NOTES IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. MARK DAVID I. AQUINO

THE LAWYER’S OATH:

I, ________________________, of ___________________________, do solemnly swear that I will

maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor
consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man’s cause for money or malice
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntarily without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

DEFINITION OF TERMS:

1. LEGAL PROFESSION – group of men and women pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the
spirit of public service (note: three elements of Legal Profession - (a) organization, (b) learning, and (c)
spirit of public service).

2. LEGAL ETHICS – embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that should govern the
conduct of every Bar member; branch of moral science that treats of the duties which a lawyer owes to
the Court, his client, his Colleagues, and the Public; is embodied in the Constitution, rules of Court, Code
of Professional Responsibility, Canons of Professional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral laws and special laws.

3. PRACTICE OF LAW – any activity in and out of court which requires the application of laws, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience (Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991).

4. TITULO DE ABOGADO – not mere possession of academic degree of LLB but membership in the
bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.

5. BAR and BENCH – Bar refers to the whole body of attorneys and counsellors; collectively, the
members of the legal profession. Bench denotes the whole body of judges (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6 th
edition).

6. LAWYER – general term for a person trained in law and authorized to advice or represent others in
legal matters; a person licensed to practice law (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6 th edition).

7. TRIAL LAWYER – one who personally handles cases in court, administrative agencies or boards.

8. PRACTISING LAWYER – one who is engaged in the practice of law.

9. CLIENT – one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice or for purposes of prosecuting or
defending a suit in his behalf and usually for a fee.
10. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW – class of persons who are by license, officers of the court empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed
by law as a consequence.

11. COUNSEL DE OFFICIO – a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court who by reason of
experience and ability, may adequately defend the accused. He is normally appointed to represent one
who is indigent in a criminal case.

12. ATTORNEY AD HOC – one named or appointed by the court to defend an absentee defendant in
the suit in which the appointment is made.

13. ATTORNEY OF RECORD – one whose name must appear somewhere in permanent records or
files of the case, or on the pleading or some instrument filed in the case or on the appearance docket.

14. OF COUNSEL – an associate attorney or employee of law offices.

15. AMICUS CURIAE – “friend of the court”. He is a person with strong interest in or views on the
subject matter of an action, but not a party to the action, may petition the court for permission to file a
brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a rationale consistent with its own views.
Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in appeals concerning matters of a broad public interest
like civil rights.

16. AMICI PAR EXCELLENCE – Bar associations which appear in court as friends to expound in
some matters of law for the information of the court.

17. BAR ASSOCIATION – is an association of members of the legal profession like the IBP where
membership is integrated and compulsory.

18. ADVOCATE – one who pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or court.

19. BARRATRY – offense of frequently stirring up quarrels and suits either at law or otherwise except
in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so; the act of fomenting suit
among individuals and offering legal services to one of them for monetary motives.

20. AMBULANCE CHASING – figuratively, lawyer’s act of chasing the ambulance chasing the victim
of an accident for the purpose of talking to him or his relatives and offering his legal services to file a case
against the person who caused the accident; a lawyer who haunts hospitals and visits the home of afflicted
persistently offering his legal services on contingent fee.

21. ATTORNEY’S FEES – reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer for the legal services he has
rendered to a client; indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party to the
prevailing party in litigation.

22. GENERAL RETAINER – fee/s intended to secure services for future legal problems.

23. SPECIAL RETAINER – fee/s paid for the engagement in a particular case.
24. CONTINGENT CONTRACT – an agreement whereby the fee, usually a fixed percentage of what
may be recovered, is made to depend on the success of the action.

25. CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT – an agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of

proceedings to enforce the clients rights; is against public policy especially where the attorney has agreed
to carry on the action at his won expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in
dispute.

26. RETAINING LIEN – attorney’s lien over the property of the client held by the lawyer to apply to
his claims upon due notice to the client.

27. CHARGING LIEN – a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments; a lawyer causes a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court that rendered judgment or issuing execution with written notice to the client and
adverse party (Rule 138, S3c. 37, Rules of Court).

28. GENERAL APPEARANCE – one that is done by a lawyer for any act except to question the
court’s jurisdiction.

29. SPECIAL APPEARANCE – one solely intended to question the court’s jurisdiction.

30. SUSPENSION – temporary withholding of a lawyer’s privilege to practice his profession for a
certain period or for an indefinite period of time.

31. DISBARMENT – the act of the Supreme Court in withdrawing from an attorney the privilege to
practice law.

32. REINSTATEMENT – restoration to a disbarred lawyer of the privilege to practice; readmission to

the membership in the Bar.

33. JUDICIAL ETHICS – branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper conduct to be
observed by all judges and magistrates in trying and deciding controversies brought to them for
adjudication which conduct must be demonstrative of impartiality, integrity, competence, independence
and freedom from improprieties. The freedom from improprieties must be observed even in the judge’s
private life.

34. COURT – a board or other tribunal which decides a litigation or contest.

35. JUDGE – a public officer who by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. A public
officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in accordance with law.

36. DE JURE JUDGE – one who is exercising the office of judge as a matter of right; an officer of a
court who has been duly and legally elected or appointed.

37. DE FACTO JUDGE – an officer who is not lawfully invested with all of the powers and duties
conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of right.
38. COURT STAFF – includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.

39. JUDGE’S FAMILY – includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, and any other relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree, or person who is a companion or employee of the judge
and who lives in the judge’s household.

REQUIREMENTS FOR BAR CANDIDATE: - (i) Philippine citizen; (ii) Philippine resident; (iii) at least
21 years of age; (iv) must be of good moral character; (v) must not have been charged of a crime
involving moral turpitude; and (vi) must have met the required educational requirements (Secs. 2 and 5,
Rule 138, Rules of Court).

REQUISITES FOR ADMISSION INTO THE BAR: (1) must meet all academic requirements; (2) pass
the bar exam; (3) oath-taking before the Supreme Court, (4) signing of the Attorney’s Roll and issuance of
certificate of membership from Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court (must be in good standing).

DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF A LAWYER (Four-Fold Duty to the Court, to the Public, to the Bar and
to his Client): (a) maintain allegiance to the Republic and support the Constitution and obey the laws; (b)
observe and maintain respect due to courts and their officers;
(c) counsel or maintain such actions/proceedings only as appears to him to be just and defenses as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law; (d) employ means only consistent with truth and honor
and never to mislead the judge; (e) maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the client’s secrets; (f)
abstain from all offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party/witness unless required by the justice of the cause he is charged with; (g) not to encourage
suit/delay any man’s cause for corrupt motive; (h) not to reject the cause of defenceless/oppressed for any
personal consideration; (i) to present every defense permitted by the law by all fair and honourable
means, in the defense of a person accused of a crime regardless of his personal opinion as to the accused’s
guilt, so that due process may be ensured (Rule 138, Sec. 20, Rules of Court).

PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW – General Rule: Any person admitted as a member of
the Bar in good and regular standing is entitled to practice of law. Exceptions – (a) person representing
himself or a friend in the MTC (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (b) in criminal proceedings in a
municipal court in a locality where a licensed member of the bar is not available (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules
of Court); (c) person representing himself in the RTC (Sec. 33, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (d) persons
authorized to represent the government in a case (Sec. 133, Rule 138, Rules of Court); (e) complainant
himself or union representatives in labor cases (Labor Code); (f) law students who have completed 3 rd
year law and enrolled in a recognized law school’s Supreme Court-approved legal education program to
represent indigent clients, provided that, such appearance if before the RTC should be accompanied at all
times by a supervising lawyer (Rule 138-A).

PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW – (a) Judges
and other officials or employees of Superior courts (Rule 138, Sec. 35, Rules of Court); (b) Officials and
employees of the Office of the Solicitor General; (c) Government Prosecutors; (d) President, Vice-
President, Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants (Art. VII, Sec. 13, Constitution); (e) Members
of Constitutional Commissions (Art.
IX-A, Sec. 2, Constitution); (f) Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. XI, Sec. 8[2]); (g) Governors, city and
municipal mayors (Ra. 7160, Sec. 90); and (h) those who by special law are prohibited from engaging in
the practice of law.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS WITH RESTRICTED RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW: (a) personal appearance as
counsel by Members of Congress before any court, electoral tribunal or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Constitution); (b) Sanggunian members may practice their legal
profession provided that they shall not (i) not appear in court in any civil case where the local
government or any governmental office, agency or instrumentality is the adverse party; (ii) appear as
counsel in any criminal case wherein an national or local government officer/employee is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office; (iii) collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which they are officials; and (iv) use property and
personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
government’s interest (RA7160); (c) a retired justice or judge receiving pension from the government
cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which the government or any of its subdivision or agencies is the
adverse party or in a criminal case wherein an officer/employee of the government is accused of an
offense in relation to his office (RA 910, Sec. 1).

GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL: (a) client pursues an illegal or immoral course of
conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; (b) client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of the canons and rules; (c) his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best
interest of the client; (d) the mental and physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively; (e) client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to
comply with the retainer agreement; (f) lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office; and
(g) other similar cases (Rule 22.01, CPR).

