d e l o f t w o l i k e c a n n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d a c c o r d i n g to the scheme o f two directions

linguistically mediated relations between a solitary actor a n d the one o f fit. I n p r o d u c i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts, a s p e a k e r d o e s n o t at a l l r e f e r

o b j e c t i v e w o r l d has n o p l a c e f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; r a t h e r h e acts i n a c c o r d a n c e

participants i n communication w h o come to an understanding with w i t h t h e l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r s o f t h e social w o r l d a n d a t t h e same t i m e

one another about something i n the world. W h e n worked out, i n i t i a t e s n e w i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I t is p u r e l y o u t o f embarrass-

m e n t t h a t Searle s y m b o l i z e s t h i s m e a n i n g , w h i c h b e l o n g s t o another
Searle's o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n p r o v e s t o b e t o o n a r r o w .
w o r l d , by a d o u b l e a r r o w c o i n e d i n respect to the objective w o r l d :
The c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h acts s e e m a t first t o fit easily i n t o t h e
m o d e l . W i t h a s p e e c h act o f t h i s t y p e , S assumes a w a r r a n t y vis-à-vis
declarative D X (p)
H f o r b r i n g i n g t h e facts i n t o a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s e n -
tence u t t e r e d ( Î ) : w h e r e b y n o special p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes are supposed to be r e -
q u i r e d . T h i s e m b a r r a s s m e n t r e c u r s o n c e a g a i n i n t h e case o f e x p r e s -
Commissive C Î I ( 5 b r i n g s a b o u t p)
sive s p e e c h acts, w h o s e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e c a n j u s t as l i t d e be
However, i n analyzing the use of i n t e n t i o n a l sentences i n an- characterized i n terms o f an actor's relations to t h e w o r l d o f existing
nouncements, w e saw t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f commissive states o f a f f a i r s . Searle is c o n s i s t e n t e n o u g h t o give e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e
s p e e c h acts c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f satisfac- inapplicability o f his scheme t h r o u g h a n e i t h e r / n o r sign:
tion f o r t h e a n n o u n c e d i n t e n t i o n t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way. I t is o n l y
e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts E 0 (p)
t h e l a t t e r t h a t is m e a n t b y ( Î ) . R a t h e r , w i t h c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h acts,
t h e s p e a k e r binds h e r w i l l i n t h e sense o f a normative obligation; a n d w h e r e b y a n y p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a t a l l is p o s s i b l e .
t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e reliability of a declaration o f i n t e n t i o n a r e of W e c a n a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f Searle's a t t e m p t a t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,
q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t s o r t t h a n t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r satisfies w h i l e r e t a i n i n g his f r u i t f u l t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h , i f we start f r o m t h e
w h e n she, as a n actor, realizes h e r i n t e n t i o n . Searle w o u l d h a v e t o f a c t t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s o f s p e e c h acts a r e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h
d i s t i n g u i s h c o n d i t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y f r o m c o n d i t i o n s o f success. t h e intersubjecdve r e c o g n i t i o n o f claims to p o w e r a n d validity, a n d
I n a s i m i l a r way, w e d i s t i n g u i s h e d n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a - i f we f u r t h e r i n t r o d u c e n o r m a t i v e Tightness a n d s u b j e c t i v e truthful-
tives s u c h as d i r e c t i v e s , c o m m a n d s , o r d i n a n c e s , a n d the like f r o m ness as v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a n a l a g o u s t o t r u t h a n d i n t e r p r e t t h e m t o o i n
s h e e r i m p e r a t i v e s ; w i t h t h e f o r m e r t h e s p e a k e r raises a n o r m a t i v e terms o f a c t o r / w o r l d relations.
validity claim, with the latter an externally sanctioned claim to T h i s revision yields the f o l l o w i n g classification:
power. For this reason, n o t e v e n t h e i m p e r a t i v e sense o f simple
• W i t h imperatives t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o a d e s i r e d state i n t h e o b j e c -
imperatives can be e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r satisfying
tive w o r l d , a n d i n s u c h a w a y t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o g e t H t o b r i n g
the imperative sentences e m p l o y e d t h e r e i n . Even i f that were
a b o u t t h i s state. I m p e r a t i v e s c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d o n l y f r o m t h e s t a n d -
s u f f i c i e n t , Searle w o u l d h a v e d i f f i c u l t y r e s t r i c t i n g t h e class o f d i r e c -
p o i n t o f w h e t h e r t h e a c t i o n d e m a n d e d c a n b e c a r r i e d o u t , t h a t is,
tives t o t h e class o f g e n u i n e i m p e r a t i v e s a n d d e m a r c a t i n g t h e f o r m e r
o n t h e basis o f c o n d i t i o n s o f success. H o w e v e r , r e j e c t i n g i m p e r a t i v e s
f r o m directives a n d c o m m a n d s , since his m o d e l does n o t allow f o r
n o r m a l l y m e a n s r e j e c t i n g a c l a i m t o p o w e r ; s u c h r e j e c t i o n is n o t
c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e validity ( o r f o r t h e satisfaction) o f n o r m s . T h i s
b a s e d o n c r i t i c i s m b u t i t s e l f expresses a will.
l a c k is especially n o t i c e a b l e w h e n S e a r l e t r i e s t o a c c o m m o d a t e d e -
c l a r a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n h i s system. • W i t h constative speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e
o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d i n s u c h a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o r e p r e s e n t a
162
Chapter 2
state o f a f f a i r s . T h e n e g a t i o n o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t
contests t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h r a i s e d b y S f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n asserted.
• With regulative speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n a
c o m m o n social w o r l d , a n d i n such a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e
e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n r e c o g n i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e . T h e
n e g a t i o n o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t H contests t h e n o r m a t i v e
l i g h t n e s s c l a i m e d by S f o r his a c t i o n .
• W i t h expressive speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n h i s
subjective w o r l d , a n d i n such a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o reveal t o a
p u b l i c a n e x p e r i e n c e t o w h i c h h e has p r i v i l e g e d access. T h e n e g a -
tion o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t H doubts t h e c l a i m r a i s e d b y S
to t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f his self-representation.
Communicatives c o n s t i t u t e a f u r t h e r class o f s p e e c h acts. T h e y c a n
also b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h a t subclass o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h a c t s — q u e s -
tioning a n d answering, addressing, objecting, a d m i t t i n g , a n d
l i k e — t h a t serve t h e organization of speech, i t s a r r a n g e m e n t i n t o t o p i c s
a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n s , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f conversational roles, t h e r e g u -
lation o f turn-taking i n conversation, a n d the l i k e . 7 7
B u t i t makes
m o r e sense t o r e g a r d t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e s r a t h e r as a n i n d e p e n d e n t
class a n d t o d e f i n e t h e m t h r o u g h t h e i r reflexive relation to the process
of communication; f o r t h e n w e c a n also i n c l u d e t h o s e s p e e c h acts t h a t
either refer directly to validity claims ( a f f i r m i n g , denying, assuring,
c o n f i r m i n g , a n d the l i k e ) o r t h a t refer to h o w validity claims are
dealt w i t h argumentatively ( g r o u n d i n g , justifying, r e f u t i n g , suppos-
i n g , p r o v i n g , a n d the like).
F i n a l l y , t h e r e is t h e class o f operatives, t h a t is, s p e e c h a c t s — s u c h
i n f e r r i n g , i d e n t i f y i n g , c a l c u l a t i n g , classifying, c o u n t i n g , p r e d i c a t i n g ,
a n d t h e l i k e — t h a t designate t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f constructive rules ( o f
l o g i c , g r a m m a r , m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d t h e l i k e ) . O p e r a t i v e s p e e c h acts
have a p e r f o r m a t i v e sense b u t no genuine communicative sense; t h e y
s e r v e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o describe w h a t o n e d o e s i n c o n s t r u c t i n g s y m -
bolic expressions i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h r u l e s . 7 8
I f o n e takes t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as basic, c o m m i s s i v e s a n d d e c l a r a -
tives, as w e l l as i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts ( b e t t i n g , m a r r y i n g ,
o a t h - t a k i n g ) a n d satisfactives ( w h i c h r e l a t e t o excuses a n d a p o l o g i e s
f o r v i o l a t i n g n o r m s , as w e l l as t o r e p a r a t i o n s ) , m u s t a l l b e subsumed
163
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
H u n d e r t h e s a m e class o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts. O n e c a n see f r o m t h i s
t h a t t h e basic m o d e s a r e i n n e e d o f f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . T h e y
c a n n o t b e u s e d f o r t h e analysis o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n u n t i l w e
to s u c c e e d i n d e v e l o p i n g t a x o n o m i e s f o r t h e whole spectrum of illocution-
ary forces d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a -
r i e s o f a s p e c i f i c basic m o d e . O n l y v e r y f e w i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — l i k e
asserting a n d ascertaining, p r o m i s i n g a n d c o m m a n d i n g , confessing
a n d disclosing—are so g e n e r a l t h a t t h e y c a n c h a r a c t e r i z e a basic
m o d e as s u c h . N o r m a l l y , t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f e x p r e s s i o n standardized
i n p a r t i c u l a r languages characterize n o t o n l y the r e l a t i o n i n general
t o v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , b u t t h e way i n w h i c h a s p e a k e r lays c l a i m t o t r u t h ,
Tightness, o r t r u t h f u l n e s s f o r a s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n . P r a g m a t i c i n d i -
cators—such as t h e d e g r e e o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e p e n d e n c e o f s p e e c h
acts, t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d past a n d f u t u r e , t h e speaker/hearer
o r i e n t a t i o n , t h e t h e m a t i c f o c u s , a n d so f o r t h — c a n h e n c e f o r t h help
the us t o g r a s p systematically the illocutionary modifications of validity
claims. O n l y a n e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t is t h e o r e t i c a l l y g u i d e d w i l l
b e a b l e t o d e v e l o p speech-act t a x o n o m i e s t h a t are i n f o r m a t i v e , t h a t
is, n e i t h e r b l i n d n o r e m p t y .
H o w e v e r , t h e p u r e types o f l a n g u a g e use o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e s u i t a b l e as g u i d e l i n e s f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g t y p o l o g i e s
o f linguistically mediated interaction. I n communicative action, the
plans o f a c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s are c o o r d i n a t e d by m e a n s
o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects o f s p e e c h acts. F o r
this reason, we m i g h t conjecture that constative, regulative, a n d
e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts also c o n s t i t u t e c o r r e s p o n d i n g types o f l i n g u i s -
as t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n . T h i s is o b v i o u s l y t r u e o f r e g u l a t i v e a n d
e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts, w h i c h are c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u -
l a t e d a n d d r a m a t u r g i c a l a c t i o n , respectively. A t first g l a n c e t h e r e
seems t o b e n o t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d i n a s i m i l a r
w a y t o c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts. H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e c o n t e x t s o f a c t i o n
t h a t d o n o t p r i m a r i l y serve t h e p u r p o s e o f c a r r y i n g o u t c o m m u n i c a -
t i v e l y h a r m o n i z e d p l a n s o f a c t i o n ( t h a t is, p u r p o s i v e activities) b u t
themselves m a k e c o m m u n i c a t i o n possible a n d stabilize i t — f o r i n -
stance, c h a t t i n g , c o n v e r s i n g , a n d a r g u i n g — i n g e n e r a l , c o n v e r s a t i o n
t h a t i n a c e r t a i n c o n t e x t b e c o m e s a n e n d i n itself. I n s u c h cases, t h e
p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e i n s t r u m e n -
164 165
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

t a l r o l e o f s e r v i n g as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n , a n d t h e
communicative n e g o t i a t i o n o f topics gains i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d be-
c o m e s t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . I s h a l l speak o f " c o n v e r s a -
tion" whenever t h e w e i g h t is s h i f t e d i n t h i s way f r o m purposive
V
ja'
a c t i v i t y t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; a r g u m e n t a t i o n is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i m - O
3
CO
p o r t a n t special case o f c o n v e r s a t i o n . A s i n t e r e s t i n t h e t o p i c s n e g o -
tiated is p r e d o m i n a n t h e r e , w e c o u l d p e r h a p s say t h a t constative S
S
'u
s p e e c h acts have c o n s t i t u t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r conversations.
a
T h u s o u r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts c a n serve t o i n t r o d u c e t h r e e '•B •3 •5
a a
1
bJO

p u r e t y p e s — o r b e t t e r , limit cases—of communicative action: conver- 3

sation, normatively regulated action, a n d dramaturgical action. I f we

f u r t h e r take i n t o account t h e i n t e r n a l relations between strategic
bo bo
a c t i o n a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts o r i m p e r a t i v e s , w e a r r i v e a t t h e clas- C a
•a •a c
s i f i c a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s i n t a b l e 2.5. o
I a
x
F o r m a l and Empirical Pragmatics o o
z
E v e n i f t h e p r o g r a m f o r a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h a t I h a v e here
m e r e l y o u d i n e d w e r e c a r r i e d o u t i n d e t a i l , o n e m i g h t ask w h a t w o u l d
be gained for a useful sociological t h e o r y o f action by such a f o r m a l -
p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h . T h e q u e s t i o n arises, a t least, w h y w o u l d n o t a n < o
empirical-pragmatic a p p r o a c h be better f o r this, an a p p r o a c h that
d i d n o t dwell o n the r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f isolated, h i g h l y ide-
C 2
a l i z e d s p e e c h acts b u t s t a r t e d a t o n c e w i t h e v e r y d a y communicative o e O .¡3

p r a c t i c e s . F r o m t h e side o f l i n g u i s t i c s t h e r e are i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r i b u -
bo 3
S
'D it
C fa
•s 53 c a
t i o n s t o t h e analysis o f stories a n d t e x t s , 7 9
f r o m sociology c o n t r i b u - .a fcr-3 V

tions to conversational analysis, 80

f r o m anthropology contributions as S B <" Sa
Pi VI
W.S £ in
to the ethnography o f speaking, 8 1
a n d f r o m psychology investiga-
tions i n t o t h e pragmatic variables o f linguistic i n t e r a c t i o n . 8 2
By c o m - a
p a r i s o n , f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s — w h i c h , i n its r e c o n s t r u c t i v e i n t e n t i o n a «
" JS
( t h a t is, i n t h e sense o f a t h e o r y o f c o m p e t e n c e ) is d i r e c t e d t o t h e M O 4>
o
conditions under which reaching understanding is possible — 8 3 fi .5 U
seems t o b e h o p e l e s s l y r e m o v e d f r o m a c t u a l l a n g u a g e u s e . 8 4
Under c
o
these circumstances, d o e s i t m a k e a n y sense t o i n s i s t o n a f o r m a l - •a u
•5b
pragmatic grounding for a theory of communicative action? a g
'bo a v
I w o u l d l i k e t o r e s p o n d t o t h i s q u e s t i o n b y first (a) enumerating c B §
o c-g
the methodological steps t h r o u g h w h i c h f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s c a n be o zs O rt
166 167
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

c o n n e c t e d u p w i t h e m p i r i c a l pragmatics; t h e n I shall (b) i d e n t i f y the • I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e l e v e l o f processes o f r e a c h i n g understanding

p r o b l e m s t h a t m a k e i t necessary t o clarify the r a t i o n a l foundations ( t h a t is, s p e e c h ) , w e b r i n g i n t h e l e v e l o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ( t h a t
o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; f i n a l l y , I w o u l d l i k e (c) to is, t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n t h r o u g h a g r e e m e n t o f the plans o f action of
take u p a strategically i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t , c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h for- individual participants).
m a l p r a g m a t i c s has t o l e a r n f r o m e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s i f i t is t o • Finally, i n a d d i t i o n to c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, we include i n o u r
avoid locating the p r o b l e m o f rationality i n the w r o n g place—that analysis t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e b a c k g r o u n d knowledge ( t h a t is, l i f e -
is, n o t i n a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n s , as is s u g g e s t e d b y W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f worlds) f r o m w h i c h participants nourish their interpretations.
action, b u t rather i n the general structures o f the lifeworlds to w h i c h
a c t i n g subjects b e l o n g . These extensions a m o u n t to d r o p p i n g the methodological provi-

a. T h e p u r e types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n c a n step sions t h a t w e i n t e n d e d i n i t i a l l y w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s t a n d a r d

b y step b e b r o u g h t c l o s e r t o t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f n a t u r a l s i t u a t i o n s s p e e c h acts. I n t h e s t a n d a r d case, t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n -

w i t h o u t sacrificing theoretical perspectives f o r analyzing the c o o r d i - t e n c e s u t t e r e d c o i n c i d e s w i t h w h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s (meint) w i t h

n a t i o n o f a c t i o n . T h i s task consists i n r e v e r s i n g i n a c o n t r o l l e d m a n - her speech a c t . 8 6

However, t h e m o r e t h a t w h i c h t h e speaker means

ner the strong idealizations to which we owe the concept of w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e is m a d e t o d e p e n d o n a b a c k g r o u n d knowledge

communicative action: that remains i m p l i c i t , the m o r e the context-specific meaning of the

u t t e r a n c e c a n d i v e r g e f r o m t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said.
• I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e basic m o d e s , w e a d m i t t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f t h e W h e n one drops the idealization o f a complete a n d literal repre-
concretely shaped i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces that f o r m the culture-specific sentation o f the m e a n i n g o f utterances, the resolution o f another
n e t w o r k o f possible i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations standardized i n each p r o b l e m is also m a d e e a s i e r — n a m e l y , d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a n d i d e n t i f y i n g
individual language. i n n a t u r a l situations between actions o r i e n t e d t o w a r d reaching u n -
• I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m o f s p e e c h acts, w e a d m i t o t h e r d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. H e r e w e m u s t t a k e
f o r m s o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i z a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts. i n t o consideration that n o t only d o illocutions occur i n contexts of
strategic a c t i o n b u t p e r l o c u t i o n s appear i n contexts o f communica-
• I n a d d i t i o n t o e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts, w e admit elliptically fore-
tive a c t i o n as w e l l . C o o p e r a t i v e i n t e r p r e t i v e processes r u n t h r o u g h
shortened, extraverbally supplemented, i m p l i c i t utterances, the u n -
d i f f e r e n t phases. A s a r u l e , t h e i r i n i t i a l p h a s e is d e f i n e d b y t h e f a c t
d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h i c h is d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e h e a r e r ' s k n o w l e d g e of
that the participants' interpretations o f the situation do n o t overlap
nonstandardized, contingent contextual conditions.
sufficiently f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. I n this phase,
• I n a d d i t i o n t o d i r e c t s p e e c h acts, w e a d m i t i n d i r e c t , n o n l i t e r a l , a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s have e i t h e r t o shift to t h e level o f metacommunication
a m b i g u o u s u t t e r a n c e s , t h e m e a n i n g o f w h i c h has t o b e i n f e r r e d f r o m or to employ means of indirectly c o m i n g to an understanding.
the context. Reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g indirectly proceeds according to the m o d e l
• T h e f o c u s is e n l a r g e d f r o m i s o l a t e d s p e e c h acts ( a n d "yes" o r "no" of i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics: through perlocutionary effects the
r e s p o n s e s ) t o s e q u e n c e s o f s p e e c h acts, t o t e x t s , o r t o conversations, s p e a k e r gives t h e h e a r e r t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g t h a t she cannot
so t h a t c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s c a n c o m e i n t o view. (yet) c o m m u n i c a t e d i r e c t l y . I n t h i s p h a s e , t h e n , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts

• I n a d d i t i o n to the objectivating, norm-conformative, a n d expres- have to be e m b e d d e d i n contexts o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. These

sive basic a t t i t u d e s , w e a d m i t a n o v e r a r c h i n g p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e strategic elements within a use of language oriented toward reaching under-

t o take a c c o u n t o f the fact t h a t w i t h every speech act p a r t i c i p a n t s i n standing can nonetheless be distinguished from strategic actions

c o m m u n i c a t i o n relate simultaneously to s o m e t h i n g i n the objective, t h r o u g h the fact that the entire sequence o f a segment o f speech

s o c i a l , a n d subjective w o r l d s . 8 5
168 169

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

stands—on the part o f all participants—under the presuppositions explanation of phenomena that are i d e n t i f i e d initially o n l y o n t h e
o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . basis o f a n i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a t u r e d b y c l i n i c a l e x p e r i e n c e .
b. A n e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t d i d n o t e n s u r e f o r i t s e l f a f o r m a l - S u c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n p a t h o l o g i e s c a n b e c o n c e i v e d o f as t h e r e s u l t
p r a g m a t i c p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e w o u l d n o t have a t its d i s p o s a l the of a confusion between actions o r i e n t e d t o w a r d reaching under-
c o n c e p t u a l i n s t r u m e n t s n e e d e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h e r a t i o n a l bases o f s t a n d i n g a n d a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. I n s i t u a t i o n s o f l a t e n t
linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n t h e c o n f u s i n g c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e every- s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n , a t least o n e o f t h e p a r t i e s b e h a v e s w i t h a n o r i e n t a -
d a y scenes o b s e r v e d . I t is o n l y i n f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s tion t o w a r d success, b u t leaves o t h e r s t o b e l i e v e t h a t a l l t h e p r e s u p -
t h a t we can secure f o r ourselves a n idea o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g p o s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a r e s a t i s f i e d . T h i s is t h e case o f
t h a t c a n g u i d e e m p i r i c a l analysis i n t o c h a l l e n g i n g problems—such m a n i p u l a t i o n that we m e n t i o n e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h perlocutionary
as t h e l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t levels o f society, t h e acts. B y c o n t r a s t , t h e k i n d o f u n c o n s c i o u s d e a l i n g w i t h c o n f l i c t s t h a t
manifestations o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n pathologies, or the development psychoanalysis explains i n terms o f defense mechanisms leads t o
of a decentered understanding of the world. disturbances o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n o n b o t h the intrapsychic a n d inter-

T h e l i n g u i s t i c demarcation of the levels of reality o f " p l a y " a n d " s e r i - p e r s o n a l levels s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . 8 8

I n s u c h cases, a t least o n e o f t h e

ousness," t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a fictitious reality, w i t a n d p a r t i e s is d e c e i v i n g h e r s e l f a b o u t t h e f a c t t h a t she is a c t i n g w i t h a n

irony, nonliteral and paradoxical uses of language, puns and a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success a n d is m e r e l y k e e p i n g u p t h e a p -

allusions, a n d t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y w i t h d r a w a l o f validity claims at a p e a r a n c e o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . T h e p l a c e o f s u c h systematically

m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l e v e l — a l l t h e s e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s rest o n i n t e n - distorted communication within the framework of a theory of action

t i o n a l l y confusing modalities o f existence. For the clarification o f the can be seen below.

mechanisms o f d e c e p t i o n t h a t a s p e a k e r has t o m a s t e r i n o r d e r t o
Social actions
do this, f o r m a l pragmatics can c o n t r i b u t e m o r e t h a n even the most
precise e m p i r i c a l description o f the p h e n o m e n a to be explained.
W i t h t r a i n i n g i n t h e basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use, t h e g r o w i n g c h i l d
gains t h e ability to demarcate by h i m s e l f the subjectivity o f his o w n Communicative action Strategic a c t i o n
experiences f r o m the objectivity o f o b j e c t i f i e d reality, f r o m t h e n o r -
m a t i v i t y o f society, a n d f r o m t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e m e d i u m o f
language. I n l e a r n i n g to deal hypothedcally w i t h the corresponding
L a t e n t strategic M a n i f e s t strategic
validity claims, he practices d r a w i n g t h e categorial d i s t i n c t i o n s be-
action action
tween essence a n d a p p e a r a n c e , e x i s t e n c e a n d i l l u s i o n , "is" a n d
" o u g h t , " sign a n d m e a n i n g . W i t h these m o d a l i t i e s o f b e i n g , he h i m -
s e l f gets a g r i p o n t h e d e c e p t i v e p h e n o m e n a that initially spring
f r o m t h e i n v o l u n t a r y c o n f u s i o n b e t w e e n his o w n subjectivity, o n t h e Unconscious Conscious
one h a n d , a n d the domains o f the objective, the n o r m a t i v e , a n d the deception deception
intersubjective, o n the other. H e n o w knows h o w one can master the (systematically (manipulation)
confusions, produce de-differentiations intentionally, and employ distorted
t h e m i n fiction, w i t , i r o n y , a n d t h e l i k e . 8 7
communication)

T h e s i t u a t i o n is s i m i l a r w i t h m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f systematically distorted I n the present context, the m a i n advantage o f a f o r m a l pragmatics

communication. H e r e , too, f o r m a l pragmatics can c o n t r i b u t e to the is t h a t i t h i g h l i g h t s , b y m e a n s o f t h e p u r e types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
170 171
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

mediated i n t e r a c d o n , precisely t h o s e aspects u n d e r w h i c h social ( s o l v e d i n t h e r a p e u t i c d i a l o g u e b y a r g u m e n t a t i v e m e a n s . Expressive

a c t i o n s e m b o d y d i f f e r e n t sorts o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e t h e o r y o f c o m m u - | k n o w l e d g e c a n b e e x p l i c a t e d i n t e r m s o f t h o s e values t h a t u n d e r l i e
n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n m a k e g o o d t h e weaknesses w e f o u n d i n W e b e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f needs, a n d o f desires a n d e m o t i o n a l attitudes.
a c t i o n theory, to the extent that i t does n o t r e m a i n fixated on Value standards are d e p e n d e n t i n t u r n o n i n n o v a t i o n s i n t h e d o m a i n
p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y as t h e o n l y a s p e c t u n d e r w h i c h a c t i o n c a n be o f evaluative expressions. These are r e f l e c t e d i n a n e x e m p l a r y m a n -
c r i t i c i z e d a n d i m p r o v e d . D r a w i n g o n t h e types o f a c t i o n i n t r o d u c e d ner i n works of art. The aspects o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a c t i o n are
a b o v e , I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o c o m m e n t b r i e f l y o n d i f f e r e n t aspects o f s u m m a r i z e d i n t a b l e 2.6.
the rationality o f action. c. T h i s c o m p l e x o f a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s , types o f k n o w l e d g e , and
Teleological actions c a n b e j u d g e d u n d e r t h e aspect o f effectiveness. f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n is, o f c o u s e , i n s p i r e d b y W e b e r ' s i d e a t h a t
The rules of action embody technically and strategically usable i n European modernity, with the development o f science, m o r a l i t y ,
knowledge, which can be criticized t h r o u g h reference to truth a n d a r t , stores o f e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e h a v e b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m
claims a n d can be i m p r o v e d t h r o u g h a feedback r e l a t i o n to the one another. These flow i n t o various domains o f institutionalized
g r o w t h o f e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e . T h i s k n o w l e d g e is s t o r e d e v e r y d a y a c t i o n a n d , so t o speak, s u b j e c t t o t h e p r e s s u r e o f r a t i o n a l i -
i n t h e f o r m o f t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d strategies. zation certain action orientations that h a d previously been deter-
Constative speech acts, w h i c h n o t o n l y e m b o d y k n o w l e d g e b u t e x p l i c - m i n e d i n a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t m a n n e r . T h e aspects o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f
i d y represent i t a n d make conversations possible, can be criticized a c t i o n t h a t can be r e a d o f f f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s h o u l d now
u n d e r t h e a s p e c t o f t r u t h . I n cases o f m o r e o b s t i n a t e controversy p e r m i t us t o g r a s p processes o f s o c i e t a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n across t h e i r
concerning t h e t r u t h o f s t a t e m e n t s , t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e o f f e r s its w h o l e b r e a d t h , a n d n o l o n g e r solely f r o m t h e selective v i e w p o i n t o f
services as a c o n t i n u a t i o n , w i t h d i f f e r e n t m e a n s , o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d the institutionalization of purposive-rational action.
t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W h e n d i s c u r s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n loses I n posing the p r o b l e m i n t h i s way, h o w e v e r , t h e role of implicit
its a d h o c c h a r a c t e r a n d e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e is systematically c a l l e d knowledge is n o t g i v e n its d u e . I t r e m a i n s u n c l e a r w h a t t h e h o r i z o n o f
i n t o q u e s t i o n , w h e n q u a s i - n a t u r a l l e a r n i n g processes a r e guided everyday a c t i o n , i n t o w h i c h the e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e of cultural ex-
t h r o u g h t h e sluice gates o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , c u m u l a t i v e effects r e s u l t .
T h i s k n o w l e d g e is s t o r e d i n t h e f o r m o f t h e o r i e s .
Table 2.6
Normatively regulated actions e m b o d y m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l knowledge Aspects of the rationality of action
a n d can be contested u n d e r t h e aspect o f rightness. L i k e claims t o
Model of
t r u t h , controversial claims to rightness can be m a d e t h e m a t i c a n d Type of knowledge Form of transmitted
e x a m i n e d discursively. I n case o f d i s t u r b a n c e i n t h e r e g u l a t i v e use o f Type of action embodied argumentation knowledge

language, p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e o f f e r s its services as a c o n t i n u a t i o n , Teleological action: Technically and Theoretical Technologies,

w i t h other means, of consensual action. I n moral-practical a r g u m e n - (instrumental, strategic) strategically useful discourse strategies
knowledge
t a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n test b o t h t h e rightness o f a given action i n
Constative speech acts Empirical-theoretical Theoretical Theories
r e l a t i o n to a given n o r m a n d , at the n e x t level, the rightness o f such (conversation) knowledge discourse
a n o r m itself. T h i s k n o w l e d g e is h a n d e d d o w n i n t h e f o r m o f l e g a l Normatively regulated Moral-practical Practical Legal and moral
action knowledge discourse representations
a n d m o r a l ideas.
Dramaturgical action Aesthetic-practical Therapeutic Works of art
Dramaturgical actions e m b o d y a k n o w l e d g e o f t h e a c t o r ' s o w n s u b - knowledge and aesthetic
j e c t i v i t y . T h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d as u n t r u t h f u l , t h a t is, critique

r e j e c t e d as d e c e p t i o n s o r s e l f - d e c e p t i o n s . S e l f - d e c e p t i o n s c a n b e d i s -
172
Chapter 2
p e r t s is i n j e c t e d , l o o k s l i k e , a n d h o w e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a d v e prac-
tices a c t u a l l y c h a n g e w i t h t h i s i n f l u x . T h e c o n c e p t o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d
t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g has t h e a d d i t i o n a l — a n d q u i t e d i f f e r -
ent—advantage o f t h r o w i n g l i g h t o n this b a c k g r o u n d o f i m p l i c i t
k n o w l e d g e t h a t e n t e r s a tergo i n t o c o o p e r a t i v e processes o f i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n . C o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n takes p l a c e w i t h i n a l i f e w o r l d t h a t
r e m a i n s a t t h e backs o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I t is p r e s e n t
to t h e m o n l y i n the prereflective f o r m o f taken-for-granted back-
g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s a n d n a i v e l y m a s t e r e d skills.
I f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f t h e last d e c a d e i n socio-, e t h n o - , a n d psy-
c h o l i n g u i s t i c s c o n v e r g e i n a n y o n e r e s p e c t , i t is o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n —
demonstrated i n various ways—that the collective background
k n o w l e d g e a n d c o n t e x t u a l k n o w l e d g e o f speakers a n d h e a r e r s d e t e r -
mines the interpretation o f their explicit utterances to an e x t r a o r d i -
n a r i l y h i g h d e g r e e . Searle has t a k e n u p t h i s d o c t r i n e o f e m p i r i c a l
p r a g m a t i c s . H e c r i t i c i z e s t h e l o n g - d o m i n a n t v i e w t h a t s e n t e n c e s ac-
q u i r e literal meaning solely b y v i r t u e o f t h e r u l e s f o r u s i n g t h e e x p r e s -
sions c o n t a i n e d i n t h e m . 8 9
So far, I t o o h a v e c o n s t r u e d t h e m e a n i n g
o f s p e e c h acts as l i t e r a l m e a n i n g i n t h i s sense. C e r t a i n l y , l i t e r a l
m e a n i n g c o u l d n o t be c o n c e i v e d a t a l l i n d e p e n d e n d y o f c o n t e x t u a l
c o n d i t i o n s ; f o r e a c h t y p e o f s p e e c h a c t t h e r e are general c o n t e x t u a l
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m u s t b e m e t i f t h e s p e a k e r is t o b e a b l e t o a c h i e v e
i l l o c u t i o n a r y success. B u t these g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s are i n
t u r n s u p p o s e d t o be d e r i v a b l e f r o m t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f t h e l i n -
g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s e m p l o y e d i n t h e s t a n d a r d s p e e c h acts. A s a m a t t e r
o f f a c t , i f f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s is n o t t o lose its o b j e c t , k n o w l e d g e of
t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a s p e e c h a c t m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d
c a n n o t d e p e n d completely o n c o n t i n g e n t b a c k g r o u n d knowledge.
H o w e v e r , Searle has s h o w n — o n t h e basis o f s i m p l e a s s e r t i o n s s u c h
as ' T h e c a t is o n t h e m a t " a n d i m p e r a t i v e s s u c h as " G i v e m e a system o f these c o n v i c t i o n s . Yet m y c o n v i c t i o n s d o f o r m a system, a n
h a m b u r g e r " — t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s
o f t h e assertoric a n d i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s e m p l o y e d t h e r e i n c a n n o t
be specified i n d e p e n d e n d y o f t h e c o n t e x t . O n c e we b e g i n to vary
relatively deep-seated a n d trivial b a c k g r o u n d assumptions, we n o t i c e
that the seemingly context-invariant validity conditions change their
m e a n i n g a n d are t h u s b y n o m e a n s a b s o l u t e . Searle d o e s n o t g o so
f a r as t o d e n y t o s e n t e n c e s a n d u t t e r a n c e s a n y l i t e r a l m e a n i n g a t a l l ;
173
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
b u t h e d o e s d e f e n d t h e thesis t h a t t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f a n e x p r e s -
s i o n is r e l a t i v e t o a b a c k g r o u n d o f v a r i a b l e i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e t h a t
p a r t i c i p a n t s n o r m a l l y r e g a r d as t r i v i a l a n d o b v i o u s .
T h e sense o f t h i s r e l a t i v i t y thesis is n o t t o r e d u c e t h e m e a n i n g o f
a speech act to w h a t a speaker means by i t i n a c o n t i n g e n t context.
Searle is n o t m a i n t a i n i n g a s i m p l e r e l a t i v i s m o f t h e m e a n i n g of
linguistic expressions; f o r t h e i r m e a n i n g i n n o w a y c h a n g e s as w e
pass f r o m o n e c o n t i n g e n t c o n t e x t t o t h e n e x t . R a t h e r , w e discover
the relativity o f the literal m e a n i n g o f a n expression only t h r o u g h a
s o r t o f p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n t h a t is n o t s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y u n d e r our
c o n t r o l . I t e m e r g e s as a r e s u l t o f p r o b l e m s t h a t o c c u r o b j e c t i v e l y a n d
have a n u n s e t t l i n g effect o n o u r n a t u r a l w o r l d v i e w . T h i s f u n d a m e n -
tal b a c k g r o u n d knowledge, w h i c h m u s t tacidy supplement our
knowledge of the acceptability conditions of linguistically stan-
dardized utterances i f hearers are to be able to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r
l i t e r a l m e a n i n g s , has r e m a r k a b l e f e a t u r e s : I t is a n implicit k n o w l e d g e
t h a t c a n n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n a finite n u m b e r o f p r o p o s i t i o n s ; i t is
a holistically structured k n o w l e d g e , t h e basic e l e m e n t s o f w h i c h d e f i n e
o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d i t is a k n o w l e d g e t h a t does not stand at our disposal,
to the extent that we cannot make i t conscious a n d place i t i n d o u b t
as w e p l e a s e . W h e n p h i l o s o p h e r s n e v e r t h e l e s s seek t o d o so, t h e n
that k n o w l e d g e appears i n the shape o f c o m m o n s e n s e certainties i n
w h i c h M o o r e , for instance, took an i n t e r e s t , 9 0
a n d to w h i c h W i t t g e n -
s t e i n r e f e r s i n h i s r e f l e c t i o n s On Certainty.
W i t t g e n s t e i n calls these c e r t a i n t i e s e l e m e n t s o f a w o r l d v i e w t h a t
a r e " a n c h o r e d i n a l l m y questions and answers, so a n c h o r e d t h a t I
cannot touch [them}." 9 1
O n l y t h o s e b e l i e f s t h a t d o n o t fit s u c h
convictions—convictions t h a t are as b e y o n d q u e s t i o n as t h e y a r e
f u n d a m e n t a l — a p p e a r t o be a b s u r d . " N o t t h a t I c o u l d d e s c r i b e the
edifice." 9 2
W i t t g e n s t e i n characterizes the dogmatism of everyday
b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s a n d skills i n a w a y s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n w h i c h
Schütz describes t h e m o d e o f taken-for-grantedness i n w h i c h t h e
l i f e w o r l d is p r e s e n t as a p r e r e f l e x i v e b a c k g r o u n d : ' T h e c h i l d l e a r n s
t o b e l i e v e a h o s t o f t h i n g s . I . e . , i t l e a r n s t o a c t a c c o r d i n g t o these
b e l i e f s . B i t b y b i t t h e r e f o r m s a system o f w h a t is b e l i e v e d , a n d i n
t h a t system s o m e t h i n g s s t a n d u n s h a k a b l y fast a n d s o m e o r more
174 175

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

a r e less l i a b l e t o s h i f t . W h a t s t a n d s fast d o e s so, n o t b e c a u s e i t is T. Farrell, "Language Action. A Paradigm for Communication," Quarterly Journal of
Communication 62 (1976): 333-334.
i n t r i n s i c a l l y o b v i o u s o r c o n v i n c i n g ; i t is r a t h e r h e l d fast b y w h a t l i e s
around it." 9 3
4. J . H e a l , " C o m m o n Knowledge," Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1978): 116ff.; G. Meggle,
Literal meanings, t h e n , are relative to a deep-seated, implicit ed., Grundbegriffe der Kommunikation (Berlin, 1981).

knowledge, about which w e normally know n o t h i n g b e c a u s e i t is 5. H . P. Grice, "Meaning," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388. See also "Utterer's
simply u n p r o b l e m a t i c a n d does n o t reach i n t o the d o m a i n o f c o m - Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning," a n d "Utterer's Meaning a n d I n -
tentions," both reprinted in H . P. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass.,
m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s t h a t c a n b e v a l i d o r i n v a l i d . " I f t h e t r u e is w h a t
is g r o u n d e d , t h e n t h e g r o u n d is n o t t r u e , n o r y e t f a l s e . " 9 4

6. D . Lewis, Conventions (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

Searle u n c o v e r s this layer o f w o r l d v i e w k n o w l e d g e functioning in
everyday life as t h e b a c k g r o u n d with which a hearer has to be 7. S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972).
f a m i l i a r i f h e is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f s p e e c h acts a n d
8. J . Bennett, Linguistic Behaviour (Cambridge, 1976).
t o a c t c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y . H e t h e r e b y d i r e c t s o u r gaze t o a c o n t i n e n t
t h a t r e m a i n s h i d d e n so l o n g as t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n analyzes s p e e c h acts 9. Cf. J . Habermas, "Intentionalistische Semantik," i n Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 307ff.; A . Leist, "Über
f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e speaker w h o relates w i t h h e r utterances einige Irrtümer der intentionalen Semantik," Linguistic Agency, University of Trier,
t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e , s o c i a l , a n d s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d s . I t is o n l y Series A, Paper No. 51 (1978). O n the critique of linguistic nominalism, see also K . - 0 .
Apel, "Intentions, Conventions, and Reference to T h i n g s , " i n H . Parret and J . Bou-
in t u r n i n g back to the c o n t e x t - f o r m i n g horizon of the lifeworld,
veresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding (Berlin, 1981), a n d " T h r e e Dimensions of
f r o m within which participants i n communication come to an u n - Understanding and Meaning in Analytic Philosophy," Philosophy and Social Criticism 7
(1980): 115-142.
derstanding with one another about something, that our field of
v i s i o n c h a n g e s i n s u c h a w a y t h a t w e c a n see t h e p o i n t s o f connection 10. K. Bühler, Sprachtheorie (Jena, 1934).
between the theory of action and social theory; the concept of
11. Ibid., p. 28.
s o c i e t y has t o be linked up t o a c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d t h a t is
c o m p l e m e n t a r y to the concept o f communicative action. T h e n c o m - 12. W. Busse, "Funktionen u n d Funktion der Sprache," i n B . Schlieben-Lange,. ed.,
Sprachtheorie (Hamburg, 1975), p. 207; G . Beck, Sprechakte und Sprachfunktionen
m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n b e c o m e s i n t e r e s t i n g p r i m a r i l y as a p r i n c i p l e of
(Tübingen, 1980).
socialization {Vergesellschaftung); a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e , p r o c e s s e s o f
societal rationalization acquire a d i f f e r e n t status. T h e y take place 13. R. Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in T. A . Sebeok, ed., Style in Language (New
York, 1960), pp. 350-377.
primarily more within the implicitly k n o w n structures o f the life-
world than in explicitly k n o w n action orientations, as Weber 14. P. Watzlawick, J . H . Beavin, and D . D.Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication
(New York, 1962); H . Hörmann, Psychologie der Sprache (Heidelberg, 1967), and Mei-
suggested. nen und Verstehen (Frankfurt, 1976).

15. K . - 0 . Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften (Dordrecht,

Notes 1967); see also S. Davis, "Speech Acts, Performance a n d Competence," Journal of
Pragmatics 3 (1979): 497ff.
1. M. B r a n d and D. Walton, eds., Action Theory (Dordrecht, 1976); A . Beckermann,
16. J . Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," chapter 1 i n the present volume.
ed., Analytische Handlungstheorie. Handlungserklarungen (Frankfurt, 1977); G . Meggle,
ed., Analytische Handlungsbeschreibungen (Frankfurt, 1977).
17. K . - 0 . Apel, "Zwei paradigmatische Antworten a u f die Frage nach der L o -
gosauszeichnung der Sprache," in Festschrift für W. Perpeet ( B o n n , 1980).
2. See J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1984), pp. 96ff.
18. See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 98ff.
3. S. Kanngiesser, "Sprachliche Universalien u n d diachrone Prozesse," i n K . - O . Apel,
19. L . Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. D . Paul a n d G . E . M . Anscombe (Oxford,
ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt, 1976), p. 278. See also T. Frentz a n d
1969).
176
Chapter 2
20. M. Weber, Economy and Society, G. Roth and C . Wittich, eds., 2 vols. (Berkeley,
1978), p. 4. Hereafter cited as ES.
21. M. Weber, "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology," Sociological Quarterly 22
(1981): 151-180.
22. H . Girndt, Das soziale Handeln als Grundkategorie der erfahrungswissenschaftlichen
Soziologie (Tübingen, 1967).
23. ES, p. 4.
24. ES, p. 26.
25. ES, pp. 24-25.
26. W. Schluchter, Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus (Tübingen, 1979),
p. 192.
27. £5, p. 327.
28. £5, p. 326.
29. ES, pp. 26-36; pp. 319-333.
30. See note 21.
31. [Editor's note:] Habermas's introduction to his Theory of Communicative Action,
vol. 1.
32. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962).
33. I shall leave aside the development that speech-act theory underwent i n the
hands of Austin himself [see "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," chapter 1 i n the
present volume] and take as my point of departure the interpretation that Searle has
given to this theory. J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969); D . Wunderlich,
Studien zur Sprechakttheorie (Frankfurt, 1976).
34. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 101.
35. B. Schieben-Lange, Linguistische Pragmatik (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 86ff.
36. D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behavior ( L o n d o n , 1965), pp. 287ff.
37. M. Meyer, Formale und handlungstheoretische Sprachbetrachtungen (Stuttgart, 1976).
38. M. Schwab, Redehandeln (Königstein, 1980), pp. 28ff.
39. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 118.
40. P. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 73
(1964): 439ff.
177
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
41. Cf. Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," chapter 1 in the present volume:
With institutionally bound speech acts, specific institutions can always be spe-
cified. With institutionally unbound speech acts, only general contextual condi-
tions . . . typically must be met for a corresponding act to succeed. . . . To explain
what acts of betting or christening mean, I must refer to the institutions of betting
or christening. By contrast, commands or advice or questions do not represent
institutions but types of speech acts that can fit very different institutions. T o be
sure, the criterion of being institutionally bound does not always permit an
unambiguous classification. Commands can exist wherever relations of authority
are institutionalized; appointments presuppose special, bureaucratically devel-
oped organizations; and marriages require a single institution (which is, however,
to be found universally). But this does not devalue the usefulness of the analytic
viewpoint. Institutionally unbound speech acts, insofar as they have any regulative
meaning at all, refer to general aspects of action norms; they are not, however,
defined by particular institutions (pp. 6 0 - 6 1 ) .
42. Cf. D. Wunderlich, " Z u r Konventionalitat von Sprechhandlungen," in D. Wun¬
derlich, ed., Linguistische Pragmatik (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 16-17; Here, Wunderlich
also provides a linguistic characterization of speech acts in standard form.
43. Even the use theory of meaning stemming from the later work of Wittgenstein—
see W. P. Alston, The Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964); Ernst
Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. Gorner (Cambridge,
1982)—remains fixated on the solitary employment of sentences. Like Frege's theory
of meaning, it takes its orientation from the noncommunicative use of assertoric
sentences in foro interno; it abstracts from the interpersonal relations between speak-
ers and hearers who reach understanding with one another about something i n the
world with the aid of communicative acts. Tugendhat justifies this self-limitation of
semantics with the argument that the communicative use of language is constitutive
only for special linguistic expressions, in particular for the performative verbs and
for the speech acts formed with them; in the areas essential to semantics, however,
language can be employed in a monological train of thought. T h e r e is in fact an
intuitively easily accessible distinction between thinking in propositions i n abstraction
from speaker-hearer relations and making interpersonal relations present in the
imagination. I n imagining stories in which the " I " — a s imagining subject—accords
itself a place in a context of interaction, the roles of participants in communication
in the first, second, and third person—however internalized—remain constitutive for
the sense of what is thought or represented. But solitary thinking in propositions is
also discursive i n more than a figurative sense. T h i s becomes evident as soon as the
validity, and thereby the assertoric force, of a proposition becomes problematic and
the solitary thinker has to move from inferring to devising a n d weighing up hypothe-
ses. H e then finds it necessary to assume the argumentative roles of proponent and
opponent as a communicative relation in his thought—as the daydreamer takes up
the narrative structure of speaker-hearer relations when she recalls scenes from
everyday life.
44. If, for example, a promise were to take the form
(1+) I promise you that I was in H a m b u r g yesterday.
178
Chapter 2
one of the conditions of grammatical well-formedness would be violated. By contrast,
if S uttered the correct sentence (1) in a situation in which it was presupposed that
H could count on a visit from 5 in any case, one of the contextual conditions typically
presupposed for promises would be violated.
45. Contributions to speech-act theory from philosophy and linguistics are chiefly
concerned with analyzing these conditions. D. Wunderlich analyzes speech acts of
the type "advising," from the theoretical perspective developed by Searle, in Grund-
lagen der Linguistik (Hamburg, 1974), pp. 349ff.
46. R. Bartsch, too, speaks in this sense of "acceptability conditions" in contrast to
conditions of correctness or validity, in "Die Rolle von pragmatischen Korrekt-
heitsbedingungen bei der Interpretation von Äußerungen," in G . Grewendorf, ed.,
Sprechakttheorie und Semantik (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 217ff.
47. Surprisingly, Searle also comes close to this view of intentionalist semantics in
Speech Acts, p. 66. Cf. Schiffer, Meaning.
48. Schwab, Redehandeln, p. 65.
49. I n the case of commands or directives, principally for the addressee; in the case
of promises or announcements, principally for the speaker; in the case of agreements
or contracts, symmetrically for both parties; in the case of advice (with a normative
content) or warnings, for both sides, but asymmetrically.
50. O n these speech-act immanent obligations, see "What Is Universal Pragmatics?,"
chapter 1 in the present volume, pp. 85ff.
51. See J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1987), pp. 31ff.
52. Because Schwab distinguishes neither between simple and normatively autho-
rized imperatives—that is, between imperative and c o m m a n d — n o r between
monologically and communicatively employed intentional sentences—that is, be-
tween intentions and declarations of intention—he draws a mistaken parallel be-
tween imperatives and declarations of intention and distinguishes both from
constative speech acts by virtue of the separation, and hierarchical ordering, of two
types of success: success in the sense of validity and success in the sense of satisfaction.
Redehandeln, pp. 72-73, 74ff., 95ff.
53. E . Stenius, "Mood and Language G a m e , " Synthese 17 (1967): 254ff; cf. D. Folles-
dal, "Comments o n Stenius's 'Mood and Language G a m e , ' " Synthese 17 (1967): 275ff.
54. A . Leist, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," Germanistische Linguistik 5 / 6 (1977):
93.
55. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
56. Ibid., p. 109.
57. H . P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," i n P. Cole and J . L . Morgan, eds., Syntax
and Semantics, vol. 3 (New York, 1974), pp. 41ff.; A. P. Martinich, "Conversational
Maxims and Some Philosophical Problems," Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1980): 215ff.
179
S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
58. F o r other objections of this kind, see J . T h o m p s o n , "Universal Pragmatics," in
J . T h o m p s o n and D. H e l d , eds., Habermas: Critical Debates ( L o n d o n , 1982), pp. 116-
59. Leist, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," p. 102; K. G r a h a m , "Belief and the Limits
of Irrationality," Inquiry 17 (1974): 315ff.
60. Searle refers to this argument in Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983), p. 9.
61. E . Tugendhat, Self Consciousness and Self-Determination, trans. P. Stern (Cambridge,
Mass., 1986), lectures 5 and 6.
62. L . Wittgenstein, Zettel, G . E . M. Anscombe and G . H . von Wright, eds. (Berkeley,
1970), § § 4 0 4 , 5 4 9 .
63. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, p. 114.
64. L . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G . E . M. Anscombe ( L o n d o n ,
1958), p. 222. Cf. S. Hampshire, Feeling and Expression ( L o n d o n , 1961); B. Aune, " O n
the Complexity of Avowals," in M. Black, ed., Philosophy in America (London, 1965),
pp. 35ff.; D. Gustafson, " T h e Natural Expression of Intention," Philosophical Forum 2
(1971): 299ff., and, "Expressions of Intentions," Mind 83 (1974): 321ff.; N. R. Nor-
rick, "Expressive Illocutionary Acts," Journal of Pragmatics 2 (1978): 277ff.
65. M. Dummett, "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," in G . Evans and J . McDowell, eds.,
Truth and Meaning (Oxford, 1976), pp. 67ff.
66. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy.
67. Dummett, "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," p. 81.
68. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
69. Ibid., p. 126.
70. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Oxford, 1972), chaps. 8 and 9.
71. A convincing example of this is P. F. Strawson's analysis of the resentment called
forth by moral violations, in Freedom and Resentment ( L o n d o n , 1974).
72. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 150ff.
73. O n e should not, however, make the requirements as strong as T. Ballmer does
in "Probleme der Klassifikation von Sprechakten," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie
und Semantik, pp. 247ff.
74. J . Searle, " A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts," in Expression and Meaning pp. Iff.
75. D. Wunderlich, "Skizze zu einer integrierten Theorie der grammatischen u n d
pragmatischen Bedeutung," in Studien zur Sprechakttheorie (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 51ff.,
"Was ist das für ein Sprechakt?," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie und Semantik,
pp. 275ff., "Aspekte einer Theorie der Sprechhandlungen," in H . Lenk, ed., Hand-
lungstheorien, vol. 3 (Munich, 1980), pp. 381ff.; B. G . Campbell, "Toward a Workable
180
Chapter 2
Taxonomy of Illocutionary Forces and Its Implication to Works of Imaginative Lit-
erature," Language and Style 8 (1975): 3ff.; M. Kreckel, Communicative Acts and Shared
Knowledge in Natural Discourse ( L o n d o n , 1981).
76. O n e measure of the flexibility of a society is the share of the totality of available
illocutionary possibilities for linking up action that is made up by institutionally
more-or-less bound, idiomatically fixed, ritualized speech acts. T h u s Wunderlich
distinguishes speech acts according to whether they depend more o n action norms
or on action situations (Wunderlich, "Skizze," pp. 86ff.). For this Campbell uses the
dimensions "institutional vs. vernacular" and "positional vs. interactional" (Campbell,
"Workable Taxonomy"). In this regard, the dimension "initiative vs. reactive" is also
relevant (Wunderlich, "Skizze," pp. 59ff.).
77. O n the speech acts that serve to organize speech, see E . Schegloff, G . Jefferson,
and H . Sacks, " A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of T u r n T a k i n g for
Conversation," Language 50 (1974): 696ff., which draws on the work of Harvey Sacks;
see also Wunderlich, Studien zur Sprechakttheorie, pp. 330ff.
78. T h e thesis that S, with an illocutionary act, informs the hearer of the execution
of this act, or tells h i m that the act is being executed, could be applied most easily
to this class of speech acts. For a critique of this thesis (which has been advanced by
L e m m o n , Hedenius, Wiggins, D . Lewis, Schiffer, Warnock, Cresswell, and others),
see G . Grewendorf, "Haben explizit performative Äußerungen einen Wahrheit-
swert?," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie, pp. 175ff. It is, of course, wrong to
assimilate operatives, which express the bringing about of constructive accomplish-
ments, to constative speech acts. With the former, the speaker connects a claim not
to propositional truth but to constructive well-formedness or intelligibility.
79. W. Kummer, Grundlagen der Texttheorie (Hamburg, 1975); M. A. K. Halliday, System
and Function in Language: Selected Papers (Oxford, 1976); K. Bach and R. M. H a n i s c h ,
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).
80. 'M. Coulthard, An Introduction into Discourse Analysis ( L o n d o n , 1977); L . C h u r c h i l l ,
Questioning Strategies in Sodolinguistics (Rowley, Mass., 1978); J . Schenken, ed., Studies
in the Organization of Conversational Interaction (New York, 1978); S. Jacobs, "Recent
Advances in Discourse Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Speech 66 (1980): 450ff.
81. D. Hymes, ed., Language in Culture and Society (New York, 1964) and "Models of
the Interactions of Language and Social L i f e , " in J . J . Gumperz and D. Hymes, eds.,
Directions in Sodolinguistics (New York, 1972), pp. 35ff.
82. R. Rommetveit, On Message-Structure (New York, 1974).
83. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprechakttheorie u n d tranzendentale Sprachpragmatik," in Apel,
ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie, pp. lOff.; Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmat-
ics?"
84. See the critical appraisal of the formal-pragmatic approaches of Allwood, Grice,
and myself i n Kreckel, Communicative Acts, pp. 14ff.
85. Classification into constative, regulative, and expressive speech acts means that
in each case we attribute one dominant basic attitude to the speaker. I n allowing for
a performative attitude, we take account of the fact that complex processes of
181
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
reaching understanding can succeed only if each speaker undertakes a regulated—
that is, rationally controlled—transition from one attitude (be it objectivating, norm-
conformative, or expressive) to the others. S u c h transformations rely on intermodal
invariances of validity. T h i s area of the logic of speech acts has scarcely been studied.
Why, for example, may we infer from the validity of an expressive speech act M p, e
the validity of a corresponding speech act of the form Mcp? I f Peter truthfully
confesses to loving Frances, we feel entitled to accept as true the assertion that Peter
loves Frances. A n d if, conversely, the assertion that Peter loves Frances is true, we feel
entitled to accept as truthful Peter's confession that he loves Frances. This transition
could be justified according to the rules of propositional logic only if we could
assimilate expressive to constative speech acts or (first person) experiential sentences
to assertoric sentences. Since we cannot, we have to look for formal-pragmatic rules
for the connections between such speech acts, which appear with the same proposi-
tional content in different modes. Table 2.7 is meant merely to illustrate which
transitions we intuitively regard as permissable (+) and which not ( - ) . These phe-
nomena cannot be explained satisfactorily by the familiar modal logics. However, on
the constructivist approach to a pragmatic logic, see C . F. Gethmann, ed., Theorie des
wissenschaftlichen Argumentierens (Frankfurt, 1980), part 3, pp. 165-240; C. E Geth-
mann, Protologik (Frankfurt, 1979).
86. T h i s is the methodological meaning of Searle's "principle of expressibility"; cf.
Speech Acts, pp. 87-88. Compare T. Binkley, ' T h e Principle of Expressibility," Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1979): 307ff.
87. J . Habermas, "Universalpragmatische Hinweise auf das System der Ich-Abgren-
zungen," in M. Auwärter, E . Kirsch, M. Schröter, eds., Kommunikation, Interaktion,
Identität (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 332ff., "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics,"
Theory and Society 3 (1976): 155-167. See also the empirical study by M. Auwärter and
E . Kirsch, "Die konversationeile Generierung von Situationsdefinitionen im Spiel 4-
bis 6-jähriger Kinder," i n W. Schulte, ed., Soziologie in der Gesellschaft (Bremen, 1981),
pp. 584ff.
88. J . M. Ruskin, " A n Evaluative Review of Family Interaction Research," Family Process
11 (1972): 365ff. J . H . Weakland, ' T h e Double B i n d Theory: A Reflexive Hindsight,"
Family Process 13 (1974): 269ff.; S. S. Kety, " F r o m Rationalization to Reason," American
Journal of Psychiatry 131 (1974): 957ff.; D . Reiss, ' T h e Family and Schizophrenia,"
American Journal of Psychiatry 133 (1976): 181ff.
Table 2.7
Intermodal transfer of validity between speech acts with the same propositional content
To
Constative Expressive Regulative
speech speech acts speech acts
From acts (truth) (truthfulness) (lightness)
Constative speech acts (truth) X + -
Expressive speech acts (truthfulness) + X
-X
Regulative speech acts (lightness)
- +
182
Chapter 2

3
89. J . Searle, "Literal meaning," in Expression and Meaning, pp. 117ff. See also R. D.
Van Valin, "Meaning and Interpretation," Journal of Pragmatics 4 (1980): 213ff. Communicative Rationality and the Theories of
90. G . E . Moore, "Proof of an External World," Proceedings of the British Academy Meaning and Action (1986)
( L o n d o n , 1939).

91. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §103, p. 16.

92. Ibid., §102, p. 16 [amended translation].

93. Ibid., §144, p. 21.

94. Ibid., §205, p. 28.

O n the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

Charles Taylor's objections to my theory should be seen i n the

c o n t e x t o f his o w n t h e o r y o f language, w h i c h follows i n the t r a d i t i o n
o f W i l h e l m v o n H u m b o l d t ' s w o r k i n t h e same a r e a . 1
. . . [Taylor]
reconstructs m y c o n c e p t i o n o f language accurately f r o m the perspec-
tive o f H u m b o l d t ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
the structure o f language (the linguistic structure or organism of
l a n g u a g e ) a n d p r a c t i c e s o f l a n g u a g e usage ( t h e l i v i n g p r o c e s s o f
s p e e c h ) — i n other words, H u m b o l d t ' s distinction between language
as ergon a n d as energeia—has, o f course, b e e n taken u p by more
r e c e n t t h e o r i e s o f l a n g u a g e (langue v e r s u s parole, l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e -
t e n c e vs. l i n g u i s t i c p e r f o r m a n c e ) . I n t h e p r o c e s s , h o w e v e r , l a n g u a g e
has b e e n d e p r i v e d o f a decisive d i m e n s i o n : the intersubjectivity o f
possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). U n l i k e H u m b o l d t , 2

n e i t h e r Saussure n o r C h o m s k y c o n c e i v e s o f d i a l o g u e (Gespräch ) as 3

t h e c e n t r a l p o i n t o f language. Taylor correctly perceives t h a t t h e

theory of communicative a c t i o n c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n a t t e m p t t o
develop a theory o f society f r o m precisely this approach to the
t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e . Yet t h e r e is a t e n s i o n i n H u m b o l d t ' s w r i t i n g s
b e t w e e n t h e basic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s w i t h w h i c h h e w o r k s , w h i c h a r e
g r o u n d e d i n a t h e o r y o f intersubjectivity, a n d the figures of thought
i n w h i c h these are c o u c h e d , w h i c h are t a k e n f r o m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f
t h e s u b j e c t . M y t h e o r y is d r a w n m o r e t o w a r d t h e o n e p o l e , T a y l o r ' s
184
Chapter 3
m o r e t o w a r d t h e o t h e r . T h i s is t h e s o u r c e o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n
us. B e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g f u r t h e r , t h e r e f o r e , a b r i e f r e v i e w o f t h e issues
i n v o l v e d is a d v i s a b l e .
H u m b o l d t c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e status o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m o f
reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) i n a m a n n e r similar
H e g e l ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f o b j e c t i v e s p i r i t . L a n g u a g e acts u p o n t h e
s p e a k i n g s u b j e c t as a n i n c i s i v e l y m o l d i n g a n d s u p r a s u b j e c t i v e f o r c e
w i t h o u t c o n f r o n t i n g h e r as s o m e t h i n g p u r e l y e x t e r n a l — a s is t h e
case, f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h t h e c o n t i n g e n t i n f l u e n c e o f n a t u r e .
s t r u c t u r e o f l a n g u a g e m a i n t a i n s a n d r e n e w s i t s e l f solely t h r o u g h t h e
linguistic c o m m u n i t y ' s practices o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e l a n -
g u a g e system m a k e s s p e e c h acts p o s s i b l e t h a t , i n t u r n , r e p r o d u c e t h e
l a n g u a g e a n d , i n so d o i n g , m a k e i n n o v a t i v e c h a n g e s i n i t , h o w e v e r
i m p e r c e p t i b l e these m a y b e . 4
E v e r y t h i n g else d e p e n d s on which
m o d e l H u m b o l d t adopts w h e n conceiving o f the m e d i a t i n g u n i t y o f
t h e s t r u c t u r e o f l a n g u a g e a n d s p e e c h p r a c t i c e s . Is l a n g u a g e as a
w h o l e a self-referential subject t h a t h o l d s t o g e t h e r t h e l i v i n g process
o f l a n g u a g e b y m e a n s o f i t s s y n t h e s i z i n g a c h i e v e m e n t s , o r is t h i s
synthesis a c c o m p l i s h e d solely i n t h e f o r m s t a k e n b y t h e f r a c t u r e d
intersubjectivity o f dialogue (Gespräch)? Humboldt did not
pletely r e l i n q u i s h the m o d e l o f t h e self-referentiality o f t h e active,
k n o w i n g s u b j e c t . H i s n o t i o n o f l a n g u a g e as a n o r g a n i s m c l e a r l y s t i l l
b e a r s t h e R o m a n t i c t r a i t s o f l a n g u a g e as a n expressive w h o l e t h a t
e x t e r n a l i z e s its essential p o w e r s a n d assures i t s e l f o f its c r e a t i v e s u b -
j e c t i v i t y b y c o n t e m p l a t i n g these o b j e c t i v a t i o n s . H u m b o l d t ' s c o n c e p -
tion o f language appears s i m p l y t o be a v a r i a t i o n o n Hegel's c o n c e p t
o f t h e c o n c r e t e u n i v e r s a l : l a n g u a g e as s u c h r e l a t e s t o t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y
o f n a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e s , a n d these i n t u r n r e l a t e t o c o n c r e t e s p e e c h
acts as t h e m o m e n t s o f t h e u n i v e r s a l , t h e p a r t i c u l a r , a n d t h e i n d i v i d -
u a l i n t h e processual web o f relations o f an i n d i v i d u a l totality.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , H u m b o l d t is not a b l e t o a r t i c u l a t e i n t h e s e
basic c o n c e p t s o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e i n s i g h t t h a t
was o f p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e t o h i m , b o t h as t h e l i b e r a l p h i l o s o -
p h e r o f a bourgeois individualism a n d i n his philosophy o f language.
F o r h e is c o n v i n c e d
t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f a l a n g u a g e is o n l y s u c h by c o m p a r i s o n , b u t t h a t its
t r u e i n d i v i d u a l i t y r e s i d e s o n l y i n t h e g i v e n s p e a k e r at a g i v e n t i m e . O n l y i n
185
Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
the i n d i v i d u a l does language attain its final d e t e r m i n a t i o n . N o one person
thinks w i t h a given w o r d exacdy w h a t a n o t h e r person thinks, a n d this
variation, n o matter how slight i t is, skitters t h r o u g h the entire language like
concentric ripples over water. A l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is thus simultaneously a
n o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g , all agreement i n ideas a n d feelings is simultaneously a
to divergence. I n the m a n n e r i n w h i c h language is m o d i f i e d i n each individual,
there is revealed, i n contrast to its previously e x p o u n d e d potency, the power
o f m a n over i t . 5
O f c o u r s e , H u m b o l d t is n o t a n e m p i r i c i s t w h o r o b b e d t h e p r o c e s s
The
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the rails o n w h i c h i t r u n s a n d a l l o w e d
the identity o f linguistic meanings to emanate f r o m the i n t e n t i o n s —
arbitrarily iterated a n d reciprocally superseding one another—of
i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l speakers. F o r h i m , t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f a c o m -
m o n p e r s p e c t i v e d o e s n o t dissolve, f o r e x a m p l e , i n t o a series of
isolated I-perspectives t h a t are r e f l e c t e d m e r e l y i n o n e another;
r a t h e r i t arises e q u i p r i m o r d i a l l y (gleichursprunglich) with the inter-
subjective validity o f linguistic expressions t h a t are identical i n m e a n -
i n g . B u t H u m b o l d t is n o less adverse t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g l a n g u a g e as
a t o t a l i t y t h a t w o u l d have t o p r e j u d g e t h e i n i t i a t i v e s a n d "yes" o r " n o "
p o s i t i o n s o f a u t o n o m o u s a n d u n i q u e subjects t h r o u g h a p r e d e t e r -
com-
m i n e d — f a t e f u l , as i t w e r e — p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H u m b o l d t w a n t s t o
d o j u s t i c e t o b o t h aspects: first, to the at once unavoidable a n d
counterfactual supposition that, i n a given instance, all participants
use t h e same e x p r e s s i o n s i n a s e m a n t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l way, f o r w i t h o u t
this i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n they w o u l d n o t even be able to enter i n t o
a d i a l o g u e ; a n d s e c o n d , t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e speakers
invariably deviate f r o m the standard m e a n i n g s o f the expressions
u s e d a n d t h a t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e casts i t s s h a d o w o v e r e v e r y l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
achieved agreement.
I t is m y i m p r e s s i o n t h a t T a y l o r d o e s n o t p a y s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n t o
this d i f f e r e n c e . Certainly, " I " a n d "We" perspectives are supposed to
c o m p l e m e n t one another; b u t i n Taylor's w o r k the latter ends u p
t a k i n g p r e c e d e n c e o v e r t h e f o r m e r . T a y l o r speaks o f t e m p o r a r y
b r e a c h e s i n a p r o c e s s u a l l y s e c u r e d c o n s e n s u s , so t h a t t h e b r e a k s t h a t
h a v e o c c u r r e d w o u l d have t o b e s e a l e d o v e r b y processes o f r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W e c a n d e t e c t signs o f t h e R o m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n of
l a n g u a g e i n t h i s view, f o r w h i c h t h e s y n t h e s i z i n g a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d
t h e u n i f y i n g p r o d u c t i v e activities o f a self-referentially o p e r a t i n g
186 187

Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

S p i r i t o f L a n g u a g e are a f i r s t p r i n c i p l e . T h e organic life o f the T h i n g s a r e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e basic c o n f i g u r a t i o n

linguistic totality branches o u t by way o f t h e s t r u c t u r a l differences o f
n a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e s i n t o t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f s p e e c h acts, y e t asserts
itself w i t h i n these d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s as t h e superordinated universal.
Against this totalizing c o n c e p t i o n o f language, Humboldt righdy
brings i n t o play the fractured intersubjectivity o f a m u t u a l u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) t h a t p e r m i t s t h e divergence, w i t h i n t h e suc-
cessfully a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t i t s e l f , o f i n d i v i d u a l l y n u a n c e d t h o u g h t s
and feelings.
Objective a g r e e m e n t a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d — t h a t is, a g r e e -
m e n t , t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h is o p e n t o q u e s t i o n — i s dependent on
b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n intersubjective r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e s p e a k e r
a n d at least o n e h e a r e r c a p a b l e o f a d o p t i n g a c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n . 6
The
i n t h e t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h is o n e o f subjects c a p a b l e o f
speech a n d action reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g about something i n the
w o r l d . W h a t is c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n is t h e r e l a t i o n o f a n
" I " t o a n equiprimordial A l t e r E g o . Space o p e n s u p b e t w e e n t h e t w o
for an intersubjectively shared lifeworld; participants i n communica-
t i o n are situated w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f this l i f e w o r l d w h e n they refer
t o o b j e c t s o r states o f affairs i n t h e w o r l d : " I n o r d e r t o d e s i g n a t e t h i s ,
a s e n s u o u s c o n c e p t t h a t n o n e t h e l e s s abstracts f r o m a l l q u a l i t a t i v e
differences m u s t be used; a c o n c e p t t h a t embraces the " I " a n d t h e
"You" i n one sphere a n d yet allows f o r a m u t u a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g
d i v i s i o n w i t h i n t h i s s p h e r e . T h e n o t i o n o f space ( r e f e r r i n g t o p e r -
s o n a l p r o n o u n s ) is s u c h a c o n c e p t . " T h e s o c i a l space o f a l i f e w o r l d
9

m o d e l o f d i a l o g u e (Gespräch), t a k e n f r o m t h e i d e a l o f P l a t o n i c d i a - i n h a b i t e d i n c o m m o n that opens u p i n the course o f dialogue p r o -

logue, 7
suggests a n o t i o n o f d i a l o g i c synthesis t h a t n o l o n g e r e n - vides t h e key to t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f society p r o p o s e d by t h e t h e o r y o f
sures—in the manner o f the reflexive force of an " I think"—a communication. H u m b o l d t already u n d e r s t o o d s p e e c h acts as c o n -
m o n o l o g i c u n i t y w i t h i n t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f ideas. R a t h e r , t h e c o m m u - n e c t i n g u p f o r i n t e r a c t i o n ; he conceives o f r e a c h i n g understanding
nicatively achieved consensus relies b o t h o n t h e i d e a l i z i n g supposi- as t h e g e n e r a t i v e mechanism o f socialization (Vergesellschaftung)—
tion of the identity o f linguistic meanings and o n the power of first as t h e m e c h a n i s m o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n ,
negation a n d autonomy of unique, irreplaceable (unvertretbar*) sub- b u t t h e n also as t h e m e d i u m b o t h o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d f o r t h e c o n -
jects f r o m w h o m intersubjective agreement to criticizable validity tinuation o f cultural traditions. Language, worldview, and f o r m of
c l a i m s has t o b e obtained—to be won—in e v e r y case. E v e r y dis- life are e n t w i n e d .
cursively a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s rests o n the power of negation of I h a v e r e c a l l e d these i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e c a u s e o f m y i n t e r e s t i n
independent subjects w h o , i n e n t e r i n g i n t o a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a - a p o i n t m a d e by H u m b o l d t w h o thereby p r e e m p t e d George H e r b e r t
tionship, recognize one another reciprocally as a c c o u n t a b l e s u b - M e a d i n c e r t a i n respects b y a h u n d r e d years. F o r H u m b o l d t a l r e a d y
j e c t s — w h e r e b y a c c o u n t a b i l i t y (Zurechnungsfähigkeit) m e a n s t h a t t h e y c o n c e i v e s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a m e c h a n i s m t h a t socializes
o r i e n t t h e i r action toward validity claims. a n d individuates i n o n e act. I n t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f f r a c t u r e d i n t e r s u b -
Even w h e n a p p l i e d t o l i n g u i s t i c p h e n o m e n a , self-consciousness— j e c t i v i t y — w h i c h d e m a n d o f c o m p e t e n t speakers t h a t they master t h e
t h e basic figure of thought o f the philosophy of the subject—does system o f p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s — s i n g u l a r i z a t i o n is j u s t as
1 0
impossible
n o t offer a s o u n d basis f o r a t h e o r y o f society. I f t h e s u b j e c t , i n w i t h o u t t h e i n e x o r a b l e c o m p u l s i o n t o u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n as is socializa-
k n o w i n g its o b j e c t s , relates a t t h e s a m e t i m e t o itself, i t e n c o u n t e r s tion without concomitant i n d i v i d u a t i o n . Language contains "the
i t s e l f i n a d o u b l e p o s i t i o n : b o t h as a s i n g l e e m p i r i c a l e n t i t y i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n i v e r s a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( Verständnis ) w i t h i n t h e s h e l l
11

w o r l d a n d as t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t f a c i n g t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e . o f the most i n d i v i d u a l expression;" " i n singling out, it connects." O n

I t e n c o u n t e r s i t s e l f as o n e a m o n g m a n y a n d as o n e a g a i n s t a l l ( H e n -
rich). B e t w e e n these t w o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e s u b j e c t t h e r e is n o space
left for the symbolically p r e s t r u c t u r e d , linguistically constituted do-
m a i n s o f c u l t u r e , society, a n d s o c i a l i z e d i n d i v i d u a l s .
the o t h e r h a n d , the person w h o communicates w i t h others will, i n
o r d e r t o step b e y o n d t h e d i v i d i n g b o u n d a r i e s o f h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y , a t
t h e s a m e t i m e also " i n c r e a s e h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n t h i s m o r e elevated
struggle." 1 2
A n d w h a t h o l d s t r u e f o r i n d i v i d u a l s h o l d s to a n even
188
Chapter 3
g r e a t e r d e g r e e f o r n a t i o n s : " I n its c a p a c i t y f o r d i v i d i n g p e o p l e s ,
language unifies the difference between individualities w i t h o u t de-
t r a c t i n g f r o m t h e m i n a n y way, b y m e a n s o f t h e m u t u a l u n d e r -
standing of foreign speech." 1 3
Language compels the i n d i v i d u a t i o n
o f peoples a n d i n d i v i d u a l persons, " b u t i n such a w o n d e r f u l way that,
precisely i n d i v i d i n g , i t awakens a f e e l i n g o f u n i t y ; i t appears i n d e e d
as a m e a n s o f c r e a t i n g u n i t y , a t least as a n i d e a . " 1 4
T h e i d e a t o w h i c h H u m b o l d t is a l l u d i n g h e r e gives e x p r e s s i o n to
t h e r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l o f s p e e c h , t h a t is, t o t h e telos i n h e r e n t i n t h e
v e r y process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r o u g h language. T h i s goal
o f r e a c h i n g u n i v e r s a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g has t o b e c o n v e y e d as a t e n -
d e n c y o f s o c i e t y as a w h o l e b e c a u s e , a n d i n so f a r as, s o c i e t y m a k e s
use o f t h e m e c h a n i s m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f o r its o w n c o o r -
d i n a t i n g purposes.
Taylor objects at this p o i n t t h a t m y e x p l a n a t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e
r a t i o n a l i t y is false because I e x p l a i n i t i n t e r m s o f a f o r m a l i s t a n d
c o g n i t i v i s t e t h i c s , a l t h o u g h h e i n n o way d e n i e s t h a t i t is a p o t e n t i a l
c o n t a i n e d i n r a t i o n a l s p e e c h . H e r e , T a y l o r is t o o q u i c k t o i n t r o d u c e
p h i l o s o p h i c a l ethics i n t o t h e debate. I n m y o p i n i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e
r a t i o n a l i t y is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y its m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l c o m p o n e n t . Every-
day c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices e x t e n d across a w i d e r s p e c t r u m of
v a l i d i t y ; c l a i m s t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness c o n s t i t u t e o n l y o n e among
several aspects o f v a l i d i t y . M o r a l issues arise o n l y w h e n c o n f l i c t s of
a c t i o n are to be resolved w i t h t h e consensus o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s f r o m
t h e p o i n t o f view o f this o n e aspect a l o n e . P h i l o s o p h y m a y take m o r a l
q u e s t i o n s as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e i n o r d e r t o e x p l a i n t h e m o r a l
p o i n t o f view, f r o m w h i c h s u c h q u e s t i o n s c a n b e a n s w e r e d ration-
a l l y — t h a t is, b y p r o v i d i n g g o o d r e a s o n s . S u c h a n e t h i c s cannot,
however, exhaust t h e r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f everyday communicative
p r a c t i c e s b u t c a n o n l y g r a s p i t i n t e r m s o f o n e o f its aspects; m o r e -
over, i t c a n o n l y d o t h i s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y .
Taylor c o u l d agree t o these reservations a n d insist nonetheless t h a t
his objections can be raised n o t o n l y against a p r o c e d u r a l ethics b u t
a g a i n s t p r o c e d u r a l r a t i o n a l i t y as a w h o l e . T h e case T a y l o r makes
a g a i n s t a p r o c e d u r a l e t h i c s is also d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e u n i t y o f c o m -
m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y as w h o l e , w h e n t h i s u n i t y is u n d e r s t o o d m e r e l y
p r o c e d u r a l l y . D o e s n o t every c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y have t o r e m a i n
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Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
e n m e s h e d w i t h t h e substantive contents o f a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f life,
w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r v i s i o n o f t h e g o o d life?
T h i s q u e s t i o n l e a d s us b a c k t o t h e p a r a d i g m s h i f t , signs o f w h i c h
a r e a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t i n H u m b o l d t ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e , a t least
o n a r e a d i n g t h a t s t r i c d y takes t h e v i e w p o i n t o f a t h e o r y o f i n t e r s u b -
jectivity. A c c o r d i n g to such a r e a d i n g , the m o m e n t s o f the universal,
the particular, a n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l are n o l o n g e r b o u n d u p w i t h t h e
o n g o i n g p r o c e s s o f s e l f - r e l a t i o n o f a h i g h e r - l e v e l subjectivity. R a t h e r ,
they are released f r o m t h e i r r e l a t i o n to a totality a n d are conceived
o f as e q u i p r i m o r d i a l r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s o f a p r o c e s s o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
that moves o u t w a r d radially i n three directions. As a mechanism of
s o c i a l i z a t i o n , t h e first a c t o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i t s e l f sets i n
m o t i o n a dialectic o f universalization, particularization, a n d i n d i -
v i d u a l i z a t i o n , a d i a l e c t i c t h a t leaves only t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d particular
i n the p o s i t i o n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l totality. W i t h i n t h e structures o f t h e
f r a c t u r e d intersubjectivity o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , general
structures o f the l i f e w o r l d , collective f o r m s o f life, a n d i n d i v i d u a l life
h i s t o r i e s arise a n d a r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . T h e "I" is
t h e r e b y f o r m e d e q u i p r i m o r d i a l l y as a s u b j e c t i n g e n e r a l , as a t y p i c a l
m e m b e r o f s o c i a l c o l l e c t i v e s , a n d as a u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l . T h e u n i v e r -
sal, p a r t i c u l a r , a n d i n d i v i d u a l c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s r a d i a l l y , as i t
w e r e , a n d n o l o n g e r as i n t e r l o c k i n g m o m e n t s w i t h i n a t o t a l i t y . T h i s
b e c a m e c l e a r t o H u m b o l d t as a r e s u l t o f h i s s t u d i e s o f t h e c u l t u r a l
development o f civilized peoples. 1 5
H e r e , i n d i v i d u a l l a n g u a g e , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f ideas, a n d n a t i o n a l
character are e n t w i n e d i n such a way t h a t i n t e r n a l correspondences
obtain between the linguistic worldviews a n d the sociocultural forms
o f l i f e o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . H o w e v e r , t h e same n a t i o n a l l a n -
guages n o t o n l y constitute t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f a f o r m o f life, they
s e r v e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as a m e d i u m t h a t traverses t h e s e b o u n d a r i e s ; a
m e d i u m i n w h i c h d i f f e r e n t t o t a l i t i e s — e a c h o n e o f w h i c h is t h e S p i r i t
o f a P e o p l e — m e e t a n d w h e r e they, f r o m t h e i r o w n respective s t a n d -
points, c o m e to an agreement w i t h each other about the w o r l d o f all
t h a t is k n o w a b l e " w h i c h lies i n t h e m i d d l e . " 1 6
Thus, national lan-
g u a g e s , as f o r m - g i v i n g p r i n c i p l e s g u i d i n g t h e s h a p e t a k e n b y t h e
individual totality o f each particular worldview a n d o f each particular
way o f l i f e , c o m e i n t o t h e i r o w n o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t , b y v i r t u e o f
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Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

their universalist core, they b o t h enable translations to be made a t t h e s a m e time a t t e m p t t o r e c o n n e c t t h e u n i v e r s a l c o r e o f m o r a l i t y

f r o m each language i n t o every o t h e r language a n d d e t e r m i n e the t o t h e e t h i c a l l i f e (Sittlichkeit) o f c o n c r e t e f o r m s o f l i f e . 2 0

p o i n t of convergence toward w h i c h all cultural developments move. O f c o u r s e , t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d is n o u r i s h e d t h r o u g h

In t h i s r e s p e c t , H u m b o l d t speaks o f t h e " c o n s t a n t and uniform the contributions o f communicative action, while the latter simulta-
w o r k " o f the Spirit: "The p u r p o s e o f t h i s w o r k is understanding n e o u s l y is n o u r i s h e d t h r o u g h t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . H o w -
( Verständnis). T h u s , n o b o d y m a y s p e a k t o a n o t h e r p e r s o n i n a m a n - ever, t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , characterized
n e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m that i n w h i c h the latter, u n d e r identical c o n d i - b y a f r a c t u r e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , p r o h i b i t us f r o m i n t u r n i n f l a t i n g t h i s
tions, w o u l d have s p o k e n t o h i m . " 1 7 c i r c u l a r process i n t o a totality. T o t h e d e g r e e t h a t t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n
B y p u t t i n g i t t h i s way, H u m b o l d t has a l r e a d y g i v e n a n o r m a t i v e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d is n o l o n g e r m e r e l y c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m
twist t o w h a t , i n f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t e r m s , is d i s c e r n i b l e — o n t h e basis of action oriented toward reaching understanding but, with the
o f t h e necessarily i d e a l i z i n g suppositions o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action— i n c r e a s i n g r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , is a burden p l a c e d o n t h e
as t h e r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l o f s p e e c h . O f c o u r s e , t h e grammatically interpretive achievements o f the actors themselves, the universal
regulated worldviews a n d f o r m s o f life appear only i n the p l u r a l ; structures o f the lifeworld stand o u t increasingly sharply f r o m the
h o w e v e r , t h e y c o n s t i t u t e t o t a l i t i e s o v e r w h i c h t h e r e is n o t s o m e f u r - particular c o n f i g u r a t i o n s o f f o r m s o f l i f e t h a t s i m p l y o v e r l a p w i t h o n e
ther, overarching supertotality b u t that rather c o r r e s p o n d to one another. I n t h e face o f such totalities, w h i c h i t reduces to a m e r e l y
a n o t h e r i n t h e i r f o r m a l a n d m o s t g e n e r a l structures. Because a l l e m p i r i c a l status, t h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n b y t h e t h e o r y o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v -
lifeworlds have to r e p r o d u c e themselves t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of ity restores to favor the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f o r m a n d c o n t e n t dis-
action o r i e n t e d toward reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the general charac- c r e d i t e d by H e g e l . 2 1

ter o f communicative r a t i o n a l i t y asserts i t s e l f i n t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a n o t h e r i n s i g h t o f H u m b o l d t ' s t h a t T a y l o r m a y

concrete f o r m s o f life. indeed use a g a i n s t m e j u s t i f i a b l y . I n The Theory of Communicative
If moral philosophy appeals to this universalist p o t e n t i a l of Action, I f a i l e d t o t r e a t p r o p e r l y t h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g {welterschliefiend)
s p e e c h — a n d H u m b o l d t d i d i n f a c t use i t as a basis f o r d e r i v i n g f u n c t i o n o f language. I n contrast to theories o f m e a n i n g oriented
s o m e t h i n g like a c o s m o p o l i t a n ethics o f r e a c h i n g understanding — 1 8 t o w a r d i d e a s o f d e n o t a t i o n a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , T a y l o r h i m s e l f has
t h e n i t can develop n o m o r e t h a n a f o r m a l o r p r o c e d u r a l ethics f r o m d e v e l o p e d a n expressivist t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e t h a t goes b a c k t o t h e
i t . I n so d o i n g , m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y has t o a c c e p t t h e f a c t t h a t , w i t h t h e work of Herder, H a m a n n , and H u m b o l d t . 2 2
H e frees t h e l i n g u i s t i c
c o n c e p t o f m o r a l i t y , o n l y o n e o f several g e n e r a l aspects o f r a t i o n a l i t y c o n s t i t u t i o n o f worldviews f r o m a f o r e s h o r t e n i n g t h r o u g h a semantic
i n h e r e n t i n linguistically structured forms o f life can be recon- o n t o l o g y i n t e r e s t e d solely i n a g r a m m a t i c a l l y r e g u l a t e d preunder-
s t r u c t e d — a n d this only f r o m the reflexive attitude o f a p a r t i c i p a n t standing of r e a l i t y as a w h o l e . Using Humboldt's work, Taylor
i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o considers n o r m a t i v e validity claims h y p o t h e t i - demonstrates h o w every language opens u p a grammatically p r e -
cally. S u c h a n e t h i c s m u s t also c o n c e d e t h a t i t c a n e x p l a i n o n l y t h e s t r u c t u r e d space, h o w i t a l l o w s w h a t is w i t h i n t h e w o r l d t o a p p e a r
formal conditions of valid m o r a l judgments, but not the empirical t h e r e i n a c e r t a i n way, a n d also a t t h e s a m e time makes possible
conditions u n d e r w h i c h m o r a l insights can be p u t i n t o practice. legitimate orders o f interpersonal relationships a n d the spontaneous
E v e r y u n i v e r s a l i s t m o r a l i t y is d e p e n d e n t o n s t r u c t u r a l l y a n a l o g o u s self-presentation o f creative-expressive subjects. "World-disclosure"
f o r m s o f life to c o m p l e m e n t a n d supplement i t . T h e circumstances m e a n s f o r T a y l o r , as f o r H u m b o l d t , t h a t l a n g u a g e is t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e
u n d e r w h i c h i t c a n c o u n t o n t h i s is less a m a t t e r f o r m o r a l philoso- o r g a n n o t o n l y o f t h o u g h t , b u t also o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s a n d o f e x p e -
p h y t h a n f o r social t h e o r y . 1 9
One c a n n o t , h o w e v e r , as T a y l o r pro- r i e n c e , o f t h e f o r m a t i o n o f ego a n d g r o u p i d e n t i t i e s . A n d yet T a y l o r
poses, d e v e l o p a n e t h i c s o f l a n g u a g e o n a H u m b o l d t i a n p l a n e and here again tends to totalize this world-disclosing function of lan-
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g u a g e . I n so d o i n g , h e s u c c u m b s t o a n e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ! p e r s p e c t i v i s m
t h a t H u m b o l d t h i m s e l f avoids.
H u m b o l d t c o n c e i v e s o f t h e d i f f e r e n t l i n g u i s t i c w o r l d v i e w s as con-
verging rays t h a t i l l u m i n a t e o n e a n d t h e s a m e w o r l d as " t h e s u m o f
t h e k n o w a b l e . " T h i s c o n v e r g e n c e is p o s s i b l e due to i n n e r w o r l d l y
l e a r n i n g processes i n w h i c h t h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f o r c e o f a n i n t e r -
p r e t i n g language has first to prove its worth w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . O f
c o u r s e , as t h e system o f r u l e s f o r a g i v e n l a n g u a g e c h a n g e s , so too
d o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f validity f o r t h e sentences that can be f o r m u -
lated i n that language. B u t w h e t h e r such conditions o f validity are
actually satisfied t o such a n e x t e n t t h a t t h e sentences can f u n c t i o n
w i t h i n t h e i r language games d e p e n d s n o t o n l y o n the world-disclos-
i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e b u t also o n t h e i n n e r w o r l d l y effects o f t h e
p r a c t i c e s t h a t i t f o r its p a r t m a k e s p o s s i b l e . Because a l l o t h e r f u n c -
t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e ( t h a t is, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , t h e
t a k i n g u p o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a n d t h e expressive self-pres-
entation o f speakers) are i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h criticizable
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s — a n d also t h e c u l -
tures o f experts that emerge o u t o f t h e m — c a n develop an i n d e -
p e n d e n t l o g i c (Eigensinn) that transcends all local boundaries. T h u s ,
the m o d e s o f action constituted by a linguistic worldview operate i n
the l i g h t o f a communicative rationality that imposes o n the partici-
p a n t s a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , a n d i n t h i s way t r i g g e r s
l e a r n i n g processes w i t h p o s s i b l e r e a c t i v e effects o n t h e antecedent
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d . T a y l o r is w r o n g t o a l l o w t h i s p r o b l e m -
solving capacity o f language t o d i s a p p e a r b e h i n d its c a p a c i t y for
w o r l d disclosure. 2 3
P r o b l e m s i n the T h e o r i e s o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
P r o p o n e n t s o f f o r m a l semantics are challenged by the p r o p o s i t i o n
that reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n language terminates i n the intersub¬
j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a n d is t h e r e f o r e a
phenomenon t h a t c a n n o t b e g r a s p e d b y a s e m a n t i c analysis o f t h e
m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s , b u t r a t h e r necessitates a p r a g m a t i c analysis o f
successful u t t e r a n c e s . R o l f Z i m m e r m a n n has c r i t i c i z e d t h e t h e o r y o f
communicative action f r o m this p o i n t o f view. 2 4
H e believes t h a t I
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Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
h a v e b e e n l e d , t h r o u g h o v e r g e n e r a l i z i n g t h e s p e c i a l case o f a c t i o n
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i n t o c a r r y i n g t h e social
aspect o f t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d validity i n t o t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ,
a n d falsely m a k i n g i t i n t o t h e c e n t r a l a s p e c t o f l a n g u a g e i t s e l f . 2 5
Z i m m e r m a n n f a i l s t o see t h a t f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s p r o v i d e s s o l u t i o n s
t o p r o b l e m s t h a t have arisen i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l t r a d i t i o n d a t i n g b a c k
t o F r e g e . I f m y p r o p o s a l s a r e c o n c e i v e d o f as a n i n t e r n a l l y m o t i v a t e d
d e v e l o p m e n t o f f o r m a l semantics, this m i g h t h e l p t o o v e r c o m e cer-
tain barriers to their being understood and accepted. 2 6
I shall sub-
s e q u e n d y discuss a d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e analysis o f i m p e r a t i v e s t h a t has
i n the m e a n t i m e p r o m p t e d m e to a m e n d my theory.
T o start w i t h , a few key w o r d s c o n c e r n i n g the most i m p o r t a n t
stages o n t h e p a t h f r o m f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s t o f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s . 2 7
T h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e is F r e g e ' s t h e o r y , w h i c h e m e r g e s o u t o f a
d o u b l e c r i t i q u e o f psychologism a n d reference semantics. M e a n i n g s
a r e t o b e a n a l y z e d o n t h e basis o f t h e f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e i r
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n as s o m e t h i n g o b j e c t i v e a n d p u b l i c l y accessible.
I t is n o l o n g e r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f a n o b j e c t b y a n a m e t h a t is t h e
m o d e l f o r l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g s , b u t r a t h e r t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n sen-
t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . I n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e s e n t e n c e f o r m s t h e
m o s t e l e m e n t a r y u n i t c o n s t i t u t i n g m e a n i n g . T h e decisive step t h e n
is t o l i n k m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f t r u t h (Wahrheitsgel¬
tung). T a k i n g a s i m p l e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e , F r e g e d e v e l o p s t h e thesis
f u n d a m e n t a l f o r t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics: o n e understands the
m e a n i n g o f a sentence i f one knows the conditions u n d e r w h i c h the
s e n t e n c e is t r u e . I n t h i s r e g a r d , F r e g e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e assertoric
force that makes a sentence a n assertion f r o m t h e p r e p o s i t i o n a l
c o n t e n t o f w h a t is s t a t e d i n i t . What h a s b e e n asserted c a n b e c o m -
pletely explicated w i t h reference to the t r u t h conditions; all the
a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e a d d s t o t h i s is that t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e considered
t o b e s a t i s f i e d . T h e p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e "p" expresses b o t h a t
once.
F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e analysis o f l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g s c a n confine
itself t o a n a l y z i n g sentences a n d can abstract f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c
r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s s e m a n t i c
a b s t r a c t i o n , F r e g e also m a k e s a less c o n s p i c u o u s c o g n i t i v i s t a b s t r a c -
tion, whereby he reduces all meanings to prepositional contents
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Chapter 3
and, i n d i r e c d y , t o t h e m e a n i n g o f assertoric sentences o r p r o p o s i -
tions. A t h i r d a b s t r a c t i o n is d u e t o t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h ,
w h i c h Davidson w i l l later e x p l a i n w i t h t h e h e l p o f Tarski's t h e o r y o f
t r u t h , s t r i p p i n g i t o f the Platonist c o n n o t a t i o n s prevalent i n Frege's
w o r k . T h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h are c o n s t r u e d p u r e l y semantically,
e x p l a i n w h a t makes a sentence t r u e , a n d d o n o t , f o r instance, e x t e n d
epistemically to a knowledge o f t r u t h conditions attributable to a
s p e a k e r o r a h e a r e r . As a r e s u l t o f these a b s t r a c t i o n s , t h e s p h e r e of
a p p l i c a t i o n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s is i n i t i a l l y p r e t t y r e s t r i c t e d . 2 8
The
f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is d r i v e n f o r w a r d b y
a t t e m p t s t o r e l a x these abstractions a n d ultimately to overcome
t h e m . L e t m e r e m i n d y o u ( i n reverse o r d e r ) o f D u m m e t t ' s v e r i f i c a -
t i o n i s t t h e o r y , w h i c h gives u p t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t o a n o b j e c t i v e c o n c e p -
tion o f t r u t h , o f t h e m o d a l theories f r o m Stenius to Searle, w h i c h
e x p a n d Frege's a p p r o a c h t o i n c l u d e t h e analysis o f nonassertoric
forces, a n d o f A u s t i n ' s speech-act theory, w h i c h d r o p s t h e semantic
abstraction once a n d f o r all. Finally, I u n d e r s t a n d f o r m a l pragmatics
as a t h e o r y t h a t succeeds i n o v e r c o m i n g e v e n t h e b a r r i e r s o f t h e
empiricist ontology within w h i c h all three o f the aforementioned
developments o f f o r m a l semantics still move.
D u m m e t t links t r u t h conditions to the knowledge that speakers
a n d h e a r e r s have o f t h e m . T r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d r e m a i n i n e f f e c -
tive f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s i f t h e y w e r e n o t
k n o w n as s u c h c o n d i t i o n s . N o w , t h i s t u r n away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v e
c o n d i t i o n s that make a sentence t r u e i n favor o f the epistemic con-
d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the speaker a n d h e a r e r are able t o i d e n t i f y a n d
r e c o g n i z e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s is s u p p o s e d n o t o n l y t o e x p l a i n t h e u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentences. I t is i n t e n d e d a t t h e same t i m e t o e x t e n d
the s p h e r e o f a p p l i c a t i o n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s t o i n c l u d e types o f
s e n t e n c e s t h a t h a d h i t h e r t o e l u d e d analysis. I f , n a m e l y , t h e r e a s o n s
t h a t t h e speaker can p r o v i d e f o r t h e possible t r u t h o f a sentence are
c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r its m e a n i n g , a n d i f i n t h i s w a y t h e m e a n i n g o f a
s e n t e n c e is l i n k e d b y w a y o f p o t e n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t o its v a l i d i t y , i n
t h e sense o f t r u t h , t h e n c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t s , m o d a l i z e d state-
m e n t s , s t a t e m e n t s w i t h a t e m p o r a l i n d e x , a n d so f o r t h a r e a l l o p e n e d
u p to an investigation based o n t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics. With
t h i s m o v e , D u m m e t t has n o t y e t d o n e a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c o g n i t i v i s t
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Communicative Rationality and the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
abstraction, let alone the semantic one. For the verificationist proce-
d u r e t h a t h e proposes i n o r d e r to establish t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s can be
c a r r i e d o u t m o n o l o g i c a l l y a n d is g e a r e d solely t o t h e t r u t h c o n d i -
tions o f assertoric sentences. V e r i f i c a t i o n c a n n o t yet be e q u a t e d w i t h
the intersubjective p u t t i n g i n t o effect o f a discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f
different v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
T h e post-Wittgensteinian m o d a l theories that nonetheless l i n k u p
w i t h F r e g e ' s ideas, s u c h as t h o s e p u t f o r w a r d b y S t e n i u s , K e n n y ,
T u g e n d h a t , a n d o t h e r s , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a t t e m p t s t o r e l a x t h e
c o g n i t i v i s t a b s t r a c t i o n : t h e i n t e n t i o n h e r e is t o m a k e accessible t h e
" f o r c e s " — n o w u n d e r s t o o d as i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s — t o a p u r e l y se-
m a n t i c analysis. T h e s i m p l e o n t o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f A u s t i n ' s t w o " d i r e c -
tions o f fit" u n d e r l i e s t h i s a p p r o a c h ; t h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e r e p r e s e n t s
t h e a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s , a n d t h e i m -
p e r a t i v e f o r c e r e p r e s e n t s t h e a d j u s t m e n t o f states o f a f f a i r s t o fit
s e n t e n c e s . T h i s m o d e l has t h e a d v a n t a g e o f i n t r o d u c i n g e a c h o f t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l modes w i t h reference to "conditions o f satisfaction."
H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h these c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o w d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t e r m s
o f t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d success c o n d i t i o n s , respectively, t h e y n o n e -
theless c o n t i n u e t o b e b a s e d o n t h e o n t o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of
l a n g u a g e as a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e w o r l d , a n d t h u s r e m a i n r e s t r i c t e d t o
t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . O n
this c o n c e p t i o n , i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces d o n o t have to be conceived o f
as m o d e s o f u s i n g s e n t e n c e s , t h a t is, p r a g m a t i c a l l y , w i t h t h e r e s u l t
that the semantic a b s t r a c t i o n r e m a i n s u n t o u c h e d . T h i s also, of
course, explains the l i m i t e d e x p l a n a t o r y p o t e n t i a l o f this approach.
F o r t h e w h o l e b r e a d t h o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s c a n i n n o way be
derived f r o m the assertoric-imperative double m o d e . Even the most
elaborately w o r k e d o u t t a x o n o m y 2 9
does n o t succeed i n e m b r a c i n g
e v e n t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m o d e s o r classes o f s p e e c h act: n o r m a t i v e
obligations, orders, a n d declarations a l l evade—as d o expressive
u t t e r a n c e s — a n a t t e m p t at classification t h a t operates using exactly
t w o r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d i n so
d o i n g , r e m a i n s b o u n d to the l o g o c e n t r i s m o f Frege's semantics. 30
I n t h e e n d i t is A u s t i n w h o , f o l l o w i n g t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , takes
t h e decisive step t o w a r d a n analysis o f s p e e c h acts a n d o v e r c o m e s t h e
semantic abstraction. H e resolutely replaces t r u t h semantics w i t h a

