Case Digests in Public Corporation

MACASIANO vs. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO

G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992

DOCTRINE: Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public
in general are outside the commerce of men and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local
government unit to private persons.

FACTS: On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Parañaque passed an ordinance authorizing the
closure of some streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of
a flea market thereon. By virtue of this, Parañaque Mayor Walfrido Ferrer was authorized to
enter into a contract to any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance
and management of flea market and/or vending areas. Because of this purpose, respondent
Palanyag Kilusang Bayan For Service entered into an agreement with the municipality of
Parañaque with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, market stalls were
put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 30, 1990, petitioner Brigadier General (Brig. Gen) Macasiano, PNP Superintendent
of Metropolitan Traffic Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These
stalls were later returned to Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter
10 days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence,
respondents filed with the court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages
and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The court issued a temporary restraining
order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter pending the hearing on the motion for writ of
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Parañaque authorizing the lease and
use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?
HELD: NO. Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the
requirement of due process, the closure of the road should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that
such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is
already withdrawn from public use, the property becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit concerned. It is only then that respondent municipality can use or convey them
for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might
lawfully used or conveyed.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local
government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private
persons. Hence, the ordinance is null and void.

BALACUIT vs. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE

 GR L-38429 June 30, 1988

DOCTRINE: The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes
the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

FACTS: Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of Butuan City which penalizes any
person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the selling of admission tickets to any
movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children
ages 7-12 to pay in full for tickets intended for adults. Petitioners, managers of theatres, filed a
complaint before the Court of First Instance praying that the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional. The CFI ruled in favor of respondents declaring the assailed ordinance to be
valid and constitutional. Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was later on denied. Hence,
this petition. Petitioners contend that the ordinance is ultra vires and is an invalid exercise of
police power. They contend that the Municipal Board does not have the power to enact such
ordinance pursuant to Sec. 15(n) of the Charter of Butuan, which provides: Sec. 15. General
powers and duties of the Board — Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject to the
conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers: xxx xxx xxx (n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . .
theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and all other
performances and places of amusements ... xxx xxx xxx Respondent justified the enactment by
invoking the General Welfare Clause provided in the charter which enables it to enact all
ordinances it may deem necessary to carry into effect or discharge the powers and duties
conferred in the Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed ordinance is unconstitutional?

HELD: NO. It is already settled that the operation of theatres, cinematographs and other places
of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated
police power by the local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only
must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. The regulatory ordinance must be reasonable,
and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business
or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theatre have a right to manage their property
in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and
that any person who did not approve could stay away. The exercise of police power by the local
government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the
legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

TAN vs. COMELEC

GR 73155 July 1, 1986
DOCTRINE: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration
of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected
must first be obtained.

FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a
New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. Pursuant
to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite. The plebiscite was
confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte, namely the Cities of Silay,
Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Petitioners opposed, on the ground that
BP 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
(1) the voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite; and (2) the
area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56
sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of
the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite was legal, and complied with the constitutional requisites
under Article XI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created, divided or merged and
there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing
boundaries of Negros Occidental. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units
would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those
in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros
del Norte. As a consequence thereof, the Court ruled that the plebiscite has no legal effect for
being a patent nullity. According to Article XI, Section 3, no province, city, municipality or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

PADILLA vs. COMELEC

 GR 103328 October 19, 1992

DOCTRINE: When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units
directly affected, it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically
dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.

FACTS: Under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, the creation of a municipality shall
be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. R.A. No. 7155 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines
Norte to be composed of 12 barangays. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on
Elections promulgated Resolution No. 2312 which states that on December 15, 1991, in the areas
or units affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labor, Camarines Norte a plebiscite will
conducted for the creation of the municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. In the plebiscite held on
December 15, 1991 more voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the
rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of
votes In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted
on December 15, 1991 prating that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is
the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results
obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution
No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12
barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa Petitioner argues that with the
approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set
forth in Tan v. COMELEC relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus reinstating the
case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary which held that where a local unit is to be segregated from
a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segregated should be included in the plebiscite.
(i.e the mother municipality does not get to vote.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite conducted is valid?

HELD: YES. The plebiscite is valid. Petition is denied. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Constitution has not affected the ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC. The words “unit or” were asked
precisely to be deleted because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units
affected. The mother municipality is affected because it would mean a loss of its territory. When
the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it
means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the
separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units
which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas
are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as
those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

G.R. NO L-29159
DOCTRINE: Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in
the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are
agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are
endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects
of their creation. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive
nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these
criteria.

FACTS: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac.
Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation
of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A committee was then appointed by
the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within
the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the
neighbourhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal Council declaring said
warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According
to respondent municipal officials, petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of
houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters
from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other
hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process
and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in
accordance with law. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the respondent. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is
unconstitutional and void?

HELD: NO. The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under the
provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by
the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. Municipal Corporations are
agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government an as such are
endowed with the police powers in order to accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation.

It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with
public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. Basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is
the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored. The purpose of the said
ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial
obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision. Petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SOLICITOR GENERAL vs. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY

204 SCRA 837
DOCTRINE: Requisites for validity of a municipal ordinance; Measures under consideration do
not conform to existing law: According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of the
Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not
allow either the removal of the license plates or the confiscation of driverÊs licenses for traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila.

FACTS: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the
Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605
and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles
obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the
decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that traffic enforcers
continued with the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General
Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the removal
of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles.

Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach
the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution requiring
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit separate comments in
light of the contradiction between the ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the
ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32
(formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Solicitor General expressed the view
that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated
legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605,
which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no
mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of
a formal challenge to its validity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 11 is justified on the basis of the general welfare clause
embodied in the Local Government Code?

HELD: NO. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate
such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites
are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient
standard.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the
national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the
particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing
municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not
pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses
for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such
sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan
Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators
only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree
itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed
by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in
case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated."

These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political
subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. The
requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation.

As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all
times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are
merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending
and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them.

Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage
licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution
of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of
freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the
end be valid, would be ultra vires.

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances
disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the
country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and
shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon
traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses
that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in
detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and
indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the
Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the
challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose
such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect
to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective
and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.

MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES

GR 111097 July 20, 1994
DOCTRINE: An ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1. It must not
contravene the constitution or any statute; 2. It must not be unfair or oppressive; 3. It must not
be partial or discriminatory; 4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5. It must be general
and consistent with public policy; 6. It must not be unreasonable.

FACTS: In 1992, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) decided to expand
its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to
Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. (Pryce), renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The project was denounced by various
civic organizations, religious groups, women’s groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led
by the mayor and the city legislators. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City then
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 (AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT
AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND
ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO),
and later on, Ordinance No. 3375-93 (AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO
AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR). Pryce assailed the ordinances before the
Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The
CA declared the ordinances invalid. Thus, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances authorizing the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit the
establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino is within the city’s territorial limits
and is valid?

HELD: NO. It is true that Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered
to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause.

Nevertheless, as a limitation on the exercise of powers under this clause, an ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements: 1. It must not contravene the constitution or
any statute. It must not be unfair or oppressive. It must not be partial or discriminatory. It must
not prohibit but may regulate trade. It must be general and consistent with public policy. It must
not be unreasonable.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot
be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents
of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

VILLACORTA vs. GREGORIO BERNARDO

GR L-31249 August 19, 1986

DOCTRINE: An ordinance which amends and violates national laws in the guise of implementing
them by imposing additional requirements would be ultra vires.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari raised against CFI Pangasinan’s decision to annul Ordinance
22 (An Ordinance Regulating Subdivision Plans Over Parcels of Land in the City of Dagupan) which
in effect requires that every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shall
before the same is submitted for approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the
Land Registration Commission, be previously submitted to the City Engineer of the City who shall
see to it that no encroachment is made on any portion of the public domain, that the zoning
ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations are observed, and that subsequent fees
be imposed thereafter. CFI annulled it because there was no showing that wouldjustify the
enactment of the questioned ordinance since Sections 1 (in requiring plans to be submitted), 2
(imposing service fees) and 3 (certification to be made by City Engineer) of Ordinance 22, are all
in conflict with the provisions of Act 496 because it imposes additional conditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 22 is a valid exercise of police power by the local government?

HELD: NO, the Court AFFIRMED CFI’s decision. Since while it takes note of the laudable purpose
of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the
government, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid
when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law
subordinated to a local ordinance. To sustain the same would be to open the floodgates to other
ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. As such,
the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. In a democratic state, protecting the
rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public.
This advice especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only
by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In
the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority
for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.
 BINAY vs. COA CHAIRMAN EUFEMIO DOMINGO
GR 92389 September 11, 1991

DOCTRINE: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power
by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. Municipal
governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.

FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed
P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the
municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement
of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons, among others: (1) the
resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general
welfare clause?
2. Whether or not the questioned resolution is for a public purpose?

HELD:
1. YES. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. Municipal governments
exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with
authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
2. YES. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is
towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social
services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect
for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for
the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common
good.

DELA CRUZ vs. PARAS

GR L-42571 July 25, 1983
DOCTRINE: A local government council cannot prohibit the establishment of nightclubs and
cabarets; it may only regulate their operations.

FACTS: On Nov. 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the
CFI of Bulacan. The grounds alleged are the following: 1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a
municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling; 2. Ordinance
No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as
the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing and;
3. That under P.D. No. 189, as amended, by P.D. No. 259, the power to license and regulate
tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of
Tourism." The answers were thereafter filed and alleged that: ”1. The Municipal Council is
authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs; 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of petitioners' right to due
process and the equal protection of the law, since property rights are subordinate to public
interests and; 3. That P.D. No. 189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils of their
jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs."

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 84 is constitutional?

HELD: NO. It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. A refusal to grant
licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction.
That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night
clubs subject to appropriate regulations. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by
virtue of a specific provision of the recently-enacted Local Government Code.The general welfare
clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of
Sec. 149 defining the powers and duties of the Sangguniang Bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact
such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and insure the protection of property therein; ..." It is a general rule that ordinances
passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with
the laws or policy of the State.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY vs. ERICTA

 GR L-34915 June 24, 1983

DOCTRINE: Ordinance requires owners of commercial cemeteries to reserve 6% of their burial

lots for burial grounds of paupers is invalid for being a exercise of eminent domain not of police
power.

FACTS: Sec 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S064 entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR
BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined
by competent City Authorities. In pursuant to this Ordinance, Quezon City Council passed a
Resolution requesting the City Engineer to stop any further selling and/or transaction of
memorial park lots in QC where the owners failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial.

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed with CFI assailing the validity of the Ordinance alleging that
it is contrary to the Constitution, QC Charter, Local Autonomy Act and the Revised Administrative
Code. Petitioners argue that it is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power, that the land is
taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers, and that the QC Council
is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, "to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein."
While, respondent contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the
questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used
for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power?

HELD: NO. An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power
to the City. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, “Violation of the provision
thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the
permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.”

The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial
park cemetery. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery
to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by

Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide
for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds
and cemeteries.

When the Local Government Code, BP Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
Panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as
prescribed by law or ordinance”, it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land
or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law
and practise in the past. It continues to the present.

Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is

different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas
for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the
subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
 ORTIGAS & CO. vs. FEATI BANK
GR L-24670 December 14, 1979

DOCTRINE: A zoning ordinance reclassifying residential into commercial or light industrial area is
a valid exercise of police power.

FACTS: Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership engaged in real estate business developing and selling
lots to the public particularly Highway Hills subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles entered into separate agreements of sale on installments
over Lots 5 and 6 Block 31, Highway Hills. On July 19, 1962, Augusto and Natividad transferred
their rights and interests in favor of Emma Chavez. Transfer contained the following restrictions
and stipulations: a.) For residential purposes only, b.) All buildings and improvements (except
fences) should use strong building material, have modern sanitary installations connected to the
public sewer or own septic tank and shall not be more than 2 meters from the boundary lines.
Resolution 27 on Feb 4, 1960 reclassified the western part of EDSA (Shaw Boulevard to Pasig
River) as a commercial and industrial zone.

