Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases on prohibited resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid
oresaid civil action, the
motions, meritorious motions, archiving of cases
 guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
G R NO. 137567
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were married on June
16, 1973 at the Immaculate Conception Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon
City. On Feb. 7, 1997, after 24 years of marriage and four children,
petitioner Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
In her answer, Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. She subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner and his paramour.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings including
the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner
argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing
motion.
Issues:
Whether or not the civil case for the nullity of marriage under
psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of
concubinage.
Ruling:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil
case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case,
it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
The petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his
marriage void. More importantly, parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumptions is that the marriage
exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a
woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ. ETC.
ET AL., respondents
G.R. No. L-15315. August 26, 1960
FACTS: On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced, already married to
Eufrocina Tan, filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage
with Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground that he was threatened and
intimidated into signing an affidavit that he and Elizabeth had been
living as husband and wife which was used by the Elizabeth in securing
their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage
license; that he was again threatened by Elizabeth and her relatives to
enter into the marriage on August 21, 1957; and that he never lived with
her. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral damages
in the amount of P2,000.
In her answer to the civil case, Elizabeth Ceasar denied the allegations of
the complaint and avers that neither she nor her relatives know of
plaintiff’s previous marriage. According to her, it was Merced who
insisted on the marriage. As a counterclaim she asked for P50, 000 for
moral damages. She later on filed a criminal complaint for bigamy
against Merced.
Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance
until final termination of the civil case on the ground that the latter
involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the
accused. This motion was granted, but upon a motion for
reconsideration by the fiscal, the order for suspension was set aside and
denied on the ground that in People vs Mendoza, judicial declaration of
nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not necessary.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a
prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: The civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be
resolved before the criminal case.
The elements of prejudicial question are the following: (1) it must be
determinative of the case before the court; (2) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.
For the first element, in order that the Merced be held guilty of the
crime of bigamy, the marriage which she contracted for the second time
with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has
been questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be decided
before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. In order that a person
may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent
marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were
it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One of the elements is
consent, without it, a marriage would be illegal and void. Since Merced
claims that he was forced into the marriage, the validity of the second
marriage is determinative of the guilt of Merced in the crime of bigamy.
The denial of the suspension of the criminal case was based on the case
of People vs. Mendoza. The same cannot be applied in this case because
of different set of facts. In this case, Mendoza was first married with
Josefa, then married Olga, and after the death of Josefa, married
Carmencita. Olga filed a case of bigamy because of the third marriage.
The Court held that he is not guilty of bigamy since the marriage with
Olga was void, having been contracted when Josefa was still alive,
whereas the marriage with Carmencita is valid because it was contracted
when the first wife was already dead.
For the second element, (NOTE: IN THIS CASE, THE CIVIL CASE AND
THE CRIMINAL CASE WERE BOTH FILED IN THE SAME COURT) Spanish
jurisprudence, requires that the essential element determinative of the
criminal action must be cognizable by another court. This requirement is
due to the fact that Spanish courts jurisdictions’ are exclusively divided
into civil or criminal. In the Philippines, where our courts are vested
with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial
question is to be applied even if there is only one court before which the
civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the
court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the
annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different
from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy.
DONATO V. LUNA
FACTS:
Leonilo Donato was charged for Bigamy. Before the arraignment of
Donato, the private respondent filed a civil action for nullity of marriage.
Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent
consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's
second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was
already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the
defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain
petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at
least five years as evidenced by their joint affidavit.
Prior to the date set for trial of Criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend on the ground that Civil case seeking his annulment of marriage
raises a prejudicial question, which must be determined first before the
criminal case may proceed.
RTC: Denied the motion to suspend proceedings in Criminal case and the
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the civil case herein raises a prejudicial question
RULING:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It
must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of
bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private
respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through
deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should
have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only
sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for
anulment of the second marriage. Petitioner has not even sufficiently
shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the
use of threats, force and intimidation.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to
evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior
to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been
living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for
more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the
defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the
proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for
estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Facts: Consing negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother,
Cecilia de la Cruz various loans totaling ₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital
Inc.). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-687599 of
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the
name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the
mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the
property for a total consideration of ₱21,221,500.00. Payment was
effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the
promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of
₱18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The
other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. a joint
venture partner of Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they
learned that the title to the property was really owned by Po Willie Yu
and Juanito Tan Teng.
Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of ₱41,377,851.48
but the latter ignored the demands. Consing filed for injunctive relief,
thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the
collection of the ₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a
mere agent of his mother. Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for
estafa through falsification of public document and for the recovery of a
sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and
De la Cruz an information for estafa through falsification of public
document. Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to
the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases.
RTC – issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
CA - Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and
Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e.
whether or not private respondent may be held liable in the questioned
transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent
Consing in both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against Consing.
Another information for estafa through falsification of public document
was filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus,
CaviteConsing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question
RTC - denied Consing’s motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for
reconsideration.
CA – granted Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside the
January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC
from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and
Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal
case). The issue in Civil Case is whether or not respondent (Consing)
merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in (the
Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the
amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for
conspiring to falsify public documents.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each
other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
The Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that
would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case. Consing
contended that the rulings of the court was not binding because it
involved Plus Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the
complainant in the Makati criminal case. He added that the decision did
not yet become final and executory, and could still be reversed at any
time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and
that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and
should not be held personally liable under a contract that had involved
property belonging to his mother as his principal.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a
prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the proceedings in
the Makati criminal case?
Held: NO. Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm
holding in the rulings in the first case to the effect that the proceedings
in the criminal case could not be suspended because the Makati civil case
was an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no
prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the
ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with
Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that
the action was predicated on fraud. As such, the action was one that
could proceed independently of the criminal case pursuant to Article 33
of the Civil Code.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each
other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling of plus builders to his
case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases
involved different complainants the civil actions Plus Builders and
Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of
similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered
by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not
be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that
Unicapital had filed.
Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be
held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for
Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent
in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Pimentel v Pimentel
FACTS:
On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel. On 7 February 2005,
petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC, for the pre-trial
and trial of Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section
36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide.
RTC: Denied the petition on the ground of prejudicial question. The
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The
RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the
validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question.
CA: the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had
already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is
required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
ISSUES:
Whether or not prejudicial question arise in the civil case for nullity of
marriage.
RULING:
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The
rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing
of the criminal action. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed
after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.[13] The relationship between
the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
case for parricide.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.
G.R. No. 125646] City of Pasig vs. COMELEC and Municipality of
Cainta
[G.R. No. 128663] Municipality of Cainta vs. COMELEC and City of
Pasig
FACTS:
Both petitions question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite
proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes
between Cainta and Pasig. G.R. 125646 involves proposed Brgy.
Karangalan, while 128663 involves the proposed Brgy. Napico. Pasig
claims both areas as part of its territory/jurisdiction while Cainta claims
that the same encroached upon areas within its territory/jurisdiction.
On April 22, 1996, Pasig City Council passed Ordinance No. 21, Series of
2016 creating Brgy. Karangalan, after the petition of said village’s
residents. Plebiscite for its creation was set for June 22 the same year. It
also issued Ordinance No. 52 on September 9, 1996, creating Brgy.
Napico. Plebiscite was set for March 15, 1997.
Cainta, upon learning of the Ordinances, immediately moved to suspend
or cancel the scheduled on the ground that the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of a pending case
before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. It filed Petitions with the COMELEC on
June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-2016) and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-
002).
COMELEC approved the first petition but dismissed the second one for
being moot because during the March 15 plebiscite, the creation of Brgy.
Napico was already ratified and approved by the majority of the votes
cast therein. Hence, the filing of G.R. 128663 by Cainta.
ISSUE: W/N the plebiscites should be suspended/cancelled in view of
the pending boundary dispute.
HELD: YES. The pending civil case presents a prejudicial question which
must first be decided before plebiscites for the barangays’ creation may
be held.
Although the general rule is that prejudicial question does not come into
play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, jurisprudence
states that in the interest of good order, the Court can suspend action on
one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated
or linked to the first (Vidad v. RTC).
A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction
to be properly identifies by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. While Pasig claims that the proposed
Barangays are within its territory, it cannot deny that portions of the
same are included in the boundary dispute case pending. The resolution
of the pending case has material bearing to the creation of Karangalan
and Napico.
As to the second petition of Cainta which was dismissed for being moot,
the Court held otherwise because the issues raised therein are still
pending determination before the RTC.
Therefore, the plebiscite for the creation of Karangalan should be held in
abeyance pending resolution of the boundary dispute. The March 15
plebiscite ratifying the creation of Napico shall likewise be annulled and
set aside.
RENATO S.D. DOMINGO on his own behalf and on behalf of his
coheirs of the late SPOUSES FELICIDAD DE DOMINGO and MACARIO
C. DOMINGO, Petitioners
vs. SPOUSES ENGRACIA D. SINGSON and MANUEL F.
