Asian Terminals vs Malayan Insurance
GR 171406 / April 4, 2011
Facts:
1. Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the
vessel MV “Jinlian” 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense.
The shipment was insured with Malayan Insurance.
2. Upon arrival of the vessel, the stevedores of Asian Terminals
unloaded the bags from the vessel and brought them to the
open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and
safekeeping pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs
and delivery to consignee. After all the bags were unloaded,
a total of 2,881 bags were in bad condition.
3. Malayan Insurance, as insurer, paid the value of the lost
cargoes to the consignee.
4. Malayan Insurance, as subrogee of the consignee, filed with
the RTC a complaint for damages against Asian Terminals.
5. RTC found Asian Terminals liable for the damage sustained
by the shipment. The proximate cause was the negligence of
Asian Terminals’ stevedores who handled the unloading of
the cargoes from the vessel. This was caused by their usage
of the steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags by the
stevedores, despite the admonitions of the Marine Cargo
Surveyors.
6. RTC orders Asian Terminals to pay P643K to Malayan
Insurance. CA agrees with the decision of the RTC
7. Asian Terminals argues claims that the amount of damages
should not be more than P5,000, pursuant to its Management
Contract for cargo handling services with the Philippine Ports
Authority(PPA). Petitioner contends that the CA should have
taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an
official act of an executive department subject to judicial
cognizance.
Issue:
Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management
Contract between petitioner and the PPA in determining
petitioner’s liability.
Held:
1. Judicial notice does not apply
2. Section 1, Rule 129
a. Judicial notice when mandatory – a court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the laws of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
3. The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the
PPA is clearly not among the matters which the court can take
judicial notice of.
a. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive
department.
b. The PPA is a GOCC in charge of administering the
ports in the country.
c. the PPA was only performing a proprietary function
when it entered into a Management Contract with
petitioner.
People v. Tomas Tundag (October 2000)
Facts:
Mary Ann Tundag, alleged that her father, Tomas Tundag, raped
her twice. First was on September 5, 1997 and the other on
November 18, 1997. 2 separate criminal cases were filed against
her father. Mary Ann Tundag also alleged that she was 13 years
old when she was raped by her father. (However, the prosecution
in the case at bar was not able to show any documents pertaining
to Mary Ann’s age at the time of the commission of the rape. The
prosecution then asked the Court to take judicial notice that Mary
Ann was under 18 years of age which was subsequently granted
without conducting a hearing.) She narrated that her father used
a knife to threaten her not to shout while he was raping her on
both occasions. While raping her, he was even asking her if it felt
good. He was even laughing. (What a bastard!) After the
commission of the second rape, Mary Ann went to her neighbor
(by the name of Bebie Cabahug) and told her what happened to
her. They reported this to the police and was later examined by a
doctor who concluded that she was not a virgin anymore. The
Trial Court convicted Tomas Tundag on both counts of rape and
was sentenced to the penalty of death. On appeal to the CA,
Tomas flatly denied that the incidents complained of ever took
place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working
as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market
and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that
evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his
brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his
daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, he
went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is
impossible for him to do such wrongdoings.
Issue: WON Tomas Tundag is guilty of the crime of rape
Held: Yes!
Tomas Tundag’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-
serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for
exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against
the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative
matters, such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an
inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face
of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the
violator of her honor. The victim’s account of the rapes
complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent. Her
testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her
that her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty
by the court.
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal
lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a history of
sexual congress on her part. According to her, the lacerations
may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into
complainants genitals. Bu this does not conclusively and
absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact
because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other
things, nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations
tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped
by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape
charges against him because she had quarreled with him after he
had castigated her for misbehavior. But such allegation of a family
feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case
for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter’s
accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human
experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag
herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that
is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to
have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he
and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This
argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial since he was
estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the only
child who lived with him.
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some
psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his
defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her
testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim
understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges
against her own father – her father’s death.
Issue 2: WON the penalty of death imposed on him is correct.
WON it was correct for the Court to take judicial notice of Mary
Ann’s age without a hearing.
Held: No. Death penalty should not have been imposed. It was
incorrect for the Court to take judicial notice of Mary Ann’s age
without a proper hearing.
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of R.A. No. 7659 penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her
father as qualified rape and a heinous crime. The elements are
as follows: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or
without her consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of
capital punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the victim is
under 18 years old at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is
a parent of the victim.
In this case, Mary Ann’s age was not properly and sufficiently
proven beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was
thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted
that she did not know exactly when she was born because her
mother did not tell her.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because they already
know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either
be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice
of facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take
judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments
of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may
take discretionary judicial notice of facts -
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions.
