Sie sind auf Seite 1von 32

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

Intelligence Analysis:
Does NSA Have What It Takes?
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

increase in the first decade of the new century. 3
Seekers of Wisdom first need sound intelli- Former secretary of state Warren Christopher
gence. Heraclitus noted that increasing religious and ethnic terror-
ism has become "one of the most important
Do National Security Agency (NSA) intelli- security challenges we face in the wake of the
gence analysts have what it takes to be successful? Cold War." 4 Similarly, transnational criminal
What is a successful analyst? Indeed, what is enterprises pose a significant threat. Insinuated
analysis? into weak governments and nongovernmental
institutions, they derive income from "alien
These questions strike at the heart of NSA's smuggling; trafficking in women and children;
mission to provide intelligence to national leaders smuggling toxic materials, hazardous wastes,
and decision makers. The imperative to answer illicit arms, military technologies, and other con-
these questions stems from two types of pres- traband; financial fraud; and racketeering." 5
sures, external and internal. Externally, NSA Costing about one percent of global GNP, these
faces a changed world order that demands enterprises threaten both the American way of
responsiveness, agility, and flexibility at a life and its quality. 6
moment's notice in response to diverse transna-
tional threats. Internally, NSA is charged with To counter these, and myriad other 21st cen-
transforming outdated Cold War organizational tury threats, policymakers, decision makers, and
structure, mentality, and methods to counter military leaders require on-time, actionable intel-
those challenges. ligence. Thus President Bush's directive ordering
a comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence
The 21st century is filled with complex, rapid- begins "[current] and accurate foreign intelli-
ly changing intelligence problems that challenge gence is essential to the success of our foreign pol-
contemporary intelligence agencies to extend well icy, law enforcement, and defense strategies and
beyond their traditional purview. Whereas in the is critical to protecting and advancing America's
20th century the majo~ threats to American secu- vital interests." 7 NSA, along with other agencies
rity were considered monolithic, today diverse within the intelligence community, must adapt to
nonstate or antistate actors deliberately threaten provide that intelligence. To successfully do so
the security of the United States in ways that requires a new paradigm for intelligence analysis
extend far beyond the traditional political and and production.
military realms. Consequently, intelligence con-
sumers need to know about the intentions and One of the ways NSA has begun to adapt is by
actions of what Adda Bozeman refers to as the envisioning an organizational model that places
"other" in her seminal work on strategic intelli- all intelligence analysts under the purview of an
gence and statecraft. 2 1\-vo examples of the signif- analytic deployment service, from which individ-
icant threats posed by "others" are terrorism and uals are assigned to specific production lines
transnational crime. Religious and ethnic terror- based on the capabilities of the former and the
ism increased through the 1990s and continues to needs of the latter. However, for this model to
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 123-2
24 February 1998
Declassify On: X1 UNCLASSIFIED Page 1
Cryptologic Quart rly UNCLASSIFIED

w rk. ·tuffi>rs n ~d to kn )W ,,·h the intdli 11 · r~uniznli 11: in whi 'h l r du ti

anal) t ' in the w rkfo rcc :m \ and \\'h 't a s t, i1hlt•ed. '' h t kin l 1 f intellig n
th<'y bring l th ' mis ·i n. ,' irnilurly. wb n 1 'A t it cust m,·1,'.
u. es its p i 11::; fow hirin, · 11110 '.ttion; t lwii\11, in
new intelli~e m:c n.11~ .' l , it mu~ . maxi111 iz th Sl'
opp rtunities nnd hire only qualifi ·d pl'l·'onnd .
Bnl wh:i t. i~ n qnalifiL•d inlellig<'n<.T an 1 1.n; f~

Hg. t F!Jnctional c re .:ompetendes fur i11telli9ence an~ lysis

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

through a series of presentations and discussions analyst and consumer is also instrumental, as this
held with personnel in our agency as well as "'rith interplay determines the nature and content of
outside government and academic experts on the resultant intelligence as well as when and how
intelligence and intelligence analysis. They con- it is disseminated.
firmed our basic thesis, corroborated our find-
ings, and made helpful suggestions that devel- Intelligence is tim~ly, actionable information
oped further our model of functional core compe- that helps policymakers, decision makers, and
tencies. military leaders perform their national security
functions. Intelligence professionals transform
Sherman Kent, one of the founders of the myriad bits of information into tailored products
national peacetime intelligence community, for these customers, who in turn develop policy
argues that intelligence requires its own litera- and strategy, to determine how the nation \!\rill act
ture. According to Kent, the purpose of this liter- in the present and in the future to preserve its
ature is to advance the discipline of intelligence. security.
Indeed, Kent believed "[as] long as this discipline
lacks a literature, its method, its vocabulary, its The intelligence business itself is about com-
body of doctrine, and even its fundamental theo- petencies, what John Gannon, former chairman
ry run the risk of never reaching full maturity." 8 of the National Intelligence Council, refers to as
Through the publication of articles on analysis "skills and expertise." He notes that "this means
and subsequent discussion, "original synthesis of people - people in whom we \!\rill need to invest
all that has gone before" occurs. 9 In keeping \l\rith more to deal \l\rith the array of complex challenges
Kent's mandate to develop an intelligence litera- we face over the next generation. "11
ture that provokes discussion and further
methodological development, we present our Analysis is the process by which people trans-
findings in this article. We seek to enable com- form information into intelligence. At the basic
ment and further discussion among the larger level, this analytic process fully describes the phe-
intelligence populace. Much more could be said nomenon under study, accounting for as many
about many of the issues we raise in this brief relevant variables as possible. At the next level,
article. It is hoped that subsequent discussion of analysis reaches beyond the descriptive to explain
these ideas among practitioners can advance fully the phenomenon. lDtimately, analysis leads
community understanding of, and thereby to synthesis and effective persuasion, often
enhance overall performance of, intelligence referred to as estirnation. 12 Analysis often breaks
analysis. down large problems into a number of smaller
ones, involving "dose examination of related
THE NATURE AND ROLE OF items of information to determine the extent to
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS which they confirm, supplement, or contradict
each other and thus to establish probabilities and
Intelligence refers to information that meets relationships." 13
the stated or understood needs of policymak-
ers .... All intelligence is information; not all Since the advent of the Information Age,
information is intelligence.1° Mark Lowenthal "[collecting] information is less of a problem and
verifying is more of one." 14 Thus the role of analy-
Understanding the nature and role of intelli- sis becomes more vital as the supply of informa-
gence is a prerequisite to defining the competen- tion available to customers from every type
cies that intelligence analysts must have in order of source, proven and unproven, multiplies expo-
to be successful. The relationship between the nentially. Intelligence analysts are more than

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

merely another information source, more than degree, Justice, Commerce, or Agriculture; the
collectors and couriers of information to cus- intelligence community; and the National
tomers. Further, Security Council (NSC) staff. 20 Overlap of both
issues and personnel mitigates the fact that each
"[the] images that are sometimes evoked of locus may have different perspectives and differ-
policymakers surfing the Net themselves, in ent interests from the others. For example, the
direct touch with their own information president, and the secretaries of state and defense
sources, are very misleading. Most of the time, are members of the NSC, which carries out presi-
as (policymakers'] access to information multi- dential policy. 21 All policymakers and their subor-
plies, their need for processing, if not analysis, dinates are free to reject intelligence findings, no
will go up. If collection is easier, selection will matter how persuasively argued they may be.
be harder. ~ 15
However, to say that policymakers dismiss
Intelligence analysts select and filter information, intelligence that doesn't support their presuppo-
interpret and put it in context, and tailor it to sitions and policy objectives is to tell only half the
meet their policy-making customers' needs. In story. There are numerous reasons why policy-
short, analysts, and analysts only, create "intelli- makers do not accept intelligence. Gregory
gence." Treverton, former vice-chair of the National
Intelligence Council, indicates that intelligence is
At its best, the results of intelligence analysis ignored both when it is inconvenient and when it
provide just the right information permitting offers nothing new. In writing about the U.S. pol-
national leaders "to make wise decisions - all pre- icy failures of the first Bush administration dur-
sented with accuracy, timeliness, and clarity. "16 ing the Balkan crisis, Treverton wonders, "If, in
The intelligence provided must "contain hard-hit- retrospect, the intelligence seems on the mark,
ting, focused analysis relevant to current policy did the policy failure derive from intelligence
issues. Therefore, analysis of raw information has unheeded, or was the intelligence h~ded but
the most impact on the decisionmaker and pro- either not new or not really actionable?" 22 ,
ducing high-quality analytical product should be
the highest priority for intelligence agehcies." 17 Treverton adds that intelligence must antici-
pate the needs of policy. "By the time pOlicy
Intelligence is judged, then, on its usefulness. knows what it needs to know, it is usually too late
But what criteria define "useful"? Amos Kovacs, for intelligence to respond by developing new
writing in Intelligence and National Security, sources or cranking up its analytic capacity." 23 A
asserts that µ,seful intelligence makes a "differ- former policymaker 1himself, he asserts that intel-
ence" to poliCymakers." 18 Finally, there is an ligence is useful to policy at three stages during
assumption that intelligence should be unbiased, the life of an issue: "'-
although it is recognized that analysts with con-
cerns about outcomes do influence the process by • If the policymakers are prescient, when the
selecting which inputs to analyze.1 9 issue is just beginning; however, there is likely to
be little intelligence on the issue at that point. 24
Whose policy should intelligence support?
Within the United States government there are • When the issue is "ripe for decision." Here
numerous loci of the policy process that depend policymakers want intelligence that permits alter-
at least in part on intelligence: the President; the natives to be considered; however, intelligence
Congress; the Executive Branch departments of often is at the point of providing background
Defense, State, and Treasury, and to a lesser

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

information necessary for understanding the view those "right" pages, even when they may not
issue. 25 wish to do so.

