Hindu Marriage Act Case Law

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Important Case Law on Hindu

Marriage Act
Questions?
All judgments have been especially summarized by Delhi Law Academy for use by its
students only
List of Judgments on HMA:
1. Surajmani Stella Kujur Durga Charan Hansdah [2001 SC]
2. Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande State of Maharashtra [1965 SC]
3. Kailash Wati Ajodhia Parkash [1971 P&H]
4. Swaraj Garg K. M. Garg [1978 Del.]
5. Babui Panmato Kuer Ram Agya Singh [1968 Pat]
6. Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah Prabhavati [1957 SC]
7. Savitri Pandey Prem Chandra Pandey [2002 SC]
8. G. Dastane v. S. Dastane [1975 SC]
9. Sureshta Devi Om Prakash [1992 SC]
10. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India [1995 SC]
11. Lily Thomas Union of India [2000 SC]
12. Dharmendra Kumar Usha Kumar [1977 SC]
13. Hirachand Managaonkar Sunanda [2001 SC]
Case Law for section 2(2) HMA:
Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah [2001]
Who is a “Hindu” for the purposes of the applicability of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 is a question of law to be determined in this appeal.
Section 2 of the Act speci es the persons to whom the Act is applicable. Clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 make the Act applicable to a person
who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments including a
Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj and
to a person who is a Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion. It is also applicable to any
other person domiciled in the territories of India who is not a Muslim,Questions?
Christian,
Parsi or Jew by religion. The applicability of the Act is, therefore, comprehensive
and applicable to all persons domiciled in the territory of India who are not
Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews by religion.
The term “Hindu” has not been de ned either under the Act or the Indian
Succession Act or any other enactment of the legislature.
In this appeal the parties are admittedly tribals, the appellant being an Oraon and
the respondent a Santhal. It is not disputed before us that in the Constitution
(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 as amended from time to time both the tribes to
which the parties belong are speci ed in Part XII. It is conceded even by the
appellant that “the parties to the petition are two tribals, who otherwise profess
Hinduism, but their marriage being out of the purview of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 in light of Section 2(2) of the Act, are thus governed only by their Santhal
customs and usage”.
The appellant has, however, relied upon an alleged custom in the tribe which
mandates monogamy as a rule. It is submitted that as the respondent has
solemnised a second marriage during the subsistence of the rst marriage with
the appellant, the second marriage being void, the respondent is liable to be
prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 494 of the Indian Penal
Code.
No custom can create an offence as it essentially deals with the civil rights of the
parties and no person can be convicted of any offence except for violation of law
in force at the time of commission of the act charged. Custom may be proved for
determination of civil rights of parties including their status, establishment of
which may be used for the purposes of proving the ingredients of an offence
which, under Section 3(37) of the General Clauses Act, would mean an act or
omission punishable by any law by way of ne or imprisonment. Article 20 of the
Constitution provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for
violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an
offence.
The expression “custom and usage” has been de ned under Section 3(a) of the Act
as:
3. (a) the expression ‘custom’ and ‘usage’ signify any rule which, having been
continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtainedQuestions?
the force of
law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family:
Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy;
Provided further that in the case of a rule applicable only to a family it has not
been discontinued by the family;
For custom to have the colour of a rule or law, it is necessary for the party claiming
it, to plead and thereafter prove that such custom is ancient, certain and
reasonable. Custom being in derogation of the general rule is required to be
construed strictly. The party relying upon a custom is obliged to establish it by
clear and unambiguous evidence.
In this case the appellant led a complaint in the Court of Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, New Delhi stating therein that her marriage was solemnised with the
respondent in Delhi “according to Hindu rites and customs”.
Nowhere in the complaint the appellant has referred to any alleged custom having
the force of law which prohibits the solemnisation of second marriage by the
respondent and the consequences thereof. It may be emphasised that mere
pleading of a custom stressing for monogamy by itself was not suf cient unless it
was further pleaded that second marriage was void by reason of its taking place
during the life of such husband or wife. In order to prove the second marriage
void, the appellant was under an obligation to show the existence of a custom
which made such marriage null, ineffectual, having no force of law or binding
effect, incapable of being enforced in law or non est. The fact of second marriage
being void is a sine qua non for the applicability of Section 494 IPC. It is settled
position of law that for fastening the criminal liability, the prosecution or the
complainant is obliged to prove the existence of all the ingredients constituting
the crime which are normally and usually de ned by a statute. The appellant
herself appears to be not clear in her stand inasmuch as in her statement in the
court recorded on 24-10-1992 she has stated that “I am a Hindu by religion”. The
complaint was dismissed by the trial court holding, “there is no mention of any
such custom in the complaint nor is there evidence of such custom. In the absence
of pleadings and evidence reference to book alone is not suf cient”. The High
Court held that in the absence of noti cation in terms of Section 2 (2) of the Act
no case for prosecution for the offence of bigamy was made out against the
respondent because the alleged second marriage cannot be termed to be void
either under the Act or any alleged custom having the force of law.
Questions?
In view of the fact that parties admittedly belong to the Scheduled Tribes and in
the absence of speci c pleadings, evidence and proof of the alleged custom
making the second marriage void, no offence under Section 494 of the Indian
Penal Code can possibly be made out against the respondent.
Case Law for section 7 HMA:
Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra
[1965 SC]
Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande, Appellant 1, was married to the complainant Indubai

in about 1956. He married Kamlabai in February 1962, during the lifetime of
Indubai. Deorao Shankar Lokhande, Appellant 2, is the brother of the rst
appellant. These two appellants, together with Kamlabai and her father and
Accused 5, a barber, were tried for an offence under Section 494 IPC. Appellant 1
was convicted under Section 494 IPC and Appellant 2 for an offence under
Section 494 read with Section 114 IPC.
2. The only contention raised for the appellants is that in law it was necessary for
the prosecution to establish that the alleged second marriage of the Appellant
1 with Kamlabai in 1962 had been duly performed in accordance with the
religious rites applicable to the form of marriage gone through. It is urged for
the appellants that the essential ceremonies for a valid marriage were not
performed during the proceedings which took place when Appellant 1 and
Kamlabai married each other. On behalf of the State it is urged that the
proceedings of that marriage were in accordance with the custom prevalent in
the community of the appellant for gandharva form of marriage and that
therefore the second marriage of Appellant 1 with Kamlabai was a valid
marriage. It is also urged for the State that it is not necessary for the
commission of the offence under Section 494 IPC that the second marriage be
a valid one.
Prima facie, the expression “whoever …marries” must mean “whoever … marries
validly” or “whoever … marries and whose marriage is a valid one”. If the marriage
is not a valid one, according to the law applicable to the parties, no question of its
Questions?
being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband or wife of
the person marrying arises. If the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage
in the eye of law. The bare fact of a man and a woman living as husband and wife
does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even
though they may hold themselves out before society as husband and wife and the
society treats them as husband and wife.
4. Apart from these considerations, there is nothing in the Hindu law, as

applicable to marriages till the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955,
which made a second marriage of a male Hindu, during the lifetime of his
previous wife, void. Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that a
marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the conditions
mentioned in that section are ful lled and one of those conditions is that
neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage. Section 17
provides that any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the
commencement of the Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party
had a husband or wife living, and that the provisions of Sections 494 and 495
IPC shall apply accordingly. The marriage between two Hindus is void in view
of Section 17 if two conditions are satis ed: (i) the marriage is solemnized
after the commencement of the Act; (ii) at the date of such marriage, either
party had a spouse living. If the marriage which took place between the
appellant and Kamlabai in February 1962 cannot be said to be “solemnized”,
that marriage will not be void by virtue of Section 17 of the Act and Section
494 IPC will not apply to such parties to the marriage as had a spouse living.
The word “solemnize” means, in connection with a marriage, “to celebrate the
marriage with proper ceremonies and in due form”, according to the Shorter
Oxford Dictionary. It follows, therefore, that unless the marriage is
“celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and due form” it cannot be
said to be “solemnized”. It is therefore essential, for the purpose of Section 17
of the Act, that the marriage to which Section 494 IPC applies on account of
the provisions of the Act, should have been celebrated with proper
ceremonies and in due form. Merely going through certain ceremonies with
the intention that the parties be taken to be married, will not make them
ceremonies Prescribed by law or approved by any established custom.
5. We may now determine what the essential ceremonies for a valid marriage
between the parties are. It is alleged for the respondent that the marriage
between Appellant 1 and Kamlabai was in “gandharva” form, as modi ed by
Questions?
the custom prevailing among the Maharashtrians. It is noted in Mulla’s Hindu
Law:
The Gandharva marriage is the voluntary union of a youth and a damsel which
springs from desire and sensual inclination. It may be noted that the essential
marriage ceremonies are as much a requisite part of this form of marriage as of
any other unless it is shown that some modi cation of those ceremonies has been
introduced by custom in any particular community or caste.
(1) There are two ceremonies essential to the validity of a marriage, whether the
marriage be in the Brahma form or the Asura form, namely—
(1) invocation before the sacred re, and
(2) saptapadi, that is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride
jointly before the sacred re….
(2) A marriage may be completed by the performance of ceremonies other than

