High-Skill Immigration to Industrial Cities: Who Benefits?

Matthew Hall
Institute of Government and Public Affairs and Department of Sociology
University of Illinois at Chicago

Deborah Graefe
Population Research Institute
Penn State University

Gordon F. De Jong
Department of Sociology and Population Research Institute
Penn State University

October 19, 2010

Word Count: 8,940

For presentation at the 2010 Fall Meeting of the Association of Public Policy Analysis and
Management, Boston (November). Please do not cite without permission from the authors.

*Direct correspondence to Matthew Hall, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 815 W.
Van Buren St., Chicago IL 60707; Email: mshall@uic.edu.
 1

High-Skill Immigration to Industrial Cities: Who Benefits?

Abstract

We use individual-level data from the 2006-2008 American Community Survey on high-skilled
immigrants and natives linked to metropolitan-level data on trends in high-skill immigration and
characteristics of labor markets to explore differences in labor market outcomes for those living
in industrial and immigrant-gateway cities. Our results indicate that high-skilled immigrants in
industrial cities are more likely to be employed and less likely to be underemployed than high-
skilled immigrants in gateway cities; patterns that are robust to micro- and metro-level controls.
In our analysis of the consequences of skilled immigration for natives, we find that, on balance,
the settlement of high-skill immigrants in industrial cities improves economic outcomes for high-
skill natives living there. Specifically, we find that in industrial cities where the immigrant share
of the high-skill population is growing, native men and women are more likely to be employed
and have higher earnings than natives in industrial cities where the skilled-immigrant population
is not growing. We also find no evidence that high-skill immigration affects the
underemployment of natives or geographically displaces natives in industrial cities.
 2

High-Skill Immigration to Industrial Cities: Who Benefits?

Since 1970, the number of immigrants living in the U.S. has quadrupled, from about 9.6 to 38.5

million. The impact these new arrivals are having on the labor market opportunities of native-

born Americans is topic of great scholarly discussion and is at the center of debates concerning

immigration reform. At the risk of over generalizing, extant research regarding the consequences

of immigration for native outcomes has centered on the effects of total immigration (i.e., of all

immigrants, regardless of the characteristics they possess) or of low-skill, predominately

Mexican immigrants. On balance, this work tends to ignore the potentially unique impacts of a

large and growing subgroup of the immigrant population: high-skilled workers.

Recent work by demographers and economists has drawn attention to the distinctive

qualities of high-skill immigrant workers (e.g., Batalova and Fix 2008; Borjas 2005; Kaestner

and Kaushal 2010; Sana 2010; Stephan and Levin 2001). Overlooked, however, are the unique

geographic patterns of high-skill immigrants. In particular, while like other immigrants, a

majority of high-skilled immigrants work and live in a handful of major metropolitan gateways,

the growth in the high-skill immigrant population has been exceedingly high in old, industrial

cities; predominantly those making up America’s Rust Belt. Yet, little is known about the factors

that attract high-skill immigrants to these areas, and just as little known about the consequences

of their arrival for their high-skill native counterparts that also reside there. The goal of this

paper is to offer some initial clues into these questions. As the title suggests, our overarching

objective is to examine who the beneficiaries are of high-skill immigration to America’s Rust

Belt.
 3

To address these questions, we use individual-level data on high-skilled workers in 37

large industrial cities and 7 traditional immigrant gateway cities1 from the three-year 2006-2008

American Community Survey public use microdata file, linked to metropolitan-level data on the

recent immigration trends, industrial mix, and housing costs of the areas these workers live and

work. Our analytic approach examines first how high-skill immigrants fare in industrial versus

traditional gateway metropolitan areas, considering three critical labor market outcomes –

employment, underemployment, and earnings. We next explore differential impacts of the in-

flow of high-skill immigrants to industrial and gateway cities for high-skill natives on the same

three economic outcomes, plus metropolitan out-migration. We analyze each of these models

separately for male and female, prime-age workers. The multistep step process in which we first

consider the economic well-being of immigrants and then investigate how these foreign workers’

arrivals affect native labor market outcomes allows us to simultaneously offer insights into the

intriguing growth of the high-skill immigrant population in industrial cities and provide needed

evidence on the consequences of immigration in non-traditional destinations.

Background

Despite low-skill Mexican immigrants being popularly perceived as the face of “new” American

immigrants, the contemporary foreign-born population is incredibly diverse. Immigrants today

come to America from nearly all reaches of the globe; in 2009 alone, 129 of the 194 officially

recognized by the State Department sent at least 1,000 migrants to America.2 Moreover, despite

regular portrayals of immigrants as lacking educational credentials, recent growth in the high-

1
Throughout this paper, “cities” and “metros” are used interchangeably to refer to Primary Metropolitan Statistical
Areas.
2
Based on analysis of data from the 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security 2010), including persons obtaining legal permanent resident status, refugee arrivals (but not those already
in the U.S. who were granted asylum), and temporary workers and their dependents.
 4

skill (i.e., college-educated) immigrant population has outpaced that of the low-skill (i.e., high

school dropout) immigrant population by a factor of 3, and among prime-age workers, high-skill

immigrants now outnumber low-skill immigrants. This trend in immigration by skill-level and

the corresponding convergence of the low- and high-skill immigrant populations is shown in

Figure 1.

Despite the rapid increase in the number of high-skilled immigrants, these workers are

not settling uniformly across the American landscape. A burgeoning body of social and policy

research has focused on the rise of new immigrant destinations: areas outside of the traditional

immigrant ports-of-entry (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and Miami) that

experienced phenomenal growth in their foreign-born populations during the 1980s and 1990s.

The dispersion of immigrants to communities with little to no prior histories of immigration has

had transformative effects on social, economic, and political institutions in these areas. This

literature has, however, almost exclusively focused on the redistribution of comparatively low-

skilled Latino immigrants (e.g., Lichter and Johnson 2006; Massey 2008; McConnell 2008;

Zúñiga and Hernández-León 2005). In other work, we have described the unevenness in the

geography of high-skilled immigrants (Hall et al. 2011). Not only have high-skilled immigrants,

like other immigrants, been resettling (or settling directly) in non-traditional areas, they have

been doing so in areas very different than those that have received the greatest amount of recent

attention – the new destinations of Mexican migrants. As the focus of this paper suggests, the

areas that have been witness to the most rapid increase in skilled immigration are old, industrial

cities. Many of these areas, such as Detroit and St. Louis, are what Singer (2009) refers to as

“Former” Gateways – cities that were once home to large Western and Eastern European

immigrant population around the turn of the last century. Others, such as Akron and Syracuse,
 5

have never been major recipients of immigrants, but are now home to growing high-skill

immigrant populations. For example, between 1990 and 2006, the number of high-skilled in

Baltimore increased by 200 percent (from about 26,714 to 80,482); a rate of growth nearly twice

as high as that observed nationally and in traditional immigrant gateways like Chicago and Los

Angeles.

That high- and low-skill immigrants are settling in different cities is no surprise. Different

industries demand different sets of skills from workers and the economic and industrial structure

of labor markets vary quite substantially across metropolitan areas. Cities also differ in their need

for foreign labor. Some metro areas draw on immigrants to fill vacancies in low-skill sectors,

where they work as builders, groundskeepers, farm hands, and cooks. Others attract immigrants

with highly-educated backgrounds to work in computing, engineering, and health industries.