Such restrictions were annotated on the TCTs. On July 23, 1962, Feati bank bought Lot 5 from
Emma Chavez while lot 6 was purchased by Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati Bank
began laying foundation and construction of a building for banking purposes on lots 5 and 6.
Ortigas & Co. demanded that they comply with the annotated restrictions. Feati Bank refused
arguing that it was following the zoning regulations. Ortigas & Co. filed a case in the lower courts
which held that Resolution No. 27 was a valid exercise of police power of the municipality hence
the zoning is binding and takes precedence over the annotations in the TCTs because “private
interest should bow down to general interest and welfare.” On March 2, 1965 the motion for
reconsideration was filed by Ortigas & Co., which was denied on March 26, 1965. On April 2, 1965
Ortigas filed notice of appeal which was given due course on April 14, 1965. Hence this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power?
2. Whether or not Resolution No. 27 can nullify or supersede contractual obligations by Feati
Bank and Trust Co.?

HELD:
1. YES, it is a valid exercise police power. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise
of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an
ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word
“regulation” under the provision. As a matter of fact, the same section declares that the
power exists any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding.

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone,
was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality.

Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos.
5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial
complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through
several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic
and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route.
Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if
not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

2. YES, it can nullify contractual obligations by Feati with Ortigas & Co. The validity of the
resolution was never assailed in the lower courts and can therefore not be raised for the first
time on appeal. The rule against flip flopping issues and arguments prevents deception in courts.
Ortigas & Co. also did not dispute the factual findings of the lower court on the validity of the
resolution. Assuming arguendo that it was properly raised, the resolution is still valid. RA 2264
(Local Autonomy Act) Sec 3 empowers municipalities to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations for the municipality. The resolution is regulatory measure.

RA 2264 Sec 12 provides that any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power
should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. This
gives more power to LGUs to promote general welfare, economic conditions, social welfare and
material progress in their locality. The non-impairment clause of contracts is not absolute since
it must be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. When general welfare and
private property rights clash, the former must prevail through police powers of the state. Lots 5
and 6 front EDSA has become surrounded by industrial and commercial complexes. Development
in the area has resulted in extreme noise and air pollution that is not conducive to health, safety
and welfare of the would-be residents. This justifies the usage by Feati Bank of the land for more
reasonable purposes
 HEIRS OF ARDONA vs. HON. REYES AND PHIL. TOURISM AUTHORITY
123 SCRA 220, OCT. 26, 1983

DOCTRINE: As long as the purpose of the taking is public, power of eminent domain comes into
play. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement
of public use.

FACTS: The Phil. Tourism Authority filed four (4) complaints with the CFI of Cebu for the
expropriation of 282 ha of rolling land for the development into integrated resort complexes of
selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The PTA will construct
a sports complex, clubhouse, playground and picnic area on said land. AN electric power grid will
also be established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system. Complimentary support
facilities (malls, coffee shops) will also be created.

The defendants alleged that the taking is not impressed with public use under the Constitution,
that the land was covered by the land reform program and therefore the Court of Agrarian
Reform and not the CFI of Cebu has jurisdiction over the case, and that the expropriation would
impair the obligations and contracts.Nonetheless, upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10%
of the value of the property, CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the public use requirement for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been complied with?

HELD: YES. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purpose for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that “public use” means “use by the public” has been
discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, power of eminent domain comes into
play. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement
of public use. The petitioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area
and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land
transfer. Also, the contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of police
power and likewise eminent domain.

The public respondents have stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that
would give the petitioners and other displaced persons productive employment, higher incomes,
decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better living standards. Our dismissing this
petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the
expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex
to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.

TORIO vs. FONTANILLA

 85 SCRA 399, OCT. 23, 1978

DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for

damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the
negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2
resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation
of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn,
organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as
Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages,
one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the
stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the
following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The
defendants were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members.

In its Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public
corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise
of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence
of any of its agents. The defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they merely acted as
agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the
management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for
damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care
and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council
exercised due diligence in selecting the person to construct the stage and dismissed the
complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily liable for damages.

ISSUES: 1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a

governmental or a corporate function of the municipality?

2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?

3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee
liable for the death of Fontanilla?

HELD:

1. It is a corporate function of the municipality. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the
municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of
the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code simply
gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it
a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or
historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and
not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The
mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to
provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking
as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for
public service. No governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of
a town fiesta.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they
exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their officers and agents in such
capacity, though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state.
In the other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right,
arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and
agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.
2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages
for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of
the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was
appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was
of wooden planks, the post and braces used were of bamboo material. The collapse of the
stage was also attributable to the great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The
municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within its command to prevent such
an occurrence. But they failed take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage,
particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating
on the stage.

Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg
who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed
Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the
construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality.
Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or
liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental
function. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing
as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors.
It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from
its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible
in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's
employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on
their part. The records do not show that municipal councilors directly participated in the
defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators
to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability.

FLORES vs. DRILON

223 SCRA 568, June 22, 1993

DOCTRINE: Sec. 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par.(d),
of RA 7227 for no legislative act prevail over the fundamental law of the land.

FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard
Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUES: (1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts?
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo
City and thus an excepted circumstance?
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to
another post?
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President?
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
which he may have received pursuant to his appointment?

HELD: (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor
of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely
what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will
work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.

(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor
of Olongapo City.

(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-
President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive
the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.

(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of
SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice
is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom
to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso
merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he
must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of
an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency,
he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long
as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public
office.

(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void;
he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such
benefits.
 MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC
243 SCRA 538, April 18, 1995

DOCTRINE: The Court believes and holds, that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term “fugitive
from justice” to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment, is an inordinate
and undue circumscription of the law.

FACTS: Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998
elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez
on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code Section 40.
Disqualification.

The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position… (e) Fugitive
from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property
in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of
Quezon.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be
facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the
term “fugitive from justice”?

HELD: NO. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or
she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under
circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
 MARIANO vs. COMELEC
242 SCRA 211, March 7, 1995

DOCTRINE: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local
unit of government cannot be overemphasized.

FACTS: Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief,
assailing unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Petitioners contend that (1)
Section 2 Article I of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and bounds
with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8 Article X
and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new corporate existence of the new city will
restart the term of the present municipal elective making it favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar
Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X of RA 7854 for adding a legislative district is unconstitutional
and cannot be made by special law.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional?

HELD: NO. Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract,
divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer,
section 2 stated that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.”

The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements
before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
 MERCADO vs. MANZANO
307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999

DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor
of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered
the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition
for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position. However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced
his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
Philippines?

HELD: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854
Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on
the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of
an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty
to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign
law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath
as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CITY OF MANILA vs. CA

179 SCRA 428, November 15, 1989
DOCTRINE: Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city
government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and
contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or
political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental
powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one
hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which
are ministerial, private and corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated
thus: “A municipal corporation proper has a public character as regards the state at large insofar
as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities
and conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 [1978]).

FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila as he was trying to board a jeepney, causing injuries which required him to incur
medical expenses. Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against the City
of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The CFI
of Manila rendered a decision in favor of Teotico and dismissing the amended complaint, without
costs. On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the CA, except insofar as the
City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00.Hence, this appeal for certiorari by the City of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila should be held liable as the incident happened on a
national highway?

HELD: YES. The question to be determined is if present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of
this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board,
or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act
409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.

The CA , however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4
of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
“damages or injury to persons or property … Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason” — specifically — “of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under
their control or supervision.”

In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of
the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets,” in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189
is decisive thereon.

xxxxx
Teotico alleged in his complaint his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which
is “under the supervision and control” of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the
City, in turn, alleged that “the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good
condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned” who “have been ever vigilant and zealous in the
performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law.“ Thus, the City
had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for
thefirst time, in its MR of the decision of the CA . Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of
fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on
appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either “control or supervision” over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos
Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from
its “control or supervision” by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x)
thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and
sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . … the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains,
and all structures in and under the same …to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and
gutters therein, . . … and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; … to regulate the
lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . .

Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with
the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is
one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
 ANDAYA vs. RTC
319 SCRA 696, December 3, 1999

DOCTRINE: It is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the five (5) eligibles
for the position of chief of police from a pool of eligible officers screened by the Senior Officers
Promotion and Selection Board, Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, without interference from local executives.

FACTS: Petitioner Andaya, Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7, submitted to the
City Mayor of Cebu a list of 5 eligibles for the mayor to choose one to be appointed as the chief
of police of Cebu City. The mayor did not choose anyone from the list because the name of his
protégé was not included therein. The City of Cebu filed a complaint against the petitioner to
require him to include the mayor’s protégé in the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by the
Regional Police Director to the mayor. Petitioner refuses stating that aside from the fact that said
protégé is not qualified; the power to designate the chief of police of Cebu City is vested with the
Regional Director. However, the mayor is authorized to choose the chief of police from a list of 5
eligibles submitted by the Regional Director. Under RA 6975, Sec 51, the mayor of Cebu City
shall be deputized as representative of the National Police Commission in his territorial jurisdiction
and as such the mayor shall have authority to choose the chief of police from a list of 5 eligibles
recommended by the Police Regional Director. Then the Regional Director, RPC No.7, appoints
the officer selected by the mayor as the Chief of Police, Cebu City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mayor has the authority to appoint the Chief of Police?

HELD: NO. As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited. In reality,
he has no power of appointment; he has only the limited power of selecting one from among the
list of 5 eligibles to be named the chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police
of Cebu City is vested in the Regional Director. Moreover, it is the prerogative of the Regional
Police Director to name the 5 eligibles from a pool of eligible officers without interference from
local executives. Hence, the mayor cannot require the petitioner to include the mayor’s protégé in
the list of 5 eligibles to be recommended by the Regional Police Director to the mayor.
 GREGO vs. COMELEC
274 SCRA 481, June 19, 1997

DOCTRINE: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code does not have any retroactive effect.

FACTS: In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct.
Subsequently, he ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila
during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-
election. Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his opponents who
wanted to dislodge him from his position. Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from
running for any elective position since he had been “removed from office as a result of an
administrative case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160. For a third time, Basco
was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again contested. In 1995,
petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC
conducted a hearing and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, the
Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second
District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco
immediately took his oath of office. COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for
disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the
COMELEC,, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for disqualification?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not agree with
its conclusions and reasons in the assailed resolution. The Court reiterated that being merely an
implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not override, but instead
remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify,
the law. The law itself cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5
of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may,”
it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word
“shall” in its rules. Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.
 BORJA vs. COMELEC
295 SCRA 157, September 3, 1998

DOCTRINE: To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy
embodied in Article X, §8 of the Constitution — the other policy is that of enhancing the freedom
of choice of the people.

FACTS: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending in
1992. In 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998.
In 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive
terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second
Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the
decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and
proclaimed as mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose
of the three-term limit?

HELD: NO. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected
to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.
Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death,
of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy
is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted
in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A
consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom
of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In
discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials
concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in
full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality
but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.
 SUBIC BAY vs. COMELEC
262 SCRA 492, September 26, 1996

DOCTRINE: In initiative and referendum, the COMELEC exercises administration and

supervision of the process itself akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.

FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created
SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses. On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic
military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses
and other installations left by the American navy. On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its
absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic
Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed
a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye
1993. The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for
Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions
are met. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC
of 1991. On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On February 1, 1995, the President
issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the
portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern
the conduct of the referendum. On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari
contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

ISSUES: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10?

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong
to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law.”?

HELD: 1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum"
is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the
exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee";
the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was
the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject
them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the
right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a
law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the
people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content
of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people
have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations
can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts
may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No.
2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the
same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved,
or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission
on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.
2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.
 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 177499, February 15, 2011

DOCTRINE: The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities

covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by Republic Act No.
9009, but by the very purpose of the Local Government Code (LGC)—Congress, by enacting the
Cityhood Laws, recognized the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the
State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which
is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.

FACTS: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to
July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government
Code.

ISSUES: 1. WON the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

HELD: The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood
bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort
to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and
CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY
G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011

DOCTRINE: Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of
judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate
amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners; Only when the landowners are
not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no
agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available.

FACTS: The petitioners owned a parcel of land situated in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City.
Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families.
Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income.

On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No.
552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary
legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for
low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The petitioners became
alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the annulment of Resolution
No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and
without force and effect.

The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor
to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase
the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.

ISSUE: WON the action of the petitioner will prosper?

HELD: The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for
expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the
same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.

In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for
the expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of
action.

The remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the
desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners' property was issued. As of
then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent
domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper
court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation
proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be
deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.

STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC., vs. CITY OF PASIG

G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011.

DOCTRINE: While a local government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real estate
tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these
properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries.