those referred to in sub-section (1), where it is allowed by the custom of the caste
to which the parties belong.
7. It is not disputed that these two essential ceremonies were not performed
when Appellant 1 married Kamlabai in February 1962. There is no evidence
on record to establish that the performance of these two essential
ceremonies has been abrogated by the custom prevalent in their community.
In fact, the prosecution led no evidence as to what the custom was. It led
evidence of what was performed at the time of the alleged marriage. It was
the counsel for the accused in the case who questioned certain witnesses
about the performance of certain ceremonies and to such questions the
witnesses replied that they were not necessary for the “gandharva” form of
marriage in their community. Such a statement does not mean that the custom
of the community deemed what took place at the “marriage” of the Appellant
1 and Kamlabai, suf cient for a valid marriage and that the performance of
the two essential ceremonies had been abrogated. There ought to have been
de nite evidence to establish that the custom prevalent in the community had
abrogated these ceremonies for such form of marriage.
8. What took place when Appellant 1 married Kamlabai, has been stated thus, by
PW 1:
Questions?
Accused nos. 1 and 3 then garlanded each other. Then they each struck each
other’s forehead.
He stated in cross-examination:
There is a custom that the father of girl should make to touch the foreheads of the
girl and boy to each other and the Gandharva is completed by the act.
9. It is urged for the respondent that as the touching of the forehead by the
bridegroom and the bride is stated to complete the act of Gandharva
marriage, it must be concluded that the ceremonies which, according to this
witness, had been performed, were all the ceremonies which, by custom, were
necessary for the validity of the marriage. In the absence of a statement by
the witness himself that according to custom these ceremonies were the only
necessary ceremonies for a valid marriage, we cannot construe the statement
that the touching of the foreheads completed the gandharva form of marriage
and that the ceremonies gone through were all the ceremonies required for
the validity of the marriage.
This statement too, does not establish that the two essential ceremonies are no
more necessary to be performed, for a Gandharva marriage. The mere fact that
they were probably not performed in the two Gandharva marriages Jeebhau had
attended, does not establish that their performance is no more necessary
according to the custom in that community. Further, Jeebhau has stated that
about ve or seven years earlier the performance of certain ceremonies which, till
then, were essential for the marriage, were given up. If so, the departure from the
essentials cannot be said to have become a custom, as contemplated by the Hindu
Marriage Act.
12. We are therefore of opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish that
the marriage between Appellant 1 and Kamlabai in February 1962 was
performed in accordance with the customary rites as required by Section 7 of
the Act. It was certainly not performed in accordance with the essential
requirements for a valid marriage under Hindu law.
13. It follows therefore that the marriage between Appellant 1 and Kamlabai
does not come within the expression “solemnized marriage” occurring in
Section 17 of the Act and consequently does not come within the mischief of
Questions?
Section 494 IPC even though the rst wife of Appellant1 was living when he
married Kamlabai in February 1962.
14. The result is that the conviction of Appellant 1 under Section 494 IPC and of
Appellant 2 under Section 494 read with Section 114 IPC cannot be
sustained.
Kailash Wati v. Ajodhia Parkash [1971 P & H]
Does the Hindu Marriage Law countenance or sanctify the concept of (what may
be conveniently so called) a weekend marriage as of right at the unilateral desire
of the wife?
3. The appellant Smt. Kailash Wati was married to the respondent Ajodhia
Parkash on in June, 1964, and at that time both of them were employed at
village level teachers-the appellant at her parental village of Bilga and the
respondent at village Kot Ise Khan. After the Marriage, the appellant was
transferred to the station of her husband’s posting and in all they stayed
together in the matrimonial home for a period of 8 to 9 months.
The allegation of the respondent-husband which is well borne out from the record
is that the appellant manoeuvred to get herself transferred again to village Bilga
and virtually ever since has been residing there with her parents against his
wishes. It is the common case that but for a paltry spell of 3 or 4 days in
September, 1971 when the appellant accompanied the respondent to Moga, the
couple has not lived together. Ajodhia Parkash respondent, therefore, led an
application for the restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act (hereinafter called as the Act) on the 4th of November, 1971, and in
her written statement the appellant took up the plea that she had never refused
to honour her matrimonial obligations but was rm in her stand that in the
existing situation she would not revert to the matrimonial home. It was
categorically stated that she was not prepared to resign her job and to return to
the conjugal home despite the insistence of the respondent.
Questions?
The Trial Court decreed the suit of the husband respondent on the 5th of
February, 1973. On an appeal preferred by the wife the learned Single Judge
upheld the ndings and the decree of the trial court.
4. The husband’s stand is that even at the time of the original presentation of the
petition in 1971, his wife had unilaterally withdrawn from the matrimonial
home for a continuous period of six years He claims to be in a position to
maintain his wife in digni ed comfort at his place of posting with his salary,
income from agricultural land and from other sources. It is highlighted on his
behalf that for the twelve long and best years of his life the wife has denied
him the society and substance of conjugal life and if she persists in her
adamance, there is little possibility of her returning home till perhaps her
superannuation from Government service.
5. On the other hand the wife’s consistent position is that the husband at the
time of marriage with his eyes open had accepted her as a working wife and
she was, therefore, under no obligation to live with her husband because
considerations of employment prevented her to do so. She claims a right to
live separately because of the fact of her posting elsewhere. Her stand is that
she has never positively denied access to her husband as and when possible in
the peculiar circumstances.
The appellant wife was willing to allow access to her husband as an when it may
be possible at her place of posting at Bilga where she was residing with her
parents. In the present case where both the spouses are employed at a place more
than eighty miles apart, the practical position is that the husband might on an
alternative week end or on any holiday make a visit to his wife and perhaps at her
option the wife if so inclined may return a visit in similar circumstances.
6. The direct issue that arises herein is whether the hallowed concept of the
matrimonial home can be whittled down to a weekend or an occasional
nocturnal meeting, at the unilateral desire of the wife to live separately?
7. Such an arrangement poses not the least dif culty where the two spouses
willingly agree to the same. So long as it is consensual such an arrangement
may indeed be to the mutual bene t of both the spouses.
8. The bundle of inde nable right and duties which bind the husband and the
wife can perhaps be best understood only in the context of their living
together in the marital home.
Questions?
Marital or conjugal rights include the enjoyment of association, sympathy,
con dence, domestic happiness, comforts of dwelling together in the same
habitation, eating meals at the same table and pro ting by the joint property
rights as well as the intimacies of domestic relations. Withdrawal from the
matrimonial home by either spouse would inevitable involve a total or partial loss
of consortium to either spouse and, consortium lies at the very root of the marital
relationship.
10. Three situations obviously come to the mind in such a withdrawal by the wife
from the matrimonial home. The rst one is, as in the present case, where the
husband marries a woman already in public or private service. Does he by
doing so impliedly give up his right to claim a common matrimonial home with
his wife? The true position in law appears to be that any working woman
entering into matrimony, by necessary implication consents to the obvious
and known marital duty of living with a husband as a necessary incident of
Marriage.
11. It may perhaps be possible for the parties to expressly bind themselves to this
effect by a clear agreement. It has been held in English Law that a mutual
agreement by husband and wife not to insist on the right and obligation of
each to live together is not against public policy.
12. The second possibility that arises is where a husband either encourages or at
least allows his wife to take up employment after marriage. Does he by doing
so again abandon his legal right of having his wife live within the matrimonial
home? A particular situation or nancial circumstances at one or the other
stage of marriage, require that both the spouses may have to seek work. In
such a situation, either by mutuality or even at the instance of the husband, a
wife might obtain gainful employment away from the matrimonial home.
Merely from this to infer that thereafter the said condition must necessarily
continue or a permanent right accrues to the wife to live away from the
matrimonial home on the ground of employment elsewhere, does not appear
to me as supportable either on principle or authority.
13. The third and the last situation is where a wife against the wishes of her
husband accepts employment away from the matrimonial home and
unilaterally withdraws therefrom. This, to my mind, would be an obvious case
of a unilateral and unreasonable withdrawal from the society of the husband
and thus a patent violation of the mutual obligation of husband and wife to
live together.
Questions?
14. However, the husband must actually establish a matrimonial home wherein he
can maintain his wife in digni ed comfort in accordance with the means and
standards of living of the parties. Secondly, the husband whilst claiming the
society of his wife in the marital home should be acting in good faith and not
merely to spite his wife.
15. On general principles alone a wife is not entitled to unilaterally withdraw from
the matrimonial home and live elsewhere merely by taking shelter behind the
plea that she would not deny access to the husband as and when possible.
Considerations only of employment elsewhere also would not furnish her
reasonable ground for withdrawal from the society and companionship of the
husband which in practical terms is synonymous with withdrawal from the
matrimonial home.
16. The crucial issue still is as to locus of the matrimonial home. It was in terms
contended that in the present times the husband had no superior right to
determine the location of the matrimonial and the wife was equally entitle to
do so. In the particular context of this case, it was suggested that the husband
was welcome to set up house with the wife at her place of posting and thus
live with her.
17. It is rst useful to examine this matter also dehors the strict rules of Hindu
Law and upon larger principles. Almost as a matter of unanimity all civilised
marriage law impose upon the husband a burden to maintain not only the wife
but also the children from the wedlock, whilst there is no such corresponding
obligation on the wife to maintain either the husband or the family despite the
fact that she may independently be in comfortable nancial circumstances.
Closely connected to this legal liability is the factor that the husband usually, if
not invariably, is the wage earner of the family and is thus compelled to live
near his place of work. It stands to reason, therefore, that the right of
choosing a home wherefrom he can effectively discharge his legal duty of
being the bread winner of the family should fall upon him:
The decision where the home should be is a decision which affects both the
parties and their children. It is their duty to decide it by agreement, by give and
take, and not by the imposition of the will of one over that of the other. Each is
entitled to an equal voice in the ordering of the affairs which are their concern.
Neither has a casting vote, though to be sure they should try so to arrange their
affairs that they spend their time together as a family and not apart.
Questions?
20. I would, therefore, conclude that even on general principles, subject to the
quali cation of the husband acting bona de, he is entitled in law to determine
the locus of the matrimonial home.
21. It remains to examine the issue in the special context of our own statutes and
the dictates of Hindu Law. Herein, what deserves particular notice is the legal
obligation which both the general and the Hindu Law attach to the status of
the husband. What may rst be borne in mind is the fact that even under the
general law a husband is bound to support his wife and children, both
legitimate and illegitimate. Under section 125(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code, a husband is obliged to maintain his wife and family on pain of stringent
processes on par with these applicable in the eld of criminal law itself.
22. Coming now to the rules of Hindu Law itself, section 18 of the Hindu Adoption
and Maintenance Act, 1956 shows that a general right inheres in Hindu wife
to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime and in the special
circumstances of prescribed matrimonial misconduct by the husband, she is
even entitled to live separately and nevertheless claim maintenance from him.
23. It is thus plain that Hindu Law imposes clear and sometimes burdensome
obligations on a Hindu male. He is bound to maintain his wife during her
lifetime. Equally, he must maintain his minor children and this obligation is
irrespective of the fact whether he possesses any property or not. The
obligation to maintain these relations is personal and legal and it arises from
mere fact of the existence of the relationship between the parties. Further,
the sacred concept of the Hindu family, which has apparently received
statutory recognition, obliges the Hindu male to maintain his unmarried
daughter and his aged or in rm parents in the eventuality of their being
unable to maintain themselves. With certain quali cations, the obligation to
maintain a widowed daughter-in-law and the dependents of a deceased from
whom any property may be inherited would also fall upon the Hindu male.
As against this, the thing is that the Hindu wife even though in independently
prosperous nancial circumstances is under no similar obligation to maintain her
husband and perhaps in his presence is not obliged to support even the children of
the family.
25. The issue arises whether the Hindu male is entitled to discharge the
aforementioned onerous obligation in a home of his own choice or is he even
further obliged to sustain his wife and children at a place other than where he
may choose to reside. Questions?
The onerous obligation, which the law imposes on the Hindu husband, is at least
co-related to the right to determine the location of the matrimonial home. To put
it in other words, as against the right of maintenance always inhering a Hindu
wife, there is a corresponding obligation to live together with the husband in his
home. That rights and duties must concur, is a principle which is too elementary to
deserve elaboration. In my view, therefore, the logical concomitant to the
obligation to maintain the wife and the family by the Hindu husband is that he at
least has the right to claim that the wife shall live with him in a matrimonial home
determined by his choice.
26. Coming now to the speci c rules of Hindu Law, it suf ces to refer to the
statement of law in the authoritative treatise Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law
in paras 442 and 555:-
442 Marital duties
The wife is bound to live with the husband and to submit herself to his
authority.
The husband is bound to live with his wife and to maintain her.
555. Separate residence and maintenance:
A wife’s rst duty to her husband is to submit herself obediently to his authority,
and to remain to under his roof and protection. She is not, therefore, entitled to
separate residence or maintenance, unless she proves that, by reason of his
misconduct or by his refusal to maintain her in his own place or residence or for
other justifying cause, she is compelled to live apart from him.
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that these rules were no longer
applicable in view of section 4 of the Hindu Marriage Act. This contention is
without substances. That section merely provides for exclusion of those rules of
Hindu Law with respect to speci c matter for which provision has been made in
the Hindu Marriage Act. Plainly enough this Act does not even remotely attempt
to de ne the general marital duties and obligations of the husband and the wife to
each other. Therefore, the applicable rules of Hindu Law cannot possibly be
excluded from their valid eld of operation.
27. Under Hindu law, the obligation of the wife to live with her husband in his
home and under his roof and protection is clear and unequivocal. Questions?
It is only in
the case of some distinct and speci ed marital misconduct on the part of the
husband, and not otherwise, that Hindu law entitles the wife to live separately
and claim maintenance therefore. This marital obligation has been further
buttressed by clear statutory recognition by section 9 of the Hindu Marriage
Act. This provides for an immediate remedy where either of the spouses
falters in his or her obligation to provide the society and sustenance to the
other. Indeed, the obligation to live together under a common roof is inherent
in the concept of a Hindu Marriage and, it cannot be torn unilaterally by the
desire of the wife to live separately and away from the matrimonial home
merely for the reason of either securing or holding a job elsewhere. Such an
act would be clearly in violation of a legal duty and it is plain, therefore that
this cannot be deemed either reasonable or a suf cient excuse for the
withdrawal of the wife from the society of her husband, as visualised under
section 9 of the Act.
28. In the present case the appellant wife deliberately and ingeniously secured
her transfer away from the matrimonial home and the place of posting of the
respondent husband at Kot Ise Khan in order to go back to her parental village
at Bilga. For the last nearly one decade the wife has virtually refused to live
with her husband except for a paltry spell of the two or three days and that
also under some pressure. She is categorical in her stand that she would not
con rm to her legal obligation to live with her husband for the sake of job
even though he is willing and is in a position to support her in reasonable
comfort in accordance with the style of life to which the parties are used to.
The time perhaps has come when the appellant must make her choice
between the job and the husband. A unilateral withdrawal from the society of
her husband in the present situation cannot possibly be deemed a reasonable
excuse so as to come within the ambit of the de nition provided under section
9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. An act contrary to a legal obligation obviously
cannot be deemed reasonable for the purpose of this provision. The
respondent husband her has waited patiently in the wings for the best part of
his life and it would perhaps be bordering on the cruel to require him to keep
on waiting endlessly in suspense.
The appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed.
*****
Questions?