196
Chapter 3
use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a n d r e p l a c e s t h e analysis o f s e n t e n c e s w i t h
a n analysis o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s . T h i s p r o v i d e s h i m
w i t h t h e scope to u n c o u p l e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces f r o m the p r o t o -
t y p i c a l case o f a n assertoric s e n t e n c e . A u s t i n b e g i n s t o f r e e h i m s e l f
f r o m an ontology t h a t is g e a r e d e x c l u s i v e l y t o w a r d t h e o b j e c t i v e
w o r l d as a t o t a l i t y o f e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s a n d t h a t r e s u l t s i n
special emphasis b e i n g p l a c e d o n assertoric sentences a n d p r o p o s i -
t i o n a l t r u t h . H i s c o n c e p t o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t o p e n s u p t h e entire
s p e c t r u m o f s p e e c h t o l i n g u i s t i c analysis. W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s thesis t h a t
m e a n i n g is t o b e s o u g h t n o t i n t h e r e l a t i o n o f s e n t e n c e s t o s o m e -
t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d , b u t r a t h e r i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d use o f
t h e s e s e n t e n c e s h a d d i r e c t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c analysts t o
t h e w e a l t h o f l a n g u a g e g a m e s t h a t r e g u l a t e " g r a m m a t i c a l l y " t h e use
o f s e n t e n c e s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f f o r m s o f l i f e . Yet, t h i s l i b e r a t i n g t u r n
away f r o m t h e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s b a c k t o t h e c o n t e x t s
o f t h e l i f e w o r l d d i d n o t o n l y p u s h t o o n e side a l l t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s o f
Frege-Davidsonian semantics; i n g i v i n g u p the reference to t h e ob-
j e c t i v e w o r l d , i t also r e n o u n c e d a n y internal r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n mean-
i n g a n d v a l i d i t y — o r rather, i t assimilated a f o r m o f validity that h a d
b e e n e q u a t e d w i t h v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , t o t h e social v a l i d i t y
o f c u l t u r a l practices. T h a t m a y have b e e n sufficient f o r a n investiga-
tion m o t i v a t e d solely b y a t h e r a p e u t i c i n t e r e s t . Yet a n y o n e w h o m a i n -
tained a n interest i n explanation a n d wished to elaborate a use
t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g i n t h e f o r m o f a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts w i t h o u t a t
t h e s a m e time s u r r e n d e r i n g l i n g u i s t i c analysis t o t h e task o f e t h n o l i n -
guistic description o f family resemblances—in t h e w i d e r sense o f
ethnolinguistic—was faced w i t h the objection that, f o r every sen-
tence, t h e r e are i n n u m e r a b l e c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t ways o f u s i n g i t .
B e c a u s e A u s t i n d i d n o t i n a n y way w i s h t o sacrifice t o c o n t e x t u a l i s m
t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e o r y , h e h a d to search f o r a systematically
m o t i v a t e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h a c t s — f o r general r u l e s f o r t h e t y p i -
c a l use o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s . W i t h t h i s , t h e p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l
p r a g m a t i c s was b o r n , a t least.
A d m i t t e d l y , A u s t i n ' s o w n analyses o f types o f l a n g u a g e use, w h i c h
he carried o u t inductively, d i d n o t lead to theoretical generaliza-
t i o n s . I n c o n t r a s t , t h e systematics o f l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s , d e v e l o p e d
b y R o m a n J a k o b s o n f o l l o w i n g K a r l B u h l e r , was m o t i v a t e d b y an
197
Communicadve Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
interest i n t h e o r y ; despite this, however, i t r e m a i n e d e n t r e n c h e d i n
the framework o f an empirical pragmatics, w h i c h could not match
the insights p r o v i d e d by f o r m a l semantics o r linguistic p h e n o m e n o l -
ogy. L a n g u a g e g a m e s , a n d s p e e c h acts as t h e i r e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s ,
c o u l d b e s u b j e c t e d o n c e a g a i n t o f o r m a l analysis o n l y w h e n a p o i n t
o f r e f e r e n c e was successfully s e c u r e d f o r s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y t h a t was
as o b j e c t i v e as t h a t a t t a i n e d b y f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s w i t h its l i n k i n g o f
m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f t r u t h . Searle r e t u r n e d t o f o r m a l
s e m a n t i c s f o r t h i s r e a s o n . A s w e h a v e s e e n , a n a l t e r n a t i v e is a v a i l a b l e
t o us i f w e f o l l o w H u m b o l d t ' s t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h t o t h e c o n s t i t u -
t i o n o f language, for this retains the idea o f a r e l a t i o n between the
various linguistically constituted worldviews a n d an objective w o r l d .
I n h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r a g m a t i c s , K a r l - O t t o A p e l has always e n e r g e t i -
cally a r t i c u l a t e d this universalist core i n t h e face o f t h e p l u r a l i s m o f
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s language games.
T a k i n g A p e l as m y p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e , I t h e n f o r g e d a l i n k t o
A u s t i n ( a n d t h e early Searle) by
a. p r o v i d i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r B i d d e r ' s l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s i n t e r m s o f
a theory o f validity;
b. generalizing the objective c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h conditions to an
i d e a o f v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s i n g e n e r a l ( i n c l u d i n g n o r m a t i v e Tightness
a n d s u b j e c t i v e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit)), while renouncing the
ontology of one world;
c. t a k i n g f u r t h e r t h e epistemic turn inaugurated by Dummett
t h r o u g h c o n n e c t i n g these c o n d i t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y w i t h a n intersubjec¬
tive c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t a t i o n ; i n order
finally to
d . r e c o g n i z e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f s p e e c h acts as t h e l i n -
guistic expression o f the raising o f validity claims that can be re-
d e e m e d i n discourse.
I have e l a b o r a t e d this idea i n t h e shape o f a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y
of meaning.
I t proceeds f r o m the simple n o t i o n t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d a speech
act i f w e k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e i t a c c e p t a b l e . W h a t is a t issue
h e r e are objective c o n d i t i o n s o f validity t h a t may n o t be i n f e r r e d
 199
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Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

directly f r o m t h e semantic c o n t e n t o f t h e linguistic expressions used, "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n — a r e able t o t a k e o n f u n c t i o n s o f a c t i o n c o o r -

b u t o n l y as m e d i a t e d b y t h e e p i s t e m i c c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker d i n a t i o n i n t h e first place. W h a t distinguishes t h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n by
for the validity o f her utterance i n the performance o f her illocu- f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s f r o m t h a t o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s is t h e i n s i g h t i n t o
tionary act. T h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m rests o n a r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l r e a - the internal connection between understanding (Verstehen) and
sons w i t h w h i c h i t c a n , i f necessary, b e r e d e e m e d i n d i s c o u r s e . The r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). T h i s does n o t m e a n , how-
reasons i n t e r p r e t the validity c o n d i t i o n s a n d , to this e x t e n t , are ever, as J e f f r e y A l e x a n d e r has c o n t e n d e d , 3 1
that I i n anyway confuse
themselves part of the conditions that render the validity claim l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen) a n d a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis).
w o r t h y o f intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n a n d make a corresponding To u n d e r s t a n d a n expression, however, means t o k n o w h o w one
u t t e r a n c e acceptable. O n l y w i t h t h i s step is t h e t u r n away f r o m c a n m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e
formal semantics to p r a g m a t i c s — i n i t i a t e d by Wittgenstein and a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . O n e c a n a l r e a d y see f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r un-
A u s t i n — t r u l y effected, a n d f u r t h e r m o r e i n such a way t h a t t h e cog- derstanding l i n g u i s t i c expressions t h a t t h e s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n be
nitivist a n d objectivist abstractions, too, can be overcome completely. c a r r i e d o u t w i t h the h e l p o f such expressions are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
T h i s i n t u r n necessitates a r e v i s i o n o f t h e basic o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s reaching understanding, t h a t is, t o w a r d a c h i e v i n g a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i -
t h a t have b e c o m e established i n p h i l o s o p h y , b u t I d o n o t w a n t t o go vated agreement between participants i n communication about
i n t o this here. s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . O n e w o u l d h a v e u t t e r l y f a i l e d t o grasp w h a t
T h i s b r i e f review o f the h i s t o r y o f the t h e o r y o f language was i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e i f o n e d i d n o t k n o w
i n t e n d e d merely to show that t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c ex- t h a t t h i s is s u p p o s e d t o serve t h e p u r p o s e o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
pressions already requires a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d validity claims a n d a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , t h a t is, o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t a g r e e m e n t — a n d the
t h a t a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e is a l r e a d y i n h e r e n t i n l i n g u i s t i c c o n c e p t o f a g r e e m e n t i n v o l v e s its " b e i n g v a l i d " f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s .
processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as s u c h . I f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a T h e d i m e n s i o n o f v a l i d i t y is i n h e r e n t i n l a n g u a g e . I r e g a r d Z i m m e r -
s p e e c h a c t d e p e n d s o n k n o w i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r its a c c e p t a b i l i t y , m a n n ' s v i e w t h a t t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is carried into
t h e n t h e speaker's i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d p o i n t s t o the g e n u i n e sphere o f speaking a n d linguistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m
t h e f u r t h e r a i m t h a t t h e h e a r e r s h o u l d accept h e r speech-act offer. t h e d o m a i n o f s o c i a l a c t i o n as a n e m p i r i c i s t m i s c o n c e p t i o n . 3 2
The
A c c e p t a n c e o r a g r e e m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e h e a r e r is e q u i v a l e n t t o o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s
r e c o g n i t i o n o f a v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker. I t is b a s e d o n of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, o f under-
t h e g o o d reasons t h a t t h e speaker offers i n o r d e r to r e d e e m the s t a n d i n g language itself.
validity c l a i m i n discourse ( o r else o n a c r e d i b l e w a r r a n t y issued b y S o m e o n e t r a i n e d i n f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s is l i k e l y t o p r e s e n t s i m p l e
t h e s p e a k e r t h a t she c o u l d p r o v i d e s u c h reasons, i f n e c e s s a r y ) . A n d i m p e r a t i v e s as a n i n c i s i v e e x a m p l e d i s p r o v i n g m y thesis. F o r i t a p -
t h e h e a r e r , w i t h h i s "yes" t o a v a l i d i t y c l a i m h e has a c c e p t e d as w o r t h y p e a r s t o b e t h e case t h a t a f o r e i g n e r w h o has j u s t a r r i v e d i n t o w n
o f r e c o g n i t i o n — t h a t is, w i t h h i s a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e speech-act o f f e r — already understands a child's (begging) request, "Give m e some
also takes u p o n h i m s e l f , as a r u l e , c e r t a i n o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e money," i f he knows the conditions u n d e r w h i c h the action re-
s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n , s u c h as o b l i g a t i o n s t o m e e t a r e q u e s t , t o t r u s t quested w o u l d be c a r r i e d o u t successfully. 33
I t l o o k s as t h o u g h a
a confession, to believe a statement, t o rely o n a p r o m i s e , o r t o obey n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m is n o t i n v o l v e d h e r e a t a l l , o r r a t h e r t h a t i t
a n order. F o r this does have consequences f o r t h e f u r t h e r course o f o n l y t h e n comes i n t o play w h e n we take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e p r a g m a t i c
t h e i n t e r a c t i o n — w h e t h e r w i t h t h e speaker o r w i t h o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h e s p e e c h a c t — s e m a n t i c a l l y a n a l y z a b l e as a
o r p e r s o n s a f f e c t e d ; a n d i t e x p l a i n s w h y l i n g u i s t i c acts o f r e a c h i n g request—can b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d p r a g m a t i c a l l y as b e g g i n g . 3 4
Against
u n d e r s t a n d i n g — w h i c h have as t h e i r c o r e a speech-act o f f e r a n d a s u c h a c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e r e a d i n g I w a n t t o s t i c k b y t h e analysis c a r r i e d
200 201
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality and the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

o u t i n The Theory of Communicative Action? 5

Knowledge o f the condi-
tions o f success, w h i c h a r e t o b e i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
c o m p o n e n t o f t h e i m p e r a t i v e i n q u e s t i o n , is n o t s u f f i c i e n t i n o r d e r
t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g , t h a t is, t h e specifically
imperative character o f the request. Rather, the hearer must u n d e r -
stand t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t h a t authorizes t h e speaker to m a k e t h e
d e m a n d , t h e r e b y l e g i t i m a t i n g h e r e x p e c t a t i o n i n t h e first p l a c e t h a t
t h e addressee has r e a s o n s t o c a r r y o u t t h e a c t i o n d e m a n d e d o f h i m .
O t h e r w i s e t h e h e a r e r lacks a n y k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r h i s
a g r e e m e n t ; i t is t h i s a g r e e m e n t w h i c h first j u s t i f i e s h i s t a k i n g o n o f
o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n — i n t h i s case, h a n d -
i n g o v e r " s o m e m o n e y . " A k n o w l e d g e o f (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success
m u s t be a c c o m p a n i e d by a k n o w l e d g e o f (b) the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r has r e a s o n s t o r e g a r d as v a l i d ( t h a t is, as n o r m a -
tively j u s t i f i e d ) a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e c o n t e n t (a)—for example,
t h a t c h i l d r e n a r e a l l o w e d t o b e g f r o m f o r e i g n e r s i n t h e streets o f
Lima. 3 6
N o w , w h a t is decisive h e r e is t h a t w e c a n n o t c o n c e i v e o f any
s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h a r e q u e s t w o u l d b e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e as s u c h w i t h -
M y m i s t a k e was t o t r e a t t h i s l i m i t case o f a p u r e i m p e r a t i v e b a c k e d
u p b y p o w e r as a class o f s p e e c h acts i n its o w n right. I n d o i n g so, as
Z i m m e r m a n n , T u g e n d h a t , a n d Skjei p o i n t o u t , I g o t caught u p i n
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . I have already revised this p o s i t i o n i n m y r e p l y t o
Skjei: 3 7
I now regard simple or normatively nonauthorized impera-
tives as a p a r a s i t i c a l c a s e . 38
A s a s o c i o l o g i s t I o u g h t t o have k n o w n
t h a t a c o n t i n u u m o b t a i n s b e t w e e n p o w e r t h a t is m e r e l y e s t a b l i s h e d
as a m a t t e r o f f a c t a n d p o w e r t h a t has b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o n o r -
m a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , all i m p e r a t i v e s t o w h i c h we a t t r i b -
ute a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y force can be analyzed a c c o r d i n g to the m o d e l
o f n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d imperatives. W h a t I w r o n g l y t o o k to be a
difference i n category n o w shrinks to a difference i n degree. T h e
b a n k robber's imperative, sanctioned by his " H a n d s U p ! , " belongs to
t h o s e limit cases o f a m a n i f e s t i y s t r a t e g i c use o f s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h
t h e m i s s i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is r e p l a c e d b y a n a p p e a l t o a r e s e r v o i r
o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s . T h i s m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use is p a r a s i t i c a l t o
the e x t e n t t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s p e e c h act o f t h i s k i n d involves
c o n d i t i o n s that are d e r i v e d f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h n o r m a -
tively a u t h o r i z e d , n o n d e g e n e r a t e imperatives can be used. 3 9

out i t being authorized or backed u p b y some kind of n o r m a t i v e I n g e n e r a l , t o b e s u r e , t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts f u n c -

b a c k g r o u n d , h o w e v e r w e a k t h i s m a y b e ; e v e n i f i t is o n l y t h e a u t h o - t i o n s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f l a t e n d y strategic a c t i o n : t h e speaker m a y
rizing n o r m that one should help people or c h i l d r e n i n distress—or n o t " a d m i t t o " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects t h a t h e wishes t o trigger i n t h e
h u m a n b e i n g s as s u c h — w h e r e b y " b e i n g i n n e e d o f h e l p " is i t s e l f o n e hearer i n the f o r m o f obligations relevant f o r the sequel o f interac-
o f the pragmatic presuppositions u n d e r l y i n g a request. A d m i t t e d l y tion, as t h e side effects o f a c o n s e n s u s t h a t is s e e m i n g l y achieved
t h e r e is t h e l i m i t case o f n o r m a t i v e l y n o n a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s , communicatively. However, the objections raised by A l e x a n d e r i n his
s u c h as t h a t o f t h e b a n k r o b b e r who threatens the b a n k teller, essay h a v e s h o w n m e y e t a g a i n t h a t m y use o f A u s t i n ' s t e r m s " p e r l o -
c o m m a n d i n g h e r t o h a n d o v e r m o n e y . I n s u c h cases, t h e c o n d i t i o n s c u t i o n a r y " a n d " i l l o c u t i o n a r y , " d i v e r g i n g as i t d o e s f r o m e s t a b l i s h e d
o f n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y m u s t b e replaced b y s a n c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s that p h i l o s o p h i c a l usage, leads t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . T h i s p r o m p t s m e
complete the acceptability conditions. T h e robber's "Hands U p ! , " to provide some terminological clarifications.
e x c l a i m e d w h i l e p o i n t i n g a r e v o l v e r , s h o w s t h a t a v a l i d i t y c l a i m has
To begin with, I want to distinguish more clearly between the
b e e n r e p l a c e d b y a p o w e r c l a i m a n d t h a t t h e i m p e r a t i v e is t o be
immediate i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m (or, as t h e case m a y b e , success) o f t h e
u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e sense o f a f a c t u a l e x p r e s s i o n o f w i l l , w h e r e b y one
speaker—namely, that the hearer understands her utterance—and
p e r s o n ' s w i l l is s i m p l y i m p o s e d o n t h e w i l l o f a n o t h e r . I n t h i s case,
t h e m o r e far-reaching a i m t h a t t h e h e a r e r a c c e p t s h e r u t t e r a n c e as
the reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions contingendy linked with the
v a l i d a n d t h e r e b y takes o n o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l of
i m p e r a t i v e p r o v i d e s t h e s p e a k e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e a d d r e s s e e has
i n t e r a c t i o n . I l l o c u t i o n a r y success i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense consists i n
g o o d reasons t o c o n f o r m .
understanding (Verstehen), whereas i l l o c u t i o n a r y success i n the
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Chapter 3
broader sense consists i n a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t has a c o o r d i n a t i n g
e f f e c t , t h a t is, i n t h e success o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n . I h a d h i t h e r t o t e r m e d
o n l y t h o s e effects " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y " t h a t are n o t r e l a t e d i n t e r n a l l y t o
t h e m e a n i n g o f the sentences u t t e r e d , whereas this t e r m usually
a p p l i e s t o a l l t h o s e effects t h e s p e a k e r has o n t h e h e a r e r t h a t go
beyond t h e m e r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e act. G i v e n
t h a t , as w e have seen a b o v e , t h e d i m e n s i o n o f v a l i d i t y is a l r e a d y
i n h e r e n t i n l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t w o u l d appear advisable to
c o u n t n o t j u s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n u t t e r a n c e ( o n t h e basis o f k n o w i n g
its a c c e p t a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s ) as p a r t o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m (or, as
t h e case m a y b e , success) o f t h e speaker, b u t also t o i n c l u d e t h e
a g r e e m e n t r e a c h e d w i t h t h e h e a r e r , t h a t is, t h e h e a r e r ' s a c c e p t a n c e
o f t h e speech-act offer. T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m i n t h e b r o a d e r sense
is also a c h i e v e d solely t h r o u g h t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
act. I w a n t t o h o l d o n t o t h i s . H o w e v e r , i n o r d e r t o b r i n g m y t e r m i -
n o l o g y m o r e i n t o l i n e w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d usage, I n o w w a n t t o c a l l a l l
effects t h a t g o b e y o n d t h i s " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y . " F o r e x a m p l e , t h e c o n -
v i c t i o n t h a t f o r m s i n a h e a r e r w h e n h e a c c e p t s t h a t a s t a t e m e n t is
t r u e c o u l d j u s t as easily b e p r o m p t e d b y a l i e ; i n t h i s case i t w o u l d
r e p r e s e n t precisely the type o f effect t h a t a speaker w i t h a strategic
i n t e n t i o n wishes t o a c h i e v e . T h i s t e r m i n o l o g i c a l c o n c e s s i o n necessi-
tates a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e class o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects: be-
t w e e n effects t h a t , i n t h e c o u r s e o f o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l
o f i n t e r a c t i o n , r e s u l t f r o m t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f w h a t is s a i d , a n d
t h o s e effects t h a t o c c u r c o n t i n g e n t l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f g r a m m a t i c a l l y
r e g u l a t e d contexts. W i t h this I wish to correct the mistake I m a d e o f
equating this distinction w i t h i n the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g w i t h the
distinction w i t h i n the theory o f action between strategically a n d
n o n s t r a t e g i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects.
I t e r m t h o s e effects s t r a t e g i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d t h a t c o m e a b o u t o n l y
i f they are n o t declared o r i f they are b r o u g h t a b o u t by deceptive
s p e e c h acts t h a t m e r e l y p r e t e n d t o b e v a l i d . P e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects
o f t h i s t y p e i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h -
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g has b e e n p u t a t t h e s e r v i c e o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c -
tions. I have r e f e r r e d t o t h i s as " t h e use o f language with an
o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e q u e n c e s " — a speaker's one-sided a n d lat-
4 0
e n d y u n d e r t a k e n s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t o conditions
203
Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s t e r m i n o -
l o g i c a l r e v i s i o n , i t is n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e t o assign all p e r f o r a t i o n s t o
t h e class o f l a t e n d y strategic a c t i o n s . 4 1
Against Jeffrey Alexander,
h o w e v e r , I w a n t t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t the distinction between communicative
and strategic action is n o t i n f l u e n c e d b y t h i s r e v i s i o n .
I define c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, i n t e r alia, by stating that a c t i o n
c o o r d i n a t i o n m u s t satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n o f a n a g r e e m e n t reached
communicatively, w i t h o u t reservation. T h e r e q u i r e m e n t that illocu-
t i o n a r y a i m s b e p u r s u e d " w i t h o u t r e s e r v a t i o n " is i n t e n d e d p r e c i s e l y
t o e x c l u d e cases o f l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n . I n s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n , l i n -
g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e ( g e n e r a l l y ) n o t u s e d
as a m e c h a n i s m o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n . H e r e , we can n o longer
explain the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f different plans o f action t h r o u g h refer-
ence to conditions for a communicatively achieved agreement that
culminates i n the intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f criticizable validity
claims; instead, we may appeal o n l y to t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r the recip-
rocal influence that opponents, a c t i n g i n a p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l way
a n d o r i e n t e d r e s p e c t i v e l y t o w a r d t h e i r o w n success, a t t e m p t t o e x e r t
u p o n o n e a n o t h e r . M y c r i t i c s have o n o c c a s i o n o v e r l o o k e d t h e f a c t
t h a t both m o d e l s o f a c t i o n a t t r i b u t e t o t h e a c t o r s a c a p a c i t y f o r s e t t i n g
goals a n d f o r g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i o n , as w e l l as a n i n t e r e s t i n e x e c u t i n g
their o w n plans o f a c t i o n . 4 2
O t h e r c r i t i c s , i t is t r u e , a c k n o w l e d g e t h e
f a c t t h a t i n b o t h m o d e l s a t e l e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n is p r e s u p -
posed; however, they i d e n t i f y the p u r s u i t o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims w i t h -
o u t r e s e r v a t i o n (as w e l l as t h e p u r s u i t o f t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s t h a t
a r e m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y success), as
envisaged i n the m o d e l o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , w i t h the egocentric
p u r s u i t o f o n e ' s o w n i n t e r e s t s a n d a i m s , as p e r m i t t e d i n t h e m o d e l
o f teleological o r strategic a c t i o n , i n such a way t h a t one model
merges with the other. 4 3
A n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s k i n d is n o t p e r m i s -
s i b l e , e v e n i f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f b o t h cases is b a s e d o n t h e s a m e
teleological language game o f goal-setting actors w h o pursue aims,
a c h i e v e r e s u l t s , a n d t r i g g e r effects. F o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y " a i m s " o f
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n n o t be d e f i n e d w i t h o u t reference to the
linguistic means o f reaching understanding: the m e d i u m o f lan-
g u a g e a n d t h e telos o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n h e r e n t w i t h i n i t
c o n s t i t u t e o n e a n o t h e r r e c i p r o c a l l y . T h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m is
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Chapter 3
n o t one o f ends a n d means. For this reason, the "aims" that a n actor
p u r s u e s in l a n g u a g e a n d c a n r e a l i z e o n l y i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h a n -
o t h e r a c t o r c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d as t h o u g h t h e y r e s e m b l e d condi-
t i o n s t h a t w e c a n b r i n g a b o u t b y i n t e r v e n i n g causally i n t h e w o r l d .
F o r t h e actor, t h e a i m s o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d r e s p e c t i v e l y t o w a r d success
a n d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e s i t u a t e d o n d i f f e r e n t levels:
e i t h e r i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d or, b e y o n d a l l e n t i t i e s , i n t h e l i n g u i s t i -
c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d l i f e w o r l d . I d o n o t m e a n t o i m p l y t h a t s p e a k i n g is a
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t a c t i o n t h a t bears its p u r p o s e w i t h i n i t s e l f a n d t h a t m u s t
be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m actions a i m e d at purposes e x t e r n a l to t h e m .
N o n e t h e l e s s , w e m u s t i n b o t h cases d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e o n t o l o g i -
c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s as w e l l as b e t w e e n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s a n d a t t i t u d e s
o f t h e a c t o r s ; w e m u s t i n e a c h case c o n c e i v e o f t h e a i m s a n d t h e
r e a l i z a t i o n o f these p u r p o s e s i n a d i f f e r e n t way.
F o r t h e speaker a n d h e a r e r i n v o l v e d , i n r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w i t h one another, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims o f u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g (Verstehen) a n d a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) l i e beyond t h e
w o r l d i n w h i c h a purposively acting individual intervenes i n o r d e r to
achieve his goal. I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims can, f r o m the perspective o f t h e
participants, be achieved o n l y w i t h i n the d i m e n s i o n o f world-disclos-
i n g l a n g u a g e itself, a n d i n s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e
r e c o g n i t i o n o f disputable validity claims depends o n the autono-
m o u s a g r e e m e n t o f a s u b j e c t w h o is h e l d t o b e a c c o u n t a b l e . Illocu-
t i o n a r y success c a n t h u s b e a c h i e v e d o n l y c o o p e r a t i v e l y a n d is n e v e r ,
as i t w e r e , a t t h e d i s p o s a l o f a n i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t i n i n t e r a c t i o n .
S t r a t e g i c a c t i o n is also s u b j e c t t o c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e d o u b l e c o n t i n -
gency o f actors e q u i p p e d w i t h f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e . Yet these p u r -
posive actors, w h o c o n d i t i o n o n e a n o t h e r w i t h r e g a r d to t h e i r o w n
r e s p e c t i v e successes, are accessible f o r o n e a n o t h e r o n l y as e n t i t i e s
in the world. T h e y have t o a t t r i b u t e successes a n d f a i l u r e s s o l e l y t o
t h e m s e l v e s , n a m e l y , as t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e i r o w n causal i n t e r v e n t i o n i n
the supposedly l a w - g o v e r n e d n e x u s o f innerworldly processes. T h e
s a m e also h o l d s , o f c o u r s e , f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s w h o are o n l y c o n s t i -
t u t e d as s u c h i n t h e first p l a c e t h r o u g h t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l
actors.
F u r t h e r m o r e , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d strategic a c t i o n d o n o t d i f f e r
p r i m a r i l y i n t e r m s o f t h e attitudes o f t h e actors b u t r a t h e r w i t h
205
C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the T h e o r i e s o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
r e s p e c t t o s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . A f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis o f
successful s p e e c h acts is r e q u i r e d p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e , i n c o m m u n i c a -
tive a c t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is s u p e r i m p o s e d o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t e l e -
o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n a n d subjects t h e a c t o r s t o p r e c i s e l y s u c h
c o n s t r a i n t s as c o m p e l t h e m to adopt a performative attitude—an
a t t i t u d e t h a t is m o r e l a d e n w i t h p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a n is t h e o b j e c t i -
v a t i n g a t t i t u d e o f t h e s t r a t e g i c actor. I n t e r a c t i o n m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h
acts o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x h i b i t s b o t h a r i c h e r a n d a m o r e
restrictive s t r u c t u r e t h a n does strategic a c t i o n .
A s g a m e t h e o r y has s h o w n , s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n has h a d t h e e f f e c t o f
g e n e r a t i n g m o d e l s . I f o n e is n o t l e d astray b y a s e m a n t i c i s t t h e o r y o f
m e a n i n g , t h a t is, i f o n e d o e s n o t s p l i t o f f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g
a n d b o n d i n g e f f e c t (Bindungswirkung) f r o m t h e s p e e c h act, r e l e g a t -
i n g t h i s e f f e c t t o c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t ways o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e , o n e w i l l
h a v e n o d i f f i c u l t y i n r e c o g n i z i n g t w o l i m i t cases o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e
a c t i o n i n t h e t w o o t h e r m o d e l s o f a c t i o n k n o w n t o us f r o m s o c i o l o g i -
c a l t h e o r y . J u s t as t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d expressive m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e
use c o r r e s p o n d t o o n e f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e respectively, so t o o a r e
n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u l a t e d a n d d r a m a t u r g i c a l a c t i o n t a i l o r e d t o fit o n e
specific a s p e c t o f v a l i d i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y : i n t h e f i r s t case, t h e l e g i t i m a c y
o f t h e p e r m i s s i b l e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d , i n t h e s e c o n d case,
the authenticity o f self-presentation. T h e above-mentioned models
r e p r e s e n t l i m i t cases ( a n d n o t , as I h a d i n c o r r e c t l y asserted, " p u r e
types") 4 4
o f action o r i e n t e d toward reaching understanding, to the
e x t e n t t h a t i n these cases t h e d y n a m i c s o f r e c i p r o c a l l y t a k i n g a
p o s i t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , w h i c h is essential
t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , is s u s p e n d e d : i n t h e o n e case, b y m e a n s o f
a presupposed value consensus a n d , i n t h e other, by a n e m p i r i c i s t
r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as i m p r e s s i o n m a n a g e m e n t , of self-presentation
oriented toward reaching understanding. 4 5
I n t h e l i g h t o f these p h i l o s o p h i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , a n u m b e r o f t h e
general misgivings raised by Alexander, Berger, Dux.Joas, a n d others
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f m y t h e o r y o f a c t i o n c a n b e
d i s p o s e d of. I i n n o way i d e n t i f y t h e p r a c t i c e o f s p e e c h w i t h t h a t o f
social a c t i o n . I d o n o t fail to r e c o g n i z e t h a t social i n t e r a c t i o n s o f a l l
types a r e m e d i a t e d b y l a n g u a g e a n d t h a t e v e n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s
 207
206
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

r e q u i r e d e m a n d i n g feats o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . H o w - c l a i m s . A p e l uses t h e v i v i d i m a g e o f t h e i n t e r l o c k i n g o f t h e i d e a l a n d
ever, b e c a u s e t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d the real communication c o m m u n i t y ; b u t this sounds almost too
reaching understanding imposes certain attitudes a n d perspectives Kantian. The d o c t r i n e o f t h e " t w o r e a l m s " has b e e n completely
o n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e actor t h a t are i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e x e r t i n g a o v e r c o m e . T h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e oriented toward
causal i n f l u e n c e o v e r a n o p p o n e n t , w h i c h is o r i e n t e d directly^ t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g demands idealizing suppositions on the
o n e ' s o w n success, I d o n o t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o n t r o v e r s i a l p a r t o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors; however, these suppositions f u n c -
types o f a c t i o n solely f r o m a n a n a l y t i c a l p o i n t o f view. T h e sociologi- tion as s o c i a l facts a n d a r e , as is l a n g u a g e i t s e l f , c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r t h e
c a l o b s e r v e r , t o o , is i n p r i n c i p l e i n a p o s i t i o n t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n f o r m i n w h i c h s o c i o c u l t u r a l l i f e r e p r o d u c e s itself.
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f t h e a t t i t u d e s t h a t , Alexander maintains that, i n the concept o f communicative ac-
f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e actor, p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e a l t e r n a t i v e . 4 7
tion, I conflate "ideological" questions w i t h m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d e m -
T h i s i d e a l - t y p i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , t h a t is, o n e w h i c h is m a d e o n the p i r i c a l ones. I a m supposed t o have tacidy smuggled in "value
basis o f c r i t e r i a u n a m b i v a l e n t f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e p r a g m a t - postulates" by way o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d
ics o f l a n g u a g e , a n d w h i c h is b y n o m e a n s m e r e l y a n a l y t i c , d o e s n o t action oriented toward reaching understanding, instead o f declaring
i n any way r o b t h e c o m p l e x c o n c e p t o f social cooperation—what them openly. The identification of linguistic understanding
M a r x t e r m e d " l a b o r " — o f its r e l e v a n c e : s o m e t h i n g t h a t is i m p o r t a n t (Sprachverstehen) w i t h a communicatively achieved agreement sup-
i n s o c i a l r e a l i t y m u s t n o t also b e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t u a l l y . More- p o s e d l y serves t h i s p u r p o s e . E v e n i f w e leave t h i s m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
over, t h e d e g r e e o f r a t i o n a l i t y o f s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n c a n v a r y ; seen aside, h o w e v e r , w h a t A l e x a n d e r o v e r l o o k s is t h e p o i n t o f t h e e n t i r e
empirically, i t rarely meets the demands o f game t h e o r y a n d decision p r o j e c t . I w o u l d n e v e r have t a c k l e d a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c reconstruc-
theory. tion o f the r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l o f speech i f I h a d n o t h a r b o r e d the
e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t I w o u l d i n this way be able to o b t a i n a c o n c e p t o f
I t s h o u l d n o w also b e c l e a r t h a t a p p r o a c h i n g a n analysis o f a c t i o n
communicative rationality f r o m the normative content o f the univer-
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m the vantage p o i n t o f
sal a n d u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f t h e noncircumventable p r a c t i c e
speech-act t h e o r y by n o m e a n s i m p l i e s a n assimilation o f this a c t i o n
o f e v e r y d a y processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t is n o t a m a t t e r
to the m o d e l of discourses—which serve t o r e l i e v e a c t i o n . 4 8
Action
o f this o r that preference, o f " o u r " or " t h e i r " n o t i o n s o f rational life;
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d v a l i d i t y is n o t (as D u x b e l i e v e s ) a s s i m i l a t e d t o t h e
r a t h e r , w h a t is a t issue h e r e is t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a v o i c e o f r e a s o n ,
t r e a t m e n t i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t have become
a voice t h a t we have n o c h o i c e b u t t o a l l o w to speak i n everyday
p r o b l e m a t i c . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I w a n t t o h o l d o n t o t h e thesis t h a t , w i t h
c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s — w h e t h e r w e w a n t t o o r n o t . P e r h a p s I have
the action-coordinating role o f factually raised a n d recognized valid-
d e v i o u s l y o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h d e f i n i t i o n s w h a t I c l a i m t o have f o u n d
ity claims, a m o m e n t o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y enters i n t o everyday c o m -
t h r o u g h r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s — t h i s , a t a n y r a t e , is t h e c l a i m o n w h i c h
m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s . C r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are J a n u s - f a c e d : as
criticism s h o u l d focus.
c l a i m s t h e y t r a n s c e n d , a t least f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i -
pants, all merely local agreements a n d r e l y o n a subversive, ever- Those w h o reproach me for neglecting materialist components
flexible reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l , disputable reasons; o n the other suspect m e o f a n o t h e r type o f i d e a l i z a t i o n . T h i s o b j e c t i o n occurs i n
h a n d , t h e y m u s t b e r a i s e d here and now w i t h i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s , w i t h several v e r s i o n s . J o h a n n e s B e r g e r suspects t h a t l u r k i n g b e h i n d m y
coverage p r o v i d e d by a n u n q u e s t i o n e d cultural background, and c o n c e p t u a l s t r a t e g y is t h e i n t e n t i o n t o d i v i d e u p , as D u r k h e i m d i d ,
accepted (or rejected) with regard to nonreversible action se- all social actions i n t o m o r a l a n d i m m o r a l actions f r o m t h e p o i n t o f
q u e n c e s — t h e social r e a l i t y o f t h e l i f e w o r l d consists o f s u c h a c t i o n view o f a l t r u i s m a n d egoism. Johannes Weiss also m a i n t a i n s t h a t
s e q u e n c e s , w h i c h are i n t e r m e s h e d b y way o f c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n owes its i n t e g r a t i v e a c h i e v e m e n t s i n t h e first
208 209
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

instance to the m o r a l force o f normative validity claims. 4 9

Apart from
i n t u i t i v e l y p r e s e n t , p r e r e f l e x i v e l y k n o w n f o r m o f l i f e t h a t is p r e s u p -
a n y t h i n g else, these r e s e r v a t i o n s d o n o t a p p l y f o r t h e s i m p l e r e a s o n
p o s e d as u n p r o b l e m a t i c — f e a t u r e s t h a t have b e c o m e c u l t u r a l l y h a b i -
t h a t I i n t r o d u c e n o r m a d v e l y r e g u l a t e d a c d o n m e r e l y as a l i m i t case
tualized for the participants i n communication a n d i n t o w h i c h they
of communicative action: the rationally motivating b i n d i n g and
have b e e n socialized. Subjects a c t i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , i n t h e i r su-
b o n d i n g e f f e c t o f s p e e c h acts s p r e a d s across t h e w h o l e s p e c t r u m of
perficially autonomous achievements i n reaching understanding,
i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces, w h i c h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e par-
are d e p e n d e n t o n the resources o f a b a c k g r o u n d knowledge of the
ticular language involved, and appear i n different constellations
l i f e w o r l d t h a t is n o t at t h e i r d i s p o s a l . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t h e r e is t h e
d e p e n d i n g o n the particular linguistic worldview a n d f o r m o f life. I t
double—philosophical a n d s o c i o l o g i c a l — p o i n t o f view i n t e r m s of
is p r e c i s e l y t h i s i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e s p e c t r u m o f v a l i d i t y
w h i c h t h e l i f e w o r l d c a n b e a n a l y z e d m o r e accurately. I t is n o t I w h o
and the interplay of cognitive, expressive, a n d aesthetic v a l i d i t y
b l e n d b o t h a n a l y t i c a l levels " i n t o o n e a n o t h e r i n a w a y t h a t is, f o r a l l
claims w i t h conventional, m o r a l , a n d legal ones t h a t accords every-
the convergence of approaches to the problem, inadmissible"
d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s t h e i r a u t o n o m y vis-à-vis ( a n d t h e i r c l e a r
(Weiss). 5 3

distinction from) normative contexts (which, moreover, comprise

only one o f three components of the background o f the lifeworld).
Notes
Weiss a n d o t h e r s have r e n d e r e d t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s m o r e s p e c i f i c i n
that they argue that the concept o f communicative a c t i o n suggests 1. [Editor's note:] Charles Taylor, "Language and Society," in A. Honneth and
the rationalist illusion that language could engender f r o m within H . Joas, eds., Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).

i t s e l f i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects; t h e y m a i n t a i n t h a t , 2. Cf. Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Über den Nationalcharakter der Sprachen," in
i n fact, t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g e f f e c t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts c a n Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie. Werke, vol. 3 (Darmstadt, 1963), p. 81: " A lively, engaged
conversation i n which the speakers truly exchange ideas, feelings, and perceptions is
arise o n l y " i f c e r t a i n s o c i a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n s as w e l l as in itself the central point of language, as it were, the essence of which can only be
p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s a r e p r e s u p p o s e d ; " a n d " i t is t o w a r d t h e s e conceived as both echo and re-echo, as address and response, which, in its origins as
in its transformations, never belongs to one but always to all, and which lies in the
empirical conditions for the development and b i n d i n g character o f
lonely depths of each person's spirit yet comes to the fore only in sociality."
rationality that the explanations o f f e r e d by a n e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y of
society m u s t be d i r e c t e d . " 5 0
T h i s is p r e c i s e l y m y c o n t e n t i o n . H o w e v e r , 3. [Editor's note:] T h e word "Gespräch" implies not only dialogue or discussion but
also conversation. I have translated it here as "dialogue" because Habermas himself
the pragmatic concept o f language permits another, nonempiricist focuses o n these more structured forms of speech rather than on conversations.
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e same t h i n g . I have n e v e r l e f t a n y r o o m f o r d o u b t Nonetheless, it may be useful to bear in m i n d that Gespräch has a broader interpre-
tation than I have given it here.
that the concept of action oriented toward reaching understanding
developed i n "Intermediate Reflections: Social A c t i o n , Purposive 4. W. von Humboldt, "Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus u n d
Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n " 5 1
m u s t be s u p p l e m e n t e d by a c o m p l e - ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts," Werke, vol. 3,
p. 438: "Language has an objective effect and is independent precisely in so far as it
m e n t a r y c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d as e l a b o r a t e d i n "Intermediate is subjectively effected and dependent. . . . Its dead part, as it were, must always be
R e f l e c t i o n s : System a n d L i f e w o r l d . " 5 2
I t w o u l d be c o m p l e t e l y i m p o s - generated anew in thought, become alive in speech or understanding (Verständnis)
and therefore completely merge with the subject. . . . I n this manner it o n each
sible to explain how e v e r y d a y processes o f c o n s e n s u s formation occasion experiences the full influence of the individual upon it; yet this influence
r e p e a t e d l y s u c c e e d i n o v e r c o m i n g t h e h u r d l e p o s e d b y t h e risk o f is already i n itself bounded by what it (language as a system) effects and has effected."

disagreement b u i l t i n t o practices o f reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the

5. Ibid., p. 439.
f o r m o f criticizable v a l i d i t y claims were we n o t able to take i n t o
a c c o u n t t h e massive preunderstanding o f participants i n communica- 6. W. von Humboldt, "Über den Dualis," Werke, vol. 3, pp. 138f.:

tion; this p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g resides i n t h e self-evident features o f a n A n unalterable dualism resides in the original essence of language, a n d the
possibility of speech is determined by someone speaking and someone replying.
T h o u g h t itself is already substantially accompanied by a proclivity for social exist-
210
Chapter 3
ence, a n d human beings long for . . . a You that accords with the I ; concepts
appear to them [human beings] to become determinate and certain only by being
reflected back by an alien capacity for thought. . . . T h e objectivity appears even
more perfected, however, if this division does not occur solely within the subject,
but rather when the person imagining can truly perceive the thought outside him,
which is possible only if perceived in another being imagining a n d thinking like
himself. T h e r e is, however, n o mediator other than language between one capac-
ity for thought a n d another.
7. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, pp. 80f.
8. [Editor's note:] T h e word "unvertretbar" expresses a particular interpretation of
the idea of irreplaceability—the idea that only I can speak on behalf of myself, in
other words, the idea of unrepresentability; for a brief discussion of this, see M. Cooke,
"Selfhood a n d Solidarity," Constellations 1 (1995): 3.
9. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 208.
10. Von Humboldt, "Über den Dualis," pp. 113ff., a n d "Über die Verschiedenheit des
menschlichen Sprachbaus," pp. 191ff., in particular, pp. 200ff.
11. [Editor's note:] T h e word "Verständnis" has connotations beyond mere compre-
hension, suggesting that two or more people see the world (or some aspect of it) in
the same way.
12. Von Humboldt, "Über die Verschiedenheit," p. 60.
13. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 150.
14. Ibid., p. 160.
15. Von Humboldt, "Über d e n Nationalcharakter der Sprachen," Werke, vol. 3,
pp. 64ff.
16. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 20: " [ T ] h e sum of all that is knowable, as the
field to be processed by the h u m a n spirit, lies i n the middle . . . between all lan-
guages."
17. Ibid., p. 419.
18. Ibid., pp. 147-148: " I f there is one idea visible throughout history that has gained
ever increasing validity . . . then it is the endeavor to overcome all barriers that
prejudices a n d one-sided views of all sorts inimically erect between humans, a n d to
treat all humanity, without consideration of religion, nation, a n d colour, as one great,
almost fraternal tribe."
19. Cf. J . Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C . L e n h a r d t
a n d S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 105f., 175f.
20. Cf. a similar argument by Rüdigier Bubner in "Rationaliät als Lebensform. Z u
J . Habermas' Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns," in Handlung, Sprache und Vernunft
(Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 295ff. O n p. 312: " I t is precisely this, however, which practical
philosophy has always regarded as a major problem, namely how consistent behavior
211
C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c d o n
can follow from valid insight. . . . Aristotie insists that the eudaimonia of a successful
life is not the object of intersubjectively mediated knowledge but is rather the final
horizon of meaningful practices that is given directly with the h u m a n disposition to
act." I have attempted to show why this position, which Bubner has since developed
fully in Geschichtsprozesse und Handlungsnormen (Frankfurt, 1984), is inconsistent if one
attempts to follow it through: see my essay i n H . Schnädelbach, ed., Rationalität
(Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 218ff.
21. Cf. J . Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 341ff.
22. C . Taylor, 'Theories of Meaning," i n his Human Agency and Language (Philosophical
Papers, vol. 1) (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 215ff.
23. I have put forward this argument with respect to Heidegger, Derrida, and Cas-
toriadis in Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 153ff., 179ff. (see chapter 9 below),
and 318f., respectively.
24. Rolf Z i m m e r m a n n , Utopie-Rationalität-Politik (Freiburg, 1985).
25. Cf. also M . Bartels, "Sprache u n d soziales H a n d e l n . Eine Auseinandersetzung mit
Habermas' Sprachbegriff," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol. 36 (1982):
226-233.
26. Cf. E . Tugendhat, " J . Habermas on Communicative Action," in G . Seebaß a n d
R. Tuomela, eds., Social Action (Dordrecht, 1985), pp. 179ff.
27. H e r e I draw on some of James Bohman's reflections; cf. the second chapter in
his doctoral dissertation Language and Social Criticism (Boston University, 1985),
pp. 139ff.
28. Davidson himself lists the categories of sentences that cannot initially be analyzed
by means of the theory. Cf. T r u t h and Meaning," in Synthese (1967): 310.
29. Cf. J o h n Searle's 'Taxonomy of IUocutionary Acts" in his Expression and Meaning
(Cambridge, 1979), pp. 1-29; cf. also J . Searle and D. Vanderveken, Foundations of
Illocutionary Logic (Cambridge, 1985).
30. Cf. my critique of Searle in chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 156ff.
31. [Editor's note:] J . Alexander, "Habermas a n d Critical Theory: Beyond the Marx-
ian Dilemma?," in Honneth a n d j o a s , Communicative Action, pp. 49ff.
32. Z i m m e r m a n n , Utopie, p. 373: "Habermas hereby expands his conceptualization
of the illocutionary sense of speech acts in such a way that it already includes an
understanding of their social function."
33. See Tugendhat's example in "Habermas on Communicative Action," p. 184.
34. Z i m m e r m a n n speaks of the "social deployment" of the same illocutionary forces
in different contexts. Here, the illocutionary meaning of a normative prescription is
"superimposed" on the illocutionary meaning of the request.
212
Chapter 3
35. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 131ff.
36. T h a t this second set of conditions belongs to the very meaning of the request
that has been uttered can be seen from what it would mean to turn down the request.
With his " n o , " the foreigner can negate the existential presuppositions on which the
propositional component rests ("I have no money o n me") or the sincerity of the
speaker ("You must be j o k i n g " ) , that is, the implicit claims to truth or truthfulness.
But only with a " n o " that challenges the normative context ("People should no
longer be begging in this day and age") does the hearer dispute the validity of the
explicitly raised claim.
37. J . Habermas, "A Reply to Skjei's 'A C o m m e n t on Performative, Subject, and
Proposition in Habermas's T h e o r y of C o m m u n i c a t i o n , ' " Inquiry, 28 (1985): 87-122.
38. [Editor's note:] See also chapters 4 and 6 in the present volume, pp. 223ff. and
301ff., respectively.
39. Formal semantics is able to stylize this limit case as the normal case all the more
easily because imperatives, in the course of ontogenesis, are learned initially as simple
imperatives reinforced by sanctions, and only later as imperatives that have normative
"backing."
40. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 126ff.
41. See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 125ff. and p. 164.
42. Misunderstandings may have been caused by the fact that, in earlier publications,
I introduced action types first in terms of criteria for the action orientations ascribed
to the actor, and not from the sociological standpoint of the combination of actor
attitudes (orientation toward success vs. orientation toward reaching understanding)
with types of coordination of different plans of action (influence vs. consensus). T h e
fundamental teleological structure of all action, including all social interactions, was
thus lost from view.
43. F o r example, M. Baurmann, "Understanding as an A i m and Aims of Under-
standing," in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Soda! Action, pp. 187ff. Cf. also J . Berger,
' T h e Linguistification of the Sacred and the Delinguistification of the Economy," in
H o n n e t h a n d j o a s , Communicative Action, p. 172. " O n e can reach an understanding
successfully and achieve success in an understanding manner (verständnisvoll). T h e
two figures of action cannot be disentangled as easily as Habermas imagines."
44. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 i n the present volume, p. 164.
45. Z i m m e r m a n n , Utopie, p. 379, nonetheless raises the justifiable objection that
"conversation" cannot be construed as a limit case of communicative action from the
same point of view as are, respectively, normativety regulated and dramaturgical
action. T h e fact that, in conversation, the interest in communication gains inde-
pendence from the interest in pursuing one's own plans of action suggests that it
should rather be considered from a functional point of view as a special case.
46. [Editor's note:] T h e G e r m a n word here is unvermittelt, which literally means
"without mediation."
213
Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d Action
47. T h i s does not exclude combinations such as those considered by Max Weber
under the heading "Social Action": in the case of economic action regulated by civil
law, for example, the conflicting action orientations are situated at a level different
from the normative consensus regarding the framework of legal conditions involved.
It equally does not exclude hybrid forms such as a politician's rhetorical behavior,
which cannot be analyzed point by point in terms of the model of latently strategic
action. Overall, indeed, the hierarchization of levels of action must be taken into
account whenever both types of action are entwined. Communicative action is always
embedded in the teleological action contexts of the individuals respectively partici-
pating in it. Admittedly, the situation of someone guilelessly pursuing a random
action goal, or one not declared explicitly due to specific circumstances, must be
distinguished from the situation of someone cunningly pursuing a deliberately con-
cealed (because it could not be declared openly) action goal that, as the likely side
effect of a communicatively achieved consensus, he strives for with a strate- gic inten-
tion. Conversely, the strategic deployment of communicative means can be subordi-
nated to the goal of consensus formation if, for example, the situation permits no
more than a "giving the other person to understand something" (Zu- Verstehen-Geben)
in an indirect way. I assume that the corresponding attitudes of the actors similarly
can form a hierarchy; attitudes oriented respectively toward success and reaching
understanding are incompatible only with reference to one and the same level of
action.
48. [Editor's note:] F o r a discussion of the various "relief mechanisms" that compen-
sate for the ever-increasing complexity of communicative action in developed socie-
ties, see J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1987), esp. pp. 179ff.
49. J . Weiss, "Verständigungsorientierung u n d Kritik," Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie
und Sozialpsychologie 1 (1983): 108ff.
50. Ibid., p. 113.
51. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 105ff.
52. [Editor's note:] I n Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 113ff.
53. Weiss, 'Verständigungsorientierung," p. 113.
4

Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated

Interactions, and the Lifeworld (1988)

I t will facilitate a perspicuous overview o f the m u l t i p l e interconnec-

t i o n s b e t w e e n a c t i o n a n d s p e e c h i f w e s t a r t w i t h t h e clearest a n d
simplest examples possible. 1
I shall e x e m p l i f y " a c t i o n " by means o f
e v e r y d a y o r p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s s u c h as r u n n i n g , h a n d i n g t h i n g s over,
h a m m e r i n g , o r sawing; I shall e x e m p l i f y "speech" by means of
s p e e c h acts s u c h as c o m m a n d s , avowals, a n d s t a t e m e n t s . I n b o t h
cases w e m a y s p e a k o f " a c t i o n s " i n a b r o a d e r sense. H o w e v e r , so as
n o t to b l u r t h e differences t h a t are i m p o r t a n t f o r m y a r g u m e n t , I
shall choose f r o m the outset two d i f f e r e n t descriptive models. First,
I shall describe actions i n the n a r r o w e r sense—simple n o n l i n g u i s t i c
a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d s o r t — a s p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t i e s (Zweck-
tätigkeiten) ; w i t h t h e s e , t h e a c t o r i n t e r v e n e s i n t h e w o r l d i n o r d e r t o
a c h i e v e h i s i n t e n d e d goals t h r o u g h t h e c h o i c e a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
o f a p p r o p r i a t e means. Second, I shall describe linguistic utterances
as acts b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a s p e a k e r w i s h e s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g
(sich verständigen) w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n about something i n the
world.

D e s c r i p t i o n s o f linguistic utterances are possible f r o m the perspec-

tive o f t h e a c t o r , t h a t is, i n t h e f i r s t p e r s o n . T h e y m a y b e c o n t r a s t e d
w i t h descriptions f r o m the perspective o f a t h i r d person w h o ob-
serves h o w a n a c t o r , b y m e a n s o f p u r p o s i v e activity, a t t a i n s a g o a l o r
h o w h e , b y m e a n s o f a speech act, reaches u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t
s o m e t h i n g w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n . I n t h e case o f s p e e c h acts, d e s c r i p -
t i o n s f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e s e c o n d p e r s o n a r e always p o s s i b l e
216
Chapter 4
( " Y o u o r d e r m e ( h e o r d e r s m e ) t o d r o p m y w e a p o n " ) ; i n t h e case o f
p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t i e s , s u c h d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e possible only w h e n the
activities are i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o contexts o f c o o p e r a t i o n ("You h a n d
over (he hands over) the w e a p o n to m e " ) .
Speech versus Action
T o b e g i n w i t h , one can appeal to the difference between descriptive
p e r s p e c t i v e s i n o r d e r t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e t w o types o f n o n l i n g u i s t i c
a n d l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s r e s p e c t i v e l y r e l y o n specific c o n d i t i o n s o f u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen). W h e n I o b s e r v e a f r i e n d h u r r y i n g past a t a
r u n o n t h e o t h e r side o f t h e r o a d , I c a n , o f c o u r s e , i d e n t i f y h e r
h u r r y i n g past as a n a c t i o n . F o r s o m e p u r p o s e s , t h e s e n t e n c e "She
h u r r i e s d o w n t h e r o a d " w i l l also suffice as a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n ;
w i t h t h i s , w e a t t r i b u t e a n i n t e n t i o n t o t h e actor, n a m e l y , t h a t she
wishes t o g e t t o s o m e w h e r e d o w n t h e r o a d as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . B u t
w e c a n n o t infer t h i s i n t e n t i o n f r o m t h e o b s e r v a t i o n ; r a t h e r w e p r e -
suppose a general context that justifies o u r conjecture o f such an
i n t e n t i o n . T o be sure, even t h e n t h e a c t i o n remains curiously i n n e e d
o f f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t m i g h t b e t h e case t h a t o u r f r i e n d d o e s
n o t w a n t t o miss h e r t r a i n , d o e s n o t w a n t t o b e l a t e f o r a l e c t u r e , o r
w a n t s t o k e e p a n a p p o i n t m e n t ; i t m i g h t e q u a l l y be t h e case t h a t she
t h i n k s she is b e i n g f o l l o w e d a n d is f l e e i n g , t h a t she has j u s t e s c a p e d
a t t a c k a n d is r u n n i n g away, t h a t she has p a n i c k e d f o r s o m e o t h e r
r e a s o n a n d is s i m p l y w a n d e r i n g a b o u t , a n d so f o r t h . A l t h o u g h , f r o m
t h e perspective o f the observer, we can i d e n t i f y a n a c t i o n , we c a n n o t
d e s c r i b e i t w i t h c e r t a i n t y as t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a specific p l a n o f a c t i o n ;
f o r t o d o so, w e w o u l d h a v e t o k n o w t h e i n t e n t i o n a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e
a c t i o n . W e c a n , b y m e a n s o f i n d i c a t o r s , d e d u c e w h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n is
a n d attribute i t hypothetically to the actor; i n o r d e r to be c e r t a i n o f
i t , h o w e v e r , w e w o u l d have t o b e a b l e t o t a k e u p t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t . N o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y d o e s n o t o f i t s e l f a f f o r d us s u c h
a n i n s i g h t i n a n y w a y — i t d o e s n o t of its own accord m a k e i t s e l f k n o w n
as t h e a c t i o n t h a t i t is p l a n n e d t o b e . S p e e c h acts, b y c o n t r a s t , d o
satisfy t h i s c o n d i t i o n .
I f I understand the c o m m a n d t h a t m y g i r l f r i e n d gives m e (or
s o m e o n e else) w h e n she t e l l s m e ( o r t h a t o t h e r p e r s o n ) t o d r o p m y
217
Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d
g u n , t h e n I k n o w f a i r l y w e l l w h a t a c t i o n she h a s c a r r i e d o u t : she has
u t t e r e d t h i s specific c o m m a n d . T h i s a c t i o n d o e s n o t r e m a i n i n n e e d
o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h e same sense as d o e s t h e r u n n i n g past o f m y
h u r r y i n g f r i e n d . F o r i n t h e s t a n d a r d case o f l i t e r a l m e a n i n g , a
speech act makes t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker k n o w n ; a hearer can
infer f r o m the semantic c o n t e n t o f the utterance h o w the sentence
u t t e r e d is b e i n g u s e d , t h a t is, w h a t t y p e o f a c t i o n is b e i n g p e r f o r m e d
w i t h i t . S p e e c h acts i n t e r p r e t t h e m s e l v e s ; t h e y h a v e a s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l
s t r u c t u r e . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y e l e m e n t establishes, as a k i n d o f p r a g -
m a t i c c o m m e n t a r y , t h e sense i n w h i c h w h a t is s a i d is b e i n g u s e d .
A u s t i n ' s i n s i g h t t h a t o n e d o e s s o m e t h i n g b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g has a
reverse side t o i t : b y p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h act, o n e also says w h a t o n e
is d o i n g . A d m i t t e d l y , t h i s p e r f o r m a t i v e sense o f a s p e e c h act reveals
i t s e l f o n l y t o a p o t e n t i a l h e a r e r w h o , i n a d o p t i n g t h e stance o f a
s e c o n d p e r s o n , has g i v e n u p t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n o b s e r v e r i n f a v o r
o f t h a t o f a p a r t i c i p a n t . O n e has t o s p e a k t h e s a m e l a n g u a g e a n d , as
it were, enter the intersubjectively shared l i f e w o r l d o f a linguistic
c o m m u n i t y i n order to benefit f r o m the peculiar reflexivity o f natu-
r a l l a n g u a g e a n d t o b e a b l e t o base t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a n a c t i o n
carried out with words o n understanding the implicit self-commen-
t a r y o f t h i s s p e e c h act.
S p e e c h acts d i f f e r f r o m s i m p l e n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s n o t o n l y b y
v i r t u e o f t h i s r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b u t also b y
v i r t u e o f t h e k i n d o f goals that can be i n t e n d e d t h r o u g h speaking,
as w e l l as t h e k i n d o f successes t h a t c a n b e a c h i e v e d . C e r t a i n l y , a t a
g e n e r a l l e v e l , all a c t i o n s , l i n g u i s t i c a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c o n e s , c a n be
c o n c e i v e d o f as g o a l - o r i e n t e d activity. H o w e v e r , as s o o n as we w i s h t o
d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n action oriented toward reaching understanding a n d
purposive activity, w e m u s t h e e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e
g a m e i n w h i c h a c t o r s p u r s u e goals, a r e successful, and produce
r e s u l t s takes o n a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g i n t h e t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e t h a n
i t d o e s i n t h e t h e o r y o f a c t i o n — t h e s a m e basic c o n c e p t s a r e i n t e r -
p r e t e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways. F o r o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , i t suffices to
d e s c r i b e p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y i n a g e n e r a l w a y as a g o a l - o r i e n t e d a n d
causally e f f e c t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . C o r r e s p o n d i n g
t o t h e g o a l , w h i c h is s e l e c t e d f r o m a s t a n d p o i n t t h a t is v a l u e l a d e n ,
is a state i n t h e w o r l d t h a t is t o be b r o u g h t i n t o e x i s t e n c e t h r o u g h
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the choice a n d application o f apparendy appropriate means. U n d e r -
l y i n g t h e p l a n o f a c t i o n h e r e is a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n
w h i c h t h e g o a l o f a c t i o n is d e t e r m i n e d (a) i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e
m e a n s o f i n t e r v e n t i o n ( b ) as a state t o b e b r o u g h t a b o u t causally (c)
i n the objective w o r l d . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t s p e e c h acts
c a n n o t be subsumed w i t h o u t difficulty u n d e r this m o d e l of pur-
posive activity; at any rate, t h e speaker h i m s e l f c a n n o t i n t e n d his
i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims i n t e r m s o f this d e s c r i p t i o n ( a - c ) .
I f w e c o n c e i v e o f a s p e e c h act as a m e a n s w h o s e e n d is r e a c h i n g
understanding (Verständigung) a n d d i v i d e u p t h e g e n e r a l a i m of
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t o t h e s u b c a t e g o r i e s of, first, t h e a i m t h a t
t h e h e a r e r s h o u l d understand t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said a n d , sec-
o n d , t h e a i m t h a t she s h o u l d recognize the validity o f t h e u t t e r a n c e ,
t h e n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f h o w t h e speaker can p u r s u e these aims does
n o t f u l f i l l any o f the three c o n d i t i o n s m e n t i o n e d above.
a. I l l o c u t i o n a r y goals c a n n o t b e d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n d y of the
linguistic means o f reaching understanding. Grammatical utterances
do n o t constitute instruments for reaching understanding i n the
s a m e w a y as, f o r e x a m p l e , the operations c a r r i e d o u t by a c o o k
constitute means for p r o d u c i n g enjoyable meals. Rather, t h e me-
d i u m o f n a t u r a l language a n d t h e telos o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
interpret one another reciprocally: the one cannot be explained
w i t h o u t recourse to the other.
b. T h e s p e a k e r c a n n o t i n t e n d t h e a i m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
as s o m e t h i n g t h a t is t o b e b r o u g h t a b o u t causally, b e c a u s e t h e k i n d
o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y success t h a t goes b e y o n d mere understanding of
w h a t is s a i d d e p e n d s o n t h e h e a r e r ' s r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t .
T h e h e a r e r m u s t , as i t w e r e , o f h e r o w n f r e e w i l l give a p p r o v a l t o
a g r e e m e n t o n a given m a t t e r by r e c o g n i z i n g (the validity of) a c r i t i -
cizable validity c l a i m . I l l o c u t i o n a r y goals can be a t t a i n e d o n l y c o o p -
e r a t i v e l y ; t h e y a r e n o t , u n l i k e causally p r o d u c e d effects, at the
disposal o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A speaker
c a n n o t a t t r i b u t e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success to himself m t h e s a m e w a y t h a t
s o m e o n e a c t i n g p u r p o s i v e l y is a b l e t o a t t r i b u t e t o h i m s e l f t h e r e s u l t
o f h i s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e n e x u s o f i n n e r w o r l d l y processes.
c. F i n a l l y , f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h e p r o c e s s o f
c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d t h e r e s u l t t o w h i c h t h i s is s u p p o s e d t o l e a d d o
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Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d
n o t c o n s t i t u t e i n n e r w o r l d l y states. P e r s o n s a c t i n g p u r p o s i v e l y en-
counter one a n o t h e r solely as e n t i t i e s i n t h e w o r l d , d e s p i t e the
freedom o f choice they m u t u a l l y a t t r i b u t e to each o t h e r ; they are
accessible f o r o n e a n o t h e r o n l y as o b j e c t s o r o p p o n e n t s . S p e a k e r a n d
hearer, by contrast, adopt a p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude i n w h i c h they
e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r as m e m b e r s o f t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d
l i f e w o r l d o f t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y , t h a t is, i n t h e s e c o n d p e r s o n .
I n reaching an understanding with one another about something i n
the w o r l d , the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims they pursue reside, f r o m their
perspective, b e y o n d the w o r l d to w h i c h they can refer i n the objec-
tivating attitude o f an observer a n d i n w h i c h they can intervene
p u r p o s i v e l y . T o t h i s e x t e n t , t h e y also r e m a i n i n a transmundane
position for one another.
W e h a v e d i s t i n g u i s h e d s p e e c h acts f r o m s i m p l e n o n l i n g u i s t i c ac-
tivities o n t h e basis o f t w o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : first, t h a t t h e f o r m e r a r e
self-interpreting actions w i t h a reflexive structure; a n d second, that
t h e y a r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d i l l o c u t i o n a r y g o a l s t h a t c a n n o t have t h e
status o f a p u r p o s e t o b e a c h i e v e d i n a n i n n e r w o r l d l y way, c a n n o t b e
realized w i t h o u t the freely given c o o p e r a t i o n a n d agreement o f an
addressee, a n d can be e x p l a i n e d o n l y w i t h recourse t o the c o n c e p t
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is i n h e r e n t i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m
itself. T h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g b o t h types o f a c t i o n a r e
d i f f e r e n t , as a r e t h e basic c o n c e p t s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e actors
themselves c o u l d describe t h e i r goals.
T h e r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e s e t w o types o f a c t i o n is also
c o n f i r m e d b y t h e d i f f e r e n t r e s p e c t i v e c r i t e r i a f o r success. P u r p o s i v e
i n t e r v e n t i o n s a n d s p e e c h acts satisfy d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s o f r a t i o n -
ality. R a t i o n a l i t y has less t o d o w i t h t h e possession o f k n o w l e d g e t h a n
w i t h h o w subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n use k n o w l e d g e . N o w ,
i t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e is e m b o d i e d in
n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s j u s t as m u c h as i t is i n s p e e c h acts. I t is t h e
s p e c i f i c w a y i n w h i c h s u c h k n o w l e d g e is u s e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t d e t e r -
m i n e s t h e sense o f r a t i o n a l i t y a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e success o f t h e
a c t i o n is assessed. I f w e t a k e as o u r p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e t h e n o n c o m -
m u n i c a t i v e use o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e i n teleological actions,
we encounter a concept o f purposive r a t i o n a l i t y — a s i t has been
e l a b o r a t e d i n t h e t h e o r y o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e . I f we start w i t h the
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c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e i n s p e e c h acts, w e
e n c o u n t e r a c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y (Verstdndigungs-
rationalitdt) t h a t c a n be e x p l i c a t e d i n t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g w i t h t h e
h e l p o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f s p e e c h acts. I n t u i t i v e l y
u n d e r l y i n g t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is t h e e x p e r i -
ence o f the noncoercively unifying, consensus-promoting force of
a r g u m e n t a t i v e speech. Whereas purposive rationality refers to t h e
c o n d i t i o n s f o r causally e f f e c t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d o f e x i s t -
i n g states o f a f f a i r s , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g is assessed w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s between
(a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y f o r s p e e c h acts, ( b ) t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
r a i s e d w i t h s p e e c h acts, a n d (c) t h e r e a s o n s p r o v i d e d f o r t h e v i n d i -
c a t i o n o f these c l a i m s i n d i s c o u r s e . T h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y
o f successful s p e e c h acts a r e o f a d i f f e r e n t c a l i b e r t h a n t h e c o n d i -
t i o n s f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f successful p u r p o s i v e activity.
These observations a r e i n t e n d e d m e r e l y t o serve as i n i t i a l e v i -
dence i n favor o f the m o r e far-reaching c o n t e n t i o n that purposive
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality m a y n o t be substituted f o r o n e an-
other. O n this premise, I r e g a r d purposive activity a n d a c t i o n o r i -
e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as e l e m e n t a r y types o f a c t i o n ,
n e i t h e r o f w h i c h may be r e d u c e d to the other. I n the f o l l o w i n g ,
w e s h a l l b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e associations into which both of
these types o f a c t i o n e n t e r i n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s .
W h a t I call communicative action emerges out o f one of these
associations.
C o m m u n i c a t i v e v e r s u s Strategic A c t i o n
I use t h e t e r m "social a c t i o n " o r " i n t e r a c t i o n " as a c o m p l e x concept
t h a t can be analyzed w i t h the a i d o f the e l e m e n t a r y concepts o f
a c t i o n a n d speech. I n linguistically m e d i a t e d interactions ( a n d o u r
d i s c u s s i o n w i l l d e a l o n l y w i t h these f r o m n o w o n ) , b o t h these types
o f a c t i o n are e n t w i n e d . T o be sure, they o c c u r i n d i f f e r e n t constel-
lations, d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces o f speech
acts a s s u m e a n a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g r o l e , o r w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts
f o r t h e i r p a r t are s u b o r d i n a t e d i n such a way t o the e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c
dynamics o f t h e e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e o f actors w h o affect o n e a n -
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Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d
o t h e r purposively t h a t the specifically l i n g u i s t i c b i n d i n g a n d b o n d -
i n g e n e r g i e s (Bindungsenergien) r e m a i n unused.
A n i n t e r a c t i o n m a y b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m
o f h o w t h e a c t i o n p l a n s o f several a c t o r s c a n b e c o o r d i n a t e d i n s u c h
a way t h a t t h e a c t i o n s o f A l t e r c a n b e c o n n e c t e d u p w i t h t h o s e of
E g o . H e r e , " c o n n e c t i n g u p " m e a n s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e m e r e l y t h e
r e d u c t i o n i n scope o f c o n t i n g e n d y c o l l i d i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r c h o i c e
to a d e g r e e t h a t makes possible t h e r a d i a l i n t e r l o c k i n g o f topics a n d
a c t i o n s i n s o c i a l spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l time. I f w e a d o p t t h e p e r s p e c -
tive o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h e n e e d f o r c o n n e c t i o n a l r e a d y arises o u t
o f t h e i n t e r e s t e a c h has i n p u r s u i n g h e r o w n a c t i o n p l a n s . A t e l e -
o l o g i c a l a c t i o n c a n b e d e s c r i b e d as t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a p l a n t h a t
relies o n the actor's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e situation. I n c a r r y i n g o u t
a p l a n , the actor comes to grips w i t h a situation, whereby the action
situation forms a segment o f the e n v i r o n m e n t interpreted by the
actor. T h i s s e g m e n t is c o n s t i t u t e d i n l i g h t o f t h e o p t i o n s f o r a c t i o n
c o n s i d e r e d r e l e v a n t b y t h e a c t o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e success o f a p l a n .
T h e p r o b l e m o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n o c c u r s as s o o n as a n a c t o r c a n
c a r r y o u t h e r p l a n o n l y i n t e r a c t i v e l y , t h a t is, w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e
a c t i o n o f a t least o n e o t h e r a c t o r ( o r o f h i s r e f r a i n i n g f r o m a c t i o n ) .
D e p e n d i n g o n h o w A l t e r ' s plans a n d actions are c o n n e c t e d u p to
t h o s e o f E g o , d i f f e r e n t types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s
result.
T h e t w o types o f i n t e r a c t i o n c a n , t o b e g i n w i t h , b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d
f r o m o n e a n o t h e r a c c o r d i n g to the respective m e c h a n i s m o f a c t i o n
c o o r d i n a t i o n — i n particular, according to whether natural language
is e m p l o y e d solely as a m e d i u m f o r t r a n s m i t t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n o r
w h e t h e r i t is also m a d e use o f as a s o u r c e o f s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . I n
t h e first case I r e f e r t o s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n a n d i n t h e s e c o n d t o c o m m u -
n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I n t h e l a t t e r case, t h e c o n s e n s u s a c h i e v i n g f o r c e o f
l i n g u i s t i c processes o f reaching understanding (Verständigung)—that is,
t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g e n e r g i e s o f language itself-becomes effec-
tive f o r t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n o f a c t i o n s . I n t h e f o r m e r case, b y c o n t r a s t ,
the c o o r d i n a t i n g effect remains d e p e n d e n t o n the influence—func-
t i o n i n g v i a n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s — e x e r t e d b y t h e actors o n the
a c t i o n s i t u a t i o n a n d o n each other. Seen f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e
participants, the two mechanisms—that o f reaching understanding,
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w h i c h motivates convictions, a n d that o f e x e r t i o n o f influence, w h i c h
i n d u c e s b e h a v i o r — m u s t b e m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . S p e e c h acts c a n n o t
be carried out w i t h the simultaneous intentions of reaching an
a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n addressee w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g a n d o f e x e r -
c i s i n g a causal i n f l u e n c e o n h i m . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f s p e a k e r s
a n d hearers, agreement c a n n o t b e i m p o s e d f r o m w i t h o u t , t h a t is,
c a n n o t b e f o r c e d u p o n o n e side b y t h e o t h e r , e i t h e r b y d i r e c t i n t e r -
vention i n the action situation or indirect exertion o f influence
( a g a i n , c a l c u l a t e d i n t e r m s o f o n e ' s o w n success) o n t h e proposi-
t i o n a l attitudes o f one's o p p o n e n t . W h a t comes about manifestly
t h r o u g h gratification o r threat, suggestion or deception, cannot
c o u n t i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y as a n a g r e e m e n t ; a n i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h i s s o r t
violates the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces arouse c o n -
victions a n d b r i n g about "connections."
Because c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e use o f l a n -
g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t has t o f u l f i l l m o r e
s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s . T h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g actors a t t e m p t to a t t u n e t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e p l a n s cooperatively w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f a s h a r e d l i f e w o r l d
a n d o n t h e basis o f c o m m o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . F u r -
t h e r m o r e , t h e y a r e p r e p a r e d t o a c h i e v e t h e s e i n d i r e c t goals o f d e f i n -
i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d h a r m o n i z i n g t h e i r aims i n the r o l e o f speakers
a n d h e a r e r s via processes of reaching understanding—that is, b y p u r s u -
i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims w i t h o u t reservation. Reaching understanding
linguistically f u n c t i o n s i n such a way t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c -
tion come to an agreement with one another about the validity
c l a i m e d f o r t h e i r s p e e c h acts or, as a p p r o p r i a t e , t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n disagreements t h a t h a v e b e e n a s c e r t a i n e d . W i t h s p e e c h acts,
criticizable validity claims are raised t h a t have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n
t o w a r d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n . A speech-act o f f e r g a i n s a b i n d -
i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e i n t h a t t h e speaker, i n r a i s i n g a v a l i d i t y c l a i m ,
issues a c r e d i b l e w a r r a n t y t h a t h e w o u l d b e a b l e t o r e d e e m t h i s c l a i m
w i t h t h e r i g h t s o r t o f reasons, i f r e q u i r e d . C o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n
thus be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m strategic a c t i o n i n t h e f o l l o w i n g respect:
t h e successful c o o r d i n a t i o n o f a c t i o n d o e s n o t r e l y o n t h e p u r p o s i v e
r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e respective i n d i v i d u a l plans o f a c t i o n b u t r a t h e r o n
t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g p o w e r o f feats o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
t h a t is, o n a r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a
rationally motivated agreement.
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T o b e s u r e , speech-act o f f e r s c a n d e v e l o p a n a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g
e f f e c t o n l y b e c a u s e t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act
t h a t is b o t h u n d e r s t a n d a b l e a n d has b e e n a c c e p t e d b y t h e h e a r e r
also e x t e n d s t o t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t
result f r o m the semantic content o f the u t t e r a n c e — w h e t h e r asym-
metrically f o r t h e hearer o r speaker o r symmetrically for b o t h par-
ties. W h o e v e r a c c e p t s a c o m m a n d feels h e r s e l f o b l i g e d t o c a r r y i t
o u t ; w h o e v e r m a k e s a p r o m i s e feels h i m s e l f b o u n d t o m a k e i t c o m e
t r u e i f n e e d be; w h o e v e r accepts a n assertion believes i t a n d w i l l
d i r e c t h e r behavior accordingly. I have s u b s u m e d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
a n d a c c e p t a n c e o f s p e e c h acts u n d e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success; a l l g o a l s
a n d effects t h a t g o b e y o n d t h i s a r e t o b e t e r m e d " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y . " I
n o w w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s ] , w h i c h arise
f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s p e e c h act, a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect^,
w h i c h d o n o t arise as g r a m m a t i c a l l y r e g u l a t e d effects f r o m w h a t has
b e e n s a i d i t s e l f b u t r a t h e r o c c u r i n a c o n t i n g e n t way, a l t h o u g h t h e y
a r e c o n d i t i o n a l o n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success. C o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g e x -
ample: H understands ( i l l o c u t i o n a r y successi) a n d accepts ( i l l o c u -
tionary success2) t h e r e q u e s t t h a t she g i v e Y s o m e m o n e y . H gives Y
" s o m e m o n e y " ( p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t i ) a n d t h u s gives p l e a s u r e t o F s
w i f e ( p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect2). T h i s l a t t e r s o r t o f e f f e c t , w h i c h is n o t
regulated by grammar, usually w i l l be a p u b l i c c o m p o n e n t o f t h e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n , o r a t least w i l l b e o f a k i n d t h a t c o u l d
be d e c l a r e d o p e n l y w i t h o u t i m p a i r i n g the course o f t h e action. T h i s
is n o t t h e case i f t h e s p e a k e r b y m e a n s o f h i s r e q u e s t wishes t o g e t
t h e addressee t o e n a b l e Y t o m a k e p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a b u r g l a r y w i t h
t h e m o n e y h e has r e c e i v e d , w h e r e b y t h e s p e a k e r assumes t h a t H
w o u l d n o t a p p r o v e o f s u c h a c r i m i n a l act. H e r e , c a r r y i n g o u t t h e
p l a n n e d c r i m i n a l a c t w o u l d b e a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect3, w h i c h w o u l d
n o t c o m e a b o u t i f t h e s p e a k e r w e r e t o d e c l a r e i t as h i s a i m f r o m t h e
beginning.
T h i s case o f latently strategic action is a n e x a m p l e o f h o w t h e m e c h a -
nism of reaching understanding works i n the construction o f inter-
a c t i o n s t h a t is d e f i c i e n t i n a n i n t e r e s t i n g way: t h e a c t o r c a n r e a c h h i s
strategic a i m o f a i d i n g a n d a b e t t i n g a c r i m i n a l act i n t h e f o r m o f a
n o n p u b l i c p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o n l y i f h e a c h i e v e s i l l o c u t i o n a r y
success w i t h h i s r e q u e s t . H e w i l l , i n t u r n , s u c c e e d i n t h i s o n l y i f t h e
 f
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Chapter 4

(1) S.T r e q u e s t t h a t y o u give Y s o m e m o n e y .

s p e a k e r professes t o b e p u r s u i n g u n r e s e r v e d l y t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m
o f h i s s p e e c h act, t h a t is, i f h e leaves t h e h e a r e r i n t h e d a r k as t o t h e U n d e r the presuppositions o f communicative action, the person to
actual violation of the presuppositions of action oriented toward w h o m a n o r d e r o r a d e m a n d is a d d r e s s e d m u s t k n o w t h e n o r m a t i v e
reaching understanding by one o f the parties involved. T h e latendy c o n t e x t t h a t authorizes the speaker to m a k e his d e m a n d , thereby
s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e lives p a r a s i t i c a l l y o n n o r m a l l a n g u a g e usage j u s t i f y i n g t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e a d d r e s s e e has r e a s o n s t o c a r r y o u t
b e c a u s e i t f u n c t i o n s o n l y i f a t least o n e o f the parties involved the required action. Knowledge o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success (for
assumes t h a t l a n g u a g e is b e i n g u s e d w i t h a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o - h a n d i n g o v e r t h e m o n e y ) , w h i c h c a n b e i n f e r r e d from t h e p r e p o s i -
w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s d e r i v a t i v e status p o i n t s t o t h e tional c o n t e n t o f ( 1 ) , d o e s n o t suffice i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e
independent logic u n d e r l y i n g linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n — a logic i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s s p e e c h a c t — t h a t is, its specific c h a r a c -
t h a t is e f f e c t i v e f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t subjects t e r qua i m p e r a t i v e . K n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success m u s t b e
t h e purposive activities o f t h e actors t o c e r t a i n constraints. supplemented by knowledge o f those conditions u n d e r w h i c h the
O f course, even i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t h e teleologically struc- s p e a k e r c a n h a v e r e a s o n s t o r e g a r d r e q u e s t ( 1 ) as a v a l i d i m p e r a t i v e ,
t u r e d sequences o f a c t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l actors p e r v a d e t h e p r o c - w h i c h m e a n s i n t h i s case, as n o r m a t i v e l y j u s t i f i e d : f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t
esses o f reaching understanding; i t is, a f t e r a l l , t h e purposive S is a d d r e s s i n g a f r i e n d , a c o l l e a g u e k n o w n t o b e g e n e r o u s i n m o n e y
activities o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t are l i n k e d u p w i t h m a t t e r s , a c r e d i t o r , o r a n a c c o m p l i c e . F o r i t is o f c o u r s e also a
one a n o t h e r via the m e d i u m o f language. However, the linguistic n o r m a t i v e validity c l a i m t h a t t h e addressee m a y reject for some
m e d i u m c a n f u l f i l l t h i s l i n k i n g - u p f u n c t i o n o n l y i f i t interrupts t h e reason or other.
plans o f a c t i o n — e a c h respectively m o n i t o r e d i n t e r m s o f t h e actor's
o w n success—and t e m p o r a r i l y changes the m o d e o f a c t i o n . T h i s (1') H: N o , y o u h a v e n o right t o ask t h a t o f m e .
c o m m u n i c a t i v e s h i f t b y w a y o f s p e e c h acts p e r f o r m e d unreservedly
I n c o n t e x t s o f m a n i f e s d y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n i t is p r e c i s e l y these v a l i d i t y
subjects t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d a c t i o n c o u r s e s — e g o c e n t r i c a l l y
c l a i m s — c l a i m s t o p r e p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h , t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d t o
geared toward the requirements o f each actor i n v o l v e d — t o the
s u b j e c t i v e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit)—that are u n d e r m i n e d . The
structural constraints o f an intersubjectively shared language. These
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is s u s p e n d e d
constraints force t h e actors to c h a n g e t h e i r perspective: they must
here.
shift perspective f r o m the objectivating a t t i t u d e o f a n actor o r i e n t e d
A b a n k r o b b e r ' s cry o f "Hands u p ! " w h i l e p o i n t i n g a g u n at a
t o w a r d success w h o w a n t s t o r e a l i z e s o m e p u r p o s e i n t h e w o r l d , t o
cashier w h o m he orders to h a n d over m o n e y demonstrates in a
the p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude o f a speaker w h o wants to reach under-
drastic fashion that, i n such a situation, the c o n d i t i o n s o f n o r m a t i v e
standing with a second person with regard to something i n the
validity have b e e n replaced by sanction c o n d i t i o n s . T h e acceptability
w o r l d . W i t h o u t t h i s s w i t c h t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e use o f language
c o n d i t i o n s f o r a n i m p e r a t i v e t h a t has b e e n s t r i p p e d o f a n y n o r m a t i v e
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e actors w o u l d be de-
b a c k i n g m u s t b e s u p p l e m e n t e d b y s u c h s a n c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s . So too
n i e d access t o t h e p o t e n t i a l i n h e r e n t i n t h e b i n d i n g a n d bonding
i n t h e case o f r e q u e s t ( 1 ) . I f t h e l a w - a b i d i n g addressee k n o w s t h a t Y
e n e r g i e s o f l a n g u a g e . T h i s is w h y a l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n f a i l s as
w i s h e s t o use t h e m o n e y she is t o give h i m i n o r d e r t o m a k e p r e p a -
s o o n as t h e addressee d i s c o v e r s t h a t h e r c o u n t e r p a r t has o n l y a p p a r -
r a t i o n s f o r a c r i m e , t h e n S w i l l have t o s u p p l e m e n t his request by
e n t l y b r o k e n o f f h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success.
p o i n t i n g t o p o s s i b l e s a n c t i o n s . H e may, f o r e x a m p l e , say:
T h e constellation o f speech a n d a c t i o n changes i n strategic a c t i o n .
H e r e , the i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g forces wane; language (2) S: I r e q u e s t t h a t y o u give F s o m e m o n e y — o t h e r w i s e I will tell
s h r i n k s t o a m e d i u m o f i n f o r m a t i o n . W e c a n see t h i s c l e a r l y i f w e t h e p o l i c e h o w d e e p l y y o u are already i n v o l v e d i n t h e w h o l e affair.
l o o k at t h e e x a m p l e j u s t m e n t i o n e d :
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Chapter 4
T h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is s h o w n sympto-
matically i n the " i f - t h e n " s t r u c t u r e o f the threat, w h i c h replaces the
validity claims presupposed i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e action with power
c l a i m s ; f r o m t h i s w e c a n see t h e c h a n g e d c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f s p e e c h a n d
a c t i o n . I n manifestly strategic action, t h e s p e e c h acts ( w h o s e i l l o c u t i o n -
a r y f o r c e s have b e e n w e a k e n e d ) r e l i n q u i s h t h e r o l e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g
a c t i o n , passing i t o n t o f o r m s o f e x e r t i n g i n f l u e n c e t h a t are e x t e r n a l
t o l a n g u a g e . S t r i p p e d i n t h i s w a y o f its p o t e n c y , l a n g u a g e n o w f u l f i l l s
o n l y t h o s e i n f o r m a t i o n f u n c t i o n s r e m a i n i n g o n c e l i n g u i s t i c feats
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g have b e e n r o b b e d o f t h e i r consensus-
f o r m i n g f u n c t i o n , and once the validity o f utterances—now sus-
p e n d e d i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n — c a n be d e d u c e d only indirectly. Speech
a c t ( 2 ) is a r e q u e s t o n l y o n t h e s u r f a c e ; i t is i n f a c t a t h r e a t :
(2a) S: I f y o u d o n o t give Y m o n e y , I w i l l t e l l t h e p o l i c e t h a t . . .
T h r e a t s a r e e x a m p l e s o f s p e e c h acts t h a t p l a y a n i n s t r u m e n t a l r o l e
i n contexts o f strategic a c t i o n , h a v e f o r f e i t e d t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y
force, a n d derive their i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g f r o m other contexts o f
e m p l o y m e n t i n w h i c h t h e s a m e s e n t e n c e s are n o r m a l l y u t t e r e d w i t h
a n o r i e n t a t i o n toward r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Acts o f this k i n d —
acts t h a t have b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t as p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — a r e not
i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a t a l l , f o r t h e y a r e n o t a i m e d a t t h e r a t i o n a l l y
m o t i v a t e d p o s i t i o n o f a n a d d r e s s e e . T h i s c a n b e seen f r o m t h e way
i n w h i c h t h r e a t s are r e p u d i a t e d :
(2a') H: N o , y o u have n o t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
The " n o " refers to e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the t h r e a t
a l o n e c o u l d a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect. T h e hearer
contests t h e reasons t h a t w e r e s u p p o s e d t o m o t i v a t e h e r to act i n t h e
m a n n e r p r e d i c t e d b y S. U n l i k e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, t h r e a t s d o n o t r e l y
o n g e n e r a l , addressee-independent reasons t h a t c o u l d c o n v i n c e any-
one. Their "then-component" p o i n t s r a t h e r to p a r t i c u l a r reasons
t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e s p e c i f i c addressees i n p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
w i t h a n e m p i r i c a l m o t i v e t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way.
L i k e s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s , i n s u l t s , t o o , o f t e n have a n ambiguous
character. T h e y may have n o r m a t i v e b a c k i n g , a n d express, f o r i n -
stance, m o r a l c o n d e m n a t i o n ; h o w e v e r , t h e y m a y also b e c o m e i n d e -
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p e n d e n t as p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, s e r v i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , t o i n s t i l l f e a r
a n d t e r r o r i n t h e addressee.
The concept of communicative action provisionally introduced
h e r e is b a s e d o n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a n d r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i t has t o b e d e v e l o p e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e o r i e s o f
m e a n i n g . I cannot a t t e m p t to do this i n detail here. Nonetheless,
I w i s h a t least t o i n t r o d u c e a n d e x p l i c a t e t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n of
the f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , w h i c h refers to the i n t e r -
n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y . T h i s , as y e t , says n o t h -
i n g about the fruitfulness o f such a theoretical approach for the
s o c i a l sciences. T h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n m u s t p r o v e
its w o r t h w i t h i n t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n . T h e l a t t e r is s u p -
p o s e d t o e x p l a i n h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e
analysis o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of communicative action may be
h e l p f u l . I t opens u p the d i m e n s i o n o f the b a c k g r o u n d o f the life-
w o r l d , w h i c h e n m e s h e s a n d stabilizes i n t e r a c t i o n s t o f o r m h i g h e r -
level aggregates.
T h e P r a g m a t i c T u r n i n the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
T h e concept o f communicative action develops the i n t u i t i o n that the
t e l o s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is i n h e r e n t i n l a n g u a g e . Reaching
u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n o r m a t i v e l y l a d e n c o n c e p t t h a t goes b e y o n d t h e
m e r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a g r a m m a t i c a l expression. A speaker reaches
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h another w i t h regard to some matter. Such an
agreement (Einverständnis) c a n b e a c h i e v e d b y b o t h p a r t i e s o n l y i f
t h e y a c c e p t t h e u t t e r a n c e s i n v o l v e d as c o r r e c t (sachgemäß). A g r e e -
m e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g is m e a s u r e d i n t e r m s o f t h e i n t e r s u b ¬
j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y (Gültigkeit) o f a n u t t e r a n c e t h a t c a n
i n p r i n c i p l e be criticized. O f course, u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f
a linguistic expression a n d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g about something
w i t h t h e h e l p o f a n utterance h e l d to be v a l i d are two d i f f e r e n t
things; an equally sharp distinction must be m a d e between an utter-
a n c e t h a t is h e l d t o b e v a l i d a n d o n e t h a t is v a l i d . Nonetheless,
q u e s t i o n s o f m e a n i n g c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d c o m p l e t e l y f r o m q u e s -
tions o f v a l i d i t y . T h e basic q u e s t i o n o f m e a n i n g theory—namely,
w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n — c a n -
228 229

Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

n o t be isolated f r o m the question of the context i n w h i c h this i n g t h a t a r e b u n d l e d t o g e t h e r , as i t w e r e , i n t h e f o c a l p o i n t of

expression m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . O n e s i m p l y w o u l d n o t k n o w
w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i f o n e
d i d n o t know how one c o u l d m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o reach
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . O n e c a n see from
the very c o n d i t i o n s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g linguistic expressions t h a t the
s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n be f o r m e d w i t h t h e i r h e l p have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n -
tation toward a rationally motivated agreement with regard to what
is s a i d . T o t h i s e x t e n t , a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e p o s s i b l e v a l i d i t y o f
u t t e r a n c e s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s , n o t j u s t f o r r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t , p r i o r to this, f o r l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g itself.
I n language, the d i m e n s i o n s o f m e a n i n g a n d validity are i n t e r n a l l y
connected.
T r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics has m a d e use o f t h i s i n s i g h t ever
since Frege: o n e u n d e r s t a n d s a n assertoric sentence i f o n e knows
w h a t is t h e case i f i t is t r u e . I t is, h o w e v e r , n o c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t i t is
a sentence a n d n o t a speech act—moreover, a propositional sen-
t e n c e r a t h e r t h a n a n o n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e — t h a t serves h e r e as t h e
p r o t o t y p e . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s t h e o r y , t h e p r o b l e m o f v a l i d i t y is l o c a t e d
e x c l u s i v e l y i n t h e r e l a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e t o t h e w o r l d c o n c e i v e d as t h e
t o t a l i t y o f facts. Because v a l i d i t y is e q u a t e d w i t h a s s e r t o r i c t r u t h , a
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e m e a n i n g a n d t h e validity o f l i n g u i s t i c ex-
p r e s s i o n s is p r o d u c e d o n l y i n t h e m o d e s o f s p e e c h i n w h i c h facts
a r e e s t a b l i s h e d . H o w e v e r , as K a r l B u h l e r a l r e a d y o b s e r v e d , t h e r e p -
r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n is o n l y o n e o f t h r e e e q u i p r i m o r d i a l (gleich-
ursprunglich) functions of language. Sentences that are used
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y serve s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o express t h e i n t e n t i o n s o r
s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) o f a speaker, t o r e p r e s e n t states o f
affairs (or s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r i n g i n t h e w o r l d ) , a n d to e n t e r i n t o
r e l a t i o n s w i t h a n addressee. T h e t h r e e basic aspects o f a s p e a k e r
reaching understanding/with another/about something are
r e f l e c t e d i n t h e s e t h r e e f u n c t i o n s . A t h r e e f o l d r e l a t i o n exists be-
t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n a n d (a) w h a t is intended
(gemeint) w i t h i t , ( b ) w h a t is said i n i t , a n d (c) t h e way in which it is
used in a speech act.
Curiously e n o u g h , each o f the t h r e e best-known approaches to
m e a n i n g t h e o r y p r o c e e d s f r o m j u s t o n e o f these t h r e e rays o f m e a n -
language; each a p p r o a c h t h e n aims to e x p l a i n the entire spectrum
o f m e a n i n g i n t e r m s o f this single f u n c t i o n o f language. I n t e n t i o n -
alist s e m a n t i c s ( f r o m G r i c e t o B e n n e t t a n d S c h i f f e r ) takes as f u n d a -
mental what the speaker means (meint), or wishes t o give to
u n d e r s t a n d , w i t h an expression used i n a given situation; f o r m a l
s e m a n t i c s ( f r o m F r e g e v i a t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n t o D u m m e t t ) takes
as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a s e n t e n c e is
t r u e (or, as t h e case m a y b e , r e n d e r e d t r u e ) ; a n d t h e use t h e o r y o f
m e a n i n g i n a u g u r a t e d by the later W i t t g e n s t e i n refers e v e r y t h i n g i n
the final instance to the habitualized contexts o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n w h i c h
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s f u l f i l l p r a c t i c a l f u n c t i o n s . E a c h o f these t h r e e
c o m p e t i n g theories o f m e a n i n g c o n n e c t s u p w i t h precisely o n e as-
p e c t o f t h e process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y wish to e x p l a i n
the m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression either f r o m the perspective
o f w h a t is m e a n t as i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g , o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of
w h a t is said as l i t e r a l m e a n i n g , o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f its use i n
i n t e r a c t i o n as u t t e r a n c e m e a n i n g . T h e s t y l i z a t i o n i n e a c h case o f
just one o f t h e t h r e e aspects s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t a k e n a c c o u n t o f i n
B i d d e r ' s s c h e m a o f l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s has l e d t o b o t t l e n e c k s t h a t I
c a n n o t g o i n t o h e r e . T h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts (as d e v e l o p e d b y
Searle, f o l l o w i n g A u s t i n ) c a m e o n t h e scene i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e
difficulties.
Speech-act t h e o r y accords the speaker's i n t e n t i o n a p r o p e r place
w i t h o u t , as i n G r i c e a n s e m a n t i c s , s i m p l y r e d u c i n g l i n g u i s t i c p r o c -
esses o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) t o strategic a c t i o n .
I n e m p h a s i z i n g t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t , speech-act t h e o r y also
takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e f e r e n c e o f s p e e c h , as
w e l l as its c h a r a c t e r as a c t i o n ; h o w e v e r , i t d o e s so w i t h o u t , as i n
Wittgensteinian pragmatics, e x c l u d i n g all validity claims that p o i n t
beyond the provincial h o r i z o n o f particular, i n p r i n c i p l e equally
l e g i t i m a t e language games. F o r w i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f satisfaction c o n -
d i t i o n s , s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y also u l t i m a t e l y respects t h e r e l a t i o n b e -
t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d w o r l d , b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e a n d states o f a f f a i r s .
By v i r t u e o f t h i s o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f v a l i d i t y as t h e satis-
faction of conditions o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h , however, speech-act
t h e o r y r e m a i n s b o u n d t o t h e c o g n i t i v i s m o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l se-
230 231
Chapter 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d

m a n t i c s . I t is p r e c i s e l y h e r e t h a t I see t h e d e f i c i t t h a t has t o b e m a d e (1") H: N o , y o u d o n ' t m e a n t h a t s e r i o u s l y — y o u a r e p u l l i n g m y

g o o d as s o o n as o n e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a l l l a n g u a g e functions, and
n o t o n l y t h e f u n c d o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , are i m b u e d w i t h validity
claims.
T h e s e n t e n c e " I give F s o m e m o n e y " is a m b i g u o u s w i t h r e g a r d t o
its m o d e ; t h i s a m b i g u i t y d i s a p p e a r s w h e n , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t ,
t h e s e n t e n c e f u n c t i o n s as a p r o m i s e , as a c o n f e s s i o n , o r e v e n as a
prediction:
(3) S: I p r o m i s e y o u t h a t I w i l l g i v e F s o m e m o n e y .
(4) S: I w o u l d l i k e t o d i v u l g e t o y o u t h a t I a m g o i n g t o give Y
some money.
(5) S: I c a n p r e d i c t t o y o u t h a t X ( a n o t h e r p e r s o n ) w i l l g i v e Y
some money.
T h e type o f validity c l a i m t h a t a speaker connects w i t h promises,
confessions, a n d p r e d i c t i o n s emerges f r o m the c o r r e s p o n d i n g nega-
t i o n s w i t h w h i c h t h e h e a r e r c o u l d r e j e c t t h e s e speech-act o f f e r s :
(3') H: N o , y o u ' v e always b e e n u n r e l i a b l e i n s u c h m a t t e r s .
leg.
( 1 " ' ) H: N o , I w o n ' t b e m e e t i n g F a n d w i l l h a v e n o o p p o r t u n i t y t o
h a n d over m o n e y to h i m .
T h e s a m e h o l d s t r u e mutatis mutandis f o r c o n s t a t i v e a n d expressive
s p e e c h acts. W h e t h e r a n u t t e r a n c e f u l f i l l s i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c -
tion is m e a s u r e d , o f c o u r s e , i n t e r m s o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ; b u t t h e
f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e i n t e r a c t i v e a n d e x p r e s s i v e f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e is
assessed i n t e r m s o f t r u t h - a n a l o g o u s c o n d i t i o n s o f a u t h o r i z a t i o n a n d
t r u t h f u l n e s s . E v e r y speech-act c a n , as a w h o l e , always b e c r i t i c i z e d as
i n v a l i d f r o m t h r e e p o i n t s o f v i e w : as u n t r u e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
statement made (or the existential presuppositions o f its p r o p o s i -
tional c o n t e n t ) ; as i n c o r r e c t w i t h r e s p e c t t o e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m a t i v e
c o n t e x t s ( o r t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e n o r m s p r e s u p p o s e d ) ; o r as l a c k i n g
i n t r u t h f u l n e s s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n . L e t us assume
f o r the m o m e n t that this t r i c h o t o m o u s extension o f the concept o f
validity, here merely sketched, c o u l d be developed i n detail. W h a t
w o u l d b e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s f o r t h e basic q u e s t i o n a d d r e s s e d b y
meaning theory?

(4') H: N o , y o u j u s t w a n t t o l e a d m e u p t h e g a r d e n p a t h . D u m m e t t a l r e a d y takes t h e first s t e p t o w a r d a p r a g m a t i c r e i n t e r ¬

p r e t a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m o f validity. H e demonstrates that t r u t h -
(5') H: N o , h e d o e s n ' t have a n y m o n e y .
c o n d i t i o n a l semantics can abstract f r o m t h e circumstances i n w h i c h

W i t h ( 3 ) t h e s p e a k e r raises t h e n o r m a t i v e c l a i m t h a t h e is e n t e r i n g a h e a r e r is i n a p o s i t i o n t o recognize w h e n t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a n

into an obligation, with (4) t h e c l a i m to subjective truthfulness a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e h a v e b e e n satisfied a t t h e v e r y m o s t o n l y i n t h e

(Wahrhaftigkeit)—to m e a n w h a t h e says, w i t h (5) a c l a i m t o p r o p o s i - case o f s i m p l e p r e d i c a t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n sentences. Relying o n the

tional t r u t h . M o r e o v e r , a s p e e c h a c t m a y b e n e g a t e d f r o m several pragmatic distinction between " t r u t h " a n d "assertibility"—between

p o i n t s o f view a n d n o t j u s t f r o m t h e aspect o f validity d o m i n a n t i n a t h e t r u t h o f a sentence a n d t h e e n t i t l e m e n t t o m a k e a n assertion by

given situation. The imperative means o f that s e n t e n c e — D u m m e t t replaces knowledge o f the t r u t h

c o n d i t i o n s w i t h a n i n d i r e c t sort o f knowledge. T h e hearer must
(1) S.T r e q u e s t t h a t y o u give F s o m e m o n e y . k n o w t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c o u l d , i f necessary,
r e d e e m h e r c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s have b e e n s a t i s f i e d .
can be t u r n e d d o w n n o t only w i t h
O n e understands a propositional sentence i f one knows what kinds
(1') H: N o , y o u have n o right t o d o so. o f r e a s o n s a s p e a k e r w o u l d have t o p r o v i d e i n o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e a
h e a r e r t h a t she is e n t i t l e d t o raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h a t s e n t e n c e .
b u t also b y c a s t i n g d o u b t o n t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e s p e a k e r o r o n
T h e c o n d i t i o n s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as t h e y h a v e t o b e satisfied i n
the existential presuppositions o f the propositional content:
 233
232
Chapter 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, and L i f e w o r l d

everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices, thus p o i n t to the supposition o f t h e c l a i m . T h e reasons i n t e r p r e t t h e validity c o n d i t i o n s a n d t o this

a g a m e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e speaker, as t h e proponent, e x t e n t are themselves p a r t o f the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e a n utterance
m i g h t c o n v i n c e t h e h e a r e r , as t h e o p p o n e n t , t h a t a p o s s i b l y p r o b l e m - acceptable. I n this, the acceptability c o n d i t i o n s p o i n t to the holistic
a t i c v a l i d i t y c l a i m is j u s t i f i a b l e . F o l l o w i n g t h i s epistemic turn i n t r u t h - c h a r a c t e r o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s ; e v e r y s i n g l e s p e e c h a c t is l i n k e d v i a
c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e validity o f a sentence can logical-semantic t h r e a d s t o n u m e r o u s o t h e r , p o t e n t i a l s p e e c h acts
n o l o n g e r b e c o n s i d e r e d as a q u e s t i o n — d e t a c h e d f r o m the process t h a t c o u l d take o n t h e p r a g m a t i c r o l e o f reasons. K n o w l e d g e o f a
o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n — o f the objective r e l a t i o n between language a n d l a n g u a g e is t h e r e f o r e e n t w i n e d w i t h k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t is a c t u a l l y
the world. t h e case i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y d i s c l o s e d w o r l d . P e r h a p s k n o w l e d g e of
T h i s suggests, however, t h a t t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h s h o u l d n o longer t h e w o r l d m e r e l y hangs o n a l o n g e r c h a i n o f reasons t h a n does
be defined semantically a n d solely f r o m the perspective of the knowledge o f a language. T h a t each c a n n o t sharply be distinguished
speaker. V a l i d i t y c l a i m s c o n s t i t u t e t h e p o i n t o f c o n v e r g e n c e f o r i n - f r o m t h e o t h e r c o n f i r m s t h e basic i d e a f r o m w h i c h w e s t a r t e d : t o
tersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n by a l l those involved. T h e y play a p r a g m a t i c u n d e r s t a n d a n e x p r e s s i o n is t o k n o w h o w o n e c a n m a k e use o f i t i n
r o l e i n t h e dynamics o f speech-act offer a n d t h e hearer's t a k i n g a order to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h someone w i t h regard to some-
p o s i t i o n w i t h h i s "yes" o r " n o . " T h i s pragmatic turn i n t r u t h - c o n d i - thing.
t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s calls f o r a r é é v a l u a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f " i l l o c u t i o n - I f this a p p r o a c h to a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g can be
ary force." Austin conceived of this force as the irrational elaborated sufficiently, a n d r e n d e r e d plausible, t h e n i t provides an
c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act, t h e a c t u a l l y r a t i o n a l p a r t b e i n g mo- e x p l a n a t i o n f o r w h y the m e d i u m o f n a t u r a l language can draw o n a
n o p o l i z e d by t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . O n a p r a g m a t i c a l l y e n l i g h t - r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e s t h a t c a n be u s e d
ened reading, the m o d a l c o m p o n e n t determines the validity claim f o r p u r p o s e s o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n . I n t h a t a speaker, w i t h his
t h a t , i n t h e s t a n d a r d case, t h e s p e a k e r raises w i t h t h e h e l p o f a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m , issues a w a r r a n t y t o p r o v i d e r e a s o n s f o r t h e
p e r f o r m a t i v e sentence. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t thereby be- v a l i d i t y o f t h e s p e e c h act, i f necessary, t h e h e a r e r — w h o k n o w s t h e
c o m e s t h e l o c u s o f a r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as a s t r u c t u r a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s a n d t h u s u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t has b e e n s a i d — i s
i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n between validity conditions, validity claims that re- c h a l l e n g e d to take u p a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d p o s i t i o n ; i f t h e hearer
f e r t o these, a n d reasons b y m e a n s o f w h i c h t h e y m a y b e v i n d i c a t e d r e c o g n i z e s t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m , t h e r e b y a c c e p t i n g t h e speech-act offer,
in discourse. Thus, the conditions o f validity n o longer remain she assumes h e r s h a r e o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f
fixated o n the propositional component; r o o m is m a d e f o r t h e i n - i n t e r a c t i o n a r i s i n g f o r a l l t h o s e i n v o l v e d f r o m w h a t is said.
t r o d u c t i o n o f f u r t h e r v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t are n o t d i r e c t e d t o w a r d
c o n d i t i o n s o f t r u t h ( o r success), t h a t is, t h a t are n o t g e a r e d t o w a r d F r o m S o c i a l A c t i o n to S o c i a l O r d e r
t h e r e l a t i o n between language a n d the objective w o r l d .

O n c e p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h has b e e n s u p p l e m e n t e d b y n o r m a t i v e I have t r e a t e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n as t w o v a r i a n t s o f
Tightness a n d subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s , i t is p o s s i b l e , i n a f i n a l s t e p , t o linguistically mediated interaction. I t holds only for communicative
generalize D u m m e t t ' s explanation. We u n d e r s t a n d a speech act action t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d
w h e n we k n o w t h e k i n d s o f reasons t h a t a speaker c o u l d p r o v i d e i n l a n g u a g e i m p e l t h e a c t o r s — i n t h e sense o f a w e a k t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e a h e a r e r t h a t h e is e n t i d e d i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m - necessity—to step o u t o f t h e e g o c e n t r i c i t y o f a p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l
stances t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h i s u t t e r a n c e — i n s h o r t , w h e n w e k n o w o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e i r o w n respective success a n d t o s u r r e n d e r
what makes it acceptable. A speaker, w i t h a v a l i d i t y c l a i m , a p p e a l s t o a themselves to the public criteria of communicative rationality.
reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l reasons t h a t he c o u l d p r o d u c e i n s u p p o r t o f T h e t r a n s s u b j e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e s o f l a n g u a g e t h u s suggest a basis f o r
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answering, f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f action theory, the classical
q u e s t i o n o f h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e .
T h e a t o m i s t i c c o n c e p t o f strategic a c t i o n d o e s n o t i t s e l f p r o v i d e us
w i t h a n y e q u i v a l e n t answer. I f i t n o n e t h e l e s s is t o serve as t h e basic
c o n c e p t i n a s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n , t h e n i t has t o b e e x p l a i n e d
h o w c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t e m e r g e solely f r o m t h e r e c i p r o c a l
e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e u p o n o n e a n o t h e r o f s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d actors
can establish themselves as stable o r d e r s . E v e r since H o b b e s , t h e
a t t e m p t has r e p e a t e d l y b e e n m a d e t o e x p l a i n h o w n o r m s w i t h t r a n s -
subjectively b i n d i n g n o r m a t i v e validity claims can develop o u t o f the
interest positions a n d i n d i v i d u a l p r o f i t calculations o f actors who
m a k e d e c i s i o n s i n a p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l way a n d w h o e n c o u n t e r e a c h
o t h e r o n l y haphazardly. Today, this " H o b b e s i a n p r o b l e m " (Parsons)
is b e i n g t a c k l e d u s i n g g a m e t h e o r y . H o w e v e r , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t I
have b e e n able t o f o l l o w t h e d e b a t e s ( f r o m A m a r t y a S e n t o J o n
E l s t e r ) , 1 have n o t g a i n e d t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w
social o r d e r can e m e r g e f r o m t h e d o u b l e c o n t i n g e n c y o f actors w h o
m a k e decisions i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f one a n o t h e r can be answered m o r e
convincingly today t h a n by H o b b e s i n his t i m e .
M o r e p r o m i s i n g t h a n the a t t e m p t to renew w i t h m o d e r n means
t h e classical c o n c e p t o f a n i n s t r u m e n t a l o r d e r is t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f
a m e d i u m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h behavior-steering infor-
m a t i o n f l o w s are c o n d u c t e d . I n s o f a r as t h i s c o n c e p t is d e f i n e d ac-
cording to the m o d e l o f a m a r k e t exchange steered by money,
s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n g e a r e d t o w a r d r a t i o n a l c h o i c e c a n be r e t a i n e d as t h e
conception o f action suitable f o r a steering m e d i u m . For example,
i n f o r m a t i o n conveyed via the m o n e y code c o n d i t i o n s — o n account
o f a built-in structure o f preferences—decisions r e g a r d i n g actions
w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e t o m o r e d e m a n d i n g a n d h i g h e r - r i s k feats o f c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n t h a t are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . T h e a c t o r as-
s u m e s a s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d a t t i t u d e — i n t h e e x t r e m e case, a p u r p o s i v e
r a t i o n a l o n e . H o w e v e r , f o r t h e actor, t h e s w i t c h t o media-steered inter-
actions results i n a n o b j e c t i v e i n v e r s i o n o f s e t t i n g goals a n d c h o o s i n g
means. T h e m e d i u m itself n o w transmits the system-maintenance
i m p e r a t i v e s o f t h e system i n q u e s t i o n ( h e r e t h e m a r k e t s y s t e m ) . T h i s
i n v e r s i o n o f m e a n s a n d e n d s is e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e actor, as M a r x
o b s e r v e d , as t h e r e i f y i n g c h a r a c t e r o f o b j e c t i f i e d social processes. T o
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Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld
this e x t e n t , media-steered interactions n o l o n g e r e m b o d y an i n s t r u -
m e n t a l reason located i n the purposive rationality o f decision m a k -
ers, b u t r a t h e r a f u n c t i o n a l i s t r e a s o n i n h e r e n t i n self-regulating
systems. T h i s a p p r o a c h , however, w h i c h is e l a b o r a t e d i n e c o n o m i c s
a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e o r y , covers o n l y s p e c i f i c d o m a i n s o f a c t i o n ; i t
d o e s n o t m e e t t h e s t a n d a r d o f a n e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y t h a t w o u l d be
s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e r a l i n scope t o e x p l a i n s o c i a l a c t i o n as a w h o l e i n
t e r m s o f strategic a c t i o n . Since behavior-steering communication
m e d i a s u c h as m o n e y m e r e l y b r a n c h o f f as s p e c i a l c o d e s f r o m a m o r e
r i c h l y s t r u c t u r e d everyday language, m e d i a t h e o r y p o i n t s t o w a r d t h e
broader framework o f a theory o f language (cf. m y The Theory of
Communicative Action, v o l . 2, p p . 2 5 6 f f ) .
T h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t r e m a i n s is t o d i s p e n s e w i t h a n y a t t e m p t
t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t o f social o r d e r i n g e n e r a l f r o m t h e p o i n t o f
view o f a c t i o n theory. T h e transsubjective structures o f language
e n t w i n e d w i t h e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s are r e p l a c e d i n t h e w o r k o f Parsons
a n d L u h m a n n b y boundary-maintaining and autopoetic systems i n t r o -
d u c e d at a m o r e g e n e r a l level t h a n are actors a n d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
mediated interactions. Actions a n d interactions can t h e n for their
p a r t b e u n d e r s t o o d as p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d social systems t h a t f o r m
environments for a n d reciprocally observe one another. I n c u t t i n g
l o o s e f r o m a c t i o n t h e o r y , however, systems t h e o r y m u s t p a y t h e p r i c e
f o r its o b j e c t i v i s t i c a p p r o a c h . Systems f u n c t i o n a l i s m cuts i t s e l f o f f
f r o m t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a n d its m e m b e r s . H e r -
m e n e u t i c access t o t h i s r e s e r v o i r o f k n o w l e d g e p r o c e e d s b y way o f
( a t least v i r t u a l ) p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices.
O f c o u r s e , i n t h e f a c e o f c o m p l e x societies, t h e s o c i a l sciences m u s t
be prepared to extract even c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e insights f r o m their
o b j e c t d o m a i n . Yet society, w o v e n f r o m w e b s o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i -
a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s , s i m p l y is n o t e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e f o r m o f a n e x t e r -
n a l n a t u r e accessible o n l y t o o b s e r v a t i o n . The meaning t h a t is
sedimented i n society's s y m b o l i c contexts a n d self-interpretations
discloses i t s e l f o n l y t o a h e r m e n e u t i c a p p r o a c h . W h o e v e r does n o t
w a n t t o b l o c k o f f t h i s p a t h f o r h i m s e l f , b u t wishes r a t h e r t o o p e n u p
t h e s o c i o c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t o f l i f e from within, has t o t a k e as h i s p o i n t
o f d e p a r t u r e a c o n c e p t i o n o f society t h a t c a n be c o n n e c t e d u p w i t h
the perspectives o n a c t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t i v e efforts o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s
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i n i n t e r a c t i o n . F o r t h i s f i r s t step, t h e c o n c e p t o f lifeworld, w h i c h
f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e
action already comes u p o n p r i o r to all sociological t h e o r i z i n g , pre-
sents i t s e l f .
T h a t social o r d e r is s u p p o s e d t o p r o d u c e a n d r e p r o d u c e i t s e l f b y
w a y o f processes o f c o n s e n s u s f o r m a t i o n m i g h t s e e m a t f i r s t g l a n c e
t o b e a t r i v i a l n o t i o n . T h e i m p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h i s i d e a b e c o m e s clear,
h o w e v e r , as s o o n as o n e r e m i n d s o n e s e l f t h a t e v e r y c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y
achieved agreement depends o n the taking u p o f " y e s " / " n o " posi-
t i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . I n t h e case o f c o m -
m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t h e d o u b l e c o n t i n g e n c y t h a t has t o b e absorbed
b y a l l i n t e r a c t i o n f o r m a t i o n takes t h e p a r t i c u l a r l y p r e c a r i o u s s h a p e
o f a n e v e r - p r e s e n t r i s k o f d i s a g r e e m e n t t h a t is b u i l t i n t o t h e c o m m u -
n i c a t i v e m e c h a n i s m itself, w h e r e b y e v e r y d i s a g r e e m e n t has a h i g h
cost. I n t h i s r e g a r d , v a r i o u s o p t i o n s are a v a i l a b l e : s i m p l e r e p a i r w o r k ;
leaving o p e n or bracketing controversial validity claims w i t h the
result that the c o m m o n g r o u n d o f shared convictions shrivels; t h e
t r a n s i t i o n t o discourses costly i n t e r m s o f t i m e a n d e f f o r t , w i t h u n -
c e r t a i n o u t c o m e s a n d d i s r u p t i v e effects; b r e a k i n g o f f communica-
t i o n ; o r finally, s w i t c h i n g over to strategic a c t i o n . I f o n e considers
t h a t e v e r y e x p l i c i t a g r e e m e n t t o a s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r rests o n a d o u b l e
n e g a t i o n , n a m e l y t h e r e p u d i a t i o n o f t h e (always p o s s i b l e ) r e j e c t i o n
o f i t , t h e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e processes o p e r a t i n g b y way o f c r i t i -
c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s h a r d l y r e c o m m e n d t h e m s e l v e s as r e l i a b l e r a i l s
along w h i c h social integration m i g h t r u n . Rational motivation,
w h i c h rests o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n say " n o , " c o n s t i t u t e s a
m a e l s t r o m o f p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n t h a t makes linguistic consensus f o r -
m a t i o n appear m o r e like a disruptive m e c h a n i s m . For the risk o f
d i s a g r e e m e n t receives ever n e w s u s t e n a n c e f r o m e x p e r i e n c e s . Expe-
r i e n c e s d i s r u p t t h e r o u t i n i z e d a n d t a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d aspects o f l i f e
a n d constitute a wellspring o f contingency. Experiences frustrate
expectations, r u n counter to habitual modes of perception, trigger
s u r p r i s e s , m a k e us c o n s c i o u s o f n e w t h i n g s . E x p e r i e n c e s a r e always
new experiences a n d provide a counterbalance to everything w i t h
w h i c h w e have g r o w n f a m i l i a r .
W i t h t h i s we have g a i n e d a f i r s t p o i n t e r i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e
c o m p l e m e n t a r y p h e n o m e n a o f the surprising a n d the familiar. A p r e -
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i Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d Lifeworld
u n d e r s t a n d i n g s e d i m e n t e d i n a deep-seated s t r a t u m o f things that
are t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , o f c e r t a i n t i e s , a n d o f u n q u e s t i o n e d assump-
tions, c o u l d e x p l a i n h o w the risk o f disagreement i n h e r e n t i n l i n -
g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n {Verständigung)—and l u r k i n g everywhere—is
a b s o r b e d , r e g u l a t e d , a n d k e p t i n c h e c k i n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s . A s is
well k n o w n , H u s s e r l i n his l a t e r w o r k , u n d e r the heading of
"lifeworld," endeavored to explore the terrain o f the immediately
familiar and the unquestionably certain. H e attempted with pheno-
m e n o l o g i c a l means to shed l i g h t o n this r e a l m o f i m p l i c i t k n o w l -
edge, o f the prepredicative a n d the precategorial, o f the f o r g o t t e n
f o u n d a t i o n s o f m e a n i n g u n d e r l y i n g everyday life-practices a n d w o r l d
experience. H e r e , I shall neither go i n t o Husserl's m e t h o d n o r the
c o n t e x t i n w h i c h h e i n t r o d u c e d his c o n c e p t o f the l i f e w o r l d ; rather,
I s h a l l a p p r o p r i a t e t h e m a t e r i a l c o n t e n t o f h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s b y as-
s u m i n g t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t o o , is e m b e d d e d i n a l i f e w o r l d
t h a t p r o v i d e s r i s k - a b s o r b i n g c o v e r a g e i n t h e f o r m o f a massive b a c k -
g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s . T h e e x p l i c i t feats o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n a c h i e v e d b y
c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors take place w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f shared, u n -
p r o b l e m a t i c c o n v i c t i o n s ; t h e d i s q u i e t t h a t arises t h r o u g h e x p e r i e n c e
a n d c r i t i q u e crashes a g a i n s t t h e — a s i t s e e m s — b r o a d a n d i m p e r -
turbable rock projecting out f r o m the deep of agreed-upon interpre-
tive p a t t e r n s , l o y a l t i e s , a n d p r o f i c i e n c i e s .
W i t h h i s c o n c e p t o f u n t h e m a t i c k n o w l e d g e , H u s s e r l has also a l -
r e a d y i n d i c a t e d a p a t h a l o n g w h i c h w e c a n u n c o v e r these founda-
tions o n w h i c h m e a n i n g rests. H e r e , h o w e v e r , w e m u s t t a k e t w o
delimitations i n t o account. T h e prereflective knowledge that accom-
p a n i e s processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h o u t i t s e l f b e i n g t h e -
m a t i z e d m u s t first be distinguished f r o m the knowledge t h a t is
concomitantly thematized i n s p e e c h acts. I n a s p e e c h act Mp, t h e p r e p -
o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e s e n t e n c e is t h e c a r r i e r (Träger) f o r t h e m a t i c
k n o w l e d g e . T h e p e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e gives e x p r e s s i o n t o a v a l i d i t y
c l a i m a n d specifies i n w h i c h sense t h e s e n t e n c e s a r e b e i n g u s e d . T h i s
self-referential commentary is d e c l a r e d p e r f o r m a t i v e l y — t h r o u g h
t h e c a r r y i n g - o u t o f a n a c t i o n — a n d is n o t , as i n t h e case o f t h e
commented-upon prepositional content, presented e x p l i c i t l y as
knowledge. I n order to make the merely concomitantly thematized
m e a n i n g o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act a v a i l a b l e i n t h e same way as t h e
 239
238
Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

t h e m a t i c k n o w l e d g e , Mp has t o b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a d e s c r i p t i o n t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h i s is e m b e d d e d . W h a t is a t issue h e r e is

o f Mp: the c o n c r e t e k n o w l e d g e o f language a n d the w o r l d that dwells per-

sistently i n t h e p e n u m b r a of the prepredicative and the precate-
(1) S: I r e q u e s t t h a t y o u give F s o m e m o n e y , gorial a n d that forms the unproblematic g r o u n d for all thematic and

m u s t b e r e f o r m u l a t e d as concomitantly thematized knowledge.