What is, however, surprising is that the skilled immigrant population is growing so rapidly in

places Americans traditionally associate with steel mills, auto plants, shipyards, and factories;

the very antithesis of high-tech America. Indeed, these areas have been credited with population

loses by their inability to attract modern industry and native talent (Frey 2004; Florida 2005).

While far from complete, the revitalization of America’s Rust Belt has is underway. The

collapse of the steel industry in Pittsburgh, for example, has been counterbalanced by growth in

highly-technical industries, particularly in the fields of biomedical technology, nuclear

engineering, and health care. Pittsburgh is home to three of the largest pharmaceutical companies

in the world (Bayer USA, GlaxoSmithKline, and Mylan, Inc.), a number of large chemical

engineering firms (Nova Chemicals, PPG Industries) and to the research arm of Thermo Fischer

Scientific. Likewise, Northeastern Ohio, historically known as the tire capital of the country is

today referred to as “Polymer Valley” for its emergence as a major player in plastics research
 6

and nanotechnology. The transformation of (some) industrial cities from predominately factory-

based economies to more diverse economies with growing knowledge-based sectors, coupled

with the fact that native workers have been abandoning these cities for decades offers some

insight into why high-skill immigrants are settling there. Our goal is to attempt to address this

question a bit more systematically, examining whether immigrants living in industrial cities

really do reap labor market benefits above and beyond those available in traditional gateway

cities, and whether their presence presents any unique challenges for native workers already

there.

Do Immigrants Benefit?

One simple possibility for why immigrant outcomes may differ in industrial and gateway cities is

compositional: that is, differences in the labor market success of high-skill immigrants living in

industrial versus gateway cities are due to compositional differences between the immigrant

populations living in these areas. While growth in skilled immigration is especially high in

industrial cities, far more immigrants (both unskilled and skilled) live in traditional gateway

cities. Extending the spatial assimilation model to a broader scale, if high-skill immigrants

possess personal characteristics – e.g., more schooling, longer stays in the U.S., or being

naturalized – that are also the conducive to employment and higher earnings (see Hall 2009),

than we may observe differences in these outcomes between immigrants in the two types of

settings. According to this argument, controlling for sociodemographic and

assimilation/acculturation characteristics of individual migrants should diminish any differences

in labor market outcomes between those living in industrial and gateway cities.
 7

Alternatively, an industrial demand explanation posits that industrial-gateway differences

in immigrant economic well-being are due to the different structures of local labor markets. As

previously noted, while industrial cities have, by definition, historically had manufacturing- and

factory-based economies, a revival from the rusting-out of these cities has taken place in many of

them. This recovery has been stimulated at least partially by the growth of highly technical

industries in the sciences, health, and information technology (Hall et al. 2011) – sectors that

employ sizeable shares of the high-skill population generally, and especially large shares of high-

skill immigrants (Batalova and Fix 2008). Following this demand-side explanation, high-skill

immigrants are attracted to industrial cities in the first place because job opportunities are more

plentiful, or at least because there are more openings for highly-technical jobs that compensate

well in industrial areas. Thus, any observed difference in labor markets outcomes between high-

skill immigrants in industrial and gateway cities should be explained by features of the

metropolitan labor markets.

Do Natives Benefit?

Any interest in the benefits of high-skill immigration in industrial cities cannot stop with the

immigrants. Indeed, the consequences of sustained levels of high immigration for natives’

economic well-being are of great concern and the focus of major political debates. There has

been a great deal of work dedicated to understanding the labor market consequences of

immigration, writ large (see Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot 2005; Smith and Edmonston 1997). Two

general perspectives frame this debate: competition/displacement and complementarity. The

classic microeconomic model of labor market competition predicts that any increase in the

supply of workers (e.g., via in-migration) will result in greater competition between workers over
 8

a fixed set of jobs, depressing wages (at least over the short-run). Studies testing the impact of

immigration on native job loss and wage decline have produced varied results (c.f., Borjas 2003;

Card 2001). Generally, they indicate small, but negative impacts of immigration on the

employment and wages of natives (Lohghi et al. 2008; Friedberg and Hunt 1995).

The potential for job competition with natives depends on the substitutability of native

and immigrant workers. While a consensus on this topic is far from being reached (c.f., Borjas,

Grogger, and Hanson 2008; Ottaviano and Peri 2006), the hour-glass shape of the immigrant

population means that natives at the tail ends of the educational distribution are most sensitive to

foreign labor. Borjas (2003), for example, finds that immigration during the 1980s resulted in

reductions in wages of 8.9% and 4.9% for high-school dropout and college graduates,

respectively; considerably higher than the immigration effects for the middle-education groups.

Among the relatively few studies focused explicitly on skill workers, Borjas (2005) finds that a

10% increase in the supply of foreign-born doctorates is associated with a 3% reduction in the

wages of their native counterparts.

Native displacement on behalf of immigrant workers may not just operate via job loss,

but also by inducing natives to flee labor markets (Borjas 2006; Card 2001; Borjas, Freeman, and

Katz 1997; Frey 1995; Filer 1992). Indeed, Borjas and colleagues (e.g., Borjas 2003; Borjas,

Freeman, and Katz 1996; Borjas and Katz 2007) argue that area-based approaches (i.e., studies

that consider the effect of immigration within labor markets) are inherently flawed because

natives may respond to the in-migration of foreign workers by all together leaving. While the

implied assumption of labor market integration has been challenged (see Card and DiNardo

2000), there is some evidence of a positive correlation between immigration and native out-

migration (Frey 1995; Kritz and Gurak 2001; but see Card and Dinardo 2000; Wright, et al.
 9

1997). Available research on this topic suggests that low-skill native workers (those with a high

school education or less) are most likely to be geographically displaced (Altonji and Card 1991;

Borjas 2006; Frey 1995; Walker, Ellis, and Barff 1992; White and Liang 1998). In short, because

labor is mobile, it is important to consider not just the impact of immigration on native

employment and earnings, but also if immigration influences the likelihood of native out-

migration.

A related, but conceptually unique perspective holds that immigrants merely replace

native workers who previously left geographies for better opportunities elsewhere. This is

especially salient in the context of Rustbelt and other industrial cities which have experienced

sustained population loss for at least two decades. Even more relevant is the fact that out-

migration from these areas has tended to be selective of young college graduates (Franklin

2003), prompting some to refer to these areas as “Brain Drain Cities” (Harden 2003). This

possibility – that immigrants may not be displacing, but merely replacing workers who had left

(or otherwise would) – increases the need for appropriately lagged variables in research seeking

to estimate the impacts of immigration, and not just its correlates.

An alternative to the competition/displacement perspective is that immigrants’ are

complementing natives’ economic success. Foreign workers entrepreneurial spirit and

innovativeness may create new markets, goods, and services which could spur enhanced

opportunities for native workers (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010; Lofstrom 2000). It is widely

assumed that low-skill immigrants complement high-skill workers (regardless of nativity) by

offering services below market value (e.g., in landscaping and housekeeping) and that high-skill

immigrants complement low-skill workers by creating labor demands that increase employment

(e.g., in housing construction) (see Borjas 1995). A complementing process is also possible if
 10

immigrants and natives are not competing for the same jobs. In the low-skill sector, the anecdote

is typically that low-skill natives will not do the work that low-skill immigrants will (e.g.,

picking lettuce in the blistering sun). In the high-skill sector, however, the argument is typically

that the local pool of high-skill natives does not possess the skills that immigrants do.