• When the policymakers have made up their MEASURES OF SUCCESS FOR

minds on the issue, but only if intelligence sup- INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
ports their view. They will be uninterested or even
hostile when it does not support their view. 26 Intelligence must be measured to be valued, so
let us take the initiative and ask our manage-
These limitations notwithstanding, Treverton ment, [and] the users, to evaluate us and our
suggests that policymakers can and should estab- products. Jan P. Herring
lish a symbiotic relationship with the intelligence
analysts who advise them: A successful intelligence analyst will have
certain personal characteristics that tend to foster
"[If] you call them in, face to face, they will dedication to the work and quality of results.
understand how much you know, and you11 Such an analyst will also have specific abilities,
have a chance to calibrate them. You'll learn skills, and knowledge to perform intelligence
more in fifteen minutes than you'd have imag- work. Finally, such an analyst will have produc-
ined. And you11 also begin to target those ana- tive relationships with customers. But how can
lysts to your concerns and your sense of the success in intelligence analysis be measured?
. ,,27

Many past measures of success have been

Similarly, the analyst has responsibilities to based on job performance, including numbers
the policymaker. In commenting on this relation- of reports issued; volumes of raw material
ship, Sherman Kent asserts processed; or degree of customer reliance on, or
satisfaction with, products or services. However,
[intelligence] performs a service function. Its these are measurements of outcome, not neces-
job is to see that the doers are generally well sarily success. When analysis follows a rigorous
informed; its job is to stand behind them with process that results in timely, actionable informa-
a book opened at the right page to call their tion used by customers, then it may be judged
attention to the stubborn fact they may be successful. Thus, an assessment of success may
neglecting, and-at their request-to analyze be made by placing along a scale two basic crite-
alternative courses without indicating choice. ria - intelligence process (doing true analysis)
and intelligence product (meeting customer
In Kent's view, the intelligence analyst is needs). As shown in figure 2, each keeps the other
required to ensure 'tenaciously that policymakers in balance, curbing the tendency toward "analysis

Intelligence Process Intelligence Product

Rigorous Analysis Conveys Intelligence
Sound Management Meets Customer's Needs

Fig. 2. An intelligence evaluation continuum

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

paralysis" and countering an assembly line These risks are carefully calculated, for successful
mentality. analysts rely on critical thinking. Nor do success-
ful analysts settle for the first answer their analy-
Intelligence Process sis reveals. Rather they employ rigorous methods
to push beyond the obvious conclusions.
Successful intelligence analysis is a holistic However, tendencies towards arrogance in trend-
process involving both "art" and "science." spotting analysis are tempered by self-awareness
Intuitive characteristics, inherent aptitudes, rig- of biases and assumptions, strengths and weak-
orously applied skills, and acquired knowledge nesses. And most importantly, successful analysts
together enable analysts to work problems in a collaborate at every opportunity. Such partnering
multidimensional manner, thereby avoiding the ensures that analytic results, even if controver-
pitfalls of both scientism and adventurism. The sial, remain grounded in reality.
former occurs when scientific methodology is
excessively relied upon to reveal the "truth"; the What role does management play in ensuring
latter occurs when "inspiration [is] unsupported analytic success? First and foremost, manage-
by rigorous analysis."30 ment effectively uses financial and political capi-
tal to ensure that analysts have access to cus-
A vital contributor to the analytic process is a tomers, and the resources they require to answer
spirit of competition, both within an intelligence- those customers' intelligence needs. This includes
producing agency and especially between intelli- the organization of the work itself, allocation of
gence agencies. There is a tendency for analysts materiel and personnel, and coordination with
working together to develop a common mindset. other producers and with customers. When man-
This trap occurs typically when analysts fail to agement is successful, the analyst has the neces-
question their assumptions about their role in the sary tools and the correct information for suc-
intelligence process and about the target. The cessful intelligence analysis. A good indicator that
Council on Foreign Relations independent task the intelligence process has been effectively man-
force on the future of U.S. intelligence recom- aged is high morale among analytic personnel.
mends that "competitive or redundant analysis be This includes a high level of satisfaction with mis-
encouraged" precisely for these reasons. 31 sion and the analysts' own performance, a feeling
of empowerment and the belief that the organiza-
Successful analysis adds value - to the infor- tion places great value on analytic talent.
mation itself, to institutional knowledge, to fellow
intelligence professionals, to the process, and to Intelligence Product
the institution or unit itself, in terms of reputa-
tion and the degree to which good analytic prac- The products of successful analysis convey
tices endure despite changes in target, customer, intelligence that meets or anticipates the cus-
and personnel. Estimative intelligence is but one tomer's needs; these products reveal analytic con-
way that this may be accomplished. The judg- clusions, not the methods used to derive them.
ments in such assessments provide the consumer Intelligence products are successful if they arm
with actionable, useful intelligence, enabling the decision maker, policymaker or military
them to make policy and strategy. leader with the information and context - the
answers - needed to win on his or her playing
Successful analysts are those whose work goes field. Such intelligence enables customers to be
to this highest level whenever possible - by taking more effective by making them smarter than they
risks these analysts go beyond mere description were before, smarter than the people they play
and explanation to make judgments, to estimate. with, and smarter than those they play against.

UNCLASSIFIED - Cryptologic Quarterly

Successful intelligence enables customers to out- judgments, usable formats, and relevant prod-
wit opponents, protect U.S. persons, bring aid to ucts.35
the nation's allies, or to judge levels of trust. It
does so by revealing decision points, actions or (U) Once production readiness and timeliness
choices available to customer, and the implica- are evaluated, the other four of Brei's fundamen-
tions of choosing one over another. tal principles then can be arranged in a checklist
or a series of questions about intelligence prod-
(U) Yet customers rarely explicitly acknowl- ucts. Typical questions might include these:
edge the role that good intelligence plays in their
own success. While they may be quick to bring • Was the reported intelligence accurate? (accu-
intelligence failures to the attention of the pro- racy)
ducing organization, customers do not always
give feedback on successful outcomes enabled by • Are there any distortions in the reported judg-
intelligence. Thus intelligence analysts and their ments? (objectivity)
management historically have looked within the
production organization for ways to measure • Is the reported intelligence actionable? Does it
success, falling into the trap of "bean-counting." facilitate ready comprehension? (usability)
But there is a better way.
Fig. 3 Me<isures of success for intelligence prcx{ucts32
(U) Six "underlying ideas or core
values" for intelligence analysis, Readiness: Intelligence systems must be responsive to
identified by William Brei, and existing and intelligence requirements of customers at all
shown in figure 3, establish the ana- levels.
lyst's "essential work processes." 33
Since they are defined in terms of the Timeliness: Intelligence must be delivered while the con-
customer, they also can be used as a tent is still actionable under the customer's circumstances.
checklist to rate the quality of prod-
ucts provided to the customer. Brei Accuracy: All sources and data must be evaluated for the
asserts that they "provide specific possibility of technical error, misperception, and hostile
qualitative objectives for managers efforts to mislead.
and leaders, and a framework for
standards against which intelligence Objectivity: All judgments must be evaluated for the pos-
services should be judged. "34 While sibility of deliberate distortions and manipulations due to
qualitative feedback from customers self-interest.
aids evaluation of some of these
objectives, the absence of customer Usability: All intelligence communications must be in a
input does not prevent their being form that facilitates ready comprehension and immediate
used in self-evaluation. application. Intelligence products must be compatible with
the customer's capabilities for receiving, manipulating, pro-
(U) The principles of readiness tecting, and storing the product.
and timeliness evaluate the intelli-
gence service's basic ability to per- Relevance: Information must be selected and organized
form intelligence production. These for its applicability to a consumer's requirements, with
two principles are limiting factors potential consequences and significance of the information
affecting what the producer can do to made explicit to the customer's circumstances.
"achieve accurate data, objective

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

•Does it support the customer's mission? Is it of that intelligence to the customer. Coupled with
applicable to the customer's requirements? Has an assessment of the intelligence production
its significance been made explicit? (relevance) process, including analytic methods and manage-
ment, a comprehensive evaluation of successful
These four principles also overlap, and poor intelligence analysis is possible. This success
quality in one can affect the quality of another. depends on the talents and skills of intelligence
Brei asserts personnel who perform analysis and production.
Thus personnel, process, and products together
accurate data provide the foundation for subse- define the art and science of intelligence analysis.
quent objective judgments, and the expression Core competencies for performing intelligence
of objective judgments in a usable form pro- work are discussed in detail in the following sec-
vides much of the basis of a relevant product. tions. These criteria are summarized in figure 4,
Thus, unverified data can not only cost an for analysts and managers to use in self-evalua-
intelligence product its Accuracy, but also tion and career development and planning.
damage its Relevance to the customer.
Therefore, the evaluation of an intelligence SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE
product needs to include not only qualitative ANALYSTS
value (or lack thereof) but also quantitative value
(e.g., low to high). A sophisticated intelligence analyst is one who
is steeped in the history and culture of a region,
While Brei's principles do not require cus- has lifelong interest in the area, and approach-
tomer input in the evaluation of intelligence, the es the study of the region as a professional
process of measuring the effectiveness of a prod- responsibility, and probably as an avocation as
uct is enhanced with customer participation. Brei well. Ronald D. Garst and Max L. Gross
considers determining what customers value to
be simple. "[L]isten to their complaints," is his Who are the most successful intelligence ana-
prescription. 37 However, this is too simple and lysts? What makes them successful? In exploring
does not guarantee that the responses will the functional core competencies for successful
address the product of interest. Rather, the ana- intelligence analysis, we observe there are charac-
lyst needs to ask directly for specific feedback teristics which, while not necessary for successful
from the customer. This is most effective if the intelligence analysis per se, do seem to be associ-
analyst (and his or her management) has a col- ated with analysts considered to be the most suc-
laborative relationship with the customer. cessful at their trade (according to the preceding
Lacking this relatiortship, intelligence assess- criteria for successful intelligence analysis).
ments and other products can include qualitative It should be noted, however, that not all success-
evaluations enabling customers to respond to ful analysts exhibit all these characteristics. The
producing organizations. Admittedly this is of characteristics we list in figure 5 are a representa-
limited value as customers are more likely to tive superset, and while individual analysts do
respond when they are unhappy with the product. seem to share certain characteristics, they do not
Further, regardless of the assessment of worth or share all of them in equal measure.
value, some customers will never respond.
First among the characteristics is that the
Nevertheless, Brei's principles do provide a most successful intelligence analysts are highly
means for evaluating a given intelligence product self-motivated and insatiably curious. They want
based on the intelligence it conveys and the value to know everything they can about the objects

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

Fig. 4. Intelligence <1n<1lysis <1ssessrnent tool

Intelligence Analysts Intelligence Process Intelligence Products

Curious Communicating Holistic Analytic Conclusions

Teaming and
Self· Motivated Competitive Decision Points

Fascinated with
Thinking Adds Value Implications of Choices

Exhibits A-ha
Highest Level Possible

Observant Critical Thinking Collaborative Readiness

Reads Literacy Timeliness

Fruitfully Obsessed Computer Literacy Customer Relations Accuracy

Takes Variable
Expression Community Relations Objectivity

Makes Creative
Foreign Language Resource Allocation Usability

Playful Research Organization of Work Relevance

Exhibits a Sense of Information Gathering

Empowering Analysts
Humor and Manipulation

Exhibits a Sense of Project/Process

Valuing Analysts
Wonder Management


Target Knowledge

Intelligence Community

Government Plans and



Analytic Resources


r. Cryptologic Quarterly .UNCl,.ASSIFIEO



under th ir crutin. . Readi11•• ond

voraci usly, l!1 )ferret out ev IT possibl pi
inf; m1ation ontho. e bj t . fa ny den\ nstmt
a ense ot'\.\ ab ut what th . ch co,:_ 1·. \ _
. :.~
new pieces of rmation aw discove.i , n ,1 l '.·
cormect:ion b p;,r en the new and older infor ma-
tion occur as a re ult of intens one niration.
These pipharuus moment.· re ft n. luu'act r-
ized as instauc.e of ·· ha!'" thinking. The most
sue sful anal , ts t nd to enjo_. their wurk - ·
"It s pla r\. t '" rk may be how they d ~ crib
what they d . fndecd they often will , tay late in
the day to complete a Line of reasoning or a por-
tion of an analyti: proje ·t.