Catungal v. Hao (Short title)
GR # 134972 | March 22, 2001
Petitioner: Sps. Ernesto and Mina Catungal
Respondent: Doris Hao
(Rule 129, Section 2)
DOCTRINE
Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters that are
commonly known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
FACTS
- Galang, leased a three-storey building situated at
Baclaran to BPI for a period of15 years and during the
 existence of the lease, BPI subleased the ground floor to
Hao.
- Galang and Hao executed a contract of lease on the
second and third floors of the building. and spouses
Catungal subsequently bought the property from Galang.
- Invoking her right of first refusal purportedly based on the
lease, Hao filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale with
RTC Makati.
- Meanwhile, the lease agreement between BPI and Galang
expired. so Spouses Catungal sent demand letters to Hao
to vacate.
- The demand letters were unheeded causing the spouses
to file two complaints for ejectment, with MeTC
Paranaque.
o Hao then filed an action for injunction with RTC of
Makati, to stop the MeTC of Paranaque from
proceeding.
- The cases were consolidated with RTC of Makati which
rendered a decision granting the injunction and annulling
the contract of sale.
- On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC and the complaints were accordingly dismissed.
- Hao elevated the case before the SC which denied the
same.
- The MeTC Paranaque, after the reversal of the decision
for injunction, proceeded with the trial of the ejectment
cases and rendered a Decision ordering Hao to vacate.
- Spouses Catungal filed a motion for clarificatory judgment
on the ground that MeTC only awarded rent for the ground
floor. MeTC clarified that the payment was only for the use
of the first floor.
- Spouses sought reconsideration, praying that Hao be
ordered to pay the use all floors and Hao.
- Instead of resolving the motion for reconsideration, the
MeTC of issued an Order, elevating the case to the RTC.
- RTC of Paranaque ordered that the rentals should covers
all floors.
- CA reduced the amount of rentals for the second and third
floors.
ISSUE/S
1. W/N CA erred in reversing the findings of the RTC by using
as basis for reducing the rental only the evidence submitted
by the parties and ignoring circumstances of which the RTC
properly took judicial notice.
PROVISIONS
Rule 129, Section 2
Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable
to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. (1a)
RULING & RATIO
1. Yes
- In ruling that the increased rental should be awarded, RTC
based its decision on the doctrine of judicial notice.
- The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property,
its location and the business practice in the vicinity and
indeed committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals.
- According to jurisprudence, the trial court had the authority
to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and
occupancy of leased premises after the termination of the
 lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated
rental in the contract of lease.
- The RTC correctly applied the legal concept of judicial
notice
- Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of
certain facts which a judge under rules of legal procedure
or otherwise may properly take or act upon without proof
because they are already known to him, or is assumed to
have, by virtue of his office.
- Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters that are
commonly known. The power of taking judicial notice is to
be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.
- Matters of judicial notice have three requisites: (1) matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) must
be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain (3) it must be known to be within the limits of
jurisdiction of the court.
- The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the
leased property subject of the case at bench based on its
location and the commercial viability.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of petitioners by reinstating the decision of the
RTC, with modifications.
 Sec. 2. Discretionary Judicial Notice
Landbank vs. Wycoco
Facts:
Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare
unirrigated and untenanted rice land, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and situated in the Barrio of
San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija. Pursuant to the CARP, Wycoco
voluntarily offered to sell his land to the DAR for P14.9 million.
The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were
the following: (1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422; (2)
Notice of Land Valuation; and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992
rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR. However, the offered
price of the DAR is only P2,280,159.82, thus, he rejected the
offer. He then filed a case before the RTC for the determination
of just compensation. The RTC ruled in his favor. It ruled that
there is no need to present evidence in support of the land
valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing
market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is
from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took
judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire
94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of
P13,428,082.00.
Issue:
WON the just compensation determined by the RTC was valid
and within its jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial,
the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice
of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging
that they were the co-owners of the parcel of land where Salvador
Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the
constructed his house without their knowledge and refused to
very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed
vacate despite their demands.
the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically
assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be
Salvodor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same
lack of jurisdiction. He contended that the complaint did not state
cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to
the assessed value of the property, which determines the
be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the
jurisdiction of the court.
property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax
Hilario maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction since their action
declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a
was an accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary
remand of the case for determination of just compensation is
estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject
necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by
property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within the said court. Also, in
courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract
their opposition to Salvador's motion to dismiss, they mentioned
of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
the increase in the assessed value of the land in the amount of
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
P3.5 million. Moreover, they maintained that their action was also
resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial
one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC had
notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual
exclusive jurisdiction.
form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact
can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes
that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
Issue:
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court,
Whether or not the action filed by Hilario was an accion
and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a
reinvindicatoria.
fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed
Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384 (April 29, 2005) Case Digest by Hilario.

Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession Held:

and/or Ownership > Actions Available to Owner > Recovery of
Real Property > Accion Publiciana and Accion Reinvindicatoria The action filed by Hilario did not involve a claim of ownership
over the property. They prayed that Salvador vacate the property
Facts:
and restore possession to them. Hence, it was an accion
publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real
property. It was not an aaccion reinvindicatoria or a suit for the
recovery of possession over the real property as owner.
The nature of the action and which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction is determined by the material allegations of
the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the
law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
The complaint did not contain an allegation stating the assessed
value of the property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, it could not thus be
determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the action.
The law also explicitly excluded from the determination of the
jurisdictional amount the demand for interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, were null
and void.
SASAN vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate
complaints against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal. In their
position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular
employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which
they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and
messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that
E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means
and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that
their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no
power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-
PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for
Services with HI, an independent job contractor which hired and
assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and
messengerial services thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted
that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business
of providing janitorial and related services to business
establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients.
On the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary
evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding
that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it
did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to
actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account
and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is
therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of
petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez,
respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC,
4th Division. The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary
evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the
basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with
sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in
"labor-only contracting."
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought
recourse with the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that
HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally
dismiss petitioners. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not submission of additional evidence on appeal is
allowed in labor cases.
RULING:
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is
not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not
controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are
directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial
justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the
NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits,
submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The
submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice
the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.
The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for
the first time on appeal, because technical rules of
procedure are not binding in labor cases.
People v Jalandoni G.R. No. L-57555 August 28, 1984
MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT
To require a separate civil action simply because the
accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with
all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of
all concerned.
Facts: Teresa Jalandoni was accused of estafa. The information
alleged that she issued several checks drawn against the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation in favor of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI); that the checks were dishonored for lack
of funds, a fact which was known by the accused; and that as a
result thereof the BPI suffered damage in the amount of
P1,391,780.00. Subsequently, BPI filed the aforesaid Motion to
Modify Judgment. BPI invoked a Court of Appeals
decision People vs. De Castillo, where the court acquitted the
appellant who was accused of malversation of public funds on the
ground of reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered her to pay
the amount of her civil liability. Accordingly, BPI prayed that in the
interest of justice and to avoid multiplicity of suits, a second
paragraph be added to Our judgment,
Issue: Whether or not Jalandoni was denied due process by not
affording to her a separate hearing.
Held: There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate
civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved
in the civil case have already been established in the criminal
proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has
been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the
criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of innocence
called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys
and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration
by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the
accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its
attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all
concerned.
Jalandoni’s claim that “[t]he amount of the civil liability, if any, is
unsettled and requires necessarily the introduction of proof
(Rollo, p. 161) is utterly devoid of merit. As shown above the
appellant has formally admitted that BPI suffered damage in the
amount of P1,391,780.00. For her now to assert that the civil
liability, if any, is unsettled is an insult to the dignity of this Court.
We cannot allow a party to state a fact only to disown it afterwards
because of convenience.
ADOLFO v. ADOLFO
March 18, 2015 | Del Castillo, J. | Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings | Clyde Tan

PETITIONERS: TEOFILO B. ADOLFO

RESPONDENTS: FE. T. ADOLFO

SUMMARY:

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
CIVIL CASE MAN-8241
Teofilo Adolfo filed a petition for judicial separation of property against
his wife, Fe, alleging that they bought with conjugal funds because
they have been separated in fact and reunion is now an impossibility
due to irreconcilable differences.
In her answer, Fe alleged that the property is not conjugal, but
paraphernal property belonging to her.
CIVIL CASE MAN-2683
Fe’s sister Florencia and her husband Juanito (Gingoyons) filed a civil
case for partition with damages, alleging that in 1988, Fe sold a 300-
square meter lot portion of the lot to the spouses Gingoyon, but that
the former refused to subdivide it. This time, Fe alleged that the
property was conjugal, and the sale was made without the signature
of Teofilo, hence it was null and void. The RTC ruled in favour of Fe
and declared it conjugal property, hence, the Gingoyons appealed to
the CA.