T o be sure, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d suggests a
(la) I n u t t e r i n g ( 1 ) , 5 has r e q u e s t e d H t o d o "p." conception of w o r l d constitution borrowed f r o m epistemology that

Unthematic knowledge is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m m e r e l y concomi- c a n n o t s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y be t a k e n over i n t o sociology. I n o r d e r to

tantly thematized knowledge o n t h e basis t h a t i t c a n n o t b e m a d e acces- a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h social p h e n o m e n o l o g y , social

t h e o r y m u s t f r o m the very outset detach itself f r o m a c o n s t i t u t i o n
sible through a simple transformation of the participant's
theory of knowledge a n d allow itself to be g u i d e d by a p r a g m a t i c
perspective i n t o the observer's perspective; unthematic knowledge
theory o f language that applies itself i n t r i n s i c a l l y to linguistically
r e q u i r e s , r a t h e r , a n analysis o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . F o r w h a t is u n t h e -
m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s . " L i f e w o r l d " s h a l l t h e r e f o r e b e i n t r o d u c e d as
m a t i c are those presuppositions t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a -
a c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t to c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. However, a for-
t i o n m u s t m a k e i f a s p e e c h act i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n is t o b e a b l e t o
m a l - p r a g m a t i c investigation, w h i c h investigates t h e b a c k g r o u n d of
t a k e o n a specific m e a n i n g a n d i f i t is t o b e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g v a l i d
t h e l i f e w o r l d b y way o f a n analysis o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , is c a r r i e d o u t
o r i n v a l i d at all.
f r o m the reconstructively obtained perspective of a participating
N o t all unthematic knowledge is c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r a particular life-
speaker. T h e use o f t h e c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d i n t h e social sciences
w o r l d , however. O f n o r e l e v a n c e i n t h i s r e s p e c t is t h e u n i v e r s a l
requires a switch over i n m e t h o d f r o m the (performative) attitude
g e n e r a t i v e k n o w l e d g e t h a t e n a b l e s c o m p e t e n t speakers t o use g r a m -
o f the [first and] second person to the (theoretical) attitude o f the
m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s p r o p e r l y i n t h e first p l a c e . E q u a l l y
t h i r d person.
i r r e l e v a n t is t h e k n o w l e d g e o f h o w o n e f u l f i l l s t h e g e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c
presuppositions of communicative action—for example, the knowl-
edge o f h o w one orients oneself t o w a r d validity claims a n d recipro- T h e Formal-Pragmatic Concept of Lifeworld
cally i m p u t e s a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o o n e another; how one identifies
objects, thus establishing contact between language a n d t h e w o r l d ; I n The Crisis of European Sciences, H u s s e r l i n t r o d u c e d t h e c o n c e p t o f
how one distinguishes between illocutionary and perlocutionary lifeworld w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f a c r i t i q u e o f reason. F r o m beneath
a i m s ; h o w o n e separates t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d t h e social w o r l d s f r o m t h e r e a l i t y t h a t t h e n a t u r a l sciences t a k e as t h e o n l y o n e , h e p u l l s o u t
the objective w o r l d ; h o w one moves f r o m action to a r g u m e n t a t i o n . the antecedently e x i s t i n g c o n t e x t o f prereflective life-practices and
A l l o f t h i s is i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e t h a t is m a s t e r e d o n l y i n t u i t i v e l y a n d w o r l d e x p e r i e n c e as t h e o u s t e d foundation of meaning. To this
requires the reflexive w o r k o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n o r d e r to be extent, the l i f e w o r l d f o r m s a c o u n t e r c o n c e p t to those idealizations
transformed from a "know-how" into a "know-that." t h a t first c o n s t i t u t e t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n o f t h e n a t u r a l sciences. I n
opposition to the idealizations o f measurement, i m p u t e d causality,
H o w e v e r , t h i s universal, prereflexive unthematic knowledge—which is
a n d m a t h e m a t i c i z a t i o n , as w e l l as t o t h e t e n d e n c y t o w a r d technolo-
p a r t o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e — s e r v e s t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f s p e e c h acts
g i z a t i o n o p e r a t i v e w i t h i n these, H u s s e r l sues f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f t h e
i n g e n e r a l ; i t g e n e r a t e s c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n b u t d o e s n o t serve t o
l i f e w o r l d as t h e i m m e d i a t e l y p r e s e n t r e a l m o f o r i g i n a r y a c c o m p l i s h -
complement and supplement i t . I n the r e m a i n i n g section I shall
ments; f r o m the perspective o f the l i f e w o r l d , he criticizes the ideali-
focus o n that o t h e r sort o f u n t h e m a t i c knowledge that complements,
zations—oblivious of their own existence—of natural scientific
supplements, a n d accompanies communicative action a n d provides
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

o b j e c t i v i s m . H o w e v e r , since t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e s u b j e c t is b l i n d t o specific horizontal knowledge (Horizontwissen) and (b) a topic-

the independent logic (Eigensinn) of linguistic intersubjectivity,
H u s s e r l is n o t a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e v e r y g r o u n d o f everyday
c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s i t s e l f rests o n i d e a l i z i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .
W i t h validity claims that transcend a l l merely local standards o f
evaluation, the tension between transcendental presuppositions a n d
e m p i r i c a l facts n o w m o v e s i n t o t h e f a c t i c i t y o f t h e l i f e w o r l d itself.
The theory of communicative action detranscendentalizes Kant's
r e a l m o f the I n t e l l i g i b l e by r e v e a l i n g the i d e a l i z i n g force o f a n t i c i p a -
tion i n the unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions o f s p e e c h acts,
t h a t is, a t t h e h e a r t o f e v e r y d a y communicative practices them-
selves—idealizations that simply e m e r g e m o r e visibly i n the extraor-
dinary forms of c o m m u n i c a t i o n that argumentations constitute. T h e
idea o f vindicating criticizable validity claims requires idealizations
that, h a v i n g descended f r o m t h e transcendental heavens d o w n
t h e e a r t h o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , d e v e l o p t h e i r effectiveness i n t h e m e d i u m
o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e ; t h e p o w e r o f resistance o f a — c u n n i n g l y o p e r -
a t i n g — c o m m u n i c a t i v e reason to the cognitive-instrumental defor-
m a t i o n s o f selectively m o d e r n i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e is also m a n i f e s t e d i n
these i d e a l i z a t i o n s .
Since t h e idealizations are d u e to a linguistic c o m p e t e n c e that t h e
s p e a k e r s possess p r e r e f l e c t i v e l y i n t h e f o r m o f a n i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e ,
the conflict between, o n the one h a n d , the explicit knowledge de-
p e n d e n t o n idealizations a n d , o n the other h a n d , the risk-absorbing
b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e takes p l a c e within t h e d o m a i n o f u n t h e m a t i c
k n o w l e d g e — i t d o e s n o t a p p e a r o n l y f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , as H u s s e r l
maintained, i n the competition between the expert knowledge
t h e e m p i r i c a l sciences a n d p r e t h e o r e t i c a l e v e r y d a y c o n v i c t i o n s . M o s t
o f w h a t is said i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s r e m a i n s u n p r o b -
l e m a t i c , escapes c r i t i c i s m , a n d avoids t h e p r e s s u r e o f s u r p r i s e
e r t e d by critical experiences, because i t draws i n advance o n the
validity o f antecedently agreed-upon certainties, i n other words, the
certainties o f the lifeworld.
The b u r d e n o f r e n d e r i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s p l a u s i b l e is a s s u m e d
p r i m a facie b y a n u n t h e m a t i c a l l y c o n c u r r e n t , r e l a t i v e l y foregrounded
knowledge o n w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s r e l y i n t h e f o r m o f p r a g m a t i c
a n d s e m a n t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . W h a t is a t issue h e r e is (a) a s i t u a t i o n -
dependent contextual knowledge.
a. T h e p e r c e i v e d e n v i r o n m e n t , w h i c h is e m b e d d e d i n c o n c e n t r i -
cally a r r a n g e d s p a t i o t e m p o r a l h o r i z o n s t h a t a r e n o t p e r c e i v e d , c o n -
stitutes t h e center o f t h e speech s i t u a t i o n . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m a y
usually suppose t h a t they i n t e r p r e t , f r o m c o o r d i n a t e d perspectives,
the m o r e trivial components o f the speech situation a n d o f their
surroundings (becoming ever m o r e d i f f u s e t h e m o r e d i s t a n t t h e y
are) more o r less i n t h e s a m e way. T h e y also assume t h a t t h e i r
d i v e r g e n t perspectives, resulting f r o m t h e i r d i f f e r i n g life-histories,
converge here a n d n o w a n d , at most, a c c o r d d i f f e r e n t relevance to
a s h a r e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h i s horizontal knowledge is
a c t u a l i z e d c o n c o m i t a n t i y yet i m p l i c i t l y w h e n s o m e t h i n g is s a i d ; i t
r e n d e r s a n u t t e r a n c e u n p r o b l e m a t i c a n d l e n d s s u p p o r t t o its a c c e p t -
to ability. I f I m e n t i o n i n t h e course o f small talk i n a p a r k i n F r a n k f u r t
t h a t i t is s n o w i n g i n C a l i f o r n i a , m y p a r t n e r i n c o n v e r s a t i o n will
r e f r a i n f r o m q u e s t i o n i n g m e f u r t h e r o n l y i f h e k n o w s t h a t I have
j u s t r e t u r n e d f r o m San F r a n c i s c o or, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t I w o r k as a
meteorologist.
b. A n e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n s t a b i l i z i n g v a l i d i t y is p l a y e d b y t h e
topic-dependent contextual knowledge t h a t a s p e a k e r c a n presuppose
w i t h i n the framework o f a c o m m o n language, t h e same c u l t u r e ,
s i m i l a r s c h o o l i n g , a n d so f o r t h — t h a t is, w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a
c o m m o n m i l i e u o r h o r i z o n o f subjective e x p e r i e n c e . T h e speaker
w h o addresses a p a r t i c u l a r t o p i c i m p l i c i t l y s u m m o n s u p f a c t u a l c o n -
t e x t s i n t h e l i g h t o f w h i c h w h a t is said a p p e a r s as t r i v i a l o r s u r p r i s i n g ,
of i n f o r m a t i v e o r i m p l a u s i b l e . F r o m this c o n c o m i t a n t l y present contex-
tual knowledge, i n f o r m a t i o n a n d r e a s o n s c a n be m o b i l i z e d as r e -
q u i r e d . T h i s w i l l b e necessary w h e n e v e r the supposition that the
ex- u n t h e m a t i c a l l y c o n c u r r e n t k n o w l e d g e is i n t e r s u b j e c t i v c l y s h a r e d a n d
agreed u p o n t u r n s o u t to be w r o n g . M y a t t e m p t to i n t r o d u c e the
c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t h e o r y o f c o m m u -
n i c a t i o n i n t h e way t h a t I a m d o i n g h e r e w i l l p r o v o k e different
questions a n d objections f r o m an audience o f academic colleagues
i n M a d r i d o r Paris t h a n , f o r e x a m p l e , i n B e r k e l e y .
This sort of unthematic knowledge easily gets d r a w n i n t o t h e
maelstrom o f problematization. T h e h o r i z o n o f the situation, or the
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Chapter 4
topic, n e e d only shift marginally. I f I exceed the usual l e n g t h o f a
l e c t u r e by even t e n m i n u t e s o r digress t o a n i m p e n d i n g h o l i d a y t r i p
w h e n dealing w i t h the topic o f l i f e w o r l d i n an academic context,
t h e n a t t e n t i o n will focus o n the violated pragmatic presuppositions
t h a t w e h a d u n t i l t h e n t a c i t l y s h a r e d . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e (a) situ-
ation-related horizontal knowledge a n d (b) topic-dependent contex-
tual knowledge are t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m (c) the background
knowledge of the lifeworld. T h e l a t t e r is s u b j e c t t o d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s
o f thematization. I t c a n n o t i n t e n t i o n a l l y be b r o u g h t to conscious-
ness i n t h e same way as is p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e f i r s t t w o , a n d i t f o r m s a
deep stratum of unthematized knowledge i n w h i c h the situation-
related horizontal knowledge and topic-dependent contextual
k n o w l e d g e — w h i c h are b o t h still relatively i n t h e foreground—have
their roots.
c. T h i s deep-seated background knowledge has a g r e a t e r s t a b i l i t y since
i t is t o a l a r g e e x t e n t i m m u n e t o t h e p r e s s u r e o f p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n
e x e r t e d b y c o n t i n g e n c y - g e n e r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e s . T h i s c a n b e seen b y
t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s l a y e r o f e l l i p t i c a l a n d always already-presupposed
k n o w l e d g e c a n b e e x t r i c a t e d f r o m t h e inaccessible m o d e o f p r o v i d -
i n g a n u n q u e s t i o n e d b a c k g r o u n d a n d t h e m a t i z e d o n l y b y methodical
effort a n d , even t h e n , o n l y p i e c e b y p i e c e . H u s s e r l p r o p o s e d t h a t a
p r o c e d u r e o f eidetic v a r i a t i o n be used f o r this purpose, namely, t h e
unrestrained i m a g i n i n g o f modifications o f the w o r l d or the project-
i n g o f c o n t r a s t i n g w o r l d s , w h i c h sheds l i g h t o n o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s of
n o r m a l i t y — a s u n c o n s c i o u s as t h e y a r e u n s h a k a b l e a n d u n a v a i l a b l e —
a n d w h i c h may b r i n g to l i g h t h o w t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f o u r everyday
p r a c t i c e s d e p e n d o n a Weltanschauung. J o h n Searle's e x a m p l e s also
r e c a l l H u s s e r l ' s m e t h o d . W i t h t h e h e l p o f these e x a m p l e s , Searle
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f s p e e c h acts r e m a i n s i n d e t e r m i -
n a t e u n t i l t h e i r s e m a n t i c a l l y fixed v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s h a v e b e e n s u p -
p l e m e n t e d by i n t u i t i v e l y k n o w n , i m p l i c i t b a c k g r o u n d assumptions
t h a t r e m a i n u n t h e m a t i c a n d are p r e s u m e d t o be c o m p l e t e l y u n p r o b -
l e m a t i c . T h u s , Searle t r a n s p o s e s " t h e cat is o n t h e m a t " i n t o o u t e r
space i n o r d e r t o m a k e us a w a r e b y m e a n s o f t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n t h a t ,
n o r m a l l y , w h e n we i m a g i n e a b o d y u p o n some surface, we i m a g i n e
i t o n l y as a f f e c t e d b y t h e f o r c e o f g r a v i t y . S i m i l a r l y , H o m o sapiens
m u s t h a v e h a d a n i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f h o w levers w o r k ever since
243
Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld
t h e y s t a r t e d t o use c e r t a i n t o o l s f o r s u r v i v a l ; y e t t h e l a w o f levers was
d i s c o v e r e d as a l a w a n d g i v e n t h e f o r m o f e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e o n l y i n
t h e c o u r s e o f m e t h o d i c a l q u e s t i o n i n g b y m o d e r n science o f our
pretheoretical knowledge.
H o w e v e r , t h e m e t h o d o f free v a r i a t i o n o f u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i -
t i o n s s o o n m e e t s its l i m i t s . T h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e l i f e w o r l d is j u s t
as l i t t l e a t o u r d i s p o s a l as we are i n a p o s i t i o n t o s u b j e c t a b s o l u t e l y
e v e r y t h i n g t o a b s t r a c t d o u b t . R a t h e r , C h a r l e s S. P e i r c e , w i t h his
p r a g m a t i c d o u b t a b o u t t h i s C a r t e s i a n d o u b t , has r e m i n d e d us t h a t
p r o b l e m s t h a t severely u n s e t t l e l i f e w o r l d c e r t a i n t i e s c o m e t o m e e t us
w i t h the objective power o f historical contingencies. Husserl h i m s e l f
h a d a l r e a d y l i n k e d h i s analysis o f t h e l i f e w o r l d w i t h t h e crisis m o t i f .
I t is a crisis a r i s i n g f r o m t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f m o d e r n science t h a t
shakes H u s s e r l o u t o f a state o f o b j e c t i v i s t i c o b l i v i o n o f b o t h w o r l d
a n d self. T h e p r o b l e m a t i z i n g p r e s s u r e b r o u g h t t o b e a r by s u c h crisis
situations, w h e t h e r o f a w o r l d - h i s t o r i c a l o r a life-historical type, ob-
jectively transforms the conditions for thematization, and only thus
creates a n i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s t a n c e f r o m w h a t is m o s t f a m i l i a r a n d m o s t
t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d . A n e x a m p l e o f t h i s is t h e t h r u s t t o w a r d m o r a l
u n i v e r s a l i s m t h a t sets i n w i t h t h e p r o p h e t i c w o r l d r e l i g i o n s , d i s r u p t -
i n g naive f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the substantive e t h i c a l life (Sittlichkeit)—
c o m m a n d i n g reverence f r o m those w i t h i n i t — o f t h e clan o r t r i b a l
a s s o c i a t i o n , a t h r u s t , i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t has s p a r k e d o f f so m a n y r e -
g r e s s i o n s t h a t i t h a d t o be r e n e w e d a t i n t e r v a l s r i g h t u p u n t i l t h i s
c e n t u r y — u n t i l the d e a t h camps o p e n e d t h e i r doors.
Like all unthematic knowledge, the b a c k g r o u n d o f the lifeworld
is i m p l i c i t l y a n d p r e r e f l e c t i v e l y p r e s e n t . I t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d , first, b y
its m o d e o f immediate certainty. T h i s l e n d s a p a r a d o x i c a l c h a r a c t e r t o
this k n o w l e d g e f r o m w i t h i n w h i c h — w i t h o u t any distance—we live
o u r lives, u n d e r g o e x p e r i e n c e s , speak, a n d act. T h e i n s i s t e n t y e t a t
t h e same t i m e i m p e r c e p t i b l e p r e s e n c e o f t h i s b a c k g r o u n d appears
as a n i n t e n s i f i e d , a l t h o u g h n o n e t h e l e s s deficient, f o r m of knowl-
e d g e . S u c h b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e lacks a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e
possibility o f b e c o m i n g problematic f o r i t comes i n t o contact w i t h
criticizable validity claims, thereby b e i n g t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o fallible
k n o w l e d g e , o n l y a t t h e m o m e n t i n w h i c h i t is e x p r e s s e d i n l a n g u a g e .
Absolute certainties r e m a i n unshakable u n t i l they suddenly disinte-
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d

g r a t e ; for, i n l a c k i n g f a l l i b i l i t y , t h e y d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e k n o w l e d g e i n t h i n g s o n w h i c h w e r e l y a n d t h e t h i n g s w i t h w h i c h w e are f a m i l i a r ,
t h e s t r i c t sense at a l l . t h e t h i n g s t h a t m o v e us, a n d t h e t h i n g s t h a t w e c a n d o — a l l o f w h i c h
T h i s deep-seated b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e is d i s t i n g u i s h e d , sec- are i n t e r m e s h e d i n this b a c k g r o u n d knowledge—are prereflective
o n d l y , b y its totalizing power. T h e l i f e w o r l d c o n s t i t u t e s a t o t a l i t y w i t h a p r é f i g u r a t i o n s o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t m u s t first b e t h e m a t i z e d i n s p e e c h
center a n d indeterminate, porous borders that recede rather t h a n acts b e f o r e i t c a n b r a n c h o u t a n d t a k e o n t h e m e a n i n g o f proposi-
p e r m i t themselves to be transcended. T h e two o t h e r f o r m s o f u n t h e - tional knowledge, of an interpersonal relationship produced
matic knowledge m e n t i o n e d — w h i c h are, relatively speaking, i n the t h r o u g h i l l o c u t i o n a r y means, o r o f the speaker's i n t e n t i o n .
foreground—derive their w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g f u n c t i o n , i n the d i m e n - T h e three attributes o f immediacy, totalizing power, a n d holistic
sion o f perception as w e l l as i n t h a t o f m e a n i n g , f r o m t h e b a c k - constitution belonging to this unthematically presupposed k n o w l -
g r o u n d i n w h i c h t h e y are r o o t e d . T h e c o m m o n s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n edge may perhaps explain the lifeworld's paradoxical f u n c t i o n as
c o n s t i t u t e s t h e c e n t e r — a n d n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e , m y b o d y , as a n a n t h r o - " g r o u n d " (Boden): h o w i t keeps c o n t i n g e n c y i n c h e c k t h r o u g h p r o x -
pologizing p h e n o m e n o l o g y has claimed—in which social spaces i m i t y t o e x p e r i e n c e . U s i n g sureties t h a t w e o b t a i n o n l y f r o m e x p e r i -
(staggered concentrically according to d e p t h a n d w i d t h ) a n d histori- e n c e , t h e l i f e w o r l d erects a w a l l a g a i n s t s u r p r i s e s t h a t t h e m s e l v e s
cal times (arranged three-dimensionally) converge p r i o r to any ob- o r i g i n a t e f r o m e x p e r i e n c e . I f k n o w l e d g e o f t h e w o r l d is d e f i n e d on
jectivation through measuring operations. The spaces a n d times t h e basis t h a t i t is a c q u i r e d a p o s t e r i o r i , w h e r e a s l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l -
e x p e r i e n c e d are t h e c o o r d i n a t e s o f our respective shared world; these edge, relatively speaking, represents a n a p r i o r i knowledge, t h e n the
c o o r d i n a t e s are always c o n c r e t e l y i n t e r p r e t e d o r e m b o d i e d , f o r i n - p a r a d o x may be e x p l a i n e d by the fact that, i n the b a c k g r o u n d o f the
s t a n c e , as v i l l a g e c o m m u n i t y , r e g i o n , state, n a t i o n , w o r l d society, a n d l i f e w o r l d , k n o w l e d g e o f the w o r l d a n d k n o w l e d g e o f language are
so f o r t h , o r as t h e succession o f g e n e r a t i o n s , e p o c h s , w o r l d h i s t o r i c a l integrated.
ages, l i f e - h i s t o r i e s i n d i v i d u a t e d i n t h e eyes o f G o d , a n d so f o r t h . I , The p r o b l e m a t i z i n g f o r c e o f c r i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e s separates t h e
i n m y b o d y , a n d I , as m y b o d y , f i n d m y s e l f always a l r e a d y o c c u p y i n g b a c k g r o u n d o f the lifeworld f r o m the f o r e g r o u n d . Such experiences
a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d w o r l d , w h e r e b y these c o l l e c t i v e l y inhab- are t h e m s e l v e s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e v a r i o u s ways i n w h i c h
i t e d lifeworlds telescope i n t o each other, overlap, a n d e n t w i n e l i k e w h a t is e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e w o r l d — t h i n g s a n d events, p e r s o n s , a n d
text and context. stories i n w h i c h p e o p l e are i n v o l v e d — i s d e a l t w i t h p r a c t i c a l l y . T h e
A t h i r d f e a t u r e , c o n n e c t e d w i t h i m m e d i a c y a n d t o t a l i z a t i o n , is t h e world of things (Zeugtvelt) a n d p r a g m a t i c c o n t e x t s o f e x p l a n a t i o n are
holism o f t h i s k i n d o f b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e t h a t , d e s p i t e t h e l a t t e r ' s c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h o u r h a n d l i n g o f t h i n g s a n d events; t h e solidary
a p p a r e n t t r a n s p a r e n c y , r e n d e r s i t i m p e n e t r a b l e ; t h e l i f e w o r l d m a y be world a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t s o f m e a n i n g a r e c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h o u r
d e s c r i b e d as a " t h i c k e t . " C o m p o n e n t s are f u s e d t o g e t h e r h e r e t h a t interactive dealings w i t h persons to w h o m we r e l a t e — t h e former
can be split u p i n t o d i f f e r e n t categories o f k n o w l e d g e o n l y u n d e r the within the framework of communities o f cooperation, the latter
pressure o f p r o b l e m a t i z i n g experiences. I n d e e d , the formal-prag- w i t h i n the framework o f linguistic communities. Ontogenedcally, the
m a t i c analyst casts h i s gaze b a c k i n t o t h e l i f e w o r l d f r o m t h e v a n t a g e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d i n w h i c h we d e a l w i t h e x t e r n a l n a t u r e i n a t e c h n i -
p o i n t of a thematic k n o w l e d g e already differentiated into facts, c a l - p r a c t i c a l way separates o n l y g r a d u a l l y f r o m t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h w e
n o r m s , a n d subjective e x p e r i e n c e s . O n l y t h e r i c o c h e t i n g o f t h i s d i f - d e a l w i t h o t h e r s w i t h i n society i n a m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l way. F i n a l l y , e x p e -
f e r e n t i a t i n g gaze leads h i m t o c o n c l u d e t h a t , i n t h e background riences w i t h o u r i n n e r nature, w i t h o u r body, needs, a n d feelings
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g are a l l o y e d are o f a n i n d i r e c t k i n d ; t h e y are reflected a g a i n s t o u r e x p e r i e n c e s o f
w i t h a relying-on-something, with a being-moved-by-something, with the external w o r l d . W h e n experiences of inner nature then gain
a knowing-how-to-do-something. T h e t h i n g s we simply assume, the independence as aesthetic experiences, the ensuing works of
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

a u t o n o m o u s a r t t a k e o n t h e r o l e o f o b j e c t s t h a t o p e n o u r eyes, t h a t s i m p l y by f u l f i l l i n g precisely one l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n . S p e e c h acts

p r o v o k e n e w ways o f s e e i n g t h i n g s , n e w a t t i t u d e s , a n d n e w m o d e s o f serve g e n e r a l l y to c o o r d i n a t e actions t h r o u g h m a k i n g possible a
behavior. Aesthetic experiences are n o t f o r m s o f everyday practice; r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n several a c t o r s ; t h e t w o o t h e r
t h e y d o n o t r e f e r t o c o g n i t i v e - i n s t r u m e n t a l skills a n d m o r a l ideas, functions of language—representation a n d e x p r e s s i o n — a r e also i n -
w h i c h d e v e l o p i n i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes, b u t r a t h e r are v o l v e d i n t h i s . T h e v i e w p o i n t o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n is t h u s s i t u a t e d
b o u n d u p with the world-constituting, world-disclosing f u n c t i o n o f at a m o r e abstract level t h a n the actor's d i r e c t l y i n t e n d e d estab-
language. lishing of a particular interpersonal relationship. Action coordina-
T h i s s t r u c t u r i n g o f e x p e r i e n c e reflects the architecture o f the t i o n i n g e n e r a l serves t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e social i n t e g r a t i o n o f a
l i f e w o r l d i n s o f a r as i t is l i n k e d t o t h e t r i c h o t o m o u s c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i f e w o r l d s h a r e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y b y its m e m b e r s . T o b e s u r e , s u c h a
s p e e c h acts a n d o f t h e b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e o f the lifeworld. To d e s c r i p t i o n already presupposes the shift i n perspective t h a t allows

b e s u r e , these g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d b e c o m e v i s i b l e o n l y us t o p o s e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e ac-

w h e n we shift perspective w i t h r e g a r d to m e t h o d . T h e terminology t i o n s t o t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . O n c e w e have methodo-

o f "background," "foreground," a n d "situationally relevant segment logically c a r r i e d o u t this shift i n perspective, we can m a k e a s i m i l a r

o f t h e l i f e w o r l d " is m e a n i n g f u l o n l y so l o n g as w e a d o p t t h e p e r s p e c - o b s e r v a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t w h a t is
said o r w i t h r e g a r d to the socialization o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g persons;
tive o f a s p e a k e r w h o w i s h e s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e
t h e s e r o l e s , t o o , are f u l f i l l e d b y s p e e c h acts i n a l l t h e i r f u n c t i o n s .
a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d a n d , i n t h i s , c a n base t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y
F r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e y serve t o
o f h e r speech-act o f f e r o n a mass o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d , u n t h e -
transmit a n d f u r t h e r develop cultural knowledge; f r o m the p o i n t
matic knowledge. T h e l i f e w o r l d as a w h o l e c o m e s i n t o v i e w only
o f view o f socialization, they serve to f o r m a n d m a i n t a i n p e r s o n a l
w h e n w e , as i t w e r e , s t a n d b e h i n d t h e b a c k o f t h e a c t o r a n d v i e w
identities.
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n as a n e l e m e n t o f a c i r c u l a r p r o c e s s i n w h i c h
t h e a c t o r n o l o n g e r a p p e a r s as t h e i n i t i a t o r b u t r a t h e r as t h e p r o d u c t O n e can n o w imagine the c o m p o n e n t s o f the l i f e w o r l d — c u l t u r a l
o f t h e t r a d i t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h she is s i t u a t e d , o f s o l i d a r y g r o u p s t o paradigms, legitimate orders, a n d personality structures—as con-
w h i c h she b e l o n g s , o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d l e a r n i n g processes t o w h i c h d e n s e d f o r m s of, a n d s e d i m e n t s d e p o s i t e d by, t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o c -
she is s u b j e c t e d . O n l y a f t e r t h i s i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v a t i n g step d o e s t h e esses that operate by way of communicative action: reaching
network of communicative actions constitute the m e d i u m t h r o u g h understanding, action coordination, a n d socialization. W h a t e n t e r s i n t o
w h i c h t h e l i f e w o r l d r e p r o d u c e s itself. c o m m u n i c a t i v e action f r o m the resources o f the b a c k g r o u n d o f the
l i f e w o r l d , f l o w s t h r o u g h t h e s l u i c e gates o f t h e m a t i z a t i o n , a n d p e r -
S o c i e t y as S y m b o l i c a l l y S t r u c t u r e d L i f e w o r l d mits the mastery o f situations, constitutes the stock o f knowledge
preserved w i t h i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices. T h i s stock o f knowledge
E v e r y s p e e c h act w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r r e a c h e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g / w i t h solidifies, a l o n g paths o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n t o i n t e r p r e t i v e paradigms
a n o t h e r p e r s o n / w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g situates t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x - t h a t are h a n d e d d o w n ; the k n o w l e d g e becomes compressed, i n t h e
p r e s s i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e speaker, i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e h e a r e r , a n d i n n e t w o r k o f i n t e r a c t i o n s o f social g r o u p s , i n t o values a n d n o r m s ; a n d
r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f c o n s t r u c t i n g i n t e r - i t c o n d e n s e s , b y way o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n processes, i n t o a t t i t u d e s , c o m -
a c t i o n s , w e have b e e n c o n c e r n e d a b o v e a l l w i t h t h e s e c o n d o f these petencies, modes o f perception, a n d identities. T h e c o m p o n e n t s o f
three aspects—the interpersonal relationship. W i t h t h e i r speech t h e l i f e w o r l d result f r o m a n d are m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h the c o n t i n u -
acts, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c t i o n a c c o m p l i s h feats o f c o o r d i n a t i o n b y ation o f valid knowledge, the stabilization o f g r o u p solidarities, a n d
establishing such relationships. However, they d o n o t achieve this t h e f o r m a t i o n o f accountable actors. T h e w e b o f everyday commu-
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Chapter 4
n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s e x t e n d s across t h e s e m a n t i c field o f s y m b o l i c con-
t e n t s j u s t as m u c h as i n t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f social space a n d h i s t o r i c a l
t i m e , c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h c u l t u r e , society, a n d
personality structures develop a n d are r e p r o d u c e d .
Culture is w h a t I c a l l t h e s t o c k o f k n o w l e d g e f r o m w h i c h the
participants i n communication, i n reaching understanding w i t h one
a n o t h e r w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g , s u p p l y themselves w i t h i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n s . Society consists o f t h e l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r s b y way o f w h i c h t h e
participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n regulate their affiliations to social
g r o u p s a n d s a f e g u a r d s o l i d a r i t y . I n t h e c a t e g o r y o f personality struc-
tures, I i n c l u d e a l l m o t i v e s a n d c o m p e t e n c i e s t h a t e n a b l e a s u b j e c t t o
s p e a k a n d act a n d t h e r e b y t o s e c u r e h e r o w n i d e n t i t y . W h e r e a s for
t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors c u l t u r e constitutes t h e c o n e o f l i g h t w i t h i n
w h i c h entities can e n c o u n t e r one a n o t h e r a n d can be represented
o r d e a l t w i t h as s o m e t h i n g , s u c h a c t o r s e n c o u n t e r n o r m s a n d s u b -
j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s as s o m e t h i n g i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d o r s o m e t h i n g i n
a s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d t o w h i c h t h e y c a n r e f e r , respectively, i n a n o r m -
conformative o r expressive attitude. I n order to prevent a wide-
spread misunderstanding, I now want to e x p l a i n why, i n the
transition f r o m communicative t o strategic a c t i o n , this scenario
c h a n g e s a l l a t o n c e f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects, a l t h o u g h n o t f o r
t h e social s c i e n t i s t w h o uses t h i s c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d .
I f w e c o n s i d e r society i n t h e b r o a d e r sense as a s y m b o l i c a l l y s t r u c -
t u r e d l i f e w o r l d , i t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t society d e v e l o p s a n d r e p r o -
duces itself o n l y via c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I t does n o t f o l l o w f r o m
this, however, that f o r t h e social scientific observer n o strategic i n -
t e r a c t i o n s c a n o c c u r i n l i f e w o r l d s c o n s t i t u t e d i n t h i s way. T o b e s u r e ,
s u c h i n t e r a c t i o n s have a d i f f e r e n t status h e r e t h a n t h e y h a v e for
H o b b e s o r i n game t h e o r y . These theories conceive o f strategic
a c t i o n as a m e c h a n i s m f o r t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f society as a n i n s t r u m e n -
tal order. F r o m the vantage point of communication theory, by
contrast, strategic i n t e r a c t i o n s can o c c u r o n l y w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f
l i f e w o r l d s a l r e a d y c o n s t i t u t e d e l s e w h e r e , m o r e precisely, as a n a l t e r -
n a t i v e o p t i o n i n case o f t h e f a i l u r e o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s . T h e y
o c c u p y , r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , as i t w e r e , s o c i a l spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s —
segments w i t h i n dimensions o f an already existing l i f e w o r l d consti-
t u t e d t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . T h e s t r a t e g i c actor, t o o , k e e p s
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Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld
t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f h i s respective l i f e w o r l d b e h i n d h i m a n d t h e i n s t i -
t u t i o n s o r p e r s o n s w i t h i n his l i f e w o r l d b e f o r e h i m , b u t i n e a c h case
t h e i r s h a p e has b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d . T h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e l i f e w o r l d
is n e u t r a l i z e d i n a p e c u l i a r w a y i n o r d e r t o p e r m i t t h e m a s t e r y o f
s i t u a t i o n s t h a t h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t e d t o t h e i m p e r a t i v e s o f success-ori-
e n t e d a c t i o n ; i t loses its a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g p o w e r as a r e s o u r c e t h a t
guarantees consensus. A n d like a l l o t h e r entities i n t h e ( n o w no
longer intersubjectively shared) lifeworld, the o t h e r participants i n
i n t e r a c t i o n are n o w also e n c o u n t e r e d o n l y as social facts—as o b j e c t s
that the actor can i n f l u e n c e ( i f n e e d be w i t h the h e l p o f p e r l o c u t i o n -
a r y e f f e c t s ) , as o b j e c t s i n w h i c h h e c a n s p a r k o f f p a r t i c u l a r r e a c t i o n s .
H o w e v e r , i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g stance o f t h e s t r a t e g i c actor, h e c a n n o
l o n g e r r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h t h e m as h e c a n w i t h a s e c o n d
person.
F o r t h e social s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v e r , t h e r e f o r e , s e q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n
( a n d , i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , systems o f a c t i o n ) c a n o c c u r i n t h e
l i f e w o r l d she analyzes t h a t a r e i n t e g r a t e d n o t b y way o f values,
n o r m s , a n d processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t , a t m o s t , b y w a y
o f the reciprocal e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e — f o r instance, t h r o u g h m a r -
ket or power relations. I t t h e n remains an empirical question
w h e t h e r t h i s a p p r o a c h b a s e d o n t h e c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d is m o r e
realistic t h a n a n a p p r o a c h o f the H o b b e s i a n type. A t first glance,
t h e r e a r e a n u m b e r o f p o i n t s i n t h e f o r m e r ' s favor. M a r k e t a n d
p o w e r r e l a t i o n s , t o o , are n o r m a t i v e l y — a s a r u l e , l e g a l l y — r e g u l a t e d ,
t h a t is, t h e y are set w i t h i n a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k . E v e n m i l i t a r y
conflicts r e m a i n e m b e d d e d w i t h i n n o r m a t i v e contexts. Civil w a r s —
a n d g e n o c i d e e v e n m o r e s o — l e a v e b e h i n d t h e m traces o f m o r a l
distress t h a t s u p p o r t t h e v i e w t h a t i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d l i f e w o r l d s
c o n s t i t u t e t h e indispensable g r o u n d even f o r strategic i n t e r a c t i o n s .
The components o f t h e l i f e w o r l d — c u l t u r e , society, a n d p e r s o n a l -
ity s t r u c t u r e s — f o r m c o m p l e x contexts o f m e a n i n g that c o m m u n i -
cate w i t h o n e another, a l t h o u g h they are e m b o d i e d i n different
s u b s t r a t a . C u l t u r a l k n o w l e d g e is e m b o d i e d i n symbolic f o r m s — i n
objects o f utility a n d technologies, i n words a n d theories, i n books
a n d d o c u m e n t s — j u s t as m u c h as i n a c t i o n s . Society is e m b o d i e d i n
i n s t i t u t i o n a l orders, i n legal n o r m s , o r i n webs o f n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u -
l a t e d p r a c t i c e s a n d c u s t o m s . F i n a l l y , p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s are e m -
250
Chapter 4
b o d i e d — i n a literal sense—in the substratum o f h u m a n organisms.
W h a t is t h u s e m b o d i e d a r e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t s t h a t c a n also b e l i q u i -
dated a n d p u t into circulation i n the currency o f n o r m a l language.
A l l m e a n i n g comes together i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e o f everyday c o m m u -
nicative practices. Nonetheless, t h e various c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e life-
w o r l d c o n s t i t u t e d i s t i n c t q u a n t i t i e s ; t h i s c a n b e seen o n t o l o g i c a l l y
f r o m t h e s p a t i o t e m p o r a l aspects o f t h e i r e m b o d i m e n t s .
C u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a r e d i f f u s e d across t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f c o l l e c t i v i -
ties a n d l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t i e s a n d i n t h e i r l i f e s p a n a r e n o t t i e d t o
t h e i d e n t i t y o f societies, l e t a l o n e p e r s o n s . T h e w o r l d r e l i g i o n s a r e
t h e best e x a m p l e o f t h i s . S o c i e t i e s , f o r t h e i r p a r t , o c c u p y a l a r g e r
s o c i a l space a n d l o n g e r h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s t h a n a p e r s o n a n d h e r
l i f e - h i s t o r y , b u t have less d i f f u s e a n d m o r e n a r r o w l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d
b o u n d a r i e s t h a n traditions. Finally, personality structures, w h i c h ad-
h e r e to t h e i r organic substrata, are d e f i n e d most sharply f r o m a
s p a t i o t e m p o r a l p o i n t o f view. F o r i n d i v i d u a l s , c u l t u r e a n d society
a p p e a r first o f a l l i n t h e shape o f a n o v e r a r c h i n g g e n e r a t i o n a l i n t e r -
relationship.
N o n e t h e l e s s , these c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d s h o u l d n o t be
c o n c e i v e d o f as systems c o n s t i t u t i n g e n v i r o n m e n t s f o r o n e a n o t h e r ;
they r e m a i n e n t w i n e d w i t h one a n o t h e r via the c o m m o n m e d i u m o f
e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e . So l o n g as n o s p e c i a l c o d e s s u c h as m o n e y o r
administrative power b e c o m e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n d split o f f f r o m this
m e d i u m — c o d e s b y w a y o f w h i c h , i n t u r n , f u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c sys-
t e m s o f a c t i o n b e c o m e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n d s p l i t o f f f r o m t h e society
component o f the lifeworld—everyday language ( w h i c h is always
m u l t i f u n c t i o n a l ) sets a l i m i t t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d .
E v e n systems o f a c t i o n t h a t a r e s p e c i a l i z e d t o a h i g h d e g r e e i n
c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n (school) o r social i n t e g r a t i o n (law) o r sociali-
z a t i o n ( f a m i l y ) d o n o t o p e r a t e o n t h e basis o f s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n s . V i a
t h e c o m m o n c o d e o f e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e t h e y also c o n c u r r e n t l y f u l f i l l
t h e o t h e r respective f u n c t i o n s alongside t h e i r o w n p a r t i c u l a r ones,
thus m a i n t a i n i n g a relation to the totality o f the lifeworld. The
l i f e w o r l d , as a s y m b o l i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d c o n t e x t o f m e a n i n g t h a t ex-
t e n d s t h r o u g h these v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n s a n d f o r m s o f e m b o d i m e n t ,
c o m p r i s e s t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s entwined with one another in an equipri-
mordial way.
251
Actions, S p e e c h Acts. Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d Lifeworld
T h e concept o f lifeworld thus explicated does n o t only provide an
a n s w e r t o t h e classical q u e s t i o n o f h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e . W i t h
the idea o f the i n t e r m e s h i n g o f the l i f e w o r l d c o m p o n e n t s , this con-
c e p t also answers t h e o t h e r q u e s t i o n o f classical social t h e o r y : t h a t
o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l a n d society. T h e lifeworld
does not constitute an environment against whose contingent
i n f l u e n c e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l has t o assert h e r s e l f . I n d i v i d u a l a n d society
d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e systems e x i s t i n g i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e e n v i r o n m e n t s
t h a t w o u l d r e l a t e t o o n e a n o t h e r e x t e r n a l l y as o b s e r v e r s . E q u a l l y ,
h o w e v e r , t h e l i f e w o r l d is n o t s o m e k i n d o f receptacle i n w h i c h i n d i -
v i d u a l s m i g h t be c o n t a i n e d l i k e p a r t s o f a w h o l e . T h e l a t t e r figure o f
t h o u g h t , w h i c h c o m e s f r o m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e s u b j e c t , is j u s t as
d e f i c i e n t as t h a t o f systems t h e o r y .
F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e s u b j e c t , society has
b e e n c o n c e i v e d o f as a w h o l e c o m p o s e d o f p a r t s , w h e t h e r as t h e state
m a d e u p o f p o l i t i c a l c i t i z e n s o r as t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f f r e e p r o d u c e r s .
T h e c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d also b r e a k s w i t h t h i s figure o f t h o u g h t . F o r
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y s o c i a l i z e d subjects w o u l d n o t b e subjects w i t h o u t
t h e n e t w o r k o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r s a n d o f t h e t r a d i t i o n s o f society
a n d c u l t u r e . O f c o u r s e , c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g subjects e x p e r i e n c e
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l i f e w o r l d s as a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d t o t a l i t y i n
t h e b a c k g r o u n d . B u t this totality, w h i c h w o u l d have to disintegrate
for them a t t h e m o m e n t o f t h e m a t i z a t i o n a n d h y p o s t a t i z a t i o n , is c o n -
s t i t u t e d b y t h e m o t i v e s a n d c o m p e t e n c i e s o f s o c i a l i z e d i n d i v i d u a l s as
m u c h as b y c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d g r o u p s o l i d a r i t i e s . T h e l i f e w o r l d
is s t r u c t u r e d b y c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r s n o m o r e
a n d n o less t h a n i t is by i d e n t i t i e s t h a t arise o u t o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n
processes. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e l i f e w o r l d d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n o r -
g a n i z a t i o n t o w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s b e l o n g as m e m b e r s , n o r a n associa-
t i o n i n w h i c h individuals j o i n together, n o r a collective comprised o f
i n d i v i d u a l participants. Rather, t h e everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
tices i n w h i c h t h e l i f e w o r l d is c e n t e r e d a r e n o u r i s h e d b y m e a n s o f
a n interplay o f c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n , social i n t e g r a t i o n , a n d s o c i a l i -
z a t i o n t h a t is i n t u r n r o o t e d i n these p r a c t i c e s .
O r g a n i s m s fall u n d e r the d e s c r i p t i o n o f persons o n l y if, a n d to the
e x t e n t t h a t , t h e y a r e s o c i a l i z e d , t h a t is, i n v e s t e d w i t h a n d s t r u c t u r e d
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

b y social a n d c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s o f m e a n i n g . P e r s o n s are s y m b o l i c
structures, whereas the symbolically s t r u c t u r e d n a t u r e - l i k e substra-
t u m , a l t h o u g h e x p e r i e n c e d as o n e ' s o w n b o d y , n o n e t h e l e s s , as n a -
t u r e , r e m a i n s j u s t as e x t e r n a l t o i n d i v i d u a l s as d o e s t h e m a t e r i a l
n a t u r a l basis o f t h e l i f e w o r l d as a w h o l e . W h e r e a s i n t e r n a l and
external nature constitute external boundaries—delimitations with
respect to an e n v i r o n m e n t — f o r socialized individuals a n d t h e i r life-
w o r l d s , these persons r e m a i n i n t e r n a l l y l i n k e d — v i a g r a m m a t i c a l re-
l a t i o n s h i p s — w i t h t h e i r c u l t u r e a n d t h e i r society.
The content of culturally handed-down t r a d i t i o n s is always a
k n o w l e d g e a c q u i r e d by persons; w i t h o u t the h e r m e n e u t i c a p p r o p r i a -
tion and further development of cultural knowledge t h r o u g h per-
sons, n o t r a d i t i o n s c a n d e v e l o p o r b e m a i n t a i n e d . T o t h i s e x t e n t ,
persons accomplish s o m e t h i n g f o r c u l t u r e b y way o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e - Figure 4.1
tive achievements. However, c u l t u r e f o r its p a r t also r e p r e s e n t s a Entwining of personality structures with culture a n d society

r e s o u r c e f o r p e r s o n s . F o r p e r s o n s are n o t " c a r r i e r s " (Träger) f o r

t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e o r g a n i c substratum can be a n d social i n n o v a t i o n s a n d find expression i n the forces o f pro-
d e s c r i b e d as a c a r r i e r f o r p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s . E v e r y c u l t u r a l t r a d i - d u c t i o n o r structures o f m o r a l consciousness. These i n n e r w o r l d l y
t i o n is a t t h e same t i m e a p r o c e s s o f e d u c a t i o n (Bildung) f o r subjects l e a r n i n g processes a r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h p r o b l e m s o f m a t e r i a l r e p r o -
c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n w h o a r e f o r m e d w i t h i n t h i s , j u s t as d u c t i o n , w i t h w h i c h we are n o t c o n c e r n e d i n t h e p r e s e n t context.
m u c h as t h e y f o r t h e i r p a r t k e e p c u l t u r e alive. S i t u a t e d a t a n o t h e r level t h a n these i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes
I n a corresponding manner, n o r m a t i v e orders, whether they solid- are processes w h e r e b y t h e l i f e w o r l d i t s e l f is s t r u c t u r a l l y d i f f e r e n t i -
i f y i n t o i n s t i t u t i o n s o r r e m a i n f r e e f l o a t i n g as f l e e t i n g c o n t e x t s , are a t e d . T h e d y n a m i c h e r e can b e e x p l a i n e d , f r o m a n i n t e r n a l p e r s p e c -
always o r d e r s o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . T h e n e t w o r k s o f i n t e r - tive, in terms of an interaction between innovative linguistic
a c t i o n o f m o r e o r less socially i n t e g r a t e d , o f m o r e o r less u n i t e d processes o f w o r l d d i s c l o s u r e a n d i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes.
g r o u p s , a r e c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y t h r o u g h t h e feats o f c o o r d i n a t i o n of To conclude, I w o u l d like to consider once m o r e , w i t h the help o f a
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g subjects. B u t , o n c e a g a i n , i t w o u l d b e w r o n g language-pragmatic reminder, the logic o f this interplay.
t o d e s c r i b e p e r s o n s as " c a r r i e r s " f o r these n e t w o r k s o f i n t e r a c t i o n . F r o m the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , we are already a c q u a i n t e d w i t h the
O n c e a g a i n , society a n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n s t i t u t e o n e a n o t h e r r e c i p - internal connection b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y : we understand
r o c a l l y . E v e r y process o f social i n t e g r a t i o n o f a c t i o n c o n t e x t s ¿5 s i m u l - t h e m e a n i n g o f a s p e e c h act i f w e k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h
t a n e o u s l y a process o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n f o r subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h i t m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . S e m a n t i c r u l e s t h u s lay d o w n t h e c o n d i -
a n d a c t i o n w h o are f o r m e d i n t h i s p r o c e s s a n d w h o f o r t h e i r p a r t i n t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y f o r t h e sentences o r s p e e c h acts p o s s i b l e i n a l i n g u i s -
e q u a l m e a s u r e r e n e w a n d s t a b i l i z e society as t h e t o t a l i t y o f l e g i t i - tic system. W i t h s u c h c o n t e x t s o f m e a n i n g language opens u p a
m a t e l y o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s (cf. figure 4.1). h o r i z o n o f possible actions a n d experiences f o r those w h o b e l o n g t o
Processes o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d e d u c a t i o n are l e a r n i n g processes t h e l i n g u i s t i c system. W o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g l a n g u a g e , as H e i d e g g e r says,
t h a t are d e p e n d e n t o n p e r s o n s . T h e y m u s t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e a l l o w s s o m e t h i n g t o be e n c o u n t e r e d as s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . I t is
s u p r a s u b j e c t i v e l e a r n i n g effects t h a t m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s as c u l t u r a l a d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n , however, w h e t h e r t h e s e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p r o j e c t e d
254 255

Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

p o s s i b i l i t i e s also prove their worth (sich bewähren) 2

i n their inner-
w o r l d l y dealings. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e semantically established c o n d i -
t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y a r e a c t u a l l y satisfied t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e s
a n d u t t e r a n c e s p o s s i b l e i n a g i v e n l i n g u i s t i c system find t h e i r place
w i t h i n f u n c t i o n i n g language games does n o t only d e p e n d o n the
w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e ; i t also d e p e n d s o n t h e success
o f i n n e r w o r l d l y practices t h a t are, however, m a d e possible t h r o u g h
t h e l i n g u i s t i c system. C r e a t i v e i n n o v a t i o n s i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c w o r l d v i e w
s h o u l d n o t b e h y p o s t a s i z e d , as H e i d e g g e r a n d F o u c a u l t have d o n e ,
as a c r y p t i c h i s t o r y — d a t i n g b a c k t o t i m e i m m e m o r i a l — o f o n t o l o g y
or forms o f knowledge. As t h e linguistic h o r i z o n of meaning
c h a n g e s , o n l y t h e conditions f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s c h a n g e w i t h
i t ; a n a l t e r e d p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m u s t prove its truth (sich bewähren) i n
its d e a l i n g s w i t h w h a t is a c t u a l l y e n c o u n t e r e d w i t h i n t h e n o w s h i f t e d
h o r i z o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s p e c t r u m o f validity claims i n s c r i b e d i n
communicative action provides f o r the feedback o f l e a r n i n g proc-
esses t o i n n e r w o r l d l y p r a c t i c e s . T h e w o r l d v i e w s t r u c t u r e s t h a t m a k e
i n n e r w o r l d l y practices possible t h r o u g h a p r e e x i s t i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o f m e a n i n g d o n o t r e n e w themselves only by virtue o f a poetic
b e s t o w i n g o f m e a n i n g ; t h e y also i n t u r n r e a c t u p o n t h e l e a r n i n g
processes t h a t t h e y have m a d e p o s s i b l e a n d w h o s e r e s u l t s find e x -
pression i n changes i n worldview structures.
well. I f the initially hermeneutically appropriated lifeworld, made
accessible f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t a n d r e c o n s t r u c t i v e l y
g r a s p e d i n its g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s , is t o b e o b j e c t i f i e d o n e f u r t h e r t i m e
i n t h e s h a p e o f a b o u n d a r y - m a i n t a i n i n g system, t h e n t h e p r o f i t
y i e l d e d f o r social s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y t h r o u g h a n analysis o f t h e l i f e -
w o r l d s h o u l d n o t b e g a m b l e d away i n t h e p r o c e s s . I n o r d e r t o a v o i d
a c o n f u s i o n o f p a r a d i g m s , I have e l s e w h e r e a t t e m p t e d ( i n The Theory
of Communicative Action, v o l . 2 ) t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a c t i o n t h e o r y a n d
t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f systems t h e o r y , g u i d e d b y t h e t h r e a d o f t h e t w i n
c o n c e p t s o f social i n t e g r a t i o n a n d system i n t e g r a t i o n . T h i s model
p e r m i t s e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h y systemic e l e m e n t s e m e r g e o n l y as t h e
r e s u l t o f h i s t o r i c a l processes. T h e d y n a m i c s o f dissociation from
c o m p l e x e n v i r o n m e n t s , w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e s s o c i e t y as a w h o l e i n its
c a p a c i t y as system, e n t e r s i n t o t h e v e r y interior o f society o n l y w i t h
the media-steered subsystems.
Notes
1. T h e absence of references is due to the nature of this essay, which is meant to
provide a rough sketch of my pragmatic approach to language.
2. [Editor's note:] See my note 52 to chapter 8, p. 380.

O n the other h a n d , neither should the restrictions o n the envi-

r o n m e n t — c o n t i n g e n t a n d e x e r t i n g influences e x t e r n a l l y — t h a t be-
c o m e visible w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p r o b l e m a t i z i n g pressure b r o u g h t
t o b e a r b y c r i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e s b e h y p o s t a s i z e d as a n a l l - d o m i n a t i n g
i m p e r a t i v e o f t h e self-assertion o f systems i n o v e r - c o m p l e x e n v i r o n -
m e n t s . I n t h i s way, systems f u n c t i o n a l i s m g r a n t s i n d e p e n d e n c e t o a
s i n g l e aspect, o n e t h a t is i n i t s e l f l e g i t i m a t e . V i e w e d as systems,
societies p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s m e r e l y f r o m t h e side o f w h a t M a r x
r e f e r r e d t o m e t a p h o r i c a l l y as t h e m e t a b o l i s m b e t w e e n s o c i e t y a n d
e x t e r n a l n a t u r e . T h e c o n s t i t u t i v e f e a t u r e o f system f o r m a t i o n is t h e
differentiation between an internal a n d an external perspective,
w h e r e b y t h e system is a t t r i b u t e d w i t h t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s y s t e m -
e n v i r o n m e n t d i f f e r e n c e as its o w n a c h i e v e m e n t . H o w e v e r , t h i s a t t r i -
bution should n o t be undertaken from t h e perspective o f an
o b s e r v e r w h o n o w s u p e r i m p o s e s a systems m o d e l o n t h e l i f e w o r l d as
5
Comments on John Searle's "Meaning,
Communication, and Representation" (1988)

Every analysis of l i n g u i s t i c processes of communication (Ver-

ständigung) is g u i d e d b y i n t u i t i o n s . W e t h i n k w e k n o w w h a t i t m e a n s
t o p e r f o r m a s p e e c h act successfully. M y c o m m e n t s serve i n d i r e c t l y
to c o m p a r e two i n t u i t i o n s o f this k i n d .
T h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t v i e w assumes t h a t a s p e a k e r S successfully per-
f o r m s a g i v e n s p e e c h act i f , w i t h t h e a i d o f a s i g n x, h e gets a n
a d d r e s s e e A t o r e c o g n i z e a n i n t e n t i o n o r a m e a n i n g (Meinung) in-
t e n d e d b y h i m ( i n t e n t i o n i ) . S achieves h i s g o a l b y m a k i n g t h i s c o m -
municative intention ( i n t e n t i o n s ) , t o o , k n o w n t o A. T h e model
a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is a n a l y z e d is t h a t
o f t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f ideas possessed b y S t o a n addressee w h o is t o
a c q u i r e possession o f t h e m w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s i g n x e m p l o y e d b y S
w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t : 5 gives A t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g b y
m e a n s o f x.
T h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i s t v i e w assumes t h a t S successfully p e r f o r m s a
s p e e c h act i f h e r e a c h e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g (sich verständigen) w i t h a n
addressee a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . H e r e , the i n t e n t i o n a l i s t
description is r e p l a c e d n o t o n l y by a m o r e complex (and thus
v a g u e r ) c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , b u t b y a different o n e . W i t h a n u t t e r a n c e
x, S a l l o w s a n addressee t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t a k i n g a p o s i t i o n w i t h a
"yes" o r a " n o " t o s o m e t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h h e wishes t o r e a c h
a g r e e m e n t w i t h her. T h e m o d e l i n t h i s case is n o t t h a t o f t r a n s m i t t i n g
258
Chapter 5
ideas b u t t h a t o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t a c o n s e n s u s w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e ( i n
p r i n c i p l e , d i s p u t e d ) m a t t e r . L a n g u a g e is n o t c o n c e i v e d as a m e a n s
f o r t r a n s m i t t i n g subjective c o n t e n t s b u t as a m e d i u m i n w h i c h t h e
p a r t i c i p a n t s intersubjectively share a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a given m a t -
ter. T h e s i g n x is n o t a t o o l t h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l c a n use, a n d w i t h w h i c h
5 gives A t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g b y p r o m p t i n g h e r t o r e c o g n i z e
h i s m e a n i n g o r i n t e n t i o n ; r a t h e r , t h e s i g n x is a n e l e m e n t of a
repertoire used i n c o m m o n that p e r m i t s the participants to u n d e r -
s t a n d t h e same m a t t e r i n t h e s a m e way.
T h e intentionalist can, w i t h m o r e sparing assumptions, offer the
p r o s p e c t o f a m o r e e l e g a n t e x p l a n a t i o n because h e w a n t s t o t r a c e
back the p h e n o m e n o n o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r t a n d i n g ( Verständigung) to
g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e success o f i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n s . I f h e can
s h o w h o w a s p e a k e r realizes h i s c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f m a k i n g h i s
i n t e n t i o n s k n o w n to a hearer, t h e n he can h o p e to e x p l a i n some-
t h i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i s t always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s i n his
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r o c e s s : t h a t is, t h e l i n g u i s t i c r u l e
system, w h i c h establishes t h e m e a n i n g o f a c o n v e n t i o n a l l y produced
expression. I c a n n o t deal w i t h t h e c r i t i q u e o f this p r o g r a m o f expla-
nation here. 1
I a m interested o n l y i n the fact that J o h n Searle—
despite his earlier c r i t i c i s m o f G r i c e — d o e s n o t w a n t to r e l i n q u i s h
t h e e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t a p p r o a c h . H e has i n t h e
m e a n t i m e g i v e n h i s speech-act t h e o r y a n i n t e n t i o n a l i s t t u r n . 2
2 n i z e h i s i n t e n t i o n i w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s i g n x. A c c o r d i n g t o Searle's
Searle h a d s h o w n i n 1969 t h a t t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f a s p e e c h act
c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d as a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t . A s p e e c h act c a n n o t
3
a d e q u a t e l y be a n a l y z e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y
b e c a u s e t h e m e a n i n g c o n t e n t o f w h a t t h e s p e a k e r wishes t o give a n
a d d r e s s e e t o u n d e r s t a n d is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e s u b j e c t i v e content
o f a s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n . F o l l o w i n g A u s t i n , Searle h a d d e s c r i b e d the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a s p e e c h a c t as t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y g o a l t h a t results
p r i m a r i l y f r o m w h a t is said i t s e l f a n d n o t f r o m t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n -
t i o n . T h e g o a l i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r consists i n t h e addressee
recognizing that the conditions for the validity o f a correctly exe-
259
C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"
c u t e d s p e e c h act a r e satisfied i n t h e g i v e n i n s t a n c e . U n d e r s t a n d i n g
a speech act r e q u i r e s k n o w l e d g e o f these c o n d i t i o n s .
Searle a t t h a t t i m e h a d a n a l y z e d s u c h c o n d i t i o n s w i t h t h e h e l p o f
t h e s e n t e n c e s u s e d i n s t a n d a r d s p e e c h acts; t o t h i s e x t e n t , h e presup-
posed t h a t S a n d A s p e a k t h e same l a n g u a g e — t h a t is, t h a t t h e y a l r e a d y
have a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l a p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e same l a n g u a g e .
However, since t h e n he holds the view t h a t he can dispense w i t h this
s t r o n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a n d c a n t r e a t t h e c o m m o n l a n g u a g e i t s e l f as
the p h e n o m e n o n i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n . For this reason, he renews
t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t a p p r o a c h ; i n d o i n g so, h o w e v e r , h e d o e s n o t i n a n y
way reverse t h e — i n i t i a l l y s e m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d — u n c o u p l i n g o f t h e
m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression f r o m the speaker's i n t e n t i o n . T o 4
a l l a p p e a r a n c e s , Searle r a d i c a l i z e s h i s e a r l i e r c r i t i q u e o f G r i c e by
tracing the concept of m e a n i n g back to cognitive intentions, w h i c h
a r e n o t o n l y p r e l i n g u i s t i c b u t are also i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e s i t u a t i o n
o f i n t e r a c t i o n . L i k e H u s s e r l , h e c o n c e i v e s o f " m e a n i n g " as t h e c o n -
t e n t o f a m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung). T o b e s u r e , i n c o n t r a s t
t o H u s s e r l , m e a n i n g s f o r Searle a r e a n a l y z e d i n t e r m s o f s o - c a l l e d
s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s , because t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n w h i c h m e a n -
i n g s are r o o t e d a r e t a i l o r e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f
states o f a f f a i r s , t h a t is, t h e y have a p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . T h i s
mentalist conception o f m e a n i n g a l l o w s Searle to retain Grice's
model in a modified form.
T h e s p e a k e r has t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f g e t t i n g a n addressee t o r e c o g -
revision, however, the i n t e n t i o n ] has the structure of a repre-
sentation (Vorstellung) "p," w h i c h is t r u e i f "jb" exists. T h u s , the
speaker can i m p o s e o n the sign x the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the existence o f
a state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d a f o r t i o r i ; h e c a n m e a s u r e t h e success
o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r t h e ad-
dressee, w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i m p o s e d o n x, r e c o g -
nizes t h e state o f affairs r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e speaker.
F r o m m y p o i n t o f view, by c o n t r a s t , a s p e e c h act, w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r
uses i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a n addressee a b o u t s o m e -
t h i n g , expresses s i m u l t a n e o u s l y (a) t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n , (b) a
state o f a f f a i r s , a n d (c) a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . A c c o r d i n g t o
260
Chapter 5
t h e o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n a l i s t view, t h i s w h o l e process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n
is s u p p o s e d t o be a b l e t o be e x p l a i n e d f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e
s p e a k e r a n d h i s i n t e n t i o n , t h a t is, i n s u c h a way t h a t (c) a n d ( b ) are
r e d u c e d t o ( a ) . Searle e x p a n d s t h i s m o d e l because h e sees t h a t w i t h
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , a r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d a n d a
d i m e n s i o n o f validity come i n t o play a n d provide the criteria for the
successful e x e c u t i o n o f a c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e .
W h i l e r e t a i n i n g the i n t e n t i o n a l i s t c l a i m to be able to e x p l a i n m e a n -
i n g , Searle m o d i f i e s t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t strategy o f e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e
e f f e c t t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e success is n o w t r a c e d b a c k t o t h e success-
f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s — w h i c h m e a n s t h a t (c) a n d (a)
a r e r e d u c e d t o ( b ) . T h i s strategy r e q u i r e s , i n t e r a l i a , t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n
o f t w o i m p o r t a n t theses:
1. T h e m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s is, i n t h e sense o f
a n analysis o f c o n d i t i o n s , m o r e p r i m o r d i a l (ursprünglicher) t h a n t h e
l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s .
2. E l o c u t i o n a r y types c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e k i n d o f
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g propositional
a t t i t u d e s o f t h e speaker.
I s h a l l use o n e o f Searle's o w n e x a m p l e s i n o r d e r t o discuss t h e
first thesis: t h a t l i n g u i s t i c n o t i o n s c a n b e a n a l y z e d i n t e r m s o f i n t e n -
t i o n a l n o t i o n s . W i t h t h i s r e d u c t i o n i s t thesis, Searle w a n t s t o g r o u n d
the t h e o r y o f language i n the philosophy of m i n d . The question
h e r e is w h e t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l c o n t e n t is p r i o r t o l a n g u a g e or
w h e t h e r i t i n t u r n b o r r o w s its o w n p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e f r o m t h e
g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f assertoric sentences (section 3 ) . I shall t h e n
p r o c e e d w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e c o n d thesis: t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y provides a conceptual f r a m e f o r the classification of
s p e e c h acts. T h e q u e s t i o n h e r e is w h e t h e r t h e m e a n i n g o f a s p e e c h
act is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l
c o n t e n t i m p o s e d o n t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o r w h e t h e r i t has t o b e
e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are d e t e r m i n e d by a
process o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t e r m i n a t i n g i n the intersubjective recog-
nition of corresponding validity claims (section 4). This will be
followed by a b r i e f exposition of an alternative approach (sec-
tion 5 ) . Finally, I shall elucidate this intersubjectivist view of
261
C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"
c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o Searle's r e c e n t analysis o f p e r f o r -
matives (section 6 ) .
3
T h e s e n t e n c e " T h e c r a n k s h a f t o f t h i s e n g i n e is b r o k e n " r e p o r t s t h e
state o f a f f a i r s t h a t t h e c r a n k s h a f t o f t h i s e n g i n e is b r o k e n . T h i s
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f t h e r e p r e s e n t e d state o f affairs i n a s i m i l a r
way t o h o w t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d s e n t e n c e c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
a c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h act i n w h i c h a s p e a k e r uses t h i s s e n t e n c e w i t h a
c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t . Searle n o w suggests r e p l a c i n g t h e a s s e r t o r i c
sentence by a drawing, thereby replacing the linguistic repre-
s e n t a t i o n b y a g r a p h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e s a m e state o f a f f a i r s . H e
imagines t h a t a m o t o r i s t w h o does n o t k n o w the language o f the
c o u n t r y i n w h i c h he finds h i m s e l f c o u l d i n t h i s way c o n v e y t o a
mechanic w h i c h p a r t o f h i s car n e e d s t o b e repaired. Now the
d r a w i n g t h a t r e p r e s e n t s a b r o k e n c r a n k s h a f t c a n also b e completed
w i t h o u t any i n t e n t i o n o f using i t f o r the purpose o f conveying this
k i n d o f i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e graphic representation o f the object can
be c o m p l e t e q u i t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n o r
use, p r o v i d e d o n l y t h a t i t is a c c u r a t e e n o u g h t o p e r m i t r e c o g n i t i o n
o f the represented state o f a f f a i r s . T h e same h o l d s g o o d w h e n S
r e p l a c e s h i s d r a w i n g w i t h o t h e r e x p r e s s i o n s , f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h ges-
t u r e s o r w o r d s y m b o l s : "We m a y say t h a t w h e n e v e r 5 p r o d u c e s x w i t h
t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t s a state o f a f f a i r s A, t h e n i t m u s t be
t h e case t h a t S p r o d u c e s x w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t a c r i t e r i o n o f
success o f h i s a c t i o n s h o u l d b e t h a t A o b t a i n s , i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e
u t t e r i n g " (p. 215).
O f c o u r s e , Searle w o u l d n o t have c h o s e n t h e e x a m p l e o f a g r a p h i c
representation i f he were c o n c e r n e d only w i t h the trivial c o n t e n t i o n
t h a t w e c a n also c o n c e i v e o f a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e state o f a f f a i r s
i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a c t u a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n s . C l e a r l y , t h e ex-
a m p l e is s u p p o s e d t o s u p p o r t t h e less t r i v i a l c o n t e n t i o n t h a t w e c a n
m a k e p r e s e n t a state o f affairs t o o u r s e l v e s in mente w i t h o u t u s i n g a n y
language—whether for purposes o f representation or communica-
t i o n . T h e s i s ( 1 ) c a n t h e n b e i n t e r p r e t e d as t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t we
262
Chapter 5
are a b l e t o d o t h i s n o t o n l y w h e n w e d o n o t use a n y l a n g u a g e b u t
e v e n w h e n w e have n o command o f a n y l a n g u a g e . However, the
conclusion drawn i n the excerpted passage d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a n y
a r g u m e n t i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s thesis. F o r h e r e , Searle a l r e a d y p r e s u p -
poses t h a t S p r o d u c e s ( o r c h o o s e s ) h i s d r a w i n g ( o r s o m e o t h e r x)
w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t s h o u l d p e r m i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f a c e r t a i n state
o f a f f a i r s , A. A n d , i n d e e d , t h e d r a w i n g o f a b r o k e n c r a n k s h a f t c a n
be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s way b y a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p r o f i c i e n t observer.
D r a w i n g s , h o w e v e r , d o n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s . As
Searle h i m s e l f observes, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e d e p i c t e d object
a n d t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f is o f a d i f f e r e n t k i n d . T h e d r a w i n g r e p r o d u c e s
a broken c r a n k s h a f t ; its usefulness depends on whether i t is
s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r t o t h e o b j e c t b e i n g d e p i c t e d . S i m i l a r i t y is, h o w -
ever, m e r e l y a necessary a n d n o t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e i n t e r -
pretation in question—namely, that the depicted crankshaft
expresses t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n .
C o n s i d e r e d o n its o w n t e r m s , t h e r e l a t i o n o f s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n
the representation a n d the original fulfills, perhaps, the role o f a
d e i c t i c g e s t u r e o r a d e s i g n a t i o n . I t p o i n t s t o a c e r t a i n object, s e r v i n g
to h i g h l i g h t this p a r t i c u l a r object a m i d s t t h e m u l t i t u d e o f all possible
objects, a n d thereby to i d e n t i f y i t . However, the d r a w i n g does n o t o f
its o w n a c c o r d r e p r e s e n t a state of affairs. I t is n o t e q u i v a l e n t t o a
s t a t e m e n t , w h i c h c o u l d b e t r u e o r false. T h e c a r t o g r a p h i c r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n o f a m o u n t a i n r a n g e m a y b e m o r e o r less a c c u r a t e ; b u t
o n l y t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t w e base o n o u r r e a d i n g o f t h e m a p —
t h a t w e i n f e r f r o m i t , so t o s p e a k — a r e t r u e o r false, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t
t h e m o u n t a i n r a n g e s are s e p a r a t e d b y w i d e valleys o r t h a t t h e h i g h e s t
p e a k lies 3,000 m e t e r s a b o v e sea l e v e l . I n t h e same way, w e c a n infer
f r o m the drawing o f a b r o k e n crankshaft the proposition that the
r e p r e s e n t e d c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n . H o w e v e r , o n l y a n i n t e r p r e t e r w h o
k n o w s in advance w h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s m e a n s
i n g e n e r a l is a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a b r o k e n
c r a n k s h a f t as a d e s i g n a t i o n w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t t h a t t h e
c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r c o u l d n o t e v e n see t h a t t h e
d r a w i n g , b y i m i t a t i n g a c e r t a i n o b j e c t , r e p r e s e n t s a state o f a f f a i r s i f
he d i d n o t already have c o m m a n d o f a language a n d k n o w , o n the
basis o f h i s l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s , h o w states o f a f f a i r s are r e p r e s e n t e d
linguistically. 5
263
C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"
4
E v e n i f , c o n t r a r y t o t h e f o r e g o i n g r e f l e c t i o n s , i t p r o v e d possible to
defend thesis ( 1 ) , t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t e x p l a n a t o r y p r o g r a m w o u l d
r e q u i r e t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f thesis ( 2 ) . B e c a u s e t h e success o f a s p e e c h
act u l t i m a t e l y is s u p p o s e d t o b e m e a s u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n d i -
t i o n s f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a state o f a f f a i r s , t h e d i f f e r e n t m o d e s
o f s p e e c h acts m u s t be a n a l y z a b l e as j u s t so m a n y ways o f r e f e r r i n g
to the satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s f o r — o r i g i n a l l y m e n t a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d —
states o f a f f a i r s : " D i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, i n s o f a r as t h e y
h a v e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , c a n b e r e g a r d e d as d i f f e r e n t m o d e s i n
w h i c h u t t e r a n c e s r e p r e s e n t reality. . . . I f w e see t h e basic f o r m o f t h e
i l l o c u t i o n a r y act as F(p) . . . t h e n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y p o i n t s w i l l d e t e r -
mine t h e d i f f e r e n t ways i n w h i c h p's a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e w o r l d "
(p. 219).
O n t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t utterances owe t h e i r m e a n i n g s to t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , o n e u n d e r s t a n d s t h e u t t e r e d sen-
tence i f one knows the conditions that make i t true. This holds to
b e g i n w i t h f o r assertoric sentences t h a t a r e u s e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h
acts. H o w e v e r , i n t h e case o f m o s t s p e e c h acts, w h a t is at issue is n o t
the existence o f states o f a f f a i r s . I f , n o n e t h e l e s s , the relation o f
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is s u p p o s e d t o be c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r t h e m e a n i n g of
n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as w e l l , t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y types m u s t b e
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e o n t h e basis o f t h e a t t i t u d e s a d o p t e d i n e a c h case b y
t h e s p e a k e r t o t h e r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s , as w e l l as o n t h e basis
o f t h e sense in which his u t t e r a n c e s r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g : " T h e basic
i d e a h e r e is t h e o l d o n e , t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a s t a t e m e n t is s o m e h o w
g i v e n b y its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ; t h e m e a n i n g o f a c o m m a n d is g i v e n by
its o b e d i e n c e c o n d i t i o n s ; t h e m e a n i n g o f a p r o m i s e is g i v e n b y its
f u l f i l l m e n t c o n d i t i o n s , a.s.o." ( p . 2 2 0 ) .
T h u s , t h e m o d e o f a s p e e c h act c h a n g e s w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
a t t i t u d e o f t h e speaker a n d w i t h the type o f satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s
f o r t h e state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l component.
H o w e v e r , t h e r e l a t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l l o w s o n l y t w o specifica-
t i o n s i n t h e sense o f A u s t i n ' s " d i r e c t i o n s o f fit": t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e
satisfied w h e n t h e w o r d s (Worte) fit t h e asserted states o f a f f a i r s ( o r
t h e w o r l d ) (-1), a n d success c o n d i t i o n s a r e s a t i s f i e d w h e n t h e d e s i r e d
states o f a f f a i r s ( o r t h e w o r l d ) are m a d e t o fit t h e w o r d s (T). Searle
264 265

Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s on Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

t h e r e f o r e e x p l a i n s t h e f i r s t t h r e e o f h i s five basic m o d e s as f o l l o w s : trast t o (1)—can no longer be inferred f r o m the illocutionarily

An u t t e r a n c e x b e l o n g s t o t h e class o f "assertives," " d i r e c t i v e s , " o r w e a k e n e d p r e c e d i n g clause. (2) has t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n i n d i r e c t
"commissives" i f its success is m e a s u r e d according to whether the s p e e c h act w h o s e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g expresses a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g
state o f a f f a i r s "p" r e p r e s e n t e d b y x f r o m w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n deviates. T h e threat actually
i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r w o u l d have t o b e c o n v e y e d l i t e r a l l y r o u g h l y
• exists e v e n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e s p e a k e r a n d h i s u t t e r a n c e , a n d
in the following f o r m :
• c o m e s i n t o e x i s t e n c e o n t h e basis o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s p e a k e r o r
his a d d r e s s e e r e g a r d x at least i n p a r t as a r e a s o n f o r b r i n g i n g a b o u t (2a) I f y o u d o n ' t h a n d o v e r t h e r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y t o Y, I
> " will notify the police that . . .

I w o u l d l i k e t o s h o w b y way o f a f e w c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s that propo- I n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t i t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t , i n t h e case o f

s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a n d d i r e c t i o n o f fit ( t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n t o (1) a n d ( 2 ) (where (2) is i n t e r p r e t e d as ( 2 a ) ) , w e are c l e a r l y n o t
s p e a k e r a n d t o t h e h e a r e r ) d o n o t suffice t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i l l o c u - d e a l i n g w i t h s p e e c h acts o f t h e same t y p e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y b o t h
tionary t y p e . L e t us c o n s i d e r first o f a l l a n i m p e r a t i v e w h i c h , d e p e n d - m e e t t h e same c o n d i t i o n s s p e c i f i e d b y Searle f o r d e t e r m i n i n g i l l o c u -
i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t , c a n b e i n t e r p r e t e d as a r e q u e s t , s u p p l i c a t i o n , t i o n a r y t y p e . T h e y satisfy t h e same success c o n d i t i o n s f o r "p" (with
c o m m a n d , a n d so f o r t h ( b u t also, as w e s h a l l see, as a t h r e a t ) : t h e s a m e d i r e c t i o n o f fit) a n d r e q u i r e t h e same p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i -
t u d e o f t h e speaker; n o n e t h e l e s s , t h e y d o n o t have t h e same i l l o c u -
(1) I r e q u e s t y o u t o h a n d o v e r t h e r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y t o Y. tionary meaning. As we s h a l l see, threats do not have proper
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e a t a l l . Searle m i g h t o b j e c t t h a t o r d e r s as w e l l as
6

W h o e v e r understands (1) can paraphrase t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g

o f t h i s s p e e c h act r o u g h l y as f o l l o w s : S gives t h e addressee t o u n d e r -
s t a n d t h a t she s h o u l d m a k e sure t h a t "p" o c c u r s . H o w e v e r , f o r t h i s i t
is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e d e s i r e d state
"/>" w o u l d be b r o u g h t a b o u t . T h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e s p e e c h act
o n l y w h e n , i n a d d i t i o n t o these success c o n d i t i o n s , she also k n o w s
the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t authorize t h e s p e a k e r t o issue h i s i m p e r a t i v e so
t h a t h e m a y e x p e c t t h e addressee t o c a r r y o u t t h e r e q u i r e d a c t i o n .
T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t already follows f r o m the fact that a speaker w h o
u t t e r s ( 1 ) w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e , i n h i s r o l e as s u p p l i c a n t , f r i e n d , n e i g h -
b o r , o r c o m m a n d e r , t o r e l y o n any n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t whatsoever m u s t
instead draw o n a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions i n o r d e r to replace
t h e m i s s i n g n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m w i t h a p o w e r c l a i m . I n t h e case
o f negative sanctions, the imperative turns, for example,
threat:
(2) I request you to h a n d over the r e q u i r e d sum o f m o n e y to
otherwise I will notify the police that . . .
T h e sanction conditions specified i n the appositive expression
take the place o f t h e missing a u t h o r i z a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s t h a t — i n con-
imperatives deprived o f their n o r m a t i v e backing a n d threats do be-
l o n g t o t h e same class o f d i r e c t i v e s a n d t h a t t h e y are d i s t i n g u i s h e d
o n l y b y h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t m o d e s o f a c h i e v i n g t h e same i l l o c u t i o n a r y
purpose. 7
W h i l e orders appeal to a p o s i t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y or to some
(intersubjectively recognized) normative context, naked imperatives
a n d e x p l i c i t threats i n v o k e sanctions. G r a n t i n g this m u c h , i t s h o u l d
b e clear, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e is s t i l l a d i f f e r e n c e in illocutionary
m e a n i n g . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f a n o r d e r "p" is t h a t t h e h e a r e r , i n
recognizing the corresponding c o n d i t i o n s o f success, realizes t h a t
she is s u p p o s e d t o b r i n g a b o u t "/>" i n a s p e c i f i c way, n a m e l y , t h r o u g h
obeying, w h i c h means meeting the normative expectation of the
speaker. F o r h i m , t h e e x p e c t e d b e h a v i o r f a l l s u n d e r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n
o f " f o l l o w i n g a previously established a n d intersubjectively recog-
into a
n i z e d n o r m . " I n t h e case o f n a k e d i m p e r a t i v e s o r t h r e a t s t h e ex-
p e c t e d b e h a v i o r d o e s n o t fit t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , a t least n o t f r o m t h e
Y— v i e w p o i n t o f t h e actor. I t has q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g : t h a t of
a v o i d i n g n e g a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t t h e h e a r e r w o u l d have t o s u f f e r
otherwise.
now
W i t h Searle we m a y say t h a t t h e h e a r e r is i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a u s e d t o
p e r f o r m t h e r e q u i r e d a c t i o n b y o r d e r s as w e l l as by i m p e r a t i v e s a n d
266
Chapter 5
t h r e a t s ; b u t t h e n i n e a c h case w e m e a n s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t b y
" i n t e n t i o n a l c a u s a t i o n . " I t is t r u e t h a t i n b o t h cases s p e e c h acts
c o n s t i t u t e f o r t h e h e a r e r at least p a r t i a l l y a r e a s o n t o b r i n g a b o u t a
c e r t a i n state o f a f f a i r s , b u t t h e types o f reasons t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a r e
d i s t i n c t i n a n i n t e r e s t i n g way. T h e r e a s o n s v i n d i c a t i n g t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h a n o r d e r a r e r e a s o n s f o r e v e r y b o d y , o r a t least f o r
all the parties w h o recognize the a u t h o r i z i n g n o r m s or institutions.
B y c o n t r a s t , reasons f o r s u b m i t t i n g t o a p o w e r c l a i m c o n n e c t e d w i t h
n a k e d i m p e r a t i v e s o r t h r e a t s d o n o t b e l o n g t o t h i s set o f g e n e r a l
reasons; t h e y are specific i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y c o u n t as r e a s o n s o n l y
f o r t h e m o r e o r less r a t i o n a l c h o i c e o f a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n with
particular preferences i n a particular situation. T h i s difference be-
c o m e s o b v i o u s w h e n t h e h e a r e r r e j e c t s t h e r e s p e c t i v e speech-acts. I n
t h e case o f a n o r d e r , a h e a r e r w h o r e j e c t s t h e speech-act o f f e r d i s -
p u t e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is a u t h o r i z e d t o e x p e c t t h e b e h a v i o r com-
m a n d e d o f her:
(1') N o , you cannot order me to do anything.
I n t h e s e c o n d case, t h e h e a r e r c h a l l e n g e s o n l y c e r t a i n e x i s t e n t i a l
presuppositions p e r t a i n i n g to t h e reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions o n
w h i c h t h e speaker d r a w s :
(2') N o , y o u have n o t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
Whereas g e n e r a l reasons can facilitate a n u n c o e r c e d a g r e e m e n t be-
t w e e n s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , specific r e a s o n s , i n t h e sense i l l u s t r a t e d
b y t h e l a t t e r case, m e d i a t e a n i n f l u e n c e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r e x e r t s o n
the attitude o f the hearer.
T o t h i s o b j e c t i o n Searle c o u l d r e s p o n d b y d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o h i s
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n successful a n d successful b u t d e f e c t i v e speech
acts. E v e r y t h i n g t h e n h i n g e s o n w h a t k i n d o f d e f i c i e n c y w e m e a n . I f
w e d e s c r i b e t h e l a c k o f a u t h o r i z i n g c o n d i t i o n s as a f a i l u r e i n p r e p a r a -
t o r y c o n d i t i o n s , as Searle has s u g g e s t e d , w e w o u l d miss t h e p o i n t .
I l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o w e t h e i r m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
t h e y c a r r y , since these c l a i m s — l i k e t r u t h c l a i m s — a r e c a p a b l e of
b e i n g intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d to the e x t e n t that they are based
o n r e a s o n s t h a t c o u n t as r e a s o n s f o r a l l p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d . N a k e d
imperatives a n d threats are d e p r i v e d o f this i l l o c u t i o n a r y force; there
267
C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"
is n o c l a i m t o v a l i d i t y associated w i t h t h e m b u t r a t h e r a p o w e r c l a i m ;
they are o r i e n t e d n o t t o w a r d t h e possibility o f c o m m o n agreement
b u t t o w a r d t h e causal effect o f t h e speaker's influence on the
hearer. 8
5
B e f o r e d r a w i n g s o m e c o n c l u s i o n s , l e t us r e t u r n t o t h e issue o f clas-
s i f i c a t i o n . T h e analysis t h a t I have p r o p o s e d f o r n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o -
r i z e d d i r e c t i v e s also a p p l i e s t o c o m m i s s i v e s .
(3) I p r o m i s e y o u I w i l l h a n d over the r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y
t o Y.
A n a d d r e s s e e c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e u t t e r a n c e as a p r o m i s e o n l y w h e n
she knows the conditions under which an accountable
(zurechnungsfähig) a c t o r c a n b i n d h i s o w n w i l l — t h a t is, t a k e o n a n
obligation to do s o m e t h i n g . H e r e , t o o , t h e n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s e is
a i m e d a t these a u t o n o m y c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h , as i n ( 1 ) , s u p p l e m e n t
t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success f o r "p." F o r i n s t a n c e :
(3') N o , y o u are far too u n r e l i a b l e f o r m e to take such a promise
seriously.
I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a d i r e c t i v e o r c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h act, t h e
h e a r e r m u s t k n o w n o t o n l y t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e state
o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d i n i t , b u t also t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t
c a n b e r e g a r d e d as l e g i t i m a t e o r as b i n d i n g . T h i s v i e w is d u e t o a
f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f a basic i n s i g h t o f t r u t h - c o n d i -
t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . T h i s is a l l t h e m o r e r e a s o n t o e x p e c t t h a t i t m a y b e
c o n f i r m e d t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e t o c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as w e l l .
I n t h i s r e s p e c t , h o w e v e r , a n a s y m m e t r y is i n i t i a l l y s t r i k i n g : t h e
v a l i d i t y o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a p p e a r s t o d e p e n d only on the
s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e "p"
u s e d i n i t ; b y c o n t r a s t , however, as o u r analysis so f a r has s h o w n , t h e
s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g success c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e state o f
a f f a i r s " t h a t p" e x p r e s s e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t is i n f a c t
n o t sufficient for the validity o f orders o r promises. T h i s asymmetry
d i s a p p e a r s as s o o n as o n e realizes t h a t , e v e n i n t h e case o f c o n s t a t i v e
268
Chapter 5
s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r m u s t i n t e n d s o m e t h i n g m o r e a n d s o m e -
t h i n g d i f f e r e n t t h a n w h a t is e x p e c t e d f r o m h i m o n t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t
r e a d i n g , namely, to get the hearer to recognize that he holds to
b e t r u e ( i n t e n t i o n ^ a n d t h a t h e wishes t o l e t h e r k n o w t h i s ( i n t e n -
t i o n s ) . T h e speaker w a n t s t o c o m m u n i c a t e t o t h e h e a r e r n o t o n l y t h e
i n t e n t i o n i t h a t he has ( t h a t h e b e l i e v e s " t h a t p"), b u t h e also w a n t s
to communicate t o h e r t h e f a c t "/>" (so t h a t t h e addressee herself
b e l i e v e s " t h a t p"). T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m d o e s n o t c o n s i s t s i m p l y i n
t h e addressee b e c o m i n g a w a r e o f t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n (Meinung);
r a t h e r , she h e r s e l f is s u p p o s e d t o a r r i v e a t t h e same v i e w as t h a t o f
w h i c h t h e speaker is c o n v i n c e d . I n s h o r t , t h e addressee is s u p p o s e d
t o a c c e p t t h e speaker's a s s e r t i o n as v a l i d . T h i s is w h a t t h e c o m m u n i -
c a t i o n o f facts is a l l a b o u t . T h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t d e s c r i p t i o n a c c o r d i n g
t o w h i c h t h e speaker i n t e n d s t o p r o d u c e i n t h e h e a r e r t h e b e l i e f t h a t
t h e s p e a k e r is c o m m i t t e d t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c e r t a i n state o f a f f a i r s
c o m e s close t o a d i s t o r t i o n . I n o r d e r t o achieve h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y
a i m , i t is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e s p e a k e r i m p o s e truth conditions
f o r a m e n t a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s o n a s i g n x a n d t h a t h e
m a k e s t h e addressee a w a r e o f these b y u t t e r i n g x ( t h e assertoric
s e n t e n c e ) , w h i c h is i m p r e g n a t e d , as i t w e r e , w i t h t h e t r u t h c o n d i -
t i o n s . R a t h e r , t h e s p e a k e r m u s t c o n f r o n t t h e addressee w i t h h i s claim
t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e t h e asserted s e n t e n c e t r u e a r e i n d e e d
satisfied.
J u s t as w i t h o r d e r s a n d p r o m i s e s , t h e r e f o r e , t h e s p e a k e r w i t h a
c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h act also raises a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t t h e
h e a r e r is s u p p o s e d t o a c c e p t . I n c o n t r a s t t o n o n c o n s t a t i v e speech
acts, h o w e v e r , t h i s c l a i m r e f e r s t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s
t h a t m a k e t h e assertoric s e n t e n c e e m p l o y e d t r u e . A g a i n s t t h i s , t h e
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s l i n k e d t o o r d e r s a n d p r o m i s e s r e f e r directly t o t h e
normative conditions that entitle one party to expect that the other
p a r t y w i l l b r i n g a b o u t t h e r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s . T h e c l a i m t o
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h refers t o t h e existence o f a state o f a f f a i r s , i n
o t h e r w o r d s to t h e f a c t "p." By contrast, the c l a i m to n o r m a t i v e
validity refers to the legitimacy o f t h e expectation that one o r o t h e r
o f t h e p a r t i e s c o n c e r n e d s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t a r e p r e s e n t e d state o f
a f f a i r s " t h a t p."
269
C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"
M y m a i n p o i n t i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t is t h e i n a d e q u a c y o f t h e
i n t e n t i o n a l i s t m o d e l . I t c o n d e m n s t h e h e a r e r t o a p e c u l i a r passivity.
I t d e p r i v e s h e r o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t a k i n g t h e speaker's utterance
seriously—that is, o f a c c e p t i n g i t as v a l i d o r o f r e j e c t i n g i t as i n v a l i d .
W i t h o u t t h e possibility o f t a k i n g a p o s i t i o n w i t h a "yes" o r "no,"
however, the process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n r e m a i n s i n c o m p l e t e .
W i t h a s p e e c h act, t h e speaker n o t o n l y p r o v i d e s t h e h e a r e r w i t h
t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e c o m e aware o f h i s o w n i n t e n t i o n ; h e f u r t h e r
c l a i m s t o h a v e r e a s o n s t h a t c a n m o v e t h e h e a r e r t o a c c e p t a n asser-
t i o n as t r u e , a n o r d e r as l e g i t i m a t e , a p r o m i s e as b i n d i n g , o r — a s I
w o u l d l i k e t o a d d a t t h i s p o i n t — a n a v o w a l as s i n c e r e . T h e speaker
c a n n o t achieve his i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f c o n v e y i n g a fact, g i v i n g a n
order, m a k i n g a request or a promise, or revealing a subjective
experience (Erlebnis) i f h e does n o t a t t h e s a m e t i m e m a k e k n o w n
t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h h i s u t t e r a n c e c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d ;
a n d , i n d e e d , h e m u s t d o so i n s u c h a w a y t h a t , i n c l a i m i n g t h a t these
c o n d i t i o n s a r e s a t i s f i e d , h e i m p l i c i d y also o f f e r s t o p r o v i d e r e a s o n s
i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s c l a i m , i f necessary. T h e h e a r e r m u s t b e a b l e t o
h a v e r e a s o n s f o r a c c e p t i n g a n a s s e r t i o n as t r u e , a n o r d e r as l e g i t i -
m a t e , a p r o m i s e as b i n d i n g , a n a v o w a l as a u t h e n t i c o r s i n c e r e (or,
alternatively, f o r q u e s t i o n i n g such claims). T h e hearer does not
u n d e r s t a n d t h e s p e e c h act i f she d o e s n o t k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r
t a k i n g s u c h a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f
a n assertion, an order, a promise, o r avowal remains concealed f r o m
t h e h e a r e r i f she b e c o m e s aware o n l y t h a t t h e s p e a k e r has a c e r t a i n
i n t e n t i o n a l state: t h a t h e believes " t h a t p"; t h a t h e w a n t s t h e h e a r e r
to b r i n g about o r t h a t h e h i m s e l f has t h e i n t e n t i o n o f b r i n g i n g
a b o u t "jb"; o r t h a t h e w a n t s t o r e v e a l t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a
b e l i e f , a f e e l i n g , a d e s i r e , a n i n t e n t i o n , a n d so f o r t h .
6
Understanding t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is c e r t a i n l y n o t
t h e s a m e as reaching understanding a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w i t h t h e h e l p o f
an u t t e r a n c e h e l d to be valid. A n equally clear d i s t i n c t i o n m u s t be
m a d e b e t w e e n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e a n d o n e t h a t is m e r e l y h e l d t o b e
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Chapter 5
v a l i d . N o n e t h e l e s s , q u e s t i o n s o f m e a n i n g c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d c o m -
p l e t e l y f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y . T h e basic q u e s t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o
9 c h a l l e n g e d f r o m t h e p o i n t s o f v i e w o f n o r m a t i v e Tightness, t r u t h f u l -
u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n c a n n o t be iso-
lated f r o m the question o f the context i n w h i c h this expression can
be a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . O n e s i m p l y w o u l d n o t k n o w w h a t i t is t o
u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression i f one d i d n o t
k n o w h o w o n e could m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g
w i t h s o m e o n e a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . I t c a n b e seen f r o m t h e v e r y c o n d i -
tions f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g linguistic expressions t h a t t h e s p e e c h acts
that can be f o r m e d w i t h t h e i r h e l p have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d
a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h a t is said. T o t h i s e x t e n t ,
t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e p o s s i b l e v a l i d i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s is p a r t o f
the pragmatic conditions not just for reaching understanding but,
p r i o r to this, o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g itself. I n
language, the dimensions o f m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y are internally
connected.
I f we start f r o m this intersubjectivist c o n c e p t i o n o f language, i l l o -
c u t i o n a r y types m a y b e i d e n t i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
associated w i t h t h e m . 1 0
I n o r d e r to identify the validity claims t h e m -
selves, t h e f o l l o w i n g h e u r i s t i c q u e s t i o n m a y b e u s e f u l : I n w h a t sense
c a n t h e s p e e c h act as a w h o l e b e n e g a t e d ? W e a r r i v e a t p r e c i s e l y
three validity claims i f we consider f r o m w h i c h p o i n t s o f view a n
i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a m b i g u o u s s e n t e n c e s u c h as
(4) I w i l l h a n d o v e r t h e r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y t o Y.
can be negated.
(4') N o , y o u are f a r t o o u n r e l i a b l e i n s u c h m a t t e r s .
(4") N o , y o u d o n ' t r e a l l y m e a n w h a t y o u say.
(4"') N o , i t will never c o m e to this.
I n t h e f i r s t case, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e u t t e r a n c e as a p r o m i s e
a n d d i s p u t e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is s u f f i c i e n t l y a u t o n o m o u s t o u p h o l d
s u c h a n o b l i g a t i o n . I n t h e s e c o n d case, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e
u t t e r a n c e as a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a n d d o u b t s t h e seriousness
o r s i n c e r i t y o f t h e i n t e n t i o n u t t e r e d . I n t h e t h i r d case, t h e h e a r e r
u n d e r s t a n d s t h e u t t e r a n c e as a p r e d i c t i o n a n d d i s p u t e s t h e t r u t h o f
271
C o m m e n t s o n Searle's " M e a n i n g , C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"
t h e s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e f u t u r e . A n y i l l o c u t i o n a r y act a t a l l c a n be
ness (Wahrhaftigkeif), a n d t r u t h . F o r e x a m p l e , a n i m p e r a t i v e s u c h as
(1) can be n e g a t e d n o t only w i t h respect to t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f the
s p e a k e r b u t also w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e speaker's i n t e n -
t i o n expressed i n i t , o r w i t h respect to t h e t r u t h o f t h e existential
presuppositions o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t i t expresses. 11
I f o n e c o n s i d e r s Searle's analysis o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r s p e e c h acts
as a w h o l e , t h e t h r e e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s c a n be f o u n d
i n h i s s c h e m a o f analysis u n d e r a d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n . I n a discus-
s i o n , Searle p r o p o s e d a n a l y z i n g t h e c l a i m t o n o r m a t i v e r i g h t n e s s i n
terms o f his " p r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s , " the c l a i m to truthfulness i n
terms o f his "sincerity c o n d i t i o n s , " a n d the c l a i m to t r u t h i n terms
o f h i s " e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s . " T h e f a c t t h a t s u c h a t r a n s l a t i o n is p o s -
sible speaks f o r t h e sharpness a n d c o m p l e x i t y o f Searle's analyses.
J o h n Searle was t h e f i r s t t o g r a s p c l e a r l y t h e s t r u c t u r e o f s p e e c h acts.
However, his p i o n e e r i n g insights p o i n t b e y o n d a f r a m e w o r k o f analy-
sis t h a t is b a s e d o n t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t m o d e l . T h e c o n c e p t o f a v a l i d i t y
c l a i m w o u l d lose its p o i n t i f i t w e r e b r o u g h t b a c k i n s i d e t h a t m o d e l .
T r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s are semantic concepts
f o r w h i c h m e n t a l i s t c o r r e l a t e s m a y also b e s p e c i f i e d . H o w e v e r , p r i -
vate access t o v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s — w h e t h e r p r e l i n g u i s t i c o r s i m p l y
m o n o l o g i c a l — c a n b e d e f e n d e d o n l y a t t h e p r i c e o f w h a t I r e g a r d as
an untenable correspondence t h e o r y o f t r u t h . I propose, therefore,
that validity c o n d i t i o n s s h o u l d be considered n o t i n isolation f r o m ,
b u t i n p r a g m a t i c c o n n e c t i o n w i t h , validity claims a n d p o t e n t i a l rea-
sons f o r t h e v i n d i c a t i o n o f s u c h c l a i m s .
C r i t i c i z a b l e validity claims, w h i c h have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o -
w a r d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n , are n e c e s s a r y f o r a s p e e c h act t o
a c h i e v e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f t h e speaker.
I n a recent paper o n performatives, 1 2
S e a r l e c o m e s f a i r l y close t o
r e c o g n i z i n g the intersubjective n a t u r e o f m e a n i n g a n d validity. T h e
analysis o f p e r f o r m a t i v e s leads t o t h e v e r y c e n t e r o f a t h e o r y t h a t
takes as its s t a r t i n g p o i n t A u s t i n ' s i n s i g h t i n t o t h e p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r
o f a s p e e c h act w h e r e b y we d o s o m e t h i n g b y s a y i n g i t . I n t h e s t a n -
d a r d f o r m o f a s p e e c h act F(/>), t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e m a k e s
explicit the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force F o f an utterance c o n t a i n i n g "p."
272 273
Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

W i t h r e g a r d to the question o f h o w performatives w o r k we f i n d two i n g a sentence such as " I h e r e b y o r d e r y o u to leave" functions,

c o m p e t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . O n e o f these t r e a t s p e r f o r m a t i v e s as s i m -
ple statements, while the other maintains that performatives do n o t
a d m i t o f t r u t h a n d falsity a n d t h e r e f o r e lack m e a n i n g i n any p r o p e r
sense. B o t h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are s t r o n g l y c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e .
P e r f o r m a t i v e sentences such as " I state t h a t . . .," " I p r o m i s e
a c c o r d i n g t o Searle, "as a p e r f o r m a t i v e , a n d h e n c e as a d e c l a r a t i o n
because (a) t h e v e r b ' o r d e r ' is a n i n t e n t i o n a l v e r b , ( b ) o r d e r i n g is
s o m e t h i n g y o u c a n d o by m a n i f e s t i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n t o d o i t , a n d (c)
t h e u t t e r a n c e is b o t h s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l a n d e x e c u t i v e , as i n d i c a t e d b y
the w o r d 'hereby.'" 1 3

you . . .," o r " I confess t h a t . . . " i n f a c t c o n s t i t u t e p e r f o r m a n c e s that W i t h o u t g o i n g i n t o detail, I shall n o w e x p l a i n — a n d q u e s t i o n — t h e

can n e i t h e r be c o n f i r m e d n o r falsified like fully fledged assertions. d e c l a r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f p e r f o r m a t i v e s . Searle has i n t r o d u c e d d e c l a -
T h e y d o n o t o p e r a t e b y way o f a c l a i m t o t r u t h . T h i s is r e v e a l e d b y ratives as s p e e c h acts t h a t b o t h e x p r e s s a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t a n d
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y first have t o u n d e r g o a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e make i t true. I n concluding a contract or closing a meeting, I let
speaker's first-person ( p e r f o r m a t i v e ) perspective [toward a second w h a t I say b e t h e case b y saying i t . W i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f t h i s m o d e l ,
p e r s o n ] i n t o the t h i r d - p e r s o n perspective o f an observer before they Searle s o m e w h a t p a r a d o x i c a l l y p o s t u l a t e s o f d e c l a r a t i o n s t h a t t h e y
t h e m s e l v e s c a n b e t r u e o r false. T h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n shows, h o w e v e r , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y satisfy b o t h d i r e c t i o n s o f fit: t h e y b o t h state a f a c t a n d
t h a t p e r f o r m a t i v e sentences have a m e a n i n g , too. Obviously, the p r o d u c e i t . T h e p a r a d o x disappears w i t h t h e observation o f h o w t h e
f o l l o w i n g sentences a u t h o r i z i n g o r l e g i t i m i z i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f c o n t r a c t law o r business
p r o c e d u r e s n o r m a t i v e l y b a c k these s p e e c h acts. I t is because o f t h i s
(5) I order you to come.
l e g a l o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l — i n any case n o r m a t i v e — b a c k g r o u n d t h a t d e c -
(5') H e orders her to come. larations can p r o d u c e a change i n the d o m a i n o f legitimate inter-
personal relationships and thereby create new social facts.
h a v e t h e s a m e m e a n i n g , i f r e f e r e n c e s a r e p r e s e r v e d . B u t , a t t h e same
C o m p a r e d w i t h d i r e c t i v e s a n d c o m m i s s i v e s , d e c l a r a t i v e s d i s p l a y fea-
t i m e , t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e switches o v e r i n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
t u r e s o f b o t h types: l i k e o r d e r s t h e y r e l y o n a n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t a n d
c o n t e n t a n d t h e r e b y loses, i f n o t its m e a n i n g , a t least its f o r c e : i t is
l i k e promises they d r a w f r o m t h e n o r m a t i v e resource o f the speaker's
included i n the topic o f another—constative—speech act. U t t e r e d
responsibility.
i n the first-person attitude [toward a second person], performative
s e n t e n c e s have a m e a n i n g (a) o n l y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h s o m e o t h e r Searle, h o w e v e r , makes a f u r t h e r m o v e ; he n o w interprets the

proposition or propositional content, a n d (b) o n l y as a k i n d of p e r f o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f a l l classes o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n l i g h t o f

e s c o r t i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d , w h i c h is a r t i c u l a t e d i n a n u n t h e m a t i c a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f d e c l a r a t i o n s . T h i s p r o p o s a l faces t w o m a j o r

i m p l i c i t way. T h e s e a n d o t h e r f e a t u r e s c a n be e x p l a i n e d as s o o n as difficulties. First, i t explodes the a r c h i t e c t u r e o f t h e classification o f

we realize that p e r f o r m a t i v e sentences (like o t h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n d i - s p e e c h acts; t h i s is because d e c l a r a t i o n s w o u l d lose t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e

c a t o r s ) are s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l a n d e x e c u t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s f o r t h e act o f place w i t h i n this classification i f they were to e x p l a i n the p e r f o r -

raising a validity claim for a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content. m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f all s p e e c h acts. O f g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t is t h e s e c o n d

Searle states t h e p r o b l e m clearly. T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t o w h i c h h i s o w n difficulty. Since m a n y performatives d o n o t appeal to o r rely o n a

p r o p o s a l r u n s are i n s t r u c t i v e ; t h e y disclose a n u n d e r l y i n g i n t u i t i o n n o r m a t i v e backing, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y p o i n t o f declarations would

close t o m y o w n . lose its specificity. C o n s e q u e n t l y , Searle is p u s h e d i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f

Searle e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s , t h e p e r f o r m a n c e
w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e act t h e y say t h e y a r e , t h r o u g h r e c o u r s e t o
d e c l a r a t i o n s — a class o f s p e e c h acts w e have n o t yet discussed. U t t e r -
r e d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f declaratives. A p a r t
of
f r o m "extralinguistic declaratives"—such as p r o n o u n c i n g a c o u p l e
h u s b a n d a n d w i f e o r d e c l a r i n g w a r — S e a r l e i n t r o d u c e s a n o t h e r cate-
g o r y o f "linguistic declarations," w h i c h are n e i t h e r attached to par-
274 275

Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's " M e a n i n g , C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

7. I am grateful to Chris Latiolais for indicating this to me.

ticular institutions like m a r r i a g e o r warfare n o r s u p p o r t e d by some
i n f o r m a l v a l u e c o n s e n s u s i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d . H o w e v e r , o n c e all i l l o - 8. Naked imperatives a n d threats are examples of perlocutionary acts that play an
c u t i o n a r y acts g a i n a d e c l a r a t i v e f o r c e so t h a t t h i s f o r c e e x t e n d s to instrumental role i n the context of success-oriented acts. T h e y have lost their illocu-
tionary force a n d derive their illocutionary meaning from other contexts of use in
r e q u e s t s , p r o m i s e s , a n d avowals as w e l l as s t a t e m e n t s , w h a t m e a n i n g which the utterance of the same sentences is mainly determined by communicative
t h e n remains for the force o f such "linguistic declarations"? Strictly goals. Such speech acts, which have gained perlocutionary independence, are not
oriented toward the rationally motivated attitude of an addressee; insofar as they are
speaking, there c a n n o t be any d e c l a r a t i o n w i t h o u t d e p e n d e n c e on
not motivated in this way, they do not rely on a reservoir of potential reasons that
authorizing or legitimizing conditions of the sort that have the are unspecific with regard to the addressee.
p o w e r t o create n e w social facts. I f , n o n e t h e l e s s , h i s analysis l e a d s
9. Cf. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprachliche Bedeutung, Wahrheit u n d normative Gultigkeit," in
Searle t o r e f e r to some declarative f o r c e i n h e r e n t i n speech itself, Archivio diFilosofia 55 (1987): 51ff.
the i n t u i t i o n b e h i n d this peculiar force m i g h t well m a t c h w h a t I
10. Cf. my classificatory schema in chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 154ff.
prefer to call the rationally m o t i v a t i n g force o f validity claims that
are i n n e e d o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n . Searle elucidates t h e i n - 11. I f the class of expressive speech acts is demarcated from the point of view of the
claim to truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) raised by the speaker for the expression of a
trinsically linguistic force o f the v e r y act o f raising a validity c l a i m
subjective experience to which he has privileged access, avowals present themselves
t h r o u g h t h e f o r c e o f a n i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t e n a b l e s a speaker, v i a h i s as the prototype. Unlike avowals, acts such as saying "thank you," congratulating, or
making excuses are not expressive speech acts, for these can succeed even when the
social roles, literally to call s o m e t h i n g i n t o existence. I n order to
speaker does not mean what he says. As i n the case of bets and christenings, the
t u r n t h e e l u c i d a t i o n i n t o a n e x p l a n a t i o n , S e a r l e has t o a s s i m i l a t e illocutionary meaning of such regulative speech acts is determined by a normative
l a n g u a g e t o i n s t i t u t i o n s . L a n g u a g e , h o w e v e r , is a n i n s t i t u t i o n o n l y i n context. I f this normative context is not violated, an act of saying "thank you" can be
valid, for instance, even when it does not come from the heart.
a metaphorical sense. T h u s Searle's e x p l a n a t i o n of how perfor-
matives w o r k reaches n o f u r t h e r t h a n this m e t a p h o r . 12. J . Searle, "How Performatives Work," Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1989): 535¬
558.

