Beruflich Dokumente
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HAJIME N A K A M U R A
Tokyo
in various ways and this gave rise to the opinion that there were several
versions of the Vedas? This illustrates clearly the general attitude towards
the Vedas in Bhart.rhari's day.
The Vedas are the sacred scriptures of orthodox Brahmanism and are
known as the ~ruti. Brahmanic scholars hold that the Vedas are not
the work of man but revelations from time immemorial acquired by
various r.sis through mystic inspiration and were handed down by them
from generation to generation. In order to differentiate between the
Vedas and the compositions of the later sages, the latter were called
sm.rti and were supposed to be based on the ~ruti, i.e. the Vedas. Both
gruti and sm.rti were handed down, from father to son, in an unbroken
chain, through ages, and the Indians in general accorded to both authority
and veneration.
Bhart.rhari accepted this view of the orthodox Brahmins: "It is said
that the words of the gruti, though their author and their origin is unknown
to us, go on forever without interruption; so does the sm.rti though it
was composed by scholars4. ''5 And again: "The words of the gruti were
composed a long, long time ago. ''6
At the Mah~pralaya (the destruction of the whole world, especially at
the end of a kalpa) the world, dissolving into the Brahman, reverts to
nothing and is reborn as a new world again. This process of annihilation
and rebirth continues in an eternal cycle while the Vedas remain un-
changed; they are unaffected by the process of birth, duration and
annihilation of the world. Thus they are without beginning and without
end. (In this respect the thought of Bhart.rhari is precisely the same as
that contained in the Brahma-satras, 7 which was also shared by the
Mim~.msh school.) On the other hand, however, the sm.rti, though of
human conception and origin, was handed down from ancient times in
an unbroken sequence. And here Bhart.rhari makes a point of empha-
sizing the fact that the composition of the sm.rti writings are multifarious:
some are clear as to their aim and purpose (for instance the writings on
medicine); some are vague and difficult to follow (as for example the
writings on what foods should and should not be eaten). But all the
sm.rti writings were propounded by the Vedic scholars (Vedavid) following
the special characteristics (lihga) of the Vedas. ''s
Bhart.rhari calls the' gruti as well as the sm.rti: ~astra 9 or agama. 1~
Frequently however the term gastra refers to the Vedas in a broad sense, 11
and the term agama stands for the sm.rti 12 and in particular the books
which give the basic rules on grammar, la The intrinsic meaning of the
term agama suggests something which has b e e n handed down from
ancient times ;14 therefore~ it can stand for books such as those of the
Vaige.sika school as well as the gastra. But in the Vakyapadiya the term
agama refers to the books of the pure orthodox Brahmanic schools and
can therefore include the ~ruti and the sm.rti. As we have already stated,
the former was of non-human creation and the latter compiled by human
effort; but the latter found its source and origins in the former. In the
concept of the transmigration of the world it is believed that the gruti
perishes only to grow like seeds (bija) out of the Vedas again. 16 "It is
our fixed belief that the agama was produced out of some source or other.
When all the agama have perished, the three Vedas will remain like seeds
to give new birth to the agama. ''17
As we can clearly see from the above quotation, Bhart.rhari regarded
the Vedas as the absolute source of all knowledge. He studied them
diligently and was well versed in them. He was also familiar with the
subtle differences which existed between the various Vedic schools, is His
work clearly reflects his veneration for the Vedas.
His views on the gruti and the sm.rti are much similar to those of the
s sm.rtayo bahur@a~ ca d.rs.t.adr.staprayo]anaO / tam evakritya lifzgebhyo vedavidbhiO
praka~itah./[ (Vfikyap.I, 7).
9 Pu.nyarfijarefers to the sm.rti as sm.rtigdstra (ad V~tkyap.I, 43).
1~ grutismrtilaks.a.nagama(Pun.yaraja ad I, 41).
u Vfikyap. I, 43; I, 137. But in a certain case he refers to the grammar of Pa.nini
as gastra (III, 13, 23, p. 441).
1~ sarvapravades, v ~gamav~ky~n~.m sm.rtiv~ky~n~.m pra.netrparigrahetta paurus, eyatvam
upagamyate - (Pun.yar~ja ad V~tkyap. I, 134).
13 Cf. V~kyap. II, 484 f.
1~ v.rddhebhya dgamalj, III, 7, 2 (p. 294); pftrvebhya agamab, III, 14, 20 (p. 456).
15 Vfikyap. III, 11, 9. See also the commentary of Hel~trSja (p. 399).
1~ tfmi (Vedavftkyani) parvagames.u vicchinne~u anyes.u pra.nett's.u agamantar(musa.m-
dhfme bijavad avatis.t.hante / (Ptm..yarfija ad V~kyap. I, 134).