Going back to Civil Case No. MAN-4821
Teofilo filed a Request for Admission of (among others)
respondent’s declaration in said Answer that the subject property
constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and
the trial court’s pronouncement in said case that the subject property
forms part of the conjugal estate.
Fe failed to answer the Request for Admission, hence, Teoflio filed a
motion to render judgment on the pleadings, alleging that since Fe
failed to answer the request for admission, the matters included in the
request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court, he is now entitled to judgment on the pleading based
on Rule 34.
Fe opposed the motion, arguing that the decision, was the subject of
an appeal, had not yet become final.
The RTC granted the motion by Teofilo, treating it as a motion for
summary judgment. It ruled that judicial separation was proper, taking
judicial notice of its decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 that the
property is conjugal property. With Fe’s failure to provide a verified
answer or denial under oath to the request for admission of the
documents, she is deemed to have admitted the genuineness of the
same.
Going back to Civil Case No. MAN-2683
The Gingoyon’s appeal to the CA, was resolved in their favour, the CA
ruling that the property is paraphernal property as established by the
records and the evidence.
It became final and executory.
Going back to Civil Case MAN-4821
Fe appealed to the CA saying that the TC was wrong in treating his
motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment.
She also asks the court to submit to the findings of the CA in Civil Case
2683 finding the property to be paraphernal.
Her appeal was favourably acted upon by the CA. The CA held that
the trial court cannot treat Adolfo’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings as one for summary judgment. It stated that in a proper
case for judgment on the pleadings, there are no ostensible issues at
all on account of the defending party’s failure to raise an issue in his
answer, while in a proper case for summary judgment, such issues
exist, although they are sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown by
affidavits, depositions or admissions. In other words, a judgment on
the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary
judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits,
depositions, or admissions. It added that Fe’s Answer appeared on its
face to tender an issue; it disputed petitioner’s claim that the subject
property is their conjugal property. The next thing to be determined is
whether this issue is fictitious or sham as to justify a summary
judgment. The CA added that although respondent was bound by the
resulting admission prompted by her failure to reply to petitioner’s
request for admission, her claims and documentary exhibits clearly
contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his request; that the
trial court disregarded the fact that the issue of whether the subject
property is conjugal was still unresolved as CA-G.R. CV No. 78971
was still pending; and that finally, the trial court should have been
guided by the principles that trial courts have but limited authority to
render summary judgments and that summary judgments should not
be rendered hastily.
Teofilo assailed the CA decision to the Supreme Court via petition
ISSUES/HELD: W/N summary judgment is proper in the case,
considering the failure of Fe to answer or deny under oath the Request
for Admission in Civil Case No. MAN-4821.
RATIO: Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an answer fails
to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party’s pleading.”
Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted “if the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file,
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”
An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it “does not deny the
material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an
answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the
complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new
matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint
expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by
the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be
improper.”
Republic of the Philippines vs. Kenrick Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 149576
PARTS OF A PLEADING – SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS
G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land
Registration Authority, Petitioner, vs. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DOCTRINE: A counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The
signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read
the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,
there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay.
NATURE OF THE CASE: The case is a petition under Rule 45 as an
appeal to the ruling of the CA against the Republic and lifting the trial
court’s order of default against Kenrick for failure to file an answer to
the Republic’s complaint.
FACTS: Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land
behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation
Office (ATO) claiming ownership over those lands. Its encroachment
resulted to the dispossession of ATO of some 30,228 square meters
of prime land. Kenrick justified its action by presenting TCTs issued in
its name and which allegedly originated from a TCT registered in the
name of Alfonso Concepcion.
When ATO verified the TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds reported that it
has no record of them and that their ascendant title, allegedly in the
name of Concepcion, was non-existent in their office. Thus, the OSG
filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of
certificates of title in behalf of the Republic against Concepcion and
Kenrick. Kenrick filed an answer which was allegedly signed by its
counsel Atty. Onofre Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be
located and be served with summons, the trial court ordered the
issuance of an alias summons by publication against him.
While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and
Committee on Justice and Human Rights investigated Kenrick’s
acquisition of fake titles. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos was
summoned and testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer and
transmitted an unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president, Victor Ong.
Apparently, the signature appearing above Garlitos’ name was not his,
he did not authorized anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he did not
know who finally signed it.
Republic: It filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick and Concepcion
in default for failure to file a valid answer because the person who
signed it was not the counsel for the respondents. Thus, the answer
was effectively an unsigned pleading. Under Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the
ROC, an unsigned pleading is a mere scrap of paper and produced
no legal effect.