On their own time rnan anal ts xhibit a

fascination .,\. th puzzle . Breaks from work may
includ the soluti n of a crossword puzzle r im-
.· . ilar exercr e.En ouragement of Sil h a tivities by
supe1~ors is a good thing. The olntion of puz-
zles and similar pastimes builds cognith con-
nections that may be of us against · ub equ~nt :
work7related problems. ·

•• J'.

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

6TUTI.E REQ . REl'> l,OR

lNTEL: IG c; CE. . ALY rs ..... ,

nu' 1"1.m1po.·t nt im~U4', n, • ;1nnhm mu:.i ha\~ n
1111i.q11,• l'l>mbm.1tfon of Wit .ru;.., oil) R lllald n. nnd i\ht~ l. Gm..;s

... .. bilitie:-; c1ri:-;c fro1n ;1pti ln le$ t11a1 h::lve dcv(~ l ­

ipt•d fr 11111 innat '. n:11\11:.. l ell:' p t •ris ties r
.t l •1H$. Altho ugh npt ituclt s nn · brgely d ter-
n 'li' bi:I\.' '• 1: llll :l. th .

011 um111ico tl 119

T he:;
. \I rno I • II <1t1i1Hatl' but
' '

' . ,
ne • :>:<:z1n·
. . a n;ilysis:

"Fig. 6. btlrtr requ!ral ~ t .sua:;os 1l intelll encc analysts ,.,


Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

• Aural: The ability to hear, listen to, and ship with customers, peers, subordinates, and
understand spoken words and sentences is one of supervisors shapes the intelligence production
the essential means humans employ to take in process. Formalized means of enhancing all these
information. Aural ability can be improved abilities can lead intelligence professionals to
through specific techniques of "active listening." considerably greater effectiveness as analysts and
This ability greatly enhances analysts' perform- leaders of analysts. This is why the Director of
ance of certain technical tasks and their interac- Central Intelligence has indicated that collabora-
tion with customers, peers and managers. tion is a cornerstone of strategic intelligence. 44
Such a collaborative environment enables "quick-
• Graphic/Visual: The ability to see, view, er reaction to fast-moving trends, greater agility
and understand graphic/visual symbols devel- in the workplace, the opportunity to save infra-
oped early in human history. Along with the abil- structure costs, and enhanced ability to deliver
ity to interpret symbols came the ability to pres- tailored products and services." 45 A collaborative
ent information in a graphic or visual manner so environment also minimizes the likelihood of
that others could understand. Even when speak- intelligence failures. For example, had imagery
ing, most humans communicate nonverbally (i.e., analysts communicated with their counterpart
graphically or visually). 43 Developing this ability area analysts in 1999, the "Yugoslav War Office"
allows for effective graphical presentation of bombed by U.S. forces that spring would have
intelligence, which can dramatically heighten its been identified as the Chinese embassy in time to
impact. avoid the resultant tragedy. 46

• Oral: The ability to communicate via We identify four distinct teaming abilities to
spoken words and sentences so that others will show the complexity of the concept. Interestingly,
understand is unique to humans. While the many existing formal training programs foster
physical capability has evolved over eons, key leadership abilities only in the context of the
developmental milestones occur during the first management function.
years of life. Oral and aural abilities are closely
linked in their development. Effective oral com- •Influencing: This ability involves effective-
munication directly affects the intelligence ly, positively influencing superiors, peers, and
analyst's credibility. subordinates in intelligence work. Analysts often
need to persuade others that their methods and
Teaming and Collaboration conclusions are valid, and they often need to
leverage additional resources. The ability to influ-
Hum ans are a:. social species, and associated ence determines the level of success they will have
abilities have evolved with human development. in these areas.
Teaming and collaborating were essential when
proto-humans moved from the relative safety of • Leading: Those who are more senior,
the trees onto the more dangerous plains of more skilled, and more successful in intelligence
Africa. Their collective lives depended on social analysis have an obligation to lead, that is, to
abilities to solve problems and overcome threats. direct others and serve as role models. The abili-
While today's threats have changed, humans ty to lead involves working \"1:ith and through
retain these abilities in order to live and work others to produce desired business outcomes.
together. Thus, developing leadership abilities enhances
the field of intelligence analysis.
Teaming and collaboration abilities enhance
intelligence analysis, since the analyst's relation-

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

• Following: Almost every grouping of of rules to arrange data in a meaningful order. In

humans has a leader. Everyone else is a follower. the context of intelligence analysis, this ability
Analysts must enhance their abilities to work allows people, often with the assistance of tech-
within a team, taking direction, and acting on it, nology, to arrange information in ways that per-
to ensure that the team produces the intelligence mit analysis, synthesis, and extraction of mean-
the customer requires. ing. The arrangement of information according to
certain learned rules leads the analyst to make
• Synergizing: Drawing on the other three conclusions and disseminate them as intelli-
teaming abilities, players in the intelligence gence. A danger arises, however, in that such
process cooperate to achieve a common goal, the ordering is inherently limiting - the analyst may
value of which is greater than they could achieve not look for alternative explanations because the
when working alone. This ability needs to be known rules lead to a ready conclusion.
encouraged and developed further to enable
cooperative behaviors within NSA and with its • Pattern Recognition: Humans detect
partners. The synergy of cooperation offers one patterns and impose patterns on apparently ran-
way of coping with the new transnational threats dom entities and events in order to understand
of the 21st century. them, often doing this without being aware of it.
Stellar constellations are examples of imposed
Thinking patterns, while criminal behavior analysis is an
example of pattern detection. Intelligence ana-
As our species designation - sapiens - sug- lysts impose or detect patterns to identify what
gests, the defining attribute of human beings is targets are doing, and to thereby extrapolate what
an unparalleled cognitive ability. We think they will do in the future. Patterns let analysts
differently from all other creatures on earth, separate "the important from the less important,
and we can share those thoughts with one even the trivial, and to conceptualize a degree of
another in ways that no other species even order out of apparent chaos." 50 However, impos-
approaches. ing or seeking patterns can introduce bias.
Analysts may impose culturally defined patterns
Intelligence analysis is primarily a thinking on random aggregates rather than recognize
process; it depends upon cognitive functions that inherent patterns, thereby misinterpreting the
evolved in humans long before the appearance of phenomena in question.
language. 48 The personal characteristics of intel-
ligence analysts are manifested behaviors that • Reasoning: The ability to reason is what
reflect thinking and/or the inherent drive to permits humans to process information and for-
think. Thinking also 'governs the processes our mulate explanations, to assign meaning to
nation's adversaries, competitors, and allies observed phenomena. It is by reasoning that ana-
engage in as they pursue their own interests. Our lysts transform information into intelligence, in
survival may depend on having better developed these three ways:
thinking abilities they do. Three basic thinking
abilities are required for intelligence analysis. 1. Induction: Inductive reasoning combines
Given the limitations posed by each one of them, separate pieces of information, or specific
simultaneous application of all three is recom- answers to problems, to form general rules or
mended for successful intelligence analysis. 49 conclusions. For example, using induction, a
child learns to associate the color red with heat
• Information Ordering: This ability and heat with pain, and then to generalize these
involves following previously defined rules or sets

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

associations to new situations. 51 rugorous induc- questions and find defensible answers), dis-
tion depends upon demonstrating the validity of cuss (to appreciate opposing '~ews and subject
causal relationships between observed phenome- their 0\\11 to 1igorous debate), and write (to
na, not merely associating them with each other. structure argnments and articulate them clear-
ly and coherently). Gregory D. Foster
2. Deduction: Deductive reasoning applies
general rules to specific problems to arrive at con- Whereas aptitudes and related abilities stem
clusions. Analysts begin with a set of rules and from an analyst's genetic makeup, a skill repre-
use them as a basis for interpreting information. sents learned expertise or proficiency based on a
For example, an analyst researching the nuclear particular ability or set of abilities. At least eight
weapons program of a country might notice that types of skills, shown in figure 7, are required for
a characteristic series of events preceded the last successful intelligence analysis.
nuclear weapons test. Upon seeing evidence that
those same events are occurring again, the ana- Critical Thinking
lyst might deduce that a second nuclear test is
imminent. 52 However, this conclusion would be There is a clear need to educate and train intel-
made cautiously, since deduction works best in ligence analysts to use their minds ... [Only] by
closed systems such as mathematics, making it of raisin?, their ;1wareness can the intelligence unit
limited use in forecasting human behavior. be assured that the a11;1lysts will avoid the traps
in being sbve to conformist thought, precedent
3. Abduction: Abductive reasoning and imposed cultural values - all enemies of
describes the thought process that accompanies objective analysis. 54
"insight" or intuition. When the information does
not match that expected, the analyst asks "why?", It is by thinking that analysts transform infor-
thereby generating novel hypotheses to explain mation into intelligence. Critical thinking is the
given evidence that does not readily suggest a cognitive skill applied to make that transforma-
familiar explanation. For example, given two tion. Critical thinking can be defined as
shipping manifests, one showing oranges and
lemons being shipped from Venezuela to Florida, !An] intellectually disciplined process of active-
and the other showing carnations being shipped ly and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, ana-
from Delaware to Colombia, abductive reasoning lyzing, synthesizing, and/or ev<lluating ... infor-
is what enables the analyst to take an analytic leap mation gnthcred from, or generated by, obser-
and ask, "Why is citrus fruit being sent to the vation, experience. reflection , reasoning, or
worldwide capital of citrus farming, while carna- communication, as a guide to belief and
tions are being sent to the world's primary action .... Thinking about [our] thinking while
exporter of that product? What is really going on lwe'rel thinkin?, in order to make lour] think-
here?" ing better.

