43. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS.

LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993

FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in

Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and
Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She
brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks “are
adulterated.” As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to
close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before
the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription.
On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer
should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which
prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.

RULING: Petition Denied.

The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on
quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of
warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the
complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food
items intended to be sold for public consumption."
The action in based on quasi-delict, therefore, it prescribes in four years. The allegations in the
complaint makes a reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of “adulterated food
items intended to be sold for public consumption.” The vendee’s remedies are not limited to
those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict
under Article 2176, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee.
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Liability for quasi-delict may
still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.

44. Singson vs BPI

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had been
rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay
a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became final and executory as only
against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently
served upon BPI — in which the Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille’s
credits against the Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the name of the
Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the
body and informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of
defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of
his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass
Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass
Service then wrote to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI because his account therein
had already been garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with
them.

Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and
Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendants lost no time to rectify
the mistake that had been inadvertently committed.Thus this action for damages.

ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiff’s claim for damages
based on torts?

HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a
tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this
view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.
Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally
ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort
on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is “contractual
both in origin and nature … the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort”.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the
bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that
an award of nominal damages — the amount of which need not be proven — in the sum of
P1,000, in addition to attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff’s
rights.

45. AIR FRANCE v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966
FACTS:

The plaintiff, Rafael Carrascoso, paid for and was issued a “First class” ticket by Air France from
Manila to Rome. During a stopover in Bangkok, the manager of Air France asked the plaintiff to
vacate his seat because a white man has a “better right” than him. At first, the plaintiff protested,
but, as things got heated up, he was asked by the other Filipinos on board to give up his seat and
transfer in the tourist class. After the trip, Carrascoso sued Air France for the embarrassment and
inconvenience he suffered. The trail court awarded damages to the plaintiff which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Air France assailed the decision. According to them, the issuance of a first
class ticket does not guarantee Carrascoso a seat in the first Class.

ISSUE: Whether or not Air France is liable for the damages to Carrascoso and on what basis

HELD: Yes. Air France is liable based on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual.
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract
to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when
Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, t h a t
t h e r e w a s b a d f a i t h w h e n A i r F r a n c e ’ s e m p l o y e e c o m p e l l e d Carrascoso to
leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already, seated”and t o t ake
a s eat i n t he t ouri st cl ass, b y reason of whi ch he su ffe red inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The Supreme
Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a
passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply
incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct onthe part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with
Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of
quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

45. AIR FRANCE v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966

FACTS: Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

The defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to
plaintiff a ‘first class’ round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in ‘first class’, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a ‘white man’, who, the Manager alleged, had a ‘better right’ to the
seat. When asked to vacate his ‘first class’ seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and
told defendant’s Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued,
and, according to said Cuento, ‘many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the manager, they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man’ and plaintiff reluctantly gave his ‘first class’ seat in the plane.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was bad faith on the part of the petitioner airline, thus making
petitioner liable for damages in favor of respondent.

RULING: That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst
others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and that there was bad faith when petitioner’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was
already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth
therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of
the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent’s counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in
Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner’s manager who gave his seat to a white man; and
(b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the
part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the
complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts
and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with
a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

47. DR. EMMANUEL JARCIA, JR. and DR. MARILOU BASTAN VS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPPINES

FACTS
Belinda Santiago lodged a complaint with the NBI against the petitioners, Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr.
and Dr. Marilou Bastan, for their alleged neglect of professional duty which caused her son, Roy Alfonso
Santiago, to suffer serious physical injuries. Upon investigation, the NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab
and he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical treatment. An X-ray of the
victim’s ankle was ordered and it showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia. Dr.Bastan entered the emergency
room and, after conducting her own examination of the victim, informed Mrs. Santiago that since it
was only the ankle that was hit, there was no need to examine the upper leg.3. A few days later, Roy
Jr. developed fever, swelling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot. Mrs. Santiago broughthim
back to the hospital; and that the X-ray revealed a right midtibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in
the shaft of the bone.

