SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
1. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEREZ signed in order to understand the transaction through their
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of
another and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong
to the owner of the land, subject to the provision of the
following articles.
FACTS: Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a
government financial institution and the official depository of
the Philippines. Respondents were officers of Asian
Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC), a
corporation engaged in the construction business. On several
occasions, respondents executed in favour of Landbank trust
receipts to secure the purchase of construction materials that
they will need in their construction projects. When the trust
receipts matured, ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds
of the construction projects or the construction materials
subject of the trust receipts. After several demands went
unheeded, LBP filed a complaint for Estafa or violation of Art.
315, par 1(b) of the RPC, in relation to PD 115, against the
respondent officers of ACDC.
ISSUE: WON the disputed transaction is a trust receipt or a
loan?
RULING: TRUST RECEIPT
There are two (2) obligations in a trust receipt transaction : (1)
covered by the provision that refers to money under the
obligation to deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the
merchandise sold. (2) covered by the provision referring to
merchandise received under the obligation to return it
(devolvera) to the owner.
Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is
presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of goods covered by the trust receipt to
the entruster, or (2) when the entrustee fails to return the goods trust receipt transaction that the person who advanced
under trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust receipts.
In all trust receipts transactions, both obligations on the part of paid in full, or if the goods had already been sold, the proceeds
the trustee exist in the alternative the return of the proceeds of should be turned over to him or her.
the sale or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw, or
processed. When both parties enter into an agreement knowing
that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipts is not
possible even without any fault on the part of the trustee, it is
not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section 13 of
P.D. 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon by the
parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale
transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the
borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the
purchase of the goods.
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that in order to judge
the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. Under this
provision, we can examine the contemporaneous actions of the
parties rather than rely purely on the trust receipts that they
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intent.
We note in this regard that at the onset of these transactions,
LBP knew that ACDC was in the construction business and
that the materials that it sought to buy under the letters of
credit were to be used for the following projects: the Metro
Rail Transit Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition
Project. LBP had in fact authorized the delivery of the
materials on the construction sites for these projects, as seen in
the letters of credit it attached to its complaint. Clearly, they
were aware of the fact that there was no way they could
recover the buildings or constructions for which the materials,
its demand letter dated May 4, 1999 sought the payment of the
balance but failed to ask, as an alternative, for the return of the
construction materials or the buildings where these materials
had been used.
The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of
construction materials to a construction site of two
government projects, as well as unspecified construction
materials. As a government financial institution, LBP should
have been aware that the materials were to be used for the
construction of an immovable property, the ownership of
whatever was constructed with those materials would
presumably belong to the owner of the land, under Article 445
of the Civil Code.
Even if we consider the vague possibility that the materials,
consisting of cement, bolts and reinforcing steel bars, would
be used for the construction of a movable property, the
ownership of these properties would still pertain to the
government and not remain with the bank as they would be
classified as property of the public domain, as defined by the
Civil Code.
In contrast with the present situation, it is fundamental in a
payment for the merchandise becomes the absolute owner of
said merchandise and continues as owner until he or she is
2. CASTRO vs GREGORIO
FACTS: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing
the decision of the CA which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition
before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the
trial court that granted Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro
(Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due to their
incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies.
Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who
succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima
Castro (Petitioner).
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed
Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was
instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed
and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth
Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report
conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition
was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by
Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing
support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she
single-handedly raised and provided financial support to
Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and
allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting
Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne
knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that
he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he
always offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged
that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children that’s why
he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment
seeking to annul the decision of the TC approving Jed and
Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and
the document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was
fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates
shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while
another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P
further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption.
Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied
the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario
and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit
provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the
adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.”
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and
was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment
of judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as
extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate
children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?
RULING: The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as
the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the
participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then
the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was
committed through the use of forged documents or perjured
testimony during the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a
reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario
and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would
have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill
the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no
other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court
granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child
born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7,
RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. The law, however, provides for several exceptions to
the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to
adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this
instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her
spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment,
Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de
facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to
adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s
children if they are 10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA
8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required
by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons
should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It
is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on
Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly
acquired jurisdiction.
3. CANG vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner Herbert and his wife, Anna Marie Clavano,
begot three children. The family was living harmoniously in
Cebu until the Anna Marie learned of an alleged extra marital
affair of her husband with one Wilma Soco, a family friend.