SKILLS REQUIRED FOR An ordered thinking process involves careful

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS judgments or judicious evaluations leading to
defensible conclusions that provide an audit trail.
Any institution that relies on professionals for When the results of analysis are controversial,
success and seeks to maintain an authentic subject to alternate interpretations, or possibly
learning climate for individual growth must wrong, this audit trail can prove essential in
require its members to read (to gain knowledge defending the process used to reach the conclu-
and insight), research (to learn how to ask good sions.

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

Fig. 7. Skills required for successful intelligence analysis


Cora Competencies
for Intelligence


Effective critical thinking also includes rou- truth: detected intruders previously believed to
tine, systematic questioning of the premises upon be submarines were in fact minks swimming in
which decisions are based. Without critical think- the waters off the Swedish coast. Blinded by the
ing, current beliefs and methods are not ques- premise that the Soviets wanted to make war
tioned, as long as they appear to produce results against Sweden, the navy had ignored this possi-
that can be reasonably explained. Yet they ble explanation for their failure to destroy
can prevent analysts from making alternative "enemy" submarines, despite the fact that the
interpretations. Writing rhetorically, Gregory alternative premise had been suggested as early
Treverton asks, "If intelligence doesn't challenge as 1987. 57 An obvious conclusion from this story
prevailing mindsets, what good is it?" 56 is that corporate mechanisms for questioning
anal)1ic premises could have resolved this intelli-
Intelligence failure can be the result when gence failure nearly a decade earlier. The lesson
alternative premises are ignored, as happened for present-day intelligence analysts is clear: cor-
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s in Sweden. porate processes for intelligence analysis must
During that time, the Swedish Navy expended allow for, and indeed, institutionalize, the ques-
considerable effort and ordnance attempting to tioning of premises.
"destroy" intruding Soviet submarines. Swedish
naval analysts (and others) repeatedly acknowl- /,iteracy
edged failure, rationalizing it as a "David versus
Goliath" contest: Sweden's tiny navy was no Intelligence analysis requires the reading and
match for the technologically advanced Soviet comprehension of \Vritten sentences and para-
submarine fleet. It was not until 1995 that graphs, often in multiple languages, at many
Swedish defense chief Owe Wiktorin revealed the points in the intelligence process. Prospective

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

intelligence analysts must be literate in order to briefings may be inadequate means for informing
perform their work at the most basic level, mak- officials, regardless of their content. Warnings
ing this skill a prerequisite for employment. go "unheard because the officials [find] the hour-
Literacy skills are crucial for understanding the long briefings to be an inefficient use of their time
target, the customer and the intelligence process. and [stop] attending."59 Similarly, they conclude
Literacy is also necessary for conducting that inadequate intelligence reporting of unrest in
research. Iran in 1978 contributed to the U.S. intelligence
community's failure to predict the fall of the
Computer Literacy Shah. 60 These examples also make it clear that
whichever method of informing policymakers is
It is a given that in the 21st century, the com- selected, the resultant products must be concise,
puter is an essential tool for intelligence analysis. tailored ones that masterfully present the intelli-
Today, analysts must be highly skilled in the use gence to the intended customer or in the cus-
of computers themselves and in the use of soft- tomer's frame of reference.
ware that will aid analysis. Word processing,
spreadsheet, and presentation programs, as well • Speaking and Presentation: Intell-
as specific programs that assist at all stages of the igence analysts are often expected to present the
analytic process, are the essential tools that can results of their analysis orally to peers, manage-
bolster success. However, tools themselves do not ment, and both internal and external customers.
provide "truth" (if such can be said to exist in the Well-developed speaking and presentation skills
intelligence analysis context). Rather, these tools are essential if the information is to be communi-
for manipulation, correlation, and presentation cated in an effective manner. The organization of
of information are a means to an end: the pro- a presentation, the manner of delivery, and
duction of intelligence. The analyst's skillful use accompanying graphics all contribute to the ulti-
of them hastens that end. mate effectiveness of the presentation in convey-
ing the intelligence.
The fact that analysts are faced with massive
volumes of data also makes use of selection and A number of computer-based tools exist to aid the
filtering tools essential. The analyst depends on creation of presentation graphics, and skillful use
these tools to make a "first cut" on the collected of these tools can enhance the presentation.
infonnation. The tools are used to filter nonrele- Furthermore, sound graphic design skills can
vant information items and retain only those assist the analyst in determining both what to
items that are pertinent to the issue being ana- portray graphically and what to convey via the
lyzed. spoken word.

Expression • Storytelling: While well-honed speaking

and presentation skills allow effective intelligence
"The capable analyst must be competent and dissemination, well-developed storytelling skills
experienced in presenting analysis both orally ensure that intelligence is convincingly conveyed.
and in writing."58 The results of analysis are use- Storytelling involves more than just creating the
less if they are poorly presented. Effective oral story. Its power lies in the way the story is told. In
and written skills are therefore essential for the the words of transformational storytelling expert
intelligence analyst. Indeed, failures of intelli- Stephen Denning, "[the] look of the eye, the into-
gence can occur when the results of analysis are nation of the voice, the way the body is held, the
inadequately presented. For example, Berkowitz import of a subtle pause, and [the storyteller's]
and Goodman note that lengthy daily or weekly own response to the audience's responses - all

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

these aspects make an immense contribution to of their analysis. Without such proficiency, they
the meaning of the story for [the] audience." 61 cannot completely comprehend target intentions
Too often the customer does not understand a and actions. When analysts misunderstand their
poorly told but important story buried in a targets, the intelligence they provide to customers
sophisticated presentation, making storytelling \vill thus be inaccurate or misleading.
an essential skill for intelligence professionals.
Once upon a time, many intelligence analysts
Storytelling is not about fiction; it is not about could rely upon the skills of professional linguists
"once upon a time." Rather, intelligence story- for translation of target information. In the cur-
telling involves creating scenarios and alternative rent intelligence community, however, this luxu-
futures for customers. Intelligence assessments ry has been reduced by over a decade of signifi-
that provide a variety of possible outcomes, cant budget and personnel cuts, rendering dedi-
recounted in considerable detail, can give the cus- cated language support unavailable to all but
tomer clues to the most effective policies or a few intelligence analysts working the largest,
strategies. An example of varying analytic out- best-funded intelligence problems. 64 Foreign lan-
comes expressed as scenarios can be found in the guage proficiency has thus become a necessity for
National Intelligence Council's Global Trends all who perform intelligence analysis.
2015. Four alternative futures for the next fifteen
years are outlined in addition to the principal sce- If budget and personnel cuts are insufficient
nario. These alternatives suggest a variety of pos- reason for seeking foreign language proficiency,
sible outcomes based on population trends, changes in intelligence targets provide additional
resource availability, technological advances, eco- arguments for its necessity. While targets of inter-
nomic conditions, ethnic identity and gover- est traditionally used their native language(s) for
nance, and local and regional conflicts. The sig- internal communications, many employed non-
nificance for the policy maker is that the future is native languages such as English for internation-
fluid. 62 While all the alternatives are possible, al communications and publications. This was
certain political and strategic decisions by the especially true of the first decade of the popular
United States could influence which outcome is use of the Internet, when English was the lingua
most likely to occur. Being prepared for various franca of that medium. However, this is chang-
outcomes enables the United States to be proac- ing. The use of native languages in international
tive and to respond appropriately as events communications is gro\ving both on and off the
unfold. Internet. Thus, proficiency in non-English lan-
guages is necessary for analysis of information,
• Writing: The basic vehicle by which intelli- approximately 80 percent of which "is not secret,
gence historically has beeh purveyed is the writ- is not online, is not in English, is not government
ten report. At the beginning of the 21st century associated, but is in the private sector, and is not
this remains the case. Yet many contemporary available locally to the analyst."65
intelligence analysts lack this basic skill, and
improvement "of writing skills, basic though they Furthermore, foreign language proficiency
may be, is often required as part of becoming a provides more than just a translation of non-
competent intelligence analyst. "63 English materials. The structure of a target's lan-
guage and that target's culture are closely related.
Foreign Language Proficiency One well-known theory of this relationship, by
Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, posits that
To be truly successful, analysts must be profi- "language is a force in its own right and it affects
cient in the language(s) employed by the subjects how individuals in a society conceive and perceive

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

reality." 66 Thus concepts essential to understand- Qingbaoyuan ji Houqu Jishu. 68 Context must
ing the target are communicated by more than determine the translation, and an analyst lacking
just the words used to express them. foreign language skills must trust the linguist to
correctly understand that context. The expertise
For example, the German terms required for that understanding might render the
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft both translate linguist a better intelligence analyst than the orig-
into English as "community." Yet this translation inal analyst. This begs the question: "Is such
ignores the interpersonal nature of the relation- duplication of personnel affordable?"
ship among the members of the first type of com-
munity, and the business context of the second. We recognize that certain forms of technical
An analyst relying on translation by another analysis have previously not required foreign lan-
might not be aware of the nature of the "commu- guage proficiency. We suggest, however, that it is
nity" in the material being analyzed. not truly known, nor can we know, whether for-
eign language proficiency would have enhanced
In Somali there are i'..vo pronouns for the that analysis. Some technical metadata analysis
English "we." A speaker of Somali uses the pro- clearly does not require language proficiency.
noun annagu when referring to the speaker and However, analysis of other types of metadata may
someone other than the person being addressed. indeed require foreign language proficiency, and
Conversely, the use of the pronoun innagu we caution against dismissing out of hand the
includes the person being addressed. So if some- need for it. Furthermore, staffing cuts require
one says in English, "We are going to the movie," that analysts review both data and metadata.
the question of "Who is 'we'?" must be asked. In Even if the metadata do not require foreign lan-
Somali there is no doubt: If annagu are going to guage competency, the underlying data do
the movies, the person being addressed is not require it. In addition, essential technical mean-
going; if innagu are going to the movies, then the ing is lost in the translation behveen linguist and
person being addressed is going. Again, an ana- technical analyst; technical analysts often need
lyst depending on a translation into English must that original source and its context. This can be
rely on the translator to convey that contextual gained only from proficiency in the original lan-
information. This inclusion or exclusion from a guage. Wtimately, foreign language proficiency
group can be quite significant. There is a consid- enables the analyst to engage in a holistic, com-
erable difference between "annagu are going to prehensive analytic process. 69
blow up the embassy," and "innagu are going to
blow up the embassy." This distinction is espe- We do recommend that the depth at which
cialJy significant to· the intelligence analyst in this the analyst must work a target determines the
case, even if the implications for the embassy degree of required foreign language proficiency.
remain the same. If analysts work a great many targets at a superfi-
cial level, they need only have a casual acquain-
Even the distinction between intelligence and tance with their language(s). Similarly, when ana-
information is language-derived. The Sinitic term lysts are assigned to an ad hoc crisis cell working
qingbao refers to a concept that can be under- a specific target for a finite period, they may also
stood either as "information" or "intelligence. "67 need only superficial language skills. In this latter
This distinction is a "Western one not shared case, if the crisis is of sufficient importance, dedi-
by East Asian languages or presumably their cated language assets will be assigned to compen-
speakers," according to the Foreign Broadcast sate for their ignorance. However, should the cri-
Information Service editor of the Chinese intelli- sis become long-term, it is reasonable to expect
gence collection manual, Guofang Keji them to acquire more than a passing skill in the

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

target's language(s). value in answering the customer's requirement.