Consequently, if immigrants are not “taking” jobs from natives, but are increasing the overall

economic vitality of labor markets (through knowledge flows, ties to foreign institutions, and

increased enrollment in graduate programs), then employment opportunities and wages for high-

skill natives should increase (Herman and Smith 2010). Consistent with this line of reasoning,

Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) find no effects of immigration on the wages of skilled workers.

Similarly, Kaestner and Kaushal (2010) explore the impact of immigration on native registered

nurses’ economic outcomes, and find no effects on either employment or wages. Peri and

Sparber (2008) argue that these null or positive findings are generated because foreign- and

native-born skilled workers specialize differently (i.e., immigrants in jobs requiring analytic

skills and natives in occupations demanding communicative skills)

There is reason to believe that natives in labor markets with different histories of

immigrant reception will respond differently to immigrants. Sociologists have long been

interested in the structural dimensions of labor market process (see Berg 1981; Farkas, England

and Barton 1988). Meta-analysis of economic studies largely confirm that context matters – i.e.,

the impact of immigration on employment and wages depends on the flexibility of the market

and the ease with which native workers are able to relocate (Longhi et al. 2008; also see Card

and Lewis 2007). Certainly, any observed effects of immigration – in our case, of high-skill

immigration – may vary according to the composition of the local native population; i.e.,

differential effects of high-skill immigration on high-skill native outcomes by industrial status

 11

may be due to differences in the composition of the latter between industrial and immigrant

gateway cities.

Data and Methods

To explore the differential outcomes for high-skilled workers in industrial and gateway cities, we

draw on individual-level data from the 2006-2008 three-year American Community Survey

Public-Use Microdata Sample. The ACS is an annual survey of 3 million households conducted

by the U.S. Census that collects detailed information formerly available in the long form of the

decennial census. Because our main group of interest – high skill immigrants – represents a

relatively narrow slice of the total U.S. population, we use the three-year ACS file which

effectively appends together the annual PUMS files from 2006 to 2008 into a single database.

We restrict our sample to high-skilled men and women of prime working-age: college-

educated persons between the ages of 25 and 45.3 For the native-born, we further restrict the

analysis to those who identify as non-Latino white or black. We limit our analysis to individuals

who reside in an “industrial” or “immigrant gateway” primary metropolitan statistical area, based

on boundaries set by the Office of Management and Budget in 2008. In our classification,

“industrial” cities refer to the 37 metropolitan areas that the Brookings Institution’s State of

Metropolitan America (2010) defines as either a “Skilled Anchor” (n=19) or “Industrial Core”

(n=18), which are distinguished from five other categories (e.g., Diverse Giant, Border Growth,

New Heartland) of the 100 largest metro areas.4 “Immigrant gateway” cities refer to 7 large

3
Widening the age interval to include older workers (e.g., 25-55 or 25-64) produces substantively similar, but
generally weaker findings. Results from these models are available on request.
4
The results are very similar if respondents in the 19 “Skill Anchors” are excluding from the sample. For the
analysis on native outcomes, the employment models (for both men and women) produce slightly weaker results
when these metro areas are excluded, but the substantive interpretation remains the same. For all other outcomes,
this alternative definition of industrial status produces results nearly identical to those shown here.
 12

metropolitan areas that serve as traditional destinations for high-skilled immigrants. A list of

metro areas included in the analysis along with the number of natives and immigrants in each is

shown in Appendix Table 1.

Our analysis of high-skill immigrants and natives focuses on four outcomes (three for

immigrants). Employment is a binary indicator of whether individuals in the labor force are

currently working. Those coded “0” are not working, but seeking employment.

Underemployment is a dichotomous variable that points to an inability to convert schooling into

an occupation commensurate with their level of education. To calculate underemployment,

occupation-specific educational means and standard deviations were calculated based on all

American workers using the three-year 2006-2008 ACS PUMS. Underemployment is defined as

a mismatch between one’s schooling and the average educational level of those with the same

occupation. Workers are considered underemployed if their level of schooling is one or more

standard deviations above the occupation-specific mean.5 Earnings refers to annual earned

income from all jobs for employed persons. Because of the right skew of the distribution,

earnings are log-transformed in regression models. For native-born individuals, we include an

additional outcome: out-migration, which is a binary indicator of whether an individual migrated

out of one of the 44 metropolitan areas under study within the last year (t-1). For the purposes of

this paper, we focus our attention on the “departure” dimension of migration (in contrast to the

“destination” dimension) which models the likelihood that an individual will leave a

metropolitan area. Thus, we do not distinguish migrants based on the area they move to and

persons are considered migrants even if they move to another one of our 44 metro areas.

5
While this operationaliation of underemployment is preferable to more crude measures of overqualification (e.g.,
based on poverty status or hours worked), it is not without limitations. By definition, a certain percentage of workers
must lie above one standard deviation from the mean, and in leptokurtic distributions, this operationalization may
not necessarily correspond to an objective mismatch in skills (see Burris 1983; but see Clogg and Shockey 1984)
 13

In analyses specific to immigrants, because our primary goal is to distinguish the

economic well-being of high-skill immigrants in industrial versus gateway cities, the key

exogenous variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether a metropolitan area is classified as

“industrial” or not. The goal in the native analyses is different: to test whether the impact of

high-skill immigration varies by metro type. In these models, the key variable is the product term

of the industrial dummy and changes in the immigrant share of the high-skill population (i.e., the

percent of the total high-skill population that is foreign-born) between 2000 and 2006.6 Micro-

level control variables incorporated in both the native and immigrant analyses include age (in

linear years7) and educational attainment (in number of years of schooling). For models specific

to immigrants, we include five measures of assimilation/acculturation: citizenship, which

identifies immigrants who have become naturalized; English, which refers to foreign-born

persons who speak English “only,” “very well,” or “well”; Years in US represents the number of

years individual immigrants have lived in the U.S.; and region of birth which is a vector of

dummy variables representing where in nine world regions (Western Europe, Eastern

Europe/Former USSR, Asia, Latin America, Caribbean, South America, Africa, and Oceania)

one was born, with Canada serving as the referent. In models specific to the native-born, we also

include a binary indicator of whether the respondent is non-Latino black. All of these

explanatory variables are generated from ACS PUMS data.

Metropolitan-level variables used in immigrant and native analyses include the

unemployment rate and real gross domestic product per capita, both measured in 2006 and based

6
In supplemental models, numerous alternative specification of high-skill immigration were investigated, including
relative change in the high-skill immigrant share, absolute change in the number of high-skill immigrants, relative
change in the high-skill immigrant population, and corresponding changes in the percent of the immigrant
population that is high-skill. Results from these models are generally consistent with the presented ones, based on
absolute changes in the high-skill immigrant share, but tend to produce statistically weaker results.
7
Because of the relatively short age range which defines our sample, the relationship between age and labor market
outcomes is approximately linear (i.e., there is no evidence of curvilinearity).
 14

on BLS data from the Regional Economic Information Systems. Metropolitan housing costs are

determined by the median rent-to-income ratio for all residents in 2006, and come from the one-

year 2006 ACS PUMS. We also include measures of sector-specific job growth between 2000

and 2006 from REIS for four industrial groupings: Professional, Scientific, and Technical

Services (Science), Management of Companies and Enterprises (Managerial), Educational

Services (Education), and Health Care and Social Assistance (Health). In out-migration models,

metropolitan-level covariates refer to the metropolitan area of residence in the prior year. Thus,

for movers, the metro variables represent characteristics of the metropolitan areas in which they

migrated from.