INSTANCES WHEN COUNSEL CANNOT RECOVER FULL AMOUNT DESPITE WRITTEN

CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES – (1) when stipulated attorney’s fees are in excess of what the
law expressly provides; (2) when the attorney is guilty of fraud or bad faith against the client; (3) when
counsel’s services were worthless because of his negligence; (4) when the contract of employment is
illegal; (5) when counsel served adverse interest, unless he acted with consent of both parties.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING ATTORNEY’S FEES (Rule 20.01, CPR) – (a) time spent and
extent and services rendered and required; (b) novelty and difficulty of question involved; (c) importance
of subject matter; (d) skill demanded of lawyer; (e) customary charges for similar services and IBP
schedule of fees; (f) probability of losing other compensation; (g) amount involved in the controversy and
benefits resulting from the service; (h) contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) character of
employment whether occasional or established; (j) the lawyer’s professional standing.

INSTANCES OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ON QUANTUM MERUIT (“as much as he deserves”) – (a) no

express contract for attorney’s fees; (b) court determines fees stipulated in the contract to be
unconscionable or unreasonable; (c) contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely formal matters or
defects in the execution; (d) counsel’s inability, for justifiable cause, to finish the case to its conclusion;
(e) when lawyer and client
disregard the contract for attorney’s fees; (f) charging of fees beyond what is fixed by law.

OBJECTIVES OF DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION – (a) Compel attorney to deal fairly and
honestly with his client; (b) remove from the profession, a person whose misconduct has proved him
UNFIT to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney; (c)
punish lawyer although not so much as to safeguard the administration of justice; (d) set as an example or
warning for other members of the Bar;
(e) safeguard the administration of justice from incompetence and dishonesty of lawyers; (f) protect the
public.

NATURE OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS – being sui generis (class by itself), it has the following
characteristics: (a) neither civil or criminal; (b) double jeopardy cannot be availed of in a disbarment
proceeding against a lawyer as such a lawyer who is convicted like for falsification cannot claim double
jeopardy; (c) can be initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP and can be initiated without a
complainant;
(d) can proceed regardless of the interest or lack thereof, if facts proven warrant; (e) imprescriptible and
as such the ordinary statues of limitations have no application to disbarment proceedings however,
unexplained delay in filing of an administrative case creates suspicion over the motives of the
complainant; (f) conducted confidentially being confidential in nature until its final determination; (g) it is
itself due process of law;
(h) whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that may be enforced in
another action like reconveyance or damages;

GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT (Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court) – (a) Deceit; (b)
Malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (c) Grossly immoral conduct; (d) Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (e) Violation of the Oath of Office; (f) Wilful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (g) Corrupt or Wilful appearance as attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so.

QUALIFICATIONS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES – (a) Justices of the Court of Appeal and Supreme
Court – natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 40 years of age, 15 years in the practice of law [Section 7(1)
of Article VIII of the Constitution]; (b) judges of lower courts
– natural-born Filipino citizen, at least 35 (for RTC) and 30 (for MTC) years of age, 10 years (for RTC)
and 5 years (for MTC) in the practice of law [Section 7(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution].

INSTANCES OF MANDATORY INHIBITION OF JUDGES – (a) judge’s actual bias/prejudice

concerning a party or personal knowledge of dispute evidentiary facts concerning proceedings; (b) judge
previously served as a lawyer or a material witness in the matter in controversy; (c) judge, or a member of
his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy; (d) judge served
as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former
associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material
witness therein; (e) judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review; (f) judge is related by
consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the 6 th civil degree or to counsel within the 4th civil
degree; or (g) judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceedings.

RE: APPLICATION FOR BAR ADMISSION (VICENTE CHING), BM#914, 10/1/1999 – Vicente
Ching passed the 1998 Bar Exam but was prohibited from taking his oath due to a “citizenship” issue
having been born on April 11, 1964 to a Chinese father and Filipino mother. Despite, his oath of
allegiance and affidavit of citizenship executed in 1999, Supreme Court denied his motion to take the
lawyer’s oath reasoning that, when he was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution
which required a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien father to follow the latter’s citizenship,
unless electing Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of 14years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until
he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly beyond the contemplation of the
requiring of electing “upon reaching the age of majority”.

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE VS. EDWIN RANA, BM#1036, 6/10/2003 – Respondent, a 2000 Bar
exam passer was precluded from signing the Attorney’s Roll because of a complaint charging him of
appearing as counsel for a local candidate before the Municipal Board of Canvassers prior to his oath-
taking in May 2001. In denying him admission into the Bar, the Supreme Court held that, before one is
admitted to the Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession.
A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
Respondent was engaged in law practice when he appeared before the canvassing board without being a
member of the Bar. It is the signing in the Attorney’s Rolls that makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that Respondent passed the bar exams is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become a lawyer, Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to
be performed, namely, his lawyer’s oath to be administered by the Supreme Court and his signature in the
Attorney’s Roll.

ROMULO VILLA VS. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ET AL., BM#674, 6/14/2005 – Junel Ama, was one
of the members of Aquila Legis Fraternity implicated and charged for the death of “Lenny” Villa. Despite
passing the bar in 1992, Junel was not allowed to take his lawyer’s oath. He later petitioned to be
admitted to the Bar when his conviction for homicide through conspiracy was set aside by the Court of
Appeals finding him only liable for physical injuries and sentencing him to 20-days imprisonment.
Supreme Court admitted him into the practice of law reasoning that the crime for which he was convicted
was only slight physical injuries, a light offense which cannot be considered a grave violation of the
moral sentiment of the community or done in the spirit of cruelty, hostility or revenge – a crime certainly
not involving moral turpitude.

SOLIMAN SANTOS, JR. VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, AC#4749, 1/20/2000 – Respondent
who last paid his IBP membership dues in 1992 subsequently failed to indicate his IBP number in his
pleadings and used at times the same IBP number for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. Supreme Court
rejected Respondent’s claim that he honestly thought that he was exempted from payment of IBP dues
being a senior citizen and being engaging in
limited law practice only as he was principally into farming. Rule 139-A, Section 9 requires every
member of the IBP to pay annual dues. Non-payment of such dues may warrant suspension or removal
from the Attorney’s Roll pursuant to Section 10 of the same rule. Respondent can engage in law practice
only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is “limited”. Further, exemption from
taxation of senior citizens does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues.

PETITION TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, Petitioner, BM#1678,

12/17/2007 – Petitioner, a Philippine Bar member migrated to Canada and became a citizen thereof.
Pursuant to RA9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003), Petitioner reacquired Filipino
citizenship and petitioned the Supreme Court to allow him to resume his law practice. In readmitting
Petitioner, Supreme Court held that, Philippine citizenship lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but later reacquired pursuant to RA 9225, is deemed never to have been lost. However,
although deemed never to have terminated his Bar membership, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues. Hence, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from the Supreme Court authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) updating
and payment in full of the annual IBP membership; (b) payment of professional tax; (c) completion of at
least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; and (d) retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

JULIETA B. NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, AC#3405, 6/29/1998 – Respondent,

while engaged as a teacher had an illicit relationship with his 17-year old student with whom he later
lived after abandoning his family. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent reasoning that, good moral
character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to
meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the privilege to practice law may be withdrawn. Immoral
conduct is conduct so wilful, flagrant or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Such conduct, must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral,
that is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency.

HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. VS. ATTY. RICHARD FUNK, AC#9094, 8/15/2012 – Hocorma
Foundation hired Respondent’s legal services in connection with, among others, the transfer of one of the
properties subject of several suits and over which same property he later instituted a suit in behalf of
Mabalacat Insttitute without the foundation’s written consent. Supreme Court suspended Respondent
from the practice of law reasoning that a lawyer owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the
highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyer’s part does
not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client’s
doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it
not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship.

LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO VS. ATTY. RODOLFO GALING, AC#6174, 11/16/2011 – Respondent

accepted Complainant’s engagement and wrote in her behalf a demand letter to Ms. Koa for dishonored
checks. Subsequently, he filed a motion for consolidation and appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa in the
estafa and BP22 cases filed against her by Complainant. The latter charged this as representation of
conflicting interests. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice holding that, a lawyer-
client relationship can exist despite close friendship. This relationship was established the moment
Complainant sought Respondent’s legal advice regarding the dishonored checks. Respondent confirmed
this relationship by drafting the demand letter and referring to Complainant therein as “my client”. The
fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that Complainant hired
another lawyer is of no moment. Non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate Respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the
prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests (Canon 15) which prohibition attaches from
the establishment of attorney-client relationship extending beyond its duration. This prohibition is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of the relationship, the lawyer learns
facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers must not only keep
inviolate the client’s confidence, but also avoid appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.

SPS. VIRGILO & ANGELINA ARANDA VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL ELAYDA, AC#7907, 12/15/10 –
Respondent failed to notify Complainants who were here clients in a civil case of the scheduled hearing
which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Later, Respondent took no steps, or at the very
least, informed his clients of the adverse decision rendered which became final and executory.
Respondent claimed that he did not have Complainants’ contact number or address and that the clients
were the ones remiss in making a follow up of their case’s status. Supreme Court suspended Respondent
from law practice citing amongst others, his duty of fidelity to his client’s cause (Canon 17) and his duty
to serve his client with competence (Canon 18), mindful not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
(Rule 18.03). It is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the
initial stages in order to have constant communication with each other. While communication is a shared
responsibility between counsel and client, it is counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the status of
their case and the court orders issued. He simply cannot wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the
development in their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for them to
adequate prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case.