The analyst determines what information is rele-
Research vant.

Research skills provide discipline and consis- • Monitoring: Once sources of information
tency for the creation of value-added intelligence. have been selected and an appropriate collection
By providing methodologies for defining the plan put in place, incoming information must be
requirement to be answered, as well as method- periodically reviewed to ensure that it sti11 pro-
ologies for answering that query, research skills vides material pertinent to the customer's
ensure analytic consistency and enable thorough requirement. The reliability of the sources and
exploration of the issues. Necessary research the validity of the information are questioned.
skills include methods of problem definition that Monitoring skills focus on that review, and often
ensure that, in collaboration with the customer, may involve analysis of descriptors and sum-
analysts correctly define or redefine the problem maries of these data. Specific skills such as the
in terms of a "research question," so as to under- use of automatically generated statistics may
stand the customer's and the analyst's own objec- assist at this point. Additionally, review of sched-
tives.70 Research strategies, when based on the uled incoming data reveals information on the
issue to be answered, help identify required status of a target. A sudden increase of pertinent
sources of information, the means of information information on a target from one source, or a
collection, and the means of analyzing and syn- decrease in the number of sources of information
thesizing the data. pertinent to a certain target, may presage a status
change in that target; analysts will want to under-
Information Gathering and Manipulation stand why that change occurred.

Information is the grist for intelligence analy- •Organizing: Skillful arrangement, format-
sis, and to be successful, analysts must aggres- ting, and maintenance of data for analysis and
sively seek it out. Then, skillful manipulation of technical report generation ensure access to the
information at all stages of the intelligence necessary materials in a usable format. When
process helps ensure accurate results that organization is neglected, intelligence failures can
meet the customer's intelligence requirements. result from lack of ready access to preselected
Unskilled manipulation can result in ambiguous essential information for making informed, accu-
management of the process and results, provid- rate judgments.
ing the customer with incorrect or ambiguous
intelligence. • Analysis/Synthesis: Information manip-
ulation skills required at this point in the process
Different information/data manipulation enable intelligence personnel to dissect individ-
skills are required for the various stages of the ual items of information (analyze) as well as com-
intelligence process. bine individual items (synthesize) in order to dis-
cover patterns, relationships, anomalies and
• Collection: This stage involves researching trends.
and gathering information from all available
sources. The intelligence analyst directs the col- • Interpretation: This is the stage in the
lection process, causing specific resources to be process where information is transformed into
tasked. Related information manipulation skills intelligence via cognitive manipulation, that is,
include selecting and filtering in order to assess assigning meaning to analyzed and synthesized
whether the information and its sources are of information using critical thinking. Leonard Fuld


I - - - - - - -
Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

Associates recently reiterated that this is a mentation, monitoring, and negotiating skills. 73 A
uniquely human process. Reviewing the twelve project/process plan defines and clarifies what
major commercial "analytic" systems tools, the needs to be accomplished; identifies necessary
Fuld study concludes "true analysis v.rill remain a resources; creates a timeline, including mile-
people function, assisted by computer technolo- stones; and makes the analyst accountable for
gy. ,,71 successful completion. There are several compo-
nents of project/process management skills:
• Dissemination: Intelligence is of no value
until it is skillfully disseminated to the appropri- • Planning: Project/process planning skills
ate recipients. Information preparation and pres- define the means by which the intelligence
entation skills manipulate the results of analysis required to meet the customer's information need
into formats required by specific customers. will be captured and interpreted. Effective plan-
ning skills ensure that adequate time and funding
• Coordination: Coordination is the are allocated for the project or process, sufficient
process of sharing both information and analytic materiel is obtained, and appropriate personnel
conclusions with other analysts within and are assigned to ensure successful completion.
among intelligence production organizations, They also include the development of challenging
before and during the production process. It is a but achievable goals, development of contingency
vital part of analysis that helps foster teaming and plans and identification of their "triggers," and
critical thinking. the identification of critical milestones and viable
alternatives to potential risks.
• Evaluation: Once the customer has been
provided with intelligence resulting from analy- • Implementation: Implementation skills
sis, a review of the applicability of that intelli- ensure the successful execution and timely com-
gence to the customer's issues must be made. pletion of project and process plans. They also
Internal and intracommunity evaluation allows ensure that resources are effectively utilized to
the intelligence to be discussed and placed in answer the customer's requirement.
larger contexts than that viewed by a single
agency. Such collaboration may also identify the • Monitoring: Project/process monitoring
additional intelligence required to clarify issues. skills include the continuous review of executed
Evaluation should be a continuous part of the plans with proper identification of progress gaps
production process. 72 and the implementation of appropriate solutions.
They help keep the analyst focused on specific
Project/Process Management aspects of the work.

Few analysts enjoy the luxury of working full • Negotiating: Analysts often have more
time on only one problem or on one aspect of a projects than they can be reasonably expected to
particular problem. Project/process management complete. Specific processes may require reallo-
skills provide the means of organizing work to cation of resources. To cope with this, analysts
effectively satisfy requirements in a timely man- must be skilled in interacting with internal and
ner. Effective use of these skills enhances the ana- external customers to maximize efficiency, meet
lyst's ability to work multiple intelligence issues deadlines, and contain costs.
in a focused, disciplined manner. We distinguish
between projects and processes. The former tend
to have finite scope and goals whereas the latter
are open-ended. Both require planning, imple-

UNCLASSIF-IED Cryptologic Quarterly

0\ -o fozz · stu ff thnt H " tll'(llllld Lh d~e - nt '>.1 .

l r.r ·LUGE ·· 6:-ickg1uuu~I. histo~·. c mm n ktiO~fl ' gc, soi.:ia!
1'S ur ·es ...- Y l, t d t1 s
is periltius. for the
\\'ith ul ,, st)liti knn11 h~ I "" n1 •mini-: th' pre,1Yide b~ hw c ._._· nd pt>~µective. Th : !for
l'l.c')!lOn ··r 1'-"UI.' lO " hil'lt lht• •ltt.lh ~I ,, :t'''itm l. lw~adt h f\·i~ion nm\ ultimatel · illow an, lj:t, t
th' io lh 1<111,11 "m 111'1 •wn l.n•\\ "h.11 qU•''· f th<' i11fom1a ti m under -1udy. I y
ti m~ ln a~i... r!Mt 1~. th ; p«r- m "ill n l m.!ll~
t 'q11,1hht'1l 111 l 'ralh I :rn ·.m.11 . l '.- ' R1 nnld
. :l~l.rnd l\ t ax I_ ' "'

f r, mili 11i l i .. nwan;-

r nntkrst, .l1rlin !-'.lli11 _ l thron,.th cxperi-
ncC' r ·study: it i!iclud : b th inpiri-n l. mat •rial
a·u d th at denv 'd · y i11feren "' r in tt•rpi et< tion.-3
Pe nding on th sp · ifir t:wg ·t. the kn wle l~
required ('< n \ ry willt>ly. ur 'S ntial :ubs t is 1 q uirem nt.
sh \\'Tl in figur .~ ·md discussed· low.

lnt Iii encc ;ma]) ·i" hi the inf is

oft n lik · ''.b in driv n by m
visi n:··bln the .. 111::st t \ tn)l~ .1<'·01f!plish.'tl Jre.1 .111111! '1 "ill h<\~t'
qu :t111ti :d" rq~io;h pr 'b.1bl\ " ill h.w~ Ii' xi th n.•

t ·uccessful tntelligence an-ll 1


-,· ----

UNCLASSlflEO Page 21

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

and will speak one or more languages of the of the nations and political systems they are
. . h 82
region. A first-rate analyst will know about the cl ea 1mg wit .
political systems, the biographies of pertinent
players, the economy, sociology, and trans- •Context of Language: The context oflan-
. an d te 1ecommu111cat1ons
portat10n . . systems. 78 guage is a part of culture, and while isolating it
makes an artificial distinction, we do so to reiter-
Gregory Treverton asserts that intelligence "is ate its importance for intelligence analysis. v\That
supposed to have the people who understand languages are utilized, by whom, and in what con-
Bonn and Delhi better than they do text, are essential in understanding the target's
Washington." 79 Without such understanding, culture. For example, much is revealed if mem-
intelligence and policy failures can occur. bers of an insurgent group communicate using
Treverton blames the failure of the U.S. intelli- primarily the language of the elite members of
gence community to predict India's 1998 nuclear their culture. Additionally, what the language
test partially on a lack of understanding by indicates about class and personal relationships
U.S. analysts of "true" Indian motivations. may provide clues to behaviors.
Questioning of premises coupled with greater
knowledge of the reasons why India would want • Economics: The economic structure and
to conduct a nuclear test should have led U.S. systems of a region or country affect its own
analysts to different conclusions. 80 behavior as well as its relations with other peo-
ples, countries, and regions. For instance, Islamic
We identify the following target knowledge law's treatment of usury generally is interpreted
areas as essential for thorough intelligence analy- as an outright prohibition on loaning money at
sis. interest because it is immoral to benefit from a
venture without sharing in the risk. Instead,
• Associated Culture: Culture can be Islamic banks advance funds in exchange for a
defined as the values, standards, and beliefs with- share of ownership, and the entrepreneur buys
in a grouping of people. Indeed, culture defines back that share over time. The values and the
that grouping of people. The study of culture approach are greatly at variance with banking
reveals the roles of individuals in the community, practice in other regions of the world, and pose a
and how they relate to nonmembers of the cul- formidable barrier to international banking,
ture. This provides insights into behaviors that thereby affecting commerce and trade.
are of value in predicting future behavior. This is
true when the target is a people or a nation as well • Geography: The natural features of a
as when the target is a specific subgroup or indi- region affect infrastructure, culture, worldview,
vidual member \\rithin a culture. Adda Bozeman, and history. Geography influences military oper-
writing in Politics and Culture in International ations; thus, an analyst working a military target
History, points out that because political systems needs to know how climate will affect military
are grounded in cultures, "present day interna- operations or what geographic features create
tional relations are therefore by definition also choke points. The analyst also needs to under-
intercultural relations. "81 She counsels: stand how geographic features affect natural
resource availability, thereby influencing interna-
[A]nalysts and policymakers in the West would tional relations. For example, Gannon et alia,
be more successful in their respective callings if writing in Global Trends 2015, identify water as
they would examine the cultural infrastructures a key global issue for at least the next fifteen
years. They indicate,"[ water] shortages occurring
in combination \vith other sources of tension -