We analyze these data using a series of regression models that take the following general

form for immigrants:

and for natives,

where, G is a link function; Yi is an outcome of interest (i.e., employment, underemployment,

earnings, or out-migration), ind is an binary indicator of industrial status; immchg is change in

the immigrant share of the high-skill population between 2000 and 2006; imm is the immigrant

share of the high-skill population in 2000; X is a vector of individual-level sociodemographic

and, for immigrants, assimilation characteristics; M is a vector of metro-level variables; and e is

a random error term. All descriptive and multivariate analyses are weighted using the person

weights provided by the ACS, and because there are multiple respondents in any given metro

area, we adjust for this nested structure of the data using the cluster procedure in Stata to

compute robust standard errors (StataCorp 2009).

 15

Results

Descriptives

Descriptive mean differences in employment, underemployment and earnings are shown for

high-skill immigrants in gateway and industrial cities in Table 1, separately for men and women.

For men, high-skill immigrants living in industrial cities are significantly more likely to be

employed and less likely to be underemployed than their counterparts living in gateway metros.

While the mean earnings of high-skill immigrant men are noticeably higher for those in gateway

cities (by $2,883), the difference is not statistically significant (t = -.56). Among immigrant

women, differences in employment are small but indicate slightly higher rates of employment in

gateway cities. Like with men, however, differences in underemployment are more visible with

rates of underemployment being about 7.6% lower in industrial than gateway cities. A similar to

their male counterparts, high-skill immigrant women’s earnings are higher in gateway cities, but

not significantly so (t = -1.46).

Corresponding descriptive patterns are shown for high-skill immigrant natives in Table 2.

For both high-skill male and female natives, levels of employment and underemployment are

relatively comparable in industrial and gateway cities. However, the industrial-gateway disparity

in earnings between these workers is large; much larger than the equivalent gap for immigrants.

For men, high-skill natives in gateway cities earn, on average, $22,576 more than high-skill

natives in industrial cities. Among women, the gap in earnings is $13,767. Also shown in Table 2

are mean differences in rates of out-migration for high-skill natives. Consistent with the long-

term trend of skilled population loss from industrial cities, migration rates are significantly

higher for high-skill male and female natives in industrial than gateway cities.
 16

Multivariate Immigrant Models

While these descriptive patterns are interesting and informative, they cannot reveal to what

extent these discrepancies are due to compositional or structural differences between industrial

and gateway cities. The series of regression models in Tables 3 and 4 seek to offer some useful

insights into these possibilities for high-skill immigrant men and women, respectively. In each

table, three models are shown for each of the three labor market outcomes (employment,

underemployment, and log earnings) – a baseline, unadjusted model (1); one that adds in micro-

level sociodemographic and assimilation/acculturation characteristics (2); and another that

includes structural features of metropolitan labor markets (3).

Starting with men, the regression coefficients Table 3 indicate that high-skill immigrant

men in industrial cities are significantly more likely to be employment and significantly less

likely to be underemployment than their counterparts in gateway cities without individual- or

metropolitan-level controls. As shown in the descriptive results, there is no significant earnings

difference between those in industrial and gateway cities.

Adding micro-level characteristics we see that labor market outcomes are better for older

immigrants, those with more years of schooling, those who are proficient in English, and for

those that have been in the U.S. longer. Caribbean and African immigrants have significantly

lower levels of employment than Canadian immigrants, and immigrants from essentially all non-

Canadian regions of the globe have higher levels of underemployment and lower earnings than

their Canadian counterparts. Most importantly, the addition of the controls for individual-level

characteristics of high-skill immigrants does not explain differences in these outcomes between

immigrants in industrial and gateway cities. The industrial coefficient for employment is

partially mediated –reduced to about three-fourths (72.4%) of its original size – but the
 17

coefficient for underemployment is actually suppressed by micro-level controls. Likewise, with

these variables included, a net negative industrial effect is revealed.8 Thus, differences in

employment, underemployment, and earnings between high-skill immigrants in industrial and

gateway do not appear to be due to (observed) compositional differences in the immigrant

populations living in these areas.

The third column of Table 3 includes structural characteristics of metropolitan labor

markets. For all three outcomes, the local unemployment rate registers a significant association,

negatively influencing employment, and positively relating to underemployment and earnings.

With a few exceptions, none of the other metropolitan variables are significantly associated with

high-skill immigrants’ labor market outcomes. For our purposes, however, the most crucial

observation is that including controls for overall metropolitan economic growth, housing costs,

and industrial-sector job growth, does not explain away the significant, positive industrial effect

on employment or the significant, negative industrial effect on underemployment. Metropolitan

characteristics do, in contrast, account for the negative industrial coefficient in the earnings

equation indicating that once metropolitan factors are held constant, there is no earnings

difference between immigrants in industrial and gateway cities.9

Corresponding regression models for high-skill immigrant women are shown in Table 4.

The unadjusted results for high-skill immigrant women parallel the descriptive patterns:

immigrants in industrial cities are less likely to be employed and underemployed and earn less

than immigrants in gateways, although the difference is only significant for underemployment.

8
The suppression of both underemployment and earnings is due almost entirely to high-skill immigrants in
industrial cities being more highly educated (Pearson’s r = .1186), and since education is positively related to both
underemployment and earnings.
9
Especially important in the attenuation of the industrial coefficient in the earnings model is GDP per capita,
possibly suggesting that differences in cost-of-living can account for the lower earnings of high-skill immigrants in
industrial cities.
 18

Micro-level controls added in column 2 for each outcome indicate that economic well-being is

generally better for high-skill immigrant women who are older, better educated, naturalized,

English speakers, and those who have been in the country longer. Immigrants from non-

Canadian countries tend, on average, to have poorer outcomes than Canadian immigrants.

Crucially, with these qualities of immigrants held at their means, the absolute size of the

industrial coefficients on underemployment and log earnings increase for the original (Model 1)

values.10

Some mediation of the industrial coefficients does occur when metropolitan variables are

added to the equation. The industrial effect on both underemployment and earnings is cut by

about 43% with the addition of structural features of labor markets. Despite these reductions in

the underemployment and earnings differences between high-skill immigrant women in

industrial and gateway metro areas, the industrial coefficients on both of these important labor

market outcomes remain relatively large in magnitude and statistically significant. The final

models indicate that with micro- and metro-level characteristics controlled, high-skill immigrant

women are about 9.8% less likely to be underemployed, but report an earnings deficit of about

6.9%.

Multivariate Native Models

Our immigrant-specific models can help us understanding if high-skill immigrants are benefiting

from their settlement in industrial cities, but an equally as – if not more – important question

concerns the impact high-skill immigration is having on their native-born counterparts in these

metropolitan areas. The next series of regression models, shown in Tables 5 (men) and 6

10
Like with men, this suppression is due mostly to the higher levels of education among high-skill immigrant
women in industrial cities.
 19

(women), seek to offer some evidence on this topic. As with immigrants, three models are shown

for each of the main outcomes, which include not just the same three examined for immigrants,

but also the likelihood of metropolitan out-migration: the first model includes four key terms, a

lagged variable of change in the percent of high-skill person who are foreign-born between 2000

and 2006, a dummy indicator of industrial status, the product of the two terms, and an anchoring

effect of the change variable (i.e., percent immigrant of the high-skill population in 2000); the

second model includes micro-level characteristic of high-skill immigrants; and the third

incorporates the same metropolitan structural characteristics used in the immigrant models.