DOLORES VDA. DE FAJARDO VS. ATTY. REXIE BUGARING, AC#5113, 10/7/2004 –

Complainant engaged Respondent to handle two cases affecting inherited land.
When asked about his fees, Respondent said, “huwag na ninyo alalahanin iyon, para
ko na kayong nanay o lola”. After the cases were settled, Complainant offered Respondent P100k but he
rejected. Years later, Complainant learned that her property had been attached by Respondent after he
filed a civil case for sum of money against her. Supreme Court suspended Respondent reasoning that, the
proper time to deal with the issue of professional fees is upon commencement of the lawyer-client
relationship. Respondent should have determined and entered into an agreement regarding his fees when
he was first retained by Complainant. Such prudence would have spared the Court this controversy over a
lawyer’s compensation, a suit that should be avoided except to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
While, a lawyer is entitled to the court’s protection against any attempt on the client’s part to escape
payment of legitimate attorney’s fees, such protection however must not be sought at the expense of truth.
Complete candor or honesty is expected from lawyers, particularly when they appear and plead before the
courts for their own causes against former clients.

TORBEN B. OVERGAARD VS. ATTY. GODWIN VALDEZ, AC#7902, 9/20/2008 – After receipt of
about P900K to represent Complainant, a Dutch national, in several cases filed by and against him,
Respondent failed to give any update as to the case status, he also failed to enter his appearance in some
cases. Respondent also failed to inform Complainant of the arraignment dates in the criminal cases
against him and even failed to mention that he was entitled to prepare counter-affidavits. Warrants for
Complainants arrests were subsequently issued for his non-attendance. Supreme Court disbarred
Respondent holding that, he had indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of Bar
members. He did not only neglect his client’s case, he abandoned his client and left him without any
recourse but to hire another lawyer. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. A lawyer is bound to serve his client
with competence and diligence. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ VS. ATTY. MANUEL SAN JOSE, AC#3569, 2/23/2007 –
Respondent was paid to file an unlawful detainer suit. When he did not file the case, Complainant
demanded for the return of her documents. Due to non-compliance by Respondent, the case prescribed.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the
responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of law, the
interest of his client. An attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.

LUCILA S. BARBUCO VS. ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, AC#5092, 8/11/2004 – Complainant

hired Respondent to appeal her case to the Court of Appeals. Later, she learned that her appeal had been
dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief. Respondent claimed that he timely filed the appeal only that
he was late in filing the required brief because he was physically incapacitated for several days due to a
vehicular incident. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court reasoned that, Respondent’s conduct
relative to the belated filing of the appellant’s brief falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on
dedication and commitment to their client’s cause. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period
constitutes inexcusable
negligence. That Respondent was suffered physical injuries from a vehicular accident cannot serve to
excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed
of not just one lawyer. He could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file the brief or, at
least, to seek extension of time to file such pleading.

FERNANDO MARTIN PENA VS. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO, AC#7298, 6/25/2007 – His demand
for separation pay for his client in an illegal dismissal case having been rejected by the Complainant,
Respondent wrote threatening to file criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification against Complainant.
Respondent alleged that the disbarment complaint against him should be dismissed for want of
certification against forum-shopping. Supreme Court held that, as to the necessity of a certification
against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint, the filing of multiple suits and conflicting decisions
rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio or by the IBP upon verified complaint of any person, thus, if the
complainant fails to attach a certification against forum shopping the pendency of another disciplinary
action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. Supreme Court reprimanded
Respondent that, while a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law, his duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice – his client’s success is wholly subordinate and his
conduct must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The writing of demand letters is
standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction, but, the letter in this case contains more than just a
simple demand to pay containing as it did a threat to file retaliatory charges against Complainant which
have nothing to do with his client’s claim.

ALEX ONG VS. ATTY. ELPIDIO UNTO, AC#2417, 2/6/2002 – For failing to heed his demand letters
seeking child support for his client, Respondent filed criminal cases against Complainant for alleged
violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and Anti-Dummy Law plus administrative cases before
the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and the Office of the Solicitor General.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent reasoning that, Canon 19 requires a lawyer to employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and not to present, participate or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent
had not exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in handling of his client’s legal affairs. He tried to
coerce Complainant to comply with his demand letter by threatening to file various charges against the
latter. After non-compliance, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative
cases – this act is malicious as the cases filed did not have any bearing or connection to his client’s cause.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. VS. ATTY. LEOVIGILDO MIJARES III, AC#8380, 11/20/09 –
Respondent was disbarred for failing to turn over certain papers which he supposedly secured for
Complainant after the latter had paid him P500k to Respondent as facilitation and processing expenses for
the titling of a certain property. Supreme Court held that, “every lawyer has the responsibility to protect
and advance his client’s interest such that he must promptly account for whatever money or property his
client
may have entrusted to him”. A lawyer’s conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of
professional ethics.

NICANOR GONZALES VS. MIGUEL SABACAJAN 249 SCRA 276 – Respondent held
Complainants’ owner’s copies of land titles purportedly. Despite demand, Respondent refused to
surrender to Complainants said titles claiming that he was holding them in behalf of a client to whom
Complainants were supposedly indebted. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court posited that, if
complainant did have alleged monetary obligations with his client, that did not warrant Respondent’s
summarily confiscating their titles since there was no showing in the records that the same were given as
collateral or any court order authorizing Respondent to take custody of said title. A lawyer shall impress
upon his client the need for compliance with laws and principles of fairness.

ATTY. RICARDO SALOMON, JR. VS. ATTY. JOSELITO FRIAL, AC#7820, 9/12/2008 – Upon his
own undertaking, Respondent (who was counsel for the plaintiff in a civil case) took possession of
Complainant’s two vehicles which were attached. Complainant claimed that, several times, one of the cars
was used by unauthorized persons and the other car was destroyed in a fire while parked in Respondent’s
residence. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. A writ of attachment issues to prevent defendant from
disposing of attached properties to secure satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the
plaintiff. When attached objects are destroyed then the attached properties would necessarily be of no
value and attachment would be for naught. A lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Thus,
money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance be
commingled with his own or be used by him.

REYNARIA BARCENAS VS. ATTY. ANORLITO ALVERO, AC#8159, 4/23/10 – Respondent

received P300k from Complainant to be used to redeem the latter’s rights as tenant of a ricefield.
Respondent told Complainant that he would deposit the money in court because the creditor refused to
accept it. Later, Complainant found out that Respondent was losing a lot in cockfights and no judicial
deposit was made. Complainant demanded for the return of his money but Respondent failed to comply.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. When a lawyer received money from the client for a particular
purpose, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
purpose. If he does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must promptly return the money to his
client.

MELVIN D. SMALL VS. ATTY. JERRY BANARES, AC#7021, 2/21/2007 – Respondent received
money for acceptance and filing fees. Despite Complainant constant follow-up as to the status of the
cases, Respondent merely answered that he was still preparing the documents. Months passed,
Respondent failed to present any document prompting Complainant to demand for a full refund.
Respondent failed to comply. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, “every lawyer
holds in trust moneys of his client that may come into his possession. Further, he should account for all
money
received from the client and deliver funds of the client upon demand. Respondent received money and
since he failed to render any legal service to Complainant, he should have promptly accounted for and
returned the money, but he failed to do so.

CLETO DOCENA VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, SR., AC#2387, 9/10/1998 – Respondent
asked for P10k to post a bond to stay the execution of a decision in a civil case pending appeal. After
favorable judgment in the appeal, Complainant went to court to withdraw his bond only to discover that
no such bond was posted, much less required. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent. While the amount
involved may be small, the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier penalty. The Code mandates
that, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but must also be
possessed at all times in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. If
it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not
only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. By
extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, Respondent reduced the law
profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable and most contemptible.

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON VS. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, AC#6116, 8/1/2012 – After
failing to pay Complainant the agreed commission for a case referral, Respondent wrote informing
Complainant that the client would shoulder payment of the commission because he agreed to reduce his
attorney’s fees. Respondent was suspended from law practice. The Supreme Court held that, practice of
law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the
legal qualifications for the profession. Respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon of the Code which prohibits
a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.

MANUEL CAMACHO VS. ATTY LUIS PANGULAYAN, ET. AL., AC#4807, 3/22/2000 –
Complainant who represented expelled students in a civil case against the school complained that the
latter’s lawyer secured the dismissal of said complaint by brokering a deal with the students allowing
them readmission into the school without Complainant’s presence or knowledge. In suspending
Respondent, the Supreme Court held that Canon 9 provides that, “a lawyer should not in any way
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law”.

JOSE C. SABERON VS. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, AC#6567, 4/16/2008 – Respondent as

counsel for a bank filed various pleading using abusive and offensive language hinting that Complainant
was merely blackmailing/coercing his client for financial gain. Supreme Court imposed a fine with a
warning on Respondent. The Code mandates for a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional
colleagues, avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel and, in his professional dealings, refrain
from using language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. The adversarial nature of our
legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in the pursuit of their duty to advance
their clients’ interests. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ VS. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, AC#5737, 10/25/2004 – Complainant was
a 4th year law student who personally instituted and appeared in cases in his own behalf. In one case,
Respondent who was the opposing party’s counsel remarked, “Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna”.
The Supreme Court admonished Respondent to be more circumspect in his performance of his duties as
an officer of the court. Respondent’s comment was intended to point out to the trial court that
Complainant was not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of Complainant’s appearance as the judge
in her order noted that Complainant was a lawyer. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
magnitude as to warrant Respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the
heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. Respondent was reminded that
Complainant is not precluded from personally litigating his cases pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA VS. ATTY. ANA LUZ CRISTAL-TENORIO, AC#6290, 7/14/2004. –
Charged with assisting in the illegal law practice of Felicisimo Tenorio who was not a Bar member,
Respondent admitted that Felicisimo is named as a senior partner because of investments in her law
office. While the disbarment case was pending, Complainant withdrew her complaint claiming that it was
all a mere misunderstanding. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. An affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case does not, in any way, exonerate Respondent. A suspension/disbarment case may proceed
regardless of Complainant’s interest/lack of interest – such proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance and are solely for the public welfare, that is, to prevent courts of
justice from the official ministrations of person unfit to practice in them. If the evidence on record
warrants, respondent may be suspended/disbarred despite complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of
charges. Respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. The lawyer’s duty to
prevent, or at the very least not assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest
and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court.

