Mustafa ‘Âlî

Time span: 
1550-1599
Education: 
Medrese
Career: 
Bureaucrat
Short biography: 

Mustafa ‘Âlî  wrote approximately 50 works of history, politics, ethics and poetry. As far as it
concerns political thought, his main work is “Counsel for Sultans” (Nushatü’s-selâtîn, usually
quoted as Nasîhatü’s-selâtîn). Pieces of political theory are to be found also in his later
works: Künhü’l-ahbâr, Mevâidü’n-nefâis fi kavâidi’l-mecâlis (“Tables of Delicacies Concerning
the Rules of Social Gatherings”) and Füsûl-i hall ü akd ve usûl-i harc ü nakd (“The seasons of
sovereignty on the principles of critical expenditure”), etc.

Work: 
As far as it concerns political thought, his main work is “Counsel for Sultans” (Nushatü’s-
selâtîn, usually quoted as Nasîhatü’s-selâtîn). Pieces of political theory are to be found also in
his later works: Künhü’l-ahbâr, Mevâ’idü’n-nefâis etc.

Nushatü’s-selâtîn (Counsel for Sultans)

Author: 
Mustafa ‘Âlî
Date: 
1586

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 Date comments: 

Completed in 1581, with minor additions added by 1586.

Manuscripts: 
Nine mss., among which one dated 1627 and another 1698 (See Tietze, 9).

• Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Qaumīya, Tārīkh turkī no. 237 (d. 1698)
• Fatih no. 3522. No colophon.
• Hüsrev Paşa no. 311 (d. 1581)
• Hazine no. 1601, fols. 8r-107r. The beginning is missing. No colophon.
• Nuruosmaniye no. 4348. No colophon.
• Nuruosmaniye no. 4347. No colophon.
• Revan no. 406. The colophon contains no date.
• Üniversite Kütüphanesi, Türkçe yazmalar, no. 4098, fols. 163v-201v (d. 1627)
• Yeni Cami no. 1014. No colophon.
Editions: 
Tietze, A. (ed.-tr.-notes), Mustafâ ‘Âlî’s Counsel for Sultans of 1581, 2 vols, Vienna 1979-1982

Summary: 
In the preface of Nushatü’s-selâtîn ("Counsel for Sultans") (Τ 1:17/89-37/120), Ali stresses the
importance of justice and of administrators (hükkâm) not promoting to the high offices the
rabble (erâzil) that is in their service, noting that sultans must now rely to viziers as it is
impossible for them to inspect themselves their army and lands. However, “in this matter [of
unqualified persons appointed to high posts] ignorance is by no means an excuse; unawareness
of the situation of the vezirs (vükelâ) will not count as a valid defense on the Day of
Judgment”. The sultan will not be excused, although his servants conceal the harsh reality. The
present sultan, as his ancestors, prefers isolation than mixing with the people and has delegated
all power to untrustworthy administrators; but then it is his duty to protect the subjects against
these administrators’ oppression. (T 1:18-23/91-98, and ff.; cf. similar thoughts in B82: “neither
permission nor allowance is authorized for deputizing someone else in [the kings’] place”). The
sultan must have close contact with high and low and interfere personally, promoting people of
intelligence and not only those trained in the Palace (T 1:25/101). Besides this, generosity is
praised as a prerequisite of a ruler or his viziers, illustrated by the story of Firdewsi (T 1:29-
32/106-12). Ali further illustrates his point with stories showing how irresponsible
appointments can bring forth ruin and disaster; the bad deeds of such people are to be blamed
on the vizier who appointed them. Here Ali also speaks against converted infidels attaining
high posts, that is against the extensive use of kuls in administration (T 1:36-37/119; cf. above).

Now Ali proceeds to an introduction (T 1:37-40/121-25), showing God’s special favors

bestowed on the Ottoman dynasty, namely: the excellence of the sultans’ palace and retinue;

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their religious orthodoxy; their freedom from plague; their absolute power to appoint their own
people as governors of far-flung provinces; their extraordinary military power; the fine state of
their finances. These bestowals incur a strong responsibility for keeping their lands in justice
and good order.