Models predicting employment, underemployment, and out-migration are estimated as logits; the

log-earnings models using OLS.

The initial, unadjusted coefficients on employment in Table 5 indicate that increases in

the immigrant share of the high-skill population are positively related to the log-odds of

employment for native high-skill men, but the share of high-skill immigrants in 2000 is

negatively associated with employment. Most importantly, the interaction between recent

changes in the high-skill immigrant share and industrial status is statistically insignificant,

indicating that the impact of recent changes in the high-skill immigrant share on high-skill native

men’s employment operates similarly in industrial and gateway cities.

Model 1 estimates for underemployment also indicate no differential effect of

immigration on the log-odds of high-skill native men being overqualified in their current jobs;

indeed, immigration appears to have no effect at all on native men’s underemployment. Both the

earnings and migration models, however, do suggest distinct immigration effects in industrial

areas. Specifically, while changes in the high-skill immigrant share have little to no effect on

high-skill natives’ earnings in gateway areas, the significant and positive interaction term
 20

between changes in percent high-skill immigrant and industrial metro indicates that the earnings

of high-skill natives in industrial cities grow faster where the high-skill immigrant population is

growing. In a similarly beneficial manner, the immigration coefficients in the out-migration

model show some evidence of high-skill immigrants geographically displacing high-skill native

men in gateway cities, but not in industrial cities. Indeed, the net immigration effect in industrial

areas is negative and indicates that, while overall native men in industrial cities have heightened

odds of out-migration, they are less likely to leave metros if the high-skill immigrant population

is growing.

As with immigrants, the second model for each outcome adds in micro-level

characteristics, age, education, and race. The coefficients on these terms indicate that economic

well-being increases with age and education, and is lower for black than white men, even in the

high-skill population.11 Consistent with migration research (see Greenwood 1997), the likelihood

of out-migration from a metropolitan area decreases with age and is higher for those with more

schooling. Importantly, holding these sociodemographic characteristics constant does not

attenuate any of the main or differential effects of immigration on employment, earnings, or

migration. With these traits of individual workers controlled, high-skill natives are more likely to

be employed where the immigrant share of the high-skill population is increasing (regardless of

industrial status). For natives in industrial cities, their earnings also increase with growth in the

high-skill immigration population, and while there remains evidence of geographic displacement

of high-skill natives in metros experiencing growth in the high-skill immigrant population, this is

only true in gateway cities (i.e., industrial natives remain less likely to out-migrate if the high-

skill immigrant population is growing).

11
In supplemental models available upon request, separate models were run for non-Latino black and white natives.
The main effect of high-skill immigration and its interaction with industrial status does not vary by race for any of
the four outcomes, for either men or women.
 21

Metropolitan-level variables tapping overall economic growth, cost of living, and

industrial sector job growth are added in the final column for each outcome. Few coefficients

register statistically significant effects, but the value of overall job growth and growth in the

health sector is clear. With these variables held constant in the final models, significant effects of

immigration remain but, in some cases, are reduced in overall size. For employment, the main

effect of change in high-skill immigration is reduced by 46%; however, the coefficient remains

statistically significant and indicates that high-skill native men are more likely to be employed in

metro areas where the immigrant share of the high-skill population is growing.

In the earnings equation, with these same features of metro areas controlled, a significant,

negative main effect of immigration emerges suggesting that high-skill immigrants may be

depressing wages of high-skill native men; a one percentage point increase in the immigrant

share of the high-skill population reduces native earnings by 2.9%. However, the positive and

significant interaction between changes in high-skill immigration and industrial status indicates

that wage depression is only observed in gateway cities. The net earnings effect of high-skill

immigration on native men’s earnings is actually positive and indicates that a one percentage

point increase in the high-skill immigrant share increases the earnings of native men by about

3.3% [exp(-.029+.061)].

The full out-migration model also points to some positive effects of immigration in

industrial cities. Specifically, with the full slate of individual- and metropolitan-level variables

controlled, high-skill natives have higher log-odds of out-migration in areas where the high-skill

immigrant population is growing, offering some support to the geographical displacement thesis.

However, the negative interaction term between changes in the immigrant share of the high-skill
 22

population and industrial status effectively offsets the main effect for high-skill native men in

industrial cities.

Corresponding results for high-skill native women are very similar to those for men. The

coefficients in Table 6 indicate that without micro- or metro-level controls, high-skill native

women have higher log-odds of employment when the immigrant percentage of the high-skill

population is increasing. Its interaction with industrial status is nonsignificant, indicating that the

employment advantage of high-skill immigration is experienced by natives in both gateway and

industrial cities. Without controls, high-skill natives in industrial cities, but not gateway metros,

see earnings gains to increases in the immigrant share of the high-skill population. In addition,

while (like men) high-skill native women in gateway cities have higher log-odds of out-

migration when the high-skill immigrant population is growing, that evidence of geographic

displacement does not appear to play out in industrial cities, as the interaction term between

immigration and industrial status more than offsets the positive main effect.

Holding constant micro-level sociodemographic and metro-level economic characteristics

does not mediate the effects of immigration on native women’s economic well-being in any

meaningful way. Indeed, with these variables in the model, the employment premium associated

with high-skill immigration remains moderately large and statistically significant and indicates

that a one-percentage point increase in the immigrant share of the high-skill population increases

the odds of employment by 8.8%, for high-skill native women in both gateway and industrial

cities. By contrast, both the earnings and out-migration models suggest some disadvantageous

effects of high-skill immigration for native women in gateway cities; namely that changes in the

high-skill immigrant population are associated with lower earnings and heightened log-odds of

migration. However, for women in industrial cities, the net wage effect is positive – a one
 23

percentage point increase in the high-skill immigrant share is associated with an increase in

native women’s earnings of about 2.6% (e(-.026+.052)-1) – and the net migration effect is effectively

zero, suggesting the immigrants are not geographically displacing high-skill native women there.

Conclusion

Our general objective in this paper has been to complement the literature on immigration

dispersion and skill differentiation by describing who the beneficiaries are of high-skill

immigration to the new destinations of foreign-born skilled workers in Industrial America. Using

individual-level data from the 2006-2008 American Community Survey PUMS linked to metro-

level data on changes in immigration and labor market conditions in 44 industrial and immigrant-

gateway cities, we examined three important outcomes of economic success – employment,

underemployment, and earnings – for prime-age, high-skilled immigrant men and women and

the same outcomes, plus metropolitan out-migration for high-skilled natives. Results from these

analyses confirm that context matters: both immigrant outcomes and the effect of immigration on

native outcomes vary by gateway vs. industrial metropolitan residence.

So who does benefit from high-skill immigrant settlement in industrial cities? A graphical

summary of our results is shown in Table 7. Overall, both the immigrant and native portions of

the analysis suggest widespread benefits of the settlement of skilled immigrants in industrial

cities. In comparison to their counterparts in gateway cities, high-skill immigrants in industrial

areas are more likely to be employed (men only) and, when employed, are significantly less

likely to be overqualified for their jobs. And, while there is an earnings disadvantage for skilled-

immigrants in industrial cities, it is largely explained by the differential costs of living between

gateway and industrial cities (but not for women).