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

such as in the Middle East - will be most worri- ry and its role in Serbian culture could have pro-
some" for the United States. 83 The inhabitants of vided policymakers with a context for Serbian
two Middle Eastern nations, Syria and Iraq, sig- and Albanian behavior in the 1990s in a region
nificantly depend on the Tigris and Euphrates where the "predominant cultural force is tradi-
Rivers for fresh water. Both rivers originate in, tion, which inevitably derives from history, poli-
and are dammed by, Turkey, whose government tics, and demographics, as well as religion." 89
has close military ties to Israel, their enemy. How
will these nations respond to a withholding of • Military: The military can be an integral
"their" water as the Turkish and Israeli govern- partner of a government; it can be the govern-
ments cooperate in opposition to Syrian and Iraqi ment itself, an external "king maker," or it may be
national interests? 84 NATO currently trains to a subordinate element unable to exert power or
fight a war in that region - could water issues be control over a government. Regardless, the role of
a cause of future military conflict? 85 the military and its history affect how a culture
views defensive and offensive military operations.
• Governmental Structure: How people A history of invasion by foreigners, as is the case
govern themselves provides insights into how in Russia, creates attitudes that insist on neutral
they will act, and how they interrelate with others. buffer states as neighbors. This in turn shapes
For instance, when strong autocratic govern- where, when, and how the military is deployed.
ments become weak, as happened in Russia when
the former Soviet Union collapsed, criminal • Technology: Technology itself can be the
elements will rise up and compete with the gov- subject of study by the intelligence analyst.
ernment for power. Weakly governed states Someone developing a target may analyze specif-
indeed are havens for criminal organizations that ic technologies and their infrastructure as they
represent the real "power behind the throne." pertain to that target. Further, the role of technol-
This certainly appears to be the case in the "nar- ogy within a region, nation, or people is an indi-
codemocraci es" of Mexico and Colombia. 86 cator of behavior. The domains of communica-
Additionally, there is evidence that rogue states tions, utilities, transportation, manufacturing,
restricted from trading internationally will wel- and others, as well as the attitudes of the people
come criminal organizations to operate from toward them, are rich sources of study.
within their country in exchange for embargoed Technology also can provide insights into sources
goods. Serbia and Iraq are two countries suspect- of information that will be available to the intelli-
ed of this activity. 87 Knowing this enhances analy- gence analyst.
sis of regions, nations, their leaders, and criminal
organizations. Intelligence Community

•History: History reveals how members of Understanding the missions and structures of
a society previously reacted and related to others, one's own agency as well as those of other agen-
revealing clues of present behavior, and elucidat- cies with similar missions reveals how intelli-
ing "the contemporary scene." 88 For example, the gence work fits into the strategic plans of the
history of the Orthodox Serbian defeat at Kosovo nation. Analysts can also develop contacts in the
Polje by the Muslim Turks in 1389 is still told intelligence community to share and acquire
today in Serbia. Within Serbia, the defeat remains information that augments their own work.
a very important national commemoration. It
affects Serb relations with the Turks' local
descendants, Muslim Kosovar Albanians.
Adequately disseminated knowledge of this histo-

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

Government Plans and Policy90 tion sources that provide the analyst with raw
materials. It is through the analysis, synthesis,
Analysts need to be aware of the plans and and interpretation of information, preferably in
policies of their own government. These may be collaborative, multiple-source combinations, and
classified and handled in separate channels from in response to customers' requirements, that ana-
those used to protect intelligence sources and lysts create intelligence. In so doing, the analyst
methods. Access to this nonintelligence informa- has two tasks: "Correctly assemble the pieces of
tion assists in the creation of accurate assess- the puzzle and, since all of the pieces of the puzzle
ments for policy-making officials by helping are never there, correctly guess what the picture
. ,,93
ensure that analysts understand customer intelli- lS.
gence requirements. Indeed, since intelligence is
an adjunct to policy, "intelligence priorities Determining what information must be ana-
should reflect policy priorities." 91 Conversely, a lyzed is a precursor to this analytic process.
lack of knowledge about government plans and Berkowitz and Goodman, writing in Strategic
policies prevents analysts from making accurate Intelligence for American National Security,
assessments. For example, if analysts lack knowl- identify "four different types of 'information'
edge about U.S. logistic planning, they might not [used by intelligence analysts] in preparing
recognize actions taken by foes to counter or dis- reports and estimates: known facts, secrets, disin-
rupt those resupply operations. 92 formation, and mysteries." 94 Known facts and
secrets must be placed in context or "revealed,"
Customers disinformation must be discounted, and cus-
tomers must be informed that mysteries cannot
The intelligence needs of the customer drive be answered. For this to occur, the types of infor-
the analytic process. Analysts must understand mation available and their validity, as well as the
their customers as both individuals and officials. sources of that information and their reliability,
They also must know what the customer wants to must be determined.
know and when and in what form the customer
wants it presented. Since customers often want to In addition, analysts need to know what spe-
know everything about a topic, analysts also need cific sources of information relevant to a particu-
to know what is not to be shared. Although lar inquiry are available for exploitation or part-
sources and methods generally are not shared lest nering. Knowing which expert sources and sub-
they be compromised, there may be other consid- ject matter experts can guide the analytic process,
erations that weigh in favor of sharing; analysts or can offer different or additional perspectives,
need to know what those are and when they enhances intelligence work. The reliability of
apply. these sources is also critical. When different
sources provide contradictory information, the
ANALYfIC RESOURCES reliability of one source versus another may pro-
vide insights into which information is accurate;
Broadly considered, intelligence is derived the sources may be open or secret, technical or
from five resources: intercepted signals, collected human.
imagery, human activity, measured emanations,
and open-source materials. Commonly known as Finally, others, known and unknown, may be
SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, MASINT and OSINT, examining similar information for the same or
none of these, despite the fact that they all share different customers. Awareness that sources of
an "INT" suffix, meaning "intelligence," really information, possibly vital information, exist,
represent intelligence. Rather they are informa- even though they remain undiscovered or

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

untapped, keeps the analyst constantly seeking gence .... This country could surely afford to spend
out new connections. more in those areas of analysis where being
wrong can have major adverse consequences." 98
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE Winning the talent war requires smart invest-
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ment in the hiring, training, and deployment of
WORKFORCE analysts.

Of all the personnel problems the intelligence The analyst's purpose is to create intelligence.
community will face in the coming years, the To do that requires appropriate abilities, skills,
most difficult to solve is likely to be maintaining knowledge and personal characteristics for rigor-
the base of talent the community requires to ous intelligence analysis and production. Well-
carry out its mission .... [Much] of the work of honed capabilities to communicate, cooperate,
the intelligence community is highly specialized and think, coupled with the skills that ensure
and requires exceptional creativity .... It is also technical competency provide the means for
safe to say that some of the most pressing ana- inteHigence work. Informed, deep knowledge of
lytic skills the community will require are pre- the issues and their background provides both
cisely those we cannot even foresee at this content and context for analysis. Analysts who are
time. 95 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. motivated to succeed, to know, and to share that
Goodman knowledge ensure that customers receive intelli-
gence of the highest possible caliber.
The above quotation from Strategic
Intelligence for American National Security The good news is that many NSA analysts do
returns us to our initial questions: "Do NSA ana- have what it takes to be successful. Their excel-
lysts have what it takes to be successful? What is lence is evident in the example they set on the job
a successful analyst? Indeed, what is analysis?" and in the quality of the intelligence they produce.
What Berkowitz and Goodman determined in The bad news is that they are not the majority of
1989 remains true in 2001. NSA remains signifi- the analytic workforce. And as has already been
cantly challenged to maintain and enhance an noted, many of the most skilled analysts will be
analytic talent base against numerous rapidly eligible to retire in the next several years, further
changing threats to national security. Further, reducing their number.
reduced hiring and rising rates of eligibility for
retirement mean that the analytic population will As a whole, the current analytic workforce
continue to dwindle at the lower end and retire lacks many of the core competencies necessary
from the upper end. 96 !oo small an analytic for successful intelligence analysis in the 21st cen-
workforce, lacking adequate mentoring and train- tury. Budget and staffing limitations deny NSA
ing from senior, expert analysts, will leave NSA the luxury of massive hiring or retraining efforts;
unable to meet the century's challenges. While the scope of what must be done exceeds available
NSA's technological capability remains widely resources. Further, while some experienced ana-
recognized, former director General Kenneth A. lysts do match the ideal described above, others
Minihan noted, "If we don't win the talent war, it are still operating within the outdated Cold War
doesn't matter if we invest in the infrastruc- paradigm. Such entrenched attitudes and meth-
ture. "97 According to the Council on Foreign ods can be difficult to change. On the other hand,
Relations' independent report on the future of many novice analysts do have the willingness and
intelligence, "less than a tenth of what the United potential to develop toward the ideal. But they
States spends on intelligence is devoted to analy- need mentors and teachers in the latest trade-
sis; it is the least expensive dimension of intelli- craft. There are not enough expert analysts to do