FLORENCE MACARRUBO VS. ATTY. EDMUNDO MACARRUBO, AC#6148, 2/27/2004 –

Respondent married and fathered two children with Complainant by representing that his previous
marriage was void. Later, he abandoned Complainant and entered into a third marriage with another
woman. In his defense, Respondent presented the decree of nullity of his marriage with Complainant and
denied employing deception in marrying her insisting that, despite her full knowledge of his prior
marriage, Complainant dragged him against his will to a sham wedding to protect her and her family’s
reputation due to her pregnancy. The Supreme Court disbarred Respondent reasoning that, “while his
marriage to Complainant has been annulled by final judgment, this did not cleanse his conduct of every
tinge of impropriety”. Having lived with Complainant as husband and wife while his first marriage was
subsisting made him liable for concubinage – conduct inconsistent with the good moral character required
for continued right to practice law. Such conduct imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the
basic social institution of marriage.

WILSON CHAM VS. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, AC#7494, 6/27/2008 – Respondent leased an
apartment owned by Complainant’s company. Despite repeated demands, she failed to settle her unpaid
account and vacated the leased premises without notifying Complainant. The Supreme Court suspended
Respondent from law practice reasoning that, “having incurred just debts, she had the moral and legal
responsibility to settle them when they became due”. Respondent’s abandonment of the leased premises
to avoid her obligations for rent and electric bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of Canon1.

ISIDRA BARRIENTOS VS. ATTY. ELERIZZA LIBIRAN-METEORO, AC#6408, 8/31/2004 –

Respondent issued several checks in payment of a pre-existing debt. Due to their dishonor, Complainant
filed BP22. In suspending Respondent, the Supreme Court held that the issuance of checks later
dishonoured for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her
unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows Respondent’s
remorseless attitude, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and order. It
also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA VS. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, AC# 7136, 8/1/2007 –
Respondent, a married man cohabited with Irene, a married woman. In his defense, Respondent posited
that, his special friendship with Irene was low-profile and not scandalous and that he did no damage to the
institution of marriage as he was still civil and in good terms with his own wife. Supreme Court disbarred
Respondent holding that Respondent did not deny his adulterous relationship with Irene, what he denied
was having flaunted such relationship maintain that it was “low profile and known only to immediate
members of their respective families”. Respondent’s denial is a negative pregnant – a denial with
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. The Rules
of Court employs the term “grossly immoral conduct” as a ground for disbarment and not “under
scandalous circumstances” as used in Art. 334 (concubinage) of the Revised Penal Code. While the mere
fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction
for illicit behaviour, it is not so with respect to the betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is
deemed disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
ROSARIO MECARAL VS. ATTY. DANILO VASQUEZ, AC#8392, 6/29/10 – Complainant, who was
the secretary of Respondent, later became his lover and common-law wife. Respondent brought
Complainant to a religious cult which he headed up in the mountains. There Respondent left her where
she was tortured, brainwashed and drugged and held in captivity until her mother and law officers rescued
her. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent holding that his acts of converting his secretary into a mistress,
contracting two marriages are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance.
Further, Complainant’s subsequent detention and torture is gross misconduct which only a beast may be
able to do.

ALFREDO ROA VS. ATTY. JUAN MORENO, AC#8382, 4/21/10 – In selling a piece of land, Respondent
issued, instead of a deed of sale, a temporary receipt and a certificate of land occupancy assuring
Complainant that he could already use the lot. When he could not register the certificate with the Register of
Deeds, Complainant confronted Respondent and learned that the latter was not the property owner and the
land was in fact subject of pending litigation. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. His credibility is highly
questionable – he even issued a bogus certificate of land occupancy to Complaint whose only fault what that
he did not know better. To the unlettered, said certificate could have easily passed as document evidencing
title. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 (not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct).
Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

RODRIGO MOLINA VS. ATTY. CEFERINO MAGAT, AC#1900, 6/13/2012 –Respondent was
counsel for an accused against whom Complainant filed a case for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority and breach of peace and resisting arrest. Respondent move for quashal of said cases alleging
double jeopardy as supposedly a similar case for slight physical injuries had been filed against his client.
The records revealed however that no such case was filed by Molina. The latter claimed that the filing of
the motion to quash was in bad faith to mislead the court. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from the
practice of law finding that, there was deliberate intent on his part to mislead the court when he filed the
motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. He should not make any false and
untruthful statement in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical
injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was secure a certification from that court that,
indeed, a case was filed.

PARALUMAN AFURONG VS. ATTY. ANGEL AQUINO, AC#1571, 9/23/1999 – To stay the execution of
a decision obtained by Complainant in an ejectment case he filed multiple petitions and even a motion to
postpone a scheduled hearing supposedly due to his appearance in another case when there was actually none.
Supreme Court suspended Respondent. It is an attorney’s duty to counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just and such defences only as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law. Because the decision in the ejectment case had reached finality and execution was being
effected, Respondent should not have filed a
petition for certiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for it than to delay execution of
judgment. Respondent likewise committed a falsehood when he stated in his motion for postponement
that he had to attend another hearing. He himself admitted that he only included such statement in order to
give more “force” to his motion. Such act violates a lawyer’s duty to avoid concealment of the truth from
the court. A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO VS. ATTY. JAMES FLORIDO, AC#5624, 1/20/2004 –

Respondent went to the Complainant who was his estranged wife to demand custody of their children
supposedly based upon a resolution of the Court of Appeals granting him temporary custody. Per
certification from the Court of Appeals, no such resolution had been issued. In suspending Respondent,
the Supreme Court held that, “candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer”. The burden cast on the
judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel.

ATTY. JOSABETH ALONSO VS. ATTY. IBARO RELAMIDA, JR., AC#8481, 8/3/10 – Respondent
was counsel for the complainant in a labor case for constructive dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruling that
there was voluntary resignation, dismissed the labor case. This decision was sustained by the Supreme
Court and became final and executor. Respondent filed a second complaint for illegal dismissal based on
the same cause. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are
neither mere words nor an empty formality. A lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice. Filing multiple petitions constitutes abuse of court
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice
punishable as contempt of court.
HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS VS. ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, AC#6442, 10/21/2004 –
Respondent who was counsel for the protestee in an electoral protest before Complainant filed a motion
to withdraw as counsel citing heavy workload. After his motion was granted, Respondent executed an
affidavit saying that he really withdrew from the case because Complainant pre-judged the case and even
insinuated that protestee would lose. This affidavit became the basis of protestee’s motion for inhibition
against Complainant. Supreme Court suspended Respondent holding that, “all members of the legal
profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, ‘do no falsehood’ and ‘conduct themselves as lawyers
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
their clients’”. When Respondent executed his affidavit retracting his reason for withdrawing as counsel,
he admitted under oath his misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as a
lawyer and failed to abide by the Code. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the
practicing lawyer. In fact, this obligation to the bench for candor and honesty takes precedence. Thus,
saying one thing in his motion and another in his subsequent affidavit is a transgression of this imperative
which necessitates appropriate punishment.

LIBIT VS. ATTY. EDELSON OLIVA 237 SCRA 375 – Respondent was charged with falsifying the
sheriff’s return of summons in a civil case where he was counsel for the plaintiff. In disbarring
Respondent, the Supreme Court held that he committed acts of misconduct
which warranted the exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The practice of law is not a right but
a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the
qualifications required by law. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts
are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. A lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the courts as he is above all an officer of the court
sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing in any in court.

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN, JR. VS. ATTY. RIZALINO SIMBILLO, AC#5299, 8/19/2003 - Respondent
posted paid ads in two national newspapers advertising his services as an “annulment expert at
P48,000.00 within 4 to 6 months. He admitted to the ads but reasoned that there was nothing wrong with
such conduct. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. The practice of law is not a business but a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture and law advocacy is not capital that necessarily yields
profits. Gaining of a livelihood should be secondary consideration as duty to public service and to
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers. Solicitation of legal business is
not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the legal
profession’s dignity. If made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to lawyers and to
the Bar. Use of simple signs stating the name/s of the lawyer’s, the office and residence address and fields
of practice as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Calling cars are acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.

PEDRO LINSANGAN VS. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, AC#6672, 9/4/09 – Respondent

solicited Complainant’s client by persistently texting and calling them to transfer legal representation with
promises of financial aid and expeditious collection of claims. Supreme Court suspended Respondent.
Lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares as the contrary would commercialize the legal
practice, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that
high character of service to which every Bar member is called. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutions malpractice – a ground for disbarment.