 24

Of at least as much interest, the results for natives also point to advantages associated

with the migration of skilled immigrants to industrial cities. Specifically, high-skill native men

and women in industrial (and gateway) cities in which the foreign-born share of the high-skill

population is expanding are more likely to be employed than their counterparts in areas where

the immigrant population is not growing. We also find no evidence that immigrants are pushing

natives into underemployment (i.e., into jobs that they are overqualified for). The earnings

equations indicate that while increases in immigration are associated with depressed earnings for

natives in gateway cities, the opposite is true of high-skill natives in industrial cities: as the

immigrant share of the high-skill population increases, the earnings of high-skill natives also

grow. Similarly, while we find evidence of geographic displacement as immigration increases,

this pattern is only true for high-skill natives in gateway cities; for those in industrial cities, the

net impact of immigration on metropolitan out-migration is nonexistent or slightly negative.

Our efforts to explain the advantages of industrial residence (for immigrants) and

industrial immigration (for natives) were unsuccessful. Very little of the industrial-gateway

difference in immigrant outcomes is due to differences in the composition of the populations

living in these cities. In fact, adjusting for the compositional differences tends to suppress even

larger advantages on behalf of industrial immigrants. Conditions and features of metropolitan

labor markets do explain a considerable portion of the premiums in economic well-being for

immigrants, but large and significant differences remain. For high-skill natives, neither

individual- nor metropolitan-level controls attenuate the beneficial effects of immigration for

those in industrial cities. What can we account the unexplained variability to? It is very likely

that we have been unable to capture all the dynamics of local labor markets with our limited set

of metro-level variables. As Peri and Sparber (2008) contend it is quite possible that immigrants
 25

and natives specialize differently, and given the differences in the structure of industrial and

gateway cities’ labor markets, it is conceivable that differences in specialization may be more

pronounced in industrial than gateway cities. Thus, if the substitutability of immigrants is more

imperfect in industrial areas, there may be greater room for high-skill immigrants to complement

the work of high-skill natives. Alternatively, a more sociological explanation may focus on

differences in the context of reception between industrial and gateway cities. De Jong and Tran

(2001) report that native attitudes about immigrants are more favorable throughout the Midwest

region – where many of our industrial cities are located – than in other regions of the country.

The data they use – the 1994 GSS – however, predates much of the resettlement of immigrants in

these areas. Moreover, in subsequent work, De Jong and Steinmetz (2004) find that receptivity

climate affects the occupational attainment of low-skill, but not high-skill natives.

In sum, our results offer relatively little support for the traditional displacement

hypothesis that high-skill immigrants are taking jobs and depressing wages for high-skill natives,

or that they are prompting natives to search for new opportunities beyond the boundaries of their

metropolitan area. It is important to recognize here that we only find such positive outcomes for

high-skill workers in industrial cities. In contrast, the impact of immigration on the earnings and

likelihood of out-migration for natives in gateway cities appears to be comparatively

disadvantageous, depressing earnings and driving natives out of gateway cities all together. We

also must stress here that the results we present here are largely descriptive in nature. We are

unable to state clear causal arguments about the impact of immigration, although our results are

generally inconsistent with at least the gloomiest accounts of the consequences of immigration.

Our initial investigations into addressing the endogeneity of changes in immigration have proved
 26

unsuccessful; but future efforts will surely need to take this concern seriously.12 And, while we

have been careful to lag variables in an appropriate manner, related work would benefit by taking

advantage of longitudinal data sources to better isolate the impacts of skilled immigration, for

both immigrants and natives.

12
We experimented with 2SLS models instrumenting the endogenous change in the immigrant share of the high-
skill population (and its interaction with industrial status) with the national share of all high-skill immigrants living
in a metropolitan area. We have also explored models in which the earlier “anchor” point of the high skill immigrant
share in 2000 serves as an instrument. Diagnostic tests for both of these alternative specifications suggest weakly
identified models (Cragg-Donald Wald tests < 1.5).
 27

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Figure 1: Trend in Low- and High-Skilled Immigration, 1994 and 2010

38

36
Percent of working age immigrants

34
Low-Skill
32

30

28

26
High-Skill
24

22

20

Note: Author analysis of weighted 1994-2010 Current Population Surveys

 32

Table 1: Mean Differences in Employment, Underemployment, and Earnings

between Industrial and Gateway Cities for High-Skill Immigrants, by Sex
High-Skill Immigrants
Men Women

Industrial Gateway Industrial Gateway

Employed .977 * .973 .953 .956
Underemployed .424 * .462 .399 * .432
Earnings $82,145 $85,025 $53,570 $57,563
Notes: industrial-gateway mean difference significant at p < .05 (two-tailed t test);
Standard errors adjusted for metropolitan clustering
 33

Table 2: Mean Differences in Employment, Underemployment, Earnings, and Out-

Migration between Industrial and Gateway Cities for High-Skill Natives, by Sex
High-Skill Natives
Men Women
Industrial Gateway Industrial Gateway
Employed .980 .975 .976 .973
Underemployed .358 .351 .324 .325
Earnings $84,938 * $107,514 $50,592 * $64,359
Out-Migrated .056 * .051 .049 * .045
Notes: industrial-gateway mean difference significant at p < .05 (two-tailed t test);
Standard errors adjusted for metropolitan clustering
 34

Table 3: Regression Models for Labor Market Outcomes for High-Skill Immigrant Men
Employment Underemployment Log Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Industrial MSA .199 * .144 * .156 ** -.153 ** -.209 *** -.190 ** -.010 -.075 * -.005
(.087) (.071) (.059) (.059) (.061) (.067) (.046) (.047) (.024)
Age .020 * .019 * .040 *** .040 *** .028 *** .028 ***
(.009) (.009) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Eduational Attainment .143 *** .139 *** .245 *** .247 *** .092 *** .091 ***
(.020) (.020) (.022) (.023) (.007) (.006)
Citizen -.123 -.119 .061 .061 .015 + .016 +
(.104) (.104) (.052) (.052) (.017) (.018)
Speaks English .464 *** .452 *** -1.141 *** -1.146 *** .554 *** .544 ***
(.057) (.062) (.047) (.047) (.031) (.035)
Years in US .006 .007 -.018 *** -.018 *** .012 *** .012 ***
(.008) (.008) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Region of Birth (Canada=ref.)
Western Europe .143 .153 .471 *** .470 *** -.053 -.064 *
(.253) (.256) (.076) (.076) (.034) (.034)
Eastern Europe/USSR -.214 -.194 .575 *** .563 *** -.307 *** -.316 ***
(.265) (.266) (.121) (.125) (.041) (.040)
Asia .013 .031 .329 *** .331 *** -.284 *** -.289 ***
(.276) (.275) (.093) (.095) (.041) (.039)
Latin American .066 .074 1.323 *** 1.338 *** -.616 *** -.592 ***
(.297) (.287) (.110) (.110) (.051) (.046)
Caribbean -.515 * -.566 * .808 *** .805 *** -.557 *** -.535 ***
(.239) (.241) (.094) (.092) (.064) (.072)
South America -.037 -.077 .875 *** .878 *** -.465 *** -.451 ***
(.287) (.287) (.089) (.089) (.067) (.072)
African -.468 -.505 * .832 *** .852 *** -.539 *** -.545 ***
(.246) (.256) (.053) (.054) (.063) (.059)
Oceania .457 .500 .276 * .271 * .100 .079
(.691) (.694) (.137) (.136) (.100) (.105)
Unemployment rate -.070 + .052 *** .024 *
(.042) (.015) (.009)
GDP per capita -.004 .006 + .012 ***
(.005) (.004) (.002)
Housing costs -.031 .015 .002
(.024) (.012) (.007)
Industrial Job Growth
Scientific -.004 -.001 -.001
(.007) (.002) (.001)
Managerial .001 .000 .001
(.001) (.001) (.000)
Education .004 .004 .002 **
(.003) (.003) (.001)
Health .013 -.006 -.001
(.010) (.005) (.002)
Constant 3.257 * .065 * 1.409 -.153 *** -4.970 *** -6.069 *** 11.088 *** 8.038 *** 7.214 ***
(.087) (.330) (1.127) (.043) (.408) (.822) (.044) (.054) (.299)