Swaraj Garg v. K. M. Garg [1978 Del.]
When the husband and the wife are both gainfully employed at two different
places from before their marriage, where will be the matrimonial home after the
marriage?
2. The wife, Swaraj, was working as a teacher at Sunam, District Sangrur, from
1956 and was the Headmistress of Government High School, in 1969. The
parties were married on 12th July, 1964 at Sunam. The husband was abroad
for some years and though he seems to be well quali ed he did not get a
satisfactory job in India. He was employed in 1966-67 at Rs 500/- p.m. The
father of the wife, a petition writer, lives at Sunam, while the father of the
husband, a farmer, lives at Village Lehra. The husband has no house in Delhi of
his own. Before the marriage or at any time after the marriage the parties did
not discuss, much less come to any agreement, as to where their matrimonial
home should be after the marriage. Therefore, even after the marriage the
wife continued to live at Sunam and the husband at Delhi. The wife came to
Delhi to live with her husband from 12th July, 1964 to 28th Aug., 1964 and
then went back to Sunam on 2nd Feb., 1965 but did not return to Delhi
thereafter.
3. The husband led a petition for the restitution of conjugal rights against the
wife on the ground that she had withdrawn herself from the society of the
husband without reasonable excuse within the meaning of S. 9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act.
4. The wife defended the petition and further pleaded that it was the husband
who treated her badly. All through he was bent upon taking out the maximum
amount of money from her and her parents. The husband has already
extracted a huge dowry from the parents of the wife and has deprived her of
jewellery, clothes and other valuable presents which had been given to her by
her parents. The husband has kept all this money and has deliberately left the
wife without good treatment at home or any proper medical treatment when
she was ill and when she was in the family way and delivered a daughter. The
reason why she could not join the husband was the cruelty meted out to her
by the husband.
Questions?
5. The petition was dismissed by the trial Court, but was allowed in appeal by a
learned single Judge of this Court. Hence this Letters Patent Appeal.
Contentions of the parties had to be decided on the correspondence which
passed between the parties.
Choice of matrimonial home:
7. The basic principles on which the location of the matrimonial home is to be

determined by the husband and the wife are based on common convenience
and bene t of the parties.
8. Normally, the husband would be earning more than the wife and, therefore, as
a rule the wife may have to resign her lesser job and join the husband, who
would be expected to set up the matrimonial home. But, as Lord Denning L. J.
said in Dunn v. Dunn [(1949) PD 98, 103], “it is not a proposition of law…. It is
simply a proposition of ordinary good sense arising from the fact that the
husband is usually the wage earner and has to live near his work.” If, as in this
case, it is the wife who alone has the job which is also a good job, and the
husband does not have suf cient income, can it be said that even then the
husband has a right to decide that the matrimonial home must be at the place
where he happens to reside and the wife must resign her job and come to live
with him there?
The parties in the case before us lived at two different places before marriage. At
the time of the marriage there was neither an express nor an implied
understanding between them that the wife was to leave Sunam and come to Delhi
to live with her husband. For, at the marriage the wife was 32 years old, had
already put in eight years service as a teacher and was looking forward to a
promotion in her job. The husband does not appear to have any worthwhile job
when he married. It could not have occurred to the parties that the wife would
have to resign her job after marriage.
10. Paragraph 442 of Mulla’s Hindu Law, 14th Edition, is as follows:
(1) The wife is bound to live with her husband and to submit herself to his
authority.
(2) The husband is bound to live with his wife and to maintain her.
Questions?
12. The uncodi ed part of the Hindu law is based partly on the Dharma Shastras
and partly on custom. The Dharma Shastras re ected the law as it ought to be.
While this may have largely coincided with the law as it was, the coincidence
was not complete. If the Dharma Shastras preached that the wife should
always submit to the husband whatever the nancial circumstances of each of
them, this was only the ideal aimed at by the authors of the Dharma Shastras.
In so far as the right to set up the matrimonial home as being given to the
husband alone at all times in preference to the wife is based on custom, this
re ected the conditions of the age in which the custom was practised. The
process by which a custom becomes law is well known. The custom must be
ancient, certain and enforceable. The last requirement is expressed by saying
that it must be supported by the opinio necessitatis. The Indian decisions cited
at the foot of paragraph 442 of Mulla’s Hindu Law are of the 1898 and 1901.
Whatever may be the conditions in that distant past more than three quarters
of a century later the conditions are greatly altered. It would be dif cult to say
now that there is any custom which obliges an earning wife to resign her job
and join her husband even though on merits it is she who is better placed to
choose the place of the matrimonial home rather than the husband. What
happens to the custom when it becomes law? Firstly, just as a proposition of
law may be rejected either because it is an incorrect formulation, or because,
though correct, it is not applicable to the instant case, a custom may be
rejected because either it is not applicable to the parties or it is held to be
malus usus. Both these reasons are applicable to show that no enforceable
custom exists as law to require the wife to abandon all her rights in favour of
the husband in this respect.
13. At the present day numerous women have taken up jobs to help their families
and also to be useful members of the society. It may be that the wife is
nancially and in other respects better situated to choose the place of the
matrimonial home than the husband. The existence of such circumstances in a
particular case would make the law stated in paragraph 442 of Mulla’s Hindu
Law inapplicable to such a case. It would appear, therefore, that the said
statement of law deserves to be reconsidered. It may be brought in line with
modern conditions.
14. In the light of the above observations, it would appear that there is no warrant
in Hindu law to regard the Hindu wife as having no say in choosing the place of
matrimonial home. Art. 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before law
and equal protection of the law to the husband and the wife. Any law which
Questions?
would give the exclusive right to the husband to decide upon the place of the
matrimonial home without considering the merits of the claim of the wife
would be contrary to Art 14 and unconstitutional for that reason.
It is true that under the Hindu law, it is the duty of the husband to maintain his
wife, but the wife is not under a corresponding duty to maintain her husband. This
also is due to the fact that normally the husband is the wage earner. If, however,
the wife also has her own income it will be taken into account and if her income is
suf cient to maintain herself the husband will not be required to pay her any
maintenance at all. It is also true that the wife is not entitled to separate residence
and maintenance except for justi cation and otherwise the husband and the wife
are expected to live together in the matrimonial home. This is also where the wife
depends on the husband nancially. If, as in this case, the wife earns better than
the husband, rstly she will not expect to be maintained by the husband and
secondly, it will not be a matter of course for her to resign her job and come to live
with her husband. Some kind of agreement and give and take is necessary.
Between the husband and the wife, the decision as to the matrimonial home has
to be taken on the balance of circumstances. If the circumstances are equally
balanced in favour of the wife and the husband, then there would be a stalemate
and neither of them would be able to sue the other for restitution of conjugal
rights. Such a breakdown of marriage for which either of them or none of them
can be blamed has now been made a ground for obtaining divorce in the United
Kingdom by S. 1 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973.
Conduct of the husband
16. In Ex. R5 the husband spoils the chances of his wife coming to him by writing
as follows:
If you are under the impression that your safe deposit what you earned and what
your father gave you on Sandhara, would be yours, you are badly mistaken. If you
come to stay with me as my wife, your all belongings are mine. You too would be
mine. You will not be able to move even a step without my permission. If I want I
can starve you for days and keep you thirsty for months. Here also I have arranged
two tutions for you of Rs 100 each. All the money you earn or given to you from
Questions?
other sources, will be mine. Immediately you have to give that to me. Then if I like I
can give you for your personal use. If I do not want to give you, you have to go
without it. It all depends on my sweet will.
18. Due to nancial dif culties of the husband and comfortable position of the
wife and also due to the discouraging conduct of the husband towards the
wife, we are of the view that the wife had a reasonable excuse for not
resigning her job and for not coming to live with the husband at Delhi. The
question of the wife withdrawing herself from the society of the husband did
not arise at all because the husband and the wife had not been able to decide
where the matrimonial home should be set up. The fault, if any, for the lack of
any agreement between them on this point was not of the wife and may be
said to be of the husband.
After carefully balancing the evidence on record and arguments of both sides, the
following two conclusions emerge:
In the absence of a pre-marital agreement between the parties, it cannot be

said that the wife who had a permanent job with good prospects was expected
to resign it, leave Sunam and come to live with the husband when the husband
did not earn enough to maintain the family at Delhi where life was costlier.
The conduct of the husband was such as to frighten the wife from joining him
and thus giving her reasonable excuse for not joining him.
******
Malus usus est abolendus: An evil custom is to be abolished
Opinio juris sive necessitates: An opinion of law or necessity
It is the belief that an action was carried out because it was a legal obligation.
Opinio juris sive necessitatis is a source of law in domestic and international cases
because it deals with beliefs. The principle of International Law is that where
states believe and accept that a practice exists and must be followed because of a
rule of law requiring it, the practice becomes a part of the body of norms known as
International Customary Law.

Questions?