FACTS: Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of
several parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all
of which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig.
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that covered by TCT No.
518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal
(Cainta). The two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos.
532250, 598424, and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued. The lot covered by
TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it. Upon Pasig’s petition to correct
the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on
June 9, 1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No.
39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City. On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a
petitionfor the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of
Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC).

This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this date. On November 28,
1995, Pasig filed a Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the
collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos.
532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements thereon (the
subject properties).

Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta,
just like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and
the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its
territorial jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes for the lots
covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta. Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-
in-Intervention when it moved to intervene on the ground that its interest would be greatly affected
by the outcome of the case. It averred that it had been collecting the real property taxes on the
subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired them.

Cainta further asseverated that the establishment of the boundary monuments would show that the
subject properties are within its metes and bounds. Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the
suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the
settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a “prejudicial question” to the
resolution of the case. The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for lack of merit.
Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its ownership and location, the RTC, on
August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favor of Pasig.
On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, to which both Sta. Lucia
and Cainta filed several oppositions, on the assertion that there were no good reasons to warrant
the execution pending appeal. On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Execution against Sta. Lucia. On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals to assail the RTC’s order granting the
execution. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the petition was raffled to the First Division of
the Court of Appeals, which on September 22, 2000, ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia. In affirming the
RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no proper legal basis to suspend the
proceedings. Elucidating on the legal meaning of a “prejudicial question,” it held that “there can
be no prejudicial question when the cases involved are both civil.”

Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions for Certiorari with this Court. Cainta’s
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 166856 was denied on April 13, 2005 for Cainta’s failure to show
any reversible error. Sta. Lucia’s own petition is the one subject of this decision.

ISSUE: WON Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to
have always done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucia’s TCTs.

HELD: The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that the resolution of the
complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not necessitate the assessment of the parties’ evidence
on the metes and bounds of their respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of
Appeals wherein we said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of both its ownership and
location. The Court of Appeals even referred to specific provisions of the 1991 Local Government
Code and Act. No. 496 to support its ruling that Pasig had the right to collect the realty taxes on
the subject properties as the titles of the subject properties show on their faces that they are situated
in Pasig. Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the “Real Property Tax Code,” the authority to
collect real property taxes is vested in the locality where the property is situated: Sec. 5. Appraisal
of Real Property. — All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current
and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated. x x x x Sec. 57.
Collection of tax to be the responsibility of treasurers. — The collection of the real property tax
and all penalties accruing thereto, and the enforcement of the remedies provided for in this Code
or any applicable laws, shall be the responsibility of the treasurer of the province, city or
municipality where the property is situated.

This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the 1991 the Local
Government Code, to wit:

Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. – All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be
appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is
situated. The Department of Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
classification, appraisal, and assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of this Code.

Section 233. Rates of Levy. – A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila
Area shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property tax applicable to their respective localities as
follows: x x x.

The only import of these provisions is that, while a local government unit is authorized under
several laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is
imperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably within its geographical
boundaries. Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from
Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the subject properties are situated within its territorial
jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.
 NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY, BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARAÑAQUE CITY, ROBERTO
GUEVARRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS PUNONG BARANGAY AND MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY
G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011.

DOCTRINE: The local government unit’s power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction
is clear under the Local Government Code.

FACTS: The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096
on October 13, 1998, entitled Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open
Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic, the pertinent portions of which
read as follows:

The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its President,
Marita Cortez, filed a Petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with
prayer for issuance of TRO with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paranaque City.

NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would cause
grave injustice and irreparable injury as [the] affected homeowners acquired their properties for
strictly residential purposes; that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned would
provide them privacy and a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public places; and that
the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the subdivision.

NSVHAI averred that contrary to what was stated in the BSV Resolution, the opening of the gates
of the subdivision would not in any manner ease the traffic congestion in the area, and that there
were alternative routes available. According to NSVHAI, the opening of the proposed route to all
kinds of vehicles would result in contributing to the traffic build-up on Doa Soledad Avenue, and
that instead of easing the traffic flow, it would generate a heavier volume of vehicles in an already
congested choke point. NSVHAI went on to state that a deterioration of the peace and order
condition inside the subdivision would be inevitable; that the maintenance of peace and order in
the residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit to the subdivision was regulated by
the Association and why the passing through of vehicles was controlled and limited; and that
criminal elements would take advantage of the opening to public use of the roads in question.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has any right to the protection of the law?

HELD: The petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioners’ recourse in questioning BSV Resolution No.
98-096 should have been with the Mayor of Paranaque City, as clearly stated in Section 32 of the
Local Government Code, which provides: Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their
Respective Barangays- The city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned,
shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s actions to see if it acted within the
scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within
the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no
reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and it
also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to
the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code, the petition must be denied.

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011.

DOCTRINE: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act, and if they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself; Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than the power
of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law—the
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down
the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them; It is the provincial government
and not the governor alone which has authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial
jails.

FACTS: Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado
were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring
with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco
Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.

ISSUE: WON the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in
contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.

HELD: The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code
and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested
before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias and
badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if the act was not one relative to the
“granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include officers with such duty
to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity. Furthermore, the
fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude application.
The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either
a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012

DOCTRINE: It is evident that under the 1986 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly.

FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao.

In response to this, on November 24, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
1946, declaring a “state of emergency” in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to
prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.

On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified
areas of the MILF.

Two days later, December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in
accordance with sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
to submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her action. In her report, President Arroyo
said that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and
risen against the government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the nature,
quantity, and quality of the rebels’ weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed units in
strategic positions, the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall,
Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks,
and patrol cars with unauthorized "PNP/Police" markings.

On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to sec. 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President’s action.

But, two days later or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao.

Petitioners Fortun and the other petitioners brought the present actions to challenge the
constitutionality of President Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao on the
following grounds:
1. For gross insufficiency of the factual basis in proclaiming a state of martial law and
suspending the [writ] in the Province of Maguindanao.
2. It is patently illegal and unconstitutional for lack of any factual basis.
3. The validity of Proclamation No. 1959, declaring a state of martial law in the province of
Maguindanao, except for the identified areas of the MILF, and suspending the writ in the same
area.

Respondents’ contention: President Arroyo’s issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial
law and restoring the writ in the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the present
petitions moot and academic. Respondents maintain that the petitions have ceased to present an
"actual case or controversy" with the lifting of martiallaw and the restoration of the writ, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of which is the subject of these petitions. Proclamation No. 1963 is
allegedly a "supervening event" that rendered of no practical use or value the consolidated
petitions.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the writ in
the province of Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the petitions moot and academic?
HELD: Yes. The court said that Proclamation No. 1963 in the petitions raised moot and academic
because the court has nothing to review. The Proclamation on Martial Law and Writ of habeas
corpus was already lifted through Proclamation No. 1963 before the Congress could perform its
duty to review and validate.

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in
exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its
own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

MEYNARDO SABILI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA

G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012

DOCTRINE: The additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a decision
is not part of the process of promulgation.
FACTS: COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa
City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2)
years and eight (8) months. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during
the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.)
Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to
CancelCertificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already
been a resident of LipaCity for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10
May 2010 local elections.

In its Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent,
declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his
Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the
statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of
which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the dulyelected
mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He
accordingly filed a Manifestation with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this
fact.

In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for
Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and
for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the
COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to
prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

HELD: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn
into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden
constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.

As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty.

Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong
or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with
grave abuse of discretion.

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule
64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence,
shall be finaland non-reviewable.

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a
certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the
COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC’s action on the appreciation and evaluation
of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the
Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment
to one of jurisdiction.
 ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION vs. CITY OF ANGELES
G.R. No. 18999, June 27, 2012.

DOCTRINE: Exempted from the payment of building permit fees are: (1) public buildings and
(2) traditional indigenous family dwellings.

FACTS: Petitioner Angeles University Foundation (AUF) is an educational institution established

on May 25, 1962 and was converted into a non-stock, non-profit education foundation under the
provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 6055 on December 4, 1975.
On August 2005, petitioner filed with the Office of the City Building Official in the City of Angeles
Pampanga an application for a building permit for the construction of an 11-storey building in its
main Campus. A Building Permit Fee Assessment and an order of payment for Locational
Clearance Fees was issued by the said office.

Petitioner claimed, through a letter addressed to respondents City Treasurer and Acting City
Building Official, that it is exempted from the payment of the building permit and locational
clearance fees and cited legal opinions rendered by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Respondents referred the matter to the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) of the
Department of Finance, which in turn endorsed the query to the DOJ. DOJ replied and affirmed
the claim of the petitioner.

Despite the petitioner’s plea, however, respondents refused to issue the building permit. Petitioner
then appealed the matter to the City Mayor but received no written response. Consequently,
petitioner paid under protest a total of P826,662.99 and the Building Permit and other documents
were issued afterwards.
Petitioner formally requested the respondents to refund the fees it paid under protest through letters
dated June 15, 2006 and August 7, 2006. But the respondents denied the claim for refund.

On August 31, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint before the trial court seeking for the refund of
P826,662.99 plus interest at a rate of 12% per annum, and for attorneys fee in the amount of
P300,000.00 and litigation expenses.

On September 21, 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. Respondents
appeal to the CA which reversed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.

So the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the building permit fee is a tax from which petitioner is exempt?
HELD: The building permit fee is neither a tax nor a charge on property. Based on Sections 102,
103 and 104, the building permit fee is a regulatory imposition on certain activities the owner may
conduct either to build such structures or to repair, alter, renovate or demolish the same. Since
building permit fees are not charges on property, they are not impositions from which petitioner is
exempt.

As to petitioner’s argument that the building permit fees collected by respondents are in reality
taxes because the primary purpose is to raise revenues for the local government unit, the same does
not hold water.

A charge of a fixed sum which bears no relation at all to the cost of inspection and regulation may
be held to be a tax rather than an exercise of the police power. In this case, the Secretary of Public
Works and Highways who is mandated to prescribe and fix the amount of fees and other charges
that the Building Official shall collect in connection with the performance of regulatory functions,
has promulgated and issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations which provide for the bases
of assessment of such fees.
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN
G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012

DOCTRINE: The writ of continuing mandamus “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
court’s decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the submission of compliance
reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor
compliance with its decision.”

FACTS: Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) is a duly registered, non-stock domestic
corporation. Its primary purpose is "to foster a united, concerted and environment-conscious
development of Boracay Island, thereby preserving and maintaining its culture, natural beauty...
and ecological balance, marking the island as the crown jewel of Philippine tourism, a prime tourist
destination in Asia and the whole world.”
Respondent Province of Aklan (respondent Province) is a political subdivision of the government
created pursuant to Republic Act No. 1414, represented by Honorable Carlito S. Marquez, the
Provincial Governor (Governor Marquez).

Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (respondent PRA), formerly called the Public
Estates Authority (PEA), is a government entity created by Presidential Decree No. 1084,[3] which
states that one of the purposes for which respondent PRA was created... was to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas.

PEA eventually became the lead agency primarily responsible for all reclamation projects in the
country under Executive Order No. 525, series of 1979.

In June 2006, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 543, delegating the
power "to approve reclamation projects to PRA through its governing Board, subject to compliance
with existing laws and rules and further subject to the condition that reclamation contracts to be
executed with any person or entity (must) go through... public bidding.”

Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources Environmental Management

Bureau (DENR-EMB), Regional Office VI (respondent DENR-EMB RVI), is the government
agency in the Western Visayas Region authorized to issue environmental compliance certificates
regarding... projects that require the environment's protection and management in the region.

ISSUE: WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project

HELD: The conduct of public hearing as part of the EIS review is mandatory unless otherwise
determined by EMB. For all other undertakings, a public hearing is not mandatory unless
specifically required by EMB.

Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that environmentally
relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into consideration in the EIA study and the formulation
of the management plan. All public consultations and public hearings conducted during the EIA
process are to be documented. The public hearing/consultation Process reportshall be validated by
the EMB/EMB RD and shall constitute part of the records of the EIA process.

In essence, the above-quoted rule shows that in cases requiring public consultations, the same
should be initiated early so that concerns of stakeholders could be taken into consideration in the
EIA study. In this case, respondent Province had already filed its ECC application before it met
with the local government units of Malay and Caticlan.

The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent endorsement
of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay onFebruary 28, 2012, which were both
undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of respondent Province. As we have established
above, the respective resolutions issued by the LGUs concerned did not render this petition moot
and academic.

It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the promotion of tourism
in Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest they kill the proverbial hen that lays the
golden egg. At the beginning of this decision, we mentioned that there are common goals of
national significance that are very apparent from both the petitioners and the respondents
respective pleadings and memoranda.