The first chapter (T 1:41-65/126-62) discusses the matters necessary for kings, as presented by
the previous Ottoman rulers or the ancient caliphs, who governed with equity and “through
beneficial innovations and laudable rules” (T 1:41/126: nev-âyîn-i hasene ve kavânîn-i
müstahsene). These requirements (lâzime), some of which have their origin on previous
literature are seventeen in number, namely: (1) to gain the love and loyalty of their subjects, by
protecting the poor, studying history, restraining their own violence (dest-i ta’addîlerini kasîr
idüb), not giving over the affairs of the state (umûr-i mülk) to eunuchs, mutes and other
courtiers, respecting the ulema and taking care of the army (T 1:41/126-27); (2) to choose an
educated, well-mannered and honest companion (musâhib), without granting him any office or
rank (T 1:41-46/127-35); (3) to reward those who offered good service to themselves and their
ancestors, to retain governors who have shown good and praiseworthy conduct, especially in
frontier regions (T 1:47/135-36); (4) to employ an extensive network of spies in order to check
the well-functioning of all services and officials, since reports by officers or clerks in favour of
other fellow-officers are not free from self-interest (T 1:47-48/136-37; cf. also B25-26); (5) to
dismiss and banish usurers (ribâ-horân), naibs and other corrupt local personalities who
oppress the subjects with their loans and whom even governors fear (T 1:48/137); (6) to
control tightly the conduct of the divan secretaries, especially to remove those addicted to
drugs, and to give special attention to the election of the re’îs-i küttâb and the tuğrakeşân/
nişâncı, being the jurisconsults (müftiyân) of the imperial laws (T 1:48-50/138-40); (7) to
appoint wise men in high offices, not giving attention to objections such as “This is not the old
custom” (kanûn-i kadîm); this view is illustrated with a story about Selim I saying that “in
selecting [the officials] [the Grand Vizier should] screen everybody in [the] glorious capital city
down to the porters that carry loads on their backs” (but this example is somehow corrected
below, T 1:67/165, when this low-descent Grand Vizier [Pirî Paşa] is described as a descendant
of a saintly family and as a worthy and wise fellow) (T 1:50-53/140-44); (8) to reward
governors and soldiers in order to have their weapons and equipment complete, and to dismiss
those who neglect these duties (T 1:53-54/144-46); (9) to create charitable foundations only
with the personal property of the Sultan, i.e. his share of the booty, and not with the public
treasury (beytü’l-mâl) (T 1:54/146; cf. B121, where the constructing of mosques, dervish
lodges etc. in a flourishing city is condemned as hypocritical); (10) to send the janissary cavalry
(bölük halkı) to Egypt instead of leaving them go astray in Istanbul after their exit from the
imperial palace (T 1:54-55/146-48; cf. B18); (11) to suppress demagogical preachers, who cause
distrust against the sultan and his officers among the people (T 1:55-57/148-50; cf. B172-73);
(12) to prevent peasants from leaving their homelands and dwell in cities, or at least to collect
the due tax (çift-bozan resmi) (T 1:57-58/150-51); (13) to exert liberality with equity, and not to
consider the lavish spending of money as generosity (sahâ vu kerem) but as waste and
dissipation (T 1:58-59/151-53); (14) to protect the public treasury (beytü’l-mâl-i müslimîn) from

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unnecessary expenditures, such as the keeping of numerous palaces in the same city or the
waste in the palace kitchen and the court artisans (T 1:59-62/153-57); (15) not to show
excessive honour to those who come from other countries, in the expense of people who have
served the Ottoman sultan for years; especially, not to give high offices to Turks or Kurds (T
1:62-63/157-59; cf. B81); (16) to offer safety in office to people that have not committed
serious mistakes, as such people’s positions must be “consolidated by perpetuation”; the old
practice of dirliks being hereditary offices (ocaklık) should be reinstated (T 1:63-64/159-61);
(17) finally, to prevent interventions of the beğlerbeğis to their provinces’ finances (T 1:64-
65/161-62).