Babui Panmato Kuer v. Ram Agya Singh [1968 Pat]
The appellant is the plaintiff whose petition for dissolution of her marriage with
the respondent has been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge.
2. The petition was founded on the ground of fraud within the meaning of clause
(c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act.
3. The petitioner was admittedly a little above 18 years of age at the time of the
impugned marriage, which took place in May, 1959. Therefore, in order to
succeed in the present proceeding the petitioner had to prove that her
marriage with the respondent had been solemnized by procuring her consent
to the marriage by fraud.
4. The case of the petitioner as made out in the petition and also supported by
her ex parte evidence in court is as follows:
Just before her marriage had been solemnized she had overheard her father
telling her mother that he had xed up a husband for the petitioner who was in an
af uent nancial condition and was between 25 and 30 years of age. Having
heard these particulars, the petitioner raised no objection to the proposed
marriage; and it might be said that she impliedly consented to the marriage
through silence. At the time of solemnization of the marriage, she was, as is
customary in a Hindu family, particularly in a rural area, under a heavy veil, in
consequence of which she should not see the bridegroom. The bridegroom, viz.,
the respondent, left on the very next morning of the marriage without petitioner’s
roksadi having been performed.
Sometime in the early part of 1960, the respondent led a criminal case against
her father under section 498, Indian Penal Code. Thereupon, her father, who had
earlier declined to send the petitioner to the respondent’s house, agreed to her
going there and the prosecution against him was withdrawn. On the 15th April,
1960 the father took her to the respondent’s house where for the rst time in the
night she discovered that besides being a man of very ordinary means the
respondent was aged even more than her father, that is to say over 60 years She
wept and wept, took no food for two days and insisted upon being sent back to
Questions?
her father’s house, whereupon the respondent beat her. However she later
stealthily escaped to her father’s place, but father chided her; and so she left his
place as well and took shelter at her uncle’s place.
Thereupon, the defendant started another case under section 498, Indian Penal
Code, against her parents and uncle. However, the respondent succeeded in
taking her to his house, where she was con ned in a room. The petitioner again
succeeded in escaping from the respondent’s house: and this time she took
shelter in her nanihal. Ultimately, in March 1961, the petitioner led the present
petition for dissolution of marriage with the respondent on the ground of fraud in
the matter of procurement of her consent whereby her marriage was solemnized.
According to the petitioner, she had no cohabitation with the respondent at all.
6. The learned Judge has rejected the petition substantially on two grounds: (1)
that there was no misrepresentation to the petitioner herself inasmuch as the
particulars of the bridegroom were not conveyed to the petitioner directly
and had been merely over-heard by the petitioner while her father was
mentioning them to her mother; and (2) that fraudulent misrepresentation
within the meaning of section 12(1)(c) must be made at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage and not earlier, that is to say, at the time of
negotiations of the marriage.
7. “Fraud” has been de ned in section 17 of the Contract Act. Here, the
petitioner was sui juris; and, therefore, her consent to the marriage should
have been obtained directly, but that was not done; and it was obviously with
a view to procuring her consent to the marriage that the particulars of the
bridegroom were conveyed to her mother, who, in the circumstances, was
acting as her agent in the matter. The suggestions made to the petitioner’s
mother were in respect of certain facts, which the petitioner’s father could
not possibly have believed to be true. The petitioner’s father must have seen
the respondent and he must have known that he was nowhere between 25
and 30 years of age at that time. Therefore, the petitioner’s father had made
suggestions to the petitioner’s agent, viz. her mother, of certain facts which
the petitioner’s father himself could not possibly have believed to be true.
Even upon the footing that her father intended to procure her consent indirectly
employing her mother for the purpose, he had a duty towards her of making true
disclosure of facts particularly with regard to the age of the proposed
bridegroom. By giving out that the bridegroom was only 25 to 30 years of age,
Questions?
while, in fact, he was in the region of 60 years, the petitioner’s father had resorted
to the active concealment of a fact which was within his knowledge or belief. If the
petitioner’s father had conveyed true facts to her mother and yet the petitioner,
who overheard the talks, did not protest, then the position could have been
materially different. But, here the relevant facts were suppressed from her
knowledge, although it was the duty of her father to convey the true position to
her. This view receives ample support from illustration (b) to Section 17 of the
Contract Act.
Illustration (a) embodies a situation where there is no duty to disclose any defect
in the matter which is the subject of bargain between the parties. In the
Illustration, mention is made of a horse, which is sold by A to B by auction.
Regarding the same matter, it is provided by Illustration (b) that where the
purchaser is a daughter who has just come of age, it is incumbent upon the seller,
viz., A, on account of his relation with the purchaser, viz., B, to disclose to B if the
horse is unsound.
in this case it was the duty of the petitioner’s father to disclose to petitioner that
the respondent was a man of nearly 60 years so that she might be free to give or
withhold her consent to the proposed marriage. Therefore, elements of fraud
were undoubtedly present.
8. The Judge is not right in holding that there was no fraudulent

misrepresentation to the petitioner since the talks were between her father
and her mother. The learned Judge has missed to note the purpose of this talk
was to convey relevant information to the petitioner through her mother so
that the petitioner might be in a position to give her consent to the proposed
marriage. Anybody, who is familiar with the family life of an average Hindu,
knows that talks about marriage between a father and a daughter are not
carried on directly but are conveyed indirectly through the agency of female
relative particularly the mother, if she is available. I am, therefore, of the
opinion that there was a fraudulent misrepresentation to the petitioner,
intended to procure her consent to the marriage.
9. It is manifest that the impression which was created in the mind of the
petitioner by the talks between her father and her mother, continued even at
the time of solemnization of the marriage, because upon the evidence it must
be held that the petitioner, being under a heavy veil, at the time of the
marriage, could have no opportunity to have a look at her husband so as to
Questions?
make her in a position to withdraw her consent even at that stage. However,
the evidence disclose that it was not until the 15th April 1960, when the true
facts with regard to the age of the respondent came to the petitioner’s
knowledge.
10. It will be noticed that the expression “at the time of the marriage” is to be
found in clause (a) as well as in clause (d) but it is non-existent in clause (c).
Therefore, the scheme of section leaves no room for doubt that in a case
falling under clause (c) it is not necessary to prove that consent was obtained
by force or fraud at the time of the marriage. All that the section requires is
that the consent should have been obtained by force or fraud before the
marriage was solemnized.
11. In my view, the case of the petitioner falls quite clearly within the ambit of
clause (c) of section 12(1) of the Act. I, therefore, annul the petitioner’s
marriage with the respondent.
*****
Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati [1957 SC]
Dissolution of a Hindu marriage particularly amongst what were called the

regenerate classes was unknown to general Hindu law and was wholly
inconsistent with the basic conception of a Hindu marriage as a sacrament: a holy
alliance for the performance of religious duties. According to Shastras, marriage
amongst Hindus was the last of the ten sacraments enjoined by the Hindu religion
for puri cation. Hence according to strict Hindu law as given by the Samhitas and
as developed by the commentators, a Hindu marriage could not be dissolved on
any ground whatsoever.
What is desertion?
Questions?
Quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates
desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state
of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending
permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion.
For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two
essential conditions must be there:
the factum of separation

the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi).
Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned:
absence of consent, and

absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the
matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.
The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two
spouses respectively.
Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances

of each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in
another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts
have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct
and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of
separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is
whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi.
The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus
deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same
time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary
animus or it may be that the separation and the animus deserendi coincide in
point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital
home with the intention, express or implied, of bringing cohabitation permanently
to a close.
If a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus paenitentiae provided by law

and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona de offer of resuming
the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory
Questions?
period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce
have been commenced, desertion comes to an end and if the deserted spouse
unreasonably refuses the offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former.
Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the
deserted spouse must af rm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married
life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in
proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like any
other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt.
Locus Poenitentiae:
Literally this signi es a place of repentance;
In law, it is the opportunity of withdrawing from a projected contract, before the

parties are nally bound; or of abandoning the intention of committing a crime,
before it has been completed.
Locus poenitentiae is a Latin phrase which means opportunity to withdraw from a

contract or obligation before it is completed or to decide not to commit an
intended crime. This signi es repentance in the context of criminal law.
Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey [2002 SC]
Alleging cruelty and desertion against the husband, the appellant- wife
approached the Matrimonial Court under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act
praying for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent by a decree of
divorce. She also prayed for direction to the respondent to return her ornaments
given to him at the time of marriage. The Family Judge allowed the petition and
dissolved the marriage of the parties on the ground of desertion by the husband.
The appellant was also granted a decree of Rs.12,000 towards the price of the
scooter, allegedly given at the time of the marriage and payment of Rs.500 per
month as permanent alimony. Questions?
Both the husband and the wife preferred appeals against the order of the Family
Court as the wife was not satis ed with the part of the order refusing to grant a
decree in her favour in respect of properties claimed by her and the husband was
aggrieved by the order of dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce. Both
the appeals were disposed of by the impugned order holding that the appellant-
wife herself was a defaulting party and neither the allegations of cruelty nor of
desertion were proved. The order passed under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage
Act and for permanent alimony was also set aside.
The facts of the case are that marriage between the parties was solemnised on
6.5.1987. The appellant-wife lived with the respondent-husband till 21st June,
1987 and according to her the marriage between the parties was never
consummated. After 21st June, 1987 the parties started living separately. The
appellant alleged that her parents gave several articles in the form of ornaments,
valuables, cash and kind as per demand of the respondent. The respondent and
his family members allegedly made further demands of Colour TV, Refrigerator
and some other ornaments besides hard cash of Rs.10,000. The father of the
appellant obliged the respondent by giving him Rs.10,000 in the rst week of
June, 1987 but could not ful l the other demands of his parents. The respondent
and his family members were alleged to have started torturing the appellants on
false pretexts. Aggrieved by the attitude of the respondent and his family
members, the appellant states to have led a petition under Section 13 of the Act
seeking dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce along with prayer for the
return of the property and grant of permanent alimony. The respondent also led
a petition seeking divorce and grant of other reliefs. However, on 14.5.1996
the respondent led an application for withdrawal of his matrimonial case which
was allowed on 19.5.1996. The appellant had alleged that the respondent was
having illicit relations with a lady residing in Gaya at Bihar with whom he was
stated to have solemnised the marriage. The allegations made in the petition
were denied by the respondent and it was stated that in fact the appellant-wife
was taking advantage of her own wrongs.
With respect to the issue of cruelty, the Family Court concluded that no evidence
had been led to prove the allegations. The Court, however, held: “but it is proved
that the respondent had deserted the petitioner, hence the petitioner will get or is
entitled to for a decree of divorce”. The High Court held: “We also do not nd any
evidence that the wife has been treated with cruelty by the husband. We are also
of the view that there is no evidence that petitioner is deserted.” Questions?
Treating the petitioner with cruelty is a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia)
of the Act. Cruelty has not been de ned under the Act but in relation to
matrimonial matters it is contemplated as a conduct of such type which endangers
the living of the petitioner with the respondent. Cruelty consists of acts which are
dangerous to life, limb or health. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where
one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or
him as to have in icted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension
of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. Cruelty may be physical or
mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or
fear to the matrimonial life of the other. “Cruelty”, therefore, postulates a treatment
of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her
mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party.
Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of
family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and
has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general,
be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other. In the instant case both the trial
court as well as the High Court have found on facts that the wife had failed to
prove the allegations of cruelty attributed to the respondent. Concurrent ndings
of fact arrived at by the courts cannot be disturbed by this Court in exercise of
powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Otherwise also the
averments made in the petition and the evidence led in support thereof clearly
shows that the allegations, even if held to have been proved, would only show the
sensitivity of the appellant with respect to the conduct of the respondent which
cannot be termed more than ordinary wear and tear of the family life.
No decree of divorce could be granted on the ground of desertion in the absence

of pleading and proof. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even in
the absence of speci c issue, the parties had led evidence and there was suf cient
material for the Family Court to return a verdict of desertion having been proved.
In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel, we have opted to
examine this aspect of the matter despite the fact that there was no speci c issue
framed or insisted to be framed.
“Desertion”, for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the
intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without
that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total
repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place
Questions?
but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the
matrimonial obligations, i.e., not permitting or allowing and facilitating the
cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by
taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual
relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race,
permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for
procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a
continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and
circumstances of each case. This Court in Bipinchandra Shah v. Prabhavati [1957]
held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passions, for example,
anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not
amount to desertion.
For the offence of desertion so far as deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there (1) the factum of separation and (2) the intention to bring
cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are
essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent,
and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the
matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. For holding
desertion proved the inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in
another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say the facts
have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct
and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of
separation.
To prove desertion in matrimonial matter it is not always necessary that one of