MANUEL VILLATUYA VS. ATTY. BEBE TABALINGCOS, AC#6622, 7/10/2012 – Supreme Court
warned Respondent that, an agreement like the one supposedly forged between him and Complainant for
the latter to receive 10% of the former’s attorney’s fees for every judicially-approved corporate
rehabilitation plan prepared by the Complainant, is violative of Rule 9.02. proscribing a lawyer from
dividing or agreeing to divide fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law.

Respondent owned what purports to be a financial and legal consultancy company which was in reality a
vehicle for Respondent to procure professional employment,
specifically for corporate rehabilitation. A company letterhead proposing that should the prospective
client agree to the proposed fees, Respondent would render legal services related to the former’s loan
obligation with a bank proves that Respondent violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers
from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. In suspending Respondent, Supreme Court held that, a
lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises though
when the business is of such nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the
lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily
lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer, or that can be used as a cloak
for indirectly solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of such a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would
be regarded as practice of law.

ATTY. JULITO VITRIOLO, ET. AL. VS. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, AC#4984, 4/1/2003 – Respondent
who was the Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher Education was
charged with solicitation of money from various applicants for correction of names pending before her
office. In disbarring Respondent, the Supreme Court ruled that, “generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a Bar member for misconduct in the discharge of his duties
as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by the Court as a Bar member. Respondent’s
misconduct as a CHED lawyer is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a Bar member. As a
lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of
money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

DAN JOEL V. LIM VS. ATTY. EDILBERTO BARCELONA, AC#5438, 3/10/2004 – Respondent who
was the chief of the NLRC-Public Assistance Center purportedly demanded money from Complainants to
in settlement of labor cases purportedly filed by their employees and even threatened to close their
businesses and put them in jail if they refused to settle. Supreme Court disbarred Respondent reasoning
that, if a lawyer’s misconduct in the discharge of official duties as a government official is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a
Bar member on such ground. Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks have
more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

WILFREDO M. CATU VS. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, A.C. No. 5738, 2/19/2008 –
Respondent, as barangay captain presided over the Lupon conciliatin proceedings over a land dispute and
later entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the subsequent ejectment case instituted
involving the same parties. Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice reasoning that, while
Sec. 90 of the Local Government Code subjected certain elective local officials to the proscription to
practice their profession, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and members of the
sangguniang baragay, however, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the the
Secretary of DILG before he entered his appearance as counsel pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 18 of the
Revised Civil Service Rules.
Non-compliance therewith constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer to obey the laws.

AURELIO M. SIERRA, VS. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, ET. AL., A.C. No. 7549, 8/29/2008 – Complainant
charged Respondent who were all city prosecutors with dereliction of duty and gross ignorance of the law
for not requiring the parties in certain criminal cases instituted by Complainant to simultaneously appear
during preliminary investigation. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint holding that, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court does not require a confrontation between the parties. Preliminary investigation is
ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits and supporting documents through exchange of
pleadings.

ANGEL BAUTISTA VS. ATTY. RAMON GONZALES 182 SCRA 151 – Respondent accepted a civil
case on contingency basis at 50% of the value of the litigated property. After termination of the
engagement, Respondent transferred to himself ½ of the property subject of litigation. Supreme Court
suspended Respondent. In executing a document transferring ½ of the subject properties to himself,
Respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client’s property or interest
involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession (Art. 1491, CC). While a
lawyer may in good faith advance litigation expenses, the same should be the subject of reimbursement.
An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expense proceedings to enforce the client’s right is
CHAMPERTOUS. Such an agreement is against public policy, especially where, as in this case, the
attorney has agreed to carry out the action at his own expenses of some bargain to have part of the thing
in litigation.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM LAW PRACTICE IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY.

LEON G. MAQUERA, BM#793, 7/30/2004 – Atty. Maquera who was admitted to the Philipppine Bar
was later admitted to law practice in Guam. The Superior Court of Guam suspended him from practicing
in Guam due to misconduct for acquiring his client’s property as payment for his legal services. The
Guam court transmitted certified copies of his suspension to the Philippine Supreme Court. May a
Philippine Bar member be suspended/disbarred for an infraction for which he has been
suspended/disbarred from law practice in a foreign country? Disbarment/suspension of a Philippine Bar
member by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action constitutes a
ground for disbarment/suspension from law practice in the Philippines. The judgment, resolution or order
of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment/suspension.

CRISTINO CALUB VS. ATTY. ABRAHAM SULLER, AC#1474, 1/28/2000 – A lawyer, under the
pretext of borrowing a blade, went to his neighbor’s house and raped her. Due to reasonable doubt
however he was acquitted. He argued that such acquittal should warrant the dismissal of the disbarment
case against him. In disbarring Atty. Suller, the Supreme Court reasoned that acquittal due to
prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not determinative of the administrative
case. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and equally important, morally.
MAXIMO DUMADAG VS. ATTY. ERNESTO LUMAYA, AC#2614, 6/29/2000 – Suspended
indefinitely from law practice, Respondent filed various pleadings including a petition to lift his
suspension seeking among others, clarification as to the exact term of his suspension considering he was
already 62 years of age and the lack of law practitioners in their locality. Later he wrote the Chief Justice
again imploring but also chiding the Court for ‘slumbering’ on acting on his petition although still
insisting his innocence. Instead of lifting his suspension, the Supreme Court fixed his period of
suspension at 10 years. The insolence of Respondent’s remonstrations that the Court was sleeping on its
job in acting on his case not only underscores his callous disregard of the myriad administrative and
judicial travails the Court has to contend with as the Court of Last Resort, it also betrays his absolute lack
of appreciation and disrespect for the efforts and measures undertaken by the Court to cope with these
concerns. Needless to state, such presumptuousness is only too deserving of rebuke. Indefiniteness of
Respondent’s suspension, far from being cruel or degrading or inhuman has the effect of placing, as it
were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands – that sanction
has the effect of giving Respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and
misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every Bar
member and officer of the courts.

LIGAYA MANIAGO VS. ATTY. LOURDES DE DIOS, AC#7472, 3/30/10 – Respondent who had
been suspended for 6 months from law practice was charged of violating the order of her suspension by
service as counsel for a Japanese national. In dismissing the petition against Respondent, the Supreme
Court noted that Respondent had already served her prior 6-months suspension and had written a
manifestation to the Court of such fact. To be sure, the Supreme Court laid the following guidelines in
relation to resumption of practice following full service of suspension, to wit: (a) the suspended lawyer
must first present proof of his compliance by submitting certifications from the IBP and Executive Judge
that he has indeed desisted from law practice during the period of suspension; (b) thereafter, the Court,
after evaluation and upon favorable recommendation from the Office of the Bar Confidant, will issue a
resolution lifting the suspension order and allow him to resume his practice. It was only unfortunate that
this procedure was overlooked with regards to Respondent’s prior suspension.

CARLOS REYES VS. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN, AC#5835, 8/10/10 – Suspended for an
aggregate period of 2 ½ years as a result of four administrative cases, Respondent petitioned the Supreme
Court for reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Bar and to be allowed to practice law.
Supreme Court granted Respondent’s application for reinstatement effective upon his submission to the
Court of a sworn statement that: (a) he has completely served the four suspension orders imposed on him
successively; (b) he desisted from the law practice during the period of suspension;
(c) he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the court in the previous
administrative cases; (d) he has furnished copies of his sworn statement to the IBP and the Executive
Judge.
LEONARD RICHARDS VS. PATRICIO ASOY, AC#2655, 10/12/10 – In 1987, Respondent was
disbarred for grave professional misconduct and ordered to reimburse P16,000 to Complainant. The latter
wrote the Court several times to report non-payment by Respondent. Respondent then sought readmission
to the Bar in 1996, claiming that he had consigned the money with the Court’s cashier. According to
Respondent, his belated compliance, that is, 9 years from the order to reimburse was due to his inability to
locate complainant. Supreme Court denied Respondent’s petition and the a later petition in 2010
reasoning that, Respondent’s justification flimsy as it is, considering that Complainant’s address was
readily available with the Court what with the numerous letters reporting Respondent’s non-compliance,
glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities that do
not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling
by displaying a lack of candor towards the Court. By taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement of the
P16,000.00 – and through consignation with this Court at that - he sent out a strong message that the legal
processes and orders of this Court could be treated with disdain or impunity.

FIDELA AND TERESITA BENGCO VS. ATTY. PABLO BERNARDO, AC#6368, 6/13/2012 –
Complainants charged that Respondent with a certain “Magat” enticed them to pay money supposedly to
expedite titling of their property without having performed the task for which he was engaged. The
Supreme Court found untenable Respondent’s defense of prescription – that the complaint was filed two
years after the supposed deceit was committed. Administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe.
The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.