As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and smooth resolution of these
issues would benefit all the parties. Thus, respondent Provinces cooperation with respondent
DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-mandated review of the proper classification and environmental
impact of the reclamation project is of utmost importance.
 CITY OF MANILA vs. ALEGAR CORPORATION
G.R. No. 187604, June 25, 2012.

DOCTRINE: The advance deposit required under Section 19 of the Local Government Code
constitutes an advance payment only in the event the expropriation prospers; If the proceedings
fail, the money could be used to indemnify the owner for damages.

FACTS: This case is about the issues that a local government unit has to cope with when
expropriating private property for socialized housing. The City Council of Manila passed
Ordinance 8012 that authorized the City Mayor to acquire certain lots belonging to respondents
Alegar Corporation, Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De Legarda, for use in the
socialized housing project of petitioner City of Manila. The City offered to buy the lots at
P1,500.00 per square meter (sq m) but the owners rejected this as too low with the result that the
City filed a complaint for expropriation against them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila.

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the City did not comply with Section 9 of
Republic Act (R.A.) 7279 (Urban Development Housing Act) which set the order of priority in the
acquisition of properties for socialized housing. Private properties ranked last in the order of
priorities for such acquisition and the City failed to show that no other properties were available
for the project. The City also failed to comply with Section 10 which authorized expropriation
only when resort to other modes (such as community mortgage, land swapping, and negotiated
purchase) had been exhausted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUES: 1. WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s ruling that the City failed to comply with
the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279 in trying to acquire the subject lots by
expropriation;
2. WON the CA erred in failing to set aside the RTC’s ruling that the City failed to establish the
existence of genuine necessity in expropriating the subject lots for public use or purpose; and
3. WON the CA erred in failing to rule that the owners’ withdrawal of its P1.5 million deposit
constituted implied consent to the expropriation of their lots.

HELD: 1. The CA correctly ruled that the City failed to show that it complied with the
requirements of Section 9 of R.A. 7279 which lays down the order of priority in the acquisition
through expropriation of lands for socialized housing. This section provides:
Section 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which
have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not
yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary
priority to on-site development of government lands.

The City of course argues that it did not have to observe the order of priority provided above in
acquiring lots for socialized housing since it found on-site development to be more practicable and
advantageous to the beneficiaries who were these lots’ long-time occupants. But the problem
remains. The City did not adduce evidence that this was so.
Besides, Section 10 of R.A. 7279 also prefers the acquisition of private property by “negotiated
sale” over the filing of an expropriation suit. It provides that such suit may be resorted to only
when the other modes of acquisitions have been exhausted.

Here, the City of Manila initially offered P1,500.00 per sq m to the owners for their lots. But after
the latter rejected the offer, claiming that the offered price was even lower than their current zonal
value, the City did not bother to renegotiate or improve its offer. The intent of the law is for the
State or the local government to make a reasonable offer in good faith, not merely a
pro forma offer to acquire the property. The Court cannot treat the requirements of Sections 9 and
10 of R.A. 7279 lightly. These requirements are strict limitations on the local government’s
exercise of the power of eminent domain. They are the only safeguards of property owners against
the exercise of that power. The burden is on the local government to prove that it satisfied the
requirements mentioned or that they do not apply in the particular case

2. Admittedly, the City alleged in its amended complaint that it wanted to acquire the subject lots
in connection with its land-for-the-landless program and that this was in accord with its Ordinance
8012. But the City misses the point. The owners directly challenged the validity of the objective
of its action. They alleged that the taking in this particular case of their lots is not for public use or
purpose since its action would benefit only a few. Whether this is the case or not, the owners’
answer tendered a factual issue that called for evidence on the City’s part to prove
the affirmative of its allegations. As already stated, the City submitted the issue for the RTC’s
resolution without presenting evidence.
3. The City insists that it made a deposit of P1.5 million with the RTC by way of advance payment
on the lots it sought to expropriate. By withdrawing this deposit, respondents may be assumed to
have given their consent to the expropriation.

But the advance deposit required under Section 19 of the Local Government Code constitutes an
advance payment only in the event the expropriation prospers. Such deposit also has a dual
purpose: as pre-payment if the expropriation succeeds and as indemnity for damages if it is
dismissed. This advance payment, a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of possession, should
not be confused with payment of just compensation for the taking of property even if it could be a
factor in eventually determining just compensation.

Here, therefore, the owners’ withdrawal of the deposit that the City made does not amount to a
waiver of the defenses they raised against the expropriation. With the dismissal of the complaint,
the amount or a portion of it could be awarded to the owners as indemnity to cover the expenses
they incurred in defending their right.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CITY OF PARAÑAQUE
G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012

DOCTRINE: It is clear from Section 234 of the Local Government Code that real property owned
by the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) is exempt from real property tax unless the
beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable person.

FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by virtue of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 (Creating the Public Estates Authority, Defining its Powers
and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes) which took... effect on February
4, 1977 to provide a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the
administration and operation of lands belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the government
with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their... development consistent with
public interest.

On February 14, 1979, by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 525 issued by then President
Ferdinand Marcos, PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating,
directing and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.

On October 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 380 transforming
PEA into PRA, which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA relating to reclamation
activities. By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City, and was issued Original
Certificates of Title (OCT Nos. 180, 202, 206, 207, 289, 557, and 559) and Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT Nos. 104628, 7312, 7309, 7311, 9685, and 9686) over the reclaimed lands.
On February 19, 2003, then Parañaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo (Carabeo) issued
Warrants of Levy on PRA's reclaimed properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San
Dionisio) located in Parañaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real property... taxes
made by then Parañaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax years 2001 and 2002.

On January 8, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRA's petition. In ruling that PRA
was not exempt from payment of real property taxes, the RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC
under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1084. It was organized as a stock corporation because it had an...
authorized capital stock divided into no par value shares. In fact, PRA admitted its corporate
personality and that said properties were registered in its name as shown by the certificates of title.
Therefore, as a GOCC, local tax exemption is withdrawn by virtue of Section 193... of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160 [Local Government Code (LGC)] which was the prevailing law in 2001 and
2002 with respect to real property taxation. The RTC also ruled that the tax exemption claimed by
PRA under E.O. No. 654 had already been expressly repealed by R.A. No. 7160 and that PRA
failed to comply with the procedural requirements in Section 206 thereof.

PRA asserts that it is not a GOCC under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. Neither is it a GOCC under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
because it is not required to meet the test of economic viability. Instead, PRA is a... government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public service pursuant
to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Although it has a
capital stock divided into shares, it is not authorized to distribute... dividends and allotment of
surplus and profits to its stockholders. Therefore, it may not be classified as a stock corporation
because it lacks the second requisite of a stock corporation which is the distribution of dividends
and allotment of surplus and profits to the stockholders.
It insists that it may not be classified as a non-stock corporation because it has no members and it
is not organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal,
literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, like... trade, industry, agriculture and
like chambers as provided in Section 88 of the Corporation Code.
Moreover, PRA points out that it was not created to compete in the market place as there was no
competing reclamation company operated by the private sector. Also, while PRA is vested with
corporate powers under P.D. No. 1084, such circumstance does not make it a corporation but...
merely an incorporated instrumentality and that the mere fact that an incorporated instrumentality
of the National Government holds title to real property does not make said instrumentality a
GOCC. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 recognizes a scenario
where a piece of land owned by the Republic is titled in the name of a department, agency or
instrumentality.

Thus, PRA insists that, as an incorporated instrumentality of the National Government, it is exempt
from payment of real property tax except when the beneficial use of the real property is granted to
a taxable person. PRA claims that based on Section 133(o) of the LGC, local... governments cannot
tax the national government which delegate to local governments the power to tax.

It explains that reclaimed lands are part of the public domain, owned by the State, thus, exempt
from the payment of real estate taxes. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for
public use or public service. While the subject reclaimed lands are still in its... hands, these lands
remain public lands and form part of the public domain. Hence, the assessment of real property
taxes made on said lands, as well as the levy thereon, and the public sale thereof on April 7, 2003,
including the issuance of the certificates of sale in favor of the respondent Parañaque City, are
invalid and of no force and effect.

ISSUE: WON the Trial Court erred when it failed to consider that reclaimed lands are part of the
public domain? THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RECLAIMED LANDS ARE PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND, HENCE, EXEMPT
FROM REAL PROPERTY TAX.

HELD: The Court finds merit in the petition.

In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation.
It cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although it has a capital stock divided into
no par value shares as provided in Section 7 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute
dividends, surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in P.D.
No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No.
525, E.O. No. 654... and EO No. 798... that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus
allotments or profits to its stockholders.

PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have members. A
non-stock corporation must have members.

Moreover, it was not organized for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 88 of the Corporation
Code. Specifically, it... was created to manage all government reclamation projects.

Likewise, it is worthy to mention Section 14, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III of the Administrative
Code of 1987, thus:
SEC 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Dominion of the Government.-
(1) The President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific
public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public...
purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. Reclaimed lands such as
the subject lands in issue are reserved lands for public use. They are properties of public
dominion. The ownership of such lands remains with the State unless they are withdrawn by
law or presidential proclamation from public use.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources"
and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be
alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or... quasi-public use.

As the Court has repeatedly ruled, properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or
foreclosure sale. Thus, the assessment, levy and foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed lands
by respondent, as well as the issuances of certificates of title in favor of respondent, are without
basis.

PIMENTEL vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA

G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012.

DOCTRINE: While it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall promote a more
responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of local autonomy does not
imply the conversion of local government units into “mini-states.”
FACTS: This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme
Court to require the Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the
International Criminal Court for the Senate’s concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution.

It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion
with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a
ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law.
Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty
prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.

The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of
the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on
hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the
executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

ISSUE: WON the executive department has a ministerial duty to transmit the Rome Statute (or
any treaty) to the Senate for concurrence?

HELD: The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the the President, being the
head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s
sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts
as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested
with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this
wise:

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange
of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication
under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as
between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task
to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as
full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is
standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together
with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations
may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even “collapse” in case the
parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for
signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the
purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final
consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily
signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign
first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the
contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to
be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties
are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that
which negotiated them.

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by
the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty,
the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.

Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two
separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is
primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith
of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic
mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts
the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving
or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been
signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties.
 TEAM PACIFIC CORPORATION vs. JOSEPHINE DAZA
G.R. No. 167732, July 11, 2012.

DOCTRINE: Narrow in scope and inflexible in character, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy

designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Daza cannot be
said to be performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function in assessing TPC’s business tax and/or
effectively denying its protest as then Municipal Treasurer of Taguig. For this reason, Daza’s
actions are not the proper subjects of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari which is the appropriate
remedy in cases where a the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. Narrow in scope and
inflexible in character, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. It is likewise considered mutually exclusive with appeal
like the one provided by Article 195 of the Local Government Code for a local treasurer’s denial
of or inaction on a protest.
FACTS: Team Pacific Corporation (TPC), operating in then Municipality of Taguig, is engaged
in the business of assembling and exporting semiconductor devices. It appears that since the start
of its operations in 1999, TPC had been paying local business taxes assessed at one-half (1/2) rate
pursuant to Section 75 (c) of Ordinance No. 24-93, otherwise known as the Taguig Revenue Code,
consistent with Section 143(c) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. When it renewed its business license in 2004, however,
TPC’s business tax was assessed by respondent Josephine Daza, in her capacity as then Municipal
Treasurer of Taguig. The assessment was computed by Daza by applying the full value of the rates
provided under Section 75 of the Taguig Revenue Code, instead of the one-half (1/2) rate provided
under paragraph (c) of the same provision. TPC paid said business tax under protest, insisting on
the one-half (1/2) rate on which its business tax was previously assessed. Alleging that no formal
action was taken regarding its protest, TPC filed its Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the RTC.
Daza argued that TPC is not entitled to the 50% business tax exemption it had been granted in the
previous years since it is not an exporter of the essential commodities enumerated under the
provisions in question. Daza likewise faulted TPC for not filing its appeal in court within 30 days
from receipt of the denial in accordance with Article 195 of the LGC. Daza prayed for the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari on the ground that the same cannot be resorted to as a substitute for a
lost right of appeal and was, by itself, bereft of merit. RTC dismissed the petition and ruled that,
rather than the special civil action of certiorari provided under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, an ordinary appeal would have been the proper remedy from the assessment
complained against.