N 31600 31600 31600 30749 30749 30749 30749 30749 30749

-2 log likelihood -3841 -3784 -3777 -21175 -19966 -19947 -39732 -36919 -36768

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Employment and underemployment columns show logistic regression
coefficients.
 35

Table 4: Regression Models for Labor Market Outcomes for High-Skill Immigrant Women
Employment Underemployment Log Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Industrial MSA -.080 -.059 -.039 -.135 ** -.181 *** -.103 *** -.088 -.128 ** -.072 **
(.088) (.089) (.074) (.042) (.042) (.027) (.051) (.046) (.023)
Age .011 *** .011 *** .025 *** .042 *** .009 *** .010 ***
(.008) (.008) (.003) (.005) (.001) (.001)
Eduational Attainment .092 *** .089 *** .159 *** .164 *** .111 *** .110 ***
(.019) (.018) (.019) (.019) (.008) (.007)
Citizen .431 *** .432 *** -.125 *** -.127 *** .110 *** .108 ***
(.106) (.106) (.036) (.035) (.013) (.012)
Speaks English .638 *** .639 *** -1.171 *** -1.166 *** .663 *** .653 ***
(.105) (.107) (.051) (.050) (.048) (.050)
Years in US .023 *** .023 *** -.023 *** -.023 *** .015 *** .015 ***
(.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Region of Birth (Canada=ref.)
Western Europe -.352 -.351 .279 *** .278 *** -.075 -.091
(.257) (.257) (.071) (.070) (.050) (.050)
Eastern Europe/USSR -.642 * -.623 * .584 *** .586 *** -.256 *** -.263 ***
(.260) (.261) (.070) (.071) (.041) (.043)
Asia -.586 * -.586 * .315 *** .320 *** -.134 *** -.143 ***
(.231) (.231) (.063) (.062) (.037) (.038)
Latin American -.607 * -.624 * .711 *** .731 *** -.437 *** -.422 ***
(.302) (.302) (.079) (.074) (.045) (.043)
Caribbean -.574 * -.570 * .579 *** .581 *** -.296 *** -.278 ***
(.246) (.251) (.058) (.063) (.055) (.046)
South America -.461 -.465 .631 *** .628 *** -.333 *** -.319 ***
(.267) (.264) (.071) (.075) (.035) (.039)
African -.782 *** -.810 *** .441 *** .447 *** -.250 *** -.258 ***
(.219) (.213) (.089) (.084) (.066) (.062)
Oceania .000 .000 .162 .161 .124 .108
(.000) (.000) (.134) (.129) (.126) (.127)
Unemployment rate -.069 ** -.021 .022
(.024) (.013) (.011)
GDP per capita -.005 .005 ** .011 ***
(.004) (.002) (.002)
Housing costs -.016 -.003 .006
(.016) (.008) (.005)
Industrial Job Growth
Scientific .003 -.003 * .001
(.004) (.001) (.002)
Managerial -.001 -.001 * .000
(.001) (.000) (.000)
Education -.006 * .008 *** -.001
(.003) (.002) (.001)
Health .011 .000 -.001
(.007) (.003) (.003)
Constant 3.088 *** .595 *** 1.710 ** -.274 *** -2.724 *** -2.921 *** 10.616 *** 7.657 *** 6.813 ***
(.021) (.400) (.817) (.041) (.383) (.532) (.039) (.174) (.298)

N 28711 28711 28711 27553 27553 27553 27553 27553 27553

-2 log likelihood -5235 -5088 -5082 -18053 -18064 -18042 -38125 -36386 -36288

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Employment and underemployment columns show logistic regression
coefficients.
 36

Table 5: Regression Models of the Impact of High-Skill Immigration on Labor Market Outcomes of High-Skill Native Men
Employment Underemployment Log Earnings Out-Migration
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Change in percent high-skill .179 *** .186 *** .100 *** .012 .004 .002 -.028 -.030 -.029 ** .138 * .151 * .181 ***
immigrant (.030) (.029) (.024) (.021) (.022) (.018) (.029) (.026) (.010) (.054) (.059) (.056)
Industrial Metro -.179 -.203 -.259 .033 .076 .035 -.340 *** -.356 *** -.185 *** .559 ** .631 *** .346 **
(.212) (.217) (.136) (.054) (.069) (.054) (.097) (.089) (.034) (.180) (.180) (.195)
Change in percent high-skill -.047 -.056 -.004 -.011 -.012 -.003 .100 ** .096 *** .061 *** -.186 *** -.193 *** -.177 **
immigrant X Industrial metro (.055) (.057) (.045) (.020) (.022) (.016) (.032) (.028) (.013) (.048) (.050) (.072)
Percent high-skill immigrant -.043 *** -.045 *** -.044 *** -.002 -.001 -.001 .003 .002 .002 -.002 -.001 -.020
(.008) (.008) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Age (in years) .030 *** .030 *** .002 .002 .046 *** .046 *** -.098 *** -.098 ***
(.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.004)
Educational attainment .125 *** .122 *** .227 *** .227 *** .083 *** .081 *** .138 *** .136 ***
(.017) (.017) (.016) (.016) (.003) (.003) (.015) (.015)
Non-Latino black -.684 *** -.692 *** .328 *** .329 *** -.314 *** -.317 *** .148 .149
(.100) (.104) (.043) (.043) (.027) (.025) (.091) (.093)
Metro unemployment rate -.092 *** -.005 .012 * -.067
(.020) (.009) (.005) (.034)
Metro GDP per capita .005 -.002 .010 * -.002
(.005) (.002) (.001) (.005)
Metro housing costs .026 .004 .000 .038
(.019) (.010) (.007) (.030)
Industrial Job Growth
Scientific .003 -.002 * .000 .001
(.002) (.001) (.000) (.001)
Managerial .002 * .000 .000 -.003 **
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.001)
Education .002 .001 .001 ** .001
(.002) (.001) (.000) (.002)
Health .007 * -.002 * .002 * -.007 *
(.004) (.001) (.001) (.003)
Constant 4.227 *** 1.184 ** .778 -.617 *** -4.565 *** -4.542 *** 11.254 *** 8.265 *** 7.636 *** -3.288 *** -2.337 *** -2.412 *
(.244) (.391) (.709) (.051) (.284) (.467) (.085) (.111) (.223) (.191) (.271) (.807)

N 99857 99857 99857 97632 97632 97632 97632 97632 97632 111162 111162 111162
Log likelihood -10592 -10482 -10461 -63466 -62315 -62306 -119148 -111730 -111335 -22756 -21816 -21771

Notes: All models control for ACS survey year and metro population size; Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Employment, underemployment,
and out-migration columns show logistic regression coefficients.
 37