13. Ibid., p. 552.

Notes

1. Cf. chapter 6 in this volume, pp. 286ff., especially notes 18 and 19, p. 305.

2. Cf. K . - 0 . Apel, "Is Intentionality More Basic than Linguistic Meaning?" in E . L e -

pore and R. Van Gulick, eds.,fohn Searle and His Critics (Oxford, 1993), pp. 31-55.

3. J . Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 49ff.

4. I n the following I refer to J . Searle, "Meaning, Communication, a n d Repre-

sentation," in R. E . Grandy a n d R. Warner, eds., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality
(Oxford, 1986). Page references i n the text refer to this essay. Searle worked out his
conception i n Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983).

5. T h e history of the philosophy of consciousness from Descartes to Husserl teaches

us that it is no coincidence that the basic concepts of mentalism were oriented toward
the representation of objects, that is, toward the subject-object relation. It was the
linguistic turn initiated by Frege that first led to the insight that, analagous to
sentences, our representations (Vorstellungen), too, have a propositional structure; cf.
E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A . G o r n e r (Cambridge,
1982).

6. J . Searle, "Intentionality and Method," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 720-733.

6
Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning
(1988)

T h r e e A p p r o a c h e s to a T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

A t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g s h o u l d a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o
u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a w e l l - f o r m e d symbolic expression. I n
1934, K a r l Bùhler p r o p o s e d a s c h e m a o f language f u n c t i o n s that
placed the linguistic expression i n r e l a t i o n s t o t h e speaker, t o t h e
w o r l d , a n d to the hearer (figure 6.1). This schema o f how linguistic
1

signs a r e u s e d p r o v e s u s e f u l i f o n e releases i t f r o m t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e
s p e c i f i c p s y c h o l o g y o f l a n g u a g e i n w h i c h i t arose, e x t e n d s t h e s e m i -
otic approach, a n d gives a c h a r i t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e t h r e e
f u n c t i o n s m e n t i o n e d . T h e d i a g r a m t h e n yields the general thesis
that language represents a m e d i u m — B ù h l e r spoke o f the o r g a n o n
m o d e l o f l a n g u a g e — t h a t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y serves t h r e e d i f f e r e n t , a l -
t h o u g h i n t e r n a l l y related, functions. Expressions that are employed
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y s e r v e t o express t h e i n t e n t i o n s ( o r s u b j e c t i v e e x p e -
riences (Erlebnisse)) o f a speaker, t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s (or
s o m e t h i n g the speaker encounters i n t h e w o r l d ) , a n d to establish
r e l a t i o n s w i t h a n addressee. T h e t h r e e aspects o f a speaker r e a c h i n g
understanding/with another person/about something are reflected
h e r e . I n l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , t h r e e c o n v e r g i n g rays o f m e a n i n g a r e
f o c u s e d . W h a t t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i o n c o n n e c t s
u p w i t h w h a t is l i t e r a l l y said i n i t , as w e l l as w i t h t h e a c t i o n as w h i c h
i t s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d . T h e r e exists a t h r e e f o l d r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n a n d w h a t is intended (gemeint)
278 279

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

c o n c a t e n a t i o n s o f signs p r o d u c e d b y h i m as a v e h i c l e f o r i n f o r m i n g
OBJECTS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS
v > his addressee a b o u t his beliefs o r i n t e n t i o n s . I n this c o n c e p d o n , the
11 I I I i ' I I I
p r e m i s e s o f t h e m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s are s t i l l p r e s u p -
• I 11 ; I 1111
i 111 ' I ' i| j Representation p o s e d as u n p r o b l e m a t i c . The representing subject (das vorstellende Sub¬
jekt) stands o v e r a n d against a w o r l d o f t h i n g s a n d events, a n d asserts
at t h e s a m e t i m e h i s s o v e r e i g n t y i n t h e w o r l d as a p u r p o s i v e l y acting
subject. F r o m t h e same p e r s p e c t i v e , h e e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r subjects
w h o , i n t u r n , assert themselves. A s s u b j e c t s c a p a b l e o f a c t i o n , t h e y
i n f l u e n c e e a c h o t h e r i n t h e way i n w h i c h t h e y g e n e r a l l y intervene
causally i n i n n e r w o r l d l y processes. T h a t t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e m e d i -
a t e d b y l a n g u a g e a p p e a r s as s o m e t h i n g s e c o n d a r y i n c o m p a r i s o n t o
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l a n d p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l subjects.
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (Vorstellungen) connect u p w i t h the substratum of
Figure 6.1
Bùhler's schema of language functions l i n g u i s t i c signs i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l way, so as t o b e c a p a b l e o f e m e r g i n g
f r o m the inwardness o f a particular i n d i v i d u a l subjectivity a n d t a k i n g
o n e x t e r n a l f o r m . I n t u r n , t h e signs, as i n s t r u m e n t s f o r i n f l u e n c i n g
b y i t , w h a t is said i n i t , a n d t h e w a y i n w h i c h i t is used i n t h e s p e e c h
a n a l i e n s u b j e c t i v i t y , are a c c o r d e d a p l a c e w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of
act. N o r m a l l y , l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g is n o t e x h a u s t e d by any o n e of
teleological action.
these t h r e e r e l a t i o n s . 2

Despite this, intentionalist semantics ( f r o m Grice to B e n n e t t a n d O n c e l a n g u a g e has b e e n a s s i m i l a t e d i n s u c h a way t o t h e p h y s i c a l

Schiffer) 3
treats as f u n d a m e n t a l o n l y w h a t t h e s p e a k e r i n t e n d s b y t h e means o f purposive interventions, the explication o f the m e a n i n g o f
expression he employs i n a given situation; f o r m a l semantics ( f r o m l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s c a n be t r e a t e d as a s p e c i a l task w i t h i n a g e n e r a l
Frege via t h e early W i t t g e n s t e i n t o D u m m e t t ) 4
begins w i t h the con- t h e o r y o f a c t i o n . A speaker S i n t e n d s to call f o r t h an effect r i n a
d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a s e n t e n c e is t r u e ; a n d t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n - hearer H by u t t e r i n g "x" i n a p a r t i c u l a r context, whereby "x" does
ing ( i n a u g u r a t e d by t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n ) 5
has r e c o u r s e t o the n o t y e t h a v e a c o n v e n t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d m e a n i n g c o n t e n t b u t has its
h a b i t u a l i z e d contexts o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n w h i c h linguistic expressions m e a n i n g conferred b y S i n t h e g i v e n s i t u a t i o n i n a w a y r e c o g n i z a b l e
serve practical f u n c t i o n s . O n c e l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r i s m ( f r o m Bloom- f o r H. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r o p o s a l o f H . R G r i c e , t h e e f f e c t i n t e n d e d
field v i a M o r r i s t o S k i n n e r ) h a d f a i l e d t o e x p l a i n t h r e e f u n d a m e n t a l
6 b y t h e s p e a k e r r e s i d e s i n t h e h e a r e r ' s b e i n g i n d u c e d by t h e u t t e r a n c e
p h e n o m e n a — n a m e l y , the i d e n t i t y o f linguistic meanings, the situ-
7 o f "x" to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker a n d to accept i t (at
a t i o n - i n d e p e n d e n c e o f the m e a n i n g o f expressions e m p l o y e d w i t h least i n p a r t ) as a r e a s o n e i t h e r f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t S i n t e n d s (meint)
r e f e r e n c e t o specific s i t u a t i o n s , a n d t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e c o m p e -
8 s o m e t h i n g specific o r f o r r e g a r d i n g t h e fact t h a t S i n t e n d s s o m e t h i n g
t e n c e t o g e n e r a t e i n n u m e r a b l e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s — t h e discus- s p e c i f i c as o c c a s i o n i n g h e r ( t h e h e a r e r ' s ) i n t e n t i o n t o d o something
s i o n has essentially b e e n d o m i n a t e d b y t h e s e t h r e e t h e o r i e s , f o r e a c h s p e c i f i c . T h e e f f e c t r, w h i c h is p r o d u c e d b y " x " a n d t r i g g e r e d i n H
9

o f t h e m has b e e n a b l e t o a p p e a l t o a f u n d a m e n t a l i n t u i t i o n . B u h l e r by S, is a s p e c i f i c b e l i e f (Meinung) or the i n t e n t i o n to carry o u t a

b r i n g s these i n t u i t i o n s t o g e t h e r i n h i s t h r e e f o l d s c h e m a o f l a n g u a g e specific a c t i o n . T w o f u n c t i o n s o f t h e sign t h a t B u h l e r h a d separated,
functions. n a m e l y , e x p r e s s i o n a n d a p p e a l , fuse c o n s i s t e n t l y i n t o o n e a n d t h e
same a c c o m p l i s h m e n t : to allow a hearer to infer the i n t e n t i o n o f the
a. I n t e n t i o n a l i s m shares w i t h B u h l e r a c o n c e p t i o n i n w h i c h l a n -
speaker a n d thereby to motivate h e r to f o r m the corresponding
g u a g e has t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a t o o l . T h e s p e a k e r uses t h e signs a n d
belief or intention.
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T h e p o i n t o f t h i s strategy o f e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t w h a t is m e a n t
(gemeint) is i n n o way d e t e r m i n e d b y w h a t is said. T h e m e a n i n g o f
a n u t t e r a n c e "x" b y S is s u p p o s e d t o b e e x p l a i n e d solely b y t h e
i n t e n t i o n w i t h w h i c h 5 utters the expression "x" i n a given context.
T h i s s t r a t e g y is g u i d e d b y t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t l a n g u a g e usage is o n l y
o n e specific m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l s o v e r e i g n t y o f p u r p o s i v e l y
acting subjects—a sovereignty that, w i t h respect to the m e d i u m o f
l a n g u a g e , reveals itself, f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e f a c t t h a t w e c a n assign t o
o b j e c t s a n y n a m e s w e c h o o s e , as w e l l as a r b i t r a r i l y b e s t o w m e a n i n g s
o n signs. U n d e r t h e same p r e m i s e s d r a w n f r o m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , H u s s e r l was a b l e t o s p e a k i n t h i s c o n t e x t o f m e a n i n g -
c o n f e r r i n g acts. I f l a n g u a g e d e r i v e s its m e a n i n g e x c l u s i v e l y f r o m t h e
i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p u r p o s i v e users o f l a n g u a g e , t h e n i t loses t h e
a u t o n o m y o f h a v i n g its o w n i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e .
b. F o r m a l s e m a n t i c s f o l l o w s a d i f f e r e n t i n t u i d o n . I t a t t e n d s t o t h e
g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s a n d ascribes t o l a n g u a g e
a status i n d e p e n d e n t of the intentions and ideas of speaking
subjects. I n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e r u l e system o f l a n g u a g e i t s e l f , t h e
p r a c t i c e o f l a n g u a g e usage a n d t h e p s y c h o l o g y o f l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g o c c u p y a status t h a t is m e r e l y s e c o n d a r y . First o f a l l , the
o b j e c t o f t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is c o n s t i t u t e d b y l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s -
sions a n d n o t b y t h e p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n speakers a n d h e a r -
ers t h a t c a n b e r e a d o f f f r o m t h e p r o c e s s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e
c o r r e c t use a n d c o r r e c t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a n e x p r e s s i o n d o n o t r e s u l t
f r o m t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f the speaker o r f r o m the conventions agreed
u p o n b y users o f l a n g u a g e , b u t f r o m t h e f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e
e x p r e s s i o n s themselves a n d t h e r u l e s w h e r e b y t h e y are c o n s t i t u t e d .
I n t h i s way, t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is d e t a c h e d f r o m a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c
c o n t e x t s a n d r e s e r v e d f o r l i n g u i s t i c analysis i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense.
A d i m e n s i o n is t h e r e b y r e v e a l e d that B u h l e r failed to take i n t o
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n his semiotically f o r e s h o r t e n e d m o d e l : that o f the
logical-semantic c o n s t r u c t i o n o f language. Admittedly, f r o m B i i h l e r ' s
p o i n t o f view, f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s pays f o r t h i s a d v a n t a g e b y l i m i t i n g its
analysis t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e .
T h i s explains b o t h the methodological abstraction o f the m e a n i n g
o f the sentence f r o m the m e a n i n g o f the utterance a n d the choice
o f t h e s e n t e n c e as t h e s m a l l e s t u n i t o f s e m a n t i c analysis. For, w i t h
281
T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
the emphasis o n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p be-
tween language a n d the w o r l d , b e t w e e n a n assertoric sentence a n d
a state o f a f f a i r s , m o v e s t o t h e c e n t e r o f analysis. O n l y w i t h s e n t e n c e s
is a s p e a k e r a b l e t o say s o m e t h i n g specific or, a c c o r d i n g t o F r e g e , t o
e x p r e s s a " t h o u g h t . " O n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o a s e n t e n c e a n d its t h o u g h t
is a h e a r e r a b l e t o t a k e a p o s i t i o n w i t h a "yes" o r " n o . " W h e n t h e
c r o u p i e r says " r e d " a f t e r t h e b a l l has c o m e t o a s t o p , t h e w o r d takes
o n a specific sense o n l y i f t h e r o u l e t t e p l a y e r , o n t h e basis o f t h e
c o n t e x t , t a c i t l y e x p a n d s i t t o t h e s e n t e n c e " R e d has w o n . "
T h e a p p r o a c h o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l semantics revolutionizes the o l d e r
a n d l o n g - d o m i n a n t v i e w p o i n t o f reference semantics, a c c o r d i n g to
w h i c h l a n g u a g e is r e l a t e d t o r e a l i t y as a n a m e is r e l a t e d t o its o b j e c t .
T h e relation o f the signified (the meaning) to the signifier (the
s i g n ) was t h o u g h t t o be e x p l i c a b l e i n t e r m s o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e
s y m b o l ( t h e m e a n i n g f u l sign) t o t h e d e s i g n a t u m ( t h e s i g n i f i e d o b -
j e c t ) . T h i s basic s e m i o t i c n o t i o n was s u i t e d t o t h e object-centered
t h e o r y o f knowledge i n the philosophy o f consciousness. 10
I n fact,
names o r d e s i g n a t i o n s , i n d e e d a l l t e r m s t h a t w e use t o i d e n t i f y
o b j e c t s , d o , as i t w e r e , establish c o n t a c t b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d r e a l i t y .
A false p i c t u r e arises, h o w e v e r , i f t h i s p a r t is t a k e n f o r t h e w h o l e . I n
t h e case o f a s i m p l e p r e d i c a t i v e s e n t e n c e , a s i n g u l a r t e r m m u s t first
be e x p a n d e d to a sentence by means o f a universal predicate expres-
s i o n b e f o r e w e c a n r e p r e s e n t a n e l e m e n t a r y state o f a f f a i r s . T h e
p r e d i c a t e s h o u l d "apply" to the object f o r w h i c h the subject expres-
s i o n " s t a n d s . " B u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e w h o l e s e n t e n c e t o t h e state
o f a f f a i r s t h a t is e x p r e s s e d i n i t m a y n o t t h e n b e c o n c e i v e d a c c o r d i n g
t o t h e m o d e l o f " s t a n d i n g f o r a n o b j e c t . " A n d i f assertoric s e n t e n c e s
are representative o f language as a w h o l e , t h e n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between language a n d the w o r l d m u s t be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f a
m o d e l d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f t h e r e l a t i o n t o a n o b j e c t : i t is facts t h a t
make a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s true.
T h i s , t h e n , is t h e k e y t o a n s w e r i n g t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n o f
t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . I f t h e m e a n i n g o f a n assertoric s e n t e n c e is
t h e state o f a f f a i r s t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t s , a n d i f t h i s s e n t e n c e is t r u e
p r e c i s e l y w h e n t h e e x p r e s s e d state o f a f f a i r s exists o r is t h e case, t h e n
we u n d e r s t a n d t h e sentence o n l y i f we k n o w the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r
w h i c h i t is t r u e . T h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e serve
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Chapter 6
as a n e x p l a n a n s f o r its m e a n i n g : "To understand a proposition
m e a n s t o k n o w w h a t is t h e case i f i t is t r u e . " 1 1
T h i s crucial insight by Frege i n t o the i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between
m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y is b a s e d u p o n a n i n t u i t i o n t h a t , t o a n t i c i p a t e ,
can be elucidated f r o m a p r a g m a t i c perspective, w h i c h Frege h i m s e l f
d i d n o t adopt. Participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n reach understanding
(sich verständigen) b y u s i n g s e n t e n c e s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d ;
i f , h o w e v e r , t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e s u t t e r e d by t h e s p e a k e r c o u l d
n o t b e j u d g e d by t h e h e a r e r , t h e y w o u l d b e c o m p l e t e l y inadequate
as t h e s m a l l e s t u n i t s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . M u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Ver-
ständigung) w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e c o n t e s t e d e x i s t e n c e o f states o f a f f a i r s
c a n be r e a c h e d by p a r t i c i p a n t s o n l y o n t h e basis o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f
s e n t e n c e s t h a t are c a p a b l e o f b e i n g t r u e .
c. Yet a d i f f e r e n t i n t u i t i o n u n d e r l i e s t h e use t h e o r y o f meaning,
w h i c h Wittgenstein developed f r o m his critique o f the t r u t h - c o n d i -
tional semantic c o n c e p t i o n he h i m s e l f once shared. Wittgenstein
uncovers the action character o f linguistic utterances. 1 2
From his
perspective, the representational f u n c t i o n , amidst the multiplicity of
ways o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e , loses its p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n . T h e m e d i u m o f
l a n g u a g e d o e s n o t serve first a n d f o r e m o s t t o d e s c r i b e o r e s t a b l i s h
facts; i t e q u a l l y serves t o issue c o m m a n d s , solve r i d d l e s , t e l l j o k e s ,
give t h a n k s , c u r s e , s e n d g r e e t i n g s , a n d p r a y . 1 3
L a t e r o n , A u s t i n uses
these p e r f o r m a t i v e verbs to analyze t h e d u a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of
s p e e c h acts, w i t h w h i c h a speaker, i n saying s o m e t h i n g , simultane-
ously does something. 1 4
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s f o r m u l a — t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a w o r d is its use i n
t h e l a n g u a g e — i s a d m i t t e d l y i n n e e d o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , f o r t h e fa-
m o u s e x a m p l e o f t h e b u i l d e r s i n t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h o f Philosophi-
cal Investigations suggests a n i n t e n t i o n a l i s t r e a d i n g . T h e assistant
l e a r n s t o b r i n g " p i l l a r s , " "slabs," a n d " b e a m s " t o t h e m a s t e r w h e n h e
calls; as s o o n as t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t u i t i v e l y m a s t e r t h e c o o p e r a t i v e
c o n t e x t , t h e y c a n assign o b j e c t s t o w o r d s t h r o u g h i m p l i c i t d e f i n i -
t i o n s . T h e h a b i t u a l i z e d w o r k p r a c t i c e s a r e t h e r e b y d e t e r m i n e d by t h e
p u r p o s e o f b u i l d i n g a h o u s e as w e l l as by t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a u t h o r -
ity between the master a n d the apprentice. For the speaker who
issues t h e d i r e c t i v e s , t h e w o r d s t h a t are c a l l e d o u t a n d t h e feats o f
c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t are s t e e r e d by t h e m f u n c t i o n as t o o l s f o r t h e r e a l i -
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T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
zation o f his i n t e n t i o n s . T h e w o r d s a p p e a r to derive t h e i r m e a n i n g
f r o m t h e p u r p o s e s a n d t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e s p e a k i n g subjects.
F o r m u l a t i o n s s u c h as, "To u n d e r s t a n d a l a n g u a g e m e a n s t o be
m a s t e r o f a t e c h n i q u e , " c o m e close t o t h e v i e w p o i n t o f i n t e n t i o n a l i s t
semantics. 15
N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e r e is a d e c i s i v e d i f f e r e n c e . W i t t g e n s t e i n
conceives o f the practice o f the language game, w h i c h determines
t h e use o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , n o t as t h e r e s u l t o f i n d i v i d u a l
t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s o n t h e p a r t o f i s o l a t e d , p u r p o s i v e subjects b u t as
the " c o m m o n behavior o f m a n k i n d . " 1 6
" L a n g u a g e g a m e " is h i s n a m e
for the totality o f the i n t e r m e s h e d linguistic utterances a n d n o n l i n -
g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s . I t is t h e p r i o r a g r e e m e n t i n a n intersubjectively
shared f o r m o f life or the p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o m m o n practices
r e g u l a t e d by i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d c u s t o m s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e i n t e r r e l a -
t i o n s h i p o f a c t i v i t i e s a n d s p e e c h acts. L e a r n i n g t o m a s t e r a l a n g u a g e
o r l e a r n i n g h o w expressions i n a language s h o u l d be understood
r e q u i r e s h a b i t u a l i z a t i o n i n t o a f o r m o f l i f e . T h e f o r m o f l i f e antece-
dently r e g u l a t e s t h e use o f w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s w i t h i n a n e t w o r k o f
possible purposes a n d possible actions.
U n l i k e the intentionalist approach, the use-theoretical approach
does n o t emphasize the t o o l character o f language b u t r a t h e r the
i n t e r m e s h i n g o f language w i t h interactive practices i n w h i c h a f o r m
o f l i f e is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e f l e c t e d a n d r e p r o d u c e d . W i t h this, the
r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d o f linguistic expressions retreats once again,
t h i s t i m e b e h i n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n speakers a n d hearers.
T h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s are n o t i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e n t i o n a l i s t i c a l l y f r o m t h e
p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e s p e a k e r b u t as r e f l e c t i o n s o f a n t e c e d e n t l y estab-
l i s h e d h a b i t u a l i z e d practices. W i t h t h e g r a m m a r o f l a n g u a g e games,
the d i m e n s i o n o f an intersubjectively shared b a c k g r o u n d knowledge
o f t h e l i f e w o r l d t h a t c a r r i e s (trägt) t h e m u l t i p l e f u n c t i o n s o f l a n -
g u a g e is d i s c l o s e d .
T h e e x a m p l e o f t h e b u i l d e r s seems t o l e n d i t s e l f r a t h e r t o c o n c e a l -
i n g t h e r e a l p o i n t o f t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g : i n a competently
m a s t e r e d l a n g u a g e g a m e , t h e s p e e c h acts carry (tragen) interactive
practices i n a completely d i f f e r e n t way t h a n t h e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t a r e
coordinated t h r o u g h t h e m i n the first place. Communicative acts
owe this p r i m a c y to a p r o p e r t y to w h i c h A u s t i n d r e w a t t e n t i o n w i t h
his investigation o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y character o f s p e e c h acts. A n
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o b s e r v e r c a n u n d e r s t a n d a n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n o n l y w h e n she k n o w s
t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o b e satisfied b y m e a n s o f i t . S p e e c h
acts, b y c o n t r a s t , i d e n t i f y t h e m s e l v e s . 17
B e c a u s e t h e speaker, i n car-
r y i n g o u t a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y says w h a t h e is doing,
a h e a r e r w h o u n d e r s t a n d s t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said c a n s t r a i g h t -
f o r w a r d l y i d e n t i f y t h e p e r f o r m e d a c t as s o m e specific a c t i o n . T h u s ,
t h e u s e - t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h is a l r e a d y b a s e d o n a n i n t u i t i o n , t h e f u l l
i m p o r t o f w h i c h has b e e n r e c o g n i z e d o n l y since W i t t g e n s t e i n . T h e
acts c a r r i e d o u t i n a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e are always s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l . T h e y
say b o t h h o w w h a t is said is t o b e u s e d a n d h o w i t is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d .
T h i s reflexive structure o f everyday language becomes tangible i n
t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s p e e c h act. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
c o m p o n e n t establishes t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t
is b e i n g u s e d a n d t h e s o r t o f a c t i o n as w h i c h t h e u t t e r a n c e s h o u l d
be understood.
T h e Limits of Semantics a n d o f Speech-Act T h e o r y
E a c h o f t h e t h r e e c o m p e t i n g t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g takes u p e x a c t l y
o n e a s p e c t o f t h e p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y seek t o
e x p l a i n the m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression f r o m the perspective
o f w h a t is m e a n t (as i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g ) , o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e
w h a t is s a i d (as l i t e r a l m e a n i n g ) , o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f use
u t t e r a n c e m e a n i n g ) . B y i n t r o d u c i n g e a c h o f these t h e o r i e s as styliza-
t i o n s o f j u s t o n e o f t h e aspects t h a t B i d d e r ' s s c h e m a o f language
f u n c t i o n s takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n simultaneously, I have a l r e a d y i m -
p l i c i t l y suggested t h e i r one-sidedness. I n o w w a n t to go t h r o u g h the
t h e o r i e s o n c e m o r e i n o r d e r (a) t o discuss t h e l i m i t s o f w h a t t h e y
are c a p a b l e o f a c h i e v i n g a n d t h e n ( b ) t o test t h e problemsolving
p o t e n t i a l o f a f o u r t h a p p r o a c h , namely, that o f the t h e o r y o f speech
acts.
a. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t p r o g r a m sets i t s e l f t h e task o f t r a c i n g t h e
conventional meaning of a random g r a m m a t i c a l expression
( x - m e a n i n g timeless) b a c k t o t h e n o n c o n v e n t i o n a l m e a n i n g o f t h e
speaker's i n t e n t i o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h the utterance o f "x" i n a p a r t i c u -
lar c o n t e x t (S-meaning o c c a s i o n a l ) . G r i c e selects h i s p r e m i s e s
s u c h a way t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n be e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f t h e
p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e o f S u p o n H. T h e m o d e l is set u p i n
285
T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
s u c h a way t h a t strategic a c t i o n c a n s e r v e as a f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t
f o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g linguistically. Given this p r e l i m i n a r y de-
cision, however, o n l y such p h e n o m e n a c a n c o m e i n t o v i e w as a r e
categorially d i f f e r e n t f r o m those supposedly to be reconstructed.
For, e v e n i n t h e m o s t c o m p l e x cases, w h a t is r e c o n s t r u c t e d is o n l y
the m e a n i n g o f an utterance "x" by S that, o n the presupposition
t h a t a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e is n o t a v a i l a b l e , is c a p a b l e o f inducing H
t o b e l i e v e o r t o i n t e n d t o d o s o m e t h i n g s p e c i f i c — t h a t is, t o under-
stand something indirectly b y way o f i n f e r e n c e s . But giving someone
s o m e t h i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d i n d i r e c t l y is a b o r d e r l i n e case t h a t , f o r its
p a r t , r e f e r s b a c k t o t h e n o r m a l case o f r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g
d i r e c t l y i n a c o m m o n language by way o f utterances t h a t i d e n t i f y
themselves.
T h i s p a r a s i t i c status reveals i t s e l f i n t h e t y p e o f counterexamples
i n t r o d u c e d b y S t r a w s o n a n d d e a l t w i t h b y S. R. S c h i f f e r , i n w h i c h S
c a n a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d e f f e c t o n l y so l o n g as t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t His
s u p p o s e d t o t a k e as S"s i n t e n t i o n d o e s n o t c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e s t r a t e g i c
u l t e r i o r i n t e n t i o n t h a t S is a c t u a l l y p u r s u i n g . 1 8
T h r o u g h t h i s asym-
m e t r y , h o w e v e r , a n i n f i n i t e regress is set i n m o t i o n t h a t c o u l d be
p r e v e n t e d o n l y i f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e a l l o w e d t o have r e c o u r s e t o
s h a r e d k n o w l e d g e , i n d e e d i n t h e final i n s t a n c e t o t h e n a t u r a l m e a n -
of i n g o f signals e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h a causal c h a i n ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t
(as s m o k e m e a n s fire). Yet t h i s r e c o u r s e f u n c t i o n s o n l y o n t h e c o n d i t i o n
t h a t b o t h sides, s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , a l r e a d y u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r a l
m e a n i n g o f s u c h a s i g n a l i n a way a n a l o g o u s t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g l a n -
g u a g e , t h a t is, i n t h e m a n n e r o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y k n o w n , n o n n a t u -
ral m e a n i n g o f a conventionally regulated sign. Schiffer makes an
i l l e g i t i m a t e leap f r o m the n a t u r a l evidence o f a signal like smoke
(accessible f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n o b s e r v e r ) t o t h e comprehen-
sion (possible o n l y i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e ) o f a communica-
t i v e l y u s e d s i g n ( t h a t is, o n e r e c o g n i z a b l y u s e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e of
i m p a r t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n ) with the corresponding propositional con-
tent that smoke means fire. 19
H e thereby smuggles i n precisely w h a t
"x"
is s u p p o s e d t o b e e x p l a i n e d , n a m e l y , t h e r e f l e x i v i t y o f a s e l f - i d e n t i f y -
i n g utterance a n d the intersubjective knowledge m a d e possible by
the comprehension of that utterance. Certainly, interactions a m o n g
in
p u r p o s i v e l y a c t i n g subjects ( w h i c h a r e m e d i a t e d solely t h r o u g h o b -
s e r v a t i o n s , t h e s t r a t e g i c d e p l o y m e n t o f signs, a n d i n f e r e n c e s ) can
286
Chapter 6
lead to the reciprocally reflected attribution o f proposidonal atti-
tudes a n d contents; they c a n n o t , however, lead to s o m e t h i n g like
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e i n t h e s t r i c t sense.
T r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics allows the rationality a n d internal
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e linguistic m e d i u m , d i s r e g a r d e d by t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t
a p p r o a c h , t o c o m e i n t o its o w n . T h e c l e a r a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h o u g h t s
a n d i n t e n t i o n s is m a d e p o s s i b l e o n l y t h r o u g h g r a m m a t i c a l l a n g u a g e ,
w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a r e a l i t y o f its o w n k i n d a n d w i t h its o w n d i g n i t y ;
states o f a f f a i r s can b e m i r r o r e d o n l y i n sentences. Yet t h i s also
bestows a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n o n t h e v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , o f
a s s e r t o r i c sentences. T h e d i v e r s e f u n c t i o n s s e r v e d b y l a n g u a g e a r e
susceptible t o analysis o n l y b y way o f t h e f o r m o f t h e s e n t e n c e s
e m p l o y e d , u l t i m a t e l y , i n d e e d , o n l y b y way o f t h e f o r m o f a s s e r t o r i c
s e n t e n c e s t h a t serve r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s . F o r e v e n t h e m e a n -
i n g o f n o n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s is e l u c i d a t e d t h r o u g h r e c o u r s e t o t h e
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e assertoric sentences t r u e . Frege h i m s e l f h a d
a l r e a d y d i v i d e d a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s i n t o t w o c o m p o n e n t s : t h e asser-
toric force o r the m o d e o f assertion m u s t j o i n u p w i t h the proposi-
t i o n a l c o n t e n t " t h a t p" i n o r d e r t o y i e l d t h e s t a t e m e n t "p," w h e r e b y
" t h a t p" s i g n i f i e s a state o f a f f a i r s a n d "p" s i g n i f i e s a f a c t , t h a t is, a n
e x i s t i n g state o f a f f a i r s . O n l y t h e m o d a l c o m p o n e n t distinguishes
i m p e r a t i v e a n d i n t e r r o g a t i v e s e n t e n c e s f r o m assertoric sentences
w i t h t h e same c o n t e n t .
I n o r d e r to explicate such distinctions between modes i n terms o f
t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s , S t e n i u s a n d K e n n y m a k e use o f a n i d e a
o f Austin's, w h o h a d assumed two o p p o s i n g " d i r e c t i o n s o f fit" b e -
t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . 2 0
T h e y begin w i t h statements
a n d i m p e r a t i v e s as t h e t w o basic m o d e s , w h e r e b y t r u e s t a t e m e n t s
r e p r e s e n t e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s a n d i m p e r a t i v e s r e q u i r e t h a t states
o f a f f a i r s b e b r o u g h t i n t o e x i s t e n c e . T h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e state-
ments true correspond to the conditions u n d e r w h i c h imperatives
a r e successfully c a r r i e d o u t . I n b o t h cases, w h a t is at issue a r e t h e
c o n d i t i o n s f o r states o f a f f a i r s , e i t h e r f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f r e c o g n i z e d
states o f a f f a i r s o r f o r t h e b r i n g i n g a b o u t o f d e s i r e d states o f a f f a i r s .
H o w e v e r , t h i s strategy o f analysis f o u n d e r s o n t h e a s y m m e t r y be-
t w e e n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d success c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a s s e r t o r i c a n d
i m p e r a t i v e sentences, respectively, a r e s u p p o s e d t o "satisfy." F o r t h e
287
T o w a r d a Critique of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g
f o r c e o f i m p e r a t i v e s c a n n o t be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a d e q u a t e l y f r o m t h e
f o r c e o f assertions o n t h e basis o f t h e o p p o s e d " d i r e c t i o n s o f fit" i n
w h i c h a s p e a k e r takes u p , w i t h i m p e r a t i v e s o r assertions, respectively,
a r e l a t i o n t o ( t h e s a m e ) state o f a f f a i r s f r o m d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s .
A h e a r e r is a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d a s e n t e n c e qua i m p e r a t i v e o n l y w h e n
she k n o w s t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r m a y e x p e c t t h a t
he c o u l d impose his w i l l u p o n a hearer, even a r e l u c t a n t one. T h e
sense o f t h e i m p e r a t i v e d e m a n d f o r c o m p l i a n c e c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d
i n t e r m s o f t h e s e m a n t i c a l l y a n a l y z a b l e k n o w l e d g e o f success c o n d i -
t i o n s ; i t c a n be e x p l a i n e d o n l y p r a g m a t i c a l l y , s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h r e f e r -
ence to the authority standing b e h i n d i t . 2 1
A d m i t t e d l y , a p u r e l y s e m a n t i c a p p r o a c h t o analysis m e e t s its l i m i t s
e v e n i n t h e case o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s t h e m s e l v e s . I n its classical
f o r m , t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics believed i t possible to i g n o r e alto-
g e t h e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r ¿5 in a position to
recognize w h e n t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a s e n t e n c e a r e satisfied i n a
g i v e n case. B u t t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s is, a t m o s t , u n -
p r o b l e m a t i c o n l y i n t h e case o f s i m p l e p r e d i c a t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n sen-
tences, w h o s e t r u t h c a n be t e s t e d i n easily s u r v e y a b l e c o n t e x t s w i t h
t h e h e l p o f r e a d i l y accessible p e r c e p t u a l e v i d e n c e . A t a n y r a t e , t h e r e
a r e n o c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y s i m p l e tests f o r p r e d i c t i o n s , c o u n t e r f a c t u a l
c o n d i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s , n o m o l o g i c a l s t a t e m e n t s , a n d so f o r t h . Asser-
t o r i c s e n t e n c e s o f these k i n d s q u a n t i f y d i m e n s i o n s t h a t a r e i n f i n i t e
or are inaccessible to observation. Michael D u m m e t t correctly
p o i n t s o u t t h a t s i m p l e r u l e s o f v e r i f i c a t i o n f o r these a n d s i m i l a r
s e n t e n c e s a r e n o t a t o u r d i s p o s a l . I t is t h e r e f o r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o
r e n d e r t h e F r e g e a n thesis m o r e p r e c i s e t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t o n e u n d e r -
stands a n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e w h e n o n e k n o w s its r u l e s o f v e r i f i c a -
tion. Relying o n the pragmatic distinction between "truth" and
" a s s e r t i b i l i t y " — t h a t is, b e t w e e n t h e t r u t h o f a s e n t e n c e a n d t h e e n t i -
t l e m e n t to m a k e a n assertion w i t h t h a t s e n t e n c e — D u m m e t t replaces
knowledge o f the t r u t h conditions (or knowledge o f the verification
rules o f a justification game geared toward observation situations ) 2 2
w i t h i n d i r e c t k n o w l e d g e : t h e h e a r e r m u s t k n o w t h e k i n d s o f reasons
w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c o u l d , i f necessary, v i n d i c a t e h i s c l a i m t h a t
p a r t i c u l a r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are satisfied. I n s h o r t , one understands
an assertoric sentence w h e n o n e k n o w s t h e k i n d s o f reasons a

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Chapter 6
speaker m u s t p r o v i d e i n o r d e r to convince a h e a r e r that the speaker
is e n t i t l e d t o raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h e s e n t e n c e . 2 3
J u s t as D u m m e t t i m p l i c i t l y m a k e s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e g a m e o f a r g u -
m e n t a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r qua p r o p o n e n t is a b l e t o c o n v i n c e
a h e a r e r qua o p p o n e n t o f t h e e n t i t l e m e n t f o r h i s t r u t h c l a i m , so
W i t t g e n s t e i n comes u p o n the presuppositions u n d e r l y i n g a similar
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r o l e s i n h i s analysis o f t h e c o n c e p t o f f o l l o w i n g a
rule. 2 4
F o l l o w i n g a r u l e m e a n s f o l l o w i n g t h e same r u l e i n e a c h case;
t h e m e a n i n g o f a r u l e is i n t e r w o v e n w i t h t h e use o f t h e w o r d " s a m e . "
A c a n n o t be c e r t a i n w h e t h e r she is f o l l o w i n g a r u l e a t a l l u n l e s s a
s i t u a t i o n exists i n w h i c h she e x p o s e s h e r c o n d u c t t o t h e j u d g m e n t
o f a c r i t i c B w h o is a b l e t o a s c e r t a i n d e v i a t i o n s f r o m t h e r u l e . I d e n -
tical m e a n i n g a n d the validity o f a r u l e are conceptually connected.
F o r t h e i d e n t i t y o f a r u l e i n t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f its r e a l i z a t i o n s d o e s
n o t r e s t u p o n observable i n v a r i a n c e s b u t u p o n t h e v a l i d i t y o f a c r i t e -
r i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h r u l e - c o n f o r m a t i v e behavior can be j u d g e d .
R u l e - g u i d e d c o n d u c t is f a l l i b l e a n d t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s t w o s i m u l t a -
n e o u s , i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e r o l e s : o n e f o r A, w h o f o l l o w s a r u l e a n d
t h e r e b y seeks t o a v o i d m i s t a k e s , a n d o n e f o r B, w h o is a b l e c r i t i c a l l y
to j u d g e t h e correctness o f the r u l e - g u i d e d c o n d u c t o f A. T h e p o i n t
o f t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n is t h a t a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n c a n h a v e a n
i d e n t i c a l m e a n i n g o n l y f o r a s u b j e c t w h o is c a p a b l e , t o g e t h e r w i t h a t
least o n e o t h e r s u b j e c t , o f f o l l o w i n g a r u l e t h a t is v a l i d for both of them.
A m o n a d i c a l l y i s o l a t e d s u b j e c t c a n n o m o r e use a n e x p r e s s i o n i n a
way t h a t m a i n t a i n s i d e n t i t y o f m e a n i n g t h a n a r u l e can be f o l l o w e d
privately.
I n t h i s way, W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t r o d u c e s t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n be-
tween m e a n i n g a n d validity i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f language's relation to
the w o r l d ; he t h e r e f o r e does n o t l i n k u p the rules f o r the m e a n i n g
o f w o r d s w i t h t h e v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , o f sentences. I n s t e a d ,
he compares the validity o f m e a n i n g conventions with the prevailing
s o c i a l v a l i d i t y o f c u s t o m s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d assimilates t h e g r a m -
m a t i c a l r u l e s o f l a n g u a g e g a m e s t o social n o r m s o f a c t i o n . O f c o u r s e ,
he thereby surrenders any r e l a t i o n to validity that transcends the
c o n t e x t o f a given language g a m e . U t t e r a n c e s are v a l i d o r i n v a l i d
o n l y a c c o r d i n g to the standards o f the language game to w h i c h they
b e l o n g . T h u s , almost i m p e r c e p t i b l y , even t h e r e l a t i o n t o t r u t h of
f a c t - a s c e r t a i n i n g s p e e c h is lost. F o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e r e p r e s e n t a -
289
T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
t i o n a l f u n c t i o n is j u s t o n e a m o n g m a n y o t h e r f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e
t h a t h a v e d e v e l o p e d , as i t w e r e , as p a r t o f t h e n a t u r a l h i s t o r y o f a
diversity o f i n t e r l o c k i n g ( a n d i n p r i n c i p l e , equally legitimate) l a n -
guage games.
b. F o l l o w i n g o n f r o m t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , A u s t i n i n v e s t i g a t e d
m o r e closely, o n t h e basis o f i n d i v i d u a l i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, h o w l a n -
g u a g e is b o u n d u p w i t h i n t e r a c t i v e p r a c t i c e s i n a f o r m o f l i f e . I n
a d d i t i o n , however, a n d u n l i k e W i t t g e n s t e i n , A u s t i n does n o t w a n t t o
i g n o r e the r e l a t i o n s h i p b r o u g h t o u t by t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics
between language a n d the objective w o r l d , between a sentence a n d
a state o f a f f a i r s . A u s t i n takes t h e f i r s t steps e n r o u t e t o a t h e o r y o f
s p e e c h acts t h a t c o m b i n e s t h e i n s i g h t s o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s
w i t h t h o s e o f l a n g u a g e - g a m e p r a g m a t i c s . A t f i r s t , t h i s leads h i m t o a
d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n t h a t i n a g e n e r a l w a y o p p o s e s i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts
t o t h e a s c e r t a i n i n g o f facts. I n s o - c a l l e d c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s , asser-
t o r i c s e n t e n c e s a r e u s e d t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s . A u s t i n also
speaks o f l o c u t i o n a r y acts h e r e : t h e s p e a k e r uses l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n
o r d e r t o say s o m e t h i n g (say w h a t is t h e case). A g a i n s t t h i s , i l l o c u t i o n -
a r y acts as s u c h a r e n o t s u p p o s e d t o h a v e a n y p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ,
n o t e v e n a m e a n i n g . W i t h s u c h a n act, t h e s p e a k e r does n o t say
a n y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d b e t r u e o r false b u t i n s t e a d p e r f o r m s a s o c i a l
a c t i o n . " H e l l o ! " d o e s n o t mean a n y t h i n g ; r a t h e r , i t ¿5 a g r e e t i n g ,
w h i c h t h e speaker can p e r f o r m w i t h this expression. O f course, such
a n act c a n b e i n f e l i c i t o u s , i f , f o r e x a m p l e , i t is c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e
w r o n g words, i n an inappropriate context, or without the correct
e m p h a s i s . I n s t e a d o f h a v i n g a m e a n i n g , a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act gives
expression to a particular force—a power o f a k i n d w i t h the b i n d i n g
c h a r a c t e r o f p r o m i s e s . W h i l e l o c u t i o n a r y acts m a k e p o s s i b l e a c o g -
n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e t h a t is, as i t w e r e , t u r n e d t o w a r d t h e w o r l d ,
speakers a n d h e a r e r s a r e a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h r e l a t i o n s a m o n g each
o t h e r w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts; t h e l a t t e r serve t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f
language.
I n i t i a l l y A u s t i n p r o p o s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g classifications:
Locutionary Act—Assertoric Sentence—Meaning—True/False
Illocutionary Act—Performative Sentence—Force—Felicitous/
Infelicitous
290
Chapter 6
T h i s d u a l i s m c o u l d n o t be m a i n t a i n e d . 2 5
A u s t i n saw f r o m t h e b e g i n -
n i n g , o f c o u r s e , t h a t m o s t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts d o n o t a p p e a r inde-
pendently but incorporate clauses w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . I n
g e n e r a l , t h e s p e a k e r c a r r i e s o u t a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act b y s a y i n g some-
thing. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t establishes o n l y t h e m o d e o f a
s e n t e n c e t h a t is u s e d as a p r o m i s e , a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , a n a v o w a l ,
a n d so f o r t h . T h e n o t a t i o n Mp i n d i c a t e s t h a t w e e x e c u t e t w o acts i n
o n e , acts t h a t c a n be s e p a r a t e d o n l y a n a l y t i c a l l y . B u t t h e n i t is n o
l o n g e r clear w h y the contrast between "force" a n d " m e a n i n g , " f a m i l -
iar f r o m t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semandcs, o u g h t to be r e t a i n e d i n a the-
o r y o f s p e e c h acts. P e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s o b v i o u s l y have j u s t as
c l e a r a m e a n i n g as assertoric s e n t e n c e s . A n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts
e x h i b i t t h e same i l l o c u t i o n a r y - p r o p o s i t i o n a l d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e as a l l
o t h e r s p e e c h acts. A s s e r t i o n s , d e s c r i p d o n s , or narratives can, c o m -
p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i r t r u t h v a l u e , be i n f e l i c i t o u s i n a way
s i m i l a r t o o t h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts: o n e c a n m a k e s u c h a mess o f
t e l l i n g a t a l e t h a t " i t is n o l o n g e r a g o o d s t o r y , " o r discuss a d e l i c a t e
m a t t e r so b l u n t l y t h a t t h o s e p r e s e n t " w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e a n y f u r t h e r
discussion o f i t . "
I f , h o w e v e r , all s p e e c h acts c a n b e a n a l y z e d i n t h e f o r m Mp, t h e n
l o c u t i o n a r y acts lose t h e s p e c i a l status t h a t was i n i t i a l l y c l a i m e d f o r
t h e m . T h e y a r e , so t o speak, a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m -
p o n e n t o f a n y a n d e v e r y s p e e c h act, a n d h a n d o v e r t h e i r monopoly
o n t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h t o a p a r t i c u l a r class o f s p e e c h acts, t h e c o n s t a -
t i v e . T h i s t h e n gives rise t o t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o n l y
constative s p e e c h acts c a n b e v a l i d o r i n v a l i d ( t r u e o r false) or
w h e t h e r o t h e r s p e e c h acts, t o o , m i g h t e x h i b i t a n e q u i v a l e n t d i m e n -
s i o n f o r t h a t o f t r u t h . I f t h e l a t t e r w e r e t h e case, w e w o u l d h a v e t o
work out a conception o f language t h a t a t t r i b u t e s n o essential i m -
p o r t a n c e t o t h e f a c t t h a t w h a t is said i n a l a n g u a g e always t r a n s c e n d s
the boundaries o f that language a n d refers to s o m e t h i n g i n the
w o r l d . B u t b o t h A u s t i n a n d Searle give a n a f f i r m a t i v e a n s w e r t o t h i s
question, albeit significantly d i f f e r e n t ones.
A u s t i n c o r r e c t s his p o s i t i o n t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h e n o w u n d e r s t a n d s
the two dimensions o f evaluation, w h i c h he had initially correlated,
respectively, w i t h l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts ( t r u t h vs. suc-
cess) , as aspects t h a t are m e r e l y a n a l y t i c a l l y s e p a r a b l e . Every s p e e c h
act can be evaluated a c c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r i t is " r i g h t " as w e l l as
291
T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
w h e t h e r i t is " i n o r d e r . " 2 6
T o be s u r e , A u s t i n d o e s n o t f i l l t h e d i m e n -
s i o n o f " r i g h t n e s s " — t o w h i c h t h e v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , o f
c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts is n o w g e n e r a l i z e d — w i t h a s p e c i f i c n u m b e r o f
w e l l - d e f i n e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ; r a t h e r , h i s " l o o s e n i n g u p o f t h e ideas o f
t r u t h a n d f a l s i t y " is s u p p o s e d t o o p e n u p a w h o l e s p e c t r u m o f aspects
o f validity, r a n g i n g f r o m p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h via goodness a n d a p p r o -
priateness to n o r m a t i v e rightness. O u t o f a wealth o f evaluative
v i e w p o i n t s , t h e l i n g u i s t i c analyst is s u p p o s e d i n e a c h case t o b e a b l e
t o i d e n t i f y t h e r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i o n o f assessment a n d t o c a p t u r e i t
d e s c r i p t i v e l y . B y c o n t r a s t , Searle w a n t s t o a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t
necessarily r e s u l t f r o m t h i s k i n d o f s u b s u m p t i o n o f v a l i d i t y , i n t h e
sense o f t r u t h , a n d n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y u n d e r a d i v e r s i t y o f "values."
I n t h e d i m e n s i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts, h e a d m i t s o n l y t h e
o n e clear-cut universal validity c l a i m that h a d already been p r i v i l e g e d
b y t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , Searle takes a step
b a c k w a r d f r o m A u s t i n a n d the later W i t t g e n s t e i n to Frege.
W e a r e n o n e t h e l e s s i n d e b t e d t o Searle f o r t h e v e r s i o n o f s p e e c h -
act t h e o r y t h a t has b e e n m o s t p r e c i s e l y e x p l i c a t e d u p t o n o w . 2 7
He
takes A u s t i n ' s c o n d i t i o n s o f f e l i c i t y a n d r e n d e r s t h e m m o r e p r e c i s e
as " p r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s ; " these r e f e r t o s t a n d a r d i z e d contexts
t h a t m u s t o b t a i n i f c e r t a i n k i n d s o f s p e e c h acts a r e t o be performed
m e a n i n g f u l l y a n d w i t h t h e p r o s p e c t o f success. H e t h e n a d d s c o m -
p r e h e n s i b i l i t y a n d sincerity c o n d i t i o n s ; these r e f e r o n t h e o n e h a n d
to the availability o f a c o m m o n linguistic m e d i u m a n d the suitability
o f the speech situation, a n d o n the o t h e r h a n d to the c o r r e s p o n d i n g
i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker. H e f u r t h e r specifies c o n d i t i o n s f o r the
s e m a n t i c f o r m t h a t t h e clauses w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t m u s t obey,
and finally faces t h e task o f s p e c i f y i n g t h e "essential conditions"
a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h d i f f e r e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces o r m o d e s o f using
l a n g u a g e c a n b e d e m a r c a t e d . T h e five basic m o d e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y
Searle ( c o n s t a t i v e , d i r e c t i v e , c o m m i s s i v e , expressive, a n d d e c l a r a t i v e
s p e e c h acts) a r e o p e n t o m o r e p r e c i s e s u r f a c e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s u s i n g
p r a g m a t i c c r i t e r i a ( s u c h as t h e d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t o f t h e s p e a k e r
a n d hearer, the degree o f intensity i n b r i n g i n g o u t the i l l o c u t i o n a r y
p o i n t , o r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l ties o f t h e s p e e c h a c t ) .
However, the differentiation of t h e basic m o d e s themselves—
m o r e o v e r , i n a v a l i d i t y d i m e n s i o n g e a r e d solely t o w a r d p r o p o s i t i o n a l
t r u t h ( w h i c h p e r m i t s v a r i a t i o n o n l y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i r e c t i o n o f fit
292 293

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d t h e w o r l d ) — i s t h e p r o b l e m o n w h i c h Searle
labors i n vain. I n b o t h directions ( f r o m " w o r d to w o r l d " a n d f r o m
"world to w o r d " ) , the relation o f language to the objective w o r l d
p r o v i d e s a basis t h a t is t o o n a r r o w f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e five p r o -
p o s e d classes o f s p e e c h acts. I n d e e d , f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e f a c t t h a t
the r i c h variety o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces c o u l d n o t be b r o u g h t to o r d e r
f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics h a d already b e e n
n o r s i g n i n s u c h cases i n o r d e r t o i n d i c a t e t h e i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e
p e r s p e c t i v e o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . I n expressive s p e e c h acts,
a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) comes i n t o play—a claim,
m o r e o v e r , t h a t Searle has a l r e a d y e m p l o y e d i n a n u n s p e c i f i c way f o r
t h e s i n c e r i t y c o n d i t i o n t h a t all c o m p r e h e n s i b l e s p e e c h acts are s u p -
p o s e d t o satisfy. A s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n c a n b e m a d e t o h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f
the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f declarative speech acts. 29

a sufficient reason f o r g i v i n g u p a l l a t t e m p t s at classification i n favor T h e s e p r o b l e m s are a v o i d e d w h e n o n e d o e s n o t r e s p o n d t o t h e

o f describing an u n o r d e r e d collection o f language-game grammars. validity problems bequeathed b y A u s t i n i n t h e way Searle does—
O n l y c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d — a n d only par- n a m e l y , w i t h a t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l - s e m a n t i c w e a k e n i n g o f speech-act
t i a l l y — a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h s e n t e n c e s a n d facts c a n t h e o r y — b u t instead interprets Btihler's language functions i n terms
be b r o u g h t i n t o a g r e e m e n t . 2 8
Assertoric force means t h a t 5 presents o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g validity claims.
t o Ha t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p" a n d t h e r e b y issues a w a r r a n t y t h a t t h e t r u t h
c o n d i t i o n s o f "p" are s a t i s f i e d — o r , s i m p l y , t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n fits S p e e c h A c t s , C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n , a n d Strategic I n t e r a c t i o n
t h e facts.

E v e n t h e i l l o c u d o n a r y f o r c e o f a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s is i n c a p a b l e A n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Bidder's schema o f language functions f r o m the

o f b e i n g e x p l a i n e d solely t h r o u g h r e c o u r s e t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of p o i n t o f v i e w o f a t h e o r y o f v a l i d i t y suggests i t s e l f as a way o u t o f t h e
success c o n d i d o n s , t h a t is, i n t e r m s o f H e f f e c t i n g t h a t "p" b e c o m e s difficulties o f speech-act t h e o r y because i t does j u s t i c e to all t h r e e
t r u e . H u n d e r s t a n d s a n i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e as a c o m m a n d , direc- aspects of a speaker r e a c h i n g understanding/with another per-
tive, a request, o r t h e l i k e o n l y w h e n k n o w l e d g e o f t h e success s o n / a b o u t something. I t i n c o r p o r a t e s w i t h i n i t s e l f t h e t r u t h c o n t a i n e d
c o n d i t i o n s ( g i v e n i n t h e clause w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) is a u g - i n t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a n d a t t h e same t i m e o v e r c o m e s t h e
m e n t e d by knowledge o f those conditions (contained i n the i l l o c u - specific one-sidedness o f i n t e n t i o n a l i s t a n d f o r m a l semantics, respec-
t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t ) u n d e r w h i c h S c o u l d justify why he regards an tively. T h e r e s u l t i n g f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis o f s p e e c h acts p r o -
i m p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e c o n t e n t "p" as l e g i t i m a t e o r e n f o r c e a b l e . W i t h vides a basis for the concept of communicative action.
t h i s , a v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f a n o r m a t i v e k i n d , w h i c h c a n n o t be reduced C o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o strategic a c t i o n ,
t o a t r u t h c l a i m , c o m e s i n t o play. T h e s a m e h o l d s f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n - yet i t r e m a i n s l i n k e d to the teleology o f t h e various i n d i v i d u a l plans
ary force o f commissive s p e e c h acts, w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r b i n d s of action that come together i n it.
h i s o w n w i l l i n t h e sense o f a n o r m a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n . T h e conditions a. F o l l o w i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e s e m a n t i c t o t h e p r a g m a t i c
f o r t h e b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r o f o b l i g a t i n g d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n are p o i n t o f view, t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f a s e n t e n c e n o longer
o f a d i f f e r e n t k i n d f r o m t h e success c o n d i d o n s , w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r poses i t s e l f as a q u e s t i o n — d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e process o f c o m m u n i -
f u l f i l l s as s o o n as h e t r a n s l a t e s his i n t e n t i o n i n t o a c t i o n — t h a t is, cation—about the objective relation between language and the
makes i t c o m e true. w o r l d . N o r can t h e validity c l a i m , w i t h w h i c h t h e speaker refers to
T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f expressive s p e e c h acts, w i t h w h i c h S t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s u t t e r a n c e , b e d e f i n e d solely f r o m t h e
expresses a subjective e x p e r i e n c e (Erlebnis) t o w h i c h h e has p r i v i - p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e speaker. V a l i d i t y c l a i m s h a v e a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n
l e g e d access, c a n b e defined neither t h r o u g h the cognitive nor t o w a r d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n by speaker a n d hearer; they can
t h r o u g h the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t i c r e l a t i o n o f a subject to the w o r l d o f b e v i n d i c a t e d o n l y w i t h reasons, t h a t is, discursively, a n d t h e h e a r e r
e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s . Searle is t h u s c o n s i s t e n t i n u s i n g a n e i t h e r - reacts t o t h e m w i t h r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n s . T h e
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Chapter 6
s m a l l e s t i n d e p e n d e n t u n i t o f e x p l i c i t l y l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h -
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is c o m p o s e d o f t h e e l e m e n t a r y s p e e c h a c t Mp,
w i t h w h i c h S raises a t least o n e criticizable validity claim for her
u t t e r a n c e , a n d o f t h e "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n t h a t d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r
H u n d e r s t a n d s a n d accepts t h e s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r f r o m S. R e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g aims at consensus f o r m a t i o n . T h e a t t e m p t by S to
reach understanding w i t h H about something i n the w o r l d termi-
nates i n t h e a g r e e m e n t b r o u g h t a b o u t b e t w e e n t h e m ; t h i s a g r e e m e n t
is t h e n s e a l e d by t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f a c o m p r e h e n s i b l e s p e e c h act. F o r
t h i s r e a s o n , u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen) a s p e e c h act a l r e a d y p o i n t s t o
t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a p o s s i b l e a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) a b o u t w h a t
is said.
O f course, the pragmatic r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m o f valid-
i t y also r e q u i r e s a c o m p l e t e r é é v a l u a t i o n o f w h a t was o r i g i n a l l y
m e a n t b y t h e " i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e " o f a s p e e c h act. A s we saw, A u s t i n
h a d c o n c e i v e d o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e as t h e l i t e r a l l y i r r a t i o n a l
c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act, w h e r e a s the rational content was
m o n o p o l i z e d by t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e ( o r its n o m i -
nalized form). Meaning and u n d e r s t a n d i n g were concentrated
solely o n t h i s r a t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t . By c o n t r a s t , t h e c o n s i s t e n t e x e c u -
t i o n o f t h e p r a g m a t i c t u r n m a k e s v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n t o t h e stewards o f
a r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n o f
v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s , v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r e f e r r i n g t o these c o n d i t i o n s , a n d
reasons f o r the v i n d i c a t i o n o f these validity claims. T h e individual
s p e e c h act is b o u n d t o t h i s s t r u c t u r e p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h its m o d a l
component. T h a t is, t h e m o d e is d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t y p e o f
c l a i m raised by the speaker w i t h h e r m i s l e a d i n g l y n a m e d " i l l o c u t i o n -
a r y " act, i n t h e s t a n d a r d case t h r o u g h t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a p e r f o r -
m a t i v e clause ( a n d also a c c o r d i n g t o t h e way i n w h i c h t h i s v a l i d i t y
c l a i m is r e f e r r e d t o ) . T h e l o c u s o f r a t i o n a l i t y is t h e r e b y t r a n s f e r r e d
f r o m the p r o p o s i t i o n a l to the i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t , a n d at the
same t i m e the validity c o n d i t i o n s n o l o n g e r r e m a i n fixated o n the
p r o p o s i t i o n . R o o m is t h u s m a d e f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f v a l i d i t y
c l a i m s t h a t a r e not d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s — t h a t is, a r e n o t
geared t o w a r d the r e l a t i o n o f language to the objective w o r l d .
Bühler's schema o f language functions h a d already placed the
linguistic expression i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker, t o
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T o w a r d a Critique of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g
t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d t o t h e addressee. A n d e a c h o f t h e t h r e e
t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g discussed i n t h e f o r e g o i n g c l a i m e d t h a t i t c o u l d
explain the comprehensibility of linguistic expressions through
s o m e o n e o f t h e s e r e l a t i o n s — w h e t h e r t h r o u g h t h e f u n c t i o n o f ex-
p r e s s i n g i n t e n t i o n s , o r o f r e p r e s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s , o r o f a c t u a l -
i z i n g a n d e s t a b l i s h i n g i n t e r a c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . W h a t w e are l o o k i n g
f o r is a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h a t takes a c c o u n t o f t h e k e r n e l o f t r u t h
i n a l l t h r e e o f t h e s e t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g . H o w e v e r , f r o m Searle's
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i t has o n c e a g a i n b e c o m e a p p a r e n t t h a t
t h e way i n w h i c h t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s c o n c e i v e s t h e i n t e r n a l
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t r u t h a n d m e a n i n g is too specialized.
C e r t a i n l y , w h e t h e r o r n o t a n u t t e r a n c e f u l f i l l s its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l
f u n c t i o n is m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ; however, t h e f u l f i l l -
m e n t o f t h e expressive a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i v e f u n c t i o n s is also m e a s u r e d
a g a i n s t c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are analogous to truth. I t h e r e f o r e w a n t t o
i n t r o d u c e s u b j e c t i v e t r u t h f u l n e s s a n d n o r m a t i v e Tightness as t r u t h -
a n a l o g o u s c o n c e p t s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts. T h e r e l a t i o n s o f
t h e s p e e c h act t o speakers' i n t e n t i o n s a n d t o addressees c a n also b e
conceived i n t e r m s o f the m o d e l o f a r e l a t i o n to the objective w o r l d .
T h a t is, t h e r e exists s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a r e l a t i o n t o t h e subjective w o r l d
( o f t h e s p e a k e r ) , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) t o w h i c h
h e has p r i v i l e g e d access, a n d a r e l a t i o n t o t h e s o c i a l w o r l d ( o f t h e
speaker, t h e h e a r e r , a n d o t h e r m e m b e r s ) , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f i n t e r p e r -
sonal relations h e l d to be legitimate. These world-concepts formed
through analogy m u s t n o t , o f c o u r s e , b e m i s u n d e r s t o o d as p a r t i a l
r e g i o n s ( i n P o p p e r ' s sense) o f t h e o n e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . 3 0
T h e subjec-
tive e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t S e x t e r n a l i z e s i n e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts ( p r o t o -
t y p i c a l l y i n avowals a n d r e v e l a t i o n s ) s h o u l d n o m o r e b e understood
as a p a r t i c u l a r class o f entities ( o r i n n e r e p i s o d e s ) t h a n s h o u l d t h e
norms l e g i t i m a t i n g an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p established be-
t w e e n 5 a n d H b y m e a n s o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( p r o t o t y p i c a l l y
t h r o u g h commands a n d promises). F r o m the perspective of the
participants, the first-person e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences e m p l o y e d in
expressive s p e e c h acts c a n b e u t t e r e d truthfully o r untruthfully, ac-
c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t h e says. B u t t h e y c a n n o t
b e t r u e o r false unless e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s are t o b e a s s i m i l a t e d
t o a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s . I n t h e s a m e way, t h e i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s

296
Chapter 6
(commands o r requests) o r i n t e n t i o n a l sentences (promises) that
are e m p l o y e d i n the attitude o f the first person [toward a second
p e r s o n ] i n r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts c a n b e right o r not right, a c c o r d i n g
t o w h e t h e r t h e y satisfy o r v i o l a t e r e c o g n i z e d n o r m a t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s
o r w h e t h e r t h e y have a b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r o r m e r e l y c r e a t e t h e i l l u -
s i o n o f b e i n g b i n d i n g . B u t they, t o o , c a n n o t b e t r u e o r false. W i t h
t h e i r s p e e c h acts, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n r e l a t e t o s o m e t h i n g
i n t h e subjective w o r l d o r t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e social w o r l d i n ways
t h a t are different f r o m t h e way i n w h i c h t h e y r e l a t e t o s o m e t h i n g i n
t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . T h a t these w o r l d - c o n c e p t s s h o u l d b e u s e d o n l y
i n an analogous sense is s h o w n b y these d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e type of
reference: o b j e c t s are i d e n t i f i e d i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n subjective
e x p e r i e n c e s ( w h i c h , i n a n expressive a t t i t u d e , I r e v e a l o r disguise as
" i n e a c h case m i n e " ) , a n d also i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n t h e n o r m s
a c k n o w l e d g e d i n e a c h case " b y u s " ( w h i c h , i n a n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e
a t t i t u d e , we f o l l o w o r c o n t r a v e n e ) .
F u r t h e r m o r e , an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Buhler's schema o f language
f u n c t i o n s f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f a t h e o r y o f v a l i d i t y leads t o t h e
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t , w i t h a s p e e c h act Mp, S r e l a t e s simultaneously t o
s o m e t h i n g i n the objective w o r l d , to s o m e t h i n g i n the subjective
w o r l d , a n d t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s h a r e d social w o r l d . E v e r y s p e e c h act
as a w h o l e c a n always be c r i t i c i z e d as i n v a l i d f r o m t h r e e p e r s p e c t i v e s :
as u n t r u e w i t h r e s p e c t t o a s t a t e m e n t m a d e ( o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) , as
u n t r u t h f u l w i t h respect to the expressed i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker,
a n d as n o t r i g h t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t
w i t h respect to t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e p r e s u p p o s e d norms them-
selves) . T o be sure, n o m o r e t h a n o n e o f these t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
c a n b e e m p h a s i z e d t h e m a d c a l l y i n a n e x p l i c i t s p e e c h act. F i n a l l y , i t
is i n t e r m s o f these t h e m a t i z e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ( m o d i f i e d o n t h e basis
o f surface distinctions according to the particular language
c o n t e x t i n q u e s t i o n ) t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s are d e f i n e d ; these
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s m u s t be c a p a b l e o f b e i n g t r a c e d b a c k t o t h r e e
basic m o d e s : t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e class o f e i t h e r c o n s t a t i v e , expressive,
o r r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts.
N o w , i f e v e r y s p e e c h act is t h e m a t i c a l l y l i n k e d w i t h s o m e
validity claim, then D u m m e t t ' s proposal for explicating the m e a n i n g
297
T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s e m p l o y e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts c a n
be generalized. We u n d e r s t a n d a speech act w h e n we k n o w w h a t
makes i t acceptable. O f c o u r s e , t h i s is a m a t t e r o f o b j e c t i v e condi-
tions o f validity that the hearer cannot infer directly f r o m the seman-
tic c o n t e n t o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n s u s e d , b u t o n l y i n d i r e c d y t h r o u g h t h e
e p i s t e m i c c l a i m t h a t t h e speaker raises f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f h i s u t t e r -
a n c e i n p e r f o r m i n g his i l l o c u t i o n a r y act. W i t h h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m , t h e
speaker appeals t o a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l reasons that c o u l d be
p r o v i d e d i n s u p p o r t o f i t . T h e reasons i n t e r p r e t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f
validity, a n d to this e x t e n t they themselves are p a r t o f the c o n d i t i o n s
that m a k e an utterance acceptable. I n t h i s way, t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y
c o n d i t i o n s p o i n t to t h e holistic c o n s t i t u t i o n o f n a t u r a l languages. I n
a l a n g u a g e , e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l s p e e c h act is c o n n e c t e d b y way o f l o g i -
c a l - s e m a n t i c t h r e a d s t o m a n y o t h e r p o t e n t i a l s p e e c h acts, w h i c h c a n
t a k e o n t h e p r a g m a t i c r o l e o f reasons. N a t u r a l l y , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e
s t r u c t u r e a n d c o n t e n t o f a s p e e c h act, t h e r e a s o n s s t a n d i n g l a t e n t l y
at t h e r e a d y a n d s u i t a b l e f o r t h e d i s c u r s i v e v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m r a i s e d i n t h a t s p e e c h act w i l l be m o r e o r less c o m p l e x as
regards type a n d scope. W h e n the speaker makes a n assertion w i t h
a simple predicative observation sentence i n the present indicative,
t h e r e a s o n s t h a t i n t e r p r e t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e s e n t e n c e are
n o r m a l l y easy t o survey. By c o n t r a s t , w h e n a c o u r t passes j u d g m e n t
o n a c o m p l i c a t e d m a t t e r o r w h e n a physicist explains a n a t u r a l event
w i t h the help o f an empirical theory, the evaluation o f the validity—
a n d t h u s also t h e comprehension—of t h e c o u r t v e r d i c t o r o f the scien-
tific explanation will require knowledge of more demanding kinds
(or
o f reasons. O t h e r w i s e w e s i m p l y d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h a t is s a i d — n o t
e v e n i f w e w e r e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l w o r d s because t h e y
have o c c u r r e d f r e q u e n t l y p r i o r t o t h i s i n other s e n t e n c e s .
W e u n d e r s t a n d a s p e e c h act w h e n w e k n o w t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s
and t h a t a s p e a k e r c o u l d p r o v i d e i n o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e a h e a r e r t h a t she
is e n t i t l e d i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h e r u t t e r -
a n c e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , k n o w l e d g e o f a l a n g u a g e is b o u n d u p w i t h
k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t is a c t u a l l y t h e case i n t h e ( l i n g u i s t i c a l l y d i s c l o s e d )
w o r l d . Perhaps knowledge o f the w o r l d merely hangs u p o n a longer
one c h a i n o f reasons t h a n k n o w l e d g e o f language. T h a t they c a n n o t be
separated sharply f r o m one a n o t h e r becomes plausible w h e n one
298 299

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

realizes t h e basic i d e a o f t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c e x p l a n a t i o n o f m e a n - c a n n o t be u n d e r t a k e n w i t h the d u a l i n t e n t i o n o f r e a c h i n g an agree-

i n g (already contained w i t h i n Bidder's schema). To u n d e r s t a n d an m e n t about something with a participant i n interaction and simulta-
e x p r e s s i o n is t o k n o w h o w o n e c a n m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h n e o u s l y causally e x e r t i n g s o m e e f f e c t o n h i m . F r o m t h e perspective
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e b o d y a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . T h e r e f o r e , i t can o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s , a n agreement c a n n o t be i m p o s e d f r o m w i t h o u t ,
already be discerned f r o m the c o n d i t i o n s f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g l i n g u i s - c a n n o t be foisted by one party u p o n the o t h e r — w h e t h e r i n s t r u m e n -
tic e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t t h e s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n b e p e r f o r m e d w i t h t h e i r tally, t h r o u g h d i r e c t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o t h e a c t i o n s i t u a t i o n , o r s t r a t e -
h e l p have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , that gically, t h r o u g h i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e ( a g a i n , c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h o n e ' s
is, t o w a r d a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h a t is s a i d . O n e o w n success) o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s o f t h e o t h e r actor. W h a t -
s i m p l y w o u l d n o t k n o w w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a n ever m a n i f e s t l y c o m e s a b o u t t h r o u g h e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e (gratifica-
utterance i f one d i d n o t k n o w that the utterance can a n d should tion or threat, suggestion or deception) cannot count
s e r v e t o b r i n g a b o u t a n a g r e e m e n t ; m o r e o v e r , i t is p a r t o f t h e c o n - i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y as a n a g r e e m e n t ; a n i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h i s s o r t f o r f e i t s
cept of agreement that it "holds" (gilt) f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e its effectiveness f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n .
d i m e n s i o n o f v a l i d i t y is t h u s i n h e r e n t i n l a n g u a g e . T h e o r i e n t a t i o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e o r strategic a c t i o n is r e q u i r e d w h e n a n a c t o r c a n
t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e c a r r y o u t h i s p l a n s o f a c t i o n o n l y i n t e r a c t i v e l y , t h a t is, w i t h t h e h e l p
mutual understanding (Verständigung)—and of linguistic under- o f t h e actions o f a n o t h e r actor (or o f his r e f r a i n i n g f r o m a c t i o n ) .
s t a n d i n g (Sprachverstehen) itself. Over a n d above this, c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n m u s t satisfy c e r t a i n co-
b. W i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r i e n t e d t o w a r d operative a n d communicative conditions:
validity claims, f o r m a l pragmatics finds a c o n n e c t i o n with action
a. T h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g a c t o r s m u s t c o n d u c t t h e m s e l v e s cooperatively
t h e o r y , a l b e i t i n a way c o m p l e t e l y different f r o m the attempt of
a n d a t t e m p t to h a r m o n i z e t h e i r plans w i t h one a n o t h e r ( w i t h i n the
i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics t o e x p l a i n processes o f r e a c h i n g under-
horizon of a shared lifeworld) on the basis of common (or
standing using concepts o f action theory. A teleological action can
sufficiently overlapping) interpretations o f the situation.
b e d e s c r i b e d as t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a p l a n o f a c t i o n t h a t is b a s e d o n
t h e actor's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n . By c a r r y i n g o u t a p l a n o f b . T h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g actors m u s t be p r e p a r e d t o a c h i e v e t h e i n d i r e c t
a c t i o n , an actor comes to grips w i t h a s i t u a t i o n , whereby the action goals o f a c o m m o n d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d o f a c t i o n coordi-
s i t u a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a s e g m e n t f r o m t h e e n v i r o n m e n t as i n t e r p r e t e d n a t i o n i n t h e r o l e s o f speakers a n d h e a r e r s b y way o f processes o f
b y t h e actor. T h i s s e g m e n t is c o n s t i t u t e d i n l i g h t o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, b y way o f t h e u n r e s e r v e d a n d s i n -
a c t i o n t h a t t h e a c t o r r e g a r d s as r e l e v a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e success cere p u r s u i t o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims.
o f h e r p l a n . T h e p r o b l e m o f c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n arises w i t h r e g a r d
T h i s means specifically that:
to i n t e r a c t i o n between several actors: h o w can Alter's plans and
a c t i o n s b e " l i n k e d u p " w i t h E g o ' s p l a n s a n d actions? T y p e s o f i n t e r - • T h e y p u r s u e t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts
a c t i o n can be distinguished a c c o r d i n g to the various m e c h a n i s m s f o r in a performative attitude, which demands an orientation toward
t h i s l i n k i n g - u p . I speak e i t h e r o f " c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n " o r o f " s t r a - reciprocally raised, criticizable validity claims.
tegic a c t i o n , " d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e actions o f d i f f e r e n t actors
• I n d o i n g t h i s , t h e y m a k e use o f t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects
are c o o r d i n a t e d b y way o f " r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " o r "exerting
(Bindungseffekte) o f speech-act o f f e r s , w h i c h c o m e a b o u t w h e n the
i n f l u e n c e , " respectively. 31
F r o m the perspective of the participants,
speaker, w i t h h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m , issues a c r e d i b l e w a r r a n t y f o r t h e
these t w o m e c h a n i s m s a n d t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g types o f a c t i o n m u -
v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is said.
tually exclude one a n o t h e r . Processes o f r e a c h i n g understanding
300
Chapter 6
. The binding and bonding effect o f a comprehensible a n d
c e p t e d s p e e c h act is c a r r i e d o v e r t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e
sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n arising o u t o f the semantic content of
s p e e c h a c t — w h e t h e r a s y m m e t r i c a l l y f o r t h e h e a r e r o r t h e speaker,
o r s y m m e t r i c a l l y f o r b o t h sides.
T h u s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f f r o m s t r a t e g i c ac-
t i o n t h r o u g h t h e f a c t t h a t successful a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n c a n n o t
traced back to the purposive r a t i o n a l i t y o f action o r i e n t a t i o n s b u t to
t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e o f a c h i e v i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is,
to a r a t i o n a l i t y that manifests itself i n the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c o m m u -
n i c a t i v e l y r e a c h e d a g r e e m e n t . T h e way i n w h i c h l i n g u i s t i c processes
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f u n c t i o n as a m e c h a n i s m f o r coordinat-
i n g a c t i o n is t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c t i o n a g r e e a b o u t
v a l i d i t y c l a i m e d f o r t h e i r s p e e c h a c t s — t h a t is, t h e y r e c o g n i z e c r i t i -
c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y . W h a t gives r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t -
i n g f o r c e t o speech-act o f f e r s is, i n t u r n , t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n
between the meaning o f an utterance o n the one h a n d , and o n the
o t h e r its v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s , t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t is s a i d ,
a n d t h e r e a s o n s t h a t c a n be m o b i l i z e d f o r t h e discursive v i n d i c a t i o n
o f this c l a i m .
L i k e a l l a c t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is p u r p o s i v e . B u t h e r e , t h e
teleology o f the i n d i v i d u a l action plans a n d o f the operations
c a r r y i n g t h e m o u t is interrupted b y t h e a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g mecha-
n i s m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O r i e n t a t i o n s a n d a c t i o n processes
are i n i t i a l l y e g o c e n t r i c a l l y g e a r e d t o w a r d a p a r t i c u l a r actor, b u t t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i v e " s w i t c h " b y w a y o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts c a r r i e d o u t w i t h -
o u t r e s e r v a t i o n places t h e m u n d e r t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f a n
intersubjectively shared language. The telos o f r e a c h i n g under-
standing i n h e r e n t i n the structures o f language compels the c o m m u -
nicative actors to alter t h e i r perspective; this shift i n perspective finds
e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e necessity o f g o i n g f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e
o f t h e s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d actor, w h o seeks t o effect s o m e t h i n g i n t h e
w o r l d , t o t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f a speaker, w h o seeks t o reach
understanding with a second person about something. 3 2
I n t h e i r s t a n d a r d f o r m , i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts are c a r r i e d o u t u s i n g
p e r f o r m a t i v e sentences. F o r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e e x p r e s -
301
T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
ac- sion, these sentences r e q u i r e p e r f o r m a t i v e verbs; f o r the subject
expression, t h e y r e q u i r e t h e first p e r s o n i n t h e p r e s e n t i n d i c a t i v e ;
the for the position o f the direct object, they require the second person.
This grammatical f o r m o f the performadve sentence m i r r o r s the
a t t i t u d e o f a s p e a k e r w h o takes u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n w i t h a
hearer i n order to reach understanding w i t h her about something,
w h e r e b y t h e s p e a k e r is r e f l e x i v e l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t
be
t h e h e a r e r m a y d i s p u t e t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is s a i d . S u c h a performative
attitude o f a n a c t o r o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n be
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n c e p t u a l l y f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e o f a suc-
cess-oriented actor o n t h e basis o f t h e w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s t h a t e a c h
p e r m i t s : w i t h o u r s p e e c h acts, w e simultaneously r e l a t e , w i t h v a r y i n g
t h e m a t i z a t i o n s , to s o m e t h i n g i n t h e objective, t h e subjective, a n d t h e
the
social w o r l d s , w h e r e a s i n a c t i n g p u r p o s i v e l y w e i n t e r v e n e solely i n
the objective w o r l d .
If, however, the a t t i t u d e t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d that
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success are n o t m e r e l y t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o n e
a n o t h e r a n a l y t i c a l l y , b u t r a t h e r c o r r e s p o n d t o t w o d i f f e r e n t types o f
i n t e r a c t i o n , t h e n f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e actors themselves they
m u s t b e m u t u a l l y exclusive. A g a i n s t t h i s , t h e o b j e c t i o n has been
r a i s e d t h a t ( i ) a n y s p e e c h act w h a t s o e v e r c a n also b e s t r a t e g i c a l l y
d e p l o y e d , a n d t h a t ( i i ) s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s , w h i c h are n o t e m b e d d e d
for
i n n o r m a t i v e contexts, do n o t express validity claims b u t r a t h e r
power claims, a n d therefore fall i n t o the category—paradoxical on
o u r a c c o u n t — o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t h a t a r e c a r r i e d o u t w i t h a n o r i -
e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success.
i. W h e t h e r conventionally regulated or not, perlocutionary ef-
fects t h a t are s t r i v e n f o r openly w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m m o n
d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n are o f a k i n d t h a t , mutatis mutandis, could
also b e e f f e c t e d t h r o u g h p u r p o s i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n alone. B u t such
n o n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p r o d u c e d effects c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d as p e r l o c u -
t i o n a r y effects b e c a u s e t h e l a t t e r are always i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y m e d i a t e d .
A d m i t t e d l y , t h e r e is t h e case o f t h e l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c s p e e c h act t h a t
a i m s at p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects t h a t a r e n o t c o n v e n t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d .
T h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c o m e a b o u t o n l y i f t h e s p e a k e r d o e s n o t
declare his aims to the hearer w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m m o n
d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , a speaker w h o wants
 303
302
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a Critique of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g

t o p e r s u a d e h i s a u d i e n c e o f s o m e t h i n g p r o c e e d s i n t h i s way, p e r h a p s addressee o f a c o m m a n d o r a r e q u e s t m u s t as a r u l e b e f a m i l i a r w i t h
b e c a u s e i n t h e g i v e n s i t u a t i o n h e lacks c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t s . Such the n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t that authorizes a speaker to make her de-
n o n p u b l i c p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c a n be a c h i e v e d o n l y p a r a s i t i c a l l y , m a n d , a n d that thereby legitimates h e r expectation that the ad-
n a m e l y , o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e s p e a k e r f e i g n s t h e i n t e n t i o n o f unre- dressee has r e a s o n s t o c a r r y o u t t h e a c t i o n d e m a n d e d . Knowledge
servedly p u r s u i n g h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d leaves t h e h e a r e r i n t h e o f success c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
d a r k as t o h i s a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of action ori- c o m p o n e n t "p" o f t h e i m p e r a t i v e Ip, is n o t s u f f i c i e n t i n o r d e r to
ented toward reaching understanding. 3 3
T h e l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c use o f u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s s p e e c h act, t h a t is, its
l a n g u a g e is p a r a s i t i c because i t f u n c t i o n s o n l y w h e n a t least o n e p a r t y s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r as a n i m p e r a t i v e . K n o w l e d g e o f t h e success c o n d i -
assumes t h a t l a n g u a g e is b e i n g u s e d w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t i o n s (a) m u s t b e a u g m e n t e d b y k n o w l e d g e o f t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s (b)
reaching understanding. Whoever acts s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n this way u n d e r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r has r e a s o n s t o r e g a r d a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h
must violate the sincerity condition of communicative action t h e c o n t e n t (a) as v a l i d , t h a t is, n o r m a t i v e l y j u s t i f i e d — f o r e x a m p l e ,
inconspicuously. t h a t c h i l d r e n i n t h e streets o f L i m a m a y b e g f r o m v i s i t i n g f o r e i g n -

T h e use o f l a n g u a g e t h a t is m a n i f e s t l y strategic also has a d e r i v a - ers. 3 5

O f c o u r s e , t h e s p e a k e r m a y c o n n e c t a v a l i d i t y c l a i m w i t h Ip o n l y

tive status; i n this case, a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e a w a r e t h a t r e a c h i n g u n - so l o n g as she k n o w s h e r i m p e r a t i v e t o b e s e c u r e d b y some or other

derstanding l i n g u i s t i c a l l y is subject to conditions of strategic n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t , be t h i s ever so w e a k .

action—and therefore remains deficient. They know and reckon F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l o b s e r v e r , t h e r e is a c o n t i n -

w i t h the fact that they must s u p p l e m e n t the i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y m e d i a t e d uum between m e r e l y de facto habitualized power relations and
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o f t h e i r s p e e c h acts w i t h e m p i r i c a l effects t h a t p o w e r r e l a t i o n s t h a t have b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o n o r m a t i v e a u t h o r -
a r e t r i g g e r e d p u r p o s i v e l y . For, i n t h e e n d t h e y r e m a i n d e p e n d e n t o n ity. H o w e v e r , f r o m t h e perspective of participants i n communica-
i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i c a t i o n : o n l y t h e p r o v e r b i a l s h o t across t h e b o w s is tion—so l o n g as t h e i r l i f e w o r l d s are s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e r w o v e n — i t is
a b l e , f o r e x a m p l e , t o d e m o n s t r a t e t o a n o p p o n e n t t h e seriousness o f p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d all i m p e r a t i v e s ( a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of
a threat. such an intersubjectively shared lifeworld) according to the model

T h i s case o f t h e m a n i f e s t l y s t r a t e g i c use o f language is t o be o f n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d imperatives. Even strangers w h o e n c o u n -

d i s t i n g u i s h e d , i n t u r n , f r o m cases o f a n i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t ter one a n o t h e r i n f o r e i g n lands w i l l , i n emergencies, expect f r o m

r e m a i n s subordinated t o t h e a i m o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I n u n s t r u c - each o t h e r a readiness to help. Even such weak n o r m a t i v e contexts

t u r e d p r e l i m i n a r y situations, a c o m m o n d e f i n i t i o n of the situation are s u f f i c i e n t t o a u t h o r i z e a s p e a k e r t o e x p e c t a c e r t a i n k i n d of

is f i r s t o f a l l c o n s t r u c t e d , as, f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n i n a n accidental behavior, w h i c h t h e hearer can criticize i f n e e d be. O n l y i n the

m e e t i n g i n a bar, a y o u n g m a n i n d i r e c t l y gives a n a t t r a c t i v e y o u n g b o r d e r l i n e case o f m a n i f e s t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n d o e s t h e n o r m a t i v e

w o m a n t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g . I n t h e same way, t h e p e d a g o g i c a l l y validity c l a i m shrivel i n t o a pure power c l a i m based u p o n a reservoir

sensitive t e a c h e r i n s t i l l s s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e i n h e r p u p i l b y m e a n s of o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s t h a t is c o n t i n g e n t a n d is n o l o n g e r convention-

compliments, so t h a t t h e p u p i l l e a r n s t o t a k e h i s o w n ideas s e r i - ally r e g u l a t e d o r g r a m m a t i c a l l y r e a d a b l e . T h e " H a n d s u p ! " o f a b a n k

ously. 34
I n cases s u c h as t h e s e , i n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n has r o b b e r w h o at p i s t o l p o i n t d e m a n d s o f t h e t h r e a t e n e d b a n k teller

f i r s t o f a l l t o establish its o w n presuppositions step b y step, the t h a t she h a n d s o v e r t h e m o n e y d e m o n s t r a t e s i n a d r a s t i c way t h a t

terminus ad quern is a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t is u l t i m a t e l y also communica- the c o n d i t i o n s o f n o r m a t i v e validity have b e e n r e p l a c e d by sanction

tively available, a n d n o t a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect t h a t w o u l d be de- conditions.

stroyed by being a d m i t t e d or declared. T h e dissolution o f the n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d appears i n a symp-

ii. I analyze s i m p l e o r n o n a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t o m a t i c way i n t h e " i f - t h e n " s t r u c t u r e o f t h e t h r e a t , w h i c h i n s t r a t e g i c
model o f t h e d e r i v a t i v e m a n i f e s t l y s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e . The a c t i o n takes t h e p l a c e o f t h e s i n c e r i t y o r e a r n e s t n e s s o f t h e s p e a k e r
304 305

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g

p r e s u p p o s e d i n the case o f communicative action. Imperatives or 12. K . - 0 . Apel, "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Hermeneutic Understanding," in
Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby (London, 1980),
t h r e a t s t h a t are d e p l o y e d p u r e l y strategically and robbed of their
pp. Iff.
n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are n o t i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — t h a t is, acts w i t h
13. L . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E . M. Anscombe ( L o n d o n ,
a built-in orientation toward reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a t all. They
1958), §§23ff.
r e m a i n p a r a s i t i c i n s o f a r as t h e i r c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y m u s t b e derived
f r o m the e m p l o y m e n t c o n d i t i o n s for normatively secured i l l o c u t i o n - 14. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962).

ary acts. 15. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §199.

I n l a t e n t l y strategic a c t i o n , t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects are depend-
16. Ibid., §206.
ent u p o n the i l l o c u t i o n a r y effects o f a use o f l a n g u a g e t h a t is o r i -
ented toward reaching understanding, however m u c h i t may be 17. D. S. Shwayder, Stratification of Behavior ( L o n d o n , 1965), pp. 47ff.
feigned on one side. I n m a n i f e s d y strategic a c t i o n , illocutionarily
18. S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972); cf. J . Habermas, "Intentionalistische
w e a k e n e d s p e e c h acts, i f t h e y a r e t o b e comprehensible, continue to Semantik," in Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns
(Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 332ff.
refer to the m e a n i n g t h e y owe t o a use o f l a n g u a g e t h a t is a n t e c e -
dently habitualized and originally oriented toward reaching under- 19. T h i s argument is developed by C . B. Christensen, " O n the Mechanism of C o m -
standing. munication," Ms. (Frankfurt, 1987).

20. E . Stenius, "Mood and Language G a m e , " Synthese 17 (1964), pp. 254ff.; A. Kenny,
Notes Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford, 1975); cf. also Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical
Philosophy, pp. 398ff.

1. K, Biihler, Sprachtheorie (Jena, 1934), p. 28. 21. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Bos-
ton, 1984), pp. 298ff.
2. K . - 0 . Apel, Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico
(Bonn, 1963). 22. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, pp. 207ff.

3. G . Meggle, ed., Handlung, Kommunikation und Bedeutung (Frankfurt, 1979).

4. M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language ( L o n d o n , 1973).
5. W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).
6. C . W. Morris, Signs, Language, Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1946).
7. N. Chomsky, "A Review of B. F. Skinner's 'Verbal Behaviour,'" in J . Fodor and J .
Katz, eds., The Structure of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), pp. 547ff.
8. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. G o r n e r (Cambridge,
1982), pp. 163ff.
9. H . P. Grice, "Utterer's Meanings and Intentions," in Studies in the Ways of Words
(Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 86ff., "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and
Word-Meaning," in ibid., pp. 117ff., and "Meaning Revisited," in ibid., pp. 283ff.
10. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, pp. 207ff.
11. L . Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuin-
ness ( L o n d o n , 1961), 4.024.
23. M. Dummett, "What Is a Theory of Meaning?," in G . Evans a n d j . McDowell, eds.,
Truth and Meaning (Oxford, 1976), pp. 67ff.
24. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§380ff.; cf. P. W i n c h , The Idea of a Social
Science ( L o n d o n , 1958); Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans.
T. McCarthy (Boston, 1987) pp. 15ff.
25. O n the development of Austin's position, see chapter 1 i n the present volume,
especially pp. 72ff.
26. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 145ff., and "Performative-Constative," in
C. E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111., 1963), pp. 22—33.
27. J . Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), Expression and Meaning (Cambridge,
1979), Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983), and Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge,
Mass., 1984).
28. For the following, cf. chapter 2, pp. 157ff. and chapter 5 in the present volume.
29. Searle's own explanation already makes it apparent that the use of a double
arrow to characterize the declarative mode expresses an embarrassment: Searle,
Expression and Meaning, p. 19. Cf. also chapter 5 in the present volume.
306
Chapter 6

7
30. Cf. the discussion of Popper's doctrine of three worlds in Theory of Communicative
Action, vol. 1, pp. 76ff.
Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of
31. J . Habermas, "Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action," in G . Seebaß Communicative Rationality (1996)
and R. Tuomela, eds., Soaal Action (Dordrecht, 1985).