In the second chapter (T 1:66-86/163-88), Ali deals with the disorder (ihtilâl) of his days,
contrary to the old customs (hilâf-i kavânîn). This happens in eight ways, namely: (1) Many
people are covetous for high positions, which are granted to them; thus, “the scum (edânî)
begins to gain power by lavishing money [in bribes]” (scum meaning “of lower origin” here)
and “the high classes (e’âlî) are disappointed and stunned” (T 1:66/163). Judges become
directors of finances or provincial governors (T 1:66-70/163-68). (2) Offices are given by way
of tax-farming (iltizâm), with fraudulent pledges. If the registers of such revenues (mukâta’a)
were checked, there would appear that they are quite disadvantageous for the state; moreover,
these revenue-farmers oppress the subjects in order to increase their gains (T 1:70-71/168-69).
(3) Provinces (either beğlerbeğiliks or sancaks) have started to be divided into further provinces,
thus reducing the income of their governors and burdening the people with more exactions.
Here, in describing the unfoundedness of an unjust governor, M. A. gives a list of the desired
qualities of such an official, namely justice, reliability, valor, sagacity, friendliness (meant here as
the opposite of rudeness) and piety (‘adâlet, emânet, şecâ’at, firâset, hüsn-i hulk, diyânet) (T
1:71-75/169-74). (4) The ulema are not honoured and protected. They have to visit viziers in
order to prevent the ignorants from overtaking them; vacant offices are given according to the
candidates’ relations with powerful men and not according to worth; provincial judges are often
ignorants (even “Turks… of the merchant class”, renc-ber tâyifesinden), sometimes presenting
even fraudulent diplomas (T 1:75-79/174-80). (5) Sons of viziers are appointed governors
while their fathers are still viziers, thus being able to oppress the people without fear of
punishment. According to Ali, the office of beğlerbeği should be given neither to princes nor to
viziers’ sons (T 1:80/180). Moreover, sons of officers who have held high offices in
borderlands should not be given high offices in the heartlands of the empire (iç il hükmindeki)
(T 1:79-81/180-82). (6) The Ottoman coin has been debased and untrustworthy. Money-
forgers have made it worthless and its prestige is rapidly declining; moreover, money-changers
(sarraf) “render defective what is complete”. In a marginal note, Ali explains how Jewish
money-changers exploited the monetary regulation of 1585/86 to their favour (T 1:81-84/182-
85). (7) Viziers and governors endow their servants with fiefs; this used not to happen until
their masters were dead. The servants in their turn use these revenues in order to become
merchants; lower people occupy thus the higher offices and the public treasure is distributed to
unworthy men (T 1:84-85/185-87). (8) Governors promote their own men to posts of
deceased persons or vacant; then they exchange these offices with fiefs, which they transfer to

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their new place of appointment, in order to carry their men with them in good honour (T 1:85-
86/187-88).

The third chapter (Τ 2:9-47/119-73) discusses “the weaknesses in the general situation (ahvâl-i
cumhûr) as caused by certain evil abuses”. As it seems, the difference from the previous chapter
lies in the fact that these abuses are not alterations of the old law, but misdeeds of established
officers. In the beginning, Ali observes that just as the Grand Vizier is responsible for the well-
being of the subjects in times of peace, the field marshal (serdar) is responsible in times of war.
The first set of “abuses” (Τ 2:9-20/119-135) concerns thus the army; a serdar should be
insightful and intelligent, wise, perspicacious, patient, and forbearing. He should keep in check
the men in his service and know how to keep control of his anger; he should care for the
timely measures in order to safeguard the well-being of his soldiers during a campaign; he
should completely abstain from taking bribes; he should dismiss the corrupt and the drug-
addicts from among his scribes. A second factor leading to the disintegration of public things
(ihtilâl-i cumhûr) is the misdeeds of the registrars of the land (kâtibü l-vilâye) (Τ 2:20-25/135-
41). They take bribes, take away from the timariots their possessions and “by and by they turn
to do business with cash” (nakdîye ile satu bâzâra mübâşeret idüb: Τ 2:20/136). There must be
a just evaluation of the value of the timars and a fair distribution of them. Another matter is
the regulation of the standard prices (narh-i rûzî) (Τ 2:25-27/141-44). Here Ali’s main point is
that if this matter is not administered with equity, “this leads to the enrichment of the low class
and to the bankruptcy and distress of the military class” (and not, as one would expect, the
further impoverishing of the poor). The rencber (translated by Tietze as farm absentees, i.e.
equivalent of the çift bozan) “break out of the circle of poverty”; this leads their relatives from
the provinces to follow their example, and ultimately to the ruin of the timariot soldiers, who
lose their peasants and have to make up with a constantly rising cost of living. In previous
times, the post of the muhtesib was given to some ulema, while now everyone is considered
qualified. Another point concerns the state of the charitable foundations founded by the
sultans (Τ 2:27-29/144-47). Due to misadministration, the food they offer is inedible. The
contrast to the establishments of Evrenos Beg in Rumelia is striking; Ali writes boldly that “the
sultans of the House of Osman have withdrawn with lack of interest whereas that afore-
mentioned beg possesses the secret of sainthood and working miracles”; were the Sultans to
inspect again and again the functioning of their establishments, the situation would be much
better. Then Ali proceeds to the tyranny of the collectors of boys for the janissaries (Τ 2:29-
30/147-48). Uneducated and harsh, they do not consult the local judge or governor and
oppress the zimmis, by taking bribes or children that are not to be taken. “In particular, the
service assigned to them is itself at variance with the Divine Law. It was only adopted in the
past out of need as a means to increase the number of Muslims” (Τ 2:30/148). Another point
concerns the collecting of old arrears, i.e. debts to the state treasury, by unrestricted officials
without recourse to the local judge (Τ 2:30-32/148-50). The very existence of such arrears is an
insult to the functioning of the central and local financial bureaucracy, who presumably does
their best in collecting all dues in time. Then Ali takes up (like Lütfi Paşa) the subject of the
extensive use of couriers (ulak), leading to oppression for the subjects (Τ 2:32-34/151-54), and