the spouse should have left the company of the other as desertion could be proved
while living under the same roof. Desertion cannot be equated with separate living
by the parties to the marriage. Desertion may also be constructive which can be
inferred from the attending circumstances. It has always to be kept in mind that
the question of desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and
circumstances of each case.
There is another aspect of the matter which disentitles the appellant from seeking
the relief of divorce on the ground of desertion in this case. As desertion in
matrimonial cases means the withdrawal of one party from a state of things, i.e., a
marital status of the party, no party to the marriage can be permitted to allege
desertion unless he or she admits that after the formal ceremonies of the
marriage, the parties had recognised and discharged the common obligation of
Questions?
the married life which essentially requires the cohabitation between the parties
for the purpose of consummating the marriage. Cohabitation by the parties is an
essential of a valid marriage as the object of the marriage is to further the
perpetuation of the race by permitting lawful indulgence in passions for
procreation of children. In other words, there can be no desertion without
previous cohabitation by the parties.
The basis for this theory is built upon the recognised position of law in
matrimonial matters that no-one can desert who does not actively or wilfully
bring to an end the existing state of cohabitation. However, such a rule is subject
to just exceptions which may be found in a case on the ground of mental or
physical incapacity or other peculiar circumstances of the case. However, the
party seeking divorce on the ground of desertion is required to show that he or
she was not taking the advantage of his or her own wrong.
In the instant case the appellant herself pleaded that there had not been
cohabitation between the parties after the marriage. She neither assigned any
reason nor attributed the non-resumption of cohabitation to the respondent.
From the pleadings and evidence led in the case, it is apparent that the appellant
did not permit the respondent to have cohabitation for consummating the
marriage. In the absence of cohabitation between the parties, a particular state of
matrimonial position was never permitted by the appellant to come into
existence. In the present case, in the absence of cohabitation and consummation
of marriage, the appellant was disentitled to claim divorce on the ground of
desertion.
No evidence was led by the appellant to show that she was forced to leave the
company of the respondent or that she was thrown away from the matrimonial
home or that she was forced to live separately and that the respondent had
intended animus deserendi. There is nothing on record to hold that the
respondent had ever declared to bring the marriage to an end or refuses to have
cohabitation with the appellant. As a mater of fact the appellant is proved to have
abandoned the matrimonial home and declined to cohabit with the respondent
thus forbearing to perform the matrimonial obligation.
In any proceedings under the Act whether defended or not the court would
decline to grant relief to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner was taking
advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purposes of the reliefs
Questions?
contemplated under Section 23(1) of the Act. No party can be permitted to carve
out the ground for destroying the family which is the basic unit of the society. The
foundation of the family rests on the institution of a legal and valid marriage.
Approach of the court should be to preserve the matrimonial home and be
reluctant to dissolve the marriage on the asking of one of the parties.
For upholding the judgment and decree of the Family Court, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant submitted that as after the decree of divorce the
appellant had remarried with one Sudhakar Pandey and out of the second
marriage a child is also stated to have been born, it would be in the interest of
justice and the parties that the marriage between them is dissolved by a decree of
divorce.
To appreciate such a submission some facts have to be noticed and the interests
of public and society to be borne in mind. It appears that the marriage between
the parties was dissolved by a decree of divorce vide the judgment and decree of
the Family Court dated 8.7.1996. The respondent-husband led appeal against
the judgment and decree on 19.1.1997. As no stay was granted, the appellant
solemnised the second marriage on 29.5.1997, admittedly, during the pendency of the
appeal before the High Court. There is no denial of the fact that right of at least
one appeal is a recognised right under all systems of civilised legal jurisprudence.
If despite the pendency of the appeal, the appellant chose to solemnise the
second marriage, the adventure is deemed to have been undertaken at her own
risk and the ultimate consequences arising of the judgment in the appeal pending
in the High Court. No person can be permitted to out the course of justice by his
or her overt and covert acts.
This Court in Ms. Jorden Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra [AIR 1985 SC 935] suggested for
a complete reform of law of marriage and to make a uniform law applicable to all
people irrespective of religion or caste. The Court observed:
“It appears to be necessary to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and

mutual consent as grounds of divorce in all cases. …. There is no point or purpose
to be served by the continuance of a marriage which has so completely and
signally broken down. We suggest that the time has come for the intervention of
legislature in these matters to provide for a uniform code of marriage and divorce
and to provide by law for a way out of the unhappy situation in which couples like
the present have found themselves.
Questions?
Marriage between the parties cannot be dissolved only on the averments made by
one of the parties that as the marriage between them has broken down, no useful
purpose would be served to keep it alive. The legislature, in its wisdom, despite
observation of this Court has not thought it proper to provide for dissolution of
the marriage on such averments. There may be cases where, on facts, it is found
that as the marriage has become dead on account of contributory acts of
commission and omission of the parties, no useful purpose would be served by
keeping such marriage alive. This Court in V. Bhagat v. Mrs.D. Bhagat [1994 SC]
held that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is not a ground by itself to
dissolve it.
As already held, the appellant herself is trying to take advantage of her own
wrong and in the circumstances of the case, the marriage between the parties
cannot be held to have become dead for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution for dissolving the marriage.
There is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed with costs throughout.
N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane [1975 SC]
This is a matrimonial dispute arising out of a petition led by the appellant for
annulment of his marriage with the respondent or alternatively for divorce or for
judicial separation. The spouses possess high academic quali cations and each
one claims a measure of social respectability and cultural sophistry. The spouses
parted company on February 27, 1961, the appellant led his petition on
February 19, 1962
14. The appellant asked for annulment of his marriage under Section 12(l)(c) on
the ground that his consent to the marriage was obtained by fraud.
Alternatively, he asked for divorce under Section 13(l)(iii) on the ground that
the respondent was incurably of unsound mind. Alternatively, the appellant
asked for judicial separation under Section 10(1)(b) on the ground that the
respondent had treated him with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable
Questions?
apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live
with her.
This Court granted to the appellant special leave to appeal, limited to the question
of judicial separation on the ground of cruelty.
Nature of burden of proof on a petitioner in a matrimonial petition: Doubtless, the

burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his or her case for, ordinarily, the
burden lies on the party which af rms a fact, not on the party which denies it. This
principle accords with commonsense, as it is so much easier to prove a positive
than a negative. The petitioner must therefore prove that the respondent has
treated him with cruelty. But does the law require that the petitioner must prove
his case beyond a reasonable doubt? In other words, though the burden lies on the
petitioner to establish the charge of cruelty, what is the standard of proof to be
applied in order to judge whether the burden has been discharged?
24. The normal rule which governs civil proceedings is that a fact can be said to be
established if it is proved by a preponderance of probabilities. This is for the
reason that under the Evidence Act, Section 3, a fact is said to be proved when
the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that
a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act
upon the supposition that it exists. The belief regarding the existence of a fact
may thus be founded on a balance of probabilities.
25. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally
governs criminal trials or trials involving issues of quasi-criminal nature. A
criminal trial involves liberty of the subject, which may not be taken away on a
mere preponderance of probabilities.
26. Neither Section 10 nor Section 23 requires that the petitioner must prove his
case beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 23 confers on the court the power to
pass a decree if it is “satis ed” on matters mentioned. Considering that
proceedings under the Act are essentially of a civil nature, the word “satis ed”
must mean “satis ed on a preponderance of probabilities” and not “satis ed
beyond a reasonable doubt”. Section 23 does not alter the standard of proof in
civil cases.
27. The misconception arises perhaps from a loose description of the
respondent’s conduct in such cases as constituting a “matrimonial offence”.
Acts of a spouse which are calculated to impair the integrity of a marital union
have a social signi cance. To marry or not to marry and if so whom, may well
Questions?
be a private affair but the freedom to break a matrimonial tie is not. The
society has a stake in the institution of marriage and therefore the erring
spouse is treated not as a mere defaulter but as an offender. But this social
philosophy has no bearing on the standard of proof in matrimonial cases.
28. Though under Section 10(1)(b), the apprehension of the petitioner that it will
be harmful or injurious to live with the other party has to be reasonable, it is
wrong, except in the context of such apprehension, to import the concept of a
reasonable man as known to the law of negligence for judging of matrimonial
relations.
The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty for

divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person
complaining of the acts. The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel
to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether
it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse. That which may be cruel to
one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to an
individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another
set.
The Court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and an ideal wife (assuming any
such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. We must therefore
understand this Dr Dastane and his wife Sucheta as nature has made them and as
they have shaped their lives.
34. We do not propose to spend time on the tri es of their married life. Numerous
incidents have been cited as constituting cruelty but the simple trivialities
which can truly be described as the reasonable wear and tear of married life have
to be ignored. It is in the context of such trivialities that one says that spouses
take each other for better or worse.
This is not a case of mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of

language or a want of civil attention to the needs of the husband and the
household. She delights in causing misery to her husband and his relations: “I want
to see the ruination of the whole Dastane dynasty”; “burn the book written by
your father and apply the ashes to your forehead”; “you are not a man” conveying
that the children were not his; “ you are a monster in a human body “I will make
you lose your job and publish it in the Poona newspapers” — these and similar
outbursts are not the ordinary wear and tear of married life, but they became, by
Questions?
their regularily, a menace to the peace and well-being of the household. Acts like
the tearing of the Mangal-Sutra, locking out the husband when he is due to return
from the of ce, rubbing chillie powder on the tongue of an infant child, beating a
child mercilessly while in high fever and switching on the light at night and sitting
by the bedside of the husband merely to nag him are acts which tend to destroy
the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony.
51. The conduct of the respondent clearly amounts to cruelty within the meaning
of Section 10(1)(b). Under that provision, the relevant consideration is to see
whether the conduct is such as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the
mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with
the respondent. The threat that she will put an end to her own life or that she
will set the house on re, the threat that she will make him lose his job and
have the matter published in newspapers and the persistent abuses and
insults hurled at the appellant and his parents are all of so grave an order as to
imperil the appellant’s sense of personal safety, mental happiness, job
satisfaction and reputation. Her once-too- frequent apologies do not re ect
genuine contrition but were merely impromptu devices to tide over a crisis
temporarily.
52. Next question is whether the appellant had at any time condoned the
respondent’s cruelty. Under Section 23(1)(b), relief prayed for can be decreed
only and only if “where the ground of the petition is cruelty the petitioner has
not in any manner condoned the cruelty”.
53. Argument of the respondent is that condonation is implicit in the act of
cohabitation and is proved by the fact that on February 27, 1961 when the
spouses parted, the respondent was about 3 months pregnant. Even though
condonation was not pleaded as a defence by the respondent it is our duty, in
view of the provisions of Section 23(1)(b), to nd whether the cruelty was
condoned by the appellant. That section casts an obligation on the court to
consider the question of condonation, an obligation which has to be
discharged even in undefended cases. The relief prayed for can be decreed
only if we are satis ed “but not otherwise”, that the petitioner has not in any
manner condoned the cruelty.
54. Condonation means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the restoration of
offending spouse to the same position as he or she occupied before the offence was
committed. To constitute condonation there must be, therefore, two things:
forgiveness and restoration. The evidence of condonation in this case is, in our
opinion, as strong and satisfactory as the evidence of cruelty. But Questions?
that
evidence does not consist in the mere fact that the spouses continued to share
a common home during or for some time after the spell of cruelty. Cruelty,
generally, does not consist of a single, isolated act but consists in most cases of
a series of acts spread over a period of time. Law does not require that at the
rst appearance of a cruel act, the other spouse must leave the matrimonial
home lest the continued cohabitation be construed as condonation. Such a
construction will hinder reconciliation and thereby frustrate the benign
purpose of marriage laws.
55. The evidence of condonation consists here in the fact that the spouses led a normal
sexual life despite the respondent’s acts of cruelty. This is not a case where the
spouses, after separation, indulged in a stray act of sexual intercourse, in
which case the necessary intent to forgive and restore may be said to be
lacking. But if during cohabitation the spouses, unin uenced by the conduct of
the offending spouse, lead a life of intimacy which characterises normal
matrimonial relationship, the intent to forgive and restore the offending
spouse to the original status may reasonably be inferred.
That inference stands uncontradicted, the appellant not having explained the
circumstances in which he came to lead and live a normal sexual life with the
respondent, even after a series of acts of cruelty on her part.
57. But condonation of a matrimonial offence is not to be likened to a full