32. I n "Communicative Competence and Normative Force," New German Critique 35

(1985): 133ff., J . Culler claims that through a tendentious choice of examples, I
smuggle a normatively laden conception of "reaching understanding" (Verständigung)
into the analysis: "When I a m reading the instructions for my word processing
program I assume that statements are correct descriptions of the system's capabilites
and that the manual has been checked for errors, but there seems no interesting
sense in which I presuppose the sincerity of any individual communicator" (p. 140).
T h e impersonal form of the written instructions for the use of a computer is,
however, no obstacle to drawing o n the model of face-to-face communication in
order to analyze the illocutionary m e a n i n g — a n d the obligations arising out of it—of
such technical instructions. T h r o u g h the conditions of the sales contract, a norma-
tive context is established that appears to justify the normative expectation, men-
tioned by Culler, that the user has toward the computer firm.
H e r b e r t Schnadelbach has r a i s e d a s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n t o m y a t t e m p t
33. 3. Cf. chapter 3 in the present volume pp. 203ff. I n an incisive article ("Haber-
to analyze t h e c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n t e r m s o f t h e j u s t i f i a b i l i t y a n d
mas's Defence of Rationalism," New German Critique 25 (1985): 145ff.), Allen Wood
has criticized my attempt to justify the primacy of the use of language oriented toward criticizability o f expressions, a n d to t h e r e b y a t t r i b u t e a key r o l e to
reaching understanding with the help of the opposition between illocutionary a n d the procedural rationality embodied i n a r g u m e n t a t i v e practices. As
perlocutionary acts. I admit that (in Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, see
pp. 119ff. i n this volume) I over-hastily conflated this meaning-theoretic distinction h e sees i t , o n e m a y c o n c e d e t h a t a l l r a t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n s
with the action-theoretic distinction between action oriented toward reaching under-
standing and action oriented toward success. It is sufficient to justify the primacy of can i n p r i n c i p l e be d e f e n d e d i n response to queries ( t h r o u g h l i n k i n g u p
the use of language oriented toward reaching understanding through the theory of argumentatively w i t h t h e i r linguistic m o d e o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) ; i t doesn't
meaning as proposed here, a n d to distinguish communicative from strategic action
f o l l o w f r o m this, however, that that w i t h w h i c h the a r g u m e n t a t i o n links u p
on the basis of the fact that the former is mediated by illocutionary acts that are
carried out without reservation, a n d is therefore subject to the performative con- must itself take the f o r m o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n o r d e r f o r i t to be capable o f
straints of the action-coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding. This b e i n g d e e m e d r a t i o n a l ; argumentative o r discursive rationality (Habermas)
mechanism interrupts, as it were, the teleology of the individual chains of action that is simply one component o f reason. T h e fixation o n the j u s t i f i c a t o r y m o d e l
are connected up by way of consensus formation, whereas the speech acts that are o f r a t i o n a l i t y seduces us i n t o r e g a r d i n g e v e r y t h i n g as i r r a t i o n a l so l o n g as i t
instrumentalized for strategic action are robbed of their illocutionary binding and
is n o t completely argumentatively or discursively v i n d i c a t e d — w h i c h means
bonding power. Perlocutionary effects, which are intially demarcated from illocution-
ary effects in purely meaning-theoretic terms, can then be described in various ways t h a t the f i e l d o f the i r r a t i o n a l w o u l d assume j u s t about gigantic p r o p o r t i o n s .
in action-theoretic terms, depending o n whether they appear openly and as suscep- O t h e r r a t i o n a l capacities i n c l u d e the capacity f o r testing reality ( F r e u d ) , f o r
tible to consensus within the framework of c o m m o n situation definitions or whether l e a r n i n g f r o m mistakes a n d errors ( P o p p e r ) , f o r solving p r o b l e m s i n feed-
they are pursued strategically and may not be declared. b a c k - c o n t r o l l e d action contexts ( G e h l e n ) , f o r purposively selecting means
( W e b e r ) — m a n y o t h e r p r o m i n e n t examples c o u l d be added to the list; those
34. T h e example is taken from Wood, "Habermas's Defence of Rationalism," p. 161.
I have m e n t i o n e d simply cannot be a c c o m m o d a t e d i n a schema o f 'justifica-
35. Cf. the example in E . Tugendhat, " J . Habermas o n Communicative Action," in t i o n " o r o f "the discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f validity claims" ( H a b e r m a s ) . 1

Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Social Action, pp. 179ff. (referred to i n chapter 3 of the
present volume pp. 199f). Schnadelbach h i m s e l f u n d e r s t a n d s r a t i o n a l i t y as a d i s p o s i t i o n f o r
reason on t h e p a r t o f subjects c a p a b l e o f k n o w l e d g e , speech, a n d
a c t i o n t h a t c a n b e c a p t u r e d d e s c r i p t i v e l y . W h a t h e sets u p
2
against
d i s c u r s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is n o t s i m p l y a ( g e n e r i c a l l y a s c r i b e d ) rational-
308 309

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

ity o f the person, identifiable with the help of corresponding cause, i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f k n o w l e d g e , i n t h e t e l e o l o g i -

expressions, b u t rather the "reflexive character" 3
o f these e x p r e s -
s i o n s . For, o f c o u r s e , w h a t w e k n o w , d o , a n d say is r a t i o n a l o n l y i f we
are a t least i m p l i c i t l y aware o f w h y o u r b e l i e f s are t r u e , o u r actions
right, a n d o u r linguistic utterances valid (or showing promise of
success f r o m a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y p o i n t o f view, o r effective f r o m a p e r -
locutionary one): " [ T ] h e t r o p e o f ' r e f l e x i v i t y ' as t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
characteristic o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n general, can thus be r e n d e r e d more
precise w i t h the h e l p o f the self-referential t h e m a t i z a t i o n o f . . .
p e r f o r m a n c e s i n the perspective o f the first person singular or p l u -
r a l ; o n l y she w h o is c a p a b l e o f saying T o r 'we,' a n d o f t h e m a t i z i n g
w h a t she is o r d o e s , a n d o f a t t r i b u t i n g i t t o h e r s e l f , is r a t i o n a l . " W i t h
4
t h i s S c h n à d e l b a c h places h i m s e l f i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f t h e philosophy
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . S i n c e t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n , h o w e v e r , w e have g o o d
reasons f o r f o l l o w i n g a suggestion o f G. H . M e a d a n d e x p l a i n i n g the
s e l f - r e l a t i o n o f t h e k n o w i n g , a c t i n g , a n d s p e a k i n g s u b j e c t — t h a t is,
the relation o f the first person "to h e r s e l f ' — o n t h e basis o f the
a d o p t i o n o f t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a second p e r s o n " o n m e . " Correspond-
i n g l y , t h e reflected s e l f - r e l a t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y S c h n à d e l b a c h as t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f r a t i o n a l i t y w o u l d be d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n : t h e r e w o u l d be
n o r e f l e c t i o n t h a t c o u l d n o t b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d as a n i n n e r d i s c o u r s e .
T h e r e f l e x i v e a t t i t u d e t o o n e ' s o w n e x p r e s s i o n s takes p l a c e a c c o r d -
i n g to the m o d e l o f the a t t i t u d e o f o t h e r participants i n a r g u m e n t a -
t i o n to the p r o b l e m a t i c validity o f one's expressions. Reflection, too,
is d u e t o a p r i o r d i a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n a n d d o e s n o t f l o a t i n t h e v a c u u m
o f an inwardness constituted free f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 5
T h e discur-
sive t h e m a t i z a t i o n o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e r a t i o n a l i t y
o f o u r e x p r e s s i o n s is m e a s u r e d , a n d t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f these
expressions stand i n a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n : t h e y refer to one an-
other. I d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h e p r o p o s a l t o r e d u c e r a t i o n a l i t y t o a d i s p o -
sition o f rational persons p r o m i s i n g .
However, this does n o t invalidate Schnàdelbach's o b j e c t i o n t o m y
p r i v i l e g i n g o f the discursive r a t i o n a l i t y e m b o d i e d i n a r g u m e n t a t i v e
practices. I w i l l accept Schnàdelbach's p o i n t o f c r i t i c i s m a n d , i n the
f o l l o w i n g , assume t h a t w e use t h e p r e d i c a t e "rational" i n the first
instance to refer to beliefs, actions, a n d linguistic utterances be-
cal s t r u c t u r e o f action, and i n the communicative structure of
s p e e c h , we c o m e u p o n various roots of rationality. T h e s e d o n o t f o r
t h e i r p a r t a p p e a r t o have c o m m o n r o o t s , a t least n o t i n t h e d i s c u r s i v e
s t r u c t u r e o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices, n o r i n t h e reflexive s t r u c t u r e o f
t h e s e l f - r e l a t i o n o f a s u b j e c t p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n d i s c o u r s e s . I t is m o r e
p r o b a b l y t h e case t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f d i s c o u r s e establishes a n i n -
terrelation a m o n g the entwined structures o f rationality (the struc-
tures o f knowledge, a c t i o n , a n d s p e e c h ) by, i n a sense, bringing
together t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l , t e l e o l o g i c a l , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e r o o t s . A c -
c o r d i n g t o s u c h a m o d e l o f intermeshed c o r e s t r u c t u r e s , d i s c u r s i v e
r a t i o n a l i t y owes its special p o s i t i o n n o t t o its f o u n d a t i o n a l b u t t o its
integrative role.
If, to b e g i n w i t h , we allow ourselves to be g u i d e d by this p i c t u r e ,
a n o t e w o r t h y consequence results. Since a r g u m e n t a t i v e practices
a r e , so t o speak, a r e f l e x i v e f o r m o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, the
j u s t i f i c a t o r y r a t i o n a l i t y e m b o d i e d i n d i s c o u r s e d o e s i n d e e d rest t o a
c e r t a i n e x t e n t o n the c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y e m b o d i e d i n every-
day a c t i o n ; n o n e t h e l e s s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality remains on a
level w i t h epistemic a n d teleological rationality. C o m m u n i c a t i v e r a -
t i o n a l i t y d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e t h e overarching s t r u c t u r e o f r a t i o n a l i t y
b u t r a t h e r one o f three core structures that are, however, i n t e r w o v e n
w i t h o n e a n o t h e r b y way o f t h e d i s c u r s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t e m e r g e s
o u t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality. T h i s p i c t u r e s h o u l d n o t , however,
be m i s u n d e r s t o o d i n a m e n t a l i s t way. J u s t as c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n -
ality may n o t be equated w i t h linguistically e m b o d i e d r a t i o n a l i t y i n
g e n e r a l , e p i s t e m i c a n d t e l e o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y are n o t o f a p r e l i n g u i s -
tic n a t u r e .
I would first o f all like to elucidate this c o m p l e x o f rationality
s t r u c t u r e s , w h i c h I have i n t r o d u c e d i n a n i n t u i t i v e way, b y m e a n s o f
some f u r t h e r remarks. I will t h e n e x p l a i n h o w various rationality
structures i n t e r m e s h w i t h i n the linguistic m e d i u m t h r o u g h refer-
e n c e t o d i f f e r e n t m o d a l i t i e s o f l a n g u a g e use a n d t o corresponding
types o f a c t i o n . F i n a l l y , I w i l l d e a l w i t h t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
language a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality. As a n a p p e n d i x , I w i l l i n d i -
cate t w o i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t r e s u l t
f r o m these considerations.
 311
310
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

T h r e e Roots of Rationality F r e e d o m is d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i f f e r e n t s e l f - r e l a t i o n s
o f t h e k n o w i n g a n d a c t i n g s u b j e c t . R e f l e x i v e f r e e d o m i n t h e sense
I n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a p r o v i s i o n a l o v e r v i e w , I w i l l discuss t h e c o m p l e - o f c o g n i t i v e o p e n n e s s ( Unbefangenheit) requires liberation f r o m the
m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n discursive s t r u c t u r e a n d r e f l e c t i o n (or egocentric perspective o f a p a r t i c i p a n t deeply involved i n action
s e l f - r e f e r e n c e as a c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f p e r s o n s ) , p r o c e e d - c o n t e x t s ; t h i s is t h e f r e e d o m w e t r a d i t i o n a l l y associate w i t h t h e t h e o -
ing t h e n t o deal w i t h the r a t i o n a l core structures o f knowledge, retical stance. F r e e d o m o f c h o i c e {Willkurfreiheit) consists i n t h e
p u r p o s i v e activity, a n d communication. c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l l y c h o o s i n g t o a c t i n o n e way o r a n o t h e r , o r f o r
m a k i n g a n e w start i n t h e c h a i n o f events. W i t h K a n t , we refer to t h e

Discursive Rationality a n d Reflection c a p a c i t y f o r b i n d i n g o n e ' s o w n w i l l o n t h e basis o f m o r a l i n s i g h t as

f r e e d o m o f w i l l (Willensfreiheit), or autonomy. Finally, ethical free-

T h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a p e r s o n is p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o h i s e x p r e s s i n g h i m s e l f d o m makes possible a deliberate life-project a n d the stabilization o f

r a t i o n a l l y a n d t o h i s a b i l i t y t o give a c c o u n t f o r h i s e x p r e s s i o n s i n a a n e g o - i d e n t i t y . C e r t a i n l y , these f o r m s o f f r e e d o m a r e dispositions

r e f l e x i v e stance. A p e r s o n expresses h i m s e l f r a t i o n a l l y i n s o f a r as h e t h a t can be ascribed to a p e r s o n ; b u t the a c c o m p a n y i n g self-relations

is o r i e n t e d p e r f o r m a t i v e l y t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s : we say t h a t h e n o t are d u e i n e a c h case t o t h e a d o p t i o n and internalization of the

o n l y b e h a v e s r a t i o n a l l y b u t is h i m s e l f r a t i o n a l i f h e c a n give a c c o u n t perspective o n me o f other participants i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n : i n the

f o r h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . W e also c a l l t h i s k i n d o f e p i s t e m i c s e l f - r e l a t i o n a n d i n t h e v a r i o u s p r a c t i c a l s e l f - r e l a t i o n s I , as

r a t i o n a l i t y accountability (Zurechnungsfdhigkeit). a first p e r s o n , a d o p t the second-person perspective i n w h i c h i n t e r -

l o c u t o r s — t h a t is, o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n ( e m p i r i c a l o r theoretical,
Accountability presupposes a reflected self-relation o n the p a r t o f
p r a g m a t i c , m o r a l , or ethical) discourses—focus o n m y expressions.
t h e p e r s o n t o w h a t she b e l i e v e s , says, a n d d o e s ; t h i s c a p a c i t y is
T h u s , i n t h e r e f l e c t i o n o f the r a t i o n a l p e r s o n w h o distances h i m s e l f
e n t w i n e d w i t h the rational core structures o f knowledge, purposive
f r o m himself, the rationality i n h e r e n t i n the structure a n d i n the
activity, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n by way o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g self-rela-
p r o c e d u r e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n is mirrored i n a g e n e r a l way. H o w e v e r , i t
tions. T h e epistemic self-relation implies a reflexive attitude o n the
b e c o m e s c l e a r at t h e same t i m e t h a t o n the integrative level of
p a r t o f the k n o w i n g subject to h e r o w n beliefs a n d convictions;
reflection a n d discourse, the three r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p o n e n t s — k n o w -
the technical-practical self-relation implies a reflexive attitude o n the
i n g , a c t i n g , a n d s p e a k i n g — c o m b i n e , t h a t is, f o r m a syndrome.
p a r t o f t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t t o h i s o w n p u r p o s i v e activity, b e i t t o his
own i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n the objective w o r l d or to his
s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d d e a l i n g s w i t h o t h e r s u b j e c t s e n c o u n t e r e d as o p p o - Epistemic Rationality
n e n t s i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . ( I u n d e r s t a n d " o b j e c t i v e w o r l d " as t h e
totality o f entities c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s are possible.) O u r k n o w l e d g e is b u i l t u p f r o m p r o p o s i t i o n s o r judgments—those
T h e moral-practical self-relation o f the communicatively acting actor e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s t h a t c a n be t r u e o r false; o n a c c o u n t o f its p r o p o -
d e m a n d s a reflexive attitude to h e r o w n n o r m - r e g u l a t e d actions; the s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , k n o w l e d g e is i n t r i n s i c a l l y o f a l i n g u i s t i c n a t u r e .
existential self-relation requires f r o m the actor a reflexive attitude to T h i s s t r u c t u r e c a n be a n a l y z e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n -
her o w n life-project i n the context o f an i n d i v i d u a l life-history w h i c h tences. However, I w i l l n o t deal h e r e w i t h t h e semantics o f proposi-
is, o f c o u r s e , i n t e r w o v e n w i t h p r e g i v e n c o l l e c t i v e f o r m s o f l i f e . M o r e - t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s o r w i t h t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f acts o f r e f e r e n c e
over, a p e r s o n ' s a b i l i t y t o d i s t a n c e h i m s e l f i n t h i s way i n these v a r i o u s and predication.
d i m e n s i o n s f r o m h i m s e l f a n d h i s e x p r e s s i o n s is a necessary c o n d i - I n order to k n o w something i n a n e x p l i c i t sense, i t is n o t , of
t i o n o f h i s freedom. course, sufficient m e r e l y to be f a m i l i a r w i t h facts t h a t c o u l d be
312
Chapter 7
r e p r e s e n t e d i n t r u e j u d g m e n t s . W e know facts a n d have a k n o w l e d g e
o f t h e m a t o u r disposal o n l y w h e n w e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y k n o w w h y t h e
c o r r e s p o n d i n g j u d g m e n t s a r e t r u e . O t h e r w i s e we speak o f i n t u i t i v e
o r i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e — o f a " p r a c t i c a l " k n o w l e d g e o f h o w o n e does
something. O n e can k n o w very well h o w to do s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t
k n o w i n g w h a t i t is t h a t goes t o m a k e u p these c o m p e t e n c i e s . By
c o n t r a s t , t h e e x p l i c i t " k n o w i n g w h a t " is b o u n d u p i m p l i c i t l y w i t h a
" k n o w i n g w h y " a n d insofar points toward potential justifications.
W h o e v e r believes t h a t h e has k n o w l e d g e a t his d i s p o s a l assumes t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g t r u t h c l a i m s .
P u t d i f f e r e n t l y , i t is p a r t o f t h e g r a m m a r o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n " k n o w i n g "
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g we k n o w c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d a n d j u s t i f i e d .
T h i s does n o t m e a n , o f course, t h a t r a t i o n a l beliefs o r convictions
always consist o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s . W h o e v e r shares views t h a t t u r n o u t
t o b e u n t r u e is n o t eo ipso i r r a t i o n a l . S o m e o n e is i r r a t i o n a l i f she p u t s
f o r w a r d h e r b e l i e f s d o g m a t i c a l l y , c l i n g i n g t o t h e m a l t h o u g h she sees
t h a t she c a n n o t j u s t i f y t h e m . I n o r d e r t o q u a l i f y a b e l i e f as r a t i o n a l ,
i t is s u f f i c i e n t t h a t i t c a n b e h e l d t o b e t r u e o n t h e basis o f g o o d
r e a s o n s i n t h e r e l e v a n t c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n — t h a t is, t h a t i t c a n be
a c c e p t e d r a t i o n a l l y . I n p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l societies, o r u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s
o f postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g , all k n o w l e d g e — f r o m t h e stance o f a
t h i r d p e r s o n — i s d e e m e d f a l l i b l e ( t h i s , t o o , is p a r t o f t h e g r a m m a r
o f the w o r d " k n o w i n g " nowadays), even t h o u g h i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e
stance, t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t , w e c a n n o t a v o i d
unconditionally r e g a r d i n g t h e asserted k n o w l e d g e as t r u e . D e s p i t e t h i s
"Platonic" n a t u r e o f knowledge, the rationality o f a j u d g m e n t does
n o t i m p l y its t r u t h b u t m e r e l y its j u s t i f i e d a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n a g i v e n
context.
O f c o u r s e , t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s w o u l d n o t be
p o s s i b l e i f w e c o u l d n o t represent o u r k n o w l e d g e , t h a t is, i f w e c o u l d
n o t e x p r e s s i t i n sentences, a n d i f we c o u l d n o t c o r r e c t i t a n d e x p a n d
i t ; a n d t h i s m e a n s : i f w e w e r e n o t a b l e also t o learn f r o m o u r p r a c t i c a l
d e a l i n g s w i t h a r e a l i t y t h a t resists us. T o t h i s e x t e n t , e p i s t e m i c r a t i o n -
a l i t y is entwined w i t h a c t i o n a n d t h e use o f l a n g u a g e . 6
I speak o f a n
epistemic core s t r u c t u r e because t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e is d e -
p e n d e n t o n its e m b o d i m e n t i n s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n : i t is n o t a self-
313
S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
supporting s t r u c t u r e . I t is t h e l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f w h a t is
k n o w n , a n d t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e w i t h a reality against
w h i c h a j u s t i f i e d e x p e c t a t i o n c a n s h a t t e r , t h a t first m a k e i t p o s s i b l e
t o d e a l w i t h k n o w l e d g e i n a r a t i o n a l way.
O n t h e o n e h a n d , we can deal w i t h o u r k n o w l e d g e operatively—
t h a t is, r e n d e r i t m o r e precise, e l a b o r a t e i t , r e c o n s t r u c t i t , systema-
tize i t , test i t f o r c o n s i s t e n c y a n d c o h e r e n c e — o n l y i f i t takes o n a
shape t h a t can be grasped symbolically. ( O n the reflexive level o f
s c i e n c e , w h e r e i t is a m a t t e r o f c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e o r i e s , t h e necessity
f o r o r g a n i z i n g k n o w l e d g e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y — a s t h e case m a y b e , u s i n g a
formal language—is s t r i k i n g . ) O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , as P e i r c e a n d
p r a g m a t i s m c o r r e c t l y e m p h a s i z e , w e have t o m a k e use o f o u r k n o w l -
edge i n practices, i m p l e m e n t i n g it i n goal-directed actions con-
t r o l l e d i n t e r m s o f success, i n o r d e r t o b e a b l e t o l e a r n f r o m n e g a t i v e
experiences. We l e a r n f r o m d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s by processing surprises
by m e a n s o f abductive j u d g m e n t , a n d by revising t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t
has b e e n r e n d e r e d p r o b l e m a t i c . ( O n t h e r e f l e x i v e l e v e l o f s c i e n c e ,
d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s o f this sort, w h i c h are t o be processed productively,
are g e n e r a t e d m e t h o d i c a l l y ; t h e r e l a t i o n to a c t i o n o f the falsifying
e v i d e n c e — t h a t is, o f t h e d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s — i s r e v e a l e d , i n p a r t i c u l a r ,
in experimental action.) 7
Teleological Rationality
A l l a c t i o n is i n t e n t i o n a l ; a n a c t i o n m a y b e u n d e r s t o o d as c a r r y i n g
o u t t h e i n t e n t i o n o f a f r e e l y c h o o s i n g a n d d e c i d i n g actor. A c t i o n has
a t e l e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e , f o r every a c t i o n - i n t e n t i o n aims at the r e a l i -
z a t i o n o f a set g o a l . O n c e a g a i n , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a n a c t i o n is
p r o p o r t i o n a t e n o t t o w h e t h e r t h e state a c t u a l l y o c c u r r i n g i n t h e
w o r l d as a r e s u l t o f t h e a c t i o n c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e i n t e n d e d state a n d
satisfies the corresponding conditions o f success, b u t r a t h e r to
w h e t h e r t h e a c t o r has achieved t h i s r e s u l t o n t h e basis o f t h e d e l i b e r -
a t e l y s e l e c t e d a n d i m p l e m e n t e d m e a n s (or, i n a c c u r a t e l y perceived
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o u l d n o r m a l l y have d o n e s o ) . A successful a c t o r has
a c t e d r a t i o n a l l y o n l y i f h e ( i ) k n o w s w h y h e was successful ( o r w h y
h e c o u l d have r e a l i z e d t h e set g o a l i n n o r m a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) and if
314 315
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

( i i ) t h i s k n o w l e d g e m o t i v a t e s t h e a c t o r ( a t least i n p a r t ) i n s u c h a p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e use o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l
way t h a t h e c a r r i e s o u t h i s a c t i o n f o r r e a s o n s t h a t c a n a t t h e same s e n t e n c e s , so t o o is i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n essentially d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
time e x p l a i n its p o s s i b l e success. use o f i n t e n t i o n a l sentences.
I n t h e s i m p l e s t case, t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that can simultaneously
justify a n d motivate a r a t i o n a l action take the f o r m o f a practical Communicative Rationality
inference. Given certain preferences, A intends i n situation S to
b r i n g a b o u t t h e state p; i n g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s A r e g a r d s t h e i m p l e - T h e r e is a p e c u l i a r r a t i o n a l i t y , i n h e r e n t n o t i n l a n g u a g e as s u c h b u t
m e n t a t i o n o f t h e m e a n s M as t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a n e c e s s a r y — o r e v e n i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , t h a t c a n b e r e -
sufficient—condition i n order to b r i n g about p with a certain prob- d u c e d n e i t h e r to the epistemic rationality o f knowledge (as classical
ability; for this reason A carries o u t the action that deploys the t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics supposes) n o r t o the p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l -
selected means. 8
W e have seen t h a t k n o w l e d g e i n t h e s t r i c t sense i t y o f a c t i o n (as i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s a s s u m e s ) . T h i s communicative
requires a reflexive " h a v i n g " o f knowledge that refers to possible rationality is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e u n i f y i n g f o r c e o f s p e e c h o r i e n t e d t o -
justifications; correspondingly, purposive-rational action requires a w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h secures f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g
reflexive " h a v i n g " — s u i t a b l e f o r possible j u s t i f i c a t i o n s — o f the deci- speakers a n intersubjectively shared l i f e w o r l d , t h e r e b y securing at
sive a c t i o n - i n t e n t i o n , t h a t is, a c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e success o f the t h e same t i m e t h e h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h e v e r y o n e c a n r e f e r t o o n e
a c t i o n . O n c e a g a i n , t h e r e is a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f m u t u a l r e f e r e n c e b e - a n d t h e same o b j e c t i v e w o r l d .
tween the rationality o f the action a n d the f o r u m o f a discourse i n
T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s serves n o t o n l y
w h i c h a n a c t o r ' s decisive r e a s o n s f o r m a k i n g h i s decision—deter-
t o give e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f a s p e a k e r b u t also t o r e p r e s e n t
m i n e d ex ante—could b e t e s t e d . T h e t h e o r y o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e deals
states o f a f f a i r s ( o r t o p r e s u p p o s e t h e i r e x i s t e n c e ) a n d t o e s t a b l i s h
w i t h t h o s e aspects o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o b l e m s o f a c t i n g s u b -
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h a s e c o n d p e r s o n . H e r e , t h e t h r e e aspects
j e c t s , w h o are g u i d e d i n a n e g o c e n t r i c way b y t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e per-
o f (a) a n a c t o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( b ) w i t h s o m e o n e (c) about
s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s o f success, t h a t c a n b e u s e d t o
s o m e t h i n g a r e r e f l e c t e d . W h a t t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h an
construct models.
e x p r e s s i o n is c o n n e c t e d b o t h w i t h w h a t is l i t e r a l l y said i n i t a n d w i t h
T h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f p u r p o s i v e activity, t o o , is e n t w i n e d w i t h t h e t w o t h e a c t i o n as w h i c h i t s h o u l d b e understood. Thus, a threefold
o t h e r core structures o f knowledge a n d speech. F o r t h e p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n exists b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n and
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a r a t i o n a l p l a n o f a c t i o n is c a r r i e d (a) w h a t is intended (gemeint) b y i t , ( b ) w h a t is said i n i t , a n d (c) the
o u t are d e p e n d e n t on the i n p u t of reliable i n f o r m a t i o n (about way in which it is used i n t h e s p e e c h act. W i t h h i s s p e e c h act, t h e
e x p e c t e d events i n t h e w o r l d , o r a b o u t t h e b e h a v i o r a n d t h e i n t e n - speaker pursues his a i m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a hearer
tions o f other actors)—even if, i n g e n e r a l , the actors a c t i n g i n a a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m , as w e w i l l r e f e r t o i t , is
p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l way h a v e t o b e satisfied w i t h h i g h l y i n c o m p l e t e t w o - t i e r e d : t h e s p e e c h act is first o f a l l s u p p o s e d t o b e understood
i n f o r m a t i o n . O n the o t h e r h a n d , such i n f o r m a t i o n can be processed b y t h e h e a r e r a n d t h e n — s o f a r as p o s s i b l e — a c c e p t e d . T h e r a t i o n a l -
i n t e l l i g e n t l y — t h a t is, r e f e r r e d t o d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g m a x i m s a n d goals i t y o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t have b e e n s e l e c t e d i n l i g h t o f p e r s o n a l prefer- t h e n d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts are s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p r e -
e n c e s — o n l y i n t h e m e d i u m o f l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s is o b - hensible a n d acceptable f o r the speaker to achieve i l l o c u t i o n a r y
vious in the case of the theoretical treatment of complex success w i t h t h e m ( o r f o r h i m t o b e a b l e t o d o so i n n o r m a l c i r c u m -
decision-making problems. But elementary action-intentions and stances) . O n c e a g a i n , w e d o n o t c a l l o n l y v a l i d s p e e c h acts r a t i o n a l
s i m p l e p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s , t o o , are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d . J u s t as b u t rather all comprehensible s p e e c h acts f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c a n
316
Chapter 7
t a k e o n a credible w a r r a n t y i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o t h e e f f e c t
t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d c o u l d , i f necessary, be v i n d i c a t e d dis-
cursively. T h u s h e r e , t o o , t h e r e is a n i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between
t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a s p e e c h act a n d its p o s s i b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . O n l y i n
a r g u m e n t a t i o n s can the validity claims i m p l i c i t l y raised w i t h a speech
a c t be t h e m a t i z e d as s u c h a n d t e s t e d w i t h reasons.
I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims may n o t be described as states t h a t c a n be
b r o u g h t a b o u t t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n the objective w o r l d . For this
reason, we s h o u l d n o t conceive o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims o f r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( w h i c h a r e , so t o speak, i m m a n e n t t o l a n g u a g e ) as
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects t h a t t h e s p e a k e r p r o d u c e s i n t h e h e a r e r w i t h
h e r s p e e c h act b y w a y o f a causal e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e . H e r e , I w o u l d
like to m a k e three observations. First, t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims c a n n o t
be d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the linguistic means o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g ; as W i t t g e n s t e i n m a d e clear-, t h e telos o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g is i n h e r e n t i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m i t s e l f . S e c o n d , t h e
s p e a k e r c a n n o t i n t e n d h e r a i m as s o m e t h i n g t o b e e f f e c t e d causally,
b e c a u s e t h e "yes" o r " n o " o f t h e h e a r e r is a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d
position; participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n enjoy the f r e e d o m o f being
a b l e t o say " n o . " F i n a l l y , speakers a n d h e a r e r s c o n f r o n t o n e a n o t h e r
i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e as first a n d s e c o n d p e r s o n s , n o t as o p p o -
n e n t s o r as o b j e c t s w i t h i n t h e w o r l d o f e n t i t i e s about w h i c h t h e y are
speaking. I n wanting to reach understanding with one another
a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , their i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims lie beyond the objective
w o r l d i n w h i c h t h e y c a n i n t e r v e n e p u r p o s i v e l y as o b s e r v i n g a c t o r s .
A s events t h a t are l o c a l i z a b l e i n t i m e a n d space, h o w e v e r , s p e e c h acts
are simultaneously p a r t o f t h e objective w o r l d i n w h i c h , like all
t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s , t h e y c a n also b r i n g t h i n g s a b o u t , t h a t is, t h e y c a n
also p r o d u c e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects.
T h e s p e a k e r w o u l d l i k e t h e a d d r e s s e e t o a c c e p t w h a t is s a i d as
v a l i d ; t h i s is d e c i d e d b y t h e addressee's "yes" o r " n o " t o t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m f o r w h a t is said t h a t t h e s p e a k e r raises w i t h his s p e e c h act.
W h a t m a k e s t h e speech-act o f f e r a c c e p t a b l e a r e , u l t i m a t e l y , t h e r e a -
sons t h a t t h e speaker c o u l d p r o v i d e i n t h e g i v e n c o n t e x t f o r t h e
v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is said. T h e r a t i o n a l i t y i n h e r e n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n
t h u s rests o n t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s
t h a t m a k e a s p e e c h act v a l i d , ( b ) t h e c l a i m r a i s e d by t h e s p e a k e r t h a t
317
S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
these c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied, a n d (c) t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w a r r a n t y
issued b y t h e s p e a k e r t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h e c o u l d , i f necessary, d i s c u r -
sively v i n d i c a t e t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m .
I n o r d e r to cover the e n t i r e s p e c t r u m o f possible validity claims,
i t m a k e s sense t o s t a r t b y p o s i n g t h e h e u r i s t i c q u e s t i o n : i n w h a t sense
c a n s p e e c h acts be n e g a t e d as a whole? I n a n s w e r i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n w e
hit upon precisely t h r e e sorts o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s : t r u t h c l a i m s i n
r e g a r d t o facts t h a t w e assert w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t s i n t h e o b j e c -
tive w o r l d ; c l a i m s t o t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) o f u t t e r a n c e s
t h a t m a k e m a n i f e s t subjective e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) to w h i c h the
s p e a k e r has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d finally, c l a i m s t o t h e Tightness o f
norms and commands t h a t are r e c o g n i z e d i n an intersubjectively
shared social w o r l d . 9
Modalities o f Language U s e
T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f a s p e e c h a c t is p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e
intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n accorded to the validity claim raised w i t h
i t . H e r e , a c o m m u n i c a t i v e s i t u a t i o n is p r e s u p p o s e d i n w h i c h the
p a r t i c i p a n t s can take o n the respective roles o f speaker a n d h e a r e r
( a n d , i f n e e d b e , t h e r o l e o f a t h i r d p a r t y p r e s e n t ) — t h a t is, c a n t a k e
o n t h e r o l e s o f t h e first, s e c o n d , a n d t h i r d p e r s o n . T h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n
o f r o l e s , w h i c h is b u i l t i n t o t h e l o g i c o f t h e system o f personal
p r o n o u n s , is e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y embodied
i n processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W e c a n see t h i s c l e a r l y i f w e
compare t h e use o f language oriented toward reaching under-
s t a n d i n g w i t h a use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t is n o t g e a r e d t o w a r d
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . F o l l o w i n g o n f r o m this d i s t i n c t i o n between the
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , I w i l l u n -
dertake differentiations i n the concept of "reaching understanding"
(Verständigung) i t s e l f .
T h e C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e o f L a n g u a g e versus t h e N o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e
Use
T h e e p i s t e m i c a n d t e l e o l o g i c a l uses o f l a n g u a g e a r e n o t dependent
o n an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between speaker a n d hearer i n a
318 319

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

c o m m u n i c a t i v e s i t u a t i o n . Elocutionary acts—and the validity claims I t is a s i m i l a r m a t t e r w i t h i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s u s e d f o r p l a n n i n g

c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e m , w h i c h have a built-in orientation toward intersub¬
jective recognition—do n o t play a f u n d a m e n t a l role ei t h er i n the
epistemic use of language, w h i c h serves p r i m a r i l y t o represent
k n o w l e d g e , o r i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f a c t i o n effects; i n these cases, t h e
language users are n o t p u r s u i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s . A l t h o u g h i n
e v e r y case l a n g u a g e has t o b e a c q u i r e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , t h e l i n g u i s -
tic e x p r e s s i o n s can be u s e d m o n o l o g i c a l l y i n s u c h i n s t a n c e s — t h a t is,
w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o a s e c o n d p e r s o n . T h a t t h e p r a g m a t i c aspects
a r e n o t r e l e v a n t i n t h e case o f t h e p u r e l y e p i s t e m i c o r teleological
use o f l a n g u a g e is clear f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
s e n t e n c e s a n d i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s essentially u s e d i n e a c h . U n l i k e ,
f o r example, questions or imperatives, p r o p o s i t i o n a l a n d i n t e n t i o n a l
s e n t e n c e s a r e n o t f u n d a m e n t a l l y t i e d t o addressees; t h e i r m e a n i n g
c o n t e n t is i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n w h i c h t h e y c a n
be e m b e d d e d — w h i c h is w h y t h e y c a n b e a n a l y z e d e x h a u s t i v e l y w i t h
t h e tools o f f o r m a l semantics. 10
One understands epistemically used p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences i f
o n e k n o w s t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t is, i f o n e k n o w s w h e n t h e y are
t r u e ; t h i s is t h e s p e c i a l case t o w h i c h t h e thesis o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l
s e m a n t i c s a p p l i e s . M o r e o v e r , i t m a k e s sense h e r e t o speak o f assign-
i n g " t r u t h v a l u e s " (as is c u s t o m a r y i n l o g i c ) , because t h e a s s e r t o r i c
f o r c e o f acts o f a s s e r t i o n is n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h such
monologically employed sentences. F o r purposes o f p u r e repre-
s e n t a t i o n w e a b s t r a c t f r o m h o w t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentence is e m b e d -
ded i n a s p e e c h act; i n o t h e r w o r d s , w e d i s r e g a r d t h e possible
c o m m u n i c a t i v e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h a s p e a k e r w o u l d assert t h e p r o p o -
s i t i o n "p" w i t h t h e a i m o f f i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n a d d r e s s e e . 11
An
e p i s t e m i c a l l y u s e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e serves t o r e p r e s e n t a state
o f a f f a i r s o r a fact. F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s s o r t o f representation, i t is
s u f f i c i e n t i f t h e a u t h o r gives ( w h o m e v e r ) to understand t h a t h e is
c o n s i d e r i n g "p" o r h o l d s i t t o b e t r u e . B y c o n t r a s t , w i t h t h e assertion
o f a f a c t , a c o m m u n i c a t i n g s p e a k e r w o u l d n o t m e r e l y w i s h t o have
a n addressee k n o w t h a t h e h i m s e l f h o l d s "p" t o b e t r u e ; r a t h e r , h e
w o u l d p u r s u e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f h a v i n g t h e o t h e r acknowledge
t h a t "p" is t r u e .
action monologically. O n e u n d e r s t a n d s i n t e n t i o n a l sentences t h a t
s t r u c t u r e p u r p o s i v e activities i f o n e k n o w s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success,
t h a t is, i f o n e k n o w s u n d e r w h i c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e y are m a d e t r u e .
C o n d i t i o n s o f success are t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n a n
a c t o r - r e l a t i v e way. As i n t h e case o f e p i s t e m i c a l l y u s e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l
sentences, t h e r e l a t i o n o f the sentences to s o m e t h i n g i n the objective
w o r l d — t h a t is, k n o w l e d g e o f t h e state o f a f f a i r s a n d d i r e c t i o n o f
fit—is sufficient f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g such pragmatically used inten-
t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s . A n i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is n o t a l r e a d y c o n n e c t e d
w i t h these p e r se; t h e y a c q u i r e t h i s f o r c e o n l y w h e n t h e a c t o r an-
nounces h e r i n t e n t i o n s i n a c o m m u n i c a t i v e s i t u a t i o n , t h a t is, w h e n
the actor utters her intentions w i t h the i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f having
o t h e r s t a k e t h e m seriously a n d c o u n t o n t h e i r b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t .
H o w e v e r , t h e n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e f o r p u r p o s e s o f
pure representation or for a plan o f action played t h r o u g h mentally
is d u e t o a f e a t o f a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t m e r e l y s u s p e n d s t h e reference—
w h i c h is always present virtually—of propositions to t r u t h , or of i n t e n -
t i o n s t o t h e seriousness o f w h a t is r e s o l v e d . T h i s is e v i d e n t as s o o n
as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r p l a n s o f a c t i o n a r e c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n . W h e n
t h i s h a p p e n s , t h e a u t h o r is e x p e c t e d t o j u s t i f y to others d i s c u r s i v e l y
w h a t she has c o n s i d e r e d m o n o l o g i c a l l y — t h a t is, i n t h e p u b l i c f o r u m
o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Certainly, such a r g u m e n t a t i o n s , too, can be c o n -
d u c t e d in foro interno, s i m i l a r t o t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h w e c a n d i r e c t
i m p e r a t i v e s t o ourselves. H o w e v e r , a r g u m e n t s a n d i m p e r a t i v e s are b y
t h e i r very n a t u r e pragmatic a n d f o r this reason, u n l i k e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
a n d i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s , c a n be i n t e r n a l i z e d o n l y together with t h e
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t are i n h e r e n t t o t h e i r m e a n i n g . P r o p o s i -
t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s c a n be d i v e s t e d o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f
acts o f a s s e r t i n g a n d a n n o u n c i n g w i t h o u t l o s i n g t h e i r meaning,
w h e r e a s e v e n in foro interno a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h o u t a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y
c o m p o n e n t w o u l d n o longer be a n i m p e r a t i v e (for even here, I , i n
t h e r o l e o f t h e first p e r s o n , d i r e c t a n i m p e r a t i v e t o m y s e l f as a fictive
s e c o n d p e r s o n ) . C o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is first e m b o d i e d o n l y i n
a p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t o p e r a t e s b y way o f v a l i d i t y
claims w h e n e v e r speaker a n d hearer, i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e d i -
320
Chapter 7
r e c t e d to second persons, (want to) reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h one
a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . T h e difference between this
a n d t h e n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e r e s u l t s f r o m t h e a d d i -
t i o n o f a v a l i d i t y c l a i m with which the speaker confronts a hearer. H e r e ,
h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m d o e s n o t c o n s i s t i n l e t t i n g t h e addressee k n o w
h i s d o u b l e i n t e n t i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t h e ( i n t e n t i o n i ) h o l d s "p" t o b e
t r u e ( o r w o u l d l i k e t o b r i n g a b o u t "p") a n d t h a t h e wishes h e r t o
k n o w this ( i n t e n t i o n s ) ; rather, h e wishes to c o m m u n i c a t e t h e fact (or
t h e i n t e n t i o n ) "p" t o t h e addressee i n s u c h a way t h a t she h e r s e l f is
convinced " t h a t p" ( o r takes s e r i o u s l y t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n "to
b r i n g a b o u t p"). T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e is n o t
t h a t t h e h e a r e r s h o u l d t a k e n o t e o f Ss b e l i e f ( o r i n t e n t i o n ) b u t
r a t h e r t h a t she s h o u l d c o m e t o h o l d t h e same v i e w as S ( o r t h a t she
s h o u l d t a k e s e r i o u s l y ^s a n n o u n c e m e n t ) . F o r 5 t o achieve h i s i l l o c u -
t i o n a r y a i m , i t is n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r H t o k n o w t h e t r u t h conditions
( o r t h e success c o n d i t i o n s ) o f "/>;" His also s u p p o s e d t o u n d e r s t a n d
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f assertions (or declarations o f inten-
tion) a n d , so f a r as p o s s i b l e , accept the c o r r e s p o n d i n g validity
claims.
I n t h e case o f a n a s s e r t i o n , t h e s p e a k e r raises a t r u t h c l a i m f o r
w h a t is s a i d . T h e h e a r e r w i l l t a k e a n a f f i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n o n t h i s ( n o
m a t t e r h o w i m p l i c i t l y ) o n l y i f h e h o l d s w h a t is said t o b e j u s t i f i e d or,
at least, r e g a r d s t h e speaker's w a r r a n t y as c r e d i b l e t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t
she c o u l d , i f necessary, c o n v i n c e t h e h e a r e r o f t h e asserted f a c t o n
t h e basis o f g o o d reasons. I n t h e case o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h
a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n , t h e h e a r e r w i l l take seriously t h e an-
n o u n c e d i n t e n t i o n i f h e is c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t
she says a n d has good reasons f o r w a n t i n g to make her an-
nouncement t r u e : h e p r e s u m e s t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e is s e r i o u s i f h e
h o l d s S's i n t e n t i o n t o b e j u s t i f i e d ( f r o m h e r p o i n t o f v i e w ) .
T h e U s e o f L a n g u a g e O r i e n t e d t o w a r d A g r e e m e n t versus t h e Use
o f Language Oriented toward Reaching Understanding
Now, o f course, it makes a difference w h e t h e r agreement (Einver-
ständnis) c o n c e r n i n g a f a c t exists b e t w e e n p a r t i c i p a n t s o r w h e t h e r
t h e y b o t h merely r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g (sich verständigen) w i t h o n e
321
S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
a n o t h e r c o n c e r n i n g t h e seriousness o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n . Agree-
ment i n t h e s t r i c t sense is a c h i e v e d o n l y i f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s are a b l e
t o a c c e p t a v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r t h e same reasons, w h i l e mutual under-
standing ( Verständigung) c a n also c o m e a b o u t w h e n o n e p a r t i c i p a n t
sees t h a t t h e o t h e r , i n l i g h t o f h e r p r e f e r e n c e s , has g o o d r e a s o n s i n
t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o r h e r d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n — t h a t is, r e a s o n s
t h a t are g o o d for her—without h a v i n g to m a k e these reasons his o w n
in l i g h t o f his preferences. A c t o r - i n d e p e n d e n t reasons p e r m i t a
stronger m o d e o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a n actor-relative rea-
sons. I n t h e f o l l o w i n g , I w i l l c o m p a r e (i) declarations o f i n t e n t i o n
a n d s i m p l e imperatives w i t h ( i i ) promises, declaratives, a n d c o m -
mands i n order to make a differentiation w i t h i n the communicative
use o f l a n g u a g e b e t w e e n a " w e a k " a n d a " s t r o n g " m o d e o f r e a c h i n g
understanding.
i . A s w e h a v e s e e n , t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h a n act o f a s s e r t i o n
f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n "p" achieves i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o n l y i f a l l
p a r t i c i p a n t s are c o n v i n c e d " t h a t p" f o r t h e s a m e reasons. So l o n g as
t h e s p e a k e r a n d addressee a c c e p t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "p" as t r u e f o r
d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s respectively, a n d b o t h k n o w w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
o t h e r t h a t these r e a s o n s c o n s t i t u t e g o o d r e a s o n s o n l y f o r t h e o n e o r
t h e o t h e r o f t h e m , t h e t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p," w h i c h is d e p e n d e n t
o n intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , is n o t a c c e p t e d as such. S i n c e a discur-
sive c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t has, f o r c o n c e p t u a l reasons,
a g r e e m e n t a n d n o t c o m p r o m i s e as its g o a l , t h e d i s c u r s i v e v i n d i c a t i o n
o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m is l e f t o p e n u n t i l actor-independent reasons m a k e
the contested t r u t h c l a i m rationally acceptable i n p r i n c i p l e for all
participants. I t is a different matter with the one-sided an-
n o u n c e m e n t o f a n a c t i o n b a s e d o n a r b i t r a r y f r e e c h o i c e ( " I w i l l leave
t o m o r r o w " ) o r w i t h s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s ( " S i t d o w n " ) . A l t h o u g h these
u t t e r a n c e s a r e , w i t h o u t d o u b t , i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, i t w o u l d b e coun-
t e r i n t u i t i v e to suppose that a speaker wishes t o b r i n g a b o u t any k i n d
o f "consensus" w i t h t h e m . T h e speaker c a n n o t r e c k o n w i t h agree-
m e n t for one-sided expressions o f w i l l . N o n e t h e l e s s i n s u c h cases,
t o o , i t is p e r m i s s i b l e t o speak i n a w e a k e r sense o f " m u t u a l u n d e r -
standing" between participants. For here, too, validity claims are
involved that one p a r t i c i p a n t raises a n d t h e o t h e r c a n a c c e p t o r
reject.
322
Chapter 7
I n t h e case o f a n n o u n c e m e n t s o r d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n , t h e
a c t o r c a n g a i n assent b y s h o w i n g t h e i n t e n d e d a c t i o n t o b e o n e t h a t
is rational i n l i g h t o f h i s p r e f e r e n c e s ( i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d
w i t h the given means). For this sort o f m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i d e -
o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y takes o n a m e d i a t i n g r o l e . I n s u c h cases, t h e
h e a r e r has g o o d r e a s o n s f o r t a k i n g t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t seriously,
e v e n i f she does n o t adopt as her own t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e c l a r e d
i n t e n t i o n . I n general, one understands the propositional content o f
a n a n n o u n c e m e n t i f o n e k n o w s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success f o r "p";
however, one u n d e r s t a n d s its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o n l y i f one
k n o w s w h y o n e s h o u l d t a k e t h e d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n s e r i o u s l y as a n
a n n o u n c e m e n t , t h a t is, w h y o n e s h o u l d c o u n t o n its b e i n g c a r r i e d
out. Certainly, a hearer, i n a given case, m a y accept the an-
nouncement as a n u t t e r a n c e t o b e t a k e n s e r i o u s l y f o r t h e same
r e a s o n s as t h e a c t o r ; h o w e v e r , i t is a s s u m e d t h a t these a r e actor-relative
reasons t h a t show t h e a n n o u n c e d a c t i o n to be r a t i o n a l f o r t h e actor
from his point of view—and therefore, f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the
addressee, likely t o be c a r r i e d o u t . T h e r e can be n o q u e s t i o n o f
" a g r e e m e n t " h e r e because t h e r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i n g t h e s i n c e r i t y o f
t h e a c t o r ' s i n t e n t i o n c a n q u a l i f y as g o o d r e a s o n s o n l y a c c o r d i n g t o
premises t h a t are v a l i d f o r t h e a c t o r b u t n o t f o r his addressee. We
m i g h t call such reasons—to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m f r o m generally accept-
a b l e r e a s o n s — " p u b l i c l y i n t e l l i g i b l e " reasons. W h a t a r e g o o d r e a s o n s
f o r t h e actor to i n t e n d to c a r r y o u t a n a c t i o n are g o o d reasons f o r
t h e addressee n o t t o d o u b t h i s i n t e n t i o n .
I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r a g a i n — t h o u g h i n e f f e c t , s i m i l a r — w i t h i m -
p e r a t i v e s . T h e r e is n o n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f i m p e r a t i v e sen-
tences, f o r i m p e r a t i v e s a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y o f a p r a g m a t i c n a t u r e . T h e i r
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s t o
m o t i v a t e a n a d d r e s s e e — t h a t is, another person—to b r i n g a b o u t "jt>."
O n e understands the propositional content o f an imperative i f one
k n o w s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success f o r t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g a c t i o n ; i n
o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g , h o w e v e r , o n e has t o
k n o w (as i n t h e case o f d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n ) w h y t h e s p e a k e r
s i n c e r e l y m e a n s w h a t she says a n d , o v e r a n d a b o v e t h i s , w h y she
b e l i e v e s she m a y e x p e c t t h e a d d r e s s e e t o c o m p l y w i t h h e r i m p e r a t i v e .
A n i m p e r a t i v e is r a t i o n a l o n l y i f ( a p a r t f r o m its v i a b i l i t y ) t h e a c t o r
323
S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality
has g o o d r e a s o n s f o r s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e addressee has reasons n o t
t o o p p o s e h e r i m p e r a t i v e . T h e s e a d d i t i o n a l reasons, t o o , a r e a c t o r -
r e l a t i v e : i n t h i s case, o n e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r ( p o s s i b l y w r o n g l y ) a t t r i b -
utes t o t h e a d d r e s s e e as g o o d r e a s o n s f o r h i m ; t h e s p e a k e r assumes
the availability e i t h e r o f sanctions, s h o u l d the desired a c t i o n fail to
b e c a r r i e d o u t , o r o f r e w a r d s , i f i t is c a r r i e d o u t . As w i t h d e c l a r a t i o n s
o f i n t e n t i o n , i n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e acts, t o o , t h e r a t i o n a l l y e x p e c t -
a b l e a c t i o n c o n s e q u e n c e s c o u n t as p a r t o f t h e a c t o r - r e l a t i v e r e a s o n s
t h a t speak f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f s u c h u t t e r a n c e s ( a l t h o u g h n o w t h e y
a r e assessed p o s i t i v e l y o r n e g a t i v e l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e
hearer).
A n n o u n c e m e n t s a n d imperatives d o n o t a i m at a g r e e m e n t ( i n t h e
strict sense). Nonetheless, they m o v e w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f a m u t u a l
u n d e r s t a n d i n g based o n validity claims a n d t h u s still w i t h i n the
d o m a i n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y . I t is t r u e t h a t t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y
o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is m e d i a t e d v i a t h e p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t
t h e resolve o r t h e d e c i s i o n has f o r t h e a c t o r w h o s e a t t i t u d e is success
o r i e n t e d ; h o w e v e r , t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success is i n t u r n m e a s u r e d i n
t e r m s o f c l a i m s t o t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s e v e n i f t h i s is o n l y w i t h
reference to the preferences o f the speaker (or i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h
t h e preferences a t t r i b u t e d by t h e speaker to t h e h e a r e r ) . T h e h e a r e r
assumes t h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t she says a n d h o l d s i t t o b e t r u e .
For this reason, declarations o f i n t e n t i o n a n d imperatives charac-
t e r i s t i c a l l y c a n b e c h a l l e n g e d u n d e r t h e t w o aspects o f t r u t h f u l n e s s
( c o m p a r e 1 ' a n d 2') a n d t h e a c c u r a c y o r t r u t h o f e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p -
positions (compare 1 " a n d 2 " ) .
(1) I w i l l sign the contract t o m o r r o w i n Tokyo.
(1') You are p u l l i n g m y leg.
(1") Y o u c o u l d n ' t possibly b e i n T o k y o b y t o m o r r o w ( d u e t o t h e
time difference).
(2) Give m e the m o n e y I n e e d now.
(2') Y o u a r e n ' t basically l o o k i n g f o r m o n e y a t a l l b u t f o r s o m e -
t h i n g quite different (namely affection).
(2") I c o u l d n ' t g e t t h a t a m o u n t o f m o n e y t o g e t h e r so q u i c k l y .
324 325

Chapter 7 Some F u r t h e r Clarifications of the Concept o f Communicative Rationality

i i . O f c o u r s e , t h e m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use w o u l d have t o c h a n g e as b e h a v i o r b u t — a s i n t h e case o f a s s e r t i o n s — a c t o r - i n d e p e n d e n t rea-

s o o n as t h e t r u t h of t h e assertions presupposed with such an- sons; h o w e v e r , u n l i k e t h e reasons f o r a s s e r t i o n s , t h e y are n o t reasons
n o u n c e m e n t s o r i m p e r a t i v e s is i t s e l f t h e m a t i z e d . S u c h a c h a n g e i n f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f states o f a f f a i r s b u t r a t h e r f o r t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f
topic would necessitate transition to an orientation toward an n o r m a t i v e l y b i n d i n g expectations. C o n n e c t e d w i t h regulative speech
" a g r e e m e n t " t h a t goes b e y o n d m e r e " r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " S u c h acts s u c h as p r o m i s e s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , a n d c o m m a n d s is a v a l i d i t y c l a i m
a s w i t c h f r o m t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r - t h a t has a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v i n d i c a t i o n i n p r a c t i c a l d i s -
s t a n d i n g t o o n e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t m a y also be i l l u s t r a t e d courses. I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s
i n a d i f f e r e n t way w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e e x a m p l e s g i v e n , f o r i n e a c h s o r t o f s p e e c h act, o n e has t o k n o w t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t that
case t h e r e is a f u r t h e r p o s s i b l e w a y i n w h i c h i t c a n be negated. e x p l a i n s w h y a n a c t o r feels a u t h o r i z e d o r o b l i g e d to p e r f o r m a
c e r t a i n a c t i o n o r w h y , as f a r as t h e a d d r e s s e e is c o n c e r n e d , she m a y
(1"') Y o u lack the g o o d w i l l necessary t o take o n such a s t r e n u - r e c k o n w i t h h i s c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e i m p e r a t i v e . I n s o f a r as t h e p a r -
ous c o m m i t m e n t . ticipants intersubjectively recognize a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d (for
example, w i t h i n the framework o f a shared l i f e w o r l d ) , they can
(1"") Y o u d o n ' t have the legal a u t h o r i t y f o r that.
a c c e p t r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts as v a l i d f o r t h e same reasons.
(2"') N o , I d o n ' t owe y o u a n y t h i n g . I n contrast to a n epistemically achieved consensus, however, this
n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d less as a r e s u l t t h a n as
H e r e , h o w e v e r , t h e s p e e c h acts a r e p r e s u m e d t o h a v e a d i f f e r e n t
a p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e . I n t h e case o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, the
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g . For, n o w , t h e n e g a t i o n o f (1) a n d (2) r e f e r s
p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d a g r e e m e n t serves as a r e s e r v o i r
t o normative v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t c o m e i n t o p l a y o n l y w h e n i n t e n t i o n a l
f o r s h a r e d reasons, w h e r e a s i n t h e case o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, t h e
and i m p e r a t i v e sentences are " e m b e d d e d " i n n o r m a t i v e contexts
reasons themselves serve as a v e h i c l e for achieving a rationally
and are "authorized" by a normative background. The an-
motivated agreement. A t a n y r a t e , t h i s is h o w i t is w i t h a v a l u e
n o u n c e m e n t o f the s i g n i n g o f the c o n t r a c t c o u l d be a commissive
consensus e x i s t i n g w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f t r a d i t i o n s h a n d e d d o w n i n
speech a c t — f o r instance, a promise w i t h w h i c h the actor c o m m i t s
a q u a s i - n a t u r a l way. H o w e v e r , a c e r t a i n a n a l o g y w i t h a n achieved
h e r s e l f t o s o m e t h i n g — o r else a d e c l a r a t i v e s p e e c h act, w i t h w h i c h
e p i s t e m i c a g r e e m e n t is e s t a b l i s h e d o n t h e p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l l e v e l o f
t h e s p e a k e r d i s c h a r g e s a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l task ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e d u t y
j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h e r e a consensus o f t h e above k i n d can n o l o n g e r be
o f a representative o f the B o a r d to i n f o r m the p u b l i c ) . T h e i m p e r a -
taken for granted, w i t h the result that the justifying n o r m s t h e m -
t i v e t o h a n d o v e r t h e m o n e y c o u l d i m p l y a f r i e n d ' s r e q u e s t , a supe-
selves r e q u i r e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . (At this p o i n t , I w o u l d like simply to
r i o r ' s c o m m a n d , a c r e d i t o r ' s d e m a n d , a n d so f o r t h .
m e n t i o n that w h a t we n o r m a l l y deal w i t h u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g "prac-
T h r o u g h backing o f this k i n d , declarations o f i n t e n t i o n a n d i m -
t i c a l r e a s o n " is n o t a n e l e m e n t a r y p h e n o m e n o n b u t r a t h e r goes
p e r a t i v e s are t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o normatively authorized e x p r e s s i o n s of
b a c k t o a n e n t w i n e m e n t — e f f e c t e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f social
w i l l s u c h as p r o m i s e s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , a n d c o m m a n d s . W i t h t h i s , t h e
i n t e r a c t i o n s — o f epistemic a n d teleological rationality w i t h commu-
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y basis o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s change.
nicative rationality.)
N o r m a t i v e reasons d o n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e p r u d e n t i a l assessments o f
arbitrarily choosing d e c i s i o n m a k i n g subjects; t h e y d e t e r m i n e r a t h e r
t h e d e c i s i o n s o f subjects w h o bind their wills a n d are t h u s a b l e t o e n t e r C o m m u n i c a t i v e v e r s u s Strategic A c t i o n

i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s . I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e case o f " n a k e d " d e c l a r a t i o n s o f

i n t e n t i o n s a n d " s i m p l e " i m p e r a t i v e s , n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n s are not I have c o m p a r e d " n a k e d " o r " s i m p l e " a n n o u n c e m e n t s a n d i m p e r a -

actor-relative reasons f o r one's o w n ( o r a n o t h e r ' s ) p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l tives w i t h n o r m a t i v e l y e m b e d d e d o n e s i n o r d e r t o u n d e r t a k e a d i f -

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Chapter 7
f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n the d i m e n s i o n o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d to
cast l i g h t o n t w o k i n d s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use. W e n o w have
t o see h o w t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n affects t h e f u n c t i o n o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a -
t i o n . U p t o n o w we have c o n s i d e r e d o n l y s p e e c h acts, t h a t is, l i n g u i s -
tic expressions, i n c l u d i n g t h e a s p e c t f r o m w h i c h t h e y themselves
r e p r e s e n t actions. However, t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y embod-
i e d i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts e x t e n d s b e y o n d v e r b a l u t t e r a n c e s t o social
a c t i o n s o r i n t e r a c t i o n s as w e l l . ( A s p e c i a l class o f t h e s e — n o r m a t i v e l y
r e g u l a t e d social a c t i o n s — h a s a l r e a d y b e e n l o o k e d a t a n y h o w i n c o n -
n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts.) W i t h
M a x W e b e r , w e c a n d e f i n e social a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y as a c t i o n s w h e r e b y
a c t o r s , i n p u r s u i n g t h e i r p e r s o n a l p l a n s o f a c t i o n , are also g u i d e d b y
t h e e x p e c t e d a c t i o n o f o t h e r s . W e w i l l speak o f communicative action
w h e r e actors c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r plans o f a c t i o n w i t h one a n o t h e r by
way o f l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, i n s u c h
a way that they d r a w o n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d bonding
p o w e r s (Bindungskrdfte) o f s p e e c h acts f o r t h i s c o o r d i n a t i o n . I n stra-
tegic a c t i o n , this p o t e n t i a l f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y r e m a i n s
u n e x p l o i t e d , even w h e r e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d .
Because t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n strategic a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r plans o f
a c t i o n w i t h o n e a n o t h e r b y way o f a r e c i p r o c a l e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e ,
l a n g u a g e is u s e d n o t c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , i n t h e sense e l u c i d a t e d , b u t
w i t h a n orientation toward consequences. F o r analysis o f t h e l a t t e r use o f
l a n g u a g e , so-called p e r l o c u t i o n s p r o v i d e a s u i t a b l e key.
T w o Sorts o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n
I w i l l s p e a k o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n in a weak sense w h e n e v e r r e a c h -
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p p l i e s t o facts a n d t o a c t o r - r e l a t i v e r e a s o n s f o r
one-sided e x p r e s s i o n s o f w i l l ; I w i l l speak o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n
in a strong sense as s o o n as r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x t e n d s t o t h e
n o r m a t i v e reasons f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h e goals t h e m s e l v e s . I n t h e
l a t t e r case, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s r e f e r t o i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d v a l u e
orientations that—going beyond their personal preferences—bind
t h e i r wills. I n weak c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n the actors are o r i e n t e d
solely t o w a r d c l a i m s t o t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s ; i n s t r o n g c o m m u n i -
cative a c t i o n t h e y are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d
i
327
Some F u r t h e r Clarifications o f the Concept o f Communicative Rationality
Tightness c l a i m s as w e l l ; i n t h e case o f s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ,
n o t j u s t a r b i t r a r y f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e b u t a u t o n o m y i n t h e sense o f
t h e c a p a c i t y t o b i n d o n e ' s w i l l o n t h e basis o f n o r m a t i v e i n s i g h t s is
presupposed.
I n t h e case o f b o t h o f t h e e x a m p l e s c o n s i d e r e d o f e x p r e s s i o n s of
w i l l that are n o t e m b e d d e d normatively, i n t e n t i o n a l a n d i m p e r a t i v e
s e n t e n c e s are a l r e a d y b e i n g u s e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , t h a t is, w i t h t h e
illocutionary a i m o f b r i n g i n g the hearer to a rationally motivated
agreement. I n s u c h cases, h o w e v e r , t h e a c t o r s , w h o are o r i e n t e d
t o w a r d success, c a n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r p l a n s o n l y i f o n e o f t h e m ac-
cepts t h e seriousness o f t h e i n t e n t i o n s o r i m p e r a t i v e s u t t e r e d b y t h e
o t h e r (as w e l l as t h e truth o f t h e b e l i e f s i m p l i e d b y t h e m ) . T w o
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e i n v o l v e d : t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e resolve o r t h e d e c i -
s i o n , a n d t h e t r u t h o f w h a t is b e l i e v e d . On this level, r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g d o e s n o t yet e x t e n d t o n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c f o r a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n i n t h e w e a k sense o f a n o r i e n -
t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e l i m i t e d n a t u r e o f t h e
a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h c a n n o t be r e a c h e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e m o t i v a t i n g
i n t e n t i o n s a n d preferences themselves, b u t m e r e l y w i t h r e g a r d to
t h e i r purposive rationality. I n this respect, r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
here means merely that the hearer understands the content o f the
d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n o r i m p e r a t i v e a n d d o e s n o t d o u b t its s e r i -
ousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) . T h e basis f o r t h e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ef-
fective i n a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n is solely t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e c l a i m
to t r u t h f u l n e s s r a i s e d f o r a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n o r f o r a n i m p e r a -
tive, t o w h i c h t h e d i s c e r n i b l e r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e resolve o r o f t h e
d e c i s i o n attests.
This common basis r e s t r i c t s t h e f r e e c h o i c e o f t h e actors a c t i n g
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y i n a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success o n l y i n s o f a r
as t h e y e x p e c t e a c h o t h e r t o r e n o u n c e a l l i n t e n t i o n s to deceive
( w h i c h a r e p e r m i s s i b l e i n s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n ) . I n weak communicative
action t h e a c t o r s d o n o t as yet e x p e c t e a c h o t h e r t o b e g u i d e d b y
c o m m o n n o r m s o r values a n d t o r e c o g n i z e r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . I
w i l l s p e a k o f strong communicative action o n l y w h e n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y
act c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d w i t h r e g a r d t o a l l t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , r e g a r d l e s s
o f w h e t h e r t h e n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m is r a i s e d e x p l i c i t l y , as i n
r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( c o m m a n d s , p r o m i s e s ) , o r r e m a i n s u n t h e m a -
328
Chapter 7
t i z e d . E v e n assertions a n d c o n f e s s i o n s , w i t h w h i c h e x p l i c i t c l a i m s t o
t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s are r a i s e d , c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o
t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e as " o u t o f p l a c e , " "brazen,"
" e m b a r r a s s i n g , " a n d so o n — i n s h o r t , as n o r m a t i v e l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e .
I n s u c h cases, t h e y v i o l a t e t h e l e g i t i m a t e l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f a social w o r l d to w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u -
nication belong.
F r o m n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t s s u c h as t h e s e , r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts
derive the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the speaker may r e g a r d h i m s e l f
as a u t h o r i z e d f o r d i r e c t i v e s , c o m m a n d s , imperatives, advice, re-
quests, p r o m i s e s , c o n t r a c t s , n e g o t i a t i o n s , a n n o u n c e m e n t s , and so
f o r t h . T o t h i s e x t e n t l i g h t n e s s c l a i m s , w i t h w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts
o f t h i s s o r t are c o n n e c t e d , r e l y o n s o m e t h i n g i n a social w o r l d i n a
m a n n e r a n a l o g o u s t o t h e way i n w h i c h t h e t r u t h c l a i m s c o n n e c t e d
w i t h c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts r e l y o n s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d
( e v e n i f n o r m s are " c o n t r o v e r s i a l " i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n facts a n d
a r e b y n o m e a n s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e a c t i n g subjects i n t h e s a m e way
as t h e e n t i t i e s t o w h i c h w e r e f e r w h e n w e state facts a b o u t t h e m ) . A t
any rate, u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g , claims to
t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness o f u t t e r a n c e s — l i k e t r u t h c l a i m s — m a y be
d i s c u r s i v e l y v i n d i c a t e d , w h i c h m e a n s o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s t h a t are
t h e same reasons f o r a l l m e m b e r s o f t h e s o c i a l w o r l d i n q u e s t i o n . T h e
a i m i n s u c h cases is a n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t ; u n l i k e a m u t u a l u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e seriousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) o f r e s o l u t i o n s
a n d decisions, such a n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t extends n o t o n l y to the
a c t o r - r e l a t i v e p r e m i s e s o f t h e p u r s u i t o f a c t i o n goals s e l e c t e d o n t h e
basis o f a r b i t r a r y f r e e c h o i c e , b u t also t o t h e actor-independent
m o d e o f s e l e c t i n g l e g i t i m a t e goals. I n s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ,
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s p r e s u m e n o t o n l y t h a t t h e y are g u i d e d b y facts a n d
say w h a t t h e y h o l d t o b e t r u e a n d w h a t t h e y m e a n , b u t also t h a t t h e y
pursue their action plans only w i t h i n the boundaries o f n o r m s a n d
values d e e m e d to be v a l i d .
U n d e r l y i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e w e a k sense is t h e p r e s u p -
p o s i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t is t h e same f o r a l l ; i n s t r o n g
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n the p a r t i c i p a n t s over a n d above this c o u n t o n
a s o c i a l w o r l d t h a t is s h a r e d b y t h e m i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y . C e r t a i n l y ,
a g r e e m e n t is r e c k o n e d w i t h i n t h e case o f assertoric s t a t e m e n t s j u s t
329
S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality
as m u c h as i t is i n t h e case o f n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s ; s t a t e m e n t s o f
f a c t a n d " o u g h t " s e n t e n c e s have t o b e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g m a d e i n t e l -
l i g i b l e f o r a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r t h e s a m e reasons. H o w e v e r , a c o g n i t i v e
a g r e e m e n t a b o u t facts r e q u i r e s t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n
o n l y t o t a k e these a g r e e d - u p o n facts i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e s u b -
sequent course o f t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n . I n c o n t r a s t t o a n o r m a t i v e agree-
m e n t , a c o g n i t i v e a g r e e m e n t d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e way i n w h i c h t h e
a c t o r s select a n d p u r s u e t h e i r a c t i o n goals; i t d o e s n o t a f f e c t w h e t h e r
t h e y a r e g u i d e d e x c l u s i v e l y by t h e i r p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s o r w h e t h e r
t h e y a r e also g u i d e d b y b i n d i n g n o r m s ( a n d values h e l d i n e s t e e m
by a l l m e m b e r s ) . Whereas i n weak c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n o n l y c o n -
stative s p e e c h acts a n d n o r m a t i v e l y n o n a u t h o r i z e d e x p r e s s i o n s of
w i l l c o m e i n t o play, s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n d e m a n d s a use o f
l a n g u a g e t h a t also r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s o c i a l w o r l d . I n c i d e n t a l l y ,
t h i s also h o l d s f o r t h o s e expressive s p e e c h acts t h a t — u n l i k e d e c l a r a -
tions o f i n t e n t i o n a n d imperatives—do n o t refer to (future) actions,
f o r e x a m p l e , expressions o f feeling.
P e r l o c u t i o n s , t h e Use o f Language O r i e n t e d t o w a r d Consequences,
a n d Strategic A c t i o n
C o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is e m b o d i e d i n l a n g u a g e g a m e s i n w h i c h
the participants take a position o n criticizable validity claims. I n the
" w e a k " f o r m s o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e a n d c o m m u n i -
cative a c t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is e n t w i n e d w i t h t h e p u r -
posive rationality of actors in an attitude oriented toward
success—although still i n such a way that t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims
dominate t h e " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y " effects t h a t i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s
m a y b e s t r i v e n f o r as w e l l . " P e r l o c u t i o n a r y " is, o f c o u r s e , t h e n a m e
w e give t o t h e effects o f s p e e c h acts t h a t , i f n e e d b e , c a n also b e
b r o u g h t a b o u t causally b y n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g , I
a m i n t e r e s t e d i n ( i ) t h o s e s p e e c h acts a n d ( i i ) t h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n
w h i c h the relationship o f dependency n o r m a l l y existing between
i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d effects is r e v e r s e d . I n
s u c h cases, c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y r e t r e a t s , l e a v i n g gaps t h a t c o n -
stitute a k i n d o f contrast o r foil f o r the peculiar b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g
p o w e r o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts.
 331
330
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

i . I w o u l d l i k e t o b e g i n b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h r e e classes o f p e r l o c u - i n g as a d e t e r r e n t o v e r s h a d o w s its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g as a n a n -
d o n a r y effects. P e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s i r e s u l t g r a m m a t i c a l l y f r o m t h e n o u n c e m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , a t h r e a t s u c h as
c o n t e n t o f a successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — a s w h e n a v a l i d c o m m a n d
(4) I f y o u d o n ' t give Peter t h e m o n e y I ' l l i n f o r m y o u r s u p e r i o r
is e x e c u t e d , a p r o m i s e is k e p t , a d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n is r e a l i z e d , o r
that . . .
w h e n assertions a n d c o n f e s s i o n s c o n s i s t e n t l y fit w i t h t h e s u b s e q u e n t
course o f the i n t e r a c t i o n . H e r e , the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims r u l e the per- may be challenged not only as a literally meant "naked" an-
l o c u t i o n a r y o n e s . B y c o n t r a s t , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effectS2 a r e g r a m m a t i - n o u n c e m e n t f r o m the two points o f view o f the lack o f truthfulness
c a l l y n o n r e g u l a t e d , t h a t is, c o n t i n g e n t , c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a s p e e c h act o f the declaration o f intention a n d the lack o f t r u t h o f the existential
t h a t , h o w e v e r , o c c u r o n l y as a r e s u l t o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success—as p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ; i t c a n also be c h a l l e n g e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o n t e x -
w h e n a p i e c e o f news, d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t , d e l i g h t s o r startles t u a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i n t e n d e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect2. (4) m a y be
t h e receiver, o r w h e n a n i m p e r a t i v e e n c o u n t e r s r e s i s t a n c e , a c o n f e s - n e g a t e d n o t o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s expressly r a i s e d
s i o n a w a k e n s d o u b t , a n d so f o r t h . F i n a l l y , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s 3 can w i t h t h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, as i n
be achieved o n l y i n a m a n n e r t h a t is inconspicuous as f a r as t h e
(4') You d o n ' t really m e a n w h a t y o u are saying.
addressee is c o n c e r n e d ; t h e success o f t h i s k i n d o f strategic a c t i o n — a
k i n d t h a t r e m a i n s l a t e n t f o r t h e o t h e r p a r t y — i s also d e p e n d e n t on (4") Y o u d o n ' t h a v e a n y t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
t h e m a n i f e s t success o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act.
I n a d d i t i o n , the context presupposed b y t h e speaker, w i t h i n w h i c h
T h e so-called perlocutions c o n s t i t u t e a s p e c i a l case t h a t is i n t e r e s t -
(4) first b e c o m e s a t h r e a t f o r a specific a d d r e s s e e , c a n also b e con-
i n g f o r a n a l y t i c p u r p o s e s . T h e s e , t o o , r e q u i r e successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y
tested:
acts as t h e i r v e h i c l e ; h o w e v e r , i n t h e case o f p e r l o c u t i o n s , e v e n t h e
apparent d o m i n a n c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m — s t i l l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e (4"') Y o u c a n ' t t h r e a t e n m e w i t h t h a t — h e has a l r e a d y k n o w n i t
last class o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t I mentioned—disappears. 1 2
for a long time.
T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act o f a s s e r t i n g
I n s u c h a case t h e s p e e c h act is n o t s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g contested; r a t h e r
(3) You are behaving like a swine. i t is s i m p l y e x p l a i n e d w h y t h e i n t e n d e d e f f e c t w i l l n o t o c c u r a n d w h y
t h e p e r l o c u t i o n r e m a i n s ineffective. O n l y i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t h a t c a n
takes o n a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g i n l i g h t o f t h e openly p u r s u e d p e r l o c u -
b e valid o r invalid m a y b e contested.
t i o n a r y a i m o f o f f e n d i n g t h e h e a r e r , f o r t h e n t h e a s s e r t i o n c o u n t s as
(However, p e r l o c u t i o n s o f this k i n d can be r e - e m b e d d e d in a
s l a n d e r , o r as a r e p r o a c h , o r as a n i n s u l t . I n a s i m i l a r way, a n y
n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t i n a s e c o n d a r y way b e c a u s e , o f c o u r s e , t h e c o n -
i l l o c u t i o n a r y act w h a t s o e v e r c a n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n t e x t , c o u n t as
d e m n a t i o n o f m i s d e m e a n o r s i n a m o r a l o r a l e g a l sense a p p e a l s t o
a n expression o f m o c k e r y o r d e r i s i o n because t h e literally expressed
a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s a n d t o t h i s e x t e n t , d e s p i t e its
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g is b l o t t e d o u t a n d r e i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e set
p e j o r a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n , is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a -
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f s h o w i n g u p t h e addressee ( o r b y t h e a l r e a d y
s o n , s u c h normatively embedded r e p r o a c h e s — u n l i k e a c t i o n s t h a t do
o c c u r r i n g effect o f t h i s ) .
n o t r e a l l y a i m t o say a n y t h i n g b u t , i n s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g , a i m t o o f f e n d
T h r e a t s represent a special sort o f p e r l o c u t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
s o m e o n e — c a n b e r e j e c t e d o n t h e basis o f reasons. S o m e t h i n g s i m i -
a c t o f a n n o u n c i n g a c o n d i t i o n a l n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n a c q u i r e s t h e sense
l a r t o w h a t h o l d s f o r m o r a l r e p r o a c h e s , c o n d e m n a t i o n s , a n d so o n
o f a threat t h r o u g h the explicit reference to the i n t e n d e d perlocu-
also h o l d s , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r l e g a l t h r e a t s o f p u n i s h m e n t ; d u e t o t h e
t i o n a r y effects o f d e t e r r i n g t h e addressee. I t s p e r l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n -
332 333

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s of t h e C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

l e g i t i m a t i n g b a c k g r o u n d consensus a b o u t the n o r m s o f p u n i s h m e n t ever, t h e t r u t h values t h a t g u i d e e a c h o f t h e m f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w

themselves, the threatened punishment is r e g a r d e d as a conse- o f t h e i r respective personal p r e f e r e n c e s a n d goals are n o t t r a n s -
q u e n c e o f a l e g a l system f o r w h i c h a g r e e m e n t is p r e s u p p o s e d ) . f o r m e d i n t o t r u t h claims, w h i c h h a v e a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d
i i . I n strategic a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l ac- i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n , a n d w h i c h t h e y t h e r e f o r e raise p u b l i c l y ,
c o r d i n g to the p a t t e r n o f p e r l o c u t i o n s . H e r e , linguistic c o m m u n i c a - w i t h a c l a i m to discursive v i n d i c a t i o n . (We are f a m i l i a r w i t h this f o r m
tion is subordinated t o t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . of indirect communication f r o m diplomatic intercourse between
Strategic i n t e r a c t i o n s are d e t e r m i n e d by the decisions o f actors i n m u t u a l l y mistrustful parties or f r o m m i l i t a r y contexts: i n the C u b a n
a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success w h o reciprocally observe o n e an- m i s s i l e crisis, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r o v e r b i a l s h o t across t h e b o w s [ o f
other. They confront one another u n d e r conditions o f d o u b l e con- t h e Russian ships] h a d to replace t h e missing i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f
t i n g e n c y as o p p o n e n t s w h o , i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r p e r s o n a l p l a n s o f the verbal announcement w i t h a signal f r o m w h i c h the o p p o n e n t
a c t i o n , exert influence o n o n e a n o t h e r ( n o r m a l l y o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o u l d i n f e r t h e seriousness o f A m e r i c a n i n t e n t i o n s . )
attitudes o f the o t h e r ) . They suspend the performative attitudes o f
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n s o f a r as t h e y t a k e o n t h e p a r t i c i p a t - C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d L i n g u i s t i c W o r l d - D i s c l o s u r e
i n g speaker a n d hearer roles f r o m the perspective o f t h i r d persons.
F r o m t h e l a t t e r v a n t a g e p o i n t , i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s are n o w r e l e v a n t A g l a n c e at t h e results o f o u r reflections so f a r shows t h a t the
o n l y as c o n d i t i o n s f o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. T h u s , u n l i k e i n t h e relationship between communicative rationality and language
communicative use o f l a n g u a g e , strategically a c t i n g subjects who s h o u l d n o t be c o n s t r u e d over-eagerly. N o t e v e r y use o f l a n g u a g e is
communicate with one another do n o t pursue their illocutionary c o m m u n i c a t i v e (see t h e first e n t r y i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a ) a n d n o t
aims unreservedly. every linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n serves t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g on
W i t h t h i s , even t h e n a r r o w basis o f r e c i p r o c a l l y a s s u m e d t r u t h f u l - t h e basis o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s (see t h e last
ness n o w d i s a p p e a r s : all s p e e c h acts a r e r o b b e d o f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y line of the schema):
b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g power. N o t only—as i n weak communicative
E x e m p l a r y types Modes o f language use
a c t i o n — a r e the shared n o r m a t i v e contexts a n d the corresponding
c l a i m s t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness l a c k i n g h e r e ; e v e n t h e c l a i m s t o t r u t h Propositional and intentional Noncommunicative
a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s r a i s e d w i t h n o n r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts are n o l o n g e r sentences used " m e n t a l l y "
a i m e d d i r e c t l y at t h e r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n o f t h e h e a r e r b u t a t g e t t i n g ("pure" representation and
t h e addressee t o d r a w h i s conclusions f r o m w h a t t h e s p e a k e r i n d i r e c t l y "monological" action planning)
gives h i m t o u n d e r s t a n d . N a t u r a l l y , t h i s is p o s s i b l e o n l y i f t h e p a r t i c i -
N o r m a t i v e l y n o n e m b e d d e d ex- Oriented toward reaching
p a n t s u n d e r s t a n d o n e a n o t h e r , t h a t is, i f t h e y f e e d p a r a s i t i c a l l y o n a
pressions o f w i l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung)
c o m m o n linguistic knowledge ( t h a t they have l e a r n e d i n contexts o f
C o m p l e t e l y i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts Oriented toward agreement
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ) . Because t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f communica-
(expressive, n o r m a t i v e , consta- (Einverständnis)
tive a c t i o n are s u s p e n d e d , h o w e v e r , t h e y n o w m a k e use o f t h i s c o m -
p e t e n c e o n l y i n d i r e c t l y t o give e a c h o t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e y tive)

b e l i e v e o r w a n t . C e r t a i n l y , s t r a t e g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects p r e s u m e o f Perlocutions O r i e n t e d t o w a r d consequences

e a c h o t h e r t h a t , i n s o f a r as t h e y m a k e d e c i s i o n s r a t i o n a l l y , t h e y base (indirect mutual
t h e i r d e c i s i o n s o n b e l i e f s t h a t t h e y themselves h o l d t o be t r u e . H o w - u n d e r s t a n d i n g — Verständigung)
 335
334
S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
Chapter 7

T h e m o d a l i t i e s o f l a n g u a g e use specify, i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h v a r i o u s c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d . W e speak o f " r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " n o t o n l y ( l i k e F r e u d )

a c t o r ' s a t t i t u d e s , f o u r d i f f e r e n t types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d ac- i n t h e sense o f a r e t r o s p e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f wishes a n d a c t i o n s b u t

t i o n o f w h i c h , however, o n l y t w o e m b o d y c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y (like Weber) w i t h respect to the l i f e - c o n d u c t o f persons a n d the

(see t h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d e n t r i e s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a ) . f o r m s o f life o f collectives. Such f o r m s o f life consist o f practices a n d

a web o f traditions, institutions, customs, a n d competencies that may
Types o f a c t i o n / a c t o r ' s b e c a l l e d " r a t i o n a l " t o t h e d e g r e e t h a t t h e y a r e conducive t o t h e
Modes o f language attitude s o l u t i o n o f p r o b l e m s t h a t arise. T o t h i s e x t e n t , a l t h o u g h f o r m s o f l i f e
use Objectivating Performative q u a l i f y as c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e t e r m " r a t i o n a l , " t h e y d o so o n l y i n t h e
i n d i r e c t sense t h a t t h e y c o n s t i t u t e t h e m o r e o r less " c o n g e n i a l " b a c k -
Nonsocial Intentional —
g r o u n d f o r establishing discursive p r o c e d u r e s and for developing
action Noncommunicative action
r e f l e x i v e c a p a c i t i e s . I n t h i s way, t h e y c a n p r o m o t e capacities for
Oriented toward — Weak p r o b l e m s o l v i n g t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t enable r a t i o n a l beliefs, actions,
reaching communicative and communication.
understanding action W i t h its c a t e g o r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d g r a m m a t i c a l p r e s t r u c t u r i n g
(Verständigung) o f t h e b a c k g r o u n d consensus o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , l a n g u a g e m a k e s a
Social c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h i s enabling o f r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . I n r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n the objective w o r l d ,
interactions Oriented toward — Strong
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r s always a l r e a d y o p e r a t e w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f
agreement communicative
their lifeworld. N o m a t t e r h o w h i g h they c l i m b , the h o r i z o n retreats
(Einverständnis) action
before t h e m , w i t h the result that they can never b r i n g the lifeworld
as a luhole before them—as is p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d — a n d
Oriented toward Strategic — s u r v e y i t as a w h o l e . I t is n o c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t t h i s B e i n g - i n - t h e - W o r l d ,
consequences interactions as a n a l y z e d b y H e i d e g g e r , c a n b e i l l u s t r a t e d b y t h e s t r a n g e s e m i t r a n -
s c e n d e n c e o f a l a n g u a g e t h a t , a l t h o u g h w e c a n use i t as a m e a n s o f
Clearly, the linguistic m e d i u m extends f u r t h e r t h a n c o m m u n i c a -
c o m m u n i c a t i o n , is n o n e t h e l e s s n e v e r a t o u r d i s p o s a l : w e always o p -
tive r a t i o n a l i t y . W i t h t h e e p i s t e m i c r a t i o n a l i t y o f k n o w l e d g e , the
erate t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of language a n d can never perfor-
teleological rationality o f action, a n d the communicative rationality
m a t i v e l y — s o l o n g as we s p e a k — o b j e c t i f y i t as a w h o l e . I n t h i s way,
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g we have b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h r e e
t h e l i f e w o r l d , w h i c h is i t s e l f a r t i c u l a t e d i n t h e m e d i u m o f l a n g u a g e ,
a u t o n o m o u s aspects o f r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t a r e i n t e r w o v e n b y way o f t h e
o p e n s u p f o r its m e m b e r s a n i n t e r p r e t i v e h o r i z o n f o r e v e r y t h i n g t h a t
common m e d i u m o f l a n g u a g e . F u r t h e r m o r e , these c o r e s t r u c t u r e s a r e
they experience i n the world, about w h i c h they reach under-
i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d t o d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s ( a n d , as S c h n a d e l b a c h cor-
standing, a n d f r o m w h i c h they can learn.
rectly emphasizes, to a c o r r e s p o n d i n g reflexivity o f the consciously
c o n d u c t e d life o f persons). T h e i r r e l a t i o n to the level o f a r g u m e n - W e h a v e p r e s u m e d u p t o n o w t h a t l a n g u a g e has a s t r u c t u r e - f o r m -
t a t i o n a n d r e f l e c t i o n is as c o r r o b o r a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s . B u t w h a t d o e s i n g p o w e r w i t h r e g a r d to beliefs, actions, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r -
l a n g u a g e as such h a v e t o d o w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f b e l i e f s , a c t i o n s , ances. H o w e v e r , s u c h a g l o b a l r e f e r e n c e t o " l a n g u a g e " c o n c e a l s t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s , a n d persons? g e n u i n e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t l a n g u a g e m a k e s w i t h its w o r l d - d i s c l o s -
ing productivity. 1 3
Certainly, the epistemic core structure o f the
A f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n is d e r i v e d f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t these expressions
p r o p o s i t i o n is p a r t o f t h e l o g i c a l s e m a n t i c s o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s . T h e
a r e e m b e d d e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a l i f e w o r l d t h a t is i n t u r n l i n g u i s t i -
336
Chapter 7
propositional attitudes o f the c o m p e t e n t speaker constitute the
structural core o f rational action. Moreover, communicative ration-
a l i t y is e x p r e s s e d i n p r a c t i c e s o f s p e e c h t h a t , w i t h t h e i r d i a l o g u e r o l e s
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e presuppositions, are geared t o w a r d the i l l o c u -
d o n a r y a i m o f intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f validity claims. The
v a r i o u s aspects o f r a t i o n a l i t y a n a l y z e d i n t h e f o r e g o i n g are reflected i n
linguistic structures. However, this entire rationality complex, on
w h i c h a society's c a p a c i t i e s f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d l e a r n i n g i n a l l its
d i m e n s i o n s d e p e n d , o b v i o u s l y d o e s n o t , as i t w e r e , s t a n d o n its o w n
t w o f e e t b u t r a t h e r n e e d s a l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d w h o s e substance is
articulated i n the m e d i u m o f language: a l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d that
f o r m s m o r e o r less s u i t a b l e c o n t e x t s , a n d p r o v i d e s r e s o u r c e s , f o r
a t t e m p t s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t o solve p r o b l e m s .
T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e sense i n w h i c h f o r m s o f l i f e c a n be " r a t i o n a l "
d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c i r c u l a r p r o c e s s t h a t takes p l a c e b e t w e e n , o n
the one h a n d , the linguistically p r i o r interpretive knowledge that
discloses t h e w o r l d f o r a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y i n a m o r e o r less
p r o d u c t i v e way a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e m o r e o r less i n n o v a t i v e
i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes t h a t a r e m a d e possible b y m e a n s o f
this, t h r o u g h w h i c h knowledge o f t h e w o r l d is a c q u i r e d a n d ex-
p a n d e d , a n d i m p e t u s is g i v e n f o r r e v i s i o n o f t h e a n t e c e d e n t inter-
p r e t i v e k n o w l e d g e . H e r e w e s h o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e levels: t h e level
o f l i n g u i s t i c a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d , t h e level o f
practices o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n such an intersubjectively
shared lifeworld, a n d the level o f the objective w o r l d , f o r m a l l y pre-
s u p p o s e d b y t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f
e n t i t i e s a b o u t w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is s a i d . T h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n
world-disclosure a n d i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes—an interac-
t i o n t h a t expands k n o w l e d g e a n d alters meanings—takes place o n
t h e m i d d l e level w h e r e , w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f t h e i r l i f e w o r l d , c o m -
m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g subjects r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h o n e another
about something i n the world.
T h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a l l o w s us t o see e v e r y -
t h i n g t h a t we e n c o u n t e r i n t h e w o r l d n o t m e r e l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f
v i e w o f specific aspects a n d r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t i e s b u t also as e l e m e n t s
o f a w h o l e , as p a r t s o f a c a t e g o r i a l l y o r g a n i z e d t o t a l i t y . A l t h o u g h i t
d o e s h a v e a relation t o r a t i o n a l i t y , i t i t s e l f is, i n a c e r t a i n sense,
337
S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
a - r a t i o n a l . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t i t is i r r a t i o n a l . E v e n a l i n g u i s t i -
cally c r e a t i v e r e n e w a l o f o u r v i e w o f t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e t h a t a l l o w s
us t o see o l d p r o b l e m s i n a c o m p l e t e l y n e w l i g h t d o e s n o t f a l l o u t o f
t h e b l u e — i t is n o " D e s t i n i n g o f B e i n g " (Seinsgeschick). For world-
d i s c l o s i n g i n t e r p r e t i v e k n o w l e d g e m u s t c o n t i n u o u s l y p r o v e its t r u t h ;
i t m u s t p u t a c t i n g subjects i n a p o s i t i o n t o c o m e t o g r i p s w i t h w h a t
happens t o t h e m i n the w o r l d , a n d t o l e a r n f r o m mistakes. O n t h e
o t h e r h a n d , the retrospectively p r o d u c e d revisions o f this w o r l d -
i n t e r p r e t i n g l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e a r e j u s t as l i t t l e a n a u t o m a t i c r e s u l t
o f successful p r o b l e m s o l v i n g . I t is m o r e a m a t t e r o f stimulating t h e
linguistic i m a g i n a t i o n — P e i r c e spoke o f abductive f a n t a s y — t h r o u g h
f a i l e d a t t e m p t s t o solve p r o b l e m s a n d f a l t e r i n g l e a r n i n g processes.
T h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e is n e i t h e r r a t i o n a l nor
i r r a t i o n a l ; as a n e n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r i t is i t s e l f
a-rational. T h r o u g h o u t the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y this a-rational char-
a c t e r has r e p e a t e d l y f a i l e d t o b e r e c o g n i z e d . A t a n y r a t e , p h i l o s o p h i -
cal i d e a l i s m f r o m Plato t h r o u g h K a n t to H e i d e g g e r has always
d i s c e r n e d Logos a t w o r k i n t h e t o t a l i z i n g p o w e r o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e
linguistic interpretation o f the w o r l d . Philosophical idealism singled
o u t this "reason" (Vernunft) as t h e c a p a c i t y f o r k n o w l e d g e of the
t o t a l i t y a n d a c c o r d e d i t a n overriding i m p o r t a n c e vis-à-vis " u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g " (Verstand), c o n c e i v e d as t h e c a p a c i t y f o r d e a l i n g r a t i o n a l l y
w i t h p r o b l e m s t h a t are p o s e d f o r us i n t h e w o r l d . I n t h e o n t o l o g i c a l
p a r a d i g m , r e a s o n was d e e m e d t o be t h e c a p a c i t y f o r c o n t e m p l a t i v e l y
g r a s p i n g t h e o r d e r o f b e i n g as a w h o l e . O n t h e K a n t i a n r e a d i n g o f
t h e m e n t a l i s t p a r a d i g m , r e a s o n c o n t i n u e d t o b e seen as t h e c a p a c i t y
f o r ideas, a l t h o u g h t h e w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g p o w e r o f these ideas was
n o w c o n c e i v e d as t h e t o t a l i z i n g a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n -
t a l s u b j e c t . H o w d i f f i c u l t i t is, e v e n i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m , t o
b r e a k f r e e f r o m i d e a l i s m , c a n be seen i n t h e case o f H e i d e g g e r w h o
still conceived epochal world-disclosures as the "Happening of
Truth" (Wahrheitsgeschehen). O n l y a soberly conducted, pragmatic-
l i n g u i s t i c t u r n p e r m i t s us t o r e l i e v e t h e w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g a n d a r t i c u -
l a t i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e o f t h e b u r d e n o f c l a i m s t o knowledge.
L i n g u i s t i c w o r l d - d i s c l o s u r e stands i n a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n t o
t h e r a t i o n a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f s u b j e c t s i n t h e w o r l d w h o are f a l -
l i b l e , t h o u g h c a p a b l e o f l e a r n i n g . S e e n i n t h i s way, r e a s o n can
338
Chapter 7
w i t h d r a w i n t o the idealizations o f validity claims a n d the f o r m a l - p r a g -
matic presupposition o f worlds; i t renounces every f o r m o f totalizing
knowledge, n o matter h o w concealed, w h i l e nonetheless requiring
o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t i e s — s e t i n their c o n t i n g e n t life-
w o r l d contexts—a universalist a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a m u t e d "transcen-
dence f r o m w i t h i n " that does justice to the irrefutably u n c o n d i t i o n a l
c h a r a c t e r o f w h a t is h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e a n d w h a t o u g h t - t o - b e .
A p p e n d i x o n a Pragmatic T h e o r y o f Meaning
Some implications for a pragmatic t h e o r y of m e a n i n g result f r o m
the distinction between the above-mentioned different modalities o f
l a n g u a g e use. S u c h a t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g m o d i f i e s t h e basic thesis o f
t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s as d e v e l o p e d b y F r e g e a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way: o n e u n d e r s t a n d s a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act w h e n o n e
k n o w s w h a t m a k e s i t a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s thesis starts f r o m t h e p r e m i s e
t h a t t h e addressee's r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t
is s a i d is t o b e w o n b y m e a n s o f a n a c c e p t a b l e speech-act o f f e r , so
t h a t she is b r o u g h t t o a c c e p t t h e s p e e c h act i t s e l f as v a l i d . 1 4
At first
glance, however, expressions o f w i l l t h a t are n o t e m b e d d e d n o r m a -
tively, s u c h as i m p e r a t i v e s a n d d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n (also s p e e c h
acts specific t o c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s s u c h as i n s u l t s a n d t h r e a t s ) , p r e s e n t
counterexamples. C l e a r l y , i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o f t h i s k i n d h a v e
built-in o r i e n t a t i o n toward a consensual acceptance. I n d e e d , the
a s s u m p t i o n that l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n aims f u n d a m e n t a l l y at
a g r e e m e n t seems c o m p l e t e l y c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e f o r , i f t h a t w e r e t h e
case, i t w o u l d have t o b e p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e
use o f l a n g u a g e as a n o r i g i n a l m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use, w h e r e a s a l l
i n d i r e c t f o r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n w h i c h o n e p a r t y gives a n o t h e r
t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g , w o u l d h a v e a d e r i v a t i v e status. I w a n t t o
( i ) b e g i n b y r e c a l l i n g t h e basic f e a t u r e s o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n
o f m e a n i n g , a n d t h e n (ii) u n d e r t a k e two revisions.
i . T h e p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g sets o u t t o e x p l a i n w h a t i t is
t o u n d e r s t a n d a s p e e c h act. I n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f s p e e c h acts,
sentences are used w i t h " c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t . " I n o r d e r f o r this
i n t e n t i o n to be realized, t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,
a t least, m u s t be satisfied:
339
S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
• A s p e a k e r a n d a n addressee w h o h a v e c o m m a n d o v e r a c o m m o n
language (or w h o c o u l d establish a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e b y way o f
translation)
• A s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t c a n be s c r u t i n i z e d b y b o t h p a r t i e s
• A n intersubjectively shared (or sufficiently "overlapping") back-
ground understanding
• A l o c a l l y s i t u a t e d u t t e r a n c e o f a speaker, w i t h a "yes" o r "no"
p o s i t i o n o n i t b y a n addressee
To e x p l a i n this I rely o n two assumptions:
1. L i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n essentially exists i n o r d e r f o r o n e p e r -
son to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e
world.
2. R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g implies that the hearer recognizes a
validity c l a i m raised by the speaker f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n .
These specifications o f e x p l a n a n d u m a n d explanans lead to the
explanation:
• T o u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is t o k n o w h o w o n e could
use i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e a b o u t s o m e -
t h i n g i n the w o r l d .
no
N a t u r a l l y , u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is n o t t h e s a m e as
reaching understanding about something with the help of an utter-
a n c e h e l d t o b e v a l i d . N o n e t h e l e s s , as has a l r e a d y b e e n o b s e r v e d b y
t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, i n language t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f m e a n i n g
a n d v a l i d i t y are i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d ; m o r e o v e r , t h e y are c o n n e c t e d
i n such a way t h a t one understands a speech act w h e n o n e knows
t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . A n o r i e n t a -
t i o n t o w a r d t h e possible v a l i d i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c
conditions n o t just o f reaching understanding b u t o f linguistic u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g itself. ( I n c i d e n t a l l y , this e x p l a i n s w h y we can l e a r n to
speak o n l y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t h a t is, i n
p r a c t i c e s f r o m w h i c h i t emerges w h e n t h e g i v e n l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y
accepts w h a t as v a l i d . )
i
340 I 341

Chapter 7 j Some F u r t h e r Clarifications o f the Concept o f Communicative Rationality

N o t " t r u t h " b u t an epistemically inflected, generalized concept o f t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p r e f e r e n c e s o f t h e speakers i n a n a t t i t u d e

" v a l i d i t y " i n t h e sense o f " r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y " is t h e k e y c o n c e p t oriented t o w a r d success ( a n d , t h u s , f r o m t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e ) . Even
for a pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . T h i s a p p r o a c h has, o f c o u r s e , perlocutions, w h i c h r i d e o n t h e b a c k s o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, c a n be
t h e c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f a s p e e c h act are criticized f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t r u t h o f the assumptions
i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h the h e l p o f t h e reasons t h a t , u n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i - i m p l i e d i n a g i v e n case ( a b o u t c o n d i t i o n s f o r context-dependent
tions, c a n serve t o v i n d i c a t e a c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m . K n o w i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s ) . O f c o u r s e , s i n c e p e r l o c u t i o n s as such d o not
t h e kinds of reasons w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r c o u l d v i n d i c a t e t h e v a l i d i t y ! r e p r e s e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a n d a r e n o t g e a r e d t o w a r d r a t i o n a l ac-
c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t is s a i d is p a r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s p e e c h act. ceptability, this k i n d o f negation can h a v e t h e sense o n l y o f an
( T h i s e x p l a i n s t h e h o l i s t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e as explanation as t o w h y t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m c a n n o t be a t t a i n e d i n
w e l l as t h e i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e a n d k n o w l e d g e the given circumstances.
of the world.)
i i . Previously, I h a d p r e s u m e d t h a t t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f s p e e c h acts Notes
d e p e n d s o n the k n o w l e d g e o f reasons t h a t justify an illocutionary
success a n d c a n r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n s p e a k e r 1. H . Schnädelbach, " U b e r Rationalität u n d Begründung," in Zur Rehabilitierung des
animal rationale (Frankfurt, 1992), p. 63.
a n d h e a r e r . I n o w h a v e t o revise t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n i n v i e w o f my
differentiation w i t h i n the concept o f reaching understanding, and 2. H . Schnädelbach, "Philosophie als Theorie der Rationalität," in Zur Rehabilitierung,
pp. 47f.
i n v i e w o f t h e status o f s p e e c h acts s u c h as i n s u l t s a n d t h r e a t s .
To understand a s p e e c h act is t o k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r the 3. [Editor's note:] Schnädelbach (as quoted by Habermas) speaks of the "reflexive
having" of expressions, knowledge, actions, intentions, utterances, and so on. Since
i l l o c u t i o n a r y o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y success t h a t t h e s p e a k e r c a n a c h i e v e it is not possible in English to speak of "having" expressions, actions, or utterances,
w i t h i t ( w i t h t h i s , w e t a k e a c c o u n t o f p e r l o c u t i o n s w h o s e success, "reflexive character" or "reflexivity" has been used as appropriate.
h o w e v e r , p r e s u p p o s e s c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act em-
4. Schnädelbach, Zur Rehabilitierung, p. 76.
p l o y e d i n a g i v e n case).
5. J . Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization," in Postmetaphysical Thinking
O n e knows the c o n d i t i o n s for the i l l o c u t i o n a r y or perlocutionary
trans, by W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 149-204.
success o f a s p e e c h act w h e n one knows the kinds of actor-inde-
p e n d e n t o r actor-relative reasons w i t h w h i c h the speaker c o u l d v i n - 6. T h i s explains the wealth of ways of using the term "rational" in academic lan-
guage; cf. the various "types of rationality" identified in H . L e n k and H . E Spinner,
d i c a t e h e r v a l i d i t y c l a i m discursively. M u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g between "Rationalitätstypen, Rationalitätskonzepte u n d Rationalitätstheorien im Uberblick,"
a c t o r s i n a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success is also p o s s i b l e ( i n a in H . Stachowiak, ed., Handbuch pragmatischen Denkens (Hamburg, 1989), pp. 1-31.

w e a k sense) i f t h e seriousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) o f a n a n n o u n c e m e n t
7. H . I . Brown, Rationality (London, 1988); cf. also the early work of H . Schnädel-
or an imperative (or threat) can be p r o v e n w i t h the h e l p o f actor- bach, " U b e r den Realismus," Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 111 (1972):
relative reasons for t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g resolve. H e r e , 88ff.

those reasons "relative to a given a c t o r " are v a l i d that, f r o m t h e p o i n t 8. G . H . von Wright, Explanation and Understanding ( L o n d o n , 1991), pp. 83-132.
o f v i e w o f t h e addressee, c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as g o o d - r e a s o n s - f o r - t h e -
9. See chapter 5 in the present volume, pp. 270ff.
given-actor.
T h e s e r e v i s i o n s take a c c o u n t o f t h e f a c t t h a t s p e e c h acts a r e i l l o - 10. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cam-
bridge, 1982), pp. 391ff.
c u t i o n a r y acts e v e n w h e n they are c o n n e c t e d o n l y w i t h claims to
t r u t h a n d truthfulness, a n d w h e n t h e s e c l a i m s t o t h e seriousness 11. Cassirer assigned the "meaning function" to the epistemic use of language, which
in science is specified as the mathematical representation of regularities or as
(and viability) of intentions and decisions can be j u s t i f i e d only

i
342
Chapter 7

8
Fregean "thoughts;" see E . Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 3, trans.
R. Manheim (New Haven, 1957), pp. 279ff. Richard Rorros Pragmatic Turn (1996)
12. F. Hundschnur, "Streitspezifische Sprechakte," Protosouologie 4 (1993): 140ff.

13. O n the world-disclosing function of language, cf. Cristina Lafont, "Welt-

erschließung u n d Referenz," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 41 (1993): 491-505; also
Martin Seel, "Über Richtigkeit u n d Wahrheit," ibid.: 509-524.