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the matter of the salaried garrisons of the fortresses (T 2:34-35/154-55), who cannot be paid
properly due to the misadministration of the officials involved. Next he proceeds to the levy of
army provisions (nüzûl) and extraordinary taxes (‘avâriz) (Τ 2:35-39/155-60): there are not
spent entirely for military purposes, but shared between governors, judges and their substitutes.
Ali notes as a bizarre curiosity the fact that the necessities of the army “are always provided by
the miserable and poor… whereas in certain sea ports and other cities and towns there are rich
merchants” (Τ 2:36/156). “The excess of world-enjoyment of the rich is counter to perfect
wisdom and circumspect policy”. The same is valid for usurers. Such people should be heavily
taxed for the benefit of the army and the treasury, as it happened during the reign of Mehmed
II or Selim I. Next, Ali turns to the old-age and invalidity pensions (Τ 2:39-40/161), given to
unworthy and unqualified people. The corn-profiteers (muhtekir), who get rich causing dearth
and scarcity, among them greedy magistrates and governors, constitute another factor of
decline (Τ 2:40/161-62). A category called by Ali “agents” (iş erleri) and “friends at court”
(maslahatgüzâr), who occupy the office of arbiters in court (muslih) and take profit from both
litigants is also a target of criticism (Τ 2:40-41/162-63). Tietze identifies them with
the şuhûdü’l-hâl. (cf. J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford 1994, 194 –note by
Menage). Some other criticism concern various goods available in the market: the disregard for
standard measurements of textiles (Τ 2:41/163) and the wasteful use of gold thread (Τ 2:41-
42/164), which is accused because thus the precious metal does not yield benefit at all and loses
its value. After all, “if everybody would conduct himself according to his profits and income,
high and low could be clearly distinguished from one another”. Another point is the constant
campaigning of the imperial army (Τ 2:42-43/164-66), regardless of the needs and abilities of
the soldiers. Reiterating a motive from the second chapter, Ali then speaks of the conferment
of offices and ranks on the basis of a pledge (T 2:43/166-67), more specifically the post of
guarding mountain passes. This leads to men of low rank advancing to high ranks on the basis
of a simple promise that is not even fulfilled. The next point (T 2:43-44/167-69) concerns the
offices of financial agents (‘ummâl) and tax-farmers (mültezim). Their high personal expenses
(including bribery) and the debts they have incurred before obtaining the post make this
practice destructive for the public treasury; moreover, the amount of all their salaries could no
doubt cover the salaries of the janissary cavalry. Thus, Ali proposes the abolition of tax-
farming (according also to the Holy Law) and the conferment of the collection of mukata’as to
these sipahis by way of trusteeship and supervisorship (emânet u nezâret). This would also put
an end to the matter of the so-called arrears (bakâyâ) as a responsibility of the subjects. Next,
Ali devotes one paragraph (T 2: 44-45/169-70) to criticize sharply the interference of women
to the affairs of the state, citing examples from the Islamic mythology. Finally, the last point
concerns physicians, oculists, healers and surgeons (T 2:45-47/170-73). In the times of Ali,
these doctors are promoted simply for being under the protection of a powerful official, and
not according to their knowledge and skill.

The fourth chapter of the book (T 2:48-95/174-224) is a kind of autobiography, obviously

with the main aim both to stress Ali’s education and skills that justify his giving of advice, and
to illustrate this state of decline described in the previous chapters. Here he states explicitly his

6
bitterness on not achieving the high posts for which he was fit and which had been promised to
him (T 2:70ff/196ff). In the end of this chapter, Ali wonders whether it is just and wise for a
Sultan to appoint insufficient men to high posts only because they were raised in his palace,
while skilled and educated men are staying without high positions solely because they have been
brought up outside it. Such evil practice has been in use since “the early days of the reign of
the late Sultan Suleyman” (T 2:93-94/222-23).