Presidential pardon under Article 72 of the Constitution which, once granted,
wipes out the guilt beyond the possibility of revival. Condonation is always
subject to the implied condition that the offending spouse will not commit a fresh
matrimonial offence, either of the same variety as the one condoned or of any
other variety. “No matrimonial offence is erased by condonation. It is
obscured but not obliterated”. Since the condition of forgiveness is that no
further matrimonial offence shall occur, it is not necessary that the fresh
offence should be ejusdem generis with the original offence. Condoned
cruelty can therefore be revived, say, by desertion or adultery.
58. It is alleged that the respondent treated the appellant with cruelty during
their brief meeting on March 19, 1961, that she refused to allow to the
appellant any access to the children, that on May 19, 1961 she wrote a letter
to the Secretary, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, containing false and
malicious accusations against the appellant and his parents and that she asked
the Government to provide her with separate maintenance.
Questions?
59. Considered in this context, the allegations made by the respondent in her
letter Ex. 318 cannot revive the original cause of action. These allegations
were provoked by the appellant by his persistent and purposeful accusation,
repeated times without number, that the respondent was of unsound mind.
He snatched every chance and wasted no opportunity to describe her as a
mad woman which, for the purposes of this appeal, we must assume to be
wrong and unfounded.
60. We therefore hold that the respondent was guilty of cruelty but the appellant
condoned it and the subsequent conduct of the respondent is not such as to
amount to a revival of the original cause of action. Accordingly, we dismiss the
appeal.
*****
Case Law for section 13B HMA:
Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash [1992 SC]
This appeal from a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court concerns the
validity of a decree of dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, and is said,
probably rightly, to raise an important issue. The issue is whether a party to a
petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 can unilaterally withdraw the consent or whether the consent once
given is irrevocable.
3. The appellant is the wife of the respondent. They were married in 1968. They
lived together for about six to seven months. Thereafter, it is said that the wife
did not stay with the husband except from December 9, 1984 to January 7,
1985. That was pursuant to an order of the court, but it seems that they did
not live like husband and wife during that period also. On January 8, 1985,
both of them came to Hamirpur. The wife was accompanied by her counsel,
Shri Madan Rattan. After about an hour’s discussion, they moved a petition
under Section 13-B for divorce by mutual consent in the District Court at
Hamirpur. On January 9, 1985 the court recorded statements of the parties
and left the matter there. Questions?
4. On January 15 1985, the wife led an application in the court, inter alia,
stating that her statement dated January 9, 1985 was obtained under
pressure and threat of the husband and she was not even allowed to see or
meet her relations to consult them before ling the petition for divorce. Nor
they were permitted to accompany her to the court. She said that she would
not be party to the petition and prayed for its dismissal. Ultimately, the
District Judge dismissed the petition for divorce. But upon appeal, the High
Court has granted a decree for dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent.
The High Court has observed that the spouse who has given consent to a
petition for divorce cannot unilaterally withdraw the consent and such
withdrawal, however, would not take away the jurisdiction of the court to
dissolve the marriage by mutual consent, if the consent was otherwise free.
The High Court also recorded a nding that the wife gave her consent to the
petition without any force, fraud or undue in uence and therefore she was
bound by that consent.
5. Section 13-B was not there in the original Act. It was introduced in 1976. It is
also necessary to read Section 23(1)(bb). Section 13-B is in pari materia with
Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B
requires that the petition for divorce by mutual consent must be presented to
the court jointly by both the parties. Similarly, sub-section (2) providing for the
motion before the court for hearing of the petition should also be by both the
parties.
6. There are three other requirements in sub-section (1). They are:
They have been living separately for a period of one year,

They have not been able to live together, and
They have mutually agreed that marriage should be dissolved.
9. The ‘living separately’ for a period of one year should be immediately

preceding the presentation of the petition. It is necessary that immediately
preceding the presentation of petition, the parties must have been living
separately. The expression ‘living separately’, connotes to our mind not living
like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The parties
may live under the same roof by force of circumstances, and yet they may not
be living as husband and wife. The parties may be living in different houses
and yet they could live as husband and wife. What seems to be necessary is
that they have no desire to perform marital obligations and with that mental
Questions?
attitude they have been living separately for a period of one year immediately
preceding the presentation of the petition. The second requirement that they
‘have not been able to live together’ seems to indicate the concept of broken
down marriage and it would not be possible to reconcile themselves. The third
requirement is that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be
dissolved.
10. Under sub-section (2) the parties are required to make a joint motion not
earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition and not
later than 18 months after the said date. This motion enables the court to
proceed with the case in order to satisfy itself about the genuineness of the
averments in the petition and also to nd out whether the consent was not
obtained by force, fraud or undue in uence. The court may make such inquiry
as it thinks t including the hearing or examination of the parties for the
purpose of satisfying itself whether the averments in the petition are true. If
the court is satis ed that the consent of parties was not obtained by force,
fraud or undue in uence and they have mutually agreed that the marriage
should be dissolved, it must pass a decree of divorce.
11. The question with which we are concerned is whether it is open to one of the
parties at any time till the decree of divorce is passed to withdraw the consent
given to the petition.
The Bombay High Court has expressed the view that the crucial time for the
consent for divorce under Section 13-B was the time when the petition was led.
If the consent was voluntarily given it would not be possible for any party to
nullify the petition by withdrawing the consent. The court has drawn support to
this conclusion from the principle underlying Order 22 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provides that if a suit is led jointly by one or more plaintiffs,
such a suit or a part of a claim cannot be abandoned or withdrawn by one of the
plaintiffs or one of the parties to the suit.
12. But the Kerala High Court, the Punjab and Haryana High Court and Rajasthan
High Court have taken a contrary view. It has been held that it is open to one
of the spouses to withdraw the consent given to the petition at any time
before the court passes a decree for divorce. The satisfaction of the court
after holding an inquiry about the genuineness of the consent, necessarily
contemplates an opportunity for either of the spouses to withdraw the
consent.
13. From the analysis of the section, it will be apparent that the ling of the
Questions?
petition with mutual consent does not authorise the court to make a decree
for divorce. There is a period of waiting from 6 to 18 months. This
interregnum was obviously intended to give time and opportunity to the
parties to re ect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. In
this transitional period one of the parties may have a second thought and
change the mind not to proceed with the petition. The spouse may not be a
party to the joint motion under sub- section (2). There is nothing in the section
which prevents such course. The section does not provide that if there is a
change of mind it should not be by one party alone, but by both.
At the time of the petition by mutual consent, the parties are not unaware that
their petition does not by itself snap marital ties. They know that they have to
take a further step to snap marital ties. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B is clear on
this point. It provides that “on the motion of both the parties…. if the petition is
not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall … pass a decree of divorce ….”
What is signi cant in this provision is that there should also be mutual consent
when they move the court with a request to pass a decree of divorce. Secondly,
the court shall be satis ed about the bona des and the consent of the parties. If
there is no mutual consent at the time of the enquiry, the court gets no
jurisdiction to make a decree for divorce. If the view is otherwise, the court could
make an enquiry and pass a divorce decree even at the instance of one of the
parties and against the consent of the other. Such a decree cannot be regarded as
decree by mutual consent.
14. Sub-section (2) requires the court to hear the parties which means both the
parties. If one of the parties at that stage says that “I have withdrawn my
consent”, or “I am not a willing party to the divorce”, the court cannot pass a
decree of divorce by mutual consent. If the court is held to have the power to
make a decree solely based on the initial petition, it negates the whole idea of
mutuality. Mutual consent to the divorce is a sine qua non for passing a decree
for divorce under Section 13-B. Mutual consent should continue till the
divorce decree is passed. It is a positive requirement for the court to pass a
decree of divorce. “The consent must continue to decree nisi and must be
valid subsisting consent when the case is heard”.
15. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the decree for dissolution of
the marriage.
*****
Questions?

Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani v. Union of India [1995 SC]
Kuldip Singh, J.
“The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code through-
out the territory of India” is an unequivocal mandate under Article 44 of the
Constitution which seeks to introduce a uniform personal law–a decisive step
towards national consolidation.
Questions for our consideration are whether a Hindu husband, married under
Hindu law, by embracing Islam, can solemnise second marriage? Whether such a
marriage without having the rst marriage dissolved under law, would be a valid
marriage qua the rst wife who continues to be Hindu? Whether the apostate
husband would be guilty of the offence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal
Code?
Petitioner 1 is the President of “KALYANI” – a registered society – which is an

organisation working for the welfare of needy-families and women in distress.
Petitioner 2, Meena Mathur was married to Jitender Mathur on February 27,

1978. Three children (two sons and a daughter) were born out of the wed-lock. In
early 1988, the petitioner was shocked to learn that her husband had solemnised
second marriage with one Sunita Narula @ Fathima. The marriage was solemnised
after they converted to Islam.
Marriage is the very foundation of civilised society. The relation once formed, the
law steps in and binds the parties to various obligations and liabilities
thereunder. Marriage is an institution in the maintenance of which the public at
large is deeply interested. It is the foundation of the family and in turn of the
society without which no civilisation can exist.
Where a marriage takes place under Hindu Law the parties acquire a status and
certain rights by the marriage itself under the law governing the Hindu Marriage
and if one of the parties is allowed to dissolve the marriage Questions?
by
adopting and enforcing a new personal law, it would tantamount to
destroying the existing rights of the other spouse who continues to be Hindu.
We, therefore, hold that under the Hindu Personal Law as it existed prior to its
codi cation in 1955, a Hindu marriage continued to subsist even after one of the
spouses converted to Islam. There was no automatic dissolution of the marriage.
The position has not changed after coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955, rather it has become worse for the apostate.
A marriage performed under the Act cannot be dissolved except on the grounds
available under section 13 of the Act. In that situation parties who have
solemnised the marriage under the Act remain married even when the husband
embraces Islam in pursuit of other wife. A second marriage by an apostate
under the shelter of conversion to Islam would nevertheless be a marriage in
violation of the provisions of the Act by which he would be continuing to be
governed so far as his rst marriage under the Act is concerned despite his
conversion to Islam. The second marriage of an apostate would, therefore, be
illegal marriage qua his wife who married him under the Act and continues to be
Hindu. Between the apostate and his Hindu wife the second marriage is in
violation of the provisions of the Act and as such would be non est.
Necessary ingredients of Section 494 IPC are: (1) having a husband or wife
living; (2) marries in any case; (3) in which such marriage is void; (4) by reason of
its taking place during the life of such husband or wife.
It is no doubt correct that the marriage solemnised by a Hindu husband after
embracing Islam may not be strictly a void marriage under the Act because he is
no longer a Hindu, but the fact remains that the said marriage would be in
violation of the Act which strictly professes monogamy.
The expression “void” for the purpose of the Act has been de ned under Section
11 of the Act. It has a limited meaning within the scope of the de nition
under the Section. The expression “void” under section 494, IPC has been used
in the wider sense. A marriage which is in violation of any provisions of law
would be void in terms of the expression used under Section 494, IPC.
A Hindu marriage solemnised under the Act can only be dissolved on any of the
grounds speci ed under the Act. Till the time a Hindu marriage is dissolved
Questions?
under the Act none of the spouses can contract second marriage. Conversion to
Islam and marrying again would not, by itself, dissolve the Hindu marriage under
the Act. The second marriage by a convert would therefore be in violation of the
Act and as such void in terms of Section 494, IPC. Any act which is in violation of
mandatory provisions of law is per-se void.
The real reason for the voidness of the second marriage is the subsisting of
the rst marriage which is not dissolved even by the conversion of the husband.
It would be giving a go-bye to the substance of the matter and acting against the
spirit of the Statute if the second marriage of the convert is held to be legal.
A matrimonial dispute between a convert to Islam and his or her non-Muslim
spouse is obviously not a dispute “where the parties are Muslims” and, therefore,
the rule of decision in such a case was or is not required to be the “Muslim
Personal Law”. In such cases the Court shall act and the Judge shall decide
according to justice, equity and good conscience. The second marriage of a
Hindu husband after embracing Islam being violative of justice, equity and good
conscience would be void on that ground also and attract the provisions of
Section 494, IPC.
Looked from another angle, the second marriage of an apostate-husband

would be in violation of the rules of natural justice. Assuming that a Hindu
husband has a right to embrace Islam as his religion, he has no right under the Act
to marry again without getting his marriage under the Act dissolved. The second
marriage after conversion to Islam would, thus, be in violation of the rules of
natural justice and as such would be void.
The interpretation we have given to Section 494 IPC would advance the interest
of justice. It is necessary that there should be harmony between the two systems
of law just as there should be harmony between the two communities. Result of
the interpretation, we have given to Section 494 IPC, would be that the Hindu
Law on the one hand and the Muslim Law on the other hand would operate
within their respective ambits without trespassing on the personal laws of
each other. Since it is not the object of Islam nor is the intention of the
enlighten Muslim community that the Hindu husbands should be encouraged to
become Muslims merely for the purpose of evading their own personal laws by
marrying again, the courts can be persuaded to adopt a construction of
Questions?
laws resulting in denying the Hindu husband converted to Islam the right to
marry again without having his existing marriage dissolved in accordance with
law.
All the four ingredients of Section 494 IPC are satis ed in the case of a Hindu
husband who marries for the second time after conversion to Islam. He has a wife
living, he marries again. The said marriage is void by reason of its taking place
during the life of the rst wife.
We request the Government of India to have a fresh look at Article 44 and
“endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the
territory of India”.
R.M. SAHAI, J.
The problem with which these appeals are concerned is that many Hindus have
changed their religion and have become convert to Islam only for purposes of
escaping the consequences of bigamy. For instance, Jitendra Mathur was married
to Meena Mathur. He and another Hindu girl embraced Islam. Obviously because
Muslim Law permits more than one wife and to the extent of four. But no
religion permits deliberate distortions. Much misapprehension prevails about
bigamy in Islam. To check the misuse many Islamic countries have codi ed the
personal Law, `Wherein the practice of polygamy has been either totally
prohibited or severely restricted. (Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Pakistan, Iran, the
Islamic Republics of the Soviet Union are some of the Muslim countries to be
remembered in this context’.
The law may provide that every citizen who changes his religion cannot marry
another wife unless he divorces his rst wife. The provision should be made
applicable to every person whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian or a
Sikh or a Jain or a Budhist.
ORDER
For reasons and conclusions reached in separate but concurring judgments the
Writ petitions are allowed in terms of answers in the opinion of Kuldip Singh, J.
Questions?