ELPIDIO TIONG VS. ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, AC#4428, 12/12/2011 –Complainant

confirmed that Respondent who was his lawyer was having an affair with his wife when he overheard,
through the extension phone, Respondent say “I Love You” to Complainant’s wife. Later, and in the
presence of their spouses, Respondent and Complainant’s wife admitted their amorous affair and then and
there, executed an affidavit before a notary public attesting to their illicit and seeking their respective
spouses’ forgiveness. This affidavit signed by Complainant, Respondent and their spouses provided that
no criminal or legal action would be taken against the offending parties. Despite such stipulation,
Complainant sought for the disbarment of Respondent who interposed the defense of pardon. Supreme
Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law holding that his act of having an affair with his
client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of
fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. Undeniably,
this illicit relationship amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary
action from the Court. A case for suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a
complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the respondent’s acts
as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the
Bar. Hence, the affidavit, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the
proceedings.
GRACE M. ANACTA VS. ATTY. EDUARDO RESURRECCION, AC#9074, 8/14/2012 – Respondent
committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he had already filed a petition for
annulment of marriage on Complainant’s behalf after receipt of P42,000.00. He went to the extent of
presenting to Complainant a supposed copy of the petition duly filed with the court. Later, Complainant
found out from the court that no such petition was filed. Finding Respondent guilty of deceit and gross
misconduct, the Supreme Court suspended him from law practice reasoning that, there is no ironclad rule
that disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is not
mandated to automatically impose the extreme penalty of disbarment where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end.

Anent the issue of whether Respondent should be directed to return the money he received from
Complainant, this case is the opportune time to harmonize the Court’s ruling on this matter. When the
matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as
member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether respondent be directed to return the amount received
from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s disciplinary authority. In this case, it is clear that
Respondent violated his lawyer’s oath and code of conduct when he withheld the amount of P42,000.00
despite his failure to render the necessary legal services and after complainant demanded its return. He
must be therefore directed to return the same.

RODOLFO ESPINOSA VS. ATTY. JULIETA OMANA, AC#9081, 10/12/2011 – Respondent

purported advised that Complainant and his wife could live separately and dissolve their marriage,
preparing for that purpose, a “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. Respondent claimed that, it was not her but a
part-time office staff who notarized the document. In suspending Respondent from law practice and being
a notary public, the Supreme Court held that, extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void and a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the
conjugal partnership, which is exactly
what Omaña did in this case.In preparing and notarizing a void document, Respondent violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 (duty not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful). Respondent knew fully that the
Kasunduan has no legal effect and is against public policy. Even granting arguendo that, it was her part-
time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Respondent’s negligence in doing her notarial
duties. A notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.

TAN TIONG BIO VS. ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES, AC#6634, 8/23/2007 – Respondent was duly
commissioned as a notary public for Quezon City but notarized a deed of sale in Pasig City. In suspending
Respondent, the Supreme Court reasoned that, while seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident,
Respondent’s act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his
notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. Respondent by performing through
the years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized indulged in deliberate falsehood. By
such malpractice as a notary public, Respondent
violated Canon 7 directing every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.

JESSICA UY VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL SAÑO, AC#6505, 9/11/2008 – For notarizing documents
despite expiration of his notarial commission, Supreme Court suspended Respondent holding that,
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show they posses, and
continue to possess, qualifications required by law for conferment of such privilege. A lawyer’s act of
notarizing without the requisite commission therefor is reprehensible constituting as it does, not only
malpractice but also the crime of falsification of public documents. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest converting a private document
into a public document making it admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. As such,
only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. Respondent’s reliance upon his
aide’s representation that his commission had been renewed shows disregard of the requirements for
issuance of a notarial commission.

DOLORES DELA CRUZ VS. ATTY. JOSE DIMAANO, JR., AC#7781, 9/12/2008 – Respondent
notarized a deed which allowed Navarro (Complainant’s sister) full ownership over the estate of their
deceased parents. Complainant’s signature on this deed was forged and Complainant did not even appear
before Respondent. Supreme Court gave no credence to Respondent’s defense that he simply relied upon
Navarro’s representations because they had been long time neighbours and he believed she would not lie
to him. Supreme Court held that notaries public should refrain from affixing their signature and notarial
seal on a document unless the persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed it and
personally appeared before them to attest to the truth of what are stated therein, otherwise, notaries public
would not be able to verify the genuineness of the signatures and whether the document is the party’s free
act or deed. Notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has
acknowledged and presented the proper residence certificate.

LORENZO BRENNISEN VS. ATTY. RAMON CONTAWI, AC#7481, 4/24/2012 – Complainant,

being a US resident, entrusted the administration of his land along with its title to Respondent. Via a
spurious Special Power of Attorney, Respondent mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to
Roberto Ho. Supreme Court suspended Respondent for violating Canon 1 for disposing his client’s
property without his knowledge or consent and partaking of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit.
Respondent’s contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then financially-incapacitated
office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that
complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged.

ATTY. FLORITA LINCO VS. ATTY. JIMMY LACEBAL, AC#7241, 10/17/2011 – Respondent is
charged with dishonesty and violation of the Notarial Law for notarizing a deed of donation allegedly
executed by Complainant’s husband (Atty. Alfredo Linco) in favor of his illegitimate minor child, despite
Respondent’s knowledge that affiant died a day prior to notarization. Respondent claimed affiant, whom
he meet prior to his demise, asked him to notarize the deed of donation which affiant signed in
Respondent’s
presence. Since Respondent did not have his notarial register, he told affiant to bring the deed to his office
anytime for notarization. Hence, despite knowledge of death, Respondent notarized the deed to
accommodate a colleague. The Supreme Court suspended Respondent from law practice and being a
notary public finding that, affiant’s previous personal appearance before Respondent does not justify the
notarization of the deed due to affiant’s absence on the day of notarization. The rule requires Respondent
not to notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to its contents and truthfulness. Further, in the
notarial acknowledgment, Respondent attested to affiant’s personal appearance before him on the day of
notarization, yet, affiant clearly could not have appeared as he already died a day before. Clearly,
Respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and his oath as a lawyer.

CORAZON NEVADA VS. ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, AC#7591, 3/20/2012 – Complainant is the
principal stockholder of a hotel where One in Jesus Christ Church holds its services. Respondent and
Complainant being both church members, became friends. Respondent took advantage of their friendship
by failing to deliver the P90,000 rental deposit paid, after Respondent represented himself as hotel
administrator and entered into a lease contract with Jung Chul for office space in the hotel. Complainant
also entrusted to Respondent several jewelries intended for sale. Respondent however, failed to return the
proceeds of the sale or the unsold articles to Complainant. In suspending Respondent from law practice
and being a notary public, the Supreme Court held that, he was guilty of misrepresentation, when he made
it appear that he was authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of Nevada when, in fact, he was
not. For failing to return or remitting proceeds of the sale, upon demand, he also breached his duty to hold
in trust property belonging to his client (Canon 16, Rule 16.03). Moreover, Respondent’s act of affixing
his signature above the printed name “Edwin Nevada”, without any qualification, veritably made him a
party to the lease contract. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of
the Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial Rules.

HON. JULIETA DECENA VS. JUDGE NILO MALANYAON, AM#RTJ-02-1669, 4/14/2004 –

During a municipal session wherein the revocation of two resolution granting authority to permit a
cockpit was being deliberate, Respondent whose nephew was one of such cockpit operators, heckled and
interruption the session by hurling accusatory remarks and insults toward the municipal official.
Respondent claimed that he was merely present during the council session in his private capacity as a
taxpayer. In imposing a fine on Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, he should be reminded that his
judicial identity does not terminate at the end of the day when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when
garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority and moral
ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala. A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. As such, he should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities, as well as behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.
SALVADOR SISON VS. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., AM#RTJ-03-1771, 5/27/2004 –
Respondent ordered Complainant who was an MMDA traffic enforcer to appear in his court and explain
why he issued a traffic ticket to Respondent’s son even if the latter had introduced himself to be a son of a
judge. For failure to appear and explain, Respondent cited Complainant in contempt, ordered him arrested
and only discharged him after admitting before Respondent that he made a mistake. Supreme Court
dismissed Respondent from the service. Initially, he appeared to be justified in holding Complainant for
contempt due to the latter’s refusal to comply with his order. However, Complainant was not a party to
any pending cases. What triggered the contempt charge was the traffic incident involving Respondent’s
son – this being a personal matter involving his son, Respondent should have refrained from ordering
Complainant’s arrest and detention. A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

CARLOS DIONISIO VS. HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, AM#RTJ98-1400, 2/1/1999 – Respondent

posted an ad in the court bulletin board for “attractive waitresses and personable waiters for the family-
owned restaurant. He even interviewed some applicants in his court. A news ad accepting such applicants
even listed the address of his court. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. His conduct constitutes
involvement in private business and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family
business. Judges must not allow themselves to be distracted from the performance of their judicial tasks
by other lawful enterprises.

ZENAIDA BESO VS. JUDGE JUAN DAGUMAN, AM#MTJ-99-1211, 1/28/2000 – Respondent was a
municipal judge of Sta. Margarita. He solemnized Complainant’s marriage in his residence in Calbayog
City. In imposing a fine on Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, a person presiding over a court of
law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without
resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must
also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their
office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. Considering that Respondent’s
jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in Calbayog City.

SALVADOR RUIZ VS. JUDGE AGELIO BRINGAS, AM#MTJ-00-1266, 4/6/2000 – In a hearing

before Respondent, Complainant who was the fiscal got into a verbal exchange with Respondent after
Complainant requested time to submit his recommendation to an accused’s guilty plea. Respondent
directed that it be put on record that Complainant does not know how to compute the proper penalty and
that he even took the bar three times. Supreme Court suspended Respondent. The duty to maintain respect
for the court’s dignity applies to members of the Bar and bench alike. A judge should be courteous both in
conduct and language especially to those appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients and the public without being petty, arbitrary,
overbearing or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and remember always
that courtesy begets courtesy.
RUFINO CASIMIRO VS. JUDGE OCTAVIO FERNANDEZ, AM#MTJ-04-1525, 1/29/2004 – After
the dismissal of the criminal case against Complainant, Respondent failed to return the cash bond posted.
Respondent only later issued a check to refund Complainant’s cash bond. Per SC Circular No. 50-95, all
collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within 24
hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, in the
name of the court, with its Clerk of Court and the Executive Judge as authorized signatories. While there
is no direct and hard evidence that Respondent made personal use of the cash bond, his wife’s issuance of
her personal check to Complainant in the amount of the cash bond, indicates so. By his actuations then,
Respondent placed his honesty and integrity under serious doubt. A judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of such in all activities.