Anna Marie filed for a legal separation case against Herbert.
The court granted petition and ordered Herbert to give
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 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
monthly financial support to the children. Thereafter, Herbert
left for the USA. He filed a divorce against Anna Marie. The
US court awarded the custody of the children to Anna Marie
and ordered Herbert to send monthly support. He then Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding
remarried thereby acquiring US citizenship. Not long after, he the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural
divorced anew. parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule
In 1987, respondents Clavano, Anna Marie’s brother and 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
sister-in-law, filed for an adoption case in Cebu. It annexed an
affidavit of consent of the eldest child, Keith (14 y/o), and of
the mother Anna Marie. According to the latter, the father had
already abandoned the kids and since she will be leaving for
the US to work, the care and custody of the children will be
best left to the Clavanos. Also, the couple has helped her in
giving the children’s needs all these years. Besides, the father
reneged on his obligation to send money as ordered by the two
courts above.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner
immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an
opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of
supporting the children while his finances were too meager
compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody
to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.
Pending the adoption case, the adoption court awarded
custody of the children to Herbert as their mother already left
thereby relinquishing custody over the children.
The petition for adoption was granted. The trial court
ratiocinated that the father abandoned the children and thus his
consent to the adoption was not anymore necessary.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto. Thus, this present
controversy at bench.
ISSUE: Is the consent of the father necessary in the adoption
of the three children?
RULING: Yes. The consent is necessary. Reversed and set
aside.
Art. 188 (NCC). The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or
over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal
guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years
of age or over, of the adopting parent or
parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or
over, of the adopting parents, if living with
said parent and the latters spouse, if any; and
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(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to
be adopted. (Underscoring supplied)
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the
petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child,
if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by
the childs spouse, if any, and by each of its known living
parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned the child, or if there are no such parents by the
general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the
child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, childrens home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers
of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but if
the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.
(Underscoring supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the
written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the
validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or
hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction
over the case even without the written consent of the parents
or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption
alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which
this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
In this case, Herbert substantially proved that he did not
abandon his children. There were numerous exchanges of
letters between them over the years, he sent things and
personal stuff to them, and in turn, the children expressed their
love for their father. He also provided receipts for bank
deposits made in favor of the children. Although Herbert did
not fully comply with the orders of the legal separation court
and divorce court to give financial assistance, it is not enough
to strip him of parental authority. The policy of the law is not
to take the children away from their parents but for the best
interest of the child. Since the father has shown that he did not
abandon his children and they retain emotional attachments to
each other, his authority over his biological children should
not be disturbed.
4. VDA DE JACOB vs CA
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be
the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be
the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
Pedro Pilapil.
ISSUE: WON Thea decree of adoption is sufficient to admit
the same?
RULING: No. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is
upon the person claiming such relationship. This Respondent
Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by
petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
5. REPUBLIC vs CA
FACTS: The petition below was filed on September 2, 1988
by private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida
P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen
years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime
B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private
respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor
Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. Private respondents prayed that judgement be
rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of
petitioners for all intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural
parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to
that of the petitioners and that the first name which
was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected
to MICHAEL.
The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988,
giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Province of Cavite and by service of the
order upon the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought
the correction of the name of the child from Midael to
Michael. He argued that although the correction sought
concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be
granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not
the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. WON publication in adoption and change of name
should be made to give jurisdiction to the court?
2. WON the Civil Registrar should be impleaded in the
adoption case?
RULING: The local civil registrar is thus required to be made
a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party,
without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice
granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
absence of-an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual
all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint
including the judgment. Nor was notice of the petition for
correction of entry published as required by Rule 108, 4 which
reads: 4. Notice and publication. - Upon filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. While there was notice given by publication in this
case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in
compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the prayer for
adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was, mentioned that
in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was
also being sought. The local civil registrar -was thus deprived
of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil
registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by
publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render
the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of
entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction
both as to party and as to the subject matter.
6. REYES vs MAURICIO
FACTS: Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner
of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan). Said
title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in
the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio.
The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of
an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the
death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the
DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F.
Mauricio (Librada), now deceased, and her alleged daughter
Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract
denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio
as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their
peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late
Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and
registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-
interest to the subject land; that , Godofredo had been working
on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of
fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and
other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit,
strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the
preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan to eject
respondents from the subject property, and had the same
notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig,
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Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary
Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the
Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio
took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy,
ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the
execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of
consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal
means to eject respondents from the subject property.
Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the
Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place
them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject
property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of
damages.
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between
him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation
of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere
tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a
tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an
agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a
relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan
and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document.
Provincial Adjudicator- concluded that Godofredo was the
tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse,
should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject
land.
DARAB - Mauricio’s are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It
found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia,
Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject
property. Under the law, they were subrogated to the rights and mother's middle name and surname. The petitioner wanted to
substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents as the
agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted by
respondents
CA - It sustained the factual findings of the DARAB with
respect to the tenancy relation between Godofredo and
Spouses Reyes and the nullity of the Kasunduan.
As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was no law providing that an adopted child can use the natural
also assailed by Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the
complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada,
Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that
Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a
legal heir.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the
status of Leonida in the instant petition
HELD: No.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of
the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the competent court; any
contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code
confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn
the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles.
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be
made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,this
Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in
a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate.
Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the
legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in
a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be
subject to collateral attack.
7. IN THE MATTER OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA-GARCIA
FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed
that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname.
Before the adoption, the child had been using her natural
change the child's name such that the child would keep her
natural mother's surname as her middle name and the
petitioner's surname as her surname. The trial court denied the
petitioner's request as there was no law that allowed an
adopted child to use the surname of the child's biological
mother as the child's middle name.
The petitioner appealed the decision arguing that while there is
mother's surname as a middle name, there is no law
prohibiting it either. It is also customary for every Filipino to
have the surname of the mother as a middle name and the use
in this instance is customary, not opposed by any interested
party or prohibited by any laws.
The petitioner argued that adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence the child's right to bear a
proper name should not be violated. In addition, permitting the
child to use her mother's surname as her middle name avoids
the stigma of her illegitimacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING: The Court held that there is no law expressly
prohibiting the child to use the surname of her natural mother
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as her middle name and what is not prohibited by law, is
allowed. It is customary for every Filipino to have a middle
name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. While
not set out in law this custom has been recognized during the
lawmaking process. In fact, the Family Law Committees had
agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
The Court also said that it is necessary to preserve and
maintain the child’s relationship with her natural mother
because under the law, she remains an intestate heir of the
mother. The underlying intent of adoption law is in favour of
the child and the effects of adoption is that the adopted is
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents
and purposes under the law. Being a legitimate child by virtue
of her adoption by the petitioner, it follows that the child is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear son/daughter of the other; or
the surname of her father and her mother.
Adoption law should be interpreted and construed liberally to
carry out the beneficial purposes of adoption with the interests
and welfare of the adopted child being the primary and
paramount consideration.
8. IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND
MICHAEL LIM
FACTS: Monina Limmarried Primo Lim (Lim) on June 1974.
They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban.
Petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear
that they were the children’s parents. The children2 were
named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim
(Michael).
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were
their own but on November 1998, Lim died.
On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario
(Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing
of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA
8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18
years and seven months old.
RTC RULING: Trial court dismissed the petitions.
The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new
husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article
III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can
singly adopt.
RULING: NO.
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions
by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We
have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision
denying the petitions for adoption.
Sec.7, Art III of RA 8552 reads:
“Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto;
or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.”
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision
means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner,
having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, must jointly adopt.
Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are
not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally
separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown
in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial
court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the
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law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation.
9. NERY vs SAMPANA
FACTS: Melody Nery (Nery) engage in the services of Atty.
Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana) for the annulment of her
marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition
for annulment was granted. As for the adoption, Sampana
asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as
the wife of her alien adopter. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana
in installment and did not ask for receipts since she trusted
Sampana.
In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien
adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended
adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act
provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can
jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.
Clearly, there was no proof that the adoption may be granted
for under the Rules on Adoption A.M no. 2-06-02 SC under
Sec 5 (Domestic Adoption) and Sec 29 (Inter-country
Adoption), petitioner does not in any of those that are
enumerated by the law. The law provides the following:

Nery alleged that Sampana sent a text message informing her
that he already filed the petition for adoption and it was
already published. Furthermore, Samapana informed Nery
that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. When Nery
asked why she did not receive notices from the court,
Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary
because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Nery inquired
about the status of the petition for adoption and discovered
that there was no such petition filed in the court.
Sampana argued that Nery’s allegations were self-serving and
unsubstantiated. However, he admitted receiving "one package
fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and
adoption. He alleged that Nery insisted on being adopted
despite the factors that affects the adoption. Thus, he
suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be married to a
close relative of, the adoption could be possible." he, required
Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage
contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt from the Japanese Embassy. Nery furnished the blurred
marriage contract, but not the certification. He alleged that he
prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he
was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the
petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have
mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the
petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have
overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana
committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after
deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
IBP found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery
believed that he filed the petition for adoption and for failing
to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nery can be legally adopted.
RULING: NO. In the present case, Sampana admitted that
despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the
petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence
and candor to his client. Sampana’s proffered excuse of
waiting for the certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy.
SEC. 29. Who may be adopted. – Only a child
legally available for domestic adoption may be the
subject of Inter-country adoption.
SEC. 5. Who may be adopted. – The following may
be adopted: (1) Any person below eighteen (18)
years of age who has been voluntarily committed to
the Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of
P.D. No. 603 or judicially declared available for
adoption; (2) The legitimate child of one spouse, by
the other spouse; (3) An illegitimate child, by a
qualified adopter to raise the status of the former to
that of legitimacy; (4) A person of legal age
regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption,
said person has been consistently considered and
treated by the adopters as their own child since
minority; (5) A child whose adoption has been
previously rescinded; (6) A child whose biological or
adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no
proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months
from the time of death of said parents. (7) A child not
otherwise disqualified by law or these rules.
(DOMESTIC ADOPTION)
Likewise as stated in Sec 4 of the same rule, it states
that:
SEC. 4. Who may adopt. – The following may adopt:
(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above-stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his country has diplomatic RELATIONS with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he has been living in
the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years
prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is
entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic
or consular office or any appropriate government
agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his
country, and that his government allows the adoptee
to enter his country as his adopted child. Provided,
further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his
country may be waived for the following: Xxx xxx
xx (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a relative

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 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouse. RULING:
Since there was no valid proof or evidence to justify
the adoption proceedings, the petition for adoption
should be dismissed.
10. CASTRO vs GREGORIO
FACTS: Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro
(Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due to their
incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies.
Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who
succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima
Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, a petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed
Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was
instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed
and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth
Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report
conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition
was granted.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment
seeking to annul the decision of the TC approving Jed and
Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and
the document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was
fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates
shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while
another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P
further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and
Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied
the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario
and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit
provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the
adopter should be personally notified of the hearing.
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and
was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment
of judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as
extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the adoption is valid.
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate
children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?
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1. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as
the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over
the proceedings, and the favorable decision was
obtained through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to
prevent the participation of any other interested party,
as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless
of whether the fraud was committed through the use
of forged documents or perjured testimony during the
trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from
having a reasonable opportunity to contest the
adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
participate, the trial court would have hesitated to
grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be
no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts,
the trial court granted the decree of adoption under
fraudulent circumstances.
2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a
child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent
of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children.(Art.III, Sec.7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for
several exceptions to the general rule, as in a
situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her
own children born out of wedlock. In this instance,
joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his
or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or
annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to
be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must
first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to
adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the
adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older
(ART.III, Sec.9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was
required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service
of summons should have been effected on the spouse
and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to
rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot
be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS (TRUSTEES / ADOPTION)
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor
on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never
validly acquired jurisdiction.
11. BARTOLOME vs SSS
NATURE OF THE CASE:
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks
to annul the March 17, 2010 Decisionof the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-
18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social
Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.},
declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased
employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
PD 626.
FACTS: John Colcolis a legally adopted child of Cornelio
Colcol( Great Grandfather ).
Cornelio died when John was only Four (4) years of age.
When John was already independent, he was employed as an
electrician (Seaman) of Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He
was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident
while on board the vessel Maersk Danville while it was in
Brazil. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried( Single ). Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina
was no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter
was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
petitioner.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the
adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the
parental authority to the biological parents of the
latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal
beneficiary of John.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his
adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under
such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to
have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration
of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of
adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored
if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter
and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously,
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend
for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents
retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who
was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from
the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of
the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right
to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without
more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent,
given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority.
Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall
accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining
beneficiary.
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