14. See chapters 2 and 6 in the present volume, pp. 116ff. and pp. 278-306, respec-
tively.

I n " T r o t s k y a n d t h e W i l d O r c h i d s " R i c h a r d R o r t y casts a r o m a n t i c

eye b a c k o v e r h i s d e v e l o p m e n t as a p h i l o s o p h e r . 1
Using the f o r m o f
a "narrative o f m a t u r a t i o n , " he presents his intellectual d e v e l o p m e n t
as a p r o g r e s s i v e d i s t a n c i n g o f h i m s e l f f r o m h i s a d o l e s c e n t d r e a m ; t h i s
was t h e d r e a m o f f u s i n g i n a s i n g l e i m a g e t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y b e a u t y
of wild orchids a n d the liberation f r o m profane suffering of an
e x p l o i t e d society: t h e d e s i r e " t o h o l d r e a l i t y a n d j u s t i c e i n a s i n g l e
v i s i o n " (Yeats). T h e e x i s t e n t i a l b a c k g r o u n d to Rorty's neopragma-
t i s m is h i s r e b e l l i o n against t h e false p r o m i s e s o f p h i l o s o p h y : a p h i -
l o s o p h y t h a t p r e t e n d s t o be a b l e t o satisfy a e s t h e t i c a n d m o r a l n e e d s
i n s a t i s f y i n g t h e o r e t i c a l ones. O n c e u p o n a t i m e , m e t a p h y s i c s w a n t e d
t o i n s t r u c t its p u p i l s i n s p i r i t u a l exercises i n v o l v i n g a p u r i f y i n g c o n -
t e m p l a t i o n o f the g o o d i n the beautiful. B u t the y o u t h f u l Rorty, w h o
h a d a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o be filled w i t h enthusiasm by Plato, Aristotle,
a n d T h o m a s A q u i n a s , p a i n f u l l y comes to realize t h a t the prospect o f
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y h e l d o u t by theory—a
c o n t a c t at o n c e desirable a n d reconciliatory—although possibly a t t a i n -
able i n t h e m o r e d e f i n i t e f o r m s o f prayer, c a n n o t be achieved a l o n g
the p a t h o f philosophy. As a r e s u l t , R o r t y r e m e m b e r s Dewey—
s c o r n e d by M c K e o n , L e o Strauss, a n d M o r t i m e r A d l e r — w h o h a d n o t
yet b e e n c o m p l e t e l y forgotten i n t h e C h i c a g o o f t h e 1940s. The
realization t h a t everyday reality conceals n o h i g h e r reality, n o r e a l m
o f b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f t o be d i s c l o s e d ecstatically, a n d t h a t e v e r y d a y p r a c -
tices leave n o r o o m f o r a redemptory v i s i o n , c u r e s t h e s o b e r e d R o r t y
344
Chapter 8
o f h i s P l a t o n i c sickness. T o b e s u r e , t h e m e m o r y o f t h e e x o t i c s i g h t
a n d the overpowering smell o f the w i l d orchids i n the mountains of
h i s c h i l d h o o d i n t h e n o r t h w e s t o f N e w Jersey c a n n o t b e e x t i n g u i s h e d
completely.
I t is r o u g h l y t h u s i n t e r m s o f h i s o w n l i f e - h i s t o r y t h a t R o r t y t o d a y
e x p l a i n s t o us t h e m o t i v e s f o r h i s v i e w o f t h e d u a l d o m i n a n c e of
D e w e y a n d H e i d e g g e r d e v e l o p e d i n Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.
Strangely e n o u g h , this self-presentation contains n o reference to the
p a r a m o u n t role played by W i t t g e n s t e i n , the t h i r d party i n the alli-
ance. Rorty's r e p o r t o n t h e experiences o f his o w n philosophical
d e v e l o p m e n t b r e a k s o f f w i t h h i s r e a d i n g o f H e g e l as h i s s t u d e n t days
i n Yale d r a w t o a close a n d h i s w o r k as a p r o f e s s i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r is
o n l y a b o u t to begin. H i s t r a i n i n g i n analytic p h i l o s o p h y w i t h his real
t e a c h e r , W i l f r i d Sellars, h i s basic c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e t r u t h o f p h y s i c a l -
i s m , h i s successful c a r e e r as a y o u n g a n a l y t i c philosopher—these
steps i n h i s d e v e l o p m e n t a r e n o t m e n t i o n e d at a l l . H o w e v e r , i t is
solely h i s a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d t h e t r a d i t i o n o f analytic p h i l o s o p h y —
t h e o n l y t r a d i t i o n i n w h o s e l a n g u a g e R o r t y has l e a r n e d t o a r g u e a n d
using w h i c h he continues to e x p o u n d his e x c i t i n g teachings bril-
l i a n t l y — t h a t c a n e x p l a i n w h y h e a t t r i b u t e s a c u l t u r a l l y c r i t i c a l sig-
n i f i c a n c e t o h i s a n t i - P l a t o n i c t u r n , a s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o
e x t e n d far b e y o n d his o w n person a n d his private switch o f p h i l o -
sophical allegiance.
I w i l l deal briefly w i t h this m o t i v a t i o n f o r a k i n d o f p h i l o s o p h i z i n g
t h a t w a n t s t o b i d f a r e w e l l t o i t s e l f as s u c h b e f o r e c o n f i n i n g m y s e l f t o
d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e n e o p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n itself.
F r o m the pragmatic radicalization o f the linguistic t u r n Rorty ob-
tains a nonrealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f knowledge. I n order to test
w h e t h e r h e r a d i c a l i z e s t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n t h e r i g h t way, I w i l l t h e n
compare the contextualist approach with the epistemological doubt
o f t h e m o d e r n s k e p t i c . I n d o i n g so I w i l l r e c a l l a p r o b l e m t h a t was
always c o n n e c t e d w i t h c o h e r e n c e c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h : t h e p r o b l e m
o f h o w t r u t h is to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y . I n
r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s q u e s t i o n , t h e r e is a p a r t i n g o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l ways.
W h e r e a s R o r t y assimilates t r u t h t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n at t h e e x p e n s e of
everyday realist i n t u i t i o n s , o t h e r s a t t e m p t to take a c c o u n t o f these
i n t u i t i o n s even w i t h i n the linguistic p a r a d i g m , w h e t h e r w i t h the h e l p
345
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
o f a d e f l a t i o n a r y strategy as r e g a r d s t h e p r o b l e m o f t r u t h o r t h r o u g h
a n i d e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e process o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f . O n t h e o n e h a n d ,
I w i l l t a k e issue w i t h t h e d e f l a t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y t h a t r e l i e s o n a s e m a n -
tic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h , e m p h a s i z i n g i n s t e a d t h e advantages of a
pragmatic viewpoint. O n the o t h e r h a n d , again f r o m a pragmatic
perspective, I w i l l criticize a k i n d o f epistemization o f the idea of
t r u t h t h a t I m y s e l f o n c e p r o p o s e d . I n d o i n g so I w i l l d e v e l o p a n
a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e l i q u i d a d o n o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m s t o t r u t h . I t is
t h i s l i q u i d a t i o n t h a t has u l t i m a t e l y c o m p e l l e d R o r t y t o e f f e c t a p r o b -
lematic n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i f i e d r e a s o n — o r , at any rate, o n e
that leads to f u r t h e r p r o b l e m s .
A Platonicalfy M o t i v a t e d Anti-Platonist
R i c h a r d R o r t y is o n e o f t h e m o s t o u t s t a n d i n g a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s ,
c o n s i s t e n t l y a r g u i n g i n a n i n f o r m e d a n d a s t u t e way. B u t h i s p r o g r a m
f o r a p h i l o s o p h y t h a t is t o d o away w i t h a l l p h i l o s o p h y seems t o
spring m o r e f r o m the melancholy of a disappointed metaphysician,
d r i v e n o n b y n o m i n a l i s t spurs, t h a n f r o m t h e s e l f - c r i t i c i s m o f a n
e n l i g h t e n e d a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r w h o wishes t o c o m p l e t e t h e l i n -
g u i s t i c t u r n i n a p r a g m a t i s t way. I n 1 9 6 7 , w h e n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y
( i n b o t h its v e r s i o n s ) h a d a c h i e v e d w i d e s p r e a d r e c o g n i t i o n c o m p a -
r a b l e to t h a t e n j o y e d by N e o - K a n t i a n i s m i n the p e r i o d b e f o r e t h e
F i r s t W o r l d War, R o r t y e d i t e d a r e a d e r w i t h t h e d e m a n d i n g l y l a c o n i c
t i t l e , The Linguistic Turn. T h i s r e a d e r , as w e c a n see i n r e t r o s p e c t ,
m a r k s a b r e a k i n t h e h i s t o r y o f a n a l y t i c t h o u g h t . T h e texts c o l l e c t e d
i n t h e r e a d e r are m e a n t t o serve a d o u b l e p u r p o s e . I n s u m m i n g u p
a t r i u m p h a n t progression, t h e y are i n t e n d e d a t t h e same t i m e t o
s i g n a l its e n d . A t a n y r a t e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h i s l a u d a t o r y g e s t u r e , t h e
m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l distance f r o m w h i c h the e d i t o r c o m m e n t s o n the
t e x t s b e t r a y s t h e H e g e l i a n message t h a t e v e r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f S p i r i t
t h a t a c h i e v e s m a t u r i t y is c o n d e m n e d t o d e c l i n e . A t t h a t t i m e R o r t y
gave t h e s t a r t i n g s i g n a l t o a d i s c o u r s e t h a t has s i n c e g i v e n i t s e l f t h e
n a m e " p o s t a n a l y t i c . " I n his i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e r e a d e r , h e speculates
o n t h e " f u t u r e " o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y — a f u t u r e t h a t relegates i t t o
t h e past tense. I n t h e face o f a s t i l l i n t a c t o r t h o d o x y , R o r t y p o i n t s t o
three approaches that concur i n their contradiction of the general
346 347
Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

basic a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " t h e r e a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h s s t i l l w a i t i n g t o even today, s o m e t h i n g o f a " d o c t r i n e , " s o m e t h i n g o f t h a t i n i m i t a b l e

be d i s c o v e r e d t h a t c a n b e j u s t i f i e d o n t h e basis o f a r g u m e n t s . " R o r t y c o m b i n a t i o n o f w i l d o r c h i d s a n d T r o t s k y : h i s i m i t a t i o n o f t h e ges-
l i n k s these anti-Platonic approaches w i t h the names Heidegger, t u r e , a t least, o f i n s i g h t t h a t is at o n c e stimulating a n d rich in practical
W i t t g e n s t e i n , a n d W a i s m a n n (whose p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o g r a m Rorty consequence. H o w e v e r , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l n e e d t o l i b e r a t e p h i l o s o p h y
even t h e n described i n terms similar to his later d e s c r i p t i o n of f r o m the sterility o f a pusillanimous postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g can
Dewey's p r a g m a t i s m ) . n o w be satisfied o n l y postmetaphysically. T h e f a r e w e l l to analytic
T h i s d i s t a n c e d gaze o n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y i n n o way c o n c e a l s t h e p h i l o s o p h y c a n n o t lead back to a devalued metaphysics. For this
i m m e n s e r e s p e c t o f t h e i n i t i a t e w h o h e r e steps o u t s i d e o f h i s own r e a s o n , t h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g o p t i o n is t o d r a m a t i z e t h e f a r e w e l l t o
t r a d i t i o n : " L i n g u i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y , o v e r t h e last t h i r t y years, has suc- p h i l o s o p h y i n g e n e r a l . O n l y i f t h e act o f l e a v e - t a k i n g i t s e l f w e r e t o
ceeded in putting the entire philosophical tradition, f r o m Par- release a s h o c k a n d i n t e r v e n e i n t o e v e r y d a y l i f e w o u l d p h i l o s o p h y
m e n i d e s t h r o u g h Descartes a n d H u m e t o B r a d l e y a n d W h i t e h e a d , "at t h e m o m e n t o f its f a l l " b e a b l e t o a c q u i r e a m o r e t h a n p u r e l y
o n t h e d e f e n s i v e . I t has d o n e so b y c a r e f u l a n d t h o r o u g h s c r u t i n y o f a c a d e m i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . B u t h o w is a s e p a r a t i o n f r o m a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o -
t h e ways i n w h i c h t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e u s e d l a n g u a g e i n t h e p h y c a r r i e d o u t w i t h analytic means s u p p o s e d to achieve significance
f o r m u l a t i o n of their problems. This achievement is s u f f i c i e n t t o o f a k i n d that w o u l d allow analytic t h o u g h t to be i l l u m i n a t e d one
p l a c e t h i s p e r i o d a m o n g t h e g r e a t ages o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o - last t i m e i n t h e b r i l l i a n c e o f its g r e a t t r a d i t i o n ? A s I u n d e r s t a n d h i s
phy." 2
O n l y t h e i r r e s i s t i b i l i t y o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y ' s a r g u m e n t s ex- naturalistically refracted impulse toward great philosophy, Rorty
p l a i n s R o r t y ' s real g r i e f . T h i s i r r e s i s t i b i l i t y leads h i m t o b i d f a r e w e l l w a n t s t o give a n a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n .
t o t h e a l l u r i n g p r o m i s e s o f m e t a p h y s i c s so i r r e v o c a b l y t h a t , e v e n post
R o r t y b e g i n s b y s h o w i n g t h a t a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y shares a f u n d a -
analytic philosophy, there can be n o alternative to postmetaphysical
m e n t a l p r e m i s e w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n i t has d e v a l u e d . T h i s is t h e c o n -
t h i n k i n g . N o n e t h e l e s s , R o r t y , t h e n as n o w , is i n search o f s o m e m o d e
viction that "there are philosophical truths still w a i t i n g to be
o f t h i n k i n g t h a t , as A d o r n o p u t s i t a t t h e e n d o f Negative Dialectics,
discovered." T h a n k s to a very G e r m a n idea that he borrows f r o m
shows s o l i d a r i t y w i t h m e t a p h y s i c s a t t h e m o m e n t o f its f a l l . T h e r e is
3

H e i d e g g e r , R o r t y t h e n a t t r i b u t e s a d r a m a t i c w e i g h t i n e s s t o t h i s proton
m e l a n c h o l y i n the s t r a i n e d i r o n y p r o p a g a t e d today by Rorty: "Rorty's
pseudos o f W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s H e i d e g g e r i a n t h e -
p o s t - p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l is i r o n i c b e c a u s e h e realizes t h a t t r u t h
sis, t h e p r o f a n e d e s t i n i e s o f t h e West a r e s u p p o s e d t o have b e e n
is n o t a l l h e w o u l d l i k e i t t o b e . I r o n y d e p e n d s essentially o n a k i n d
f u l f i l l e d o n l y w i t h i n t h e scope o f a n e p o c h a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g ;
o f nostalgie de la vérité." E v e n t h e r o m a n t i c d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r b e t w e e n
4

m o r e o v e r , o n e g o v e r n e d by m e t a p h y s i c s . O f c o u r s e , u n l i k e H e i d e g -
i r o n y a n d seriousness, H e i d e g g e r a n d Dewey, c a n n o t ease t h e p a i n .
ger, R o r t y c a n n o l o n g e r stylize p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g p o s t a n a -
B e c a u s e m e t a p h y s i c s has c o m m a n d o n l y o v e r t h e l a n g u a g e o f k n o w l -
l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y as a sacral " C o m m e m o r a t i o n o f B e i n g " (Andenken
e d g e , t h e a e s t h e t i c i z a t i o n o f its c l a i m t o t r u t h a m o u n t s t o a n anaes-
des Seins). Rorty understands the deconstruction o f the history o f
t h e t i c i z a t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n as m e r e c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e .
m e t a p h y s i c s as a d e f l a t i o n a r y d i a g n o s i s i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s sense. A n t i -
T h e r e a l i t y o f t h e ideas w i t h w h i c h P l a t o n i c t h e o r y p r o m i s e d t o b r i n g
P l a t o n i s m d r a w s its e m i n e n t l y p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o n l y f r o m t h e
us i n t o c o n t a c t is n o t t h e s a m e as t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y a p p e a l o f aes-
severity o f t h e sickness t h a t i t is s u p p o s e d t o c u r e . T h e u n m a s k i n g
thetic experience. W h a t once aspired to be " t r u e " i n an e m p h a t i c
o f P l a t o n i s m is a i m e d , b e y o n d s c h o l a s t i c i s m , a t a c u l t u r e t h a t is
sense c a n n o t b e p r e s e r v e d i n t h e m o d e o f t h e " e d i f y i n g . " I n f o r f e i t -
a l i e n a t e d f r o m i t s e l f p l a t o n i s t i c a l l y . I f , finally, t h e act o f l e a v e - t a k i n g
i n g t h e b i n d i n g p o w e r o f its j u d g m e n t s , m e t a p h y s i c s also loses its
is n o t t o e x h a u s t i t s e l f i n n e g a t i o n , R o r t y has t o o p e n a p e r s p e c t i v e
substance. 5

that w i l l enable a new self-understanding that can take the place o f

W h e n o n e is f a c e d w i t h t h i s d i l e m m a i t is possible t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e o l d , d e f l a t e d o n e . W i t h t h i s e n d i n view, h e a d a p t s D e w e y ' s
the move Rorty finally m a k e s i n o r d e r t o give b a c k t o p h i l o s o p h y , H e g e l i a n i s m f o r h i s o w n p u r p o s e s i n s u c h a w a y t h a t a p e r s p e c t i v e is
348 349

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

o p e n e d o n everyday practices t h a t are n o l o n g e r d i s t o r t e d by P l a t o n - j e c t s . F o r classical e p i s t e m o l o g y , t h e r e is a c o n s t i t u t i v e s e p a r a t i o n

ist p r e j u d i c e s . I n t h i s way, l i k e H e g e l , e v e n t h e "last" p h i l o s o p h e r s between i n n e r a n d o u t e r — a d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d b o d y — t h a t ap-
capture their own time once more i n thought. peals t o t h e p r i v i l e g e d access o f t h e first p e r s o n t o h e r o w n e x p e r i -
Rorty knows, o f course, that such m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflections ences. T h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y o f t h e first p e r s o n is s u s t a i n e d by t h e
cannot transform the self-understanding of philosophy o n their wellsprings o f three paradigm-constituting assumptions:
o w n . H e cannot get outside o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t using p h i l o s o p h y
6

1. t h a t w e k n o w o u r o w n m e n t a l states b e t t e r t h a n a n y t h i n g else;
t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h i s t h o u g h t s . R o r t y w o u l d n o t be t h e s c r u p u l o u s
a n d sensitive, suggestive, a n d s t i m u l a t i n g p h i l o s o p h e r t h a t h e is w e r e 2. t h a t k n o w i n g takes place e s s e n t i a l l y i n t h e m o d e o f r e p r e s e n t i n g
h e t o i n s i s t solely o n t h e r h e t o r i c a l r o l e o f t h e r e e d u c a t o r . The objects; a n d
d i a g n o s i s o f a false s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o o , r e m a i n s a m a t t e r f o r 3. t h a t t h e t r u t h o f j u d g m e n t s rests o n e v i d e n c e t h a t v o u c h e s f o r
t h e o r y . R o r t y has t o p r o v i d e a r g u m e n t s i f h e is t o c o n v i n c e his their certainty.
colleagues that the "Platonic" d i s t i n c t i o n between " c o n v i n c i n g " a n d
Analysis o f t h e linguistic f o r m o f o u r experiences a n d t h o u g h t s
" p e r s u a d i n g " m a k e s n o sense. H e has t o p r o v e t h a t e v e n a n a l y t i c
discovers i n these assumptions three c o r r e s p o n d i n g m y t h s — t h e
p h i l o s o p h y r e m a i n s captivated by t h e spell o f the metaphysics against
m y t h o f t h e g i v e n , t h e m y t h o f t h o u g h t as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d t h e
w h i c h i t is b a t t l i n g .
m y t h o f t r u t h as c e r t a i n t y . I t is s h o w n t h a t we c a n n o t c i r c u m v e n t t h e
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n as t h e m e d i u m f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d c o m -
T h e Pragmatic T u r n
m u n i c a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e r e are n o u n i n t e r p r e t e d experiences
(Erfahrungen) t h a t a r e accessible o n l y p r i v a t e l y a n d e l u d e p u b l i c
R o r t y ' s i m p o r t a n t b o o k Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)
assessment a n d c o r r e c t i o n . M o r e o v e r , k n o w l e d g e o f o b j e c t s is n o t a n
p u r s u e s a n u m b e r o f a i m s . B y c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h t o its c o n c l u s i o n t h e
adequate m o d e l for the knowledge o f propositionally structured
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness, he wants to c o m -
states o f a f f a i r s . F i n a l l y , t r u t h is a p r o p e r t y o f c r i t i c i z a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s
p l e t e a n o t yet c o m p l e t e d l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n such a way t h a t t h e
t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t ; i t c a n be j u s t i f i e d o n l y o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s —
Platonist self-misunderstanding deeply r o o t e d i n o u r culture be-
it cannot be authenticated o n the basis of the genesis of
c o m e s o b v i o u s . M y d o u b t s r e l a t e t o t h e s e c o n d step. D o e s t h e p r a g -
representations.
m a t i c t u r n , w h i c h R o r t y r i g h t l y d e m a n d s i n t h e face o f s e m a n t i -
Rorty, o f course, connects this critique o f m e n t a l i s m w i t h the m o r e
cally f i x a t e d a p p r o a c h e s , r e q u i r e a n anti-realist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
far-reaching a i m o f radicalizing t h e linguistic t u r n . H e wants to show
knowledge?
"what philosophy o f language comes to w h e n p u r i f i e d o f attempts to
a. T h e basic c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e sub-
i m i t a t e e i t h e r K a n t o r H u m e . " So l o n g as t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n
7

j e c t has, f r o m P e i r c e t o W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d H e i d e g g e r , b e e n s u b j e c t e d
is p r o j e c t e d m e r e l y o n t o t h e s e n t e n c e - f a c t relation, the resulting
to a relendess critique. R o r t y draws o n c o n t e m p o r a r y a r g u m e n t s
s e m a n t i c answers r e m a i n t i e d t o t h e m e n t a l i s t m o d e o f q u e s t i o n i n g .
( a m o n g o t h e r s t h o s e o f Sellars, Q u i n e , a n d D a v i d s o n ) i n o r d e r t o
So l o n g as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Darstellung) o f states o f a f f a i r s — l i k e
e x p o s e t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f m e n t a l i s t e p i s t e m o l o g y w i t h a v i e w
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung) o f o b j e c t s — i s c o n c e i v e d as a t w o -
8

t o a c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n . T h e i d e a s o f "self-consciousness" a n d "sub-
p l a c e r e l a t i o n , t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n leaves t h e " m i r r o r o f n a t u r e " — a s
j e c t i v i t y " i m p l y t h a t t h e k n o w i n g s u b j e c t c a n disclose f o r i t s e l f a
metaphor for knowledge of the world—intact.
p r i v i l e g e d s p h e r e o f i m m e d i a t e l y accessible a n d a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n
R o r t y w a n t s t o m a k e f u l l use o f t h e c o n c e p t u a l scope t h a t has b e e n
e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) w h e n i t d o e s n o t f o c u s d i r e c t l y o n o b j e c t s b u t
o p e n e d u p by t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . W i t h Peirce he replaces
r a t h e r r e f l e x i v e l y o n i t s o w n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (Vorstellungen) o f ob-
350
Chapter 8
the two-place r e l a t i o n between r e p r e s e n t i n g subject a n d r e p r e s e n t e d
object w i t h a three-place relation: the symbolic expression, w h i c h
a c c o r d s v a l i d i t y to a state o f a f f a i r s , f o r a n i n t e r p r e t i v e c o m m u n i t y .
T h e o b j e c d v e w o r l d is n o l o n g e r s o m e t h i n g t o be r e f l e c t e d b u t is
s i m p l y t h e c o m m o n reference p o i n t f o r a process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n
(Verständigung) b e t w e e n m e m b e r s o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y
w h o come to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h one another w i t h regard to
s o m e t h i n g . T h e c o m m u n i c a t e d facts c a n n o m o r e be s e p a r a t e d f r o m
the p r o c e s s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a n t h e supposition o f a n o b j e c t i v e
w o r l d can be separated f r o m t h e intersubjectively shared i n t e r p r e t i v e
h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n always a l -
ready operate. Knowledge n o longer coincides w i t h the correspon-
d e n c e o f s e n t e n c e s a n d facts. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , o n l y a l i n g u i s t i c t u r n
t h a t is r i g o r o u s l y c a r r i e d t o i t s c o n c l u s i o n c a n , i n o v e r c o m i n g m e n -
t a l i s m , also o v e r c o m e t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f t h e M i r r o r o f
Nature.
b. I a m i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r R o r t y p e r f o r m s t h i s
plausible pragmatic radicalization o f the linguistic t u r n i n the right
way. I f w e n o l o n g e r r e f e r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s o n l y t o l a n g u a g e
as t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Darstellung), relating
t h e m i n s t e a d t o l a n g u a g e as i t is u s e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , a n a d d i t i o n a l
d i m e n s i o n is o p e n e d u p . T h i s is t h e d i m e n s i o n o f i n t e r a c t i o n s a n d
t r a d i t i o n s — t h e p u b l i c space o f a l i f e w o r l d s h a r e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y
b y t h e l a n g u a g e users. T h i s e x p a n d e d p e r s p e c t i v e allows t h e e n t w i n -
i n g o f the epistemological a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f the socialized i n d i -
v i d u a l s w i t h t h e i r processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o
b e c o m e visible: "Once conversation replaces c o n f r o n t a t i o n [ o f per-
sons w i t h states o f a f f a i r s ] , t h e n o t i o n o f t h e m i n d as M i r r o r of
N a t u r e can be discarded." T h e " c o m m u n i c a t i o n m o d e l " o f k n o w l -
9
e d g e h i g h l i g h t s t h e p o i n t t h a t w e h a v e n o u n f i l t e r e d access t o e n t i -
ties in the world, independent of our practices of reaching
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d the linguistically constituted context o f o u r life-
w o r l d : " E l e m e n t s o f w h a t w e c a l l ' l a n g u a g e ' o r ' m i n d ' p e n e t r a t e so
deeply i n t o w h a t we call 'reality' t h a t t h e v e r y p r o j e c t o f r e p r e s e n t i n g
o u r s e l v e s as b e i n g ' m a p p e r s ' o f s o m e t h i n g ' l a n g u a g e - i n d e p e n d e n t '
is f a t a l l y c o m p r o m i s e d f r o m t h e s t a r t . " 1 0
T h i s is a q u o t a t i o n f r o m H i l a r y P u t n a m w i t h w h i c h R o r t y agrees.
N o n e t h e l e s s , R o r t y has s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n P u t n a m ' s " i n t e r n a l
351
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
r e a l i s m " i n m i n d . P u t n a m ' s " i n t e r n a l r e a l i s m " stresses t h a t t h e c o n -
d i t i o n s f o r t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f k n o w l e d g e c a n b e a n a l y z e d o n l y in
connection with t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f a m u t u a l
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o w h a t is s a i d . O n R o r t y ' s view, " b e i n g
i n t o u c h w i t h r e a l i t y " has t o b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o t h e j a r g o n o f " b e i n g
i n t o u c h w i t h a h u m a n c o m m u n i t y " i n such a way that the realist
i n t u i t i o n , to w h i c h m e n t a l i s m w a n t e d to d o j u s t i c e w i t h its M i r r o r o f
N a t u r e a n d its c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d r e p r e -
sented object, disappears completely. F o r Rorty, every k i n d o f r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d is a d a n g e r o u s i l l u s i o n .
Now, i t is c e r t a i n l y t h e case t h a t w i t h the pragmatic t u r n the
epistemic a u t h o r i t y o f t h e first p e r s o n singular, w h o inspects h e r
i n n e r self, is d i s p l a c e d b y t h e first p e r s o n p l u r a l , b y t h e " w e " o f a
c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y i n f r o n t o f w h i c h every person justifies
h e r views. H o w e v e r , i t is o n l y t h e e m p i r i c i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s n e w
a u t h o r i t y t h a t leads R o r t y t o e q u a t e " k n o w l e d g e " w i t h w h a t is ac-
c e p t e d as " r a t i o n a l " a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a n d a r d s o f o u r r e s p e c t i v e
communities.
J u s t as L o c k e a n d H u m e r e f e r r e d t h e i r m e n t a l i s t r e f l e c t i o n s t o t h e
consciousness o f e m p i r i c a l persons, K a n t r e f e r r e d his to t h e c o n -
sciousness o f subjects " i n g e n e r a l . " L i n g u i s t i c r e f l e c t i o n s , t o o , c a n b e
r e f e r r e d to c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t i e s " i n g e n e r a l . " B u t Rorty, t h e
n o m i n a l i s t , stands i n t h e e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n a n d refers epistemic
a u t h o r i t y t o t h e r e c e i v e d social p r a c t i c e s o f " o u r " r e s p e c t i v e c o m m u -
n i t i e s . H e r e g a r d s t h e u r g e " t o see s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as
m o r e t h a n j u s t such practices" 11
as n o n s e n s i c a l . R o r t y h i m s e l f m a k e s
the c o n n e c t i o n between, o n the one h a n d , the contextualist inter-
p r e t a t i o n o f the pragmatic t u r n a n d the anti-realist u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o f knowledge a n d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , the rejection o f a Kantian
strategy o f analysis: 12
" I f we see k n o w l e d g e as a m a t t e r o f c o n v e r s a -
t i o n a n d o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e , r a t h e r t h a n as a n a t t e m p t t o m i r r o r
n a t u r e , w e w i l l n o t b e l i k e l y t o envisage a m e t a p r a c t i c e w h i c h w i l l b e
the c r i t i q u e o f all possible f o r m s o f social p r a c t i c e . " 1 3
For Rorty, such
a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c a t t e m p t w o u l d be a relapse i n t o f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m .
I n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d
self-consciousness h a d , w i t h " t h e m e n t a l " a n d " i n t r o s p e c t i o n , " r e -
spectively, s e c u r e d f o r p h i l o s o p h y — w h i c h a t t h a t t i m e h a d t o find a
new place alongside t h e n e w physics—an object d o m a i n a n d a
352 353

Chapter 8 Richard Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

m e t h o d o f its o w n . A s a r e s u l t , p h i l o s o p h y was a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d k n o w i n g d o n o t offer a n s w e r s , g o o d o r b a d , to L o c k e ' s q u e s t i o n s , any m o r e

t h a n L o c k e ' s r e m a r k s a b o u t l a n g u a g e offer a n s w e r s to F r e g e ' s . 1 6

i t s e l f as a f o u n d a t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e t h a t c h e c k e d a n d j u s t i f i e d t h e
f o u n d a d o n s o f all o t h e r disciplines. R o r t y n o w holds t h e view that T h i s discontinuity m e a n s t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s are n o t s e t t l e d
t h i s same f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g takes possession o f t h e through finding t h e r i g h t answers; r a t h e r , t h e y f a l l i n t o disuse o n c e
p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e w h e n i t stops s h o r t o f a c o n t e x t u a l i s t u n d e r - t h e y h a v e lost t h e i r m a r k e t v a l u e . T h i s also h o l d s f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f
standing of knowledge a n d justification. Universalist approaches the objectivity o f knowledge.
within the philosophy of language—such as R o r t y d i s c e r n s i n D u m - On t h e m e n t a l i s t view, o b j e c t i v i t y is e n s u r e d when the repre-
m e t t a n d others—come u n d e r suspicion here. s e n t i n g s u b j e c t r e f e r s t o h i s o b j e c t s i n t h e r i g h t way. H e c h e c k s t h e
subjectivity o f his representations against the objective w o r l d : "'sub-
C o n t e x t u a l i s m a n d S k e p t i c i s m as P r o b l e m s S p e c i f i c to P a r t i c u l a r j e c t i v e ' c o n t r a s t s w i t h ' c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o w h a t is o u t t h e r e , ' a n d t h u s
Paradigms m e a n s s o m e t h i n g l i k e ' a p r o d u c t o n l y o f w h a t is i n h e r e . ' " 1 7
O n the
l i n g u i s t i c view, t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f b e l i e f s is n o l o n g e r c h e c k e d d i r e c t l y
W h e n R o r t y r e g a r d s c o n t e x t u a l i s m as t h e necessary c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h r o u g h confrontation with the w o r l d b u t rather t h r o u g h public
a f u l l y e x e c u t e d l i n g u i s t i c t u r n , h e is r i g h t i n o n e r e s p e c t : c o n t e x t u - agreement achieved i n the c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y : "a ' s u b j e c -
a l i s m d e s i g n a t e s a p r o b l e m t h a t c a n o c c u r o n l y w h e n we r e c k o n on t i v e ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n is o n e w h i c h has b e e n , o r w o u l d b e , o r s h o u l d b e ,
a r e a s o n e m b o d i e d i n l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s . B u t h e is w r o n g t o see set aside b y r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s a n t s . " 18
W i t h this, the intersubjectivity o f
c o n t e x t u a l i s m at t h e s a m e time as t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m . T h i s r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g replaces t h e objectivity o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e
v i e w has its r o o t s , i f I a m c o r r e c t , i n a p r o b l e m a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e - w o r l d relation becomes d e p e n d e n t o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n be-
philosophical paradigms. tween speakers a n d hearers. T h e v e r t i c a l w o r l d - r e l a t i o n o f repre-
L i k e , for example, A p e l a n d T u g e n d h a t , Rorty regards the history s e n t a t i o n s of s o m e t h i n g , o r o f p r o p o s i t i o n s about s o m e t h i n g , is b e n t
of philosophy as a succession o f t h r e e p a r a d i g m s . H e speaks o f b a c k , as i t w e r e , i n t o t h e h o r i z o n t a l l i n e o f t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of
metaphysics, epistemology, a n d the philosophy of language. 1 4
Of participants i n communication. The intersubjectivity of the life-
course, the philosophy o f language has d e t a c h e d i t s e l f o n l y h a l f - w o r l d , w h i c h subjects i n h a b i t i n c o m m o n , displaces t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f
h e a r t e d l y f r o m m e n t a l i s m . R o r t y believes t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n can a w o r l d t h a t a solitary subject confronts: "For pragmatists, the desire
b e c a r r i e d t h r o u g h c o n s i s t e n t l y t o its c o n c l u s i o n o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f f o r o b j e c t i v i t y is n o t t h e desire t o escape t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f o n e ' s
a c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n t h a t takes its leave o f p h i l o s o p h y as s u c h . 1 5
I t is c o m m u n i t y , b u t s i m p l y t h e d e s i r e f o r as m u c h i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e a g r e e -
n o t j u s t t h e p r o b l e m s b u t t h e way o f p o s i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t c h a n g e s m e n t as p o s s i b l e . " 1 9
R o r t y w a n t s t o say: t h e p a r a d i g m s h i f t t r a n s f o r m s
w i t h the leap f r o m one p a r a d i g m to the next: p e r s p e c t i v e s i n s u c h a way t h a t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s as s u c h a r e
passé.
T h i s p i c t u r e o f a n c i e n t a n d m e d i e v a l p h i l o s o p h y as c o n c e r n e d w i t h things,
t h e p h i l o s o p h y of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h t h r o u g h t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s w i t h T h e contextualist understanding o f the linguistic t u r n f r o m which
ideas, a n d t h e e n l i g h t e n e d c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c e n e w i t h words h a s t h i s a n t i - r e a l i s m e m e r g e s goes b a c k t o a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e rise a n d
c o n s i d e r a b l e plausibility. B u t this s e q u e n c e s h o u l d n o t be t h o u g h t o f as fall o f paradigms that excludes c o n t i n u i t y o f theme between para-
o f f e r i n g t h r e e c o n t r a s t i n g views a b o u t w h a t is p r i m a r y , o r w h a t is f o u n d a - d i g m s as w e l l as l e a r n i n g processes t h a t e x t e n d across p a r a d i g m s . I n
tional. I t is n o t that A r i s t o d e t h o u g h t t h a t o n e c o u l d best e x p l a i n i d e a s a n d
f a c t , t h e t e r m s i n w h i c h we u n d e r t a k e a c o m p a r i s o n of paradigms
w o r d s i n t e r m s o f t h i n g s , w h e r e a s D e s c a r t e s a n d R u s s e l l r e a r r a n g e d the
reflect o u r hermeneutic starting p o i n t — a n d , thus, our own para-
o r d e r o f e x p l a n a t i o n . It w o u l d b e m o r e c o r r e c t to say that A r i s t o t l e d i d n o t
h a v e — d i d n o t feel the n e e d o f — a t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e , a n d t h a t D e s c a r t e s d i g m . T h a t R o r t y selects f o r h i s c o m p a r i s o n the frame of reference
a n d L o c k e d i d not have a theory of m e a n i n g . Aristotle's r e m a r k s about o f o b j e c t i v i t y , s u b j e c t i v i t y , a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y r e s u l t s f r o m t h e basic
354 355
Chapter 8 Richard Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

c o n c e p t u a l perspective f r o m w h i c h we n o w describe the linguistic tained the ontological paradigm: the idea that the t r u t h o f j u d g -
t u r n o f mentalism. O n the other h a n d , the picture o f a contingent ments is g u a r a n t e e d by a correspondence with r e a l i t y t h a t is
succession o f i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e p a r a d i g m s d o e s n o t i n a n y w a y fit g r o u n d e d i n r e a l i t y itself. T h i s " r e s i d u a l " i n t u i t i o n , as i t w e r e , w h i c h
w i t h this description. Rather, f r o m the perspective o f t h a t f r a m e of h a d l o s t n o n e o f its suggestive p o w e r w i t h t h e s w i t c h o f p a r a d i g m ,
r e f e r e n c e , a s u b s e q u e n t p a r a d i g m a p p e a r s as a n a n s w e r t o a p r o b l e m j o i n e d f o r c e s w i t h t h e n e w s k e p t i c a l q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r — a n d i f so,
b e q u e a t h e d t o us b y t h e d é v a l u a t i o n o f a p r e c e d i n g p a r a d i g m . C o n - how—the agreement between representation a n d represented ob-
t r a r y t o w h a t R o r t y supposes, p a r a d i g m s d o n o t f o r m a n a r b i t r a r y j e c t is t o b e g r o u n d e d o n t h e basis o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f o u r subjective
sequence b u t a dialectical relationship. e x p e r i e n c e s . I t is t h i s q u e s t i o n t h a t first p r o v o k e s t h e epistemological
N o m i n a l i s m r o b b e d t h i n g s o f t h e i r i n n e r n a t u r e o r essence a n d quarrel between Idealism and E m p i r i c i s m . 2 0
However, i n light o f this
d e c l a r e d g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s t o b e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f a finite m i n d . S i n c e g e n e a l o g y i t b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t — a n d t h i s is m y m a i n p o i n t here—
then, comprehending t h a t w h i c h is (das Seiende) i n t h o u g h t has t h a t c o n t e x t u a l i s m is b u i l t i n t o t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c
lacked a foundation i n the conceptual constitution o f beings them- p a r a d i g m j u s t as s k e p t i c i s m is b u i l t i n t o m e n t a l i s m . A n d o n c e a g a i n ,
selves. T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f m i n d w i t h n a t u r e c o u l d n o l o n g e r b e t h e i n t u i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t r u t h t h a t c a r r y o v e r o r s t i c k w i t h us f r o m
c o n c e i v e d as a n o n t o l o g i c a l relation, the rules of logic n o longer the preceding paradigms lead to an intensification of these
r e f l e c t e d t h e laws o f r e a l i t y . Pace R o r t y , m e n t a l i s m r e s p o n d e d t o t h i s problems.
challenge by reversing the o r d e r o f explanation. I f the knowing
J u s t as t h e d i s p u t e a b o u t u n i v e r s a l s at t h e e n d o f t h e M i d d l e A g e s
subject can n o l o n g e r derive the standards f o r k n o w l e d g e f r o m a
c o n t r i b u t e d to the devaluation o f objective reason, the critique of
d i s q u a l i f i e d n a t u r e , i t has t o s u p p l y t h e s e s t a n d a r d s f r o m a r e f l e x i v e l y
i n t r o s p e c t i o n a n d p s y c h o l o g i s m at t h e e n d o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n -
d i s c l o s e d s u b j e c t i v i t y itself. R e a s o n , o n c e e m b o d i e d o b j e c t i v e l y i n t h e
t u r y c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e shaking u p o f subjective reason. W i t h the
o r d e r o f n a t u r e , retreats to subjective spirit. W i t h this, the b e i n g - i n -
d i s p l a c e m e n t o f reason f r o m the consciousness o f t h e k n o w i n g sub-
i t s e l f (das Ansich) o f t h e w o r l d is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f
j e c t t o l a n g u a g e as t h e m e d i u m b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a c t i n g subjects
a w o r l d t h a t is g i v e n f o r us, t h e s u b j e c t s — a w o r l d o f represented
c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h one another, the o r d e r o f explanation changes
o b j e c t s o r phenomena. Whereas u p to t h e n , the constitution of the
o n c e m o r e . E p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y passes o v e r f r o m t h e k n o w i n g s u b -
w o r l d o f being-in-itself h a d enabled a correspondence o f thought
ject, w h i c h supplies f r o m w i t h i n herself the standards for the objec-
with reality—true judgments—the truth of judgments is n o w sup-
tivity o f experience, to the j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices o f a linguistic
p o s e d to be measured against the certainty o f evident subjective
c o m m u n i t y . U p to t h e n the intersubjective v a l i d i t y o f beliefs h a d
e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse). R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h o u g h t leads t o o b j e c t i v e
resulted f r o m the subsequent convergence o f thoughts or repre-
k n o w l e d g e i n s o f a r as i t c o m p r e h e n d s t h e p h e n o m e n a l world.
sentations. I n t e r p e r s o n a l agreement h a d b e e n e x p l a i n e d by the o n -
T h e c o n c e p t o f subjectivity i n t r o d u c e d a dualism between i n n e r tological a n c h o r i n g o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s o r by the shared psychological
a n d outer that seemed to c o n f r o n t the h u m a n m i n d w i t h the pre- o r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e n d o w m e n t s o f k n o w i n g subjects. F o l l o w i n g t h e
c a r i o u s task o f b r i d g i n g a c h a s m . W i t h t h i s , t h e way was c l e a r e d f o r linguistic t u r n , however, all explanations take the p r i m a c y o f a c o m -
s k e p t i c i s m i n its m o d e r n f o r m . T h e p r i v a t e c h a r a c t e r o f m y p a r t i c u - mon l a n g u a g e as t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t . D e s c r i p t i o n o f states and
l a r s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s , o n w h i c h m y a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y is b a s e d , events i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , l i k e t h e s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of experi-
simultaneously p r o v i d e s r e a s o n t o d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d as i t ences t o w h i c h t h e s u b j e c t has p r i v i l e g e d access, is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
a p p e a r s t o us is n o t i n f a c t a n i l l u s i o n . T h i s s k e p t i c i s m is a n c h o r e d i n t e r p r e t i n g use o f a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e t e r m
i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n c e p t s o f t h e m e n t a l i s t p a r a d i g m . A t t h e same " i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e " n o l o n g e r r e f e r s t o t h e r e s u l t o f a n observed c o n v e r -
t i m e i t c o n j u r e s u p m e m o r i e s o f t h e c o m f o r t i n g i n t u i t i o n t h a t sus- gence o f the thoughts or representations o f various persons, b u t to
356
Chapter 8
the p r i o r commonality of a linguistic preunderstanding or horizon
o f the l i f e w o r l d — w h i c h , f r o m the perspective of the participants
t h e m s e l v e s , is presupposed—within which the members of a c o m m u -
nication community find themselves before they reach under-
s t a n d i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n the w o r l d . Finally, the
c o n t e x t u a l i s t q u e s t i o n , w h i c h s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d w i t h t h e epis-
t e m o l o g i c a l d o u b t o f skepticism, results f r o m this p r i m a c y o f the
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f s h a r e d b e l i e f s o v e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h r e a l i t y (a
r e a l i t y t h a t is always a l r e a d y i n t e r p r e t e d ) .
T h e p r a g m a t i c t u r n leaves n o r o o m f o r d o u b t as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e
o f a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r descriptions. Rather, f r o m Peirce to
W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e i d l e C a r t e s i a n d o u b t has b e e n r e j e c t e d as a p e r f o r -
mative contradiction: " I f you tried to d o u b t everything you w o u l d
n o t g e t as f a r as d o u b t i n g a n y t h i n g . T h e g a m e o f d o u b t i n g i t s e l f
p r e s u p p o s e s c e r t a i n t y . " O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a l l k n o w l e d g e is f a l l i b l e
2 1
a n d , w h e n i t is p r o b l e m a t i z e d , d e p e n d e n t o n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A s s o o n
as t h e s t a n d a r d f o r t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f k n o w l e d g e passes f r o m p r i v a t e
certainty to p u b l i c practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , " t r u t h " becomes a three-
p l a c e c o n c e p t o f v a l i d i t y . T h e v a l i d i t y o f p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are f a l l i b l e
i n p r i n c i p l e is s h o w n t o b e v a l i d i t y t h a t is j u s t i f i e d for a p u b l i c . 2 2
M o r e o v e r , because i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m t r u t h s are accessible
o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e q u e s t i o n n o w arises o f
h o w i n t h a t case t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n c a n s t i l l b e i s o l a t e d f r o m
t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t is j u s t i f i e d . U n e a s e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h i s p r o b -
l e m b r i n g s o l d e r i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t t r u t h o n t o t h e scene. I t a w a k e n s
m e m o r y o f a correspondence between t h o u g h t a n d reality or o f a
c o n t a c t w i t h r e a l i t y t h a t is s e n s o r i a l l y c e r t a i n . T h e s e i m a g e s , w h i c h
a r e s t i l l suggestive d e s p i t e h a v i n g l o s t t h e i r b e a r i n g s , are b e h i n d t h e
q u e s t i o n o f h o w the fact t h a t we c a n n o t transcend t h e linguistic
h o r i z o n o f j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t r u e
p r o p o s i t i o n s fit t h e facts. I t is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e contemporary
r a t i o n a l i t y debates circle a r o u n d t h e concepts o f t r u t h a n d refer-
ence. 2 3
J u s t as s k e p t i c i s m d o e s n o t s i m p l y a s s i m i l a t e b e i n g t o a p p e a r -
a n c e b u t r a t h e r gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e uneasy f e e l i n g t h a t w e might
b e u n a b l e t o separate t h e o n e f r o m t h e o t h e r c o n v i n c i n g l y , n e i t h e r
does contextualism, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , equate t r u t h w i t h j u s t i f i e d
a s s e r t i b i l i t y . C o n t e x t u a l i s m is r a t h e r a n e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e e m b a r r a s s -
357
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
m e n t t h a t w o u l d e n s u e i f we did have t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e o n e t o t h e
o t h e r . I t m a k e s us aware o f a p r o b l e m t o w h i c h c u l t u r a l r e l a t i v i s m
p r e s e n t s a s o l u t i o n t h a t is false b e c a u s e i t c o n t a i n s a p e r f o r m a t i v e
self-con tradic t i o n .
T r u t h and Justification
Even i n the comprehension o f e l e m e n t a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t states
o r events i n t h e w o r l d , l a n g u a g e a n d reality interpenetrate i n a
m a n n e r t h a t f o r us is indissoluble. T h e r e is n o n a t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f
isolating the constraints o f reality that m a k e a statement t r u e f r o m
t h e s e m a n t i c r u l e s t h a t lay d o w n t h e s e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . W e can
e x p l a i n w h a t a f a c t is o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e t r u t h o f a s t a t e m e n t
o f f a c t , a n d w e c a n e x p l a i n w h a t is r e a l o n l y i n t e r m s o f w h a t is t r u e .
B e i n g , as T u g e n d h a t says, is v e r i t a t i v e b e i n g . 2 4
Since the t r u t h of
beliefs o r sentences can i n t u r n be j u s t i f i e d o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f
o t h e r b e l i e f s a n d sentences, w e c a n n o t b r e a k f r e e f r o m t h e m a g i c
circle o f o u r language. T h i s f a c t suggests a n a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t
conception o f knowledge and a holistic conception of justification.
B e c a u s e w e c a n n o t c o n f r o n t o u r s e n t e n c e s w i t h a n y t h i n g t h a t is n o t
i t s e l f a l r e a d y s a t u r a t e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , n o basic p r o p o s i t i o n s c a n be
d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h a t w o u l d be p r i v i l e g e d i n b e i n g a b l e t o l e g i t i m a t e
t h e m s e l v e s , t h e r e b y s e r v i n g as t h e basis f o r a l i n e a r c h a i n o f j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n . R o r t y r i g h t l y e m p h a s i z e s " t h a t n o t h i n g c o u n t s as j u s t i f i c a t i o n
unless b y r e f e r e n c e t o w h a t we a l r e a d y a c c e p t , " c o n c l u d i n g f r o m t h i s
" t h a t t h e r e is n o way t o g e t o u t s i d e o u r b e l i e f s a n d o u r l a n g u a g e so
as t o find s o m e test o t h e r t h a n c o h e r e n c e . " 2 5
T h i s does n o t m e a n , o f course, t h a t the c o h e r e n c e o f o u r beliefs
is s u f f i c i e n t t o c l a r i f y t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h — w h i c h
has n o w b e c o m e c e n t r a l . C e r t a i n l y , w i t h i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m ,
t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n c a n n o l o n g e r be c o n c e i v e d as c o r r e s p o n -
d e n c e w i t h s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d , f o r o t h e r w i s e w e w o u l d have t o
be able to "get outside o f language" w h i l e u s i n g language. Obviously,
we c a n n o t c o m p a r e linguistic expressions w i t h a piece o f u n i n t e r -
p r e t e d o r " n a k e d " r e a l i t y — t h a t is, w i t h a r e f e r e n c e t h a t e l u d e s o u r
linguistically b o u n d inspection. 2 6
Nonetheless, the correspondence
i d e a o f t r u t h was a b l e t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f a f u n d a m e n t a l aspect o f t h e
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Chapter 8
m e a n i n g of the truth predicate. This aspect—the n o t i o n o f uncon-
d i t i o n a l v a l i d i t y — i s swept u n d e r t h e c a r p e t i f t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i -
t i o n is c o n c e i v e d as c o h e r e n c e w i t h o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s o r as j u s t i f i e d
a s s e r t i b i l i t y w i t h i n a n i n t e r c o n n e c t e d system o f assertions. Whereas
w e l l - j u s t i f i e d assertions c a n t u r n o u t t o b e false, we u n d e r s t a n d t r u t h
as a p r o p e r t y o f p r o p o s i t i o n s " t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t . " C o h e r e n c e d e -
p e n d s o n practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t l e t themselves be g u i d e d by
standards that change f r o m t i m e to time. T h i s accounts f o r the
q u e s t i o n : " W h y does t h e f a c t t h a t o u r b e l i e f s h a n g t o g e t h e r , s u p p o s -
i n g t h e y d o , give t h e least i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y are t r u e ? " 2 7
T h e " c a u t i o n a r y " use o f t h e t r u t h p r e d i c a t e 2 8
shows t h a t , w i t h t h e
t r u t h o f propositions, we c o n n e c t an u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m that p o i n t s
beyond a l l t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e
e v i d e n c e t h a t we b r i n g t o b e a r i n o u r c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n has t o
be s u f f i c i e n t t o e n t i t l e us t o raise t r u t h c l a i m s . A l t h o u g h t r u t h c a n -
n o t b e r e d u c e d t o c o h e r e n c e a n d j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y , t h e r e has t o
be a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H o w , o t h e r -
w i s e , w o u l d i t be p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h a t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f "p" suc-
cessful a c c o r d i n g t o o u r s t a n d a r d s , p o i n t s i n f a v o r o f t h e t r u t h o f "p,"
a l t h o u g h t r u t h is n o t a n a c h i e v e m e n t t e r m a n d d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n
h o w w e l l a p r o p o s i t i o n can be j u s t i f i e d . M i c h a e l W i l l i a m s describes
t h e p r o b l e m as a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n two equally reasonable ideas:
" F i r s t , t h a t i f we are t o h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t h e
t r u t h o f w h a t we b e l i e v e a b o u t t h e w o r l d m u s t be i n d e p e n d e n t of
o u r b e l i e v i n g i t ; a n d s e c o n d , t h a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n is i n e v i t a b l y a m a t t e r
o f s u p p o r t i n g b e l i e f s b y o t h e r b e l i e f s , h e n c e i n t h i s m i n i m a l sense a
matter of coherence." 2 9
T h i s leads t o t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t q u e s t i o n :
"Given o n l y knowledge o f w h a t we believe a b o u t the w o r l d , a n d h o w
o u r b e l i e f s fit t o g e t h e r , h o w c a n w e s h o w t h a t these b e l i e f s a r e l i k e l y
to be t r u e ? " 3 0
T h i s q u e s t i o n s h o u l d n o t , however, be u n d e r s t o o d i n a skeptical
sense, f o r t h e c o n c e p t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h w e , as s o c i a l i z e d i n d i -
v i d u a l s , always a l r e a d y find ourselves w i t h i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y dis-
closed horizon of our lifeworld implies an unquestioned
b a c k g r o u n d o f intersubjectively shared convictions, proven true i n
p r a c t i c e , w h i c h m a k e s n o n s e n s e o f t o t a l d o u b t as t o t h e accessibility
o f t h e w o r l d . L a n g u a g e , w h i c h w e c a n n o t "get o u t s i d e o f , " s h o u l d
359
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
n o t be u n d e r s t o o d i n analogy to the inwardness o f a r e p r e s e n t i n g
s u b j e c t w h o is as i f c u t o f f f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d o f r e p r e s e n t a b l e
objects. T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between j u s t i f i a b i l i t y a n d t r u t h , a l t h o u g h
i n n e e d o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n , signals n o g u l f b e t w e e n i n n e r a n d o u t e r , n o
d u a l i s m t h a t w o u l d h a v e t o b e bridged a n d t h a t c o u l d give rise t o t h e
s k e p t i c a l d o u b t as t o w h e t h e r o u r w o r l d as a whole is a n i l l u s i o n . T h e
p r a g m a t i c t u r n p u l l s t h e r u g f r o m u n d e r t h i s s k e p t i c i s m . T h e r e is a
s i m p l e r e a s o n f o r t h i s . I n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , w e c a n n o t use l a n g u a g e
w i t h o u t acting. S p e e c h i t s e l f is e f f e c t e d i n t h e m o d e o f s p e e c h acts
t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t are e m b e d d e d i n c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n a n d
e n t w i n e d w i t h i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n s . A s a c t o r s , t h a t is, as i n t e r a c t i n g
a n d i n t e r v e n i n g subjects, we are always a l r e a d y i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h i n g s
a b o u t w h i c h we can m a k e statements. L a n g u a g e games a n d practices
a r e interwoven. " A t some p o i n t . . . w e h a v e t o leave t h e r e a l m o f
s e n t e n c e s ( a n d t e x t s ) a n d d r a w u p o n a g r e e m e n t i n a c t i o n a n d ex-
perience (for instance, i n using a p r e d i c a t e ) . " 3 1
F r o m the point of
view o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f language, Husserl's phenomenological
conclusion t h a t w e "are always a l r e a d y i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h i n g s " is
confirmed.
F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e q u e s t i o n as t o t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n be-
tween justification a n d t r u t h — a connection that explains why we
may, i n l i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us, raise a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l
t r u t h c l a i m t h a t a i m s b e y o n d w h a t is j u s t i f i e d — i s n o t a n e p i s t e m o -
l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n . I t is n o t a m a t t e r o f b e i n g o r a p p e a r a n c e . W h a t is
at stake is n o t t h e c o r r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f r e a l i t y b u t everyday
practices t h a t m u s t n o t fall a p a r t . T h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t unease betrays a
w o r r y a b o u t the s m o o t h f u n c t i o n i n g o f language games a n d prac-
tices. R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n n o t f u n c t i o n u n l e s s t h e p a r t i c i -
pants refer to a single objective w o r l d , thereby stabilizing the
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d p u b l i c space w i t h w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is
m e r e l y s u b j e c t i v e c a n be c o n t r a s t e d . 3 2
T h i s supposition o f an objec-
tive w o r l d t h a t is i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s f u l f i l l s a f u n c t i o n a l
r e q u i r e m e n t o f o u r processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
W i t h o u t t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n , e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , w h i c h rest o n t h e ( i n a
c e r t a i n sense) P l a t o n i c d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n b e l i e v i n g a n d k n o w i n g
unreservedly, w o u l d c o m e apart at t h e s e a m s . 33
I f i t were to t u r n o u t
t h a t w e c a n n o t i n a n y way m a k e this d i s t i n c t i o n , t h e r e s u l t w o u l d b e
360 361

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

more of a pathological self-misunderstanding than an illusionary o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n r e m o v e d f r o m everyday practices remains w i t h i n

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d . W h e r e a s s k e p t i c i s m suspects a n e p i s t e - the reach o f "our" practices. 35

m o l o g i c a l mistake, c o n t e x t u a l i s m supposes a faulty c o n s t r u c t i o n i n

t h e way w e l i v e .
C o n t e x t u a l i s m t h u s raises t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a n d , as t h e case
m a y b e , h o w t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t w e c a n i n p r i n c i p l e d i s t i n g u i s h be-
t w e e n w h a t - i s - t r u e a n d w h a t - i s - h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e c a n be b r o u g h t i n t o
t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m . T h i s i n t u i t i o n is n o t " r e a l i s t " i n a n e p i s t e m o -
l o g i c a l sense. E v e n w i t h i n p r a g m a t i s m t h e r e is a p a r t i n g o f ways w i t h
r e g a r d to this question. Some are pragmatist e n o u g h to take seri-
ously realist everyday i n t u i t i o n s a n d t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between
c o h e r e n c e a n d t r u t h t o w h i c h t h e y attest. O t h e r s r e g a r d t h e a t t e m p t
t o c l a r i f y t h i s i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n as h o p e l e s s , t r e a t i n g e v e r y d a y r e a l i s m
as a n i l l u s i o n . R o r t y w a n t s t o c o m b a t t h i s i l l u s i o n b y r h e t o r i c a l m e a n s
a n d p l e a d s f o r reeducation. W e o u g h t t o g e t u s e d t o r e p l a c i n g t h e
desire for objectivity w i t h the desire f o r solidarity a n d , w i t h W i l l i a m
J a m e s , t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g " t r u t h " as n o m o r e t h a n t h a t i n w h i c h i t is
g o o d for "us"—the liberal members of Western culture or Western
s o c i e t i e s — t o b e l i e v e . " [ P r a g m a t i s t s ] s h o u l d see themselves as w o r k -
i n g a t t h e i n t e r f a c e b e t w e e n t h e c o m m o n sense o f t h e i r c o m m u n i t y ,
a c o m m o n sense m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y G r e e k m e t a p h y s i c s a n d by
p a t r i a r c h a l m o n o t h e i s m . . . . T h e y s h o u l d see t h e m s e l v e s as i n v o l v e d
i n a l o n g - t e r m a t t e m p t t o c h a n g e t h e r h e t o r i c , t h e c o m m o n sense,
a n d self-image o f t h e i r c o m m u n i t y . " 3 4
Before I deal w i t h this proposal, I w o u l d like to e x a m i n e w h e t h e r
t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s are as h o p e l e s s as R o r t y assumes. A r e t h e r e not
p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h e f a c t t h a t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n successful i n
o u r justificatory context points i n favor o f the context-independent
t r u t h o f the j u s t i f i e d proposition? I a m interested above a l l i n two
attempts at explanation: a d e f l a t i o n a r y one, w h i c h disputes that
" t r u t h " has a n y n a t u r e a t a l l t h a t c o u l d be explicated; a n d an
T h e S e m a n t i c C o n c e p t i o n o f T r u t h a n d the P r a g m a t i c P e r s p e c t i v e
T a r s k i ' s C o n v e n t i o n T — " ' / > ' is t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f p"—relies on a
d i s q u o t a t i o n a l use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e t h a t c a n b e i l l u s t r a t e d , f o r
instance, by the example o f c o n f i r m i n g a n o t h e r person's statements:
" E v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e witness said y e s t e r d a y is t r u e . " W i t h t h i s , t h e
s p e a k e r m a k e s h i s o w n " e v e r y t h i n g t h a t was s a i d , " i n s u c h a way t h a t
he could repeat the corresponding a s s e r t i o n s i n t h e stance o f t h e
first p e r s o n . T h i s use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e is n o t e w o r t h y i n t w o
respects. F o r o n e t h i n g , i t p e r m i t s a g e n e r a l i z i n g r e f e r e n c e t o s u b j e c t
m a t t e r t h a t is m e n t i o n e d b u t n o t e x p l i c i t l y r e p r o d u c e d . T a r s k i uses
this p r o p e r t y i n o r d e r to construct a t h e o r y o f t r u t h that generalizes
a b o u t a l l i n s t a n c e s o f "T." F o r a n o t h e r , t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e w h e n
u s e d i n t h i s way establishes a r e l a t i o n o f e q u i v a l e n c e between two
linguistic expressions—the w h o l e p o i n t o f t h e T a r s k i a n strategy o f
e x p l a n a t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h i s . For, t h r o u g h e x p l o i t i n g t h e d i s q u o t a -
t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , t h e inaccessible " r e l a t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d e n c e " b e -
tween language a n d w o r l d o r sentence a n d fact can, i t appears, be
reflected o n t o the tangible semantic r e l a t i o n between the expres-
sions o f a n o b j e c t l a n g u a g e a n d t h o s e o f a m e t a l a n g u a g e . N o m a t t e r
h o w o n e conceives o f the representational f u n c t i o n o f statements,
w h e t h e r as " s a t i s f a c t i o n " o f t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o r as " f i t t i n g " t h e facts
t o t h e s e n t e n c e s , w h a t is e n v i s a g e d i n e v e r y case a r e p i c t u r e s of
relations that extend beyond language. I t n o w seems p o s s i b l e t o
c l a r i f y t h e s e p i c t u r e s w i t h t h e h e l p o f i n t e r r e l a t i o n s t h a t are internal
to language. T h i s i n i t i a l i d e a a l l o w s us t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y w e a k r e a l i s t
c o n n o t a t i o n s are c o n n e c t e d w i t h the semantic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h —
e v e n i f i t is c l e a r t h a t t h i s c o n c e p t i o n c a n n o t s u s t a i n a s t r o n g e p i s t e -
mological realism i n the manner o f Popper. 3 6

epistemic one, w h i c h inflates the idea o f a j u s t i f i e d assertion to such

an extent that t r u t h becomes the l i m i t concept o f the justificatory N o w , i t was a l r e a d y n o t i c e d a t a n e a r l y stage t h a t t h e semantic
p r o c e s s . O f c o u r s e , d e f l a t i o n i s m is p e r m i t t e d t o d e - t h e m a t i z e the conception o f t r u t h c a n n o t v i n d i c a t e its c l a i m t o b e a n e x p l i c a t i o n
c o n c e p t o f t r u t h o n l y to t h e e x t e n t that this c o n c e p t can continue o f the full m e a n i n g o f the truth-predicate. 3 7
T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s is
t o s u s t a i n r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n s , w h i l e t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t i o n is a l l o w e d t h a t t h e d i s q u o t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n is n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m a t i v e b e -
t o i d e a l i z e t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t its i d e a cause i t a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . One
362
Chapter 8
u n d e r s t a n d s t h e m e a n i n g o f C o n v e n t i o n T w h e n o n e k n o w s w h a t is
meant (gemeint) w i t h t h e r i g h t - h a n d side o f t h e b i c o n d i t i o n a l . T h e
m e a n i n g o f the truth-predicate i n the sentence " E v e r y t h i n g that the
w i t n e s s s a i d yesterday is t r u e " is p a r a s i t i c o n t h e assertoric m o d e o f
t h e witness's assertions. B e f o r e a n a s s e r t i o n c a n be q u o t e d i t m u s t
b e " p u t f o r w a r d . " T h i s p r e s u p p o s e d assertoric m e a n i n g c a n b e a n a -
l y z e d i n a n e x e m p l a r y way b y l o o k i n g a t t h e "yes" a n d " n o " positions
o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o raise o r r e f u t e o b j e c t i o n s ; i t
c a n also b e seen i n t h e " c a u t i o n a r y " use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e , w h i c h
recalls t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t even
p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t have b e e n j u s t i f i e d c o n v i n c i n g l y c a n t u r n o u t t o b e
false.
The truth-predicate belongs—though n o t exclusively—to the lan-
g u a g e g a m e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . F o r t h i s r e a s o n its m e a n i n g c a n
e l u c i d a t e d ( a t least p a r t l y ) a c c o r d i n g t o its f u n c t i o n s i n t h i s l a n g u a g e
g a m e , t h a t is, i n t h e pragmatic dimension o f a p a r t i c u l a r e m p l o y m e n t
o f the predicate. Whoever confines herself to the semantic dimen-
sion o f sentences a n d o f m e t a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m e n t a r i e s o n sentences
c o m p r e h e n d s only the reflection o f a p r i o r linguistic practice that,
as r e m a i n s t o be s h o w n , e x t e n d s e v e n i n t o e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s . How-
ever, t h e d e f l a t i o n a r y t r e a t m e n t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h , t h r o u g h its
s e m a n t i c d i m m i n g o f t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t r u t h , has t h e a d -
vantage o f a v o i d i n g discussions a b o u t the " n a t u r e " o f t r u t h w i t h o u t
h a v i n g to f o r f e i t a m i n i m a l o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d the d i s t i n c t i o n be-
tween k n o w i n g and believing, between being-true a n d being-held-to-
be-true. This strategy aims at uncoupling these elementary
distinctions from the dispute about substantial epistemological
views. I f i t c a n be s h o w n t h a t t h e s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h is
s u f f i c i e n t t o e x p l a i n t h e u s u a l m e t h o d s o f i n q u i r y a n d t h e o r y selec-
t i o n — t h a t is, s u f f i c i e n t also t o e x p l a i n w h a t c o u n t s as "success" o r
"growth i n knowledge" i n the scientific enterprise—we c a n rescue
t h e weak realist supposition o f a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r descrip-
tions w i t h o u t boosting u p the concept o f t r u t h i n an epistemologi-
cal-realist way. 38
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , science is n o t t h e o n l y s p h e r e — a n d n o t e v e n
t h e p r i m a r y o n e — i n w h i c h t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e has a use. E v e n i f a
d e f l a t i o n a r y c o n c e p t o f t r u t h were sufficient f o r e l u c i d a t i n g the fact
363
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
o f science, f o r r e n d e r i n g the f u n c t i o n i n g o f o u r practices o f i n q u i r y
t r a n s p a r e n t , this w o u l d still n o t dissipate t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t d o u b t . For
this d o u b t extends n o t only to the c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d selection of
theories, i n d e e d , n o t o n l y to practices o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n general:
w i t h respect to the pretheoretical o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h i n h e r e n t
i n everyday practices, a semantic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h simply does n o t
h e l p us a t a l l .
W h a t is a t issue i n t h e l i f e w o r l d is t h e p r a g m a t i c r o l e o f a J a n u s -
faced n o t i o n o f t r u t h that mediates between behavioral certainty a n d
d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d assertibility. I n t h e n e t w o r k o f e s t a b l i s h e d prac-
tices, i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t have b e e n a c c e p t e d a g a i n s t
a b r o a d b a c k g r o u n d o f intersubjectively shared convictions consti-
tute the rails a l o n g w h i c h behavioral certainties r u n . However, as
be s o o n as t h e s e c e r t a i n t i e s lose t h e i r h o l d i n t h e c o r s e t o f s e l f - e v i d e n t
beliefs, they are j o l t e d o u t o f t r a n q u i l l i t y a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a
corresponding n u m b e r o f questionable topics that thereby b e c o m e
subject to debate. I n m o v i n g f r o m a c t i o n to r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e , 3 9
w h a t is i n i t i a l l y n a i v e l y h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e is r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e m o d e o f
b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t y a n d assumes t h e f o r m o f a h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o -
s i t i o n w h o s e v a l i d i t y is l e f t o p e n f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e d i s c o u r s e .
T h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n takes t h e f o r m o f a c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e b e t t e r
a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o r of, o r against, c o n t r o v e r s i a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , a n d
serves t h e c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h f o r t r u t h . 4 0
W i t h this d e s c r i p t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices g u i d e d by t h e idea
o f t r u t h , h o w e v e r , t h e p r o b l e m is p o s e d a n e w o f h o w t h e systematic
m o b i l i z a t i o n o f g o o d reasons, w h i c h a t b e s t l e a d t o j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s ,
is s u p p o s e d n o n e t h e l e s s t o b e a d e q u a t e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d i s c r i m i -
n a t i n g between j u s t i f i e d a n d unjustified t r u t h claims. To begin w i t h ,
I s i m p l y w a n t to k e e p h o l d o f t h e p i c t u r e o f a c i r c u l a r process t h a t
p r e s e n t s i t s e l f t o us f r o m a p e r s p e c t i v e e x p a n d e d by means o f the
t h e o r y o f a c t i o n : shaken-up b e h a v i o r a l certainties are t r a n s f o r m e d
on the level o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n t o controversial validity claims
raised f o r h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s ; these claims are tested discur-
s i v e l y — a n d , as t h e case m a y b e , v i n d i c a t e d — w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e
discursively accepted t r u t h s can r e t u r n t o t h e r e a l m o f a c t i o n ; w i t h
t h i s , b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s (as t h e case m a y b e , n e w o n e s ) , w h i c h r e l y
o n beliefs u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y h e l d t o be t r u e , are p r o d u c e d o n c e
364 365

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

m o r e . W h a t still r e m a i n s t o be e x p l a i n e d is t h e m y s t e r i o u s p o w e r o f T h e Epistemic Conception of Truth in a Pragmatic Perspective

t h e d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t t h a t authorizes t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s
in a r g u m e n t a t i o n , i n t h e role o f actors, to accept unreservedly T h e stubborn p r o b l e m o f the relation between t r u t h and justifica-
j u s t i f i e d assertions as t r u t h s . F o r i t is c l e a r f r o m t h e d e s c r i p t i o n f r o m t i o n makes understandable the a t t e m p t to distinguish " t r u t h " f r o m
t h e p o i n t o f view o f a c t i o n t h e o r y t h a t a r g u m e n t a t i o n c a n f u l f i l l t h e "rational acceptability" t h r o u g h an idealization o f the conditions o f
r o l e o f troubleshooter w i t h r e g a r d t o b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s t h a t have j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s a t t e m p t p r o p o s e s t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d ac-
b e c o m e p r o b l e m a t i c o n l y i f i t is g u i d e d b y t r u t h i n a c o n t e x t - i n d e - c o r d i n g t o " o u r " s t a n d a r d s is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n
p e n d e n t — t h a t is, unconditional—sense. i n t h e s a m e way t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t is
A l t h o u g h w h e n w e a d o p t a r e f l e x i v e a t t i t u d e we k n o w t h a t a l l d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a p r o p o s i t i o n that c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d i n any c o n -
knowledge is f a l l i b l e , i n e v e r y d a y l i f e w e c a n n o t s u r v i v e w i t h h y - t e x t . A p r o p o s i t i o n is " t r u e " i f i t c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d u n d e r ideal
p o t h e s e s a l o n e , t h a t is, i n a p e r s i s t e n t l y f a l l i b i l i s t way. T h e organized epistemic conditions (Putnam) 4 1
or could win argumentatively
f a l l i b i l i s m o f scientific i n q u i r y can deal hypothetically w i t h c o n t r o - reached agreement i n an ideal speech situation ( H a b e r m a s ) 4 2
or in
v e r s i a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n d e f i n i t e l y because i t serves t o b r i n g a b o u t an ideal c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y ( A p e l ) . 4 3
W h a t is t r u e is w h a t
a g r e e m e n t s t h a t are uncoupled f r o m a c t i o n . T h i s m o d e l is n o t s u i t a b l e may be a c c e p t e d as r a t i o n a l u n d e r i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s . Convincing
f o r t h e l i f e w o r l d . Certainly, we have t o m a k e decisions i n t h e life- objections have b e e n r a i s e d t o t h i s p r o p o s a l , w h i c h dates b a c k t o
w o r l d o n t h e basis o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n ; m o r e o v e r , e x i s t e n t i a l Peirce. The objections are directed i n p a r t against conceptual
risks s u c h as t h e loss o f t h o s e closest t o us, sickness, o l d age, and d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e i d e a l state a d o p t e d ; i n p a r t t h e y s h o w t h a t a n
d e a t h are t h e m a r k o f h u m a n l i f e . H o w e v e r , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g these i d e a l i z a t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t a c h i e v e its g o a l be-
u n c e r t a i n t i e s , everyday r o u t i n e s rest o n a n u n q u a l i f i e d t r u s t i n the cause i t e i t h e r distances t r u t h t o o f a r f r o m j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y o r
knowledge o f lay p e o p l e as m u c h as e x p e r t s . W e w o u l d step o n no n o r far enough.
b r i d g e , use n o car, u n d e r g o n o o p e r a t i o n , n o t e v e n eat a n e x q u i s i t e l y The first k i n d o f objection draws a t t e n t i o n to the paradoxical
p r e p a r e d m e a l i f we d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e k n o w l e d g e used to be nature o f the n o t i o n of "complete" or "conclusive" knowledge—
safeguarded, i f we d i d n o t h o l d t h e assumptions e m p l o y e d i n the fixed as a l i m i t c o n c e p t — t h a t , w h e n its i n c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d f a l l i b i l i t y
p r o d u c t i o n a n d e x e c u t i o n o f o u r a c t i o n s t o be t r u e . A t a n y r a t e , t h e is t a k e n away f r o m i t , w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e (human) knowledge. 4 4

performative need for behavioral certainty rules out a reservation i n P a r a d o x i c a l , t o o , is t h e i d e a o f a final consensus o r definitive l a n -
p r i n c i p l e w i t h r e g a r d t o t r u t h , e v e n t h o u g h we k n o w , as s o o n as t h e guage that w o u l d b r i n g to a standstill all f u r t h e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n or
naive p e r f o r m a n c e o f a c t i o n s is i n t e r r u p t e d , t h a t t r u t h c l a i m s c a n a l l f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t w h a t is meant as a
b e v i n d i c a t e d o n l y d i s c u r s i v e l y — t h a t is, o n l y w i t h i n t h e relevant s i t u a t i o n o f i d e a l m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t a n d s r e v e a l e d as a s i t u -
c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T r u t h may be assimilated n e i t h e r to behav- a t i o n b e y o n d t h e necessity f o r ( a n d t h e p r o b l e m s c o n n e c t e d w i t h )
i o r a l certainty n o r to j u s t i f i e d assertibility. Evidently, o n l y s t r o n g l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 4 5
T h i s o b j e c t i o n is
conceptions of knowledge a n d t r u t h — o p e n to the accusation of d i r e c t e d n o t j u s t a g a i n s t a n i d e a l i z a t i o n t h a t h y p o s t a t i z e s f i n a l states
Platonism—can do justice to the unity o f the illocutionary m e a n i n g as attainable states i n t h e w o r l d . E v e n i f t h e i d e a l r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s a r e
o f assertions, w h i c h t a k e o n d i f f e r e n t r o l e s i n t h e r e a l m s o f a c t i o n u n d e r s t o o d as a i m s t h a t are n o t a t t a i n a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e , o r a t t a i n a b l e
a n d d i s c o u r s e respectively. W h e r e a s i n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s "truths" only approximately, i t remains "paradoxical t h a t we would be
p r o p u p behavioral certainties, i n discourses they p r o v i d e t h e refer- o b l i g e d t o strive f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a n i d e a l w h o s e r e a l i z a t i o n
ence p o i n t f o r t r u t h claims that are i n p r i n c i p l e fallible. w o u l d be the e n d o f h u m a n h i s t o r y . " 4 6
As a regulative idea, the
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critical p o i n t o f the o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h becomes clear only
w h e n t h e f o r m a l o r p r o c e s s u a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d not
its aims, are i d e a l i z e d .
T h e s e c o n d k i n d o f o b j e c t i o n leads t o t h e same c o n c l u s i o n . T h e s e
objections are d i r e c t e d n o t a g a i n s t t h e i n c o h e r e n t r e s u l t s o f t h e
i d e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e t a r g e t e d states b u t a g a i n s t t h e o p e r a t i o n o f i d e a l i -
z a t i o n itself. N o m a t t e r h o w t h e v a l u e o f t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n d i t i o n s is
enhanced t h r o u g h i d e a l i z a t i o n s , e i t h e r t h e y satisfy t h e uncondi-
t i o n a l character o f t r u t h claims by means o f requirements that cut
o f f a l l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f a m i l i a r t o us, o r
else t h e y r e t a i n t h e c o n n e c t i o n t o p r a c t i c e s f a m i l i a r t o us b y p a y i n g
the price that r a t i o n a l acceptability does n o t exclude the possibility
o f e r r o r e v e n u n d e r these i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t is, d o e s n o t s i m u l a t e
a p r o p e r t y " t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t " : " I t w o u l d be a p p a r e n t e i t h e r t h a t
t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s a l l o w t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r o r t h a t t h e y a r e so
i d e a l as t o m a k e n o use o f t h e i n t e n d e d c o n n e c t i o n with human
abilities." 4 7
I n h i s d e b a t e s w i t h P u t n a m , A p e l , a n d m e , R o r t y m a k e s use of
these objections n o t i n o r d e r to d i s c r e d i t t h e e p i s t e m i z a t i o n o f t r u t h
b u t i n o r d e r t o r a d i c a l i z e i t . W i t h h i s o p p o n e n t s h e shares t h e view
that the standards f o r the r a t i o n a l acceptability o f propositions, al-
t h o u g h t h e y c h a n g e h i s t o r i c a l l y , d o n o t always d o so a r b i t r a r i l y . A t
least f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , r a t i o n a l i t y s t a n d a r d s
are o p e n t o c r i t i q u e a n d c a n b e " r e f o r m e d , " t h a t is, i m p r o v e d o n t h e
basis o f g o o d reasons. U n l i k e P u t n a m , h o w e v e r , R o r t y d o e s n o t w a n t
t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e f a c t o f l e a r n i n g processes b y c o n c e d i n g t h a t
j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices are g u i d e d by a n idea o f t r u t h t h a t transcends
t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n t e x t i n q u e s t i o n . H e c o m p l e t e l y rejects i d e a l i z i n g
l i m i t concepts a n d interprets the difference between justification
a n d t r u t h i n s u c h a way t h a t a p r o p o n e n t is p r e p a r e d i n a g i v e n case
t o d e f e n d h e r views n o t o n l y h e r e a n d n o w b u t e v e n i n f r o n t o f
a n o t h e r a u d i e n c e . W h o e v e r is o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t r u t h i n t h i s sense is
w i l l i n g "to justify his convictions i n f r o n t o f a c o m p e t e n t audience"
o r " t o i n c r e a s e t h e size o r d i v e r s i t y o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n a l commu-
nity." 4 8
O n R o r t y ' s view, e v e r y i d e a l i z a t i o n t h a t goes b e y o n d t h i s w i l l
founder on the p r o b l e m t h a t i n i d e a l i z i n g we m u s t always take
s o m e t h i n g f a m i l i a r as o u r p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; u s u a l l y i t is " u s , " t h a t
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Richard Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
is, t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y as w e a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h i t : " I c a n -
n o t see w h a t ' i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y ' c a n m e a n e x c e p t 'ac-
c e p t a b i l i t y t o a n i d e a l c o m m u n i t y . ' N o r c a n I see, g i v e n t h a t n o s u c h
c o m m u n i t y is g o i n g t o have a G o d ' s eye view, t h a t t h i s i d e a l c o m m u -
n i t y c a n b e a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n us as w e s h o u l d l i k e t o b e . N o r c a n
I see w h a t ' u s ' c a n m e a n h e r e e x c e p t : us e d u c a t e d , sophisticated,
t o l e r a n t , w e t l i b e r a l s , t h e p e o p l e w h o a r e always w i l l i n g t o h e a r t h e
o t h e r side, t o t h i n k o u t a l l t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s , e t c . " 4 9
O f course, i t can be objected to this that an idealization o f the
j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s does n o t i n a n y way have t o t a k e t h e " t h i c k "
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f o n e ' s o w n c u l t u r e as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; r a t h e r ,
it can start w i t h the f o r m a l a n d processual characteristics o f justifica-
t o r y p r a c t i c e s i n g e n e r a l t h a t , a f t e r a l l , a r e t o b e f o u n d i n all c u l -
t u r e s — e v e n i f n o t b y a n y m e a n s always i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d f o r m . T h e
fact that the practice o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n compels the participants
themselves to make pragmatic assumptions w i t h a counterfactual
c o n t e n t fits i n w e l l w i t h t h i s . W h o e v e r e n t e r s i n t o d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e
serious i n t e n t i o n o f b e c o m i n g convinced o f s o m e t h i n g t h r o u g h d i a -
l o g u e w i t h o t h e r s has t o p r e s u m e performatively that the partici-
p a n t s a l l o w t h e i r "yes" o r " n o " t o b e d e t e r m i n e d solely b y t h e f o r c e
o f the better a r g u m e n t . However, w i t h this they assume—normally
i n a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l w a y — a s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t satisfies i m p r o b a b l e
c o n d i t i o n s : openness to the p u b l i c , inclusiveness, equal rights to
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i m m u n i z a t i o n against e x t e r n a l o r i n h e r e n t c o m p u l -
s i o n , as w e l l as t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g ( t h a t is, t h e s i n c e r e e x p r e s s i o n of utterances). 5 0
I n these
u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h e i n t u i t i o n is ex-
p r e s s e d t h a t t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e r e s i s t a n t t o spatially, socially, a n d
t e m p o r a l l y u n c o n s t r a i n e d a t t e m p t s t o r e f u t e t h e m . W h a t we h o l d t o
b e t r u e has t o b e d é f e n d a b l e o n t h e basis o f g o o d r e a s o n s n o t m e r e l y
i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t b u t i n a l l p o s s i b l e c o n t e x t s , t h a t is, a t a n y t i m e
a n d against anybody. T h i s provides t h e i n s p i r a t i o n f o r the discourse
t h e o r y o f t r u t h : a p r o p o s i t i o n is t r u e i f i t w i t h s t a n d s a l l a t t e m p t s t o
refute i t u n d e r the d e m a n d i n g conditions o f rational discourse. 51
H o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t i t is also t r u e for this reason. A
t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p" says t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r "p" are
satisfied. W e have n o o t h e r way o f a s c e r t a i n i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s
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is t h e case e x c e p t b y way o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , f o r d i r e c t access t o
u n i n t e r p r e t e d t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s is d e n i e d t o us. B u t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
t r u t h c o n d i d o n s are satisfied d o e s n o t i t s e l f b e c o m e a n epistemic
f a c t j u s t because w e c a n o n l y establish w h e t h e r these c o n d i t i o n s are
satisfied b y way o f discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e t r u t h claim—whereby
w e have a l r e a d y h a d t o i n t e r p r e t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i n l i g h t o f t h e
r e l e v a n t sorts o f r e a s o n s f o r t h e c l a i m i n q u e s t i o n .
A consistently epistemic r e a d i n g o f the discourse-theoretical expla-
n a t i o n o f t r u t h already founders o n the p r o b l e m that n o t all o f the
processual properties m e n t i o n e d retain a "connection with human
abilities." Nonetheless, w i t h regard to the argumentative presuppo-
sitions o f g e n e r a l inclusiveness, e q u a l rights t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n , f r e e d o m
f r o m repression, a n d o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g , we
c a n i m a g i n e in the present w h a t a n a p p r o x i m a t e l y i d e a l s a t i s f a c t i o n
w o u l d l o o k like. T h i s does n o t h o l d f o r a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the f u t u r e , o f
future corroboration (Bewährung) . 5 2
T o be sure, the o r i e n t a t i o n to-
w a r d t h e f u t u r e , t o o , essentially has t h e c r i t i c a l p o i n t o f r e m i n d i n g us
of the ethnocentric l i m i t a t i o n a n d the fallibility o f every actually
a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t , n o m a t t e r h o w r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d ; t h a t is, i t
serves as a r e m i n d e r t o us o f t h e p o s s i b l e f u r t h e r d e c e n t e r i n g o f t h e
p e r s p e c t i v e o f o u r j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y . T i m e , h o w e v e r , is a c o n -
straint o f a n o n t o l o g i c a l k i n d . Because a l l r e a l discourses, c o n d u c t e d
i n a c t u a l t i m e , are l i m i t e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e f u t u r e , w e c a n n o t k n o w
w h e t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are r a t i o n a l l y acceptable today w i l l , even
u n d e r a p p r o x i m a t e l y i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s , assert t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t a t -
t e m p t s t o r e f u t e t h e m i n t h e f u t u r e as w e l l . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h i s
very limitedness condemns o u r finite m i n d s to be content with
r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y as sufficient proof o f t r u t h : " W h e n e v e r w e raise
t r u t h c l a i m s o n t h e basis o f g o o d a r g u m e n t s a n d c o n v i n c i n g evi-
d e n c e w e presume . . . t h a t n o n e w a r g u m e n t s o r e v i d e n c e w i l l c r o p
u p i n the future that w o u l d call o u r t r u t h claim i n t o q u e s t i o n . " 5 3
I t is n o t so d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a -
t i o n , as subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n , have t o b e h a v e i n t h i s
way i f w e l o o k a t a p r a g m a t i c d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e i r d i s c o u r s e s , w h i c h
a r e e m b e d d e d i n t h e l i f e w o r l d . I n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , as w e have
seen, socialized i n d i v i d u a l s are d e p e n d e n t o n b e h a v i o r a l certainties,
w h i c h r e m a i n c e r t a i n t i e s o n l y so l o n g as t h e y a r e s u s t a i n e d b y a
knowledge t h a t is a c c e p t e d u n r e s e r v e d l y . C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s is
369
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f a c t t h a t , w h e n w e p u t f o r w a r d t h e a s s e r t i o n "p" i n
a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e , we have t o b e l i e v e t h a t "p" is t r u e u n c o n d i -
t i o n a l l y e v e n t h o u g h , w h e n we a d o p t a r e f l e x i v e a t t i t u d e , w e cannot
r u l e o u t t h a t t o m o r r o w , o r s o m e w h e r e else, r e a s o n s a n d e v i d e n c e
c o u l d e m e r g e t h a t w o u l d i n v a l i d a t e "/>." H o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t y e t
e x p l a i n w h y we a r e permitted t o r e g a r d a t r u t h c l a i m e x p l i c i t l y r a i s e d
f o r "p" as v i n d i c a t e d as s o o n as t h e p r o p o s i t i o n is r a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t e d
u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e . W h a t d o e s i t m e a n t o say t h a t
t r u t h c l a i m s c a n b e " v i n d i c a t e d " discursively?
The Pragmatic Conception o f T r u t h
I t is s t i l l u n c l e a r what i t is t h a t authorizes us t o r e g a r d as t r u e a
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t is p r e s u m e d t o b e j u s t i f i e d i d e a l l y — w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s
o f finite m i n d s . W e l l m e r speaks i n t h i s r e g a r d o f a " s u r p l u s " r e s i d i n g
i n the " a n t i c i p a t i o n o f f u t u r e c o r r o b o r a t i o n . " Perhaps i t w o u l d be
b e t t e r t o say t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o c o n v i n c e t h e m -
selves o f the justification of a controversial validity claim have
r e a c h e d a p o i n t w h e r e they have b e e n b r o u g h t by t h e u n c o n s t r a i n e d
f o r c e o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t t o a c e r t a i n shift in perspective. W h e n , i n
t h e course o f a process o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s attain t h e
conviction that, having taken o n b o a r d all relevant i n f o r m a t i o n a n d
h a v i n g w e i g h e d u p all the relevant reasons, they have exhausted t h e
reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l possible o b j e c t i o n s to t h e n all motives for
c o n t i n u i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n have b e e n , as i t w e r e , u s e d u p . A t a n y r a t e
t h e r e is n o l o n g e r a n y r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n f o r retaining a h y p o t h e t i c a l
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p" b u t t e m p o r a r i l y l e f t
o p e n . F r o m the perspective o f actors w h o have t e m p o r a r i l y a d o p t e d
a reflexive a t t i t u d e i n o r d e r to restore a partially d i s t u r b e d back-
ground understanding, the de-problematization of the disputed
t r u t h c l a i m m e a n s t h a t a l i c e n s e is issued f o r r e t u r n t o t h e a t t i t u d e
o f a c t o r s w h o a r e i n v o l v e d i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d m o r e naively.
As s o o n as t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n o p i n i o n a r e r e s o l v e d b e t w e e n " u s " a n d
" o t h e r s " w i t h r e g a r d t o w h a t is t h e case, " o u r " w o r l d c a n m e r g e o n c e
more with "the" world.
W h e n t h i s s h i f t takes p l a c e w e , w h o as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a -
t i o n a c c e p t t h e t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p" as j u s t i f i e d , r e a p p o i n t t h e state o f
a f f a i r s " t h a t p"—problematized u p t o n o w — w i t h its r i g h t s as a n
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Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

a s s e r t i o n Mp t h a t c a n b e r a i s e d f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of the first c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e f a l l i b i l i t y o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Conversely,

p e r s o n . A n a s s e r t i o n t h a t has b e e n disposed of a r g u m e n t a t i v e l y i n t h i s t h i s f a l l i b i l i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s also reacts b a c k u p o n e v e r y d a y practices
w a y a n d r e t u r n e d t o t h e r e a l m o f a c t i o n takes its p l a c e i n a n i n t e r - w i t h o u t thereby destroying the dogmatism of the lifeworld. For
subjectively shared l i f e w o r l d f r o m w i t h i n whose h o r i z o n we, the actors, w h o as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n have learned that
a c t o r s , r e f e r t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s i n g l e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . I t is a m a t t e r no c o n v i c t i o n is p r o o f a g a i n s t c r i t i c i s m , d e v e l o p i n t h e l i f e w o r l d ,
h e r e o f a formal s u p p o s i t i o n , n o t o n e t h a t p r e j u d g e s s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t too, r a t h e r less d o g m a t i c attitudes toward their problematized
n o r o n e t h a t suggests t h e g o a l o f t h e " c o r r e c t p i c t u r e o f t h e n a t u r e convictions.
o f t h i n g s " t h a t R o r t y always c o n n e c t s w i t h a r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n . B e c a u s e T h i s stereoscopic p e r c e p t i o n o f processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n and
a c t i n g subjects have t o c o p e w i t h " t h e " w o r l d , t h e y c a n n o t avoid c o m m u n i c a t i o n , layered a c c o r d i n g t o a c t i o n - c o n t e x t s a n d d i s c o u r s e s ,
b e i n g realists i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e i r l i f e w o r l d . M o r e o v e r , t h e y are a l l o w s us r e c o g n i z e t h e embeddedness o f d i s c o u r s e s i n t h e l i f e w o r l d .
a l l o w e d t o b e realists b e c a u s e t h e i r l a n g u a g e g a m e s a n d p r a c t i c e s , so Convictions play a d i f f e r e n t role i n a c t i o n t h a n i n discourse a n d
l o n g as t h e y f u n c t i o n i n a w a y t h a t is p r o o f a g a i n s t d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , " p r o v e t h e i r t r u t h " i n a d i f f e r e n t way i n t h e f o r m e r t h a n i n t h e l a t t e r .
" p r o v e t h e i r t r u t h " (sich bewähren) i n b e i n g c a r r i e d o n . I n everyday practices, a prereflexive " c o p i n g w i t h the w o r l d " decides
This pragmatic authority responsible for c e r t a i n t y — i n t e r p r e t e d i n w h e t h e r convictions " f u n c t i o n " o r are d r a w n i n t o t h e m a e l s t r o m o f
a r e a l i s t way w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d — p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n , w h e r e a s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n i t d e p e n d s solely on
is s u s p e n d e d o n t h e r e f l e x i v e l e v e l o f d i s c o u r s e s , w h i c h are r e l i e v e d reasons w h e t h e r controversial validity claims deserve r a t i o n a l l y m o -
of the burdens o f action and where only arguments count. Here, our tivated r e c o g n i t i o n . I t is t r u e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a -
gaze t u r n s away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d t h e d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d t r u t h poses i t s e l f o n l y o n t h e r e f l e x i v e
we e x p e r i e n c e i n o u r d i r e c t dealings w i t h i t , to focus exclusively o n level; however, o n l y the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n actions a n d discourses
o u r c o n f l i c t i n g interpretations o f the w o r l d . I n this intersubjective p e r m i t s a n answer t o this q u e s t i o n . T h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t d o u b t cannot
dimension o f contested i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , an assertion " p r o v e s its b e d i s s i p a t e d so l o n g as w e p e r s i s t i n r e m a i n i n g o n t h e l e v e l of
t r u t h " solely o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s , t h a t is, w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d neglect the transformation—secured by per-
a u t h o r i t y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p o s s i b l e r e f u t a t i o n , n o t f o r p r a c t i c a l l y ex- s o n a l u n i o n , as i t w e r e — o f t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h o s e w h o act i n t o t h e
p e r i e n c e d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . H e r e , however, the fallibilist conscious- knowledge o f those w h o argue, w h i l e equally neglecting the transfer
ness t h a t w e c a n e r r e v e n i n t h e case o f w e l l - j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s d e p e n d s o f knowledge i n the opposite direction. O n l y the e n t w i n i n g o f the
o n an o r i e n t a t i o n toward t r u t h whose roots e x t e n d i n t o the realism two d i f f e r e n t p r a g m a t i c roles played by t h e Janus-faced c o n c e p t o f
o f everyday practices—a realism n o l o n g e r i n force w i t h i n discourse. t r u t h i n action-contexts a n d i n r a t i o n a l discourses respectively can
T h e orientation toward unconditional t r u t h , which compels partici- e x p l a i n w h y a j u s t i f i c a t i o n successful i n a l o c a l c o n t e x t p o i n t s i n f a v o r
pants i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n to presuppose ideal justificatory conditions of the context-independent t r u t h o f t h e j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f . J u s t as, o n
a n d requires o f t h e m an ever-increasing decentering o f the justifica- t h e o n e h a n d , t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h allows t r a n s l a t i o n o f shaken-up
t i o n c o m m u n i t y , is a r e f l e x o f t h a t o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e — r e q u i r e d i n t h e b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s i n t o p r o b l e m a t i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n s , so t o o , on
l i f e w o r l d — b e t w e e n believing a n d k n o w i n g ; this d i s t i n c t i o n relies o n the o t h e r h a n d , does the firmly retained orientation toward truth
t h e s u p p o s i t i o n , a n c h o r e d i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , o f p e r m i t t h e translation back o f d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d assertions into
a single objective w o r l d . 5 4
I n t h i s way, t h e l i f e w o r l d w i t h its s t r o n g , reestablished behavioral certainties.
a c t i o n - r e l a t e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d k n o w l e d g e projects i n t o dis-
T o e x p l a i n t h i s w e have o n l y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r i n t h e r i g h t way t h e
course a n d provides the reference p o i n t — t r a n s c e n d i n g justifica-
p a r t i a l statements assembled h e r e u p t o now. I n t h e l i f e w o r l d actors
tion—that keeps alive among participants in argumentation a
depend o n b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s . T h e y have t o c o p e w i t h a w o r l d
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Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

presumed t o be o b j e c t i v e a n d , f o r t h i s r e a s o n , operate with the edge o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h reflexive experiences i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n t o

distinction between believing and k n o w i n g . 5 5
There is a practical h a r m o n y w i t h the everyday realism ascribed to t h e l i f e w o r l d . I f t h e
necessity t o r e l y i n t u i t i v e l y o n w h a t is u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y held-to-be- actors i n the l i f e w o r l d — t e m p o r a r i l y — c a n n o t a v o i d b e i n g "realists,"
t r u e . T h i s m o d e o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y h o l d i n g - t o - b e - t r u e is r e f l e c t e d o n so m u c h t h e w o r s e f o r t h e m . I n t h a t case i t is u p t o t h e philosophers
t h e d i s c u r s i v e level i n t h e c o n n o t a t i o n s o f t r u t h claims that p o i n t to r e f o r m the misleading commonsense c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h .
b e y o n d the given context o f justification a n d require the supposition T o be sure, d e f l a t i o n i s m , o p e r a t i n g a l o n g t h e lines o f Michael
o f ideal justificatory c o n d i t i o n s — w i t h a resulting decentering o f the W i l l i a m s w i t h a s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h , is s t i l l t o o s t r o n g f o r
j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y . F o r this reason, the process o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h i s p u r p o s e . I n s t e a d , R o r t y r i g o r o u s l y c a r r i e s t h r o u g h t o its c o n c l u -
c a n be g u i d e d by a n o t i o n o f t r u t h t h a t transcends justification al- s i o n a n e p i s t e m i z a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h . Because t h e r e is
t h o u g h i t is always already operatively effective in the realm of action. T h e n o t h i n g a p a r t f r o m j u s t i f i c a t i o n , a n d because n o t h i n g follows f o r t h e
f u n c t i o n o f the validity o f statements i n everyday practices explains t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n f r o m its j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y , t h e c o n c e p t o f
w h y t h e discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s m a y at t h e s a m e t i m e t r u t h is superfluous. " T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d t r u t h
b e i n t e r p r e t e d as t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a p r a g m a t i c n e e d f o r j u s t i f i c a - is o n e w h i c h makes n o difference except for the r e m i n d e r that
t i o n . T h i s n e e d f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , w h i c h sets i n t r a i n t h e t r a n s f o r m a - j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o o n e a u d i e n c e is n o t j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o a n o t h e r . " 5 6
Even
t i o n o f shaken-up behavioral certainties i n t o problematized validity t h e o n l y n o n r e d u n d a n t use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e — t h e " c a u t i o n a r y "
c l a i m s , c a n b e satisfied o n l y b y a t r a n s l a t i o n o f d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d one—requires r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t is a m a t t e r o f i n v e n t i n g a n d i m -
beliefs back i n t o behavioral t r u t h s . p l e m e n t i n g a new vocabulary that does w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t o f t r u t h
B e c a u s e i t is, i n t h e e n d , t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t dissipates t h e c o n - a n d e l i m i n a t e s r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n s ( s u c h as t h e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n o b -
textualist d o u b t about everyday realist intuitions, the objection j e c t i v e w o r l d , t a l k o f r e p r e s e n t i n g facts, a n d so f o r t h ) : "We s i m p l y
seems l i k e l y t h a t t h e w h o l e d i s p u t e is p r e j u d i c e d b y m y t e n d e n t i o u s refuse t o t a l k i n a c e r t a i n way, t h e P l a t o n i c way. . . . O u r e f f o r t s a t
description o f the e m b e d d i n g o f discourses i n the l i f e w o r l d . Rorty p e r s u a s i o n m u s t t a k e t h e f o r m o f g r a d u a l i n c u l c a t i o n o f n e w ways o f
w o u l d certainly n o t deny the c o n n e c t i o n between r a t i o n a l discourse speaking, rather t h a n of straightforward argumentation w i t h old
a n d a c t i o n . H e w o u l d also a g r e e w i t h o u r e s t a b l i s h i n g o f a c o n n e c - ways o f speaking." 5 7

tion between the two perspectives: between the perspective of the

p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o seek t o c o n v i n c e e a c h o t h e r of T h e Naturalization o f Linguistified R e a s o n
the correctness o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , a n d the perspective o f a c t i n g
subjects i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r language games a n d practices. However, R o r t y ' s p r o g r a m o f r e e d u c a t i o n has p r o v o k e d q u e s t i o n s a n d o b j e c -
R o r t y w o u l d n o t d i s t i n g u i s h these perspectives f r o m each o t h e r i n tions. 5 8
I n t h e first i n s t a n c e , R o r t y h i m s e l f m u s t s h o u l d e r t h e b u r d e n
s u c h a way t h a t t h e o n e is r e l a t i v i z e d a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r . F o r the o f p r o o f f o r h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o leave t h e l a n g u a g e of common
p u r p o s e o f his d e s c r i p t i o n , he b o r r o w s f r o m the perspective o f par- sense as i t is. A s a r u l e , p r a g m a t i s t s m a k e s u b s t a n t i a l a l l o w a n c e s f o r
ticipants i n argumentation the i m p r i s o n m e n t i n dialogue that pre- t h e m s e l v e s o n t h e basis t h a t t h e i r views a r e a t o n e w i t h common
v e n t s us f r o m b r e a k i n g f r e e f r o m c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; at the sense. S t r a n g e l y e n o u g h , n e o p r a g m a t i s t s b o a s t o f t h e i r r o l e as " a t h e -
same t i m e , he borrows f r o m the perspective o f actors t h e m o d e o f ists i n a n o v e r w h e l m i n g l y r e l i g i o u s c u l t u r e . " T h e i r t h e r a p y is s u p -
c o p i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d . I t is t h r o u g h t h e blending into one another o f posed to reach through the pathological language games of
these opposing perspectives that the ethnocentric certainty is p h i l o s o p h e r s t o t h e d i s t o r t i o n s f o r w h i c h P l a t o n i s m is r e s p o n s i b l e i n
formed—a c e r t a i n t y t h a t p r o m p t s R o r t y t o ask t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h y d a i l y l i f e itself. I n o r d e r t o m a k e p l a u s i b l e P l a t o n i s m ' s i d e a l i s t v i o -
w e s h o u l d i n t h e first p l a c e a t t e m p t t o b r i n g t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t k n o w l - l e n c e , R o r t y has t o l e t h i m s e l f i n f o r a d i a g n o s i s o f t h e h i s t o r y o f
374
Chapter 8
W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s as a h i s t o r y o f d e c l i n e . H o w e v e r , w h a t H e i d e g -
g e r o r D e r r i d a , f o r e x a m p l e , have t o say i n t h e i r o w n f a i r l y m e t a -
p h y s i c a l ways about the critique of metaphysics is, o n Rorty's
e s t i m a t i o n , m o r e p a r t o f t h e " e d i f y i n g " l i t e r a t u r e t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o
b e r e s e r v e d f o r p r i v a t e p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e self a n d c a n n o t , a t a n y r a t e ,
serve t h e p u b l i c c r i t i q u e o f a l i e n a t e d l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s . 5 9
O f course, m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n the m o t i v a t i o n f o r this enterprise
is t h e q u e s t i o n o f its v i a b i l i t y . I w o u l d l i k e t o c o n c l u d e w i t h j u s t t w o
questions i n this regard:
a. Is t h e e n v i s a g e d r e v i s i o n o f o u r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g compatible
w i t h t h e f a c t o f a n a b i l i t y t o l e a r n t h a t is n o t a l r e a d y c o n s t r i c t e d a
priori?
b . W h a t is t o h a p p e n t o t h e n o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f r e a s o n , a n d h o w
c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e is t h e p r o p o s e d n e o - D a r w i n i s t s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n of
r a t i o n a l beings?
a. T h e p r o g r a m o f a r a t i o n a l r e v i s i o n o f d e e p l y r o o t e d P l a t o n i c
p r e j u d i c e s presumes we are capable o f a l e a r n i n g process t h a t n o t
o n l y can take place w i t h i n a given vocabulary a n d a c c o r d i n g to the
s t a n d a r d s p r e v a i l i n g i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t b u t t h a t seizes h o l d o f t h e
v o c a b u l a r y a n d standards themselves. T h i s reason alone requires
R o r t y to p r o v i d e a suitable equivalent f o r an o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h
t h a t aims b e y o n d the p r e v a i l i n g c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I f , however,
the d i s t i n c t i o n between " t r u e " a n d ' j u s t i f i e d " shrinks to the fact that
t h e p r o p o n e n t is p r e p a r e d t o d e f e n d "p" e v e n i n f r o n t o f a different
a u d i e n c e , t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r s u c h a n a n t i c i p a t i o n [ o f t r u t h ] is
missing. R o r t y counters this o b j e c t i o n by conceding a cautious ide-
alization o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s . H e allows t h a t w h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y
was c a l l e d t h e " p u r s u i t o f t r u t h " m i g h t j u s t as w e l l be d e s c r i b e d as
the "pursuit o f intersubjective, u n f o r c e d agreement a m o n g larger
a n d larger g r o u p s o f i n t e r l o c u t o r s " : "We h o p e to j u s t i f y o u r b e l i e f to
as m a n y a n d as l a r g e a u d i e n c e s as p o s s i b l e . " 6 0
R o r t y , i t is t r u e , d o e s
n o t w a n t t h i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d a n "ever-
r e t r e a t i n g g o a l , " t h a t is, as a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a . E v e n t h e l a r g e r a u d i -
ence a n d the o v e r a r c h i n g c o n t e x t are supposed to be n o m o r e t h a n
a different audience a n d a different context. Nonetheless, Rorty
adds to this description the qualifications m e n t i o n e d : ever-expand-
375
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
i n g size a n d e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g d i v e r s i t y — t h a t is, c o n d i t i o n s t h a t h a m -
p e r t h e p o s s i b l e success o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n c e r t a i n , n o t c o m p l e t e l y
a r b i t r a r y , ways.
R o r t y c a n n o t e x p l a i n t h i s i m p e d i m e n t t o t h e success o f a r g u m e n -
t a t i o n t h a t is u n n e c e s s a r y f r o m a f u n c t i o n a l p o i n t o f view. W i t h t h e
o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d "more a n d m o r e , " "larger a n d larger," a n d " i n -
creasingly diverse" audiences, R o r t y b r i n g s a weak idealization i n t o
p l a y t h a t , o n h i s p r e m i s e , is f a r f r o m s e l f - e v i d e n t . A s s o o n as t h e
concept of truth is e l i m i n a t e d i n f a v o r o f a context-dependent
epistemic validity-for-us, the n o r m a t i v e reference p o i n t necessary t o
e x p l a i n w h y a p r o p o n e n t s h o u l d e n d e a v o r t o seek a g r e e m e n t f o r "p"
beyond the boundaries of her own group is m i s s i n g . T h e i n f o r m a d o n t h a t
t h e a g r e e m e n t o f a n i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e a u d i e n c e gives us i n c r e a s i n g l y
less r e a s o n to fear that we w i l l be r e f u t e d presupposes the v e r y
i n t e r e s t t h a t has t o b e e x p l a i n e d : t h e d e s i r e f o r "as m u c h i n t e r s u b -
j e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t as p o s s i b l e . " I f s o m e t h i n g is " t r u e " i f a n d o n l y i f i t
is r e c o g n i z e d as j u s t i f i e d "by u s " b e c a u s e i t is g o o d " f o r u s , " t h e r e is
n o rational motive for e x p a n d i n g the circle o f members. N o reason
exists f o r t h e d e c e n t e r i n g e x p a n s i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y
e s p e c i a l l y since R o r t y d e f i n e s " m y o w n e t h n o s " as t h e g r o u p i n f r o n t
o f w h i c h I f e e l o b l i g e d t o give a n a c c o u n t o f myself. T h e r e is, h o w -
ever, n o n o r m a t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a n y f u r t h e r o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d
the a g r e e m e n t o f "strangers," m e r e l y an e x p l a n a t o r y p o i n t e r t o w a r d
t h e a r b i t r a r y f e a t u r e s o f a " l i b e r a l W e s t e r n c u l t u r e " i n w h i c h "we
i n t e l l e c t u a l s " a d o p t a m o r e o r less u n d o g m a t i c a t t i t u d e . B u t even w e
a r e a s s u r e d b y R o r t y t h a t , "we m u s t , i n p r a c t i c e , p r i v i l e g e o u r o w n
g r o u p , e v e n t h o u g h t h e r e c a n be n o n o n c i r c u l a r j u s t i f i c a t i o n for
d o i n g so." 61
b. I n l o s i n g t h e r e g u l a t i v e i d e a o f t r u t h , t h e p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n loses t h a t p o i n t o f o r i e n t a t i o n b y m e a n s o f w h i c h s t a n d a r d s o f
j u s t i f i c a t i o n are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m " c u s t o m a r y " n o r m s . T h e sociolo-
g i z i n g o f the practice o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n means a n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f rea-
s o n . A s a r u l e , social n o r m s c a n b e d e s c r i b e d n o t m e r e l y f r o m t h e
p o i n t o f v i e w o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l o b s e r v e r b u t also f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e
o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n l i g h t o f t h e s t a n d a r d s t h e y h o l d t o be t r u e . W i t h o u t
a reference t o t r u t h o r reason, however, t h e standards themselves
w o u l d n o l o n g e r have any p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n a n d w o u l d
376 377

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

t h u s f o r t h e i r p a r t f o r f e i t t h e status o f n o r m s capable o f being entiation between the perspectives o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t a n d the ob-

j u s t i f i e d . I n this respect, they w o u l d n o l o n g e r even be customary server. I n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w h i c h a r e o w e d t o t h e i n t e r s u b -
n o r m s . T h e y w o u l d b e nothing more than social facts, a l t h o u g h t h e y j e c t i v e possession o f a s h a r e d l a n g u a g e , a r e a s s i m i l a t e d t o t h e p a t t e r n
w o u l d c o n t i n u e to c l a i m v a l i d i t y " f o r u s , " t h e r e l e v a n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f adaptive behavior (or i n s t r u m e n t a l a c d o n ) . A c o r r e s p o n d i n g de-
c o m m u n i t y . If, despite t h i s , t h e p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n is n o t to differentiation between the strategic a n d t h e nonstrategic use of
c o l l a p s e , a n d i f t h e p r e d i c a t e " r a t i o n a l " is n o t t o lose its n o r m a t i v e language, between a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success a n d a c t i o n ori-
c h a r a c t e r — t h a t is, i f b o t h are t o c o n t i n u e t o be a b l e t o f u n c t i o n — ented toward reaching understanding, robs Rorty o f the conceptual
t h e r a t i o n a l i t y s t a n d a r d s v a l i d f o r us h a v e t o b e , i f n o t j u s t i f i e d , t h e n means for d o i n g justice to the intuitive distinctions between convinc-
at least e x p l a i n e d . i n g a n d p e r s u a d i n g , b e t w e e n m o t i v a t i o n t h r o u g h r e a s o n s a n d causal
F o r t h i s R o r t y falls b a c k o n a n a t u r a l i s t d e s c r i p t i o n o f human e x e r t i o n o f influence, between learning and indoctrinadon. The
b e i n g s as o r g a n i s m s t h a t d e v e l o p t o o l s i n o r d e r t o a d a p t t h e m s e l v e s c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e m i n g l i n g o f t h e o n e w i t h t h e o t h e r has t h e u n p l e a s -
o p t i m a l l y t o t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h t h e a i m o f satisfying t h e i r n e e d s . a n t c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t we lose t h e c r i t i c a l s t a n d a r d s o p e r a t i n g i n
L a n g u a g e , t o o , is s u c h a t o o l — a n d n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e , a m e d i u m f o r e v e r y d a y l i f e . R o r t y ' s n a t u r a l i s t strategy leads t o a c a t e g o r i a l l e v e l - i n g
r e p r e s e n t i n g r e a l i t y : " N o m a t t e r w h e t h e r t h e t o o l is a h a m m e r o r a o f d i s t i n c t i o n s o f s u c h a k i n d t h a t o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s lose t h e i r sensitivity
g u n o r a b e l i e f o r a s t a t e m e n t , t o o l - u s i n g is p a r t o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n f o r differences t h a t d o make a difference i n everyday practices. 63

o f t h e o r g a n i s m w i t h its e n v i r o n m e n t . " 6 2
W h a t a p p e a r s t o us as t h e
normative dimension of the linguistically constituted h u m a n m i n d Notes
m e r e l y gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t i n t e l l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n s are
functional f o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a species t h a t , t h r o u g h a c t i n g , m u s t 1. R. Rorty, 'Trotsky a n d the Wild O r c h i d s , " Common Knowledge 3 (1992): 140-153.

" c o p e " w i t h reality. T h i s n e o - D a r w i n i s t self-description d e m a n d s an
i r o n i c p r i c e . F o r Rorty, i n r e p l a c i n g t h e " c o r r e c t d e s c r i p d o n o f facts"
w i t h "successful a d a p t a t i o n t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , " m e r e l y e x c h a n g e s
one k i n d o f objectivism for another: the objectivism o f "represented"
reality f o r the objectivism o f i n s t r u m e n t a l l y "mastered" reality. A l -
t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y , w i t h t h i s , t h e d i r e c t i o n o f fit f o r i n t e r a c t i o n
between h u m a n b e i n g s a n d w o r l d is c h a n g e d , w h a t r e m a i n s the
2. R. Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn. Recent Essays in Philosophical Method (Chicago,
1970), p. 33.
3. T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans, by E . B. Ashton ( L o n d o n , 1973), p. 408
(amended translation).
4. M. Williams, Unnatural Doubts (Princeton, N.J., 1996), p. 365 (n. 51). Cf. also
R. Rorty, "Is Derrida a Quasi-Transcendental Philosopher?," Contemporary Literature
(1995): 173-200.

s a m e is t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d as t h e t o t a l i t y o f 5. Cf. T h e exchange between T. McCarthy and R. Rorty in Critical Inquiry 16 (1990):

e v e r y t h i n g t h a t we c a n , i n t h e o n e case, " r e p r e s e n t , " i n t h e o t h e r , 355-370, 633-641.
"deal w i t h . "
6. Rorty, Linguistic Turn, p. 39.
The pragmatic t u r n was supposed to replace the representa-
7. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 261.
t i o n a l i s t m o d e l o f k n o w l e d g e w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i o n m o d e l t h a t sets
successful i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) i n 8. [Editor's note:] Habermas notes that in English the word "representation" is used
to refer to both Darstellung and Vorstellung.
t h e p l a c e o f a c h i m e r i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t is, h o w e v e r ,
p r e c i s e l y t h i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e d i m e n s i o n t h a t is i n t u r n c l o s e d o f f i n 9. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 170.
a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g d e s c r i p t i o n o f processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n and com-
10. H . Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), p. 28; R. Rorty,
m u n i c a t i o n t h a t c a n b e g r a s p e d as s u c h o n l y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of "Putnam and the Relativist Menace, "Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 443.
p a r t i c i p a n t s . R o r t y uses a j a r g o n t h a t n o l o n g e r p e r m i t s a n y d i f f e r -
11. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 390.
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Chapter 8
12. Ibid., p. 179: " [ T h e contexualist view] threatens the n e o K a n t i a n image of phi-
losophy's relation to science and to culture. T h e urge to say that assertions and
actions must not only cohere with other assertions and actions but 'correspond' to
something apart from what people are saying and doing has some claim to be called
the philosophical urge."
13. Ibid., p. 171.
14. Cf. H . Schnädelbach, "Philosophie," in E . Martens and H . Schnädelbach, eds.,
Grundkurs Philosophie (Hamburg, 1985), pp. 37-76.
15. [Editor's note:] Habermas remarks that the subtitle to the G e r m a n translation
of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is A Critique of Philosophy (Eine Kritik der Philoso-
phie) .
16. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 263.
17. Ibid., p. 339.
18. Ibid.
19. R. Rorty, Philosophical Papers I: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge, 1991),
p. 23.
20. Only the empiricists were prepared to call "objective" the experience (Erfahrung)
that "corresponds to what is there outside" (Rorty). T h e transcendental idealists, by
contrast, reduce even the objectivity of experience to necessary subjective conditions
of possible experience.
21. L . Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans, by D. Paul and G . E . M. Anscombe (Oxford,
1969), §115, p. 125.
22. H . Schnädelbach, " T h e s e n über Geltung u n d Wahrheit," in Zur Rehabilitierung
des animal rationale (Frankfurt, 1992), pp. 104—115.
23. With respect to a critique of Rorty's approach, I will confine myself in the
following to the problem of truth. However, I would like to indicate, at least, that we
would not be able to explain the possibility of learning processes without reference
to the capacity for recognizing the same entities under different descriptions.
24. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cam-
bridge, 1982), pp. 50ff.
25. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 178.
26. Cf. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 232: "We need only ask whether or not the
'direct' grasping of facts on which such comparison depends is supposed to be a
cognitive state with propositional content. I f it isn't, it can have no impact on
verification. But if it is, all we have been given is another kind of belief."
27. Ibid, p. 267.
28. R. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and T r u t h , " in E . Lepore, ed., Truth and Inter-
pretation (Oxford, 1986), p. 343.
379
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
29. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 266.
30. Ibid., p. 249.
31. F. Kambartel, "Universalität richtig verstanden," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
44 (1996): 249.
32. It is no accident that I introduced the formal-pragmatic concept of the gram-
matical supposition of an objective world in the context of the theory of action. Cf.
J . Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, vol. 1 (Boston,
1984), pp. 75-101; vol. 2 (Boston, 1987), pp. 119ff.
33. Cf. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 238: "All that is involved in the idea of an
objective world as 'what is there anyway' is that an objective proposition's being true
is one thing and our believing it to be true, or being justified in believing it to be
true, something else again."
34. R. Rorty, "Is T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry? Davidson vs. Wright," Philosophical Quarterly
45 (1995): 281-300 (here, p. 300).
35. D. Davidson pursues a third strategy that could be called "theoreticist" or, as he
himself proposes, "methodological;" cf. D. Davidson, " T h e Folly of Trying to Define
T r u t h , " Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 263-278. Davidson uses the semantic concep-
tion of truth, understood in a nondeflationary way, as the undefined basic concept
for an empirical theory of language. Both the concept of truth, which is used as a
theoretical term in his theory of language, and the theory itself, which is supposed
to explain the comprehension of linguistic expressions, can prove their truth (sich
bewähren) at one and the same time. For this reason, Davidson's implicit "theory of
truth" can be discussed only in connection with his theory as a whole. I n general, I
see the following difficulty: on the one hand, Davidson disputes that the concept of
truth has a content capable of being explicated, to this extent allying himself with
the deflationist polemic against attempts to explain the meaning of truth; on the
other hand, he has to secure for the truth-predicate, over and above its disquota-
tional function, a certain content as far as the theory of rationality is concerned in
order to explain the veridical nature of beliefs. To this extent he joins forces with
Putnam and Dummett, who insist that Tarski's Convention T says nothing about the
actual meaning of truth. Standing between these two positions, Davidson, instead of
merely using the concept, sees himself compelled to write learned treatises on a
concept he declares to be "indefinable"—treatises in which he does, at least, in a
metacritical way, isolate the realist intuitions bound up with truth. Cf. D. Davidson,
" T h e Structure and Content of T r u t h , " Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 279-328.
Davidson holds onto the idea that we can know something of an objective world
"which is not of our own making." This view separates him from Rorty who attempts
in vain to pull Davidson over to his own side of an abolitionist understanding of truth.
Cf. D. Davidson, " A Coherence Theory of T r u t h and Knowledge," in A. Malachowski,
ed., Reading Rorty (Oxford, 1990), pp. 120-139; cf. also Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson,
and T r u t h . " For a comparison of Davidson's and my own approaches to the theory
of language, see B. Fultner, Radical Interpretation or Communicative Action (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Northwestern University, 1995).
36. K. R. Popper, ' T r u t h , Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge," in
Conjectures and Refutations (London, 1963), pp. 215-250.
380
Chapter 8
37. E . Tugendhat, "Tarskis semantische Definition der Wahrheit," Philosophische
Rundschau 8 (1960): 131-159, reprinted in his Philosophische Aufsätze (Frankfurt,
1992), pp. 179-213.
38. I refer here to positions held bv P. Horwich and A. Fine; cf. M. Williams, " D o We
(Epistemologists) Need a Theory of T r u t h ? , " Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 223-242.
39. I introduced this distinction in the Christian Gauss Lectures on founding sociol-
ogy in the theory of language (1971); cf. J . Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 1-126, esp. pp. 104ff.
40. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 22-42.
41. H . Putnam, "Introduction," in Realism and Reason (Cambridge, 1983).
42. J . Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns.
43. K . - 0 . Apel, "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit u n d Letztbegründung,"
in F o r u m für Philosophie, ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frankfurt, 1987), pp. 116¬
211.
44. C . Lafont, "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
42 (1994): 1007-1023; Williams, Unnatural Doubts, pp. 233ff.
45. A. Wellmer, "Ethics and Dialogue," in The Persistence of Modernity, trans. D. Midgley
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991), p. 175 (amended translation).
46. A. Wellmer, "Wahrheit, Kontingenz, Moderne," in Endspiele (Frankfurt, 1993),
p. 162. English translation as Endgames: Essays and lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature
of Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).
47. Davidson, " T h e Structure a n d Content of T r u t h , " p. 307.
48. R. Rorty, "Sind Aussagen universelle Geltungsansprüche?," Deutsche Zeitschrift für
Philosophie & (1994): 982f.
49. Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," pp. 451f.
50. J . Habermas, "Remarks on Discourse Ethics," in Justification and Application, trans.
C. C r o n i n (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), pp. 30ff, pp. 58f.
51. L . Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral (Frankfurt, 1993), p. 277.
52. [Editor's note:] T h e G e r m a n term "sich bewähren" and its cognates have generally
been rendered here as "prove to be true" (in the sense of "turn out to be t r u e " ) , so
as to preserve in translation its connection with "wahr" true. Sich bewähren is proving
to be true in the sense of standing the test, withstanding critical scrutiny. However,
because it is the term that Albrecht Wellmer used to render "corroboration" in his
influential discussion of Popper, where the reference is clearly to Wellmer's idea of
"anticipating future Bewährung" "corroboration" is used. See A. Wellmer, Critical
Theory of Society, trans. J . C u m m i n g (New York, 1974).
381
R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
53. Wellmer, "Wahrheit," p. 163; cf. the corresponding reflections on "superasserti-
bility" in C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).
54. Cf. Lafont "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," p. 1021: "Only the presupposition
of a single objective world . . . permits [us] to make the unconditional validity of
truth compatible with a fallible understanding of knowledge."
55. I cannot in the present context deal with moral and other normative validity
claims that have a built-in orientation toward discursive vindication. They lack the
property of "transcending justification" that accrues to truth claims through the
supposition of a single objective world built into the communicative use of language.
Normative validity claims are raised for interpersonal relationships within a social
world that is not independent of "our making" in the same way as is the objective
world. T h e discursive treatment of normative claims is, however, "analogous to truth"
insofar as the participants in practical discourse are guided by the goal of a com-
manded, permitted, or forbidden "single right answer." T h e social world is intrinsi-
cally historical, that is, ontologically constituted in a different way than the objective
world. F o r this reason, in the case of the social world, the idealization of the justi-
ficatory conditions cannot include an "anticipation of future corroboration
(Bewährung)," in the sense of an anticipated refutation of future objections (Win-
gert) , but only in the critical sense of a proviso concerning approximation, that is, a
proviso concerning the justification community's actually achieved state of decenter-
ing. T h e discursive vindication of a truth claim says that the truth conditions, inter-
preted as assertibility conditions, are satisfied. I n the case of a normative validity
claim, the discursively achieved agreement grounds the corresponding norm's wor-
thiness to be recognized; to this extent the agreement itself contributes to the
satisfaction of the norm's conditions of validity. Whereas rational acceptability merely
indicates the truth of a proposition, it provides a constructive contribution to the
validity of norms.
56. Rorty, " I s T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry?," p. 300.
57. R. Rorty, "Relativism: Finding and Making," Ms. (1995), p. 5.
58. T. McCarthy, "Philosophy and Social Practice: Richard Rorty's 'New Pragma-
tism,'" in Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 11-34.
59. R. Rorty, "Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy," Revue Interna-
tionale de Philosophie 49 (1995), 437-460; cf. my reply in ibid., pp. 553-556.
60. Rorty, "Is T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry?," p. 298.
61. Rorty, Philosophical Papers I, p. 29.
62. Rorty, "Relativism: Finding and Making," pp. 1 If.
63. T h e same objectivism and the same kind of insensitivity could be shown through
reference to Rorty's egocentric or ethnocentric description of processes of interpre-
tation, for example, of hard cases of intercultural understanding (Verständigung).
Unlike Gadamer, Rorty does not have recourse to the symmetrical conditions for an
adoption of perspectives learned by speakers and hearers in learning the system of
personal pronouns and making possible a reciprocal convergence of interpretive
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Chapter 8

9
horizons that, initially, are far apart. Instead, he takes as his starting point an asym-
metrical relationship between " u s " and "them," so that we have to judge their utter- O n the Distinction between Poetic and
ances according to our standards and assimilate their standards to ours; cf.
J . Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass., Communicative Uses of Language (1985)
1992), pp. 135ff. This assimilatory model of understanding (Verstehen) partially coin-
cides with Davidson's model of interpretation. However, what for Davidson is the
result of a methodological decision to view the interpretation of linguistic expressions
as the application of the hypotheses of an empirically turned theory of truth, results
for Rorty from the decision (of strategic significance for his theory) in favor of a
naturalist descriptive vocabulary.