ISSUE: WON Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan are guilty of negligence

HELD: YES. Although, according to expert testimony, the 2 doctors could have done more to treat the patient
Roy, there was no precise evidence and scientific explanation pointing to the fact that the delay in the
application of the cast to the patient’s fractured leg because of failure to immediately diagnose
the specific injury of the patient, prolonged the pain of the child or aggravated his condition or even
caused further complications. What is lacking here is evidence to prove that the doctors were the ones at fault for
the serious physical injuries sustained by Roy. The fact stands though, that in failing to perform
an extensive medical examination to determine the extent of Roy Jr.’s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan
were remiss of their duties as members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of
argument that they did not have the capacity to make such thorough evaluation at that stage, they should
have referred the patient to another doctor with sufficient training and experience instead of
assuring him and his mother that everything was all right. There existed a physician-patient relationship, and by
assuring Belinda that everything was fine, they deprived the victim of further medical help. Petitioners were
absolved in the criminal charge for the reason that a reasonable doubt
existed but they are liable for damages. There is no direct evidence proving that it was their
negligence that caused the suffering of Roy.

48. Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana

FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement and
bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr.
Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread
on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr.
Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating
room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the attending nurses made some
remarks on the Record of Operation: “sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search
done but to no avail continue for closure” (two pieces of gauze were missing). A “diligent
search” was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be
closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but the doctors told her
that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an
oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After
months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer.
Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in) protruding from her
 vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away.
However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of
gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr.
Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of
gauze in Natividad’s body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique
Agana also filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against the
two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil
was abroad). Pending the outcome of the cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her
children). RTC found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC
dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice. NO; DR.
AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil’s negligence. YES

RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones who put
/ left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the operation record (re:
number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes’ alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and
found it in order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at
least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if it has been shown that a
surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patient’s abdomen because of the dangers
attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by
advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the effects of the
foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit. What’s worse in this case is that he
misled her by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation.

Medical negligence; standard of diligence

To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a health
care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would have done [or wouldn’t have done], and that the failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
 Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision; if he fails to
do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it
 Breach – failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient
 Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery
 Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury; could be traced from his act of closing the
incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still
missing; what established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted from patient’s vagina
 DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas’ does not convince the
court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence.

Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur

1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management of the defendant [DR.
FUENTES] — LACKING SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR. AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those
who had control or management used proper care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the
surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such
role is evident from the following:
 He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
 He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
 He ordered the closure of the incision

HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND
DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its professionals.
However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that modern hospitals are
taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to its patients, by employing
staff of physicians, among others. Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the
universal rule of respondeat superior. Here are the Court’s bases for sustaining PSI’s liability:
 Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship


o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-

employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire, fire, power of control]
 Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in somehow misleading
the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and specializations of their
physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose
names it proudly paraded in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it
vouched for their skill and competence.
o

 If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars the quality of its
services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for its agents’ acts.
 Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

o This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s liability for the negligent
acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the application of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed to perform the
duty of exercising reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility
for medical treatment. PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in
the note of the count nurse, and this established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of
silence and concealment about the gauzes.
o


PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the report of the attending
nurses + the fact that the operation was carried on with the assistance of various hospital
staff
o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within
its walls and take an active step in fixing the negligence committed
 PSI also liable under NCC 2180