ISSUE: WON TPC availed of the correct remedy against Daza’s i llegal assessment when it filed
its petition for certiorari before the RTC?

HELD: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and being the wrong mode of appeal.

A taxpayer dissatisfied with a local treasurer’s denial of or inaction on his protest over an
assessment has 30 days within which to appeal to the court of competent jurisdiction. Under the
law, said period is to be reckoned from the taxpayer’s receipt of the denial of his protest or the
lapse of the 60 day period within which the local treasurer is required to decide the protest, from
the moment of its filing. RTC correctly ruled that TPC’s filing of its petition was still within the
period prescribed under the assailed provision. Whether or not a Rule 65 petition for certiorari was
the appropriate remedy from Daza’s inaction on TPC’s letter -protest is, however, an entirely
different issue which, considering the RTC’s ruling that it should have filed an ordinary appeal
instead. TPC erroneously availed of the wrong remedy in filing a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to
question Daza’s inaction on its letter -protest. The rule is settled that, as a special civil action,
certiorari is available only if it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Daza cannot be said to be performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function
in assessing TPC’s business tax and/or effectively denying its protest as then Municipal Treasurer
of Taguig. For this reason, Daza’s actions are not the proper subjects of a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari which is the appropriate remedy in cases where a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law.

Narrow in scope and inflexible in character, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. It is likewise considered mutually
exclusive with appeal like the one provided by Article 195 of the LGC for a local treasurer’s denial
of or inaction on a protest.
 PACIFICO C. VELASCO vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 169253, February 20, 2013.

DOCTRINE: Under Section 46 of the Local Government Code, the vice-mayor automatically
assumes the powers and duties of the mayor in case of the latter’s temporary absence.

FACTS: On September 21, 1999, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued a Resolution
ordering the dismissal of Engr. Emmanuel Agonoy, Municipal Engineer of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte,
for gross neglect of duty. The latter did not file a motion for reconsideration, instead, he filed a
petition for review in the Court of Appeals (CA).

Despite his knowledge of the said CSC resolution, petitioner Mayor Pacifico C. Velasco of
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, allowed Agonoy to report for work as Municipal Engineer. He even issued
on October 2, 1999 a Memorandum to the Municipal Treasurer of Bacarra, Lorna S. Dumayag,
informing her that she had no reason not to pay the salaries and other benefits of Agonoy in his
capacity as Municipal Engineer. She was likewise directed to pay Agonoy's salary and other
benefits until the Supreme Court had finally decided the case.

Agonoy continued reporting for duty as municipal engineer from November 11, 1999. On August
18, 2000, the CA denied Agonoy's petition for review and his motion for reconsideration on
September 20, 2000. Undaunted, Agonoy filed a petition for review of the CA decision with this
Court.
On October 17, 2000, Mayor Velasco issued a Memorandum to the Municipal Treasurer directing
her to immediately release Agonoy's salary, Representation and Transportation Allowance
(RATA) and other benefits.

On December 4, 2000, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 145016, resolved to deny the petition for
review filed by Agonoy. On February 28, 2001, Agonoy resigned as Municipal Engineer. The
Resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the petition for review of Agonoy became final and
executory on May 10, 2001. On March 18, 2002, Philip Corpus Velasco, the Vice Mayor of
Bacarra, filed a Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Mayor Velasco,
Agonoy and Municipal Treasurer Dumayag for violation of Republic Act No. 3019.

On April 25, 2003, the Ombudsman found probable cause against petitioner Mayor Velasco for
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, and filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan
charging him of that crime.

The petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that it did not
charge the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. He alleged therein that
1. While he was aware of the CSC resolution dismissing Agonoy from the service, he was not
bound by it because he was not a party to CSC Case No. 99-2137;
2. He did not receive any directive from the CSC ordering him to implement its resolution;
3. Even if the CSC did issue the said directive, he could not prevent Agonoy from reporting for
work;
4. He permitted Agonoy to report for work, and receive salaries and other benefits from the
municipality because the resolution of the CSC dated September 21, 1999 was not immediately
executory. It cannot, therefore, be claimed that he gave unwarranted benefits to Agonoy
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

On October 8, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion of the petitioner.
It ruled that the Information alleged all the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019. The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan likewise
denied in a Resolution dated November 24, 2003. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the respondent court erred in not quashing the information?

HELD: The petition has no merit and is, therefore, denied.

As the Municipal Mayor of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, he was mandated to ensure that all officers,
including himself, abide by Article I of Section 444(b)(x)[13] of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which directs executive officials and employees of the
municipality to faithfully discharge their duties and functions as provided by law.

Considering such duty, the petitioner had to enforce decisions or final resolutions, orders or rulings
of the CSC. The petitioner should have known that in case of Agonoy's failure to file any motion
for the reconsideration of the CSC Resolution, such resolution would become executory, and he
would thus be mandated to enforce the same.

However, if Agonoy had filed a petition for review in the CA and the appellate court had issued a
stay of execution as provided for in Section 82 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, in tandem with Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the
petitioner could not be faulted for allowing Agonoy to continue working and receiving
compensation therefor.

In this case, Agonoy did not file any motion for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution; while he
filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution in the CA and in this Court, no stay order was
issued by either courts in his favor.
 LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013.

DOCTRINE: The Local Government Unit (LGU) also has, under the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and
regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment
have been faithfully complied with. While the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of
promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of
natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority.

FACTS: Leovegildo Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. During
his term, he organized a multi-sectoral consultative assembly composed of civil society groups,
public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the
transportation of salvaged forest products. To regulate the said products, the mayor shall issue a
permit to transport after payment of corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.

There and then, 221 information for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC were filed against Ruzol and
the municipal administrator Guillermo Sabiduria claiming that the authority to issue said permit
belongs to the DENR.

RUZOL’S DEFENSE: As mayor, he is authorized to issue said permits pursuant to RA 7160 which
give the LGU not only express powers but also those powers that are necessarily implied from the
powers granted as well as those that are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGU’s efficient
and effective governance. LGU is given powers that are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare of the inhabitants.
RA 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of DENR and LGU, and the permits
to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage and control communal forests
with an area not exceeding 50 square kilometres.

Under the said law, the municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue and
to levy fees in accordance therewith. The only kind of document the DENR issues is denominated
“certificate of timber origin” and “certificate of lumber origin.” There was no proof of conspiracy
between the two accused. The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of
the 221 Transport permits through the PENR officer Rogelio Delgado, Sr., in a multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Acquitted Sabiduria but found Ruzol guilty as charged. under Sec 5 of PD
705 (Forestry Code), the DENR shall be responsible for the protection, development, management,
regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and supervision of the operation of
licensees, lessees and permittees for the taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy
or use thereof.

In RA 7160, it was determined that since the authority relative to salvage forest products was not
included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue
transport permits remains with the DENR, and thus cannot be exercised by the LGU.

ISSUES:
1. WON the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products
solely with the DENR and no one else?
2. WON the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are valid?
3. WON Ruzol is guilty of usurpation of official function?

HELD: 1. No. The Court ruled that Ruzol is not guilty of usurpation of official function under
Art. 177 of the RPC. Under said provision, there are two ways of committing this crime: By
knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government [usurpation of
authority]; and shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so [usurpation of official functions].

In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits
under the alleged pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so for such
authority properly belongs to the DENR.

2. No. The Court ruled that the authority to issue transport permits does not remain exclusively
with the DENR. LGU, under LGC of 1991, has ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations
and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set
forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.

While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of
promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of
natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such authority. While
the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not
the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this
function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be
synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO
192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion of
all other government instrumentalities, i.e., LGU.

On the contrary, the claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the
principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution in relation to the general welfare
clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991.

Pursuant to Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991, municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact
such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the
protection of property in the municipality.

The significant role of the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint Memorandum
Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU
Partnership on Devolved and other Forest Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly
by the DILG and the DENR in 1998.

The Court ruled that the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a
manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an additional measure which was
meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the LGU’s
territorial jurisdiction. If there appears to be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes,
rules or regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the proper action is not to
immediately uphold one and annul the other, but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible.

3. No, the Court held that the permits issued by Ruzol are invalid for failure to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth by law.

The Court held that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity.
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is
exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein
the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed, as stated by Sec. 444 of the LGC that the
authority of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits should be "pursuant to a law or
ordinance." Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is
that "local revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance.”

4. No. Ruzol is not guilty of usurpation of official function for DENR is not the sole government
agency vested with the authority to issue said permits pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs
may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport
were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In
effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor
and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft
of any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used
in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.

Contrary to the claim of Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith to regulate and monitor the
movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal
logging. In fact, the records will bear that the requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzol’s
decision alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of the participants
during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.

As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the burden of protecting the environment is placed not
on the shoulders of DENR alone––each and every one of us, whether in an official or private
capacity, has his or her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not only a
responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and should freely exercise. Considering the
rampant forest denudation, environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources,
each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the responsibility of protecting and
conserving our treasured natural resources.

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES
G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013.

DOCTRINE: Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to

limitations like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local
Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers,
responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local officials have
been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the
Constitution.
FACTS: Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29, 1998 - MGB-RO
denied Golden Falcon’s application for FTAA on for failure to secure the required area clearances
from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO. Golden
Falcon appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (MGB-CO).
February 10, 2004 - pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS filed with the
PENRO of Bulacan their applications for quarry permit covering the same area subject of Golden
Falcon's FTAA application. July 16, 2004 – MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcon’s appeal.
September 13, 2004 - AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration
permit covering the same subject area. Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping
applications of AMTC and the persons applying for quarry permits – the contention was the date
the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to other permit applications from other
parties. October 19, 2004 - upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director
Ramos stated that the denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final on August 11, 2004, or
fifteen days after GoldenFalcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of
Golden Falcon’s application became open to permit applications only on that date.

Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating
that the subject area became open for new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29,
1998 (MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere
reaffirmation of the MGB-RO’s April 29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29.

Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for quarry
permit, now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor
of Bulacan. PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said applications.
Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR
Secretary. The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the
governor’s issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos
that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO
denial). Hence, the applications for quarry permit filed on February 10, 2004 were null as these
were filed when the area was still closed to mining location.
On the other hand, AMTC filed its application when the area was already open to other mining
applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale mining permits were also issued in
violation ofSection 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Governor pursuant to Sec.
43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program.

ISSUES: 1. WON DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive
control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR
Secretary substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

2. WON Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-Scale
Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts) has the power of
supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs.
HELD: DENR Sec’s act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of review under the RA
7076 and its IRR; Assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence,
are not unconstitutional.

Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is

granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The LocalGovernment Code of 1991; (2)
R.A. 7076 or the People's Small ScaleMining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of1995.

“Control” - the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what asubordinate officer had
done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

“Supervision” - the power of a superior officer to see to it that lowerofficers perform their
function in accordance with law.

The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 ofthe Constitution refers
to the administrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority.
It does not make local governments within the State. Administrative autonomy may
involve devolution of powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following national
policies or standards and those provided by the LocalGovernment Code, as the
structuring of LGUs and the allocation of powers/responsibilities/resources among the
LGUs and local officials are placed by the Constitution to Congress under Article X Section 3.

It is the DENR which is in charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development and utilisation of the country’s natural resources,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement
of the small-scale mining law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision, control
and review of the DENR. The LGC did notfully devolve to the provincial government the
enforcement of thesmall-scale mining law.

RA 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented

by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076).
Section 24 of the law makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct supervision
and control of the Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review by the same.

Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications should be filed with the
PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the provincial governor, for applications outside the
mineral reservations. DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of
RA7076 likewise provides that the DENR Secretary shall exercise direct supervision and control
over the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
Board’s (PMRB) powers and functions shall be subject to review by the DENR Secretary.
DENRAdministrative Order No. 96-40 or the Revised IRR of the PhilippineMining
Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-Scale MiningPermits shall be filed with
the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through their respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas
outside the MineralReservations, and further, that the LGUs in coordination with
theBureau/Regional Offices shall approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and
gravel, quarry xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5hectares.
Petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not confer upon DENR and
DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the
Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit
because the DENR Secretary was granted the power of review in the PMRB’s resolution of
disputes under Sec. 24 of RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary
to nullify and cancel the Governor’s issuance of permits emanated from its power of review under
RA 7076 ad its IRR. Its power to review and decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-
Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the
determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect
to the matter in controversy and on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of
their respective rights.

The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial
power of the DENR can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the Provincial
Governor in issuing Small-Scale MiningPermits nor “control” over the said act of the Provincial
Governor as it is a determination of the rights of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on
the law.