An epilogue (T 2:96-109/225-46), divided in ten sections, gives various piece of advice,

addressed not to kings and viziers but to their servants. The first section (T 2:96-101/225-34;
cf. also B110) deals with the rules of conversing with kings and other great men. Ali stresses
that men of learning and culture “would be the perfect match to the noble royal temperament”.
There is a marked difference between the companion (musâhib) and the courtier (nedîm), since
the former is a wise person who can give useful advice, while the latter evokes laughter and
gaiety (but cf. B26: “it is an error for a musahib to seek high office”). There are certain rules
distinguishing various occasions to speak to the king; one must approach him when riding in
horseback in a different way than when in a banquet. Here Ali speaks of the rules of good
behaviour, which he was to take up again in his Mevâidü’n-nefâis. The second section (T 2:101-
102/234-36) deals with the need of getting along well with both high and low, as people “are all
brothers in their humanity, friends in their familiarity and relations, neighbors in their closeness
to one another, equals in their talents and capabilities, and kinsmen of body and soul in respect
to their blood relationship”. The third section (T 2:102-104/236-38) concerns the relations
with servants (hidmetkâr); all people, from kings to servants of low rank, are creations of God.
Consequently, sultans must not treat sipahis with contempt, nor ulemas “crush the laymen
(cühelâ) with their disdain”; servants and slaves must be treated with kindness and mildness. In
the fourth section (T 2:104/238-39), Ali observes that excessive servility and affection towards
the womenfolk is not permissible, as well as overly attachment to possessions, landed estates,
and palaces. The fifth section (T 2:105/240) warns in a similar way against overabundance of
food in banquets and excessive liberality in such meals; the same goes for furnishings and
clothes, when one is not in harmony with his rank (hasb-i hâline göre, mikdârına göre,
haddinden tecâvüz kılmamak) (sixth section, T 2:105-6/240-42; more analytical descriptions in
B137-39 [clothes] and B143-44 [dwellings]; cf. Andreas Tietze, “Mustafâ Âlî on Luxury and the
Status Symbols of Ottoman Gentlemen”, Studia turcologica memoriae Alexii Bombaci dicata),
while oversupply of horses leads also to upheavals and trouble (seventh section, T 2:106/242).
In the eight section (T 2:106-7/242-44), Ali talks also against display of learnedness and
knowledge, “all the more so as scholars of learning and wisdom, men of education and
eloquence are in our time looked upon with misgivings by high and low and with jealousy by
notables and people of importance”. The ninth section (T 2:108/244-45) deals with Holy War,
a duty imposed on all Muslims, who in their turn should not show laxness or avarice in this
respect. Finally, the tenth section (T 2:109/245-46) concerns worship and observations of
religious prescriptions.

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In a short Appendix (T 2:110-14/246-53), Ali defends himself against accusations of self-
interest and bias, saying among others that he is “aware of the hierarchy of people (derecât-i
enâm) and in every manner acquainted with the classes of high and low (tabakat-i havâss u
‘avâmm)”. In his conclusion, he stresses that such writings as his “are meant to further the
orderly state of the world and the good functioning of the affairs of its inhabitants” (nizâm-i
ahvâl-i mükevvenât ve intizâm-i umûr-i mahlûkât) (T 2:113/252); he has shown an ability and
eagerness to comprehend the laws of the House of Osman and the innovations of the
monarchs (kavânîn-i âl-i ‘Osmân ve nev-âyîn-i şehriyârân) (ibid.). Finally, in the Supplement  (T
2:115-16/254-56), Ali emphasizes that the great merit of his book lies in the fact that it has
examples and stories from his own experience, giving reliable information on the time present.
Sultans, viziers, generals, judges and administrators must all study this book with attention.

Thematic units: 
The sultan must hold audiences for his subjects
The imperial council must be accessible to everybody
The sultan must be accessible to statesmen etc
The sultan must study history
The sultan should avoid luxury and expenses
The sultan is supported by God
The sultan is the shadow of God on earth
The sultan should avoid wine/drugs
The sultan must consult with experienced men
The sultan should not consult with women
The sultan should govern through beneficial innovations
The sultan must appoint statesmen himself
The mistakes of high officers must be seen with mildness
The sultan must respect old and devoted followers of his dynasty
The sultan should respect the Holy Law and the ulema
The ultimate responsibility for mischiefs belongs to the sultan
Fiefs should not be granted to non-military officials
Peasants leaving their land must be made to go back
Viziers must be controlled
High offices must not be given to Turks and Kurds
High offices must not be given to Turks and Kurds
Everyone should spend according to his grade and not imitate his superiors
Infidels should not acquire high posts
Posts should not be given with bribery
Slaves must not be excessively used in administration
Appointments should be given according to education
Weights and measures must be inspected
Prices must be regulated
Spies/Informants must inform about the kingdom

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 Messengers must be few and controlled
Indiscipline soldiers must be dismissed from the army
The janissaries must spend their youth in barracks
The number of kuls must be decreased/not increased
State lands must be preserved
Farming out revenues is ineffective or is not to be preferred
The number of vakfs should be decreased (or not be increased)
Merchants should be taxed by priority
Coinage must be inspected
Rich merchants should be taxed heavily
Source comments: 
Ali stresses that his Counsel for Sultans differs from others in the fact that it uses personal
experience and recent stories; uses stories about Iskender etc. Elsewhere, he speaks with
contempt of Lütfi Paşa, as an ignorant Albanian (B41).