o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil

49. PNB vs. FF CRUZ and Company Inc.654 SCRA 333

Facts: Plaintiff FF Cruz opened a combo account and dollar savings account with PNB,
wherein its President Felipe Cruz and Secretary-Treasurer Angelita A. Cruz were the
named signatories. While they were out of the country, applications for cashiers and
managers check bearing the president’s signature were presented to and both approved by the
PNB. The first was on March 27, 1995 for P9, 950,000.00payable to Gene B. Sangalang
and the other was on April 24, 1995 for P3,260,500.31 payable to Paul Bautista. The
amounts were debited by the PNB against the combo account of FF Cruz. Upon return to the
country Angelita examined their statement of account with PNB and noticed the deductions
and claimed that it was unauthorized and fraudulently made, FF Cruz requested PNB to
credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks. PNB refused, thus FF Cruz
filed suit for damages against the PNB and its own accountant Aurea Caparas. PNB averred
that It exercised due diligence in handling the account. The applications for
managers check have passed through the standard bank procedures and it was only after
finding no infirmity that these were given due course. In fact, it was Caparas, the accountant
of FF Cruz, who confirmed the regularity of the transaction. The trial court ruled that F.F.
Cruz and Company, Inc. was guilty of negligence in clothing Aurea Caparas with authority
to make decisions on and dispositions of its account which paved the way for the fraudulent
transactions that and that FF Cruz was negligent in not immediately informing PNB of the
fraud However, PNB was, likewise, negligent in not calling or personally verifying
from the authorized signatories the legitimacy of the subject withdrawals considering that
they were in huge amounts. For this reason, PNB had the last clear chance to prevent
the unauthorized debits from FF Cruz’s combo account. Thus, PNB should bear the whole
loss. CA Affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification on the award of damages
that PNB should only pay 60% of the actual damage and FF Cruz should bear the
remaining 40% for its contributory negligence.

Issue: Is PNB liable for the loss?

Held: As correctly found by the appellate court, PNB failed to make the proper
verification because the applications for the managers check do not bear the signature
of the bank verifier. PNB concedes the absence of the subject signature but argues that the
same was the result of inadvertence. PNB was negligent in the handling of FF Cruz’s combo
account, specifically, with respect to PNBs failure to detect the forgeries in the
subject applications for managers check which could have prevented the loss. As we have
often ruled, the banking business is impressed with public trust. A higher degree of
diligence is imposed on banks.

50.

51. PHILAM INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. AND AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE

CO., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND D.M. CONSUNJI INC.,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Four gensets from the United States of America were ordered by Citibank, N.A. (Citibank).
Petitioner AHIC insured these gensets under Certificate No. 60221 for USD 851,500 covering
various risks.[1] The insurance policy provided that the claim may be paid in the Philippines by
Philam Insurance Co., Inc, AHIC’s local settling agent.[2]

Citibank’s broker-forwarder, Melicia International Services (MIS),[3] transported the gensets in

separate container vans. It was instructed by Citibank to deliver and haul one genset to Makati
City,[4] where the latter’s office was being constructed by the building contractor, DMCI.

MIS was further instructed to place the 13-ton genset at the top of Citibank’s building. The
broker-forwarder declined, since it had no power cranes. Thus, Citibank assigned the job to
private respondent DMCI, which accepted the task.
On 16 October 1993, DMCI lifted the genset with a crane (Unic-K-2000) that had a hydraulic
telescopic boom and a loading capacity of 20 tons. During the lifting process, both the crane’s
boom and the genset fell and got damaged.

After two days, DMCI’s surveyor, Manila Adjusters & Surveyors Co. (MASC) assessed the
condition of the crane and the genset. According to its Survey Certificate, the genset was already
deformed.
Citibank demanded from DMCI the full value of the damaged genset, including the cost,
insurance and freight amounting to USD 212,850. Private respondent refused to pay, asserting
that the damage was caused by an accident.

Thereafter, Citibank filed an insurance claim with Philam, AHIC’s local settling agent, for the
value of the genset. Philam paid the claim for PhP 5,866,146.

Claiming the right of subrogation, Philam demanded the reimbursement of the genset’s value
from DMCI, which denied liability. Thus, on 19 April 1994, Philam filed a Complaint with the
RTC to recover the value of the insured genset.

At the trial court, petitioner Philam did not invoke res ipsa loquitur. Rather, during the pre-trial
conference, the parties agreed on this sole issue: “Whether or not the damage was the fault of the
defendant or within their area of supervision at the time the cause of damage occurred.”

The RTC ruled in favor of Philam and ruled that the loss or damage to the genset was due to the
negligent operation of the crane.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners have sufficiently established the negligence of DMCI for the former
to recover the value of the damaged genset.

HELD: NO. For DMCI to be liable for damages, negligence on its part must be
established.Additionally, that finding must be the proximate cause of the damage to the
genset.We agree with the CA that Philam failed to establish DMCI’s negligence.

Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a conduct that involves an
unreasonably great risk of causing damage; or, more fully, a conduct that falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonably great risk of harm.