In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it mustbe shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonabledoubt. In
this case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17 b(3)(iii)
of the LGC and Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said
provisions ofthe law.Hence, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
 SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013.

DOCTRINE: The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated
in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful
winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position.

FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines
and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his
return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate
of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in
September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the
Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village,
Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before
the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower
court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga

Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to
comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay?

HELD: The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of
the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a
person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in
such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established,
that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a
time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted
that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at
the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia
became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. When he came to the Philippines in
November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so
with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts,
Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile
there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of
his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia)
would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has
merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such
conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house
in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he
should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that
the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived
and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with
political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos
is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the
COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos
presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay.
The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding
his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
The Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

HENRY L. SY vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 202690, June 5, 2013

DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the

time of the taking.
FACTS: November 7, 1996, the City through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, filed a complaint for
expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land, owned and registered
under the name of Henry Sy, which was intended to be used as a site for several government
activities.

March 18,1997, pursuant to Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), the City
deposited the amount pf P241,090 with the Office of the Clerk of Court, representing 15% of the
fair market value of the subject property based on its tax declaration. Sy did not question the
right to expropriate the property but only the amount of just compensation. The RTC tasked 3
commissioners to determine the proper amount of just compensation. It was decided by 2 of
them that it should be P5, 500 per sq. m. to be computed from the date of the filing of the
expropriation complaint (November 7, 1996). On the other hand, 1 said that the amount should
be P13,500 per sq. m. The RTC ruled that just compensation should be P5, 500 per sq. m. It also
didn’t award damages and back rentals in favor of Sy. For equity considerations, 6% legal interest
was awarded computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation until full payment of just
compensation. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling with the modification that the City should pay
Sy the amount of P200, 000 as exemplary damages (because the City took the property without
even initiating expropriation proceedings) and attorney’s fees equivalent to 1% of the total
amount due. Sy was denied payment for back rentals and damages for shelved plans of
utilization.

Both Sy and the City’s motion for reconsiderations were denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding the amount of just compensation, its grant of 6% legal
interest, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?

HELD: The correct legal interest is 12% owing to the nature of the City’s obligation as an effective
forbearance. It was held in Republic v. CA that “the debt incurred by the government on account
of the taking of the property subject of an expropriation constitutes and effective forbearance
which therefore, warrants the application of the 12% legal interest.” Also, legal interest should
accrue from the time of the “taking” of the property in 1986 (when the property was already
used as a Barangay day care and office) and not from the filing of the complaint for expropriation
on November 7, 1996. The lack of proper authorization, i.e. resolution to effect expropriation,
did not affect the character of the City’s taking of the subject property in 1986. There is “taking’
when the owner is actually deprived of the use of his property thus, the legal character of the
City’s action as one of “taking” did not change.

Because of such irregularity in the actual “taking” and filing of the expropriation proceedings,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees should be awarded to the landowner for equity
purposes. MIAA v. Rodriguez states that “these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should
be suppressed and corrected. Hence the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is in
order.”

With regard to the amount of just compensation, the P5, 500 per sq. m. cannot be sustained. This
was derived from documents that were issued in 1996. Valuation should be based as of the time
of the taking which was in 1986. Thus, the case should be remanded to the RTC for proper
assessment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The CA decision is SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the RTC.

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, vs. CITY OF CEBU

G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013.

DOCTRINE: A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the substantive requirements.
Congress enacted the Local Government Code (LGC) as the implementing law for the delegation
to the various Local Government Units (LGUs) of the State’s great powers, namely: the police
power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation.

FACTS: On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance
No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating
the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City. On July 29,
1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury
Jaban (Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin
Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon.
Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations
Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for
being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages. Their complaint
alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on
Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office and after less than
10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for
three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a
fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such imposition the fine was
without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was also compelled to payP1,500.00
(itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing
and final judgment; That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where
there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative and that
he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing
and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice. On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi
(Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property,
declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages. He averred that on the
morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street
outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle, upon returning outside, his car was
towed by the group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic. The cases were consolidated.
The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void. The City of Cebu
and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the
Ordinance No. 1664 valid. Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the
Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals
were consolidated.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional?

HELD: YES.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests of a
valid ordinance thusly: The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was
enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent Page 2 of 2 merit,
like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes,
as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R. No.

135962, March 27, 2000, the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied) In the present case,
delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu. The CA opined, and
correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules
and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue
of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC. The police power granted to
local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people
to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly
those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty and property. Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the
guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained.

Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. The
subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in
the City of Cebu at all times.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce
the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply
driving away. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for their
lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
 SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR, BATANGAS
G.R. No. 204429, February 18, 2014.

DOCTRINE: Section 142 of the Local Government Code grants municipalities the power to
levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces.

FACTS: Petitioner Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) In the course of its business, Smart
constructed a telecommunications tower within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality. The
construction of the tower was for the purpose of receiving and transmitting cellular
communications within the covered area.On 30 July 2003, the Municipality passed Ordinance No.
18, series of 2003, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects."On
24 August 2004, Smart received from the Permit and Licensing Division of the Office of the Mayor
of the Municipality an assessment letter with a schedule of payment for the total amount of
P389,950.00 for Smarts telecommunications tower.Due to the alleged arrears in the payment of
the assessment, the Municipality also caused the posting of a closure notice on the
telecommunications tower.On 9 September 2004, Smart filed a protest, claiming lack of due
process in the issuance of the assessment and closure notice. In the same protest, Smart challenged
the validity of Ordinance No. 18 on which the assessment was based. The Municipality denied
Smarts protest. On 17 November 2004, Smart filed with Regional Trial Court of Tanauan City,
Batangas, Branch 6, an "Appeal/Petition" assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 18.

TRIAL COURT RULED: The trial court held that the assessment covering the period from 2001
to July 2003 was void since Ordinance No. 18 was approved only on 30 July 2003. However, the
trial court declared valid the assessment starting 1 October 2003, citing Article 4 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, in relation to the provisions of Ordinance No. 18 and Section 166 of Republic
Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing,
the Petition is partly GRANTED. CTA Division and CTA En Banc dismissed the petition for
review of Smart.

The Ruling of the CTA En Banc: The CTA En Banc dismissed the petition on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. The CTA En Banc declared that it is a court of special jurisdiction and as such, it
can take cognizance only of such matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction. Citing Section 7(a),
paragraph 3, of Republic Act No. 9282, the CTA En Banc held that the CTA has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal, decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial
Courts in local tax cases originally resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction. However, the same provision does not confer on the CTA jurisdiction to resolve cases
where the constitutionality of a law or rule is challenged.

ISSUES: 1. WON the [CTA En Banc Decision and Resolution] should be reversed and set aside
for being contrary to law and jurisprudence considering that the CTA En Banc should have
exercised its jurisdiction and declared the Ordinance as illegal?
2. WON the [CTA En Banc Decision and Resolution] should be reversed and set aside for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence considering that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply in [this case]?
3. WON the [CTA En Banc Decision and Resolution] should be reversed and set aside for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence considering that the respondent has no authority to impose the
so-called "fees" on the basis of the void ordinance?
HELD: Smart argues that the "fees" in Ordinance No. 18 are actually taxes since they are not
regulatory, but revenue-raising. Smart contends that the designation of "fees" in Ordinance No. 18
is not controlling.

The Court finds that the fees imposed under Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes.Section 5, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution provides that "each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such
taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government."Consistent with this
constitutional mandate, the LGC grants the taxing powers to each local government unit.
Specifically, Section 142 of the LGC grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees, and
charges not otherwise levied by provinces. Section 143 of the LGC provides for the scale of taxes
on business that may be imposed by municipalities while Section 147 of the same law provides for
the fees and charges that may be imposed by municipalities on business and occupation.The LGC
defines the term "charges" as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or
property, while the term "fee" means "a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or
inspection of a business or activity."In this case, the Municipality issued Ordinance No. 18, which
is entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects," to regulate the
"placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph
and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus, and provide for the correction,
condemnation or removal of the same when found to be dangerous, defective or otherwise
hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitant[s]."

It was also envisioned to address the foreseen "environmental depredation" to be brought about by
these "special projects" to the Municipality. Pursuant to these objectives, the Municipality imposed
fees on various structures, which included telecommunications towers.As clearly stated in its
whereas clauses, the primary purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate the "placing, stringing,
attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone
wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus" listed therein, which included Smarts
telecommunications tower. Clearly, the purpose of the assailed Ordinance is to regulate the
enumerated activities particularly related to the construction and maintenance of various
structures. The fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not impositions on the building or structure itself;
rather, they are impositions on the activity subject of government regulation, such as the
installation and construction of the structures.Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to
regulate certain construction activities of the identified special projects, which included "cell sites"
or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in
nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of the
Municipality, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not
taxes.In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that "if the
generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is
a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained
does not make the imposition a tax."Considering that the fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not in the
nature of local taxes, and Smart is questioning the constitutionality of the ordinance, the CTA
correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, Section 187 of the LGC, which
outlines the procedure for questioning the constitutionality of a tax ordinance, is inapplicable,
rendering unnecessary the resolution of the issue on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Smart argues that the Municipality exceeded its power to impose taxes and fees as provided in
Book II, Title One, Chapter 2, Article II of the LGC. Smart maintains that the mayors permit fees
in Ordinance No. 18 (equivalent to 1% of the project cost) are not among those expressly
enumerated in the LGC.COURT:As discussed, the fees in Ordinance No.18 are not taxes.
Logically, the imposition does not appear in the enumeration of taxes under Section 143 of the
LGC.Moreover, even if the fees do not appear in Section 143 or any other provision in the LGC,
the Municipality is empowered to impose taxes, fees and charges, not specifically enumerated in
the LGC or taxed under the Tax Code or other applicable law. Section 186 of the LGC, granting
local government units wide latitude in imposing fees, expressly provides:

Section 186. Power To Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. - Local government units may exercise
the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically
enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That
the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public
hearing conducted for the purpose.

Smart argues that the Municipality is encroaching on the regulatory powers of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC).

COURT: The fees are not imposed to regulate the administrative, technical, financial, or marketing
operations of telecommunications entities, such as Smarts; rather, to regulate the installation and
maintenance of physical structures Smarts cell sites or telecommunications tower. The regulation
of the installation and maintenance of such physical structures is an exercise of the police power
of the Municipality. Clearly, the Municipality does not encroach on NTCs regulatory powers.

Smart: Ordinance No. 18 violates Sections 130(b)(3)27 and 186 of the LGC since the fees are
unjust, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory.

COURT: On the constitutionality issue, Smart merely pleaded for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 18 in the Prayer of the Petition, without any argument or
evidence to support its plea. Nowhere in the body of the Petition was this issue specifically raised
and discussed. Significantly, Smart failed to cite any constitutional provision allegedly violated by
respondent when it issued Ordinance No. 18. Settled is the rule that every law, in this case an
ordinance, is presumed valid. To strike down a law as unconstitutional, Smart has the burden to
prove a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, which Smart miserably failed to do.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY vs. JADEWELL PARKING

SYSTEMS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160025, April 23, 2014.
DOCTRINE: In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian Panlungsod in rescinding the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) — be it first or second act of rescission — was clearly in the
exercise of its legislative or administrative functions and was not an exercise of a judicial or quasi-
judicial function.

FACTS: On February 9, 2005, this Court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
directing Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon, his agents, representatives and/or any person or
persons acting upon his orders or in his place or stead to immediately reopen the streets and/or
premises operated and/or occupied by Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell). They
were further directed to let the said streets and premises remain open until further orders of this
Court.

However, Jadewell subsequently informed this Court that, contrary to the representation of Mayor
Yaranon and in violation of the writ (of preliminary mandatory injunction), the parking spaces,
roads and streets operated and/or occupied by Jadewell remained closed. It presented pictures
taken on March 1, 2005 showing the continued closure of the parking spaces at Burnham Park and
the adjoining Abad Santos Drive, Lake Drive and Harrison Road. It also submitted affidavits of
pay parking customers attesting to the fact that until now, the parking spaces and streets that
Jadewell previously utilized for pay parking has not been opened. Further, counsel for Jadewell
furnished with a copy to the court of its February 15, 2005 letter to Mayor Yaranon urging the
latter to comply with the writ.