1~ na j(ttv akart.rkar~ ka~cid ~gama .mpratipadyate / bljar~ sarvgtgamapaye trayy evftdau
vyavasthit~//(V~tkyap. I, 134).
~ In his commentary on the Mahfibhfi.sya he refers to and quotes from Taittiriy~t.h,
Vfijasaneyinah., A~valSyana- and Apastamba (-~rauta) -s5tra, Bahv.rca-(~rauta)-sfitra-
bh~.sya, Nirukta, Pr~tti~fikhya and ~ik.sa (Kielhorn in Indian Antiquary, 1883, p. 227).
BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 285
Vedanta (Upani.sad), which deals with the Brahman, is the only adequate
one. Therefore we can say that Bhartrhari's doctrines were based on
the Vedanta philosophy although on the surface he appears to be an
ordinary Brahmin scholar professing the same Vedic ideas as all other
scholars of his time.
it was his adoption of the Vedanta philosophy that brought about this
great change in the study of grammar.
In what way is the study of grammar a quest for spiritual liberation?
To find an answer to this question we must refer to his ideas on meta-
physics. With this in mind, a study of his metaphysics will be made in
another article and, as an introduction to this, his theory concerning
knowledge in general will be discussed first.
59 (1- yah na gnas ma bu.hi sde pa dag las kha cig phyir zlog par byed de -1) / . . . . . . .
(2- lu has ~e bar len pa po ltar gyur pasha na gnas pa yod pa ltar hgyur ba.hi las yohs su zad
pas [ mi lasogs pa.hiphuhpo Ke bar blab bahi Ke bar len pa po Kid duhgyur bar grags pas
rjes ~u dpag pas ~e bar len pa po rned pa ~id du bstan pa kho bo cag mi .hdod de -2)
. . . . . . .
(3-
lob ba rkah pa.hi tshod dpags kyis /
Kam ha.hi lam du rgyug pa ltar /
rjes su dpag pa gtsor .hdsin pa /
rnam par ltuh ba mi dka.ho // -3)
72 V~kyap. I, 32.
78 See Paul Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophic, II, 1, S. 212.
~4 [svavaky~nam asatyarthatapratipadanaya] sarvam mithyd bravfmfti [ukte] naitad
vakya.m vivak$yate (= warthata na prasagjanfya) / tasya (= satyavakyagya) mithyabhi-
dhane hi prakranto 'rtho na gamyate // (V~kyap. HI, 3, 25, p. 108).
298 HATIME NAKAMURA
be found anywhere, then the very words that thou utterest lack their own
essence and all things cannot be deprived of their nature". " I f thou
assertest that only this sentence of thine has its essence (i.e. it is not false)
then the very previous assertion will mean nothing when it is heard." 75
These arguments were brought forward in order to refute the doctrine
of the Mfidhyamika that all things are void. Similar arguments were also
found in the Ny~tya-sQtra (II, 1, 13-14). 78
Bhartrhari was against adding the statement " . . . . . is false" to an
assertion. In other words, though he maintained that all things were
false, he tried to find truth in that assertion at least. This can be traced
in his statement that "inference is wrong and therefore the dgama is not
wrong" thus totally refuting inference.
As in his refutation of inference, Bhart.rhari had finally to betray the
fact that he virtuaUy resorted to reasoning, although he ardently expressed
his absolutely orthodox attitude in his arguments for the sacred scriptures.
He held them in profound veneration maintaining that disobedience of
their laws to be evil without questioning whether this was really right or
wrong. But the sacred books, which Bhart.rhari believed in so absolutely,
were collections of the wise words of philosophers who had lived hundreds,
even a thousand, years before his time so that there were many phrases
which were meaningless and their obvious or superficial meanings were
found to be doubtful on philosophical and theological grounds. Some-
times scholars interpreted them in such a way that the original meaning
was lost. Bhart.rhari himself admitted that this had happened. "Though
all men are able through the agama to understand things the fruit of
which is yet to be experienced, what is stated in the agama can be in-
terpreted in the contrary meaning." 77
The above extract makes it clear that Bhart.rhari himself acknowledged
the fact that various interpretations differed occasionally from and con-
tradicted what was stated in the sacred books. Therefore when confronted
with cases of this kind, it was logical reasoning on the part of scholars
engaged in the elucidation of the text and not the sacred scriptures
themselves which led to a final decision. This opinion was confirmed by
Scholars who came after him were fully aware of Bhartrhari's am-
biguous attitude. His veneration of the sacred books was disregarded
as being common to other schools of thought and the metaphysical side
of his studies which he had built up so carefully was examined with great
interest; a~ this led to his being called a logician (naiy~yika) by the great
scholar V~caspatimi~ra. T h e i r o n y ofthisis of course obvious; Bhart.rhari
had always opposed the logicians of other schools of thought.