Bibliography: 
• Black, A., The History of Islamic Political Thought. From the Prophet to the Present,
Edinburgh 2011 (2nd ed.), 260-262
• Fleischer, C., Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The historian Mustafa Âli,
Princeton N.J. 1986, 95-105
• Fodor, P., “State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th-17th Century Ottoman Mirror for
Princes”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. 40/2-3 (1986), 224-225
• Gökbilgin, T. M., “XVII. Asırda Osmanlı devletinde ıslâhat ihtiyaç ve temayülleri ve Kâtip
Çelebi”, in Kâtip Çelebi. Hayatı ve eserleri hakkında incelemeler, Ankara 1991 (1st ed. 1957)”,
199-201
• İnan, K., “Remembering the good old days: the Ottoman nasihatname [advice letters] literature
of the 17th century”, in Andreas Gémes, Florencia Peyrou, Ioannis Xydopoulos
(eds), Institutional Change and Stability Conflicts. Transitions and Social Values, Pisa 2009, 114-
115
• Yılmaz, C., “Osmanlı siyaset düşüncesi kaynakları ile ilgili yeni bir kavramsallaştırma:
Islahatnâmeler”, Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi 1/2 (2003), 304-6

Mevâidü’n-nefâis (Tables of Delicacies)

Author: 
Mustafa ‘Âlî
Date: 
1600
Manuscripts: 

Two known mss.:

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• A ms. mentioned in a private collection: Raif Yelkenci (published as Cavid Baysun, Mevâ'ıdü'n-
nefâis fî Kavâ'idi'l-mecâlis, Istanbul 1956)
• Bursa Genel Kitaplığı, Orhan Gazi böl. 1214
Editions: 
• Âli, Mustafa bin Ahmed, Mevâidü’n-nefâis fi kavâidi’l-mecâlis, ed. Cavid Baysun, Istanbul 1956:
fasc. edition of a lost photographed ms.
• Şeker, M. (intr.-ed.), Gelibolulu Mustafa 'Âlî ve Mevâ'idü'n-nefâis fi-kavâ'ıdi'l-mecâlis (Ankara
1997): in transcription.
Summary: 
In one of his last books, Mevâidü’n-nefâis fi kavâidi’l-mecâlis ("Tables of Delicacies
Concerning the Rules of Social Gatherings"), Ali reiterates some of themes presented
in Künhü’l-ahbâr. For instance, he speaks of poets and scholars made viziers by previous
illustrious kings (B13); the need for the sultans to choose well-bred servants, even when these
were originally infidels, using the science of physiognomy (B15-16; cf. also B167-69); janissaries
placed in special barracks until they grow up (B17); the young men in royal service should not
associate with people outside the palace, as it was done until the reign of Suleyman (B20); the
same is valid for the aghas of the palace (B20-21). “Ignorant products of the palace slave
system… have infiltrated the ranks of the Divan scribes”, taking positions that used to be given
only to renowned ulemas (B23ff). Elsewhere, Ali turns against the excessive number of palace
artisans (B57-58). He also reiterates his charges against excessive numbers of field marshals
(serdar), adding that the system of appointing a vizier as “virtual monarch” (padişah-i manevî)
leads to the disordering of public affairs (B82). Especially young kings should campaign
personally (B110-11). An interesting point is Ali’s discussion of pirates, whom he describes as
potential fighters of the faith (B33ff). Ali observes that “God made members of the human
race dependent upon one another through the diversity of crafts and abilities … The sultans of
the world… absolutely need every single man of trade and must have recourse to them”; so,
“there is certainly a need for the kings and princes to assign position and glory (…); for wealthy
persons to expend property and goods for the public weal; certainly for craftsmen to display
their artistry and mastery; and for farmers to harvest canonically lawful food from their plowed
lands. Similarly, there is demand on all sides for the knowledge of scholars, for the benevolent
prayers of the righteous, for the warring and raiding of men of combat” (B37-38, ch. 12). In
the chapter on ulemas (ch. 28, B67-74) we read: “whether [the graduates of the medreses] be a
poor son of the Turks or a wealthy man, whether a lowly sort blessed with comprehension or
one of the privileged, by following the orderly path they attained the rank permitting them to
be called learned”. Ali criticizes the law of Mehmed II on assigning ranks and degrees to the
ulema, because the late Sultan did not consider the fact that even an accomplished ulema of
high rank could be corrupted with bribery; this corruption of the learned class started mainly
in the last days of Suleyman (B67-68). In the days of Selim II, ignoramuses and rogues became
judges and accumulated wealth; Ali praises here Mehmed III as a person who prevented bribery
and restored some of the high offices of ulema into their previous purity (B70); however, it did

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not occur to these days sultans that “the maintenance of good public order is dependent upon
orderly maintenance of laws and ordinances” (B72).