Lily Thomas v. Union of India [2000 SC]
Under the Hindu Marriage Act, if the marriage takes place in spite of the fact that
a party to that marriage had a spouse living, such marriage would be void under
Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Such a marriage is also described as void
under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act under which an offence of bigamy has
been created. This offence has been created by reference. By providing in Section
17 that provisions of Sections 494 and 495 would be applicable to such a
marriage, the legislature has bodily lifted the provisions of Sections 494 and 495
IPC and placed them in Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act. This is a well-known
legislative device. The important words used in Section 494 are “marries in any
case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of
such husband or wife”. These words indicate that before an offence under Section
494 can be said to have been constituted, the second marriage should be shown
to be void in a case where such a marriage would be void by reason of its taking
place in the lifetime of such husband or wife.
26. It may be pointed out that Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act corresponds
to Sections 43 and 44 of the Special Marriage Act. It also corresponds to
Sections 4 and 5 of the Parsi Marriage & Divorce Act and Section 61 of the
Indian Divorce Act.
27. If a person marries a second time during the lifetime of his wife, such marriage
apart from being void under Sections 11 and 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
would also constitute an offence and that person would be liable to be
prosecuted under Section 494 IPC. While Section 17 speaks of marriage
between two “Hindus”, Section 494 does not refer to any religious
denomination.
28. Change of religion does not dissolve the marriage performed under the Hindu
Marriage Act between two Hindus. Apostasy does not bring to an end the civil
obligations or the matrimonial bond, but apostasy is a ground for divorce
under Section 13 as also a ground for judicial separation under Section 10 of
the Hindu Marriage Act. Hindu law does not recognise bigamy.
Questions?
29. In Gul Mohd. v. Emperor [1947 Nag] the High Court held that the conversion
of a Hindu wife to Mohammedanism does not, ipso facto, dissolve the
marriage with her Hindu husband. She cannot, during his lifetime, enter into a
valid contract of marriage with another person. Such person having sexual
relations with a Hindu wife converted to Islam, would be guilty of adultery
under Section 497 IPC as the woman before her conversion was already
married and her husband was alive.
30. Mere conversion does not bring to an end the marital ties unless a decree for
divorce on that ground is obtained from the court. Till a decree is passed, the
marriage subsists. So long as that marriage subsists, another marriage cannot
be performed, not even under any other personal law, and on such marriage
being performed, the person would be liable to be prosecuted under Section
494 IPC.
Prosecution under Section 494 in respect of a second marriage under

Mohammedan law can be avoided only if the rst marriage was also under the
Mohammedan law and not if the rst marriage was under any other personal law
where there was a prohibition on contracting a second marriage in the lifetime of
the spouse.
39. We are not here concerned with the status of the second wife or the children
born out of that wedlock as in the instant case we are considering the effect of
the second marriage qua the rst subsisting marriage in spite of the husband
having converted to “Islam”.
40. Interpreting the scope and extent of Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code this
Court in Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani v. Union of India [1995] held:
The second marriage of a Hindu husband after conversion to Islam, without

having his rst marriage dissolved under law, would be invalid. The second
marriage would be void in terms of the provisions of Section 494 IPC and the
apostate husband would be guilty of the offence under Section 494 IPC.
59. We cannot accept the contention that the law declared in Sarla Mudgal case
cannot be applied to persons who have solemnised marriages in violation of
the mandate of law prior to the date of judgment. This Court had not laid
down any new law but only interpreted the existing law which was in force. It
is a settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back
to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the
Questions?
judgment because concededly the court does not legislate but only gives an
interpretation to an existing law. We do not agree with the arguments that the
second marriage by a convert male Muslim has been made an offence only by
judicial pronouncement. The judgment has only interpreted the existing law
after taking into consideration various aspects argued at length before the
Bench which pronounced the judgment. The review petition alleging violation
of Article 20(1) is without any substance and is liable to be dismissed on this
ground alone.
60. It was contended in Sarla Mudgal that making a convert Hindu liable for
prosecution under the Penal Code would be against Islam, the religion
adopted by such person upon conversion. No person, by the judgment
impugned, has been denied the freedom of conscience and propagation of
religion. The second marriage solemnised by a Hindu during the subsistence
of a rst marriage is an offence punishable under the penal law.
Muslim law permits more than one marriage during the subsistence of one and
another though capacity to do justice between co-wives in law is a condition
precedent. Even under the Muslim law plurality of marriages is not
unconditionally conferred upon the husband.
Case Law for section 23(1)(a) HMA:
Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar [1977 SC]
On her application made under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the
respondent was granted a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in August
1973. A little over two years after that decree was passed, in October 1975, she
presented a petition under Sec. 13(1A)(ii) of the Act for dissolution of the
marriage by a decree of divorce.
In the petition under Section 13(1A)(ii) she – we shall hereinafter refer to her as
the petitioner – stated that there had been no restitution of conjugal rights
between the parties to the marriage after the passing of the decree for restitution
of conjugal rights and that there was no other legal ground why the relief prayed
for should not be granted. Questions?
Her husband, the appellant before us, in his written statement admitted that
there had been no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties after the
passing of the decree in the earlier proceeding, but stated that he made attempts
“to comply with the decree (for restitution of conjugal rights) by writing several
registered letters to the petitioner” and “otherwise” inviting her to live with him.
He complained that the petitioner “refused to receive some of the letters and
never replied to those which she received,” and according to him the petitioner
“has herself prevented the restitution of conjugal rights she prayed for and now
seeks to make a capital out of her own wrong.” The objection taken in the written
statement is apparently based on Section 23(1)(a) of the Act.
2. On the pleadings the following issue was raised:
“Whether the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of her own wrong for
the reasons given in the written statement?”
The Additional District Judge allowed the petition and granted the petitioner a
decree of divorce as prayed for. An appeal from this decision taken by the husband
was summarily dismissed by the Delhi High Court. In this present appeal the
husband questions the validity of the decree of divorce granted in favour of the
petitioner.
3. Sec. 13(1A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act allows either party to a marriage to
present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on
the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between
the parties to the marriage for the period speci ed in the provision after the
passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Sub-section (1A) was
introduced in Sec. 13 in 1964. Section 13 as it stood before the 1964
amendment permitted only the spouse who had obtained the decree for
restitution of conjugal rights to apply for relief by way of divorce; the party
against whom the decree was passed was not given that right. The grounds for
granting relief under Section 13 including sub-section (1A) however continue
to be subject to the provisions of Section 23 of the Act.
It is contended by the appellant that the allegation made in his written statement
that the conduct of the petitioner in not responding to his invitations to live with
him meant that she was trying to take advantage of her own wrong for the
purpose of relief under Section 13 (1A)(ii). On the admitted facts, the petitioner
Questions?
was undoubtedly entitled to ask for a decree of divorce. Would the allegation, if
true, that she did not respond to her husband’s invitation to come and live with
him disentitle her to the relief?
We do not nd it possible to hold that it would. In Gajna Devi v. Purshotam Giri a