Table 6: Regression Models of the Impact of High-Skill Immigration on Labor Market Outcomes of High-Skill Native Women
Employment Underemployment Log Earnings Out-Migration
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Change in percent high-skill .087 *** .109 *** .084 *** -.026 -.030 -.010 -.023 -.023 -.026 ** .148 * .167 * .209 **
immigrant (.025) (.023) (.025) (.026) (.026) (.018) (.026) (.023) (.009) (.061) (.064) (.071)
Industrial Metro -.088 -.109 -.021 .011 .049 .002 -.291 * -.286 * -.157 ** .523 * .589 ** .373 **
(.184) (.184) (.094) (.053) (.065) (.062) (.129) (.114) (.048) (.214) (.223) (.217)
Change in percent high-skill -.025 -.043 -.042 .032 .029 .021 .077 ** .074 ** .052 *** -.167 ** -.179 ** -.187 *
immigrant X Industrial metro (.039) (.039) (.034) (.023) (.024) (.020) (.027) (.024) (.012) (.053) (.054) (.086)
Percent high-skill immigrant -.023 ** -.027 *** -.020 *** .006 .007 * .002 .004 .004 .006 ** -.001 .000 -.022
(.007) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.013) (.014) (.014)
Age (in years) -.001 -.001 .004 .004 * .014 *** .014 *** -.102 *** -.102 ***
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.004)
Educational attainment .159 *** .157 *** .167 *** .167 *** .107 *** .106 *** .113 *** .110 ***
(.017) (.018) (.015) (.015) (.004) (.004) (.017) (.017)
Non-Latino black -.597 *** -.583 *** .267 *** .272 *** .006 .006 *** -.127 -.119
(.064) (.066) (.025) (.026) (.017) (.015) (.075) (.076)
Metro unemployment rate -.067 *** -.017 -.004 -.073
(.012) (.009) (.007) (.042)
Metro GDP per capita .000 .000 .006 *** .003
(.003) (.001) (.001) (.006)
Metro housing costs -.023 .009 -.008 .042
(.014) (.010) (.006) (.033)
Industrial Job Growth
Scientific .000 -.001 .001 * .002
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.002)
Managerial .002 * -.001 * .001 -.003 **
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.001)
Education .000 .000 .001 .000
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.003)
Health .001 -.003 ** .001 * -.005
(.004) (.001) (.000) (.008)
Constant 3.884 *** 1.371 *** 2.363 *** -.838 *** -3.858 *** -3.868 *** 10.694 *** 8.411 *** 8.311 *** -3.464 *** -2.009 *** -2.342 **
(.218) (.300) (.549) (.063) (.270) (.388) (.100) (.148) (.204) (.235) (.384) (.844)

N 105127 105127 105127 102469 102469 102469 102469 102469 102469 134579 134579 134579
Log likelihood -12374 -12266 -12252 -64583 -63954 -63935 -135038 -133295 -133135 -25301 -24225 -24162

Notes: All models control for ACS survey year and metro population size; Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Employment, underemployment,
and out-migration columns show logistic regression coefficients.
 38

Table 7: Summary of Results for High-Skill Persons in Industrial Cities

High-Skill Group Employment Underemployment Earnings Out-Migration

Immigrant Men B B -- n/a
Immigrant Women -- B D n/a

Native Men B -- B B / --
Native Women B -- B B / --

Notes: "B" refers to effects that are significantly beneficial (at p < .05) to those in industrial cities;
"D" to effects that are significantly disadvantageous; "--" to null effects; and "n/a" to non-
applicable models (out-migration not an outcome for immigrants)
 39

Appendix Table 1: High-Skill Immigrant and Native Sample Sizes, Total Number of High-Skill Immigrants, and Immigrant Share of
High-Skill Population, by Metropoltian Area

Immigrant Share of High-Skill

ACS High-Skill Sample High-Skill Immigrants Population
Immigrants Natives 2000 2006 2000 2006 Change

Akron, OH 117 1,571 6,365 7,616 6.44 6.46 .02

Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 280 2,098 12,360 18,569 8.60 11.10 2.50
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 76 796 3,147 4,717 5.60 7.76 2.15
Baltimore-Towson, MD 1,288 7,166 48,371 80,482 10.28 14.22 3.93
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 131 2,538 5,851 9,238 3.81 5.18 1.37
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 3,699 14,207 159,162 208,249 14.74 17.51 2.77
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 709 2,505 32,491 43,339 15.08 18.55 3.46
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 215 2,417 11,627 13,922 6.92 7.59 .67
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 4,998 20,406 270,277 348,540 16.76 19.08 2.31
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 458 4,943 19,110 26,755 6.31 7.68 1.37
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 534 4,460 26,417 30,288 8.47 9.28 .81
Dayton, OH 130 1,787 7,207 8,236 5.90 6.66 .76
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 1,613 7,405 80,427 109,141 12.71 15.14 2.44
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 86 2,078 6,051 7,437 4.99 5.21 .22
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 82 1,085 4,617 6,159 5.85 6.58 .73
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, C 598 2,994 22,364 35,842 10.40 15.30 4.90
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 3,356 8,569 138,291 202,665 19.50 23.47 3.97
Jackson, MS 51 1,374 1,846 2,514 2.28 2.85 .57
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 12,431 15,615 633,915 795,988 34.14 36.67 2.53
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 242 3,265 8,817 10,988 5.55 5.94 .39
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 304 2,801 10,765 15,500 6.14 7.99 1.85
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 5,734 6,075 251,893 373,421 35.31 41.80 6.49
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 256 2,532 15,069 19,362 6.22 7.24 1.02
New Haven-Milford, CT 394 1,792 17,572 22,972 12.50 14.28 1.78
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 173 1,952 13,408 12,048 7.40 7.82 .42
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ 17,797 35,698 973,218 1,227,893 27.73 30.47 2.74
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE 2,105 12,543 106,604 141,886 10.95 12.70 1.75
Pittsburgh, PA 401 5,563 21,059 27,411 5.60 6.40 .80
Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 51 987 3,696 4,169 3.88 3.83 -.04
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 220 1,216 9,611 14,004 10.67 12.03 1.36
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-ME 409 3,145 18,974 26,279 8.98 10.72 1.74
Rochester, NY 254 2,835 14,877 19,108 8.15 9.59 1.44
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 6,147 8,857 288,310 353,577 28.17 31.88 3.71
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA 35 1,191 2,688 2,911 3.80 3.77 -.04
Springfield, MA 173 1,557 8,155 9,642 7.69 7.98 .28
St. Louis, MO-IL 546 6,444 25,760 33,913 6.20 6.97 .77
Syracuse, NY 120 1,470 7,664 6,557 8.22 6.08 -2.14
Toledo, OH 87 1,149 5,488 5,960 7.28 7.02 -.26
Tulsa, OK 120 1,449 6,809 10,085 5.50 6.81 1.31
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA 370 3,257 16,627 21,962 7.80 8.74 .95
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD 5,740 17,106 244,514 339,037 19.03 22.15 3.12
Wichita, KS 97 1,004 4,061 7,441 5.20 9.01 3.82
Worcester, MA 319 1,381 10,209 15,892 11.44 15.09 3.65
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 31 861 1,956 2,768 3.21 4.45 1.24

Notes: ACS sample includes prime-age, college-educated men and women; "Immigrant gateways" are italicized