1
F r o m this c o m p l e x discussion [between Jacques D e r r i d a a n d J o h n
S e a r l e ] , J o n a t h a n C u l l e r selects as t h e c e n t r a l issue t h e q u e s t i o n o f
1

w h e t h e r J o h n A u s t i n succeeds i n m a k i n g w h a t a p p e a r s t o b e a t o t a l l y
harmless, provisional, and purely methodological move. Austin
w a n t s t o a n a l y z e t h e r u l e s i n t u i t i v e l y m a s t e r e d by c o m p e t e n t speak-
ers, i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h t y p i c a l s p e e c h acts c a n b e executed
successfully. H e b e g i n s t h i s analysis by f o c u s i n g o n s e n t e n c e s f r o m
normal e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s t h a t are u t t e r e d s e r i o u s l y a n d u s e d as simply
and literally as p o s s i b l e . T h u s , t h e u n i t o f analysis, t h e standard
s p e e c h act, is t h e r e s u l t o f c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t i o n s . T h e t h e o r e t i c i a n of
s p e e c h acts d i r e c t s h i s a t t e n t i o n t o a s a m p l e o f n o r m a l linguistic
utterances f r o m w h i c h all complex, derivative, parasidc, a n d deviant
cases h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s d e m a r c a t i o n is a c o n c e p -
tion of "customary" or n o r m a l linguistic practice—a concept of "or-
d i n a r y l a n g u a g e " w h o s e h a r m l e s s n e s s a n d c o n s i s t e n c y D e r r i d a calls
i n t o q u e s t i o n . A u s t i n ' s i n t e n t i o n is c l e a r : h e w a n t s t o analyze t h e
u n i v e r s a l p r o p e r t i e s of, f o r e x a m p l e , " p r o m i s e s " w i t h r e s p e c t t o cases
i n w h i c h the u t t e r a n c e o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g sentences actually functions
as a p r o m i s e . N o w , t h e r e are c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h s u c h s e n t e n c e s lose
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a p r o m i s e . S p o k e n b y a n a c t o r o n t h e stage,
as p a r t o f a p o e m , o r e v e n w i t h i n a m o n o l o g u e , a p r o m i s e , as A u s t i n
tells us, b e c o m e s " p e c u l i a r l y n u l l a n d v o i d . " T h e same h o l d s f o r a
384 385

Chapter 9 O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

p r o m i s e t h a t o c c u r s i n a q u o t a t i o n , o r f o r o n e t h a t is m e r e l y m e n - is r e m o v e d f r o m t h e q u o t e d p r o m i s e t h r o u g h t h e f o r m o f i n d i r e c t
t i o n e d . I n such contexts, t h e r e is n o serious o r binding use, and s p e e c h : i t is t h e r e b y t a k e n o u t o f t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t " f u n c t i o n s , "
s o m e t i m e s n o t e v e n a literal use, o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g performative t h a t is, i n w h i c h i t c o o r d i n a t e s t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s
s e n t e n c e , b u t r a t h e r a d e r i v a t i v e o r p a r a s i t i c use. As Searle repeats i n i n t e r a c t i o n a n d gives rise t o c o n s e q u e n c e s r e l e v a n t f o r a c t i o n .
insistently, fictional o r s i m u l a t e d o r i n d i r e c t m o d e s o f use are " p a r a - O n l y t h e s p e e c h a c t a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m e d i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e is effective
s i t i c " i n t h e sense t h a t l o g i c a l l y t h e y p r e s u p p o s e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a as action; t h e p r o m i s e m e n t i o n e d i n q u o t a t i o n , o r r e p o r t e d , d e p e n d s
s e r i o u s , l i t e r a l , a n d b i n d i n g use o f t h e s e n t e n c e s g r a m m a t i c a l l y a p - g r a m m a t i c a l l y u p o n t h i s . S u c h a s e t t i n g d e p r i v i n g i t o f its i l l o c u t i o n -
p r o p r i a t e f o r p r o m i s e s . C u l l e r e x t r a c t s essentially t h r e e objections ary force constitutes the bridge between quotation and fictional
f r o m D e r r i d a ' s texts; these a r e a i m e d a t s h o w i n g t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . E v e n a c t i o n o n t h e stage rests o n a basis o f e v e r y d a y
s u c h a use o f l a n g u a g e a n d a r e m e a n t t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e u s u a l actions ( o n t h e p a r t o f t h e actors, d i r e c t o r , stageworkers, a n d t h e a t e r
d i s t i n c t i o n s between serious a n d s i m u l a t e d , l i t e r a l a n d m e t a p h o r i c a l , employees); i n the context o f this f r a m e w o r k , promises can f u n c t i o n
everyday a n d fictional, a n d c u s t o m a r y a n d parasitic m o d e s o f speech in a different way t h a n t h e y d o " o n stage," g i v i n g rise t o o b l i g a t i o n s
collapse. relevant f o r the sequel o f a c t i o n . D e r r i d a makes no attempt to

a. W i t h h i s i n i t i a l a r g u m e n t , D e r r i d a p o s i t s a n o t v e r y i l l u m i n a t - " d e c o n s t r u c t " this distinctive f u n c t i o n a l m o d e o f everyday language

i n g l i n k between quotability a n d iterability, o n the one h a n d , a n d within communicative action. I n the illocutionary binding and

fictionality, o n t h e o t h e r . T h e q u o t a t i o n o f a p r o m i s e is o n l y a p p a r - b o n d i n g (bindende) f o r c e o f l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s , A u s t i n d i s c o v e r e d

ently something secondary i n comparison with a directly made a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n t h a t subjects n o r m a l s p e e c h —

promise, for the indirect r e p o r t i n g of a performative utterance i n a s p e e c h t h a t is p a r t o f e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s — t o constraints different

q u o t a t i o n is a f o r m o f r e p e t i t i o n , a n d as q u o t a b i l i t y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e f r o m those o f fictional speech, s i m u l a t i o n , a n d i n t e r i o r m o n o l o g u e .

p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e p e t i t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a r u l e , t h a t is, c o n v e n - T h e c o n s t r a i n t s u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts d e v e l o p a n a c t i o n -

t i o n a l i t y , i t b e l o n g s t o t h e essence o f e v e r y c o n v e n t i o n a l l y g e n e r a t e d c o o r d i n a t i n g f o r c e a n d give rise t o c o n s e q u e n c e s r e l e v a n t f o r a c t i o n

u t t e r a n c e — a n d t h u s also t o t h a t o f p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s — t h a t i t d e f i n e t h e d o m a i n o f " n o r m a l " l a n g u a g e . T h e y c a n b e a n a l y z e d as

c a n b e q u o t e d a n d , i n t h e b r o a d e r sense, fictionally reproduced: " I f those i d e a l i z i n g suppositions t h a t we have to m a k e i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e

i t w e r e n o t possible f o r a character i n a play to m a k e a p r o m i s e , t h e r e action.

c o u l d be n o promises i n real life, f o r w h a t makes i t possible to b. T h e s e c o n d a r g u m e n t r a i s e d b y C u l l e r , w i t h D e r r i d a , a g a i n s t

p r o m i s e , as A u s t i n tells us, is t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n v e n t i o n a l p r o c e - A u s t i n a n d Searle relates t o j u s t s u c h i d e a l i z a t i o n s . A n y g e n e r a l i z i n g
dure, o f formulas one can repeat. For m e t o be a b l e t o m a k e a analysis o f s p e e c h acts has t o b e a b l e t o specify g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l
p r o m i s e i n 'real life,' there m u s t be iterable p r o c e d u r e s o r f o r m u l a s c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f s t a n d a r d i z e d s p e e c h acts.
s u c h as a r e u s e d o n stage. ' S e r i o u s ' b e h a v i o r is a s p e c i a l case o f S e a r l e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , has t a k e n o n t h i s t a s k . L i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s ,
3

role-playing. " 2
however, change their meanings depending o n shifting contexts;
I n this a r g u m e n t , D e r r i d a obviously already presupposes w h a t he moreover, c o n t e x t s are so c o n s t i t u t e d as t o be o p e n t o e v e r - w i d e r -
wants to prove: that every c o n v e n t i o n t h a t p e r m i t s t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f r e a c h i n g s p e c i f i c a t i o n . I t is o n e o f t h e p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f o u r language
e x e m p l a r y a c t i o n s i n t r i n s i c a l l y possesses n o t m e r e l y a s y m b o l i c b u t t h a t w e c a n release u t t e r a n c e s f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n a l c o n t e x t s a n d t r a n s -
also a fictional c h a r a c t e r . B u t i t w o u l d first have t o b e s h o w n that p l a n t t h e m i n t o d i f f e r e n t o n e s — D e r r i d a speaks o f " g r a f t i n g . " I n t h i s
conventions r e l a t i n g t o p l a y u l t i m a t e l y are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m m a n n e r , we c a n , i n r e l a t i o n t o a s p e e c h a c t s u c h as a " m a r r i a g e v o w , "
n o r m s o f a c t i o n . A u s t i n uses t h e q u o t a t i o n o f a p r o m i s e as a n e x a m - t h i n k o f ever-new a n d m o r e i m p r o b a b l e contexts; t h e specification
p l e o f a d e r i v a t i v e o r p a r a s i t i c f o r m because t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s does n o t r u n u p against any n a t u r a l
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Chapter 9 O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

limits: "Suppose that the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a m a r r i a g e ceremony p o s i t i o n s ; b u t these i d e a l i z a t i o n s are n o t l o g o c e n t r i c , a r b i t r a r y acts

were m e t b u t that one o f the partners were u n d e r hypnosis, o r again that theoreticians b r i n g to bear o n u n m a n a g e a b l e contexts i n order
t h a t t h e c e r e m o n y w e r e i m p e c c a b l e i n a l l respects b u t h a d b e e n t o give t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f m a s t e r i n g t h e m ; r a t h e r , t h e y are p r e s u p -
c a l l e d a ' r e h e a r s a l , ' o r f i n a l l y , t h a t w h i l e t h e s p e a k e r was a m i n i s t e r positions that the participants themselves have to make i f c o m m u n i -
licensed to p e r f o r m weddings and the couple had obtained a l i - cative a c t i o n is t o b e p o s s i b l e at a l l .
cense, the t h r e e o f t h e m were o n this occasion a c t i n g i n a play that, c. T h e r o l e o f i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s c a n also b e c l a r i f i e d i n c o n -
coincidentally, included a w e d d i n g c e r e m o n y " 4
Such a v a r i a t i o n o f n e c t i o n w i t h s o m e o t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h i s s a m e state o f a f f a i r s .
contexts p r o d u c i n g changes i n m e a n i n g c a n n o t i n p r i n c i p l e be ar- Because c o n t e x t s are changeable a n d can be expanded in any
r e s t e d o r c o n t r o l l e d , because c o n t e x t s c a n n o t b e e x h a u s t e d , t h a t is, d i r e c t i o n whatsoever, t h e same t e x t c a n b e o p e n t o d i f f e r e n t r e a d -
t h e y c a n n o t b e m a s t e r e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y o n c e a n d f o r a l l . C u l l e r shows i n g s ; i t is t h e t e x t i t s e l f t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e its u n c o n t r o l l a b l e effec-
c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t A u s t i n c a n n o t escape t h i s d i f f i c u l t y e v e n b y t a k i n g tive history (Wirkungsgeschichte). However, Derrida's deliberately
refuge i n the i n t e n t i o n s o f speakers a n d hearers. I t is n o t the p a r a d o x i c a l s t a t e m e n t t h a t e v e r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is i n e v i t a b l y a m i s i n -
thoughts o f bride, b r i d e g r o o m , or priest that decide the validity o f t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d every u n d e r s t a n d i n g a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , does n o t
the ceremony, b u t their actions a n d the circumstances u n d e r w h i c h follow f r o m this venerable h e r m e n e u t i c insight. Culler justifies the
t h e y are c a r r i e d o u t . " W h a t c o u n t s is t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h e d e s c r i p - s t a t e m e n t " A l l r e a d i n g s are m i s r e a d i n g s " as f o l l o w s : " I f a t e x t c a n b e
t i o n o f the circumstances: w h e t h e r the features o f the c o n t e x t ad- u n d e r s t o o d , i t can i n p r i n c i p l e be u n d e r s t o o d repeatedly, by d i f f e r -
d u c e d create a frame that alters t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f the ent readers i n d i f f e r e n t circumstances. T h e s e acts o f r e a d i n g or
utterances." 5
u n d e r s t a n d i n g are n o t , o f course, i d e n t i c a l . T h e y involve modifica-
Searle has r e a c t e d t o t h i s d i f f i c u l t y b y i n t r o d u c i n g a q u a l i f i c a t i o n tions a n d differences, b u t d i f f e r e n c e s w h i c h are d e e m e d n o t to
to the effect that the literal m e a n i n g o f a sentence does n o t c o m - m a t t e r . W e c a n t h u s say . . . t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a special case o f
p l e t e l y fix t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e s p e e c h act i n w h i c h i t is misunderstanding, a particular deviation or determination of misun-
employed; r a t h e r , i t d e p e n d s o n t a c i t s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n b y a system d e r s t a n d i n g . I t is m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h o s e misses d o n o t m a t t e r . " 6

o f b a c k g r o u n d assumptions r e g a r d i n g the n o r m a l i t y o f general con- H o w e v e r , C u l l e r leaves o n e t h i n g o u t o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e produc-

d i t i o n s i n the w o r l d . These prereflective b a c k g r o u n d certainties are tivity o f the process o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e m a i n s u n p r o b l e m a t i c only
o f a h o l i s t i c n a t u r e ; t h e y c a n n o t b e e x h a u s t e d by a c o u n t a b l y finite so l o n g as a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s r e t a i n h o l d o f t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t o f a
set o f s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . Sentence-meanings, n o m a t t e r h o w w e l l ana- p o s s i b l e , a c t u a l l y r e a c h e d , m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) i n
l y z e d , t h u s are v a l i d o n l y r e l a t i v e t o a s h a r e d b a c k g r o u n d knowledge w h i c h t h e same u t t e r a n c e s are a s s i g n e d t h e same m e a n i n g . A s G a d a -
t h a t is c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d o f a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . How- mer has s h o w n , even the h e r m e n e u t i c endeavor, w h i c h aims to
ever, Searle m a k e s c l e a r t h a t p o s i t i n g s u c h a r e l a t i o n b y n o m e a n s b r i d g e t e m p o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l distances, r e m a i n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e
b r i n g s w i t h i t t h e m e a n i n g - r e l a t i v i s m t h a t D e r r i d a a i m s t o show. So idea o f a possible, actually achieved, agreement.
l o n g as l a n g u a g e g a m e s a r e f u n c t i o n i n g a n d t h e p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g U n d e r t h e pressure to make decisions i n h e r e n t i n everyday c o m -
c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d has not broken down, participants municative practices, participants are dependent on an action-
r e c k o n w i t h c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d — a n d clearly, r i g h t l y s o — t h a t coordinating agreement. The more removed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are
a r e a s s u m e d as " n o r m a l " i n t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . A n d i n cases f r o m this k i n d o f "serious s i t u a t i o n , " t h e m o r e they can free t h e m -
where individual background convictions do become problematic, selves f r o m t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n a c h i e v a b l e c o n s e n s u s .
t h e y f u r t h e r assume t h a t t h e y c o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e r e a c h a r a t i o n a l l y B u t they can never w h o l l y free themselves f r o m t h e idea t h a t m i s i n -
m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t . B o t h are s t r o n g , t h a t is t o say, i d e a l i z i n g s u p - t e r p r e t a t i o n s w o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e have to be criticizable i n terms o f
388 389

Chapter 9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s o f L a n g u a g e

a n a g r e e m e n t a i m e d f o r i n a n i d e a l way. T h e i n t e r p r e t e r d o e s n o t functions, i t has t o p r o d u c e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s -

impose this idea o n her object; rather, i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude s i o n a n d speaker, h e a r e r , a n d state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d . Buhler
o f a p a r t i c i p a t i n g o b s e r v e r , she takes i t o v e r f r o m t h o s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o n c e p t u a l i z e d t h i s i n h i s s e m i o t i c s c h e m a as t h e s i g n f u n c t i o n s of
d i r e c t l y w h o c a n act communicatively only on the presupposition of inter- expression, appeal, a n d representation. To the extent that language 8

subjectively identical ascriptions of meaning. Thus, I do n o t wish to f u l f i l l s a p o e t i c f u n c t i o n , h o w e v e r , i t d o e s so i n t h e r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n

m a r s h a l a W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n positivism o f language games against D e r -
r i d a ' s thesis. I t is n o t a n y g i v e n h a b i t u a l i z e d p r a c t i c e t h a t d e c i d e s j u s t
w h a t m e a n i n g is a t t r i b u t e d t o a t e x t o r a n u t t e r a n c e . 7
Rather, lan-
g u a g e g a m e s w o r k o n l y because t h e y p r e s u p p o s e i d e a l i z a t i o n s t h a t
transcend any p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e g a m e , idealizations that—as
necessary c o n d i t i o n o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g — g i v e rise t o
t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t is o p e n t o c r i t i c i s m o n t h e basis
o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . A l a n g u a g e o p e r a t i n g u n d e r these k i n d s o f c o n -
s t r a i n t s is s u b j e c t t o a n o n g o i n g test. E v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
tices, i n w h i c h a c t o r s h a v e t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t something
i n the w o r l d , stand u n d e r the n e e d to prove t h e i r w o r t h ; such a p r o o f
o f w o r t h is m a d e p o s s i b l e i n t h e first p l a c e by these i d e a l i z i n g s u p -
p o s i t i o n s . I t is o n t h e basis o f t h i s n e e d f o r e v e r y d a y l i n g u i s t i c p r a c -
tices t o p r o v e t h e i r w o r t h t h a t o n e m a y d i s t i n g u i s h , w i t h A u s t i n a n d
S e a r l e , b e t w e e n " c u s t o m a r y " a n d " p a r a s i t i c " uses o f language.
o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n t o itself. C o n s e q u e n t l y , r e f e r e n c e t o a n
object, i n f o r m a t i o n a l content, and truth-value—validity conditions
in general—are e x t r i n s i c t o p o e t i c l a n g u a g e ; a n u t t e r a n c e is p o e t i c
t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t is d i r e c t e d t o t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m itself, t o its
a own linguistic f o r m . Roman Jakobson integrated this specification
i n t o an e x p a n d e d schema of language functions. I n addition to the
basic f u n c t i o n s , w h i c h g o b a c k t o B u h l e r — e x p r e s s i n g the speaker's
intentions, establishing interpersonal relations, and representing
states o f a f f a i r s — a n d t w o f u r t h e r f u n c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o m a k i n g c o n -
t a c t a n d t o t h e c o d e , h e ascribes t o l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s a p o e t i c
f u n c t i o n , w h i c h d i r e c t s o u r a t t e n t i o n t o " t h e message as s u c h . " 9
We
a r e less c o n c e r n e d h e r e w i t h a c l o s e r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e p o e t i c
f u n c t i o n ( i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u i v a l e n c e is
p r o j e c t e d f r o m t h e axis o f s e l e c t i o n t o t h e axis o f c o m b i n a t i o n ) than
w i t h a n i n t e r e s t i n g c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t is i m p o r t a n t f o r o u r problem

U p t o t h i s p o i n t I have c r i t i c i z e d D e r r i d a ' s t h i r d a n d f u n d a m e n t a l o f d e l i m i t i n g n o r m a l ( f r o m o t h e r k i n d s of) speech: "Any a t t e m p t to

a s s u m p t i o n only to the e x t e n t t h a t (against Culler's reconstruction reduce the sphere o f poetic f u n c t i o n to poetry or to confine poetry

o f D e r r i d i a n arguments) I have d e f e n d e d t h e possibility o f demar- t o p o e t i c f u n c t i o n w o u l d be a delusive oversimplification. Poetic

c a t i n g n o r m a l l a n g u a g e f r o m derivative f o r m s . I have n o t y e t s h o w n f u n c t i o n is n o t t h e sole f u n c t i o n o f v e r b a l a r t , b u t o n l y its d o m i n a n t ,

how fictional speech can be d e m a r c a t e d f r o m t h e n o r m a l ( t h a t is, d e t e r m i n i n g f u n c t i o n , w h e r e a s i n a l l o t h e r v e r b a l a c t i v i t i e s i t acts as

e v e r y d a y ) use o f l a n g u a g e . T h i s a s p e c t is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o n e f o r a s u b s i d i a r y , accessory c o n s t i t u e n t . T h i s f u n c t i o n , b y p r o m o t i n g t h e

Derrida. I f "literature" and "writing" constitute the m o d e l for a p a l p a b i l i t y o f signs, d e e p e n s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d i c h o t o m y o f signs

universal insurmountable textual context within which all genre a n d objects. H e n c e , w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h poetic f u n c t i o n , linguistics

d i s t i n c t i o n s u l t i m a t e l y dissolve, t h e y c a n n o t b e s p l i t o f f f r o m other c a n n o t l i m i t i t s e l f t o t h e field o f p o e t r y . " 1 0

Poetic speech, therefore,

d i s c o u r s e s as a n a u t o n o m o u s r e a l m o f fiction. For the l i t e r a r y critics is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d o n l y by v i r t u e o f t h e p r i m a r y a n d s t r u c t u r e -

w h o f o l l o w D e r r i d a i n t h e U n i t e d States, t h e thesis o f t h e autonomy f o r m i n g f o r c e o f a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n t h a t is always f u l f i l l e d together

o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c w o r k o f a r t is u n a c c e p t a b l e f o r t h e f u r t h e r r e a s o n with other language functions.

t h a t t h e y w a n t t o set t h e m s e l v e s o f f f r o m t h e f o r m a l i s m o f New Richard O h m a n n m a k e s use of Austin's approach i n order to

C r i t i c i s m a n d f r o m s t r u c t u r a l i s t aesthetics. e x a m i n e t h e s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s o f p o e t i c l a n g u a g e i n t h i s sense. F o r
The Prague Structuralists originally tried to distinguish poetic h i m , t h e p h e n o m e n o n i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n is t h e fictionality of
from o r d i n a r y language w i t h respect to the relation o f each to t h e l i n g u i s t i c w o r k o f a r t , t h a t is, t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c a p p e a r -
e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y . I n s o f a r as l a n g u a g e o c c u r s i n communicative a n c e (Schein), w i t h w h i c h a s e c o n d a r e n a , s p e c i f i c a l l y r e m o v e d f r o m
390 391

Chapter 9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses o f Language

r e a l i t y , is o p e n e d u p o n t h e basis o f o n g o i n g e v e r y d a y practices. p e n d e n c e o f t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k o f a r t i n D e r r i d a ' s sense. She d o e s n o t

W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s p o e t i c l a n g u a g e is its " w o r l d - g e n e r a t i n g " capac-
i t y : " A l i t e r a r y w o r k creates a w o r l d . . . b y p r o v i d i n g t h e r e a d e r w i t h
impaired a n d i n c o m p l e t e s p e e c h acts w h i c h h e c o m p l e t e s by s u p p l y -
ing the appropriate circumstances." 11
T h e p e c u l i a r disempowerment o f
s p e e c h acts, w h i c h g e n e r a t e s f i c t i o n s , consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t s p e e c h
acts a r e r o b b e d o f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e , r e t a i n i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y
m e a n i n g s o n l y as r e f r a c t e d b y i n d i r e c t r e p o r t i n g o r q u o t a t i o n : " A
l i t e r a r y w o r k is a d i s c o u r s e w h o s e s e n t e n c e s l a c k t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
f o r c e s t h a t w o u l d n o r m a l l y a t t a c h t o t h e m . I t s i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is
m i m e t i c . . . . Specifically, a l i t e r a r y w o r k p u r p o r t e d l y i m i t a t e s a series
o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h i n f a c t h a v e n o o t h e r e x i s t e n c e . B y d o i n g so, i t
leads t h e r e a d e r t o i m a g i n e a speaker, a s i t u a t i o n , a set o f a n c i l l a r y
events, a n d so o n . " 1 2
T h e bracketing o f illocutionary force virtualizes
t h e r e l a t i o n s t o t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h t h e s p e e c h acts a r e i n v o l v e d
t h a n k s t o t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e , a n d releases t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n
interaction f r o m an o b l i g a t i o n to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g about some-
t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o n t h e basis o f i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s i n s u c h a
way t h a t t h e y c a n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r p l a n s o f a c t i o n a n d t h u s e n t e r
i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o t h e s e q u e l o f a c t i o n : " S i n c e t h e quasi¬
s p e e c h acts o f l i t e r a t u r e are n o t carrying on the world's business—de-
scribing, u r g i n g , contracting, etc.—the reader may well attend to
consider nctionality, the bracketing o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y force, a n d the
u n c o u p l i n g o f poetic language f r o m everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
tices t o b e decisive selective c r i t e r i a , b e c a u s e f i c t i o n a l e l e m e n t s of
l a n g u a g e s u c h as j o k e s , i r o n y , fantasies, s t o r i e s , a n d p a r a b l e s p e r v a d e
o u r everyday discourse a n d i n n o way constitute an autonomous
universe c u t o f f f r o m "the w o r l d ' s business." Conversely, w o r k s o f
n o n f i c t i o n , m e m o i r s , t r a v e l r e p o r t s , h i s t o r i c a l r o m a n c e s , e v e n romans
a clef o r t h r i l l e r s t h a t , l i k e T r u m a n C a p o t e ' s In Cold Blood, a d a p t a
factually d o c u m e n t e d case i n n o way c r e a t e an unambiguously
f i c t i o n a l w o r l d , e v e n t h o u g h we o f t e n c o u n t these p r o d u c t i o n s , f o r
t h e m o s t p a r t a t least, as " l i t e r a t u r e . " P r a t t uses t h e r e s u l t s o f studies
i n sociolinguistics by W. L a b o v 1 6
to prove that natural narratives, that
is, t h e " s t o r i e s " t o l d s p o n t a n e o u s l y o r o n r e q u e s t i n e v e r y d a y l i f e ,
o b e y t h e s a m e r h e t o r i c a l laws o f c o n s t r u c t i o n as, a n d e x h i b i t s i m i l a r
structural characteristics to, literary narratives. "Labov's data m a k e
it necessary t o a c c o u n t f o r n a r r a t i v e r h e t o r i c i n t e r m s that are n o t
exclusively l i t e r a r y ; t h e fact that Active o r m i m e t i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d
utterances can o c c u r i n almost any r e a l m o f e x t r a l i t e r a r y discourse
requires that we d o t h e same f o r A c t i v i t y o r m i m e s i s . I n o t h e r
w o r d s , t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a w o r k ' s A c t i v i t y a n d its l i t e r a r i n e s s is
indirect." 1 7

them i n a nonpragmatic way." 1 3

Neutralizing their b i n d i n g and
Nonetheless, the fact that n o r m a l language is p e r m e a t e d with
b o n d i n g f o r c e relieves t h e d i s e m p o w e r e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts f r o m t h e
fictional, narrative, metaphorical—in general, with rhetorical—ele-
pressure to make decisions i n t r i n s i c to everyday communicative
m e n t s does n o t yet speak against t h e a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n t h e a u t o n -
practices, removes t h e m f r o m the sphere o f n o r m a l speech, a n d
o m y o f the linguistic w o r k o f art by the b r a c k e t i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y
thereby empowers t h e m for the playful creation of new worlds—or,
f o r c e s . For, a c c o r d i n g to Jakobson, n c t i o n a l i t y is a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
rather, for the u n m i t i g a t e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the world-disclosing
feature s u i t e d to d e m a r c a t i n g l i t e r a t u r e f r o m everyday discourses
force o f innovative linguistic expressions. T h i s specialization i n the
only to the extent that the world-disclosing f u n c t i o n o f language
world-disclosing f u n c t i o n o f language explains the peculiar self-
predominates over the other linguistic functions a n d determines the
referentiality o f poetic language to w h i c h Jakobson refers a n d that
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o n s t r u c t . I n a c e r t a i n respect, i t is t h e
p r o m p t s G e o f f r e y H a r t m a n t o p o s e t h e r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n : "Is n o t
r e f r a c t i o n a n d p a r t i a l s u b l a t i o n (Aufhebung) o f illocutionary validity
literary language the n a m e we give to a d i c t i o n whose f r a m e of
c l a i m s t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e s t o r y f r o m t h e eyewitness statement,
r e f e r e n c e is s u c h t h a t t h e w o r d s s t a n d o u t as w o r d s ( e v e n as s o u n d s )
t e a s i n g f r o m i n s u l t i n g , i r o n y f r o m m i s l e a d i n g , h y p o t h e s i s f r o m asser-
r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g , at once, assimilable meanings?" 1 4

t i o n , f a n t a s y f r o m p e r c e p t i o n , t h e t r a i n i n g m a n e u v e r f r o m t h e act o f
M a r y L . Pratt refers to O h m a n n ' s s t u d i e s 1 5
i n order to r e f u t e — a d - warfare, a n d the i m a g i n e d scenario f r o m t h e r e p o r t o n an actual
m i t t e d l y by means o f speech-act t h e o r y — t h e thesis o f t h e i n d e - c a t a s t r o p h e . B u t i n n o n e o f these cases d o t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts lose
392 393

Chapter 9 O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses of L a n g u a g e

t h e i r action-coordinating b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g force. Even i n the m a t i c a n a l y s t o f l a n g u a g e stalks l i t e r a r y t e x t s f r o m o u t s i d e , as i t w e r e .

cases a d d u c e d f o r t h e sake o f c o m p a r i s o n , t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e func- O f c o u r s e , t h e l a t t e r have to satisfy a final c o n d i t i o n ; i n t h e case o f
t i o n s o f t h e s p e e c h act r e m a i n i n t a c t i n s o f a r as t h e f i c t i o n a l e l e m e n t s literary texts, tellability must gain p r e d o m i n a n c e over other func-
c a n n o t be detached f r o m contexts o f life-practice. T h e world-disclos- t i o n a l characteristics: " I n the e n d , tellability can take p r e c e d e n c e
i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e d o e s n o t g a i n i n d e p e n d e n c e vis-a-vis t h e over assertibility itself." 2 0
O n l y i n t h i s case d o the f u n c t i o n a l de-
expressive, r e g u l a t i v e , a n d i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . By c o n t r a s t , p r e - m a n d s a n d s t r u c t u r a l constraints o f everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
cisely t h i s m a y be t h e case i n T r u m a n C a p o t e ' s l i t e r a r y t r e a t m e n t o f tices (which Pratt defines by means of Grice's conversational
a p a r t i c u l a r event, n o t o r i o u s i n legal circles a n d carefully researched; p o s t u l a t e s ) lose t h e i r f o r c e . T h a t e v e r y o n e is c o n c e r n e d t o p r e s e n t
f o r w h a t g r o u n d s t h e primacy a n d t h e s t r u c t u r i n g f o r c e o f t h e p o e t i c h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the conversation i n f o r m a t i v e l y , to be relevant,
f u n c t i o n is n o t t h e d e v i a t i o n o f a f i c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f r o m t h e straightforward, a n d to avoid obscure, ambiguous, a n d l o n g w i n d e d
d o c u m e n t a r y r e p o r t o f a n e v e n t , b u t t h e e x e m p l a r y way o f d e a l i n g u t t e r a n c e s a r e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s o f normal language i n c o m m u -
w i t h i t t h a t takes t h e case o u t o f its c o n t e x t a n d m a k e s i t t h e o c c a s i o n nicative action, b u t n o t o f poetic speech: " O u r tolerance, indeed
for an innovative, world-disclosing, a n d eye-opening representation p r o p e n s i t y , f o r e l a b o r a t i o n w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e t e l l a b l e suggests
i n w h i c h the rhetorical means of representation depart f r o m com- that, i n G r i c e a n terms, the standards o f quantity, quality, a n d m a n n e r
m u n i c a t i v e r o u t i n e s a n d take o n a life o f t h e i r o w n . f o r d i s p l a y t e x t s d i f f e r f r o m t h o s e G r i c e suggests f o r declarative

I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o see h o w P r a t t is c o m p e l l e d to w o r k o u t this speech i n his m a x i m s . " 2 1

p o e t i c f u n c t i o n against h e r w i l l . H e r sociolinguistic counterproposal I n t h e e n d , t h e analysis leads t o a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e thesis t h a t

b e g i n s w i t h a n analysis o f t h e s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t p o e t i c s p e e c h
shares w i t h o t h e r d i s c o u r s e s — t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t w h e r e b y a n a r r a t o r
o r l e c t u r e r t u r n s t o a p u b l i c a n d calls its a t t e n t i o n t o a t e x t . T h e t e x t
is s u b j e c t e d t o c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e s o f p r e p a r a t i o n a n d s e l e c t i o n be-
f o r e i t is r e a d y f o r d e l i v e r y . F i n a l l y , b e f o r e a t e x t c a n lay c l a i m t o t h e
p a t i e n c e a n d capacity f o r j u d g m e n t o f t h e a u d i e n c e , i t has t o satisfy
c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a o f r e l e v a n c e : i t has to be worth telling. T h e r e l i a b i l i t y is
assessed i n t e r m s o f t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f s o m e s i g n i f i c a n t e x e m p l a r y
e x p e r i e n c e . I n its c o n t e n t , a t e l l a b l e t e x t r e a c h e s b e y o n d t h e l o c a l
c o n t e x t o f t h e i m m e d i a t e s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n a n d is o p e n t o f u r t h e r
e l a b o r a t i o n : "As m i g h t b e e x p e c t e d , t h e s e t w o f e a t u r e s — c o n t e x t u a l
detachability and susceptibility to elaboration—are equally i m p o r -
tant characteristics o f l i t e r a r y u t t e r a n c e s . " 1 8
O f course, l i t e r a r y texts
share these characteristics w i t h "display texts" i n g e n e r a l . T h e latter
are characterized w i t h respect to t h e i r special c o m m u n i c a t i v e func-
t i o n s : t h e y are d e s i g n e d t o s e r v e "a p u r p o s e I have d e s c r i b e d as t h a t
o f v e r b a l l y r e p r e s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s w h i c h are
h e l d t o b e u n u s u a l o r p r o b l e m a t i c i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e addressee
will respond a f f e c t i v e l y i n t h e i n t e n d e d way, a d o p t t h e i n t e n d e d
e v a l u a t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t a k e p l e a s u r e i n d o i n g so, a n d g e n e r -
a l l y find t h e w h o l e u n d e r t a k i n g w o r t h i t . " 1 9
O n e sees h o w t h e p r a g -
i t w o u l d like to refute. To the degree that the poetic, world-disclosing
f u n c t i o n o f language gains p r i m a c y a n d s t r u c t u r e - f o r m i n g f o r c e ,
l a n g u a g e escapes t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c -
t i o n s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e . T h e space o f fiction, w h i c h is o p e n e d u p w h e n
linguistic f o r m s o f expression b e c o m e reflexive, results f r o m t h e fact
that the i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g forces b e c o m e ineffec-
t i v e — a s d o t h e i d e a l i z a t i o n s t h a t m a k e p o s s i b l e a use o f language
oriented toward reaching understanding, thereby enabling a coordi-
n a t i o n o f plans o f action that operates via the intersubjective recog-
n i t i o n o f criticizable validity claims. O n e c a n also r e a d D e r r i d a ' s
d e b a t e w i t h A u s t i n as a d e n i a l o f t h i s d o m a i n o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i -
cative p r a c t i c e s , w h i c h is s t r u c t u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o a l o g i c o f its o w n ;
the d e n i a l o f such a d o m a i n corresponds to t h e d e n i a l o f an a u t o n o -
mous realm of fiction.
2
Because D e r r i d a d e n i e s b o t h o f t h e a b o v e , h e is a b l e t o analyze a n y
given discourse i n accordance w i t h the m o d e l o f poetic language,
a n d d o so as t h o u g h l a n g u a g e i n g e n e r a l w e r e d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e
p o e t i c use o f l a n g u a g e specialized i n world-disclosure. F r o m this
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v i e w p o i n t , l a n g u a g e as s u c h c o n v e r g e s w i t h l i t e r a t u r e o r i n d e e d w i t h
" w r i t i n g . " T h i s aestheticizing of language, which is purchased with the
twofold denial of the independent logics of normal and poetic speech, also
e x p l a i n s D e r r i d a ' s i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o w a r d t h e t e n s i o n - f i l l e d p o l a r i t y be-
t w e e n t h e p o e t i c , w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a n d its p r o -
saic, i n n e r w o r l d l y f u n c t i o n s ; t h e s e f u n c t i o n s a r e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t
by a m o d i f i e d version o f B u h l e r ' s schema o f language f u n c t i o n s .
L i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d processes s u c h as t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f k n o w l -
edge, the transmission o f culture, the f o r m a t i o n of personal identity,
socialization, and social i n t e g r a t i o n involve mastering problems
p o s e d i n t h e w o r l d ; t h e y owe t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f l e a r n i n g p r o c -
esses, w h i c h D e r r i d a c a n n o t a c k n o w l e d g e , t o t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c s
o f these p r o b l e m s a n d t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m t a i l o r e d t o deal w i t h
t h e m . F o r D e r r i d a , l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d processes i n t h e w o r l d are
e m b e d d e d i n a world-constituting context that prejudices everything;
t h e y a r e f a t a l i s t i c a l l y at t h e m e r c y o f t h e h a p p e n i n g s o f t e x t c r e a t i o n
b e y o n d t h e i r c o n t r o l , o v e r w h e l m e d by the poetic-creative transfor-
mation of a background designed by archewriting, a n d c o n d e m n e d
t o be t e m p o r a l l y a n d s p a t i a l l y l i m i t e d . A n a e s t h e t i c contextualism
b l i n d s h i m to the fact t h a t everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices, by
v i r t u e o f t h e i r b u i l t - i n idealizations, m a k e possible l e a r n i n g p r o c -
esses i n t h e w o r l d , i n r e l a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g power
o f i n t e r p r e t i n g l a n g u a g e has t o prove its worth. T h e s e l e a r n i n g p r o c -
esses d e v e l o p a n i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c t h a t t r a n s c e n d s a l l l o c a l b a r r i e r s
because experiences a n d j u d g m e n t s are f o r m e d o n l y i n the l i g h t o f
criticizable validity claims. D e r r i d a neglects the p o t e n t i a l f o r nega-
tion i n h e r e n t i n t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; h e allows t h e c a p a c i t y t o solve p r o b l e m s t o d i s a p p e a r
b e h i n d the world-creating capacity o f language; the f o r m e r capacity
is possessed by l a n g u a g e as t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h t h o s e a c t i n g
communicatively enter i n t o relations to the w o r l d w h e n e v e r they
reach understanding with one another about something i n the
jective w o r l d , i n t h e i r c o m m o n social w o r l d , o r i n the subjective
w o r l d s t o w h i c h e a c h has p r i v i l e g e d access.
R i c h a r d R o r t y c a r r i e s o u t a s i m i l a r act o f l e v e l i n g . U n l i k e D e r r i d a ,
h o w e v e r , h e does n o t r e m a i n i d e a l i s t i c a l l y fixated u p o n the history
o f m e t a p h y s i c s as a t r a n s c e n d e n t h a p p e n i n g (Ubergeschehen) t h a t d e -
395
O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses of L a n g u a g e
t e r m i n e s e v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g t o R o r t y , science
a n d m o r a l i t y , e c o n o m i c s a n d p o l i t i c s , a r e at t h e m e r c y o f a p r o c e s s
of language-creating p r o t u b e r a n c e s i n just the same way as a r t a n d
philosophy. L i k e K u h n i a n history o f science, the f l u x o f i n t e r p r e t a -
tions flows r h y t h m i c a l l y between the r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g a n d n o r m a l i z a -
tion of language. Rorty observes this b a c k - a n d - f o r t h movement
2 2
between two situations i n all d o m a i n s o f c u l t u r a l life:
O n e is t h e sort o f s i t u a t i o n e n c o u n t e r e d w h e n p e o p l e pretty m u c h a g r e e o n
w h a t is w a n t e d , a n d a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t h o w best to get it. I n s u c h a s i t u a t i o n
t h e r e is n o n e e d to say a n y t h i n g t e r r i b l y u n f a m i l i a r , for a r g u m e n t is typically
a b o u t t h e t r u t h o f a s s e r t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t t h e utility o f v o c a b u l a r i e s .
T h e c o n t r a s t i n g s i t u a t i o n is o n e i n w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g is u p for grabs at
o n c e — i n w h i c h t h e motives a n d t h e t e r m s o f d i s c u s s i o n s a r e a c e n t r a l
subject of argument. . . . I n s u c h p e r i o d s p e o p l e b e g i n to toss a r o u n d o l d
w o r d s i n n e w s e n s e s , to t h r o w i n t h e o c c a s i o n a l n e o l o g i s m , a n d t h u s to
h a m m e r o u t a n e w i d i o m w h i c h i n i t i a l l y attracts a t t e n t i o n to itself a n d o n l y
later gets p u t to w o r k . 2 3
O n e n o t i c e s h o w t h e N i e t z s c h e a n p a t h o s o f a Lebensphilosophie that
has m a d e t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n b e c l o u d s t h e s o b e r i n s i g h t s o f pragma-
t i s m ; i n t h e p i c t u r e p a i n t e d by R o r t y , t h e r e n o v a t i v e p r o c e s s o f l i n -
guistic world-disclosure n o l o n g e r has a counterpoise i n t h e processes
o f c r i t i c a l t e s t i n g t h a t are p a r t o f i n n e r w o r l d l y p r a c t i c e s . T h e "yes"
and "no" of communicatively a c t i n g a c t o r s is p r e j u d i c e d a n d r h e t o -
rically o v e r d e t e r m i n e d by t h e i r linguistic contexts to such a degree
t h a t t h e a n o m a l i e s o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g t h e phases o f e x h a u s t i o n are
p r e s e n t e d o n l y as s y m p t o m s o f w a n i n g v i t a l i t y , as a g i n g processes, as
processes a n a l o g o u s t o n a t u r a l o n e s — a n d a r e n o t seen as t h e r e s u l t
o f unsuccessful s o l u t i o n s t o p r o b l e m s a n d invalid answers.
I n n e r w o r l d l y linguistic practices d r a w t h e i r p o w e r o f negation
f r o m v a l i d i t y claims t h a t go b e y o n d t h e h o r i z o n s o f the c u r r e n t l y
given context. B u t the contextualist c o n c e p t i o n o f language, laden
ob- as i t is w i t h Lebensphilosophie, is i n s e n s i t i v e t o t h e a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g
force o f the counterfactual, w h i c h makes itself felt i n the idealizing
presuppositions o f communicative action. For this reason, D e r r i d a
a n d R o r t y also f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e t h e p e c u l i a r status o f d i s c o u r s e s ,
w h i c h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n and tailored
t o a single v a l i d i t y d i m e n s i o n ( t r u t h o r n o r m a t i v e Tightness), t h a t is,

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Chapter 9
to a single c o m p l e x o f p r o b l e m s (questions o f t r u t h or justice). I n
modern societies, t h e s p h e r e s o f s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d l a w have
c r y s t a l l i z e d a r o u n d these f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h e c o r r e s p o n d -
i n g c u l t u r a l systems o f a c t i o n a d m i n i s t e r problemsolving capacities i n a
way s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n w h i c h t h e e n t e r p r i s e s o f a r t a n d l i t e r a t u r e
a d m i n i s t e r capacities for world-disclosure. Because D e r r i d a o v e r g e n e r a l -
izes t h i s o n e l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n — t h e p o e t i c — h e n o l o n g e r n o t i c e s
the complex relation between the n o r m a l language of everyday
p r a c t i c e s a n d t h e t w o n o n e v e r y d a y s p h e r e s , w h i c h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,
as i t w e r e , i n o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s . T h e p o l a r t e n s i o n b e t w e e n w o r l d -
d i s c l o s u r e a n d p r o b l e m s o l v i n g is h e l d t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t h e c l u s t e r o f
f u n c t i o n s o f everyday language; b u t a r t a n d l i t e r a t u r e , o n t h e one
h a n d , a n d science, m o r a l i t y , a n d law, o n t h e other, specialize i n
experiences a n d k i n d s o f k n o w l e d g e t h a t develop a n d can be w o r k e d
o u t w i t h i n t h e c a t c h m e n t a r e a o f j u s t one l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n a n d one
dimension o f v a l i d i t y , respectively. D e r r i d a h o l i s t i c a l l y levels these
complicated relations i n order to equate philosophy w i t h literature
a n d c r i t i c i s m . H e fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h e special status t h a t b o t h p h i -
l o s o p h y a n d l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , e a c h i n its o w n way, assume as m e d i a -
tors between the cultures o f experts a n d t h e everyday w o r l d .
O n the one h a n d , literary criticism, institutionalized i n Europe
since t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a r t
[ f r o m o t h e r v a l u e s p h e r e s ] . I t reacts t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g a u t o n o m y of
l i n g u i s t i c w o r k s o f a r t b y m e a n s o f d i s c o u r s e s s p e c i a l i z i n g i n ques-
t i o n s o f taste. I n s u c h d i s c o u r s e s , t h e c l a i m s w i t h w h i c h l i t e r a r y texts
a p p e a r a r e s u b m i t t e d t o e x a m i n a t i o n — c l a i m s t o " a r t i s t i c t r u t h , " aes-
thetic h a r m o n y , e x e m p l a r y validity, innovative power, a n d authentic-
ity. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a e s t h e t i c c r i t i c i s m is s i m i l a r t o t h e f o r m s of
a r g u m e n t a t i o n specializing in propositional truth and normative
r i g h t n e s s , t h a t is, t o t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l discourses. I t is, h o w -
ever, n o t m e r e l y a n e s o t e r i c c o m p o n e n t o f a c u l t u r e o f e x p e r t s b u t ,
o v e r a n d above t h i s , has t h e task o f m e d i a t i n g b e t w e e n t h e c u l t u r e s
o f experts a n d the everyday w o r l d .
T h i s bridging function o f a r t c r i t i c i s m is m o r e c l e a r l y e v i d e n t w i t h
r e g a r d t o m u s i c a n d t h e p l a s t i c arts t h a n w i t h r e g a r d t o l i t e r a r y
w o r k s , w h i c h are, o f course, already f o r m u l a t e d i n the m e d i u m of
l a n g u a g e , e v e n i f i t is a p o e t i c , s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l o n e . I n t h i s s e c o n d ,
397
O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses of L a n g u a g e
exoteric respect, c r i t i c i s m accomplishes a process o f t r a n s l a t i o n o f a
u n i q u e k i n d . I t draws the e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n t e n t o f the w o r k o f a r t i n t o
n o r m a l language; the innovative potential o f art a n d literature for
t h e f o r m s o f life a n d life-histories t h a t r e p r o d u c e themselves via
everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action can be unleashed o n l y i n this m a i e u -
tic way. T h i s innovative potential then finds expression in the
c h a n g e d c o m p o s i t i o n o f a n evaluative v o c a b u l a r y — i n t h e r e n o v a t i o n
of value-orientations a n d n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s — w h i c h alters the
tincture o f modes o f life t h r o u g h altering modes o f perception.
Like literary criticism, philosophy, t o o , takes u p a p o s i t i o n w i t h
t w o f r o n t s — o r a t least t h i s is t r u e o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h n o
longer promises to vindicate the claims o f r e l i g i o n i n the n a m e o f
t h e o r y . O n t h e o n e h a n d , i t d i r e c t s its i n t e r e s t t o t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of
s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d l a w a n d a t t a c h e s t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m s t o its state-
ments. I t distinguishes itself by posing p r o b l e m s w i t h a universalist
t h r u s t a n d b y its s t r o n g t h e o r e t i c a l strategies, t h e r e b y m a i n t a i n i n g
a n i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e sciences. A n d yet p h i l o s o p h y is n o t
simply an esoteric c o m p o n e n t o f a c u l t u r e o f experts. I t maintains
j u s t as i n t i m a t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a n d
w i t h s o u n d c o m m o n sense, e v e n i f i t r e l e n t l e s s l y a n d subversively
shakes u p t h e c e r t a i n t i e s o f e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s . I n t h e face o f systems
of knowledge differentiated according to particular dimensions of
validity, p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g represents t h e lifeworld's interests i n
the totality o f f u n c t i o n s a n d structures t h a t are clustered together
and combined i n communicative action. Admittedly, it maintains
t h i s r e l a t i o n t o t o t a l i t y by m e a n s o f a r e f l e x i v i t y l a c k i n g i n t h e l i f e -
w o r l d ' s b a c k g r o u n d , w h i c h is p r e s e n t i n t u i t i v e l y .
I f o n e b e c o m e s aware o f this ( h e r e m e r e l y sketched) t w o - f r o n t
p o s i t i o n o f [ l i t e r a r y ] criticism a n d p h i l o s o p h y — t o w a r d the everyday
w o r l d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t o w a r d t h e special cultures o f a r t a n d
l i t e r a t u r e , s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d law, o n t h e o t h e r — i t b e c o m e s c l e a r
what the leveling o f the genre distinction between philosophy and
literature, a n d the assimilation o f philosophy to literature and of
l i t e r a t u r e t o p h i l o s o p h y (as c o n t e n d e d a b o v e ) , m e a n . S u c h a l e v e l i n g
mixes u p the constellations i n w h i c h the rhetorical elements of
l a n g u a g e t a k e o n entirely different roles. T h e r h e t o r i c a l e l e m e n t o c c u r s
i n its pure form o n l y i n t h e s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i t y o f p o e t i c e x p r e s s i o n , t h a t
398 399

Chapter 9 O n the D i s d n c t i o n between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

is, i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f f i c t i o n , w h i c h specializes i n w o r l d - d i s c l o s u r e . a c h i e v e m e n t . Conversely, the l i t e r a r y - c r i d c a l capacity f o r judgment

T h e n o r m a l l a n g u a g e o f e v e r y d a y l i f e , t o o , is i n e r a d i c a b l y r h e t o r i c a l ; loses its p o t e n c y w h e n , as e n v i s i o n e d by D e r r i d a ' s d i s c i p l e s i n l i t e r a -
b u t h e r e , w i t h i n the cluster of m u l t i p l e language functions, the ture departments, i t switches f r o m appropriating the content of
r h e t o r i c a l elements recede. I n the routines o f everyday practices, the a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e i n t o a c r i t i q u e o f m e t a p h y s i c s . T h e false assimi-
world-constituting linguistic framework is n e a r l y paralyzed. The l a t i o n o f o n e enterprise to the o t h e r robs b o t h o f t h e i r substance.
s a m e h o l d s f o r t h e s p e c i a l i z e d l a n g u a g e s o f science a n d t e c h n o l o g y , A n d so w e r e t u r n t o t h e issue w i t h w h i c h w e s t a r t e d . W h o e v e r t r a n s -
law, m o r a l i t y , e c o n o m i c s , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , a n d so f o r t h . T h e y , too, poses t h e r a d i c a l c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n i n t o t h e d o m a i n o f r h e t o r i c i n
a r e n o u r i s h e d by t h e i l l u m i n a t i n g p o w e r o f m e t a p h o r i c a l t r o p e s ; b u t o r d e r t o d e f u s e t h e p a r a d o x o f s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i t y also d u l l s t h e s w o r d
the rhetorical e l e m e n t s — a l t h o u g h by no means exterminated—are o f t h e c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n . T h e false p r e t e n s i o n o f eliminating the
tamed, as i t w e r e , a n d e n l i s t e d f o r s p e c i a l p u r p o s e s o f problem- g e n r e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d l i t e r a t u r e c a n n o t l e a d us
solving. o u t o f this a p o r i a . 2 4

The rhetorical dimension plays a d i f f e r e n t a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t

r o l e i n t h e l a n g u a g e s o f l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m a n d p h i l o s o p h y . B o t h are Notes
f a c e d w i t h tasks t h a t are p a r a d o x i c a l i n s i m i l a r ways. T h e y a r e s u p -
posed to feed the contents o f e x p e r t cultures, i n each o f which 1. [Editor's note]: Habermas is here referring to the 1970s debate between Jacques
Derrida and J o h n Searle. In his essay "Signature Event Context," in Margins of
k n o w l e d g e is a c c u m u l a t e d u n d e r j u s t o n e aspect o f v a l i d i t y , i n t o Philosophy (Chicago, 1982), pp. 307-330, Derrida devotes the last section to a discus-
everyday linguistic practices i n w h i c h the various language functions sion of Austin's theory. Searle refers to this in "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply
to D e r r i d a , " Glyph 1 (1977): 198-208 (Derrida's essay also appeared in Glyph 1).
a n d aspects o f v a l i d i t y r e m a i n i n t e r m e s h e d , f o r m i n g a s y n d r o m e . A t Derrida's response appeared in Glyph 2 (1977): 162-254, under the tide "Limited I n c
t h e s a m e t i m e l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m a n d p h i l o s o p h y are s u p p o s e d to abc. . . . " I n his discussion of Derrida, Habermas draws on J . Culler, On Deconstruction
(Ithaca, N . Y , 1982).
a c c o m p l i s h t h i s task o f m e d i a t i o n u s i n g m e a n s o f e x p r e s s i o n t a k e n
f r o m p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e s s p e c i a l i z i n g i n q u e s t i o n s o f taste o r t r u t h . 2. Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 119.
T h e y c a n resolve t h i s p a r a d o x o n l y by r h e t o r i c a l l y e x p a n d i n g a n d
3. J . Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), and Expression and Meaning (Cambridge,
enriching t h e i r special languages to the e x t e n t r e q u i r e d to link 1979).
u p — i n a targeted way—indirect c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h manifest pro-
4. Culler, On Deconstruction, pp. 121ff.
positional contents. This explains the strong rhetorical strain char-
acteristic of studies by l i t e r a r y critics and philosophers alike. 5. Ibid., p. 123.
E m i n e n t c r i t i c s a n d m a j o r p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e also w r i t e r s o f s t a t u r e .
6. Ibid., p. 176.
I n their rhetorical accomplishments, literary criticism and philoso-
p h y have a family r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h l i t e r a t u r e — a n d to this extent, 7. Cf. ibid., pp. 130ff.

w i t h o n e a n o t h e r as w e l l . H o w e v e r , t h e i r f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p d o e s n o t 8. K. Biihler, Sprachtheorie (Jena, 1934), pp. 24ff.

e x t e n d b e y o n d t h i s . For, i n e a c h o f these e n t e r p r i s e s , the tools o f
9. R. Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in T. A. Sebeok, ed., Style in Language
rhetoric are subordinated r e s p e c d v e l y t o t h e d i s c i p l i n e o f a different
(Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 350-377, here p. 356.
form of argumentation.
10. Ibid.
If, following Derrida's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , philosophical thinking
w e r e to be relieved o f the d u t y o f solving p r o b l e m s a n d m a d e to 11. R. O h m a n n , "Speech-Acts and the Definition of Literature," Philosophy and Rheto-
ric^ (1971): 17.
assume t h e f u n c t i o n o f l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , i t w o u l d b e r o b b e d not
m e r e l y o f its seriousness, b u t also o f its p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d c a p a c i t y f o r 12. Ibid., p. 14.
400 401

Chapter 9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s o f L a n g u a g e

13. Ibid., p. 17. answers to have. Today, however, it is evident that the scope of universalist ques-
tions—for instance, the question of the necessary conditions for the rationality of
14. G . Hartman, Saving the Text (Baltimore, 1981), p. xxi. utterances, or of the general pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action and
argumentation—does indeed have to be reflected in the grammatical form of uni-
15. Cf. also R. O h m a n n , "Speech, Literature and the Space Between," New Literary versal propositions; it does not, however, have to be reflected in any unconditional
History 5 (1974): 34ff. validity or "ultimate foundations" claimed for such universalist propositions or for
their theoretical framework. T h e fallibilist consciousness of the sciences has long
16. W. Labov, Language in the Inner City (Philadelphia, 1972). since caught up with philosophy as well.
With this kind of fallibilism, we, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, do not
17. M. L . Pratt, A Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington, 1977), p. 92. I in any way dispense with truth claims. Such claims cannot be raised in the perfor-
am grateful to Jonathan Culler for drawing my attention to this interesting book. mative attitude of the first person in any other way than as claims that—qua c l a i m s —
transcend space and time. But we are also aware that there is no zero-context for
18. Ibid., p. 148. truth claims. T r u t h claims are raised here and now and have a built-in orientation
toward criticism. H e n c e we reckon with the trivial possibility that they will be revised
19. Ibid. at some future date or in some other context. Just as it always has, philosophy
understands itself as the guardian of rationality in the sense of a claim of reason
20. Ibid., p. 147. endogenous to our form of life. I n its work, however, philosophy prefers a combina-
tion of strong propositions with weak status claims; this is so little totalitarian that
there is no call for a totalizing critique of reason against it. O n this point cf. J . Haber-
21. Ibid.
mas, "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consciousness and Communi-
cative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen(Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
22. Cf. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1984), pp. 273ff.

23. R. Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," in his Philosophical Papers II: Essays
on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 85-107, here p. 88, and Consequences
of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, 1982), esp. the introduction and chapters 6, 7, and 9.

24. At any rate, our reflections have brought us to the point from where we can see
why Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida get into this aporia at all. T h e y continue to
defend themselves as though, like the first generation of Hegelian disciples, they were
still living in the shadow of the "last" philosopher. They are still battling against the
"strong" conceptions of theory, truth, and system that have in fact belonged to the
past for over a century and a half. T h e y still think they have to arouse philosophy
from what Derrida calls "the dream of its heart." They believe they have to tear
philosophy away from the delusion of expounding a theory that has the last word.
Such a comprehensive, closed, and definitive system of propositions would have to
be formulated in a language that is self-explicating, that neither needs nor permits
further commentary, and that thereby brings to a standstill the effective history
(Wirkungsgeschichte) in which interpretation is heaped upon interpretation endlessly.
Rorty speaks of the demand for a language "which can receive no gloss, requires no
interpretation, cannot be distanced, cannot be sneered at by later generations. It is
the hope for a vocabulary which is intrinsically and self-evidently final, not only the
most comprehensive and fruitful vocabulary we have come up with so far" (Rorty,
Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 93f.).
I f reason were bound, under penalty of demise, to hold on to these classical goals
of metaphysics, pursued from Parmenides to Hegel; if reason as such (even after
Hegel) stood before the alternative of either insisting on the strong conceptions of
theory, truth, and system as they were customary in the great tradition or of renounc-
ing itself, then an adequate critique of reason would have to be so very radical that it
could scarcely avoid the paradox of self-referentiality. Nietzsche saw the matter in this
way. A n d , unfortunately, Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida, too, still seem to confuse
the universalist posing of questions that continues to be part of philosophy with the
long since abandoned claims to universalist status that philosophy once alleged its
10
Questions and Counterquestions (1985)

I a m happy to accept the editor's invitation to r e s p o n d to the articles

b y R i c h a r d R o r t y , M a r t i n Jay, T h o m a s M c C a r t h y , a n d J o e l W h i t e -
book. 1
T h o u g h c r i t i c a l , t h e i r f r i e n d l y s p i r i t reveals t h a t w e a r e a l l
concerned, i f n o t w i t h t h e same p r o b l e m s , t h e n a t least w i t h t h e
same t h e m e s . A t t h e same t i m e , i t is i m m e d i a t e l y a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e r e
is s o m e d i f f e r e n c e between us, f o r i n s t a n c e , b e t w e e n Rorty and
m y s e l f . T h e gaps b e t w e e n t h e d i f f e r e n t u n i v e r s e s o f d i s c o u r s e be-
c o m e so w i d e a t t i m e s t h a t t h e m i x t u r e o f r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,
s u p p o s i t i o n s , a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s s u d d e n l y also serves t o r e v e a l
residual unconscious presuppositions, implications, a n d b a c k g r o u n d
assumptions. A l l this a m o u n t s to the q u i t e n o r m a l confusion i n
c o n v e r s a t i o n a m o n g f r i e n d s w h o have sufficiently d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s o f
view.
T h e c o n f u s i o n o f l i n e s o f a r g u m e n t is m u c h m o r e d r a s t i c i n c o n -
t r o v e r s i e s a m o n g adversaries w h o , f e e l i n g t h a t t h e i r i d e n t i t y is t h r e a t -
ened by the others' fundamental convictions, struggle with
r h e t o r i c a l w e a p o n s . Scarcely a n y o n e w o u l d d i s a g r e e t h a t s u c h d i s -
t a n c e s a n d o p p o s i t i o n s have i n c r e a s e d a n d i n t e n s i f i e d i n t h e m o d e r n
age, w h i c h has i t s e l f b e c o m e a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t o p i c o f t h e first r a n k
since t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I n d i v i d u a l s , g r o u p s , a n d n a t i o n s h a v e
d r i f t e d f a r a p a r t as r e g a r d s t h e i r b a c k g r o u n d s o f b i o g r a p h i c a l a n d
s o c i o c u l t u r a l experience. T h i s p l u r a l i z a t i o n o f d i v e r g i n g universes o f
 405
404
Questions and Counterquestions
C h a p t e r 10

s t r a i g h t j a c k e t o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , R i c h a r d R o r t y has u n d e r t a k e n
d i s c o u r s e is p a r t o f s p e c i f i c a l l y m o d e r n e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e s h a t t e r i n g o f
the most ambitious project: he wants to destroy the t r a d i t i o n o f the
n a i v e c o n s e n s u s is t h e i m p e t u s f o r w h a t H e g e l calls " t h e e x p e r i e n c e
p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — f r o m its C a r t e s i a n b e g i n n i n g s — w i t h
o f r e f l e c t i o n . " W e c a n n o t n o w s i m p l y w i s h t h i s e x p e r i e n c e away; we
t h e a i m o f s h o w i n g t h e pointlessness o f t h e e n t i r e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e
c a n o n l y n e g a t e i t . I n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f o u r c u l t u r e , i n v e s t e d as i t is
foundations and limits of knowledge. H e concludes that philoso-
with r e f l e c t i o n , t h e t h r u s t o f t h i s e x p e r i e n c e has t o be worked
p h e r s , t o be r i d o f t h e p r o b l e m , n e e d o n l y r e c o g n i z e t h e h y b r i d
t h r o u g h n o t o n l y p o l i t i c a l l y b u t also p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . T o d a y w e can
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s i e s a n d give t h e field o v e r t o t h e p r a c t i -
s u r v e y t h e s p e c t r u m o f answers g i v e n b y p h i l o s o p h e r s : r o u g h l y speak-
tioners o f science, politics, a n d daily life. L i k e the later W i t t g e n s t e i n ,
i n g , i t e x t e n d s a l l t h e way f r o m h i s t o r i c i s m t o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m .
R o r t y sees p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f as t h e sickness w h o s e s y m p t o m s i t p r e -
O n t h e o n e h a n d , D i l t h e y , W e b e r , Jaspers, a n d K o l a k o w s k i t a k e a n
v i o u s l y a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t r i e d t o c u r e . B u t R o r t y is s t i l l e n o u g h of
a f f i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n o n t h e g r o w i n g p l u r a l i s m o f "gods a n d d e m o n s "
a p h i l o s o p h e r t o give a r e a s o n f o r h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t h a t w e a v o i d
(Glaubensmachte), existential m o d e s o f b e i n g , myths, value attitudes,
t h e Holzweg of philosophical justification; one shouldn't scratch
a n d metaphysical o r r e l i g i o u s worldviews. A p h i l o s o p h y t h a t treats
w h e r e i t d o e s n ' t i t c h . I t is j u s t t h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " i t d o e s n ' t i t c h "
f o r m s o f t r u t h i n t h e p l u r a l is s u p p o s e d t o leave t o t h e sciences t h e
t h a t I find p r o b l e m a t i c .
j o b o f p r o v i d i n g an adequate reservoir o f consensual knowledge. O n
t h e o t h e r h a n d , p h i l o s o p h e r s s u c h as H u s s e r l , t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n , F o r m s o f l i f e a r e t o t a l i t i e s t h a t always e m e r g e i n t h e p l u r a l . T h e i r

P o p p e r , a n d A p e l a l l a t t e m p t t o m a i n t a i n , a t a h i g h e r l e v e l o f abstrac- c o e x i s t e n c e m a y cause f r i c t i o n , b u t t h i s difference d o e s n o t a u t o m a t -

t i o n , t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n , e v e n i f o n l y i n a p r o c e d u r a l sense. T h e y i c a l l y r e s u l t i n t h e i r incompatibility. S o m e t h i n g s i m i l a r is t h e case f o r

distill t h e c o m m o n characteristics o f r a t i o n a l activity that m u s t i m - t h e p l u r a l i s m o f values a n d b e l i e f systems. T h e c l o s e r t h e p r o x i m i t y

p l i c i t l y b e p r e s u p p o s e d i n t h e p l u r a l i s m o f "gods a n d d e m o n s " a n d i n w h i c h c o m p e t i n g "gods a n d d e m o n s " h a v e t o l i v e w i t h e a c h o t h e r

i n t h e a r g u m e n t a t i v e collisions b e t w e e n universes o f discourse. In i n political c o m m u n i t i e s , the m o r e tolerance they d e m a n d ; b u t they

t h i s way, t h e r e arise w h a t R o r t y calls " m e t a n a r r a t i v e s , " t h a t is, t h e are n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e . C o n v i c t i o n s c a n c o n t r a d i c t o n e a n o t h e r o n l y

theories o f rationality that are supposed to a c c o u n t f o r why, a n d i n w h e n t h o s e c o n c e r n e d w i t h p r o b l e m s d e f i n e t h e m i n a s i m i l a r way,

w h a t sense, we c a n s t i l l c o n n e c t o u r c o n v i c t i o n s as w e l l as o u r de- b e l i e v e t h e m t o r e q u i r e r e s o l u t i o n , a n d w a n t t o d e c i d e issues o n t h e

scriptive, n o r m a t i v e , a n d evaluative statements w i t h a t r a n s c e n d i n g basis o f g o o d r e a s o n s .

v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t goes b e y o n d m e r e l y l o c a l c o n t e x t s . T o b e s u r e , i t is also a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f m o d e r n i t y t h a t w e have

g r o w n a c c u s t o m e d t o l i v i n g w i t h d i s a g r e e m e n t i n t h e r e a l m o f ques-
T h e s e a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l answers t o t h e unavoidable e x p e r i e n c e o f
tions t h a t a d m i t o f " t r u t h ; " we simply p u t controversial validity claims
m o d e r n i t y ; w h e n t h e y are s h a r p e n e d i n t o t h e o p p o s i t i o n between
t o o n e side " f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g . " N o n e t h e l e s s , w e p e r c e i v e this p l u -
r e l a t i v i s m a n d a b s o l u t i s m , a n unmediated c o n f r o n t a t i o n e m e r g e s be-
r a l i s m o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n v i c t i o n s as a n i n c e n t i v e f o r l e a r n i n g p r o c -
tween pure historicism a n d pure transcendentalism. A t that p o i n t ,
esses; w e l i v e i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f future r e s o l u t i o n s . As l o n g as w e
t h e f a i l u r e s o f b o t h p o s i t i o n s b e c o m e c l e a r : t h e o n e side c a r r i e s t h e
retain the perspective o f participants a n d d o n o t merely l o o k over
b u r d e n o f self-referential, pragmatic contradictions a n d paradoxes
o u r o w n s h o u l d e r s as h i s t o r i a n s a n d e t h n o g r a p h e r s , w e m a i n t a i n
t h a t v i o l a t e o u r n e e d f o r c o n s i s t e n c y ; t h e o t h e r side is b u r d e n e d w i t h
precisely the distinctions that Rorty wants to retract: between valid
a f o u n d a d o n a l i s m t h a t conflicts w i t h o u r consciousness o f t h e falli-
a n d s o c i a l l y a c c e p t e d views, b e t w e e n g o o d a r g u m e n t s a n d t h o s e t h a t
b i l i t y o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e . N o o n e w h o reflects o n this s i t u a t i o n
a r e m e r e l y successful f o r a c e r t a i n a u d i e n c e a t a c e r t a i n t i m e .
w o u l d w a n t t o be l e f t i n t h i s b i n d .
I n believing t h a t he can consistently replace the i m p l i c i t l y n o r m a -
I n the c o n t e x t o f o u r discussion h e r e , this r e a d i n g o f t h e present
tive c o n c e p t i o n o f " v a l i d a r g u m e n t s " w i t h t h e d e s c r i p t i v e c o n c e p t o f
s i t u a t i o n is n o t r e a l l y i n d i s p u t e , a l t h o u g h R o r t y , B e r n s t e i n , a n d I
" a r g u m e n t s h e l d t o b e t r u e f o r us a t t h i s t i m e , " R o r t y c o m m i t s a n
r e a c t t o i t i n d i f f e r e n t ways. F o r c e f u l l y f r e e i n g h i m s e l f f r o m the
406 407

C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

o b j e c t i v i s t fallacy. We c o u l d n o t e v e n u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of Rorty absolutizes the perspective o f the observer, Bernstein remains

w h a t w e d e s c r i b e f r o m a t h i r d - p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e as a r g u m e n t a t i v e w i t h i n the perspective o f the p a r t i c i p a n t a n d enters i n t o a debate
c o n d u c t i f we h a d n o t already l e a r n e d the p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f t h a t t o d a y leads b e y o n d t h e m i s t a k e n a l t e r n a t i v e s o f h i s t o r i c i s m a n d
a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h a t is, w h a t i t m e a n s f r o m the transcendentalism, a debate g o i n g o n between Gadamer, A r e n d t ,
p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e f i r s t p e r s o n t o raise a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t p o i n t s Rorty, a n d m e , a m o n g others. 3
B e r n s t e i n does n o t e n d his s p l e n d i d
b e y o n d t h e p r o v i n c i a l a g r e e m e n t s o f t h e specific local c o n t e x t . O n l y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e diverse p a t h s o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n — a d i s c u s s i o n
t h i s c a p a c i t y gives o u r opinions t h e c h a r a c t e r o f convictions. ( T h i s is t h a t has n o t y e t c o m e t o a c l o s e — w i t h a p r o p o s a l f o r a t h e o r e t i c a l
n o less t r u e f o r e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s t h a n f o r a r g u m e n - solution; he ends i t rather w i t h a practical r e c o m m e n d a t i o n : we
tative d i s p u t e s a b o u t t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l v a l i d i t y o f s t a t e m e n t s . ) Any ought t o act u n d e r the presupposition o f the u n i f y i n g power of
mutual understanding produced in communication and reproduced communicative reason. I n order to make this a r g u m e n t m o r e i n t e l -
i n t h e l i f e w o r l d is b a s e d o n a r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l r e a s o n s t h a t m a y ligible, let me c i t e a thesis o f H e r b e r t S c h n a d e l b a c h w i t h w h i c h
be c h a l l e n g e d , reasons t h a t f o r c e us t o t a k e a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d B e r n s t e i n w o u l d probably agree: " t h a t the difference between what
p o s i t i o n o f "yes" o r " n o . " T h i s calls f o r a different t y p e o f a t t i t u d e f r o m w e always c l a i m f o r o u r r a t i o n a l i t y a n d w h a t w e a r e a c t u a l l y a b l e t o
t h a t w h i c h w e b r i n g t o t h e c l a i m s o f m e r e l y i n f l u e n t i a l ideas. F r o m explicate as r a t i o n a l c a n i n p r i n c i p l e n e v e r b e eliminated." 4
If I
the perspective o f the p a r t i c i p a n t , a m o m e n t o f unconditionality is u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f h i s b o o k c o r r e c d y , i t is f o r t h i s r e a s o n
b u i l t i n t o t h e conditions o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g under- t h a t B e r n s t e i n f r o m the start locates t h e m o m e n t o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y
s t a n d i n g . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e first p e r s o n , t h e q u e s t i o n of b u i l t i n t o t h e u n i v e r s a l i s t v a l i d i t y claims o f o u r c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
w h i c h b e l i e f s a r e j u s t i f i e d is a q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h b e l i e f s a r e b a s e d o n tices i n t h e h o r i z o n o f practical r e a s o n ; h e finds i n t h e communica-
g o o d r e a s o n s ; i t is n o t a f u n c t i o n o f l i f e - h a b i t s t h a t e n j o y s o c i a l tive i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a p r a c t i c a l p o s t u l a t e , o n e t h a t is
c u r r e n c y i n s o m e places a n d n o t i n o t h e r s . d i c t a t e d b y r e a s o n itself. H e refuses t o r e g a r d t h e p r o c e d u r a l u n i t y
o f r a t i o n a l i t y w i t h i n the historical a n d c u l t u r a l m u l t i p l i c i t y o f stan-
A n d because i n t h e m o d e r n age t h e gaps b e t w e e n competing
dards o f r a t i o n a l i t y as a q u e s t i o n t h a t is accessible t o theoretical
convictions reach deep i n t o the d o m a i n of questions that " a d m i t o f
treatment.
t r u t h , " t h e r e exists, c o n t r a r y t o R o r t y , a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t " t o see
s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as m o r e t h a n j u s t s u c h practices." 2
I s u s p e c t t h a t b e h i n d B e r n s t e i n ' s a r g u m e n t a t i v e strategy t h e r e lies
T h e stubbornness with w h i c h philosophy clings to the role o f the a n a b s o l u t i z i n g o f t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t t h a t is c o m p l e -
" g u a r d i a n o f r e a s o n " c a n h a r d l y be d i s m i s s e d as a n i d i o s y n c r a s y of m e n t a r y t o R o r t y ' s a b s o l u t i z i n g o f t h a t o f t h e o b s e r v e r . I d o n o t see
self-absorbed intellectuals, especially i n a p e r i o d in which basic why one c o u l d n o t , at least i n a p r e l i m i n a r y way, e x p l o r e a third
i r r a t i o n a l i s t u n d e r c u r r e n t s are b e i n g t r a n s m u t e d o n c e a g a i n i n t o a path—one t h a t I have e m b a r k e d u p o n w i t h m y t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i -
d u b i o u s f o r m o f p o l i t i c s . I n m y o p i n i o n , i t is p r e c i s e l y t h e n e o c o n - cative a c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s a p p r o a c h , p h i l o s o p h y s u r r e n d e r s its
servatives w h o a r t i c u l a t e , intensify', a n d s p r e a d t h i s m o o d o f t h e t i m e s c l a i m to be t h e sole r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n matters o f rationality and
v i a t h e mass m e d i a — w i t h s u c h a n e f f e c t t h a t " i t i t c h e s . " enters i n t o a nonexclusive division o f labor w i t h the reconstructive
sciences. I t has t h e a i m o f c l a r i f y i n g t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of the
2 r a t i o n a l i t y o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t m a y b e p r e -
s u m e d t o b e u n i v e r s a l because t h e y a r e u n a v o i d a b l e . T h e n philoso-
I n h i s latest b o o k , R i c h a r d B e r n s t e i n gives us a n o t h e r a n s w e r : i n - p h y shares w i t h t h e sciences a f a l l i b i l i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t h a t its
stead o f b i d d i n g farewell to p h i l o s o p h y f r o m t h e artificially a l i e n a t e d strong universalist suppositions require confirmation i n an inter-
viewpoint o f an ethnologist, he turns i t toward the practical. W h i l e play w i t h e m p i r i c a l theories. 5
This revisionary self-understanding of
408
C h a p t e r 10
the r o l e o f p h i l o s o p h y m a r k s a b r e a k w i t h t h e aspirations o f first
philosophy (Ursprungsphilosophie) i n a n y f o r m , e v e n t h a t o f t h e t h e -
o r y o f knowledge; b u t i t does n o t m e a n that p h i l o s o p h y abandons
its r o l e as t h e g u a r d i a n o f r a t i o n a l i t y . W i t h its s e l f - i m p o s e d modesty
o f m e t h o d , a p h i l o s o p h y s t a r t i n g f r o m f o r m a l pragmatics preserves
the possibility o f speaking o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n the singular. U n l i k e the
sciences, i t has t o a c c o u n t r e f l e c t i v e l y f o r its o w n c o n t e x t o f e m e r -
gence and thus for its o w n place i n history. 6
For this reason,
" m e t a n a r r a t i v e s , " i n t h e sense o f f o u n d a t i o n a l " u l t i m a t e g r o u n d i n g s "
o r t o t a l i z i n g p h i l o s o p h i e s o f h i s t o r y , c o u l d n e v e r e v e n arise.
The most i m p o r t a n t achievement o f such an approach is t h e
possibility o f clarifying a concept o f communicative rationality that
escapes t h e snares o f W e s t e r n l o g o c e n t r i s m . Instead o f following
Nietzsche's p a t h o f a totalizing a n d self-referential critique o f reason,
w h e t h e r i t be via H e i d e g g e r to D e r r i d a , o r via Bataille to F o u c a u l t , 7
a n d t h r o w i n g t h e b a b y o u t w i t h t h e b a t h w a t e r , i t is m o r e p r o m i s i n g
t o seek t h i s e n d t h r o u g h t h e analysis o f t h e already o p e r a t i v e poten-
tial f o r r a t i o n a l i t y c o n t a i n e d i n everyday practices o f communica-
t i o n . H e r e the validity dimensions o f propositional t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e
r i g h t n e s s , a n d subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) o r a u t h e n t i c i t y
are e n t w i n e d w i t h each other. F r o m this n e t w o r k o f a b o d i l y a n d
interactively shaped, historically situated reason, o u r philosophical
t r a d i t i o n has s e l e c t e d o u t o n l y t h e s i n g l e t h r e a d o f propositional
t r u t h a n d t h e o r e t i c a l reason a n d stylized i t i n t o the m o n o p o l y o f
humanity. T h e c o m m o n g r o u n d that unites b o t h von H u m b o l d t and
p r a g m a t i s m w i t h t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d A u s t i n is t h e i r o p p o s i -
t i o n t o t h e ontological p r i v i l e g i n g o f t h e w o r l d o f e n t i t i e s , t h e episte-
mological p r i v i l e g i n g o f c o n t a c t w i t h o b j e c t s o r e x i s t i n g states of
a f f a i r s , a n d t h e semantic p r i v i l e g i n g o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s a n d p r o -
positional t r u t h . Logocentrism means neglecting the complexity o f
reason effectively o p e r a t i n g i n t h e l i f e w o r l d , a n d r e s t r i c t i n g reason
t o its c o g n i t i v e - i n s t r u m e n t a l d i m e n s i o n (a d i m e n s i o n , w e m i g h t a d d ,
t h a t has b e e n n o t i c e a b l y p r i v i l e g e d a n d selectively u t i l i z e d i n p r o c -
esses o f c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i z a t i o n ) .
R o r t y takes W e s t e r n l o g o c e n t r i s m as a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e e x h a u s -
t i o n o f o u r p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e a n d as a r e a s o n t o b i d f a r e w e l l
t o p h i l o s o p h y as s u c h . T h i s way o f r e a d i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n c o u l d not
409
Questions and Counterquestions
b e m a i n t a i n e d i f p h i l o s o p h y w e r e t o b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n s u c h a way
as t o e n a b l e i t t o c o p e w i t h t h e e n t i r e s p e c t r u m o f aspects o f r a t i o n -
a l i t y — a n d w i t h t h e h i s t o r i c a l f a t e o f a r e a s o n t h a t has b e e n a r r e s t e d
a g a i n a n d a g a i n , i d e o l o g i c a l l y m i s u s e d a n d d i s t o r t e d , b u t t h a t also
s t u b b o r n l y raises its v o i c e i n e v e r y i n c o n s p i c u o u s act o f successful
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . S u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is p o s s i b l e o n l y i f p h i l o s o p h y
does n o t r e m a i n fixated o n t h e n a t u r a l sciences. H a d R o r t y not
shared this fixation, he m i g h t have e n t e r t a i n e d a m o r e flexible a n d
accepting relationship to the philosophical t r a d i d o n . Fortunately,
n o t all p h i l o s o p h i z i n g can be s u b s u m e d u n d e r the p a r a d i g m o f the
p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness.
R o r t y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e n e e d i n t h e m o d e r n age f o r self-reassur-
a n c e is a c a p r i c i o u s p r o b l e m c r e a t e d b y i n t e l l e c t u a l s — i n d e e d , e v e n
a t y p i c a l l y G e r m a n p r o b l e m . I n h i s v i e w i t arises f r o m t h e e s o t e r i c
Weltschmerz o f s m a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s , f r o m t h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n with
a w o r l d t h a t was lost a l o n g w i t h t h e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s o f t h e i r f a t h e r s .
B u t does i t n o t r e m a i n a n o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r o r n o t the socially
integrative powers o f religious t r a d i t i o n t h a t have b e e n shaken up
b y e n l i g h t e n m e n t c a n find a n e q u i v a l e n t i n t h e u n i f y i n g , c o n s e n s u s -
c r e a t i n g p o w e r o f reason? T h i s was i n d e e d t h e m o d v a t i o n behind
G e r m a n I d e a l i s m ; t h i s type o f i d e a l i s m has f o u n d e q u a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l
proponents i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f P e i r c e , R o y c e , M e a d , a n d Dewey, i n
w h i c h R o r t y p r e f e r s t o p l a c e h i m s e l f . W h a t is p e r h a p s specifically
German is t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept of alienation, b o t h i n the
H e g e l i a n - M a r x i s t version a n d i n the early R o m a n t i c version taken u p
b y N i e t z s c h e . T h e same t h e m e r e s o n a t e s n o t o n l y i n p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s t
F r a n c e ; s i n c e t h e 1960s, a n d I n e e d n o t r e m i n d R o r t y o f t h i s , t h e
d i s c u s s i o n o f m o d e r n i t y i n c o n f l i c t w i t h i t s e l f has n o w h e r e b e e n so
l i v e l y as i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s — a d m i t t e d l y , m o r e so a m o n g social
scientists a n d p s y c h o l o g i s t s t h a n a m o n g a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s . Carl
S c h o r s k e e v e n t h o u g h t h e c o u l d see i n t e l l e c t u a l a f f i n i t i e s b e t w e e n
t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n scene a n d W e i m a r G e r m a n y . W h i l e t h e
e x p r e s s i o n " p o s t m o d e r n " was n o t i n v e n t e d b y A m e r i c a n n e o c o n s e r -
vatives, t h e y a t least p o p u l a r i z e d i t .
D o n o t these a n d s i m i l a r signs i n d i c a t e t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a r t i c u l a t e
shifts i n m o o d , w h i c h t h e y i n n o way i n v e n t b u t w h i c h h a v e i n s t e a d
p a l p a b l e social a n d o f t e n e c o n o m i c causes? A s a g o o d p r a g m a t i s t , I
410
C h a p t e r 10
hold t h e view that a p h i l o s o p h e r ' s capacity to create problems
t h r o u g h i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n c i t i n g d o u b t is q u i t e l i m i t e d . I share Peirce's
d o u b t a b o u t any type o f Cartesian d o u b t . P r o b l e m s e m e r g e i n situ-
a t i o n s o v e r w h i c h we a r e n o t i n c o n t r o l ; t h e y a r e s o m e t h i n g t h a t
o b j e c t i v e l y h a p p e n s t o us. T h e s l o g a n t h a t l e f t i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a r e t h e
cause o f t h e m i s e r y t h e y analyze has b e e n b a n d i e d a b o u t f o r t o o l o n g
a m o n g r i g h d s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n G e r m a n y t o b e c r e d i b l e . I t is n o m o r e
c r e d i b l e i n t h e a t t r a c t i v e p a c k a g i n g o f a t h e o r y o f t h e n e w class.
T o m e , t h e n o t i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l " v a l u e e l i t e s " is a b s o l u t e l y w o r t h -
less. L i k e R o r t y , I have f o r a l o n g t i m e i d e n t i f i e d m y s e l f w i t h t h e
r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c m e n t a l i t y t h a t is p r e s e n t i n t h e best A m e r i c a n
traditions a n d articulated i n A m e r i c a n pragmatism. This mentality
takes s e r i o u s l y w h a t a p p e a r s t o s o - c a l l e d r a d i c a l t h i n k e r s as so m u c h
r e f o r m i s t naïveté. Dewey's " a t t e m p t t o c o n c r e t i z e c o n c e r n s w i t h t h e
d a i l y p r o b l e m s o f o n e ' s c o m m u n i t y " expresses b o t h a p r a c t i c e a n d
a n a t t i t u d e . I t is a m a x i m o f a c t i o n a b o u t w h i c h i t is i n f a c t s u p e r f l u -
ous t o p h i l o s o p h i z e .
Rorty puts i n question the entire u n d e r t a k i n g o f the theory of
c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. As o p p o s e d t o this f o r m o f q u e s t i o n i n g , the
r e s e r v a t i o n s o f M a r t i n Jay, T h o m a s M c C a r t h y , a n d J o e l W h i t e b o o k
c o n c e r n p a r t i c u l a r steps i n its e x e c u t i o n . T h e s e a u t h o r s d i r e c t t h e i r
attention to complications i n m y a t t e m p t to w o r k o u t the concept of
c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y . Jay p o i n t s o u t a n u n d e r - i l l u m i n a t e d as-
p e c t ; M c C a r t h y t o u c h e s u p o n a c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y ; W h i t e b o o k deals
w i t h a p r o b l e m t h a t e m e r g e s as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e t h e o r y . W i t h i n
the f r a m e w o r k o f a b r i e f reply, I can r e s p o n d o n l y by a l l u d i n g to h o w
I have d e a l t w i t h s o m e o f these p r o b l e m s i n t h e past a n d h o w I w o u l d
l i k e t o w o r k o n o t h e r s i n t h e f u t u r e . A n a d d e d d i f f i c u l t y h e r e is t h a t
o n l y M c C a r t h y directs his r e m a r k s to m y m o r e recent works.
3 T h e r e is n o n e e d
W i t h a g r e a t d e a l o f h e r m e n e u t i c sensitivity, M a r t i n Jay has c o l l e c t e d
a n d i n t e r p r e t e d m y scattered r e m a r k s o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f aesthetic
m o d e r n i t y . I n e v e r y case these r e m a r k s h a d a s e c o n d a r y character
t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y arose o n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f o t h e r t o p i c s a n d
always i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e discussions a m o n g A d o r n o , B e n j a m i n , a n d
411
Questions a n d Counterquestions
M a r c u s e . I n The Theory of Communicative Action, m y d i s c u s s i o n o f M a x
Weber's t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e a n d his diagnosis o f t h e times r e q u i r e d
understanding the autonomous art that emerged i n m o d e r n Europe
( t o g e t h e r w i t h a r t c r i t i c i s m i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d since t h e e i g h t e e n t h
c e n t u r y ) as t h e p r o d u c t o f a d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d as t h e r e s u l t o f a
process o f r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . W e b e r d e s c r i b e d t h e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of
w o r l d v i e w s as a p r o c e s s o f d e c o m p o s i t i o n and differentiation. On
t h e o n e h a n d , t h e basic s u b s t a n t i v e c o n c e p t s w i t h w h i c h t h e w o r l d
orders o f "salvation h i s t o r y " a n d c o s m o l o g y were c o n s t r u c t e d have
d i s s o l v e d ; w i t h t h i s d i s s o l u t i o n , o n t i c , m o r a l , a n d expressive aspects
are n o l o n g e r fused i n t o o n e a n d t h e same c o n c e p t . W i t h o u t t h e
possibility o f recourse t o G o d a n d t h e c o s m i c o r d e r as a n o r i g i n ,
t h e o l o g i c a l a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l f o r m s o f g r o u n d i n g lose t h e i r c r e d i b i l -
ity. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p r o f a n e f o r m s o f " k n o w l e d g e " that are
relatively i n d e p e n d e n t o f o n e a n o t h e r have arisen alongside a sub-
jectivized " f a i t h . " Philosophy, forced i n t o the position o f mediator,
becomes dependent o n these. A s d o c u m e n t e d i n the division o f
K a n t ' s t h r e e Critiques, questions o f t r u t h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m
q u e s t i o n s o f j u s t i c e a n d these i n t u r n f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f taste.
O r i g i n a t i n g i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i d e a l i s t aesthetics s t r i c t l y
d i s t i n g u i s h e d aesthetic pleasure f r o m o t h e r " e m p i r i c a l " f o r m s of
s a t i s f a c t i o n ; t h a t is, i t s e p a r a t e d t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b l i m e , o n
the one h a n d , f r o m the useful a n d the desirable, o n the other. A r t
e m e r g e s w i t h its o w n p r o p e r c l a i m , as d o s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y , l a w
a n d m o r a l i t y . M a x W e b e r speaks o f t h e i n t e r n a l o r i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c
(Eigensinn) o f e a c h o f these t h r e e c u l t u r a l v a l u e s p h e r e s , w h i c h a r e
also s e p a r a t e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n t h e f o r m o f f u n c -
t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i e d systems o f a c t i o n . S i n c e t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f A r -
n o l d H a u s e r i n t o t h e social h i s t o r y o f m o d e r n a r t , t h i s institutional
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a r t has f r e q u e n t l y b e e n a n a l y z e d . 8
here to go i n t o t h e e x t e r n a l aspects o f t h e
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the forms o f p r o d u c t i o n o f art, the purposes to
w h i c h i t was p u t , o r t h e m o d e s o f its r e c e p t i o n i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m
sacrally b o u n d a r t , t h r o u g h t h e a r t o f t h e c o u r t a n d p a t r o n , t o
b o u r g e o i s c o m m e r c i a l i z e d a r t . W h a t is i n d i s p u t e a r e t h e i n t e r n a l
9
aspects o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t since t h e e i g h t -
e e n t h c e n t u r y . O n e o f t h e t w o q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d b y M a r t i n Jay is t h e
412
C h a p t e r 10
e x t e n t t o w h i c h o n e c a n speak o f a n a e s t h e t i c - p r a c t i c a l rationality, o r
e v e n o f a learning process, i n t h i s s p h e r e .
T h e r e is a n u n m i s t a k a b l e i n d i c a t o r f o r t h e f a c t t h a t a c e r t a i n type
o f " k n o w i n g " is o b j e c t i f i e d i n a r t w o r k s , a l b e i t i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n
i n t h e o r e d c a l discourse or i n legal o r m o r a l representations. These
objectivations o f spirit, too, are f a l l i b l e a n d hence criticizable. A r t
c r i t i c i s m arose a t t h e same t i m e as t h e a u t o n o m o u s w o r k o f a r t ; a n d ,
since t h e n , i t has b e c o m e a n e s t a b l i s h e d i n s i g h t t h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t
calls f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , e v a l u a t i o n , a n d e v e n " l i n g u i s t i f i c a t i o n "
(Versprachlichung) o f its s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . A r t c r i t i c i s m has d e v e l o p e d
f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t specifically d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t f r o m the
argumentative forms of theoretical and moral-practical discourse.
As d i s t i n c t f r o m merely subjective p r e f e r e n c e , the fact that we l i n k
j u d g m e n t s o f taste t o a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m p r e s u p p o s e s n o n a r -
b i t r a r y s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e j u d g m e n t o f a r t . A s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l dis-
c u s s i o n o f " a r t i s t i c t r u t h " reveals, w o r k s o f a r t raise c l a i m s with
regard to their unity or h a r m o n y (Stimmigkeit), their authenticity,
a n d t h e success o f t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n s , a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e y m a y
assessed a n d i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e y m a y f a i l . F o r t h i s r e a s o n I b e l i e v e
t h a t a p r a g m a t i c l o g i c o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n is t h e m o s t appropriate
g u i d i n g t h r e a d w i t h t h e h e l p o f w h i c h t h e " a e s t h e t i c - p r a c t i c a l " type
o f r a t i o n a l i t y can b e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o v e r a n d against o t h e r types o f
rationality.
W h e n we r e f e r t o l e a r n i n g processes, i t is t h e w o r k s o f a r t t h e m -
selves, a n d n o t t h e d i s c o u r s e s a b o u t t h e m , t h a t are t h e l o c u s o f
directed and c u m u l a t i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . As M c C a r t h y correctly
notes, w h a t accumulates are n o t epistemic contents b u t , rather, the
effects o f t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , w i t h its o w n i n d e p e n d e n t logic, o f a
s p e c i a l s o r t o f e x p e r i e n c e : p r e c i s e l y t h o s e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e s o f
w h i c h o n l y a d e c e n t e r e d , u n b o u n d s u b j e c t i v i t y is c a p a b l e . A u t h e n t i c
e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h i s type a r e p o s s i b l e o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e
categories o f the p a t t e r n e d expectations o f organized daily experi-
ence collapse, that the r o u t i n e s o f daily action a n d conventions
o r d i n a r y l i f e are d e s t r o y e d , a n d t h e n o r m a l i t y o f f o r e s e e a b l e a n d
a c c o u n t a b l e c e r t a i n t i e s are s u s p e n d e d . T h e e v e r - m o r e r a d i c a l u n -
c o u p l i n g o f this p o t e n t i a l for experience, the p u r i f i c a t i o n o f the
aesthetic f r o m admixtures o f the cognitive, the useful, a n d the
413
Questions and Counterquestions
m o r a l , is m i r r o r e d i n t h e r e f l e c t i o n s o f t h e e a r l y R o m a n t i c period
(especially i n F r i e d r i c h Schlegel's w o r k ) , i n the aestheticism of
B a u d e l a i r e a n d t h e S y m b o l i s t s , i n t h e p r o g r a m o f I'art pour I'art, i n
the surrealistic celebration o f i l l u m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h s h o c k effects,
w i t h its a m b i v a l e n c e o f a t t r a c t i o n a n d r e p u l s i o n , o f b r o k e n c o n t i n u -
ity, o f t h e s h u d d e r o f p r o f a n i z a t i o n , o f a g i t a t e d d i s g u s t — i n s h o r t , i n
the r e f l e c t i o n o f those m o m e n t s i n w h i c h the bewildered subject
"transgresses h i s b o u n d a r i e s , " as B a t a i l l e p u t s i t . W h a t is r e f l e c t e d i n
these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d declarations is a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the
f o r m o f aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , i n d u c e d by avant-garde a r t itself, i n t h e
d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d e c e n t e r i n g a n d u n b o u n d i n g o f subjectivity. A t the
1 0
same t i m e , this d e c e n t e r i n g indicates a n increased sensitivity t o w h a t
remains unassimilated i n the interpretive achievements o f prag-
matic, epistemic, a n d m o r a l mastery o f the demands a n d challenges
o f e v e r y d a y s i t u a t i o n s ; i t effects a n o p e n n e s s t o t h e e x p u r g a t e d ele-
m e n t s o f the unconscious, the fantastic, a n d the m a d , the m a t e r i a l
a n d t h e b o d i l y — t h u s t o e v e r y t h i n g i n o u r speechless c o n t a c t w i t h
be
r e a l i t y t h a t is so fleeting, so c o n t i n g e n t , so i m m e d i a t e , so i n d i v i d u a l -
i z e d , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y so f a r a n d so n e a r t h a t i t escapes o u r n o r m a l
categorical grasp.
B e n j a m i n c a l l e d t h i s style o f e x p e r i e n c e " c o n c e n t r a t e d distrac-
t i o n " a n d set i t o f f f r o m t h e c o n t e m p l a t i v e style o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e
characteristics a n d tendencies o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f avant-garde art,
a n a l y z e d r e p e a t e d l y since B e n j a m i n a n d A d o r n o , p o i n t i n t h e d i r e c -
t i o n o f t h e f o r m e r style o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e loss o f a u r a a n d t h e
i m p o r t a n c e o f a l l e g o r y are c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e
o r g a n i c a l l y u n i f i e d w o r k o f a r t a n d its p r e t e n d e d t o t a l i t y o f m e a n i n g ;
o n e can t h i n k h e r e o f the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e ugly, o f the negative
as s u c h . B y t r e a t i n g m a t e r i a l s , m e t h o d s , a n d t e c h n i q u e s reflectively,
t h e a r t i s t o p e n s u p a space f o r e x p e r i m e n t a n d p l a y a n d t r a n s f e r s
t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e g e n i u s t o "free c o n s t r u c t i o n " (freie Arbeit) . n
Forced
n o v e l t y , d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e latest t r e n d s , a n d t h e a c c e l e r a t e d p a c e
of o f fads p e r p e t u a t e t h e creative b r e a k w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a n d s e r v e t o
m a k e a l l stylistic m e a n s e q u a l l y accessible. A r t b e c o m e s a l a b o r a t o r y ,
the critic an expert, the development o f art the m e d i u m o f a learn-
i n g p r o c e s s — h e r e , n a t u r a l l y , n o t i n t h e sense o f a n a c c u m u l a t i o n o f
epistemic contents, o f a n aesthetic " p r o g r e s s , " w h i c h is p o s s i b l e o n l y
414
C h a p t e r 10
i n i n d i v i d u a l d i m e n s i o n s , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s i n t h e sense o f a c o n c e n -
trically e x p a n d i n g , progressive e x p l o r a t i o n o f a r e a l m o f possibilities
structurally opened u p w i t h the autonomization of art. ( I do
k n o w w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e results o f Piaget's g e n e t i c p s y c h o l o g y are
as a p p r o p r i a t e h e r e f o r t h e analysis o f t h i s " l e v e l o f l e a r n i n g " as t h e y
a r e f o r t h e analysis o f t h e stages o f p o s t c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f
law a n d morality. I t e n d to be r a t h e r skeptical.)
M a r t i n Jay's o t h e r q u e s t i o n concerns the relation between
i n d e p e n d e n c e of art i n a culture o f experts a n d the cultural impov-
e r i s h m e n t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . J a y asks w h y I d o n o t unambiguously
decide between A d o r n o a n d Benjamin—between the esotericism
t h e exclusive, often h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed avant-garde w o r k o f a r t , a n d
t h e h o p e s f o r p r o f a n e i l l u m i n a t i o n i n e x o t e r i c mass a r t . H e n o t e s
t h a t I s e e m t o find s o m e t r u t h i n b o t h p o s i t i o n s .
P e t e r B ü r g e r takes a n u n a m b i g u o u s p o s i t i o n . I n h i s view,
i m p u l s e o f several a v a n t - g a r d e m o v e m e n t s t o r e b e l a g a i n s t t h e i n s t i -
t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f a r t , a g a i n s t its b e i n g s p l i t o f f f r o m t h e l i f e w o r l d ,
was c o r r e c t d e s p i t e the failure o f the surrealist r e v o l t . 1 2
I do
differ w i t h this j u d g m e n t p e r se. T h e intention of redeeming
p r o m i s e o f h a p p i n e s s , w h o s e s u p e r a b u n d a n c e r a d i a t e s b e y o n d a r t , is
p a r t o f a r t itself. B u t t h i s i n t e n t i o n c a n n o t b e r e a l i z e d i n t h e way i n
w h i c h the surrealists w a n t e d , t h r o u g h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n o f aesthetic
a p p e a r a n c e (Schein) as t h e m e d i u m o f a r t i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s
false s u b l a t i o n (Aufhebung) o f art i n t o life certainly does n o t pre-
clude the possibility o f a correct m e d i a t i o n o f art w i t h the l i f e w o r l d .
A n aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e t h a t is n o t s i m p l y t o b e t r a n s p o s e d into
j u d g m e n t s o f taste b y t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l a r b i t e r s , t h a t is n o t m e r e l y t o
circulate i n the realm o f art alone, w o u l d entail a change i n the
status o f a n , as i t w e r e , e x p e r i m e n t a l l y u n b o u n d subjectivity.
I f a e s t h e d c e x p e r i e n c e is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e c o n t e x t o f i n d i v i d -
u a l l i f e - h i s t o r i e s , i f i t is u t i l i z e d t o i l l u m i n a t e a s i t u a t i o n a n d t o t h r o w
l i g h t o n i n d i v i d u a l l i f e - p r o b l e m s — i f i t a t a l l c o m m u n i c a t e s its i m -
pulses t o a c o l l e c t i v e f o r m o f l i f e — t h e n a r t e n t e r s i n t o a language
g a m e t h a t is n o l o n g e r t h a t o f a e s t h e t i c c r i t i c i s m b u t b e l o n g s r a t h e r
t o e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s . I t t h e n n o l o n g e r affects o n l y
o u r evaluative language o r m e r e l y renews the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f needs
that color o u r perceptions; rather, i t reaches i n t o o u r cognitive
415
Questions a n d Counterquestions
interpretadons a n d normative expectations a n d transforms the to-
t a l i t y i n w h i c h these m o m e n t s are r e l a t e d t o e a c h o t h e r . I n t h i s
not r e s p e c t , m o d e r n a r t h a r b o r s a Utopia t h a t b e c o m e s a r e a l i t y t o t h e
degree that the m i m e t i c powers sublimated i n the w o r k o f art find
resonance i n the mimetic relations o f a balanced a n d undistorted
intersubjectivity i n everyday life. However, this does n o t r e q u i r e t h e
liquidation o f a n a r t set o f f f r o m l i f e i n t h e m e d i u m o f aesthetic
the appearance, b u t r a t h e r a changed constellation o f a r t a n d t h e l i f e w o r l d .
I d e v e l o p e d these ideas e a r l i e r a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f A l b r e c h t W e l l -
mer. 1 3
I n t h e m e a n t i m e , W e l l m e r has e l a b o r a t e d t h e m i n such an
of i n g e n i o u s way t h a t I can here be content simply to refer to his
treatment. 1 4
I d o n o t wish to retrace W e l l m e r ' s subtle l i n e o f a r g u -
m e n t b u t o n l y t o r e p e a t h i s m a i n thesis i n o r d e r t o o f f e r i t as a n
a n s w e r t o M a r d n Jay's q u e s t i o n . T h e f a c t t h a t w e c a n d i s p u t e t h e
the r e a s o n s f o r e v a l u a t i n g a w o r k o f a r t i n a e s t h e t i c d i s c o u r s e is, as w e
said, a n u n m i s t a k a b l e i n d i c a t i o n f o r a validity c l a i m i n h e r e n t i n
w o r k s o f a r t . T h e aesthetic "validity" o r " u n i t y " t h a t we a t t r i b u t e t o a
not w o r k r e f e r s t o its s i n g u l a r l y i l l u m i n a t i n g p o w e r t o o p e n o u r eyes t o
a w h a t is s e e m i n g l y f a m i l i a r , t o disclose a n e w a n a p p a r e n d y f a m i l i a r
reality. T h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m a d m i t t e d l y stands f o r a potential f o r " t r u t h "
that can be released only i n the w h o l e c o m p l e x i t y o f life experience;
therefore, this " t r u t h p o t e n t i a l " may n o t be c o n n e c t e d to (or even
identified w i t h ) j u s t one of the three validity claims constitutive for
communicative a c t i o n , as I have p r e v i o u s l y b e e n i n c l i n e d t o m a i n -
t a i n . T h e o n e - t o - o n e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t exists b e t w e e n t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e
validity o f a n o r m a n d the n o r m a t i v e validity claims raised i n r e g u -
l a t i v e s p e e c h acts is n o t a p r o p e r m o d e l f o r t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e
potential for t r u t h o f works o f art a n d the transformed relations
b e t w e e n self a n d w o r l d s t i m u l a t e d b y a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e .
N e i t h e r t r u t h n o r t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) m a y be a t t r i b u t e d u n m e t a -
p h o r i c a l l y to w o r k s o f a r t , i f o n e u n d e r s t a n d s " t r u t h " a n d " t r u t h f u l n e s s " i n
the sense of a pragmatically differentiated, everyday c o n c e p t of truth. We
c a n e x p l a i n t h e way i n w h i c h t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s — a n d e v e n n o r m a t i v e
t i g h t n e s s — a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y i n t e r l a c e d i n w o r k s o f a r t o n l y by a p p e a l i n g
to t h e fact t h a t the w o r k o f art, as a s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n w i t h a n aesthetic
validity c l a i m , is at the s a m e t i m e o b j e c t o f a n experience, i n w h i c h t h e t h r e e
d i m e n s i o n s o f validity a r e unmetaphorically i n t e r m e s h e d . 1 5
416
C h a p t e r 10
4 t o " o u r s , " so t h a t i n t h e case o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n w e e i t h e r revise o u r
Thomas M c C a r t h y raises t w o sorts o f o b j e c t i o n s : first, against m y
systematic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f W e b e r ' s d i a g n o s i s o f t h e t i m e s ; a n d sec-
o n d , a g a i n s t m y analysis o f i n t e r p r e t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . S i n c e I b e -
lieve t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p e s t a b l i s h e d b y M c C a r t h y b e t w e e n t h e t w o
p r o b l e m s is a r t i f i c i a l , I w i l l first d e a l s e p a r a t e l y w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f
the objectivity of understanding.
I n t h e field o f m e a n i n g t h e o r y , I h o l d t h e v i e w t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d
a literally m e a n t speech act w h e n we k n o w the c o n d i t i o n s under
w h i c h i t c o u l d be a c c e p t e d as v a l i d b y a h e a r e r . T h i s p r a g m a t i c a l l y
e x t e n d e d v e r s i o n o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s is s u p p o r t e d b y t h e
f a c t t h a t w e c o n n e c t t h e e x e c u t i o n o f s p e e c h acts t o v a r i o u s v a l i d i t y
claims: claims to the t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s (or o f the existential
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) , c l a i m s t o t h e Tight-
ness o f a n u t t e r a n c e ( w i t h r e s p e c t t o e x i s t i n g n o r m a d v e contexts),
a n d c l a i m s t o t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) o f a n e x p r e s s e d i n t e n -
t i o n . W i t h these c l a i m s w e issue, as i t w e r e , a w a r r a n t y f o r their
v i n d i c a t i o n , s h o u l d t h i s b e n e c e s s a r y — a b o v e a l l b y o f f e r i n g , a t least
i m p l i c i t l y , reasons f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f o u r s p e e c h acts. A h e a r e r k n o w s
t h e c o n t e n t o f w h a t is said w h e n h e k n o w s w h a t r e a s o n s ( o r w h a t
sorts o f r e a s o n s ) t h e s p e a k e r w o u l d give f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f h e r s p e e c h
act ( u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r ( e v e n the
social scientific i n t e r p r e t e r w h o deals w i t h linguistically formed
data), does n o t u n d e r s t a n d symbolically p r e s t r u c t u r e d objects ( i n
t h e n o r m a l case, c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s ) i f h e d o e s n o t also
u n d e r s t a n d t h e reasons p o t e n t i a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e i r v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
N o w t h e i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t is t h a t r e a s o n s a r e o f a special n a t u r e .
T h e y c a n always b e e x p a n d e d i n t o a r g u m e n t s t h a t w e t h e n u n d e r -
s t a n d o n l y w h e n we recapitulate (nachvolhiehen) them i n the light of
some standards of rationality. T h i s " r e c a p i t u l a t i o n " requires a recon-
s t r u c t i v e a c t i v i t y i n w h i c h we b r i n g i n t o p l a y o u r o w n s t a n d a r d s o f
r a t i o n a l i t y , a t least i n t u i t i v e l y . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t ,
h o w e v e r , o n e ' s o w n s t a n d a r d s o f r a t i o n a l i t y m u s t always c l a i m g e n -
eral validity, w h i c h can be restricted o n l y subsequently f r o m the
perspective o f a t h i r d person. I n short, the interpretive reconstruc-
t i o n o f reasons requires t h a t we place " t h e i r " standards i n r e l a t i o n
417
Questions and Counterquestions
preconceptions o r relativize " t h e i r " standards o f rationality against
"ours."
T h e s e p r e c o n c e p t i o n s d o i n d e e d l e a d t o t h e r a t h e r " s t r o n g " thesis
t h a t w e cannot u n d e r s t a n d reasons w i t h o u t a t least i m p l i c i t l y evaluat-
ing t h e m . M c C a r t h y argues t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n is false, since, e v e n
i f i t is t h e case t h a t i t is necessary t o t a k e u p a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d
"yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n reasons i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m , t h e
i n t e r p r e t e r c a n n o t o n l y a g r e e o r d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e m b u t c a n also
p r a c t i c e a k i n d o f a b s t e n t i o n ; h e has t h e o p t i o n o f " l e a v i n g t o o n e
side" t h e question o f the validity o f " t h e i r " rationality standards ( a n d
h e n c e o f the reasons themselves). However, I t h i n k t h a t such a n
a b s t e n t i o n is also a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d p o s i t i o n , j u s t as m u c h as a
"yes" o r a " n o , " a n d i n n o way relieves us o f t h e necessity o f t a k i n g
a p o s i t i o n . A b s t e n t i o n i n this c o n t e x t does n o t really signify a t r u e
d e c l a r a t i o n o f n e u t r a l i t y b u t o n l y signals t h a t we a r e p u t t i n g off
problems for the time being a n d wish to suspend o u r interpretive
e f f o r t s . F o r e x a m p l e , so l o n g as w e are u n a b l e t o see a p e r s p i c u o u s
internal relation between the categorial frameworks o f Aristotelian
a n d N e w t o n i a n physics, we d o n o t k n o w p r e c i s e l y i n w h a t sense
Aristotle, i n contrast to N e w t o n , w a n t e d to " e x p l a i n " n a t u r a l proc-
esses. S i m p l y n o t i n g t h e c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n various paradigms
c o m e s close t o c o n f e s s i n g t h a t w e d o n o t y e t u n d e r s t a n d t h e physics
a n d m e t a p h y s i c s o f A r i s t o t l e as w e l l as w e d o t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s
a b o u t n a t u r e i n classical mechanics.
T h e r a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h G a d a m e r always
e m p h a s i z e d , b e c o m e s especially c l e a r i n e x t r e m e cases s u c h as, f o r
example, the interpretation o f mythical narratives. U n d e r c u t t i n g or
l e a v i n g t o o n e side ( o r m e r e l y s h a k i n g o n e ' s h e a d w h i l e a c c e p t i n g )
t h e totalisdc categories of a worldview within w h i c h the narrative
i n t e r w e a v i n g a n d (as i t a p p e a r s t o us) t h e c a t e g o r i c a l c o n f u s i o n of
s u r f a c e p h e n o m e n a lay c l a i m t o e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r m e r e l y i n d i c a t e
that we are p u t t i n g o f f — p r e m a t u r e l y b r e a k i n g o f f — t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e
p r o c e s s . T h i s is t a n t a m o u n t t o c o n f e s s i n g t h a t w e d o n o t y e t u n d e r -
stand the p o i n t o f mythical m o d e s o f t h o u g h t . We u n d e r s t a n d t h e m
o n l y w h e n w e c a n say w h y t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d g o o d r e a s o n s f o r t h e i r
c o n f i d e n c e i n t h i s type o f e x p l a n a t i o n . B u t i n o r d e r t o achieve this
418 419

