LEAH PALMA vs. HON. DANILO P.

GALVEZ

FACTS:
Petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr.
Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional fault, negligence
and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted
from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was
doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of somebody else. Defendants
filed their respective Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint,
praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra
Mangaser and herein private respondent Agudo.

Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them. On February 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted
his return of summons stating that the alias summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its
annexes, were served upon private respondent thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the
same as private respondent was out of the country. On March 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent filed a
Notice of Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer stating that he was just engaged by
private respondent's husband as she was out of the country and the Answer was already due. On March 15,
2004, private respondent's counsel filed a Motion for Another Extension of Time to File Answer, and stating
that while the draft answer was already finished, the same would be sent to private respondent for her
clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the counsel prayed for another 20
days to file the Answer.On March 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons, since she was
temporarily out of the country; that service of summons on her should conform to
Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner filed her Opposition to the motion to
dismiss, arguing that a substituted service of summons on private respondent's husband was valid and binding
on her; that service of summons under Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other
modes of service, i.e., by personal or substituted service.

On May 7, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent's motion to dismiss. It found that
while the summons was served at private respondent's house and received by respondent's husband, such
service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the
summons was served, thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a
complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was
not validly served with summons; that substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that
private respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on
herby publication

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid service of summons on private respondent.

RULING:
Yes. In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of
summons or by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Private
respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of
summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.We have
held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at
the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus,
the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and
discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons
is as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that
private respondent was out of the country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her
husband, Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and
discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private
respondent's behalf.Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place where the
summons was served was her residence, though she was temporarily out of the country at that time, and that
Alfredo is her husband. In fact, in the notice of appearance and motion for extension of time to file answer
submitted by private respondent's counsel, he confirmed the Sheriff's Return by stating that private
respondent was out of the countryand that his service was engaged by respondent's husband. In his motion for
another extension of time to file answer, private respondent's counsel stated that a draft of the answer had
already been prepared, which would be submitted to private respondent, who was in Ireland for her
clarification and/or verification before the Philippine Consulate there. These statements establish the fact that
private respondent had knowledge of the case filed against her, and that her husband had told her about the
case as Alfredo even engaged the services of her counsel.

SAGANA VS. FRANCISCO

FACTS:
On Dec.13, 1994, Arnel Sagana filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City. He alleged that on
November 20, 1992, Richard Francisco, with intent to kill, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh.

On January 31, 1995, process server Manuel Panlasigui attempted to personally serve the summons to
respondent, Francisco, at his address: No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was unsuccessful because
the occupant, who refused to give his identity, said that the respondent is unknown at the said address.
Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to respondent’s office through registered mail on
February 9, 1995. However, despite three notices, the respondent failed to pick up the summons.

The Trial Court then dismissed the case on account of “petitioner’s lack of interest to prosecute”, noting that the
petitioner did not take any action since the filing of the Server’s Return on 8 February 1995. In response, the
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent and that
respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. The trial court granted petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration on August 4, 1995, conditioned upon the service of summons on the respondent
within 10 days from receipt of the Order.
Thus, on August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at the respondent’s address but
was told by Michael Francisco, the respondent’s 19-year old brother, that the respondent no longer lived at the
said address. As such, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco.

On November 10, 1995, the petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, since the respondent still
failed to file an Answer despite the service of summons. The trial court granted the Motion, finding that the
summons was validly served through his brother, Michael, and allowed the petitioner to present his evidence
ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents were furnished to respondent at his address.

On March 1, 1996, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma,
filed a Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the summons or that he was authorized to receive
the summons on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the substituted service did not comply with Section 8,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not served at the defendant’s residence or left with any
person who was authorized to receive it on behalf of the defendant. Michael Francisco also asserted in an
Affidavit of Merit that his brother had left their residence in March 1993, and that respondent would only call
by phone, or write his family without informing them of his address.

Thereafter, Michael Francisco submitted his respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his Rejoinder, he
attached a copy of an Affidavit prepared by the respondent, dated December 23, 1992, where he declared
himself a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, the
same lawyer who represented respondent’s brother before the trial court.

The trial court denied Michael Francisco’s Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, holding that: “plaintiff
had already sent numerous pleadings to defendant at his last known address. As also pointed out by [petitioner]
in his Opposition, movant has not adduced evidence, except his affidavit of merit, to impugn the service of
summons thru him. Movant herein also admits that defendant communicates with him through telephone.
Movant, therefore, being a person of sufficient age and discretion, would be able, more likely than not, to inform
defendant of the fact that summons was sent to him by the court.”