It would be a long stretch to construe these as acts of negligence. Not all omissions can be
considered as negligent. The test of negligence is as follows: Could a prudent man, in the case
under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty
of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.

Applying the test, the circumstances would show that the acts of the crane operator were rational
and justified. DMCI’s crane operation team determined accordingly that there was a need to raise
the boom in order to put the genset in the exact location. Indeed, the heavy equipment must be
secured in its proper place.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much
can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are
before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger.

In this case, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable, since there is direct evidence on the issue of
diligence or lack thereof pertaining to the lifting of the genset. The doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.

In any event, res ipsa loquitur merely provides a rebuttable presumption of negligence. On this,
we have already pointed out that the evidence does not prove negligence on the part of DMCI,
and that due diligence on its part has been established.

Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption arising from the doctrine cannot be
availed of, or is overcome when the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as
to the specific act of negligence that caused the injury complained of; or when there is direct
evidence as to the precise cause of the accident, and with all the attendant facts clearly
present.[51] Finally, neither the presumption nor the doctrine would apply when the circumstances
have been so completely elucidated that no inference of the defendant's liability can reasonably
be made, whatever the source of the evidence.

Absent any finding of negligence, we sustain the CA’s findings that DMCI exercised due
diligence; that the event is an accident; and that consequently Philam cannot claim damages for
the damaged genset.

52. SERVANDO VS. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO.

Facts: Bico and Servando loaded on board the FS-176 the following cargoes: 1.528 cavans of
rice and 44 cartons of colored paper, toys and general merchandise. Upon the arrival of the
vessel, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order to the warehouse of the Bureau
of Customs. At 2:00 pm of the same day, a fire of unknown reasons razed the warehouse. Before
the fire, Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice. The petitioners are now claiming
for the value of the destroyed goods from the common carrier.

The Trial Court ordered the respondent to pay the plaintiffs the amount of their lost goods on the
basis that the delivery of the shipment to the warehouse is not the delivery contemplated by
Article 1736 of the New Civil Code, since the loss occurred before actual or constructive
delivery. The petitioners argued that the stipulation in the bills of lading does not bind them
because they did not sign the same. The stipulation states that the carrier shall not be responsible
for loss unless such loss was due to the carrier’s negligence. Neither shall it be liable for loss due
to fortuitous events such as dangers of the sea and war.

Issue: Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the destruction of the goods
Held: No. There is nothing on record to show that the carrier incurred in delay in the
performance of its obligation. Since the carrier even notified the plaintiffs of the arrival of their
shipments and had demanded that they be withdrawn.

The carrier also cannot be charged with negligence since the storage of the goods was in the
Customs warehouse and was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the
warehouse belonged and maintained by the Government, it would be unfair to impute negligence
to the appellant since it has no control over the same.

Appellant, as obligor, is exempt from liability for non- performance because the burning of the
warehouse containing appellees' goods, which is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss,
is a fortuitous event or force majeure which could not have been foreseen by appellant.

Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the
obligor is exempt from liability for non- performance. (See Art. 1174 of the New Civil Code.)
The Partidas(Law II, Title 33, Partida 7), the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code,
defines "caso fortuito" as "an event that takes place by accident and could not been have
foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of
robbers."

In the dissertation of the phrase "caso fortuito" the Encyclopedia Juridicada Española says: "In a
legal sense and consequently, also in relation to contracts, caso fortuito presents the following
essential characteristics:
(1) the cause of the unforseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it imposible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
creditor."

There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier incurred in delay in the performance
of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their
shipment, out had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand,
appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.

Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in
the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with
their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the
government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control
whatsoever over the same.
The lower court in its decision relied on the ruling laid down in Yu Biao Sontua vs. Ossorio, 43
Phil. 511, where this Court held the defendant liable for damages arising from a fire caused by
the negligence of the defendant's employees while loading cases of gasoline and petroleum
products. But unlike in the said case, there is not a shred of proof in the present case that the
cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom's warehouse was in any way attributable to the
negligence of the appellant or its employees. Under the circumstances, the appellant is plainly
not responsible.