C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

d e g r e e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e have t o e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n 5
between " t h e i r " s o r t o f e x p l a n a t i o n a n d t h e k i n d we a c c e p t as c o r -
r e c t . W e m u s t be a b l e t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e successful a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l I first w a n t t o isolate t h o s e e l e m e n t s o f W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e t h a t
l e a r n i n g processes t h a t s e p a r a t e " u s " f r o m " t h e m ; " b o t h m o d e s o f I a p p r o p r i a t e d i n t o m y o w n view ( a ) . I n so d o i n g , w e t h e n e n c o u n t e r
e x p l a n a t i o n have t o b e l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e same u n i v e r s e o f dis- M c C a r t h y ' s c o n c e r n f o r t h e costs o f a p r o c e s s o f disenchantment
c o u r s e . So l o n g as t h i s is n o t a c h i e v e d , t h e f e e l i n g r e m a i n s t h a t o n e t h a t n o w leaves o p e n o n l y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p r o c e d u r a l u n i t y o f
d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g . I t is t h i s p e r p l e x i t y t h a t finds its reason cutting across different forms of argumentation (b).
appropriate expression i n the suspension of one's interpretive McCarthy finally treats t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e synthesis o f t h e d i f f e r e n -
efforts. t i a t e d m o m e n t s o f r e a s o n u n d e r t h r e e q u i t e d i s t i n c t aspects. H e lists
B u t i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w f r o m t h i s t h a t t h e sciences t h a t m u s t estab- three problems t h a t c a n n o t b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r t h e same a n a l y t i c
lish h e r m e n e u t i c access t o t h e i r o b j e c t d o m a i n also h a v e t o re- perspective ( t h a t is, t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e v a r i o u s basic a t t i t u d e s
nounce the objectivity of knowledge. I have criticized this t o w a r d t h e o b j e c t i v e , t h e social, a n d t h e s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d s ) (c).
hermeneutist position i n various ways. 16
I n principle, I do not see a. T o b e g i n w i t h , l e t m e t u r n t o w h a t I h a v e a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m
any difficulty i n achieving some theoretical knowledge even i n those W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e . I n W e b e r ' s view, t h e a s s e r t i o n o f a d i f f e r -
domains o f r e a l i t y w i t h w h i c h w e have c o n t a c t p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h e n t i a t i o n o f " v a l u e s p h e r e s " e a c h w i t h its o w n i n d e p e n d e n t logic—
n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e o r expressive a t t i t u d e s . M y r e s e r v a t i o n s c o n c e r n w h i c h was i n s p i r e d b y t h e n e o - K a n t i a n s E m i l L a s k a n d H e i n r i c h
o n l y those theoretical positions that i g n o r e the h e r m e n e u t i c d i m e n - R i c k e r t — c a n plausibly be d e f e n d e d i n r e g a r d to m o d e r n E u r o p e o n
sion of access t o the object d o m a i n entirely. 1 7
I f the sentence t w o levels: first, o n t h e level o f ideas t h a t c a n b e t r a n s m i t t e d i n
M c C a r t h y c r i t i c i z e s is t o b e r e a d as r e p o r t i n g m y o w n view, " t h a t traditions (scientific theories, m o r a l a n d legal beliefs, as w e l l as
n o t h i n g c a n be l e a r n e d i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e a b o u t inner a r t i s t i c p r o d u c t i o n s ) ; b u t also, s e c o n d , o n t h e l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l a c t i o n
n a t u r e qua s u b j e c t i v i t y , " 18
t h e n i t may be u n d e r s t o o d only i n the systems, i n w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d i n g " d i s c o u r s e s " a n d a c t i v i t i e s a r e g i v e n
sense o f a r e j e c t i o n o f purely o b j e c t i v i s t a p p r o a c h e s t o p s y c h o l o g y . professionally and institutionally organized f o r m . T h e differentia-
M c C a r t h y is f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n of whether the t i o n o f value spheres corresponds to a d e c e n t e r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p l e x e s t h a t have b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n m o d e r n t i m e s t h e w o r l d , w h i c h is a n i m p o r t a n t i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e p r o f e s -
a n d h a v e a c h i e v e d a c e r t a i n a u t o n o m y d o n o t , as i t w e r e , also c o m - sionalized t r e a t m e n t o f cultural traditions separated i n t o questions
m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d h a v e t h e i r r o o t s i n o n e a n d t h e same o f t r u t h , j u s t i c e , a n d taste. T h i s m o d e r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d
r e a s o n . I n m y view, t h i s t o p i c c a n b e t r e a t e d i n d e p e n d e n d y o f the makes possible a hypothetical a p p r o a c h to p h e n o m e n a a n d e x p e r i -
problem of interpretive understanding. For this purpose, the ences, w h i c h a r e i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f l i f e w o r l d c o n t e x t s
schema reproduced b y M c C a r t h y is n o t r e a l l y a f r u i t f u l p o i n t of a n d a n a l y z e d u n d e r e x p e r i m e n t a l l y v a r i e d c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s is e q u a l l y
d e p a r t u r e . I t s p u r p o s e was o n l y t o r e p r e s e n t t h e c o n t e n t o f Max t r u e f o r t h e states o f a n o b j e c t i f i e d n a t u r e , f o r n o r m s a n d m o d e s o f
W e b e r ' s f a m o u s Zwischenbetrachtung} 9
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i n response to a c t i n g , a n d f o r t h e reflective experiences o f a n " u n b o u n d " subjectiv-
earlier objections, I m a d e the mistake o f r e f e r r i n g to this schema i n i t y (set f r e e f r o m t h e p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e ) . The
a systematic w a y . 20
A n d M c C a r t h y does the same here. M y previous w e l l - k n o w n d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e by c o g n i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology
carelessness t h u s m a k e s i t necessary i n w h a t f o l l o w s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between s t r u c t u r a l l y d e f i n e d levels o f l e a r n i n g , o n t h e o n e hand,
more carefully between my interpretation of Weber and my own a n d the l e a r n i n g o f contents, o n the other, certainly may n o t be
views. a p p l i e d i n t h e same way t o s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t . I n t h i s r e s p e c t ,
my f o r m u l a t i o n s were not careful enough.
420
C h a p t e r 10
Compared to the g r o w t h o f theoretical knowledge, described by
M c C a r t h y as t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c o n t e n t s across p a r a d i g m shifts,
the trends i n the development o f a r t (discussed m o r e extensively
a b o v e ) d o n o t so m u c h s i g n i f y a n a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c o n t e n t s as t h e
progressive c o n s t i t u t i o n o f a specific d o m a i n o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t a n d
aesthetic experience p u r i f i e d o f cognitive and m o r a l admixtures;
t h e y also s i g n i f y e x p a n d i n g e x p l o r a t i o n s t h a t i l l u m i n a t e m o r e and
m o r e o f t h i s r e a l m o f e x p e r i e n c e . Yet t h i s c o n c e n t r i c e x p a n s i o n is
n o t a c c o m p a n i e d by the f a m i l i a r effect o f a d e v a l u a t i o n o f f o r m e r l y
h e l d i n s i g h t s t h a t is t y p i c a l f o r c u m u l a t i v e l e a r n i n g processes. M o r a l
a n d legal theories occupy a m i d d l e position. H e r e , too, we can
observe the constitution o f a d o m a i n o f autonomous morality and
m o r a l u n i v e r s a l i s m t h a t d i s t i l l s a class o f r a t i o n a l l y solvable problems
u n d e r t h e s i n g l e aspect o f j u s t i c e o u t o f t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e c o n -
t e x t s o f e t h i c a l l i f e . L e a r n i n g processes i n t h i s s p h e r e are s i m i l a r t o
a t h e o r e t i c a l progress achieved w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f a single para-
d i g m . T h u s , i n t h e m o d e r n age, t h e e x p l i c a t i o n a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f
m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s m a k e a c e r t a i n " p r o g r e s s " t h a t is n o t e x h a u s t e d i n
ever-new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e same m o r a l p r i n c i p l e .
H o w e v e r , t h e thesis t h a t c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i z a t i o n c a n b e grasped
as a selective a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y p o t e n t i a l c o n t a i n e d i n
m o d e r n structures o f consciousness requires the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l sup-
p o s i t i o n o f a nonselective m o d e l o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . I n this 2 1
c o n n e c t i o n , I have s u g g e s t e d t h a t f o r t h e v a l u e s p h e r e s o f s c i e n c e ,
m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t i n m o d e r n E u r o p e "we s h o u l d be a b l e t o demon-
strate p l a u s i b l e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s w i t h t y p i c a l f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a -
t i o n , e a c h o f w h i c h is s p e c i a l i z e d i n a c c o r d w i t h a u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y
claim." 2 2
T h u s , t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f is p u t o n t h e t h e o r y o f a r g u m e n -
t a t i o n ; l e a v i n g aside e x p l i c a t i v e d i s c o u r s e a n d t h e r a p e u t i c c r i t i q u e ,
t h i s has t o d i s t i n g u i s h a n d c l a r i f y t h e systematic c o n t e n t o f t h r e e
different forms of argumentation: empirical-theoretical discourse,
m o r a l discourse, a n d aesthetic c r i t i q u e . 2 3
I t was d u e t o t h e c o n t e x t
o f Weber's diagnosis o f the times t h a t I d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e t h e three
r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p l e x e s v i a a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h e o r y b u t b y way o f a
s c h e m a t h a t was s u p p o s e d t o r e p r e s e n t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a d e -
centered understanding o f the w o r l d . Indeed, the m o d e r n under-
standing o f the w o r l d structurally opens u p the possibility o f taking
421
Questions and Counterquestions
o b j e c t i v a t i n g , n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e , a n d expressive attitudes t o w a r d
t h r e e d i f f e r e n t w o r l d s (objective, social, o r s u b j e c t i v e — i n short, to
states o f a f f a i r s , n o r m s , o r subjective e x p e r i e n c e s ) ; i t also a l l o w s us t o
v a r y t h e s e a t t i t u d e s i n r e l a t i o n t o o n e a n d t h e same w o r l d . I f w e k e e p
t o t h e s c h e m a i n figure 10.1 ( o r i g i n a l l y figure 11 i n v o l u m e 1 o f The
Theory of Communicative Action), b u t leave aside its a p p l i c a t i o n t o
W e b e r ' s d i a g n o s i s o f t h e t i m e s a n d p u r s u e i n s t e a d a systematic l i n e
o f t h o u g h t , the three forms of argumentation corresponding to the
m o d e r n c o m p l e x e s o f r a t i o n a l i t y c a n , to begin with, b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h
t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s a l o n g t h e d i a g o n a l ( 1 . 1 , 2.2, 3 . 3 ) .
b. B a s e d o n r e f l e c t i o n s i n t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , I t a k e as m y
s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h e v i e w t h a t facts, n o r m s , a n d s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s
have t h e i r primary l o c u s i n " t h e i r " c o r r e s p o n d i n g w o r l d s (objective,
s o c i a l , o r s u b j e c t i v e ) , a n d in the first instance a r e accessible, o r i d e n -
tifiable, o n l y f r o m the perspective o f a n actor w h o adopts a c o r r e -
sponding attitude (be it objectivating, norm-conformative, or
e x p r e s s i v e ) . I t is i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s l i n e a r o r d e r i n g t h a t t h e first
o f t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s M c C a r t h y t r e a t s a t t h e e n d o f h i s a r t i c l e arises.
H o w is i t t h a t w e c a n t a l k i n a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e a b o u t s o m e -
t h i n g i n t h e s u b j e c t i v e o r social w o r l d s , t h a t is, a b o u t t h o s e e l e m e n t s
t h a t w e first e x p e r i e n c e as s o m e t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e o r t h a t w e first e n -
c o u n t e r as s o m e t h i n g n o r m a t i v e ? I n t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e ( f o r i n -
stance, s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e ) w e c a n i n c o r p o r a t e these e l e m e n t s o n l y
i f w e t h e m a t i z e s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s a n d n o r m s as states o f a f f a i r s
after h a v i n g t r a n s f o r m e d t h e m i n t o c o m p o n e n t s o f the objective
w o r l d . I n everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n we c e r t a i n l y succeed, w i t h o u t
m u c h t r o u b l e , i n t r a n s f o r m i n g expressive utterances (or sentences
i n t h e first p e r s o n ) i n t o e q u i v a l e n t s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e t h i r d person,
or i n accurately r e p o r t i n g the c o n t e n t o f n o r m a t i v e utterances or
imperatives f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t h i r d person. O n the level
o f s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e , however, t h e r e is a t e n d e n c y t o d e l i m i t t h e
o b j e c t d o m a i n s of, f o r e x a m p l e , p s y c h o l o g y o r s o c i o l o g y b y n e g l e c t -
i n g t h e i r h e r m e n e u t i c dimensions i n such a way t h a t t h e c o m p o -
n e n t s o f t h e s o c i a l o r subjective w o r l d s are n a t u r a l i s t i c a l l y a s s i m i l a t e d
t o p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s o r t o o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r . I n e a c h case, t h e y a r e
m a d e i n t o c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , i n h e r e n t l y accessible
o n l y i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e ; t h a t is, t h e y a r e f o r c e d i n t o t h e
422 423

C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions

basic c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f physicalism o r b e h a v i o r i s m . As op-

\ Worlds
p o s e d t o t h i s n a t u r a l i s t r e d u c t i o n , t h e p o i n t h e r e is s i m p l y t o d e -
1 2 3 1 fend nonobjectivist approaches in psychology and the social
Objective Social Subjective Objective sciences.
Basic \
Mutatis mutandis, t h e same q u e s t i o n s arise f o r m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l d i s -
attitudes \
course a n d , i n d i r e c t l y , f o r aesthetic c r i t i c i s m . T h e s e f o r m s o f a r g u -
m e n t a t i o n a r e also i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d t o c o m p o n e n t s o f o n e s p e c i f i c

3 Art w o r l d , t h e social o r t h e subjective. H e r e , t o o , e l e m e n t s o f t h e o t h e r

Expressive t w o w o r l d s m u s t b e b r o u g h t i n t o p l a y i n s u c h a w a y as t o a v o i d t h e
d a n g e r s of, respectively, moralism a n d aestheticism, j u s t as p r e v i o u s l y
t h e d a n g e r o f objectivism h a d t o b e a v o i d e d . W e c a n t h u s o b s e r v e t h a t
A Cognitive-instrumental s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t have n o t o n l y b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from one
rationality another, t h e y also c o m m u n i c a t e with one another. B u t w i t h i n the
1 1 X
boundaries o f each expert culture, the d i f f e r e n t m o m e n t s o f reason
1
Objectivating
Science j | Social c o m e i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h e a c h o t h e r i n s u c h as w a y as t o a v o i d v i o l a t i n g
Technology ,technologies t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c o f t h e d o m i n a n t f o r m o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n spe-
c i a l i z e d e i t h e r i n t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e Tightness, o r a e s t h e t i c u n i t y . T h i s
Moral-practical is o n e c o n c e r n o f t h e last c h a p t e r o f The Theory of Communicative
2 rationality Action} 4

Norm- X
A t this p o i n t the motivation b e h i n d McCarthy's criticism becomes
conformative Law |^ Morality
clear: a n interest i n the q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h e m o m e n t s o f reason can
retain their u n i t y w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d o f h o w this u n i t y can be
T Aesthetic-practical a d e q u a t e l y e x p r e s s e d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , m y
3 X ' rationality schematic presentation o f Weber's diagnosis of the times leads
Expressive M c C a r t h y to conflate three quite distinct questions u n d e r a single
Eroticism j Art v i e w p o i n t . A s has j u s t b e e n s h o w n , f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s p l a y a
1 r o l e i n t h e analysis o f these i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n the cognitive,
1
m o r a l , a n d expressive m o m e n t s o f r e a s o n . B u t t h e o t h e r t w o q u e s -
Figure 10.1 t i o n s r e a l l y have n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m : first, t h e q u e s t i o n
Rationalization complexes o f h o w the k n o w l e d g e p r o d u c e d i n e x p e r t cultures can be m e d i a t e d
w i t h e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s ( w h i c h I have a l r e a d y t o u c h e d u p o n a b o v e
i n r e l a t i o n to the constellation " a r t a n d l i f e " ) ; a n d second, the ques-
t i o n o f w h e t h e r we can provide an e q u i v a l e n t f o r the m e a n i n g of
traditional worldviews—for their meaning-bestowing function.
c. W i t h t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t a n d science, p r o b l e m s
o f m e d i a t i o n a r i s e — s u c h as t h e r e l a t i o n o f a r t a n d l i f e , o r o f t h e o r y
a n d practice. Since Hegel, a c o r r e s p o n d i n g p r o b l e m has e m e r g e d
424
C h a p t e r 10
t h a t has t o d o w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l l i f e (Sitt¬
lichkeit). This problem has less t o d o w i t h a n expressive a t d t u d e
t o w a r d t h e social w o r l d t h a n w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n s i g h t s o f a
postconventional m o r a l i t y w o u l d r e m a i n w i t h o u t any i m p a c t o n real
l i f e u n l e s s m o r a l i t y is a n c h o r e d i n c o n c r e t e f o r m s o f e t h i c a l l i f e . T h e
deontological ethics d e v e l o p e d i n t h e K a n t i a n t r a d i t i o n d o indeed
offer a s o l u t i o n to the p r o b l e m o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; they show h o w to
choose between controversial n o r m s o f a c t i o n w i t h g o o d reasons ( i n
l i g h t o f w h a t c o u l d be w i l l e d b y a l l ) . B u t t h e y d o n o t o f f e r any
solution for two resultant problems: first, t h a t o f t h e application o f
j u s t i f i e d n o r m s t h a t are g e n e r a l a n d a b s t r a c t e d f r o m a n y content;
a n d s e c o n d , t h a t o f t h e efficacy o f p u r e m o r a l i n s i g h t s t h a t h a v e b e e n
g a i n e d u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n o f abstracting f r o m available m o t i v a -
t i o n s . A u t o n o m o u s m o r a l i t y owes its g a i n i n r a t i o n a l i t y t o t h e t r a n s -
f o r m a t i o n o f q u e s t i o n s o f t h e g o o d l i f e i n t o p r o b l e m s o f j u s t i c e . As
a consequence of this deontological abstraction, i t can provide only
answers t o q u e s t i o n s l a c k i n g s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s . T h i s n e c e s s a r y d i s r e -
gard for the complexity o f concrete forms o f life, i n w h i c h m o r a l
m o m e n t s a r e always i n t e r l a c e d w i t h e v a l u a t i v e , c o g n i t i v e , a n d e x p r e s -
sive m o m e n t s , calls f o r s p e c i f i c c o m p e n s a t i o n s t h a t m a k e g o o d t h e
deficits w i t h regard to the a p p l i c a t i o n a n d realization o f m o r a l i n -
sights. I a m n o t a b l e t o g o f u r t h e r i n t o t h i s q u e s t i o n here. 2 5
T h e discussions o f m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l l i f e , o f t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e ,
a n d o f a r t a n d life all center a r o u n d the idea o f n o n r e i f i e d everyday
c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices, a f o r m o f life w i t h structures o f a n u n d i s -
t o r t e d intersubjectivity. Such a possibility m u s t today be w r u n g f r o m
t h e professional, specialized, self-sufficient cultures o f experts and
f r o m t h e f u n c t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e s o f state a n d e c o n o m y t h a t d e s t r u c -
t i v e l y i n v a d e b o t h t h e e c o l o g i c a l basis o f l i f e a n d t h e communicative
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of o u r l i f e w o r l d . T h i s s a m e i n t u i t i o n is e x p r e s s e d i n
M a r x ' s Utopian perspective o n t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y : to the
e x t e n t that the reason expressed i n Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y can be em-
b o d i e d i n the forms of life o f an emancipated society, philosophy
s o m e h o w b e c o m e s p o i n t i e s s . F o r M a r x , p h i l o s o p h y r e a l i z e d is p h i -
l o s o p h y s u b l a t e d (aufgehoben). The theory of communicative action
gives t h i s i d e a a n o t h e r r e a d i n g : t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n c a n n o t b e rees-
tablished o n t h e level o f c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s i n terms o f a substantive
425
Questions and Counterquestions
w o r l d v i e w b u t o n l y o n t h i s side o f t h e e x p e r t c u l t u r e s , i n t h e n o n -
r e i f i e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices o f everyday life. I n d e e d , i n a c e r t a i n
way, t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n is a tergo always a l r e a d y r e a l i z e d i n c o m m u -
nicative action—namely, i n s u c h a way t h a t w e h a v e a n i n t u i t i v e
knowledge o f it. A philosophy that wants to b r i n g this i n t u i t i o n to a
c o n c e p t u a l l e v e l m u s t r e t r i e v e t h e s c a t t e r e d traces o f r e a s o n i n c o m -
m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s themselves, n o m a t t e r h o w m u t e d t h e y m a y b e .
However, i t c a n n o t simply repeat t h e a t t e m p t , l o n g since discredited,
t o p r o j e c t s o m e t h e o r e t i c a l p i c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e .
I t h i n k I have l e a r n e d f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n o f H e g e l i a n - M a r x i s m ,
f r o m t h e h i s t o r y o f c r i t i c a l social t h e o r y f r o m M a r x t o B e n j a m i n ,
Bloch, Marcuse, a n d A d o r n o , that any a t t e m p t to e m b e d the per-
spective o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n a p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s t o r y o f n a t u r e , h o w -
ever i n d i r e c t l y i t is d o n e , m u s t p a y t h e p r i c e o f d e d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g
f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e b e h i n d whose categorial distinctions we can n o
l o n g e r r e t r e a t i n g o o d c o n s c i e n c e . A l l t h i s is n o t r e a l l y a n a r g u m e n t
b u t m o r e a n e x p r e s s i o n o f s k e p t i c i s m i n t h e face o f so m a n y f a i l e d
a t t e m p t s t o h a v e o n e ' s cake a n d eat i t t o o : t o r e t a i n b o t h K a n t ' s
i n s i g h t s a n d , a t t h e same t i m e , t o r e t u r n t o t h e " h o m e " (Behausung)
from which these same i n s i g h t s h a v e d r i v e n us. But, perhaps,
M c C a r t h y or others will someday succeed i n f o r m u l a t i n g the c o n t i -
n u i t i e s b e t w e e n h u m a n h i s t o r y a n d n a t u r a l h i s t o r y so c a r e f u l l y t h a t
they are weak e n o u g h to be plausible a n d yet s t r o n g e n o u g h to
p e r m i t us t o r e c o g n i z e h u m a n b e i n g s ' p l a c e i n t h e c o s m o s (Scheler),
at least i n b r o a d o u t i i n e s .
6
T h e philosophical purpose b e h i n d Joel Whitebook's attempt to op-
pose to " l i n g u i s t i c i d e a l i s m " t h e t r u t h o f t h e materialist t r a d i t i o n
f r o m Feuerbach t h r o u g h M a r x a n d F r e u d to the later F r a n k f u r t
S c h o o l accords w i t h M c C a r t h y ' s a r g u m e n t s against b a n n i n g a l l sub-
stantive m o m e n t s f r o m the c o n c e p t o f a p r o c e d u r a l rationality. T h e
theoreticians o f Western M a r x i s m were relentless i n t h e i r search f o r
some A r c h i m e d i a n p o i n t between K a n t a n d H e g e l f r o m w h i c h they
m i g h t retrieve the materialist tradition w i t h o u t surrendering the
justificatory achievements of formalist t h o u g h t , o n the one h a n d , or
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C h a p t e r 10
the meaning-bestowing capacity o f holistic t h o u g h t , o n the other.
T h e s e p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e i n a g r e e m e n t o n t h e g o a l ; t h e y d i f f e r e d as
t o h o w t o a t t a i n i t since t h e y c o u l d n o t a v o i d p a y i n g s o m e p r i c e f o r
it, w h e t h e r excising part o f Kant, o r H e g e l , or M a r x . M c C a r t h y a n d
W h i t e b o o k chastise m e e i t h e r f o r c u t t i n g t o o m u c h f r o m H e g e l a n d
totalizing forms of thought (McCarthy), or too m u c h f r o m M a r x and
m a t e r i a l i s m ( W h i t e b o o k ) . I n t h e i r c o m m o n diagnosis o f too m u c h
K a n t i a n i s m , b o t h a g r e e w i t h R o r t y , w h o is d i s t u r b e d less b y t h e
l a t t e r ' s f o r m a l i s m t h a n b y its s u p p o s e d f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m .
W h i t e b o o k ' s analysis sheds l i g h t o n t h e r e c e p t i o n o f F r e u d i a n i d
p s y c h o l o g y b y H o r k h e i m e r , M a r c u s e , a n d A d o r n o , as w e l l as o n t h e i r
c r i t i q u e o f e g o p s y c h o l o g y a n d t h e f a m o u s thesis o f t h e " e n d o f t h e
i n d i v i d u a l . " W h i t e b o o k h i m s e l f r e t a i n s a m o r e o r less o r t h o d o x i n -
t e r p r e t a t i o n o f F r e u d ; f r o m a clinical perspective, he regards the
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f e g o p s y c h o l o g y m o r e as s u p p l e m e n t s t o t h e classical
F r e u d . I n m y view, h o w e v e r , t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f H e i n z H a r t m a n n
a n d h i s allies lies i n h a v i n g d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e n e e d t o revise m e t a -
psychology; the revision itself s h o u l d c o m e rather f r o m cognitive
d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology. Piaget's a p p r o a c h c a n s u p p l e m e n t as-
sumptions about the psychodynamic development o f the child with
h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s , so as t o
give us a h a n d l e o n , a n d m a k e e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t a b l e , t h e i m p l i c i t l y
n o r m a d v e c o n t e n t o f s u c h c o n c e p t s as "ego s t r e n g t h , " "conscious
c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n , " a n d "the r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f drives." I have p r o -
posed a c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f approaches de-
r i v i n g f r o m P i a g e t a n d F r e u d . T o m y m i n d , t h i s p r o p o s a l has a
n u m b e r o f advantages: ( i ) I t creates a c o m m o n ground between
Freud's therapeutic a n d metapsychological writings, by c o n n e c t i n g
t h e s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l o f i d , ego, a n d superego w i t h the experiences
gained i n the c o m m u n i c a t i o n between patient a n d analyst. 2 6
(ii)
T h i s version conceptualizes clinical intuitions about deviant and
successful processes o f e g o d e v e l o p m e n t b y m a k i n g d e f e n s e m e c h a -
n i s m s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e as i n n e r - p s y c h i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n d i s t u r b a n c e s
and by relating the extremes of overly defined/deficient
boundaries (isolation/diffusion) to the pragmatic presuppositions
o f intact intersubjectivity a n d u n d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 2 7
(iii)
R e a d i n g psychoanalysis i n t e r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y also e x -
427
Questions a n d Counterquestions
p l a i n s t h e c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e a n d i n d i v i d u a t i n g effects o f t h e O e d i -
p a l c o n f l i c t t h a t r e m a i n s decisive f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e s t r u c -
t u r e o f p e r s o n a l i t y . S t r u c t u r a l l y d e s c r i b e d levels o f i n t e r a c t i o n serve
h e r e as a c o n c e p t u a l b r i d g e c o n n e c t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t a l l o g i c a n d
developmental dynamics. 2 8
( i v ) F i n a l l y , s u c h a r e a d i n g o f f e r s a cate-
gorial f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h metapsychology can be connected up
w i t h t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f r e s e a r c h o n s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d t h e f a m i l y . 2 9
I n Parson's version, t h e vocabulary o f a t h e o r y o f drives f o r m u l a t e d
i n t e r m s o f e n e r g y loses its c u r r e n c y h e r e .
A s I see i t , n o t h i n g o f s i g n i f i c a n c e is l o s t i n t h i s r e a d i n g . T h e
h y d r a u l i c m o d e l a n d its r e l i a n c e o n a m e c h a n i c s o f i n s t i n c t u a l e n -
e r g y has o n l y a m e t a p h o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r , e v e n f o r F r e u d h i m s e l f . I n
a n y case, o n e c a n n o t have b o t h t h e a n a l y t i c i n s t r u m e n t o f a d e p t h
h e r m e n e u t i c s a n d a t h e o r y o f drives f o r m u l a t e d i n quasi-physicalist
concepts. T h e F r e u d o - M a r x i s m o f the earlier F r a n k f u r t School c o u l d
conceptually integrate psychology a n d sociology only t h r o u g h the
m e c h a n i z a t i o n o f i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n ; b u t , as W h i t e b o o k shows, t h i s r e -
sults i n a false a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n t h e d o m a i n o f t h e o r g a n i s m ,
w h i c h is d e s c r i b e d i n b i o l o g i c a l t e r m s , a n d t h e d o m a i n o f t h e social
apparatus, w h i c h invades the i n d i v i d u a l f r o m t h e outside. I t c e r t a i n l y
m a k e s m o r e sense t o a t t e m p t t o i n t e g r a t e b o t h d i s c i p l i n e s f r o m t h e
b e g i n n i n g w i t h i n t h e same c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k . S u c h a f r a m e w o r k
w o u l d p e r m i t us t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f p e r s o n a l i t y as
s o c i a l i z a t i o n (Vergesellschaftung), a n d t o u n d e r s t a n d s o c i a l i z a t i o n as
individualization.
If one is c l e a r a b o u t t h e p u r e l y methodological c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s
decision, one n e e d n o t fear t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s W h i t e b o o k has i n
m i n d . I t is o n l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f a r e i f y i n g t h e o r y o f d r i v e s
that the extralinguistic referent o f b o t h the structure and autonomy
o f " i n n e r n a t u r e " gets l o s t a l o n g w i t h t h e v o c a b u l a r y o f i n s t i n c t a n d
d r i v e e n e r g y , c a t h e x i s , d i s p l a c e m e n t , a n d so f o r t h . B u t t h e e s s e n t i a l
d i f f e r e n c e a c t u a l l y consists o n l y i n r e p l a c i n g " d r i v e e n e r g i e s " w i t h
" i n t e r p r e t e d needs" a n d d e s c r i b i n g "instinctual vissicitudes" f r o m
ego
t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f i d e n t i t y f o r m a t i o n a n d processes o f i n t e r a c t i o n .
O n this r e a d i n g , i n s p i r e d by the t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n n e r
n a t u r e is n o t i n a n y way v a p o r i z e d i n t o a c u l t u r a l i s t h a z e . 3 0
I t does
n o t d e t e r m i n e i n a d v a n c e t h a t t h e s u b s t r a t u m o f i n n e r n a t u r e has
428
C h a p t e r 10
to f i t h a r m o n i o u s l y i n t o linguistic structures, a n d even be utterly
a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e m . B u t such a categorial f r a m e w o r k does d e c i d e i n
favor o f t h e perspective o f a l i f e w o r l d intersubjectively shared
p a r t i c i p a n t s . O n e d o e s give u p b i o l o g i c a l o r p h y s i c a l i s t t h i r d - p e r s o n
descriptions o f the organic substratum. This change i n perspective
d o e s n o t e n t a i l t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f i n n e r n a t u r e as a n e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c
referent.
Whitebook is l e d astray b y s o m e o f m y r e m a r k s t h a t b e l o n g t o
another context. They were made apropos the question of whether
a theory of natural evolution could be projected f r o m such
i n t e r n a l perspective. N a t u r a l l y , I a m e n o u g h o f a materialist to take
as m y s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h a t K a n t is r i g h t o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t h i s
s t a t e m e n t s a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h D a r w i n . I have n e v e r h a d a n y d o u b t s
a b o u t the primacy o f n a t u r a l history over the history o f the h u m a n
species. N o n e t h e l e s s , i t is b e t t e r n o t t o t r y t o resolve a l l p r o b l e m s
w i t h t h e same t h e o r y , o r e v e n w i t h t h e o r i e s o f t h e same t y p e . T h e
n e o - D a r w i n i a n t h e o r y o f e v o l u t i o n has a d i f f e r e n t status a n d f o r m
f r o m N e w t o n i a n physics, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d R o m a n t i c theories
o f n a t u r e , o n t h e o t h e r . T h e t h r e e t h e o r i e s are n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h
t h e s a m e " n a t u r e . " " I n s t i n c t u a l n a t u r e " as d e a l t w i t h , respectively, i n
e t h o l o g y a n d psychoanalysis is j u s t as d i s t i n c t . I t seems t o m e t h a t t h e
s i n g l e m o s t i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n h e r e is w h e t h e r t h a t " i n n e r n a t u r e "
w h o s e f a t e f u l e n t w i n e m e n t i n l i f e - h i s t o r i e s is t h e o b j e c t o f p s y c h o -
analysis c a n b e b e t t e r e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h i n t e r a c t i o n a l c o n c e p t s o r
t h r o u g h concepts w i t h m o r e strongly physicalist o r biological c o n n o -
t a t i o n s . T h e v a l u e o f a t h e o r y is s u r e l y a m a t t e r o f e m p i r i c a l f r u i t f u l -
ness a n d n o t a m a t t e r o f t h e s p e c u l a t i v e c o n t e n t o f its f u n d a m e n t a l
concepts. 3 1
I t is, h o w e v e r , q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e t o ask h o w i t is t h a t I c a n h o l d o n t o
t h o s e m a t e r i a l i s t m o t i f s t h a t F r e u d o - M a r x i s m d r e w o n i n its t h e o r y
o f d r i v e s . W h i t e b o o k suspects t h a t a t h e o r y o f society t h a t n o longer
takes o v e r i n t a c t t h e F r e u d i a n t h e o r y o f d r i v e s necessarily truncates
an i m p o r t a n t normative d i m e n s i o n , namely, that o f happiness.
t h e same t i m e , h e also sees a n excess o f u t o p i a n i s m b u i l t i n t o " l i n -
g u i s t i c i d e a l i s m . " T h e " c o n c e r n f o r h a p p i n e s s " seems necessarily
b e c o m e s e c o n d a r y t o t h e " p a s s i o n f o r j u s t i c e " i n a t h e o r y t h a t gets
i n v o l v e d w i t h g e n e t i c s t r u c t u r a l i s m a n d d i r e c t s its i n t e r e s t t o g e n e r a l
429
Questions a n d Counterquestions
structures o f rationality, b o t h i n the development of the individual
a n d i n social e v o l u t i o n . I s h a l l l i m i t m y s e l f h e r e t o t h e m o r a l a n d
by l e g a l d i m e n s i o n , since b o t h W h i t e b o o k a n d M c C a r t h y , e a c h i n h i s
o w n way, r e n e w t h e c r i t i q u e o f e t h i c a l f o r m a l i s m ( a n d b o t h w i t h
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s a m e passage i n m y essay o n B e n j a m i n ) .
First o f a l l , I have t o p o i n t o u t t h a t I have revised m y earlier
interpretation 3 2
o f t h e p o s t c o n v e n t i o n a l stage o f m o r a l j u d g m e n t . 3 3
Even i f the a p p r o a c h o f a discourse ethics favored by A p e l a n d myself
were to be accepted i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussions, i t w o u l d o n l y have
an achieved an adequate description of the conditions o f p r i n c i p l e d
m o r a l j u d g m e n t as s u c h . Previously, I was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r a b o u t
t h e f a c t t h a t s u c h a c o m p e t e n c e f o r j u d g m e n t d o e s n o t eo ipso p r e -
s u p p o s e a f l e x i b l e e g o i d e n t i t y , e v e n i f i t n o l o n g e r accepts as g i v e n
t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f n e e d s (as d o e s K a n t i a n e t h i c s ) b u t r a t h e r (as
i n discourse ethics) opens t h e m to a n u n c o n s t r a i n e d intersubjective
process o f w i l l f o r m a t i o n . T h e cognitive capacity to j u s t i f y m o r a l
a c t i o n s a n d n o r m s has t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d i f i t is t o b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e
i n the c o n t e x t o f ethical life. O n l y a capacity f o r j u d g m e n t ( i n f o r m e d
by p r a c t i c a l reason) makes possible a n a p p l i c a t i o n o f abstract a n d
g e n e r a l n o r m s t h a t is a p p r o p r i a t e t o p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s ; o n l y m o -
tivational resources a n d structures o f i n n e r c o n t r o l makes possible
a c t i o n s t h a t are i n a c c o r d w i t h m o r a l i n s i g h t . W i t h o u t t h e c a p a c i t y
for j u d g m e n t a n d motivation, the psychological conditions for trans-
l a t i n g m o r a l i t y i n t o e t h i c a l l i f e are m i s s i n g ; w i t h o u t t h e c o r r e s p o n d -
i n g p a t t e r n s o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h a t is, w i t h o u t " f i t t i n g "
f o r m s o f l i f e t o e m b o d i e d m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e social c o n d i t i o n s f o r
t h e i r c o n c r e t e e x i s t e n c e are m i s s i n g . T h i s is t h e s u b s t a n c e o f H e g e l ' s
c r i t i q u e o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l i t y , a c r i t i q u e t h a t has always b e e n
r e c o g n i z e d i n t h e c r i t i c a l t h e o r y o f society. A u t o n o m y i n Kant's
sense, w i t h t h e s t r i c t s e p a r a t i o n o f d u t y a n d i n c l i n a t i o n a n d w i t h o u t
t h e awareness o f t h e ego's c o m m u n i c a t i v e access t o its o w n i n n e r
n a t u r e , also s i g n i f i e s u n f r e e d o m ; A d o r n o d e v e l o p e d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s
o f t h i s i n t h e t h i r d p a r t o f h i s Negative Dialectics. I n psychological
At
t e r m s , t h i s m e a n s t h a t i n n e r n a t u r e is n o t t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e
perspective o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n m e r e l y t h r o u g h t h e capacity o f m o r a l
to
judgment (as i t is r e c o n s t r u c t e d i n terms o f a discourse ethics).
R a t h e r , s u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e is a t t a i n e d o n l y t h r o u g h t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f
430
C h a p t e r 10
a n e g o - i d e n t i t y m a k i n g p o s s i b l e "a f r e e d o m t h a t l i m i t s i t s e l f i n t h e
intention of reconciling, if not of identifying, worthiness with
happiness." 3 4
I n t h e t h e o r y o f society, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l
life can be f o u n d i n the contrast b e t w e e n general structures o f the
l i f e w o r l d t h a t are c a p a b l e o f b e i n g r a t i o n a l i z e d , o n t h e o n e hand,
a n d t h e p l u r a l i t y o f e x i s t i n g l i f e w o r l d s i n t h e i r specific, c o n c r e t e
historical totalities, o n the other. Particular f o r m s o f life a n d life-his-
t o r i e s f o r m a c o n t e x t t h a t r e m a i n s i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d a n d is e x p e r i -
e n c e d by us o n l y as a h o r i z o n ; t h i s c o n t e x t c a n n o t b e o b j e c d v a t e d
in toto. C e r t a i n l y , d i f f e r e n t l i f e w o r l d s m a y b e c o m p a r e d u n d e r d i f f e r -
e n t a b s t r a c t p o i n t s o f view; b u t o n l y a f e w s u c h aspects a r e so g e n e r a l
t h a t t h e y c a n b e d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e c u l t u r a l p a r a d i g m s o f a specific
l i f e w o r l d . T h i s is t r u e , f o r i n s t a n c e , o f p r o b l e m s o l v i n g c a p a c i t i e s t h a t
can be m e a s u r e d against the s t a n d a r d o f universal validity claims
( s u c h as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h a n d n o r m a t i v e r i g h t n e s s ) a n d t h a t c a n
a c c u m u l a t e i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e forces o f p r o d u c t i o n , i n the
g r o w t h o f t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , as w e l l as i n p r o g r e s s i n t h e stages
of moral judgment. However, happiness, u n l i k e justice or knowl-
e d g e , is n o t a c o n c e p t t h a t relates t o o n l y o n e o f these d i m e n s i o n s
a n d t o g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . I t is r e l a t e d t o p a r t i c u l a r
constellations o f lived practices, value orientations, traditions, a n d
c o m p e t e n c i e s as a w h o l e . I t s o b j e c t is always a h i s t o r i c a l l y u n i q u e
c o n f i g u r a t i o n . We d o i n d e e d h a v e m o r e o r less d e f i n i t e feelings
a b o u t t h e success o f m o d e s o f l i f e a n d — w i t h less d e c e p t i o n — a b o u t
t h e i r f a i l u r e . B u t e n o r m o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s s t a n d i n t h e way o f c o n c e p -
t u a l i z i n g , as we c a n d o i n t h e case o f m o r a l i t y , these clinical i n t u i t i o n s
a b o u t t h e " g o o d l i f e " i n a u n i v e r s a l l y b i n d i n g way, a l t h o u g h t h i s was
o n c e t h e a i m o f classical e t h i c s . O n e has t o b e satisfied w i t h r e c o g -
n i z i n g necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u c h a l i f e .
M a n y o f those w h o have b e e n raised i n a Protestant m i l i e u t e n d
toward the p r e s u m p t i o n that the balance o f happiness, overall a n d
i n the l o n g r u n , c a n n o t be drastically altered. B u t even this goal
w o u l d n o t b e a c h i e v e d i f e v e r y g e n e r a t i o n d i d n o t set other g o a l s f o r
t h e m s e l v e s a n d u n d e r t a k e a n e w Utopian e f f o r t s t o c h a n g e t h e b a l -
a n c e o f h a p p i n e s s . P e r h a p s i t is a r e m n a n t o f t h e o d i c y t o assume t h a t
e v e r y f o r m o f l i f e i n h e r e n t l y possesses t h e same c h a n c e t o find its
431
Questions and Counterquestions
happiness. S u c h speculations are surely idealist i n the b a d sense
given the o v e r w h e l m i n g experience of individual unhappiness and
c o l l e c t i v e s u f f e r i n g , a n d i n v i e w o f s o c i a l c a t a s t r o p h e s t h a t are so
t e r r i b l e because, f o r all t h e i r quasi-naturalness, they do n o t arise
f r o m n a t u r a l necessity. O v e r a n d o v e r a g a i n , t h e necessary c o n d i -
t i o n s f o r a " g o o d l i f e " are carelessly a n d a r b i t r a r i l y v i o l a t e d . I t is f r o m
this experience that the t r a d i t i o n o f t h o u g h t that unites M a r x a n d
F r e u d d r a w s its i n s p i r a t i o n . I a m i n f u l l a g r e e m e n t w i t h W h i t e b o o k
i n m y d e s i r e n o t t o give u p this f o r m o f m a t e r i a l i s m .
I n c o n c l u s i o n , I d o n o t w a n t t o pass o v e r i n s i l e n c e t h e f a c t t h a t
M c C a r t h y a n d W h i t e b o o k t o u c h u p o n a basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem
t h a t , i f I a m c o r r e c t , s t i l l awaits a n a d e q u a t e r e s o l u t i o n t h i s side o f
H e g e l i a n l o g i c : H o w is i t p o s s i b l e t o w e a k e n t h e c l a i m s o f statements
a b o u t t o t a l i t i e s so t h a t t h e y m a y b e j o i n e d t o g e t h e r w i t h stronger
statements a b o u t general structures?
Note
1. [Editor's note:] T h e reference is to the following essays in R. Bernstein, ed.,
Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1985): R. Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard
on Postmodernity;" M. Jay, "Habermas and Modernism;" T. McCarthy, "Reflections
on Rationalization in The Theory of Communicative Action;" J . Whitebook, "Reason and
Happiness: Some Psychoanalytic Themes in Critical T h e o r y . "
2. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 390.
3. R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia, 1983).
4. H . Schnadelbach, in W. Kuhlmann and D. Bohler, eds., Kommunikation und Reflex-
ion (Frankfurt, 1983), p. 361.
5. J . Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.,
1990).
6. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston,
1987), pp. 398ff.
7. I have never used the term "neoconservative" in this connection. I did once, in
passing, compare the critique of reason in Foucault and Derrida to the "Young
Conservatives" of the Weimar Republic. Usually Hans Freyer, A r n o l d G e h l e n , Martin
Heidegger, Ernst Junger, and Carl Schmitt are numbered among this group. T h e y all
take from Nietzsche the radical gesture of a break with modernity and a revolutionary
renewal of premodern energies, most often reaching back to archaic times. Like any
comparison, it has its weaknesses, but in the G e r m a n context it does illuminate
432
C h a p t e r 10
intellectual affinities that, notwithstanding the politically contrasting positions, stem
from the authority of Nietzsche (see my essay "Modernity versus Postmodernity," New
German Critique 22 (1981): 3-22).
8. Cf. P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis, 1983). Cf. also his "Institution
Kunst," in Vermittlung, Rezeption, Funktion (Frankfurt, 1979), and Kritik der idealistischen
Ästhetik (Frankfurt, 1983).
9. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston,
1984), pp. 157ff.
10. Ibid., pp. 40ff., and the references given there.
11. Bürger, Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik, pp. 104ff.
12. Cf. also P. Bürger, "Das Altern der Moderne," i n j . Habermas and L . von Friede-
berg, eds., Adorno Konferenz 1983 (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 177ff.
13. Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," pp. 12ff.
14. See A. Wellmer, ' T r u t h , Semblance, Reconciliation," in The Persistence of Moder-
nity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, trans. D . Midgely (Cambridge,
Mass., 1991).
15. Ibid., p. 165.
16. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 120ff. and 130ff.; and " I n -
terpretative Social Science and Hermeneuticism," in N. H a n n , R. Bellah, P. Rabinow,
and W. Sullivan, eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 251-270.
17. J . Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and G . A.
Stark (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).
18. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p. 237.
19. Ibid., p. 238.
20. J . Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," in J . B. T h o m p s o n and D. H e l d , eds.,
Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 248ff.
21. O n this "rather risky model," cf. my Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1,
pp. 239ff.
22. Ibid.
23. Cf. my excursus on argumentation theory, ibid., pp. 18-42.
24. " I n each of these spheres, the process of differentiation is accompanied by a
countermovement that always re-incorporates the other two, initially excluded validity
aspects under the primacy of the dominant one. I n this way, nonobjectivist approaches
to the human sciences also bring into play the perspectives of moral and aesthetic
critique, while not endangering the primacy of the question of truth; only in this way
is a critical theory of society possible. T h e discussion of an ethics of responsibility or
433
Questions and Counterquestions
conviction and the more pronounced consideration of hedonistic motives bring the
perspectives of the calculation of consequences and the interpretation of needs into play
within universalistic ethics, perspectives that lie within the cognitive and expressive
validity domains; in this way, materialistic ideas can also be given their due, without
endangering the autonomy of the moral perspective. Finally, post-avant-garde art is
characterized by the simultaneous presence of realistic and 'committed' (engagiert)
tendencies along with the authentic continuation of classical modernity, out of which
the independent logic of the aesthetic sphere was distilled. With realistic and 'com-
mitted' art, cognitive and moral-practical moments enter once again into art, at the
level of the wealth of form set free by the avant-garde" (Theory of Communicative Action,
vol. 2, pp. 396ff.).
25. Cf. Habermas, "Über Moralität und Sittlichkeit: Was macht eine Lebensform
rational?," in Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt, 1991), pp. 31ff.
26. T h i s was, in any case, my intention in the F r e u d chapter of my Knowledge and
Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston, 1971). I do not find any basis in F r e u d for
the strict separation between a clinically justified theory of neurosis and a metapsy-
chological superstructure that Adolf Grünbaum proposes in "Freud's Theory: T h e
Perspective of a Philosopher of Science," Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 57, no. 6 (1983). T h i s separation completely obscures the
specific roots of Freudian theory in the experiences of the analytic dialogue. Such
an operation may be useful for the argumentative purpose of assimilating Freudian
theory to the standard model of unified science, only to reject it then for failing to
measure up to its standards. At the same time, it expresses the decision not to
consider the hermeneutic character of this science.
27. Cf. J . Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," in On the Logic of the
Social Sciences, and "Überlegungen zur Kommunikationspathologie," in Vorstudien und
Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984).
28. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," in Moral Con-
sciousness and Communicative Action.
29. R. Döbert, J . Habermas, and G. Nunner-Winkler, Entwicklung des Ichs (Köln,
1977), pp. 9ff.
30. K. H o r n expresses similar reservations in "Geheime kulturalistische Tendenzen
der modernen psychoanalytischen Orthodoxie," in Psychoanalyse als Wissenschaft
(Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 93ff.'
31. With respect to the empirical questions, I would like to point out that my
reflections on the change in symptoms typical of our times and on the significance
of the adolescent crisis are quite similar to those of Whitebook. Cf. Theory of Commu-
nicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 386ff.
32. Cf. J . Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and
the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1979), pp. 78ff.
33. Cf. Habermas, " A Reply to My Critics." See also the essays in Habermas, Moral
Consciousness and Communicative Action.
34. Cf. Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity."
Selected Bibliography and Further Reading

This bibliography is meant to lead readers further into the literature related to
Habermas's program of formal pragmatics. I have included mainly secondary discus-
sions of Habermas's writings rather than the sources that he cites (these are docu-
mented in the notes to the various chapters). T h e exception is where Habermas
mentions a particular writer repeatedly or deals in detail with her or his work. F o r
Habermas's work itself, I have included only those primary texts evidently relevant
to formal pragmatics or deemed by h i m to be correlative. English translations have
been cited where available.

Agger, B e n , 1981. "A Critical Theory of Dialogue," Humanities in Society 4: 7-30.

Ajzner, J a n , 1994. "Some Problems of Rationality, Understanding, and Universalistic

Ethics in the Context of Habermas's T h e o r y of Communicative Action," Philosophy of
the Social Sciences 24(4): 466-484.

Aladjem, Terry K., 1995. " O f Truth and Disagreement: Habermas, Foucault and
Democratic Discourse," History of European Ideas 2 0 ( 4 - 6 ) : 909-914.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1967. Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften (Dor-
drecht: Reidel).

Apel, Karl-Otto, ed., 1976a. Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1976b. "Sprechakttheorie u n d uranszendentale Sprachpragmatik—

zur Frage ethischer N o r m e n , " in Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic, pp. 10¬
173.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980a. Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. G . Adey and

D. Frisby ( L o n d o n : Routledge and Kegan Paul).

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980b. "Hermeneutic Philosophy of Understanding as a Heuristic

Horizon for Displaying the Problem-Dimension of Analytic Philosophy of Meaning,"
Philosophy and Social Criticism 7: 241-259.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980c. " T h r e e Dimensions of Understanding Meaning in Analytic

Philosophy: Linguistic Conventions, Inventions, and Reference to Things," Philosophy
and Social Criticism 7: 115—142.

436
Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r Reading
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1981a. " C . S. Peirce a n d the Post-Tarskian Problem of an Adequate
Explication of the Meaning of T r u t h , " Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18:
3-17.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1981b. "Intentions, Conventions, and Reference to Things," in
H . Parret and J . Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: de Gruyter).
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987a. "Sprachliche Bedeutung, Wahrheit und normative
Gültigkeit," Archivio di Filosofa 55 (1987): 51ff.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987b. "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit u n d Letztbe-
gründung," in F o r u m für Philosophie, ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp), pp. 116-211.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992a. "Is Intentionality More Basic than Linguistic Meaning?," in
E . Lepore a n d R. Van Gulick, eds., fohn Searle and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell),
pp. 31-55.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992b. "Illokutionäre Bedeutung u n d normative Gültigkeit: Die
transzendentalpragmatische Begründung der uneingeschränkten kommunikativen
Verständigung," Protosoziologie 2: 2-15.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992c. "Normatively G r o u n d i n g 'Critical Theory,'" in A. Honneth,
T. McCarthy, C. Offe, and A. Wellmer, eds., Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished
Project of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Austin, J . L . , 1961. "Performative Utterances," in Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), pp. 233-252.
Austin, J . L . , 1962. How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Austin, J . L . , 1963. "Performauve-Constative," in C . E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and
Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press), pp. 22-33.
Bar-Hillel, Y , 1973. " O n Habermas's Hermeneutic Philosophy of Language," Synthese
26: 1-12.
Bartels, Martin, 1982. "Sprache u n d soziales H a n d e l n : eine Auseinandersetzung mit
Habermas' Sprachbegriff," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 36: 226-233.
B a u r m a n n , Manfred, 1985. "Understanding as an A i m and Aims of Understanding,"
in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Sodal Action.
Beatty, Joseph, 1979. "Communicative Competence and the Skeptic," Philosophy and
Sodal Crititism 6: 267-288.
Belardinelli, Sergio, 1991. " L a teoría consensual de la verdad de Jürgen Habermas,"
Anuario Filosófico, pp. 115-123.
Bernstein, Jay, 1992. "De-Divination a n d the Vindication of Everyday-Life: Reply to
Rorty," Tijdschrift voor Filosofe 54(4): 668-692.
437
Selected Bibliography a n d Further R e a d i n g
Bernstein, Richard, 1983. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and
Practice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
Bernstein, Richard, ed., 1985. Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T
Press).
Berten, André, 1989. "L'éthique et la Politique," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 87:
74-96.
Bogen, David E . , 1989. "Reappraisal of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action in
Light of Detailed Investigations of Social Praxis," journal for the Theory of Sodal Behav-
iour 19: 47-77.
Bohman, James, 1985. Language and Social Crititism, P h . D . Dissertation, Boston U n i -
versity.
B o h m a n , James, 1986. "Formal Pragmatics a n d Social Criticism," Philosophy and Social
Crititism 11: 331-353.
Bohman, James, 1988. "Emancipation and Rhetoric: T h e Perlocutions a n d Illocu¬
tions of the Social Critic," Philosophy and Rhetoric 21 (3): 185-204.
B o h m a n , James, 1992. "Critique of Ideologies," in M. Dascal, D. Gerhardus, K. L o -
renz, a n d G . Meggle, eds., Philosophy of Language: An International Handbook of Contem-
porary Research ( B e r l i n / N e w York: de Gruyter).
B o h m a n , James, 1994. "World Disclosure a n d Radical Criticism," Thesis Eleven 37:
82-97.
Bohman, James, a n d Terence Kelly, 1996. "Intelligibility, Rationality, and Compari-
son," Philosophy and Sodal Crititism 22(1): 81-100.
Bühler, Karl, 1934. Sprachtheorie (Jena: Fischer).
Canovan, Margaret, 1983. " A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Haber-
mas and Arendt," Political Theory 11: 105-116.
Chomsky, Noam, 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T
Press).
Cobben, P., 1984. "Habermas' Theorie van het Kommunikatieve Handelen," Tijdschrift voor
Filosofie 46: 216-268.
Comesana, Manuel, 1994. " L a Teoria de la Verdad en Habermas," Dianoia 40: 245¬
261.
Cometti, Jean-Pierre, 1992. "Raison, Argumentation et Légitimation: Habermas, Apel
et les Apories de la Communication," Philosophiques 19(1): 3-24.
Cooke, Maeve, 1993. "Habermas and Consensus, " European Journal of Philosophy 1(3):
247-267.
438
Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r Reading
Cooke, Maeve, 1994. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Corredor, Cristina, 1993. "Intentos de formulación de u n a teoría general de actos de
habla (J Searle y J Habermas)," Revista de Filosofía 6: 119-130.
Cotesta, Vittoria, 1986. "Riferimento e Verita," AQUINAS 29: 465-502.
Courtois, Stephane, 1994. " L e faillibilisme de Jürgen Habermas et ses difficultés: u n
faillibilisme conséquent est-il possible?," Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 33(2):
253-282.
Couture, Tony, 1993. "Habermas, Values, a n d the Rational, Internal Structure of
Communication, "Journal of Value Inquiry 2 7 ( 3 - 4 ) : 403-416.
Culler, Jonathan, 1985. "Communicative Competence and Normative F o r c e , " New
German Critique 35: 133ff.
C u s h m a n , D. P., and P. K. Tompkins, 1980. " A T h e o r y of Rhetoric for Contemporary
Society," Philosophy and Rhetoric 13: 43-67.
Czuma, Hans, 1981. "Rede oder Gewalt," Conceptus 15: 102-111.
Dallmayr, F r e d , 1987. "Life-World and Communicative Action," in B. Parekh, ed.,
Political Discourse (New Delhi: Sage), pp. 152-178.
Derrida, Jacques, 1977. "Signature Event Context," reprinted in Derrida. Margins of
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Derrida, Jacques, 1977. "Limited I n c abc . . . ." Glyph 2: 162-254.
Dews, Peter, 1996. " T h e T r u t h of the Subject: Language, Validity and Transcendence
in L a c a n a n d Habermas," in P. Dews a n d S. Critchley, eds., Deconstructive Subjectivities
(Albany: S U N Y P r e s s ) , pp. 149-168.
Dorschel, Andreas, 1988. "Is T h e r e Any Normative Claim Internal to Stating Facts?,"
Communication and Cognition 21: 5-16.
Dorschel, Andreas, 1990. "Handlungstypen u n d Kriterien: Z u Habermas' Theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns" Zätschrift für Philosophische Forschung 44(2) : 220-252.
Dummett, Michael, 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper & Row).
Dummett, Michael, 1976. "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," in G . Evans a n d j . McDow-
ell, eds., Truth and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Ferrara, Alessandro, 1987. " A Critique of Habermas's Consensus T h e o r y of T r u t h , "
Philosophy and Social Criticism 13: 39-67.
Fultner, Barbara, 1995. Radical Interpretation or Communicative Action, Ph.D. Disserta-
tion, Northwestern University.
Fultner, Barbara, 1996. ' T h e Redemption of T r u t h : Idealization, Acceptability and
Fallibilism in Habermas' Theory of Meaning," International Journal of Philosophical
Studies 4 ( 2 ) : 233-251.
439
Selected Bibliography a n d Further Reading
G e i m a n n , Kevin Paul, 1990. "Habermas's Early Lifeworld Appropriation: A Critical
Assessment," Man and World 23(1): 63-83.
Geuss, Raymond, 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory (New York: Cambridge University
Press).
Griffioen, Sander, 1991. ' T h e Metaphor of the Covenant in Habermas," Faith and
Philosophy 8 ( 4 ) : 524-540.
Grondin, J e a n , 1989. "Habermas und das Problem der Individualität," Philosophische
Rundschau 36: 187-205.
Haarscher, Guy, 1986. "Perelman and Habermas," Law and Philosophy 5: 331-342.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston:
Beacon Press).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1973. "Wahrheitstheorien," reprinted in Habermas, Vorstudien und
Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1976a. "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics," Theory and
Society 3: 155-167.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1976b. "Universalpragmatische Hinweise auf das System der I c h -
Abgrenzungen," in M. Auwärter, E . Kirsch, and M. Schröter, eds., Kommunikation,
Interaktion, Identität (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston: Beacon Press).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1982. "A Reply to my Critics," i n j . B. Thompson and D. Held,
eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press), pp. 219-283.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1983. "Interpretative Social Science a n d Hermeneuticism," in
N. H a a n , R. Bellah, P. Rabinow, and W. Sullivan, eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry
(New York: Columbia University Press).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1984. Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen
Handelns (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1984/1987. The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans.
T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1985a. "A Reply to Skjei's 'A C o m m e n t on Performative, Sub-
ject, and Proposition in Habermas's Theory of Communication,'" Inquiry 28: 87¬
122.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1985b. "Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action," in
Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Social Action.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1987. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence
(Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
440
Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r R e a d i n g
Habermas, Jürgen, 1988. On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and
G . A. Stark (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1990. "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consaous-
ness and Communicative Action, trans. C . L e n h a r d t and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge,
Mass: T h e M I T Press).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1992. Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1993. "Remarks on Discourse Ethics," in Habermas, Justification
and Application, trans. C . C r o n i n (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Habermas, Jürgen, 1996. Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.:
T h e M I T Press).
Hall, J . A., 1982. "Gellner and Habermas on Epistemology and Politics. Or, Need We
Feel Disenchanted?," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12: 384—408.
Healy, Paul, 1987. "Is Habermas's Consensus T h e o r y a Theory of T r u t h ? , " Irish
Philosophical fournal 4: 145—152.
Heath, Joseph, 1995. "Threats, Promises and Communicative Action," European four-
nal of Philosophy 3(3): 225-241.
Hesse, Mary, 1995. "Habermas and the Force of Dialectical Argument," History of
European Ideas 21(3): 367-378.
H o h n , H a n s j o a c h i m , 1989. "Vernunft—Kommunikation—Diskurs: Z u Anspruch
und Grenze der Transzendentalpragmatik als Basistheorie der Philosophie," Freie
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 36: 93-128.
H o n n e t h , Axel, 1979. "Communication and Reconciliation: Habermas's Critique of
A d o r n o , " Telos 39(1): 45-61.
Husserl, E d m u n d , 1970. The Crisis of the European Sciences, trans. D. C a r r (Evanston,
III.: Northwestern University Press).
Iking, Karl-Heinz, 1976. "Geltung als Konsens," Neue Hefte für Philosophie 10: 20-50.
Ingram, David, 1982. " T h e Possibility of a Communication Ethic Reconsidered:
Habermas, Gadamer, and Bourdieu on Discourse," Man and World 15: 149-161.
Ingram, David, 1987. Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (New Haven: Yale University
Press).
Johnson, James, 1991. "Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action," Political
Theory 19(2): 181-201.
Johnson, James, 1993. "Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between
Critical T h e o r y and Rational C h o i c e , " American Political Science Review 87(1): 74-93.
441
Selected Bibliography a n d Further R e a d i n g
Kambartel, F., and H . J . Schneider, 1981. "Constructing a Pragmatic Foundation for
Semantics," in G. Fl0istad, ed., Contemporary Philosophy A New Survey, vol. 1 (The
Hague: Nijhoff), pp. 155-178.
Keuth, Herbert, 1979. "Erkenntnis oder Entscheidung: die Konsenstheorien der
Wahrheit u n d der Richtigkeit von Jürgen Habermas," Zeitschrift ßr allgemeine Wissen-
schaftstheorie 10: 375-393.
Kissling, Christian, 1991. "Habermas et la theologie: Notes pour une discussion entre
la theologie et la Theorie de l'agir communicationnel," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie
und Theologie, pp. 235-244.
Kolb, David, 1992. "Heidegger and Habermas on Criticism and Totality," Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 52(3): 683-693.
Kompridis, Nikolas, 1994. " O n World Disclosure: Heidegger, Habermas, and Dewey,"
Thesis Eleven 37: 29-45.
Kujundzic, Nebojsa, and William Buschert, 1993. "Staging the Life-World: Habermas
and the Recuperation of Austin's Speech Act Theory," fournal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour 23 (1): 105-116.
Lafont, Cristina, 1993. La Razon como Lenguaje (Madrid: V i s o r ) .
Lafont, Cristina, 1994. "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Phi-
losophie 42(6): 1007-1023.
Lara, Maria Pia, 1995. "Albrecht Wellmer: Between Spheres of Validity," Philosophy and
Social Criticism 21(2): 1-22.
Leist, Anton, 1977. "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," Germanistische Linguistik 5/6.
Leist, Anton, 1989. "Dieseits der 'Transzendentalpragmatik': gibt es sprachprag-
matische Argumente für Moral?," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung AS: 301-317.
Levin, David Michael, 1994. "Making Sense: T h e Work of Eugene G e n d l i n , " Human
Studies 17(3): 343-353.
Machado, C . E . J . , 1988. ' T h e Concept of Rationality in Habermas: T h e 'Linguistic
T u r n ' of the Critical T h e o r y " (in Portuguese), Trans/Form/Acao, pp. 31-44.
McCarthy, Thomas, 1978. The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.:
T h e M I T Press).
McCarthy, Thomas, 1979. 'Translator's Introduction," i n j . Habermas, Communication
and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press).
McCarthy, Thomas, 1980. "Reflections on Rationalization in The Theory of Communi-
cative Action, " in Bernstein, ed. Habermas and Modernity.
McCarthy, Thomas, 1991. "Practical Discourse: O n the Relation of Morality to Poli-
tics," in Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
442
Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r R e a d i n g
McCumber, J o h n , 1985. "Critical T h e o r y and Poetic Interaction," Praxis International
5: 268-282.
McGuire, R., 1977. "Speech Acts, Communicative Competence and the Paradox of
Authority," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10: 30-45.
Merrill, Sarah A., 1990. "Linguistics as a Borderline Case," in Merrill, ed., Abeunt
Studio in Mores: A Festschrift for Helga Doblin on Philosophies of Education and Personal
Learning or Teaching in the Humanities and Moral Sciences (New York: L a n g ) .
Mertens, T., 1986. "Habermas en Searle: Kritische Beschouwingen bij de Theorie van
het Communicatieve Handelen," Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 48: 66-93.
Misak, Cheryl, 1994. "Pragmatism and the Transcendental T u r n in Truth and Ethics,"
Transactions of the Charles S. Peine Society 30(4): 739-775.
Misgeld, Dieter, 1977. "Discourse and Conversation: T h e T h e o r y of Communicative
Competence a n d Hermeneutics in the Light of the Debate between Habermas and
Gadamer," Cultural Hermeneutics 4: 321-344.
Murphy, Peter, 1985. "Meaning, T r u t h , a n d Ethical-Value," Praxis International 5:
225-246.
Nagl, Ludwig, 1984. " D i e Wahrheitsfrage zwischen sprachanalytischer Transforma-
tion u n d historisch-systematischer Dimensionierung," Philosophische Rundschau 31:
85-94.
Nielsen, Kai, 1994. "How to Proceed in Philosophy: Remarks after Habermas," Thesis
Ekvm 37: 10-28.
Nordquist, J o a n , 1986. Social Theory: A Bibliographic Series, no. 1: Jürgen Habermas: A
Bibliography (Santa Cruz: Reference & Research).
Nordquist, J o a n , 1991. Social Theory: A Bibliographic Series, no. 22: Jürgen Habermas II:
A Bibliography (Santa Cruz: Reference & Research).
Nusser, Karl-Heinz, 1985. 'Totalität ohne Subjekt," Zeitschrift für Philosophische For-
schung 39: 590-599.
Oehler, Klaus, 1995. " A Response to Habermas," in K. L . Ketner, ed., Peirce and
Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries (New York: Fordham University Press).
Pettit, Philip, 1982. "Habermas on T r u t h and Justice," in G . H . Parkinson, ed., Marx
and Marxisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 207-228.
Pickard, Dean, 1993. "Habermas, A Postmodern Critique," Auslegung 19(1): 1-21.
Power, Michael, 1993. "Habermas a n d Transcendental Arguments: A Reappraisal,"
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23(1): 26-49.
Rasmussen, David M., 1990. Reading Habermas (Oxford: Blackwell).
Redding, Paul, 1989. "Habermas's T h e o r y of Argumentation," The Journal of Value
Inquiry 23: 15-32.
443
Selected Bibliography a n d Further Reading
Roderick, Rick, 1985. "Habermas on Rationality," Man and World 18: 203-218.
Roderick, Rick, 1986. Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: St.
Martin's Press).
Rorty, Richard, 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press).
Rorty, Richard, 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: University of C a m -
bridge Press).
Rorty, Richard, 1991a. Philosophical Papers I: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press).
Rorty, Richard, 1991b. Philosophical Papers II: Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press).
Rorty, Richard, 1994. " S i n d Aussagen universelle Geltungsansprüche?," Deutsche Zeit-
schrift für Philosophie 42(6): 975-988.
Rosenberg, J . and C . Travis, eds., 1971. Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice H a l l ) .
Saiedi, Nader, 1987. " A Critique of Habermas's T h e o r y of Practical Rationality,"
Studies in Soviet Thought 33: 251-265.
Schatzki, Theodore, 1986. ' T h e Rationalization of Meaning and Understanding:
Davidson and Habermas," Synthese 69: 51-79.
Scheit, Herbert, 1991. Wahrhat—Diskurs—Demokratie: Studien zur "Konsensustheorie der
Wahrheit" (Freiburg: Karl Alber).
Schiller, Hans-Ernst, 1990. " Z u r sozialphilosophischen Bedeutung des Sprachbegriffs
Wilhelm von Humboldts," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 44(2): 253-272.
Schmidt, James, 1979. "Offensive Critical Theory: Reply to H o n n e t h , " Telos 39(1):
62-70.
Schnädelbach, Herbert, 1977. Reflexion und Diskurs (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).
Schnädelbach, Herbert, 1992. ' T h e s e n über Geltung u n d Wahrheit," in Schnädel-
bach, Zur Rehabilitierung des animal rationale (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).
Schneider, Hans J . , 1982. "Gibt es eine 'Transzendental-' Universalpragmatik'?,"
Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 36: 208-225.
Schurz, Gerhard, 1980. "Soziale Erwartungen u n d ideale Sprechsituation: ein for-
males Modell," Conceptus 14: 47-57.
Searle, J . R., 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
444
Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r Reading
Searle, J . R., 1971a. "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," in Rosenberg
and Travis, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Language, pp. 262-275.
Searle, J . R., 1971b. "What Is a Speech Act?," in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings
in the Philosophy of Language, pp. 614-628.
Searle, J . R., 1977. "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to D e r r i d a , " GlyphV. 198-208.
Searle, J . R., 1979. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press).
Searle, J . R., 1981. "Intentionality and Method," fournal of Philosophy 78: 720-733.
Searle, J . R., 1983. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press).
Searle, J . R., 1984. Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press).
Searle, J . R., 1986. "Meaning, Communication, and Representation," in R. E . Grandy
and R. Warner, eds., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
Searle, J . R., 1989. "How Performatives Work," Linguistics and Philosophy 12: 535-558.
Seebafi, G . , and R. Tuomela, eds., 1985. Social Action (Dordrecht: Reidel).
Skirbekk, Gunnar, 1983. "Pragmatism in Apel and Habermas," in G . Fl0istad, ed.,
Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey (The Hague: Nijhoff), pp. 387-416.
Skjei, Erling, 1985. "A C o m m e n t on Performative, Subject, and Proposition in Haber-
mas's T h e o r y of Communication," Inquiry 28: 87-104.
Southgate, David, 1995. "Insanity Ascriptions: A Formal Pragmatic Analysis," Journal
for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25(3): 219-235.
Speranza, Jorge L . , 1991. " U n Grice alemán? E n torno de las estrategias conversacion-
ales: acercade Habermas acerca de G r i c e , " Revista Latin de Filosofía 17(1): 133-148.
Sullivan, William M., 1978. "Communication and the Recovery of Meaning: An
Interpretation of Habermas," International Philosophical Quarterly 18: 69-86.
Swart, H . A. P., 1979. "Kritiek van Habermas' Consensus-Theorie van de Waarheid,"
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 71: 167-172.
Swindal, James, 1994. " T h e Problem of Problematization in Discourse Ethics," Phi-
losophy and Social Criticism 20(3): 1-18.
Tejera, Victorino, 1996. "Has Habermas Understood Peirce?," Transactions of the Char-
les S. Peirce Society 32(1): 107-125.
T h o m p s o n , J o h n B., 1982. "Universal Pragmatics," in Thompson and Held, eds.,
Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press), pp. 116-133.
445
Selected Bibliography and Further Reading
Tietz, Udo, 1994. "Transformation der Sprachanalyse," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philoso-
phie 42(5): 861-881.
Trans, Van-Doan, 1989. " O n H u m a n Rationality. Habermas's T h e o r y of Consensus,"
Philosophical Review (Taiwan) 12: 389-430.
Tugendhat, Ernst, 1982. Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Tugendhat, Ernst, 1985. " ] . Habermas on Communicative Action," in Seebaß and
Tuomela, eds., Social Action.
Tugendhat, Ernst, 1986. Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, trans. P. Stern (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Turski, George, 1979. "Some Considerations on Intersubjectivity and Language,"
Gnosis 1: 29-44.
Umhauer, G e r d , 1983. " Z u m normativen Fundament sprachlicher Verständigung in
der Konzeption einer 'idealen Sprechsituation,'" Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung
37: 88-101.
Van Nieuwstadt, J . , 1983. "De Relatieve Zelfstandigheid van Taalhandelingen," Kennis
en Methode 7: 356-367.
Van Zyl, Albert, 1995. ' T h e Dilemma of Grounding in the Modernity-Postmodernity
Debate," South African Journal of Philosophy 14(4): 168-174.
Visker, Rudi, 1992. "Habermas on Heidegger and Foucault: Meaning and Validity in
the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity," Radical Philosophy 61: 15-22.
Wagner, Gerhard, and Heinz Zipprian, 1991. "Intersubjectivity and Critical C o n -
sciousness: Remarks on Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action," Inquiry 34(1):
49-62.
Ware, Robert X . , 1982. "Habermas's Evolutions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12:
591-620.
Weber, Max, 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Soaology, ed. G . Roth
and C . Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press).
Weber, Max, 1981. "Some Categories of Interpretive Understanding," Sodological
Quarterly 22: 151-180.
Wellmer, Albrecht, 1991. The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and
Postmodernism, trans. D. Midgely (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Wellmer, Albrecht, 1992. "What Is a Pragmatic T h e o r y of Meaning?," in A. H o n n e t h ,
T. McCarthy, C . Offe, and A. Wellmer, eds., Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished
Project of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Wellmer, Albrecht, 1998. Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of
Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
446
Selected Bibliography a n d Further R e a d i n g
White, Stephen K., 1988. The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and
Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Index
Whitton, Brian J . , 1992. "Universal Pragmatics a n d the Formation of Western Civili-
zation: A Critique of Habermas's T h e o r v of H u m a n Moral Evolution," History and
Theory 31(3): 299-312.
Wood, Allen, 1985. "Habermas's Defence of Rationalism," New German Critique 25:
145ff.
Z i m m e r m a n n , Rolf, 1984. "Emancipation and Rationality: Foundational Problems in
the Theories of Marx and Habermas," Ratio 26: 143-166.
Z i m m e r m a n n , Rolf, 1985. Utopie—Rationalität—Politik (Freiburg: Karl Alber).
Acceptability conditions, 8-9, 11, 82¬
83, 132-133, 139, 200, 225, 233, 269,
297, 312, 339-340, 367. See also
Speech acts, acceptability of; Truth
conditions; Validity claims, accept-
ability of
Accountability, 186, 267, 310
Action, 114-118, 217, 313. See also Dis-
course, vs. action
analytic theory of, 105-107
as purposive activity, 105, 112-114,
121-123, 126, 163, 170, 203, 215,
217-219, 221, 224, 298, 301, 314 {see
also Communicative action; Strategic
action)
communicative (see Communicative
action)
coordination of (see Verständigung, as
action-coordinating mechanism)
instrumental, 118, 226, 299, 377
linguistic vs. nonlinguistic, 59-60, 216¬
220
oriented toward reaching under-
standing (see Verständigung)
oriented toward success (see Strategic
action)
purposive-rational (zweckrational), 114,
117-118, 234, 332 (see also Rational-
ity, purposive)
social, 2, 21, 62-63, 93n2, 106, 113¬
119, 169, 205, 207, 213n47, 220, 233¬
235, 326, 334
sociological theory of, 105-106, 111¬
112, 132, 227, 234
strategic (see Strategic action)
symbolic, 63
teleological (see Action, as purposive
activity)
Adorno, T. W., 346, 410, 412, 414, 425¬
426, 429
Aesthetic experience, 245-246, 412¬
415, 420
Aesthetic modernity, 410
Agreement. See Consensus. See also Ver-
ständigung, vs. Einverständnis
in a strict sense (Einverständnis), 17¬
18, 321-324, 328-329
Alexander, J„ 27, 199, 201, 203, 207
Alston, W. P., 67
Analytic philosophy, 25, 51, 144, 344¬
348, 405
Apel, K . - 0 . , 21-22, 25, 43, 110, 197,
207, 352, 365-366, 404, 429
Argumentation, 4, 14-15, 164, 170¬
171, 240, 307, 311, 334, 362-371,
406, 420-423. See also Communica-
tive Action; Discourse
idealizing suppositions of, 4-5, 14-15,
367-368, 370
Art, 18, 171, 246, 389-390, 395-397,
411-415, 420, 433n24. See also Aes-
thetic experience; Criticism; Expert
cultures; Validity, aesthetic; Validity
claims, aesthetic
autonomy of, 388, 391, 393, 396, 411,
413-414, 420
and lifeworld, 396-397, 4 1 2 ^ 1 5
Austin, J . L . , 3, 6-7, 15, 56, 66-82,
101n86, 110-111, 122-123, 125,
128-129, 155, 195-196, 217, 232,
282, 289-291, 294, 383-386,
408
448
Index
Bar-Hillel, Y., 27
Bataille, G . , 408, 413
Behaviorism, linguistic, 26-27, 278
Benjamin, W., 410, 412, 414, 425
Bennett, J . , 27, 106, 229, 278
Berger, J . , 207
Bernstein, R., 404, 406-407
Binding and bonding power. See
Speech acts, binding and bonding
power of
Bühler, K., 17, 107, 110-111, 196-197,
228, 277-280, 284, 293-296, 298,
389, 394
Bürger, R, 414
Carnap, R., 25, 33-34, 108
Cartesian doubt, 243, 356, 358, 410
Chomsky, N . , 35, 37-38, 40-41, 46-47,
183
Commands. See Imperatives
Communication
general presuppositions of, 2, 21, 24,
44, 48, 80, 145, 207, 339
indirect, 121, 285, 302, 333, 338 (see
also Strategic action)
pathologies, 93n2, 168-169
Communication community, 207, 338,
350-351, 353, 355-356, 360, 3 6 5 - 367
Communicative action, 3-5, 22-24, 57,
62-63, 93n2, 105, 111, 118, 128-129,
140-142, 145, 163-164, 167, 169,
203-205, 215, 222, 224, 233, 236,
299, 326, 425. See also Language, com-
municative use of; Verständigung
functions of, 16, 111, 247
idealizing suppositions of, 4-5, 15,
144, 166, 169, 190, 207, 240, 332,
385-386, 393, 395
and lifeworld, 6, 111, 237 (see also Life-
world; Knowledge, background)
obligations resulting from, 4, 82-87,
124, 130-131, 137-138, 145, 198,
223, 233, 300
primacy of, 2-2, 15, 21, 102n92, 122,
306n33
rationality of (see Rationality, commu-
nicative)
vs. strategic action, 93n2, 119-129,
145, 167, 169, 203-206, 217, 220¬
227, 248, 293, 298-304, 377
theory of, 1, 8, 55, 106-107, 110, 112,
164, 170, 174, 183, 200, 207-208,
240, 293, 407, 410
weak vs. strong, 18, 326-329, 332, 334
(see also Verständigung, vs. Einverständ-
nis)
Communicative competence, 2, 47-50,
53-54
Communicative rationality. See Rational-
ity, communicative
Comprehensibility, 22-24, 49-50, 79,
87, 145, 291. See also Validity claims
Consensus, 4, 13-14, 23, 142-145, 160,
185-186, 188, 201, 203-204, 221,
236, 294, 298-299, 325, 353, 364¬
365. See also Agreement, in a strict
sense (Einverständnis); Verständigung
Contextual conditions of meaning. See
Meaning, contextual conditions of
Contextualism, 196, 344, 351-360, 363,
371-372, 395
Conversation, 163-164, 170, 212n45
Criticism, art and literary, 396-399,
411-412, 414, 423
Culler, J . , 383-388
Culture, 186, 248, 250-253, 395-396,
411, 419. See also Lifeworld, three do-
mains of
Davidson, D., 8, 109, 194, 348, 379n35
Declarations, 272-274, 292, 321-325,
327, 338. See also Performatives
D e r r i d a . J . , 18, 383-388, 393-396, 398¬
399, 400n24, 408
Dewey, 343-344, 346-347, 409-410
Dialogue, 184-187
Directions of fit, 158-161, 195, 263¬
265, 273, 286-287, 291-292, 376
Discourse, 4, 13-14, 86-87, 170, 236,
309-311, 314, 363, 367-372, 393,
395-396, 412, 421, 423. See also
Argumentation
vs. action, 93n2, 206, 313, 364, 369¬
372
Discourse ethics, 13, 188, 367, 370,
429. See also Justice
Dramaturgical action, 163-164, 170¬
171, 205
Dummett, M., 7-9, 11-12, 51, 109, 152¬
154, 194, 229, 231, 278, 287-288,
296, 352
Dürkheim, E . , 207
Epistemology, 239, 348-352
Ethical life (Sittluhkdt), 191, 243, 424,
429-430
449
Index
Ethnocentrism, 372, 375, 381n63
Expert cultures, 171, 192, 240, 395¬
398, 411, 413-414, 419-420, 423-425
Fallibilism, 12, 154, 236, 243-244, 312¬
313, 337, 349, 356, 364-365, 368¬
371, 401n24, 404, 407, 412. See also
Validity claims, criticizability of
Fictionality. See Language, poetic use of
Freedom, 310-311, 316, 430
Frege, G . , 7-8, 51, 66, 109, 193-195,
229, 278, 281-282, 286, 338
Freud, S., 307, 335, 425-428, 431,
433n26
Gadamer, H . - G . , 387, 407, 417
Gehlen, A., 307
Grice, H . P., 27-28, 106, 147, 229, 259,
278-279, 284, 393
Hartman, G . , 390
Hartmann, H . , 426
Hegel, G . W. F., 184, 191, 344-345,
348, 404, 424-426, 429
Heidegger, M., 253-254, 335, 337, 344,
346-348, 408
Historicism, vs. transcendentalism, 404,
407
Humboldt, W. von, 183-192, 297,
209nn2,4,6, 408
Husserl, E . , 237, 239-240, 242-243,
259, 280, 359, 404
Ideal speech situation, 13-14, 365, 367¬
368
Illocutionary acts, 7, 10, 57-58, 64-70,
73-74, 82, 85, 122-123, 126, 163,
266, 289-290, 333, 340
Illocutionary aims, 122-123, 125, 127,
201-204, 218, 258, 268-271, 299,
315-316
Illocutionary force, 7-8, 15, 55-57, 66¬
67, 72, 75-77, 81-83, 85, 88, 110,
157, 159, 195-196, 232, 266, 272,
292, 294, 296, 383-386, 390. See also
Speech acts, binding and bonding
power of
and speaker's warranty, 4, 8, 83-88,
130, 136-138, 145, 198, 222, 233,
269, 299, 316
Illocutionary success, 83, 124-128, 130,
132, 136, 201-204, 218, 223, 315,
340, 385. See also Speech-act offer;
Speech acts, success of
Imperatives, 61, 67, 76, 132-141, 145,
160-161, 199-201, 226, 264-268,
275n8, 286-287, 292, 295-296, 302¬
304, 319, 321-327, 338. See also L a n -
guage, strategic use of; Power claims;
Speech acts, regulative; Strategic ac-
tion, manifest
Information theory, 26-27
Insults, 226-227, 330, 338. See also Per-
locutions; Strategic action, manifest;
Threats
Intentional sentences, 10, 138-139,
296, 318. See also Language, expres-
sive use of; Promises; Semantics, i n -
tentionalist; Speech acts, expressive
Jakobson, R., 196, 389-391
Jay, M., 410-415
Justice, 5, 12, 396, 411, 424. See also Dis-
course ethics
vs. happiness, 18, 428-431
Justification, 5, 11-14, 197, 307, 325,
351-352, 355-356, 365, 370, 372,
375-376, 406, 424. See also Discourse;
Fallibilism; T r u t h , vs. justification; Va-
lidity claims, criticizability of / vindi-
cation of
Kanngiesser, S., 61, 106
Kant, I . , 42-43, 45, 240, 311, 337, 349,
351, 411, 425-426, 428-429
Knowledge, 170-171, 340
background, 16, 167, 171-173, 242¬
245, 283, 386 (see also Lifeworld)
cultural, 248-250, 253 (see also Life-
world, three domains of)
horizontal (Horizontwissen), 241-242
(see also Lifeworld, as background)
implicit, 33, 40, 46-47, 171-174, 237¬
238, 240, 309
intuitive, 2, 39, 235, 242, 309 (see also
Rule consciousness)
practical vs. objective, 33, 35, 39, 238,
312
prereflective, 2, 16, 33, 40, 119, 171,
237
topic-dependent contextual, 241¬
242
unthematic, 237-238, 240-244, 246
Kreckel, M., 157-159
450
Index
Labov, W., 391
Language
cognitive use of, 10, 75-78, 80-81, 86,
89, 144, 289 (see abo Speech acts,
constative)
communicative use of, 10, 15, 142,
207, 315, 318-320, 338, 370 (see also
Communicative action)
communicative use vs. poetic use of,
384-385, 388-398
dividing vs. unifying capacity of, 187¬
188
expressive use of, 80-81, 87, 89, 144
(see also Speech acts, expressive)
functions of, 49-50, 54, 72, 79, 81, 89¬
90, 92, 107, 110-111, 142-143, 165,
192, 196-199, 228, 231, 277-278,
282, 288, 293, 389 {see also Btihler, K.)
holistic nature of, 58, 90, 233, 297
interactive use of (see Language, regu-
lative use of)
knowledge of a, 2, 233, 245, 261-262
297
noncommunicative use of, 10, 317¬
320, 333-334 (see also Rationality,
epistemic / teleological)
parasitic use of, 15, 122, 201, 224,
302, 384, 388 (see also Strategic ac-
tion)
poetic use of, 15, 168, 383-384, 389¬
390, 392-393, 397-398 (see also
Language, world-disclosing function
of)
pragmatic dimension of (see Sentence,
vs. utterance)
problem-solving capacity of, 15, 192,
394, 396
reflexivity of, 39, 64-65, 217, 284
regulative use of, 75-78, 81, 86, 89,
111, 144, 289
representational function of, 50-52,
58
strategic use of, 5, 17, 201, 224, 302,
377 (see also Strategic action)
uncircumventability of, 335, 349-350,
355-59, 372 (see also Lifeworld, as
background)
validity basis of, 3, 17, 21-25, 74, 88
(see also Validity claims)
world-disclosing function of, 15, 191¬
192, 204, 246, 253-254, 335-337,
390-396 (see also Language, poetic
use of)
Language games, 7, 196-197, 203, 217,
254, 283, 288-289, 292, 329, 359,
362, 370, 372-373, 386, 388, 414, 420
L e a r n i n g process, 41, 170, 192, 204,
246, 252-253, 336, 353, 366, 374,
394, 405, 412-413, 418
Lifeworld, 111, 174, 187, 189, 208, 236¬
246, 250-251, 334, 350, 353, 363¬
364, 368, 370-373, 407-408; 430. See
also Communicative Action
as background, 16, 127, 172, 174, 206,
208-209, 227, 243, 245, 283, 335¬
336, 350, 356, 358, 363, 370, 386 (see
also Knowledge, background)
cultural impoverishment of the, 414
invasion of, 424
rationalization of the, 191, 430
reproduction of the, 16, 190-191,
200, 246-247 (see also Culture)
as resource, 191, 209, 247, 336
as stabilizing factor, 16, 237, 240, 245,
359
three domains of, 208, 247-251
Locutionary acts, 66, 72-73, 75, 122¬
123, 289-290
Logocentrism, 110, 195, 337, 408
L u h m a n n , N . , 235
Marcuse, H . , 410, 425
Marx, K., 206, 234, 254, 424-426, 431
McCarthy, T., 410, 412, 415-426, 431
Mead, G . H „ 187, 308, 409
Meaning, 192-198, 227-233, 239. See
also Semantics
contextual conditions of, 7, 11-12, 16,
52, 61, 67-68, 172-173, 227-228,
385-387
intentionalist theory of, 106, 121, 257
(see abo Semantics, intentionalis)
nominalist theory of, 106, 354
pragmatic theory of, 6-7, 9-10, 12,
16, 52, 66-67, 72, 131, 197-199, 227¬
233, 298, 338-341, 416
semantic theory of, 6, 9, 51-52, 131,
193-195, 228 (see abo Pragmatics, for-
mal vs. formal semantics; Semantics,
truth-conditional)
use theory of, 6-7, 48, 51, 67, 109,
196, 229, 278, 282-284
and validity, 66, 129-140, 193, 197,
227-228, 253, 270-271, 282, 288,
300, 339 (see abo Language, validity
basis of)
451
Index
Mentalism, 259, 337, 348-355, 411. See
abo Meaning, intentionalist theory of
Metaphysics, 343, 346-348, 352, 374,
394
Modernization, 420. See abo Rationaliza- Pragmatics
tion
Morality, 190-191, 395-397, 424, 429¬
430. See abo Expert cultures; Validity formal vs. empirical, 2, 26, 28-29, 35¬
claim, normative
Morris, C . W., 26-27, 278
Mutual understanding. See Verständigung
Neoconservatism, 406, 409, 431n7
Neo-Darwinism, 374, 376, 428
Neo-Kantianism, 345
Neopragmatism, 13, 343-344, 373
O h m a n n , R., 389-390
Organon model. See Bühler, K.
Paradigm shift, 110, 189, 337, 346, 352¬
355, 417, 420
Peirce, C. S., 43, 243, 313, 337, 348¬
349, 356, 365, 409-410
Performative attitude, 65, 71, 89-91,
132, 166, 205, 219, 224, 299-301,
310, 312, 316, 319, 332, 369, 388,
406. See abo World-relations
Performatives, 7, 271-273. See abo Dec-
larations
Perlocutionary acts, 111, 122-127, 140,
167, 226-227. See abo Perlocutions;
Strategic action
Perlocutionary effects, 123-129, 167,
201-202, 223, 301-302, 316, 329¬
332
Perlocutions, 326, 329-333, 340-341.
See abo Insults; Language, strategic
use of; Strategic action, manifest;
Threats
Personality structures, 247-250, 253
Philosophy of consciousness, 279-281,
348, 405, 409
Philosophy, role of, 347-348, 351-352,
395-399, 400n24, 405-409, 411, 424.
See abo Paradigm shift
Piaget,J., 46, 53, 414, 426
Platonism, 186, 194, 337, 343-348, 359,
373-374
Pluralism, 403-407, 430
Popper, K., 295, 307, 361, 404
Postmetaphysical thinking, 5, 312, 328,
346-347. See abo Rationality, commu-
nicative
Power claims, 111, 137-138, 200-201,
226, 264, 266-267, 303. See abo I m -
peratives; Language, strategic use of;
Strategic action, manifest
empirical, 157-158, 163, 172, 197,
351
41, 45, 52, 54-55, 164-168, 351
formal vs. formal semantics, 6-7, 9¬
10, 26-28, 51-52, 54, 151-154, 192¬
194, 196, 198-199
formal vs. universal, 1-2, 9 2 n l
intersubjectivist vs. intentionalist, 257¬
260, 263, 268-269, 271
universal vs. transcendental hermeneu-
tics, 41-46
Pratt, M. L . , 390-393
Promises, 68, 83, 267-268, 324-325,
327, 383-384. See abo Imperatives;
Speech acts, regulative
Psychoanalysis, 169, 426-428
Putnam, H . , 13, 350, 365-366
Rationality, 219, 307-308, 325, 404,
407-409, 418, 420-423
aesthetic-practical, 412
communicative, 4—5, 18, 120, 136,
139-140, 168, 171, 188, 190, 192,
198-199, 207, 220, 222, 233, 240,
294, 300, 309, 315-317, 319, 323,
326, 329, 333-334, 336, 407-408, 410
(see abo Postmetaphysical thinking)
discursive, 188, 190, 307-311, 334
epistemic, 309, 311-313, 334
purposive, 105, 114, 117, 203, 219¬
220, 234-235, 323, 327, 329
teleological, 113, 170, 203, 206, 309,
313-314, 322, 334 (see abo Action, as
purposive activity)
three core structures of, 18, 105, 308¬
311, 314, 334, 336
Rationalization, 105, 117, 171, 174,
335, 411, 420, 422
Realism, 351, 353, 360-362, 370, 372-373
Reconstruction, rational, 2, 28-41, 190,
207, 416
Reconstructive sciences, 29, 46, 407
Rorty, R., 13, 343-354, 357, 360, 366¬
367, 370, 372-377, 381n63, 394-395,
404-410, 426
Rule consciousness, 2, 33-36, 45, 383.
See abo Knowledge, intuitive
Ryle, G . , 33
452
Index
Sanctions, 131, 134-138, 200-201, 225,
264-265, 303. See also Imperatives;
Perlocutions; Power claims; Strategic
action, manifest; Threats
Schiffer, S. R., 106, 229, 278, 285
Schluchter, W., 114
Schnadelbach, H . , 10, 307-308, 334,
407
S e a r l e . J . R., 3, 6-7, 61-62, 81-84, 156¬
161, 172-174, 194, 197, 242, 258¬
275, 291-295, 383-386
Semantics. See also Meaning
formal, 6, 10, 51, 54, 192, 194-195,
197, 229, 278, 280-282 (see also Prag-
matics, formal vs. formal semantics)
intentionalist, 54, 106-107, 112, 121,
229, 278-280, 284 (see also Pragmat-
ics, intersubjectivist vs. intentionalist)
reference, 52, 108, 281
truth-conditional, 8, 109-110, 152,
154, 193-194, 228-232, 282, 286¬
287, 295, 338
Sentence vs. utterance, 2, 6-7, 26, 48¬
53, 66-69, 193. See also Pragmatics,
formal vs. formal semantics
Skepticism, 344, 354-356, 359-360
Social action. See Action, social
Social integration, 221, 236, 247, 250¬
254. See also Communicative action
Socialization, 157, 174, 187, 189, 209,
247-248, 250-253, 427, 429. See also
Communicative action, functions of
Social order, 4-5, 16, 105, 227, 233¬
239, 251. See also Society
Society, 89-92, 174, 186, 235, 245-254.
See also Lifeworld, three domains of;
Social order; World-concepts
Speech, validity basis of. See Language,
validity basis of
Speech-act offer, 70, 82, 110, 120, 130¬
132, 136, 198, 233. See also C o m m u n i -
cative action; Illocutionary success;
Speech acts, acceptability of
Speech acts, 74-75, 79, 84, 86, 128,
139, 141, 269, 293, 296-297, 340,
385, 390
acceptability of, 11, 74, 82, 84, 87-88,
132, 139, 141, 197-198, 220, 232¬
233, 297-298, 316, 338, 340 (see also
Acceptability conditions; Meaning,
contextual conditions of; Speech
acts, success of)
binding and bonding power of, 15,
76, 84-85, 110, 128, 136, 163, 205,
208, 221-224, 233, 299, 326, 332,
385, 390, 392-393 (see also Illocution-
ary force; Verständigung, as action-
coordinating mechanism)
classification of, 3, 7, 75, 77, 81, 109,
140, 154-165, 180n85, 196, 267, 273,
291-292, 295
consensual, 21, 24
constative, 58, 73-77, 86-87, 137-138,
144, 161-163, 267-268, 290, 292,
325, 328 (see also Language, cogni-
tive use of; Validity claims, to truth)
double structure of (see Speech acts, il-
locutionary and propositional com-
ponet of)
expressive, 80, 87, 137-138, 144, 147,
151, 156, 161-163, 292-293, 295 (see
also Language, expressive use of; Va-
lidity claims, to truthfulness)
illocutionary and propositional com-
ponent of, 57-58, 63-74, 110, 122,
144, 232, 290, 294
indirect, 166, 265 (see also Communica-
tion, indirect)
institutionally bound, 60-62, 76, 82,
85, 88, 128-129, 131, 162
institutionally unbound, 60-62, 76,
83, 85, 88
propositionally differentiated, 58-64,
146
regulative, 3, 86-87, 137, 144, 162¬
163, 295-296, 325, 327-328 (see also
Language, regulative use of; Validity
claims, to normative lightness)
self-referential structure of, 123-124,
217, 219, 237, 272-273, 284-285
standard form of, 56-64, 68, 122, 131,
166-167, 217, 259, 271, 294, 300¬
301, 383
success of, 49, 56, 74, 81-82, 87, 120
(see also Illocutionary success)
Speech-act theory, 7-8, 28, 46-47, 55¬
56, 109, 194, 229, 289-293, 295
Strategic action, 4, 24, 63, 118, 123,
126-129, 169, 202-205, 224-226,
249, 326, 330, 332-334. See also Ac-
tion, instrumental; Communicative
action, vs. strategic action; Impera-
tives; Language, strategic use of; Per-
locutionary acts
derivative status of, 3, 15, 21, 332
latent, 140, 169, 201-203, 223-224,
301-302, 304
manifest, 201, 225-226, 302-304
453
Index
Strawson, P. E . 27, 42, 125, 127, 285
Systems, 234-235, 254-255, 396-397,
411, 419
Tarski, 194, 361
Taylor, C , 183, 185, 188, 190-191
Threats, 226, 265-266, 275n8, 303-304,
330-331, 338. See also Imperatives; I n -
sults; Language, strategic use of; Per-
locutions; Strategic action, manifest
T r u t h , 5, 11, 14-15, 75, 193-194, 349,
354-363, 375, 379n35, 404. See also
Semantics, truth-conditional; Validity
claims, to truth
and argumentation, 5, 14—15, 362, 368
vs. justification, 355, 357-360, 363¬
375, 406
pragmatic theory of, 13—15, 345, 357¬
358, 360, 364-365, 367-372
as regulative idea, 13-14, 365-366,
374-375
and sensorial certainty, 356
T r u t h conditions, 6, 8-11, 14, 152-154,
172, 193-197, 231, 263, 268, 281¬
282, 286-287, 356-357, 361, 368. See
also Acceptability conditions; Seman-
tics, truth-conditional
Tugendhat, E . , 148-150, 152, 201, 352,
357
Validity
aesthetic, 121, 396, 412, 415 (see also
Art; Validity claims, aesthetic)
dimensions of, 6, 22, 141-143, 159,
197-198, 208, 228-232, 291, 293,
295, 396-397, 408 (see also World-con-
cepts)
moral, 12-13, 15 (see also Discourse
ethics; Justice; Morality; Validity
claims, normative)
Validity claims, 3, 8, 22-24, 49, 52-54,
68, 73, 81, 85-86, 88-89, 92, 110¬
111, 135-136, 138, 140-154, 186,
188, 192, 197, 232, 240, 293-294,
416. See also Communicative action;
Language, validity basis of; Meaning,
and validity
aesthetic, 412, 415 (see also Validity,
aesthetic)
criticizability of, 11-12, 120, 143, 154,
206, 231, 236, 296, 394-395 (see also
Fallibilism; Validity claims, vindica-
tion of)
discursive thematization of, 86-87 (see
also Discourse)
normative, 199-200, 208, 234, 303,
381n55 (see also Morality; Validity,
moral)
to normative Tightness 3, 22, 76-79,
81, 88-89, 91, 115, 136-137, 141,
143, 147, 292, 327-328, 332 (see also
Imperatives; Speech acts, regulative)
suspension of, 63, 168, 205, 225, 390¬
391, 393 (see also Language, poetic
use of)
to truth, 3, 22, 74-81, 88-90, 137,
141, 143, 146-147, 150, 153-154,
231-232, 326-328, 332-333, 359 (see
also Speech acts, constative)
to truthfulness, 3, 22, 80-81, 88-89,
91, 137, 293, 326-328, 332 (see also
Speech acts, expressive)
types of, 3, 23, 81, 92, 165, 230, 270¬
271, 295, 317 (see also Speech acts,
classification of)
universal, 3, 8, 15, 22, 34, 75, 77, 81,
86, 89-90, 144, 146, 154, 430
universalist, 397, 400n24, 404, 407 (see
also Discourse ethics)
vindication of, 5, 9, 11-13, 22, 24-25,
73, 136, 152-154, 195, 198, 222, 240,
266, 297, 300, 312, 316, 340, 363¬
364, 368-369, 372, 416 (see also Argu-
mentation; Fallibilism)
Verständigung, 2, 11, 15, 1 9 n l , 21-24,
27-28, 44-45, 48, 50, 88-89, 93n2,
119-121, 127, 142-143, 183-184,
186, 199, 227, 247, 298, 339, 387,
406. See also Communicative action;
Consensus
as action-coordinating mechanism,
105-107, 111, 121, 129-132, 139,
163, 167, 187-188, 199, 206, 221,
223, 233, 247, 249, 298-300, 326¬
327, 385, 387
vs. Einverständnis ("weak" vs. "strong"
mode of), 17-18, 320-325, 328, 333¬
334, 340 (see also Communicative ac-
tion, weak vs. strong)
as "telos" of human language, 120,
188, 203, 218, 227, 300, 316
Weber, M., 105, 112-118, 171, 213n47,
307, 326, 335, 404, 411, 416, 418-421
Weiss, J . , 207-208
Wellmer, A., 365, 368-369, 414
454
Index

Whitebook,J., 410, 425-431

Williams, M., 358, 373
Wittgenstein, L . , 6, 8, 51, 109, 149, 151,
173-174, 196, 229, 278, 282-284,
288-289, 292, 316, 338, 344, 346¬
348, 356, 404-405, 408
World-concepts, 89-92, 111, 295-296,
350. See also Validity, dimensions of
World-disclosure. See Language, world-
disclosing function of
World-relations, 49-50, 68, 89-92, 110,
143-144, 158-159, 161-162, 165-166,
186, 245-246, 295-296, 301, 353¬
354, 376, 390, 394, 419, 421. See also
Performative attitude
Worldviews, rationalization of, 115, 411
Wunderlich, D., 27, 34-35

Z i m m e r m a n n , R., 192-193, 199, 201