ENGRACIO DIALO, JR. VS. JUDGE MARIANO MACIAS, AM#RTJ-04-1859, 7/13/2004 –

Complainant and a companion, who were both witness in the administrative case for immorality filed
against Respondent by his wife. On their way to Manila for the hearing of the administrative case, they
were arrested and detained by police reports based upon Respondent’s report that they were would-be
assassin. During the pendency of the administrative case against Respondent for oppression, Complainant
withdrew his complaint. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Complainant’s withdrawal/disavowal of the
contents of his administrative complaint does not necessarily warrant its dismissal. Administrative actions
cannot depend on complainant’s will/pleasure who may, for his own reasons, condone what may be
detestable. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint
against the respondent because public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and
employees of the judiciary. By respondent’s act of requesting for complainant’s and his companion’s
warrantless arrest, he violated complainant’s constitutional right, an act which partakes of the nature of
oppression, defined as an “act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of
authority.”

ATTY. GLORIA LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU VS. JUDGE RAPHAEL B. YRASTORZA, A.M.

No. RTJ-03-1793, 2/5/2004 – When Complainant asked for a resetting, Respondent cut her off saying,
“Do not give me so many excuses x x x I don’t care who you are! x x x You can file one thousand
administrative cases against me. I don’t care”. In another case, Respondent scolded Complainant for
failure to file pre-trial brief. Subsequently, when pre-trial was conducted and Complainant was absent due
to another engagement, Respondent ordered Complainant’s client to produce the original documents in
five minutes or the case would be dismissed. Supreme Court reprimanded Respondent. Mere desistance
on Complainant’s part does not warrant dismissal of an administrative complaint against any member of
the bench and the judiciary. Court’s interest in the judiciary’s affairs is a paramount concern that knows
no bounds. Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal and becomes the visible
representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. The tenor of Respondent’s statement can easily instill in the minds of those
who heard them that as a judge he is above the law. Respondent’s unfounded act of insulting Complainant
in open court and cutting her off in mid-sentence while she was still explaining her side exhibited a
manifest disregard of
his duty be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct proceedings in court with
fitting dignity and decorum.

HEINZ R. HECK VS. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, AM#RTJ-01-1657, 2/23/2004 – Prior to his
appointment as RTC judge, Respondent supposedly violated the notarial law by notarizing documents in
1980 to 1984 without being commissioned as notary public. May a retired judge disciplined for notarizing
documents without the necessary commission more than 20 years ago? Supreme Court fined Respondent.
A judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary. Possession of
good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement
to the practice of law. Thus, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor. Respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a
member of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. Even
then, though Respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the
bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

RODRIGO Q. TUGOT VS. JUDGE MAMERTO COLIFLORES, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1332,

2/16/2004
– Respondent dismissed an ejectment case wherein Complainant was one of the plaintiffs. The latter
appealed the dismissal but were advised to re-file their notice of appeal because the records transmitted to
the appellate court did not have a notice of appeal. As it turned out, the notice of appeal was not lost but
was simply misplaced in Respondent’s office. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Courts exist to dispense
and promote justice. Realization of this solemn purpose depends to a great extent on the intellectual,
moral and personal qualities of the men and women who are called to serve as judges. Misplacement of
the notice of appeal indicates gross negligence. Respondent should have been more prudent in
determining the cause of its temporary loss, which caused unnecessary inconvenience to Complainant,
whose right to appeal was affected. As administrative officers of the courts, judges should organize and
supervise court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. He should adopt a system of
records management, so that files are kept intact despite the temporary absence of the person primarily
responsible for their custody.
ELENA R. ALCARAZ VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1539, 4/14/2004 –
Having declared Complainant and her co-defendants in a civil collection suit in default, Respondent
proceeded with plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence and thereafter, rendered judgment in
plaintiff’s favour. rendered judgment in a civil case Complainant alleged that she was not furnished
various pleading and orders including plaintiff’s motion to declare defendants in default and the order
granting the same. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Rule 9, Sec. (a) of the Rules on Civil Procedure
requires that “a party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take
part in the trial”. So, even when a defendant is already declared in default, he is entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings. Respondent’s failure to comply with the elementary dictates of procedural rules
constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code is explicit in its mandate that, “a judge
shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence”. Competence is the mark of
a good judge. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his own fellowmen, the
judge owes it to the public who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient
in the law.
SPS. RODOLFO & SYLVIA CABICO VS. JUDGE EVELYN DIMACULANGAN-QUERIJERO,
AM#RTJ-02-1735, 4/27/2007 – Respondent dismissed a criminal case for rape on ground of full payment
of civil liability and disinterest to prosecute, despite the manifestation in court that Complainants who
were the parents of the 17-year old victim would not settle and their refusal to sign the affidavit of
desistance. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Respondent dismissed the criminal case after the accused
had paid their individual civil liability. This is in utter disregard and in gross ignorance of the law because
payment of civil liability does not extinguish criminal liability. When a law or rule is basic, a judge owes it
to his office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. As an advocate of justice
and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the
interpretations of our laws. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, Respondent owes the public
and the court she sits in proficiency in the law.

MARISSA MONDALA VS. JUDGE REBECCA MARIANO, AM#RTJ-06-2010, 1/25/2007 –

Respondent supposedly misrepresented in her report of pending cases that a decision had already been
rendered in a certain case when in fact, it was still with Complainant (legal researcher) for research and
drafting. Respondent claimed mere oversight and not misrepresentation, i.e., at the time the monthly
report was made, a decision had actually been prepared. Supreme Court fined Respondent. A decision in a
civil case is rendered only upon the signing by the judge who penned the same and upon filing with the
clerk of court. A draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until the same is duly signed
and delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation. Under Sec. 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, judges ought to ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

GIDEON JUSON VS. JUDGE VICENTE MONDRAGON, AM#MTJ-07-1685, 10/3/2007 –

Respondent purportedly delayed for over three year in resolving Complainant’s motion to intervene in a
civil case for recovery of a land. Respondent admitted the delays citing failing health due to a stroke and
his load of supervising three courts at a time as causes therefor. Supreme Court fined Respondent. Rules
prescribing time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. Judicial office exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the
law in the discharge of official duties. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases
or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they
are submitted for decision or resolution. His failing health, as an excuse for the delay hardly merits
serious consideration. Even if he was stricken by an illness hampering his due performance of his duties,
it was incumbent upon him to inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide the cases assigned to
him. As to his additional work in supervising three courts at a time, such will not exonerate him. His
failure to decide the case on time cannot be ignored. Respondent should have know that if his caseload,
additional
assignments or designations, health reasons or other facts prevented the timely disposition of his pending
cases, all he had to do was simply ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of his
cases.

CONRADO LADIGON VS. JUDGE RIXON GARONG, AM#MTJ-08-1712, 8/20/2008 –

Respondent used his title as “judge” and his court’s official stationary in writing a letter-complaint to the
Chairman of the First United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA about the surreptitious manner of the
incorporation of the Banard Kelly Memorial United Methodist Church, singling out Complainant to be
part of the deception. Admitting that he used his court’s letterhead and signed his letter using the word
“judge”, Respondent reasoned that he merely used an ordinary bond paper and typed thereon his court’s
station “to indicate the return or inside address”. Supreme Court admonished Respondent. What is
involved here is the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities”. Respondent’s transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being
very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his
title. Use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances of the
use – the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of “impropriety” or “appearance of
impropriety”. Respondent crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint
involving an alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge
with the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of
official recognition or notice of the reported violation.

JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN VS. JUDGE SIBANAH USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 2-15-11 –

Complainant and her co-party litigants filed a motion to inhibit Respondent. During the hearing for said
motion, Respondent became emotional, forced Complainant to testify without counsel, demanding a
public apology, relentlessly interrogating her and finally ordering her detained for direct contempt finding
her in direct contempt until she divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the court but not
exceeding 30 days. Supreme Court fined Respondent. No amount of rationalization can reconcile the limit
of the 10-day period of imprisonment for direct contempt set in Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court with
the 30-day maximum period of imprisonment fixed by Respondent. By virtue of his office, Respondent
knows or should have known this so basic a rule. The glaringly clarity of the rule tripped Respondent to
commit a glaring error which was made even more flagrant by the fact that Respondent was actually
detained for 19 days. Failure to follow basic legal commands as prescribed by law and the rules is
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law.

OCA VS. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO LEONIDA, AM#RTJ-09-2198, 1/18/11 – Per judicial
audit and inventory conducted when Respondent availed of optional retirement, the Office of the Court
Administrator determined that Respondent failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases as well
as to resolved motions in 10 civil cases. Supreme Court fined Respondent. A judge’s failure to decide a
case within the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with
utmost rigor for delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his
right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it
undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary
lowering its standards and bringing it to disrepute. The administration of justice demands that those who
don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them. As frontline
officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-
bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and
confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent.