RTC: It granted the Republic’s motion. It ruled Kenrick’s answer “to be
a sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.” It
also ordered that the answer be stricken from the records, declared
Kenrick in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex
parte.
Republic: It presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its
case and formally offered its evidence.
Kenrick: Its motion for reconsideration was denied. So, it elevated the
matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
CA: It assailed the RTC’s decision. It granted Kenrick’s petition for
certiorari and lifted the trial court’s order of default against Kenrick
Then, it ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. It ruled
so because it found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing
to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination.
It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer and
concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody
in his stead.
Republic: It moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid answer on the
ground that its pleading was unsigned by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.
HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading must be “signed
by the party or counsel representing him.” The law is clear, and the
counsel’s duty and authority to sign a pleading is personal to him and
may not be delegated to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that
he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is
counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work
involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the
members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor
of one who is not.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by
unqualified persons, something the law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos
entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that
authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been
cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing
shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by
another “as long as it conformed to his draft.” We give no value
whatsoever to such self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority
for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that
respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and
the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains
that even if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned
pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled
as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly
administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in
arbitrariness and injustice[1].
The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by
the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation
in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to
forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While
it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when,
for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure[2]. In
this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it
should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed
by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus,
he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.
PETITION GRANTED
Ching vs. Court of Appeals and Allied Banking Corporation 331
SCRA 16 Apr 27, 2000
Ching, officer of Philippine Blooming Mills, executed a trust receipt
agreement in favor of ABC. Ching agreed to sell the goods for cash
with the express obligation to remit to the bank the proceeds of the
sale and/or to turn over the goods, if not sold, on demand. Ching, once
in possession of goods allegedly with grave abuse of confidence
misappropriated to his own personal use the said goods and/or the
proceeds of the sale, and despite repeated demands, failed and
refused to remit the proceeds of sale to ABC. He was charged before
the RTC Makati with four counts of estafa under Art 315 par. 1(b) of
the RPC, in relation to the"Trust Receipts Law.” Ching filed a case
before the RTC Manila for declaration of nullity of documents and for
damages. Ching asked for suspension of criminal prosecution on the
ground of prejudicial question, RTC denied. Ching moved to
reconsider but the same was denied. CA denied the appeal.
Notwithstanding the decision of CA, the RTC-Manila admitted Ching’s
amended complaint which, inter alia, prayed the court for a judgment:
Declaring the transaction as one of "pure and simple loan with the
trust receipts as mere additional or side documents" contrary to
petitioners allegation in his original complaint that the trust receipts
were executed as collateral or security.
ISSUE: Whether the judicial admission in the original complaint was
abandoned by virtue of an amended complaint
RULING: sPleadings superseded or amended disappear from the
record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial
admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the
pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must be formally offered in
evidence. If not offered in evidence, the admission contained therein
will not be considered.[30]Consequently, the original complaint, having
been amended, lost its character as a judicial admission, which would
have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal
offer.[31]The amended complaint takes the place of the original. The
latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further
function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of
the record.[32]
The actuations of petitioner demands stern rebuke from this Court.
This Court is not unwary of the tactics employed by the petitioner
specifically in filing the amended complaint only after the promulgation
of the assailed decision of the CA. A lapse of almost 2yrs from the
filing of the original complaint to the filing of the amended complaint,
is too lengthy a time sufficient to enkindle doubts as to the true
intentions of petitioner regarding the early disposition of the pending
cases. Though the granting of leave to file amended pleadings is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court which would not
normally be disturbed on appeal, this rule is relaxed when evident
abuse thereof is apparent.[33] Amendments are not proper and
should be denied when: (1) delay would arise; (2) amendments
would result in a change of cause of action or defense or change the
theory of the case; (3) would be inconsistent with the allegations in the
original complaint. Ching, by filing the amended complaint, in effect,
altered the theory of his case. The allegations embodied in the
amended complaint are inconsistent with that of the original complaint
inasmuch as in the latter, petitioner alleged that the trust receipts were
intended as mere collateral or security, the principal transaction being
one of pure loan. Yet, in the amended complaint, petitioner argued
that the said trust receipts were executed as additional or side
documents, the transaction being strictly one of pure loan without any
trust receipt arrangement. Obviously these allegations are in discord
in relation to each other and therefore cannot stand in harmony. These
circumstances gives doubt the genuine purpose of petitioner in filing
the amended complaint. Again, we view petitioners actuations with
abhorrence and displeasure. T he civil action for declaration of nullity
of documents and for damages does not constitute a prejudicial
question to the criminal cases for estafa.