ARTICLE III – THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said
Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should
be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then
the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent
could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no
longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres [G.R. No. 98050,

March 17, 1994]

Facts:
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding
of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom
the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an
amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the
supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential
employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider
the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents.
Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a
certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics,
accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS
appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due
process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.

Issue:
Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Held:
There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS
agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance
with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present
its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and
examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its
arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos
from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A.
Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is
a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area
to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be
given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in
the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Alonte vs. Savellano [G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]

Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process

Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura

Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC
Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged
intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance.
The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano
later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being
due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie
when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of
her desistance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD:
The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to
animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The
standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown
impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is
remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

Aniag vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994]

Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing
arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance
of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327
providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and
transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioner’s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car
driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms.
Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner
also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a
security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the
filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective
position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that
“gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and other acts mentioned in the
resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to
petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner
from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in
the elections.

Issue:
Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the
firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his
car

Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority.
However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist
nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at
the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the
car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any
justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless
search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that
the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was
also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was
not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation.
Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that
petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not
informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by
the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence
in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and
therefore, set aside.
Spouses Romualdez vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 167011, April30, 2008]

Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC
and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their
residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information
against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the
same.
Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On
May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the
COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners
be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Issue:
WON due process was violated.

Held:
No.

First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a
language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section
10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses
charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand
to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears
to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the
Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of
the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to
be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were
based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties
at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.

Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process
because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and
the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact,
the nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the
charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution
En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or
submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC.
Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the
allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the
Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the
Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body.
Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we
agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably
apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that
preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint
and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce
controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.

Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Alcuaz [G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989]

180 SCRA 218 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to “construct and operate
such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals” in the
Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe
Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was
later promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of
the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the
NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary
permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%.
NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the
said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to
fix rates for public service communications, does not provide the necessary
standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation
of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT
asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC
and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the
jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the
exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently
clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain
rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the
exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is
limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable
feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule
that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that
some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes
a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the
manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard,
the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done
without due process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed
upon PHILCOMSAT.

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations [G.R. No. 46496, February 27,
1940]
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Motion For New Trial; Grounds

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay
off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of
the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General,
arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD:
Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the
time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly
obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the
Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.

Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong [G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993]
222 SCRA 644 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Academic Freedom – Power
of School to Dismiss Erring Students
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila
Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died
as a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a
resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found
seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the
expulsion of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio
Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said
students.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order
dismissing such students pursuant to its rules.
HELD: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring
students and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not
deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute
longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently
enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is academic freedom on the
part of the school which includes:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;
b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council [G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 2010]

FACTS:

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the
crime of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like
“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government
to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and
overbreadh doctrines?

RULING:
No.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.

In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.