On 20 September 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff.

On November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he received a
copy of the trial court’s Decision on November 9, 1999, and that the same was contrary to the law, facts, and
evidence, and prayed that his appeal be given due course.

On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective briefs, a copy of which was sent
to respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City.

The respondent attended the preliminary conference on September 3, 2002, but the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the appellate court rendered the Decision granting the appeal
and setting aside the Decision of the trial court on the grounds that the service of summons was irregular and
such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial court. The trial court’s decision was void since it did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he alleged that respondent did, in fact, reside at No. 36
Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the original copy of the envelope containing
respondent’s Notice of Appeal, which indicated respondent’s return address to be No. 36 Sampaguita St.
Nonetheless, on January 29, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the
petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons upon the respondent.

HELD:

YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find there was proper substituted service of summons
upon the respondent.

Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court provided:

Section 8. Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.

The personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although unsuccessfully. The trial
court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of work, but to no avail. These diligent
efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's return, the process server's notation, as well as
the records of the case. Moreover, respondent’s claim that he moved out of their residence on March 1993
without informing his family of his whereabouts despite the regular calls and letters is incredulous. It is even
more implausible when the respondent admitted to receiving the trial court’s decision on September 20, 19999
which was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City, and that his Notice of Appeal indicated the same
address. He also admitted to receiving a copy of the appellate court’s order for a preliminary conference which
was also sent to the same address. Finally, it is unbelievable that, since respondent and his brother was assisted
by the same lawyer, none of them was able to inform respondent of the receipt of summons.

Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned to his original home, if he
actually did leave his home.

The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify
the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the
claim against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, the respondent was duly apprised of the action against him and had every
opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner. However, since he refused to disclose his true
address because of his own pretenses, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The 13 August 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its 29 January 2004 Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

ROBINSON VS. MIRALLES

FACTS:
In 2000, Celita Miralles filed with RTC Paranaque City a complaint for sum of money against Remelita Robinson.
The sheriff went to effect the summons. However, the security guard, assigned at the gate of the subdivision
where Robinson lived, refuse to let the sheriff go inside the subdivision. The security guard alleged that he was
instructed by Robinson not to let anybody proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite the sheriff's
explanation, the guard still refused admittance. The sheriff returned the second time to serve the summons. The
same thing happened. So, the sheriff served the summons by leaving a copy thereof together with the copy of
the complaint to the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche, who refused to affix his signature on the
original copy thereof, so he will be the one to give the same to the defendant.

Eventually, Robinson was declared in default and judgment was rendered ordering her to pay US$20,054.00. A
copy of the decision was sent to her by registered mail. In 2003, she filed a petition for relief from the judgment
by default. She claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void. She contends that the service of summons upon the
subdivision security guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or staying
at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly authorized to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence,
the substituted service of summons is not valid and that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her
person.

The trial court issued a Resolution denying the petition for relief. The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether a substituted service of summons upon petitioner has been validly effected.

RULING:
Yes. We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully,
and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However,
we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural
rules, that governs.

In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice.
The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence
whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of
summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny
having received the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security
guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it
has acquired jurisdiction over her.

CHU VS. MACH ASIA

FACTS:

Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing dump trucks and heavy
equipments. Petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator, one (1) motorgrader
and one (1) payloader. Petitioner made down payments with the balance payable in 12 monthly installments
through Land Bank postdated checks. However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment, they were
dishonored by the bank either by reason of “closed account,” “drawn against insufficient funds,” or “payment
stopped.”

Respondent filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money, replevin,
attorney’s fees and damages against the petitioner. The RTC issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of
replevin on the subject heavy equipments. Sheriff Cortes proceeded at petitioner’s given address for the
purpose of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond. However, the Sheriff
failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, since the latter was not there. The Sheriff then
resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the complaint received by a certain Rolando
Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner. Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading. Upon motion the
RTC issued an Order declaring defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to present its evidence
ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision against the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:
Was the substituted service of summons to the security guard considered to be a valid as to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner Chu?
RULING:
NO. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be
served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.”

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who
received the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summon. Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard
who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence
that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus,
service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if
defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a
judgment rendered against them is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null and
void.