A special chapter (ch. 15, B43-46) is devoted to the behavior of kings (“men who conquer their
way to power”, sahib-i zuhur[1]; cf. Fleischer 280ff). “As for monarchs of any age, their being
“The Shadow of God” is determined by their conforming to the Shari’a”. Ali criticizes ignorant
people who now and then make their appearance among some Turkmens or Tatars and think
they can become kings “with the right to Coin and Sermon” (he mentions explicitly Celalis).
“Given that every realm has an established ruler, these people cannot maintain stability and
power unless the possessor of a realm is utterly tyrannical… [o]r unless the claimant proves
himself superior and more powerful than the established ruler, and in comparison to him takes
more bribes, so that the non-Muslim and Muslim subjects and the army all turn against the
ruler and dispatch a letter of invitation to someone who calls himself a celali” (B45). Ruling
lineages have their own time-span allotted to them, which reach its end due to negligence that
comes from wine-drinking (of the king), inclination to accumulate wealth, and falling into the
wiles of women. The true treasury of a kingdom is its subjects, neglect of which will surely
lead to destruction of the king. Another chapter (ch. 96, B162-65) speaks of generosity and
beneficence. A ruler whose treasury realizes an annual income of 2,000 yük akçes should
expend 20 yük annually in gifts (i.e. 1%) and 2 yük per occasion to a person who merits it (i.e.,
0.1%). Ali calculates the gifts given by the Ottoman sultans and finds them rather ungenerous;
this contradicts somehow some other advice he gives elsewhere, but one should note that here
he talks of gifts granted to erudite men (among which he obviously would like to be counted
himself).

Some other themes are also relevant to political issues. Ali stresses that loftiness of aspiration
leads to high ranks (ch. 23, B58-60). From this observation he goes once again to a criticism of
bribery and nepotism (implying that nowadays aspiration is not enough). Now, “to ensure that
the workshop known as the Ottoman state (…)… should not suffer damage through bribery”
the king needs to use intelligent and learned persons. “However, whenever the foundation of a
state (…) is damaged so that the great personages turn their thoughts to bribery; whenever
kings and ministers toss aside the safeguarding of the law so that their intelligent subjects, who
seek their rights without having to pay money, rot in corners, dismissed from office; whenever
unworthy and unprincipled low-brows who know only how to count out the coinage of bribery
are raised day by day to offices of lofty rank” –then the state begins to collapse (B59). Here Ali
uses a simile of the state as a workshop; the task of securing its functioning as a big
waterwheel; the king as the master of the workshop; the vizier as a capable apprentice who can
repair the waterwheel. In another point, while describing the clothing suitable for each class (ch.
81, B137), Ali distinguishes society in four distinct classes, namely sultans and princes, viziers
and governors, notables of the realm who are considered to be among the middling ranks,
finally artisans, merchants and craftsmen. Of special interest is the chapter on kings’ sociability
(ch. 41, B92-95). Older kings used to take their meals together with their children, viziers and
companions; this custom stopped in the reign of Selim I (see Brookes’ note 585, p. 93). Ali

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 criticizes this new practice of seclusion with the verse: Haughtiness does not suit a king whom
I love. A chapter on “evil persons” (ch. 103, B170-72), however, stresses that the reaya should
not mix in the company of people in power (…) and that “they should not become cross by
thinking that extrajudicial taxes (tekâlif-i örfiye) are unprecedented when they are imposed”.
Although the corruption of judges and provincial governors has disrupted the order of the
world, the subjects should not have the permission to bar from their villages beys and judges
whom they do not want, because thus lowbred and wicked people “aveng[e] themselves on
their rulers”.

[1] “The manifest one”, by which Ali means men not born into a ruling house but who rise to
power by force of arms (n. by Brookes, B43).