And now we come to a discussion of his doctrine as a true believer in
the sacred scriptures. Arguments which refute logic do not necessarily
support the sacred books. And scriptures or sacred writings are not
confined to the Brahmin belief alone; they are found in the Buddhist and
Jain beliefs as well. Therefore Bhart.rhari must have had some good
reason for insisting that only the sacred writings of the orthodox Brahmin
belief should be honoured and revered. As we have discussed earlier, he
acknowledged two classes of sacred books: those collected by the ancient
rs.is (Vedas) and those compiled by scholars who came later (smrti).
Bhart.rhari insisted that the minds of the .r.sis and the scholars in question
were perfect and flawless, transcending the past and the future and it
was not for shallow human understanding to refute what they had said
and written. "The knowledge of the wise, lucid and unscathed in their
minds, with knowledge concerning the past and the future, is as sound
and reliable as that which we acquire through our senses. ''Ss "The
truths told by those who see with the sacred eye, things which are un-
even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of
straw though it might be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly
not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks
from a well thinking only that it belongs to his father:
api paurusam adeya.m ~dstram ced yuktibodhakam /
anyat tv (trsarn api tydjya.rn bhavya.m nydyaikasevina [[
yuktiyuktam upadeya.m vacana.m balakad api [
anyat t.r.nam iva tyajyam apy ukta.m padmayoninft [/
yo 'srnattdtasya kftpo 'yam iti kaupa.m pibaty apab [
tyaktvft gfthga.m purastha~n ta~n ko na ~asty atigarhitam [[
(Yogav~sist.ha II, 18, 2--4; Vidhushekhara Bhattacharyya, The .Zlgamagastra of
Gauqlapada, University of Calcutta, 1943, p. 303).
84 V~easpatimigra comments on the Brahmas~tra-bh~t.syaby ~aflkara as follows in
I, 3, 28 where Saflkara refutes the spho.ta theory: "ditirnfttrarn atra sftcitarn, vistaras tu
Tattvabinddv avagantavya iti / ala~n va naiyayikair vivddena.' (p. 260). Here Tattvabindu
is the name of a book written by V~caspatimi~ra in accordance with the theory of
the Bh~tt.t.as. See also Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 403.
s~ avirbh~taprak(tddnftm anupadrutacetasam / atitandgataj~na.m pratyaks, an na vi~is.-
yate [/(Vakyap. I, 37),
BHARTRHARITHE SCHOLAR 301
perceivable because they are beyond perception, cannot be denied by
inference."se
Of course he did not admit the sensory perceptions to be correct in
themselves. To prove this Bhart.rhari gave the following answers to the
question as to whether things are really what our senses tell us they are. 87
"The empty sky appears to have a surface, just like fire-flies seem to be
made of fire. When seen from a different aspect the empty sky has no
surface and the fire-fly no fire." 88 "Therefore the wise observe correctly
with the mind even those things which can be directly perceived by the
senses. As intuition should be true knowledge, we should not represent
the things which we perceive." 89
Bhart.rhari was very critical of perceptive recognition but respected
intuition which the .r.sis esteemed so highly. And as the sacred writings
were full of intuitive knowledge Bhart.rhari insisted that they be observed.
He held that a certain knowledge exists in our daily life which cannot
reach us through inference but only through our own perceptive ex-
perience. "Knowledge regarding jewels and gold which belongs to those
who have made a study of these things cannot be fully conveyed to those
who have made no study of them, except through learning and training;
it cannot be derived from inference. ''9~ He then adds that the contents
of the sacred scriptures are understood by the rs.is who practised Yoga.91
What was the object of the intuition of the .r.sis? According to his
philosophy it was without doubt "the Brahman consisting of words".
This point will be dealt with later. According to Bhart.rhari's philosophy
too, the Vedas possess the highest authority because they are the reflection
or image of the Brahman. Therefore his profound belief in the Vedas
can be attributed to the fact that the .r.sis in ancient times held the intuition
of the Brahman in profound veneration. Bhart.rhari accorded a place of
primary importance to the training and discipline through which the
intuition of the Brahman could be attained. But even in his philosophy,
the Brahman is a state which transcends words; the .r.sis attained their
The first and second methods are those applied by ordinary men and
according to one view-point of his, perception is stable and inference
subsists on it. 96 While emphasizing however the fact that inference is
unstable, he resorts to it in his own writings.