OCA VS. JUDGE BENJAMIN ESTRADA, AM#RTJ-09-2173, 1/18/11 – In the review of the monthly
report of cases from MTCC Malaybalay, Bukidnon, the OCA noted that Respondent issued orders
dismissing certain cases even when he was no longer the judge of said court having been promoted to the
RTC. Likewise the RTC Executive Judge (Bacal) issued similar orders affecting certain MTCC cases.
Both judges admitted the acts claiming that they did not intend to violate the law, acting as they did out of
their desire to uphold the accused’s right to liberty in the cases they took cognizance of. Both judges were
fined by the Supreme Court. Their shared intention to uphold the accused’s right to liberty cannot justify
their action in excess of their authority in violation of existing regulations. The vacuum in a first level
court (MTC) due to the absence of a presiding judge is not remedied by a take-over of the duties of the
still-to-be appointed or designated judge for that court, which is what they did. Instead of allowing
Respondent and herself to act on pending MTCC cases, the RTC Executive Judge should have designated
a municipal judge within her area of supervision to act on the pending cases.

IMELDA MARCOS VS. JUDGE FERNANDO PAMINTUAN, AM#RTJ-07-2062, 1/18/11 – In 1996,

then Judge Reyes issued an order which later became final and executor releasing the Golden Buddha
status in custodial egis to the heirs of Rogelio Roxas. In implementing said order, Respondent in his May
2006 Order added a statement to the effect that the Golden Buddha in the court’s custody was a “fake or
mere replica”. Having been previously warned and punished for various infraction, Respondent was
dismissed from the service by the Supreme Court. While judges like any other citizen are entitled to
freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary. It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executor, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in ay respect either by the court which rendered
it or even by the Supreme Court. It is inexcusable for Respondent to have overlooked such basic legal
principle no matter how noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-
informed, thus, they are expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times. When
the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.

ATTY. NORLINDA DESCALLAR VS. HON. REINERIO RAMAS, AM#RTJ-06-2015, 12/15/10 –

For omitting to reflect his absences in his May and June 2005 Certificates of Service, Supreme Court
FINED Respondent for dishonesty. Respondent admitted he reported for work intermittently or did not
report at all, after his Order that he had to temporarily stop working due to the death threats he receiving
in relation to a decision he made over
an electoral protest case. Indeed, there may be threats to his life as alleged in his order but such threats do
not justify cessation from performing judicial functions. Threats are concomitant peril in public office
especially in the judiciary, where magistrates decide and determine sensitive issues that normally generate
or provoke reprisals from losing litigants. This is a consequence that a judge should be prepared of. Their
exalted position entails a great responsibility unyielding to one’s personal convenience. Respondent is
presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of Judicial Conduct - a judge
should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence (Canon 3), a judge be faithful
to the law and maintain professional competence (Rule 3.01), and a judge to observe high standards of
public service and fidelity at all times (Rule 3.09). Respondent irrefragably failed to observe these
standards by making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service to cover up his absences.

GAUDENCIO PANTILO III VS. JUDGE VICTOR CANOY, AM#RTJ-11-2262, 2/9/11 – Supreme
Court FINED Respondent for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and appearance of
impropriety for verbally ordering the release of the accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide even when no information was yet filed. Respondent also granted accused’s motion
to release his impounded vehicle despite said motion despite violation of the 3-day notice rule. In his
defense, Respondent invoked accused’s constitutional right to bail which supposedly did not require that a
person be charged in court before one could apply for it. While, It is settled that an accused in a criminal
case has the constitutional right to bail, herein-complaint focused on the manner of accused’s release from
detention. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR
collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no
written release order. While Respondent insisted that such may be considered as “constructive bail,” there
is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of another.

JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN VS. JUDGE SIBANAH USMAN, AM#RTJ-11-2666, 2-15-11 – In a

hearing on a motion for inhibition filed by Complainant relative to a suit pending before Respondent, the
latter forced Complainant to take the stand, then and there, demanded a public apology and relentlessly
interrogated her till Respondent issued an order finding Complainant guilty of direct contempt and
ordered her detention until she divulged her informant or publicly apologized to the Court but not to
exceed 30 days. Supreme Court FINED Respondent reasoning that, no amount of rationalization can
reconcile the limit of the 10-day period of imprisonment for direct contempt set in Sec. 1, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court with the 30-day (maximum period of) imprisonment that Respondent fixed in his order. By
virtue of his office, Respondent knows or should have known this so basic a rule. The glaring clarity of
the rule tripped Respondent to commit a glaring error, which was made even more flagrant by the fact that
Complainant was actually imprisoned for 19 days. Failure to follow basic legal commands as prescribed
by law and the rules is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. By accepting the exalted position of a
judge, Respondent ought to have been familiar with the legal norms and precepts as well as the
procedural rules.
DANIEL SEVILLA VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO LINDO, AM#MTJ-08-1714, 2/9/11 – Complainant
charged that Respondent repeated reset the hearing of the BP22 case he filed so as to force him to enter
into a compromise agreement evident from Respondent’s comment to him that, “Mr. Sevilla, ang hirap
mo namang pakiusapan. Konting pera lang yan. Bahala ka maghintay sa wala.” In imposing a FINE on
Respondent, Supreme Court held that, a trial judge who allows, or abets, or tolerates numerous
unreasonable postponements of the trial, whether out of inefficiency or indolence, or out of bias towards a
party, is administratively liable. Postponement of a hearing in a civil/criminal case may at times be
unavoidable, the Court however, disallows undue/unnecessary postponements of court hearings, simply
because they cause unreasonable delays in the administration of justice and, thus, undermine the people’s
faith in the Judiciary, aside from aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants. Thus,
the Court has enjoined for postponements and resettings to be allowed only upon meritorious grounds.
The strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force and greater reason to prosecutions
involving violations of BP 22, the prompt resolution of which has been ensured by their being now
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure – a rule precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy
disposition of cases. Respondent flagrantly violated the letter and spirit of both of Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer justice impartially and without delay; and of
Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which required him as a trial judge “to be prompt in disposing
of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.”

LYDELLE CONQUILLA VS. JUDGE LAURO BERNARDO, AM#MTJ-09-1737, 2/9/11 –

Respondent was charged with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct and ignorance of the law for
conducting a preliminary investigation and finding probable cause therein to charged Complainant with
direct assault. Supreme Court SUSPENDED Respondent, reasoning that, Respondent’s conduct of such
preliminary investigation directly contravenes A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (effective October 5, 2005),
amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The latter removed the conduct
of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts and making it incumbent upon them to
forward the records of the case to the Prosecutor’s Office for preliminary investigation. Indeed,
competence and diligence are prerequisites (Canon
3) to the due performance of judicial office. Hence, when a law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their
office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules and should be diligent in keeping
abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.

ELADIO PERFECTO VS. JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO ESIDERA, AM-RTJ-11-2270, 1/31/11 –

Respondent was charged with soliciting and receiving money from a fiscal and a private practitioner
supposedly to defray expenses for a religious celebration and barangay fiesta. In her answer, Respondent
brushed off the affidavit of Fiscal Ching who witnessed the solicitation, claiming that the fiscal who was a
former law student to whom she gave a 3-grade because her ‘codigo’ was still inserted in the examination
booklet, is of “dubious personality” with a “narcissistic personality disorder”. FINED for
impropriety and conduct unbecoming, the Supreme Court held that, use of acerbic words was uncalled for
considering Respondent’s status. Further, her act of soliciting (under the guise of a religious cause)
betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an
impartial dispenser of justice, held in high esteem and respect by the local community, which must be
preserved at all times. It spawns the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or
pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into donating
money through her charismatic group for religious purposes. A judge must be like Caesar’s wife - above
suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a
member of the judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as
a private individual. It is never trite to caution Respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech
and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant
observation.

FLORENDA TOBIAS VS. JUDGE MANUEL LIMSIACO, AM-MTJ-09-1734, 1-19-11 –

Complainant who charged Respondent with corruption for allegedly offering “package deals” to
litigants, claimed that the court stenographer informed her sister that Respondent required
P30,000 to provide counsel, prepare pleadings and ensure a favorable decision in an ejectment
case. Respondent did not personally accept the initial payment of P10,000 but admitted to talking
with Complainant’s sister, recommending a lawyer and subsequently preparing a motion for
counsel to withdraw. Fined for gross misconduct, the Supreme Court held that, although the
alleged offer of package deals by Respondent to litigants was unsubstantiated, it was improper
for Respondent to talk to prospective litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to handle
cases. The act of preparing the motion for counsel to withdraw is likewise improper and
unethical. The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of his
office. Said acts of Respondent violate Sec. 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Sec. 2 of Canon 3
(Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

ANTONINO MONTICALBO V. JUDGE CRESENTE MACARAYA, AM#RTJ-09-2197, 4/13/11 –

In admonishing Respondent for citing a non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case
number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 – in his order, the Supreme Court
held that, a search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the
Supreme Court. Further, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, “CA G.R.” and, it cannot
be considered a CA case because the respondent was the “Court of Appeals.” This was counter to the
standard of competence and integrity expected of those occupying Respondent’s judicial position. A judge
must be “the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.” While a judge may not be
disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an
injustice, still he is required to observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his
official duties.