Faced with the conflicting manifestations of the parties, this Court directed Judge Iluminada
Cabato-Cortes, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, to determine
whether or not Mayor Yaranon in fact complied with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and to submit a report thereon. Investigation of the Judge are as follows: That on March 21, 2005
at around 2:25 in the afternoon, the Honorable Executive Judge instructed the undersigned together
with Gilbert Evangelista to go to Jadewell Parking Systems particularly along Harrison and Ganza
Areas to verify whether said premises are already open for business, but it is still closed with G.I.
pipe railings measuring about 74 feet at the main entrance and exit; April 4, 2005, the undersigned
were again instructed by the Executive Judge to check on the premises of Jadewell Parking
Systems, particularly located at the aforementioned areas to find out whether there were changes
in the physical set up but there was none; Judge Cabato-Cortes personally visited the premises on
April 4, 2005. She found that the account of sheriff Bacolod accurately reflected the actual
condition in the said premises. She observed that there were several policemen posted at the
parking area adjacent to Ganza Restaurant. When she interviewed some of the policemen, they
confirmed that the entrance and exit to the parking area were indeed closed.

ISSUE: WON the City Mayor of Baguio committed direct and indirect contempt by disobedience
and acting opposition to its authority?

HELD: Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or defiance of the court's orders but also
such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court arid the administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Under the Rules of Court,
contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge. It can be punished summarily without hearing.If the
pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court
where the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt. It is equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a judge. Contemptuous statements made in the pleadings
filed with the court constitute direct contempt. Similarly, false or misleading allegations in a
pleading or other document filed with the court having cognizance of the case tending to frustrate
the due dispensation of justice constitute direct contempt. Candidness to the court is essential for
the expeditious administration of justice.

Here, Mayor Yaranon misled this Court into believing that he had already obeyed the directive
contained in the writ. The very caption of his paper itself manifested his intention to make believe
that the writ had been fully complied with. It attempted to create the impression that the premises
and streets previously operated by Jadewell were already open pursuant to this Court's order when
in fact they were not. Indubitably, it constituted fraud on the court punishable as contempt.
His continuing refusal to carry out and implement the writ is a willful disregard of and
disobedience to this Court's lawful orders. His defiance controvertibly proves his intention to tie
the hands of justice and prevent it from taking its due course. Hence Baguio City Mayor Braulio
D. Yaranon is hereby found GUILTY of (1) direct contempt for the falsehood he deliberately
foisted on this Court and (2) indirect contempt for his continued disobedience to and defiance of
the writ of preliminary injunction the court had issued.

AURELIO M. UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014.

DOCTRINE: The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays is essentially legislative in nature.

FACTS: On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution
No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to
the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming
the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to “ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters
therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991.”
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No.
12-0797 which reads: WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to
highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the
said plebiscite.

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern
Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted
were allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.

Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and
directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the
LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that
while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an
existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly
affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase “qualified voters therein” used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not
just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position
by enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will
cause material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but
also of the province as a whole.

On October 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB),
by a vote of 5-2 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-
0925.
ISSUE: WON the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those
in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from a component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC)?

HELD: The entire province of Nueva Ecija. The upward conversion of a component city, in this
case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-
cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought
about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be
free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction
of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the
province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial
jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to
carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the
requirement that the alteration be “substantial.”

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS vs. ALFREDO S. LIM

G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014.

DOCTRINE: The Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 expressly provides that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the
city” subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code.

FACTS: Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS) et.al. filed a petition against Hon. Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, reclassifying the Oil Depot
in Pandacan Terminal, from industrial to commercial area and to cease and desist from operating
their businesses from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.

Oil companies, Chevron, Shell, Petron as well as DOE sought to intervene and asked for the
nullification of said ordinance. The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case
because the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property
rights. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate.

On the other hand, the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City
of Manila who recommended the approval of the ordinance cited:

• The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile
products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline,
kerosene and fuel oil among others;
• The depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
• It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace and
• In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.

ISSUE: WON the enactment of the ordinance a legitimate exercise of police power?
HELD: Yes. The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all
the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare.However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals,
safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand
to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power
clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.
SC reiterated the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.

GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR. vs. HON. JESSE M. ROBREDO

G.R. No. 195390. December 10, 2014

DOCTRINE: The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of
Local Government Units (LGUs).

FACTS: On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the
Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify
the three issuances of Robredo for being unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion: MC No. 2010-83 entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids
and Public Offerings, which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs. Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 352 of LGC of 1991 requires
the posting within 30 days from end of each fiscal year in at least 3 publicly accessible and
conspicuous places in the LGU a summary of all revenues collected and funds including the
appropriations and disbursements of such funds during the preceding fiscal year. RA No 984
(Government Procurement Reform Act) called for the posting of the Invitation to Bid, Notice of
Award, Notice to Proceed and Approved Contract in the procuring entities premises, in newspapers
of general circulation, the Philippine Govt Electronic Procurement System and the website of
procuring entity. Responsibility of Local Chief Executive: All Provincial Governors, City Mayors,
and Municipal Myors, are directed to faithfully comply with the above cited provisions of laws,
and existing national policy, by posting in conspicuous places within public buildings in the
locality, or in print media of community or general circulation, and in their websites.

MC No 2011-08 directing for the strict adherence to Section 90 of RA No 10147 of the General
Appropriations Act of 2011. Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 90 stipulates that the
amount appropriated for the LGUs share in the IRA shall be used in accordance with Sections
17(g) and 287 of RA No 7160. The annual budgets of LGUs shall be prepared in accordance with
the forms, procedures, and schedules prescribed by the Department of Budget and Management
and those jointly issued with the Commission on Audit. Sanctions:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions - An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on: (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross
negligence, or dereliction of duty.

ISSUE: WON the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal
autonomy enshired in the Constitution and the LGC?

HELD: NO.
Petitioners assailed issuances interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in
the Constitution and the LGC. MC 2010-138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties
when it restricted the meaning of development and enumerated activities which the local
government must finance from the 20% development fund component of the IRA and provided
sanctions for local authorities who shall use the said component of the fund for the excluded
purposes stated therein. Robredo cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local
legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects that the
20% component of its IRA should fund. Court: Petitioners arguments are untenable. The
Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy of LGUs (Article X of
Constitution) It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution that enhancing local autonomy
that the LGC was enacted.
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable
them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national
government to the local government units.] Local autonomy means a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. Autonomy
is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress. (Limbona v Mangelin)

To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the
President over LGUs to mere supervision. The President exercises general supervision over them,
but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. (Section 4, Article X of
Constitution) It is petitioners contention that Robredo went beyond the confined of his supervisory
powers, as alter ego of the President, when he issued MC No 2010-138. They argue that the
mandatory nature of the circular, with the threat of imposition of sanctions for non-compliance,
evinces a clear desire to exercise control over LGUs. However, the Court perceives otherwise. A
reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the
LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section
287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. The assailed
circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20%
development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was
diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.
The issuance of MC No. 2010-138 was brought about by the report of the COA that the
development fund was not being utilized accordingly. To curb the alleged misuse of the
development fund, the respondent deemed it proper to remind LGUs of the nature and purpose of
the provision for the IRA through MC No. 2010-138. The enumeration in the circular was not
meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. It was incorporated in
the assailed circular in order to guide them in the proper disposition of the IRA and avert further
misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed to be incompatible with the purpose
of the fund. LGUs remain at liberty to map out their development plans based on their own
discretion and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be
expended for development projects.

The local autonomy granted LGU does not completely severe them from the national government
or turn them into impenetrable states. Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being
enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable
for malfeasance or violations of existing laws. Answering petitioners claim that the requirement
to post other documents in the issuances went beyond the provisions in LGC and RA No 9184: It
is well to remember that fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs with unbridled discretion in the
disbursement of public funds. They remain accountable to their constituency.

The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, are but implementation
of this avowed policy of the State to make public officials accountable to the people. They are
amalgamations of existing laws, rules and regulation designed to give teeth to the constitutional
mandate of transparency and accountability. Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged
by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in
trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency,
patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to
the needs of the people they are called upon to serve. (ABAKADA GURO Party List v Purisima).

The Constitution strongly summoned the State to adopt and implement a policy of full disclosure
of all transactions involving public interest and provide the people with the right to access public
information. Section 352 of the LGC and RA No 9184 are responses to this call for transparency
and both laws establish a system of transparency in procurement process in government agencies.
The publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans and procurement plans of LGUs
required in the assailed issuances could not have infringed on the local fiscal autonomy of LGUs.
The issuances do not interfere with the discretion of the LGUs in the specification of their priority
projects and the allocation of their budgets. The posting requirements are mere transparency
measures. Section 352 of the LGC that is being invoked by the petitioners does not exclude the
requirement for the posting of the additional documents stated in MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08.

The Constitution, which was drafted after long years of dictatorship and abuse of power, is now
replete with numerous provisions directing the adoption of measures to uphold transparency and
accountability in government, with a view of protecting the nation from repeating its atrocious
past. It commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of information on all matters relating to
official transactions and those involving public interest. (Section 28, Article II and Section 7,
Article III) The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting good
governance through transparency, accountability and participation. The action of the respondent
is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his power as alter ego of the President. The power
to govern is a delegated authority from the people who hailed the public official to office through
the democratic process of election. He must not frown upon accountability checks which aim to
show how well he is performing his delegated power. For, it is through these mechanisms of
transparency and accountability that he is able to prove to his constituency that he is worthy of the
continued privilege.

JOSE J. FERRER, JR. vs. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015.
DOCTRINE: The Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) is specific in providing that the power
to impose a tax, fee, or charge, or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the
local government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance.

FACTS: Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance, Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City, which will collect 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php 100,000.00.
This shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special
assessment shall go to the General Fund under a special account to be established for the purpose.
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 was enacted collecting garbage fees on
residential properties which shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special
account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections. Petitioner, a Quezon City
property owner, questions the validity of the said ordinances.

ISSUES: 1. WON the Socialized Housing Tax is valid?

2. WON the ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double taxation?

HELD: 1. The SHT is valid. The tax is within the power of Quezon City Government to impose.
LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a lawful
subject and a lawful method. Herein, the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to
raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the
police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. On
the question of inequality, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as
two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation
conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning
of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which
impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another. Further, the
reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive
since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. Even better, on
certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit.
2. No. Pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers under
Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative
bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. In this regard, the LGUs shall share with the national
government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within
their territorial jurisdiction. The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, affirms this
authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of its provisions. Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect
such reasonable fees and charges for services rendered. The fee imposed for garbage collections
under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity as provided by the
same. As opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. Hence, not being a tax, the
contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation
must necessarily fail.

ALTA VISTA GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB vs. THE CITY OF CEBU
G.R. No. 180235, January 20, 2016.

DOCTRINE: The Local Government Code (LGC) authorizes the imposition by local government
units (LGUs) of amusement tax under Section 140.
FACTS: A golf course has been operated in the city of Cebu for 5 years already. The local
government has promulgated a law for imposing tax on amusement places in their jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON golf course is to be considered an amusement place?

HELD: Golf course cannot be considered as an amusement place and is therefore not subject to
amusement tax. According to Section 140 of the Local Government Code on amusement tax, the
province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement.

In applying the principle of ejusdem generis, where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follows the
former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons,
things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. A
golf course is not similar to that of the expressly provided amusement places as it cannot be
considered as an amusement place in itself. An amusement place is defined as a place where people
enter to witness a show or a performance.

ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016.

DOCTRINE: Apart from the grounds provided in Section 68, any of the grounds in Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code as well as in Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
may likewise be raised in a petition for disqualification.
FACTS: Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Councilor for the
Fourth District of Manila. On the date of Chua's proclamation, however, Imelda E. Fragata, a
registered voter, filed a Petition captioned as a "petition to declare [Chua] as a nuisance candidate"
and "to deny due course and/or cancel [Chua's] Certificate of Candidacy." Moreover, Bacani filed
a Motion to Intervene with Manifestation and Motion to Annul Proclamation.

Bacani argued that Chua, being a dual citizen, was unqualified to run for Councilor. Moreover,
Chua allegedly continued on using her American passport and did not execute an oath of
renunciation of her American citizenship. With Chua being a dual citizen at the time she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy, Bacani prayed that the Commission on Elections annul Chua's
proclamation.