The third method is to be found only in the ancient .r.sis and the Yogins
who through a system of abstract meditation and rigid asceticism aim to
become united with the Brahman. While the first two methods are earth
bound, the last is not of this world. The sacred books are based upon
the third method which is described and known as ~ptavaeana in India.
The term pratyak.sa is sometimes used for the third as well as the first
method since both methods base their experience on clear evidence. 97
Needless to say however the first and third methods differ from each
other fundamentally. Though Bhartrhari revered the aptavaeana above
all, in point of fact he made use of the three methods. The three methods,
according to Bhart.rhari, are nothing but the self-manifestation of the
absolute Brahman. This will be discussed in another article.
To page 292
A1-Mansur a Muslim Caliph published an edict in which he declared
that God had decreed hell fire for those who believed that truth could be
found by means of unaided reason. All books on logic and metaphysics
were burnt.
Algazel a Muslim philosopher wrote a book called "The Destruction
of the Philosophers" pointing out that, since all the truth necessary to
life is to be found in the Koran, speculation independent of revelation
is pointless.
Abelard in his famous book "Sic et Non", ("Yes and N o " ) states that
96 "If the words were founded upon the dar~ana (= pratyak.sa) there would be no
need for inference. Indeed when the dar~ana is established why should be need for
inference?" (na calam anumanaya kabdo darAanaparvaka.h / siddhe hi dar~ane ki.m syad
anumanaprayojanam/[ (V~kyap. III, 13, 12, p. 436).
~7 In the Brahrnasfitras the Vedas are called pratyak.sa, cf. BS. I, 3, 28; III, 2, 24;
IV, 4, 2O.
304 HAJIME NAKAMURA
To page 297
Eubalides said as follows: "Wenn ich sage: ich liJge, liige ich dann oder
sage ich die Wahrheit? Wenn ich dabei die Wahrheit sage, so ltige ich;
wenn ich abet lfige, so sage ich eben die Wahrheit. Die L~sung liegt
darin, dass in diesem Falle die Form des Urteils, welche den Anspruch
involviert, etwas als seiend als wahr auszusagen, zuf~illigerweise mit dem
Inhalt des Urteils in Widerspruch steht. Als Curiosurn mag in Erinnerung
gebracht werden, dass es . . . von den Kretern heisst: " . . . Die Kreter
sind immer LiJgner." (P. Deussen Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie,
II, 1, Leipzig, 1911, S. 212.)
To page 298
According to the Muslim mystics, every text of the Koran had seven
or seven hundred layers of interpretation, the literal meaning being only
for the ignorant and the vulgar. It would seem to follow that a philoso-
pher's teaching could not possibly conflict with the Koran; for among
seven hundred interpretations there would surely be at least one that
would fit what the philosopher had to say. (B. Russell, A History of
Western Philosophy, New York, 1945, p. 426.)
To page 302
The three kinds of knowledge, as were set forth by Bhart.rhari, were
mentioned in nearly the same way by Thomas Aquinas; according to
him there are three ways of knowing God: by reason, by revelation and
by intuition of things previously known only by revelation, although he
says almost nothing about the third way. (B. Russell, op. cit., p. 460.)
ABBREVIATIONS
~afikara ad BS. ~afikara: Brahmasfttra-bha.sya (AnSS. No. 21). Poona, 1900. The
English translation of the passages of this work cited in this article
is by Georg Thibaut, SBE., XXXIV (Oxford, 1890), and cited here
with slight modifications.
SDS. The Sarvadar$ana-sam.graha of Sfiya.na-Madhava,ed. by Vasudev
Shastri Abhyankar. Government Oriental Series, No. 1 (Poona,
1924).
Taisho The Taish6 Tripit.aka, ed. by J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe.
Tattvasam.graha The Tattvasa.mgraha of ~fintarak.sita with the Commentary of
Kamalaw ed. by Embar Krishnamacharya. Gaekwad's Oriental
Series, No. 30 (Baroda, 1926).
BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 305
Va~ap. Vakyapad[ya, ed. with the commentary of Pun yar~tja and of HelSrSja.
Benares Sanskrit Series (Benares, 1887-1907, 1928-1937).
P.S. In preparing the English translation Prof. Jun Orui of Toyo University, Tokyo,
helped the author greatly. The translation was revised by Mrs. Koch. The rewritten
MS. was looked over by Dr. Minoru Kiyota who has come from America to study
with the author at the University of Tokyo. Here the author wants to express his
sincere gratitude to these scholars, without whose kind help this article could not
have been brought to its present state of completion.