SINGSON, Respondents
Facts: Spouses Macario and Felicidad Domingo are the parents of
respondent Engracia Singson and petitioners Renato Domingo and his
co-heirs whom he represents herein, namely: Consolacion, Borja, and
Rafael, Ramon, and Rosario.
The Spouses Domingo owned a parcel of land in San Juan, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3and the house built Macario
died on February 1981, while Felicidad died on September 1997.
2006, Engracia filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment/unlawful
detainer, Consolacion, Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon. Engracia claimed, she
is the absolute owner of the subject property, having bought the same
from the Spouses Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale
dated 2006 and the TCT was cancelled and TCT No. 12575 covering the
subject property was already issued under her name. The petitioners
only learned of the supposed sale of the subject property when they
received the summons and a copy of the complaint.
Petitioners filed a complaint which sought the nullity of the sale. They
alleged that the Absolute Deed of Sale was a nullity since the signatures
of their parents appearing thereon as the supposed vendors were
forged.
Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon filed a Joint Affidavit Complaint,
claiming that Engracia falsified the signatures of their parents in
charging her with the crimes of falsification of public document, estafa,
and use of falsified documents. Spouses Engracia and Manuel Singson
were charged with the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. On July 11, 2008, the Spouses
RTC granted the motion to suspend the proceedings filed by the Spouses
Singson.
APPEAL: RTC gravely abused its discretion when it directed the
suspension of the proceedings in the Criminal Case on the ground of
prejudicial question. claimed that where both a civil and criminal case
arising from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes
precedence.
CA all the elements of a prejudicial question under sections 6 and 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are present, no abuse on the part of RTC
Engracia moved that Rafael be substituted by his heirs since he had
already died.
Petitioners filed a motion, which sought to exclude Rafael as being
represented by Renato. They averred that they were unable to effect a
substitution of the heirs of Rafael as plaintiffs in the case since they
could not locate them.
When the case was called, the petitioners and their counsel failed to
appear, which thus prompted Engracia's counsel to move for the
dismissal of the complaint and be given time to file the proper pleading.
The RTC gave Engracia's counsel 10 days within which to file a motion to
dismiss.
On July 29, 2011, the RTC issued an Orders' in Civil Case No. 70898,
dismissing the petitioners' complaint due to their and their counsel's
repeated failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearing dates.
petitioners: the RTC erred in dismissing their complaint on a mere
technicality. They also claimed that Engracia's motion to dismiss is but a
mere scrap of paper since the same did not comply with Sections 4, 5
and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The CA, affirmed the RTC
Issues: 1st: whether the proceedings were properly suspended on
the ground of prejudicial question; 2nd: whether the dismissal of the
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 due to failure to prosecute
was proper – YES
Held:
YES. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises
in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally
in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues
involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must
be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can
proceed. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflict decisions.
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to
cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must -be present: (1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Based on the issues there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in
the case at bar. The defense of the Spouses Singson in the civil case for
annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the subject property from her
parents prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on the
Absolute Deed of Sale are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil
case is based on the very same facts, which would be necessarily
determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case.
If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are
genuine, then there would be no falsification and the Spouses Singson
would be innocent of the offense charged. Otherwise stated, a conviction
on the first criminal case, should it be allowed to proceed ahead, would
be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally
decided in the civil case that indeed the signatures of the Spouses
Domingo were authentic.
Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages in cases provided
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which may also
constitute criminal offenses, may proceed independently of the criminal
action. In instances where an independent civil action is permitted, the
result of the criminal action, whether of acquittal or conviction, is
entirely irrelevant to the civil action.
The concept of independent civil actions finds no application in this case.
To stress, the main issue raised in Civil Case No. 70898, i.e., the
genuineness of the signature of the Spouses Domingo appearing in the
Absolute Deed of Sale, is intimately related to the charge of estafa
through falsification of public document in Criminal Case No. 137867;
the resolution of the main issue in Civil Case No. 70898 would
necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the Spouses
Singson.
Accordingly, the RTC Branch 264 correctly suspended the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of prejudicial question since, at
the time the proceedings in the criminal case were suspended, Civil Case
No. 70898 was still pending.
PresumptiveCivilPersonality,Art.40.NCC
CARMEN QUIMIGUING vs. FELIX ICAO
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing sued Felix Icao in CFI Zamboanga . In her complaint
it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had
close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by
force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per
month, damages and attorney's fees.
Defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed
the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a
result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but
the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment
was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE:
Can the plaintiff-appellants ask for support and damages from defendant
despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint?
RULING:
YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee , even if the said child is only "en
ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its
being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of
a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if
such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil
Code).
Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of
the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides
moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts.
Birth,Art.41,NCC
Geluz vs CA
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know
Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula
Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar
were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her
parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy
aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she
was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she
again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion
and the latter’s daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez
Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning
for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor
given his consent on the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that
constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages.
Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari
CA and RTC: Predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines
ISSUE: Can Oscar, who voluntarily procured her wife’s abortion, recover
damages from the physician who caused the same?
HELD: No.
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for
the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not
endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals
predicated.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can
take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity
as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur)
under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly
limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with
the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there
is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages
at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased,
his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect
either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230)
Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of
moral damages evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous
abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative
or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s indiscretion to
personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he
but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that he’s
after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity claim,
which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
Restrictions or Modification on capacity to act, Art. 38-39, NCC
FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA, respondents
G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.
FACTS: On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from
active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department
of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due
to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949,
Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly
donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real property through the
execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On
December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court
issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing
Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank and
Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On
March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her
in issue in her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting
as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages
against herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute
Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the
property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had
truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be
void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving
valid consent. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the
lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of
insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he
executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court
and the Court of Appeals and denied the petition of the petitioners.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously
a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other
contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts
presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or
with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be
free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be
clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders
the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not
necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By
merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities. Thus, the
lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time
and this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced. Since the donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the
property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been
presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her
children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in
question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The Supreme Court notes the
issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before the
court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it
prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract.
As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in
court within four years.
DOMINGO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land. She allegedly sold them
to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who
claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners Eugenio Domingo,
Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest
surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by means
of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate the
same. Consequently, on February 2, 1976, herein respondent Felipe
Rigonan filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. They alleged that they were
the owners of the three parcels of land through the deed of sale executed
by Paulina Rigonan; that since then, they had been in continuous
possession of the subject properties and had introduced permanent
improvements thereon; and that defendants (now petitioners) entered
the properties illegally, and they refused to leave them when asked to do
so.
Herein petitioners, as defendants below, contested plaintiffs
claims. According to defendants, the alleged deed of absolute sale was
void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration. They said that
Paulina Rigonan did not sell her properties to anyone. As her nearest
surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited the
three lots and the permanent improvements thereon when Paulina died
in 1966. They said they had been in possession of the contested
properties for more than 10 years. Defendants asked for damages
against plaintiffs.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents
by virtue of intestate succession and stating that the deed of absolute
sale was fake and void. The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is the sale valid despite the lack of consideration?
HELD:
NO. The sale was null and void ab initio due to lack of consideration,
being grossly and shockingly inadequate. Consideration is the why of a
contract, the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to
enter into the contract. On record, there is unrebutted testimony that
Paulina as landowner was financially well off. She loaned money to
several people. We see no apparent and compelling reason for her to sell
the subject parcels of land with a house and warehouse at a meager
price of P850 only.
In Rongavilla vs. CA, 294 SCRA 289 (1998), private respondents were in
their advanced years, and were not in dire need of money, except for a
small amount of P2,000 which they said were loaned by petitioners for
the repair of their houses roof. We ruled against petitioners, and
declared that there was no valid sale because of lack of consideration.
In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract,
Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died an
octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed was
allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed
were entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The
general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely
because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmities.[27]However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the
mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently,
and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably
incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that
at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already
incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played
with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is
in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the
sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt
to show that said price was paid to and received by her. Thus, we are in
agreement with the trial courts finding and conclusion on the matter:
The whole evidence on record does not show clearly that the fictitious
P850.00 consideration was ever delivered to the vendor. Undisputably,
the P850.00 consideration for the nine (9) parcels of land including the
house and bodega is grossly and shockingly inadequate, and the sale is
null and void ab initio.
G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002
MARIO J. MENDEZONA, et al. petitioners,
vs.
JULIO H. OZAMIZ, et al., respondents.
FACTS: The case is a suit for quieting of title. It was instituted on 1991
by petitioner spouses Mario and Teresita Mendezona as initial plaintiffs
and spouses Luis, Maricar and Teresita Mendezona joined as co-
plaintiffs.
In their complaint, the petitioners, alleged that the Mendezona spouses,
et al. own a parcel of land each in the Banilad Estate, Lahug, Cebu City
with almost similar areas, covered and described in TCTs of the Registry
of Deeds of Cebu City.
They ultimately traced their titles of ownership over their respective
properties from a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989
executed in their favor by Carmen Ozamiz for and in consideration of the
sum (₱1,040,000.00)
The petitioners initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their said
respective titles caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis
pendens, which came about as a result of an incident in Special
Proceeding No. 1250 of the RTC of Oroquieta City, a proceeding for
guardianship over the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated
by the respondents Julio H. Ozamiz, et al.
It appears that on January 1991, the respondents instituted the petition
for guardianship with the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, alleging
that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness in July 1987, had
become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends; that she
could no longer take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason
of her failing health, weak mind and absent-mindedness. Mario
Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, herein petitioners who are nephews of
Carmen Ozamiz, and Pilar Mendezona, a sister of Carmen Ozamiz, filed
an opposition to the guardianship petition.
Paz O. Montalvan was designated as guardian over the person of Carmen
Ozamiz while petitioner Mario J. Mendezona, respondents Roberto J.
Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz were designated as joint guardians over
the properties of the said ward.
Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed with the guardianship
court their "inventories and Accounts", listing therein Carmen Ozamiz’s
properties, cash, shares of stock, vehicles and fixed assets, including a
10,396 square meter property known as the Lahug property. Said Lahug
property is the same property covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of the
petitioners. Respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz
caused the inscription on the titles of petitioners a notice of lis pendens,
regarding Special Proceeding No. 1250, thus giving rise to the suit for
quieting of title.
Respondents opposed the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the Lahug
property and alleged that the titles issued in the petitioners names are
defective and illegal, and the ownership of the said property was
acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration
for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable and at the time of
the sale Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of
her mental faculties; and that her properties having been placed in
administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract with
petitioners.
Carmencita Cedeno and Martin Yungco, instrumental witnesses to the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, and, Atty. Asuncion
Bernades, the notary public who notarized the said document, testified
that on the day of execution of the said contract that Carmen Ozamiz was
of sound mind and that she voluntarily and knowingly executed the said
deed of sale.
For the defendants, the testimonies of respondent Paz O. Montalvan, a
sister of Carmen Ozamiz; Concepcion Agac-ac, an assistant of Carmen
Ozamiz; respondent Julio Ozamiz; Carolina Lagura, a househelper of
Carmen Ozamiz; Joselito Gunio, an appraiser of land; Nelfa Perdido, a
part-time bookkeeper of Carmen Ozamiz, and the deposition of Dr. Faith
Go, physician of Carmen Ozamiz, were offered in evidence.
The petitioners presented as rebuttal witnesses petitioners Mario
Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, to rebut the testimony of respondent
Julio H. Ozamiz; and, Dr. William Buot, a doctor of neurology to rebut
aspects of the deposition of Dr. Faith Go on the mental capacity of
Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the sale.
RTC:
1. The property described in the complaint was sold, with reservation of
usufructuary rights by Carmen Ozamiz to the plaintiffs under a valid
contract, voluntarily and deliberately entered into while she was of
sound mind, for sufficient and good consideration, and without fraud,
force, undue influence or intimidation having been exercised upon her,
and consequently, the Court orders the defendants herein to
acknowledge and recognize the plaintiffs’ title to the aforecited property
and to refrain from further clouding the same
CA: reversed the factual findings of the trial court and ruled that the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract
since the petitioners failed to prove that the consideration was actually
paid, and, furthermore, that at the time of the execution of the contract
the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired.
Thus, the appellate court declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale of April
28, 1989 is null and void. It ordered the cancellation of the certificates of
title issued in the petitioners’ names and directed the issuance of new Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly
certificates of title in favor of Carmen Ozamiz or her estate. discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.
Petitioners alleged that Judge Durias’s testimony is a newly-discovered
evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the
court below by the exercise of due diligence.

Issue: whether to consider the testimony of Judge Durias as newly

discovered evidence.

Held: NO. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered
evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the
following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after
trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced
during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the
evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or
impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter
the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought
to be introduced at the new trial.
We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met
by the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of
Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the
defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to
present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a
party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness.
Neither can Judge Durias’ testimony in another case be considered as
newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge
Durias which were existing before and during the trial, could have been
presented by the petitioners at the trial below.1The testimony of Judge
Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him by
questioning.
It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly
discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and
its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the
preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it; there is a
failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts in
question, especially where information was not sought from co-parties;
there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there
is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the
complaining party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other
evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available discovery procedures