Thematic units: 
The sultan should campaign in person
Even if a peasant becomes soldier, his relative must not to
Posts should not be given with bribery
The janissaries must spend their youth in barracks
Bibliography: 
• Brookes, D. S. (tr.), The Ottoman Gentleman of the Sixteenth Century: Mustafa
Âli’s Mevâ’idü’n-nefâ’is fî kavâ’idi’l-mecâlis, “Tables of Delicacies Concerning the Rules of
Social Gatherings, Harvard 2003

Füsûl-i hall (The seasons of sovereignty)

Author: 
Mustafa ‘Âlî
Date: 
1598
Manuscripts: 

• Nuruosmaniye Ktp., El Yazmaları Bölümü, No. 3399, v.1a-149a

• Süleymaniye Ktp., Fazıl Ahmed Paşa Bölümü, No. 249, v.1a-162a
Editions: 
Demir, M. (ed.), Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, Füsûl-i hall ü akd ve usûl-i harc ü nakd (İslam
devletleri tarihi, 622-1599), Istanbul 2006.

Summary: 
Political advice is contained also in Füsûl-i hall ü akd ve usûl-i harc ü nakd (“The seasons of
sovereignty on the principles of critical expenditure”), a short history of the Islamic states from

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622 up to 1592. Ali himself stresses that he compiled this work in order to show how
kingdoms can be corrupted and how their fall can be prevented (D60). The introduction begins
with the motto that God Almighty has ordained kings to His slaves on earth; then He singled
out (imtiyaz virdi) eminent people (bellü başlu ademler) with the position of viziers, judges and
officials, in order to help the kings, either in their power with justice or in their politics with
political measures (gerek adâletle hükûmetde gerek hüsn-i tedbîr ve siyâsetde) (D55). As a
consequence, kings must discern wise and worthy people from the unwise. The permanency of
the kings’ power (mülk ü devlet) depends on their making their subjects and army, as well as the
ulema and wise men, love them. A second prerequisite is that they must also have one or two
companions (musâhib), who should be wise, disinterested, indifferent for public offices,
knowing the science of history and the way the world must be; they should inform the king for
the thoughts and the situation of the subjects. Thirdly, they must give very high attention to the
fixing of market prices: if the sultans consider this matter trivial and leave it to the judges, then
low-class people become rich and the army becomes poor (D56-57). Fourthly, kings must use
spies in order to know in detail the situation of the borders and of the adjacent countries.

Then Ali proceeds in giving a summary of every Muslim dynasty, focusing on the causes of its
decline. While some of these causes have to do with specific events, others pertain to his
political views. Thus, Ummayads declined because of their greed for earthly wealth and because
they did not give proper attention to the counsel of wise men; Abbasids because they did not
protect their people from the Mongol invasions; Ghaznevids, because they let women and
eunuchs interfere with state affairs, they changed often their officials and they let governors and
high-standing men impoverish; the kings of Şirvan, because of their tyranny and oppression
towards their subjects; various dynasties, because of civil wars between brothers. A supplement
(D141-43) speaks of the Ottoman dynasty. The Ottomans differ from most of the previous
dynasties in that they did not obtain power by any stratagem or trick, but by practicing the Holy
War, while other Anatolian states that finally submitted to the Ottoman sultans declined
because of their tyranny and oppression. Mehmed II’s vizier, Mahmud Paşa, proposed to him
the promulgation of a legal code (bir kânûn-i kadîm vaz’ itmişlerdir), a measure that no
previous Muslim king had taken, and suggested that once this code was promulgated decline
could not touch the Ottoman state, if only for two reasons: first, if any of Mehmed’s
successors decided to promulgate his own law; second, if outsiders (ecnebi) intermingle among
the army. Indeed, states Âli, when such outsiders from Istanbul became accepted in the
janissary army during the imperial festival of 1582 decline can be said to have started. From
this point on, the janissary corps started to oppress the Muslims. Moreover, the granting of
important posts, such as the scribes of the janissary bölüks or of the treasury, through bribery
further corrupted the old law. Bribery reached such a degree, that it was considered licit (helal)
like the tithe from fiefs (D142-43).

Thematic units: 
The sultan must consult with experienced men
The sultan must have boon companions who will inform him of truth

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 Women and eunuchs should not interfere to state affairs
Weights and measures must be inspected
Spies must inform about the enemy kingdoms
Bibliography: 
• Demir, M. (ed.), Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, Füsûl-i hall ü akd ve usûl-i harc ü nakd (İslam
devletleri tarihi, 622-1599), Istanbul 2006: Introduction
• Fleischer, C., Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The historian Mustafa Âli,
Princeton N.J. 1986, 177-178 and 301ff.
• Kütükoğlu, B., “Âlî Mustafa Efendi”, TDVİA
• Şeker, M., “Political view of ‘Âlî: evaluation of the work of ‘Âlî so-called ‘Fusul-i harj u naqd’”,
in Daniel Panzac (ed.), Histoire économique et sociale de l’Empire ottoman et de la Turquie
(1326-1960). Actes du sixième congrès international tenu à Aix-en-Provence du 1er au 4 juillet
1992, Paris 1995, 855-864

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