learned Judge of Delhi High Court observed:
Section 23 existed in the statute book prior to the insertion of Section 13(1A)….
Had Parliament intended that a party which is guilty of a matrimonial offence and
against which a decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights had
been passed, was in view of Sec. 23 of the Act, not entitled to obtain divorce then
it would have inserted an exception to Section 13(1A) and with such exception the
provision of Section 13(1A) would practically become redundant as the guilty
party could never reap bene t of obtaining divorce, while the innocent party was
entitled to obtain it even under the statute as it was before the amendment.
Section 23 of the Act, therefore, cannot be construed so as to make the effect of
amendment of the law by insertion of Section 13(1A) nugatory.
The expression “petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own
wrong” occurring in Cl. (a) of S. 23(1) of the Act does not apply to taking
advantage of the statutory right to obtain dissolution of the marriage which has
been conferred on him by Sec. 13(1A)…. In such a case, a party is not taking
advantage of his own wrong, but of the legal right following upon of the passing of
the decree and the failure of the parties to comply with the decree….” Therefore, it
would not be very reasonable to think that the relief which is available to the
spouse against whom a decree for restitution has been passed, should be denied
to the one who does not insist on compliance with the decree passed in his or her
favour. In order to be a ‘wrong’ within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a), the
conduct alleged has to be something more than a mere disinclination to agree to
an offer of reunion, it must be misconduct serious enough to justify denial of the
relief to which the husband or the wife is otherwise entitled.
4. In the case before us the only allegation made in the written statement is that
the petitioner refused to receive or reply to the letters written by the
appellant and did not respond to his other attempts to make her agree to live
with him. This allegation, even if true, does not amount to misconduct grave
enough to disentitle the petitioner to the relief she has asked for. The appeal is
therefore dismissed.
Questions?
*****
Case Law for section 23(1)(a) HMA:
Hirachand Managaonkar v. Sunanda [2001 SC]
The point that arises for determination in this case is short but by no means
simple. The point is this: whether the husband who has led a petition seeking
dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce under Section 13(1-A)(i) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be declined relief on the ground that he has failed
to pay maintenance to his wife and daughter despite an order of the court.
2. The relevant facts of the case may be stated thus: The appellant is husband of
the respondent. On the petition led by the respondent under Section 10 of
the Act seeking judicial separation on the ground of adultery on the part of
the appellant a decree for judicial separation was passed by the High Court of
Karnataka on 6-1-1981. In the said order the Court considering the petition
led by the respondent, ordered that the appellant shall pay as maintenance
Rs 100 per month to the wife and Rs 75 per month for the daughter. Since
then the order has not been complied with by the appellant and the
respondent has not received any amount towards maintenance. Thereafter,
on 13-9-1983 the appellant presented a petition for dissolution of marriage
by a decree of divorce on the ground that there has been no resumption of
cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of more than
one year after passing of the decree for judicial separation.
3. The respondent contested the petition for divorce on the ground that the
appellant having failed to pay the maintenance as ordered by the Court the
petition for divorce led by him is liable to be rejected as he is trying to take
advantage of his own wrong for getting the relief. The High Court by the
judgment dated 10-4-1995 accepted the plea taken by the respondent and
refused to grant the appellant’s prayer for divorce. The said order is assailed
by the appellant in this appeal by special leave.
4. Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the only condition for
getting a divorce under Section 13(1-A) is that there has been no resumption
Questions?
of cohabitation for a period of one year or upwards. Section 23(1)(a) has no
application to a case under Section 13(1-A)(i). Alternatively, she contended
that the “wrong” allegedly committed by the appellant has no connection with
the relief sought in the proceeding i.e. to pass a decree of divorce. An order for
payment of maintenance is an executable order and it is open to the
respondent to realise the amount due by initiating a proceeding according to
law.
5. Originally nine different grounds were available to a husband or wife for
obtaining a decree of divorce under sub-section (1) of Section 13. Under
clause (viii) of the sub-section, a marriage could be dissolved by a decree of
divorce on a petition presented by the husband or the wife on the ground that
the other party has not resumed cohabitation for a period of two years or
upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation against that
party. Under clause (ix) of the sub-section, a marriage could be dissolved by a
decree of divorce on a petition presented by the husband or the wife on the
ground that the other party had failed to comply with a decree for restitution
of conjugal rights for a period of two years or upwards after the passing of a
decree of restitution against that party.
6. Amending Act of 1964, which came into force on 20-12-1964, effected two
signi cant changes. Clauses (viii) and (ix) which constituted two of the nine
grounds on which a marriage could be dissolved by a decree of divorce were
deleted from sub-section (1) and secondly, a new sub-section i.e. sub-section
(1-A) was added to Section 13. It is clear from these amendments introduced
in 1964 that whereas prior to the amendment a petition for divorce could be
led only by a party which had obtained a decree for judicial separation or for
restitution of conjugal rights, this right is now available to either party to the
marriage irrespective of whether the party presenting the petition for divorce
is a decree-holder or a judgment-debtor under the decree for judicial
separation or the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, as the case may be.
This position is incontrovertible.
7. The question is: whether in a petition for divorce led under sub-section (1-A)
of Section 13, it is open to the court to refuse to pass a decree on any of the
grounds speci ed in Section 23 of the Act, insofar as any one or more of them
may be applicable.
8. The contention that the right conferred by sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 is
absolute and unquali ed and that this newly conferred right is not subject to
the provisions of Section 23 is fallacious. This argument appears to be based
on the erroneous notion that to introduce consideration arising under Section
Questions?
23(1) into the determination of a petition led under sub-section (1-A) of
Section 13 is to render the amendments made by amending Act of 1964
wholly meaningless. As noted earlier, prior to the amendment the right to apply
for divorce was restricted to the party which had obtained a decree for judicial
separation or for restitution of conjugal rights. Such a right was not available to the
party against whom the decree was passed. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13
which was introduced by the amendment confers such a right on either party
to the marriage so that a petition for divorce can, after the amendment, be led
not only by the party which had obtained a decree for judicial separation or for
restitution of conjugal rights but also by the party against whom such a decree was
passed. This is the limited object and effect of the amendment introduced in
1964. The amendment was not introduced in order that the provisions
contained in Section 23 should be abrogated and that is also not the effect of
the amendment. The object of sub-section (1-A) was merely to enlarge the right to
apply for divorce. The very language of Section 23 shows that it governs every
proceeding under the Act and a duty is cast on the court to decree the relief
sought only if the conditions mentioned in the sub-section are satis ed, and
not otherwise.
9. The next contention that arises for consideration is whether the appellant by
refusing to pay maintenance to the wife has committed a “wrong” within the
meaning of Section 23 and whether in seeking the relief of divorce he is taking
advantage of his own “wrong”.
10. After the decree for judicial separation was passed on the petition led by the wife it
was the duty of both the spouses to do their part for cohabitation. The husband was
expected to act as a dutiful husband towards the wife and the wife was to act as a
devoted wife towards the husband. If this concept of both the spouses making
sincere contribution for the purpose of successful cohabitation after a judicial
separation is ordered then it can reasonably be said that in the facts and
circumstances of the case the husband in refusing to pay maintenance to the
wife failed to act as a husband. Thereby he committed a “wrong” within the
meaning of Section 23 of the Act.
11. If the provisions in Section 13(1-A) and Section 23(1)(a) are read together the
position that emerges is that the petitioner does not have a vested right for
getting the relief of a decree of divorce against the other party merely on
showing that the ground in support of the relief sought as stated in the
petition exists. It has to be kept in mind that before granting the prayer of the
petitioner to permanently snap the relationship between the parties to the
Questions?
marriage every attempt should be made to maintain the sanctity of the
relationship which is of importance not only for the individuals or their children but
also for the society.
12. Next question is the meaning and import of Section 10(2) in which it is laid
down that where a decree for judicial separation has been passed it shall no
longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the
court may, on the application by petition of either party rescind the decree.
The question is whether applying this statutory provision to the case in hand
can it be said that the appellant was relieved of the duty to cohabit with the
respondent since the decree for judicial separation has been passed on the
application led by the latter. On a fair reading of sub-section (2) it is clear
that the provision applies to the petitioner on whose application the decree
for judicial separation has been passed. Even assuming that the provision
extends to both the petitioner as well as the respondent it does not vest any
absolute right in the petitioner or the respondent not to make any attempt for
cohabitation with the other party after the decree for judicial separation has
been passed. As the provision clearly provides, the decree for judicial
separation is not nal in the sense that it is irreversible; power is vested in the
court to rescind the decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so on an
application by either party. The effect of the decree is that certain mutual rights
and obligations arising from the marriage are as it were suspended and the rights
and duties prescribed in the decree are substituted therefor. The decree for
judicial separation does not sever or dissolve the marriage tie which continues
to subsist. It affords an opportunity to the spouse for reconciliation and
readjustment. The decree may fall by a conciliation of the parties in which
case the rights of the respective parties which oat from the marriage and
were suspended are restored. Therefore the impression that Section 10(2)
vests a right in the petitioner to get the decree of divorce notwithstanding the
fact that he has not made any attempt for cohabitation with the respondent
and has even acted in a manner to thwart any move for cohabitation does not
ow from a reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions. The object
and purpose of the Act is to maintain the marital relationship between the spouses
and not to encourage snapping of such relationship.
13. Now we come to the crucial question: whether refusal to pay alimony by the
appellant is a “wrong” within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act so as
to disentitle the appellant to the relief of divorce. We have already held that
even after the decree for judicial separation was passed by the Court on the
Questions?
petition presented by the wife, it was expected that both the spouses will
make sincere efforts for a conciliation and cohabitation with each other, which
means that the husband should behave as a dutiful husband and the wife
should behave as a devoted wife. In the present case the respondent has not
only failed to make any such attempt but has also refused to pay the small
amount of Rs 100 as maintenance for the wife and has been marking time for
expiry of the statutory period of one year after the decree of judicial
separation so that he may easily get a decree of divorce. In the circumstances,
it can reasonably be said that he not only commits the matrimonial wrong in
refusing to maintain his wife and further estrange the relation creating acrimony
rendering any rapprochement impossible but also tries to take advantage of the said
“wrong” for getting the relief of divorce. Such conduct in committing a default
cannot be brushed aside as not a matter of suf cient importance to disentitle
him to get a decree of divorce under Section 13(1-A).
14. The question that remains to be considered is whether the appellant husband
can be said to have committed and to be committing a “wrong” within the
meaning of Section 23(1)(a) by continuing to live with his mistress even after
passing of the decree for judicial separation on the ground of adultery. The
respondent presented the petition seeking a decree of judicial separation on
the ground that the appellant has been living in adultery since he is living with
another lady during the subsistence of the marriage with her. The Court
accepted the allegation and passed the decree for judicial separation. Even
after the decree the appellant made no attempt to make any change in the
situation and continued to live with the mistress. To pursue still such an
adulterous life with no remorse, even thereafter, is yet another “wrong” which
he deliberately continued to commit, to thwart any attempt to reunite and, in
such circumstances can it be said that the passing of a decree for judicial
separation has put an end to the allegation of adultery; or that the chapter has
been closed by the decree for judicial separation and therefore he cannot be
said to have committed a “wrong” by continuing to live with the mistress.
Living in adultery on the part of the husband in this case is a continuing

matrimonial offence. The offence does not get frozen or wiped out merely on
passing of a decree for judicial separation which as noted earlier merely suspends
certain duties and obligations of the spouses in connection with their marriage
and does not snap the matrimonial tie. In that view of the matter accepting the
contention of the appellant would defeat the very purpose of passing the decree
for judicial separation. Questions?
20. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with costs.
R E F U N D P O L I C Y ( H T T P : // W W W. D E L H I L A WA C A D E M Y. C O M / H O M E / R E F U N D - P O L I C Y/ )
T E R M S O F S E R V I C E ( H T T P : // W W W. D E L H I L AWA C A D E M Y. C O M / H O M E / T E R M S - O F - S E R V I C E / )
D e s i g n e d a n d d e v e l o p e d b y D e l h i L a w A c a d e m y, C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 7
D e l h i L a w A c a d e m y i s I n d i a' s n e s t o n l i n e l a w c o a c h i n g i n s t i t u t e .
O u r a w a r d - w i n n i n g f a c u l t y i s f r o m I I T B o m b a y, I I M A h m e d a b a d , B I T S P i l a n i a n d
D e l h i U n i v e r s i t y.
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Important Case Law on Hindu

List of Judgments on HMA:

Case Law for section 2(2) HMA:

Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah [2001]

Case Law for section 7 HMA:

Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande, Appellant 1, was married to the complainant Indubai

4. Apart from these considerations, there is nothing in the Hindu law, as

(1) invocation before the sacred re, and

(2) A marriage may be completed by the performance of ceremonies other than

Case Law for section 9 HMA:

Kailash Wati v. Ajodhia Parkash [1971 P & H]

442 Marital duties

555. Separate residence and maintenance:

The appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed.

Case Law for section 9 HMA:

Swaraj Garg v. K. M. Garg [1978 Del.]

Choice of matrimonial home:

7. The basic principles on which the location of the matrimonial home is to be

10. Paragraph 442 of Mulla’s Hindu Law, 14th Edition, is as follows:

Conduct of the husband

In the absence of a pre-marital agreement between the parties, it cannot be

Malus usus est abolendus: An evil custom is to be abolished

Opinio juris sive necessitates: An opinion of law or necessity

Case Law for section 12 HMA:

Babui Panmato Kuer v. Ram Agya Singh [1968 Pat]

8. The Judge is not right in holding that there was no fraudulent

Case Law for section 13 HMA:

Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati [1957 SC]

Dissolution of a Hindu marriage particularly amongst what were called the

the factum of separation

absence of consent, and

Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances

If a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus paenitentiae provided by law

Literally this signi es a place of repentance;

In law, it is the opportunity of withdrawing from a projected contract, before the

Locus poenitentiae is a Latin phrase which means opportunity to withdraw from a

Case Law for section 13 HMA:

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey [2002 SC]

No decree of divorce could be granted on the ground of desertion in the absence

To prove desertion in matrimonial matter it is not always necessary that one of

“It appears to be necessary to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and

Case Law for section 13 HMA:

N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane [1975 SC]

Nature of burden of proof on a petitioner in a matrimonial petition: Doubtless, the

The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty for

This is not a case of mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of

57. But condonation of a matrimonial offence is not to be likened to a full

Case Law for section 13B HMA:

Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash [1992 SC]

They have been living separately for a period of one year,

9. The ‘living separately’ for a period of one year should be immediately

Case Law for section 17 HMA:

Petitioner 1 is the President of “KALYANI” – a registered society – which is an

Petitioner 2, Meena Mathur was married to Jitender Mathur on February 27,

Looked from another angle, the second marriage of an apostate-husband

Case Law for section 17 HMA:

Lily Thomas v. Union of India [2000 SC]

Prosecution under Section 494 in respect of a second marriage under

The second marriage of a Hindu husband after conversion to Islam, without

Case Law for section 23(1)(a) HMA: