Preliminary Injunction

Case #1
MARTA VDA. DE DE LA CRUZ , petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GENARO TAN TORRES, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and ROSALINDA Z. TIONGCO, respondents. (G.R. No. L-
14925. April 30, 1960)

DOCTRINE:
Section 1 of Rule 60 of the Rules of court provides for 2 classes of injunction, to wit: (a) the preliminary
injunction, and (b) the final injunction. The first is essentially a provisional remedy which may be granted
at any stage of an action prior to final judgement while the second is the one included in the judgement as
the relief or part of the relief prayed for in the complaint.

What cannot stand alone as an independent suit by itself is one which exclusively seeks the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, a remedy that must be ancillary to the principle case. issuance of this
provisional remedy is proper in an action for injunction wherein the entirety of the relief sought consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period of
perpetually. This, in fact is authorized under Sec 3 par (a), Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.

If the defendant was not served with a copy of the plaintiff’s bond, we believed that such fact does not
adversely affect the writ already issued and is, certainly, not a reversible error of the lower court. This
formal defect may be cured by subsequent notice to or knowledge of the defendant. Indeed, it may be
considered waived where, as in this case at bar the defendant seeks to file a counterbond.

The writ of a preliminary injunction may be granted or dissolved only upon good and valid grounds, the
determination and sufficiency of which rests within the sound discretion of the court. In the absence of
grounds such as the insufficiency of the allegations of the complaint or that the continuance of the writ
already granted would cause great damages to the defendant, while the plaintiff may be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer (Sec. 6, Rule 60, Rules of Court), the mere offer of the
counterbond does not suffice to warrant the dissolution of the preliminary writ.

FACTS:
1. Plaintiff, Rosalinda Tiongco alleged that she is the owner in fee simple and in actual material
possession of Lot in dispute, already introduced improvements on the land and ready for harvest.
2. Defendant, Marta dela Cruz with her children and several armed men, entered the lot and
destroyed Tiongco’s barbed wire fences and house. They pronounced that “they shall be back and shall
harvest the palay of the plaintiff through force and intimidation”
3. 2 days later, plaintiff Tiongco prayed that the defendant be enjoined from doing so, that after due
hearing and giving of a bond in a sum the court may fix, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued.
4. The counsel of parties asked to be given time to file an amicable settlement. The gist of which
manifests that the defendant agrees to the issuance of the writ provided that she be allowed to file a
counter bond in order to preserve her possession and preservation of the palay.
5. After 14 days, Trial Court issued the writ and that if the defendant wants to lift the writ she should
file the corresponding petition.
6. The defendant filed the present petition for Certiorari and Mandamus

Petitioners’ Argument:
(a) that injunction, being a provisional remedy, cannot stand alone as a main action
(b) that the allegations in the complaint are in sufficient to warrant the issuance of the writ.
(c) That the issuance was improper since he had no showing that he was served a copy of the
plaintiff’s bond.
(d) That the lower court should have considered his readiness to file a counterbond for the purpose of
quashing the writ.
Respondents’ Argument: Not mentioned

RTC –Not mentioned.

CA – Not mentioned.

ISSUE:
(a) WON a writ of preliminary injunction may be heard by itself (YES)
(b) WON the allegations are sufficient to issue a writ (YES)
(c) WON a copy of the writ should be served to the defendant (NO)
(d) WON a counterbond is sufficient to quash a writ of preliminary injunction. (NO)

RULING:

Section 1 of Rule 60 of the Rules of court provides for 2 classes of injunction, to wit: (a) the preliminary
injunction, and (b) the final injunction. The first is essentially a provisional remedy which may be granted
at any stage of an action prior to final judgement while the second is the one included in the judgement as
the relief or part of the relief prayed for in the complaint.

What cannot stand alone as an independent suit by itself is one which exclusively seeks the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, a remedy that must be ancillary to the principle case. There can be no
question that the issuance of this provisional remedy is proper in an action for injunction wherein the
entirety of the relief sought consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained
of, either for a limited period of perpetually. This, in fact is authorized under Sec 3 par (a), Rule 60 of the
Rules of Court.

Here, the plaintiff-respondent alleges ownership and peaceful possession, she alleges that defendant has
committed acts of dispossession and destruction and such have resulted and will result in serious
irreparable damage and injury. Based on these, the court is not prepared to rule, in the absence of a
contrary showing, that the lower court abused its discretion.

As to the issue that the defendant was not served with a copy of the plaintiff’s bond, we believed that
such fact does not adversely affect the writ already issued and is, certainly, not a reversible error of the
lower court. As held in Rodolfo v Alfonso, et al., 76 Phil. 232., this formal defect may be cured by
subsequent notice to or knowledge of the defendant. Indeed, it may be considered waived where, as in
this case at bar the defendant seeks to file a counterbond. At most, the defendant can ask the court to
order the plaintiff to serve her a copy.

Apparently, the defendant-patitioner concluded from the order of the court that the mere filing of the
counterbond will sufficiently quash the writ. It is incorrect and improper to assume that the parties’
manifestation was the only reason of the court to issue the provisional remedy. For one thing, the court in
its order said the proper petition should be file, secondly, that the lower court’s discretion in issuing the
writ cannot be controlled by the parties.

The writ of a preliminary injunction may be granted or dissolved only upon good and valid grounds, the
determination and sufficiency of which rests within the sound discretion of the court. In the absence of
grounds such as the insufficiency of the allegations of the complaint or that the continuance of the writ
already granted would cause great damages to the defendant, while the plaintiff may be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer (Sec. 6, Rule 60, Rules of Court), the mere offer of the
counterbond does not suffice to warrant the dissolution of the preliminary writ.

It is noted that this petition should have been addressed to the CA, being a case involving a remedy in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction, but since no serious question of fact is present, SC wishes to dispose of the
matter now.
Case #2
EMILIO APACHECHA and ROSITA OTERO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE VALERIO V. ROVIRA, as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Branch IV); EUSTAQUIO AGOS, MARIA BALAJADIA
and PACIFICO LUMAUAG, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-28454. May 18, 1978]

DOCTRINE:
Execution issued before the expiration of the time to appeal may be stayed upon the approval by the
court of a sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the appellant, conditioned upon the performance of the
judgement or order appealed from in case it may be affirmed wholly or in part.

The supersedeas bond may be proceeded against on motion before the trial court, with notice to the
surety, after the case is remanded to it by the appellate court.

The bond referred to in Sec 9, Rule 58 in connection with Sec 20 of Rule 57 refers to a claim for damages
resulting from an improper preliminary injunction which requires the filing of an application for damages
before the entry of final judgement and a hearing thereon with notice to the surety before it can be
proceeded against. It is not identical with the supersedeas bond.

Where a claim by one litigant that the parties have already amicably settled their case is denied by the
other party, the issue becomes factual issue which should be threshed out in the trial court.

Before execution may be issued against a person who files a supersedeads b ond, the exact amount of
the liability of the judgement debtor, which may not necessarily be the full amount of the bond filed, must
be clarified in the lower court.

FACTS:
1. In a previous civil case, a favorable judgement was granted to Petitioners for failure of
Respondents, Agos and Balajadia to submit the printed record on appeal on time.
2. Pending appeal, respondents filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of a judgement in
favor of petitioner.
3. After the appeal was dismissed, petitioners moved to enforce the supersedeas bond against surety,
respondent Pacifico Lumauag, when the execution of their favorable judgement remained unsatisfied.
4. Respondent judge denied the motion and sustained the contention of Lumauag that under Sec 9 of
Rule 58 in connection with Sec 20 of Rule 57, in order that a surety may be bound under the bond for
damages, the application for damages must be filed before the entry of final judgement and there must
be a hearing and notice to the surety.
5. Hence, this present petition for Certiorari, assailing the order of respondent judge for denying
petitioner’s prayer that respondent Pacifico Lumauag be made to pay, as surety, on the supersedeas
bond

Petitioners’ Argument:
The matter on hand is not a claim for damages in a case of preliminary injunction governed by Rule 58,
but a motion to enforce the supersedeas bond filed by Lumauag and two others to secure the stay of the
immediate execution of a judgement in favor of the petitioners, which is specifically governed by Sec 3
Rule 39.

Respondents’ Argument:
The motion should have been file before final judgement, according to Sec 9, Rule 58.

CFI –Denied Petitioners motion adopting Respondent’s contention that the matter is based on Sec 9,
Rule 58.
IAC – Not mentioned.

ISSUE:
(a) WON there was a need to have filed the motion before the final judgement. (NO)

RULING:
In the case at hand, there was no need to file the motion before final judgement. Petitioners are correct
that what they seek is not damages resulting from an improper preliminary injunction. Rather, they are
after the execution of a judgement in their favor which was stayhed on the strength of the supersedeas
bond filed by Lumauag.

Anent Lumauag’s contention that the parties have reached an amicable settlement, this was not raised in
the lower courts. It was also denied by the petitioners which has become a factual issue, which should be
threshed out in the lower courts.

The court also notes, what needs to be clarified before the execution may issue against Lumauag is the
exact amount of the liability of the respondents, which does not m=seem to be necessarily the full amount
of the supersedeas bond of P10,000.

Petition is granted and respondent judge to proceed with petitioner’s motion of execution of judgement.

Case #3
G.R. No. 88705 June 11, 1992
JOY MART CONSOLIDATED CORPORATION vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PHOENIX OMEGA DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY

DOCTRINE:

The lone issue of whether the trial court continued to have control of the writ of preliminary
injunction even after the same had been raised to the Court of Appeals for review. The answer is no.

After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the Court of
Appeals for determination of the propriety of its issuance (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998), the trial court
(notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate court) could not interfere
with to preempt the action or decision of the Court of Appeals on the writ of preliminary injunction whose
annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the LRTA.

In petitioning the trial court to lift the writ of preliminary injunction which they themselves had
brought up to the Court of Appeals for review, Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forum-shopping. After
the question of whether the writ of preliminary injunction should be annulled or continued had been
elevated to the Court of Appeals for determination, the trial court lost jurisdiction or authority to act on the
same matter.

By seeking from the trial court an order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction, Phoenix and LRTA
sought to divest the Court of Appeals of its jurisdiction to review the writ. They improperly tried to moot
their own petition in the Court of Appeals- a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the appellate
court or of disrespect for said court.
FACTS:

1978-79 the govt planned the light rail transit system for the commuting public from baclaran to
balintawak monument. The property of joy mart was at carried street, sta. cruz manila where isitann
department store is located and 3 adjoining lands which the president hotel leased by joy mart stands. It
was among the properties which was to be expropriated. In cooperation, joy mart consented to sell the
property and be given the first option to redevelop the entire area. LRTA agreed on such.

Later, joy mart constructed 8 storey building amounting to 50 million. On Nov 28, 1986 LRTA
entered into a commercial stalls Concession contract with Phoenix awarding all the area and commercial
spaces and the 15 on-line stations. Joy mart have learned on the said contract and inform LRTA its first
option to redevelop. Hence, filed a complaint for specific performance of contract and damages against
LRTA and Phoenix before the RTC manila.

Joy mart also asked the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,
commanding LRA and Phoenix to cease and desist from construction being property adjacent to the
leased premises. Judge Luna issued the writ. Phoenix sought relief in CA by filing a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to require TC to lift the writ and refrain from implementing it. Meanwhile, in trial court,
LRTA and Phoenix filed separate answers to joy mart.

While the certiorari petition to review before the CA was pending, LRTA and Phoenix filed in the
RTC a joint petition to dissolve the writ of prelim injunction, alleging it causes tremendous losses to them
because they been unable to use the commercial stalls and would suffer 2.7M damages to be earned and
rentals. RTC dissolved the writ of prelim injunction.

Motion for Reconsideration of joy mart was denied. CA dismissed phoenix’s petition for certiorari
for being moot and academic. Joy mart sought relief before the CA for certiorari and prelim injunction and
restraining order. Despite the TRO, phoenix continued its construction activities. However, the CA
dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the TC continued to have control of the writ of prelim injunction even after the
same had been raised to the CA for review.

RULING:

Negative. After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to the CA
for determination of the propriety of its issuance (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998), the RTC (notwithstanding the
absence of a TRO from the appellate court) could not interfere with or pre-empt the action or decision of
the CA on the writ of preliminary injunction whose annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the
LRTA. In petitioning the TC to lift the writ of preliminary injunction which they themselves had brought up
to the CA for review, Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forum-shopping. After the question of whether
the writ of prelim injunction should be annulled or continued had been elevated to the CA for
determination, the TC lost jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter. By seeking from the TC an
order lifting the writ of prelim injunction, Phoenix and LRTA sought to divest the CA of its jurisdiction to
review the writ. They improperly tried to moot their own petition in the CA—
a clear case of trifling with the proceedings in the appellate court or of disrespect for said court.
The trial judge played into the hands of Phoenix and the LRTA, and acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in granting their motion to dissolve the writ of injunction. Judicial
courtesy behooved the TC to keep its hands off the writ of preliminary injunction and defer to the better
judgment of the CA the determination of whether the writ should be continued or discontinued.

The non-issuance of a TRO by the CA upon receipt of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 12998
simply meant that the TC could proceed to hear and decide the main complaint of Joy Mart for specific
performance of contract and damages against the LRTA and Phoenix. It did not give the lower court a
license to interfere with the appellate court's disposition of the writ of preliminary injunction. The private
respondents' application to the TC for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction that was pending
review in the CA was a form of forum shopping which this Court views with extreme disapproval. The
lower court's proceeding being void for lack of jurisdiction, the writ of preliminary injunction should be
reinstated, and the petition to annul the writ (CA-G.R. SP No. 12998) should be dismissed on the ground
of forum shopping as provided in Rule No. 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, Rules of Court. Hence,
petition Granted.

Case #4
BONIFACIO MONTILLA PEÑA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and SOLEDAD OPPEN MONTILLA, respondents.
G. R. No. 102930 July 10, 1995

DOCTRINE:The Court of Appeals would have "no jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding involving
an incident in a case to rule on the merits of the main case itself which was not on appeal before
it. The Court realizes that there could be occasions when a felicitous disposition of the case
becomes compelling in the interest of justice. This extraordinary recourse, however, is done
sparingly and only when highly exceptional circumstances can justify its exercise.

FACTS:
Soledad Oppen Montilla, a widow of about 85 years of age, and Bonifacio Peña, her grandson, are
the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively, in Civil Case No. 394 before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental, Branch 62, stationed in Bago City. The defendants (Plaintiff herein)) is one of the
sons of Lina Montilla Peña, who in turn, is a daughter of the plaintiff (Respondent herein). Atty Magdaleno
Peña, counsel for and attorney-in-fact of Soledad, is the other son of Lina Montilla Peña and the elder
brother of Bonifacio. Soledad’s husband, Bonifacio Montilla, has long been deceased. Besides Lina M.
Peña Soledad has a son, named Candido Montilla, who is under Soledad’s judicial guardianship.

(Respondent’s Argument)The principal allegations contained in the verified complaint in Civil Case
No. 394, filed on 19 September 1990 and held by the appellate court to be a case for injunction, with
preliminary prohibitory injunction and restraining order. The allegations provide that Defendant, acting for
herself and as the then judicial guardian of the incompetent Candido Oppen Montilla, plaintiff executed
and delivered to Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña a Special Power of Attorney, with full power and authority to
exercise of general administration, control and supervision of all the aspects of its farming operations,
finance, management, sales. The plaintiff was ordered to turn over the management to Atty. Magdaleno
M. Pena. Thereafter, Bonifacio accompanied by the local Provincial Commander of the Philippine
Constabulary and a a group of more than thirty (30) military personnel, riding on an Armored Personnel
Carrier, a B-150 assault vehicle, and a Hummer jeep, tried to enter and retake possession of said house
of the plaintiff.

(RTC) The trial Judge denied the defendant's prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and
reinstated Bonifacio Peña to his possession of the residential house at Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental.

(CA)The defendant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order. The appellate court granted the defendant’s appeal and declared the
trial court’s judgment to be null and void. The preliminary injunction is made permanent, and private
respondent Bonifacio M. Peña is hereby restrained and prohibited from entering in, and interfering with
the use, occupation and enjoyment of, petitioner’s residential house and compound in Barrio Ubay,
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.

Hence, this petition for review filed by plaintiff Bonifacio.

ISSUE: Did the respondent CA exceed its jurisdiction when, in a special civil action of certiorari, it did not
confine itself to the issue outlined in the petition but instead proceeded to decide the issues of the case
filed in the court of origin on the merits and without benefit of trial?

RULING:
YES. The pleadings, along with the evidence adduced by the parties at the hearing before the trial
court on the prayer for preliminary injunction, would disclose that petitioner was not in possession of the
property in question at the time case was initiated by private respondent on 19 September 1990; that
private respondent (through Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña) had previously taken over actual and physical
possession thereof; that the property was under co-ownership by and among Soledad Montilla, Candido
Montilla and Lina Montilla Peña; that the holding of private respondent, together with Candido Montilla, in
the c o-ownership constituted well more than a majority interest (5/6 in the residential house and 2/3 in
the lot), with Lina Montilla Peña, the mother of petitioner, owning the minority share (1/6 in the house and
1/3 in the lot); and that, most importantly, petitioner himself would appear to have no actual interest in the
co-ownership nor any valid proprietary claim on the property itself.

It should have been enough, nonetheless, for the appellate court to merely set aside the questioned
orders of the trial court for having been issued by the latter with grave abuse of discretion. In likewise
enjoining permanently herein petitioner "from entering in, and interfering with the use or occupation and
enjoyment of, petitioner’s (now private respondent) residential house and compound," the appellate court,
in effect, precipitately resolved with finality the case for injunction that was yet to be heard on the merits
by the lower court. Elevated to the appellate court, it might be stressed, were mere incidents of the
principal case still then pending with the trial court. In Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court of Appeals,
219 SCRA 69, we ruled that the Court of Appeals would have "no jurisdiction in a certiorari
proceeding involving an incident in a case to rule on the merits of the main case itself which was
not on appeal before it."

The Court realizes that there could be occasions when a felicitous disposition of the case becomes
compelling in the interest of justice. This extraordinary recourse, however, is done sparingly and only
when highly exceptional circumstances can justify its exercise. The instant case falls far too short to call
for another deviation from the rule that otherwise requires a full ventilation in the standard manner of a
justiciable controversy.

The decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED by SUSTAINING that part which sets aside the
questioned orders of the trial court and by DELETING the portion which enjoins permanently petitioner
from interfering with the use, possession and enjoyment of the property in litigation. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the court of origin.