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

both the teaching and the performance of sophis- with two realistic scenarios requmng analytic
ticated intelligence production. judgments and conclusions. A significantly
greater number of the newly trained analysts
Therefore, NSA needs ways to enable intelli- derived the correct answers to the scenarios than
gence analysts now on the job to enhance their analysts in a control group that used purely sub-
professional skills. One approach to this problem jective methods. These findings demonstrate that
is to provide specialized training in analytic meth- while "exploiting a structured methodology can-
ods through the National Cryptologic School not guarantee a correct answer, using a struc-
(NCS). In order, however, to ensure that subse- tured methodology ensures that analysis is per-
quently produced intelligence is accurate and formed and not overlooked." 101
useful, such training must focus on rigorous ana-
lytic processes that minimize biases introduced Folker therefore recommends widespread
by the analyst, the customer, the sources of teaching of these methodologies during "both ini-
the information, or the information itself. tial and subsequent training." 102 However, train-
Collaborative training efforts such as those pro- ing is of little value unless it can be immediately
posed in the national Strategic Investment Plan applied. Thus NSA organizational structures, cul-
for Intelligence Community Analysis offer anoth- ture, and processes must be aligned to permit and
er way by which NSA analysts can acquire the to reward rigorous analysis. Unless NSA analysts
skills necessary for rigorous analysis. 99 employ what they learn immediately upon
returning to their workplaces, they will forget
One analytic method, "Analysis of Competing what they have learned. And unless these same
Hypotheses," developed by Central Intelligence analysts are recognized and appreciated for per-
Agency (CIA) analyst Richards Heuer, provides a forming sophisticated analysis, they will not
structured approach to rigorous intelligence embrace change. Significant recognition for high-
analysis. In Heuer's methodology, which is used level analysis will inspire others to follow, creat-
at the CIA, the analyst begins with a full set of ing a new culture that fosters and sustains excel-
alternative possibilities rather than the apparent lence in tailored intelligence production.
single most likely alternative. The most probable
hypothesis is found to be the one with the least Even if the entire analytic workforce adopts
evidence against it, not the one with the most evi- rigorous analytic techniques, NSA will still lack
dence for it. This contrasts with conventional sufficient resources to meet customer needs. It
analysis, which generally entails looking for evi- will still need to hire new analysts, either from
dence to confirm a favored hypothesis. Following outside the agency or from within. However,
the scientific method, Analysis of Competing these new employees must be highly qualified.
Hypotheses seeks to eliminate hypotheses, NSA cannot afford remedial training for prospec-
whereas conventional analysis seeks to prove tive new employees lacking the necessary abilities
them. 100 The end result is an actionable intelli- and skills for intelligence analysis. Similarly,
gence product that adds value to the customer's employees transferring into the analytic disci-
development and execution of policy or strategy. plines from other fields must have the prerequi-
site abilities and skills for analysis before joining
Robert Folker's recent experiments in Theater this discipline. The field of intelligence analysis is
Joint Intelligence Centers provide hard evidence not a catchall for employees transferring from
that such rigorous methods do foster analytic downsized career fields.
excellence. In four experiments, Folker provided
analysts with one hour of training in Analysis of Some prospective new hires do come to NSA
Competing Hypotheses, then presented them with an academic background in intelligence, and

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

many current employees pursue continuing NSA. These include a minimal prerequisite to
studies related to intelligence. Unfortunately, visit target countries as part of analytic orienta-
intelligence studies at the university level tend to tion, rewards for acquiring and maintaining for-
focus on intelligence and policy, not on tradecraft. eign language proficiency, encouragement to
Further, it is questionable whether the fledgling remain within substantive areas of expertise, and
field of intelligence studies by itself yet offers the periodic rotational assignments to customer
wherewithal to support a claim of expertise by agencies. 104 Enacted as part of employee training
someone educated in that specialty, except in the and orientation, these measures can substantially
narrow, self-assessment areas of intelligence enhance analysts' target knowledge and skills.
process or organization. Only one nongovern-
mental institution in the world offers an under- In combination with the right knowledge,
graduate degree in intelligence research and skills, abilities, characteristics, and methodolo-
analysis: Mercyhurst College in Pennsylvania; gies, the organizational and structural changes
advanced studies are offered in conjunction with begun in the past year offer a possibility to
a law-enforcement related degree. Within several genuinely transform the analytic work force to
years, the University of New Mexico is planning meet the challenges of the 21st century. Specific
to offer undergraduate through doctoral degrees changes in analytic culture, processes, and tech-
in intelligence; the stated goals of this program niques offer NSA a unique opportunity to rebuild
are to focus on the tradecraft of strategic intelli- analysis to effectively cope with a changed world.
gence.103 Other institutions, such as Wright State The recognition that technology supports, and is
University in Ohio, are beginning intelligence not a replacement for, the mental processes of
analysis programs. But these academic programs analysis, highlights this opportunity.
are too small and too limited to meet the needs of
NSA or other intelligence agencies for qualified However, for true transformation to occur,
analysts. much work still must be done. It remains to be
seen whether the corporation and its workforce
Furthermore, general academic preparation are willing and able to carry out this essential
is not enough. Training new and current intelli- work. Finally, it may be that the organizational
gence analysts in professional tradecraft is NSA's changes under way do not go far enough. The
responsibility and obligation. In the 1980s, the proposed structure is still large and centrally
NCS filled a vital role of providing analysts with planned. Many, if not most, modern intelligence
both specific job-related training and encultura- challenges are not. More agile responses to those
tion appropriate to NSA's mission. Today, with challenges, as yet undefined, may be required to
the investment of adequat,e resources, including counter them. 105
the development of modern curricula in intelli-
gence tradecraft, the NCS can be positioned once A corporate strategy focusing on both what
again to meet analytic training needs. This invest- customers require and how a professional analyt-
ment could include partnering with academic ic workforce can be developed is a logical follow-
programs offering "distance learning" programs on to the transformations NSA already has
and other means of outsourcing instructional begun. The results of implementing such a strat-
resources. egy will be profound, if the transformation
remains grounded in NSA's mission and is sus-
The Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles tained through changes in leadership. In this cli-
and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence mate, talented and motivated analysts who are
Community identified several additional actions highly knowledgeable about their customers and
to improve the quality of analysis that apply to their targets will apply rigorous analytic tech-

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

niques to create actionable intelligence for deci- Notes

sionmakers. Under expert management, analysts 1. From Brooks Haxton, tr., Fragments, the
will apply critical thinking skills in evaluating Collected Wisdom of Heraclitus (New York: Penguin,
their own work, ensuring that it is of the highest 2001), 33.
caliber. As these analysts collaborate extensively 2. Adda Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence and
with others in the intelligence community, the Statecraft: Selected Essays (McLean: Brassey's,
example they set will inspire others to excellence. 1992), 7.
3. For a comprehensive examination of the rise of
Making this vision a reality requires action. religious and ethnic terrorism, see Mark
The Intelligence Analysis Assessment Tool pro- Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: the Global
vided earlier in this article is meant to be a guide Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of
to action and an instrument of change. This tool California Press, 2000).
can be a means for assessing the present state of 4. Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History:
intelligence analysis; identifying gaps; tailoring Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford:
the hiring, training, and deployment of analysts Stanford University Press, 1998), 446. (Also quoted in
to the mission; fine-tuning corporate and analyt- Juergensmeyer.)
ic processes; and steering management practices 5. John Gannon, et alia, National Intelligence
in consonance with the corporate strategy. If each Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the
analyst and manager takes action according to Future with Nongovernment Experts (Washington
these guidelines, then NSA will be able to say, DC: National Foreign Intelligence Board, 2000) 41;
"Yes, we have what it takes to succeed in the 21st hereafter National Intelligence Council. For other
century." views of security threats to America, see also Loch
Johnson, Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Intelligence and America's Quest for Security (New
York: New York University Press, 2000); and Robert
Acknowledgments are due to the many per- D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the
sonnel within the Department of Defense who Dreams of the Post-Cold War (New York: Random
challenged our ideas and critiqued our work. House, 2000).
Thanks also are due to James Holden-Rhodes, 6. National Intelligence Council, 42.
Ph.D., University of New Mexico; Mr. Robert 7. George W. Bush, "National Security Presidential
Heibel, Mercyhurst College; Hugo Keesing, Directive 5," May 9, 2001. This directive instructs the
Ph.D., Joint Military Intelligence College; Director of Central Intelligence to conduct a compre-
Marilyn Peterson, Financial Analysis hensive review of U.S. intelligence. The order gives the
Coordinator, New J.ersey Division of Criminal DCI a broad mandate to" challenge the status quo."
Justice; Adam Pode, formerly of Mercyhurst 8. Donald P. Steury, ed., Sherman Kent and the
College; Robert David Steele, CEO, Open Source Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays
Solutions; and Russell Swenson, Ph.D., Joint (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence,
Military Intelligence College. Colleagues in the Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), 14.
international Generic Intelligence Training 9. See Sherman Kent, "The Need for an
Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Drug Intelligence Literature," Studies in Intelligence, Spring
Enforcement Administration, also provided valu- 1955 (reprinted in Studies in Intelligence, 45th
able comments. Anniversary Special Edition, Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2001), 1-11.
10. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From
Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000),

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly
{b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