COMELEC held that it the petition was one for disqualification, regardless of the caption stating
that it was a petition to declare Chua a nuisance candidate. The Petition alleged a ground for
disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, specifically, that Chua was a
permanent resident in the United States. Considering that Chua is a dual citizen, the Commission
held that Chua was disqualified to run for Councilor pursuant to Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. Consequently, Chua's Certificate of Candidacy was void ab initio, and all votes
casted for her were stray. Chua's proclamation was likewise voided, and per Maquiling, Bacani
was declared to have garnered the sixth highest number of votes. Thus, in the Resolution, the
Commission on Elections Second Division ruled in favor of Fragata and Bacani. MR was denied.
Chua filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES: 1. WON Chua should be disqualified to run for public office?

2. WON private respondent Imelda E. Fragata filed a petition for disqualification or a petition to
deny due course/ cancel certificate of candidacy?

HELD: 1. YES. A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run. The candidate must also possess
none of the grounds for disqualification under the law. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and
personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate requirements, the latter being an
additional requirement for qualification to run for public office. With petitioner's failure to execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, petitioner was a dual citizen at the
time she filed her Certificate of Candidacy. Under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, she
was disqualified to run for Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National
and Local Elections.

Elections are more than a numbers game. Hence, in Maquiling: The ballot cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met
before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and
eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications
of candidates.

With her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy, her Certificate
of Candidacy was void ab initio. She was correctly considered a non-candidate. All votes casted
for her were stray, and the person legally entitled to the position is private respondent Krystle
Marie C. Bacani, the candidate with the next highest number of votes among the eligible
candidates. The Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in annulling Chua's
proclamation and subsequently proclaiming private respondent Bacani.

2. It was a petition for disqualification. What remedy to avail himself or herself of, however,
depends on the petitioner. If the false material representation in the certificate of candidacy relates
to a ground for disqualification, the petitioner may choose whether to file a petition to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification, so long as the petition
filed complies with the requirements under the law. Before the Commission on Elections, private
respondent Fragata had a choice of filing either a petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
certificate of candidacy or a petition for disqualification. In her Petition, private respondent Fragata
did not argue that petitioner made a false material representation in her Certificate of Candidacy;
she asserted that petitioner was a permanent resident disqualified to run for Councilor under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Private respondent Fragata's Petition, therefore, was a
petition for disqualification.

CITY OF PASIG vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

G.R. No. 181710, March 7, 2018

DOCTRINE: Under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, a municipality is bereft of
authority to levy and impose franchise tax on franchise holders within its territorial jurisdiction.
That authority belongs to provinces and cities only.1 A franchise tax levied by a municipality is,
thus, null and void. The nullity is not cured by the subsequent conversion of the municipality into
a city.

FACTS: On 26 December 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Pasig enacted
Ordinance No. 25 which, under its Article 3, Section 32, imposed a franchise tax on all business
venture operations carried out through a franchise within the municipality, as follows:

ARTICLE 3 -FRANCHISE TAX

Section 32. Imposition of Tax. - Any provision of laws or grant of exemption to the contrary
notwithstanding, any person, corporation, partnership or association enjoying a franchise and
doing business in the Municipality of Pasig, shall pay a franchise tax at the rate of fifty percent
(50%) of one percent (1%) of its gross receipts derived from the operation of the business in Pasig
during the preceding calendar year.

By virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7829, which took effect on 25 January 1995, the Municipality
of Pasig was converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Pasig. On 24 August
2001, the Treasurer’s Office of the City Government of Pasig informed the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO), a grantee of a legislative franchise,4 that it is liable to pay taxes for the
period 1996 to 1999, pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 25. The city, thereafter, on two separate
occasions, demanded payment of the said tax in the amount of ₱435,332, 196.00, exclusive of
penalties.
On 8 February 2002, MERALCO protested5 the validity of the demand "claiming that the same be
withdrawn and cancelled for the following reasons: (1) Ordinance No. 25 was declared void ab
initio by the Department of Justice (DOJ) for being in contravention of law, which resolution was
reiterated in another case that questioned the validity of the franchise tax, etc.; (2) The Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC) ordered the Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, to refund
MERALCO the amount the latter paid as franchise tax because the former lacked legal foundation
in collecting the same, as municipalities are not empowered by law to impose and collect franchise
tax pursuant to Section 142 of the LGC; (3) The CA affirmed the RTC decision; and (4) The
petition for certiorari filed by the then Municipality of Pasig before the Supreme Court, assailing
the decision of the CA that sustained the RTC, was likewise dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration of the Municipality of Pasig was denied with finality.

ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in ruling that the City of Pasig had no valid basis for its
imposition of franchise tax for the period 1996 to 1999?

HELD: Yes.
I. Unlike a city, a municipality is bereft of authority to levy franchise tax, thus, the ordinance
enacted for that purpose is void. The conversion of the municipality into a city does not lend
validity to the void ordinance. Neither does it authorize the collection of the tax under said
ordinance.

The power to impose franchise tax belongs to the province by virtue of Section 137 of the LGC
which states:
CHAPTER II
Specific Provisions on the Taxing and Other Revenue-Raising Powers of Local Government Units
ARTICLE I. Provinces
Section 137. Franchise Tax. - Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special
law, the province may impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at the rate not exceeding
fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar
year based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the municipalities are prohibited from levying the taxes specifically allocated
to provinces, viz:

ARTICLE II. Municipalities

Section 142. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise provided in this Code, municipalities
may levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces.

Section 151 empowers the cities to levy taxes, fees and charges allowed to both provinces and
municipalities, thus… ARTICLE III. Cities

Section 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. - Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may
levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided,
however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and
independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
The LGC further provides that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge or to generate revenue
shall be exercised by the Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an
appropriate ordinance. This simply means that the local government unit cannot solely rely on the
statutory provision (LGC) granting specific taxing powers, such as the authority to levy franchise
tax. The enactment of an ordinance is indispensable for it is the legal basis of the imposition and
collection of taxes upon covered taxpayers. Without the ordinance, there is nothing to enforce by
way of assessment and collection.

However, an ordinance must pass muster the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency
with the prevailing laws.12 Otherwise, it shall be void.

It is not disputed that at the time the ordinance in question was enacted in 1992, the local
government of Pasig, then a municipality, had no authority to levy franchise tax. Article 5 of the
Civil Code explicitly provides, "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity." Section 32 of Municipal
Ordinance No. 25 is, thus, void for being in direct contravention with Section 142 of the LGC.
Being void, it cannot be given any legal effect. An assessment and collection pursuant to the said
ordinance is, perforce, legally infirm.

Consequently, the CA was correct when it declared that the demand of the City of Pasig upon
MERALCO for the payment of the disputed tax was devoid of legal basis. It bears emphasizing
that the DOJ and the RTC of Pasig City had previously declared Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance
No. 25 as void ab initio. 14 Even the City of Pasig, it seems, does not contest the invalidity of said
ordinance.15

It is submitted, however, that when Pasig was converted into a city in 1995 by virtue of R.A. No.
7829 (the cityhood law) it was authorized to collect and impose a franchise tax. Demurring from
the rulings in Arabay and SMC cited in the assailed CA decision, the City of Pasig insists that the
demand for payment of franchise tax was justified for the period 1996 up to 1999, or when Pasig
was already a city. Unlike the present case, the City of Pasig continues, Ara bay and SMC involved
taxes paid prior to the respective municipalities' conversion into cities.
The court is not persuaded. The doctrinal rule on the matter still rings true to this day - that the
conversion of the municipality into a city does not remove the original infirmity of the subject
ordinance. Such doctrine, evoked in Arabay and SMC, is squarely relevant in the case at bar. In
these two separate cases, the sales taxes were paid by the petitioners pursuant to ordinances enacted
prior to the conversion of the respondents into cities, or at which time the latter were without
authority to levy the said taxes. Finding the municipal ordinances to be void, the Court minced no
words in declaring the payments of taxes under the ordinances to be without basis even if
subsequently the respondents became cities. Fittingly, the Court ordered the refund of the said
taxes to the petitioners.

The instant case is no different from Arabay and SMC. As in those cases, the cityhood law (R.A.
No. 7829) of Pasig cannot breathe life into Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, ostensibly
by bringing it within the ambit of Section 151 of the LGC that authorizes cities to levy the franchise
tax under Section 137 of the same law. It is beyond cavil that Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance
No. 25 is an act that is null and void ab initio. It is even of little consequence that Pasig sought to
collect only those taxes after its conversion into a city. A void ordinance, or provision thereof, is
what it is - a nullity that produces no legal effect. It cannot be enforced; and no right could spring
forth from it. The cityhood of Pasig notwithstanding, it has no right to collect franchise tax under
the assailed ordinance.

Besides, the City of Pasig had apparently misunderstood Arabay. In that case, the taxes subject of
the refund claim included those paid after the conversion of Dipolog into a city. Thus, while the
creation of the City of Dipolog was effective on 1 January 1970, the petitioner, Arabay, Inc.,
applied for the refund of taxes paid under the questioned ordinance for the period from December
1969 to July 1972.16 As previously noted, the Court granted the refund.

II. The cityhood law of Pasig did not cure the defect of the questioned ordinance.
The petitioner cites - Section 45. Municipal Ordinances Existing at the Time of the Approval of
this Act. - All municipal ordinances of the municipality of Pasig existing at the time of the approval
of this Act shall continue to be in force within the City of Pasig until the Sangguniang Panlungsod
shall, by ordinance, provide otherwise.
As we see it, the cited law does not lend any help to the City of Pasig's cause. It is crystal clear
from the said law that what shall continue to be in force after the conversion of Pasig into a city
are the municipal ordinances existing as of the time of the approval of R.A. No. 7829. The
provision contemplates ordinances that are valid and legal from their inception; that upon the
approval of R.A. No. 7829, their effectivity and enforcement shall continue. To 'continue' means
(1) to be steadfast or constant in a course or activity; (2) to keep going: maintain a course, direction,
or progress; or (3) to remain in a place or condition. It presupposes something already existing.

A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it cannot have binding force and effect. Such is Section 32
of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 and, being so, is outside the comprehension of Section 45 of R.A.
No. 7829

We are not in full accord with the explanation given by the City of Pasig - that Section 45 of R.A.
No. 7829 intended to prevent the City of Pasig from becoming paralyzed in delivering basic
services. We can concede that Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829 assures the City of Pasig continued
collection of taxes under ordinances passed prior to its conversion. What the petitioner fails to
realize is that Section 32, Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is not the singular source of its income or
funds necessary for the performance of its essential functions. The argument of the City of Pasig
is at best flimsy and insubstantial. The records, it should be noted, bear no evidence to demonstrate
the resulting paralysis claimed by the City of Pasig. An unsupported allegation it is, no better than
a mere conjecture and speculation.

III. There is no ambiguity in Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829.

As a last-ditch effort to persuade this Court, the City of Pasig calls out a latent ambiguity in Section
42 of R.A. No. 7829 in order to pave the way for the operation of the cardinal rule in statutory
construction requiring courts to give effect to the legislative intent. It pounces on the same
ambiguity so that it may be resolved in favor of promoting local autonomy.
We disagree. We have already established that the provision is clear enough to dislodge any notion
that it gives curative effect to the legal infirmity of Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25.
The legislative intent behind Section 42 of R.A. No. 7829, as previously discussed, did not
comprehend the affirmance of void or inexistent ordinances.

Neither can the bare invocation of the principle of local autonomy provide succor to settle any
ambiguity in Section 42 of R.A. No. 7829, if doubt as to its meaning may even be supposed. While
we can agree that an ambiguity in the law concerning local taxing powers must be resolved in
favor of fiscal autonomy,18 we are hampered by the nullity of Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance
No. 25. At the risk of being repetitive, the said ordinance cannot be given legal effect. It must be
borne in mind that the constitutionally ordained policy of local fiscal autonomy was not intended
by the framers to be absolute. It does not provide unfettered authority to tax objects of any kind.
The very source of local governments' authority to tax also empowered Congress to provide
limitations on the exercise of such taxing powers. Precisely, Congress' act of withdrawing from
municipalities the power to levy franchise tax by virtue of Section 142 of the LGC is a valid
exercise of its constitutional authority.

In this case, the validity of the municipal ordinance imposing a franchise tax cannot be made to
rest upon the ambiguity of a provision of law (Section 42, R.A. No. 7829) operating supposedly,
albeit mistakenly, under the context of promoting local autonomy. Regard, too, must be made for
the equally important doctrine that a doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting
the power of taxation must be resolved against the local government unit.

In fine, the City of Pasig cannot legally make a demand for the payment of taxes under the
challenged ordinance, which is void, even after its conversion into a city. The CA, thus, committed
no reversible error.
Case Digests in Public
Corporation

Custodio, Shiela Arman B.

 Atty. Lapid
Sundays 1:00-3:00 pm