11. Director of Central Intelligence National (Alexandria: Society of Competitive Intelligence

Security Advisory Panel, Strategic Investment Plan Professionals, 1996), 63.
for Intelligence Community Analysis (Washington 30. Steven R Mann, "Chaos Theory and Strategic
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000) Thought," Parameters 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1992) 67.
/cia/oublications /unclass sin/index.html 11. Quoted in MSgt Robert D. Folker, Jr., Intelligence
Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers: An
Experiment in Applying Structured Methods, Joint
Military Intelligence College Occasional Paper
Number Seven (Washington, DC: Joint Military
13. R. H. ~athams, "The Intelligence Analyst's Intelligence College, 2000), 13.
Notebook," in Strategic Intelligence: Theory and 31. Council on Foreign Relations, Making
Application, 2d. ed. (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence:
Inte1ligence Training Center, 1995), 88. A Report of an Independent Task Force, 11.
14. Gregory Treverton, Reshaping National Downloaded from the Federation of American
Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge: Scientists,, 4 June 2000.
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 10. 32. William S. Brei, Captain, USAF, Getting
15. Ibid, 10. Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure,
16. Loch K. Johnson, "Analysis for a New Age," Joint Military Intelligence College Occasional Paper
Intelligence and National Security, ll.4, October, Number Two (Washington, DC: Joint Military
1996, 658. Intelligence College, 1996), 6.
17. Kevin P. Stack, "Competitive Intelligence," 33. Ibid., 6.
Intelligence and National Security, 13.4, Winter 1998, 34. Ibid., 5.
194. 35. Ibid., 6.
18. Amos Kovacs, "Using Intelligence," Intelli- 36. Ibid., 6.
gence and National Security, 12.4, October, 1997, 148. 37. Ibid., 5.
19. Lowenthal, 4. 38. Ronald D. Garst and Max L. Gross, "On
20. Ibid., 120-121. Becoming an Intelligence Analyst," Defense
21. Ibid., 122. While Lowenthal lists five loci, dur- Intelligence Journal, 6.2 (Fall 1997), 55.
ing the Clinton administration the secretary of the 39. Don McDowell, Strategic Intelligence: A
treasury had a seat on the NSC, raising that agency to Handbook for Practitioners, Managers, and Users
equal status with State and Defense. (Cooma: Istana Enterprises, Pty. Ltd., 1998), 216.
22. Gregory Treverton, Reshaping National 40. Garst and Gross, 47.
Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge: 41. Conversation with Dr. S. Alenka Brown-
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 178. Vanhoozer, Director, Center for Cognitive Processing
23. Ibid., 179. Technology, Advanced Computing Technologies,
24. Ibid., 183-184. BWXT Y-12, Oak Ridge, TN, April 2001.
25. Ibid., 184. 42. We do not suggest that individuals lacking one
26. Ibid., 185. or more of these abilities due to physical impairment
27. Ibid., 191. would be unable to perform intelligence analysis.
28. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for However, we do suggest that in the absence of correc-
American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton tive technologies, an impaired person may not be able
University Press, 1949), 182. to perform certain functions of analysis or production
29. Jan P. Herring, Measuring the Effectiveness that depend on the impaired ability.
of Competitive Intelligence: Assessing and 43. Conversation with Dr. S. Alenka Brown-
Communicating Cl's Value to Your Organization Vanhoozer, April 2001.

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED

44. Director of Central Intelligence National 59. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman,
Security Advisory Panel, Strategic Investment Plan Strategic Intelligence for American National Security
for Intelligence Community Analysis, (Washington, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 32.
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000) 60. Ibid., 202.
/cia/publications /unclass_sip/index.html. Last refer- 61. Stephen Denning, The Springboard: How
enced 1 June 2001. Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-Era
45. Director of Central Intelligence, Strategic Organizations (Boston, MA: Butterworth Heineman,
Intent for the United States Intelligence Community, 2001), xxii.
(Washington DC: CIA, March 1999) 8. (Unclassified 62. National Intelligence Council, 2000, 83-85.
reference; overall classification of source was SECRET 63. Berkowitz and Goodman, 54.
CODEWORD, Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals). 64. For one view of the staffing cuts at the National
46. Gregory Treverton, 10. Security Agency, see Mathew M. Aid, "The Time of
47. Terence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: Troubles: The US National Security Agency in the
The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain Twenty-First Century," Intelligence and National
(London: W.W. Norton & Company, Ltd., 1997), 21. Security, 15.3, Autumn 2000, 5-9.
48. Keith Devlin, "The Role of Conceptual 65. Robert David Steele, "The New Craft of
Structure in Human Evolution" in Bernhard Ganter Intelligence: an Alternative Approach Oriented to the
and Guy W. Mineau, eds, Conceptual Structures: Public," The Future of Intelligence in the 21st Century,
Logical, Linguistic, and Computational Issues, 8th Priverno, Italy, 14-16 February 2001. The quote is
International Conference on Conceptual Structures from Steele's remarks and is not in his published ver-
(Berlin: Springier Verlag, 2000), I. sion of the paper. Clarification was made via personal
49. See also Yu, Chong Ho's 1994 paper, email communication, 18 May 2001. Because the con-
"Abduction? Deduction? Induction? Is there a ference operated under "Chatham House Rule," Mr.
Logic of Exploratory Data Analysis?" http://seamon- Steele is quoted with permission. 66. Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember,
Logic_of_EDA.html (Last accessed 6 June 2001). Anthropology, 9th Edition (Upper Saddle River:
50. Garst and Gross, 47. Prentice Hall, 1999), 225.
51. Closer and Weir, 81. 67. Concise English-Chinese/Chinese-English
52. Jerome K. Closer and Sandra M. Dictionary, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University
Weir, Intelligence Research Methodologies, An Press, 1999), 363.
Introduction to Techniques and Procedures for 68. FBIS Editors' comments to the English trans-
Conducting Research in Defense Intelligence lation of Hua, Zhongwen and Wang, Zongxiao,
(Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence School, 1975), Guofang Keji Qingbaoyuan ji Houqu Jishu (Sources
81. and Techniques of Obtaining National Defense
53. Gregory D .. Foster, "Research, Writing, and the Science and Technology Intelligence) (Beijing: Kexue
Mind of the Strategist," Joint Force Quarterly, 11 Jishu Wenxuan Publishing Co., 1991).
(Spring 1996): 74-79. 69. According to the NSA Historian's office, three
54. Don McDowell, 216. great American cryptologists of the past century,
55. National Drug Intelligence Center, Basic Elizebeth and William Friedman, and Lambros
Intelligence Analysis Course, #9, PowerPoint Callimahos, were conversant in multiple foreign lan-
Presentation, April 2001. guages. The "best verifiable list" shows Elizebeth
56. Gregory Treverton, 5. "studied Latin, Greek, and German" (her own words);
57. William H. Starbuck, "Unlearning Ineffective her husband, William, was fluent in French, German,
or Obsolete Technologies," International Journal of and based on literature in his library and his back-
Technology Management, 1996, 11: 725-726. ground - his father was a translator in the Czar's court
58. Garst and Gross, 49. and spoke eight languages - Russian; and Callimahos

UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarterly

was fluent in seven languages including Italian, Greek, 87. Phil Williams and Roy Godson, "Anticipating
French, and German, and had learned several others, Organized and Transnational Crime," The Future of
including Japanese. Intelligence in the 21st Century, Priverno, Italy, 14-16
70. Russell G. Swenson, Francis J. Hughes, et alia, February 2001, 11.
"Research Design," Research: Design and Methods 88. Adda Bozeman, 1994, 57.
(Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 89. Kristan J. Wheaton, The Warning Solution:
2001), 19-20. This publication is an essential guide for Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information
analysts developing research and analytic strategies. Overload (Fairfax: AFCEA International Press, 2001),
71. Leonard Fuld, Fuld Associates, "Intelligence 13.
Sofuvare: Reality or Still Virtual Reality," Competitive 90. For a more complete discussion of this matter
Intelligence Magazine, 4.2, March-April, 2001, 24-25. see Treverton, 2001, chapter 6.
72. See also Capt. William S. Brei, Getting 91. Lowenthal, 42.
Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure, 92. Berkowitz and Goodman, 116.
Joint Military Intelligence College Occasional Paper 93. \!Vheaton, 10.
Number Two, (Washington, DC: Joint Military 94. Berkowitz and Goodman, 86.
Intelligence College, 1996). 95. Ibid., 154.
73. Clifford C. Kalb, "Core Competencies: A 96. External Team Report: A management Review
Practitioner's View," document 207612, Merck & Co., for the Director, NSA, October 22, 1999,
Inc., n.d.
74. "Knowledge," The American Heritage f. Accessed 4 June 2001. For a different but related
Dictionary, 2nd College Edition, 1976 Ed. perspective see also the report of the "internal"
75. John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, The Social New Enterprise Team:
Life of Information (Boston: Harvard Business School nsa_new_ enterprise_team_recommendations. pdf.
Press, 2000), 1-2. 97. Quoted in Robert K. Ackerman, "Information
76. Ibid., 1. Age Poses New Challenges to Intelligence," Signal,
77. Ibid., 49. Oct 1998, 24.
78. Ibid., 49-50. 98. Council on Foreign Relations, 1996, 11-12.
79. Ibid., 5. 99. Director of Central Intelligence National
80. Ibid., 5. Security Advisory Panel, Strategic Investment Plan
81. Adda Bozeman, Politics and Culture in for Intelligence Community Analysis (Washington,
International History: From the Ancient Near East to DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000) 29ff.
the Opening of the Modern Age, 2nd Edition (New Downloaded from \-\WW.
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 5. unclass_sip/index.html
82. Ibid., 1994, 5-6. 100. For a complete discussion of the Analysis of
83. National Intelligence Council, 28. Competing Hypotheses, see Chapter 8 of Richards
84. For further discussion of this issue, see Heuer, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis
Frederick M. Lorenz and Edward J. Erickson, The (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence,
Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications of the 1999).
Southeastern Anatolia Project (Washington, DC: 101. Folker, 33.
National Defense University Press, 1999); and Robert 102. Ibid., 33.
D. Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the 103. James Holden-Rhodes, personal communica-
Balkans, Middle East, and the Caucasus (New York: tions, 11-14 June 2001.
Random House, 2000). 104. Aspin-Brown Commission, Preparing for the
85. Lorenz and Erickson, 47. 21st Century, Washington, DC, March 1, 1996, x-x.
86. Personal conversation with Dr. James Holden- 105. For an examination of how intelligence might
Rhodes, University of New Mexico, September 2000. be done in the 21st century, see Bruce D. Berkowitz

Cryptologic Quarterly UNCLASSIFIED/lf6R 6FFl01AL l::ISE 9~1b¥

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

and Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the

Information Age (New Haven: Yale University Press,

(U//rouo1 lisa senior technical leader at

the National Security Agency. During 18 years of intelligence
community service, he has held a number ofdifferent assign-
ments in the Washington, DC, area and overseas. The many
diverse assignments enabled! Ito
earn credenti.als
in technical communication analysis, intelligence analysis,
and intelligence research. He has created and taught intel-
ligence analysis courses for the/ National Cryptologic
School as well as for other government agencies. His most
recent assignment was in the Art and Science of Analysis
organization where his work foe sed on im rovin method-
olo ies for intelli ence anal.· sis.

(U/ /fOl:J~ leader at the National Security

Agenc ," she was introduced to the field by her
father, retired. Through diverse
exo;,rj~n~e ~n mte 1gence support an produc··· tion assignments
I __ lhas earned credentials in technical communications
ana ys1s, intelligence research, and foreign language analysis,
and has created and taught intelligence anal sis courses f r
the National Cr ptolo ic School.

(U~ fcurrent work on core com.___ _ _ _ _ _ __.

petencies arose from their continuing advocacy of best practices in
intelligence analysis, as members of the Art and Science of Analysis organization.